THE SOVIET POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954-1964

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
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THE SOVIET POSITION ON
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--
Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954--1964

An Annex to Report on Soviet Interests in
Arms Control and Disarmament

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and
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PREFACE

The material contained herein constitutes a supplement to the report entitled Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament--The Decade Under Khrushchev, 1954-1964, prepared under contract (ACDA IR-15) with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The report proper concentrates its focus on three periods--1954-1956, 1957-1962, and 1962-1964. For each period the analysis in the report is introduced by a brief factual summary of the manifest Soviet negotiating posture and the propaganda line that accompanied it.

This annex volume contains the same general material in considerably more detailed form. While it does not purport to tell the whole historical story, it may be of interest to those wishing to explore the material in greater detail. In addition to Messrs. Clemens and Griffiths, contributions were made by Peter Kenez, Paul Marantz, and Joseph L. Nogee.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
Chapter I

THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA: A NEW ROUND AFTER STALIN

1954-1956

A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance


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<td>1952 March 14-August 29</td>
<td>1954 May 13-June 22</td>
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<td>1954 July 20-29</td>
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<td>1955 August 29-October 7</td>
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<td>1956 March 19-May 4</td>
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<td>1956 July 3-16</td>
<td>1957 March 18-September 6</td>
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This table shows the periods of meetings of the two principal disarmament negotiating bodies referred to in the text, apart from meetings of a purely formal or procedural nature. The basic forum for negotiations from 1954 till 1957 was the Subcommittee, where the United States, Soviet, British, French, and Canadian governments negotiated behind closed doors, though with the understanding that their verbatim record would eventually become public.
It took the form of a statement by Andrei Vyshinsky to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30 during debate on the disarmament item. In this statement the Soviet Union dropped the demand for unconditional prohibition of all nuclear weapons regardless of conventional arms reductions or control measures—a demand that had characterized Soviet policy for many years. Specifically, the Soviets declared themselves willing to negotiate on the basis of the principles laid out in the so-called Anglo-French proposals of June 11, 1954 on the phasing of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Inherent in this proposal was the willingness to proceed in stages, instead of the immediate and sweeping measures contained in previous Soviet proposals.

Oscillation in the Soviet position even at that point was not long in coming. TASS on February 18, 1955 carried a statement proposing the immediate destruction of all nuclear stocks; the freezing of conventional forces and military budgets as of January 1, 1955; and the convening of a world disarmament conference forthwith; in other words, restating the old Soviet position with virtually no change. Thus when the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) reconvened on February 25, 1955, Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, by insisting on priority for the position stated by TASS, appeared to renege on the position originally presented to the Assembly.

On March 11, 1955, however, Moscow again appeared to return to its previously stated willingness to negotiate on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. The details were spelled out in a Soviet proposal of March 18, 1955 that was in many ways similar to the French elaboration of the plan originally introduced by the Western nations on March 8. The Soviet and Western plans appeared to be in agreement on the following points:

1. The disarmament program should begin with a freeze on military forces and spending. (In dispute was the base period for the freeze and whether, as Moscow proposed, armaments should be included.)

2. Reductions of military manpower and conventional armaments should take place in two stages.

3. Production of nuclear weapons should halt at the end of the first stage (Western proposal) or at the beginning of the second stage (Soviet proposal).

4. Following the latter two stages there might be a reduction of forces to the minimum levels needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. obligations.
5. "Existing" stocks of nuclear materials would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. (Later in 1955 Moscow announced it would take part in the United States-proposed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nothing was said in the DCSC about an end to production of fissionable materials.)

This set of proposals seemed to constitute a wide framework of consensus potentially broader than any East-West agreement since 1945. Nonetheless there were important differences, which Western proposals in mid-April of the same year helped to bridge. But the Soviet démarche of May 10, 1955, seemed to go still further toward narrowing the gap between East and West.

2. May through December 1955: Soviet Demarche and U.S. "Reservation." The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were particularly significant in three respects. First, they acknowledged that, as the West had been insisting for years, hidden nuclear stockpiles were an undeniable possibility in the contemporary world; this effectively put an end to Soviet demands for a simple uninspected ban on nuclear weapons. Second, although they constituted a comprehensive "package," the May 10 proposals' emphasis on a nuclear test ban and ground control posts marked the beginnings of Soviet interest in a partial measures approach which became explicit in March 1956.¹ And third, they represented a movement toward Western positions on some of the details of disarmament, particularly in terms of the interrelationship between disarmament and security, that was nothing short of dramatic by contrast to the glacial pace of negotiations until then.

Specifically, the Soviet May 10 proposal adopted the Western position on force levels, the timing of nuclear disarmament, and the principle of a single control organ (the first three items listed in Table 1.2). It also accepted the Western view that the base period for the initial freeze should be 1954 rather than 1955. At the same time the three East-West differences on inspection and control remained as indicated on items 4-5 in Table 1.2. Questions of control were

central then—as they still are. They were in fact discussed in a separate section of the May 10, 1955 document, which argued that international distrust did not presently permit states to allow international inspection of industrial and other facilities basic to their security. An agreement that purported to authorize such inspection "would create a false sense of security" because "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons..." Premier Bulganin made the same point in a speech to the Warsaw Pact conference on May 11. In defending the new Soviet position on disarmament inspection he explained, "It is possible to have controllers, but not to exert control."

Clearly an inner contradiction pervaded the Soviets' May 10 démarche, growing out of their acknowledgment of the clandestine-weapon problem coupled with a call at the same time for complete nuclear disarmament under what might or might not be adequate international control. Moscow offered two approaches in an apparent effort to overcome this dilemma. First, the May 10 démarche began with a "political declaration" listing the major cold war issues and calling for their early resolution in order to "create the requisite conditions for the execution of a broad disarmament program" with "international control over its implementation." Second, the May 10 statement on control proposed the establishment, during the first stage of conventional reductions, of static control posts to guard against surprise attack. These would be established "at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and in aerodromes" in the territory of the states concerned. These posts would be supplemented by the single control organ with expanding powers and unlimited access to the objects subject to its jurisdiction.

Without wholly facing up to the many political and technical difficulties raised by its new proposals, Moscow implied that confidence-building measures—including measures to guard against certain types of surprise attack—would create a climate in which unrestricted inspection might either be allowed (though this was never specified by Moscow) or—more likely in the light of increased good will between states—become superfluous.

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2Ibid., p. 470.
The seeds of the partial-measures approach that Moscow pursued increasingly in the next two years existed in the comprehensive program espoused on May 10, 1955—not only in the surprise attack posts but in another measure proposed for the first time by a great power: a nuclear test ban, to be implemented in the first stage. The May 10 proposal posited that the test ban would be supervised by an international commission reporting to the General Assembly. (However, Moscow's position evolved in 1955 and 1956 to deny the need for special machinery to inspect a test ban.)

The May 10 initiative involved other unresolved problems. One was its timetable, calling for only one year per stage. Another was its proposed liquidation of all overseas bases in 1956 and 1957. Also, it postponed many vital details for a world disarmament conference to be called early in 1956. Finally, all measures of "prevention" and "suppression" regarding violations of the agreement were entrusted to the veto-ridden Security Council.

Despite the difficulties, the Soviet demarche of May 10, 1955 appeared an oasis in a desert after the barren record of ten years' disarmament negotiations. The response of the Western negotiators indicates the degree of at least verbal consensus that seemed suddenly to have been achieved. The French representative, Jules Moch, immediately termed the Soviet move "historic" because "it repeats earlier proposals by the Western powers," adding "that the whole thing looks too good to be true." The United States delegate, James Wadsworth, on May 12 said he was "gratified to find that the concepts which we have put forward over a considerable length of time ... have been accepted in a large measure by the Soviet Union." Mr. Johnson of Canada spoke of "a marked advance," and Anthony Nutting, representing the United Kingdom, described the Soviet initiative as "an encouraging development and a significant advance."

In retrospect it may be significant that the May 10 proposals were made on the same day that the West invited Moscow to attend a Heads of Governments Conference—a meeting at the Summit. It can be suggested that the Soviet initiative may have been intended to condition the atmosphere in which an East-West rapprochement was to take place. The West, in any case, moved to adjourn the DCSC,

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3 United Nations Document DC/SC.1/PV.48, p. 43.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., p. 12.
Table I.2  
MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SUBCOMMITTEE, MARCH 8 TO MAY, 10, 1955  

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<tr>
<th>Western Position</th>
<th>Soviet Position</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Force Levels</strong></td>
<td><strong>Blanket cut of one third in Big Five manpower.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manpower reductions in two stages to specified levels for the Big Five (1 to 1.5 million for the United States, Soviet Union, and C.P.R.; 650,000 for Great Britain and France).</td>
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| **2. Nuclear Weapons** | Complete nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the second stage of conventional arms reductions. |
| Complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons at the end of the two-stage process of conventional disarmament. (Modified on April 19, 1955 by the Anglo-French 75 per cent "compromise," which proposed splitting the difference between the Western- and Soviet-proposed phasing. The United States and Canada did not approve this compromise proposal pending Moscow's response—a point stressed in Soviet historical writing.) | |

| **3. Control Organ** | International control organ to be in position to supervise each stage of disarmament before it begins. |
| One control organ with expanding powers to supervise first conventional and then nuclear disarmament. | Temporary organ to supervise conventional disarmament followed by a permanent organ to supervise nuclear disarmament. |

| **4. Transition Between Stages** | |
| International control positioned "simultaneously" with the beginning of each disarmament stage. | |
Transition from one stage to next dependent on report of control organ. Only tentative deadlines. ("Residual elements of Baruch Plan" in Soviet terminology.)

5. Right of Access

Inspectors to have "unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them . . . to perform their duties." (Emphasis added.)

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1 March 8 plan, United Nations Document DC/SC.1/15/Rev.l; April 19 compromise, ibid., DC/SC.1/24; April 21 control plan, ibid., DC/SC./25; for historical comment on point 2 above, see V. Zorin, ed., Bor'ba Sovetskovo Soiuza za razoruzhenie, 1946-1960 (Moscow, 1961), pp. 182-184; also, pp. 196-199, where subsequent conflicts among the Western allies in September 1955 are discussed.

Transition from one stage to another according to predetermined schedule of 6 to 12 months per stage. ("Total automism" in Western terminology.)

Inspectors to have "unrestricted access, within the limits of the supervisory functions they exercise, to all establishments [these objects to be specified], subject to control." (Emphasis added.)

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2 March 18 plan, United Nations Document DC/SC.1/19/Rev.l; no substantive changes until May 10, 1955.
apparently because the Heads of Governments Conference might drastically alter the terms of discussion. The Soviet delegation, in contrast, protested that negotiations should continue in the DCSC in order to lay the basis for a disarmament agreement at the Summit. The Western majority prevailed, and the DCSC adjourned on May 18, 1955 until after the Heads of Governments Conference.

The chiefs of state met in Geneva in July of 1955. From July 18 to 22 they discussed disarmament, European security and Germany, and cultural and economic exchange programs. On the first topic, Premier Bulganin introduced a modified version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal, dropping its "political declaration," its statement concerning clandestine weapons, and some of its less feasible features, such as the two-year timetable and the proposed liquidation of foreign bases. But some troublesome changes were also made. The most egregious of these was an additional specification that non-great-power armed forces be limited to 150,000 to 200,000 men—a provision obviously directed against the recently developed NATO plans to build a 500,000-man Bundeswehr. (The May 10 proposal had said that limits on the forces of smaller powers would be fixed early in 1956 by a "World Disarmament Conference."

At the Summit meeting there was actually no real negotiation on disarmament. In fact, in Geneva the Western heads of government made no reference to the positions they had advanced and debated earlier that spring in the DCSC. Nor did they reply to Bulganin's amended version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal except to assert that static control posts were insufficient to guard against surprise attack. Instead the Western leaders spoke in terms of control measures, each advocating an approach that would, they said, lead later to disarmament. President Eisenhower thus made his surprise "Open Skies" proposal for aerial inspection of the Soviet Union and the United States. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden pushed for an experimental zone of arms limitations and inspection in Central Europe; French Premier Faure espoused budgetary controls of armaments.

The various issues and proposals dealing with control of armaments were soon overshadowed by the chief item of contention at the Summit: European security and Germany. Moscow proposed that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be replaced by an all-European security pact within the framework of which the presumably neutralized Germany might be reunited. The West, however, refused to disband NATO and insisted that Germany should be reunited only on the basis of free elections and a free hand in foreign and military policy—conditions that Moscow quickly rejected.
Disarmament negotiations continued when the DCSC reconvened in New York late in August of 1955. Each delegation continued to press the basic line taken by its government at Geneva. On September 5 Harold Stassen representing the United States announced that his government was placing a "reservation" on all American "pre-Summit" disarmament positions. He and the other Western delegates still espoused the control measures advocated by their governments at Geneva but called for additional research to overcome the difficulties of control alluded to in Moscow's statement of May 10.

In anticipation of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session and also the Foreign Ministers conference following up the Summit meeting, the DCSC halted its deliberations on October 7, 1955.

From October 27 through November 16, 1955 the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva wrestled with the same issues discussed at the Summit conference in July. They finally admitted what the heads of government had not: that such new "spirit" as existed in East-West relations was not adequate to resolve divergent positions on European security and Germany, on economic and cultural exchange -- and on disarmament and its control.

The disarmament issue was next debated in December 1955 at the Tenth General Assembly Session in New York. The resolution on disarmament that was finally passed--over Soviet bloc opposition -- resembled the final statement issued by the Western foreign ministers at Geneva. It called on the DCSC to continue its efforts toward comprehensive disarmament, giving priority to (1) such confidence-building measures as President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection and Premier Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers, and (2) to all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as were feasible. The Faure and Eden proposals at the Summit Conference were also to be studied, along with India's nuclear test ban suggestion.1

1 UNGA Resolution 914 (X) proposed by the four Western members of the DCSC. Passed on December 16, 1955 by 56-7-0, the negative votes coming from the Warsaw Pact nations. Moscow had proposed amendments to the resolution stressing the East-West "rapprochement" that had been achieved on (1) force levels, (2) the phasing of nuclear disarmament, and (3) the "need to set up effective international control." The Soviet amendments would also have given a dominant role to Moscow's proposals of May 10 and July 21, 1955, which the Western-sponsored resolution passed over in silence. (Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. 1, pp. 583-584.)
3. 1956: Détente and Partial Measures. The Summit meeting of 1955 was followed up by a series of letters exchanged between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin, which was kept up throughout 1956, actually intensifying during the Suez crisis. Even considering the lack of real rapport and the amount of propaganda involved, these exchanges can be viewed as reflecting a growing sense in both capitals that personal exchanges might play an important role in controlling tension between the parties. In the sense that they were inspired by mutually perceived fears about intentions, above all the fear of surprise attack, such high-level communications came to have vital significance in the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the subsequent installation of the "Hot Line."

Premier Bulganin's letters were particularly interesting in historic context for their circumspect and "reasonable" tone and their emphasis on agreements already reached and on the common interests of the two superpowers. There appeared to be a connection between Moscow's apparent desire to perpetuate some semblance of the "Geneva spirit" and the preparations for the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in February 1956. On January 23 Premier Bulganin proposed a United States-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation. In his reply of January 28, President Eisenhower scouted this offer, calling for deeds, not words, and reminded Moscow that the obligations it proposed were already in the U.N. Charter. On February 1 Bulganin's reply dilated on the benefits to be gained from a United States-Soviet or all-European security pact, pointing to Moscow's "deeds" in reducing its military personnel and budgets and in closing such foreign bases as Porkkala-Udd, and the Soviet "initiative" in concluding the Austrian State Treaty.

While letters continued to pass at intervals between Moscow and Washington, London, and Paris, negotiations resumed in the DCSC between March 19 and May 4, 1956 and in the Disarmament Commission itself between July 3 and 16. In the 1956 negotiations the West continued to emphasize "Open Skies" as well as other inspection plans but also elaborated programs for comprehensive disarmament --conventional and nuclear. Britain and France--as in 1954 and 1956--attempted "syntheses" and compromises to bridge the gulf between Washington's and Moscow's proposals. 1

On March 27, 1956 the Soviet Union introduced its only resolution at the DCSC in that year. The first part of the Soviet proposal provided for limiting and reducing conventional armaments and armed forces to the levels specified in the May 10 document but in two rather than three years as proposed earlier. As at the Summit and the Foreign Ministers Conferences in 1955, Moscow again provided that China's obligations could be determined only with the participation of the Peking regime.

The control provisions were somewhat more specific and far-reaching than Moscow had proposed in 1955. Ground control posts were again suggested, but with the clarification that they would be enumerated in a special agreement that would also extend to the signatories' foreign bases. The control organ again was to have unlimited access to all objects of control, now spelled out as "military units, stores of military equipment and ammunition; land, naval, and air bases; factories manufacturing conventional armaments and ammunition." Since no ban on nuclear production was contained in the May 10, 1955 plan, the problem of dealing with clandestine nuclear production did not arise. However, Moscow had apparently agreed to inspection—not just over "disarmament" but over all conventional armaments.

The May 10, 1955 plan had provided that "unlimited access to all objects of control" would commence only during the second stage of conventional force reductions, allowing solely for fixed control posts during the first stage. No such qualification existed in the March 26, 1956 Soviet proposal, which simply said that subsequent agreement would be needed to determine the size of conventional reductions for each year. The 1956 draft even seemed to take a step toward the "prior positioning" of control by specifying that the control organ would be established within two months of the convention's entry into force and one month before the first reductions began. It is evident that Moscow's March 27, 1956 proposal offered even greater opportunities for exploring the control issue than the plan of May 10, 1955 (a fact overlooked by most commentators of the period).

The March 1956 proposal outlined a scheme for a zone of armament limitation and inspection in Central Europe that was similar to the 1954-1955 Eden Plan and the Rapacki Plans of 1957 and 1958. "Both parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them" would be included. (It should be noted that it did not say "both Germanies." ) First, ceilings would be placed on foreign forces in the zone. Second, the stationing of atomic formations and weapons in the zone would be prohibited—a move obviously designed to thwart U.S. plans for NATO. Third, "joint inspection of the armed forces and armaments" in the zone would be instituted.
The Soviet draft reflected Moscow's growing interest in partial measures. It declared:

Independently of the attainment of agreement on the problems of disarmament, it is considered desirable that states should agree to carry out partial measures in this field, as follows:

1. To discontinue forthwith tests of thermonuclear [sic] weapons.

2. To ensure that no atomic weapons are included in the armaments of troops in German territory. The states concerned shall take the necessary measures to carry out this provision within three months.

3. To reduce the military budgets of states by up to 15 per cent as against their military budgets for the previous year.¹

The preamble of the Soviet document stated the hope that the proposed reduction of conventional weapons would "facilitate . . . agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination . . . " But no renunciation of nuclear weapons was advocated either with or without a "self-defense" escape clause. The only limitations suggested on atomic and hydrogen weapons were the two measures that according to the proposal could be agreed on independently of progress toward conventional disarmament: a ban on thermonuclear weapons tests and a ban on stationing atomic weapons in Germany.

In presenting the Soviet plan Andrei Gromyko declared that the aim of the proposal was to single out those measures on which agreement was most feasible. Replying to the protests by Western representatives concerning the absence of any provisions to reduce nuclear weapons, Gromyko pointed out that the continued proposals by Britain and France of comprehensive (that is, conventional and nuclear) disarmament contradicted the support for partial measures by the heads of government at the 1955 Summit Conference.

¹Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 603-607. (Italics added.)
As for 1956, Gromyko took the line that the Soviet Union was proposing a "different approach" to the disarmament problem since the linking of conventional and atomic disarmament "has been a serious obstacle on the way to agreement." However he expressly reaffirmed the comprehensive package of May 10, 1955 and stated that his "sole motive" in separating conventional and nuclear disarmament was to reach agreement.¹

This generally conciliatory Soviet public posture on disarmament questions continued when Gromyko on July 12, 1956 appeared to accept the ceilings proposed by the Western powers in March 1956 of 2,500,000 men for Soviet, Chinese, and United States forces and 750,000 men each for Britain and for France. Moscow said it was prepared to agree to these levels "as a first step," provided the West agreed to follow this in a second stage with reductions to the lower levels that Moscow had endorsed at the 1955 Summit Conference. The Soviet delegate noted that the levels now proposed were considerably higher than those the West had proposed in the spring of 1955 to follow the second 50 per cent conventional reduction. Gromyko also observed that the West had upped its ceiling for the smaller powers from 150,000-200,000 to 500,000 men. Noting once more Bonn's plan to establish a 500,000 man Bundeswehr, Gromyko said, "It is not hard to guess where this new figure came from."² It was thus not surprising--but unpromising for serious negotiations--that Soviet acceptance of the Western-proposed force levels for the great powers was conditioned on a limit of 150,000 to 200,000 men for other states. Furthermore, the "acceptance" was within the context of a larger program that included a ban on the testing and use of "atomic" and "hydrogen" weapons, a ban on the production of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all nuclear stocks.

It should also be noted, however, that according to Gromyko if the other powers preferred it, Moscow was willing to negotiate conventional disarmament separately from nuclear disarmament.³ In addition, Moscow affirmed its willingness to make further unilateral reductions if the United States, Britain, and France carried out a "corresponding reduction in their own armed forces and armaments."⁴

³Ibid., pp. 682-683.
⁴Ibid., p. 639.
After the Disarmament Commission adjourned on July 16, 1956, President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin resumed their correspondence and continued it at an intensive pace for the rest of the year. Most of the letters concerned nuclear testing; the Soviet Union wanted an immediate test ban without inspection, which it held to be superfluous. The United States held that a test ban would be meaningful only in the context of a larger disarmament agreement and asserted that science had yet to devise adequate inspection methods.¹

On November 17, 1956, Premier Bulganin sent the President a declaration entitled "Concerning the Question of Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension."² Its main thrust was to assail Western involvement in the "counterrevolutionary military plot against People's Hungary" and also to characterize the war against Egypt as an integral part of a general imperialist plot against peace. Recounting Moscow's deeds in behalf of peace, the declaration closed by presenting a modified version of the May 10, 1955, Soviet proposal for comprehensive nuclear and conventional disarmament to be executed in two years.

This November 17 Soviet proposal contained two items of technical interest. First, it defined for the first time the territorial limits within which Moscow would permit aerial photography. This took the form of a zone extending 800 kilometers to the east and to the west of the line where NATO confronted Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Since much of NATO’s defenses would be covered but little Soviet territory, the proposed zone had little appeal for the West.³ The Soviet proposal, moreover, did not indicate at what stage even this variant of "Open Skies" would come into effect.⁴

¹Ibid., Documents Nos. 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, and 184.
²Ibid., pp. 721-729.
³In April 1957, the United States made a counterproposal that shifted the axis farther east in Europe and specified a second inspection zone in the Far East. On April 30, 1957, Moscow agreed in principle to both U.S. suggestions but modified them to take in more territory that included U.S. bases. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 784-785.
⁴At the 1955 Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had said that aerial photography could be considered during the final stage of a comprehensive disarmament program.
A second interesting feature of the Soviet November 17, 1956 declaration was that it served as the basis for the comprehensive proposals Moscow put forward at the DCSC early in 1957. Moreover, in language slightly stronger than the May 10, 1955 initiative it forecast the line on general and complete disarmament that Premier Khrushchev was to put forward in 1959. The November declaration stated that after completion of the measures envisaged for the next two years it would be "necessary to raise the question about the complete liquidation of armed forces and armaments of all types with retention by states of only such contingents of militia (police) which are necessary for assuring internal security and the security of frontiers." It was a small step from this concept to Moscow's 1960 proposal that such national militias would form the contingents by which the Security Council would maintain the peace.

In 1956, however, neither side addressed itself directly to the other. Dual and even quadruple monologues were the result. "Interim sparring" is Bechhoefer's apt term for the disarmament proceedings in the latter half of 1955 and throughout 1956, while both sides groped toward the positions adopted during the "intensified effort" begun in 1957.\(^1\) Certainly until the United States completed its announced reappraisal of policy in mid-November 1956 the many exchanges of views could have been only "debates, even among our allies, and not true negotiations."\(^2\)

B. Political and Propaganda Uses of the Disarmament Issue

Manifest Soviet arms control policy has of course two intimately connected aspects. One is the position taken in the diplomatic or negotiations form. The other is the propaganda line that accompanies and supports Soviet disarmament diplomacy. Thus simultaneously with the shift in the Soviet negotiating posture in 1955-1956 a change took place in Moscow's manipulation of the disarmament issue outside the negotiating forum. The change became most noticeable in the May 10 proposals and in their treatment in Soviet propaganda media and continued to be evident throughout most of 1956. Soviet propaganda machinery seemed to move away from the heavy-handed efforts of the Stalin era to "expose" imperialist hypocrisy in the negotiations. Instead of "struggle" from below to set the masses against the capitalist elites, Soviet communications media aimed now at dividing the elites themselves—trying to

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 325
isolate the "aggressive circles" while appealing to "sober" forces in Western leadership circles. Thus, instead of simplistic slogans of "ban the bomb" addressed to the "broad masses," Moscow adopted a more sophisticated tack that was designed essentially to obscure East-West antagonisms and to encourage the development of moderate opinion in and around the Western governments. The Soviet aim was to neutralize and undermine the basis for an uncompromising American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and thus secure relaxation of Western pressures against the Communist bloc. The rationale for this particular version of "divide and conquer" was formulated by Lenin in 1922, and it appears to correspond closely to Soviet policy in the 1955 round.¹

This new subtler line in Soviet propaganda developed spasmodically and with some difficulty in 1954 and 1955. First, the peace fronts had difficulty expressing in a popular way the more complicated and gradualist disarmament programs that Moscow adopted. Second, poor material for slogans was provided by the Soviets' May 1955 recognition that political distrust and clandestine weapons production presented real obstacles to disarmament. Third, Communist propaganda, by trying to "expose" Western foot dragging in the negotiations, would tend to alienate the very moderate forces the new proposals sought to win over.

But a problem central to both policy and propaganda was the German question. For the period of initiative in Soviet arms control policy from September 1954 to May 1955 events were proceeding that involved the signing and then the ratification of arrangements providing for the rearmament of West Germany. Without attempting here to evaluate the relative weight of the pressures on Soviet policy stemming from the arms race and the fear of German rearmament, one can crudely reconstruct the sort of dilemma Soviet tacticians faced in pursuing a soft line on armaments while seeking stratagems that might halt German rearmament as, for example, the European Defense Community had been halted.

Alongside the external factors, Soviet propaganda, like Soviet foreign policy in general, also had to adjust to changes in the internal party struggles, specifically the shifts in the fortunes of Malenkov (still ascendant in September 1954), Molotov (still quite powerful in January and February 1955), and Khrushchev, who evidently gained effective control over foreign policy between March and July 1955.

Perhaps because of conflicting pressures of the sort just referred to, Soviet mass communications did little toward the end of 1954 and during the first months of 1955 to reinforce the conciliatory impression made by Vyshinsky on September 30 at the United Nations in his statement of agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Anglo-French disarmament memorandum. Rather, Soviet propaganda adhered to a rather hard line primarily directed against the London-Paris accords to rearm West Germany and the December decision of the NATO Council to equip NATO forces with tactical nuclear weapons. A characteristic Soviet comment ran: "He who wants disarmament cannot rearm West German militarism."

Stalinist patterns in Soviet policy were again evident in January 1955 when the World Peace Council launched its Vienna Appeal signature campaign against "the preparation for nuclear war"—a move that prefigured the stance Soviet negotiators would take at the DCSC from February 25 until March 8, 1955. The month of January also saw Moscow charge the United States before the U.N. Security Council with "aggression" in the Formosan crisis.

From mid-March 1955, however, as Soviet diplomacy took a noticeably softer course in dealing, for example, with Yugoslavia and Austria as well as with disarmament, the line of Soviet propaganda organs modulated accordingly. A World Peace Council meeting scheduled for May was postponed until June, apparently to permit the formulation of a position more in accord with the May 10 proposals and the Soviet campaign for détente. For Moscow's new gradualist approach to controlled prohibition of nuclear weapons based on progress in conventional reductions was quite out of keeping with the World Peace Council's tradition, reiterated in the Vienna Appeal, of demanding outright prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. Certainly the May 10 recognition of the problem of clandestine production and storing of nuclear weapons was entirely counterproductive for agitation on the need to "ban" nuclear weapons.

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But as indicated at the outset the relative complexity of the May 10 proposals did not translate readily into attractive and self-evident propaganda propositions on which to build mass peace fronts. What these changes in the Soviet negotiating position did do was to allow the World Peace Council to advance a somewhat more "reasonable" and "sober-minded" approach to the disarmament issue and thereby enhance its influence among more "respectable" peace-oriented and liberal sentiment in Western Europe and Britain. They were thus consistent with the developing general line reflecting a new strategy toward the Western elites. Accordingly in the months immediately following the May 10 negotiating concessions, the peace fronts emphasized that the positions of East and West had drawn so close that agreement was now "only a matter of good will."

The interplay was quite clear between the manifest Soviet policies toward arms control and the evolving general line of Soviet policy, a policy aimed at substantially improving East-West relations and securing an atmosphere of détente. For if any Western move could have been expected to be mercilessly exploited by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, it was the West's reluctance to back its positions after May 10, 1955. But while Soviet diplomats hit hard in the DCSC (and later at the Foreign Ministers conference) at signs of this reluctance, Soviet public declarations failed to take advantage of this singular opportunity for "exposure." A Soviet magazine reported that at the Helsinki World Peace Council assembly in June "many speakers expressed regret that the new Soviet proposals were still not sufficiently widely known in the West." The United States "reservation" on its pre-Geneva positions was hardly noted in the official organ of the Cominform—and then only toward the end of the year, on November 25 and December 30, 1955. Soviet restraint in not "exposing" the reservation on United States negotiating positions may have been based on the reasoning that a hostile propaganda of exposure would have had the effect of neutralizing any tendency of the United States leadership to seek out a less antagonistic relationship with Moscow. On balance, instead of playing up the West's apparent embarrassment over the disarmament issue, Soviet media stressed the positive prospects for détente and the desirability, if not the immediate possibility, of disarmament.

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2 For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, November 25 and December 30, 1955.
The orchestration of Soviet propaganda across the board, with détente the dominant theme, was simultaneously illustrated by Soviet propaganda on the related matter of West German rearmament. It worked hard to prevent final ratification of the Paris Accords, which took place in May 1955, but from that point on Soviet mass media seemed to run out of steam, possibly because a continued hard line would be at cross purposes with the new emphasis on better East-West relations.

Apparenty undeterred by the cool response to Moscow's new line among Western governments, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team continued its peace offensive, incidentally illustrating another of its facets as they toured Asia later in 1955. Bulganin meanwhile kept up his correspondence with Eisenhower. Visits were arranged for "K and B" to London and Paris. The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 at least gave unequivocal doctrinal sanction to the peaceful path of revolutionary development and the noninevitability of war.
Chapter II
FROM SPUTNIK TO CUBA: 1957-1962

A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance

1. An Overview. Prior to analyzing the various measures put forward by Moscow from 1957 until 1962 it may be useful to outline the major subjects of negotiation during those years and the forum in which the negotiations took place.

The U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) was the main avenue of negotiations in 1957, when, from March to August, its final session was held. While Moscow initially put forward some comprehensive proposals, the major focus of the negotiations was on a series of partial measures that could be implemented without great delay. The State Department has termed this round of negotiations "the intensified effort," reflecting in part the fact that the United States had finished in November 1956 the basic policy review it had begun in March 1955.

The U.N. General Assembly in 1957 showed such interest in disarmament that it was dubbed the "Disarmament Assembly." However, we shall not focus very intensively on the Assembly. Every year it hears reports on the progress of the disarmament negotiations during the year, holds a debate, and usually adopts a resolution that sets the terms of reference for the next year's negotiations.

The year 1958 was notable because it marked the first unilateral test suspension by any country and because this was followed later in the year by a de facto three-power moratorium on nuclear testing that persisted until 1961. 1958 also witnessed the first East-West conferences of experts, meeting on the subjects of a nuclear test ban and the prevention of surprise attack, issues the West hoped could be dealt with as technical rather than political aspects of arms control and disarmament. The first of these meetings produced one of the first East-West agreements of the postwar era in the form of a statement defining the kind of system needed to control a test ban.

Technical and political talks on the test ban problem continued in 1959, during which period Moscow also made a rash of proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Of great political importance, Chairman Khrushchev laid before the United Nations General Assembly a plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD). Although he followed it by alternative proposals for partial measures, the propaganda impact of his speech was such that both sides have since felt compelled
to keep on the table detailed GCD packages while discussing also more manageable topics.

The year 1960 saw both sides discuss GCD in a Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, while negotiations continued among the three nuclear powers on the test ban issue, and France began the tests that would bring her into the nuclear club. Both sets of negotiations faithfully reflected the deterioration in East-West relations following the U-2 incident and the abortive Paris Summit Conference.

Test ban negotiations continued in 1961, but the Soviets became increasingly intransigent, a portent that they would soon break the moratorium that had existed since 1958. But even while Moscow prepared to test a 50-megaton bomb, however, Ambassadors McCloy and Zorin on September 21, 1961 reached a joint U.S.-Soviet agreement on the principles to guide future disarmament talks.

The General Assembly late in 1961 endorsed a proposal of the three nuclear powers that an Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meet in Geneva early in 1962, composed of eight neutral states in addition to the five Communist and five Western states that made up the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960. The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) convened in Geneva in March 1962 without France, which refused to take part. Earlier in the year the Geneva conference on the cessation of nuclear testing, which had had well over 300 meetings since 1958, met for the last time. Its members then gathered as a subcommittee of the ENDC, where the nuclear powers continued their deliberations on a test ban.

The zigs and zags in Soviet policy toward comprehensive and partial disarmament measures from 1957 to 1962 will now be outlined in more detail.
Table II.1

DATES OF SESSIONS OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANS, MARCH 14, 1962 TO APRIL 28, 1964

a. Plenary Sessions

1. Meetings 1-56 March 14-June 14, 1962
4. Meetings 96-147 February 12-June 21, 1963
5. Meetings 148-156 July 30-August 29, 1963
7. Meetings 188-217 June 9-September 17, 1964

b. Three-Power Subcommittee

Meetings 1-50 March 21-December 18, 1962

2. Comprehensive Disarmament. The term "comprehensive" is used to distinguish those proposals that involve a large number of measures to be carried out over a certain period of time, usually in stages. Thus it will be recalled that Moscow's proposal of May 10, 1955 offered a comprehensive package covering nuclear and conventional forces although it dealt only with the first two stages of disarmament, leaving a third-stage transition to complete disarmament to be specified later. The March 27, 1956 Soviet proposal was comprehensive only in its application to conventional forces; however, it was accompanied by several partial measures dealing with nuclear weapons.

In the period from 1957 until 1962 Moscow brought forward four different versions of comprehensive disarmament, all of which purported to deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and all of which spelled out the steps to be taken through a third and final stage of complete disarmament down to the level of police forces needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. Charter obligations. Moscow supported one set of comprehensive disarmament measures from late 1956 until August 1957; another from September 1959 until April 1960; a third from June 7 to 27, 1960; and a four March 15, 1962 (similar to the June 1960 stand but with substantial alterations, most notably in September 1962).

A tentative judgment on the feasibility of these GCD proposals indicates that they all suffered from an overload of one-sided measures that if accepted would be crippling to Western security. The reader will note that the nature of these one-sided measures varied somewhat from one plan to another, but in each plan it is doubtful that a basis existed for East-West agreement. It will also be observed, however,
that the modifications of the Soviet stand late in 1961 and again late in 1962 went some distance toward narrowing East-West differences.

a. From Suez to Sputnik: 1956-1957. The basis for Moscow's comprehensive proposals in 1957 was laid in a declaration from Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower on November 17, 1956 dealing with disarmament as well as with the Suez crisis. Bulganin proposed that within two years the United States, the Soviet Union, and China reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million men in one year and to 1 to 1.5 million men the second year; France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men the first year and 650,000 men the second year; and other states to 150,000 to 200,000 men.

The communication also called for an immediate ban on testing, production, and use of nuclear weapons and for destruction of nuclear stockpiles and elimination of nuclear weapons from all armaments. The Soviet declaration also advocated the reduction of military forces in Germany, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact countries; the liquidation in two years of all foreign bases; and the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Effective international control was also espoused, but only two concrete proposals were made: static control posts to guard against surprise attack; and aerial photography in Europe to a depth of 800 kilometers east and west of the line dividing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In this limited way Moscow seemed to accept for the first time a truncated version of Eisenhower's 1955 "Open Skies" plan. Bulganin also suggested that, following the implementation of these measures, national forces be reduced to the militia (police) levels required "for assuring internal security and the security of frontiers."

Qualified acceptance of aerial inspection constituted the only new note in Bulganin's letter. The suggested force levels and the time for their implementation were virtually identical with the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, at the Summit Conference, and of March 27, 1956. They differed from the first only in specifying that other states be kept to a level far smaller than that planned by West Germany for its new Bundeswehr. Perhaps the most notable shift in the November 1956 Soviet

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position was the return to attempts to limit nuclear weapons, which the March 1956 Soviet proposals had bypassed ostensibly on the ground that less comprehensive disarmament might be more feasible. Finally, the November 1956 statement was much less specific about inspection procedures than the Soviet proposals of 1955 and March 1956.

The main points of Bulganin's November 1956 letter became the basis for the Soviet negotiating position when the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee reconvened in London in March 1957. However, the Soviet delegation at the DCSC singled out the European area for special emphasis under two separate headings: The suggested "effective international control organ" was to have as its primary task the establishment of and control over aerial inspection in the 800-kilometer zone; and a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe" was urged as an "important step toward the solution of the disarmament problem," thus reiterating almost verbatim the language of Moscow's March 27, 1956 proposals. Although the Soviet government had proposed an immediate suspension of nuclear tests in a draft resolution introduced in the United Nations on January 14, 1957, no reference to this measure was made in the March 18, 1957 paper.

The atmosphere of the 1957 negotiations was much improved over 1956. "Item by item" rather than "plan by plan" discussions were the customary procedure. Soviet and Western diplomats mixed informally much more than in 1956 and 1955. But the improved atmosphere did not mean that there were no longer profound differences between the Soviet and Western plans. The major gap resulted from the fact that Moscow's opening stand at the 1957 DCSC emphasized comprehensive measures while the West now stressed partial measures. After the Easter recess, however, Soviet representative Zorin announced:

Taking into account that the Western Powers are not at present prepared to conclude an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme, and desiring to release the disarmament issue from its present deadlock... The Soviet Government proposes that the Governments represented [on the DCSC] should reach an agreement on partial disarmament measures.

\[1\] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 736-737.
\[2\] Ibid., pp. 752-757.
\[3\] April 30, 1957; ibid., p. 779-780.
Zorin went on to discuss possible partial measures, most of which, however, could also be seen as part of a comprehensive program:

**Force Levels:** Moscow reaffirmed its acceptance of the force levels proposed for Stage I in the Soviet proposals of November 1956 and March 1957, which were agreeable to the West. But Zorin implied that no reduction to these levels could be made unless the West agreed in advance to the Stage II reductions advocated by Moscow.

**Armaments and Military Expenditures:** The Soviet Union affirmed its March 1956 proposal for a 15 per cent cut in conventional armaments and military budgets, contrasted with the 10 per cent reduction advanced by the U.S. representative. However, no reference was made to U.S. proposals for beginning with major armaments or for storage of some armaments in disarmament depots during the first stage.

**Control:** For a first-stage agreement Moscow proposed more limited controls than it had already accepted in principle for a more comprehensive program in 1955-1956. The proposed control organ for this stage would be established within the framework of the Security Council. Its functions would include receiving and examining the information provided by states on their implementation of partial measures. There was no reference to control posts at airfields, to objects of control, to unimpeded access to objects of control, or to the principle of inspection adequate to assure compliance with agreed measures in the first stage, even though all of these principles had been approved by Moscow in 1955 and 1956. The question of ground control posts at airfields was now postponed until the second stage and tied to the achievement of a 1.5 million force level and the complete prohibition and elimination from national armaments of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Although Moscow had implied earlier that control posts would be established throughout the United States and the Soviet Union, the April 30, 1957 proposal provided for such posts only in the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, the eastern United States, and western border regions of the Soviet Union.

**Prohibition of the Use of Atomic Weapons:** Moscow continued to demand prohibition of the use of atomic weapons but without reference to U.S. proposals regarding long-range
missiles and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Nuclear Testing: The April 1957 proposal called for separating the test ban issue from other matters of nuclear disarmament and solving it "without delay." The West, in contrast, insisted that a test ban be linked with a cutoff of production of nuclear material for weapons.

Bases: Instead of the complete liquidation of foreign bases Moscow proposed agreement in the first instance "as to which of those bases can be liquidated during a period of one or two years."

Force Reductions in Germany and Elsewhere in Europe: The April 1957 document referred to Bulganin's proposal of November 17, 1956 for a one third reduction of foreign troops stationed in Germany. Such a move, Zorin argued, would lessen international tensions.

Aerial Inspection: The Soviet Union was ready to apply aerial inspection within a sector of Europe and the Far East as proposed by Washington but "with a modification." The modification would have included huge areas of Western bases but relatively little Soviet territory. Soviet diplomats indicated informally, however, that the exact limits of the zones were subject to negotiation.¹

The DCSC negotiations from April through August 1957 saw a significant narrowing of the gap between the Western and Soviet positions on separable measures, the details of which will be discussed below in considering various partial measures.² If, however, one looks at the total package


²Secretary of State Dulles perhaps overstated the success of the 1957 negotiations when he told the press on September 10: "more progress toward disarmament has been made at these talks than has been made before in the long history of efforts toward disarmament"; and also that the "real meeting of minds" which is precedent to any meaningful agreement was also achieved--and could be achieved again--by methodical cultivation of private consultations over a sustained period. (Ibid., p. 32.)
proposed by Moscow in March and then modified in April 1957, the over-all impression is that it was much less negotiable than its 1955 and March 1956 predecessors if only because of less satisfactory provisions for control and inspection. Further there is a distinct impression that Moscow's comprehensive package of March 1957 was but an opening card meant to be discarded after exacting some propaganda gain. Its promulgation came in the backwash of Soviet embarrassment over Hungary and with Kremlin warnings regarding Western machinations for war.

The Soviet delegate over the summer of 1957, however, had shown growing displeasure with the slowness of the proceedings, especially with the insistence of the Western four that they could not and would not negotiate on an inspection zone in Europe without consulting the nations concerned. On August 27, 1957 Mr. Zorin made an unexpected and violent 90-minute attack on the "aggressive North Atlantic bloc," the "fruitless disarmament talks," and the "ruling circles'. . . double game," accusing the United States of designing its inspection proposals "to contribute to the preparation of aggressive war." The Soviet government subsequently refused to participate any longer in the DCSC.

The reasons for the Soviet move to discontinue using the DCSC as the basic negotiating forum have been aptly summarized by Bechhoefer: (1) Because the Western four had to obtain NATO clearance for measures concerning European security, the DCSC had become cumbersome and ineffective. (2) Harold Stassen's denigration over the summer of 1957 meant that negotiations with him were fruitless, reinforcing the Kremlin's belief that the only useful forum for negotiations was a summit meeting. (3) Western proposals, including those presented informally on August 27, 1957 (and formally on August 29), required acceptance of the entire package of measures before any one of them, such as a test ban, could be implemented. This all-or-nothing approach virtually precluded any immediate agreements. (4) The breakup of the disarmament negotiations would serve as an ominous event by which Moscow may have hoped to influence the forthcoming West German elections.

A fifth possible consideration was Moscow's testing of an ICBM on August 26 and the imminent launching of the first earth satellite on October 2, 1957. The weight of this consideration is dismissed by Bechhoefer on the ground that Moscow showed a

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serious interest the following year in test ban and surprise-attack negotiations and because the first four factors seem sufficient to explain the Soviet move. Sixth, there is no indication that the power struggle in the Kremlin and resultant ousting of the "antiparty group" in July 1957 had a perceptible impact on the DCSC negotiations. Finally, a strong gesture to impress Peking may have been wanted. Whatever the Soviet motives, Zorin's violent speech could not have been calculated to win over moderates in the West.

b. Khrushchev in New York and Paris: September 1959-May 1960. The DCSC had held its last meeting in August 1957. The years 1958 and 1959 saw technical and political negotiations over a test ban and surprise attack. On August 5, 1959 the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a new forum in which five states from the Communist bloc and five from the West would take part, with the first meeting to be held early in 1960.¹

The agenda for this proposed Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was determined in large part by the fact that general and complete disarmament was strongly endorsed by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union at the U.N. General Assembly that convened in New York in September 1959. British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd outlined a three-stage plan for GCD to the Assembly on September 17, but his presentation was overshadowed by Premier Khrushchev's famous address of September 18, 1959.² On September 19 the Soviet government submitted a declaration that provided a programmatic statement of the disarmament proposals in the Premier's speech.³

¹ Already in 1958 the Soviet bloc achieved "parity" in the negotiating forum when the Soviet delegations to the two "experts" conferences in Geneva were joined by three Eastern European delegations, making four delegations each from the East and West.

² Texts of both addresses are in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1447-1460.

³ Ibid., pp. 1460-1474.
Khrushchev's address and the accompanying declaration served as the basis for the Soviet negotiating posture at the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference during its first session, March 15-April 29, 1960. The new Soviet stand was reminiscent of Litvinov's diplomacy at the League of Nations negotiations 1927-1934, when Moscow put forward sweeping plans for general disarmament but, in case the "capitalist" governments were not ready for radical solutions, went on to submit more limited proposals. Moscow's 1959 program was the first Soviet proposal of the postwar era to spell out the provisions of all three stages of GCD and to advocate completion of the entire program in four years.\(^1\) The Soviet plans of 1955, 1956, and 1957, in contrast, had made provision only for the first two stages of disarmament, to be implemented in two or two-and-one-half years, while only raising the question of eventual complete disarmament.

Analysis of Moscow's 1959 stand reveals that it not only detailed the nature of Stage III disarmament but also focused entirely on the end results of GCD. In Stage III, armies, navies, and air forces would cease to exist; general staffs and war ministries would be abolished; people would return to constructive work; all military bases would be eliminated; states would "retain only limited police (militia) contingents--of a strength agreed upon for each country--equipped with light firearms and intended solely for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the citizens' personal safety." International control was to be established, but its functions and powers would "correspond to the nature of the disarmament measures being implemented." Upon completion of the entire disarmament process the international control organ would have "free access to all objects of control." It could institute a general system of aerial observation.

In a departure from the inner logic displayed in Moscow's comprehensive proposals of 1955-1957 the 1959 declaration called for the complete disbanding of armed forces in Stage II but

\(^1\)Khrushchev's speech specified a four-year timetable but did not break it down into stages as did the accompanying declaration. The British proposal of September 17, 1959 constituted the most detailed Western statement to that time concerning the nature of a third and final stage of disarmament. It was characteristically more cautious and less grandiose than Khrushchev's statement of September 18. (Ibid., pp. 1450-1451.)
deferred the destruction of nuclear weapons, missiles, and air force equipment until Stage III.¹ The retention of nuclear weapons until that time may have afforded a kind of nuclear umbrella, but without any personnel to support it after Stage II.

As in 1927, 1932, and 1955-1957, the 1959 proposal for sweeping disarmament was immediately followed by suggestions for limited measures in case the West was not ready to embark upon GCD. Khrushchev's address and the accompanying declaration singled out the following partial measures for immediate consideration:

(a) Establishment of a control and inspection zone and reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned;

(b) Establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe;

(c) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European states and abolition of military bases in the territories of foreign states;

(d) Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member states of NATO and the member states of the Warsaw Treaty;

(e) Conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one state upon another.

To add to the confusion, both the Khrushchev speech and the Soviet declaration added that "The Soviet Government considers it appropriate to recall its disarmament proposals of 10 May 1955, which outlined a specific scheme for partial measures in the field of disarmament. It is convinced that these proposals constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue." Finally, Moscow again expressed itself in favor of an immediate cessation of nuclear testing for all time.²

¹Formally speaking, the 1959 Soviet proposal differed from others that preceded and followed it in that it did not require the abolition of any foreign bases until Stage II.

No state could now ignore the issue of GCD. The General Assembly on November 20, 1959, in its Resolution 1378 (XIV), called upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution to the problem of GCD. It recommended that the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee consider the British, Soviet, and other relevant proposals so that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.\textsuperscript{1}

c. The Ten Nation Talks: March 15-April 29, 1960. The Ten Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva from March 15 to April 29, when it recessed in anticipation of the Paris Summit Meeting, and it met again from June 7 to June 27, 1960.\textsuperscript{2} Unlike the negotiations over comprehensive disarmament when the DCSC met in London in 1957, the 1960 talks were rather vitriolic even before the U-2 and summit difficulties.\textsuperscript{3}

Three main issues were debated prior to the April 29 recess. The first problem arose from Moscow's insistence that only the Soviet proposal be discussed since it alone met the mandate of the General Assembly to work toward GCD. The Communist bloc program was the same as that contained in the Soviet declaration of September 18, 1959. The West's proposal, submitted on March 16, 1960,\textsuperscript{4} was an elaboration

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 1545.

\textsuperscript{2}The five Western countries represented were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy; the five Communist states were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.


of previous Western proposals, including the British proposal to the General Assembly in September 1959. By comparison with later Western proposals, the position advocated in 1960 resembled more a collection of partial measures, to be implemented in stages, than an integrated program. The nature of the third stage was, perhaps realistically, rather tentative. The Communist negotiators announced themselves ready to discuss these partial measures but on the condition that the West admitted it did not wish to negotiate on comprehensive disarmament. 1

The second issue was inspection and control. The Communist delegations objected that the West sought control first and disarmament later. The West complained that the Soviet program would permit inspection only after disarmament had taken place. Moscow refused verification of the announced base figures from which reductions were pledged. Aerial inspection would be allowed over all Soviet territory only after GCD had been accomplished, although Zorin stated that his government would consider such observation over part of the Soviet Union to verify partial measures—an apparent allusion to possible measures in East and Central Europe and in the Arctic.

The third problem was one of timing. Both East and West talked of three stages, but the Communist program insisted on an automatic transition from one stage to another, the whole process to be completed in four years. The Western position was that the situation would have to be evaluated after each stage to determine how and when the next would commence.

Both sides submitted additional papers, ostensibly to break the deadlock—Moscow on April 11, the West on April 26. The conference recessed on April 29 with the Communist states pledging their determination to work for GCD and the West insisting that progress be made on specific measures. 2

1 Griffiths, op. cit.

d. Nuclear Disarmament First, June 7-27, 1960. In May the U-2 plane was shot down over Sverdlovsk, and the Paris Summit Conference quickly ended, dimming still more the prospects for fruitful negotiations when the Ten Nation Committee reconvened on June 7, 1960. Five days before the committee resumed its negotiations Moscow circulated a revision of its September 1959 disarmament program to 80 countries; this revised program was the basis for the Soviet bloc's position during the remainder of the Ten Nation talks. The West for its part sought to elicit discussion of its own March 16, 1960 proposals and to obtain clarification of the revised Communist position.

Moscow's new stand purported to meet several Western criticisms of its previous proposals. The Soviet proposals of September 1959 and March-April 1960 had deferred nuclear disarmament until the third stage, to accord with Western desires to proceed initially with reductions of the conventional forces in which the Soviet Union held an advantage. France, however, had expressed the view that disarmament should begin with the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. Therefore the revised Soviet proposal put this measure in the first rather than the third stage, and it provided for the destruction of nuclear weapons in the second stage. Moscow implied that the quid pro quo for this Soviet "concession" (considering the Soviet lead in ballistic missiles) was that foreign bases would have to be eliminated in the first instead of the second stage. For the United States and the United Kingdom, of course, the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles and overseas bases in Stage I would end their prime means of deterrence, making these aspects of Moscow's revised proposals absolutely unacceptable.

Another ostensible concession was an indication in the negotiations that Moscow might forgo a four-year timetable. But Moscow continued to insist on the principle that some fixed schedule had to be agreed on before disarmament could begin. Further, Moscow rejected suggestions that joint research be carried out to determine the problems or even feasibility of implementing each measure.

The United States delegation nevertheless conceded that "some elements of the June 2 paper . . . appeared to represent some slight movement toward a more rational approach to disarmament. . . ." One of these elements was Soviet recognition,

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1 Ibid., pp. 925-932.
2 Ibid., pp. 926-927.
apparently for the first time in the postwar negotiations, of the need for "measures for preserving peace and security in accordance with the U.N. Charter." The revised Soviet proposal provided that states would undertake in Stage III, "where necessary, to place at the disposal of the Security Council units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining at their disposal." States would allow international inspection to ensure that the size and location of these militia units accorded with the agreed quota. However, the introduction to the revised Soviet proposal specified that the militia detachments could be used "solely for the purpose of maintaining peace among nations, not for the suppression of peoples who are struggling for their independence and social progress, and not for interference in the internal affairs of states."

The control council was apparently to be structured on troika principles, although it was not clear whether Communist, Western, and neutralist states were to have the same representation. If they had an equal voice, the two thirds majority rule meant that a united Communist faction could block all action if joined by just one neutralist vote. The international inspectorate in any event would not be able to determine if clandestine installations existed in excess of agreed amounts but would be limited "merely to counting those particular installations or forces that a government declared it was eliminating." However, the powers of the controllers would expand in "conformity with the scope and nature of the disarmament measures involved."

A final problem with the new Soviet text, which again helped to emphasize its propagandistic purposes, was its stipulation that all details of GCD should be worked out in a single treaty at the Ten Nation Conference and then be submitted to a world conference. This approach, in the opinion of the U.S. delegation, would impede even the first measures toward halting the arms race.

U.S. representative Frederick Eaton returned to Washington for consultations during the week of June 19. Modifications and amplifications of the U.S. position were worked out during this time, and Soviet representative Zorin was informed before the June 27 meeting that these changes would be presented in a few

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
days after consultation with the other Western delegations. In the light of these events the subsequent behavior of the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations during the meeting of June 27 was particularly outrageous. The Polish chairman refused to permit Western representatives to speak, recognizing only Communist speakers. He then declared the Ten Nation Conference ended. The Communist delegations walked out, never to return, but the United States put its new position on the record.\(^1\) An invitation to the Communist states to reconsider their withdrawal was turned down. The whole episode was reminiscent of the violence with which Mr. Zorin displayed in the DCSC in August 1957 and the shoe pounding of Mr. Khrushchev later in 1960 at the General Assembly.\(^2\)

A letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 27, 1960 explained that the Soviet Union felt compelled to break off the talks because the West showed no interest in disarmament but only in controls to provide espionage data for NATO, which was intensifying the arms race. The Soviet Premier was particularly incensed that the British Defense Minister Watkinson had recently visited Washington in order to supply Britain with the latest rocket weapons and that U.S. and British planes would soon fly around the clock with nuclear weapons.\(^3\)

e. Closer East-West Agreement in Principle, September 1961. Following the collapse of the Ten Nation talks in 1960 the next major East-West negotiations concerning GCD took place from June to September 1961 in private talks between the Soviet Union and the United States that culminated in an important agreement announced on September 20, 1961--the "Joint Statement on Agreed

\(^1\) Verbatim Records, pp. 933-936.

\(^2\) However the new U.S. programs did not represent a particularly hopeful basis for renewed negotiations. Bechhoefer has commented that the U.S. proposals' "illogical linking of measures of limitation and reduction with control systems unsuitable for these measures seems to testify to hasty preparation and liberal use of paste and scissors." Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 553; for point-by-point comparisons of the two Soviet plans and the two plans endorsed by the United States at the Ten Nation talks, see U.S. Department of State, Disarmament at a Glance (Washington, n.d.).

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 938.
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations.\textsuperscript{1} This statement came during a period of deep international tension marked by renewed East-West confrontations in Berlin and the resumption by Moscow on September 1 of atmospheric nuclear testing and of underground testing on September 15 by the United States. On September 25, to round out the picture, President Kennedy presented to the General Assembly the most detailed blueprint for GCD until then proposed by the United States,\textsuperscript{2} and on September 26 he signed the bill creating the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The joint U.S.-Soviet statement was negotiated by Ambassadors McCloy and Zorin. It announced agreement on eight principles to guide future negotiations. The main change in U.S. policy was that Washington made a sharp commitment to work for GCD, including the "elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction" and "the discontinuance of military expenditures." The United States also agreed that time limits should be specified for each stage until the disarmament process was completed.

Soviet policy seemed in turn to move closer to Western positions on inspection and control. Moscow ended its earlier insistence on "automatic transition" by agreeing that the transition from one stage of disarmament to another should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

The Kremlin also agreed then with the Western view "that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace..." Moscow went beyond its 1960 position by affirming that states should place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{1}U.N. Document A/4879; Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 439.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 475 ff.
Qualifications were entered about national liberation or social change.

The apparent concessions of each side were highly qualified in other ways, and the prime issue that had long divided East and West still remained: Moscow explicitly refused to agree to what it termed "inspection over armaments." Zorin refused to accept a statement that international verification should ensure that not only "agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage." 1

The Eighteen Nation Committee: Modifications in Moscow's Position, March-September 1962. The wide anxiety resulting from East-West tension in 1961 increased public concern that disarmament negotiations should continue. The successor to both the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960) and the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (1958-January 1962) was the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), agreed upon by the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the United Nations in late 1961 and approved by the General Assembly on December 20 of that year. The ENDC in effect added eight neutral states to the Ten Nation Committee of 1960. (After that forum had proved unacceptable to Moscow the Soviet Union had proposed enlarging it by five uncommitted nations, but this was unacceptable to the West because of its similarity to the troika. The final compromise was to add eight states--Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic--thus forming the ENDC.) Whatever similarity to the troika principle remained in the ENDC structure was partially vitiated by the rule of unanimity in voting. France's refusal to participate in the ENDC left it with seventeen active members.

The ENDC convened in Geneva on March 14, 1962 and was the primary locus of disarmament negotiations in 1962, holding three plenary sessions throughout the year: March 14 to June 14; July 16 to September 7; and November 26 to December 20. It was agreed early in the conference that plenary meetings would be devoted to discussions of GCD, and that two subsidiary organs would be established to permit concurrent consideration of other matters. The Committee of the Whole would examine partial measures that might facilitate GCD and lessen international tension. A subcommittee of the three nuclear powers would negotiate a nuclear test ban. 2 (In 1963 these two subsidiary organs ceased to meet,

1See the McCloy-Zorin correspondence immediately following the agreement, U.N. Document A/4880, in ibid., p. 442.

2In practice however the ENDC plenary sessions also devoted much time to the test ban, in 1962 as well as later.
and the ENDC divided its sessions between discussions of GCD, collateral measures, and a test ban.) A harbinger of future difficulties was Premier Khrushchev's effort to convert the opening meeting of the ENDC into a summit conference. Reluctantly he acquiesced to an Anglo-American counter proposal that the foreign ministers attend the opening sessions and that the heads of government intervene when appropriate.¹

The ENDC had before it a Soviet and a U.S. plan for GCD. Moscow's proposal, tabled on March 15, 1962, was entitled "Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control." The U.S. plan, a detailed elaboration of President Kennedy's proposal to the General Assembly in 1961, was introduced as an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" on April 18, 1962.² During the course of the negotiations both nations modified certain elements of their programs, which will be discussed later in this section.

The Soviet draft treaty was essentially the same as that endorsed by Moscow during the second session of the Ten Nation talks in 1960, but parts of it had been modified in keeping with the principles agreed on in September 1961 by Ambassadors Zorin and McCloy.

The major structural flaws from the Western standpoint were those that had persisted since 1961:

1. Elimination in Stage I of all nuclear delivery vehicles—rockets, airplanes, surface ships and submarines, and artillery. Destruction in Stage II of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

2. Liquidation of all overseas bases in Stage I.

3. "Control over disarmament" but no "control over armaments" that were not yet scheduled for elimination. Only after GCD was carried out would the international inspectorate "have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each state party to the treaty." Only then would aerial inspection and photography be instituted. The new U.S. proposal for "zonal


² Texts in ibid., pp. 103-126, 351-381.
inspection" was also rejected by Moscow as being "inspection prior to disarmament" and hence as "espionage." ¹

4. A fixed timetable for the implementation of GCD in four to five years.

5. A troika structure in the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectorate, with decisions by a two thirds vote.

6. U.N. peacekeeping to be subject to the Security Council and thus to a potential veto by a permanent member; to bypass the Security Council would violate national sovereignty by creating a "superstate." ²

Perhaps the two major advances of the 1962 Soviet proposal over 1960 were reaffirmation of the principles jointly agreed to by Washington and Moscow in September 1961. Article I of the new Soviet draft provided that the transition from one stage to another would "take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate." (How this provision could be squared with the necessity of adhering to a set timetable was not reconciled.)

Second, the draft treaty provided for strengthening U.N. peacekeeping capabilities with each stage of disarmament. States were to implement Article 43 of the Charter making available to the United Nations armed forces, assistance, and rights of passage. After reduction to police (militia) levels, certain police units would be specially earmarked for use by the Security Council. The command of these units, however, would be by the troika principle and, apparently, by unanimous agreement. ³

Furthermore the negotiations showed that Moscow did not want disarmament to impede revolution. When the United States urged that the phrase "in a peaceful world" be added to a "draft preamble of a treaty on general and complete disarmament," Zorin objected. He stated that

¹Cited from the provisional verbatim records of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, April 16, 1962, p. 31; references to these documents cited hereafter as ENDC/PV.

²ENDC/PV.26, April 24, 1962, p. 29.

³See Article 37.2 of the Soviet draft treaty.
the political purpose of such external regulation of the whole varied process of the historical development of individual nations and countries can only be to delay the progressive development of society and to impede the national liberation movement and the far-reaching social and economic changes which are in progress and which must inevitably come about in the different countries of the world.¹

During the summer and fall of 1962 Moscow took a number of steps that came closer to the Western position on certain topics:²

1. On July 16 Moscow accepted the U.S. proposal for an approximate 30 per cent reduction in conventional arms in Stage I and 35 per cent (from the original) in the succeeding two stages. Initially the Soviet Union had advocated the reduction of these armaments "in direct proportion" to cuts in the armed forces. However, the U.S. plan provided for first-stage cuts only of those major armaments whose destruction would be relatively easy to verify, while the Soviet amendment would cut all arms by 30 per cent in the first stage—thus producing a staggering problem for verification of light and easily concealed weapons.

2. On the same day Moscow endorsed a group of measures to reduce the risk of war, all of them adaptations of proposals previously introduced by the United States, for example, exchange of military missions and the establishment of rapid communications between heads of governments and the U.N. Secretary-General. (On the other hand the Soviet amendments also included one that would have prohibited major joint military maneuvers between two or more states, thus precluding joint NATO exercises.)

3. On July 24 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested that the Soviet Union would be willing to consider a 5-year time limit instead of its initial 4-year limit for completion of GCD.

4. Gromyko also expressed his government's willingness to reach a compromise force level of 1.9 million men (midway between the 2.1 and 1.7 figures proposed by the United States and Soviet Union respectively) at the end of Stage I.

¹ENDC/PV.17, April 10, 1962, p. 21.
5. Following the end of the second session of the ENDC in early September disarmament was discussed at the U.N. General Assembly. There on September 21 Gromyko endorsed the "nuclear umbrella" principle that had been expounded by American scientists at the Pugwash Conference in Moscow two years earlier. The Soviet Foreign Minister expressed his government's willingness to have the United States and the Soviet Union retain in their own territories until the end of Stage II "an agreed, strictly limited number of ICBM's, antimissile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category." However, all attempts by Western diplomats to explore the specifics of the Soviet proposal were rebuffed when the ENDC met again late in 1962. Semyon Tsarapkin demanded that the West first agree in principle to the nuclear umbrella concept before discussions began on its details.

6. **Summary.** To summarize, none of the comprehensive proposals advocated by Moscow from late 1956 until late 1962 seemed to offer a promising basis for East-West agreement. The problems common to all of them were:

- Inadequate inspection procedures, especially in the refusal to allow verification of existing armaments.
- An inflexible and probably unrealistic timetable of four to five years.
- Provision for the elimination of overseas bases in the first of the second stage of disarmament.
- United Nations peacekeeping forces subject to great power veto.

The Soviet proposals between late 1956 and August 1957 were particularly striking for the manner in which they backed off from the inspection procedures Moscow had endorsed in 1955 and early 1956. The subsequent Soviet proposals of 1959-1962 had in common the structural defect that they would radically alter the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons one way or the other. Khrushchev's proposals to the United Nations in 1959 put off nuclear disarmament until Stage III. The Soviet proposals of June 1960 and March 1962, however, would have reversed this priority and destroyed all nuclear delivery systems in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.

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1. A revised version of the Soviet draft treaty that incorporated this and most of the Soviet proposals since March was circulated by the U.N. Secretariat on September 24, 1962 as U.N. Document A/C.1/867.

2. ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22.
Some narrowing of the differences between the East and West resulted from shifts in Soviet policy in 1960-1962, and there has been some movement toward accommodation with the Western position on the need for U.N. peacekeeping forces, although Moscow has insisted on their being subject to the Security Council. Moscow has shown some awareness of the need for an international inspectorate to affirm that conditions are ready for the transition from one stage to another. Most important, perhaps, Moscow recognized in September 1962 the desirability for the nuclear powers to retain a limited number of nuclear contingents after the first stage of disarmament.

It is difficult to compare the comprehensive proposals Moscow endorsed from 1955 through 1962 because each set was different in important respects. Judged in terms of over-all feasibility, however, two orders of magnitude may be suggested: the proposals of 1955 and early 1956 seem more feasible than any that Moscow espoused from late 1956 until perhaps late 1962. The 1955, early 1956, and late 1962 proposals were much closer to the Western position and suffered fewer structural flaws than those of late 1956 and early 1962. An interesting corollary of this evaluation is that Moscow seems not to have expected or sought serious negotiations of its 1957-1962 proposals, which were tabled mainly for propaganda purposes while more serious talks went on concerning various partial measures. The 1955 and early 1956 comprehensive proposals, in contrast, seemed to be treated relatively seriously by Soviet negotiators even while they began to work out a partial measures approach.

Finally, we should note that during the 1962 negotiations the Soviet stand was that ENDC discussion of partial or collateral measures that might ease tension and strengthen confidence among states "should not divert the attention of members of the Committee from the execution of their principal task, which is to draw up and negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament." 1 A Soviet memorandum of March 19, 1962 reaffirmed support for eight partial measures that Moscow had urged upon the General Assembly in September 1961 but did not even bother to enumerate them once more.


2 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.
3. **Partial Measures.** One of the most significant changes in Soviet policy on arms control during 1955-1956, it now appears, was Moscow's new interest in negotiating on partial disarmament measures. In retrospect we can see that 1955 marked a turning point from which a major trend can be dated—a trend toward a more sophisticated propagation of partial measures, many of them relatively negotiable in terms of military-balance agreements acceptable to both sides. Indeed Khrushchev's address to the General Assembly in 1959--after proposing GCD--advocated five partial measures and went on to reaffirm the May 10, 1955 proposals that he said "outlined a specific scheme for partial measures in the field of disarmament." The Soviet government was still convinced, the Premier added, that the May 10 proposals "constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue."¹

As we have seen, negotiations on GCD often touched on partial measures that could be separated out of the package and considered individually. Thus, for example, a reduction of ground forces, the elimination of overseas bases, even the destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles—at least theoretically—could be negotiated separately. Indeed Jules Moch succeeded to some extent in having "item by item" debate. But usually agreement on one item was contingent on ultimate consensus on a whole package. This approach therefore must be distinguished from negotiation on "collateral" issues, as they were termed in 1962, that could be agreed on individually and would, it was hoped, enhance the chances for more comprehensive disarmament agreements.

A wide range of partial measures was espoused by Moscow from 1956 to 1962. Khrushchev's 1959 address to the United Nations mentioned five such measures that the Kremlin frequently endorsed in this period:

1. The establishment of a control and inspection zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned;

2. The establishment of an 'atom-free' zone in Central Europe;

3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign States;

4. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty;

5. The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another.\(^1\)

Here we shall single out two sorts of partial measures for special emphasis: regional arms controls and a nuclear test ban. These were the partial measures backed most consistently and with the most apparent interest by Moscow; by focusing on them we shall also be able to provide a framework for discussion of related matters—nuclear-free zones, a nuclear production cutoff, and surprise-attack measures such as control posts.

a. **Regional Arms Controls and Surprise Attack.** While the Bolshevik government did not espouse disarmament propaganda until 1922, it recognized from the beginning of its existence the value of pursuing what might now be termed regional arms control or disengagement along its eastern and western frontiers to guard against foreign intervention.\(^2\)

From 1947 to 1954 the Soviet government brought forward a number of proposals to deal with the German problem. Each solution had three common elements: first, withdrawal of foreign troops; second, political neutralization of Germany; third, as the reward, reunification of Germany. (The Soviet draft peace treaty of 1952, reintroduced at Berlin in 1954, permitted Germany to have military forces.)

As noted in Chapter I, Moscow responded warmly in 1954 and 1955 to the Eden Plan and brought forward on March 27, 1956 a Soviet plan for the creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments. A more radical formulation of these ideas was circulated in Soviet notes to the Western governments.

\(^{1}\)As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 1459.

\(^{2}\)A survey of Soviet Russia's peace treaties signed in the first years of the Bolshevik regime and culminating in the very detailed provisions of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of June 1, 1922 indicates that the following principles were incorporated, to varying degrees, in many of the treaties between the Soviet government and the Central Powers, Japan, the "succession states," and Russia's neighbors such as Rumania and Poland: establishment of neutral zones along territorial and water frontiers, within which the number of soldiers and the quantity and quality of equipment would be limited; evacuation and demobilization in certain areas, including the surrender of property and equipment to one side or the other; pledges to support international agreements to neutralize Estonia, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, Holland, and Lake Ladoga, if such agreements were worked out. Leonard Shapiro, ed., *Soviet Treaty Series* (Washington: The Georgetown University Press, 1950), Vol. I, *passim*; see his bibliography for original sources.
on November 17, 1956—at the height of the Hungarian uprising. Contrary to Western preferences, it specified that all foreign bases would be eliminated in two years and called for a nonaggression pact between the two alliances. Of more appeal to the West, it reintroduced the concept of control posts to guard against surprise attack and accepted the idea of aerial inspection in Europe. On the next day, November 18, at a Kremlin reception, Khrushchev called for the reciprocal withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and of NATO forces from Western Germany together with the abolition of all foreign bases.

Variations of the March and November 1956 Soviet proposals were reintroduced by Soviet diplomats at the DCSC and in notes to Western governments in the first half of 1957. Frequent reference was made to "Sir Anthony Eden's proposal" of 1955. Bonn was warned that arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons would preclude German reunification.\(^1\)

An expansion of the territory involved was suggested by Khrushchev in a program televised in Moscow on June 2, 1957 for American audiences. He suggested that foreign troops be withdrawn from both Germanies, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and from Italy, Turkey, and other countries. (But he affirmed that Communist regimes would remain, based "upon the will of peoples" in the socialist bloc countries.)\(^2\)

Various East European governments began also to make disengagement proposals, with the effect of reinforcing Soviet positions. The motives of the East European regimes and Moscow may have been quite diverse. But it appears that the Soviet government not only tolerated such initiatives but encouraged and endorsed them. The most conciliatory version of the famed Rapacki Plan, as we shall see, was adumbrated almost a year before in a number of Soviet proposals.

A "Balkan zone of peace" without atomic weapons and joined in a mutual security pact was proposed by Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in September 1957. It was to include Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Mr. Stoica’s overtures, accepted with some reservations by Yugoslavia, were

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\(^1\) The following analysis of Soviet bloc and Western proposals and commentary is based largely on documentation in Eugene Hinterhoff, Disengagement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1959). For a convenient summary and chronology of disengagement proposals, see his Appendix 10, pp. 414-442.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 204-205.
turned down by Turkey and Greece, but the Soviet Union, as we shall see, revived the idea of a Balkan zone of peace in May 1959.

The Romanian initiative of September 1957 was followed by a similar Polish move. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed his plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in a speech to the General Assembly on October 2, 1957; the proposal was reiterated in notes circulated by Warsaw in February 1958. This first version of the Rapacki Plan suggested the creation of a nuclear-free zone to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies. Nuclear weapons would be neither manufactured nor stockpiled in this zone; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited. The four great powers would guarantee these provisions by a "broad and effective control" comprising ground and aerial inspection. The plan did not propose merging NATO and the Warsaw Pact but argued that the "system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of a broader disarmament agreement." In contrast to a second variant of the plan in November 1958, no provision was made for a reduction of troops in the zone.

The basic ideas of the Rapacki Plan were endorsed in letters from Bulganin from December 10 to 14, 1957 to all U.N. members, all NATO countries, plus Spain and Switzerland. Explicit reference was made to Rapacki's U.N. address; in addition, however, Bulganin proposed a withdrawal of troops from the zone, a European security pact, and a moratorium on nuclear testing anywhere as of January 1, 1958. Much of Bulganin's program was outlined in a seven-point "peace plan" adopted by the Supreme Soviet on December 21, 1957. A letter from Bulganin on January 8, 1958 to Messrs. Macmillan and Eisenhower again endorsed the Rapacki Plan and also called for a summit meeting. Official Soviet and Warsaw Pact statements throughout 1958 reiterated the proposal for a nuclear-free zone or the withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Europe or both.

President Eisenhower on January 12, 1958 indicated the response of the Western governments to the Rapacki Plan. In replying to Bulganin's letter of December 10 he did not explicitly reject the idea of the nuclear-free zone but raised two objections: that it did not deal with the main problem--nuclear production by the Soviet Union and the United States; and "there cannot be great significance in de-nuclearizing a small area when [as the Bulganin

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 214.}\]
letter stated] 'the range of modern types of weapons does not know of any geographical limit.' . . .”¹ Similar objections were raised in a committee report to the Consultative Assembly of the Western European Union on April 14, 1958.²

The United States rejected the Rapacki Plan in a statement from Ambassador Beam to the Polish government on May 3, 1958. Beam mentioned most of the objections cited in the Eisenhower letter of January 12 and added that the effectiveness of the plan would depend upon the "good intentions of the outside the area." Further:

The [Polish] proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.³

A second version of the Rapacki Plan was brought forward by the Polish Foreign Minister at a press conference in Warsaw on November 4, 1958. Rapacki indicated that the revised plan was intended to meet the Western objections to his initial proposals. A two-stage plan was now suggested: first, a freeze on existing nuclear weapons in the zone; second, a reduction of conventional forces and, simultaneously, complete de-nuclearization of the zone. Both steps would be strictly controlled.

The novelty of this revised Rapacki Plan has been exaggerated by some analysts, for, as we have seen, numerous Soviet statements backing the Rapacki Plan in late 1957 and earlier in 1958 had already advocated not only de-nuclearization but also withdrawal of foreign troops from the zone.

Immediately following the presentation of the revised Rapacki Plan on November 4, 1958, two events offered an insight into the role that disengagement was to play in Soviet bloc military and political strategy. The first was the opening of the "Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack," which met in Geneva from November 10 to December 18. The Soviet proposals there were essentially an expansion of the Rapacki Plan and of

² Hinterhoff, op. cit., p. 229.
Bulganin's November 17, 1956 proposals for aerial and ground inspection within a zone in Central Europe and added an aerial photography zone in eastern Siberia and the western half of the United States. The November 1958 Soviet proposals to the Surprise Attack Conference broadened the aerial photography zone to cover Iran, Japan, and Okinawa.

The Soviet proposals to the Surprise Attack Conference described for the first time the nature of the control posts that Moscow had been advocating in more general terms since 1955 and 1956. There would be 28 control posts on Warsaw Pact territory (including 6 in the Soviet Union) and 54 posts in NATO and CENTO territory (including 6 in United States territory). The posts would be situated at railway junctions, major ports, and on main roads. They would be staffed by 3 to 4 officers from each side, serviced by nationals of the country inspected, and the chief of the post would also be from that country.

Moscow made clear that these posts would be of little avail if not linked with other steps to reduce concentrations of forces in Central Europe. The Soviet government therefore proposed (a) a reduction in the foreign armies on the territories of European states and (b) not keeping modern types of weapons of mass destruction in either part of Germany.\(^1\)

The Soviet proposals appeared to be aimed more at avoiding the outbreak of local war that might escalate than at protection against surprise nuclear attack. However, it should be noted that Soviet military strategy posited that a nuclear surprise attack would have to be accompanied by a massive follow-up by more conventional forces. Therefore the efficacy of the control posts might have been greater in Soviet than in Western eyes.

In any event, the Soviets turned down the Western proposals to the Surprise Attack Conference, which concentrated on various ways of inspecting nuclear delivery systems to ensure they were not being mobilized for attack. Significantly the Soviet bloc delegates to these technical talks apparently included no scientists but consisted entirely of foreign office and military personnel.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 470.
In Bechhoefer's words the Soviet proposals to the Surprise Attack Conference "again showed the Soviet concern lest Germany receive nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was willing to pay a price, though not a high one, in terms of penetration of the iron curtain for some assurance that Germany would not become a nuclear power."

The second event illustrating the probable objectives of the revised Rapacki Plan came on November 10, 1958 (the day the Surprise Attack Conference opened), when Khrushchev announced that an end must be made to the occupation of Germany and that West Berlin must be converted to a free city. The Soviet note of November 27 was then delivered, proposing that Berlin should be made a free demilitarized town with no armed forces in it. If the West did not agree to a German peace treaty Moscow would sign one with East Germany, and if there were an attack on East Germany, it would be viewed as an attack on the Soviet Union.

In this way, Soviet bloc diplomacy utilized disengagement proposals as part of an orchestrated campaign to persuade the West to accept the East European status quo, withdraw from Berlin, forgo the rearmament of West Germany, keep nuclear weapons off German territory, and withdraw NATO forces from German soil, obviously ranging along a spectrum from the barely possible to the utopian.

The reaction of the West to the Khrushchev stick and Rapacki carrot was negative; the Soviet response was to present still other proposals and to lift, temporarily at least, any semblance of an ultimatum. From December 1958 to September 1959, variations on the Rapacki and free city plans were put forward in talks by Khrushchev with Philip Noel-Baker, Carlo Schmid, Field Marshal Montgomery, and Hugh Gaitskell; in Mikoyan's press conferences in the United States; in addresses to the Twenty-First Party Congress; and finally in the Soviet GCD proposal at the United Nations in September 1959.

But even before the May 1960 summit, statements by Washington, Bonn, and Paris made clear that the West was not willing to negotiate a settlement of the German problem on terms even close to those advocated by Moscow. As a consequence, while Moscow, Warsaw, and other East European governments continued

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1 Ibid., p. 481.

2 Pravda, November 27, 1958.
to affirm their support of disengagement, these affirmations lost much of their plausibility after 1960. Their proposals came at moments when they could have some propaganda potential although their immediate negotiating value was questionable. Thus while Moscow was preparing to test a 50-megaton bomb in a show of strength over Berlin, it asked the General Assembly (on September 26, 1961) to consider a variety of collateral measures including nuclear-free zones initially in Central Europe, then in the Far East and Africa.

For the "people's democracies," advocacy of disengagement was still a way to obtain some diplomatic prominence. Poland introduced a slightly revised version of the 1958 Rapacki Plan into the ENDC Committee of the Whole in March 1962, but the proposal was not given formal consideration due to procedural wrangling. Nevertheless Rapacki himself published articles on his plan in Communist, Western, and neutralist country journals.

China had deferred comment on the original Rapacki Plan until December 19, 1957, when Peking announced its support of the Soviet Union's recent peace proposals including a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. In addition the Chinese welcomed the TASS proposal of January 21, 1958 that the Middle East be turned into an area free of nuclear and rocket bases. Throughout 1958 there were conflicting indicators regarding Peking's view toward a nuclear-free zone in Asia. The president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated that he would welcome a conference to (a) establish de-atomized zones; (b) stop flights with nuclear bomb loads; (c) stop nuclear testing; and (d) ban the manufacture, stockpiling, and use of such weapons. This fourth condition of course almost negated any semblance of Chinese desire to acquiesce in a de-nuclearized Far East. At other moments in 1958 China approved a nuclear-free zone for Asia and Africa but showed no anxiety over the nth-country problem; rather, there were hints that China planned to become a nuclear power.

Alice L. Hsieh speculated in 1961 that Moscow might have persuaded Peking in 1958 to accept a nonnuclear status, provided

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American strategic forces were removed from the Far East.\(^1\) The latter condition must have appeared rather hypothetical at the time. In any case we now have Chinese documents charging that Moscow first pledged to give Peking assistance to develop nuclear weapons in October 1957 and then broke this pledge in June 1959. But even from the way Peking downgraded the nuclear-free zone concept in 1958 and exploited it as propaganda Mrs. Hsieh rightly surmised that the Chinese government "very early discarded the notion in favor of another strategy."\(^2\)

A sign of the growing Soviet concern about relations with China may have come on January 27, 1959, when Khrushchev addressed the Twenty-First Congress. He gave only perfunctory approval to the Rapacki Plan but asserted emphatically that a "zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone, can and must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin area."\(^3\) From January to mid-April 1959 Chinese spokesmen either ignored, distorted, or gave qualified support to Soviet advocacy of a nuclear-free Far East. Even this qualified support may have been partially spurred by pressure from the Japanese and Korean Communist parties and by a common anxiety about increased deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Far East. The most restricted Chinese endorsement of the denuclearized zone concept came on April 18 when Chou En-lai advocated an area of peace and free of atomic weapons "throughout the whole of East Asia and the Pacific regions"--an implication that only part of China would be included,\(^4\) and hardly Sinkiang--where nuclear energy facilities are known to be located.

The timing and site of Soviet advocacy of a nuclear-free zone of peace in the Balkans may also have been related to the emerging Sino-Soviet rift.\(^5\) Khrushchev supported such a zone in a May 26,

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 103.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 109.
\(^3\)Pravda, January 28, 1959.
\(^4\)Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
\(^5\)Rumania had made a similar proposal in 1957.
1959 speech in Tirana--two days before Chinese Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai arrived there. Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union might establish missile bases in Albania if the West set up bases in Italy and Greece. Mrs. Hsieh speculated that this could have been a hint that Moscow would do no more for Peking than to establish Soviet bases to defend China in case U.S. rockets were emplaced, for example, in Japan. A speech by P'eng on May 31 approved Khrushchev's idea of a peace zone in the Balkans but suggested that a Western attack on Albania would provoke a world war.¹

To round out this picture we should note that in Riga on June 11, 1959 Khrushchev proposed a nuclear and missile-free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic area. Either as a result of or despite Khrushchev's suggestion the governments of Norway and Denmark opted against installing U.S. missile bases on their territories.

In the one contemporary example of formally agreed demilitarization of a significant territory the Soviet Union, United States, and ten other countries with interest in Antarctica on December 1, 1959 signed an agreement to use that territory "for peaceful purposes only." The parties obligated themselves not to build military bases there, carry out maneuvers, test weapons, or carry out nuclear explosions.² One might add finally that French testing in the Sahara in 1960 prompted additional Soviet proposals for an atom-free zone in Africa, to which some African statesmen responded positively.

b. Nuclear Test Ban. If disengagement may be characterized as an arms control problem that is predominantly political, the problem of halting nuclear testing is one that has been complicated by intricate technological factors. But its political ramifications were global in scope both because of their relation to the nth-country problem and because they reflected pressure from world public opinion.

¹Hsieh; op. cit., pp. 162-163. The U.S. State Department turned down the nuclear-free Balkans proposal on essentially the same grounds that it had repudiated the Rapacki Plan in 1958: "It is obvious that the range of weapons at the disposal of the USSR makes the concept of an atom-free Balkan zone meaningless as far as the security of the free nations in that area is concerned." Statement of July 11, 1959, in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1435.

²Ibid., pp. 1550-1556.
We shall seek in brief compass to review the main trends of the negotiations to determine the nature of the Soviet interest in a cessation or banning of nuclear testing.\(^1\) In the previous chapter we saw that Moscow was the first great power to propose a nuclear test ban "as one of the first measures" in a comprehensive disarmament program. This statement of May 10, 1955 was reaffirmed by Bulganin at the Summit in July.

Soviet proposals early in 1956 seemed to envision a ban on thermonuclear weapons tests but were silent on nuclear tests.\(^2\) A ban only on thermonuclear testing was proposed by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress on February 14 and by the Soviet Delegation to the DCSC on May 27, 1956. The ban on thermonuclear tests was one of three partial measures which Moscow told the DCSC should be agreed on independently of progress on other areas of disarmament. In contrast to the May 10, 1955 proposal, the ban on thermonuclear testing proposed by Moscow on March 27, 1956 was specified as a measure separable from other disarmament moves. Further, the March 1956 proposal continued the position which Moscow took late in 1955 that international controls were not needed to verify a test ban.

However, a test ban on both nuclear and thermonuclear tests was proposed to the DCSC on July 12, 1956 by Andrei Gromyko and on September 11, 1956 in a letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower. Both Soviet statements denied the need for inspection.

At the opening of the DCSC session on March 18, 1957 Soviet delegate Zorin proposed as a separable measure a ban on testing, reaffirming Moscow's refusal to accept international controls. By this time the potential importance of the distinction between nuclear and thermonuclear weapons testing seems to have become blurred. But the importance of inspection had not. Khrushchev announced in Helsinki in June 1957 that Moscow would agree to international inspection even though it was not scientifically necessary. Affirming this point at the DCSC on June 14, 1957, Zorin nonetheless insisted that the West first agree in principle

\(^1\) Much of the following analysis is based upon documentation in Ciro Elliot Zoppo, "The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotiation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1963.

\(^2\) However a joint Soviet-Indian statement of December 13, 1955 called for an unconditional prohibition on the manufacture and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
to a two- or three-year moratorium on atomic and hydrogen weapons testing; the details of an inspection system could then be worked out. From the beginning to the end of this session of the DCSC, however, the West insisted that progress on a test ban be linked with other measures, ranging from a nuclear production cutoff to a rather comprehensive package.

The next major Soviet move in the test ban negotiations came on March 31, 1958, when--soon after completion of a major Soviet test series--Moscow officially announced its decision to suspend nuclear tests unilaterally. The Soviet government "sincerely" hoped its initiative would be followed by other states, but if other states tested, the Soviet government would feel free to resume testing in the interests of its security. No inspection scheme was suggested in the March 31 announcement or in a follow-up letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower on April 4. However on May 5--a few days after the United States resumed testing in the Pacific--Moscow again endorsed its June 1957 willingness to establish international control. Agreement on the details of a controlled test ban could easily be reached at a summit conference, the Soviet statement declared, but only after the United States and the United Kingdom halted their tests.

Another significant Soviet move came on May 9, 1958, when the Soviet Union agreed to President Eisenhower's proposal for a conference of experts to examine the technical problems of controlling a nuclear test ban. The Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests met in Geneva from July 1 to August 22, 1958. The recommendations of this meeting were to facilitate the political decisions taken by a subsequent East-West forum--the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

The Conference of Experts reached agreement on the technical feasibility of monitoring an agreement for the suspension of nuclear

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1 Some Soviet tests took place between September 30 and November 3, 1958 but were apparently suspended until September 1, 1961.

2 For background, see Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 488 ff. For further discussion of technical aspects, see the many RAND Corporation studies on the subject and Walter C. Clemens, Jr. "Automated Inspection of Underground Nuclear Testing" (Santa Barbara, California: General Electric Defense Programs Operation, 1962).
weapons testing by means of a network of from 160 to 170 (manned) land-based posts and ten ship-based posts to monitor the ban, supplemented by regular flights of air-sampling aircraft and by special flights to investigate suspicious events. This system would probably detect and identify explosions down to a yield of about one kiloton taking place on the earth's surface, in the open ocean, and at altitudes up to ten kilometers. It would probably detect explosions of this yield at higher altitudes but would not always distinguish them from natural phenomena.

The major problem arose in connection with underground explosions. The suggested system would probably record seismic signals from subterranean blasts of a one-kiloton yield but might not identify whether the signals arose from explosions or earthquakes. Each year from 20 to 100 underground events of a five-kiloton yield could not be distinguished as to their origin—man-made or natural.1

The United States and the Soviet Union accepted the report of the experts and on August 22, 1958, the day after its submission, President Eisenhower suggested a meeting of the three nuclear powers to negotiate an agreement to suspend nuclear testing and to establish an international control system on the basis of the experts' report. At the same time the President expressed the willingness of the United States to suspend testing on the basis of reciprocity on a year-by-year basis, provided that: (a) the agreed inspection system were installed and working effectively, and (b) progress were being made on the arms control measures long sought by the United States.

The tripartite conference of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union commenced in Geneva on October 31, 1958, and on that date the first two announced their adherence to a moratorium on testing. Except for occasional recesses, the conference remained in session until January 1962, after which time its work was carried on in a subcommittee of the ENDC.

At the start procedural matters such as debate on the agenda obstructed progress of the test ban negotiations. But more formidable problems arose at the first meeting of the conference in January 1959 after its Christmas 1958 recess. Data from underground explosions carried out in Nevada in the fall of 1958 disclosed that the method of distinguishing earthquakes from underground explosions recommended in the experts' report was much less effective than had been estimated. The new "Hardtack II" data indicated "that seismic signals produced by explosions

are smaller than had been anticipated and that there are consequently about twice as many natural earthquakes equivalent to an underground explosion of a given yield as had been estimated by the Geneva Conference of Experts." For these reasons, either a greater number of on-site inspections or a greater number of inspection posts (or both) would be necessary for an effective inspection system.\(^1\) The U. S. government therefore called for more study of the technical problems of a test ban. It stated that American scientists were studying modifications of the system recommended at Geneva in order to restore its originally estimated capability of detecting underground experiments.\(^2\)

The U. S. Scientific Panel on Seismic Improvement reported on March 16, 1959, suggesting how the 180-station Geneva network could be strengthened. The Hardtack tests, the panel declared, demonstrated that the Geneva system would have about the same capability to identify seismic events above the equivalent of 20 kilotons as was originally estimated for seismic events above 5 kilotons. However, by improving the equipment (using 100 instead of 10 seismometers per station) and techniques (analysis of long-period surface waves) recommended at Geneva the network of 180 posts could have the capability to identify a disturbance of 10 kilotons that had been expected for events of 5 kilotons.

A still greater refinement of detection capacity was offered. The panel suggested that the Geneva network be augmented with an auxiliary system of unmanned seismic stations. If they were spaced at 170 kilometer intervals in and adjacent to the seismic areas of the world, about 98 per cent of the events as small as one kiloton equivalent located within the network would be identified.\(^3\) The panel spelled out its recommendations on March 31, 1959. It called for the development of "unattended telemetering seismic detectors"—an antecedent to the "black box" proposals of 1962—to use in a network of auxiliary stations around selected manned stations.\(^4\)

As might have been expected, the initial Soviet response to the Hardtack report was to question its motivation and to refuse

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\(^1\)Ibid., Document 337. See also, Bechhoefer, *op. cit.* , pp. 509 ff.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 1335.

\(^3\)Ibid., Document 347.

\(^4\)Ibid., Document 349.
renewed consideration of a problem already settled. In December 1959, however, Soviet experts finally agreed to analyze the Hardtack data and take part in a Technical Working Group established by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The Soviet experts' review of the Hardtack report led them to charge on December 18, 1959 that the Nevada tests were carried out unscientifically with instruments inferior to those assumed by the Geneva experts in 1958; that the U. S. scientists had apparently misrepresented their findings; that, rather than weakening the capacity of the Geneva network to identify low-yield seismic disturbances, the Hardtack tests demonstrated a greater capacity than had been expected.  

Table II.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED WORLD-WIDE CONTINENTAL EARTHQUAKES</th>
<th>5 Kilotons and Greater</th>
<th>10 Kilotons and Greater</th>
<th>20 Kilotons and Greater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Conference of Experts, August 1958</td>
<td>20-100</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva network and equipment on basis of Hardtack data of January 1959</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva network with improvements within the present state of technology on basis of &quot;Hardtack&quot; data, April 1959</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these differences, the Technical Working Group of Soviet, U. S., and British scientists agreed with a number of the basic recommendations of the U. S. Scientific Panel for Seismic Improvement regarding the instruments and techniques to be employed by the detection station network. However, nothing was said

1Ibid., Document 340.

2Ibid., Document 400, Annex II.
regarding many of the panel's specific proposals such as the development of unmanned seismic detectors.¹

Another step toward resolution of the technical problems of a test ban came when Moscow agreed to a Western proposal for another experts' meeting, this one to examine the problems of detecting nuclear tests in outer space. Scientists from the three powers reported on July 10, 1959 that three alternative systems of satellites could be used to police outer space against illegal nuclear explosions; whichever system was adopted could be incorporated into the network of 180 fixed ground control posts recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958. The recommendations of the 1959 experts' meeting were officially adopted by the Soviet Union on August 10, 1959.²

On September 30, 1958 the Soviet Union resumed testing, announcing that it was forced to do so because the United States had tested after the Soviet Union's unilateral suspension. One month later--on October 30--the Soviet government emphatically rejected the U. S.-U. K. proposal for a one-year suspension of tests, proposing instead a permanent test ban. Nevertheless, Moscow ended its test series on November 3, 1958, and Soviet leaders repeatedly stated that their government would not resume testing unless another power broke the moratorium. The Soviet Union was the first country to break the moratorium--on September 1, 1961.

The political conference on test suspension, which had been planned to follow the experts' meeting in Geneva, opened on October 31, 1958. Between 1958 and 1962 it adopted a number of articles for a proposed test ban treaty, the first of which, agreed to on December 6, 1958, committed the signatories to prohibit tests and not to give assistance to fourth countries.³ Previously the Soviets had favored an agreement limited to the three nuclear powers. Moscow on January 12, 1959 agreed to a provision that any country could accede to the treaty but insisted that the operation of the treaty with respect to the three original parties was not to be linked to the accession of other states.⁴ Even after this date, however, Moscow showed great reluctance to include provisions that might obligate any other power--except France.

¹Ibid., Document 400, Annex I.
²Zoppo, op. cit., p. 441.
⁴Ibid., January 12, 1959.
On January 19, 1959, shortly after presenting the Hardtack II findings, the two Western powers made a major concession by abandoning the demand that the duration of the proposed test ban treaty be linked to progress in other areas of arms control. Another conciliatory move by the West came on April 13, 1959 when the United States, supported by Britain, proposed a "phased" test ban. The proposal called for an internationally controlled ban on tests in the atmosphere and under water as a first stage; underground and high-altitude explosions would be included later. Meanwhile a joint research program would study the problem of detecting underground explosions. The notion of a "phased" test ban was rejected by Khrushchev on April 25, 1959, and he endorsed instead a suggestion by Harold Macmillan calling for a predetermined number of annual inspections. In presenting this proposal in Geneva on April 27 the Soviet delegate stated that his government would not insist on a veto if agreement were reached on limiting inspections to a predetermined number (which, however, he did not specify).

The United States announced on August 26, 1959 that it would continue the suspension of tests to the end of 1959. Two days later the Soviet Union said that it would refrain from nuclear testing so long as the West continued its test suspension. Moscow made this point again on December 30, one day after President Eisenhower announced that the United States reserved the right to resume nuclear weapons testing after December 31, 1959. There was no immediate indication, however, that Washington planned to resume tests in 1960.

Both East and West showed increased interest in some form of limited test ban in 1960. On February 11 the United States tabled at Geneva a proposal that would ban all tests above ground up to heights where both parties agreed that effective control could be established, all tests in the oceans, and all tests above the present "threshold of detection and identification"—a seismic magnitude reading of 4.75 or more. The Soviet counterproposal came on March 19: a ban on testing in the atmosphere, outer space, the oceans and on underground tests above the 4.75 threshold. On underground tests below that threshold there would be a 4- to 5-year moratorium. While this proposal did not correspond precisely with the U.S. position, it resembled the solution Britain had advocated as a way of bridging the differences of each side.¹ A less important Soviet concession on February 16 had been an agreement on a small number—as yet undetermined—of on-site inspections.

each year without, as previously insisted, seismic readings that would have excluded many suspicious earth tremors. ¹

Progress toward a limited treaty continued on March 29, 1960 when Eisenhower and Macmillan issued a joint statement accepting in principle a moratorium on nuclear tests below the 4.75 threshold. The statement called for acceleration of negotiations on the problems that remained to be resolved--control post staffing, composition of the control commission, number of on-site inspections allowed each year, and voting matters. But both Washington and London said that as soon as a test ban treaty had been signed and arrangements made for a coordinated research program for improving underground test detection, they "would be ready to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below that threshold . . . ." Moscow was invited to join at once in plans for this joint research.

On April 4 all the major Democratic candidates for President (Senators Symington, Johnson, Kennedy, and Humphrey) agreed that if elected they would continue any test moratorium President Eisenhower might undertake with Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union on May 3 accepted Western proposals for joint underground nuclear testing to improve methods for detecting such tests, Tsarapkin repeating Soviet demands for a four- to five-year moratorium on other nuclear tests while the research program was under way. However, Moscow objected to the Western position that joint research be done on a national basis with three-power observation. The Soviet position was that the test research should be done jointly by Soviet and Western scientists. (On several occasions later in 1960 the Soviet Union protested U.S. plans to explode nuclear devices as part of Project Vela to improve the capability to detect and identify nuclear explosions.)

Despite the political effects of the Paris summit debacle in May 1960, test ban negotiations in July and August saw increased East-West agreement. On July 5 Soviet delegate Tsarapkin accepted a British plan for East-West parity in the staffing of leading posts in the international control commission. U.S. delegate Wadsworth agreed to the same proposal the next day. The West reiterated on July 13 its acceptance (first stated on February 11, 1960) of the Soviet-sponsored principle of a fixed number of annual on-site inspections. ² Moscow responded on July 26 by specifying for the first time the actual number of such inspections--three. More than


² See ibid., p. 418.
that, Tsarapkin stated, would be unnecessary and would jeopardize Soviet security. He termed the quota proposed by the West—twenty—as "unrealistic" and unacceptable.¹

On July 27 the three powers agreed that all underground tests of greater intensity than 4.75 and all tests in the atmosphere, the oceans, and space should be banned by the draft treaty. On August 11 all three delegations agreed that the inspection and control system should be operational within six years of the signing of the projected draft treaty. The major differences that remained when the talks recessed late in August were: (a) the number of permitted on-site inspections—three or twenty; (b) the number and political composition of the international control commission; and (c) Moscow's insistence on the right to inspect any atomic devices used in U.S. seismic research.

When talks resumed on September 27, 1960, Washington proposed a 27-month moratorium on underground tests that was rejected by Moscow on October 5, the Soviet delegate continuing to insist on a moratorium of four to five years.

Beginning in August 1960 the United States began to warn that time was running out and that progress would have to be made if testing were not to be resumed. As France continued her test program begun in 1960, exploding four small-yield nuclear bombs by April 25, 1961, the Soviet Union registered perfunctory protests.

In April 1961 the United States and Britain introduced in Geneva a number of proposals that represented concessions to previous Soviet demands. These included provisions to (a) reduce the number of control posts on Soviet territory from 21 to 19; (b) extend from 27 months to 3 years the proposed moratorium on small underground tests; (c) institute a satellite system to detect all nuclear weapons tests in space; (d) ask Congress for legislative authority to permit Soviet internal inspection of the nuclear devices used in seismic research and peaceful engineering programs in the United States; (e) accept a veto over the total annual budget of the control commission; and (f) organize the policy-making control commission so as to give the Soviet Union and its allies parity with the Western powers.

The spring and summer of 1961 saw a general hardening of the Soviet position in the negotiations. Khrushchev's interview with Walter Lippmann was particularly ominous. He declared (April 17, 1961) that first, the Western powers were not ready to conclude a test ban agreement; second, the Soviet Union had never tested

¹Cited in Zoppo, op. cit., p. 453.
underground because if war came, she would use the biggest weapons; third, an agreement was unlikely because of French determination to continue testing; and, fourth, the Soviet Union would never agree to a single neutral administrator because "there are no neutral men." On March 21, 1961 Moscow withdrew its previous agreement to a single administrator to oversee the daily administrative tasks of the control organ and proposed instead a troika of three men, each with veto power.

At the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna on June 3 and 4, 1961 Khrushchev made it clear that a neutral administrator for the test ban control organization would be unacceptable and that enforcement measures had to be subject to Soviet veto power. More important, the Soviet government suggested that in the absence of general disarmament, international inspection of a test ban would constitute espionage. Therefore Moscow suggested that the two countries should "take up the main, cardinal question—the question of general and complete disarmament." Following this line the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks gave the West an ultimatum on June 12: either accept the Soviet terms for a test ban or merge the negotiations in broader talks on GCD.

On June 21 Khrushchev vowed to renew nuclear testing immediately if the West resumed such explosions. On July 7 Moscow charged that the United States was seeking to justify test resumption. And on August 30 TASS declared that the pressures created by imperialist countries had forced the Soviet Union to resume testing, which then commenced two days later. The United States resumed underground testing on September 15, but negotiations continued.

On September 3, 1961 the West proposed a treaty similar to that signed in August 1963. It would have banned atmospheric testing, relying only on national inspection systems. It was turned down by Moscow on September 9 because it permitted underground tests to continue.

Moscow's "breaking the moratorium," as it was interpreted in the West, produced an important change in Western policy: whereas before the United States and Britain had observed a voluntary moratorium of a specified duration on underground nuclear tests, they now refused to consider any such measure that Moscow could again break at will.

This position was a natural reaction on Washington's part, but it narrowed considerably the alternatives by which the interests of both sides might be met in a compromise agreement.
On November 28, 1961 Moscow proposed a three-environment ban with a moratorium on underground tests, pending broader agreement on an international control system over an envisioned program of GCD. A similar Soviet proposal was made on September 3 and 5, 1962 but without specifying any relations between the proposed ban and GCD. Both proposals ran counter to the new U.S. principle that rejected voluntary moratoriums that could be violated at will.

The alternatives open for a compromise were narrowed still more by the Soviet position from 1961 to late 1962, which withdrew Moscow's 1960 agreement to an annual quota of three on-site inspections.

Moscow paid lip service to a neutralist compromise proposal made at the ENDC in March 1962, placing responsibility for the policing of a comprehensive test ban in the hands of an international scientific body outside the countries to be inspected but with powers to carry out on-site inspection of suspected disturbances upon the invitation of the nation concerned. While Washington read the notion of invitational inspections broadly to mean virtually obligatory inspection, Moscow interpreted it narrowly, as virtually void of obligatory character.

After the Soviet Union failed to accept a U.S.-proposed comprehensive test ban with on-site inspection, the United States resumed atmospheric testing from April to November 4, 1962.

On August 1, 1962 President Kennedy announced that data from the Project Vela program would permit the West to reduce the number of on-site inspections needed to police a test ban. On August 9 the United States offered extensive concessions to the Soviet position: a reduction in the number of on-site inspections per year and in the number of control posts on Soviet territory (from 180 to 80) and staffing of the posts by nationals of the host country but with international supervision. The Soviet response, however, was negative because of continued U.S. insistence on on-site inspections.

On August 27, 1962 the United States and Britain offered the Soviet Union a choice of two treaties: a limited treaty like that of September 3, 1961 (and August 5, 1963) or a comprehensive treaty with international inspection. Both choices were rejected by Moscow. The first Soviet counterproposal, on August 29, 1962, called for an uninspected but "definitive" ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but with what amounted to a moratorium on underground testing "until it was replaced by a permanent solution," the basis of which could be the neutralist proposal of March 1962.1

This Soviet proposal for a three-environment ban linked with a moratorium of indefinite duration on underground testing was repeated on September 3 and 5, 1962. The extent to which this proposal marked a Soviet effort to break the deadlock over underground testing will be discussed at greater length in Chapter III. But, Chinese sources in August 1963 claimed that Moscow had informed Peking on August 25, 1962 of its readiness to sign a nonproliferation agreement with the United States, which, if true, corroborates the possible significance of the Soviet proposal of August 29-September 3.

To summarize the complicated story of the test ban negotiations, we can focus on the major alternatives assayed to deal with the U.S. interest in effective controls and the Soviet requirements for secrecy and military security: (1) a comprehensive test ban; (2) a partial ban with a moratorium on underground tests; (3) a partial ban with no restriction on underground tests. The progress and obstacles to each approach will now be summarized.

First, the Western version of a comprehensive treaty was unacceptable to Moscow because of the extensive control measures proposed. The Soviet version was turned down by the West because it offered too little control. Familiar behavior patterns intruded: The West wanted security before disarmament; it wanted scientific reliability while Moscow sought political and military effects. Its insistence on technical reliability was interpreted in Moscow as stalling or as a desire for espionage; in effect the West was proposing inspection over armaments instead of actual disarmament. Soviet resistance to intrusion raised fears in the West that Moscow might cheat.

The second hope for a compromise agreement seemed to lie in a limited test ban accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing, during which control systems were expected to be improved so that seismic disturbances could be detected and identified with minimal or no intrusion. A number of obstacles prevented such a compromise. Before listing them, however, we must reiterate that other problems remained to be solved even if East-West differences were reconciled on the moratorium. As Eisenhower and Macmillan made clear in March 29, 1960, their agreement to a moratorium was conditional on progress in the negotiations concerning the composition of the international control organ, its voting procedures, and so forth. With this caveat in mind we can enumerate the obstacles that frustrated agreement on the specific issue of a moratorium on underground testing. First, the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1957 treated a
test ban as a separable measure but the West did not. Therefore the West turned down the Soviet proposal of June 1957 for a two- or three-year moratorium on all nuclear testing with international control posts on U.S., U.K., and Soviet territory. Second, after the West accepted the idea of a separate test ban in 1958 and a phased (that is, limited) test ban in 1959, the West tended to advocate a much shorter moratorium than was acceptable to Moscow. The Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of March 1960 stated that the moratorium had to be of agreed duration. Moscow on May 3, 1960 proposed a limited ban with a four- or five-year moratorium, but the West on September 27, 1960 advocated a moratorium of 27 months and on March 21, 1960 a moratorium of three years. Third, after Moscow resumed nuclear testing in 1961, the West turned down the very concept of a moratorium not formalized by treaty. Therefore the Soviet proposals of November 28, 1961 and August 29-September 3, 1962 for a limited test ban with moratoriums of indefinite length were summarily rejected. Fourth, when some momentum toward East-West agreement existed in the spring and summer of 1960, it was interrupted by political and military developments extraneous to the negotiations. Fifth, measures that one side would have found acceptable at one moment were proposed prematurely or too late. Thus the two- or three-year moratorium proposed by Moscow in 1957 corresponded with a position acceptable to the West only in 1960 and early 1961. And the four- to five-year moratorium advocated by Moscow in late 1961 and 1962 was not much longer than the three-year measure proposed by the West prior to the resumption of Soviet testing in 1961.

The third alternative was a limited test ban without any limitation on underground testing. This was offered to Moscow on April 13, 1959, on February 17, 1960, on September 3, 1961, and on August 27, 1962, but it was not accepted until July 25, 1963.

B. Communications: The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament

Manifest Soviet arms control policy was part of a world-wide communications network designed to create a response favorable to Soviet objectives. For purposes of analysis we shall look first at the communications directed to the anti-Communist West and then at the messages aimed at those who opposed Western "capitalism" or "imperialism." The first audience consisted broadly not only of the "ruling circles" but also of the middle classes and even the working classes in the West, especially where, because of "embourgeoisement" or nationalism, the old appeal to class struggle had little meaning. The second audience consisted of Communist party members everywhere, "anti-imperialist" elites in the emerging nations, and perhaps the disgruntled "masses" still ripe for
agitation in some Western countries.

The purposes of these communications will not be discussed here in detail, but their content and style immediately imply much about Moscow's objectives without considerable reading between the lines or familiarity with other data. Generally speaking we can state that the communications to the West aimed at winning support for policies of accommodation with the Soviet Union, while the propaganda to the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist elements aimed at rationalizing Moscow's steps toward accommodation with the West. Needless to say, this accommodation had to be on terms acceptable to the Soviet Union and might be achieved by threat of coercion as well as by persuasion.

1. The Appeal to the West. We shall distinguish broadly two kinds of communication connected with Soviet disarmament policy: first, the statements of Soviet diplomats and statesmen, whether in the negotiating forum or in more public arenas, which we shall call "disarmament diplomacy;" second, the communications transmitted by the mass media—especially the radio and the press. In some cases, however, we shall join observations on these two levels of communication and consider the reinforcement of one by the other.

On the whole, as we shall see, there was continuity of patterns that emerged in 1955—"reasonableness" in proposals and "restraint" in criticism. But by contrast with this restraint a new element was also introduced in 1959: an attempt literally to "sell" disarmament by appeal to the profit motive.

a. Disarmament Diplomacy. Soviet disarmament diplomacy generally continued the appearance of realism and conciliation that it began to acquire in 1954-1956. This appearance would be essential not only to East-West arms control agreements but also to the relaxation of East-West tensions.

The proposals most likely to strike the West as reasonable and negotiable were partial measures on matters of joint East-West concern: surprise attack, nuclear testing, tensions and armaments in Central Europe (of special concern in London and Paris if not in Washington). Precisely because these matters affected Soviet security, it was in Moscow's interest to pose as a supporter of a reasonable compromise to deal with these common dangers. While Soviet proposals for GCD did not appear particularly feasible to Western elites, they conditioned the political climate so that partial measures seemed less improbable and probably served to strengthen the propaganda image of the Soviet Union.
Soviet diplomacy sought maximum publicity for its proposals. The propaganda importance Moscow attached to its disarmament campaign is seen from the large number of changes in the Soviet line that were announced not in the negotiating chamber but in more public arenas. Some examples may illustrate the point. Thus Moscow's qualified acceptance of the "Open Skies" plan came in a Bulganin letter to President Eisenhower in 1956. Soviet acceptance in 1957 of the principle of inspection over a nuclear test ban was first stated by Khrushchev in Finland before Zorin could reverse the Soviet stand in the SC. The Rapacki Plan was announced in the General Assembly in 1957 and modified in a press conference in 1958. Also in 1958 Moscow's proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing and agreement to technical talks on the test ban took place in correspondence between the Kremlin and the White House. Moscow's proposals for nuclear-free zones in 1959 were generally expounded far from any negotiating chamber. Khrushchev's GCD proposal was made to the General Assembly in 1959. The Supreme Soviet announcement in 1960 of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces was communicated to all the parliaments of the world and to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ostensibly to obtain reciprocal action in other states. The General Assembly was the forum for Gromyko's announcement in 1962 and 1963 that Moscow then endorsed a "nuclear umbrella" principle. Other such instances could be cited, the most salient however coming in 1963.

The conciliatory style of Soviet diplomacy in 1955 kept up through much of the 1956-1962 period but with some sharp deviations. The 1957 negotiations in the DCSC were noteworthy for the unprecedented social mixing and informal discussions that took place between Soviet and Western delegates. The Soviet agreement in 1958 to the principle of technical talks (on the test ban and surprise attack) was also without precedent, although the Soviet scientists turned out to be much more politically active than their Western counterparts. Bilateral negotiations in private produced the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the principles of a disarmament treaty in 1961.

However in 1956-1962, as in 1955, Soviet diplomats showed less restraint than the Soviet mass media, especially those directed to Western readers. In August 1957, as noted before, Zorin signaled the imminent end of Soviet participation in the DCSC by making a

1For a dour picture of "Eastern" diplomacy, see Nathan Leites, Styles in Negotiation: East and West on Arms Control, 1958-1961, RAND Memorandum, RM-2838-ARPA (Santa Monica, California: November 1961).
bitter denunciation of the West. Moscow refused in September to resume negotiations in that forum. Western motives were impugned by Moscow in 1959 when U.S. scientists presented the "Hardtack" data to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The crudest Soviet diplomacy in the 1956-1962 period took place in 1960 in connection with the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee. The Communist bloc delegations took a belligerent stand throughout the Ten Nation talks, even before the Paris Summit Conference, and finally walked out of the conference never to return. Khrushchev himself on several occasions in 1961--at the Paris summit and later at the General Assembly--exceeded somewhat the customary diplomatic norms.  

Again in 1961, as Moscow seemed to move toward resumption of nuclear testing, Soviet disarmament diplomacy, like Soviet foreign policy generally, took on a stern demeanor, a possible exception being the McCloy-Zorin private negotiations. Soviet behavior in 1962 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was fairly restrained--by the presence of neutrals if for no other reason--except for Zorin's vitriolic rejection of a Soviet-sponsored ban on war propaganda, after Moscow overruled him on the terms of a compromise declaration he had accepted.

b. The Printed Word. Soviet diplomacy was explained for audiences around the world in radio broadcasts and periodical publications of many kinds and in many languages. Our analysis will focus mainly on the line argued in two journals that more than any other media, purport to explain Soviet foreign policy to the non-Communist reader in the West--International Affairs and New Times. The former is published monthly and contains slightly more sophisticated and longer articles than the latter, which is a weekly. Both are available in Russian for Soviet audiences as well as in many foreign languages.

As with foreign radio broadcasts to the West, especially to the United States, one may wonder what kind of audience is actually reached by International Affairs and New Times, and what the Soviet government believes their impact can be and on whom. In any event, these two journals provide an indication of the major themes and trends in Soviet propaganda to the West.

1 His behavior at the Bucharest Party Congress in June 1960 also was quite boisterous.
Both journals seem generally to have continued the propaganda emphases inaugurated in 1955. From 1956 to 1962 the tendency was to play up the possibility and desirability of disarmament and East-West détente, the need for reasonable compromise on East-West differences, and the benefits to all interests from a reduction of international tension and military expenditure.

"RestRAINT" rather than "exposure" was the usual way of dealing with Western disarmament positions. Moscow often claimed that Western intransigence was the main reason why disarmament negotiations had failed. But when compared with Soviet propaganda of the Stalin period or even with the treatment of other themes during the 1956-1962 period (such as Western policy toward the underdeveloped nations or Western military strategy), International Affairs' criticism of Western arms control policy was relatively restrained and mild. The main purpose of these Soviet discussions of disarmament evidently was not primarily to attack the West but to project to Western and third-world public opinion the image of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving country with which productive negotiations could be conducted.

This general picture must be modified, however, to take account of a certain hardening in Soviet disarmament propaganda at many moments from 1956 to 1962—usually in connection with some new manifestation of East-West tension. Such was the case in late 1956 and early 1957 (Hungary and Suez); in mid-1958 (Lebanon and Quemoy); mid-1960 (the U-2 and the Paris summit); and 1961 (Berlin and related events). At these moments even International Affairs, not to speak of the World Marxist Review and the internal Soviet press took on a much tougher line toward the West. This harsher tone in a journal like International Affairs, it may be assumed, was meant less to rally the "masses" against "capitalist" governments than to "sober" the middle classes.

Further, while Soviet propaganda generally manifested considerable restraint in dealing with Western policies, it also registered its concept of the "good" by reference to "evil." Thus, depending on the exigencies of time and place, certain Western leaders were singled out for personal attack, for example, John Foster Dulles, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle; along with strategists such as Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, and Maxwell Taylor were
severely criticized.

With this broad-brush treatment in mind, we shall now trace briefly the manner in which Soviet media presented the disarmament issue to the West. By 1959 some radically new elements had entered the Kremlin's "soft-sell" approach.

In early 1956 International Affairs painted disarmament in optimistic tones but stated that Moscow had done its part; progress now depended on the West. Agreement on disarmament would end the arms race and facilitate the settlement of other problems. It would allow a transfer of funds to the developing countries. Steps already taken by the Soviet Union were "practical proof" of its striving for disarmament. Only the future would "show whether the Western powers will switch from talking about disarmament to real cooperation in solving this problem, the most urgent and vital of our time."4

Following the Hungarian and Suez crises late in 1956, the tone of Soviet pronouncements changed significantly. In keeping with the new belligerent "anti-imperialist" tone of all Soviet

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propaganda, statements on disarmament also became harsher. Whereas in 1956 the West was occasionally criticized for using disarmament talks as a screen to hide a continuing arms race, in 1957 the preparation of nuclear war was said to be the West's aim: "Is it not evident that the U.S. rulers are forcing the world to the brink of an atom war?" 1 "Preparations for an atomic war are continuing at a mounting pace." 2

In keeping with this belligerent tone the Western powers, and especially the United States, were explicitly warned of the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons: "The aggressor will not be able to find refuge anywhere, neither on the banks of the Hudson or the Potomac. And the more adventuristic minds across the Atlantic might do well to assimilate this ruthless truth." 3

But even while the West was accused early in 1957 of preparing atomic aggression, New Times and International Affairs stressed the possibilities for East-West agreement. 4 New Times, for example, in an article on the DCSC quoted James Reston to the effect that there is now "a serious basis for limited agreement with the Kremlin in the disarmament field." 5 The article then went on to say: "None would deny that talks on this subject are

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beset with not a few difficulties, but, given good will and the readiness to work for mutually acceptable decisions, they can be overcome.\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{International Affairs} echoed the same thought: "To be sure, there are still many outstanding issues in international relations. But they can be settled if the countries concerned show readiness to settle them and make extensive use of the tried and tested method of negotiation."\textsuperscript{2} An article in the February 1957 issue commended a U. N. resolution on disarmament as a "positive step" offering further evidence of the value of negotiations as the only way to reach agreements that are in the interests of all countries concerned. The following month an editorial reiterated that "the Soviet Union takes into account the stand of the Western powers on disarmament and other questions and has expressed readiness to examine any proposals likely to promote confidence between states and bring about a détente."\textsuperscript{3}

It is not quite clear why the Soviet leadership chose to emphasize the theme of Western war preparations in early 1957. Perhaps this was done to facilitate the unification of the Soviet Union's shaky East European empire; perhaps the Soviet Union hoped to draw the attention of world public opinion away from its actions in Hungary. It is even possible that this new line was a product of the temporary weakening of Khrushchev's power position that evidently took place during this period.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{2}M. Marinin, "Some Conclusions," \textit{International Affairs}, No. 1, 1957, p. 118.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Editorial, "The Bedrock of Soviet Foreign Policy," \textit{ibid.}, No. 3, 1957, p. 9.
\end{itemize}
In any case, impending events soon brought this phase to a close.

Following Khrushchev's triumph over the "antiparty group" in June 1957, Soviet propaganda immediately took on a more mellow tone and the theme of war preparations was muted. This occurred not because foreign policy was necessarily a major issue between Khrushchev and his opponents but because once Khrushchev emerged victorious, he chose to identify himself with the peace aspirations of the Soviet people by portraying the "antiparty group" as opponents of peaceful coexistence. Although there were certainly foreign policy differences between Khrushchev and the defeated opposition (especially between Khrushchev and Molotov), foreign policy had been only one element in the complex struggle for power. Once Khrushchev's former colleagues had been defeated (and were thus unable to reply to his charges) he attempted to discredit them as enemies of serious negotiation and reasonable compromise.\(^1\)

The July 1957 issue of *International Affairs* began with a strong editorial endorsing peaceful coexistence and proclaiming the necessity of personal contacts between statesmen of the socialist and capitalist camps.\(^2\) The editorial called for "negotiation on the basis of mutual advantage taking into consideration the interests of both parties." The August issue condemned the "antiparty group" for opposing efforts to lessen tension and for advocating a policy of "tightening all screws" and called for

\(^1\)"This group attempted, in effect, to oppose the Leninist course toward peaceful coexistence among states with differing social systems, to oppose the relaxation of international tension and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and all the peoples of the world... [Molotov] denied the advisability of establishing personal contacts between leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the statesmen of other countries, which is essential in the interests of achieving mutual understanding and improving international relations." "Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee--On the Anti-Party Group of G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich and V. M. Molotov," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1957, No. 23, p. 6. This publication will be referred to hereafter as CDSP.

"patient negotiations, regard for the interests of the countries concerned, [and] the desire to find a business-like solution to controversial questions."\(^1\)

Following the ouster of the "antiparty group," Soviet propaganda again turned to the theme it had emphasized earlier in the year and that Moscow had championed at the DCSC--the issue of a nuclear test ban. Here was an issue suitable for agitation of the "masses" as well as for manipulation of middle-class sentiments. *New Times* cited scientists from the Soviet Union and abroad on the hazards of radioactive fallout.\(^2\) In April 1957 *International Affairs* reprinted an article from *Look* by Adlai Stevenson urging a ban on hydrogen bomb tests.\(^3\) The World Peace Council came out against nuclear tests in May, and in August the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs meeting in Tokyo followed suit.\(^4\) An editorial in *New Times* on August 22, 1957 remarked: "There can be no doubt that the Tokyo appeal for public mobilization will fall on receptive soil."\(^5\)

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\(^1\)"Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--general'naia liniia vneshnei politika Sovetskogo Soiuza" [The Leninist Course of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union], *Kommunist*, No. 11, August 1957, pp. 3-11. Quotation from p. 8.


By the beginning of 1958, Soviet treatment of disarmament gave the impression of being considerably milder than it had been during much of the previous year.\textsuperscript{1} There was a temporary recurrence of charges of Western war preparations in mid-1958 in connection with the Middle Eastern and Offshore Islands crises,\textsuperscript{2} but the rest of the 1958 Soviet discussions of disarmament were marked by more restrained criticism of the West.\textsuperscript{3} Approximately twice as many articles on disarmament appeared in International Affairs in 1958 and 1959 as in the 1956-1957 period, a suggestion at least of greater propaganda interest. The quality of these articles indicated an increasing familiarity with Western writing on arms control, although Soviet writers usually distorted Western views. A trend toward more detailed exposition of Soviet proposals, for example, on nuclear-free zones, could also be noted.

An illuminating case study of the way Soviet propaganda dealt with a Western concession took place in 1958. When Moscow announced its unilateral test suspension in March, Soviet media gave this great prominence.\textsuperscript{4} Western recalcitrance was then cited as the reason for failure to agree on a test ban.\textsuperscript{5} But when the


\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.
West agreed in October 1958 to a year-by-year moratorium on testing, Soviet media gave this move little attention. The official Soviet position was that a year-by-year suspension was inadequate, but, had Moscow's commitment been firmer to strengthen moderate elements in the West, this narrowing of the gap might have been stressed.

In early 1959 the Soviet Union continued to accuse the West of obstructing agreement. Moscow's propaganda organs and Soviet diplomats attacked the U. S. "Hardtack" data that had been submitted in January, 1959 to qualify Washington's position on underground test controls. Despite this complication, Soviet disarmament propaganda in the first half of 1959 generally maintained the tone of restrained criticism that characterized 1958.

The Soviet push toward a summit meeting, which began in the summer of 1959, brought a warmer tone to International Affairs in August and September. Editorials proclaimed: "No one has anything to lose from the ending of the cold war and the achievement of agreements designed to secure peace: all countries can but gain from it." Further: "There is every requisite now for a sharp turn for the better in international relations, for the complete elimination of the cold war in the interests of all mankind." International Affairs asserted: "It may be confidently

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1 In the following articles, although the subject of nuclear testing is discussed, the one-year moratorium is not even mentioned: A. Lebedinsky, "New Facts on Radiation Hazards," International Affairs, No. 7, 1959, pp. 25-27; K. Semyonov, "Obstruction Tactics Continue," ibid., No. 8, 1959, pp. 9-13; V. Kirillov, "The Post War Disarmament Problem," ibid., No. 9, 1959, pp. 13-17.


3 Editorial, "The Soviet Union, the United States and the Fate of Peace," International Affairs, No. 9, 1959, pp. 4-5.
said that all the objective conditions for the advent of such an era have been created."¹

The Soviet GCD proposal of September 1959, as Khrushchev told the General Assembly, did not imply that Moscow was not desirous of negotiating on partial disarmament measures. This argument was reiterated in both International Affairs and World Marxist Review.² The first article on GCD to appear in International Affairs asserted:

If the Western Powers for one reason or another are not prepared to agree to universal and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union, as before, will bend its efforts towards reaching understanding with other states on the relevant partial steps and the strengthening of security.³

Similarly, in his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev repeated: "Our proposals state in writing, in black and white, that if the Western powers are not prepared to accept GCD, we feel it possible and necessary to reach an understanding at least on partial measures in the sphere of disarmament."⁴

The propaganda line of the World Marxist Review at this time emphasized "struggle" rather than "negotiations" for peace. It could be that Khrushchev's presentation at the General Assembly was meant as grist both for mass propaganda and for


appeals to the moderates. His plea for GCD would serve the first purpose; his alternative partial disarmament measures the second. Advocacy of GCD of course might appeal to certain moderate groups as well as to various radical elements.

The most drastic innovation in Soviet propaganda to the West from 1956 to 1962 was a reversal of the traditional position on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist society. Beginning in 1959 the arms race was no longer depicted as a necessary crutch for a degenerate capitalism. It was portrayed as an obstacle to the kind of growth that Japan and Germany, relatively unburdened by defense expenditures, enjoyed. This argument was adumbrated in a colloquium published in May 1958 by International Affairs, reinforcing the suspicion that this modification of Communist economics was for foreign audiences. But a Hungarian economist wrote in the same vein in an Hungarian journal early in 1959. And the Soviet party magazine Kommunist presented a limited revision of the old "crisis" theory in August 1959, suggesting a wish to convince Communists as well as Westerners that disarmament was possible. The stage was set for Khrushchev to reassure American businessmen in his September 1959 trip to the United States that they stood to gain from a redirection from war to civilian industry. Some Western

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1 One of the first U.S. studies of this change in Soviet writing was by Herbert Ritvo, "Internal Divisions on Disarmament in the USSR," in Seymour Melman, ed., Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962), pp. 222-223. An unpublished manuscript by Michael J. Lavelle, S.J., "The Economics of American Disarmament: A Soviet View" (1963) explores the problem at greater length. The major Soviet work has been I. Glagolev, ed., Ekonomicheskie Problemy Razoruzheniia (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1961). As Ritvo noted in his article, however, Glagolev, a short time before this book, had written a treatise in which he stressed the vested interests that monopoly capitalists have in the arms industry.
Some people in the West assert that disarmament threatens grave consequences for the economy of the capitalist countries. . . . The least that can be said about such assertions is that they are completely unsubstantiated. I have had occasion to talk with representatives of American business circles, and the most reasonable of them have nowhere so gloomy a viewpoint and are confident that U.S. industry is fully able to cope with the tasks of shifting the entire economy to production of goods for peaceful uses.

He then went on to say that disarmament would benefit Western economies by allowing a reduction of taxes, increased expenditures for public welfare, an expansion of the domestic market, and greater international trade. An editorial in the February 1960 issue of International Affairs quoted a statement of the National Planning Association of the United States in support of this view, and subsequent issues of International Affairs also discussed this theme.

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2 "Thus, we have a situation when a certain section of the U.S. ruling class is beginning to lose economic incentives in the arms drive. . . . The basic trend and character of the arms drive now conducted by the aggressive circles of the imperialist states inevitably reduces the economic incentive in war preparations for larger sections of businessmen in most of the capitalist countries."
From mid-1961 until late 1962, however, *International Affairs* seems to have stressed the benefits that workers might enjoy if the arms burden were lifted. After the Cuban missile crisis the advantages of disarmament for businessmen were emphasized once more.

When the Paris Summit Conference collapsed in May 1960, Soviet disarmament propaganda hardened. Although statements during the next few months were not nearly so conciliatory as those in late 1959 and early 1960, neither did they appear so harsh as the pronouncements of early 1957. In breaking up the conference, Khrushchev was very careful to state that the Soviet Union was not rejecting all negotiations, and he added that it would be desirable to hold negotiations in six or eight months when the international atmosphere had cleared and the

1 L. Gromov, "Our Idea of a World Without Arms" (*International Affairs*, No. 7, 1963, pp. 54-55) is aimed solely at Western workers; R. Yevzerov ("Militarism and the Uneven Development of Capitalism," *ibid.*, No. 7, 1962, pp. 11-18) discusses the economic consequences of disarmament but makes no attempt to reassure Western businessmen as was done during 1960; L. Gromov and V. Strigachev ("Invalid Economic 'Arguments' about Disarmament," *ibid.*, No. 9, 1962, pp. 32-39) make some remarks aimed at allaying the fears of Western businessmen, but the article seems to be directed mainly at Western workers.

2 K. Ivanov, M. Kalugin, B. Batsanov, "Economic Programme for Disarmament," *ibid.*, No. 12, 1962, pp. 8-16. In this article it is not only said that Western businessmen will not be hurt by disarmament; even the arms manufacturers are reassured: "The only losers would be a small handful of arms manufacturers. . . . But even the arms manufacturers . . . could convert their plants to produce consumer goods instead of weapons for the destruction of people."

United States had elected a new president. In his speech in East Berlin after leaving Paris Khrushchev said: "If we can't get a working agreement on the settlement of disputed international issues with the present leaders of the U. S. A. or with the president who takes over from Eisenhower, we'll wait until the president after that." The World Marxist Review and International Affairs echoed this line.

Soviet discussions of disarmament in the latter part of 1960 and the first half of 1961 suggest an impression of drift and uncertainty. This uncertainty changed to intransigence in June 1961, when Moscow announced that further test ban talks should take place in the context of GCD negotiations. International Affairs explained:

Taking into account the situation that has arisen at the Geneva talks on ending nuclear tests, the Soviet Government has arrived at the conclusion that it is evidently hard to reach agreement now on this question (control) and that perhaps it would be better for our countries to begin with the cardinal question—general and complete disarmament.

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1 N. S. Khrushchev, statement, in CDSP, No. 20, 1960, p. 5.
2 N. S. Khrushchev, speech, in ibid., No. 21, 1960, p. 4.
5 Editorial, "The Principal Problems of the Time," ibid., No. 7, 1961, p. 8; V. Khvostov (in "The Prospects of Disarmament," ibid., No. 11, 1962, p. 49) later observed: "I will not conceal the fact that after the U-2 spy flight and especially after the threats of atomic war addressed to us last year over the West Berlin issue, we, Soviet people, have decided to be even more circumspect about our country's defences. This is apropos of inspection."
From mid-1961 up through the Cuban crisis late in 1962, Soviet disarmament propaganda became less reasonable in appearance, and the number of articles on disarmament in International Affairs declined somewhat relative to the 1958-1960 period. Attention shifted from partial measures to GCD and the West's opposition to the latter. The First World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace convened in the Kremlin in July 1962 and was addressed by Chairman Khrushchev. It was also addressed by several Americans such as Dr. Homer Jack, who managed to push through a minority resolution protesting nuclear testings by Moscow as well as the West. Finally, as noted above, there were signs that Moscow had slackened its appeal to Western business interests regarding the economic benefits of disarmament and was now addressing itself more to the "workers," a trend that seems to have been reversed following the Cuban encounter.

2. The Appeal to Anti-Capitalism and Anti-Imperialism. There was another side to the coin presented to the West. For if Soviet security interests had to be promoted with the capitalist foe, Moscow's leading position also had to be preserved and promoted among the Communist and other revolutionary forces opposing the West. Soviet policy regarding East-West détente and disarmament had to be rationalized for the benefit of party workers in the Soviet Union, Communists abroad (especially in China), and the non-Communist revolutionaries of the emerging nations.

a. The Existence of "Sober" Forces. The rationale for Khrushchev's policies toward the West emerged in stages, partly as a result of prodding from Peking and other strongholds of orthodoxy. In 1956 Khrushchev denied the fatal inevitability of war and proclaimed the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. In 1957 it was announced that the opponents of peaceful coexistence

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2See Dr. Jack's reports published by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy; for the Khrushchev speech, see Vseobshchee i polnoe razoruzhenie--garantia mira i bezopasnosti vsekh narodov (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962).
were "antiparty." Later in 1957 it was argued that Sputnik showed the balance of forces was swinging in favor of the socialist camp. All the while the economic benefits of disarmament for the developing countries and for the socialist economies were also reiterated.

As the pressure from the "dogmatists" increased, however, more elaborate justifications for a revisionist Soviet foreign policy were worked out. The argument that disarmament was economically feasible for capitalism was also addressed to the readers of Kommunist and to the Supreme Soviet, in case some of this audience doubted the feasibility of disarmament. As in 1954-1956, the Kremlin posted the existence of "sober forces" in the West, even when these forces seemed at times to sink below the Kremlin's official horizon. As before, the sober forces were said to know that peace was necessary; now it was added that some of them recognized that it could also be profitable.

The years 1959-1960 saw the Kremlin go to still greater lengths to justify both its image of a heterogeneous adversary and the utility of collaborating with certain elements in the Western "ruling circles." First, Moscow unveiled certain party archives to provide scriptural revelation in support of its position. Second, Soviet ideologists gave new content to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence to make it an instrument of revolution as well as a safeguard of peace.

b. The Sanction of Scripture. Beginning in 1959--the same year the line changed on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalism--the Kremlin commenced publication of Lenin's advice to the Soviet delegation to the Genoa economic conference in 1922. Harsh words reaffirming Communist doctrine about the inevitability of war and class struggle, Lenin warned, were superfluous and should be avoided. Soviet negotiating behavior, including propagation of a "broad pacifist program" by Moscow, should be "biting" but "nice." By such tactics, said Lenin, "we will win even if Genoa fails."

Lenin's instructions were not all published at once. But the first and most revealing set of these materials--a letter exchange between Chicherin and Lenin in 1922--was passed to the press on July 27, 1959 and appeared later that year in the obscure Lenin Miscellany, Volume XXXVI, available only in Russian. Other
materials appeared at intervals (but none from mid-1960 until early 1961), culminating in two documents printed in Pravda in 1964. In 1960 and 1962 some of the materials were available for non-Russian readers of New Times.

With the publication of the first group of Genoa materials in 1959 a statement by Lenin published long before assumed new meaning. Speaking soon before the Genoa conference was to take place, Lenin noted, in words that since 1959 have been paraphrased time and again by Soviet spokesmen in the international Communist debate:

Of course when we go to Genoa as merchants, it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we deal with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are pressing for a military solution to the problem, or with those representative of the bourgeois camp who are attracted to pacifism, be it of the palest hue and one that from the Communist point of view will not stand up to the slightest criticism. It would certainly be a poor merchant who could not master this difference, and, adapting his tactics to this end, achieve his practical objectives.1

Whenever the phrase "It is not a matter of indifference to us. . . ." occurs in current Soviet and international Communist statements, it may be assumed that a case is being made for collaboration--informally by means of detente or formally by means of entente or agreements--with heterogeneous Western elites.

As will be seen, the "It is not a matter of indifference to us" line was first advanced publicly at high level by Otto Kuusinen in his notable Lenin anniversary speech of April 1960,2


at a moment when the Chinese ideological onslaught intensified. Presumably the new Lenin documents were cited and explained orally at party meetings for those who did not read Lenin Miscellany or even Pravda.

c. The Enrichment of Doctrine. The second way the Kremlin sought to rationalize its policies was to add new content to its peaceful coexistence doctrine. Moscow was now heavily engaged in a two-front struggle that seemed to require contradictory strategies. If Moscow sought to placate the Chinese, a more aggressive foreign policy was called for; if the Kremlin wanted better relations with the West, a less aggressive policy was needed. A "unity of opposites," to use Marxist terminology, was assayed. The new line on peaceful coexistence called for both struggle and collaboration (i bor'ba i sotrudnichestvo) in dealing with the West. 1 Again the turning point was in 1959.

A brief review of the evolution of the peaceful coexistence doctrine is required to appreciate its development in 1959-1960. 2

In the period from 1953 through 1958 the discussions of relations with the West went through two phases. In the first years after Stalin's death the term peaceful coexistence was little used; and main emphasis was on such phrases as "the relaxation of international tension" and the "settlement of disputes by peaceful means." 2 After the Twentieth Party Congress a second phase began, and the term peaceful coexistence was used more widely.

Khrushchev's ideological revisions at the Twentieth Party


2 See A. Leont'ev, "O mirnom sosushchestvovanii dvukh sistem" [On Peaceful Coexistence of the Two Systems], Kommunist, No. 13, 1954, pp. 43-58. The article emphatically rejected the notion of the export of revolution and said that it was necessary to expand mutually profitable economic and cultural exchanges.
Congress imparted a new significance to "peaceful coexistence." It had always been the "Leninist policy," the First Secretary averred. Its aim, however, was portrayed in relatively passive terms: to ensure peace and prevent war. In this vein Khrushchev cited approvingly the five principles of peaceful coexistence that had been endorsed at Bandung in 1955 and by China and India in 1954.

From 1956 until early 1959, Soviet spokesmen and publicists often spoke of peaceful coexistence—calling it the "Leninist policy"—but endorsed it mainly as a way of promoting peace, non-intervention, and equal respect for the sovereign rights of all states. In this fashion it was even hailed as the basis for relations between the member states of the socialist camp.

Even prior to the Twenty-First Party Congress in January 1959, an important change occurred, and the emphasis shifted from peaceful coexistence to competitive coexistence. The nature of the changes inaugurated at the Twenty-First Party Congress is clear if we compare the structure of the arguments used before and after January 1959.

In the period 1953-1958 the argument was addressed mainly to the West. It was said: At the present time there are only two possibilities, either war or peaceful coexistence. In order to avoid war, there is no choice but to live and cooperate together. Peaceful coexistence is a necessity. At the Twenty-First Congress this was all changed. It was then declared that a long period of peaceful coexistence was not just a necessity, it was also a great opportunity. The period of peaceful coexistence would enable the

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socialist system to overtake and surpass the capitalist system and thus pave the way for the world-wide victory of socialism.

Prior to the Twenty-First Congress there had been some mention of economic competition, but this element played a very minor role in the discussion. The argument was cast in the form: Of course there are differences between capitalism and socialism, but there is no need for these to lead to war. Let us compete peacefully instead. Once again the argument still centered on the problem of avoiding war. In 1959 the emphasis shifted; it was proclaimed that economic competition provided the key to the world-wide victory of socialism. In the 1953-1958 period it was said that socialism would eventually triumph because it was a superior system to capitalism, but it was not said how this victory would take place.

Beginning at the Twenty-First Congress, the nature of the competition was more clearly spelled out. Whereas competition previously had usually been discussed in vague terms as a contest between two social systems and two different sets of ideals, now it was viewed almost entirely as a production race between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. But the Soviet doctrine went even further. It not only specified the form of the competition but also offered a timetable to indicate how it would proceed. The year 1965 was to mark a turning point in world history. By 1965 the socialist camp was to produce more than 50 per cent of the world's industrial output. As a result, according to a typical article: "By 1965, a relatively brief period, the socialist camp will have become stronger than the

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1 This approach is exemplified in L. Leont'ev, "Sotsializm v ekonomicheskom sovremnennii s kapitalizmom," [Socialism in the Economic Competition with Capitalism], Kommunist, No. 15, 1957, pp. 107-121; "Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie-generalnaja linija vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The Leninist Course of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union], ibid., No. 11, 1957, p. 3; M. Baturin, "Peace and the Status Quo," International Affairs, No. 1, 1958, p. 76.

imperialist camp not only in some but in all respects. This will be such a turning point in history that its consequences cannot be foreseen today."¹ Even more important, by approximately 1970 the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in per capita production, and this would be "a universal-historical victory of socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism."²

Not only would economic competition lead to the economic victory of the socialist bloc; it would also provide the key to ensuring peace. At the Twentieth Party Congress it was merely said that as a result of the appearance of new forces in the world, one of which was the socialist camp, war was no longer a fatalistic inevitability. Now it was explicitly stated that the growing strength of the socialist camp was the main force preventing war:

> The real possibility of eliminating war from the life of society develops in proportion to the growth and strengthening of the world socialist system. . . . The struggle for peace in contemporary conditions is first of all a struggle for the fulfilling and overfulfilling of the national economic plans of the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries' plans of peace.³

These doctrinal modifications appeared to represent a still growing confidence in the Soviet economy. With ostensible assurance Khrushchev declared that the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union was final and capitalist encirclement no longer existed. The Soviet leaders seemed to believe that they could actually challenge the West through economic competition. The emphasis on domestic prosperity for the Soviet people was also popular internally, and the ideological refinements could be used to induce greater efforts to overfulfill the new plan.


²"S'ezd stroitelei kommunizma" [Congress of the Builders of Communism], Kommunist, No. 2, 1959, p. 15.

³"Iskliuchit' mirovuiu voinu iz zhizni obshchestva" [To Eliminate War from the Life of Society], Kommunist, No. 9, 1959, pp. 3-5.
Another motive behind the changing line was Chinese pressure. It was no accident therefore that following Peking's broadside in April 1960, "Long Live Leninism," Soviet doctrine went still farther and heralded peaceful coexistence as the key to world revolution and the class struggle. Peaceful coexistence was then billed as "a specific form of the class struggle" and even as "the highest form of the class struggle."1

The extent to which the meaning of peaceful coexistence was changed in mid-1960 can perhaps be best seen when the new phrases about the class struggle are compared to an article attacking the "antiparty group," which appeared in the August 1957 issue of Kommunist. In this article the "antiparty group" was severely criticized for its opposition to peaceful coexistence, but at no point was it suggested that peaceful coexistence is a means of fomenting revolution. Peaceful coexistence was defended solely as a means of promoting peace and lessening tension, and in support of this point a resolution of the Twentieth Party Congress was quoted to the effect that the five principles of peaceful coexistence "constitute the best formula under present conditions for relations among states with different social systems..."2

After mid-1960 peaceful coexistence was no longer presented as simply a system of state relations, and the pronouncements on peaceful coexistence manifested a new militancy. After mid-1960 it was said that the socialist camp had the power "to force the imperialists to abandon war and to impose on them the policy of peaceful coexistence."3


2"Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--general'naia liniiia vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo Soiuza" [The Leninist Course of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union], Kommunist, No. 11, 1957, pp. 5 and 11.

It is important to note that the goal of concrete agreements with the West was still retained, but it was specified that this goal could be realized through the might of the socialist camp and not as a consequence of the good will of the imperialists. This was simply a device to defend a conciliatory policy in militant terms. Further evidence on this point is provided by an important article by F. Konstantinov and Kh. Momdzhyan, two of the editors of Kommunist, in the July 1960 issue of that journal. They adopted the new militant line and spoke of imposing peace on the imperialists and forcing them to accept disarmament, but at the same time they stated: "The theory of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems presupposes certain agreements, mutual concessions, and even more compromises."

Khrushchev's visit to the United States, as noted before, marked the most vigorous Soviet campaign for GCD since the 1930's, as well as renewed Soviet affirmation of the need to negotiate partial disarmament measures that could be immediately implemented. The GCD proposal in effect provided propaganda grist for the more revolutionary aspect of Soviet foreign policy, although it turned out to be the subject of violent Chinese attacks.

"Peace Does Not Come, It has to be Won," was the title of an article in the September 1959 issue of the World Marxist Review. The main theme was that peace must be "imposed" by mass struggle against the bourgeoisie (as opposed to being negotiated on an equal basis between the governments of East and West).

Even in the period following the Paris Summit Conference collapse and the Bucharest Congress in 1960, when the Soviet line took on a veneer of militancy to meet the Chinese challenge, the importance of negotiations and compromise was stressed. The party journal Kommunist declared: "The theory of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems presupposes certain agreements, mutual concessions, and even some more compromises." And the December 1960 statement of the 81 Communist parties meeting in Moscow declared:

1 F. Konstantinov and Kh. Momdzhyan, "Dialektika i sovremennost'" [Dialectics and the Present], Kommunist, No. 10, 1960, p. 46.

2 Ibid.
The policy of peaceful coexistence is also favoured by a definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries, which takes a sober view of the relationship of forces and the dire consequences of a modern war.¹

In reviewing the work of the 81 party conference Premier Khrushchev declared, citing the master:

Two trends are observed in the policy of the capitalist camp vis à vis the socialist countries: a bellicose-aggressive one and a moderate-sober one. V. I. Lenin pointed to the necessity of establishing contact with those bourgeois circles that gravitate toward pacifism, "be it even of the poorest kind." He said that in the struggle to preserve peace we must also use sensible representatives of the bourgeoisie.²

The new Party Program adopted in October 1961³ had nothing to say on disarmament except to reaffirm the party's policy of working for "general and complete disarmament under strict international control" and the abolition of all overseas bases. The program devoted a great deal of space, however, to further elaboration of the peaceful coexistence line as it began to emerge in 1959. The "chief aim" of Soviet foreign policy, it declared, was to "provide peaceable conditions for the building of a communist society in the U. S. S. R. and developing the world socialist system, and together with the other peace-loving peoples to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination." The program underlined that "to abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission of communism"; that this could be done by the "peoples who can and must force the imperialists into disarmament." Peaceful coexistence was an "objective necessity," but peaceful


²CDSF, No. 4, 1961, p. 11. The World Marxist Review translation of the speech softened many key phrases; for example, the last sentence in this quotation was rendered as "we should not overlook also the saner representatives of the bourgeoisie" (World Marxist Review, No. 1, 1961).

³For texts of the former 1919 program, the draft and final versions of the 1961 program, see Jan F. Triska, ed., Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962).
coexistence implied not only the absence of interstate violence; it also "serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between them." Peaceful coexistence would benefit all mankind except the "big monopoly magnates and militarists." It would (1) steadily strengthen "the world socialist system"; (2) aid the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries; (3) facilitate the national-liberation struggle; and (4) accord with the interests of the bourgeoisie who wish to be spared a thermonuclear war.

The CPSU pledged to work to strengthen "all the organizations and parties that strive to avert war, the neutralist and pacifist movements and the bourgeoisie circles that advocate peace and normal relations between countries." The party would "expose" the initiators of war and take all steps to defend the Soviet Union and "socialist camp as a whole." It would "oppose all wars of conquest, including wars between capitalist countries, and local wars aimed at strangling people's emancipation movements, and support... anti-imperialist wars of liberation." 1

These ideas were amplified in Soviet writings in 1961 and 1962, which endeavored to rationalize détente in terms of revolution. In explaining the need for closer relations between East and West, an important article in Pravda on January 11, 1962 argued that there were two compelling reasons for cooperation between states with different social systems, one political the other economic. In the political realm all states have an interest in preventing nuclear war, and for this a certain amount of joint action is necessary. In the economic realm there is a common interest in mutually profitable trade. 2

In fact international trade was no longer simply portrayed as being desirable; it was elevated to the status of an objective economic law. The Diplomatic Dictionary of 1961 stated:

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1 Ibid., pp. 63-67.
The necessity of peaceful cooperation is dictated by the development of the productive forces of society. With the present level of development of productive forces no single country can develop normally without economic and cultural links with other countries. The restoration of international economic ties is an objective economic necessity.¹

To meet the Chinese challenge, Soviet policy had to be portrayed as a manifestation of revolutionary militance. To this end it was argued that the present historical period, characterized by the simultaneous existence of two conflicting social systems, is a period of unprecedented complexity. As a result, relations between socialist and capitalist states are not characterized just by cooperation as the revisionists claimed, nor just by conflict as the dogmatists alleged. Rather there is a dialectical combination of both "struggle and cooperation" (i bor'ba i sotrudni-chestvo). As one writer put it in 1961: "Peaceful coexistence is a dialectical process that organically combines the sharpest class struggle between socialism and capitalism, and cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preserving peace."²

d. The Obsolescence of Doctrine. Finally, perhaps the most radical step by which Moscow justified its policies against Chinese attack was simply to deny the relevance of Lenin's teachings on imperialism to the present era. For Moscow this was "creative Leninism, and the revelations of Lenin's views in 1922 helped to justify it. Khrushchev candidly told the Bucharest Congress in June 1960:

The thesis, enunciated at the 20th and 21st Congresses of our Party, that war is not inevitable in our time has immediate bearing on the policy of peaceful coexistence. The tenets on imperialism that Lenin advanced still hold true; they serve as before, and will go on serving, as a

lodestar for us in our theory and practice. But it must not be forgotten that Lenin's tenets on imperialism were put forward and developed by him decades ago, when many phenomena that have now become decisive for the development of the historical process and for the entire international situation did not exist.

Khrushchev warned:

Comrades, when it comes to this question we must not now repeat mechanically what Vladimir Il'ich Lenin said about imperialism many decades back, and again and again reiterate that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism has won all over the world.¹

A cynic might say that the Kremlin's modifications of ideology proved it was a fig leaf to cover the expediencies of power politics. This judgment would ignore the role that perception of a changing reality is bound to exert upon any systematic and somewhat rational world view. But it would seem fair to argue that the Kremlin's revision of the line on the economic consequences of disarmament upon capitalism represented a crude manipulation of theory for policy purposes without any basis in a materially changed reality. On the other hand the thesis that war is no longer inevitable was implicit acknowledgment that atomic weapons had foreclosed policy alternatives still available in earlier times.

¹Pravda, June 22, 1960.
Chapter III

THE SPIRIT OF MOSCOW: DÉTENTE AND LIMITED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
1962-1964

A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance

1. Moves on the Test Ban and GCD. Shortly before the Cuban missile crisis erupted, Moscow shifted its position on two central issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after rejecting two alternative test ban proposals put forward by the United States on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a moratorium on underground testing "while continuing negotiations on the final prohibitions of such explosions." A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961, but with the provision that inspection over the underground test moratorium could take place only in the content of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Moscow's August 29-September 3 position seemed no longer to be contingent upon GCD measures being enacted, but Soviet representative Kuznetsov clouded the issue on September 5 by reiterating Moscow's support for its stand on November 28, 1961. In any event the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture on principle because--after Soviet test resumption in 1961--the West would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium.¹

The other shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took place during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21, 1962:

Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.²

Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of the disarmament program. But during the brief third session of the


The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was not followed by any immediate or dramatic shifts in Soviet positions on the test ban, GCD, or collateral measures in either the United Nations General Assembly or the ENDC. At the General Assembly meeting in New York the Soviet government continued to attack Western proposals for a partial test ban or a comprehensive ban with on-site inspection. A more positive chord was sounded on December 5, 1962, when the United States and Soviet Union announced agreement on certain measures of cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Soviet position on a nuclear test ban was formally modified for the first time since September when on December 3 and 10, 1962, Moscow publicly espoused the idea of automatic seismic stations—"two or three" on Soviet territory—to control an underground test ban. Delivery of the sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the Soviet Union would have to be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft, but Moscow would be prepared to agree to servicing by foreign personnel.

The usual pattern of backing and filling followed. As the United States and Great Britain in the following days pressed for

1ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22. However, on March 27, 1963 the Soviet delegate elucidated for the first time that Moscow would permit inspection of the missile launch pads. ENDC/PV.114, March 27, 1963, pp. 39-40.

2ENDC/PV.90, December 10, 1962, pp. 13-27. The "black box" idea had been endorsed by U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash Conference in September 1962; Soviet diplomats broached it again privately during the October meeting at the General Assembly and again in Geneva on November 7; it was treated favorably by Radio Moscow's Domestic Service on November 10 and in an Izvestiiia article of November 11; open discussion took place in Geneva after November 13, but Moscow did not espouse the idea publicly at the General Assembly until after it had finished its test-ban debate.
a meeting of experts to discuss this proposal, the Soviet representa-
tive alleged that an attempt was being made to sabotage agreement. But as the third session of the ENDC ended in frustration and acrimony, Premier Khrushchev in private correspondence with President Kennedy renewed Soviet agreement on December 19 to "2 to 3" on-site inspections per year for the control of a comprehensive test ban treaty, thereby thus returning to a position first held in 1960. Significantly, Khrushchev made clear that the concession was being offered primarily to assist the American President to obtain do-
mestic support for an agreement. In his reply, President Kennedy insisted--cordially--that the minimum number of inspections accept-
able to the United States was between eight and ten. Meanwhile, informal talks were taking place in New York among Soviet, American, and British representatives. They lasted from January 14 through January 31, 1963, when they were broken off by Moscow on the issue of the number of on-site inspections, on which neither side seemed ready to budge.

In subsequent negotiations at the ENDC the Western powers

1Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1239-1242.

2Communication from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, dated December 19, 1962, in United Nations Document DC/207, April 12, 1963 (also ENDC/73, January 31, 1963). Khrushchev repeated that the USSR would accept three automatic seismic stations. He outlined in his letter three zones in which those stations could be established: Central Asia, Altai, and the Far East. He also specified the most suitable sites within each zone.

3Letter dated December 28, 1962 from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev, in ibid. (also ENDC/74, January 31, 1963). Kennedy found Khrushchev's suggestions for locating unmanned seismic stations helpful, but inadequate. He felt that there would be need for a number of stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka and Tashkent areas. Khrushchev had no objections to stations in these areas providing that the number of stations remained fixed at three. Communication from Khrushchev to Kennedy, dated January 7, 1963, in ibid.
on April 1, 1963 reduced their demand from 8-10 to 7 on-site inspections, but in the following month the debate degenerated to the point where the Soviet negotiator declared that it was 'a sheer waste of time.'

2. Limited Agreements and the "Spirit of Moscow." While the test ban negotiations showed little prospect of success the ENDC discussions on other arms control items in the spring of 1963 appeared equally inauspicious. The five Communist delegations attacked the Nassau agreement of December 1962, plans for U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation, the Franco-German treaty of cooperation of January 1963, and U.S. overseas bases--particularly those serving Polaris submarines. A number of Soviet proposals were aimed directly against these Western positions--a declaration "On Renunciation of Use of Foreign Territories for Stationing Strategic Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons," a draft nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, and a proposal for declaring the Mediterranean a nuclear-free zone. On June 21, just before the ENDC recessed, the Soviet representative rejected a draft treaty put forward by the Mexican delegate that would have prohibited the orbiting or stationing in space of nuclear weapons.

It was against this background of hostile negotiating behavior in the ENDC that Moscow was negotiating a direct communications link with Washington as well as a test ban agreement. Evidence of progress on the hot line was indicated on April 5, when the Soviet delegate declared that his government agreed to the United States proposal "immediately, without waiting for general and complete disarmament." On April 26, even as the United States

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3 ENDC/PV.147, June 21, 1963, p. 49.
6 ENDC/PV.118, April 5, 1963, p. 52.
delegate made his first reference to the possibility of agreement on this question, the Soviet representative made a blistering attack on the Western powers.\textsuperscript{1} The Soviet government signed the direct communications link agreement with the United States on June 20, 1963, shortly before an otherwise apparently fruitless ENDC session ended—a striking illustration of the counterpoint in the East-West debate.

Meanwhile private talks on a test ban treaty were proceeding among unofficial representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. In March 1963 a small number of scientists from the three countries met in London to explore possible compromises; although the meeting was a private one, it was evidently under the auspices of the respective governments. No formula for an agreement was reached, but each side apparently did succeed in impressing the other with its interest in agreement. On April 24 and May 31 the effort was pursued further in personal messages from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Premier Khrushchev. Following the Soviet Premier's second reply the Western representatives were able to announce on June 10 the scheduling of a "high-level" conference of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow on July 15.\textsuperscript{2} Appropriately, in the United States notice of this meeting was given by President Kennedy in his widely remarked American University address of June 10, 1963.

Speaking in Berlin on July 2, 1963, Khrushchev announced that in the forthcoming three-power talks in Moscow the Soviet government was interested in concluding a partial test ban agreement. Modifying the Soviet negotiating position previously revealed on September 3, 1962, Khrushchev dropped the qualification of an (uninspected moratorium) on underground testing while a total ban was being negotiated but now called for the simultaneous signing of an East-West nonaggression pact. At the same time he reiterated the Soviet view that international control over a comprehensive treaty was unnecessary, equating such control with legalized espionage.\textsuperscript{3}

While circumstantial evidence suggests that Khrushchev had

\textsuperscript{1}ENDC/PV.125, April 26, 1963, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{2}Great Britain, Further Documents Relating to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (London, 1963), p. 7 (Cmd. paper 1284).

opted for a test ban agreement even before his July 2 statement, and may have recognized that a partial ban held the greatest prospects of success on both sides, it was not yet entirely clear that the nonaggression pact issue might not be used by the Kremlin to scuttle agreement at the last minute. Sino-Soviet negotiations were simultaneously in progress in Moscow, and some members of the Soviet leadership may have been opposed to a test ban agreement either at that time or more generally. At any rate, on July 19, Khrushchev publicly confined himself to the "hope" that a nonaggression pact would emerge from the test ban negotiations. The three-power negotiations began in Moscow on July 15 as scheduled, and after the first day Moscow let the nonaggression pact issue drop to the background, although it was clear that the final communique would have to make some mention of it. The negotiations thereafter were friendly and businesslike.

The main problems were the withdrawal clause and the question of depositories for the treaty. These were solved with relatively little difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the former being overcome by a circumlocution. On July 25 the treaty was initialed and on August 5, 1963 it was signed. As for the nonaggression pact, the Soviet government was content to accept an accompanying statement to the effect that the three governments would consult with their respective allies for the purpose of achieving an agreement satisfactory to all.

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1 Moscow ceased jamming the Voice of America broadcasts in May and June 1963 and, as indicated, the hot line agreement was signed on June 20, 1963. Khrushchev publicly commended President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10 in Pravda of June 15, 1963; further, in June 1963, the Soviet publication New Times singled out the fact that Secretary of State Rusk on May 29, 1963 had supported the proposal of a group of United States Senators for a partial ban as being in the interest of both countries. New Times, No. 23, 1963, p. 32 (Russian edition, June 7, 1963).


The impression of détente generated by the limited test ban treaty pervaded the brief fifth session of the ENDC, which met through the month of August. But there were no basic changes of position on the part of either the Soviet Union or the West. The nuclear powers were still unable to agree on an agenda for collateral measures, and the debate remained general. Moscow continued to plead the case for a nonaggression pact even though bluntly informed by the United States representative that the ENDC was not the place for that matter. While urging that the momentum gained by the test ban be used to settle the problem of GCD, Soviet negotiators also advanced the various collateral measures proposed by Khrushchev in his speech of July 19, 1963, including a cut in military budgets, a reduction of forces in both Germanies, and measures to prevent surprise attack. On this last question, which was known to hold some interest for the United States, Mr. Tsarapkin made clear that an agreement would have to be combined "with certain partial disarmament measures."  

The ENDC adjourned soon thereafter and did not reconvene until January 21, 1964.

New Soviet moves were, however, taken at the Eighteenth General Assembly meeting in New York in the fall of 1963. On September 19 Mr. Gromyko further modified the Soviet position on a "nuclear umbrella," conceding that a limited number of nuclear missiles might be retained through the end of the disarmament process.

At the same time the Soviet government reversed the position it had taken on June 20, 1963 in the ENDC and assented to a joint Soviet-American agreement not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.  

President Kennedy on the following day agreed to talks on the latter proposal, and on October 3 the Soviet Foreign Minister joined his American and English colleagues in an agreement in principle. Accordingly on October 17, 1963 the United Nations General Assembly by acclamation adopted Resolution 1884 (XVIII), which endorsed the Soviet-American "understanding" on this issue and called upon all states to refrain from Orbiting nuclear

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1ENDC/PV.152, August 16, 1963, p. 33.


weapons in space.\textsuperscript{1}

Other signs of limited movement in Soviet positions on arms control in this period were evident as the year 1963 drew to a close. At the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference in Vienna the Soviet Union accepted some safeguards to ensure that fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes by aid recipients,\textsuperscript{2} and at the United Nations the Soviet Union joined the United States in an agreement on certain legal principles governing the exploration and use of outer space. In fact the latter agreement, which was approved by the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on November 22, failed to contain several Soviet principles—such as the prohibition of nongovernmental activities in space—which had been objectionable to the United States.\textsuperscript{3} On December 13 Mr. Khrushchev announced a unilateral reduction in the Soviet military budget and the possibility of a cutback in Soviet armed forces. And on December 31, 1963 he addressed a letter to all heads of state urging an agreement on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes—a proposal of questionable value but obviously aimed at least in part at China.\textsuperscript{4}

Another East-West agreement came on April 20, 1964, when—after an unpublicized plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in February—private negotiations among Washington, London, and Moscow led to simultaneous pledges by the three governments to cut back production of fissionable materials.

3. Hardening of the Line in the ENDC. In the ENDC session that commenced on January 21, 1964, however, Soviet negotiators vigorously rejected the new United States proposals for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles and for a reduction of Soviet and American strategic bomber forces. Instead Moscow laid major emphasis on GCD (including its concession of September 1963 on the


\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 292.

"nuclear umbrella"), the destruction of all bombers, reciprocal budgetary reductions, and a nonaggression pact. Moscow argued that the United States proposal on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons could not be taken seriously until the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) project was abandoned; the Kremlin also refused to dissociate from other partial measures the proposal of ground control posts against surprise attack. By March 1, 1964 Mr. Gromyko was publicly charging the West with responsibility for the lack of progress at the ENDC, and an undertone of recrimination continued to be evident in Soviet statements until the end of the session on April 28.

We might sum up the period from September 1962 to mid-1964 as one of extraordinary movement toward agreements on the fringes of the disarmament problem. However, the Soviet approach to East-West agreements for arms control and disarmament reflected a notable duality between public and private negotiating posture. Publicly Soviet representatives continued in the negotiations to pursue lines of conduct that often seemed to undermine the possibility of agreement, while privately Moscow proceeded toward specific understandings with the United States.

B. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament

Soviet propaganda treatment of the arms control and disarmament issue, in common with Soviet negotiating behavior in the ENDC, seems generally to have been antagonistic to the West even when private talks between Moscow and Washington were proceeding favorably. The outstanding exceptions to this rule arose in connection with the test ban and the understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, when Moscow exhibited definite propaganda restraint.

1. War Danger and Antagonism Toward the West. Soviet propaganda from the spring of 1962 until after the Cuban crisis of October laid great emphasis on the Soviet GCD program and the benefits its realization would bring to the underdeveloped and developed nations alike. However, as some of the substantive differences about policy began to become clear, Moscow turned to criticizing the West, particularly the United States, for its lack of a constructive approach. This was particularly evident with the test ban issue, when Western insistence on on-site inspection was depicted time and again as an intelligence scheme. Parallel

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1Izvestia, March 2, 1964.
to this line on disarmament (and at a time when the Soviet leadership was probably deciding on the Cuban missile adventure), Soviet propaganda increasingly emphasized the danger of war and United States preparations for a new Cuban invasion. But even while Moscow was broadcasting to Western populations a highly critical view of Western negotiating conduct, it did so in a relatively calm and even reasonable tone, with little or no invective and no emphasis on mass peace action. On a related point, the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist went to press on August 24, 1962 with an article by Khrushchev on problems of economic integration in which he made strong claims that the capitalist states had accepted the Soviet economic challenge and were in fact already engaged in peaceful economic competition.

The limited shift in Soviet policy on the test ban issue on August 29-September 3, 1962, at the ENDC was described by Pravda on the following day as "opening the way to agreement." New Times on September 8, 1962 described the move in similar terms. The Soviet willingness to agree to a limited test ban cum moratorium was affirmed by Khrushchev in a speech on October 1, 1962. The possible significance of the Soviet move of August 29-September 3 is suggested also by a subsequent Chinese charge that the Soviet Union notified Peking on August 25, 1962, that it had agreed to a U.S. proposal to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear powers and that non-nuclear powers should refrain from seeking to buy or produce atomic weapons.2 As the Cuban missile crisis approached, Soviet comment continued to focus on the test ban issue, stressing alleged Western obstruction tactics and Moscow's willingness to negotiate on the basis of its own proposals or the neutralist "compromise" memorandum of April 1962.

2. After Cuba. In the aftermath of the Cuban episode Soviet propaganda stressed the opportunities for U.S.-Soviet agreement on the test ban and other arms control measures as a result of Soviet

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1 Pravda, October 2, 1962.

concessions. Indeed the same day that Khrushchev announced that Russia's missiles were being withdrawn from Cuba Moscow stated the U.S. and Soviet positions on a test ban were "close."\(^1\) Subsequently, although the United States and Britain continued to be attacked in Soviet media for continued obstruction of the test ban talks, Moscow emphasized that conditions were more favorable for agreement and that in fact the work of the Three-Power Subcommittee was "gradually advancing."\(^2\) Nonetheless, following the British announcement of November 12 that it planned to conduct a nuclear test in Nevada with United States cooperation, the Soviets stepped up their accusations of Western obstruction and maneuvering which they alleged aimed to avoid agreement.

As the ENDC resumed its deliberations in November 1962, the Soviet concession on the "nuclear umbrella" that had been announced to the U.N. General Assembly by Andrei Gromyko was stressed as a manifestation of Soviet good will that required Western concessions in turn. Soon, however, the Soviet negotiator was reportedly engaged in "exposing" Western moves to accelerate the arms race with its plans for a NATO nuclear force while posing in favor of disarmament.\(^3\) Soviet propaganda also criticized the United States and Britain for their negative reaction to Moscow's proposal of December 10 to use automatic seismic stations ("black boxes") to police underground testing in a comprehensive ban and for their efforts to evade compliance with the recent General Assembly resolution calling for an end to all testing by January 1, 1963.\(^4\)

At the same time, Moscow radio, both foreign and domestic, carried reports of Soviet-American agreements of December 5 at the General Assembly on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and on the peaceful uses of resources released by disarmament; also on December 14 Moscow domestic service carried an interview with Senator Albert Gore, which emphasized the point that further agreements were possible. This time Khrushchev's highly conciliatory report of December 12 to the Supreme Soviet on foreign policy was being translated for distribution in all major languages.

Khrushchev's December 19 letter to President Kennedy conceding the possibility of two or three on-site inspections was advertised as a step to meet the West part way. The Soviets emphasized that a

\(^1\)TASS in English to Europe, October 28, 1962, 1611 GMT.
\(^2\)Moscow International Service, November 18, 1962, 1000 GMT.
\(^3\)TASS in English to Europe, December 4, 1962, 1748 GMT.
\(^4\)General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVII) of November 6, 1962.
rapprochement of Soviet and American positions had taken place on the test ban. But now Moscow's propaganda increasingly noted that within the United States government there were opponents of any compromise. In breaking off the private three-power talks in New York on January 31, 1963 on the grounds that the West was not "showing good will," Moscow, citing Edward Teller and Nelson Rockefeller, emphasized that the United States administration was under "strong pressure" not to conclude a test ban agreement. The American test resumption soon thereafter was assailed as an attempt to poison the atmosphere at Geneva, and it was implied that this move was due to pressure from the "right." At the same time Soviet propagandists continued to stress the advantageous economic consequences of GCD, particularly in connection with economic aid to the underdeveloped countries.

3. Hardening of the Propaganda Line, March-May 1963. By March 1963 Soviet media were once again emphasizing the lack of headway in Geneva and questioning the good faith of the Western powers. Western moves on the MLF, deployment of Polaris, and Canadian-American nuclear weapons cooperation were all described as fostering nuclear proliferation, increasing tension, and thus impeding progress on GCD. The Soviets gave considerable propaganda coverage to their proposal of February 10, 1963 in the ENDC prohibiting the stationing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on foreign territory. In this proposal the existence of a war danger was cited, and Western public opinion was urged to insist that common sense prevail. Similarly the Soviet proposal of a nonaggression pact was discussed in terms of Western evasion of agreements to better the international situation, giving particular attention to the "aggressive designs" of the French and West German governments.

As the direct Moscow-Washington communications link—the hot line—was being negotiated, Soviet media continued to accuse the Western powers of procrastination on all issues at Geneva. Although Soviet propaganda indicated obliquely that there was interest in a test ban in the United States government, the movement toward a hot line agreement was minimized; instead Western

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On this occasion Moscow noted that "Influential elements" were exerting pressure on the Kennedy administration not to sign a test ban.
rejection of "constructive" Soviet proposals was emphasized in Soviet propaganda throughout the remainder of the fourth ENDC session. Particular attention was given to the negative Western response to the Soviet proposal of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean, again with explicit references to Polaris and to possible MLF deployment. (However, when the hot line agreement was signed, Soviet media acknowledged it as a "bright spot" in the ENDC's work and a proof of Soviet good will in seeking agreements with the West.)

In sum, while the ground was being prepared for the partial test ban treaty in private talks among the three powers and also in the Soviet-American agreements of the period, the Soviet propaganda line on the ENDC was basically antagonistic. The earlier tendency, manifested in the period December 1962 to February 1963, to imply that the Kennedy administration did not have a free hand in negotiating a test ban was subordinated in the later months to an antagonistic propaganda attacking "aggressive" Western moves outside the negotiating forum.

4. Agreements and Propaganda Restraint, June-October 1963. Khrushchev's favorable comments of June 15, 1963 on President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10 and Khrushchev's proposal of a partial test ban at Berlin on July 2, Soviet statements began to play down United States "aggressiveness" and instead indicated a recognition that the governments with which they were negotiating were under pressure from "militarist 'ultras' and the big war monopolies" not to enter into agreements or move toward détente.

With the initialing of the test ban treaty on July 25, 1963 and the subsequent debate on the issue in the United States, Soviet propaganda emphasized two main themes: The agreement furthered a relaxation of tensions and created favorable conditions for the

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1 Izvestiia, June 22, 1963.

2 In addition to the hot line, a Soviet-American agreement on limited space satellite cooperation was signed on March 20, 1963 in Rome, and on May 21 a memorandum on Soviet-American cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was initiated in Moscow. New Times, No. 13, 1963, p. 22 and No. 22, 1963, p. 32.

3 See, for example, "The Test Ban Talks," New Times, No. 29, July 1963.
solution of other East-West problems,¹ and it "exposed" the "reactionary" groups in the West that were most opposed to agreements and détente.²

Table III.1 characterizes the Soviet propaganda view of the debate in the West on the test ban in this period. It should be cautioned that Soviet media laid great emphasis on the various individuals and groups constituting the "aggressive circles" while saying relatively little about the majority of "sober-moderate" individuals and groups that supported the partial test ban. Nonetheless Soviet reporting of the struggle over the test ban in the West was suggestive of Soviet political interests in East-West security agreements.

The main line of Soviet comment on the test ban agreement was that the "madmen" were exposed, isolated, and weakened in the debate that followed the agreement. The treaty was seen as a means of "tying the hands" of those in the West who were most vociferous in their opposition to the "socialist" states,³ while at the same time the "forces of peace" had been strengthened. In this connection Soviet commentators emphasized that American political leaders were showing an increasing understanding of the need for policies of coexistence rather than policies of force. This view complemented the other main Soviet propaganda line to the effect that a start had been made toward a relaxation of tensions and the step-by-step negotiation of other outstanding East-West problems.

Soviet domestic propaganda on the test ban made the point that the relaxing effect of the test ban on the international

¹See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0310 GMT, TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 5, 1963, 0600 GMT; and TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1619 GMT.

²See, for example, TASS in English to Britain, July 31, 1963, 1800 GMT; Moscow in Danish to Denmark, August 2, 1963, 1600 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 and 1900 GMT; Moscow in English to Britain, August 5, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow in English to Southeast Asia and Australia, August 5, 1963, 1300 GMT; and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 6, 1963, 0100 GMT.

³Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, April 18, 1963, 1400 GMT.
Table III.1
TEST BAN DEBATE IN THE WEST AS DESCRIBED BY SOVIET PROPAGANDA MEDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> Senator Goldwater; Dr. Teller; Mr. Nixon; Senators Jackson, Stennis, Dirksen, Symington, Thurmond, Curtis, Mundt, Russell, and Long; Congressman Halleck, Miller, and Hosmer; Generals Power, Walker, and Wedemeyer; unspecified &quot;military circles&quot; including &quot;Pentagon people,&quot; unnamed &quot;madmen&quot; representing the military and arms production interests.</td>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> Strauss; Adenauer; von Brentano; von Hassel; Krome; Barzel; &quot;right wing of CDU party;&quot; unspecified &quot;Bonn militarists.&quot;</td>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> General De Gaulle and unspecified French &quot;extremists.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro:</strong> President Kennedy; Secretaries Rusk and McNamara; Senators Humphrey, Fulbright, Aiken, Saltonstall, Clark, Church, Young, and Mansfield; the &quot;majority of the Senate;&quot; General Maxwell Taylor; various United States business interests not involved in arms production; Professor Shulman; Dr. York.</td>
<td><strong>Pro:</strong> Schroeder; &quot;Schroeder group;&quot; Erhard described as somewhat &quot;flexible.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1 For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 27, 1963, NBO GMT; Moscow in German to Germany, July 28, 1963, 1030 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow in English to eastern North America, September 7, 1963, 0112 GMT.

2 See, for example, TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT, and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 21, 1963, 0300 GMT.

3 Moscow in German to Germany, July 28, 1963, 1030 GMT; Moscow in English to Britain, August 4, 1963, 1900 GMT.

4 TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; Moscow in Danish to Denmark, August 2, 1963, 1600 GMT.
5 TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; and TASS in English to Europe, August 17, 1963, 1850 GMT.


8 TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT.

9 Yudin, op. cit.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 TASS in English to Europe, August 29, 1963, 1159 GMT.

13 TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT.

14 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400 GMT.

15 TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT.

16 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 20, 1963, 1800 GMT; and Yudin, op. cit.

17 TASS in English to Europe, September 6, 1963, 1215 GMT.

18 Yudin, op. cit.

19 TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 1916 GMT; Moscow in English to Britain, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT.

20 For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 27, 1963, 1430 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow in English to Southeast Asia and Australia, August 5, 1963, 1300 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 18, 1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, September 3, 1963, 0624 GMT.

21 For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 21, 1963, 0922 GMT; Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.
22. Izvestia, August 15, 1963; Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.

23. For example, TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1637 GMT; Yudin, op. cit.; and TASS in English to Europe, September 7, 1963, 1930 GMT.

24. TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1637 GMT.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. TASS in English to Europe, August 29, 1963, 1917 GMT; and Yudin, op. cit.


29. Ibid.

30. TASS in English to Europe, September 4, 1963, 1855 GMT; Moscow in English to eastern North America, September 7, 1963, 0112 GMT.

31. Moscow Domestic Service, August 18, 1963, 1400 GMT.

32. Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.

33. Pravda, August 20, 1963; Yudin, op. cit.; Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe, September 26, 1963, 2232 GMT.

34. TASS in Russian to Europe, August 26, 1963, 1920 GMT.

35. Ibid.


37. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 18, 1963, 1400 GMT; and Grigoryev, op. cit.

38. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 16, 1963, 1800 GMT; and Grigoryev, op. cit.
situation inhibited the formation of new multilateral NATO or European nuclear forces. ¹ It was also asserted that the Soviet negotiating proposals that accompanied the test ban² had provoked "a tense struggle" among the NATO powers.³ Noting the line-up of

¹ Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 12, 1963, 1900 GMT; Krasnaia zvezda, August 16, 1963.

² On July 26 in a Pravda interview Khrushchev proposed that further efforts be devoted above all to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact; as additional measures he proposed the freezing or reduction of military budgets, implementation of measures to prevent surprise attack, reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in East and West Germany, and a Soviet-Western exchange of troop representatives between forces stationed in Germany. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT.

³ Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.
the NATO members on the issue of a nonaggression pact, Moscow added that this struggle was "going on not only inside NATO but in every Atlantic country."\(^1\) The Federal Republic of Germany was consistently portrayed as the chief obstruction to further East-West agreement and on occasion as "blackmailing" the United States to this end.\(^2\) French opposition to further East-West agreements was also stressed.\(^3\)

Perhaps most interesting, however, was the Soviet propaganda treatment of the resumption of underground testing by the United States almost immediately after the limited test ban was signed. To some in the West the United States resumption of testing at this particular moment might have seemed inappropriate. To some in Moscow and in the Communist peace fronts it represented a good opportunity for a propaganda line "exposing" the United States' lack of good faith in seeking further measures. On September 4 Moscow broadcast a formal statement by J. D. Bernal, president of the World Peace Council, charging that the United States test resumption was "an affront to humanity" and "a direct blow against the spirit of the agreement"; Bernal called upon the Communist peace fronts to condemn the action of the United States.\(^4\) It is understood, however, that Soviet news agencies were subsequently directed not to publish or broadcast the Bernal message. Soviet media appear to have continued the moratorium on propaganda opposing the United States underground tests until October 12, 1963, when in

\(^1\)Ibid. The division on a nonaggression pact at the NATO Council session in Paris late in August 1963 was reported as follows: the United States, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Italy for the pact; the Netherlands, Portugal, and Iceland for it but with reservations; France, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey opposed to the pact and even to East-West talks about it.

\(^2\)See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.

\(^3\)See, for example, Moscow in English to eastern North America, August 12, 1963, 0030 GMT.

\(^4\)TASS in English to Europe, September 4, 1963, 1901 GMT.
a broadcast to Italy the tests were criticized by Moscow as not being in the spirit of the limited test ban treaty.1

In mid-October 1963 another instance of Soviet propaganda restraint may have occurred in connection with the Soviet-American informal "agreement" not to orbit nuclear weapons in space. On October 10 Moscow Domestic Service told the Soviet people that, following Gromyko's proposal of September 19 to the General Assembly, an "agreement in principle" had been reached by the American, Soviet, and British governments not to orbit nuclear weapons.2 On October 10 and 11 Mr. Gromyko had discussions with Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy and then proceeded to New York for discussions with the Soviet delegation. On October 17 Radio Moscow reported that the General Assembly had unanimously approved the "expression" of the Soviet and American "intention" not to orbit nuclear weapons.3

At some point between October 10 and 17 an "agreement" or "agreement in principle" among the three powers had become a Soviet-American "expression of intention" endorsed by the General Assembly.4 Possibly the Soviet government exaggerated the extent of the preliminary agreement, although Moscow cited The New York Times as having greeted it with satisfaction.5 In any case, not only did Moscow avoid commenting on the apparent change in the American position, but it also emphasized the General Assembly resolution as representing "a new important step toward further relaxation of international tension."6 (Soviet propaganda on the resolution also noted that

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1 Moscow in Italian to Italy, October 12, 1963, 1900 GMT.
2 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963, 0600 GMT.
3 TASS in English to Europe, October 17, 1963, 1759 GMT.
4 On October 8 in a foreign broadcast Moscow referred to "the New York agreement" as "further proof that the policy of peaceful coexistence has gained the upper hand" over the Pentagon and unnamed "U.S. politicians." Moscow in French to Africa, October 8, 1963, 1600 GMT.
5 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963, 0600 GMT.
6 TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 2107 GMT. See Izvestiia editorial of same date.
it had been received with "indignation" and "disappointment" by Senator Goldwater and "the most aggressive-minded elements of U.S. military quarters." \(^1\)

5. **Stiffening of the Propaganda Line, October 1963-April 1964.** On October 21, 1963, as talks on East-West problems continued between Washington and Moscow and as Khrushchev continued to seek to convene a conference of the international Communist movement to excommunicate the Chinese, TASS released the first major Soviet warning to the West since the test ban was signed. It took the form of a warning that the NATO talks begun on October 11 to set up the MLF could obstruct progress toward further East-West agreements;\(^2\) it emphasized that the Western powers could not verbally oppose the spread of nuclear weapons while in practice seeking to supply them to the Bundeswehr.

This slight hardening of the Soviet propaganda line was also reflected in new activity by the Communist peace fronts, which had been dormant since the "World Congress of Women" in Moscow in June 1963. Thus Khrushchev's October 25 warning against allowing the détente to lead to the "moral and spiritual demobilization of the forces of disarmament"\(^3\) was followed by "Peace Week" (November 17-24) in France and the Warsaw session of the World Peace Council (November 28-December 1). The latter called for renewed mass actions, emphasizing a comprehensive test ban, opposition to nuclear proliferation including the MLF, nuclear-free zones, and the mobilization of "pressure" on the ENDC to progress toward a GCD treaty.\(^4\)

The slightly less conciliatory Soviet diplomatic and propaganda-agitational line on the disarmament issue after the understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons in space was prolonged by Khrushchev's continuing inability to cope with the Chinese and by the improbability of further agreements for some time after the assassination of President Kennedy. Soviet propaganda became increasingly preoccupied with comments on Western diplomatic activity to establish the MLF. Khrushchev's December 13 announcements

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\(^1\) TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 1433 GMT.

\(^2\) TASS in English to Europe, October 21, 1963, 1213 GMT.


of a cut in the Soviet military budget and a possible unilateral force reduction were characterized by Soviet media as tension-reducing moves designed to influence the MLF discussions at the Paris NATO Ministerial Council session of December 16 and 17. By the end of the year Khrushchev was speaking in terms of disarmament by "mutual example."

As the ENDC resumed in January 1964, Moscow proposed a series of partial measures that were advertised as facilitating GCD. By March, as the Soviet Union began again to seek support for a world Communist conference and as the ENDC settled down to unproductive discussion, Mr. Gromyko attacked the West for barring all progress in Geneva while Radio Moscow asserted that the Soviet draft GCD treaty was "the only plan" that could form the basis of negotiation.¹

On April 20, 1964 the joint declaration of intent to reduce production of fissionable materials was announced and characterized by the Soviets as "a major new step toward easing international tension."² No further agreements, formal or informal, took place in the arms control area during the remainder of the period before Khrushchev was deposed, and Soviet propaganda continued to stress Western obstruction in the ENDC.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Soviet Union's continuous propaganda line, like the general lack of conciliation in its public negotiating posture, was aimed as much at covering the Soviet left flank against internal and external criticism from "orthodox" Communists who objected to conciliation and an agreement with "imperialism" as it was to putting political pressure on the West to take a more reasonable approach to the control of modern weapons. The Soviet leadership's vulnerability to the charge of collusion with "imperialism" that could arise from accommodation with the West suggests that when the Kremlin seeks an agreement on arms control, it may wish to remove the negotiations from the public forums and conduct them privately, perhaps while continuing a somewhat hard propaganda line.

¹ Moscow in German to Germany, March 10, 1964, 1245 GMT.
² Pravda, April 23, 1964.