GERMAN PROBLEMS AND AMERICAN POLICIES

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In September 1965, twenty years after Nazi Germany's total defeat Ludwig Erhard, the plump, cigar-smoking symbol of postwar German prosperity, was triumphantly reelected its Chancellor. Have West Germans once again opted for peace and prosperity, for their amazingly successful postwar concentration on making money rather than for a nationalist foreign policy—a course which has made them the second trading and the third industrial nation in the world? With their dynamic industrial growth, massive social services programs, and no significant political radicalism, either neo-Nazi or Communist, have the Germans again become, as in the eighteenth century, the most peaceful, least nationalistic nation in Europe?

Probably not. Appearances deceive, but history can correct them. Germany has been in our times, as in our fathers' and grandfathers', the most dynamic force for change in Europe; it is not likely to slumber much longer. Not that the blundering nationalism of World War I and the satanic Nazism of World War II are about to return: for Germans, as for most other people, nothing fails like failure. West Germany's problems today, and the dilemmas they pose for American foreign policy, are new, different ones. They arise out of a new combination of economic prosperity, foreign policy passivity, the lack of German unity, thermonuclear weapons, and the transformation of the bipolar postwar scene into a new, multipolar world.

First, the post-1949 German Federal Republic is a new Germany. It is no longer, as until 1945, predominantly Prussian and Protestant,
a proudly different, "middle" Europe between East and West. Rather, it is a truncated West Germany. It has fifty instead of eighty million inhabitants; its historic capital, Berlin, is divided and walled inside the hostile East Germany Communist state; it is as much Catholic as Protestant; and, given its division and West Berlin's isolation, it consciously wants to be part of a united Western Europe dependent on the United States for its national security. It wants this because it knows that the thermonuclear missile age has decisively changed the world military balance. Neither Germany alone nor Western Europe together can overtake the strategic military and space lead of the United States and the Soviet Union—the more so since the dream of European unity is disappearing into Gaullist mists.

For twenty years West Germany has concentrated on reconstruction and industrial growth at home and foreign trade abroad. It has abstained from any major international initiatives. Its postwar need for American support has made it normally a faithful follower of Washington on the international scene. Its older and middle generations, still caught in the collective shame when not the individual guilt of the Nazi period, have been understandably reluctant to play any specifically German role in foreign policy. Finally, until recently Russia appeared so overwhelmingly powerful that any thoughts of getting out of Moscow what it clearly would not give of its own volition, the reunification of East Germany, seemed quixotic. The West Germans were therefore content to cultivate their own prosperous gardens.
But now in 1965 this situation is changing—still largely under the surface, to be true, but with increasing rapidity. America should beware of letting its comfortable acceptance of its erstwhile enemy’s passivity blind it to the stirrings in West Germany of things to come. Modern history teaches that no great, proud nation—and the Germans have always been that—will long tolerate passively the division of its country. This is the more true of a state, West Germany, which is such an economic and technological giant, which has now the largest land army (12 divisions) in Western Europe, and which knows very well that its economic potential and conventional power can easily be converted, as France, for example, has begun to do, into thermonuclear delivery capacity.

Moreover, of all European states, West Germany has a unique additional incentive to resume an active foreign policy role. It alone is a nation divided. One-third of it is a semi-colonial tyranny, occupied by 22 Red Army divisions and ruled by Walter Ulbricht, who maintains Communist power by secret police terror, the Berlin Wall, and the barbed-wire Iron Curtain running through the heart of Germany.

Finally, three new factors have in the last few years added to the potential for mobility in German foreign policy. First, an increasing proportion of Germans—those under thirty, at least—who are not personally and knowingly involved in Nazi crimes and tyranny feel no personal responsibility for Nazism or for not having resisted it. They therefore have none of the inhibitions of their elders about resuming
the role in the world to which West German economic, technological, and conventional military power, they think, entitles them. In other words, German patriotism is on the rise. Second, particularly among the German youth, the German political ideal of the postwar years, European unification, has been increasingly shattered by General de Gaulle's nationalism; and his recent flirt with Moscow has largely ended his political influence in Germany. Third, the Sino-Soviet split and Gaullism in Europe are increasingly transferring the Cold War East-West bipolarity into a multipolar, differentiated world, in which France is trying to keep on at least passable terms with almost all other major powers; in which America, many Europeans think, is moving toward a détente with the Soviet Union, the more so because it is increasingly tied down in East Asia; and in which--more and more Germans think--Bonn should not be the only major power to remain passive.

All these developments have resulted, German public opinion polls convincingly demonstrate, in a constantly increasing commitment in West Germany, particularly among the youth, to German reunification as the primary goal of West German foreign policy and to an increasing dissatisfaction at Bonn and Washington for the lack of progress toward this goal.

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This has not led, at least as yet, to any serious German question-
ing of the alliance with the United States; but it has resulted in a questioning of certain American policies and in a wish for a more forceful assertion of West German national interests within NATO in general and the German-American relationship in particular. This new West German assertiveness centers in three areas: first, the most long-term, German reunification; second, policies toward West Germany's eastern neighbors and in particular toward East Germany; and third, and at present the most serious, toward the problem of West Germany's access to nuclear weapons.

Reunification, most West Germans increasingly realize, is both the main and unchangeable German national goal and, given the adamant Soviet unwillingness even to discuss the problem, the one which is highly unlikely to be achieved in the near future. West Germans' motives in their commitment to reunification are double: national and humanitarian—and the two sometimes conflict. As Soviet adamancy has increasingly made the attainment of reunification fade into the distant future, many West Germans increasingly concentrate on improving the human lot of their brothers to the East. Yet, as we shall see below, such improvement often can come only at the expense of the kind of concessions to Ulbricht that strengthen his position and thus made reunification even more unlikely.

Finally, official West German policy on reunification is, it is fair to say, more legalistic and declarative than realistic: it calls
for the reunification by free elections of all of Germany within the territorial boundaries of 1937. This would mean that what is now Western Poland (between the present frontier on the Oder and Neisse and the 1939 frontier, part of northern Poland, most of former East Prussia) and part of the Soviet Union (the area around the former East Prussian city of Konigsberg, now Kaliningrad) would all return to Germany. Furthermore Bonn supports the right of all Germans expelled from the territories east of these boundaries to return to their former homes. This would primarily mean the return of some two and one half million Sudeten Germans to Czechoslovakia, from which they were expelled at the end of World War II.

To list these claims is, to anyone except an extreme German nationalist, to demonstrate how little they have to do with practical, attainable political goals. Is it really likely that in any foreseeable future the Soviet Union, short of its total defeat in war (a defeat which would mean the thermonuclear devastation of most of the Northern Hemisphere), would ever allow these claims to be realized—to say nothing of the Poles and the Czechs? The first thing to say therefore about the official Bonn position on reunification is that it is so unrealistic that it is not credible—and that it cannot therefore be taken very seriously by any of its allies. Why, then, does Bonn maintain it?

First, there live in West Germany twelve million people expelled from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line and from Czechoslovakia;
and no freely elected German government is likely to risk their electoral displeasure in order, by abandoning these claims, to make more credible a policy for reunification which has no chance for success soon anyway. Second, most Germans, expellees or not, hope that in this question, as it has until now in others, time will work in their favor; and, making a virtue out of necessity, they are prepared to wait. Third, they see no point in surrendering in advance claims for which they think they may get something in return when and if serious negotiations with the Russians on reunification ever do get under way.

That they will get a price—from Warsaw, for example—is, however, a German illusion. Gomułka does not want Bonn to recognize the Oder-Neisse line since its refusal to do so is his best proof to the Polish people that they need an alliance with Moscow, and therefore must have Communism in Poland, in order to preserve Poland from West German territorial revanchism. Conversely, Bonn's recognition of it would take this card out of his hand and thus help to prepare the way for eventual Polish popular acceptance of German reunification.

West Germany's allies are committed by treaty to support her reunification; but to date they have done so more formally and verbally than in practice. France has already de facto recognized the Oder-Neisse line; de Gaulle wants German reunification only if Russian power recedes to its own borders, thus giving France, through a newly-independent East Europe, some balance against a reunited Germany. Great Britain would prefer the permanent partition of Germany and therefore gives at best
lip-service to its reunification. The United States does want German reunification, but it has in recent years increasingly tended to subordinate it to détente with the Soviet Union, and specifically to arms control and disarmament measures.

Until recently West Germany had no relations with East Europe because it refused to establish them with governments, like the East European Communist ones, which have diplomatic relations with East Germany—the so-called Hallstein Doctrine. Two developments have changed this German abstention toward the East: the great changes in East Europe itself, and pressure from Washington, plus competition from London, Paris, and Rome.

During the last few years West Germans have realized that Eastern Europe has changed rapidly. Romania has become at least as independent from the Kremlin as Yugoslavia; Tito has passed the Romanians, going back toward Moscow while they have been moving away. Albania has become a Chinese, not a Soviet satellite. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have seen extensive internal liberalization. Above all, Moscow's failure to overcome Peking's challenge to its leadership of world communism, and, since the 1962 Cuban crisis, America's pulling ahead of Russia in military power and economic growth, have resulted in a drastic and continuing decline in Soviet authority in East Europe as elsewhere. Finally Western failure to act in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution made clear to West Germany and East Europe that Western force would not be used to push back Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Its logical implication,
embraced by President Kennedy in 1961 and, largely under American pressure, by the Adenauer government in 1963, was that the West, including West Germany, should follow a policy of peaceful engagement toward East Europe: increased trade and cultural exchange in order to encourage domestic liberalization and greater independence from Moscow.

Until 1964 this policy was hotly debated in West Germany. The new Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, and the Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, advocated this policy of flexibility by West Germany toward East Europe. Its opponents, the "German Gaullists," led by Franz Josef Strauss and ex-Chancellor Adenauer, denounced it because, they claimed, it would weaken Germany's chances for reunification and because it meant giving in to American pressure when Washington, they maintained, was more interested in coming to a détente with Moscow, even at the cost of recognizing the status quo in East Europe, and thereby the permanent division of Germany, than in fulfilling its obligations to Bonn, to support German reunification.

But four recent developments have taken some of the wind out of the German Gaullists' sails. First, De Gaulle's flirt with the Russians and his rapprochement with East Europe, particularly with the Poles, have disillusioned his former German admirers, who are now convinced that he will not really support German reunification. Second, Romania's move away from Soviet influence has gone so far that no Germans can now deny that Bucharest is much more independent from Moscow and more favorable to Bonn. Third, Schröder's policy of flexibility has led to the
establishment of West German trade missions in every East European capital except Prague, and German businessmen are anxious to resume cultivating their traditional East European markets. Fourth, Washington, particularly under President Johnson, has increasingly made clear that it is not prepared to sacrifice fundamental West German interests in Berlin or elsewhere for the sake of a détente with Moscow.

The struggle in Bonn between Strauss and Schröder is more concerned with personal ambition and policy toward Paris and Washington than policy toward East Europe. Even so, and although Erhard refused to bow to Strauss's drive to get Schröder replaced as Foreign Minister, the new German government, because of opposition by Strauss and Adenauer, will probably be somewhat more cautious, at least at first, in initiatives toward the East.

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The brings us to the one major still disputed area of West German policy: relations with East Germany. It is a cardinal principle of West German foreign policy, endorsed in formal treaty by its allies, that it alone represents the German people and that Ulbricht's government is a foreign-imposed colonial one. Conversely, it remains a cardinal principle of Soviet and East German foreign policy to achieve international recognition of East Germany as the "second German state," and, since 1958, to have West Berlin recognized as a third such state,
thus cutting its ties both with West Germany and the Western Allies.

In 1961 the building of the Berlin Wall caused a fundamental change in West Germans' views of the East German problem. Cut off from any personal contact with their friends and relatives in East Germany, and feeling that the Wall had frozen the East Germany tyranny in power for many years to come, West Germans became increasingly anxious to maintain personal and political contact with their East German brothers and to do whatever could be done to ease their human lot. A natural feeling; but it has to a considerable extent played into Ulbricht's hands, for now that he has the Wall, only he can grant passage through it for West Germans and West Berliners, and he can and does exact a political price for passage.

Furthermore, since 1962, West Germans, particularly left-wing intellectuals, have increasingly realized the great changes under way in Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and quite naturally have asked themselves the question, If it can happen there, why not in East Germany as well? If America and West Germany are properly carrying on a policy of peaceful engagement toward East Europe, then why not toward East Germany as well? To put it in the terms of current West German political discussion, cannot in East Germany, as elsewhere in the East European Communist states, change come about by small steps (kleine Schritte) through increased contacts (Wandel durch Annäherung)? And even if liberalization does not set in soon, is it not better, even at the inevitable price of concessions to Ulbricht and his resultant inevitable political up-grading (politische Aufwertung), to do something:
maintain human contact with the East German population and try to alleviate its lot?

A humanly understandable and, on the surface, politically sophisticated policy—but, in my view, a mistaken and dangerous one. Why?

First, it is, I think, contrary to German as well as to American interests. The fact alone that Ulbricht is so anxious, as is Moscow, to get concessions from Bonn and Washington which increase his political status in the world should make West Germans highly suspicious of such a policy. Second, the history of the negotiations between West Berlin and East Germany about granting West Berliners passes to go through the wall to visit their relatives in East Berlin can best be termed, as the leading Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung recently put it, one of "little steps backward." Slowly but surely the West Berlin and Bonn leaders have made concessions to Ulbricht: the pass negotiations, for example, at East German insistence, are now not between West and East Germany but between West Berlin and East Germany, thus giving support to Ulbricht's thesis that West Berlin should be a third state, not tied with West Germany, that East Berlin is a part of East Germany, and that therefore the latter, not the former is the appropriate negotiating partner.

Third, any such policy of greater contacts with East Germany inevitably affects the whole Berlin situation. In that divided city such a policy of "little steps" is exactly what Ulbricht has been using in
order gradually to undermine Western rights in all of Berlin without
at any one time challenging, as Khrushchev vainly did in 1958-1962,
the so-called "three essentials" of American policy toward the city:
free access, American troop presence, and the present ties between
West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Unlike West German or American
negotiations with, say, Poland or Hungary, any negotiations by Bonn
or West Berlin with East Germany occur in a context where Ulbricht,
not Erhard or Brandt, has the best cards since only he can give what
the West Germans want, more contacts with East Germany, and he can
also at any time put Berlin under pressure and thus blackmail Bonn
into concessions. Such blackmail, by salami tactics—"small steps"—
is not easily answerable either by Washington or Bonn.

It must also be frankly said that the course of these negotia-
tions to date has in my view clearly demonstrated that Ulbricht is a
more ruthless, calculating, able negotiator than either Chancellor
Erhard or West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. Time and again Bonn and West
Berlin, under the pressure of humanitarian and election considerations,
have eventually given in to Ulbricht's blackmail. The result is for
the West a humiliating paradox: during the last two years, when Soviet
prestige and authority has been failing throughout East Europe, Ulbricht
has constantly been politically up-graded. Moreover, in spite of some
economic decentralization and decline in mass terror, no political or
cultural liberalization has occurred in East Germany; on the contrary,
it is increasingly becoming a tyrannical exception in the midst of a
liberalizing and more independent East Europe.
There is one final reason why in my view the policy of "small steps" is dangerous to West German and American interests: for several reasons it inhibits effective American response in West Berlin to Ulbricht's pin-prick"small steps" challenges. First and most important, it is psychologically very difficult for Americans to respond promptly and firmly to West German requests to stand up to Ulbricht's challenges (when he flew East German helicopters over West Berlin, to cite the most recent examples) when these same Germans are making concessions to Ulbricht. Second, exactly because Ulbricht's challenges are so limited, it is difficult for the West to find an equally limited response. Third, when America is increasingly committed in Vietnam, it is unlikely to risk a crisis in Berlin unless the challenge is major and unmistakeable.

But, proponents of the "small steps" policy reply, what is the alternative? Can one expect the Germans to sit idly by and let their relatives and friends in East Germany suffer without making any attempt, even if a risky one, to better their lot? The alternative, in my view, is a policy of isolation of East Germany, with a view toward eventually convincing the Russians and the other East European states that East Germany has become such an anachronism in a differentiated East Europe and such an obstacle to a genuine settlement with the West that it must be forced by Moscow to move toward liberalization and reunification. Such a process is not beyond the bounds of possibility: Ulbricht is already perceptibly but fruitlessly displeased, for example, by the
improvement of relations between Bonn and Bucharest; and it is likely that the main reason he agreed to the pass arrangement in Berlin was the desire of the Russians and other East Europeans to do something to counteract the damage that they were all suffering throughout the world by the prison symbol of the Berlin Wall.

Furthermore East Germany, unlike the other East European states, is neither a state nor a nation. Rather, it is the smaller and poorer part of one German nation; and, since it is not a nation, it cannot become a national Communist state. The 1953 Berlin rising proved to the Russians what Ulbricht had known: once political liberalization in East Germany starts, it cannot be stopped at the stage of national communism but it will lead directly on to the collapse of communism in East Germany and to German reunification. Therefore the "small steps" policy will always be one-sided: when Bonn offers Ulbricht "small steps," Ulbricht will win his political up-grading, but East Germany will not get political liberalization or greater independence from Moscow. Not surprisingly so: why should Ulbricht, or his successors, risk liberalization or moving away from Moscow? They would be signing their own death-warrants, quite literally, for only Red Army tanks maintain them in power. Conversely, only Moscow can decisively change the situation in East Germany, and therefore only pressure on Russia, by convincing it, and Poland and Czechoslovakia as well, that changes there are in their interests, can bring such changes about.
One final argument in favor of the "small steps" policy must be considered: isolation of East Germany is impossible anyway since the British, French, and Italians will not accept it; therefore we must try "small steps," because any alternative policy is not possible. But isolation does not mean preventing cultural exchange, which is desirable because West always on balance wins over East in it. Nor does it mean cutting off Western trade with East Germany, because neither Bonn nor Washington can force West Europe to do this. Moreover, non-strategic West German trade with East Germany is desirable because it gives Bonn, and Washington, levers on Ulbricht to counteract his blackmail tactics. What isolation does mean is preventing the political up-grading of Ulbricht, even at the cost of hindering exchange or visits of persons or trade.

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Certain clear policy implications for Washington follow from the above. In the first place, West Germany will be increasingly committed to reunification; and, if we wish to maintain our alliance with Bonn, so must we. Second, if our commitment to German reunification, and Bonn's, are to be, as they increasingly will have to be, more than just declaratory, they must be credible and realistic, i.e. they must be such that they will eventually be acceptable to the national interests—as opposed to the Communist ideology—of Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The world is changing rapidly, and over the decades to come Russia will be
faced by a resurgent China along its long Asian borders as well by its own domestic economic, social, and ethnic problems. It cannot wish to have a powerful but hostile West Germany on its western security borders, allied with, and influencing against it, the American super-power across the Atlantic. Moreover West Germany's economic and technological resources are such that, if converted into nuclear weapons capacity, they would further change the balance of power against Russia. The same arguments apply to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Conversely, West Germany cannot realistically hope for, as America should not favor, a return to the 1937 German boundaries. It is not in the real West German interest, and certainly not in ours, to have Germany set out, alone if necessary, on a course toward regaining them which Russians, Poles, and Czechs would resist to the death. America's permanent interest, like Great Britain's in the nineteenth century, is that neither the European nor Asian continents be dominated by any single hostile power. Rather, the security interests of all, including Russia and East Europe, should be taken into account, and traditional European rivalries subdued and contained in multinational associations. Specifically, therefore, a credible and active American policy for German reunification should have two aspects: it should take into account the security interests of West Germany, Russia, and East Europe, (and it must therefore continue to urge on Bonn a policy of peaceful engagement with Eastern Europe), and it should preclude concessions to Moscow which would work against its achievement. This would mean that
the United States, contingent on reunification, would commit itself to support, first, the present East German-Polish border (the Oder-Neisse line); second, some verifiable military status for what is now East Germany, as well as for an equivalent area to the East, which would preclude the West German army, upon reunification, from advancing from the Elbe to the Oder (which would probably include the de-nuclearization of both the reunited Germany and of Poland and Czechoslovakia but their continued inclusion in Western or Eastern anti-ballistic missile [ABM] defenses, and in some kind of European security system); and, third, economic compensation to Russia and East Europe for the loss of East German trade, if any, attendant upon German reunification, plus some attractive form of association of East Europe with the Common Market.

The United States should not publicly proclaim this policy against the will of its West German ally. But we should make clear to Bonn that we would be unwilling to intensify our support of German reunification except within this context; and we should encourage public discussion, here and in Europe, of the issues involved.

The other part of this policy, that of not sacrificing German reunification to a détente with the Soviet Union, raises the final, and most immediate, issue of West German and American foreign policy: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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The non-proliferation issue has most recently come to the fore because of the resumption of Soviet-American Geneva negotiations on disarmament. Many West Germans, notably ex-Chancellor Adenauer, have maintained that the American position there, as expressed first by our Disarmament Agency head William Foster in a *Foreign Affairs* article and then in our draft non-proliferation treaty, went far toward surrendering the principle of the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) and toward a treaty which would permanently deny to West Germany any access, multilateral or otherwise, to nuclear weapons, in order to get Moscow to sign a non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, these Germans declare, even if Moscow were to sign such a treaty, which is unlikely, neither the Soviets nor we could permanently enforce it against West Germany, because no powerful nation can be forced, but only persuaded, not to have nuclear weapons, and because other nations, notably India and Israel, will soon follow the example of France and China and obtain nuclear weapons, if necessary on their own.

The American draft treaty does not formally preclude the MLF. In any case, it seems highly unlikely that Moscow will agree to it or any other treaty which does not bar all access to nuclear arms to West Germany. That Moscow fears West German nuclear arms is both true and understandable. Emotionally, after the destruction the Nazis wreaked on Russia in World War II, Russians naturally fear a revival of German military power. Strategically, the conversion of West German economic and technological into nuclear potential would swing the strategic
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balance strongly against the Soviet Union and would give nuclear weapons to a nation one-third of whose territory is occupied, and oppressed, by the Red Army.

West Germany's minimal short-range foreign policy aim, on the other hand, is to escape from its present second-class status, i.e. to be treated as an equal by Washington, Paris, and London, in order thereby more effectively to press for reunification. Furthermore, Germans increasingly realize that the possession of nuclear weapons increases any power's leverage against the predominant power in its own alliance system and its protection against its enemies. Yet for many reasons, including its own treaty commitments against their manufacture, the strong world-wide opposition to its obtaining them, and the realization that their acquisition would probably be an additional barrier to any eventual West German-Soviet détente leading to reunification, the West German government is not at least as yet in favor of the acquisition of national German atomic weapons. Faced, however, with the thread of a non-proliferation treaty inimical to its interests, it is reviving its own support of the initially American-proposed multilateral atomic force.

Washington alone can in the near future give Bonn any kind of access to nuclear weapons, since neither Britain nor France will. Ideally there is much to be said, given the history of the last hundred years, for a non-nuclear Germany. Yet if we deny now to a democratic Germany multilateral participation in nuclear weapons, we are not likely
indefinitely to be able to prevent, without using force (which we cer-
tainly would be most reluctant to do), a much more nationalistic Germany
getting national nuclear weapons on her own--and within a context of a
greatly intensified German nationalist drive for reunification which
would be indeed a danger for world peace. "Politics," Bismarck rightly
remarked, "is the art of the possible"--and since it is probably im-
possible in the long run to deny Germany some access to nuclear weap-
ons, we should both be receptive to any German wishes for multilateral
participation in them, and we should make clear to the Soviets that,
since in our view (as, realistically, in theirs) this is the best hope
of preventing national German nuclear weapons, we will refuse to sign
any non-proliferation treaty which forbids such a step. Moreover we
should now begin to explore with West Germany and our other European
allies a multilateral active defense system (of anti-ballistic missiles)
against the thousands of medium-range Soviet nuclear missiles directed
against Western Europe.

Non-proliferation of atomic weapons is, for those powers like
ourselves who already have them, a natural policy, but it is opposed
to the interests of, since it condemns to permanent second-class status,
all other major powers, particularly those menaced by outside threats
(such as India, Israel, and West Germany are.) We cannot prevent pro-
liferation any more than King Canute could keep back the tide. There-
fore to pay a price to Moscow for the ostensible preventing of something
which will happen anyway is naïve, and to pay for it the price of
antagonizing one of our major allies, West Germany, of making impossible the long-term continuation of our present alliance with it, and, what is worst of all, of pushing it toward the acquisition of national nuclear weapons, is foolish indeed. Moscow cannot stop non-proliferation any more than we can. We can, if we are wise, by making it multilateral, further our own and our German ally's interests and decrease its danger. That Moscow has no allies with West Germany's power or to whom it would give even multilateral access to nuclear weapons is its, not our, problem: it is the price of its inability to solve the problems of devolution of power from empire to alliance.

Our interest is in the prevention of nuclear war, reunification of Germany and of Europe, and in the gradual bringing back of a de-ideologized and no longer expansionist Russia into the world concert of nations. If we remain firm in Europe and in Asia, and if we welcome West Germany as an ally and support a realistic policy for its reunification and for its multilateral nuclear status, rather than try fruitlessly to condemn it permanently to be divided and without even access to multilateral nuclear weapons, we may look forward with some confidence to the future of Europe and of our relations with it.