THE REVIVAL OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISMS

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The slow but sure revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe can best be analyzed by considering its two major causes: first, changes in external influences and, second, domestic developments.

I

The primary external influence in Eastern Europe remains the Soviet Union. One of the results of the Second World War was that Eastern Europe fell into the Soviet sphere of influence; and, although to a lesser extent, it continues there until this day. At first, under Stalin, Eastern Europe increasingly became something close to a part of the Soviet Union. One of the tasks of his successors was to begin an imperial readjustment, in which Eastern Europe was the lesser problem; China, we now know, was the major one.

Paradoxically, it was largely not in spite of but because of the 1956 Polish October and Hungarian Revolution that by the late nineteen fifties Khrushchev seemed to be doing quite well in Eastern Europe. (We did not know then what we do now: he was already doing badly with China.) Khrushchev's program of de-Stalinization probably strengthened the Communist regime, at least for the present, within the Soviet Union, and it to some extent helped the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. (For example, between 1953 and 1957, and again after 1960, it greatly improved relations between Moscow and Belgrade.)

But for many reasons, including in particular the disintegration of relations between Moscow and Peking, this reconsolidation in Eastern Europe of the late fifties proved to be short-lived. (The point at which Moscow and Peking felt that a move toward a break rather than toward a reconciliation was probable was, at the latest, in 1959, and probably in 1958.)

Although few in the West then realized this, the leaders of Eastern Europe must have. They also realized that, as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute and of the gradual revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe, the dream of Marx and Lenin of proletarian internationalism, already transformed by Stalin into Soviet nationalism, was giving way to the re-emergence of the interests of


the East European nations and states rather than those of the international Communist movement or of the Soviet Union itself.

At the same time, and particularly after the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev (and, it now appears, his successors) were abandoning their dream of the continued "permanent revolution from above" of Soviet society and therefore of East European society as well. They apparently foresee its replacement by legitimization of the Communist regimes through economic accomplishments. This will give them more popular support; but one wonders, as many in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must wonder as well, what justification there is for Communist party rule when the economy, not the party's "permanent revolution," is the center of society.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has led, along with increased nationalism in Eastern Europe, to a gradual albeit unequal decline of Soviet authority in the area. This decline has increased the possibility of maneuver of the East European state and party leaderships both within the Sino-Soviet context and, for many of them, with the West as well. One sees this most strikingly in the case

of Romania, and one can even already see it to some extent in the case of such a hitherto Stalinist state as Czechoslovakia.

Other factors originating from the West have also been significant for East European developments. One is certainly the great rise in the economic and therefore of the political power of Western Europe, and in particular the more active East European policies of France and West Germany. 6 Secondly, there was the United States victory in the Cuban crisis, which went far, particularly in Romania, to convince the Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe that history is at least for the present probably not on the side of the Soviet Union.

The unity of the international Communist movement is gone, split not only into two but many parts, and most probably irreversibly. The revival of Chinese territorial and boundary ambitions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union make its reversibility even less likely. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung and his associates are committed to a long-range attempt to depose the Soviet Union as the head of the international Communist movement. This nation-state and ideological clash must seem even more irreversible to the East European leaders than it does to us.

Finally, a whole series of ethnic and boundary questions is re-emerging in the Soviet Union, in China, and in Eastern Europe.

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itself. Two world wars started in Central Europe over still unsolved and now reintensifying ethnic problems.

To the decline of Soviet authority and the increasing power and influence of the West in Eastern Europe, there is added a declining fear on the part of the East European leaderships that they need fear Western, or for that matter, Soviet intervention. The successful defiance of Moscow by Romania has been only one of its results. A whole series of domestic East European developments reinforces these trends.

II

The three most important recent domestic developments in Eastern Europe are the general economic growth, the increasing elite and mass nationalism, and the giving way of mass police terror to de-Stalinization and partial reform. These three developments have resulted in, first, a somewhat greater identification of the East European regimes with the peoples of these countries (a trend intensified by the regimes' declining identification with the Soviet Union) and, secondly (in addition to a declining fear of Western intervention) their declining need of Soviet troops to uphold their authority. However, there remain limits within which Soviet hegemony would probably still be asserted--specifically, as in Hungary in 1956, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or collapse of a one-party Communist regime.
There was in Eastern Europe from 1953 until 1956 a period known as the thaw,\(^7\) which culminated in and was reversed by the Hungarian Revolution,\(^5\) giving way thereafter to a reconsolidation of Communist power. Since about 1960, and more clearly since 1962, a new thaw has begun in Eastern Europe. As compared with the thaw there in the early fifties, this new thaw is first geographically more inclusive: with the exception of Albania and Poland, it includes to a greater or lesser extent all East European states. Secondly, it is less political and literary and more nationalist and economic in inspiration. Thirdly, it centers less among creative literary and revisionist intellectuals and more in the Communist party and economic apparatus.

The new thaw in economics has been caused primarily by the growing complexity and inefficiency of the East European economies. This is most clearly the case with respect to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, by far the most industrialized of East European states; their economic liberalization is much like what is occurring, more slowly, in the Soviet Union itself. The increasing development and complexity of their economies makes increasingly necessary, if only for the sake of efficiency, major reforms in


central planning in the direction of decentralization and of the introduction of a rational price system and of something close to a market economy. This problem, in turn, has led to an increasing conflict between the economic and managerial technicians, whose primary goal is economic efficiency, and the old-line party apparatchiki, whose coercive and propagandistic policies were useful in the period of rapid economic growth before a certain plane of industrialization was reached but whose same skills are increasingly counter-productive in increasingly complex economies.

This economic thaw was set off, or at least was greatly aided, by the beginning of the so-called Liberman discussion in the Soviet Union and by the worsening of economic conditions in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The proposals for decentralization of Professor Liberman of Kharkov, first introduced publicly in an article in Pravda in September 1962, involved decentralization and greater priority for consumer goods. They have been fairly rapidly accompanied by, and in part have probably given a convenient excuse for allowing to break through, similar but more far-reaching developments in Eastern Europe. These developments have been accompanied


by some shift in East European trade toward Western Europe, particularly by Romania, as well as by an increasing flood of tourists from the West, particularly Western Europe, a development encouraged by the East European regimes largely for economic reasons. Finally, Bucharest blocked Khrushchev's attempt to push forward much more rapidly the economic integration of East Europe.

I turn now to the nationalist elements, the second major factor in this new thaw. Three important points stand out: first, nationalism is endemic in Eastern Europe and it naturally revives when external pressure against it slackens; second, the revival of nationalist thought and action on the part of the Communist leaders is more important than, although in part induced by, that of their followers or the masses of the population; and, third, as before the reviving East European nationalism are often mutually hostile. The East European Communist leaders now recognize that neither the international Communist movement nor the Soviet Union, but their own states are the true framework of power. Once these nationalist feelings rise and result in some differences with, or, in Romania, partial defiance of, Soviet policy, other developments then become almost inevitable.

Since any East European state which even partially opposes the Soviet Union can no longer as completely as before rely upon

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Soviet support, it must therefore necessarily try to generate more popular support at home and also, if only minimally, to reinsure itself with some other external power. With the exception of Albania, where the power is China, with all other East European states this has resulted in the improvement of relations with the West. The combination of the necessity for more popular support at home and for improved relations with the West tends to result in concessions to the population of the country concerned and to a gradual decline in the domestic and external extremism of the party apparat.

The new thaw in Eastern Europe has not been confined only to nationalist and economic developments. There have been, varying from country to country, considerable changes also in the cultural sphere, both with respect to decline in the rigid limits of socialist realism (for example, a greater tolerance for abstract art) and also to a greater degree of Western cultural influence at both the elite and mass levels: creative literature, for example, and Western jazz.

III

Turning to the individual East European countries, one must first attempt to set up some categories of analysis. Any categories, for eight countries as increasingly different as these eight are, always oversimplify the analysis, but there do seem to be some general, approximate common patterns.
First, one may consider the leadership's domestic policies: whether or not it is neo-Stalinist (i.e., rigid) or reformist or even revisionist, and in addition, the direction in which it is moving. Second, one may consider its policy toward the West: whether it is conciliatory or hostile. Third, one may consider its attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, the major current foreign policy factor affecting East European countries; within this context one can consider a regime as either moderate, that is to say, opposed to a total and definitive break between Moscow and Peking, or extremist, that is to say, in favor of such a break or, minimally, in favor of the most extreme Soviet moves toward it.

First, with the partial exception of Romania and Yugoslavia, there has been no major change in the allegiance of East European states with respect to the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1960. There have been, however, significant minor changes. They may be summed up by saying that Soviet influence in Eastern Europe has consistently declined, and the influence of other Communist parties, in particular the Chinese (in Albania only), the Italian, and (although decreasingly) the Yugoslav has increased. Above all, the relative independence of the East European parties has increased since about 1959; indeed recent research has indicated that the Romanian deviation can be dated back in published material to 1958.  

Second, since 1960 the differentiation among these states has greatly

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increased. Third, although there has not yet been a formal split in the international Communist movement there has been a de facto break between the Soviet Union and China, a development which is probably the major foreign policy factor influencing the decisions of all East European leaderships.

IV

In considering developments in the individual East European states, one may best begin from the south, with the two most exceptional ones: Albania and Yugoslavia. The most significant thing about Albania is that for the first time since the withdrawal of the Mongols in the fourteenth century, a European state is under the influence of a major Far Eastern power: not just a traditional Far Eastern power, not even just a modernizing expansionist empire such as Japan, but a major modernizing Asian power with international revolutionary ambitions. The reason for the Albanian defiance of Moscow and its gradual 1957-1960 shift to Peking was the Albanians' fear and hatred of Yugoslavia, which twice before had nearly succeeded in not only deposing but—as things go in that part of the world—murdering the leadership of the Albanian Communist party. Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu naturally had no intention of running such a risk again. In 1955, Hoxha and Shehu were convinced, the Soviet Union had been prepared to sacrifice them to its greater interest in a rapprochement in Yugoslavia; and as Sino-Soviet differences deepened in the late fifties they believed that
Khrushchev was preparing to do the same thing again. Their choice--to ally with Peking against Moscow--was therefore natural and rational; and so far it has proved on balance quite successful.

True, the economic damage resulting from the loss of Soviet aid was very great in Albania--but that was so in China as well, and the damage is now gradually being repaired in both countries. The Chinese continue to support Albania, and there appears to be no reason why they will not do so in the future. (Whether Albania is following a policy significantly different from China, within an over-all alliance, remains doubtful.) Albanian relations with the West have been minimal, in spite of some anticipation in the early sixties that such relations might develop; but Tirana has become increasingly a center for pro-Chinese and pro-Albanian dissidence in Western European communism. Finally, Albania is significant because when direct overt Sino-Soviet polemics decline, as in the month after the fall of Khrushchev, one can tell from what the Albanians are saying what the Chinese are thinking: the rapid resumption of Albanian attacks upon the new Soviet leadership first made clear that Sino-Soviet reconciliation was not in the cards.\footnote{William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), passim and "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965," \textit{op. cit.}}

Yugoslavia is far more complicated. Stalin's 1948 break with Tito--Tito most reluctantly became a heretic--really began the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe. The latest Moscow-Belgrade
rapprochement probably began secretly in 1958-1959, concomitantly with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations; it became public by 1962. By 1965 Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy were largely aligned, particularly with respect to the West and underdeveloped areas.

There were internal Yugoslav reasons why Tito felt it desirable to allow his relations with the West to worsen and to improve his relations with Moscow. First, the Yugoslav economy tends to move cyclically from relative prosperity to near-crisis. In 1960 and 1961, and again by 1965, it was in crisis as a result of bad harvests and industrial and balance-of-payments difficulties. Second, Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, is both anti-German and anti-Chinese. Third, Tito is over seventy. The succession crisis in Yugoslavia will probably be the most difficult of any East European country. Yugoslavia has not one nation but six: the Serbs, the largest; the Croats, farther to the north; the Slovenians, the farthest north of all; and to the south the Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Albanians (half as many as those within the Albanian borders). Nationality tensions in Yugoslavia have caused more blood to flow than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

These tensions were submerged by the Communists, in part genuinely, as the result of popular recoil from the fratricidal slaughter of the war, and in part also because the Communists simply suppressed them by police measures. They are, however, re-emerging rapidly, particularly because, in spite of very large-scale
investments in the underdeveloped areas in the south and east of Yugoslavia, the economic growth of Slovenia and Croatia has been so great that the economic gap between the north and south is greater than it was in 1939. Furthermore, the immense investments in the south are made at the cost of the Croats and Slovenes to the north, a fact which in turn gives an economic as well as a religious and historical base to the nationalities tensions.

It is often said in Belgrade, and only half jokingly, that Tito is the only Yugoslav. Half Croat and half Slovene, he succeeded in identifying himself in the popular consciousness with the idea of Yugoslavia. But he is almost the only leading Yugoslav Communist who has. The two major contenders for the succession, the Serb Rankovic and the Slovene Kardelj, are thought of by the people not as Yugoslavs but as a Serb and a Slovene. One must assume, therefore, that nationalities tensions in Yugoslavia will greatly increase after the departure of Tito from the scene.

In the last year there has been a counteroffensive of the Croat and Slovene liberals against Belgrade's attempt to crack down, which occurred, in part in order to further the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, in 1961-1962. There has been very considerable intellectual ferment in Croatia and Slovenia, resulting in the case of Slovenia in the arrest and imprisonment of several rebellious writers in the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana, and in Croatia in the Mihajlov case. There has been a strong drive, led by the Communist leader of Croatia, Vladimir Bakaric, to bring about more economic
decentralization, thus furthering the autonomy of Slovenia and Croatia.

It would appear that the 1964 Congress of the Yugoslav Party was a victory for the liberals. Most recently, the worsening economic crisis has led to more economic decentralization at home but is also in large part responsible for the by now almost complete rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's only remaining source of foreign aid. As to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Yugoslavs would be in favor of a total break if they felt there were a serious danger of a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. Since there is not, they now prefer not to have a total break in order to retain greater freedom of maneuver.

Among the more rightist or reformist East European regimes, Poland is exceptional. Although the major gains of 1956 have been retained (the end of agricultural collectivization and of secret police terror, the uneasy but continuing *modus vivendi* with the Roman Catholic Church, and Polish autonomy from Moscow), Gomułka has otherwise, particularly in the more peripheral areas of culture and (in part) economics, been retreating from liberalization. The Polish "retreat from October" has many causes: Gomułka's dislike for intellectuals, his lack of concern for the West, the increasing

power of the more extremist party group known as the "Partisans," the economic stagnation of the country, and in general what appears to be a downward cycle in Polish affairs. Poland is no longer the freest country in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it is the only East European country except Yugoslavia where agricultural collectivization remains ended and where the Roman Catholic Church has such power. The Poles are unenthusiastic about a Sino-Soviet break; but their dependence on the Soviet Union (a dependence, by the way, of any Polish government, because of the necessity of protecting their western frontier) forbids them to defy the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the greatest changes in any East European country in the last five years have occurred in Hungary. In the first place, Kádár, in 1956 considered one of the greatest quislings of history, has performed an amazing job of self-rehabilitation; he has now achieved relative popularity. Hungary today is probably the freest country in Eastern Europe, in terms of cultural relaxation, foreign travel, and the end of mass secret police terror. True, agricultural collectivization continues, but the regime has introduced a kind of sharecropping which has greatly modified it. Hungarian relations with the West, particularly with West Germany, have

improved and at the same time the rise of Romanian nationalism in Transylvania (the northwestern part of Romania, where more than one and one-half million Hungarians live), has led to a reappearance of Hungarian nationalism within Hungary, concentrated, as so often before, on the Transylvanian question.

As to the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kádár also does not really want a Sino-Soviet break, but he still depends too much on Soviet economic aid and troops to be able to defy Moscow. Nevertheless, both Gomužka and Kádár demonstrated after Khrushchev's fall their dislike for the manner in which it had been carried out: their attitude toward the Soviet Union has thus become, within these narrow limits, somewhat ambivalent.

What until recently one would have called the leftist or extremist leaderships in Eastern Europe, the East Germans, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians, have also become very special cases. To begin with the most exceptional: East Germany—neither a state nor a nation, neither German nor democratic nor a republic. Its Communist regime probably never can be consolidated as long as West Germany remains so prosperous and powerful. Ulbricht remains the most hated Communist leader in the world. It is probable that, if the Soviet troops were withdrawn and the population of East Germany were convinced they would not return, Ulbricht and his associates would be hanging from lamp posts within a few hours. Nevertheless, as a result of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East German refugee flow, there has been a certain improvement
in the Pankow regime's position. Because of this, because of the necessity of improving economic productivity and therefore the necessity of economic reforms, and because of pressure from Moscow, there has been since the summer of 1962 a certain limited liberalization in East Germany, primarily in economics, moving toward more decentralization and a greater role for the market and rational prices. There have been also improvements in food supply, in the situation of the youth, in the system of justice, and, to some extent, in the cultural field.

In foreign policy--and this for East Germany means the problem of German reunification--the situation remains unchanged. Ulbricht strongly fears any Soviet rapprochement with West Germany; he must therefore have been rather disquieted in the last months of Khrushchev's power. Ulbricht does not want a total Sino-Soviet break. He would like to be able to afford to play a little with the Chinese, with some of whose policies he sympathizes; but his total dependence on Soviet troops, his conviction that without them he is doomed, means that he remains in foreign policy, and largely in domestic policy as well, a servant of Soviet policy. Even so, he tries to be no more hostile to the Chinese than Moscow insists upon.

Of the previously neo-Stalinist regimes, by far the greatest internal changes have occurred in Czechoslovakia. There internal

policy seems now to be in transition from extremist to liberal. The Czechs have always been cautious. Their last successful revolt was in 1620; and it is unlikely, given their long experience in surviving, that they will soon revolt again. But the Czech economy is very developed, and by 1962-1963 it was in a very major crisis. The rate of economic growth in Czechoslovakia in 1963 was -0.1 percent, almost a record for the world--if one excepts Indonesia. Because of this economic crisis, because of the inability of this highly-developed country to grow with the system of central planning, the political leaders of Czechoslovakia, and particularly its head, Antonín Novotný, have reluctantly felt compelled to listen to the advice of their economists and to move toward major economic decentralization. 17 At the same time and also because of their need for more foreign currency, they have felt forced to allow a flood of Western tourists to visit the country. There has also been a considerable increase in cultural freedom within Czechoslovakia, as well as some signs of the revival of Czech-Slovak rivalry which plagued the first interwar Czechoslovak Republic.

In spite of all this, Novotný, who was the Stalinist leader of Czechoslovakia, has survived. True, he has disposed of many of his associates, and perhaps only by throwing overboard this ballast has he been able to save himself. But at the present time not only

has he survived, but he was apparently sufficiently confident of
his own strength so that after the fall of Khrushchev he indicated
more public displeasure than almost any other East European leader.
He reportedly refused to go to Moscow for the October Revolution
celebration, the only East European leader who did so--a step which
has, of course, given him greater popularity in the country.
Czechoslovakia may well, slowly and cautiously, try to imitate
Romania's new foreign policy, at least in part. 18

There have also been stirrings, albeit of a different kind, in
Bulgaria. The Soviet Union is back in the Balkans where the
Tsar was in 1880: it can rely at most on Bulgaria. Bulgaria has
also carried out extensive decentralization of its economy, and
some Bulgarian economists have exhibited a certain degree of ideo-
logical economic revisionism. Much more importantly, in the spring
of 1965 the Sofia regime uncovered and crushed a politico-military
conspiracy against it--the first time that any East European Com-
munist army was even partially involved in an antiregime conspiracy.
The conspirators were basically nationalist in orientation, not
pro-Chinese, and most of them had a wartime partisan background.
Although crushed, the conspiracy showed the weakness of the Zhivkov
regime. Out of tradition, out of the weakness of the present Bul-
garian regime, out of the need it feels for protection against the

18. Viktor Meier, "Die Tschechoslowakei am Kreuzweg," Neue
Zürcher Zeitung, June 6, June 20, and July 8, 1965.
rebellious Yugoslavs and Romanians, Bulgaria remains, as it did in 1880, a satellite of Russia; but the unsuccessful coup showed that even in Sofia Soviet control is neither certain nor necessarily permanent. 19

Romania is by far the most interesting country in Eastern Europe. As has been pointed out before, recent research has indicated that the beginnings of Romanian dissent go back to 1958. The documentation available for this early period is entirely economic; it concerns the Romanian rejection of multilateral economic integration within CMEA, a move caused primarily by Bucharest's justified fear that it would profit only the countries already industrialized, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, while Romania would remain primarily a source of raw materials, an economic colony of the Soviet Union and of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which the Romanians are no more likely to accept than is any other economically colonized underdeveloped country. Romania is by far the wealthiest country in Eastern Europe, not only because of its timber and agricultural products but also because of its very major resources in oil and natural gas. It has therefore substantial resources to build its own industrialized economic base, and it is determined to use them to do so.

The Romanian differences with the Soviet Union have not been only economic; they have historical and political causes as well. The Romanians have always been anti-Slav and anti-Russian. Moreover, in 1940 the Soviet Union unilaterally annexed the northern part of Romania, Bessarabia and Bukovina, a move which still rankles in Romanian hearts. Furthermore, the present Communist leadership of Romania is almost entirely "native"; it is composed of people who did not spend the interwar period or the Second World War in Moscow, and it is almost entirely ethnically Romanian in origin. (Most top Hungarian, Ukrainian, or Jewish Communists were purged in 1952-1957.) The Romanian Communist leaders saw their opportunity in the Sino-Soviet dispute; and they have known how to maneuver brilliantly between Moscow and Peking. (Such dancing on a tightrope is nothing new in Romanian history: the Romanians changed sides in the First and Second World Wars at just the right time and with very favorable results.)

As became publicly and totally clear in its declaration of April 1964, the Romanian leadership has adopted a modified national communism. Its partial break with Moscow has led to an improvement of its relations with the West and with its own population, to the release, for example, of political prisoners, and to an increasing degree of cultural liberalization. Nevertheless, Romania's national communism fundamentally reflects the desire of brilliantly, if treacherously, successful bureaucrats to run their own affairs and to play with all sides for their own benefits to have good relations

with everybody, that is, except Hungary, where the Transylvanian

problem makes this impossible. In spite of Romania's refusal to

attend the March 1965 18-party conference, its relations with

Moscow remain correct, and those with Belgrade and Warsaw excellent.

The Romanians have now probably the best position they have

ever had in their history. They can balance not only against their

immediate neighbors and against the West on the one hand and the

Russians on the other, but they can also balance the Russians

against the Chinese.

Finally, what of the most recent developments? After Khru-

shchev's fall quite a few of the East European parties, the Poles,

the Czechs, the East Germans, and the Hungarians, publicly indicated

their dislike for the way his removal was handled, a dislike made

clearest by Novotný's refusal to go to Moscow. It is increasingly

clear that Khrushchev's fall and his successors' indecision, divi-
sion, and dilemma in Vietnam have greatly diminished the already

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(with bibliography); Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian
Dispute with Comecon," loc. cit.; J. F. Brown, "Eastern Europe,"
Survey, No. 54 (January 1965), reprinted in Leopold Labedz, ed.,
International Communism After Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: The
M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 65-83; c. k. /Christian Kind/, "Rumaniens
industrielles Aufbauprogramm," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 11, 1964;
and Viktor Meier, "Rumaniens Selbständigkeit im Ostblock," May 9,
12, 15, 19, 22, 25, 1965 and "Annäherung Bukarests an Prag," ibid.,
declining Soviet prestige in Eastern Europe.

What, then, are the factors which characterize the East European scene today? The downgrading of the secret police and the decline of mass terror both within and without the party make it easier for the intelligentsia, particularly managerial and economic ones, and harder for the party apparat. This, plus economic development, leads toward the decline of the decisive superiority of the party apparat over various competing élites. There are, of course, limits to this liberalization; and it is important to understand both how far liberalization has gone and its limits.

As the Hungarian Revolution demonstrated, the Soviets probably are still unwilling to allow the denunciation of a formal military alliance with the Soviet Union. Yet Albania and Yugoslavia are not allied with the Soviet Union in any effective military sense, and one must at least pose the question whether the Romanians in fact remain so. The Soviet Union would probably also not allow the formal abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the end of Communist hegemony, and of a one-party state, but one can keep the ideology and so redefine it--as, for example, the Yugoslavs did--that in part it becomes revisionist and thus increasingly likely to infect its neighbors.

Then there is the evolution within the apparat itself: the decline in the power of the agitprop and of the purely party apparatchiki, the increase in the power of economic technicians, and the moving toward power of a new, postwar generation. The
Communist élites of Eastern Europe are increasingly modernizing, anti-Soviet, nationalistic, anti-Western, and anti-democratic. What was Communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe is becoming more authoritarian in character. Mass terror is becoming exceptional. There are greater areas of autonomy for non-party élites. There is a gradual change from the atmosphere of ideological struggle and revolution from above to more pragmatic and economic goals. Finally, there is increased independence from Moscow.

This re-emergence of national identities in Eastern Europe will not soon probably produce democracy. It will, however, probably lead to some, albeit limited, liberalization, but above all to the nationalization and bureaucratization of the East European dictatorships.