NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE:
THE SOVIETS AT GENEVA 1962-1964

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Any analysis of disarmament qua disarmament must of necessity be incomplete, if not superficial. The observation that disarmament policy is a function of overall national strategy, military technology, economic alternatives, diplomatic considerations and the political environment has been so often made that one can easily ignore it as a cliche. Disarmament policy is only one element — and by and large only a small one at that — of a major power's foreign policy. Any dramatic changes in a nation's disarmament policy is the product, not the cause, of deeper and more widespread developments in foreign policy. The year 1963 did indeed witness dramatic changes in Soviet policy and saw for the first time the consumation of agreements in limited but nonetheless important arms control measures. The question naturally arises, "What factors induced the USSR to come to agreement with the West?"

This study of Soviet disarmament policies does not seek to answer that question but only to provide information that might be helpful in the quest. It is an incomplete study because it is based primarily upon the proposals and statements that constitute the formal record of disarmament negotiations.

1. By disarmament policy I mean the specific disarmament or arms control proposals made by a nation, the techniques used to advance these proposals and all actions taken by a nation which are intended to influence another power's response to the proposals.

2. The "hotline" agreement, Test Ban treaty and resolution neutralizing outer space are actually the second, third and fourth arms control measures agreed upon between the U.S.S.R. and the West. The first was the Antarctica Treaty signed in December 1959. Articles I and V of the treaty provided for the maintenance of the continent as a disarmed area and Article III provided for a system of inspection to guarantee observance.
The primary data utilized are the verbatim records and supporting documents of the ENSO. In order to assess the nature of the changes in Soviet disarmament and arms control policies in 1963, it is necessary to examine first the U.S.S.R.'s policies preceding that year. For that reason approximately half of this paper will be concerned with Soviet disarmament policies in 1962.
Chapter One

1962: AN INTERLUDE

The events of 1962 illustrate the generalization that disarmament policies are the consequence of fundamental foreign policy developments rather than their cause. Throughout 1962 nothing of lasting significance took place in the field of disarmament; yet during that year developments unfolded which were subsequently to have a great impact on the disarmament policies of the Soviet Union. Foremost among these developments were the refroidissement in Sino-Soviet relations, the economic drain of lagging agricultural production, an increase in United States superiority in long-range strategic capability and, perhaps most important of all, the detente in East-West relations as a result of the Cuban missile crisis.

In retrospect the year 1962 seems to have been a period of consolidation and gestation for Soviet disarmament policies. With the resumption of nuclear tests in August 1961 and Soviet repudiation on November 28, 1961 of its previous acceptance of international controls, the efforts of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty collapsed completely. This followed by approximately one year the walkout (on June 27, 1960) of the Soviet representatives from the Ten-Nation Disarmament

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Conference and the end of efforts to negotiate general disarmament. As
1961 merged into 1962 disarmament negotiations for all practical purposes
had ceased.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

The successor to both the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, (hereafter referred to as ENDC)
agreed upon by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union at
the United Nations in late 1961 and approved by the General Assembly on
December 20. It was inevitable after the break-up of the Ten-Nation Com-
mitee that a successor body would be created for general disarmament
negotiations. No sooner has one disarmament forum expired then pressure has
been generated for a new body. In effect, the numerous committees, commis-
sions and conferences established since 1946 have constituted one permanent
diplomatic conference---changing in membership and mandates---but always
available to consider measures for disarmament.

Originally these bodies were dominated by Western powers. By the
latter 1950's the Soviets were demanding parity of membership which they
eventually obtained: first in 1958 with the Surprise Attack Conference and
Geneva Conference of Experts and then in 1960 with the Ten-Nation Committee.
Following their walk-out of the Ten-Nation Committee the USSR announced its
refusal to reconvoke that body. The Soviet Government proposed enlarging
the committee by the addition of five uncommitted nations, but this was
unacceptable to the West because of its similarity to the "troika". The
compromise finally agreed upon---adding eight neutral members to form an
Eighteen-Nation Committee—is in reality close to the original Soviet concept inasmuch as each member is looked upon as belonging either to the Eastern, Western or neutral group. Since all decisions are made by a unanimous vote the troika principle is actually irrelevant.

On March 14, 1962 the ENDC convened in Geneva. It is currently in its seventh session. The table below outlines the periods of ENDC activity:

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<th>ENDC Plenary Sessions</th>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>First session:</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>Sixth session:</td>
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<td>Seventh session:</td>
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Three Power Subcommittees

21 March-18 December 1962 Meetings 1-50

Committee of the Whole

28 March-19 July 1962 Meetings 1-9

2 The members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are Brasil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechooslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States. President DeGaulle has chosen not to send a French representative.
Throughout 1962 the ENDC was the principal locus of disarmament negotiations. It was early agreed that the plenary meetings would be devoted to a discussion of general and complete disarmament. In order to permit concurrent consideration of other matters two subsidiary organs of the Committee were established: a Committee of the Whole to examine partial measures that might facilitate general disarmament and lessen international tension, and a sub-committee of the three nuclear powers to negotiate a nuclear test ban. These procedural arrangements were modified in 1963 when the Committee of the Whole and the three-power sub-committee ceased to meet and the ENDC chose to divide its plenary sessions between discussions of general disarmament, collateral measures and a test ban. An interesting innovation for disarmament conferences was the decision to make the Soviet and American representatives permanent co-chairmen. Their function was to consult regularly in order to work out any differences that might hinder the smooth operation of the Conference.

The Soviet Plan: Utopia in four or five years

All early indicators pointed to a long, arduous Conference. Neither side had given any public hints that it was prepared to make substantial concessions from previous positions. Indeed during the summer of 1961 prolonged bilateral discussions were necessary before an acceptable statement of principles could be devised to serve as a mandate for a renewal of disarmament negotiations. The resulting "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles" created a broad and vague superstructure that might comfortably house both the United States and Soviet plans. Messers McCloy and Zorin, who negotiated the Joint Statement agreed that disarmament must be complete, general and effectively
controlled; that it must be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, which should insure that neither side secured a military balance in the process; and that peace-keeping and dispute-settling institutions must be created for a disarmed world. The United States made a determined but unsuccessful effort to add a clause guaranteeing verification of retained, as well as destroyed, arms --- a vital point in the western proposals.

Another harbinger of difficulties was Premier Khrushchev’s efforts to convert the opening meetings of the ENDC into a summit conference. As an alternative to the Anglo-American suggestion that foreign ministers attend the opening sessions, the Soviet leader proposed the convocation of the ENDC by the Heads of Governments represented on the Committee. He responded somewhat splanatically to the Western refusal, seeing in it a foretaste of stalemate. "We cannot help wondering whether your reluctance to go to Geneva, Mr. President", Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy on February 21, "is not due to the fact that you have already privately condemned the Committee of Eighteen to failure, making up your mind in advance that the Committee will not succeed in dealing with the problems which it was set up to solve." Khrushchev took this occasion to review previous Soviet objections to Western proposals, in particular their demands for strict control. "An impression is being formed," he said, "that some disarmament game

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is being played.... Various plans are brought out which are deliberately calculated to be rejected by the other side.\textsuperscript{6} Eventually the Soviet premier accepted Western assurances that the Heads of Government would intervene when appropriate, and he acquiesced in the use of foreign ministers to start the Conference's work.

It is unnecessary for the purposes of this analysis to describe in detail the Soviet disarmament plan offered before the Committee. Though entitled a draft treaty, it was like its Western counterpart, no more than an outline of basic provisions to be incorporated into some future treaty. Also like its Western counterpart the Soviet plan was an expanded revision of earlier proposals. Its objectives were total as implied by the words general and complete: "general" meant that every nation possessing arms should disarm and "complete" meant the total abolition of all weapons. It is worth noting here that unlike the test ban conversations, those involving general disarmament never reached the stage of meaningful negotiations. The discussions rarely moved from broad generalization to specifics. Each side prepared long speeches designed either to defend its own position or attack that of the opposition, but never to explore an acceptable middle position. In a word, the discussions of general disarmament in 1962 were more in the nature of parallel monologues than a dialogue. The outline below summarized the main elements of the Soviet plan and contrasts with them the comparable positions of the United States plan:\textsuperscript{7}


Soviet Plan

a) General and complete disarmament to be brought about in three consecutive stages over a four year period.

b) In first stage (lasting fifteen months) all means of delivering nuclear weapons (vis., ships, airplanes and missiles) to be destroyed and all foreign military bases on alien territories disbanded.

c) First stage manpower reduction for United States and USSR to 1,700,000. Corresponding reduction of conventional arms and military budgets. Prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and orbiting of weapons of mass destruction.

United States Plan

a) Disarmament to be achieved in three stages but the transition to each stage not automatic. Stage II would not begin, e.g., until "all militarily significant states" (presumably including Communist China) had acceded to the treaty. Major powers would retain a veto over transition to stages II and III. No total time period established for completing disarmament.

b) In first stage (lasting three years) armaments reduced by 30%. Flight tests of missiles limited to an agreed quota. Production of fissionable material for military purposes to cease and an agreed quantity of U-235 to be transferred to peaceful uses. Parties would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion and would refrain from the use of force of any type. Military bases not reduced until second stage.

c) Force level reduction to 2,100,000. Prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and orbiting of weapons of mass destruction.
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<th><strong>Soviet Plan</strong></th>
<th><strong>United States Plan</strong></th>
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<td><strong>d)</strong> In second stage (15 months) all nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons to be eliminated; cessation of production of nuclear weapons.</td>
<td><strong>d)</strong> In second stage (three years) parties to reduce fissionable materials &quot;to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages.&quot;</td>
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<td><strong>e)</strong> Second stage manpower reduction for United States and USSR to 1,000,000 men with a proportional reduction of conventional arms and equipment.</td>
<td><strong>e)</strong> Second stage manpower reduction and armaments reduction by 50% of remainder at end of first stage. Military bases destroyed.</td>
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<td><strong>f)</strong> In third stage (one year) &quot;military machinery of States&quot; to be eliminated except for firearms to maintain internal order and small militia to be used for maintenance of international peace.</td>
<td><strong>f)</strong> Stage III an indeterminate period. When the necessary controls worked out and agreed upon the disarmament process to be completed.</td>
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<td><strong>g)</strong> Each disarmament measure to be &quot;accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.&quot; An international disarmament organisation to be created to exercise control. IDO Control Council composed of &quot;the three principal groups of States existing in the world.&quot; With majority vote required for decisions.</td>
<td><strong>g)</strong> Control provisions more specific and rigorous. International Disarmament Organisation to have &quot;unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for... effective verification&quot;. Verification to cover not only destroyed arms but retained armaments. As a verification technique the United States proposed a plan of progressive on-site inspection.</td>
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<td><strong>h)</strong> A United Nations peace force to be created via article 43 of United Nations Charter, Command of units made available to United Nations force to be composed on a &quot;troika&quot; basis. No enforcement section can be taken without the approval of the Security Council, i.e. with veto.</td>
<td><strong>h)</strong> A United Nations peace force would be established in the second stage and so strengthened in the third stage &quot;that no State could challenge it.&quot; During the second stage all parties would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide legal disputes.</td>
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These two blueprints for a disarmed world differed on three fundamental issues. In the order of importance, as determined by the amount of time consumed in discussion, they were: (1) The sequence and timing for disarmament of the various components of both countries' military structure; (2) the nature of the control arrangements to guarantee verification of agreed measures; and (3) the institutional arrangements to promote national security in a disarmed world. In focusing upon these three issues, we do not mean to suggest that there were not other points of disagreement or that other differences were not serious. In fact the catalogue of differences is lengthy, and few have been resolved. Soviet and Western responses to these three issues, however, constituted the core of their disarmament differences in 1962 and 1963. Indeed, over the whole post-war period these issues have consistently and continuously plagued the disarmament negotiators.

The problem of sequence and priorities for doing away with armaments was manifested in the debate over what should be contained in the first stage of the program. The key feature of the Soviet plan --- and that which rendered it most objectionable to the West --- was the first stage provision eliminating in toto all the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and all foreign military bases on alien territories. Almost all other first stage measures, including a reduction of manpower and conventional armaments, were tied to this provision. Those troops released as a consequence of the eliminating of nuclear delivery vehicles and the dismantling of foreign bases would be among the first to be disbanded; and conventional armaments production in turn would cease in proportion to the number of troops demobilized. Only by destroying nuclear delivery vehicles and foreign military bases in the first stage, the Soviets
insisted, could the danger of an attack with nuclear weapons be completely eliminated. Nuclear attack they contended was the greatest threat confronting mankind and the greatest source of tension in the world. Overseas military bases were by their very nature aggressive. 8 A radical evil required a radical cure.

Western objections centered around the military imbalance that would be created by the immediate destruction of both the United States nuclear deterrent and the NATO alliance. Europe would be vulnerable to the concentration of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe after all American forces had pulled back across the Atlantic. Almost equally objectionable from the Western viewpoint was the "unrealistic" time span — 15 months — allotted for the implementation and verification of such a radical proposal. As will be noted below the West envisaged a considerably more comprehensive control system than did the Russians and did not believe one could be put into operation and working in so short a period.

A second dividing issue was control. Here, too the 1962 and 1963 debates were variations on themes composed as far back as 1946 and earlier. Control has in the Western mind become the substitute for trust. Ironically the Soviets have been unable to accept extensive control precisely because of

8 A characteristic expression of the Soviet position on military bases was Zorin's statement before the ENDC that, "Military bases, as well as the stationing of foreign troops in the territory of other States, are a peculiar military institution of its own kind engendered by the cold war and, in its turn, engendering tension in relations between States. The main purpose of foreign military bases in alien territory is not to defend the State which possesses such bases. Foreign military bases are, above all, strongpoints for aggressive hostile actions." ENDC/PV 12, 30 April 1962, p. 9.
distrust. Their spokesmen have repeatedly professed a willingness to accept control — indeed Foreign Minister Gromyko told the ENDC, "Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word.... Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament."— yet, the characteristic feature of their control proposals was vagueness. Article two of the Soviet plan provided "Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure." But nowhere in the treaty was "measures as are necessary" defined. From the text of the Soviet draft treaty the parameters of an inspection system emerge. There is frequent reference to inspectors. The sentence "Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs ... above" is used almost identically in 10 articles and similar expressions are found in 12 other articles. The treaty stipulates that inspectors shall have unimpeded access to financial records, and that documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to the disbanding of personnel shall be made available to the I.D.O. Finally when total disarmament is achieved the I.D.O. will have the right of access at any time to any point within an inspected territory and shall have the right to utilize aerial inspection.

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9 ENDC/PV. 2, 15 March 1962, p. 11.

10 This quotation and the following references to the Soviet control provisions are taken from the "Revised Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control" of 22 September 1962. The text is contained in Documents on Disarmament 1962 (two volumes), United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication No. 19. Washington, D. C. Nov. 1963, pp. 913-938. (Hereinafter this volume will be cited simply as Documents 1962.)
With one important exception Western objections to Soviet control provisions were general rather than specific. They were more perturbed over the plan's omissions than its contents. The West wanted reasonable assurances that all disarmament measures could and would be verified. That meant agreement had to be reached on the specific modalities of control for each disarmament measure. In some situations these modalities have not even been determined, such as, for example, a method for detecting concealed nuclear weapons. Thus the United States proposal had an element of contingency about it. It envisaged the formation of joint study groups to formulate workable control measures; and until such measures are agreed upon the United States has refused to commit itself to consummate any disarmament program and has refused to agree to any time period within which a disarmament program can be completed.

Soviet failure to include any provisions for joint studies on the means of eliminating nuclear weapons marks, in fact a backsliding from previous Soviet disarmament provisions. As far back as 1955 the USSR acknowledged that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control," and as recently as its proposals of September 23, 1960 the USSR provided for joint studies for controlling the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.12


Opposition to technical studies of any kind was one of the hallmarks of the Soviet negotiating posture in 1962.

The one specific control feature on which the East and West clashed sharply was the question of control over retained armaments. The Western powers demanded that at each stage of disarmament verification measures guarantee not only that each side reduce its forces and arms as specified but also that at every stage of the disarmament program neither side possess more men or material than the plan specified. As one means to bring about this kind of verification the United States proposed a scheme for progressive zonal inspection. Simply stated this idea contemplated dividing the major powers into a number of zones. At each stage of disarmament the major powers would reveal the number and description of arms in every zone and controllers would inspect a number of zones to correspond with the percentage of disarmament undertaken. Both the plan of progressive zonal inspection and the principle of inspecting retained arms were bitterly condemned. "The demand for verification of the levels of the armed forces and armaments remaining in the possession of the States," Valerian Zorin told the ENDC, "is...control prior to disarmament, control over armaments, and we have every reason to regard this as military intelligence work and espionage." In Soviet diplomatic parlance the expression "control over armaments" refers to verification of retained arms. In contrast to "control over disarmament" which at least in principle they accept, control over armaments remains anathema.

13 ENDC/PV. 21, 16 April 1962, p. 31.
A third major difference between the Soviet and United States plans concerned the means by which national security would be maintained in a disarmed world. Specifically, both sides clashed over the composition of and command over any international army created to suppress a possible aggressor. Much of this debate, of course, had a hypothetical quality because it involved problems that would be encountered after disarmament. The Western powers wanted agreement on a strong international peace force whose command would not be paralyzed by a "troika" structure or by big power veto. Although not a feature of its plan, the United States wanted serious consideration given to the possibility of equipping such a peace force with nuclear weapons.

Soviet opposition to an international army not checked by a veto took the form of a defense of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council and national sovereignty. Ambassador Zorin accused the United States of "attempting to bypass the Security Council." He also charged that "The United States is, in fact, proposing no less than the establishment of some supra-State, supra-national authority possessing international armed forces and entitled to dictate its will to States and to take enforcement measures against them." The Romanian representative warned that "Peace cannot be built upon the ruins of the sovereignty of States."

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Some Strategic and Tactical Considerations

One of the problems of analyzing disarmament negotiations is separating those strategies and tactics which are related to events beyond

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1. ENDC/PV. 26. 24 April 1962, p. 29. See also ENDC/PV. 27. 25 April 1962, pp. 34-35.
2. ENDC/PV. 30. 3 May 1962, p. 34.
the conference room from those which are sui generis to the negotiations.
Disarmament negotiations have become virtually a permanent feature of the Cold War and have over the years given birth to a ritual or code of behavior which is peculiar to this form of international intercourse. At times proposals seemed to have become ends instead of means and to have acquired a life of their own. Negotiations have had to be pursued even when the expectations of success were low. Speeches have to be prepared, responses made, criticisms rebutted.

Soviet strategy at Geneva in 1962 was dictated less by the prospects of bridging East-West differences, and in so doing consummating an agreement, than by hopes of enhancing the USSR's image as the standard bearer of peaceful co-existence and exposing the West as the fountainhead of international tension. The presence of eight neutral members at the conference created both a challenge and an opportunity to use the disarmament forum to win support for Soviet policies among the uncommitted nations. Certainly it does not detract from the seriousness of purpose and sincerity of motivation of those at the ENDC to note that propaganda played a significant role in Soviet (as in Western) calculations. Whether or not an agreement might emerge, it was important to prepare the groundwork for future debates in future conferences. In this connection one of the most persistent Soviet objectives was to get the West to commit itself to a wide range of specific disarmament measures. If successful, the USSR might subsequently argue that the West had already accepted a Soviet program and accuse it of reneging.
Some of the Soviet tactics at Geneva were clearly related to recognizable objectives; others not. Some were obvious, others were subtle. Among the more prominent of the Soviet tactical maneuvers and diplomatic practices were the following:

a) The Soviets sought to focus the discussion on their own rather than Western proposals.

b) The Soviets consistently preferred to discuss all issues in plenary sessions rather than in smaller sub-committees or technical committees.

c) The Soviets assumed the posture of proposing the most complete and comprehensive --- even radical --- disarmament measures.

d) The Soviets sought to have formally recorded general formulas that glossed over East-West differences in preference to thrashing out the differences.

e) Proportionally more time was consumed by the Soviets in attacking the other side's proposals and motivations than by the West.

f) The Soviets utilized compromise and the appearance of compromise.

The primary activity of the ENDC in its first session was the drafting of a text for the early articles of a comprehensive treaty. First before the conference was the USSR's Draft Treaty Submitted on 15 March, followed by the United States' Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty of April 18. Probably not expecting to be successful, the
Soviet bloc quickly sought to have the USSR plan adopted as the basis for discussion. Taking the titles of the two documents literally they argued that the Soviet proposal was more complete since it was a draft treaty whereas the United States' proposal was only an outline of basic provisions for a treaty. The Czech representative, for example, argued that the Soviet plan constituted "a logical and organic whole", that it was "realistic" and "balanced" while the United States plan on the other hand was "a grouping of a number of individual measures".\textsuperscript{16} E.L.M. Burns, the Canadian representative, quite frankly called the spade for what it was:

If one document is taken as the framework of our discussions, it puts those who are adhering to the formulation of the other document at a negotiating disadvantage. They would be put in the position of always having to offer amendments or objections, and thus would be shown, artificially, as being negative in their attitude. I am sure that no one here wishes to adopt a procedure which would have that result.\textsuperscript{17}

On this issue the Soviets did not press. But they did press their position on two other procedural points. Zorin opposed an American suggestion that the plenary conference identify major substantive areas of

\textsuperscript{16}EDC/PV. 10, 27 March 1962, pp. 26-27. Possibly the most outlandish claim for the Soviet text was the one made by Foreign Minister Gromyko in an address before the Supreme Soviet on April 21, 1962. He said: "Without fearing a lapse into exaggeration, it may be said that the submission of our draft treaty has been the main event in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Some participants in the Committee have frankly admitted to us that they expected new major proposals from the Soviet Government, but nobody imagined that it would put forward a document, in which the whole process of disarmament from beginning to end was set out so precisely and accurately, in almost mathematical language." Documents 1962, vol. 1, pp. 421-425.

\textsuperscript{17}EDC/PV. 15, 4 April 1962, p. 46.
a disarmament program and have these areas discussed in subcommittee. He wanted the conference to consider the documents presented by both sides rather than "particular questions". Throughout the negotiations the Soviet team laid great stress on the importance of the texts before the conference. They sought to have discussions center around texts rather than issues.18

Even more emphatic was Soviet opposition to the use of subcommittees, technical committees or meetings of experts. On this issue they fought not only the West but several of the neutrals as well. The Anglo-American team tried in vain to induce the Soviets to join with them in committees of experts to work out technical problems, particularly technical problems associated with control. Brazil and Sweden also pressed for technical studies at various stages of debate. Typical was V. V. Kuznetsov's response of August 27 to such a request by Arthur Dean:

Mr. Dean raised the question of setting up a working party on the reduction of conventional armaments. As we know, this is not the first attempt of the Western Powers to set up various types of working parties, technical commission.(sic), groups of experts, and so on, right from the very beginning of the work of the Committee, while the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament had still not been agreed. Such an approach would not only be unlikely to facilitate and expedite agreement on the main questions, but would undoubtedly deflect the attention of the Committee from its basic task and lead the negotiations into a deadlock. 19

As a result of these Soviet positions on points of procedure no use was made of technical subcommittees or committees of experts by the ENDC in 1962.

On April 17 the ENDC received and adopted ad referendum a working

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18 The procedures adopted by the Committee followed more closely the Soviet than the Western point of view. See ENDC/1/Add.1, 28 March 1962; ENDC/1/Add.2, 16 July 1962; and ENDC/1/Add.3, 21 July 1962.

19 ENDC/PV. 75. 27 August 1962, p. 49.
draft of a preamble that had been agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the first of several documents which ultimately, it was hoped, would combine to constitute a full treaty on general and complete disarmament. It was agreed by the conference that in instances where it was impossible to reconcile differences the disputed wording preferred by the United States would be placed in single brackets and that preferred by the USSR in double brackets. Hopefully at this initial stage in treaty-drafting the first text submitted contained few brackets.20 This might be expected of the preamble, which merely expressed in general terms the purposes of the treaty. But the differences were significant.

The USSR objected to two phrases desired by the United States. One was the expression "in a peaceful world" which the United States insisted should immediately follow the title: "draft preamble of the treaty on general and complete disarmament," and the other was a statement of purposes by which the nations declared "their goal to be a free, secure and peaceful world of independent States adhering to common standards of international conduct, a world where change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." Arthur Dean wanted these words included in the preamble in order to make clear the United States contention that disarmament alone would not assure perpetual peace. Inevitably even in a disarmed world conflicts would arise and large nations might be tempted to commit aggression against relatively weaker neighbors. Therefore there would be a place for and a need for United Nations peace-keeping machinery.

20 The text of the draft is ENDC/L.11/Rev.1. 17 April 1962. This text replaced an earlier draft submitted on April 6. The first draft (ENDC/L.7/ April 1962) did contain many differences of wording but in the interim the differences had been worked out.
Recognising further that there would be change in a disarmed world the United States wanted an explicit affirmation that such change take place in accordance with United Nations principles, i.e., be peaceful.

Behind this seemingly innocuous phraseology and the justification for it lay a subtle challenge to one aspect of Marxist-Leninist ideology. It undermined the legitimacy of violent revolution and what the Communists call "wars of national liberation". The Soviet spokesman understood this.

A reply made by Valerian Zorin on April 11 deserves lengthy quotation because it focuses upon a deep incompatibility between the two sides with respect to a disarmament program. In effect Zorin was saying that disarmament would not impede the spread of communism. He observed:

We consider that the statement ... proposed by the United States, that our goal is "a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter", is incorrect. As we know, far-reaching changes are taking place throughout the world as a result on the one hand, of the liberation of former colonial peoples from colonial dependency and the creation of new independent States and, on the other, of major social and economic changes caused by the natural historical process of the revolutionary transformation of society in accordance with the interests and wishes of the popular masses struggling for national and social emancipation.

These changes vary from country to country, depending on historical, national, and economic conditions, and it would be quite unrealistic to believe that this many-sided historical process can be contained within any predetermined framework. To do so would be to attempt to impose on each country or nation, from outside and by means of interference in its domestic affairs, a framework, laws and principles which may be unsuitable to that country or nation, which is the master of its own fate. The political purpose of such external regulation of the whole varied process of the historical development of individual nations and countries can only be to delay the progressive development of society and to impede the
national liberation movement and the far-reaching social and economic changes which are in progress and which must inevitably come about in the different countries of the world.²¹

This clash of concepts notwithstanding, the work of the co-chairman on the preamble was looked upon as relatively successful. As the United States and the USSR moved from generalities to specifics, however, the differences became more exposed. The war of the brackets began in earnest. On May 31 the co-chairmen offered their revisions of Articles 1, 2 and 3 and on August 7 of Article 4.²² The first three articles were general statements of what obligations the parties would assume under the disarmament treaty. Many of the differences in wording, therefore, reflected the specific differences in content of the two plans. Double brackets (the Soviet wording) for example, surrounded the prohibition of nuclear weapons which could not be accepted as an obligation by the United States until means of verification were known. Correspondingly, single brackets enclosed the obligation that control provide assurance that arms not exceed agreed levels. Article 4 defined the basic tasks to be undertaken in stage I. The text as offered by the co-chairmen reflected little more than the basic differences of both sides in substance.

Aside from differences over content, the issue that provided the most debate was whether the obligations should be so worded as to imply a full commitment or merely indicate what commitments would be undertaken

²¹E/NDC/PV.17, 10 April 1962, p. 21.
in succeeding articles. The Soviets, to illustrate, wanted the first sentence of Article 1 to read: "The States Parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake". Valerian Zorin in debate made it clear that this wording was intended to mean a binding obligation when accepted. "This is an important question of principle which," he said, "in essence, comes down to whether we want to do really serious practical work or to remain in the realm of pious wishes that commit no one to anything." In refusing to comply with this Soviet demand Arthur Dean pointed to the tactical considerations involved:

Let me be very clear. We do not wish to be put into a position in which, having accepted certain obligations in Part I, we later come to a point in our drafting of the entire treaty where we are told that the particular obligation has already been accepted and that there is no point in discussing further details of that obligation.

Later, during the third ENDC session and throughout much of 1962 this tactic was pursued with considerable vigor in a slightly different manner. In September Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced what appeared to be a significant modification of the Soviet plan. His government agreed that a limited number of missiles might be retained by the United States and the USSR through the second stage. The Western powers expressed an interest in the proposal and began systematically to make inquiries about its meaning. Semyon Tsarapkin refused to amplify Gromyko's offer. He insisted that before he could discuss the details the Western Powers would have to accept the

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23 ENDC/PV. 18, 11 April 1962, p. 23.
24 ENDC/PV. 20, 13 April 1962, p. 12.
proposal "in principle". When pressed to examine the details either in private or in subcommittee Tsarapkin replied heatedly:

Instead of agreeing on the principles of an agreement between us, they [the United States and the United Kingdom] try to start a discussion on details of various kinds.... However, everyone, including even those who are trying to divert the work of the Committee into a morass of fruitless discussions on details, should understand that before we can talk about specific questions and details in connexion with the new Soviet proposal it is essential that the Western Powers should agree with the fundamental principle that disarmament should begin with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories.45

This tactic of demanding agreement in principle before going into detailed discussion was reminiscent of Soviet behavior in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960. In that body the Soviet bloc refused to discuss the details of any control measure until the West had accepted their disarmament proposals.

Finally there was the tactic of compromise. To suggest that some Soviet modifications in 1962 were motivated by tactical considerations is not to deny any serious effort on their part to bridge East-West differences. In all likelihood several motivating factors were involved. Unquestionably some of the Soviet Union's concessions were made to eliminate weakness in its plan, to strengthen it against effective criticism and to win the backing of the uncommitted powers.

When the ENDC convened for its second session in July the USSR was prepared to make several concessions to the West, though all on relatively lesser issues. On July 16 Ambassador Zorin submitted some modifications

and additions to the Soviet plan which, he said, were made "to accommodate the United States and the other Western Powers". The modification consisted of an agreement to reduce all conventional armaments by 30% in the first stage and by 35% (from the original) in the succeeding two stages. This provision was similar to the United States proposal and met the objections of those who criticized the original Soviet plan for its vagueness on conventional disarmament. There remained, however, an important difference between the 30% first stage cuts envisaged by the United States and the USSR. The United States plan provided for first stage cuts only of those major armaments whose destruction would be relatively easy to verify while the USSR would cut all arms in the first stage by 30%. The Soviet proposal would have introduced staggering problems of verification for light and easily concealed weapons.

The additions to the Soviet plan comprised a new article proposing three measures to reduce the danger of an outbreak of war. These measures were to commence in the first stage and remain in effect through the program. They provided:

1. From the commencement of the first stage substantial joint military movements or manoeuvres of armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

   The States Parties to the Treaty agree to notify in advance substantial military movements or manoeuvres of their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States Parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States Parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between the Heads of their Governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.27

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This article paralleled one in the United States plan, but there were significant differences. The United States plan provided for advanced notification of military movements, for an exchange of military missions and for the establishment of reliable communications between the heads of government. It did not, obviously, prohibit joint military maneuvers between two or more states since this would have rendered impossible coordinated planning and training of NATO armed forces. One important feature of the American plan not included in the Soviet addition was provision for observation posts to be established at agreed locations to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.28

These formal amendments to the Soviet plan were accompanied by verbal assurances that the USSR would be willing to modify its programs in other instances. Foreign Minister Gromyko gave two specific assurances in a speech delivered before the EDC on July 24. "If," he said, "...the Western Powers are prepared to carry out general and complete disarmament not in four but in, say, five years, there will be nothing to argue about, and the question of the time-limit can be settled without much difficulty." He then suggested a compromise between the first stage manpower figure of 1.7 million in the Soviet plan and 2.1 million in the United States plan: "let us put our heads together and see how our positions can be reconciled. Perhaps both sides will accept the figure of 1.9 million men by the end of the first stage."29 Subsequently Valerian Zorin extended Gromyko's time

28Ibid., pp. 146-147.
29EDC/PV. 60, 24 July 1962, p. 36.
limit offer to the first stage. He agreed that the duration of the first stage could be twenty-four months instead of fifteen.\textsuperscript{30}

This loosening of its disarmament position was accompanied by indications that the Soviet Union was at the same time prepared to follow a hard line. On July 22, only two days before Gromyko’s speech before the ENDC (and one day before signing of the Geneva accords neutralising Laos) the Soviet Government announced the planned resumption of nuclear tests. Even as he made his concessions the Soviet Foreign Minister warned that: "We will make no concessions on the question of whether nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited" and "we can say most definitely that there will be no agreement on general and complete disarmament which does not provide for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territory in the first -- I repeat, the first -- stage."\textsuperscript{31}

A potentially more significant compromise was made by the USSR during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21:

Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} ENDC/PV. 64, 1 August 1962, p. 29 and ENDC/PV. 65, August 1962, pp. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{31} ENDC/PV. 60, 24 July, 1962, pp. 36-37.

Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of the disarmament program. How meaningful it was as a concession would depend upon the clarifications offered by the Soviet bloc. During the brief third session of the EMDC in November and December the Western representatives made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to extract from the Soviet spokesmen explanations of the Gromyko proposal. Again, as so often in the past, they demanded Western acceptance "in principle" before they could elucidate. When the EMDC closed its third session on December 20th the mood of the conference was not optimistic.

**Collateral Measures**

A Committee of the Whole was created by the EMDC to consider collateral measures concurrently with the debate on general and complete disarmament in the plenary sessions. From 28 March through 25 May the Committee held only eight sessions during which time it considered proposals on a cessation of war propaganda and debated what other items to consider. Beyond agreement to begin discussion of the issue of war propaganda -- a subject preferred by the USSR -- the Committee of the Whole could not agree on a priority of subjects to debate. Both sides fought to have the Committee discuss subjects of its own choosing. Since the Committee began its work with a Soviet-preferred subject, the West expected the Committee to take up a Western proposal next. At its ninth meeting on July 19 the Committee discussed both a Soviet and a Western
subject, but the agenda problem remained unsolved with the consequence that the ninth was the Committee's last session in 1962.

Interest in collateral measures appeared to be clearly secondary in Soviet policy to general and complete disarmament. In a memorandum submitted at the beginning of the ENDC's work the USSR stressed that negotiations on proposals to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and promote disarmament (i.e., collateral measures) "should not divert the attention of members of the Committee from the execution of their principal task, which is to draw up and negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament." During 1962 the Soviet Union did not appear to have a fixed policy on what objectives to pursue in discussions of collateral issues. As will be noted below, in May Soviet spokesmen repudiated their own position on war propaganda and incurred considerable, if only temporary, embarrassment.

The initial Soviet proposals for collateral measures were put forward somewhat indirectly. A Soviet memorandum of 19 March reaffirmed Soviet support for measures the USSR had urged upon the General Assembly in September 1961 --- but the memorandum did not describe these measures.\[34\]

\[33\] Disarmament Commission Official Records, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, pp. 139-140.

\[34\] In its memorandum of March 19 the Soviet Union merely noted that "The proposals of the Soviet Government on such collateral measures are contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government which was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 September 1961." Ibid., p. 139. The text of that memorandum is in Documents on Disarmaments 1961, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 5, August 1962, Washington, D.C. pp. 496-504. (Hereafter this source will be identified as Documents 1961).
On September 26, 1961 the USSR had proposed before the Sixteenth General Assembly eight collateral measures. They were:

1. Freezing of the military budgets of States. (at that time a ceiling as of 1 January 1961 was proposed).

2. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. Alternatively the USSR would also agree to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.35

3. Prohibition of war propaganda. This might take the form of special legislation prohibiting war propaganda or merely a joint declaration calling for its cessation.

4. Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries.36

35In its Memorandum of September 26, 1961 the USSR reaffirmed its support of a Ten Power Draft Resolution introduced on November 1, 1960 before the First Committee. The original sponsors of this resolution, which renounced the use of nuclear weapons, were African states. The resolution was not voted upon. Documents 1960, pp. 343-345.

5. Withdrawal of troops from foreign territory. Soviet troops would leave Germany, Hungary and Poland while, the United States, France, Canada and the United Kingdom would withdraw their troops from NATO countries. As an alternative the USSR proposed a reduction of troops in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, particularly of foreign troops in Germany.

6. Measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers would undertake not to give nuclear weapons to other countries either individually or "within the framework of some military bloc." 37

7. Establishment of nuclear-free zones. Suggested areas for such zones were Central Europe, Far East and Pacific basin, and Africa. 38

8. Steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack. As the most practical step to take the memorandum proposed setting up land control posts at railway junctions, ports and roads. 39


38 A resolution declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone was introduced before the First Committee of the Fifteenth General Assembly but it was never voted upon. See Documents 1960, p. 365. At the following session of the Assembly a resolution was passed 55-0-44 which called upon the United Nations membership "To consider and respect the continent of Africa as a demilitarized zone. General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), November 28, 1961.

While reaffirming these collateral measures the USSR stated that it considered a nuclear test cessation to be the foremost measure to reduce international tension. This issue will be considered separately below.

The first proposal formally submitted before the Committee of the Whole was Poland's Plan for a Denuclearized and Limited Armaments Zone in Europe. This new Rapacki Plan would create a denuclearized zone of Poland, Czechoslovakia and both Germanies in two stages. In Stage One there would be a freezing of nuclear weapons and missiles in the zone. The manufacture or introduction into this territory of nuclear weapons of nuclear delivery vehicles would be prohibited. Nor could new bases of facilities for the stockpiling of these weapons be established. In Stage Two all nuclear weapons and missiles in the zone would be eliminated and conventional forces reduced. These disarmament measures would be verified by a special control body maintaining ground and air surveillance and having appropriate control posts. All nuclear powers would agree not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone nor impair in any way the status of the zone.

This proposal for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe as a partial disarmament measure had its origin in the plan submitted by Poland before the Twelfth General Assembly. On October 2, 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed

\[\text{\textsuperscript{40}}\text{ENDC/G.1/1, March 28, 1962.}\]
that East and West Germany join with Poland in prohibiting the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on their respective territories.\textsuperscript{41} It might be noted that the Soviet Union had twice previously proposed before the Disarmament Subcommittee a similar nuclear-free zone in Europe. On March 27, 1956 the USSR proposed that a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments...be established in Europe, including territory of both parts of Germany and of States adjacent to them."\textsuperscript{42} All atomic and hydrogen weapons would be prohibited in the zone. But this proposal as well as a similar one made on March 18, 1957\textsuperscript{43} linked creation of a demuclearized zone in Central Europe with a comprehensive disarmament programme.

Foreign Minister Rapacki's proposal of October 1957 marked the beginning of a Polish initiative to stabilize the status quo in Central Europe prior to agreement either on general disarmament or the problem of German unification. His plan was amplified in a memorandum to United States Ambassador Jacob Beam in February 1958. Czechoslovakia was included within the contemplated zone and provision was made for a

\textsuperscript{41} General Assembly Official Records, Twelfth Session, 697 Plenary Meeting, pp. 235-236.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 752-757. See also the letter of Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower of December 10, 1957, Ibid., p. 925; and Declaration Submitted by the Soviet Government at the Geneva Surprise Attack, Nov. 28, 1958, Ibid. p. 1270. In his famous speech of September 19, 1959 calling for complete and general disarmament Premier Khrushchev listed establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe as a partial measure the USSR supported. Ibid. p. 1473.
control system to insure compliance by all involved. The four powers occupying Germany would be prohibited from maintaining nuclear weapons within the zone or transferring nuclear weapons to any of the governments in the zone. In November of that same year Foreign Minister Rapacki amended his original proposal, dividing the implementation of the plan into two stages. Stage one would encompass a nuclear freeze and in the second stage there would be a reduction of conventional forces simultaneously with the complete demobilisation of Central Europe. The amended version was very similar to the Polish proposal of March 1962.

Canada offered yet another suggestion to the Committee of the Whole. As the first item of business the Canadian representative proposed that the Committee discuss measures to insure the peaceful uses of outer space. He contended that both sides were sufficiently near agreement to subscribe to a declaration prohibiting the orbiting of weapons in outer space. Zorin rejected the contention arguing that outer space could not be isolated from possible military use until the problem of disarmament was solved.

But neither Canada's suggestion nor Poland's proposal ever came up for formal consideration. Beyond agreeing to begin with a discussion of the cessation of war propaganda the Committee could not agree upon an

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45News Conference Remarks etc. in Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 1217-1219. See also Documents 1960, pp. 245-260.
47ENDC/PV. 37, 15 May 1962, pp. 24-25.
order for debating topics. On April 2 the co-chairmen were able to announce only that six questions had been put forward for discussions, three each by both sides. The communique noting this fact, however, had to arrange the items in two parallel columns, lest a single column imply a priority of one item over another. The questions put forward by the Soviet Union were:

Establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe.

Measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

These items favored by the United States were:

Cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons.

Reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications.

Measures to insure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only.

Efforts by the West to get the Soviets to agree to discuss a subject proposed by the West alternately with one proposed by the Soviet Union failed and consequently, largely due to Soviet indifference, the work of the Committee ceased after approval on May 23 of a Declaration against War Propaganda.

\[1^{48}FNDC/G. 1/2, April 2, 1962.\]
The Declaration against War Propaganda unanimously approved ad referendum by the Committee was essentially an innocuous instrument condemning war propaganda, "meaning propaganda in whatsoever form or country conducted which can provoke or encourage a threat to or breach of the peace."\(^4\)\(^9\) It called upon all states to adopt, within the limits of their constitutional systems, appropriate practical measures to suppress such propaganda. Originally sponsored by the USSR, this kind of a measure had never been particularly popular with the Western powers because of its vagueness and the danger to free speech inherent in a vigorous implementation of it. Yet the West, after inserting qualifications to protect free speech went along. Approval of the declaration by the ENDC in plenary session was scheduled for May 29.

On May 29 as the ENDC convened for what was to be a routine approval Valerian Zorin announced that "the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that, in its present form, the draft Declaration against War Propaganda does not meet the requirements of the situation and calls for considerable improvement."\(^5\)\(^0\) He let loose a bitter attack upon West German "revanchists," provocations in Southeast Asia, and publications in the United States extolling the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government, without any advanced notice, then proposed the addition of paragraphs which would have condemned "all appeals for a preventive nuclear war," "propaganda for revanchism and for the revision of the state frontiers in Europe" and "incitement to the use


\(^5\)\(^0\)ENDC/FV. 14, 29 May 1962, p. 6.
force against peoples which have embarked on the course of national liberation and independent development." If these additions in themselves would not have guaranteed rejection by the West, the added demand that all states within six months adopt legislation making war propaganda a grave crime, certainly would, as the Soviet Government well knew. For reasons of their own the Soviets had decided to kill any action or agreement on a declaration against war propaganda.

The West reacted angrily and even some neutrals expressed bitterness. Arthur Dean called the Soviet performance "astonishing". He noted that no one in the Soviet delegation had "spoken to us before this meeting of its profound change in attitude." Mexico's Pedilla Nervo was moved to observe: "I think that all the representatives at this Conference have experienced a feeling of surprise, to say the least." Mexico and Sweden both accepted the Declaration as reported out of Committee, thus in effect publicly expressing their displeasure with the Soviet manoeuvre.

Part of this erratic behavior must be explained by developments outside of the conference. Ambassador Zorin in his statement referred to "recent events, including those of the last few days, which cannot be ignored." He mentioned among these the occupation of Thailand by United States forces. Quite likely developments in Southeast Asia were affecting the ENDC. In May a serious crisis developed in Laos which undermined the fragile cease fire that had been effected during the convocation of the Fourteen Nation Conference at Geneva. Communist military pressure in northwestern Laos threatened

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50a Ibid., p. 20.
to overrun the area and destroy the entire Laotian Royal Army. In response to this clear violation of the cease-fire, President Kennedy took the sensational steps of sending a carrier task force into the Gulf of Siam and followed that with the dispatch of substantial United States troops to Thailand. This vigorous action stemmed the Communist military advance. Moscow may well have been using the ENDC as a means of protesting this action. Certainly the loss of the Declaration was a small price to pay. Indeed since the Soviet Union had already enacted legislation outlawing "war propaganda" it may have been to its advantage not to have the West subscribe to such a declaration. This way the USSR could still pose as the champion opponent of war propaganda.

Later that year the USSR again resurrected the issue. Foreign Minister Gromyko requested inclusion of the item "Condemnation of propaganda favoring preventive nuclear war" in the agenda of the seventeenth General Assembly. His proposed draft resolution not only condemned preventive nuclear war but any first use of nuclear weapons as well. There was little chance of pushing through their draft but Soviet aims were more modest. Ambassador Zorin asked in Committee debate only that the question be referred to the ENDC. He hoped that there would be no objection of having no Assembly discussion on it. The United States representative agreed to this action on the understanding that; "... there should be no implication that the General Assembly in any way subscribes to the language

or the logic of the explanatory memorandum and the draft resolution submitted on this item by the Soviet Union. These have not been discussed and we do not believe that they reflect the views of the majority of the Assembly." The issue was referred without action to the ENDC.

Toward A Test Ban

The Kremlin's decision to resume nuclear testing in 1961 encompassed a cessation---if only temporarily---of meaningful negotiations for a test ban treaty. Its method of terminating the negotiations was simply to link them to general and complete disarmament. "The conclusion of a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear tests...in isolation from a programme of general and complete disarmament", warned the USSR shortly after resuming its tests, "could only give the peoples in illusory feeling of security...." There may have been some inadequacies of coordination between the military, scientific and diplomatic agencies responsible for Soviet disarmament policies early in 1962, for the Soviet representative at the defunct Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests refused to agree to the referral of the test ban negotiations to the ENDC where it might be considered along with general and complete disarmament. Moscow accused the West of seeking to

52 A/C.1/PV. 1284, pp. 2-5. The United States, well conditioned by Soviet maneuvers interpreting General Assembly action as endorsement of its position added: "Furthermore, we believe that there should be no implication that the General Assembly believes that the Geneva Committee should take up this item at a particular time, or in a particular manner, or with any special priority. We do not believe that it is the intention of the First Committee to make any such recommendation; indeed, it is in no position to do so, since the item has not been discussed. It is also our understanding that the Committee's action will imply no recommendation to the Geneva Committee as to whether or how it shall proceed to deal with the item."

distract the ENDC's attention from general and complete disarmament by burdening it with the test ban question. On January 29, 1962 the Geneva test ban conference adjourned, never to be resumed, and for a while it was uncertain where or when test ban negotiations would take place. Eventually the Soviets acceded to the Western plan for utilizing the ENDC for test ban as well as general disarmament negotiations. On March 20, 1962 the nuclear powers agreed in an informal meeting to establish a three-Power subcommittee as a separate organ of the Committee to consider a treaty abolishing nuclear tests.

Even so, the Soviet position was now more divergent from that of the West than it had ever been before. Moscow had already rejected any part of an international control system. Those elements of international control that had been hammered out with the West in almost three years of negotiations were formally rejected on November 28, 1961 as "a completely discredited basis." At a stroke the USSR repudiated its proposal of June 14, 1957, the report of the 1958 Conference of Experts, the report of the 1959 high-altitude group and all the parts of the draft treaty agreed upon by the three nuclear powers. As an alternative, "new approach" to the problem, the USSR proposed to end all tests relying exclusively on national detecting systems. The four short articles of its proposed treaty were as follows:

Art. 1. The States Parties to this Agreement solemnly undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.

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Art. 2. For the purpose of exercising mutual supervision of compliance with the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall use their national systems of detecting nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.

Art. 3. The States Parties to this Agreement undertake not to conduct any underground tests of nuclear weapons until they have agreed together on a system of control over such tests as a constituent part of an international system of control over compliance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Art. 4. This Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, and shall be open for adherence to by all States.

In effect, the Soviets were asking for a limited treaty with reciprocal verification and a moratorium of indefinite duration for underground tests, a proposal categorically rejected by the West.

During the first two sessions of the UNDC, lasting from March through September 1962, test ban diplomacy took a back seat to Soviet military needs. Moscow's 1961 total of 50 nuclear tests (19 unconfirmed) were followed in 1962 by 40 more. Throughout this period the Soviet negotiators adopted a "hard line". They continuously attacked Western motives, offered no concessions and repeatedly refused proposals for technical discussions. There is some evidence that the Soviets would just as soon have broken off negotiations.

55Soviet draft agreement of November 28, 1961 in Ibid., 158-159.

56United States Atomic Energy Commission data as cited in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1963, p. 44. Tass in announcing the resumption of tests on July 21, 1962 defended the Soviet position on the grounds that "the Soviet Union...has the right to be the last to end nuclear tests in the world." International Negotiations, p. 255.
entirely and would have used the resumption of United States atmospheric tests in late April as an excuse had not the neutrals put pressure on them to remain in the conference.\(^\text{57}\) In any event the initiatives during this period came either from the West or the neutrals and the response was consistently negative.

The United States and United Kingdom representatives informally informed the Soviet representatives on March 15 that their governments were prepared to modify their draft treaty of April 18, 1961 to make it comprehensive from the outset as the USSR had previously sought. This involved reducing the treaty threshold from 4.75 degrees seismic magnitude to 0. The Western powers were prepared to do this without increasing the number of control posts on Soviet territory or the number of on-site inspections.\(^\text{58}\) There was not the slightest interest on the Soviet side. On the following day Premier Khrushchev told an election meeting in Moscow that not even underground tests required international controls.

Failing to budge the Soviet diplomats from their opposition to any international verification the Western powers on April 9 appealed directly to Premier Khrushchev. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan coupled their appeal with a warning that the tests planned for late April would proceed as scheduled if the Soviets failed to change their position. Khrushchev in reply equated an international control system with NATO intelligence organs and asked rhetorically, "How can we accept your proposal if we have no reason to trust you?"\(^\text{59}\)

\(^{57}\)I have no documentation for this assertion but individuals who participated in the ENDC have told me that this was the case.


\(^{59}\)Letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister Macmillan, April 12, 1962 in International Negotiations, p. 211.
On April 16, ten days before the United States began its 1962 atmospheric tests in the Pacific, the eight neutral members of the ENDC made a determined effort to break the East-West deadlock with an interesting compromise proposal. The essence of their plan was contained in three points.

(1) Effective control for a test ban "might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions."

(2) All data from this control system would be processed by an international commission, "consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists."

(3) All parties would "accept the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." Should the nature of an event be in doubt the parties to the treaty "could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event...".

For the West the plan offered a form of international control in the international supervisory commission and a recognition of the possibility of the need for on-site inspection. For the Soviets it substituted national detection systems for international control posts and left on-site inspection to an invitational basis only. In truth the proposal solved nothing because it covered up fundamental differences with a semantic paperwork rather than resolve them. But it did provide a backdrop for much of the test ban debate in the spring.

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For a brief period Soviet diplomacy responded with alacrity and flexibility to the challenge. Valerian Zorin on April 19 accepted the Eight Nation memo "absolutely clearly and unequivocally" as the basis for subsequent negotiations. In that very same meeting Arthur Dean was complaining that "the position of the eight sponsors still seems to us somewhat obscure on the precise nature of the obligations...in regard to...on-site inspections." On the following day Dean announced United States acceptance of the memorandum "as one of the basis for negotiation, but not as an exclusive basis for negotiation."

Immediately each side sought to interpret the document as supporting its own position. Zorin insisted that "The proposals of the eight neutralist states completely shatter the myth of the Western Powers that it is impossible to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests without establishing an extensive system of international control...". Barely minutes later Joseph Godber observed that "it seems to me that these new proposals do accept the principle of an international network of detection posts." Later the United States was to develop the argument that the neutralist plan provided for obligatory on-site inspection while the Soviets were convinced that there

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61 ENDC/PV. 24, 19 April 1962, pp. 16 and 39. On April 17, the day after the Memorandum was offered Arthur Dean made a lengthy speech in which he asked for clarification by the eight neutrals on thirteen points. As far as the records does, he never received the requested clarification.


63 ENDC/PV. 24, 19 April 1962, pp. 10 and 12.
was no such obligation. The neutrals who might have clarified their intention had decided as a matter of joint policy not to offer any clarification or interpretation of their test. In the Ethiopian representative's words the joint memo would have to "rest on its own merits".

In mid-June the ENDC recessed for a month. In the interim the United States Department of Defense made public some preliminary conclusions and observations obtained from Project Vela, the research program to find improved methods of detecting nuclear explosions. The preliminary findings gave evidence that existing instrumentation might be more effective in detecting and identifying earthquakes and underground explosions than was earlier supposed. When the ENDC reconvened on July 16 Arthur Dean offered to discuss the scientific data of Project Vela and its implications with the committee either formally or informally. Zorin expressed no interest in examining the data, charging in the Three-Power Subcommittee that the Vela findings were not germane to the negotiations. On July 21 Tass announced Soviet intentions to resume nuclear testing. On August 5 the USSR exploded a bomb of nearly 30 megatons force, the second most powerful bomb ever detonated.

Early in August Arthur Dean privately informed Valerian Zorin that the United States was prepared to modify its test ban proposals. Because of the

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64See the speech by Arthur Dean on 7 May in which he asserted "But, of course, paragraph 4 does not speak of any obligation to have on-site inspections at all: the only obligation of a party is to furnish the necessary facts about a suspicious and significant event to the international commission. As I have indicated previously, this obligation to furnish facts need not involve on-site inspections at all, unless the party wishes to invite the commission under paragraph 4, except in those cases under paragraph 5 where the on-site inspection is found to be the only means by which the necessary facts can be obtained by the international commission." ENDC/PV 32, 7 May 1962, p. 20. See also Valerian Zorin's reply that same day, Ibid., p. 29.

65ENDC/PV. 24, 19 April 1962, p. 5. One reason the neutrals did not interpret their own memorandum was because they could not all agree upon a single interpretation.

66 International Negotiations, pp. 246-248.
increase in long-range detection capability revealed by the Project Vela findings
the United States was prepared to accept a test ban control system "composed of
internationally-supervised national stations rather than of internationally-
operated stations" as outlined in the April 18, 1961 proposal. Further the
United States was prepared to decrease the number of on-site inspections re-
quired for verification. However, Dean emphasized that since the United States
would be relying on seismic data from more distant stations the need for on-site
inspection was intensified, not diminished.67

Obligatory on-site inspection remained as the principal barrier to agree-
ment. Representative Zorin could see only in the new offer the old position of
the United States "slightly 'dolled up' for purposes of disguise." Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who in mid-August replaced Ambassador Zorin, in-
formed the EDC that he saw "nothing hopeful or rational in these proposals."68

Caught in the frustrating interchange of charges and counter charges over
the issue of on-site inspection several of the neutral members of the EDC
attempted to formulate proposals that might somehow get around that issue. One
was a Mexican proposal, originally offered in May, to set a terminal date on
nuclear testing and the other a Brazilian suggestion for a limited test ban.
The latter suggestion, in particular, offered a way out of the on-site inspection
impasse and for this reason the idea was incorporated in a new set of proposals
made by the West on August 27. The United States and the United Kingdom

67See Ibid., pp. 261-265. Up to this point the United States had been de-
manding 180 internationally operated stations of which 19 would be located in
the Soviet Union. As to on-site inspections the United States was seeking be-
tween 12 and 20.

proposed two alternative draft treaties, one providing for an end to all nuclear testing with verification by an International Scientific Commission (having the power of on-site inspection) and the other ending nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space only.\(^6\)\(^9\)

Soviet disinterest in either draft treaty was manifest immediately. On the day they were formally presented V. V. Kuznetsov remarked that "Judged on a first impression, these documents repeat the already familiar United States proposals...The first document...gives grounds for thinking that the proposals of the non-aligned countries [i.e., the April 16 Memorandum] are completely rejected...The second document...is aimed at virtually legalizing underground nuclear weapon tests."\(^7\)\(^0\) Obviously Kuznetsov's remarks reflected more than a first impression. For the moment Moscow had no intention to negotiate a test ban.

In September the EIDC agreed to recess for the annual United Nations disarmament debate. President Kennedy proposed that during the recess the Three-Power Subcommittee continue to meet. Mr. Kuznetsov agreed on the condition that the discussion be based either upon the 1961 Soviet proposals or the Eight-Nation memorandum, but not the United States-United Kingdom alternative treaties. Perhaps because of the obvious unacceptability of his conditions, Kuznetsov abandoned them, and it was agreed that each delegation could choose its own basis for negotiations in the Subcommittee. When the EIDC reconvened the Subcommittee had no successes to report. During the interim, however, a forced disarmament in Cuba was to cause a re-appraisal of arms policy in the communist world.

\(^6\)For the texts of the alternative treaties see Disarmament Commission Official Records, Supplements for January 1961 to December 1962, pp. 252-261.\(^9\)

\(^7\)EIDC/PV. 75, August 1962, pp. 34-35.
CHAPTER II

1963: A BREAKTHROUGH

The changes that developed in Soviet disarmament policies during 1963 had their immediate origin in the events of October 1962. It is impossible to measure with any precision the effect upon Soviet intentions, expectations and inhibitions produced by the Cuban confrontation of 1962, but clearly in the aggregate the impact was great. Premier Khrushchev may have undertaken construction of MBM and IRBM sites on Cuba to protect the island from an anticipated United States invasion (as he insisted in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on December 12) or he may have been attempting to shift the ratio of United States-USSR long-range missile capability in his favor in order to influence the settlement of a number of political issues. In any event the action constituted the first Communist attempt to station strategic weapons outside of Soviet soil and was a major gamble. By acting cautiously, yet decisively, the Kennedy administration not only destroyed Soviet Russia's counter-capability in Cuba, but it demonstrated the United States' determination to fight rather than permit a reversal of the balance of power. One can only speculate on how the Kremlin assessed its alternatives during the crisis and after, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that some kind of a decision to establish a **modus vivendi** (in the short run) emerged rather than engage in the effort of reversing the strategic balance by a costly missile race. This interpretation would explain much of Soviet diplomacy in 1963.
There was no immediate effect of the Cuban crisis on Soviet test ban policy. Atmospheric nuclear tests had been scheduled for the fall of 1962 by both powers and were consummated as planned throughout the period of the crisis. The United States Pacific tests ended on November 4 and those of the USSR several weeks later. In the General Assembly no new Soviet position emerged. The principle of inspection which Khrushchev was willing to apply to the removal of missiles from Cuba was not to be applied to underground nuclear tests. Ambassador Zorin continued to reject international control and on-site inspection as instruments of Western subversion. He repeated previous Soviet allegations that a limited test ban would only serve to legalize and encourage underground tests and called for a complete test ban, including a moratorium on underground tests without any controls. Ironically both nuclear powers voted together against the majority on one of the General Assembly's test ban resolutions. They abstained on a resolution that inter alia condemned all nuclear tests.

Similarly Soviet policy in the thirdENDC session showed no immediate changes. Perhaps because they were unsure of their position the Soviet representatives sought to postpone the resumption of the Geneva Conference until early 1963. Western and neutral pressures, however, brought agreement to resume negotiations on November 26th.

One new approach which stirred considerable interest was the possible use of automative seismic Stations (popularly known as "black boxes") to reduce the amount of international control in a test ban agreement. The idea first became popular as the result of a suggestion made by three American and three Soviet
scientists attending the Tenth Conference on Science and World Affairs ("Pugwash") in London during September 1962. Acting in an individual capacity the six scientists prepared a formal document which proposed the use of automatic seismic stations. "These will be sealed in such a way that they cannot be tampered with, and they will be self-contained. The instruments will be installed by the host government, and periodically returned to the international commission for inspection, replacement, repair, etc." They proposed installing a large enough number of such stations to constitute a good check on the seismic data supplied by all stations. "We think", they concluded, "a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the international control commission will need to request very few on-site inspections."

The use of automatic seismic stations was discussed privately by both sides in New York before the ENSDC resumed its sessions in Geneva. According to Western accounts the Soviets in private advocated the use of these stations as an alternative to international control or on-site inspections. On December 3 Soviet representative Semyon Tsarapkin publically endorsed the Pugwash proposals in very general terms. Exactly one week later the Soviet Union for the first time made public detailed proposals for the use of automatic seismic stations. Tsarapkin began by repeating the Soviet contention that underground

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tests, as any tests, could be adequately detected by national means without the need for international control or inspection. He then proposed that a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests include the use of automatic seismic stations. "The Soviet Union", he noted, "is prepared to agree that two or three such stations should be set up on the territory of States possessing nuclear weapons, including the territory of the Soviet Union." Delivery of the sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the USSR would have to be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft but the USSR would be prepared to agree to the participation of foreign personnel.\textsuperscript{73}

The United States reacted cautiously. Ambassador Dean committed the United States to a careful study of the proposal but insisted at the same time that "there is no evidence so far available to our scientists...which indicates that a system of automatic stations could replace completely or substantially a manned network of control stations or could do away with the need for a necessary number of obligatory on-site inspections."\textsuperscript{74} Both he and United Kingdom representative Michael Wright pressed for a meeting of experts to determine where and how far the use of automatic seismic stations could be utilised. In this as in all previous efforts in the Committee the West was unsuccessful. Tsarapkin insisted that the use of expert committees was a technique to sabotage agreement. "We are altogether against the attempts of our Western partners in the negotiations", he told the ENDC on December 7, "to evade their responsibility, to avoid concluding a political agreement, by shifting responsibility for this matter to the technical experts."\textsuperscript{75} On December 20 the ENDC concluded its third session still with no results to show.

\textsuperscript{73} ENDC/PV. 90, 10 December 1962, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{74} ENDC/PV. 89, 7 December 1962, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{75} ENDC/PV. 88, 7 December 1962, p. 34.
The frustration and acrimony attending the closing meetings of the ENDC's third session belied the Soviet interest in a test ban agreement. On the day preceding the recess Premier Khrushchev addressed a letter to President Kennedy offering to permit two to three on-site inspections a year as part of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. "Control...would, of course, mainly be effected by national detection systems, operating in conjunction with the automatic seismic stations." Khrushchev reaffirmed his view that such inspections were technically unnecessary and stated that he was making the concession only to facilitate Senate ratification of an agreement. This concession of three inspections was not new, having been as recently as 1960 among Soviet Russia's proposals, but it did mark the first substantial step toward a test ban agreement taken by the Kremlin since the resumption of testing in 1961.

In spite of Khrushchev's disclaimer about the need for inspection, Kennedy in reply expressed satisfaction "that you are prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspection." He considered the Soviet Premier's suggestions "helpful in starting us down the road to an agreement." But the minimum number of inspections the United States would accept was between eight and ten. Khrushchev maintained that on October 30, 1962, in discussions held in New York with V. V. Kuznetsov, Arthur Dean had said that two to four on-site inspections a year

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76 Communication from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, dated 19 December, 1962 in United Nations Document DC/207, 12 April 1963 (also ENDC/73, 31 January 1963). Khrushchev repeated that the USSR would accept three automatic seismic stations. He outlined in his letter three zones in which these stations could be established: the Central Asian, the Altai and the Far Eastern. He also specified the most suitable sites within each zone.

77 Letter dated 28 December 1962 from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev, Ibid., (also ENDC/74, 31 January 1963). Kennedy found Khrushchev's suggestions for locating unmanned seismic stations helpful but inadequate. He felt that there would be need for a number of stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka Tashkent areas. Khrushchev had no objections to stations in these areas providing that the number of stations remained fixed at three. Communication from Khrushchev to Kennedy, dated 7 January 1963 in Ibid.
would be sufficient to meet American demands. Kennedy replied that "there appears to have been some misunderstanding." There is indeed some confusion about what United States spokesmen conveyed to USSR representatives during some informal meetings held in New York and Washington in late October 1962. V. V. Kusnetsov virtually swore that Arthur Dean assured him that two to four inspections a year would be adequate, and he and Semyon Tsarapkin insisted that Professor Jerome Wiesner gave similar assurances to Soviet academician Fedorov during informal conversations. Khrushchev may well have believed that his "concession" would meet the demands of the Kennedy administration and Congress, in which case he erred badly. The exchange of letters at the summit was followed up by informal talks among the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR which lasted from January 14-31. To facilitate these conversations President Kennedy on January 26th ordered a suspension of underground tests scheduled in Nevada. When, however, it became clear to the Soviets that the United States was not prepared to accept their figures they terminated the private conversations. A resumption of the American tests in Nevada followed shortly.

78 Kusnetsov told the 16-Nation Committee on 22 February 1963, "I have had such meetings with Mr. Dean. In a conversation he had with me on 30 or 31 October last year, Mr. Dean said that the main point on which we differed was that of underground tests. 'If the Soviet Union were to agree to a small number, say two to four inspections, I assure you', he said, 'that there will be no more differences between us.' Of course, that was an unofficial figure. The United States representative is right in that respect; but that was the figure which Mr. Dean named. And you know...that there were other instances and other conversations during which the United States suggested the figure of two to three to the Soviet Union. In particular there was a conversation between our scientist, Professor Fedorov, and Professor Wiesner, also at the end of October 1962, during which the United States interlocuter named the figure of two to three inspections." ENDC/PV, 101, 22 February 1963, p. 48. See also the statement of Semyon Tsarapkin in ENDC/PV, 113, 25 March 1963, p. 16.
Winter 1963: Hardening of Test Ban Positions

The Fourth session of the ENDC commencing on February 12, 1963 failed to maintain the momentum generated by the Pugwash black box proposals and Khrushchev – Kennedy exchanges. It seemed as though the Soviets had for the while decided to keep the whole issue on ice. Although the ENDC devoted a majority of its meetings to nuclear weapons tests, there were no meetings of the Three-Power Subcommittee. Nor, until its recess of 21 June, was the Committee able to record any change of position on tests.

William C. Foster at the opening meeting of the ENDC observed that the verification system now accepted by both sides was "substantially different from the kinds of systems this Committee was discussing before the recess." He described the essential features as follows:

1. The system was premised on the use of nationally owned and operated detection networks. The national stations would submit data regularly to an international data-collection center.

2. Automatic seismic stations would supplement the data collected by national stations. Initially in the private talks during the recess the United States sought agreement on ten such automatic stations in both the United States and the USSR. Later on the United States suggested that its requirements could be met with seven automatic stations, if satisfactory assurances could be obtained concerning the characteristics

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79ENDC/PV. 96, 12 February 1963, p. 10.
of the Soviet seismographic networks. The Soviet figure remained fixed at three.

3. The system utilized on-site inspections. The United States wanted a quota of eight to ten inspections annually and the USSR three.

During February, March and April the debates were repetitious and sterile. The United States defended its figure of eight to ten on-site inspections as the minimum necessary to constitute an effective deterrent against cheating. Soviet spokesmen contended that existing national systems could detect all underground tests and that in fact the United States had unofficially already accepted the two to four figure. As had happened so often in the past with similar deadlocks a familiar pattern of debate developed: the Western powers strove to engage the Soviets in technical discussions either informally or in subcommittee while the latter evaded such discussions and fought for agreement in principle.

William Foster prodded his Soviet colleague to abandon temporarily the quest for agreement on numbers and work out, instead, the modalities of an inspection system. He wanted discussion, for example, on such questions as the nationality of inspection teams, the criteria which would make an event eligible for inspection, the extent of area to be inspected, and the means for carrying out inspection. As a precondition to discussing these questions the Soviets demanded Western concurrence on the figure of three for the number of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations.

We must realize clearly [said Tsarapkin] ...that any attempt to pass on to the consideration of secondary questions, whether of a technical, organization or administrative and financial character, without preliminary agreement on the basic questions -- that is, the

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inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations — will only bring about new deadlocks and new differences.... We are now witnessing an obvious manoeuvre by the Western Powers. They wish to drag the Committee into a quagmire of technical discussions so as to avoid an agreement and to camouflage the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are responsible for the new deadlock in the negotiations...81

Failing to get Soviet cooperation in the discussion of details the United States early in March proceeded to present its own ideas on the subject. The details revealed to the Committee had previously been made known to the Soviets but no response had been forthcoming. "We believe," said Charles Stelle, "that by making our position clear to all the members of the Conference, we may stimulate a discussion...."82 In a word, the Soviet hand was being forced. On April 1, 1963 the United States and the United Kingdom formally submitted a "Memorandum on Position" which summarized the Western position to date. In it both Western powers supported "the concept of reciprocal inspection, in accordance with which each nuclear side plays a primary role in the arrangements concerning on-site inspection in the territory of the other."83 They agreed to accept an annual quota of seven

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Under their proposal a state would have up to sixty days from the time a seismic event took place to designate that event as one to inspect. Once an event was selected the designating state would have to indicate the location and boundaries of the area selected for inspection. This area could be an ellipse with a semi-major axis of no more than fifteen kilometers, with a maximum area of 500 square kilometers. As safeguards for the state under inspection the Western powers agreed that the receiving state could use its own aircraft and pilots to transport the inspection team. Also there could be measures to prevent the inspection team from being able to view the territory of the receiving state en route to the inspection area, as well as the use of flight routes to avoid passing over certain portions of the receiving state. The inspection team would consist partly of persons from the inspecting nuclear side and partly of persons from an international staff. The leader of the team would be one of the team members from the inspecting nuclear side.
on-site inspections provided that the modalities of the inspection system conformed to their requirements.

In March and April the argument over inspection quotas hardened. On March 18 Tsarapkin flatly informed his colleagues: "Two to three inspections are a good number, and this is the key to an agreement. Any attempt to wring from the Soviet Union further opportunities for intelligence purposes is doomed to failure." Stelle replied immediately and as vigorously: "Two to three on-site inspections...is a figure which the Soviet Union has known and knows is unacceptable to the United States. This 'take-it-or-leave-it' approach is not negotiation." During April the representatives of both powers were acknowledging an impasse openly. "If one is to give a candid opinion of what is happening in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the question of the prohibition of tests," observed Semyuni Tsarapkin on the last day of April, "it is that these are no longer real negotiations but a sheer waste of time."85

One last attempt was made by several of the neutrals to rescue the fourth session from complete failure. It had its origins in efforts by the nonaligned representatives to work out another joint memorandum that might budge the two positions on the cardinal inspection issue. The eight neutrals worked up a proposal to establish not an annual quota of inspections

85 ENDC/PV. 126, 29 April 1963, p. 24. See also the statements of Tsarapkin and Stelle in ENDC/PV. 123, 22 April 1963, pp. 14 and 24.
but a quota for a period of years. They suggested a quota for a seven
year period which might range from 31 to 35 inspections. As it turned
out none of the nuclear powers cared for the compromise and the proposal
was never formally introduced. A variant, however, was proposed by the
three African members, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic.
They pleaded with the nuclear powers to "rise above quarreling over an
insignificant difference of one or two inspections, and to accept a
reasonable compromise-quota..." As a possible compromise they suggested
"that three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections - or an
adequately proportionate figure spread over more years - may be needed to
dispel mutual suspicions." This memorandum was formally proposed on
June 10th. The thrust of its effort was toward a total test ban. On the
same day as it was announced President Kennedy was delivering a speech at
American University which revealed new negotiations to be conducted in
Moscow. In the ensuing weeks the African proposal became lost in the
developments leading to a partial test ban.

Disarmament: A Parallel Deadlock

The inconclusiveness of Soviet test ban policy during the winter and
spring of 1963 was matched by a corresponding indecisiveness on other dis-
armament issues. The policies of detente, stimulated by the Cuban crisis,
were not reflected in Geneva at all. Soviet unwillingness to follow through
with the promise of Khrushchev's turn-of-the-year correspondence was

86 An account of this abortive effort is described by Arthur S. Lall in
"The Nonaligned in Disarmament Negotiations," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

unquestionably linked with the developing crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet foreign policy at this time was adhering to a delicate balance between "peaceful coexistence" with the West and comradely relations with the Chinese. The former aspect was reflected in the relaxation of pressure against Berlin. Khrushchev's demands that the Berlin issue be resolved were dropped during the Cuban crisis and not renewed throughout the winter and spring of 1963. In a speech in East Berlin on January 16, 1963 the Soviet Premier repeated a recent suggestion that Allied troops might be stationed in West Berlin under the aegis of the United Nations. The latter aspect was reflected in the uncompromising stand at Geneva taken by Soviet negotiators in the early months of 1963.

During the fourth ENDC sessions the participants agreed to divide their time so that the Monday sessions would be devoted to nuclear tests, Wednesday sessions to general and complete disarmament and those on Friday to "collateral measures". Although this schedule was adhered to generally, in fact, the proportion of time actually spent discussing nuclear tests was far greater (it being agreed that this subject could be raised at any time) and that devoted to general disarmament far less than a third. In vain did Soviet spokesmen argue that complete and general disarmament was the main issue before the Committee. The West and all eight neutrals were in rare agreement that the nuclear test question was the most important one before the Committee, and it was the issue most discussed.

That part of the discussion involving general disarmament centered around the first stage measures concerning nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments and measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Western powers continued to pry from the Russians an amplification of their
"nuclear umbrella" concession made before the Seventeenth General Assembly. In particular they sought answers to two vital questions: (1) how many and what kinds of missiles the Soviets contemplated permitting the nuclear powers to retain through the second stage; and what verification measures could be established to ensure that neither side possessed more than the agreed number! Tsarapkin insisted that the USSR had given enough explanation to enable the West to accept or reject the proposal in principle. Sir Paul Mason, for the United Kingdom, insisted that Gromyko's proposal remained "almost as cryptic as when it was first announced." Finally on March 27 Semyon Tsarapkin made a statement which marked the first clarification - albeit limited - since Gromyko first introduced the proposal in September. "The main criterion", he said, "which we suggest as the guiding principle in determining the number of missiles to be retained is that the quantity should be minimal so that, while being an additional guarantee against aggression, it could not at the same time serve the purposes of war or make possible the implementation of aggressive designs." Then as to control he stated: "The Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching pads. It considers that such launching pads should not be more numerous than the remaining missiles." As a guide to numbers the minimal principle was not much help. Nor did the Western powers feel enlightened about what control measures would be acceptable to Moscow. For what it was worth, however, this was the first

89 Id., p. 40.
indication that the USSR would permit inspection of missile launch pads. Repeated efforts by the United States and the United Kingdom to obtain further elaboration proved fruitless. Early in May Charles Stelle complained to his colleagues that "We now know hardly anything more about the proposal than when it was first introduced."  

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90 ENDC/PV. 129, 8 May 1963, p. 28.
Propaganda and Progress on Collateral Measures

An unwillingness to give the Chinese grounds for charging appeasement was not the only factor guiding Soviet disarmament policy at this time. By every diplomatic and propagandistic means available Soviet disarmament policy makers attempted to limit American nuclear superiority and to inhibit its possible use. This effort expressed itself in proposals and campaigns on prohibiting the testing and use of nuclear weapons; establishing denuclearized zones throughout the world; destroying nuclear delivery vehicles and overseas basis containing missile sites; dissolving NATO; neutralizing Germany and signing an East-West non-agression pact. Indeed Soviet defense of these "collateral measures" occupied more of their attention at this time than did the subject of general and complete disarmament, a favorite of theirs.

An opportunity presented itself in the fissures then developing within the Western alliance. Anglo-American relations underwent a serious strain late in 1962 as a result of the Kennedy Administration's sudden decision to cancel production of the Skybolt air-to-ground missile, upon which Britain was depending as the basic weapon of its bomber-borne nuclear deterrent force. Some of the damage was repaired by agreements reached between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy offered to furnish Britain a number of Polaris missiles to be installed in British-built submarines. It was further agreed that except where "supreme national interests" were at stake these missiles were to be used as part of a multilateral NATO
deterrent force. While for the moment the Conservative Government seemed satisfied, there was considerable opposition to the Nassau agreements voiced by the Labor Party whose accession to power in 1964 seemed more than a possibility.

But the crisis with Britain was nothing to that with France. President deGaulle dismissed with disdain a Franco-American agreement along the Nassau line. On January 14, 1963 the French President rejected the entire concept of a NATO multilateral force and affirmed France's determination to build her own nuclear deterrent force. In so doing he rejected the nuclear leadership of the Anglo-Saxon team and turned instead to cooperation with West Germany as Europe's first line of defense. On January 22, 1963 France and West Germany signed a bilateral treaty of cooperation providing inter alia for frequent high-level meetings and a common foreign and defense policy.

These developments afforded the Soviets a propaganda opportunity which they utilised to the utmost. The February and March speeches of all five of the Communist powers were replete with attacks upon the Nassau Agreement, Canadian and American cooperation in nuclear defense, the Franco-German treaty and American use of overseas bases. To support these efforts the Soviet Union in February formally introduced before the ENDC two new collateral measures. On February 12, 1963 Ambassador Kuznetsov tabled a declaration "On renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons." Under this proposal the nuclear powers would, independently of a general disarmament agreement, agree:
1. To dismantle bases located in foreign territory for submarines carrying nuclear and rocket weapons and to renounce the use of foreign ports as bases for such submarines.

2. To withdraw from foreign ports aircraft carriers having on board aircraft armed with nuclear weapons.

3. To dismantle strategical rocket installations located in foreign territory and to transfer to their own national territory rockets of 1,500 km range and over and the corresponding nuclear warheads.

4. To withdraw strategic aircraft designed for delivering nuclear bombs to their targets as well as these nuclear bombs, from bases located in foreign territory to within their own national boundaries. 91

Just over a week later the USSR introduced a draft proposal for a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Powers. By its terms the "States parties" to both pacts would undertake to refrain from attack and the threat or use of force in any manner. Provision was included for peaceful settlement of disputes and consultations should threatening situations arise. 92

The speeches made in defense of these proposals were hardly designed to be convincing. They all bristled with accusations of aggressive intent against the Western powers. Nor was there any serious attempts by the Soviets to rebut the Western charges that if implemented, these proposals would concede unilateral advantages to the Communist camp.


92ENDC/77, 20 February 1963 in Ibid.
Indeed, Poland for one was quite willing to admit the one-sided nature of the Soviet proposal to renounce the use of foreign territories for strategic purposes.

Its object [noted Mr. M. Hlustajn] is to remove from international relations the most dangerous elements of friction introduced by the cold war, and it is natural that the party which contributed to bringing this negative situation into being should make the greater efforts and the greater contributions to restore the status quo ante and to normalize the situation. Inasmuch as the United States and its allies are responsible for the tension set up by the existence of bases on foreign territory, it is only right that they should bear the greater onus of the costs of the operation.93

This was an unusually frank admission. Similarly, it was the same Polish representative who more concisely than any other spokesman spelled out the Soviet purposes behind the non-aggression pact.

We come to the heart of the problem, because whatever the terms and arguments used, the attitude to the question of concluding a non-aggression pact reflects the position on the question of normalizing and stabilizing the European situation.

Such stabilization primarily implies acceptance of the political and juridical status created in central Europe as a consequence of the defeat of Hitler's Germany and of the later developments which resulted in the establishment of two German States: the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.94

The West had no objections to any declaration of peaceful intent and the United Kingdom found an agreement of non-aggression between the representatives of the two parts acceptable, but the signing of any treaty that

93ENDG/PW. 139, 31 May 1963, pp. 21-22.
would enhance the legal status of East Germany was absolutely unacceptable.

Another Soviet thrust against the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force was a proposal made by the USSR in late May that "the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea should be declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons."\(^\text{95}\) It was no coincidence that this proposal was circulated only two days before the NATO Council was to hold its regular spring meeting in Ottawa. As expected the Ottawa Council had approved that part of the Nassau agreement which envisaged the assignment of nuclear forces to NATO's European command. The Soviet proposal which followed by several months the announcement that three United States Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean would replace obsolete Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey and Italy, also contained a strong warning to any Mediterranean country which permitted American nuclear submarines to use their bases. Joseph Godber, United Kingdom representative, summarized the Western response in labeling the demilitarized Mediterranean proposal "pure propaganda." As such it was ignored.

Finally two other anti-nuclear proposals were formulated outside of either of the two blocs. One was a Declaration on the Demilitarisation of Latin America drawn up by the Governments of Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico and formally approved by them on April 29, 1963. By this declaration the five governments announced their willingness to sign

\(^{95}\text{ENDC/91, 27 May 1963 in United Nations document DC/208, 5 September 1963}\)
a Latin American multilateral agreement "not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices." The USSR reiterating its sympathy with the concept of denuclearized zones promised to study the document carefully. The other proposal was a draft treaty submitted by Mexico on June 21, just before recess, which would prohibit the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons. Tsarapkin in a brief statement rejected the Mexican proposal by re-affirming the USSR's position of March 15, 1958. Six years previously the USSR had rejected a proposal prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes on the grounds that this kind of a limitation could not be divorced from the problem of disarmament in general and United States overseas bases in particular. Though no action on either of these proposals was taken by the ENDC, both were shortly to be approved by the General Assembly.

While the Communist bloc spokesmen were advancing their proposals the Western powers were pushing theirs. The debate was highly unorganized because both sides not only disagreed on content but on the agenda. Consequently while the Soviets were advocating measures to inhibit nuclear warfare the West was speaking on measures to reduce the risk of war by

96 ENDC/87, 6 May 1963 in Ibid.
accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. Toward the
very end of March Charles Stelle for the first time discussed in
plenary session some of the details envisaged by the United States
in a system of direct communication between Washington and Moscow.
He repeated an oft-made suggestion that the subject might best be
negotiated informally.

On April 5, 1963 at the end of a lengthy speech criticising
United States proposals, including measures to prevent war by
accident, Semyon Tsarevkin unexpectedly announced his government's
willingness to establish a direct line of communication with the
United States "For all its inadequacy," he said, "that measure
might have certain positive results. The Soviet Union is ready
to to agree immediately, without waiting for general and complete
disarmament, to the establishment of a direct telephone or teletype
communications line between the Governments of the Soviet Union and
the United States." 99 This step, small in comparison to the total
problem, was of great significance because it constituted a clear
and definite step by the Kremlin toward achieving better relations
with the West.

Ironically throughout April there was virtually no mention of
the Soviet concession in the plenary meetings. Negotiations for a

99ENDC/PV. 118, 5 April 1963, p. 52.
hot line had moved to informal sessions and apparently there was an agreement not to discuss the problem publically until all the wrinkles were ironed out. Indeed the public part of the ENDC sessions continued to reflect the asperity that had marked the February and March meetings. At the meeting immediately following Tsarapkin's acceptance Joseph Godber made an unusually sarcastic speech to which Tsarapkin replied: "I must say that no criticism applies to you as Chairman of our Conference. You are courteous and considerate enough. But the point is that when you begin to speak as the representative of the United Kingdom, you immediately undergo a transformation." Immediately in the next session James Barrington, the Burmese representative, commented, "I simply cannot imagine that we can go on in this fashion meeting three times a week, listening to the same speeches, the same arguments, trying to fool ourselves into the belief that somehow, from somewhere, a solution is going to drop out of the skies." Finally, on April 17 only three meetings after Tsarapkin's acceptance the Brazilian delegate was ready to admit failure. "As things stand today," observed Mr. A. A. de Mello Franco, "the Brazilian delegation can see in this Conference no genuine promise of an early prospect of real negotiations or of putting new life into our work in a constructive sense. The Brazilian delegation even wonders if the decision to resume our meetings in such an atmosphere of impotence and confusion was really a wise one."  

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100 ENDC/PV. 119, 8 April 1963, p. 38. The chairmanship referred to by Tsarapkin was for the day only.

101 ENDC/PV. 120, 10 April 1963, pp. 48-49.

102 ENDC/PV. 121, 17 April 1963, p. 5.
Not until the 26th of April did Charles Stelle mention the hot line in the plenary session and then only to observe that "the possibility of a first concrete agreement" existed. On that same day Tsarapkin delivered a blistering speech against the Western powers beginning with the statement: "The Soviet delegation cannot hide its deep disappointment and alarm at the situation that exists in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in regard to all three groups of problems with which the Committee is dealing." He then formally rejected the Western proposal for an exchange of nuclear military missions or information which he saw as a means for collecting reconnaissance information for aggressive reasons. At this stage the hot line agreement was no more than a tentative first step.

Even as it became evident that the hot line negotiations would be successful there was little comment or discussion in the ENDC. Part of this was a reflection of the agreement's minimal accomplishment, part frustration over the test ban failure and part because of the realization that all disarmament issues would be negotiated between the governments directly concerned and not in the committee. Mrs. A. Myrdal, Swedish representative, expressed the sentiment late in April that, "This whole session of the Conference since we reconvened in February can be characterized at best as a period of waiting." She added: "We are aware that certain feelers exist between the nuclear Powers directly concerned."

On June 20, 1963 the United States and the USSR signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" formalizing their agreement on a direct communications link.

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103 ENDC/PV. 125, 26 April 1963, p. 23.

Each government agreed to be responsible for the link on its own territory. The line consists of a telegraph system routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{The Treaty}

The public record gives little evidence to explain why the Soviet leadership chose to accept the American hot line proposal early in April. There is certainly no hint in the verbatim records of the NEDC. One obvious hypothesis is that it was a step in a policy calculated to bring about a major reduction in East-West tension. The hot line agreement appears to have been the product of a general re-evaluation of East-West relations undertaken by Premier Khrushchev as an aftermath of the Cuban crisis. As such the hot line was part of the broad trend of thinking in the Kremlin reflected by Khrushchev's acceptance of on-site inspection in December 1962 and the limited test ban treaty in the summer of 1963. Certainly the Cuban confrontation revealed the vital necessity of both sides being able to convey information and intention quickly and accurately. During the crucial early days of the American quarantine of Cuba a United States patrol plane accidentally violated Soviet territory in the Arctic. Fortunately the Soviet reaction was mild.

The hot line thus appears to be the first of three arms control measures taken in 1963 (partial test ban and neutralisation of outer space, the others) which gave substance to Khrushchev's doctrine of "Peaceful Co-Existence". Unlike the first, however, the latter two agreements involved a reversal of Soviet policy. For that reason they more conclusively revealed a new direction in Soviet policy. This is particularly true of the partial test ban treaty.

\textsuperscript{105}ENDC/97, 20 June 1963 and annex.
When on August 27, 1962 the Western powers proposed a treaty basically along the same lines as the one signed on August 5, 1963 as an alternative to a complete test ban, the USSR bitterly rejected it. In the First Committee and Plenary debates of the Seventeenth General Assembly the Soviet position remained that a cessation of tests in the atmosphere, under water and outer space only would serve to legalize underground tests. Khrushchev's acceptance of a partial test ban was a calculated major reversal of Soviet foreign policy. The question arises, why?

During 1963 Soviet disarmament policy was complicated by the USSR's relationship with the Peking regime. Moscow's response to the quarantine of Cuba only served to justify in Chinese eyes their suspicions that the Russians were willing to abandon their revolutionary goals for an accommodation with the West. Khrushchev had to consider that every agreement with the West strengthened the Chinese charge that he was a "revisionist". His problem was further complicated by the massive Chinese assault on India in October 1962. Soviet neutrality in the dispute and the continuation of its economic aid to India only further inflamed Chinese anti-Russian sentiment. Moscow was caught between its espousal of "peaceful co-existence" and its loyalty to the Communist camp.

If, in fact, the Soviet leadership had decided after October 1962 to seek a broad accommodation with the West, Premier Khrushchev was confronted with the difficult problem of making it palatable to his Chinese ally. The strong reaction he must have received from the Chinese to his December 1962 initiative may well have caused him to pause rather than push forward. From January through May 1963 Soviet disarmament policy was uncertain and hesitant. It is quite likely that Soviet unreadiness to engage in serious negotiations was a
reflection of the uncertainty of Soviet policy towards Peking. Indeed the harshness of Messrs. Kuznetsov and Tsarapkin's language in the fourth EDC session may have been a result of concern about vulnerability to Chinese charges that the Soviet Union was capitulating to the United States.

During the first six months of 1963 Sino-Soviet relations steadily and preceptably degenerated. Premier Khrushchev in a speech at a Communist meeting in East Berlin on January 16, 1963 pleaded for a truce to the polemics. Unfortunately for his cause the humiliation inflicted upon members of the Peking delegation at a later session only undermined Khrushchev's efforts. For their part the Chinese exacerbated tensions by their appeal to anti-white racism at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Tanganyika during February. On February 21 the Soviet leadership made an effort to halt the growing rupture by proposing a bilateral meeting to iron out differences. Khrushchev was thereupon invited to visit the Chinese leaders in Peking. He declined the invitation and in turn welcomed Chairman Mao or a competent delegation to Moscow for ideological talks. Both parties finally agreed to hold a conference in Moscow at the beginning of July and in the meanwhile to observe a moratorium on charges and accusations.

Meanwhile the USSR continued to hold open the door to a test ban agreement. The polemics in Geneva did not describe the whole situation. In March a small number of American, British and Soviet scientists met in London to explore possible compromises. Although the meeting was a private one it was clearly under the auspices of the respective governments. No formulas for an agreement were reached but each side did convince the other of the sincere interest of the other.106 On April 24 and May 31 this effort was pursued further in

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106 My source for this information is a paper from which I have not received permission to quote.
personal messages from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to
Premier Khrushchev. Following the Soviet Premier's second reply the Western
representatives were able to announce on June 10th a high level conference
between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Moscow
on July 15th.107

Notice of this meeting was given to the American public by President
Kennedy in a major address at American University on June 10, 1963. The
President referred to the nuclear test ban treaty as the only major area
"where the end is in sight", though he acknowledged that here too "a fresh
start is badly needed." To facilitate the coming negotiations President
Kennedy announced a cessation of United States nuclear tests in the atmosphere
so long as no other nation tested.108 Later the principle negotiators were
identified as Lord Hailsham (United Kingdom), Averall Harriman (United States),
and Andrei Gromyko (USSR).

At this point it is not clear how far Premier Khrushchev was prepared
to go in order to reach an agreement. One hopeful sign was the cessation in
June of Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts. Another was the hot
line agreement of June 20. Khrushchev, however, had in no way revealed any
specific concessions he was prepared to make. Indeed in his last letter to
Kennedy and MacMillan the Soviet Premier had adopted an uncompromising and
pessimistic tone as far as concessions on control were concerned. It is
possible that there was no fixed Soviet position at this time due to
uncertainty about the outcome of the Sino-Soviet conference in early July.

107British Command Paper 2184. Further Documents Relating to the
Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Miscellaneous No. 16

108UNDC/95, 11 June 1963 in United Nations document DC/208, 5 September
1963.
If Khrushchev had harbored hopes of a reconciliation with the Chinese, they were rudely dashed by the Chinese letter of June 14. In it the Chinese reiterated their ideological position and hostilely posed twenty-five loaded questions for discussion at the forthcoming conference. Furious at this breach of the moratorium on polemics the Russians expelled several persons connected with the Chinese embassy for distributing copies. As far as the Russians were concerned this letter revealed the irreconcilable nature of the Sino-Soviet division and heralded the failure of the ideological conference. In effect, freed from the obligation to appease the Chinese Khrushchev was now in a position to implement his policy of Peaceful Coexistence as he saw fit. Actually a nuclear test treaty with the West could be used as a vehicle to undermine and further isolate the Chinese.

Khrushchev's response to President Kennedy's June 10 address and the first solid indication of what might be expected from the Three-Power Moscow conference was his speech in East Berlin on July 2, 1963. Perhaps playing upon the suspense of his listeners he began: "Everyone, of course, is wondering whether an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests will now at last be concluded." The heart of his message was a commitment to conclude an agreement on a partial test ban, a prohibition of all but underground tests. Some ambiguity attended this speech because of what appeared to be a linking of a partial test ban with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw pact powers. "An agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests," he said, "together with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between those two groupings of States, will create a new international atmosphere...." Any prospects for a complete prohibition

109 ENDG/112, 22 August 1963 in Ibid.
of tests were dashed by his denial of the need for international control and his equating such again with legalised espionage.

July was a busy month in Moscow. On the fifth the Chinese delegation arrived. Both sides talked and acted as though they expected the conference to fail, which it did. Five days before the Chinese departed the Anglo-American team arrived to begin negotiations on a limited test ban. Progress developed unexpectedly smoothly. While the talks were in progress Premier Khrushchev delivered an address before his Council of Ministers in which he suggested that the non-aggression pact would not be an obstacle to a partial test ban. "We think that the question of how a non-aggression pact should be formulated could be settled without any particular difficulty to the mutual satisfaction of both sides." Khrushchev added: "The main thing here is not the form but the content; the main thing is that the other side also should display a desire for the easing of tension and the elimination of the state of 'cold war'." He expressed "hope" that such a pact might come out of the then current negotiations. In this speech Khrushchev also raised the questions of freezing military budgets, measures to prevent surprise attack, the reduction of foreign troops in both Germanies and a German peace treaty as issues which should be negotiated. As it turned out these problems were not at issue in the talks. There were only two points involving the text of the partial treaty that caused some concern with the Soviet delegation. One concerned the language of the withdrawal clause. The Soviets wanted it to be less specific than the American draft, so that there would be no explicit right for the United States to denounce the treaty if Communist China conducted

110 ENDC/113, 23 August 1963 in Ibid. This speech was delivered June 19th.

111 See footnote 106.
a nuclear test. They also wanted each of the three original parties designated as depository powers and each free to permit states to adhere to the treaty without communicating this information to the others. Thus Moscow would in no way be involved with Nationalist China's accession. The Anglo-American negotiators complied with these demands. On July 25 the treaty was initiated and on August 5 signed.

The treaty's basic provisions are as follows:112

1. Each of the parties undertakes not to carry out any nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater nor "in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted".

2. Each of the parties undertakes not to encourage or in any way participate in such a nuclear explosion.

3. Any amendment to the treaty must be approved by a majority of all the adhering parties and the United States, United Kingdom and USSR.

4. The treaty shall be open to all states for signature.

5. The treaty shall be of unlimited duration but each party can withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

As to the non-aggression pact, the USSR was content to accept an accompanying statement to the effect that the three governments would consult with their respective allies for the purpose of achieving an agreement satisfactory to

The non-aggression pact was pushed aside.

The Fifth ENDC Session

A mood of good will pervaded the brief fifth session of the ENDC which met through the month of August. Not unexpectedly Tsarapkin allotted credit for the relaxation of tensions and successful negotiation of the partial test ban to Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence. Notwithstanding the harmony and lack of rancor there were no basic changes of position among the principal parties. The nuclear powers were still unable to agree upon an agenda for collateral measures so the debate continued to be general. Tsarapkin continued to plead the necessity of a non-aggression pact even though bluntly informed by Charles Stelle that "this is neither the forum nor the time for discussion of a non-aggression arrangement between the NATO and Warsaw alliances."113

Among other collateral measures advocated by the Soviet representatives were those mentioned in Khrushchev's July 19th speech — viz, a cut in military budgets, a reduction of forces in both Germany and measures to prevent surprise attack. As an important anti-surprise attack measure Khrushchev had singled out the establishment of ground posts at airports, railway junctions, main roads and in major ports on both sides of the iron curtain. This type of limited control measure had previously been popular in the West and would undoubtedly be welcomed if not tied to unacceptable conditions. Tsarapkin did not spell out what other measures the USSR would demand except to say that control posts would have to be "combined with certain partial disarmament measures." He referred his colleagues to the Soviet proposals of November 29, 1959 specifically excluding aerial photography.114

113 ENDC/PV. 152, 16 August 1963, p. 38.

repeated United States proposals for a system of ground observation posts and advance notification of major military movements, but he observed that "we are prepared to accept an arrangement limited solely to a system of ground observation posts." He asked the Soviet delegation to elaborate on its own views.

On the subject of complete and general disarmament the only modification was a United States amendment to its disarmament outline which provided for the transfer in Stage One of a specific quantity of U-235 from weapons to non-weapons use. Throughout the year United States representatives had been advocating an agreement to transfer 50,000 kgs. of U-235 to peaceful uses. Such a measure could be verified easily without revealing closely guarded secrets of nuclear weapons design. Stelle informed the Committee that back in April the United States had offered to consider an arrangement by which the United States would transfer a larger amount, within reason, of U-235 than the Russians. He suggested the possibility of a transfer of 60,000 kgs. by the United States to 40,000 kgs. by the Russians as an example. But the Soviets were not interested.

Detente at the United Nations

Soviet behavior in the summer session of the CNDG failed to reveal the real significance of the "Spirit of Moscow" either as to disarmament in particular or Soviet relations with the West in general. It was possible that

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115 ENDC/FV. 152, 16 August 1963, p. 7.

116 ENDC/FV. 151, 14 August 1963, pp. 11-12. The text of the amendment is ENDC/30/Add 3, 14 August 1963. At the same session the United States also submitted draft articles VI to XII (relating to nuclear disarmament in stage I). These are contained in ENDC/109, 14 August 1963.
the spirit was no more than a temporary tactic to divide the West and lull it into complacency; or possibly it was the first step in the liquidation of the cold war and a resolution of the fundamental issues pitting the Communist camp and free world against each other. As events unfolded the Spirit of Moscow turned out to be neither. It was more than a tactic and less than a settlement. Moscow clearly sought an easing of tensions and, if not liquidation of the issues dividing both sides, at least an avoidance of new controversy.

Moscow's policy of detente was most clearly evidenced in its relations with the United Nations. None of the root problems, such as those of finance, administration, voting in the organization were settled; but a number of long-standing lesser problems were resolved. For years, for example, the USSR had opposed giving to the International Atomic Energy Agency authority to apply stringent safeguards to ensure that fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes. As a donor, rather than a recipient, of atomic resources the Soviet Union would not be subject to international safeguards, but it is very possible that pressures could develop in the future to apply the practices of the I.A.E.A. to the major nuclear powers. During the summer of 1963 Moscow backed away from its long-standing objection to such safeguards and formally approved their use at the seventh I.A.E.A. General Conference in October.117 Soviet cooperation in another important matter was demonstrated in its concurrence in November on the allocation of radio frequencies for space communications at a special Geneva conference of the International Telecommunication Union.118 Another deadlock of several years was eased when:


118Ibid., pp. 338-339.
the USSR and the United States came to agreement on a statement of legal principles governing the exploration and use of outer space. The draft formally approved by the committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on November 22 failed to contain several Soviet principles—such as the prohibition of non-governmental activities in space—which had been objectionable to the United States.

As to disarmament the Soviets wanted to maintain the spirit of detente but not to the point of concessions on any fundamental issues. On the crucial question of inspection their position was as adamant as ever. Indeed, in insisting that no inspection whatsoever was needed for a complete test ban Soviet spokesmen appeared to be reneging on Khrushchev's previous offer of two to three inspections.

Andrei Gromyko's address before the United Nations on September 19 was a determined effort to sustain the mood of rapprochement. From the point of view of long range possibilities his most important statement was a further modification of the Soviet plan to eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. The West had strongly opposed this feature of the Soviet disarmament plan because of its great reliance upon strategic missile forces as a deterrent. Without this deterrent NATO would be vulnerable to the large concentration of conventional forces the Soviet Union could bring to bear upon Europe. A year earlier at the Seventeenth General Assembly Gromyko had modified the Soviet plan by agreeing that some missiles with nuclear warheads might be retained through the second stage. Now at the Eighteenth session Gromyko extended this concession by accepting a retention of a limited number of missiles through the end of the disarmament process. Important as this concession could be potentially, failure by the Soviets to link it to a meaningful method of verification, undermined its impact. Indeed consistent Soviet opposition to any system of verification has rendered comprehensive disarmament unlikely in the

119 Ibid., p. 339.
A more fruitful suggestion by Gromyko was a proposal for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree jointly to prohibit the orbiting of nuclear weapons. This kind of an idea met ideally the Soviet program for sustaining the Spirit of Moscow: it symbolized the concept of peaceful coexistence without either infringing upon USSR sovereignty or involving a loss of power. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, so far as was known, had plans to place nuclear weapons in orbit, and many military estimates considered the potential cost beyond its potential worth. When on October 3 the Foreign Ministers of the three nuclear powers met in New York they were able to concur on Gromyko's proposal. Instead, however, of limiting the agreement to the nuclear powers, it was broadened to include all nations and embodied in a General Assembly resolution. On October 17 the General Assembly after only two days of debate adopted by acclamation Resolution 1884 (XVIII) which called upon all States "To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner." Other resolutions supported by the USSR and adopted by the Assembly requesting the ENDC to resume negotiations "with energy and determination" and endorsing the partial test ban were basically routine.

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121 See Ibid., Agenda Items 26 and 73.
Not all of the Soviet Union's efforts were directed toward accommodation. The spirit of Moscow did not preclude propagandistic maneuvering such as Gromyko's suggestion that the ENDC meet at the heads-of-government level in 1964. This was but a mild repetition of an attempt by Khrushchev in 1962 to involve the heads-of-government in the disarmament negotiations. Similarly Soviet pressure for General Assembly Resolution in 1909 (XVIII) requesting the ENDC to study "urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the production of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons." could only have propagandistic value in view of the Western reliance on nuclear weapons.

There were other developments during the fall and winter of 1963 which exposed the fragile base of the East-West rapprochement. In October American and British troops were detained on the autobahn to Berlin, and in early November a minor crisis followed a Soviet refusal to pass an American convoy. The detention of Professor Frederick Barghoorn in November halted temporarily East-West negotiations on cultural exchanges. Adequate explanations for these and other incidents are lacking. For, taken together they did not constitute a repudiation of Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence, irritating though they were. On the Western part every effort was made to encourage the Russians in their campaign to generate good-will instead of tension. In spite of some domestic pressure to the contrary President Kennedy approved and successfully negotiated the sale of two and one half million tons of wheat to the USSR. Finally as the year drew to a close

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122 See Ibid., Agenda Item 27. This resolution was actively opposed by the United States.
Premier Khrushchev announced (December 13) that the Soviet Union would reduce its military budget for the coming year and was thinking of cutting back its armed forces. This and the agreement permitting West Berliners to visit relatives in East Berlin during the holiday period carried the Spirit of Moscow into 1964.
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND SOME SPECULATIONS

(A) Soviet disarmament policy during 1962 and 1963 was, as always, guided by a broad assessment of Western military strengths and political intentions. The period from March 1962 (when ENDC first convened) through October 1962 (Cuban crisis) was diplomatically a dormant period as the USSR digested the results of its 1961 and 1962 atmospheric tests. The Soviet decision to break the unofficial moratorium in 1961 was a calculated political risk dictated apparently by what the military and scientific community felt to be necessary to catch up with the United States. American successes in missile and Polaris submarine development may by 1960 and 1961 have undermined Soviet confidence in their own ICBMs. Apparently recognizing an inferiority to the United States both in numbers and versatility of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union sought a partial compensation in developing high megaton weapons.

(B) It is more than likely that the pace of qualitative advance through atmospheric testing had slowed down by the end of 1962, so that the likelihood of one side or the other achieving a technological supremacy was far less than previously. By 1962 the nuclear giants had come closer to achieving an overall nuclear parity than ever before. Thus any freezing of the military situation would minimize the prospects of either side's scoring an unexpected breakthrough, if one was possible.

(C) The major political incentive for the test ban treaty was the Kennedy reaction to Khrushchev's efforts to station strategic missiles on Cuba. This action:
1. Destroyed the USSR's potential countervailability to the overall United States strategic superiority.

2. Convinced the Kremlin that the United States would fight before permitting a reversal of the balance of power.

It is possible that Khrushchev decided it would be better to achieve a detente (of indefinite duration) with the West rather than engage in a costly arms race to overtake it by purely military means. This decision was probably due to:

a) economic strains of the USSR economy, particularly in agriculture.

b) belief that an East-West detente might intensify Allied differences.

c) a desire to expand trade with the West.

(D) Khrushchev's offer of three on-site inspections in December 1962 was the first concrete step toward achieving a test ban since the Soviet resumption of the tests in 1961. It appears that he honestly believed that would be acceptable to the West.

(E) From January through June 1963 Soviet disarmament diplomacy was hesitant and uncertain. This apparently reflected the uncertainty of Soviet policy toward Peking. It is clear that Peking violently opposed a United States - USSR test ban treaty and this must have restrained the Soviet Premier who did not relish a break with the Chinese. It is more than likely that the Chinese letter of June 14 (coupled with other events) convinced the Russian leader of the intractability of the Chinese and of the futility of appeasing them. Thus freed, he carried through with his earlier initiative toward a test ban.
(F) Khrushchev may have seen an East-West detente as an important means of stabilizing Communist control in East Germany. The fact that the West could come to what would be heralded as a major agreement with the USSR while Germany remained divided would likely be interpreted as an indication of its acceptance of the status quo in Europe.

(G) It is not improbable that there is a personal element in Khrushchev's efforts to associate his regime with peace. A test ban treaty would give substance to his policy of peaceful co-existence. In his declining years Khrushchev would like to be remembered as a man of peace and the liquidator of Stalinism. Unquestionably the test ban is a popular policy with the Soviet peoples, and like most politicians, Khrushchev wants to be popular. Also since the consumation of this treaty is so much a product of his decisions and since it was negotiated and signed in Moscow, Khrushchev could expect to win tremendous propaganda benefits.

(H) Throughout 1962 and 1963 two facets of Soviet disarmament diplomacy remained constant:

1) The USSR emphatically rejected the imposition of any controls. Even the offer of two to three on-site inspections was made grudgingly and condemned as unnecessary. Hostility to controls is imbedded deeply in the Soviet Weltanschauung and stands as a major barrier to further agreements. The Soviets are sincere in viewing this as a political question.

2) All Soviet negotiations are accompanied by propagandistic tactics to inhibit the Western use of or reliance upon nuclear weapons.
Finally the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee plays a distinctly secondary role in the negotiation of disarmament issues. Its existence is primarily a response to the pressures of public opinion. To be sure, it is useful as the hot line results revealed. But the important agreements (like the test ban) will be negotiated by plenipotentiaries in private. There was virtually no indication at Geneva that Soviet policy makers were moving toward a partial test ban.