SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1964-1965

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I

A Brief Historical Background

All the issues in the Sino-Soviet rift have been clear since late 1963, when the territorial, military, and alliance issues assumed their proper place as at least as important as the more ideological points of conflict. Consequently, neither Khrushchev's fall nor any subsequent development has substantially modified Sino-Soviet irreconcilability.

In the first place, Soviet retention of the territories the Tsars annexed in Sinkiang and the Maritime Provinces and its domination of Outer Mongolia and Chinese determination to recover these traditional Chinese territories probably continue to make any alliance between a strong Russia and a strong China with its present boundaries far from permanent.

Secondly, China is an irredentist power not only to the west and north but to the east as well. Peking regards the recovery of Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu, and more generally the expulsion of American power from the shores of Asia, as one of its vital interests. The post-Stalin Soviet leadership has preferred a détente with the strategically more powerful United States above Sino-Soviet reconciliation (i.e., they proclaim "peaceful coexistence" and the "non-inevitability of war") and therefore Moscow remains unwilling to accept the high level of risk-taking vis-à-vis Washington which Peking considers essential to achieve its vital interest of expelling America from the Western Pacific. As a result, Moscow and Peking's common enemy,
America, serves as a divisive rather than a unifying force. More generally, the Chinese base their hopes of driving back the Americans on the revolutionary potential of the underdeveloped, colored areas ("the epicenter of the world revolutionary struggle") and insist that Moscow must be willing to take the risk of giving military aid to revolutions in the underdeveloped colored areas. To Moscow's reply that this values national liberation struggle above the "world socialist system" and moreover runs the risk of American escalation and therefore of general or nuclear war (i.e., it is contrary to peaceful coexistence) the Chinese retort that the American "paper tiger" will withdraw rather than escalate to general war.

Thirdly, Moscow's unwillingness to give China vast economic aid and assistance toward obtaining an atomic capacity greatly increased the strains arising from differences in national interests.

Fourthly, the shared ideology, although it postponed public polemics and open split, made pragmatic compromise close to impossible and therefore eventually speeded up the alliance's collapse.

Fifthly, after Moscow refused Peking the massive economic aid which alone could have made possible rapid Chinese industrialization and, on the other hand, after Mao's short-lived hundred-flowers experiment had scared him away from domestic liberalization, Khrushchev and his associates remained determined to de-Stalinize in order to enable more effective exploitation of Soviet industrial potential. Consequently a sharp contrast developed between Moscow's and Peking's internal policies, with Mao
considering Soviet internal relaxation a direct menace to China's maintenance of an ascetic, fanatical, labor-intensive police state.

Thus the Chinese apparently became convinced that the Moscow leadership was a grave threat both to Chinese national interests and to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (between which they almost surely do not consciously distinguish) and that therefore China must replace the Soviet Union as the head of a new, reformed, orthodox (but not pluralistic) Communist movement. In order to carry out this aim, Peking has attempted to gain control over, and, where it could not get control, to split into factions, the Communist parties, first in East Asia and then throughout the world.

The chronology of the Sino-Soviet dispute is too long and complex to summarize here, and its development up to the end of November 1963 has already been treated in detail.\(^1\) Several points about it, however, are especially important for understanding the 1964-1965 developments. In my judgment the 1963 Chinese revelations indicated that the "point of no return" in Sino-Soviet relations occurred at the latest in the summer of 1959 and perhaps

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even before. Since then the public dispute has followed a cyclical course of escalation and then partial détente, each cycle ending with Moscow-Peking relations worse than before and with other Communist parties obtaining more autonomy from the Soviet Union. What ostensibly have been Sino-Soviet attempts at reconciliation have actually been tactical maneuvers intended primarily to worsen the other's position and to gain more support among other Communist parties. Thus the most important dynamic characteristic of these cycles have been the steadily accelerating decline of Soviet influence, the increasing rise of Chinese influence, and the growth of Communist pluralism--i.e., the greater assertion of national autonomy by other Communist parties, particularly the ones previously under Soviet control.

The Chinese have found it increasingly desirable, while protesting their opposition to a split and their desire to discuss and solve the differences, to take an ideologically adamant policy position and to intensify their factional and splitting activity. The Soviets, on the other hand, have increasingly tried to mobilize other Communist parties for collective action against the Chinese, i.e., to close off the possibility of neutralism or passivity and thereby to preclude the success of Chinese factionalist activities. Most of this article will deal with the second such Soviet attempt, which began in early 1964. Before turning to it, however, Moscow's unsuccessful first attempt, in September-October 1963, must be briefly summarized.

In July 1963, after the failure of the Sino-Soviet bilateral meeting and the Soviet signature of the partial test ban treaty,
something like a Sino-Soviet schism occurred: mutual polemics became explicit, general, and violent, and in September 1963 the Russians moved toward calling an international Communist meeting for the purpose of excommunicating the Chinese.

By so doing the Soviets and the Chinese had reversed their previous tactics; each now largely adopted the other's previous method of crisis management. Until then the Soviets had demanded a bilateral Sino-Soviet meeting while the Chinese had called for multilateral or all-party talks. By September 1963, however, the Chinese demanded resumption first of bilateral, then of multilateral, and, last, of all-party talks, and stressed "adequate preparations," i.e., delay. The Soviets, on the other hand, after having earlier used party congresses as anti-Chinese fora, demanded the rapid reconvening of the November 1960 26-party editorial commission, to be followed soon thereafter by an all-party meeting.

This simultaneous reversal of tactics reflected the changing Sino-Soviet balance of forces. As long as the Soviets thought that they could force the Chinese, if not to surrender, then to retreat by mobilizing international Communist pressure against them, i.e., by demonstrating that Chinese aims were unrealizable and that time would lead to Soviet gains (by forcing neutrals and reluctant allies off the fence), they wanted bilateral Sino-Soviet talks. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted an all-party forum so that they could demonstrate to other Communist parties their adamancy, their rising influence, and thereby make the danger of a split seem unacceptable. By mid-1963, however, the
Soviets had clearly become convinced (a) that the Chinese would neither back down nor even retreat, (b) that Peking's factional activity was so dangerously successful that Soviet influence in the Communist world was declining, and Chinese influence rising, with increasing rapidity and, therefore, (c) that speedy "political isolation" of the Chinese was necessary, i.e., there must be a formal split, whereby neutrals and recalcitrants could be forced into line and the decline of Soviet influence thereby halted if not reversed.

The Chinese, on the other hand, were convinced that (a) the Soviets were indeed preparing for a split and allying with Washington against them in all crucial foreign policy issues, (b) Chinese influence was rising and a formal split might slow down this rise, and, therefore, (c) formal international unity (i.e., avoidance of split) plus stepped-up factional activity within international Communism and alliance with all non-Communist powers outside it who were both anti-Soviet and anti-American offered Peking the best chance for further improving its position.

Within this context, and with these reversed tactics, Khrushchev began his first public attempt to convene an international conference to excommunicate the Chinese in late September 1963. He did this by the "surrogate" method, i.e., by reprinting resolutions of unconditionally pro-Soviet parties calling for such a meeting, by censoring less favorable parts of resolutions by other parties, and by strongly intensifying Soviet polemics against the Chinese. Privately, the Soviet leadership brought strong pressure on pro-Soviet parties in order to force their public compliance with the conference plan.
But here as so often before the Soviets once again were blocked by their chief tactical problem. They still had an assured majority of parties, including their most powerful allies, on the policy issues of the dispute, and in particular in favor of international détente and de-Stalinization. But their majority was rapidly declining as their decreasing authority and increasing record of failures emboldened their allies to assert their own interests on the organizational issue: the degree of centralized (i.e., Soviet) control over other Communist parties. The Soviet plan, unfolded in September and October 1963, called for an international conference, preceded by an editorial commission meeting, to undertake the formal revision of the November 1960 Moscow Declaration so as to declare that the Chinese Communist Party, not the Yugoslavs, was now the "main danger," that priority must be given to combatting the CCP, and therefore its "political isolation" must be brought about. To accomplish this there must be proclaimed (as Moscow had failed to do in 1960) a formal ban against factionalism in the international Communist movement, and neutralism on this issue must be precluded.

By early October several moderate, conditionally pro-Soviet parties were publicly opposing this Soviet plan. The Romanians and Italians were the most active, but the Norwegian, Swedish, and British Communists were also unenthusiastic, and the Poles were also opposing behind the scenes. The Romanians probably refused, as they did in 1964-1965, to come to such a Soviet-arranged conference at all, and the Italian Communists probably refused to make a firm commitment to do so. Whether or not there
were serious differences at that time in the Soviet leadership about Khrushchev's proposed conference remains unclear; some of his associates probably raised doubts about the wisdom of moving so rapidly toward such extreme goals when such important parties as the Romanians and Italians were so recalcitrant. In any case, on October 25, 1963 Khrushchev called for an end to Sino-Soviet polemics and said that time would demonstrate which was correct, Moscow or Peking. This statement, plus his omission of any reference to a conference, indicated clearly that that Soviet plan had for the time being been at least postponed.2

2. The above is primarily based on Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 207-230. I have since had the opportunity of reading an unfortunately still unpublished manuscript by Christian Duevel on this same episode, in which two additional important points are made: first, sometime between September 12 and 24 there was passed for the press the annual yearbook of the Institute of World Academy and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in which a listing of the socialist countries, for the first and only time before or since (to my knowledge), omitted China, North Korea, and Albania (but not North Vietnam); and, second, the November 1963 issue of Problemy mira i sotsialisma (passed for the press, October 19, 1964) (World Marxist Review, VI, 11), which contained the article by Romanian Premier Maurer opposing the conference, also reproduced excerpts from declarations by various parties calling for such a conference. Duevel deduces from this that the Soviets were unable to gain a majority in the editorial board of the journal to exclude the Maurer article, a fact which contributed toward, and indeed may have been primarily responsible for, Khrushchev's abandonment of the meeting; I would rather think it probably reflected some intermediate stage in Khrushchev's retreat from it. For the October 26 Chou Yang speech, see infra, p.15 and footnote 5.
Two developments highlighted Sino-Soviet relations in the past year and a half and combined to bring them to a new crisis by June 1965. The first was the accelerated decline of Soviet influence in the Communist world, climaxed by the failure of the second Soviet attempt to mobilize its allies for collective action against China. The second was the American military escalation into North Vietnam and the Soviet decision not to risk a major military confrontation with the United States when its own vital national interests were not directly involved and the prime profiteers from such a confrontation would be not Moscow but its enemies or unreliable friends in Peking or Hanoi.

The Soviet Conference Plan Renewed

1. Calm Before the Storm (December 1963-April 1964)

The Soviets probably never abandoned their conference plans; they only executed a temporary tactical retreat to regroup their forces. In public they refrained from anti-Chinese polemics, urged Peking to do the same, and reiterated their demonstrated desire to improve relations with China. In private they began a new conciliatory exchange of letters with the Chinese. Expecting to succeed in neither, they hoped that their apparent moderation would help dispel the fears of their reluctant allies, that Moscow would try to reimpose Soviet control over them once a split
with Peking had occurred. Taking, therefore, a very pragmatic position concerning the style of Sino-Soviet negotiations, they proposed that both sides should agree on as many issues as they could and should postpone the consideration of undecided questions. In particular, they should cooperate against imperialism, i.e., not go beyond Moscow's vital national interests in so doing. Consequently they offered a resumption of economic and technical (but not of military) assistance to China. Finally, they were silent on the vexed Albanian and Yugoslav issues.

All the elements in this Soviet position have one factor in common: they were calculated to appeal to Moscow's reluctant allies (Romanians, Cubans, Italians, and others) who all wanted the end of polemics, the deferment of unagreed issues, the end of Soviet use of economic and technical assistance as a means of pressure (but no atomic aid to a militant China which might stumble into a nuclear war), and a more pragmatic Soviet position on the Yugoslav and Albanian issues. From these parties' point of view the Chinese could legitimately be expected to accept all these points, or at least to keep quiet about those they did not. Conversely, the Soviets had nothing to lose by making these proposals, since (a) they could feel quite sure that Peking would not accept them and (b) the subsequent Chinese refusal would help Moscow gain allies for relaunching of the conference project.

The Chinese, on the other hand, continued to play a double game. They had helped foil the first Soviet attempt at a conference in part by deliberately creating a credible deterrent
against it--i.e., they had convinced the reluctant Soviet allies that they were prepared to be so adamantly opposed to compromise with Moscow that the Soviets would feel compelled to plunge into a split. Moreover, they did this while maintaining a public position against a split and in favor of (prolonged) negotiation, i.e., delay.

The Chinese were most likely to gain supporters among reluctant Soviet allies on the organizational issue (independence from Moscow) and the least likely so, except for Castro, on such policy issues as priority for revolutionary struggle in underdeveloped areas, high risk-taking vis-à-vis Washington, and anti-de-Stalinization. Peking therefore stressed the organizational and procedural issues and tried to center its secret exchanges with the Soviets on attacking the Soviet intention to compel them to surrender or to force a split, while declaring that the CCP preferred delay and was opposed to a split (like the reluctant Soviet allies). Meanwhile, their public pronouncements considerably intensified their ideological extremism. In any case, the Chinese did not want an international split but rather, like the reluctant Soviet allies, preferred delay, so as to increase Chinese opportunities for factionalism and splitting with individual parties, while the Soviet allies wanted to avoid renewed Soviet pressure against their autonomy. The Soviets, the Chinese could feel sure, would soon again feel compelled to call a conference, thereby allowing them to abandon their private conciliatory position while still putting the Soviets in the wrong with their reluctant allies.
The interim conciliatory Soviet line was first outlined in a November 29 letter from the CPSU to the CCP Central Committee. Addressed also to Mao personally and signed by Khrushchev, it was not made public by Peking until May 8. Since Moscow must have assumed, correctly, that Peking would reject its overtures (except perhaps for some minor increase in Sino-Soviet trade), the letter's contents and the fact that Moscow did not publish it were primarily intended to appeal to the reluctant Soviet allies. The letter contrasted strikingly with the September-October 1963 Moscow conference plan and was reminiscent of, and probably influenced by, the PCI position. True, it reaffirmed Soviet support for an all-party conference, but this time for one which "will lead not to a split . . . but to genuine unity and solidarity. . . ." Polemics should be ended, but not "exchanges on view on questions of principle." Sino-Soviet relations must be improved to benefit not primarily either Moscow or Peking but rather "the Communist movement," particularly those parties which, "forced to . . . struggle against imperialism in extremely difficult and complex circumstances . . . , rightly consider they require friendship with both the CPSU and the CCP."

(The reference to such neutralist or only partially pro-Chinese parties as Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea was clear.) The pragmatic Soviet position was outlined clearly:

. . . not to concentrate on . . . differences between us but let them wait . . . develop our
cooperation... where favorable possibilities exist.

particularly for peace and against imperialism. Specifically, the Soviet letter proposed (a) increase in Sino-Soviet trade, (b) resumption of Soviet technical aid and sending of specialists to China, particularly in the oil and mining industries, (c) scientific, technical, and cultural Sino-Soviet cooperation, and (d) discussions on delineation of the Sino-Soviet boundary, the historical nature of which, it stated, should be taken for granted and accepted.

The Chinese ideological, and therefore political, position had already hardened--albeit this was then known only within the Chinese élite--in late October. On October 26, the day after Khrushchev publicly retreated from his conference plan, Chou Yang, Chinese agitprop deputy head, in a speech in Peking first provided the ideological imperative for Chinese factionalism. The

3. The parallel to the agreed formulation for the second Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement is striking (see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 47, 85-87).

speech reflected policy decisions by the Chinese leadership to intensify their factional activities and bring them into the open by the formal establishment of rival "Marxist-Leninist" Communist parties, as well as to intensify intellectual repression domestically. The keynote of the speech, although Leninist in spirit, went far beyond anything that Lenin had ever explicitly proclaimed:

"Political parties genuinely representing the revolutionary proletariat," i.e., pro-Chinese, therefore "are bound to appear" everywhere. Conversely, the CPSU leadership's revisionism was leading it to forfeit "its place in the ranks of the vanguards of the international proletariat," a role which, Chou implied, would fall to China. Knowing that any increase of factionalism would not appeal to the reluctant Soviet allies, Chou implicitly but clearly defended the Romanian resistance to Soviet "neocolonialist theory." Finally, in order to strengthen its desired international image as organizationally conciliatory and pluralistic even if ideologically adamant, Peking did not publish the Chou speech until December 27, by which time the Soviet resumption of their conference plan was again becoming clear, thereby
making it seem that they rather than the Chinese, were pushing for an international split. 5

Fitting theory to practice, the Chinese expanded and brought more into the open their factional activities. The subsequent weeks saw the official call for founding congresses of two new "Marxist-Leninist" (i.e., pro-Chinese) parties, in Belgium and Ceylon, and a "declaration of Marxist-Leninists" foreshadowing a third such party in Australia. In all three cases the Communist party concerned had formerly been pro-Soviet, and Chinese activity and Chinese financing had played a significant role in the split and the formation of the new pro-Chinese groups. 6


Moreover Chou En-lai's December 1963-January 1964 visit to Africa and Albania signaled not only Peking's continued support of Albania's intransigence but also an increase in Chinese political, economic, and subversive activities in the Black Continent.

That Sino-Soviet conflict within international Communist front organizations remained at a high level became clear at the November 28-December 3, 1963 Warsaw meeting of the World Council of Peace, where a dissenting Chinese resolution was voted down by a pro-Soviet majority. Furthermore at the Djakarta preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference Peking succeeded in vetoing the inclusion of the Soviets as full members, as the Soviets had earlier been excluded from a Djakarta Afro-Asian trade union meeting.

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11. Djakarta correspondent's dispatch in English to NCNA Peking, June 29, 1964, 1418 GMT.
Nor were the Soviets inactive on the factional front. In view of subsequent events one may assume that Moscow was already in active contact with Yoshio Shiga, who some months later, with Soviet support, began efforts to set up an anti-Chinese group (and eventually Communist party) in Japan.\textsuperscript{12}

The only significant Soviet success in this phase was the marked improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations signaled by the January 1964 Soviet-Cuban communique. In it Fidel Castro, presumably in return for more Soviet economic aid, endorsed the Soviet position that peaceful coexistence was the "general line" and the 1957 and 1960 "condemnation of factional and sectional activity . . . in the international Communist movement" and

\[\ldots\text{ expressed his approval of the measures undertaken by the CPSU Central Committee for the liquidation of existing differences in and the strengthening of unity and cohesion of the ranks of the international Communist movement}.\ldots\]

Even so, Cuban silence on Sino-Soviet relations continued thereafter, thus indicating that Castro's lack of enthusiasm for a Sino-Soviet split remained.

Moscow also increasingly met Chinese challenge in underdeveloped areas, the more so because of the opportunities offered the Soviets by the increasingly radical and anti-Western policies of many of these states. In a forerunner of Khrushchev's mid-1964 expedition to Cairo and stepped-up courtship of Algeria,

\textsuperscript{12} See p. 39, infra.

\textsuperscript{13} Pravda, January 23, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 4 (February 19, 1964), pp. 26-27, at p. 27.
Pravda in early December 1963 authoritatively, albeit not explicitly, modified the November 1960 Declaration's concept of "national democracy" (of which legalization of Communist parties, something which Ben Bella and Nasser were unwilling to permit, had been one of the preconditions) by substituting for it the new concept of "revolutionary democracy," or, more generally, of "non-capitalist development." The latter, Pravda declared, may occur without the existence of a Communist party

... in countries where the proletariat has not yet taken shape as a class or where it has not yet become a sufficiently powerful force ... but then only by the influence of the world socialist system ...

i.e. the Soviet Union takes the place of the local Communist party, and cooperation with the Soviet Union guarantees socialist development.14

Later in the month Khrushchev made this even more explicit. While Marxist-Leninists would prefer a "national democratic state" (i.e. toleration of a legal Communist party), he declared,

Of course this does not preclude other forms of development along the path of national liberation and social progress ...

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He prescribed only one condition:

Socialism cannot be built on positions of anti-communism, opposing the countries in which socialism has won the victory and persecuting the Communists. ... 15

i.e. to "build socialism" (and get Soviet support) a radical nationalist regime must ally itself with the Soviet Union and, although it may ban the existence of a Communist party, it must not imprison or persecute individual Communists, but rather allow them to participate in the ruling élite.

Finally, pro-Soviet publications made clear as early as January if not explicit, that Moscow would not remain inactive in the face of Chinese factional activity. 16

Khrushchev's early January 1964 proposal for renunciation of force in territorial disputes was probably also primarily aimed at countering Peking's claims to Soviet territory. 17

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In mid-December the Chinese published their sixth "Comment" on the July 14 Soviet "Open Letter," this time on peaceful coexistence. This article did not throw any substantially new light on the Chinese position, which remained one of advocating higher risk-taking in national liberation struggles. Like Peking's November 19 fifth "comment," it was so phrased as to counteract the Soviet denunciation of the Chinese as warmongers opposed to peaceful coexistence, while at the same time it appealed to all strongly anti-American Communist parties by stressing Khrushchev's priority for a Soviet-American agreement. The article was primarily significant for its reaffirmation, for the first time after the (then still not publicly known) November 29 Soviet letter, of the adamancy of the Chinese position. It made no reference to the organizational and procedural issues. The Albanians continued their vitriolic denunciations of Khrushchev, which the Chinese regularly reprinted.

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That the Chinese position was becoming increasingly and explicitly more adamant became even more clear with the publication on February 4, 1964 of Peking's seventh "Comment," entitled "The Leaders of the C. P. S. U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times." This article made explicit what the Chou Yang speech had implied: the Chinese now publicly and explicitly demanded nothing less than the complete reversal of Soviet domestic and foreign policy since Stalin's death, plus Moscow's abandonment of its allies and acquiescence in Peking's subversion of them. After reiterating the Chou Yang formulation that splits always occur in communist parties and that true Marxist-Leninists must struggle against revisionists even if the latter are in a "temporary" majority, the article declared that

... the leaders of the CPSU headed by Khrushchev have become the chief representatives of modern revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the international Communist movement...

As evidence the article referred to, without explicitly identifying, Soviet policy toward Romania; it expanded explicitly and at length on Soviet coercion of Albania; it for the first time explicitly accused Khrushchev of conspiring with Marshal P'eng Teh-huai in 1959;

21 Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, February 4, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, VII, 6 (February 6, 1964), pp. 5-21, at pp. 9, 11, 14.
and, finally, it ascribed the origin of Khrushchev's revisionism to "the lush growth of the bourgeois elements inside the Soviet Union," a theme which the Chinese would soon extensively elaborate, and to imperialist policy. The CCP was not anti-Soviet, the article continued, but Khrushchev was; by attacking him the CCP represented the true interests of the Soviet people. With respect to the headship of, or vanguard position in, the international Communist movement, the article declared that no headship is now possible since all parties are "independent and completely equal," but that in any case the CPSU has by its "revisionism and split-tism . . . automatically forfeited the position of 'head'." Thus the CCP explicitly and unilaterally revised the 1960 Declaration, which had termed the CPSU the "vanguard." With respect to the Soviet position that the majority of all parties could bind all of them the article not only again explicitly rejected it but declared that the Soviet majority was "false." With respect to the CCP's support of "Marxist-Leninist" (i.e., pro-Chinese) parties, the article reaffirmed that this would continue and specifically endorsed the Belgian, Brazilian, Italian, Australian, U.S., and Indian pro-Chinese groups. Finally, the article reiterated the Chinese position against the end of public polemics, gave the Soviets another detailed list of demands for their capitulation, and reaffirmed Chinese firmness and refusal to compromise.
Whether or not the Chinese knew when they published their February 4 article that Moscow was preparing a similar attack remains unclear. In any case the Chinese vow to resist to the end Soviet attempts to split the international movement was calculated to appeal to the parties who opposed a split, and who were not immediately menaced by Peking's announcement of intensified Chinese factional activities.

On February 12 the Soviets sent a letter to all but the pro-Chinese parties; although never published, its contents can be inferred from subsequent Austrian, Romanian, Soviet, and Chinese Communist sources. Moscow declared that Peking had not yet replied to the Soviet November 29, 1963 letter, but rather was intensifying both polemics and factional activities. Therefore the forthcoming Soviet Central Committee plenum would discuss fully the situation, decide upon the required measures, and publish its proceedings. Moreover the letter stressed that it was necessary to "give a rebuff" to the Chinese and take "collective..."

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22 The most complete summary is in the report of Franz Muhri to the Austrian CP CC Plenum of May 6, 1964, Volksstimme (Vienna), May 13, 1964 (JPRS 25,061, June 15, 1964, pp. 11-21, at pp. 14-15). A briefer Soviet summary is in the February 22, 1964 CPSU CC letter, cited in ftn. 27, infra; and still briefer references are in the Romanian CC statement published on April 27, cited in ftn. 62, infra, and the February 20 CCP CC letter, cited in ftn. 27, infra. Whether the CPSU CC actually approved this letter is not clear; the only published reference to it discussing Sino-Soviet relations is on February 15, when it approved the resolution discussed below.
measures to strengthen the unity" of the international Communist movement. This should be done through an international conference, the further postponement of which was being utilized by Peking only for its splitting activities.

The subsequent violent Suslov report of February 14 to the Soviet Central Committee was primarily an organizational move. Suslov declared that the CCP leaders "have created the direct threat of a split," in that they

... have ... countered the general line of the international Communist movement with their own special line, which revises from positions of great-power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adventurism the 1957 and 1960 Declarations ... .

Moreover by their "schismatic activity" the Chinese leadership aims

... toward forming under its aegis something in the nature of a special international bloc and counterposing it to the international Communist movement as a weapon for intensifying the struggle against it ... .

(This probably was an eventual Chinese goal, but a more distant one than the Soviet one of organizing their own bloc against Peking.) Therefore, Suslov continued,

... The policy and activities of the Chinese leaders today constitute the chief danger to the unity of the international Communist movement ... .
Suslov rehashed at length the Soviet viewpoint on the past course of the dispute; but unfortunately he revealed little or no significant new facts concerning it. He declared (truthfully) that the Chinese had by their actions rejected the Soviet proposals of November 29, 1963. He denounced the Chinese theory of an intermediate zone (a rapprochement with Japan and Western Europe directed against Moscow and Washington) and their attitude on the Yugoslav and Albanian questions. He attacked Mao's personality cult as comparable to Stalin's, and simultaneously denounced "the anti-Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov . . . who have been expelled from . . . our party"--the first public announcement of their expulsion and an implied threat to the Chinese position within the international Communist movement. He declared that the "filthy scheme" of the Chinese "to isolate Comrade Khrushchev from the Central Committee . . . is doomed to complete and shameful failure." In sum, condemning the totality of the Chinese positions, Suslov declared that Moscow would resume polemics against the "neo-Trotskyite" Chinese positions, that the struggle with them would be "serious and . . . prolonged," and that there must be held an international conference so as to make possible

... collective efforts ... to determine the necessary ways and means for preserving and strengthening the Marxist-Leninist unity of the Communist ranks ...
Suslov said nothing about excommunication, but also nothing about omitting anything which would endanger unity; rather, particularly by declaring that the CCP was now the "main danger," he clearly implied that the 1960 Declaration should be revised accordingly and (somewhat less explicitly) that organizational machinery for "strengthening unity" might be necessary.\(^{23}\)

The Suslov report and the resultant Soviet Central Committee resolution were not published for nearly two months, on April 3. Why? Two explanations suggest themselves. First, there was resistance to them within the Soviet leadership that resulted in a compromise providing for postponement of publication. Second, the balance for postponement was tipped by the Romanian mediation attempt. As to the first possibility, some reports to this effect circulated in Moscow after Khrushchev's fall.\(^{24}\) That the Suslov report included

\(^{23}\) Pravda, April 3, 1964; quoted (with a minor revision) from CDSP, XVI, 13 (April 22, 1964), pp. 5-16, at p. 5, and XV, 14 (April 29, 1964), pp. 3-17, at pp. 8, 14-17. The late Otto Kuusinen declared at the same plenum that in China there was "no dictatorship of the proletariat and no leading role of the Communist Party"; rather, there is a dictatorship of the individual. \(\sqrt{\text{i.e. Mao}}\) (Pravda, May 19, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 20, June 10, 1964,.pp. 3-14, 10, at p. 4 /Pravda's italics/)

\(^{24}\) The plenum was very "expanded"; it was also attended by hundreds of other party and governmental officials (Pravda, February 11, 1964.) Furthermore, the Suslov report was given in the larger Congress Palace rather than in the Supreme Soviet meeting place, where the plenum first met, (Tatu from Moscow in Le Monde, February 18, 1964), and Moscow later declared that "6,000 activists" were present (CPSU CC to CCP CC, March 7, 1964, cited in ftn. 33, infra.) In view of Khrushchev's October 2, 1964, expanded presidium session, including some thousands (Pravda, October 2, 1964), one may perhaps speculate that Suslov also spoke to such large audiences that the CC may have felt itself to have been packed.
the first public announcement of the expulsion from the CPSU of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov (a move which had probably been in dispute among the Soviet leadership at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress) strengthens the credibility of such reports, indicating renewed dissension on this and other issues. As to the second, Bucharest has declared25 (and Moscow has not denied) that the Romanian protest came on February 14, the day of Suslov's report, and that the Soviet reply agreeing to postponement reached Bucharest the same day.

On the following day, February 15, the Soviet Central Committee adopted a resolution whose equivocal contents implicitly reflected the decision to postpone publication. Although it, like Suslov's report, was violent in tone and declared that "ideological exposure" (i.e. resumption of polemics) and "a decisive rebuff to Chinese schismatic activities" were required, it did not mention an international conference, it did not officially "approve" Suslov's report but only "heard and discussed" it, and it stated, which Suslov did not, that the plenum "expresses its readiness to exert further efforts toward normalizing the relations between the CPSU and the CCP..."26

25 See footnote 62, infra.
Simultaneously with their appeal to the Soviets the Romanians also appealed to the Chinese to end polemics and proposed a Sino-Romanian bilateral meeting. On February 17 Mao replied agreeing to such a meeting and adding that, if it took place soon, Peking would "temporarily" suspend polemics.

But Mao's apparent reasonableness was deceptive, as became apparent to Communist élites when they received copies of the (then unpublished) February 20 Chinese letter to Moscow. The optimal Chinese strategy, since predictably a renewed Soviet move toward an international conference was unavoidable and since the Chinese wanted neither split nor reconciliation, was to delay such a conference and thereby ensure its failure. From Peking's viewpoint it probably appeared strategic, with respect to the reaction of other Communist parties, flatly to reject the ostensibly conciliatory Soviet November 29, 1963 letter. The Chinese therefore waited until the Soviets resumed their drive for a conference, thereby permitting them to accuse Moscow of once more desiring a "schismatic" conference while professing conciliation.

The Romanian move, which Peking made possible by its substantive adamancy, must have seemed to the Chinese an excellent contribution to their preferred strategy. Tactically, Peking was quick to seize upon the fact that the Soviets had circulated a "factional" letter against them without sending them a copy. 27 (In all likelihood

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"it was no accident that" on the same day, February 20, the Albanians seized the Soviet embassy buildings in Tirana.\textsuperscript{28}

The Soviets immediately and violently replied that they had not sent a copy to Peking because the Chinese had consistently refused to reply to their conciliatory demarches but had on the contrary continued to attack them and intensified their "schismatic factional activity."\textsuperscript{29} The Chinese thereupon challenged the Soviets to carry out their "empty threats," to tell them exactly what they proposed to do, to publish the Chinese views, and to send Peking the February 12 letter.\textsuperscript{30}

The Chinese sent the Soviets their (only later published) reply to the latter's November 29, 1963 article on February 29, 1964, the day before the Romanian delegation's arrival in Peking. Its contents made Chinese strategy clear. Substantively, the Chinese remained adamant and arrogant: as in their previous published articles and unpublished letters, they summarized uncompromisingly the issues in the dispute and dared the Soviets to do their worst. With respect both to specific Soviet proposals for renewed contacts and to the organizational issue of the international conference, they took a seemingly conciliatory attitude. Although they denounced

\textsuperscript{28} Izvestiya, February 25, 1964.


\textsuperscript{30} CCP CC to CPSU CC, February 27, 1964, \textit{ibid.}, VII, 19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 11-12.
the Soviets for alleged subversive activities in Sinkiang, they agreed to accept the "historic" Sino-Soviet border as a basis for Sino-Soviet border negotiations. (These negotiations in fact had begun in Peking on February 25; we know nothing of their course or outcome, but presumably they were broken off without results.)

The Chinese letter's position on Sino-Soviet economic relations was mixed: they rejected the return of Soviet experts on the ground that Moscow could not be trusted not to use them again as a political weapon; they denounced the Soviets for having made them pay for the Soviet arms sent to China during the Korean War; and with respect to trade they declared that they had proposed, and Moscow had prevented, an increase in Sino-Soviet economic exchanges. They added two points sure to appeal to the Romanians: Moscow should cease trying to perpetuate lack of economic and industrial development in some socialist countries, and all socialist countries should be able to join a genuinely international CMEA. As to public polemics, the Chinese (correctly) pointed out that the Soviets had started them and at first refused to agree to their halt, but now had reversed their position since the polemics were not to Moscow's advantage; that the Soviets continued to carry on some direct polemics\(^3\) as did other Communist parties (significantly, Poland and Romania were omitted from the latter list—a clear indication

\(^3\) Jen-min Jih-pao, March 1, 1964; and Peking Review, VII, 10 (March 6, 1964), pp. 27-29.
of where Peking thought it might get support); and suspension of polemics could only follow bilateral and multilateral consultations. Peking endorsed an international conference with "adequate preparations." For this purpose the Chinese proposed that bilateral Sino-Soviet talks should be resumed in Peking from October 10 to 25, 1964, to be followed by a preparatory meeting of seventeen parties, those in power (excluding Yugoslavia) plus Indonesia, Japan, Italy, and France.  

The specific Chinese proposal for resumption of negotiations looked reasonable on the face of it. Bilateral Sino-Soviet discussions would be resumed in the autumn (i.e. within several months.) They would be in Peking because the last such meeting had been in Moscow. The size and composition--17 instead of 26 member preparatory committee (as in 1960)--could be justified as including two pro-Soviet and two pro-Chinese nonruling parties while eliminating inter alia those parties (Brazil, India, Great Britain, the United States, and Australia) in which pro-Chinese groups had already been constituted and either had been or probably would be constituted as parties, thereby preventing endless dispute over the committee's membership. Yet closer study makes clear that the Chinese had stacked the procedure and participants in their favor. No specific

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date was set for the preparatory committee meeting, and it presumably could not meet until Sino-Soviet discussions had been successful, i.e. unless China's terms were accepted by Moscow—in other words, never. If one adds to the six clearly pro-Chinese parties (Albania, China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan) the four others either opposed to an international conference or at least to excommunication of the Chinese (Cuba, Italy, Poland, and Romania), the Chinese potentially had the support of ten out of the seventeen. Even if Poland finally voted with the Soviets, as it probably would, the result would be nine to eight in the interests of Peking. So far had Soviet control slipped.

The March Sino-Romanian discussions in Peking came to nothing. The Chinese would not even agree to suspend polemics during bilateral discussions about their suspension. While the discussions were taking place, the Soviet Central Committee on March 7 answered the Chinese letters of February 27 and 29. The Soviet letter condemned the Chinese ideological deviations and factional activity as strongly as before. It dismissed the Chinese demand that the Soviets publish Peking's articles as a proposal actually for intensifying polemics. It declared that the Soviets continued to refrain from polemics and that the Chinese should do likewise and cease their factional activity. It reiterated that the general line for the international Communist movement could "only collectively" be worked out, while stressing that Moscow anticipated and would work toward renewed international
Communist unity. It (correctly) termed the Chinese February 29 letter a total rejection of the Soviet November 29, 1963 proposals. Finally, it welcomed the Chinese endorsement of a conference; however, it declared (hypocritically) that the delay proposed by the Chinese was "inexplicable," and added that "we also fail to understand" why the Chinese proposed only 17 members of the preparatory committee. It proposed instead that bilateral Sino-Soviet discussions resume in Peking in May 1964, that the preparatory committee, composed of the same 26 parties as in 1960, meet in June-July 1964, and that the all-party meeting, "with the agreement of the fraternal parties," convene in autumn 1964. 33

After inconclusive discussions in Peking and thereafter in Pyongyang the Romanian delegation stopped in Moscow. There the Soviets at first insisted they must publish the February plenum material, but then agreed that if the Romanians could persuade the Chinese to cease polemics, the Soviets would continue to do likewise. The Romanians thereupon drafted an "Appeal," to be addressed to all parties by Moscow, Peking, and Bucharest, which they sent to the Soviets and Chinese on March 25. Moscow accepted it "in general"; Peking apparently did not reply; but on March 31 the Chinese published the eight "Comment" on the Soviet Open Letter of July 1963,

which in turn precipitated Soviet publication of the February plenum material on April 3.  

The eighth "Comment" added little of substance to Peking's position. Its primary significance was in its total rejection of all Soviet approaches, thereby symbolizing the end of the post-November 1963 public détente and the resumption of open polemics by both sides. It was written "in more explicit terms than before," i.e. more clearly directed against Khrushchev personally, and more explicit in demanding his removal. It reiterated, without further developing, the Chinese thesis that the social basis of Khrushchev's revisionism was "the capitalist forces that are ceaselessly spreading in the Soviet Union." It stressed violent revolution and declared that the Soviet line of peaceful transition had betrayed the revolutions in Cuba, Algeria, and Iraq. Finally, by describing Khrushchev as the revisionist successor of Browder as well as of Tito, it underlined the evils of the Soviet policy of rapprochement with Washington.  

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34 For the above, see the Romanian April 27 resolution, cited in fn. 62, infra.  
The April 1964 publication of the February Suslov report and the Soviet Central Committee resolution\(^{36}\) signaled the beginning of a new phase: the second and a much more explicit, all-out Soviet attempt to mobilize other Communist parties against the Chinese. Four aspects of this phase may be distinguished: (1) the maximum Soviet position, (2) the Chinese opposition to it, (3) the resistance of other Communist parties opposed to Moscow's aims, and (4) the resultant Soviet retreat with respect to the purposes and tactics of the proposed international conference.

The Maximum Soviet Position

Once the Suslov report was published, a wave of anti-Chinese agitation swept Soviet supporters in the international Communist

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\(^{36}\) The accompanying April 3, 1964 Pravda editorial, "Fidelity to the Principles of Marxism-Leninism," was only notable because it omitted any mention of an international conference, concerning which, however, Suslov's formulations were repeated in the long "For the Unity of the International Communist Movement on Principles of Marxism-Leninism," Kommunist, No. 5, March 1964, (passed for the press, April 4, 1964), pp. 13-52 (JPRS 244, 404, April 30, 1964.) For Chinese reaction, see Peking Review, VII, 18 (May 1, 1964), pp. 13-19. In March the CPSU Institute of Marxism-Leninism had (opportunely, to say the least) discovered Marx's and Engels' previously undiscovered 1872 amendments to the First International's rules, which provided for the suspension of national federations by the general council. Text: World Marxist Review, VII, 4 (April 1964), pp. 34-36.
movement. On May 15 Suslov declared that an international conference was "necessary."

(In his February 14 report he had said only that the CPSU "advocates" such a conference.) At the end of April Moscow announced that "more than 70" parties favored such a conference. On June 9 Pravda published an article by the head of the Paraguayan party calling for an "early" conference and declaring that delay would mean intensified Chinese factional activity and that indefinite postponement was "impossible."

Moscow concentrated its attack on the nationalistic and anti-Soviet Chinese formulations, particularly Mao's "intermediate zone" theory, the Chinese insistence that the basis of the world revolutionary struggle was the peasantry rather than the proletariat, Peking's demand to "reexamine and correct" the 1957 and 1960 Declarations, and the growing cult of Mao's personality. Moreover the Soviets insisted (incorrectly) that the November 1960 conference had made majority decisions binding on all parties. They simultaneously attacked Chinese internal policies, denouncing the CCP's

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39 See the Kommunist article cited in footnote 41, infra.
violation of its own statutes and its lack of party program.\textsuperscript{11}

By far the most important aspect of the maximum Soviet position was expressed in a brief passage of an April 3 speech by Khrushchev in Budapest:

\begin{quote}
... The objective requirements of our economic development, as well as the necessity for struggling against all kinds of efforts to weaken the solidarity of the socialist countries, demand persistent work on the improvement of the entire system of our mutual relations. Apparently it would be expedient to think jointly about those organizational forms that would make it possible to improve the constant exchange of opinions and the coordination of foreign policy between the member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, the participants in the Warsaw Pact ... \textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

In other words, some kind of formal political coordinating organ should be established, in which Moscow would inevitably swing the most weight.

The Chinese Response: Peking's Foreign Policy Made Explicit

There is, surprisingly, no documentary evidence that the Chinese exploited the ominous implications of this Khrushchev declaration for those parties wishing to consolidate and extend their

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{12} Pravda, April 1, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 15 (May 6, 1964), pp. 7-8, at p. 7.
\end{footnotes}
increased autonomy from Moscow. Nevertheless, the Chinese adamantly refused to attend an international conference, the calling of which, they declared, would cement a split. Conversely, they also reiterated that they did not desire a split. In sum, on the issue of postponing the conference or of emptying it of any real content, Peking's position was partially aligned with that of the reluctant pro-Soviet parties. A Chinese May 7 reply to the March 7 CPSU letter was the clearest statement until that time of Peking's preference for indefinite delay of a conference, i.e., of the continuation of a united international Communist movement in theory but of its paralysis in practice. It declared that the termination of the resumed Soviet polemics must be awaited before resuming bilateral Sino-Soviet discussions, for which Peking now suggested May 1965 instead of October 1964, and it added that either Moscow or Peking could request still further postponement, thereby implying it would be still further postponed. As to the all-party meeting, preparations for it "may require four or five years, or even longer," i.e., as far as Peking was concerned it was postponed ad kalendas Graecas. Finally, the Chinese immediately published this letter and all the previously unpublished correspondence dating from November 29, 1963, thus in effect ending any possibility of serious Sino-Soviet negotiations.\(^{43}\)

Thereafter Chinese polemics against Moscow continued unabated. They were only, as usual, exceeded in venom by those of the Albanians. At the end of May Hoxha declared that Khrushchev and his associates were criminals who had conspired to kill Stalin, and that "terror, murder, imprisonment, and concentration camps prevail in the Soviet Union." 44

Peking presumably inspired a New Zealand CP proposal for a pro-Chinese international communist meeting, 45 but when no other parties endorsed it, the Chinese let it drop.

Moscow, not to be left behind, accused Peking of financing its factional activities by a world-wide narcotics traffic. 46

The unconditionally pro-Chinese parties continued to support Peking completely: 47 of the conditionally pro-Chinese ones, Hanoi

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44 Zëri i Popullit, May 27, 1964 (in a speech delivered May 24).
opposed the Soviet call for a conference but called for resumption of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks and did not mention polemics.\footnote{Lao Dong CC April 21, 1964, circular letter to all CP's, ibid., p. 34.}

The summer of 1964 also saw the most explicit elaboration to date of Chinese foreign policy with respect to the two areas of the world they hope to mobilize against their two enemies, the Soviet Union and the United States: the underdeveloped world of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the capitalist states of Western Europe and Japan.

Chinese policy toward the underdeveloped areas was elaborated at a series of Afro-Asian Economic Seminars by their spokesman Nan Han-chen, who generalized the Chinese model of economic development for all underdeveloped countries. In a speech at the Second Seminar at Pyongyang on June 20, Nan struck the keynote:

\ldots The fundamental way of developing an independent national economy is to carry on economic construction on the basis of self-reliance. \ldots to rely mainly on the enthusiasm, initiative and creativeness of the masses and \ldots the internal resources and the accumulation of capital in the country.\footnote{NCNA English Pyongyang, June 20, 1964, in SCMP 3245, June 24, 1964, pp. 26-29. See also Peking Review, VII, 27 (July 3, 1964), pp. 18-22, and a speech by Fang Yi at a June 16 Geneva meeting of the Economic Preparatory Meeting for the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference, ibid., VII, 26 (June 26, 1964), pp. 8-10. For a Soviet reply, see K. Dontsev, "Peking's False Tone," Izvestia July 12, 1964. For Chinese economic aid policy, see Ai Ching-chu, "China's Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries," Peking Review, VII, 31 (August 21, 1964), pp. 14-18.}
In other words, Peking recommended labor-intensive economic development, plus, as Nan added, mutual Afro-Asian economic assistance (and without either Soviet or American economic aid.) American economic aid, he continued, was given in order to plunder the Afro-Asian countries by keeping them underdeveloped and their raw material resources in foreign capitalist hands, by manipulating the terms of trade so as to keep prices of raw materials low and those of imported finished goods high, and by cooperating with the "modern revisionists" (i.e. the Soviet Union) to "manipulate the United Nations or other world or regional economic organizations." In a speech at another such seminar in Algiers in February 1965, Nan added one further and quite un-Leninist note:

... The policy of a diversified economy with food grains as the key link in developing agriculture is ... an important prerequisite for the rapid development of the national economy and steady industrialization ....

That is, agriculture (and light industry) should have priority over development of heavy industry: a model which was in any case the only one to which most underdeveloped countries could aspire in the near future.

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Chinese policy toward the capitalist states of Western Europe and Japan was made most explicit by Mao himself in a July 10, 1964 interview with a group of Japanese socialists. It was also the height of Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union, then and since. He challenged the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union with respect to all its acquisitions during and after World War II as well as all the Tsarist acquisitions, for which "we have not yet presented the bill." He appealed primarily to Japanese and West German irredentist nationalism (with respect to the Kurile islands and the former German territories east of the present Oder-Neisse East German-Polish frontier.) Mao's assault was contained in the following crucial paragraph:

... There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. In keeping with the Yalta agreement the Soviet Union, under the pretext of insuring Mongolia's independence, actually placed this country under its domination. Mongolia takes up an area which is considerably greater than the Kuriles. In 1954 when Khrushchev and Bulganin were in China we took up this question but they refused to talk to us. They appropriated a part of Romania. Having separated a portion of East Germany they chased away the local inhabitants to West Germany. They divided a part of Poland and annexed it to the Soviet Union and gave a part of East Germany to Poland as compensation. The same thing took place in Finland. They took everything they could. Some people have declared that the Singkiang area and the territories north of the Amur must be included in the Soviet Union. The USSR is concentrating troops along its border.

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51 Quoted from CDSF, XVI, 34 (September 16, 1964), pp. 6-7, at p. 7.
Seldom has Moscow been so menaced with so few words. The revelation (confirmed later by Moscow) that in 1954 Mao had demanded the return of Outer Mongolia indicated how long back his ambitions reached and how early Sino-Soviet relations must have been soured by Mao's ambitions. The reference to Bessarabia ("a part of Romania") showed how he hoped to use this Romanian irredenta to pry Bucharest farther away from Moscow. The reference to the Polish and German boundaries—the most crucial issue in Europe—showed how Mao hoped to play Warsaw and Bonn against Moscow. His previous assertion that the Kurile Islands belonged to Japan closed the circle: Mao's "second intermediate zone" policy means a bouleversement des alliances: West Germany and Japan allied with China against Moscow and Washington. He accused Khrushchev of wanting to annex even more Chinese territory; and, finally, by his assertion that "the USSR is concentrating troops along its border," he intimated that military escalation, at least into extensive border conflicts, might occur.

The Mao interview was never published in China, perhaps because it sounded so pro-Japanese ("The Japanese nation is a great nation"—exactly the same words General de Gaulle used in referring to the German nation!). Although it was briefly reported in Japan

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52 The NCNA news item, Jen-min Jih-pao, July 11, 1964 (SCMP 3258, July 15, 1964) only reported that the conversation had taken place.
in mid-July and in full in mid-August, and Moscow must have known of it then, it did not become known throughout the world until Pravda republished it on September 2, along with a violent rejoinder of its own. This indicated that the Soviets had tried to get Peking to repudiate the interview, but that Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Ping-nan had only replied that "if Mao Tse-tung said so, he agreed with him." In addition, Chou En-lai had given an August 1 interview to Asahi with "essentially . . . the same ideas . . . ." Pravda then declared that Mao by this interview had made clear that he was

. . . actually prepared to come to agreement with anybody for the sake of the struggle against the friends and allies of People's China--the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism . . . .

Pravda did not attempt to conceal the seriousness of Mao's territorial claims; on the contrary it set them forth in full and reaffirmed the historical validity of the present Sino-Soviet boundaries. To question them, it went on, would

. . . inevitably generate a whole series of mutual demands, claims, and insoluble conflicts among countries of Europe and Asia . . . .

54 Sekai Shuho (Tokyo), August 11, 1964.
As to the Kuriles, Pravda hinted that if Japan were no longer an American base some agreement might be reached about them. It concluded by declaring that Mao's demand was reminiscent of those of his "predecessors" for Lebensraum—obviously Hitler.

In September Khrushchev replied to the Mao interview by declaring

... the Chinese leaders are... all but proposing the division of the territory of the Soviet Union...

that Moscow now had a weapon of unlimited destructive power (a declaration not reproduced in the Soviet text of the interview) and that Soviet frontiers were inviolable. As to Mao's interview, he stated:

... Mao Tse-tung calls himself a Communist, yet the philosophy he developed in his talk is alien to the people of labor; it cannot be the philosophy of a representative of the most progressive revolutionary doctrine—communism...

Repeating the theme of the Pravda editorial, he added that

... given today's weapons of annihilation, it is especially dangerous, I might even say criminal, to seek wealth through the expansion of Lebensraum...

True, he continued, the Tsars had annexed territory, but so had the Chinese Emperors:

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56 In a speech in Prague, September 4, 1964, in Pravda, September 5, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 36 (September 30, 1964), pp. 6-8, at p. 7.
...Take Sinkiang, for example. Have Chinese really lived there since time immemorial? The indigenous population of Sinkiang differs sharply from the Chinese in ethnic, linguistic, and other respects. It is made up of Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz and other peoples. The Chinese emperors subjugated them in the past and deprived them of their independence...

The threat was clear: Moscow could stir up trouble for the Chinese in Sinkiang. (The Chinese have often charged the Russians with doing just this.)

The Chinese also had no difficulties with their allies about the conference, concerning which their extreme, unconditional supporters in any case shared their views, while their moderate, conditional allies, such as the Indonesian Communist Party, were opposed to it for the same reasons as the Italian and Romanian Communists: it would split the international Communist movement and therefore diminish their bargaining power vis-a-vis their major ally—for these Asian Communists, China. The Japanese Communists, threatened by Soviet support of their dissident minority, continued their anti-Soviet polemics.

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57 For the statement re a weapon of unlimited destructive power, see AFP from Moscow, Le Monde, September 17, 1964; for Khruschev's statement that he was misquoted, Pravda, September 22, 1964 (his speech to the World Youth Forum.) Soviet text: Pravda, September 20, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 38 (October 1, 1964), pp. 3-7.

Opposition by Pro-Soviet Parties to Moscow's Conference Project

Those pro-Soviet communist party leaderships opposed to an international conference wanted more autonomy from the CPSU and therefore feared attempts by Moscow, as in 1957 and 1960, to use such a conference to reestablish its control. Moreover the nationalism in their countries, intensified in some by ethnic and minority problems or traditional hatred of Russia, made decline in Soviet influence helpful in strengthening their own domestic appeal. Conversely, in some countries proximity to the Soviet Union, need for Soviet support against other enemies, or traditional pro-Soviet sentiments in their parties restrained their opposition to Soviet desires.59

1. Romania was both the most opposed to the conference and in the strongest position to resist it. Traditional anti-Russian feelings, the Bessarabian irredenta, the determination of Romanian Communists to industrialize rather than remain a source of raw materials for CMEA, rich resources saleable on the world market (oil, grain, and timber), a tightly-knit, nativist, and ruthless party leadership, and a skill at intrigue inherited from the Byzantines and Phanariots—all these enabled Gheorghiu-Dej to maneuver

59 For a perceptive communist analysis, see Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski /editor of Polityka and PZPR CC candidate member/ in Kamena (Lublin), No. 1/2, January 31, 1965, pp. 1, 10 (JPRS 29,309, March 26, 1965.) It should also be noted that organizational consequences often occurred: e.g., in late October 1964 at the Budapest WFTU General Council meeting, Cuba, Romania, and Italy abstained on the vote on a unity appeal, while China and her allies opposed. (Oggi in Italia /Clandestine/ in Italian to Italy, October 25, 1964, 1930 GMT.)
between the Russians and the Chinese to his, and Romania's advantage. Bucharest had been largely responsible for the delay in the February 1964 Soviet attempt to summon a conference; it had openly opposed the September-October 1963 one; and it had altogether gone the farthest in defiance of Moscow.

By April 1964 Romania had successfully sabotaged Khrushchev's plan for supranational planning within CMEA. Romania's foreign trade pattern had been diversified so that the country was no longer so vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure. Bucharest was rapidly improving its relations with Western Europe and the United States and de-emphasizing Russian and increasing Western cultural influence. Further, the Romanians had clearly established a special position in Sino-Soviet affairs: support for Moscow on the substantive policy and issues; opposition to a split and to a pro-Soviet international conference; refusal to attack China publicly; mediation between Moscow and Peking while simultaneously cementing good relations with the Italian, Polish, and Yugoslav parties. Then at the


end of April the Romanian position was made explicit with the publication and wide distribution of a "Statement" endorsed by an enlarged Central Committee plenum.  

After detailing Romanian attempts at mediation, the statement took the Soviet side on all the substantive issues in the dispute. However, it condemned Moscow as well as Peking, although neither by name, for the violence of their polemics and for their attempts to remove each other's leadership. Peking was especially censured for its thesis of the inevitability of splits and for its factional activities. However, more importantly, with respect to the CMEA issue the statement was clearly if implicitly anti-Soviet. It flatly rejected multilateral economic integration as incompatible with national sovereignty, and it declared that "distinctive national and state features" would continue "even when socialism has triumphed on a world scale or at least in most countries." All socialist countries, it went on, should be members of CMEA (thereby adding to Romania's potential allies within the organization), and there should be some kind of participation possible for underdeveloped countries ("the path of non-capitalist development"); i.e. Romania, like Yugoslavia, wanted to diversify its alliances. Finally, after

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63 And it did: at the June 1964 Geneva UN World Trade Conference Romania voted with and tried to join the group of 75 underdeveloped countries. See East Europe, XIII, 7 (July 1964), p. 47.
sharply criticizing Stalin for the great purges and for his break with Tito (that is, opposing any recurrence of either) the statement concluded with a call for the end of polemics and for bilateral Sino-Soviet discussions in order to set up a "commission . . . of representatives of a number of parties," and only thereafter a "thoroughly prepared" international conference with "all" parties participating. In effect the statement took the Chinese position on the preparatory committee and the conference and implied strongly that Romania would not attend a Soviet-summoned international meeting. In sum therefore it was indeed a Romanian declaration of independence from Moscow.

During the summer and early autumn of 1964 Soviet-Romanian relations worsened still further, and it became increasingly certain that the Romanians would not participate in the Soviet-sponsored conference. Bucharest polemicized against Soviet articles and radio broadcasts (whereupon Moscow retreated) and censored the Romanian

64 Quoted from "Statement," pp. 30-32, 52-53.
65 Even so, the strength and subtlety of Bucharest's position was demonstrated by the fact that Moscow evidently felt compelled to publish even a carefully edited summary of the statement in World Marxist Review, VII, 7 (July 1964), pp. 60-61.
Frequent Soviet-Romanian negotiations apparently came to nothing, and even Tito's urging Gheorghiu-Dej to be cautious did not improve the situation. Romania continued to expand its contacts with the West and its moves toward limited domestic liberalization (release of political prisoners, rise in wages, price cuts). In August both Soviet and Chinese delegations attended the Bucharest liberation celebration.

2. The Italian Communist Party's effective resistance to the Soviet conference plan was a second blow to Moscow's position within the international Communist movement. The PCI's long-term goals are incompatible with Soviet domination of the Communist world. The Italian Communists want (a) an increase in electoral power, toward which they are working by professing a revisionist program and by weakening the unpopular PCI alignment with Moscow, thus decreasing...
its clash with Italian nationalism; (b) primacy in West European communism; and (c) a major role, not only in Western Europe but also in the underdeveloped world, in a pluralistic international Communist movement. To further these goals Togliatti used his great personal prestige, his experience in international communism, and all the *habilita* of Machiavelli.\(^73\)

As early as January 1964 Togliatti said publicly that Tito joined him in expressing "many reservations" on an international conference.\(^74\) Just before the publication of the Suslov report, Mario Alicata declared that any attempt to "excommunicate" and "expel" a party would be "unacceptable to us."\(^75\)

Later that same month Togliatti was even more specific:

> . . . When people began to talk about holding a new conference of all Communist parties, to examine and judge the position held by the Chinese comrades . . . this . . . could result . . . in an excommunication . . . ; this, it seemed to us, would be useless and harmful . . .

He made clear the basis of the PCI's fears:

> The method of solemn excommunication . . . contains . . . the danger of a resurgence of authoritarian and sectarian systems in the leadership of individual parties . . .

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\(^75\) Ibid., April 1, 1964.
Rather, he declared, there should be "a series of bilateral or group meetings" (that is, a West European one, for example, with the PCI taking the lead), based on the conception of international Communism as "a movement united by a profound solidarity but open to necessary diversities and to the circulation of ideas . . . ." In June he called for an international communist aggiornamento:

. . . autonomy, unless it is to develop into isolation, or still worse, into a centrifugal tendency, must postulate not only the diversity of position, but profound, reciprocal recognition, tolerance, debate, and comparison, which, however, does not mean condemnation and breaking of relations at every turn . . . . we can be effective in our struggle only by giving the entire movement a plan which is profoundly different from the traditional one . . . .

Furthermore, the PCI proposed "revising and expanding numerous parts" of the November 1960 Moscow Declaration, particularly with respect to Yugoslavia and such national liberation movements as the new Algerian socialist party."77 Finally, the PCI flatly rejected Khrushchev's "new organizational forms":

. . . We shall not combat effectively the myth of monolithism by seeking an agreement that would again render rigid the workers' movement at precisely

76 From an interview with Togliatti in Rinascita, XXI, 26 (June 27, 1964), p. 9 (JPRS 25,576, July 24, 1964, pp. 53-56.)
those points where it has started to advance toward renovation. . . . 78

Thus, although Togliatti reaffirmed his support of Moscow and his opposition to China in the substantive issues of the dispute, he was clearly not prepared to participate in Khrushchev's mobilization toward collective "political isolation" of the Chinese.

The PCI also continued to develop and expand its revisionist program. In April 1964 one of its major left-wing figures, Pietro Ingrao, declared that organized non-socialist parties should exist after the PCI comes to power, 79 and in July another article in *Rinascita* went even further in rejecting Lenin's theory of the state. 80 Nor did the visits of several PCI delegations to Moscow change the Italian position.

In August Togliatti himself went to the Soviet Union, where, after inconclusive discussions with Brezhnev and Ponomarev in Moscow, he prepared a memorandum for his scheduled talks with Khrushchev. 81 Before meeting with Khrushchev he was stricken with a fatal heart attack. In spite of Brezhnev's attempt at the funeral in Rome to persuade him not to, Togliatti's successor Luigi Longo,

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encouraged by the Yugoslavs, Poles, and Romanians, decided to publish the memorandum since generally known as the "Togliatti Testament." 82

More than any other single document this marked the decline in Soviet power and influence in the international Communist movement. Not that it said anything strikingly new about the PCI's policies; rather, it was a codification of the accumulation of Italian Communist heterodoxy. But its publication under such dramatic circumstances, plus the fact that Moscow republished it and took issue with it only very indirectly, made clear to the world that Moscow was increasingly becoming a paper tiger.

Togliatti began by declaring that the PCI would "take part actively" in the proposed conference. Yet this was only a formal concession: he made clear that the PCI would come to the conference to oppose (and, he implied, would refuse to accept) Soviet aims; moreover it would advance its own position. The PCI, he went on, would prefer, first, "objective and persuasive" polemics with Peking, then a series of regional meetings during "a year or more," and only then an international meeting which, "if it were to appear

necessary in order to avoid a formal split... one could also renounce." Furthermore, he continued, in fact not nearly enough practical steps had been taken against Chinese factionalism. Communist parties should meet with non-Communist radical nationalist groups in underdeveloped countries for this purpose (a hint of the PCI's view that the latter should really be included in any unity.)

The CCP could not be excluded from international Communism, Togliatti maintained, if only because Chinese cooperation is necessary against imperialism. Moreover a split would lead to much too great a concentration on the struggle against Peking. He flatly rejected "any proposal to create once again a centralized international organization." Rather he postulated that "unity in diversity" should be obtained by

... rather frequent contacts and exchange of experiences among the parties on a broad scale, convocation of collective meetings dedicated to studying common problems by a certain group of parties, international study meetings on general problems of economy, philosophy, history, etc... plus objective "discussions," not personalized polemics (but not silence on existing differences.)

Thus Togliatti voiced what had been the Yugoslav position since Stalin's break with Tito: a Communist "commonwealth" with no more formally binding links than the British. He specifically indicated that he was opposed both to excessive nationalism and to "forced exterior uniformity" among Communist states.
Togliatti's blow to Soviet authority was even greater, however, in that he sharply criticized Soviet internal affairs. He revived his 1956 thesis that not just Stalin's personality was responsible for Stalinism; he advocated "open debates on current problems" by leaders of Communist states; and he took exception to the Soviet "slowness and resistance" in returning to "a wide liberty of expression and debate on culture, art, and also on politics."

Nor did Togliatti's death bring any modification in the PCI's opposition to the Soviet conference objectives. On the contrary, the fact that Moscow and almost all other pro-Soviet parties published the Togliatti testament strengthened the Italian position. Immediately before Khrushchev's fall, in a report to a PCI Central Committee Plenum, Enrico Berlinguer proudly declared:

... the prestige of the PCI is today greater than ever before in the past... 

and pronounced the end of Soviet hegemony:

... The moment has come to realize that the situation has changed, to get rid of any nostalgia, to recognize that the kind of unity which we want to build tomorrow is and will have to be in the future a unity that recognizes differences as inevitable and accepts these differences without leading to any condemnations... 

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Another speaker, Luciano Gruppi, one of the most revisionist PCI leaders, put the case for Italian (and, for that matter, Chinese) "national communism" very precisely and in so doing took the same position against a ban on factionalism as do the Chinese:

... One thing which we cannot accept is the principle of a majority which would be in a position to force the minority to accept its decisions; this principle was valid when there was an international organization but it can no longer be valid today when it would signify a limitation of the autonomy of the parties... 84

3. Yugoslavia, not surprisingly, was the first to reprint and endorse the Togliatti testament. 85 The near-identity of Italian and Yugoslav Communist policy on the proposed international conference had been clear ever since Khrushchev first launched the idea in September 1963. Tito never endorsed it at any time. 86 Yet, for several reasons, Yugoslav statements on the issue were much fewer and less precise than Italian ones. First, Yugoslavia was not, since it had not been in 1960, a member of the 26-nation preparatory committee; it therefore did not need to take a position about either the committee meeting or its composition. Secondly,

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85 Politika, September 5 and 6, 1964.
largely because of internal economic troubles and a rising nationalities problem, Tito was anxious to continue his post-1960 rapprochement with Khrushchev. Consequently he was disinclined to take a clearly anti-Soviet position on the conference issue. Thirdly, he could well afford to let the Romanians and Italians express what was also his opposition, the more so since their success and the subsequent Soviet retreat had made clear by summer 1964 that Tito need not fear Soviet attempts to reimpose tighter control on East Europe, thereby making the price of his rapprochement with Moscow the endangering of Yugoslav internal autonomy and external maneuverability. Fourth, Tito feared to attract Moscow's opposition to his still active goal (dating from 1945-1948) of asserting Yugoslav influence in the Balkans. He therefore preferred that loosening of Soviet control, and the resultant greater opportunities for Belgrade, be initiated elsewhere. Indeed, during the summer of 1964 Tito appears to have feared that Gheorghiu-Dej might be risking Soviet intervention in Romania, for after a hastily-arranged meeting with Khrushchev in Leningrad Tito reportedly soon thereafter conferred with Gheorghiu-Dej in order to caution him to go more slowly in asserting Romanian independence.

87 For a significant Soviet pro-Yugoslav article, see "Yugoslav Today," World Marxist Review, VII, 3 (March 1964), pp. 65-73.
4. Poland's opposition to Khrushchev's conference plans was the cautious one of any East European state that did not totally support the Soviet proposal. Gomułka, like most Poles, remains convinced that raison d'état (the guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line against Germany) requires a Polish-Soviet alliance. Yet he wishes to prevent a renewed Soviet attempt to reimpose its control on Poland. Moreover, as a convinced Communist—"one of the few," as the Warsaw joke goes, in Poland—Gomułka is undoubtedly appalled by the disarray of the international Communist movement and strongly opposed to a Sino-Soviet split, the more so because he is so anxious to prevent factional strife in Warsaw.

Gomułka's real position became clear, if only between the lines, in his speech at the mid-June 1964 Fourth Polish Party Congress. There, after a long but relatively non-polemical rejection of the Chinese views, he declared that not Peking but "a majority" of Communist parties should determine when preparations for a conference should begin, that is, Poland would, like the Italian Communists, attend the conference. He went on:

... In the present situation it seems expedient to start in the very near future preparations for a conference with the participation of the parties

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90 The small group of Polish Stalinists condemned at the Fourth PZPR Congress were not pro-Chinese, although they may have been in contact with the Chinese or Albanian embassies in Warsaw. See the excerpts from their clandestine pamphlet in East Europe, XIV, 3 (March 1965), pp. 7-15.
representing the most important areas of the world. A committee composed of such parties would carry out preliminary discussions, which, having been discussed within individual parties and among parties, would be the basis of the future joint resolutions... |

"The most important areas of the world"—who would represent East Asia, the CCP and its allies having refused to attend? Only the pro-Soviet Dange Indian CP? Clearly, Gomužka was trying to stall, as indicated by his elaborate procedure for discussions of drafts. Furthermore the advance text of the speech released to correspondents contained a passage, which Gomužka did not deliver, to the effect that parties not attending the conference would "put themselves in the pale of the international movement." Perhaps he cut it because he gave the speech on June 15, the same day that the Soviet letter of that date, explicitly calling for a conference, was dispatched. Contemporary accounts from Warsaw reported signs that Gomužka and his associates were greatly disturbed by the preemptory tone of the letter. Not surprisingly, the subsequent Polish congress resolutions contained no mention of the conference. Clearly, Warsaw was giving only the most reluctant and minimal cooperation to Khrushchev's international conference plans.

91 Trybuna Ludu, June 16, 1964.
5. Cuba's leader Castro was, like most Asian Communists, out of sympathy with Khrushchev on the key issues of peaceful versus revolutionary transition to socialism and of détente with the United States. Castro wanted to replace Moscow as the decisive influence over Latin American Communism, despite his dependence on Moscow for massive and essential economic aid and realization that a Communist Cuba could hope for none but Soviet military protection against Washington. His disagreement with Khrushchev's policy of détente became even clearer after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and with the Cuban refusal to sign the Moscow partial test ban treaty. On the other hand, Castro's 1963-1964 visits to Moscow had brought the public Cuban position on the Sino-Soviet dispute still closer to Khrushchev's, presumably as the price for increased Soviet economic aid. Castro did not want a Sino-Soviet split; yet he could not afford directly to oppose Soviet desires. He therefore continued his ban on public discussion of Sino-Soviet differences in Cuba. In view of subsequent developments one may assume that the Soviets were making some concessions to Castro, possibly with respect to Cuban influence over Latin American communism and the "violent road." In any case, whether spurred by Soviet concessions or economic necessity, Cuban President Dorticos intimated in early October

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95 For the above, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 198-202 (with bibliography) and Ernst Halperin, "Latin America," Survey, No. 54 (January 1965), and Labedz, op. cit., pp. 151-167.
that Cuba would attend the proposed preparatory committee meeting. By then, however, Castro hardly needed to worry that such a conference would produce the split he wanted to avoid.

6. As for the rest of the international Communist movement, the British, Norwegian, and Swedish parties, small, threatened by affluence and major social democratic parties, and therefore increasingly revisionist and factionalized, were anxious to keep the Sino-Soviet dispute out of their ranks and consequently were notably unenthusiastic about the Soviet plans for a conference. However, their lack of size and influence made their wishes relatively unimportant in Soviet considerations.

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96 In an interview in Cairo with Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, October 11-12, 1964.

The Soviet Retreat

That Khrushchev would again abandon his international conference plans, as in October 1963, was most unlikely. With the publication of the Suslov report and the Central Committee resolution in April he had gone too far. But his retreat, although more concealed, was no less great; by mid-June he had clearly been forced to abandon his main objective of "collective mobilization" against the Chinese.

In early April Khrushchev had spoken of tightening multi-party ties within the pro-Soviet camp in order to better combat the Chinese factionalism. By early June an Izvestiya article had already scaled this down to "a periodically functioning conference of Ministers"—typical of CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; while an article in Partiinaya Zhizn not only drew no organizational conclusions but also, while reaffirming the "Leninist principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority," and reiterating Khrushchev's favorite phrase that parties should "synchronize watches," concluded by declaring only that

... if a party finds itself in isolation or in the minority on any question, the authoritative

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See p. 37, supra.

opinion of the majority must prompt it to self-
criticism, to a careful rechecking of its posi-
tions. . . . 100

In June a Soviet propagandist hinted that Peking could not necessarily
count on Moscow's support in any "terrible hour of trial." 101

On June 15 Moscow sent a letter to the Chinese that was in
reality intended to gain support among other parties. With respect
to substantive issues it unequivocally declared that Peking was
attempting to form its own bloc in order to split the movement, and
it denounced Chinese great-power chauvinism. On procedural issues,
it insisted that the "overwhelming majority" of Communist parties
favored an international conference "without delay"; that those
parties with reservations had them only about the timing because
of the Chinese position; that only the Chinese and Albanians were
opposed in toto (a far from true statement); and that no one party
could prevent the holding of such a conference. The letter indicated
some willingness to compromise on the date but flatly rejected the
Chinese proposal of four or five years delay. Moreover the Soviets
also rejected the attendance of pro-Chinese groups. With respect
to the substance of the conference, however, Khrushchev's retreat

100 "Against Splitters, For Unity of the Communist Movement,"
Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 11, June 1964, pp. 8-20, reprinted, slightly
abridged, in Pravda, June 3 and 4, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI,
22 (June 24, 1964), pp. 3-8, at p. 7.

101 Yury Zhukov, "The Chinese Wall," Pravda, June 21, 1964,
quoted from CDSP, XVI, 25 (July 16, 1964), pp. 3-4, at p. 4.
was plain. The letter declared that Moscow wished to concentrate on what "unites" Communist parties, on normalization rather than aggravation of differences. More significant, it admitted that the conference "will not immediately manage . . . to arrive at a common opinion on all questions" and declared that parties should nonetheless cooperate on positions held in "common" and "refrain in the future from any action that would aggravate the difficulties," thereby avoiding any chance of a split or worsening of differences. There was no more talk of a "collective rebuff" of the Chinese, nothing about tightening the ties between pro-Soviet parties: rather, phrases reflecting the Italian, Romanian, and Yugoslav "exchanges of views" formulae instead of Khrushchev's April views.

Although the Chinese did not formally reject the Soviet June 30 letter a month thereafter, their publication on July 13, one year after the 1963 Soviet "Open Letter," of their ninth "Comment" thereon made clear that their position was hardening. Entitled "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," it was ideologically the most original and significant of the whole series. It addressed itself to two general areas: the embourgeoisement of Soviet society and the future course of Communism in China.

The "comment"'s treatment of the "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union was in the best tradition of Machajski, Mosca, Trotsky, and Djilas. After having reiterated the Chou Yang thesis that the class struggle between bourgeois and proletarian elements and therefore the danger of the restoration of capitalism remained great during the "very, very long historical stage" of socialism, it declared that the

... activities of the bourgeoisie ... constantly breed political degenerates in the ranks of the working class and Party and government organizations, new bourgeois elements and embezzlers and grafters in state enterprises owned by the whole people and new bourgeois intellectuals ... .

These are the "social base of revisionism." But, the article continued,

... the gravity of the situation lies in the fact that the revisionist Khrushchev clique have usurped the leadership of the Soviet Party and state and that a privileged bourgeois stratum has emerged in Soviet society ... .

This in turn has led to "an unprecedented danger of capitalist restoration" and to "an irreconcilable and antagonistic class contradiction" between Khrushchev and his privileged stratum and the masses of the Soviet people.

Given this Chinese view of Soviet "degeneration," the most extreme until that date, the article contrasted it with the most ascetic, grim, and fanatical view of China's future which Peking--
and, in this instance, Mao personally, in fifteen points—had ever set forth. Transition to communism, Mao declared, will take "anywhere from one to several centuries." To prevent bourgeois degeneration during this long period, physical labor for cadres must be continued, incomes must be leveled, army, militia, and police must remain under strict party control, and above all great attention must be paid to "the question of training successors for the revolutionary cause of the proletariat . . . a matter of life and death for our party . . . for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten thousand years . . . ." 103

On July 28 the Chinese finally replied to the Soviet June 30 letter. Moscow had "laid down a revisionist political program and a divisive organizational line" in order "arbitrarily, unilaterally, and illegally" to call an international meeting to bring about "an open split." After accusing Moscow of trying to subvert the Indian and Japanese Communist Parties, and declaring that unanimity was necessary for convening any international meeting, the letter concluded: "We firmly believe that the day your so-called meeting takes place will be the day you step into your own grave . . . ." 104


Two days later, on July 30, the Soviets dispatched a circular letter to the 26 participants in the 1960 preparatory committee meeting summoning them to meet in Moscow on December 15, 1964. The meeting would occur, the letter said, even if all parties summoned did not attend. Even more explicitly than the previous June 30 letter, the Soviets stressed that the proposed meeting should not lead to a split:

... The meeting will be called not to condemn anybody, to "excommunicate" anybody from the Communist movement and the socialist camp, to attach insulting labels, or to throw irresponsible charges ... The meeting would "enrich and develop" (that is, not revise) the 1957 and 1960 declarations. Finally, the letter repeated the June 30 formulations about concentrating on areas of agreement and putting differences aside.105

A month later, after charging Moscow with supporting the American attempt to intervene in Vietnam via the United Nations (the first clear signal of the growing importance of the issue in Sino-Soviet affairs) the Chinese replied that:

105 Text: only in ibid., VIII, 13 (March 26, 1964), pp. 19-20. The August 10, 1964 Pravda editorial, "An International Conference Is the Path to the Solidarity of the Communist Movement," which announced that the conference had been summoned, was much more polemical in tone than the letter, but it added nothing substantively new to it.
the day in December 1964 on which you convene your drafting committee will go down in history as the day of the great split in the international Communist movement... 106

By September the Soviet attitude toward the conference had become increasingly ambivalent, reflecting, probably, some differences in the Soviet leadership concerning tactics about it. Although Moscow published the Togliatti testament, it immediately, if esoterically (in theses on the hundredth anniversary of the First International) replied to its autonomist views by declaring that

relations among the socialist states cannot be limited merely to the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in one another's internal affairs, although they do presuppose the fullest and most consistent implementation of these principles. They also presuppose fraternal mutual aid and close cooperation among the socialist states...

Moreover, a new set of criteria for proletarian internationalism was set forth:

In the activity of the International, along with certain historically transitory organizational forms conditioned by the then-existing stage in the development of the

international workers' movement, there were expressed for the first time the most important organizational principles of proletarian internationalism. They are:

-- the duty to recognize the basic principles of the International on the part of all parties entering into it;

-- the duty to observe the decisions adopted within the framework of the International, with the subordination of the minority to the will of the majority;

-- the banning of factional schismatic activity within the ranks of the International.

These principles retain their importance in our time as well.\(^{107}\)

(Peking would reject all three principles, but the Italians and Romanians would reject (and the Poles and others oppose) the second as well; therefore Moscow must either break with them as well or abandon it; and without it they could no longer enforce their will.)

Later that month, at the Moscow celebration of the centenary of the First International, Ponomarev declared, in another indirect reply to the Togliatti testament, that:

... The desire to interpret the independence of parties as a departure from the resolution of

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common international tasks, as some kind of "neutrality" in coping with common causes, cannot in the least be regarded as either a sign of independence or a sign of maturity.

However—and here the "objective" ambivalence became clear—he also reiterated the CPSU's July 30 conciliatory line:

... The goal of the new conference, as the CPSU Central Committee understands it, lies not in "excommunicating" anyone from the Communist movement or in "severing" anyone from it but in strengthening its unity, in continuing the creative resolution of the urgent problems of the world Communist movement.

For the Western reader the Soviet dilemma may be clearer by an analogy with the United Nations General Assembly. There the United States until recently had an assured majority, and the Russians therefore refused to accept Assembly decisions, but so did the French But if the Russians or French or French or Italians refuse to accept these decisions there is little the United States can do about it, since the French and most other small nations most of the

pro-Soviet parties so fear the collapse of the United Nations /International Communist movement/ that they will not vote for the Russians' /Chinese/ or the French /PCI/ expulsion.

Meantime, Sino-Soviet rivalry in the underdeveloped areas further intensified. Four aspects merit particular attention: (1) organizational rivalries, (2) differences within the Soviet leadership concerning tactics, (3) the role of other communist parties, particularly the PCI, and (4) the Congo rebellion.

Sino-Soviet organizational rivalries in the underdeveloped world centered around the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and the preparations for the Second Afro-Asian Conference ("Second Bandung.") In the former Peking continued its efforts to set up and develop new Afro-Asian organizations from which Moscow would be excluded. In the latter the Chinese succeeded in preventing the acceptance of Moscow as a full member at the Jakarta preparatory meeting, but the Soviets continued their efforts to achieve admission.109

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Khrushchev's December 1963 relativization of Soviet ideology concerning "national democracy," the "construction of socialism," and participation of communists in "revolutionary democratic" states on the path of "non-capitalist development" has already been mentioned. In spring and summer 1964 differences of opinion within the Soviet leadership became apparent on these points, centering on how favorable an attitude to take toward such "revolutionary democratic" leaders as Ben Bella and Nasser, and to what extent the wishes of Middle Eastern Communists should be subordinated thereto. Khrushchev increasingly adopted the preference for the former view of a group of young intellectuals in the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International Affairs, while Suslov, Ponomarev, and those responsible for dealing with communist parties tended to support the latter.

The increasing, differentiated activities of other communist parties in the underdeveloped world, made possible by their increasing autonomy from Moscow, were particularly characteristic of the Italian and Cuban parties. Cuba's activities centered on trips by Guevara and others, intended to mobilize support against Washington.
and to propagate the Cuban model of national liberation struggle. The PCI was active particularly in North Africa, where its relations with the FLN were especially close, and also in Asia and Latin America. As Togliatti's testament clearly showed, the PCI's autonomist attitude with respect to international communist unity inter alia extended that concept to include such revolutionary national liberation movements as the FLN; i.e. the PCI abandoned any unity composed exclusively of communist parties for a larger one including revolutionary movements of all kinds. The PCI was clearly sympathetic to Khrushchev's views, and Togliatti went out of his way in his testament to endorse them. (In fact, so did the Chinese—another illustration of how organizational autonomists relativize ideology from no matter what substantive position.)

The 1964 "rebellion" in the Congo was largely tribal in character, and its causes included social dislocation and economic decline. Its leadership was mediocre and often pathological; and it lacked strategy and sufficient external support. Although it became more anti-literacy and racist as it developed, it was never ideological in character nor centrally directed. The Russians, restrained by the memories of their failures in Guinea in 1959 and in the Congo in 1960, might well have continued their initial reserve toward it had not Peking supported the rebel leaders Mulele,

112 For the PCI, see pp. 104-108 and 127, infra. Yugoslav activity became less significant as CPSU-LCY rapprochement intensified.
Gbenya, and Soumaliot, from its enclaves of influence in Bujumbura, Brazzaville, and elsewhere. Tshombe retaliated by throwing South African white mercenaries, plus American planes and exile Cuban pilots, into the fray, a move which aroused anti-American sentiments, notably in East Africa. Thereupon the Russians could no longer resist both opportunity and Chinese competition. Even so, they carefully did not commit themselves openly or completely to the "rebellion": they sent arms via Algiers and Cairo, and when Tshombe's white mercenaries broke the organized rebellion, they quietly ceased their support. Meanwhile, although the Chinese had been thrown out of Bujumbura and were meeting increased Soviet (and French) competition, in Brazzaville, rising unrest in Tanzania and Uganda continued tempting Peking, as Chou En-lai's June 1965 visit to East Africa demonstrated.\(^{113}\)

The Fall of Khrushchev

Khrushchev was removed as First Secretary and Prime Minister on October 1 by the CPSU Central Committee, as a result of a conspiracy carried through against him by his designated successors, Brezhnev and Kosygin. That he did not "resign," as the official announcement indicated, because of age and ill-health is certain; the probable cause of his fall must be deduced from what material is available.

The primary causes for Khrushchev's fall, in my view, were internal and bureaucratic in character: the crisis in the Soviet economy and agriculture, and his apparent determination to attempt to surmount them and to increase his personal power by going over the heads of the Presidium and the Central Committee to acquire support from élite public opinion. Foreign policy issues probably played some role in Khrushchev's fall, although, in my view, not a decisive and probably not even a major one. Press reports from Moscow indicated that Khrushchev's intention to attempt a


115 See the obviously inspired press agency dispatches from Moscow in The Times (London), Le Monde, and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 31, 1964. The most detailed account of the "29 points" was in a Moscow dispatch in Paese Sera (Rome), October 30, 1964; as to their doubtful authenticity, see a denial, Pancaldi from Moscow in L'Unità, October 30 and 31, 1964. (JPRS 27,590, November 30, 1964.)
rapprochement with Bonn was probably one of the more important ones; at any rate, it was the position his successors most rapidly and completely reversed. Khrushchev's failure either to force the Chinese to retreat or to mobilize effective collective action against them was, as has been shown above, sufficiently clear to have made this an obvious charge against him, and press reports indicate it may well have been so used. Nevertheless all available evidence and the course of Sino-Soviet relations thereafter indicate that Khrushchev's successors at most objected to some of his tactics against Peking, but shared with him a refusal to agree to the total Soviet capitulation that Peking demanded.
After Khrushchev:  
The Soviet Attempt at Rapprochement with Peking  

Soviet and Chinese Strategy  

1. The Strategy of the Post-Khrushchev Leadership  
The overthrow or death of a dictator is usually followed by a struggle for power; and even though there are as yet few clear signs of such a struggle among Khrushchev's successors, it is probably under way. At any rate, the current Soviet leaders not only have been preoccupied with the serious domestic economic and agricultural situation but also, like any collective leadership, are less capable than a dictator of pursuing a clear-cut, decisive course. Consequently, and since Moscow's relations with Washington were at the time of Khrushchev's ouster still relatively smooth, the Soviets tried at once for a partial détente in the Sino-Soviet crisis.  

Yet their maximum objective can hardly have been anything like a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Peking had demanded total capitulation from Khrushchev. Khrushchev had fallen. However, the new Soviet leaders were anxious to gain domestic popularity, which they could get only by further liberalization at home and détente abroad:
exactly the opposite of the Chinese demands. The Central Committee resolution announcing Khrushchev's "resignation" had reaffirmed the validity of the Twentieth and Twenty-Second CPSU Congresses, thus automatically cutting off any possibility of total agreement with Peking. Furthermore, with Khrushchev gone, Mao aware of the lack of authority of his successors, and Peking having exploded its first atomic device, the new leaders could hardly expect that the Chinese would soften their attitude toward the Soviets.

What the new Moscow leadership wanted from the Chinese was much less: cessation of polemics, détente in Sino-Soviet relations, the containment if not decline of Sino-Soviet competition throughout the world, cooperation on such foreign policy issues as Vietnam: an agreement to disagree and a pragmatic armistice. To obtain these ends, the new Soviet leaders appeared ready to resume extensive economic and technical assistance to China, and, unlike Khrushchev, probably to postpone indefinitely the scheduled international Communist conference. The reaction of Khrushchev's removal of hitherto pro-Soviet parties, with the exception of the French and Bulgarian, had been far from satisfactory from the Soviet viewpoint. Even the East Germans and the Czechs, as well as the Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, and Italians had expressed praise for Khrushchev's merits, thus going contrary to Moscow's indirect criticism of him, and only after they had sent delegations to Moscow for "explanations" did they, with the exception of the Italians, endorse Khrushchev's replacement. The Italians defiantly
reasserted their criticism, including criticism of Soviet internal policies. The Austrian CP, although with more reserve, did the same. The Romanians, on the other hand, gave only minimal notice to the fall of their hated enemy.\textsuperscript{116} Soviet authority and influence had clearly been dealt another blow, one which did not escape notice by the Chinese.

2. Post-Khrushchev Chinese aims were, however, just the opposite. The fall of their chief opponent, which they had long demanded and predicted, had finally occurred; and on that same day they had exploded their first atomic device\textsuperscript{117} in spite of Moscow's having cut off all atomic, military, and economic aid. Chinese influence had been steadily rising, and Soviet influence steadily declining; was this trend now not likely to accelerate still further? Finally, all this had been accompanied by, and in large


part, as Peking must have been convinced, caused by, the total refusal of Peking to yield an inch.

Having succeeded in delaying for some time the international conference by such tactics, was it not now likely that if they continued on the same course, partially concealed by apparently conciliatory moves, the conference would be postponed still further if not canceled, thus further increasing Chinese and decreasing Soviet prestige? Moreover Peking also had to pay attention to its allies, many of whom (the Japanese Communists, for example, as well as the Albanians) had exposed themselves greatly vis-a-vis the Soviets. Any sign of Chinese concessions to the Soviets would have imperiled Peking's support within the international Communist movement and made it the more difficult to reactivate its alliances when and if--and most likely when--Sino-Soviet relations worsened again. It would have been surprising if Mao had changed his tactics after such a victory; and, as it soon became clear, he did not.

Not that Peking wished to appear totally inflexible; it wanted to improve, or at least not worsen, its relations with parties such as the Romanians who were opposed to an international conference for their own reasons and who wanted a decline in Sino-Soviet hostility. (The signs of disquiet in East Europe over Khrushchev's fall made this consideration even more attractive.) But, as the previous period had demonstrated, it was the Soviets, rather than the Chinese, who felt compelled to move toward a formal international
split in order to cut their losses. Peking could therefore safely afford to return to its former tactic of suaviter in modo, fortiter in re: to respond with formal politeness to any Soviet overtures, but to reassure its supporters and ensure the revival of Soviet hostility by making clear its substantive refusal to make any concessions.

Chou En-lai in Moscow

Direct Soviet polemics against the Chinese ceased with Khrushchev's fall; and Peking also ceased explicit polemics against the Soviets. Whether this was a unilateral Soviet initiative reciprocated by the Chinese, or whether it was accompanied by some formal exchange of letters between Moscow and Peking we do not know. The former seems more likely. Moreover, the new Soviet leadership hinted it might modify its attitude on the international conference and on Soviet economic aid to China. Moscow invited a high-level Chinese delegation to the November 7 October Revolution celebrations in Moscow, and Peking sent Chou En-lai, Ho Lung (another Politburo member), and among others K'ang Sheng and Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, both participants in the July 1963 Sino-Soviet bilateral discussions. That Moscow also invited a Yugoslav government and party delegation but not an Albanian one was a clear sign that no decisive Soviet

118. "... duty ... of wide cooperation in all spheres of economic ... life ... an international conference of all communist parties [my italics--W. E. G], in "Unshakeable Leninist General Line of the CPSU," Pravda, October 17, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 40 (October 28, 1964), pp. 3, 6, at p. 6.
concessions were in the offing. On the other hand, Albania began attacking Khrushchev's successors soon after he was removed, a move which Peking may not have initiated but which it could, but did not, prevent.

The celebrations demonstrated that Sino-Soviet substantive differences remained as great as ever. Brezhnev's November 6 speech amounted to a complete rejection of the Chinese views. He emphasized production of consumer goods over heavy industry; he lifted restrictions on collective farmers' private plots; he reaffirmed the validity of the Twentieth CPSU Congress. He reiterated the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence; he specifically endorsed the partial test ban treaty, the CPSU Program and the "state of the whole people"; and he listed Yugoslavia as a socialist country. He appealed to the Chinese only to improve interstate relations and to tolerate differences in methods of socialist construction, with effectiveness being the test of correctness. (This was substantially the June 15, 1964 Soviet position.) Brezhnev's most hostile statement, from Peking's viewpoint, must have been his declaration that the time was "obviously ripe" for an international Communist conference to serve "cohesion" and "unity."


120. Pravda, November 7, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 43 (November 18, 1964), pp. 3-9. The conference call was repeated in
The Soviet plan, then, was to improve Sino-Soviet state relations on a pragmatic basis. To this end the October Revolution slogans were somewhat more anti-American, and there were some earlier indications that Moscow might be willing to make minor concessions to Chinese views about strategy toward the United States.

The Chinese response was substantively at least as negative as before Khrushchev's fall. Although Peking's October Revolution anniversary message was cordial, and the Chinese reprinted some Pravda editorials and Brezhnev's speech, P'eng Chen's October "In the Vanguard of the Struggle for Communism and Peace," Pravda, November 10, 1964. The first post-Khrushchev reaffirmation of Soviet support for a conference of "all" Communist parties was much more general and made no reference to timing. See "Soviet Progress Reviewed on the Eve of the 47th October Revolution Anniversary," Kommunist, No. 15, October 1964 (passed for the press, October 26, 1964), pp. 3-9 (JPRS 27, 466, November 20, 1964).

121. Pravda, October 18, 1964. (They did not refer to the partial test ban treaty or to international détente.)

122. E.g., the Soviet-Cuban communiqué of October 18 (ibid., October 19, 1964), which listed the anti-imperialist struggle before the reinforcement of peace. (See Michel Tatu, "La politique soviétique sans M. Khrouchtchev, II. Vers une reprise de contact avec la Chine?", Le Monde, November 4, 1964.) The same was true of "Foreign Policy and the Contemporary World," Kommunist, No. 3, February 1965 (passed for the press February 22, 1965), pp. 3-14, but it also reaffirmed (in italics) a view Peking rejected, that "The question of peace has been and remains the overriding issue of all contemporary life."

Revolution speech and the November 7 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial repeated, firmly albeit politely, the major Chinese theses: revolutionary violence, dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e. no "state of the whole people"), "unanimity through consultation" (i.e. Chinese factionalism), a violent anti-United States policy, socialist states (i.e. not including Yugoslavia), modern revisionism as the "main danger," and the Chou Yang thesis of the inevitability of splits.\(^{124}\)

Compared to this restatement, the reference to "temporary" Sino-Soviet difficulties which could be "gradually dissolved" was not so significant. Finally, the editorial declared that "Khrushchev revisionism" would be "spurned by the people . . . in the past, . . . in the present . . . and in the future"--a clear warning to Brezhnev and Kosygin.\(^{125}\) Moreover even before November 7 Albanian, West European, and Asian pro-Chinese parties and groups were already denouncing Khrushchev's successors.\(^{126}\)

Chou made his continued disapproval of Soviet policies publicly clear in Moscow. When Brezhnev welcomed the Yugoslav delegation, he alone did not applaud,\(^{127}\) and he laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb

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\(^{126}\) See Kevin Devlin, "Pro-Chinese Factions Intensify Struggles," RFE/Munich, November 19, 1964.

\(^{127}\) Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbian, November 6, 1964, 1830 GMT.
as he had in 1961. On November 13 there was a formal meeting between the Soviets and Chinese, to which the Soviet communique referred as "frank" and "comradely" but to which the Peking communique did not deign to apply any adjective at all. Chou later said that he had unsuccessfully tried to get the Soviets to abandon the conference project, but he had succeeded only in getting it postponed.

On November 13 the rising Chinese hostility was simultaneously evidenced by the publication, allegedly postponed since mid-October, of a long Albanian attack on the Italian Communist Party. It was mainly devoted to outlining and rejoicing over the differences between the Soviet and the Italian "revisionists." More significant for Sino-Soviet relations was its flat statement that "the present Soviet leadership... resolutely pursues the revisionist line of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Congresses" and its call for "defending, ... helping ... and ... supporting unreservedly ... new parties and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups"—i.e. the intensification of pro-Chinese factional activity.


On November 21, with the publication of an exultant and defiant Hung Ch'i editorial, "Why Khrushchev Fell," the Chinese position was once again in the open. Peking maintained that Khrushchev's fall, which was inevitable because of his "revisionist general line," had been long foreseen. In twelve points the editorial summed up and rejected the totality of Soviet foreign and domestic policies and all of the Soviet moves against Peking. The article concluded with a barely veiled warning to the new Soviet leaders:

... the course of history will continue to be tortuous. Although Khrushchev has fallen, his supporters—the U.S. imperialists, the reactionaries and the modern revisionists—will not resign themselves to this failure. These hobgoblins are continuing to pray for Khrushchev and are trying to "resurrect" him with their incantations, vociferously proclaiming his "contributions" and "meritorious deeds" in the hope that events will develop along the lines prescribed by Khrushchev, so that "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" may prevail. It can be asserted categorically that theirs is a blind alley.

Different ideological trends and their representatives invariably strive to take the stage and perform. It is entirely up to them to decide which direction they will take...132

This defiant Chinese article may well have encouraged the new Soviet leadership to dispatch a circular letter on November 24, 1964 summoning the postponed drafting committee meeting for March 1, 1965. China and her allies immediately again refused to

132. "Why Khrushchev Fell," Hung Ch'i, Nos. 21/22, November 21, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, VII, 48 (November 27, 1964), pp. 6-9. The reference to "contributions" refers to East European Communist leaders' statements about Khrushchev, but it implied that the new Soviet leadership took the same view.
attend. Although conciliatory in form, it in fact marked the Soviet decision to resume--under far less favorable conditions--its "collective mobilization" against the Chinese.

Simultaneously Jen-min jih-pao began reprinting comments on Khrushchev's fall by pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties, among them a violent November 1 Albanian editorial entitled "Khrushchev's Fall Did Not Entail the Disappearance of Khrushchevian Revisionism," and a declaration by PKI leader Aidit that Khrushchev's removal was not "the end of the struggle to smash modern revisionism" and that Moscow should amend the Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Congress resolutions.

In January 1965 Mao told Edgar Snow that there was "possibly some but not much . . . improvement in Sino-Soviet relations." Then by late January Peking was reprinting much more bitter anti-

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133. See, e.g., the December 1 PKI refusal in ibid., VII, 52 (December 25, 1964), pp. 17-18.

134. Pravda, December 12, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, VIII, 13 (March 26, 1965), pp. 21-22. The letter also contained the information that China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania had previously refused to participate in any international meeting, that the Japanese and Indonesian parties had "requested further information" (and, in fact, did not participate); and Romania refused to participate unless all others did--i.e. in fact refused. See also the implicitly anti-Chinese "The State of the Whole People," Pravda, December 6, 1964.


Soviet articles, for example, a Japanese Communist attack denouncing the new Soviet leadership for "disruptive activities" within the Japanese party and an Albanian one specifically calling for the end of the truce in explicit Sino-Soviet polemics, which, allegedly, "the present revisionist Soviet leadership" were only using to "restore all the links and agreements maintained by Khrushchev with the imperialists." Peking also renewed its attacks on India and publicized extensively the first congress of the pro-Chinese Indian Communist Party.

Moreover (as Tirana made public in early February), at the beginning of January Poland, presumably on Moscow's behalf, had invited Albania to the January 19-20 Warsaw meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. The Albanian reply was a long violent demand for a total and humiliating Soviet capitulation as the price of its attendance, by far the most extreme Albanian demand ever made on Moscow. Not only did the Albanians demand that the Soviets publicly renounce their Albanian policy and make economic and military reparations to Tirana, but they also insisted on


141. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
the end of Soviet military aid to Yugoslavia and India, the immediate signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, the immediate denunciation of the partial nuclear test ban treaty by Moscow and all other Warsaw Pact members, and a collective commitment to see that all socialist countries received nuclear weapons (presumably given by Moscow) "as a counter-measure" if West Germany is admitted to the MLF or otherwise gets nuclear arms. One wonders if all this was Chinese-inspired; perhaps the Albanians were trying to over-commit Peking. Yet this was the second time Moscow had reluctantly made an overture to the Albanians, and the second time Tirana had violently rejected it.143

As in many other areas, the new Soviet leadership initially gave some indications in its policies toward underdeveloped areas that it might abandon Khrushchev's intensified rapprochement with radical nationalists for a more orthodox position.144 However, the inexorable dynamic of competition with the Chinese, plus the

142. Zeri i Popullit, February 2, 1965, which included the texts of a January 5, 1965 note from Warsaw to Tirana, a January 15 Tirana reply, including a long letter to the Warsaw Pact meeting, a Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee decision of January 20, and a final brief Albanian note to the Warsaw Pact of January 29. (This may well, like other Albanian moves, have been somewhat more extreme than Peking desired, but the Chinese have never disavowed Tirana, and the degree of Albanian deviation from Peking, if any, remains in question.)

143. For the March 1963 incident, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 117-118.

144. Ra'anana, op. cit., the return of "national democracy" in the May Day slogans (Pravda, April 22, 1965), and in Pieter Keuneman, "New Features of the National Liberation Movement," World
similarly heterodox position of such right-wing parties as the PCI, appeared in mid-1965 to be pushing Moscow back toward something like Khrushchev's courting of such "revolutionary democrats" as Ben Bella and Nasser. Indeed, some signs indicated that Moscow might even be contemplating going farther than Khrushchev and considering such a radical move as abandoning entirely Communist parties in such areas as North Africa for alliance with the FLN and Nasser, in the hope (like Stalin with the Kuomintang) that Arab Communists could more effectively infiltrate and influence from within than languish in jail and impotence.

Finally, in January and February Peking praised Sukarno's denunciations of the United Nations, and his withdrawal from it, and gave its approval, albeit guardedly and without a firm commitment

Marxist Review, VII, 12 (December 1964), pp. 3-9; the anti-Nasser article by Khaled Bagdash, "Syria's New Road," ibid., VIII, 3 (March 1965), pp. 7-14; Radio Moscow, Leninist University of the Millions broadcasts, March 16, 18, 25, 30 and April 1, 6, 1965. I am most grateful to Dr. Ra'anana for enlightening discussions on this subject.


to support it, to the Indonesian President's proposal to form a new and "revolutionary" United Nations. The Chinese probably envisage, once they can extract it from Soviet control, the eventual transformation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization into such a "revolutionary" United Nations; but they are too shrewd to risk their support in underdeveloped areas by trying to persuade them all to withdraw from the only organization where their votes are not overshadowed by their lack of political and military power. But that Peking was committed to paralyzing the United Nations, even if it did not hope that it could soon destroy it, became clear in mid-February when the Albanian General Assembly delegate almost succeeded in forcing a vote on the Article 19 issue and thus wrecking the efforts for a Soviet-American compromise on it. Although Moscow and Washington eventually succeeded in foiling this plan, several African states demonstrated their opposition to great power domination by endorsing or abstaining on the vote.


The Vietnam Crisis and After

On February 7, Soviet Premier Kosygin and a Soviet delegation, including several high-ranking military officials, arrived in Hanoi. Kosygin had stopped over in Peking on February 6, where he was correctly but coolly received by Chou-En-lai. On that same day American bombers carried out the first of a series of raids on North Vietnam. Since then Sino-Soviet relations have been increasingly influenced by the Vietnam crisis. With the brief and partial exception of the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, this was the first time since the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis that the action of a major non-Communist power—in all three instances, the United States—exercised major influence on Sino-Soviet relations.

(As in the case of the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu and the 1962 Cuban crises, Sino-Soviet relations had been worsening again, after a temporary improvement, before American action influenced them significantly, but also, as in the two previous instances, this worsening was considerably accelerated by Washington's position.) Before turning to the March 1964 Moscow 28-party conference, therefore, we must pause to analyze the significance of this new external factor.

1. The Vietnam issue. For some years Viet Cong guerrilla activity had been increasing in South Vietnam, and the Saigon


government's control of the country weakening. The Viet Cong's political organization, the National Liberation Front (NLF), substantially and increasingly under Hanoi's control, became increasingly confident, as did Hanoi (itself increasingly pro-Chinese) and Peking that Washington would eventually withdraw from Saigon. Concomitantly, United States support of South Vietnam had increased. After the overthrow of Diem, Viet Cong victories, and a series of coups d'état in Saigon President Johnson decided that direct American military intervention was necessary to prevent a neutralist coup in Saigon and to redress the military balance so that negotiations with Hanoi might not result in its absorption of the South and, more generally, to contain Chinese expansionism and to demonstrate that "national liberation wars" could not defeat American power. The American decision to escalate was apparently taken around the turn of the year; and a Viet Cong attack on an American installation at Pleiku, and perhaps Ksygin's visit to Hanoi as well, provided a convenient opportunity to begin it.

2. Soviet policy on Vietnam. American escalation in Vietnam presented an unavoidable but exceedingly embarrassing problem for Moscow, the more so after the escalation. Khrushchev had come

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close to disengaging the Soviet Union from Vietnam and Laos; how-
ever, Kosygin's visit to Hanoi was a sign that the new Soviet
leadership was attempting to reestablish some Soviet influence in
Hanoi. Given its decision to postpone but eventually to summon the
international Communist conference, Moscow wanted Hanoi's neutrality
if not support for this move. More importantly, even before the
American escalation, and the more so thereafter, the deepening
crisis in Saigon confronted the Soviets with great dangers and con-
siderable opportunities. As long as Moscow could not completely
control Hanoi—the Soviets had no reason to think that this had been
or soon would be the case; indeed, since May 1963 Hanoi had been
pro-Peking—the overriding Soviet interest in Vietnam remained the
avoidance of a major confrontation with Washington over an area
which it could not control and whose victories would benefit Peking
more than Moscow. Specifically, if, as in late 1964 it seemed
likely to American as well as to Soviet observers, Washington would
(as Hanoi and Peking expected) eventually withdraw rather than
escalate, Moscow could not afford to have been inactive during such
a major Chinese victory and American defeat. On the contrary, the
Soviets had to participate in the victory so as to limit China's
gains from it. After America escalated, Moscow was more able than
Peking to offer Hanoi modern antiaircraft defenses to limit the

bombing, and Hanoi therefore by February 1965 was actually more dependent on Moscow than before and therefore more amenable to Soviet influence. Finally, given the continuing if temporarily latent Sino-Soviet hostility and Soviet determination to cut its losses within the international Communist movement, Moscow could not afford to give to other Communist parties the impression that it would entirely sacrifice its "proletarian international" obligations to Hanoi to its overriding interest in avoiding a confrontation with the strategically superior United States; to do so would be playing into Peking's hands. Even before the American escalation the new Soviet leadership's move toward a rapprochement with Hanoi stemmed at least in part from Moscow's desire to establish some measure of Soviet control over a situation which potentially threatened to drag the Soviet Union nolens volens into a confrontation with Washington. On the international level the Soviets wanted to prevent or limit American escalation by negotiations, which, they hoped, would lead first to neutralization and then to the absorption of South Vietnam by a Hanoi no longer under predominant Chinese influence. After the escalation the Soviets were in a much worse dilemma: they had both more reason and more opportunity to try to recover control over Hanoi, but their fear of a confrontation with Washington precluded them giving Hanoi the military assistance which alone would have made their recovery of control possible.

3. **Chinese policy on Vietnam.** Peking's objectives in Vietnam were quite different from Moscow's. True, both shared a desire
to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States; indeed Mao himself and his associates have consistently been careful to make clear that they will not attack the United States unless Washington first attacks them. Nevertheless, as the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute has made clear, there was a basic difference between the Soviet and the Chinese assessment of American policy when confronted with a "national liberation struggle." Mao was convinced, contrary to Soviet leaders, that protracted guerrilla struggle would make American escalation unlikely, and, if and when it occurred, both limited and unsuccessful. (Even so, the American escalation seriously questioned the original Chinese thesis that America is a paper tiger, i.e. will not escalate, and tended to support the contrary Soviet view.) Specifically, Mao now prefers more rather than less American intervention in Vietnam as long as the United States does not defeat the Viet Cong or attack China itself, and as long as Hanoi remains recalcitrant: the resultant protracted U.S.-Viet Cong struggle would draw Hanoi closer to Peking, would raise Chinese prestige both within and outside of the Communist movement, would further justify an extremist domestic policy in China, and, finally, would force Moscow to abandon its priority for détente with Washington for a more militant posture


that could only justify Chinese policy and further China's security interests.

4. Hanoi's policy on Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh combines guerilla communism with Vietnamese nationalism, anti-colonialism, and determination to reunify Vietnam. He had defeated the French; the Viet Cong seemed well on the way to victory; why should he retreat, despite American escalation? He did need and wanted more Soviet support, and he had never wanted a Sino-Soviet split; rather, his own security interests demanded joint Sino-Soviet support for Hanoi against Washington. Therefore, at least unless American escalation were to wreak major damage in North Vietnam or American ground forces were to defeat the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, or both, he, like Mao, wanted to continue the war. The same was even more true for the National Liberation Front, to whom victory must have seemed within reach, and who had no desire to return, as they had in 1954, to the North to wait for a better day.

155. For the most extreme (and pro-Chinese) Hanoi position, see Truong Chinh, "Let Us Raise High the Creative Marxist-Leninist Banner and Hold Fast to the Party's Military Line," Quan Doi Nhan Dan (Hanoi), February 4, 1965. Although Hanoi's position has been moderately and conditionally pro-Chinese since May 1963 (see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 128-130, 192-193), a December 1963 Lao Dong CC communiqué (Nhan Dan, January 21, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, January 23, 1964) carefully distinguished between "the Tito revisionist clique, a lackey of imperialism" and "... mistaken people within the international Communist movement ... who commit the error of revisionism or right-wing opportunism [i.e., the Soviets]." The former are to be exposed and opposed, the latter struggled with "for the sake of unity." Cf. j. c. k. Joseph C. Kun, "North Vietnamese Still on the Fence," RFE/Munich, January 27, 1964.
The Kosygin Visit, American Escalation, and Sino-Soviet Relations

As might have been expected, the Kosygin visit to Peking and Hanoi and the simultaneous initiation of American bombing raids on North Vietnam worsened Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American relations. The February 10 Soviet-North Vietnamese communique, cordial in tone, included a Soviet commitment to "strengthen the defense capacity of the DRV,"156 and shortly thereafter construction began around Hanoi for Soviet ground-to-air antiaircraft missiles.157

However, the February 8 Soviet and Chinese governmental declarations on the American bombing differed, and these differences intensified thereafter. Both of course condemned it strongly; but

156. Pravda, February 11, 1965, quoted from CDSP, XVII, 6 (March 3, 1965), pp. 9-11, at p. 9. Kosygin also visited Pyongyang, where he seems to have had more success: North Korea as of this writing had practically ceased polemics with Moscow. For the visit, see Pravda, February 13-16, 1965; and for subsequent indications, Demichev in ibid., April 23, 1965 and Kim Il-song in Indonesia, April 14, in KCNA, April 19, 1965, both cited from j. c. k. [Joseph C. Kun], "North Korea: Back in the Middle?", RFE/Munich, May 7, 1965, q. v.


while Moscow, with careful imprecision, spoke only of being forced, together with its allies and friends, to take further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen the defense capability of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Peking declared that:

all the other Socialist countries have the unshirkable international obligation to support and assist it with actual deeds.

Furthermore Peking's attack on the United States was considerably more violent than Moscow's.

That the Peking Kosygin-Chou conversations did not stem the worsening of Moscow-Peking relations in spite, apparently, of Kosygin having renewed the previous Soviet offers to expand economic and technical cooperation, soon became clear. Although the mid-February Soviet and Chinese messages on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance were cordial in tone, their substantive differences were even clearer than in the February 8 statements, particularly with respect to the United States. Shortly thereafter Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi declared that peaceful coexistence with the United States is "impossible" and that:

159. See Kosygin's speech after his Hanoi trip, Pravda, February 27, 1965 (CDSF, XVII, 9 /March 24, 1965, pp. 3-6; Borba, February 21, 1965.

... only in concrete action against United States imperialism and its followers can the Sino-Soviet alliance be tested and tempered and Sino-Soviet unity be consolidated and developed. . . .

He also demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam as a precondition for peace there.\(^\text{161}\) Kosygin, on the other hand, while he also demanded U.S. withdrawal, referred to this problem only as an "obstacle."\(^\text{162}\)

By the end of February reports indicated that Moscow had told Paris that it would support General de Gaulle's plan for a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam.\(^\text{163}\) Peking and Hanoi, on the other hand, rejected negotiations.\(^\text{164}\) In addition, just before the March 1 opening date of the preparatory committee for an international conference, the Chinese declared that Moscow was supporting "a vicious scheme of the United States to promote neo-colonialism"--the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force.\(^\text{165}\) In another sign of the new storm to come, Peking began to accuse Moscow of resuming polemics.\(^\text{166}\)


\(^{162}\) Pravda, February 17, 1965.


\(^{164}\) André Fontaine in ibid., February 27, 1965; Jen-min Jih-pao, February 19, 1965.

\(^{165}\) Ibid., February 25, 1965 (SCMP 3407, March 2, 1965.)

\(^{166}\) Jen-min Jih-pao, February 26, 1965, et seq.
The March 1965 Moscow 18-Party Meeting

Developments from Khrushchev's fall until the March 1 18-party meeting confirmed the accelerating decline of Soviet influence. Both the membership and the character of the meeting became less favorable from the Soviet viewpoint. Romania refused to come at all. Cuba's attendance became certain only shortly before the meeting; and although this indicated that Soviet-Cuban relations had improved, a communique of a late 1964 meeting of Latin American Communist parties in Havana 167 indicated that Moscow had made some concessions to Castro concerning revitalization of violent struggle in Latin America and that Cuba continued to oppose any Sino-Soviet split. 168 The British Communist Party almost did not attend the


meeting at all (its one representative arrived a day late) and made clear its opposition to the meeting itself and its refusal to cooperate in the originally specified purposes.

However, the position of the Italian Communist Party was perhaps most important in changing the character of the meeting. After Khrushchev's fall the PCI intensified its attempts to influence other parties to support its views concerning the international conference and otherwise, particularly the Vietnam crisis and policy toward underdeveloped areas. Its main right-wing leader, Giorgio Amendola, made a major new proposal: the formation of a unified working class party which would be based "neither on social democratic nor on communist positions," just as radical national liberation movements were not, and which would encourage "the most advanced currents of modern thought," not only those of Marx, Lenin, Labriola and Gramsci but also "other philosophical and cultural positions." Amendola implicitly advocated the end of democratic centralism and the allowing of factions:


... one cannot pretend to create a unitary party on the ideological positions occupied by the communist avant-garde. The communists will continue, naturally, their Marxist struggle within the unitary party, in a permanent, democratic debate of ideas. ...

True, this meant communist "infiltration from within"; but perhaps as important was his justification for his proposals: communism, like social democracy, had failed to realize a "socialist transformation of society." 172 Amendola's proposals were not endorsed by his associates, but the PCI rejected 173 Soviet criticism of them. 174 In mid-February the PCI made clear that it would attend only if the meeting were consultative in character. 175 Thereupon Moscow, which before had referred to it as the "first session of the editorial commission," 176 (i.e. identifying it with the

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preparatory meetings prior to the 1960 conference) was forced to term it only a "consultative meeting." Thus the meeting was emptied of all effectively anti-Chinese content before it ever began.

The "consultative meeting" of 18 parties met in Moscow from March 1 to 5. The meetings were secret, and the only major published documentation on its discussions available by mid-1965 was the speech of the chief Italian Communist delegate, Enrico Berlinguer. When one compares it with the conference communique (summarized below), one realizes clearly how great a victory the PCI won at the conference, and how complete was the Soviet defeat. Berlinguer stated frankly that the PCI's views at this meeting, on which a "consultative character has been opportunely conferred, on some points are different from those of other comrades. After quoting and endorsing Togliatti's testament on the conference, including the criticism of the slowness of democratization in socialist countries, Berlinguer rejected "the myth of an improvised

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and global solution" of Sino-Soviet differences in favor of "gradual construction" of unity, which would include close contacts with radical revolutionary movements in order, after the "liquidation of outlived schemes and methods" among Communist parties, to create "the basis of a world-wide unity of the whole revolutionary movement." After carefully rejecting nationalist and regional views and declaring that the PCI had "no objection in principle" to international meetings, he then made clear that the PCI refused to accept Soviet objectives for such a meeting. The two-year attempt to convene one, he said, "could not be judged entirely positively."

It had divided parties into "supporters and opponents of a conference."

... The practical result of this ... was that the conference, announced as imminent, did not take place ...  

because of the risk of a split. At the present conference "the fundamental part of the revolutionary forces of an entire continent such as Asia" are absent. He then flatly declared:

... Our viewpoint is summed up in the conviction that it is proper to recognize that the conditions for a new, useful international conference of all the fraternal parties have not yet matured. ...  

Not, he went on, that the idea of such a conference should be abandoned: it should remain a "perspective" but not the immediate goal. However--and here the PCI veto became clear and detailed:
... we are opposed to putting in motion an organizational mechanism before the necessary political conditions have matured, one which would in any case be contrary to the purely consultative character of our meeting. We are absolutely in agreement with those comrades\textsuperscript{180} who have excluded any eventuality in which this meeting could adopt decisions or formulate propositions relative to the date of the conference or the date of the other meetings which may be prepared, as well as to the themes of discussion and its course. We are not in agreement with the views of certain comrades\textsuperscript{181} that we should consider the dates and places of the next meetings. I add also, with all explicitness, that we are totally opposed to any proposals which would tend to give organizational continuity, in whatever form, to this meeting. We can in no sense give the impression of constituting an organizing committee for the conference or for an eventual preparatory meeting of the 81 parties.

Probably the British and Cubans, and to some extent the Poles, supported Berlinguer's views, while the Soviets, French, and the three split parties (Australian, Brazilian, and Indian) favored a stronger anti-Chinese stand than actually emerged from it.

The meeting was a fiasco for Moscow. Its final communique made clear that the participants had only "held consultations" and "exchanged opinions"; and only once, in reaffirming the 1960 Declaration in favor of international Communist conferences, was it specifically stated that the participants "unanimously" agreed. Its formulations on international politics reflected the hardening Soviet line against the United States, but an accompanying statement on Vietnam was couched in very general terms. "Unity of action

\textsuperscript{180.} British? Cuban?--W. E. G.

\textsuperscript{181.} French? Bulgarian? Soviet?--W. E. G.
in the struggle against imperialism" was advocated, "even given the existence of disagreements concerning the political line and many important problems in theory and tactics"--i.e., it was tacitly admitted that Sino-Soviet disagreements would continue for a long time. The passages concerning further "collective efforts" made clear that the Italian view had prevailed over the Soviet; despite his death months before, Togliatti was the victor of the conference. Although the desirability of an international conference was "unanimously" affirmed, it was thereafter so qualified that in fact it was indefinitely postponed. There was no date set for such a conference; it was to meet "at a suitable time." Not only must it be "carried out with the observance of the principles of full equality and the independence of each party," but also it must be "thoroughly" prepared. Specifically it was to be prepared not by a preparatory committee (a body which the meeting implicitly dissolved) but by a "preliminary consultative meeting" of all the 81 parties that met in Moscow in 1960. Consultations must be carried out with "all" these parties in order to "solve the question" of calling the preparatory meeting and "joint efforts should be actively exerted to create favorable conditions for participation in its preparation by all the fraternal parties." Not only, then, the Italians but presumably also the Chinese could delay even the 81-party preparatory consultative meeting for a long time to come. Finally, the communique, like Togliatti's testament, called for the end of open polemics, the continuation of a comradely "exchange of
opinion," and the end of "the interference of some parties in the internal affairs of others." 182

What was not in the communique was perhaps an even clearer indication of the Soviet losses than what was. There was no mention of collective mobilization or of a "firm rebuff" of the Chinese, indeed no reference to the Chinese at all except the very indirect one about "unfriendly and offensive" polemics; no mention of dogmatism as "the main danger" (and no mention of the Yugoslavs); and no mention of majority decisions being binding. Indeed, by the emphasis on independence and equality the communique implicitly reaffirmed the role of unanimity. Moreover the reactions of various West European parties to the communique showed that the meeting had reinforced their drift away from Moscow, 183 and a subsequent Pravda editorial went even farther than the communique in emphasizing the necessity for "new" ways and approaches to unity. 184


The Chinese Response

1. The March 4 Moscow Student Demonstration. If the participants in the Moscow 18-party meeting had any illusions left about Peking's response to their efforts, these must have been swept away by the violent March 4 demonstration by Chinese and Vietnamese students against the American Embassy in Moscow. In view of its timing and of subsequent developments, it is most probable that this demonstration was staged by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow on orders from Peking. (It bore many resemblances to the 1963 Naushki incident.)

On March 4 several hundred Chinese students led Vietnamese and other students in storming Soviet police lines before the American Embassy. Serious fighting broke out, and many were injured on both sides; Soviet mounted police, in scenes reminiscent of Cossack charges under the Tsars, unsuccessfully rode into the students in order to disperse them; and only when several hundred Red Army soldiers arrived did the students disperse. Peking violently protested, alleging that Soviet police had tortured Chinese students and that Soviet hospitals had refused to treat them, and demanding that the Soviets "admit their errors," "apologize to the students,"


and "severly punish" the Soviet police involved. The Soviets rejected the protest, termed the demonstration a "premeditated provocation," declared that any similar ones would be "resolutely cut short," and stated that international law required the Soviets to protect foreign embassies. The Chinese on March 16 sent another note, again demanding that Moscow "admit its mistakes" and apologize to the students, and added sarcastically:

How ruthless you were to the demonstrators against U.S. imperialism, and how abjectly subservient you were to the U.S. imperialists!

When the injured Chinese students returned to Peking, they were received with all honors, whereupon Moscow declared that they were faking their injuries and that the Chinese were concocting a "propaganda farce." The violence of the Soviet protests was probably in part due to the fact that this demonstration was the first such outbreak in the Soviet Union not under the regime's control since 1917. However, the violence of the Chinese response,

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188. Soviet note, Pravda, March 13, 1965; CDSP, XVII, 10 (March 31, 1965), pp. 4-5.


190. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

and the genuinely provocative nature of the demonstration and its aftermath, fundamentally reflected the grave deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations then under way.

Although the first official Chinese commentary on the conference did not appear until March 22, the Peking press had made clear by reprinting alleged Soviet attacks on China and articles from pro-Chinese parties that in Peking's view the conference represented "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and that Moscow was conspiring with Washington to sell out the DRV's and the Viet Cong's interests. On March 20, in publishing the Moscow meeting communique, Peking spoke of "a schismatic meeting convoked by the leadership of the CPSU unilaterally, illegally, and by scraping bits and pieces together. . . ." Then on March 22 Peking published "A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting," a programmatic statement that marked the death sentence for any Sino-Soviet reconciliation and signaled the opening of a major Chinese campaign against the new Soviet

192. Peking Review, VIII, 10 (March 5, 1965), pp. 27-31, and VIII, 11 (March 22, 1965), pp. 11-12. The Albanians again signaled the Chinese position. On March 18 they declared that the March Moscow conference "of hardened conspirators . . . decisively tore the mask from the present Soviet leadership. . . . Alongside N. Khrushchev and with him, they are the greatest plotters and splitters the history of the international Communist movement had known, revisionists and incorrigible renegades of Marxist-Leninism, allies and auxiliaries of imperialism." (Zeri i Popullit, March 18, 1965.)

193. Jen-min Jih-pao, March 9, 10, 12, and 13, 1965. See also the introduction to the 3rd volume of Khrushchev's works, Peking Review, VIII, 10 (March 5, 1965), pp. 11-12.

leadership. The meeting, it declared, was "illegal and schismatic
. . . quite small and most unseemly . . . a gloomy and forlorn
affair"—i.e. a fiasco. It was "rent with contradictions and dis-
unity": some "wholeheartedly" supported Moscow, some "halfheartedly"
e.g. the Italians some were only a "claque"; and "still others"
the Cubans? "may have temporarily fallen into the trap from
naiveté." The new Soviet leadership, the article continued, was
continuing "Khrushchevism . . . revisionism, great power chauvinism,
and splittism." They removed Khrushchev only because he was too
"odious" and "stupid":

. . . all their fine words only amount to selling
horsemeat as beefsteak. . . . they are saying one
thing and doing another . . . they are still bent
on deepening the differences, wrecking unity, and
. . . openly splitting the international Communist
movement. . . .

The meeting's proposal for "concerted action" against the
imperialists was also a "swindle," for "they continue to adhere to
Khrushchev's reactionary policy of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the
domination of the world"—i.e. they will not break with Washington
and support Chinese policy. Specifically, the article went on,
Moscow is willing to compromise on the United Nations Article 19
controversy and to join with Washington to set up a U.N. peace
keeping force; the Soviets want negotiation instead of struggle
in Vietnam; they are continuing their attempts to subvert the
Japanese, Indonesian, and Burmese Communist parties; and they con-
tinue Khrushchev's "erroneous" policies toward Albania and their
alignment with Tito. Finally,

To sum up, what the new leaders of the CPSU have been doing can be described as "three shams and three realities": sham anti-imperialism but real capitulationism, sham revolution but real betrayal, sham unity but a real split. They are still doing what Khrushchev did... "four alignments with and four alignments against": alignment with imperialism against socialism, alignment with the United States against China and the other revolutionary countries, alignment with the reactionaries everywhere against the national-liberation movements and the people's revolutions, and alignment with the Tito clique and renegades of all descriptions against all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and all revolutionaries fighting imperialism...

Rather than ending polemics, the modern revisionists must be refuted publicly, even if it takes "ten thousand years." Moreover the Moscow meeting created "new and serious obstacles" for an international meeting, the preparation for which will now take not four or five years but "twice as long, or even longer"--i.e. China will indefinitely refuse to participate. As a precondition for "concerted action against the enemy and unity against imperialism," Moscow must publicly repudiate the meeting, "Khrushchev's revisionism, great power chauvinism, and splittism," the Twentieth and Twenty-Second CPSU Congresses, and "all the words and deeds of the leaders of the CPSU against China, Albania, the Japanese Communist Party and the other Marxist-Leninist parties." As for China, the article concluded,--and this was its most important point--the Moscow meeting has given the "Marxist-Leninist parties... the right to take the initiative":
we have not given enough support to the revolutionary left in some countries and henceforth must greatly intensify our endeavors in this respect.

In sum, then, Peking defied the new Soviet leadership, refused to cooperate with it on the Vietnamese or any other issue, and announced the intensification of its anti-Soviet factional activity throughout the international Communist movement. 195

After the Moscow Meeting:
The Further Worsening of Sino-Soviet Relations

As of this writing (June 15, 1965) Sino-Soviet relations have continued to worsen ever since the March 1965 Moscow meeting. Peking has intensified its offensive against Moscow in all directions and has continued to center its attack on the Vietnam issue. Although the Chinese propaganda position has been made more difficult by the further hardening of Soviet policy and by increased American willingness to negotiate, Peking has stubbornly maintained that Moscow continues to plot with Washington to sell out Hanoi. Thus each time that Moscow has tried to diminish, although not eliminate, its differences with Peking by increasing Soviet hostility to Washington, Peking (and Hanoi) have further hardened their

positions. This Soviet response has paralleled Washington's reduction of most of the conditions it had previously attached to negotiation centering on Vietnam, a step which in turn has made the Soviet position more difficult.

One point of caution must be made: at the level of military policy, where events in Vietnam are increasingly determined, both Moscow and Peking have continued their caution in the face of extended American bombings of North Vietnam and, beginning in April, increased commitment of American ground troops to South Vietnam. Although in April Moscow for the first time explicitly stated its willingness in principle to send Soviet volunteers to North Vietnam, the commitment was carefully qualified and made clearly applicable only to a future contingency, not present policy: "if . . . U.S. aggression is intensified . . . if need be, and if the DRV government so requests. . . ." 196 Likewise, in early May Peking's Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching, in an otherwise belligerent article, repeated Mao's January formulation that "we will not attack unless we are attacked." 197

196. See the joint USSR-DRV communiqué, Pravda, April 18, 1965, quoted from CDSP, XVII, 16 (May 12, 1965), pp. 14-15, at p. 13. See also the Kosygin speech, Pravda, April 20, 1965. Brezhnev had earlier (ibid., March 24, 1965), apparently in response to a March 22 NLF request for volunteers, hinted that Soviet volunteers might be sent.

197. Lo Jui-ching, op. cit.
President Johnson's April 7 offer of "unconditional negotiations" was answered by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong the following day, April 8, with a four-point program clearly unacceptable to Washington: (1) immediate and total American withdrawal from South Vietnam, (2) no foreign troops in either North or South thereafter (i.e. no UN or other peace keeping force), (3) South Vietnamese affairs to be settled without foreign intervention according to the NLF (Viet Cong) program, and (4) peaceful unification of Vietnam with no foreign intervention. True, Moscow also rejected Johnson's proposals and endorsed Pham's, but it did so less enthusiastically, while Peking had even before insisted on the one point Johnson was unwilling to concede: that Washington could negotiate only with the NLF. Moreover, although Moscow's attitude hardened and in mid-March the Soviet government refused to join London in proposing a cease-fire in Vietnam, China reportedly at least temporarily held up Soviet aid going to Hanoi refused


(as did Hanoi) to allow a visit from London's special envoy Patrick Gordon-Walker,\textsuperscript{204} declared that "Khrushchev's successors are pursuing the Khrushchev line to form an anti-China alliance with Nehru's successors,"\textsuperscript{205} exploded a second atomic bomb,\textsuperscript{206} denounced the 17-nation nonaligned appeal as one "masterminded and created by the Tito clique,"\textsuperscript{207} and sabotaged the attempt—to which the Soviets had agreed—to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Cambodia as a means of beginning informal negotiations on Vietnam.\textsuperscript{208}

Meanwhile Peking's polemics against Moscow became constantly sharper. Perhaps the most substantively significant was a long article by Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching. By declaring that the Maoist strategy of "active defense should not have the holding or capturing of territory as its major objective" and by reaffirming

\begin{itemize}
  \item 204. Lewis from London in \textit{ibid.}, April 13, 1965.
  \item 208. Originally Cambodia had requested the convening, but only to guarantee its neutrality, on March 15; of the two co-chairmen, Moscow agreed on April 3 and London on April 26. By that time London was hoping to use the conference to negotiate on Vietnam, whereupon Moscow hesitated, and Sihanouk presumably under Chinese pressure, on April 24 declared that not Saigon but the NLF must represent South Vietnam, thus ending the project. See Tanner from Moscow in \textit{The New York Times}, April 15, 28, 1965; \textit{The Times} (London), April 27, 1965; and a CPR government statement, May 2, 1965, in
\end{itemize}
the superiority of men and revolutionary fervor over weapons and atom bombs, he seemed almost to be implying that Hanoi should accept maximum American bombing and continue fighting indefinitely. More generally he made the case against Soviet caution in its support of Hanoi, because of its interest in avoiding a confrontation with Washington, a criterion of the rightness of Soviet policy:

.. Countries which have won victory should support and help the revolutionary struggles of those countries and peoples that have not yet won victory. The socialist countries should serve as base areas for the world revolution. .. Whether or not a country which has won victory dares to serve as a base area for the world revolution and to support and aid the people's revolution in other countries is the touchstone of whether or not it is really for revolution and whether or not it really opposes imperialism .. 209

The spring of 1965 saw intensified Sino-Soviet propaganda battles at various international Communist front organization

Peking Review, VIII, 19 (May 7, 1965), pp. 11-12, a commentary on a May 1 Cambodian government statement.

meetings in Algiers\textsuperscript{210} and Accra,\textsuperscript{211} further conflict between the pro-Chinese Japanese Communist Party and Soviet-supported Japanese Communist dissidents and the pro-Soviet left wing of the Japanese Socialist Party,\textsuperscript{212} plus Chinese protests against Soviet expulsion of Chinese students in Moscow\textsuperscript{213} and prevention of a North Vietnamese student protest in Leningrad.\textsuperscript{214} Furthermore Peking continued its efforts to exclude the Soviet Union and Malaysia from the second Bandung Conference, scheduled for late June in Algiers.\textsuperscript{215}


\textsuperscript{212.} Akahata, April 2, 14, 1965.

\textsuperscript{213.} In an April 13 Chinese Foreign Ministry memorandum to the Soviet embassy in Peking, NCNA English, May 5, 1965, 1741 GMT.

\textsuperscript{214.} NCNA English, May 6, 1965, 1301 GMT. Hanoi did not make any reference to the incident.

Since late January 1965, then, after the fleeting pause subsequent to Khrushchev's fall, Sino-Soviet relations had worsened again. The basic causes of the dispute, and the depth of differences and emotional involvement on both sides, made Khrushchev's successors as unsuccessful as he in either containing or isolating the Chinese. On the contrary, their influence continued to decline. Moreover, American escalation in Vietnam further exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations.

Why this was the case has already been described; it remains only to set forth the manner in which the Vietnam issue, added on top of all the other Sino-Soviet strains, led the Chinese to openly accuse the Soviets of conspiring with the Americans to sell out Hanoi.

As has been so frequently the case in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Tirana preceded Peking in the public accusation, although one may assume that Peking had already made the charge privately and that the only decision which remained for the Chinese was when to publicly denounce the Soviets on this score. On April 20 the Albanians declared:

... The diabolical aim of the ... Brezhnev-Kosygin-Mikoyan-Suslov group ... is to get the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into their snare by undertaking an operation allegedly to send arms and volunteers into that country. ... This action ... is accompanied by American bombings, which decrease only with the conclusion of the Soviet operation—that is, when so-called Soviet "volunteers," as alleged experts, rocket technicians, etc., have occupied key places in Vietnam.
Thus, the Soviet revisionists . . . hope and endeavor to create a favorable, relatively calm situation for negotiations with the Americans, and to turn Vietnam and Indochina into a base for plots and threats against the Chinese Peoples' Republic. . . .

In late May and mid-June Peking adopted substantially the same position, first in a speech at the PKI Higher Party School by P'eng Ch'en and then, even more extensively and authoritatively, in a long editorial article. (The latter, published on the second anniversary of the Chinese June 13, 1963 "25 points," will be the basis of analysis here, with some additions from P'eng's speech when necessary.)

The June 13, 1965 article began by reiterating the thesis of the ninth "Comment" that Khrushchev's social base was "the new privileged bourgeois stratum." This same stratum, the new article added, "got rid of Khrushchev" because he was "too stupid and disreputable" and therefore "endangered their dominant position." His replacements, the article continued, has been Khrushchev's closest associates, were fundamentally associated with his whole


219. See pp. 66-68 supra.
revisionist line, and, like him, represent the "privileged bourgeois stratum" and therefore "can only act in conformity with the interests of that stratum and pursue a revisionist line. . . ."
(In other words, the new Soviet leadership must be revisionist.)
They are "old actors" "who face the . . . awkward and difficult problem of how to deck themselves out as new ones." Therefore they face an insoluble contradiction: they profess revolution but practice "Soviet-U.S. cooperation" against revolution. They practice therefore, " . . . compared to Khrushchev, a more covert, more cunning, and more dangerous revisionism. . . ." (P'eng Ch'en went even further, implicitly applying to the new Soviet leadership the formulation of Lenin and of the 1949 Cominform Resolution:

". . . Objectively they are a political detachment of the bourgeoisie . . . its agents in the labor movement. . . ."
clearly implying that they are even worse than Sukarno and Norodom Sihanouk:

". . . they really cannot be compared with the anti-imperialist and revolutionary representatives of the national bourgeoisie in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, nor even with the anti-imperialist and patriotic representatives of royal families and the nobility. . . ."

The article accused the new Soviet leadership of continuing Khrushchev's anti-Albanian and pro-Indian policies, and of trying to subvert the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties. Worse,
While making some gesture of aid to Vietnam, they have divulged their "aid" plans to the Americans in advance and have been busy in Washington, London, and Paris trying to bring about peace negotiations in a painstaking effort to find a "way out" for the U.S. aggressors.

The article then turned to a Soviet argument which, one suspects, has probably been causing the Chinese some trouble: "unity against imperialism." The Soviets, the article declared, preach "unity," in spite of having disrupted unity by "brazenly calling the schismatic March meeting." Moreover,

they have a despicable aim . . . to capitalize on the aspirations of the people of the world for . . . closer unity . . . in the face of the U.S. imperialists' rabid aggression. . . .

The article concluded:

We therefore must continue our triumphant pursuit and firmly carry forward the fight against Khrushchev revisionism to the very end. . . .

The Soviets had long been patient in the face of the rising post-March Chinese polemics, but, predictably, their patience—or was it, perhaps, their hesitation to act—gave way. P'eng Ch'en's speech proved too much for Moscow to bear, and upon its departure the Soviet delegation to the PKI 45th anniversary celebration issued

220. P'eng (p. 18) modified this somewhat (but presumably only for tactical purposes) by prefacing the same statement with: "We still place some hope in the leadership of the CPSU, and will welcome the day when they admit and rectify their mistakes. . . . But it seems that this day is still far off."

a statement accusing P'eng of having made "provocative and slanderous" attacks on CPSU policy and the Soviet government and expressing regret that such a "remarkable" occasion should have been used by the Chinese for their "splitting purposes."\textsuperscript{221}

But the Soviets were in, if anything, a worse--albeit basically the same--dilemma as before. They published a Portuguese Communist Party resolution calling for an international conference;\textsuperscript{222} yet simultaneously tried to accommodate reluctant Soviet supporters within the international Communist movement by indicating that no new international organizational form should be set up and that formally decisions of an international conference are not binding on its members, quoting Lenin to the effect that

\begin{quote}
... The moral significance of the decisions of an international conference is such that non-observance is an exception in practice. ...
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{223}

Moreover, the Portuguese CP resolution both supported the conclusions of the March 1 meeting and stressed that:

\begin{quote}
It is known that communist and workers parties differ in their views as to the forms and methods of overcoming the existing differences, the resolution says. In the majority of cases this difference reflects the striving of each party to make its own constructive
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} \textit{Pravda}, June 7, 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{222} \textit{Ibid.}, June 13, 1965.
\end{itemize}
contribution toward the restoration and consolidation of the unity of the international communist movement.

Meanwhile, the head of a PCI delegation had declared upon his return from Hanoi:

... The Vietnamese Party of Labor is one of the parties which did not take part in the Moscow Conference, and disagrees with the CPSU and, in fact, with us as well, on the advisability of participating in this conference; but we found a common ground, and what seemed important to us and which should be recorded here as well, is that they not only expressed their interest, their sympathy--as the party secretary put it--with the last words Comrade Togliatti left us, but that they consider the watchwords stressed in Togliatti's testament--unity in diversity--to be a watchword which should be adopted by the whole Communist movement and which in any event the Party of Labor accepts as a watchword, as a direction which had value for it. ...

That such assurances were necessary can be seen in the Cuban-Italian communique repeating of Berlinguer's March formulations about

... new forms of unity, solidarity, and cooperation for the whole world revolutionary and working-class movement, based on equality, independence of judgment and respect for the norms that should regulate relations between all the Marxist-Leninist parties. ...


Peking, to whom any opposition to a Soviet-staged conference was welcome, could only be triumphant. Moscow, on the other hand, was showing signs of resuming anti-Chinese polemics and, perhaps, of once again attempting to rally support against Peking. But if Khrushchev could not get rid of the spirits of disunity he had summoned up, how, after their March 1965 Moscow fiasco, could Brezhnev and Kosygin?