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SUMMARY REPORT

SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT



CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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The Decade Under Khrushchev 1954-1964

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Preface

The study whose findings are summarized here has had as its object to analyze in depth the chief factors, both internal and external, that go into the formulation of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy for several recent periods of both high and low apparent Soviet interest in arms control. The governing purpose has been to see if it is possible to discern in more general terms the configurations of factors related to Soviet interest in certain forms of limitations on the arms race.

We have thus examined continuity and change in the strategic-military situation, the external political conditions, and in the economic and the internal political situations in the decade under Khrushchev, beginning in 1954-1956 with the first signs of what proved to be a significant shift in Soviet policy; following the evolution of the patterns and factors that had emerged from 1957 through late 1962; and ending by focusing on the manner in which these elements came together in 1963-64 to produce some East-West arrangements on arms control.

In the study we have, first, outlined briefly the manifest expressions of arms control policy in the form of negotiations and propaganda, without either accepting or rejecting the face value of these expressions; second, we have sought to look beneath surface policy to analyze the key relevant contextual factors; third, certain limited conclusions have been drawn for each of the three periods; and fourth, we have attempted to pull together at the end our findings and conclusions. The latter are summarized in the pages that follow.

A number of individuals contributed to this study. Working on it full-time during the whole period of research were Walter C. Clemens, Jr. and Franklyn Griffiths; contributing on a part-time basis were Fritz Ermarth, John Hoagland, Peter Kenez, Paul Marantz, and Joseph L. Noguee. Occasional consultants were Franklyn D. Holzman, Herbert Levine, and Marshall Shulman.

The division of labor in the research phase was as follows: Walter Clemens focused on the negotiations and external political aspects and also supervised research assistance; Franklyn Griffiths concentrated on the propaganda and political uses of disarmament, and internal Soviet politics. Fritz Ermarth contributed the economic inputs, John Hoagland the military-strategic data, and Joseph Noguee the negotiating history for the 1962-1964 period.

When it came to drafting chapters of the report itself Clemens prepared the initial version of Chapter III and Griffiths Chapter IV and both contributed to Chapters II and V. The undersigned served as overall supervisor and editor and drafted certain sections of the report. Indispensable substantive and intellectual contributions were made at all stages of the study by Donald L. M. Blackmer, Morton Gorden, and Alexander Korol, and the editing process was generously assisted under acute pressures of time by Jean Clark. Judith Tipton and Lisa Walford helpfully assisted with the typing, production, and administration.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. The Decade in Retrospect

The whole tone of Soviet policy toward arms control and disarmament shifted in 1954-1956 along with the rest of Soviet foreign policy. The move was away from heavy-handed "exposure" tactics of the Stalin era to the cultivation of a "reasonable" and conciliatory appearance in the style and substance of Soviet disarmament proposals and propaganda; toward accommodation with Western positions and the adoption of partial-measures approaches instead of the "ban the bomb" slogans of the late-Stalin period.

At a minimum it appeared that the shift in arms control policy was aimed at undermining the West's will and ability to maintain its defenses. But the increased feasibility and realism in Soviet policy suggested there might also be a qualified but growing Soviet interest in enacting certain measures that might reduce the danger of surprise attack, impede German rearmament, and freeze research and development of nuclear weapons at a moment favorable to the Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1960, even after the world began to talk of a "missile gap" in Moscow's favor, the manifest Soviet interest in various partial measures, particularly a cessation or ban on nuclear testing, continued.

1955 was a time when multiple opportunities seemed to be opening up for influencing events to conform to the revised desires and expectations of Soviet leaders. But even by 1956 the limits to their prospects were beginning to appear. By 1959 a sense of reality was returning and, as the decade matured, a protracted morning-after set in. 1955 may have marked a sharp decline in the paranoia so long characteristic of the Soviet outlook; but it left a dualism in that outlook that bordered on the schizoid.

The reasons were several. One was that by the very nature of the situation the desires and expectations of the Soviet leaders were essentially contradictory, and each had the effect of setting in action a countervailing force. Even in inner Soviet reasoning one senses internal tensions. For every reasonable measure of agreement with the adversary to warm up the atmosphere, save money, or forfend the threat of later annihilation there was always a new argument against appearing weak, or a danger on a new flank, a new difficulty raised by the enemy, or a new temptation to exploit.

From 1954 to 1961 the Soviet Union thus endeavored to relax tensions with the West even while seeking to bury it by economic and political competition. It tried to keep China within the Soviet

fold even while refusing it nuclear weapons and on occasion restraining Peking's military and foreign policy. It endeavored to avoid a showdown with either Washington or Peking while maintaining and increasing Soviet influence to the east and to the west and to the south as well. Détente with the West was the logical policy expression of the renewed "peaceful coexistence" doctrine, implying "struggle" short of major war while the zone of Communist influence expanded. But détente contributed to erosion of the leading strings from Moscow to the satellite capitals both in the east and west. Agreements that controlled China's force levels or inhibited its capacity to test nuclear weapons were desirable from the standpoint of Russian national security; but disarmament propaganda had the effect of further alienating an increasingly militant Peking.

If in 1955 détente was paramount, the opening opportunity to leapfrog the northern tier of U.S. treaty states and penetrate into the African vacuum at the same point in time was close to being paramount. If in 1959 and 1960 the spirit of Camp David and the GCD line were highly functional to Soviet strategy, the chance to consolidate a new client state 90 miles off the coast of Florida was too good to miss. If in 1961 Moscow's touted missile lead proved to be by and large non-existent, nevertheless the exigencies of keeping East Germany in camp required the most serious risks to be run in Berlin that year.

Arms control policy had a greater or lesser role to play in all these operations, either neutralizing forces inimical to Moscow or in cultivating sentiment favorable to the Soviet Government. Indeed, disarmament in some form may have been the logical policy expression of the new appreciation of the non-utility of general nuclear war. But it ran afoul of accumulated suspicion of the West, the tempting political uses of the threat of force, the powerful military factions in the Soviet Union, and the extraordinary functional difficulty in arriving at formulas that satisfied both the Western need for reassurance and the Soviet wish for secrecy. If in 1962 the more sophisticated Soviet leaders had marked, absorbed, and digested the contemporary American school of strategy featuring minimum deterrence and the arms control doctrine, the chance to drastically revise the strategic equation with an end-run via Cuba proved too tempting.

But the narrowing of alternatives open to the Soviets was not just a product of their own schizoid view of things. From 1956 to 1961 the bases of Soviet optimism were undermined one after another by events not of their own immediate making. First, the Polish uprisings and then the Hungarian revolution of 1956 shook the foundations both of the empire gathered by Stalin and of Moscow's leadership in international communism. Following these shocks came a more

profound threat--ideological, political, and even military--from Peking, creating for Moscow even as early as 1957 the classic spectre of a two-front struggle. The Western front was proving unyielding in the face of Soviet pressure on Berlin, and the military and economic power of the West during the rest of the 1950's grew stronger and more integrated despite the autonomous course steered by Paris after 1958.

Undoubtedly Moscow marked well the new and potentially disastrous political fissures opening in NATO as the 60's began. But the overriding reality was that by 1960 Washington was about to reverse such missile gap as there may have been and this at a time when a downturn in the Soviet economy made the relative weight of military expenditures more onerous. Finally, the attempted leap into the "third world" had reaped little fruit: the emerging nations appeared as little susceptible to Soviet as to Western influence. As for arms control and disarmament, failure of the 1955 approach, Western disinterest in disengagement, and the start of the ICBM and space races all reinforced the growing sense of the unreality of the debate, culminating in Khrushchev's 1959-1960 initiative in proposing sweeping general disarmament. The 1958 technical talks and the moratorium on testing seemed vastly overshadowed.

By 1961 and 1962 the Soviet Government thus seemed to be faced with some new choices to make. Given its narrowing alternatives, what policy course could it realistically pursue? Could it seek accommodation with both Peking and the West? Should it concentrate on internal or external development? And what arms control measures, if any, remained relevant to its still-changing strategic and political circumstances? The 1961 joint principles statement represented surprising consensus. But other pressures within the Kremlin seemed to militate for short-cuts to redressing the strategic balance vis-à-vis the West, first by the testing of a 61-megaton bomb in 1961 and then by the Cuban missile gamble in 1962. It must have seemed that only from a position of power would the problems on both eastern and western fronts prove more amenable to solution on Soviet terms. While Soviet diplomacy stalled for time, Moscow's apparent interest in partial disarmament measures seemed to decline as the Kremlin increasingly returned to the propaganda of general and complete disarmament.

The failure of the 1962 Cuban venture to yield an improved bargaining position for the Soviets again narrowed the alternatives but this time seemed to indicate with new clarity the desirability of at least a temporary accommodation with the West. This option was made the more feasible by Washington's apparent willingness to forego a more aggressive strategy designed to exploit the Soviet

retreat; by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations; and by the economic difficulties that pressed hard on Russia in 1963.

In 1963 many of the essential conditions for serious Soviet interest in arms control agreements in fact came together. Moscow possessed a minimum deterrent braced with some 50-megaton bombs, but had no prospect of attaining superiority over the United States. Washington indicated its willingness to collaborate with Moscow to keep the peace and control the arms race. No rapprochement seemed possible with China. A success for "peaceful coexistence" could help Khrushchev internally. Economic incentives were strong to lower defense spending by such moves as a ban on nuclear testing, keeping the arms race from outer space, and slowing the production of fissionable materials.

The Khrushchev decade had begun with Moscow confident that it was riding a tide of history and would soon vanquish capitalism in political and economic competition. It ended with Moscow apparently pleased just to stabilize the military-political situation with the West and cut losses within the international Communist movement, accepting, at least up to Khrushchev's removal, the consequences of the defection of China.

B. Soviet Interests in Arms Control

The basic framework of our study has been an analysis in depth of four underlying factors for the Khrushchev decade. Although we have treated them in similar fashion, and even have ventured to rank-order them in accordance with our estimate of their relative saliency as determinants of Soviet interests in arms control, the first three factors--military, external political and economic--represent both objective situations with which Soviet leaders must deal and policy goals for which arms controls might be instrumental or functional as appropriate means. This pertains particularly clearly to the first and second factors.

The fourth factor is of a different order. Soviet leadership has in the past decade demonstrably not been monolithic in its view of things, and we believe that the manner in which contending Soviet elites perceived the world situation and attempted to act upon it on occasion exerted a strong influence upon the specific arms control policies followed.

1. The Strategic Situation

Of the four factors we have studied, the military-strategic factor best accounts for both the stability and the fluctuations in

Soviet policy towards arms control. Moscow's deep concern to avoid central war and its acquisition of a credible minimum deterrent generally account for the fixed elements among Soviet interests and policies on arms control, while the changing balance between Soviet and U.S. strategic forces appears to have been the key factor in inducing the shifts in Soviet arms control policies throughout the decade. The factors of the kind the Soviets like to call "permanently operating" shaped Moscow's evaluation of the changing military balance.

a. The Disutility of War. The first of these two factors to become constants in the Kremlin's outlook was the belated recognition in 1954-1956, in Soviet military thought, of the decisive role that surprise nuclear attack could play in modern war. Despite occasional bravura assertions that only capitalism would perish in a nuclear exchange, Soviet political thinking also acknowledged an awareness that central war under modern conditions would destroy Communist as well as capitalist society. Since a nuclear first-strike could be decisive to the whole course of the war and not just to a single operation, it behooved Kremlin policy to make greater efforts to control the military-political environment so that the West did not attack the Soviet Union on grounds either that it was weak or that it was soon to overtake and bury the capitalist system. It therefore served Soviet interests to pursue a political-military line that both lowered manifest danger to the West and raised the threat of crushing retribution. The first aim could be partially effected by a reasonable posture in arms control negotiations, while the second led Moscow to maintain an impressive military machine, which the Kremlin warned could pre-empt Western plans for aggression.

As for limited war, the Soviet government appeared genuinely concerned that such a war might escalate or that another power such as Germany or China might by catalytic action involve the great powers in a direct confrontation. It thus may not have wished to give carte blanche in the Formosa Strait, and declared Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1959. Such concerns seem in part to have underlain a whole series of Soviet arms control proposals, from ground control posts to symbolic acts such as a nonaggression pact or a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In part but not entirely for propaganda purposes, Soviet theory also belittled the chances of containing a war fought with "tactical" nuclear weapons. (The political motivations for all these moves are discussed below).

Throughout the decade Soviet policy makers generally sought to avoid or at least keep under control conflicts that could lead to war. Soviet interests were to be promoted primarily by

political and economic competition, thereby making a virtue of the necessity of avoiding war. While Moscow occasionally showed its big stick, it tended to speak softly. At times the Kremlin dealt out threats and ultimata, but only in Berlin and Cuba in 1961 and 1962 did Moscow approach the brink--and then only when desperate to redress its diminishing bargaining power, and in the process evidently making a serious miscalculation of the probable U.S. response under President Kennedy. In order to avoid great power confrontations Moscow tended to limit its actual support to national liberation movements far below the level suggested by its propaganda. The objective of controlling East-West tensions to avoid war was served generally by the very existence of arms control negotiations. More specifically, it was served by cultivating personal contacts with Western leaders and--eventually--by a direct communications link with Washington.

b. Mutual Deterrence. A second "permanently operating" factor in Moscow's strategic outlook was the confidence that the Soviet state, for the first time since 1917, possessed the means decisively to deter attack upon it. The potential destruction that could be wrought by surprise nuclear attack had changed the "laws of war," but the equally striking fact was that in 1953-1955 the Soviet Union developed hydrogen as well as nuclear bombs plus the means to deliver them to Europe, to SAC bases around Russia, and--at least on one-way missions--to the United States itself. Throughout the decade the actual number of U.S. bombers and ICBM's capable of striking the Soviet Union far outnumbered the Russian strategic delivery vehicles that could reach the United States, but the Soviet government possessed a credible minimum deterrent from about 1954, the magnitude of which was vastly exaggerated in the Western and Soviet press at least until 1961. Further, a very large number of Soviet medium-range bombers and later, missiles held Western Europe hostage. Not by accident the concept "deterrence" is rendered in Russian as "terrorization". Soviet confidence that the West did not plan or want war was reinforced by personal contacts with Western leaders and visits to Western countries.

Feeling relatively secure against calculated attack by a nuclear power, and basking in the bright haze of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" legends, the Soviet government shed much of the paranoia of Stalinist times. At the least Moscow's new deterrent allayed long-standing fears arising from Russian vulnerability. But it also raised Moscow's political strategy to a new level of importance because there was now a diminished belief that the West would respond to Moscow's political-economic offensive by military intervention--at least not by attack upon Soviet territory.

Depending on how "minimum" the Soviet deterrent appeared to the West, the Kremlin could also press for political concessions. Furthermore in disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union could consider dispensing with arms--present or potential--not considered essential to preserve the Soviet minimum deterrent, provided of course that the West reciprocated or had already eliminated such equipment. Moscow could now approach the negotiations with a quid pro quo to match Western concessions, in contrast to the wholly negative Soviet stance when confronted with the Baruch Plan in 1946. Finally, Moscow's realization that both sides acknowledged an effective balance of terror helped Khrushchev to revise Lenin's 1916 dictum that disarmament was neither possible nor desirable so long as capitalism endured; peaceful coexistence was now dictated by "life itself."

c. The Strategic Balance. Interacting with the Kremlin's acknowledgment of mutual deterrence in East-West relations, the changing nature of the military balance precipitated certain specific Soviet interests in achieving some concrete forms of arms control. We judge that the Kremlin's interest in achieving such measures was relatively high from 1955 to 1960, low from 1960 to 1962, and highest in 1962-1964. In the first period the seemingly high Soviet interest in arms control appears to have been based upon an expectation of significant improved relative strength and the bargaining power this would carry with it vis-à-vis the West. The low point occurred when Moscow's military and political advantages were being rapidly undermined and the Kremlin leadership sought by desperate measures to regain them. But when after the Cuban debacle Moscow had resigned itself for the time being to reliance on a minimum deterrent much smaller than U.S. strategic might, the Soviet interest in arms control measures reached a high point in the decade under study.

Closer analysis of this pattern reveals more concretely the strategic rationale behind Soviet interests at different times. From 1954 to 1960 Soviet strategic expectations were high, even though the United States far outnumbered the Soviet Union in strategic delivery vehicles--mainly bombers. It appears that for a time in late 1959 and early 1960 Moscow may have had a slight lead in the number of ICBM's on launchers. In any event the Soviet Union was far ahead of the United States from 1957 through 1964 in the development of powerful boosters capable of shooting large payloads into space. The Kremlin obviously intended to exploit this situation in political bargaining; but Soviet interest was also evidenced in advocacy of the kinds of arms controls its diplomacy championed from 1955 to 1960--re-

ductions of conventional forces and a nuclear test ban. Given secondary attention but nonetheless reflective of strategic interests were measures regarding bases and calling for disengagement in Central Europe.

The first step in implementing that strategic interest was reduction in conventional forces. A large infantry was no longer necessary to hold Europe hostage, and Soviet armed forces were unilaterally cut from over 5 million to just over 3 million men from 1955 to 1961. The Soviet bases in Austria, Porkkala-Udd, and Port Arthur were eliminated in 1955. By 1960 Khrushchev went further: he talked of the obsolescence of surface naval vessels and bombers as well as of large ground forces and pointed to the economies their reduction would allow while at the same time Soviet fire-power actually increased due to nuclear technology. Soviet official statements in 1956 and 1960 also noted the economy's need for the manpower resources resulting from demobilization. In 1960 a fifth branch of the armed forces was formed--the Strategic Rocket Forces. Khrushchev's "atomic fetishism," as the Chinese called it, was only partially checked by the influence of more conservative marshals who insisted that "balanced" forces be maintained, armed of course with the latest weapons.

From 1955 to 1960 Moscow often called on the West to reciprocate in the reduction of armed forces (and the elimination of foreign bases), and Soviet disarmament proposals stressed such measures. The point most stressed by Soviet propaganda about Moscow's May 10, 1955 proposal was its endorsement of Western-proposed force levels of 1 to 1.5 million men for the United States, Soviet Union, and China. Such a measure would have forced greater reductions upon Moscow than upon Washington, but it would have effectively forced U.S. troops to withdraw to a "Fortress America" by the end of 1957. (Complete nuclear disarmament was to begin in mid-1957 and be completed at the end of the year.)

In the same vein, perhaps because of Moscow's imminent space triumphs, the Soviet proposals of March 27, 1956 dealt exclusively with conventional force reductions, plus the banning of hydrogen bomb tests (just before London planned its first tests) and the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Beginning at the 1955 Summit Conference Moscow also espoused a ceiling of 200,000 men for states other than the big five--a move clearly aimed at thwarting plans for a German Bundeswehr of 500,000 men.

The second principal arms control measure flowing directly from Soviet strategic interests was to halt nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons. By the time Moscow completed its March 1958 test series the Kremlin seems to have concluded that a

moratorium on further testing would help to keep what it considered to be its lead in strategic rocketry and prevent refinement of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Since the Soviet Union could shoot larger payloads into space, Moscow was concerned to prevent war-head miniaturization by the United States. A test cessation would also slow the development of small, "clean," mobile bombs for use in limited war. So long as this strategic situation prevailed it was in Moscow's interest to accept a test ban that had these desired effects provided excessive international inspection on Soviet territory were not required.

As to the third set of measures reflecting strategic interests, Moscow endeavored also to keep U.S. weapons from being stationed in other countries and to prevent nuclear proliferation, especially to Germany and China. In 1955 and 1956, while SAC bases were still a vivid threat to Soviet security, Moscow advocated control posts in air fields and other designated locations, but--in this pre-Sputnik period--said nothing about missile launchers. And the Soviet concern to reduce the general danger of war, economize on conventional forces, drive the United States out of Europe, prevent German rearmament, and capitalize on Soviet medium-range and long-range rockets was reflected by Moscow's almost constant advocacy of disengagement and the denuclearization of Central Europe together with inspection and ground control posts.

The threat posed by China to Soviet strategic interests seems to have been of special concern to Moscow. In the short run China might involve Russia in a war with the West or, at the least, undermine Soviet efforts for détente, as in 1958-1959. In the long run there was the possibility of territorial disputes and, more important, the prospect of great conventional and nuclear Chinese military power. Moscow tried to keep Peking militarily dependent upon a Soviet nuclear shield based in the Soviet Union and from 1957 to 1959 placated Chinese nuclear aspirations by some kinds of long-term aid in developing a new defense technology.

In June 1959, according to Chinese sources, Moscow flatly refused to provide a sample atomic bomb or technical data required to produce one. Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Moscow's espousal of peaceful coexistence as the highest form of international class struggle were both aimed in part, although with little prospect of success, at inhibiting China's military pretensions. (There is reason to speculate, but as yet no firm evidence that--as charged by Peking--Khrushchev may have sought in 1962 or 1963 to impose with the West a nonproliferation agreement upon China.) France's acquisition of a nuclear capability seemed less threatening and more inevitable, but Moscow did what it could to promote nuclear-free zones where France planned to test.

By 1961 most of the bases for the optimistic calculations that underlay the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1955 had been undermined or proved illusory. The salient strategic factor was that while Moscow still possessed a credible minimum deterrent, its political bargaining position was seriously eroded by a sharp and mounting U.S. lead in the production of ICBM's, a lead that was publicized as establishing a real missile gap but this time in Russia's disfavor. The Soviet response could have been to negotiate more earnestly on arms control in order to check the U.S. lead; but Moscow opted instead to kill the test ban talks by trying to link them with GCD, and to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. If the Soviet Union could not produce more missiles than the United States, it chose to test larger warheads than Washington considered a sound military investment. Regardless of military utility, the up to 61-megaton tests were fully exploited by Moscow to terrorize public opinion and in this way to add to the power base on which Soviet diplomacy rested.

After Moscow's tests had been completed, a year of drift and ambivalence in Soviet foreign policy ensued, a year in which the Kremlin appeared unsure whether to strive again for a bold move to enhance its power position or for some accommodation with the West including agreements on arms control. Apparently content with the results of its own nuclear tests, the Kremlin moved in November 1961 and again in September 1962 to ban all nuclear tests with at least a moratorium on underground testing. But Moscow was willing to pay little for such a ban and rejected the principle of even limited on-site inspection until the winter of 1962. The lack of commitment to immediately feasible partial measures was manifested by Moscow's emphasis on GCD in the Eighteen Nation talks in 1962. The Soviet GCD program, however, was made increasingly realistic by a number of modifications, notably Gromyko's endorsement in September 1962 of the principle of retaining nuclear weapons in the disarming process.

But while Soviet disarmament policy stalled for time, the strategic imbalance tilted still more to Russia's disfavor, and the Kremlin decided on another bold move to improve its psychological and strategic position against the West: the emplacement of missiles in Cuba, which ended in humiliating retreat.

The point of maximum arms control activity came after Cuba. The limited arms control agreements of 1963-1964--the hot line, the partial test ban, the ban on bombs in orbit, the pledge to slow fissionable material production--followed the Soviet failure dramatically to modify the strategic equation via the Caribbean, and all reflected a desire to freeze or at least slow down a race in armaments in which the West was rapidly outpacing the Soviet Union.

The hot line may in part have reflected Moscow's desire to reduce the danger of inadvertent war. Soviet leaders declared that if either side were to benefit from the test ban it would be the Soviet Union since it held the lead in testing huge warheads. Although the Soviet Union could not presently hope to match the United States in ICBM's, to freeze the number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side as Washington proposed early in 1964 would rule out all prospect of parity. What the Soviet Union could accept would be a reduction of forces on both sides toward a common level--the idea of a nuclear umbrella, which Moscow agreed in September 1963 be maintained until the very end of the process of general and complete disarmament. The idea of relying upon a minimum deterrent of the same size as Washington's had become increasingly attractive for Moscow in a world where the United States outproduced the Soviet Union and where Peking and the NATO allies threatened to obtain nuclear forces of their own. However, the interests of both sides would probably require that a minimum nuclear deterrent possessed by Moscow and Washington be accompanied by a nonproliferation agreement accepted by or imposed on the rest of the world.

Because of Moscow's interest in avoiding war and its confidence--- at least in 1955-1959---in a "peaceful victory for communism," there may have been more than propaganda in its espousal of general and complete disarmament. In theory disarmament was an appropriate adjunct to the pursuit of the "peaceful offensive" under the changed "objective conditions." However, if implemented it would have deprived the Soviet Union of the extraordinary bargaining power it obtained from the political uses of nuclear weapons through threats, deterrence, and implied actions. Moreover serious disarmament might have had the effect of vitiating Communist élan in many countries.

In any case, there is little evidence that Moscow has regarded GCD as a feasible program actually to carry out in the foreseeable future. All that can be said about it is that with a nuclear umbrella sustained throughout the process some version of GCD, no matter how utopian it seems today, is no longer unthinkable in terms of Soviet security interests.

The major limitations to Soviet interest in arms control were, like the inducements, also military in nature. As long as Moscow enjoyed a lead in the research and development of rockets, the Soviet Union wanted to keep both its strengths and weaknesses veiled by military secrecy. Therefore it rejected aerial inspection except with heavy qualifications and turned down any

other form of "inspection over armaments." Further, Soviet production of fissionable materials was behind that of the United States, and Moscow refused to tie a test ban to a nuclear production cut-off; only by 1964 was Moscow apparently ready to announce a slow-down in the production of fissionable materials.

2. External Political Perspectives

The opportunities and constraints which the Soviet leaders perceived as they looked to the east, to the west, and to the south, exerted a powerful influence on their evaluation of both the military and the political uses of the disarmament issue. The Kremlin's perception of the political environment provided above all the basic sense of the possible and the desirable that gave direct guidance to Soviet arms control policy.

The roles that policy toward Western, Communist, and non-aligned states played in the shaping of Soviet arms control interests cannot be directly compared with each other since the arms control problem arose primarily in relations with the West. However, because the Soviet Union was engaged in a two-front campaign and was facing tremendous political and even military challenges from Peking, an opportunity or difficulty on the Western front became doubly significant. The role of the southern front--the "third world" --was marginal but cannot be ignored.

a. The View to the West. A profound change took place in the Kremlin's political perspective in 1954-1956 that conditioned Soviet interests in arms control throughout the remainder of the Khrushchev decade. Soviet policy toward the West from 1954 to 1964 thus endeavored to avoid the mistakes of Stalin's hard line and to capitalize on the opportunities it had previously underrated. Since the West's political and military unity (including German participation in NATO and the WEU) had been spurred by an apparent threat from Moscow, the Kremlin now sought generally to reverse this trend by lowering the threat and stressing the advantages of accommodation with the new Soviet line. Whereas Stalin's policies often tended to treat the Western elites as a homogeneous antagonist, the Khrushchev regime recognized diversity within and between the NATO governments and sought to cultivate and exploit these differences, using as a key instrument a more reasonable stance on arms control and disarmament.

A central Soviet objective in arms control policy was to strengthen moderate, "sober" forces in the West who could move their governments away from an arms build-up and a forward strategy and toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Disarmament propaganda, concessions, and eventually agreements were used instrumentally to isolate the "hards" and strengthen the "softs" in the West, particularly in the United States. Such measures were also used to create propaganda that would put pressure on U.S. overseas base policy, U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, German rearmament, and other aspects of Western military planning. Proposals for disengagement helped to foster anti-German sentiment in Britain and France. Advocacy of a nuclear test ban helped to stir differences between Washington and London on the one hand and Paris on the other because of the latter's lag in nuclear testing. Working in the opposite direction, Moscow's proposal in June 1960 to abolish all nuclear delivery systems in the first stage of GCD was evidently calculated to be welcome in Paris but not in London or Washington, thereby increasing friction among them.

Khrushchev staked much of his entire foreign policy upon the calculation that "moderates" existed in the West and that their hand could be strengthened; this premise had to be defended against critics in Moscow as well as in Peking. Khrushchev may have been chastened several times in the decade by the apparent stiffening of Western policy (as in late 1955, mid-1960, and 1961), but he seemed to assume that a more moderate orientation would eventually prevail.

The "permanently operating factor" in Moscow's view of the external political situation since 1955 has, we believe, been the premise that some kind of accommodation with moderate forces in the West is both desirable and possible. From 1955 to about 1960 this orientation was qualified by the Kremlin's belief that the influence of international communism, guided by the socialist fatherland, would gradually expand while the sphere of capitalism contracted. As Peking posed a more intense threat from 1959 to 1962 and as the "third world" showed by 1961 its resistance to Soviet penetration, the narrowing of alternatives and the impact of reality intensified for Soviet decision-makers. First in theory, after 1959, and then also in practice, after the abortive quick-fix attempt in Cuba, Moscow's interest in working with moderate forces in the West took on an aspect of collaboration as well as struggle, increasing rather than restraining the Soviet interest in partial measures of arms control and arrangements to preserve peace and the political status quo.

b. The View to the East. Whereas there was diversity in the West that could be subject to Soviet political manipulation, Peking presented to Soviet policy a more monolithic front which generally opposed Khrushchev's efforts toward peaceful coexistence and arms control agreements with the West. That opposition ran squarely

athwart Moscow's potent interest in maximizing its position of leadership in the international Communist movement, initially by keeping China within the Soviet camp and, as this failed, in keeping ahead of Peking both in the international Communist movement and in influencing the "gray zones." A third set of Soviet interests derived from the military desideratum of preventing Chinese moves that could involve Russia in a war, which in turn involved keeping China from acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly, depending on the priority accorded to one or another of these basic interests, the effect of China could be either to restrain or accelerate Moscow's posture of accommodation with the West.

Moscow at first, from 1956 to 1959, endeavored to mollify Peking's political and military aspirations by adding tough phrases to Communist pronouncements on East-West relations and by offering some assistance in developing nuclear strength. No doubt many Soviet party and military officials found their own reasons to oppose détente and arms control reinforced by the realization that such an orientation was alienating Peking. Even after 1959 a faint hope of rapprochement with the world's most populous nation may have exerted some drag on Soviet policy, if only because it added to other conservative pressures for restraint in moving toward coexistence.

The net result of China's military and political threat was, however, in effect to push Moscow steadily westward, to increase its interest in arriving at a test ban and other agreements to impede proliferation, and to defend in ever stronger terms the thesis that "a world without arms is a world without war." By mid-1959 the die was cast as Moscow tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to China and to rebut forcefully its ideological critique. Even after the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit debacle in 1960 Moscow gave no quarter to Chinese orthodoxy. At Bucharest in June and in Moscow later on in the year Khrushchev assailed dogmatic insistence that imperialism remained unchanged. The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1962 and the evident abandonment of Soviet hopes of mending the breach probably helped remove the last inhibitions in Moscow to moves toward détente and arms control with the West. The 1963 "Treaty of Moscow" was then used against Peking--even in propaganda to the "third world"--likening the Chinese opponents of the test ban to "madmen" such as Goldwater and Adenauer.

Just as Moscow seemed willing to sacrifice political interests in relations with China in order to pursue détente--and appropriate arms control agreements--with the West, so the Kremlin may have even been willing to risk the probable loss of considerable political control in Eastern Europe in exchange for the high-priority strategic

desideratum of neutralizing Germany. But even here there were potential political payoffs. An incidental benefit of favoring German neutralization was its popularity in Eastern Europe. Rapacki's proposals, for example, gave a semblance of autonomy to Polish foreign policy, and their rejection by the West deepened Eastern Europe's sense of dependence upon the Soviet Union. Even more important, the Soviet campaign for disarmament probably won some favor for Moscow among the war-weary peoples of Eastern Europe.

c. The View to the South. The influence of the "third world" upon Soviet arms control policies was also quite marginal and indirect during the decade. Virtually no Soviet security interests have been at stake in these areas, except perhaps that of complicating the maintenance of Western bases or the carrying out of French nuclear testing. The major relationship of this zone to Soviet arms control interest emerged in 1954-1955 when Moscow decided that opportunities for penetration in Africa and Asia could fruitfully be exploited to accelerate the departure of Western colonialism and to win a foothold for communism. The Soviet decision to move into this "gray zone," partly by arms shipments but mainly by political and economic means, increased the importance of desensitizing the West by a conciliatory disarmament posture. The object of winning favor for Soviet policy added to Moscow's reasons for posing as the champion of a test ban, a nuclear-free Africa, the liquidation of Western bases, and the supporter of national independence, (although in 1961 the Soviet government ignored the sentiments of the non-aligned nations meeting at Belgrade and the U.N. resolution appealing to Moscow not to test its giant bombs).

Since 1961 the task of Soviet propaganda has been to persuade the nonaligned nations that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence is more in their interest than either the bellicose ways favored by Peking, or Western "neo-colonialism." To strengthen its revolutionary image the Soviet Union continues to qualify its support for a warless world and the renunciation of force by insisting on the unavailability and justness of wars of national liberation. In practice, however, Moscow has sought to impose a broad-front policy on the Communist parties in the "third world," and has shown some restraint even in exploiting unstable situations in the new states as in the Congo in 1960-1961 and Laos in 1961-1962. All of this feeds back to the image Moscow wishes to convey to the West, and specifically to the possibility of continued arms control agreements.

3. The Economic Factor

Our analysis of the decade corroborates the supposition that a powerful centralized government would probably never allow internal economic pressures to dissuade it from policies considered essential to state security. The interaction of economic incentives to seek a reduction of defense expenditures and Soviet policies on arms control demonstrates that such incentives could have an impact on Moscow's negotiating posture only at a time when the Kremlin felt secure from imminent external attack or at a time when it had no prospect of a significant strategic gain from greater investments in defense.

The "economic burden of defense" as defined in the report does not appear in 1954-1956 to have been a strong force motivating the Kremlin to seek a reduction of defense expenditures. Moscow's general sense that it could triumph in economic competition with the West was, however, an important premise of the softer turn in Soviet foreign policy generally, one which tended to persist even after the optimistic expectations underlying it had cause to falter.

Some economic incentives to reduce military spending existed even in 1955-1958, when Soviet economic growth was continuing at a high rate. Moscow was confronted with a number of scarcities in agriculture, housing, light industry, and in manpower, which could be alleviated by the transfer of human and material resources from defense. These economic factors helped to reinforce Moscow's military interests in reduction of conventional ground forces and the limitation of nuclear testing. More important, an atmosphere of East-West détente was absolutely essential if Soviet military posture were to rely upon a minimum deterrent of prototype bombers and first-generation missiles instead of striving immediately to mass-produce these weapons.

From 1958 to 1961 the economic incentives to cut defense spending increased as the Soviet economy's overall growth rate became slower at a time when the investment required for military and space technological development was soaring. The party's pronouncements in 1959 that Soviet production would soon overtake that of the United States in many areas added to the pressures to keep economic growth at a high rate. By 1961, however, it appeared that Russia's efforts to overtake the United States militarily as well as economically had landed the Soviet Union on a treadmill; the chances for keeping up with, much less surpassing, the West seemed dim indeed. The United States was producing large numbers of ICBM's and other advanced equipment,

and the European economies showed strong prospects of integration and dynamic growth that contrasted sharply with the situation in the Comecon countries.

By 1961 therefore Moscow had even stronger economic as well as military reasons to seek a stabilization of the arms race; but it was precisely in 1961 and 1962 that the Soviet government increased its military spending, raised food prices, and took a more intransigent stand on arms control negotiations. This seems powerful evidence that economic incentives by themselves could not be decisive in shaping Soviet foreign and arms control policy.

On the other hand, in 1963, when the strategic situation seemed neither so threatening nor so promising as before Cuba, the same economic reasons to reduce or stabilize defense spending could reinforce the weight of the military and political factors in favor of limited arms control agreements with the West. An end to nuclear testing, a promise to keep bombs out of orbit, and a slow-down of fissionable material production could all ease the drag that defense--along with other economic problems--exerted upon Soviet growth. Two additional political and economic goals could also be served by the limited agreements of 1963-1964. First, if a lengthy détente made it possible gradually to lower the Soviet military budget, Moscow might be able to accelerate its economic growth, strengthen its claim to be a model of scientific socialism, and enhance its ability to influence the developing nations. An upturn in Soviet growth would also mean a stronger capacity for an intensified defense effort after the breathing space was over. Second, the goal of greater growth and prosperity could also be served by the long-term trade credits from the West which Moscow might hope to obtain in the improved political climate that followed the arms controls of 1963-1964.

Whether the Soviet economy would soon become stronger and, if so, whether this strength would again be intensively applied to surpassing the West militarily would of course depend upon many variables, including the manner in which a new generation of Soviet leaders assessed their problems to both east and west. But other measures of arms control might be influenced by the economic factor. Moscow has indicated an interest in some formal undertaking to reduce military budgets. And the time may have been developing for some understanding between Moscow and Washington not to intensify the arms race by efforts to build anti-missile defense systems.

4. Internal Political Factors

Our knowledge about the internal workings of Soviet policy is limited like that of the shadow-watcher in Plato's cave. But the available evidence suggests that domestic political factors have been an important conditioner of Soviet interests and policies in arms control. The way in which the men in the Kremlin perceived arms controls was of course the primary determinant of policy that might be adopted, and if the leadership were divided in its assessment or under conflicting demands from the pressure of other goals, powerful limitations would be set up. Furthermore the peace and disarmament issues became entangled on occasion in the political in-fighting within the Kremlin itself, serving as weapons in the internal power struggle.

Nikita Khrushchev's own perception of the world must have been shared by many of his colleagues since his power was by no means so unlimited as Stalin's. The main opposition to a policy favoring détente and arms control probably came from certain military and party leaders and possibly managers in defense production and heavy industry. Khrushchev's critics saw in his policies threats to various of their interests, or in any event used as a basis of their criticisms the alleged or threatened inroads in defense spending, the preservation of military and economic secrecy, defense against foreign intrusion, or the avoidance of debilitating effects of prolonged détente on the international movement. The loosening of Soviet influence upon China and Eastern Europe as a result of détente with the West would also concern these groups.

The fact that Khrushchev was almost ousted in 1957 and was in fact removed in 1964 offers the most concrete demonstration that his power was not absolute and confirms that the reduction of Soviet armed forces begun in 1960 and Khrushchev's radical advocacy of reliance on nuclear-rocket forces was opposed by many military leaders. There were some countervailing internal forces, but they were less coherent. Certain pressures arose out of Soviet society for a relaxation of international and internal tensions and for peace and prosperity, desires that gained momentum with de-Stalinization and were articulated increasingly by Soviet writers and some scientists.

There is evidence that the peace and disarmament issue was used in power struggles within the Kremlin, most clearly in 1955, in 1957, and perhaps in 1962-1964. Thus Khrushchev gained power in 1954 by accusing Malenkov of shortcutting defense requirements but then used the issue of détente to isolate Molotov after Malenkov

was removed. This power-play coincided with a hard Soviet line on disarmament from September 1954 to February 1955 while Malenkov's star was falling and Molotov's rising, and with renewed concessions in the negotiations from March to May 1955 as Khrushchev edged out his second rival. Again in 1957 Khrushchev accused his heterogeneous opposition in the "antiparty group" of opposing "peaceful coexistence."

It is likely that internal power struggles induced some of the sharp zigs and zags in Soviet arms control policy in 1960-1962 and may well have stimulated the desperate measures Soviet foreign policy took to redress its waning power; we do not yet have enough information about this period, however, to establish a clear relationship between these moves and the rise and fall of particular forces in the Kremlin. Following the Cuban fiasco and the party reorganization of November 1962, internal opposition to Khrushchev's policies seemed once more pronounced. Kozlov in particular seemed to be opposing a policy of conciliating the West and diverting resources from heavy industry. Kozlov's incapacitating illness in April 1963 coincided with a softer line signaled by a change in the May Day slogans. The removal of this critic may have been a key factor that allowed Khrushchev to agree to the hot line and the nuclear test ban and to break off negotiations with the Chinese.

By early 1964, however, Khrushchev seemed again to be under pressure from the defense and heavy industries and from the marshals not to make reductions in the defense budget or in number of military personnel (and, we may speculate, to pursue the development of an anti-missile defense). By this time Khrushchev was also publicly indicating differences of opinion among party members over foreign policy. Nonetheless he apparently preserved sufficient freedom of action to enter into a commitment to cut back the production of fissionable materials.

On balance it appears that Khrushchev generally enjoyed sufficient power to carry out far-reaching innovations in foreign and military affairs and arms control policy, overriding whatever internal opposition may have existed. Thus Khrushchev engineered concessions to Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia prior to the 1955 Summit Conference; he himself announced in June 1957 that Moscow would accept limited on-site inspection over a test ban; his power determined Soviet entry into a moratorium on nuclear testing from 1958 to 1961. It was Khrushchev who pushed through the reduction of conventional forces in 1955, 1956, and 1960 and the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces; upon his initiative the Soviet military budget was allegedly reduced in December 1963 and the Soviet Government stated in April 1964 its intention to slow production of fissionable materials.

Most important perhaps, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line, which had represented a central problem exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations from 1956 to 1964, continued to prevail. In each case Khrushchev had to overcome some domestic opposition and persuade the members of the elite close to the seat of power to go along with his policies. Although the record indicates that he often succeeded, there may well have been occasions when domestic opposition forced Khrushchev to take a harder stand than he otherwise would have preferred--for instance, the refusal in 1961 to stand by the principle of limited on-site inspection and the later insistence that there be no more than three such inspections. At other times internal opposition may simply have prevented a concession the First Secretary wanted in order to spur the arms control negotiations. Such suggestions of "things that never happened" obviously cannot be documented, but they seem inherently possible. In general the domestic political situation seems to have served as a key factor that could either open or close the door to some alternative suggested by external considerations. Usually the door seems to have been open to the policies favored by Khrushchev, but perhaps not always so far as he may have liked. Occasionally he himself was probably forced to slam it shut in the face of internal dissension. And in Cuba he certainly proved to be as hair-raising a gambler himself as any leader of modern times.

The forces and problems confronting the Kremlin after Stalin's death were in a sense larger than the individuals who succeeded him to power. Certainly the high optimism and ebullient style of Soviet foreign policy throughout most of the decade bore the personal stamp of Khrushchev. That there was broad support for his policies was due in large part to the necessity of coming to grips with the hard realities of the nuclear age, economic scarcity, and the existence of enormous problems on the eastern and western fronts. The management of power in the Kremlin will always, until constitutionalism comes, involve an inextricable combination of high policy and base impulses and tactics of personal ambition and power-seeking. We can guess the primary reasons for Khrushchev's eventual removal in 1964 had more to do with his style and his domestic policy plus his inability to cope with the problem created for the international Communist movement by the Chinese than with the orientation of his policy toward the West. But the squalid and Byzantine style of succession in the Kremlin must leave as "not proven" any attempts to correlate the internal power struggle with rational policy choices.

C. 1965--A Postscript

We emerge with the impression that in the period under review the Kremlin's interests called for at least some tangible measures of arms control to be achieved. The first reason lay in the complementarity between Soviet strategic theory, military posture and strategic expectations, and the Kremlin's proposals which would have preserved Soviet strengths while limiting those of the West. Second, the conflicts of political and military interests between Moscow and Peking gave the Soviet leadership good cause to stabilize relations with the West and to endeavor to prevent nuclear spread. Third, the mounting burden of defense expenditures reinforced the external military and political reasons to seek arms controls, détente, and East-West trade. Fourth, the Soviet leadership appeared at least tentatively to believe that its economic system would allow it to compete better in a disarming than in an arming world. None of these four inducements to arms control could be fully gratified by a mere relaxation of East-West tensions. Only specific arms control agreements could secure the strategic, political, or economic desiderata arising from these diverse factors.

As of early 1965 it was too early to say with assurance whether Soviet policy during the past decade had found a new orientation that might bring it into a generally less hostile relationship with the West. Moscow continued to have strong inducements to move toward the West. The latter could not be readily defeated; an ally against China might be needed; there were increasingly shared interests; and it was not clear that either side was going to win the game with the developing nations. Emphasis on collaboration rather than struggle might prove to be the more useful approach in Moscow's relations with the West.

But how the successors to Khrushchev would view the alternatives could not be predicted. The world of early 1965 still bore family resemblances to that of 1955 in that the visage of peaceful coexistence could still from time to time be dominated by the familiar earmarks of the older, harsher outlook. The de-Stalinization process could still turn out, like the Sino-Soviet schism, to be reversible in terms of some things that count for the West. Soviet moves toward accommodation with the West could still be interpreted as temporary steps backward to prepare for a subsequent offensive. And comprehensive disarmament--even if qualified by provision for a U.S. and Soviet minimum deterrent--still seemed remote.

Yet other forces continued to work for sobriety regarding the arms race. The implicit threat in the very existence of nuclear arsenals remained. The potential dangers for Soviet policy in the expansion of the nuclear club continued to threaten. The traditional elements of Sino-Russian relations remained implicit in state relations vis-à-vis China, fortified by the differential in their respective stages of development as exemplars of "scientific socialism." And the growth of expectations and habits of modernity on the part of both people and leaders in the Soviet Union could be expected to have at least some effect on policy. In short, many of the same forces that militated for limited arms controls in 1963 were still impinging upon Soviet decision-makers at the beginning of 1965, and the new leaders appeared perhaps even more pragmatic in their approach than the generation that succeeded Stalin ten years before.

Soviet leaders at the start of 1965 thus lived within two general representations of reality. They had to mediate between them as part of the process of retaining power--which makes internal conditions so potent a factor. They once again had to calculate their futures, if only in contingency planning, in terms of the chronic two-front nightmare. The prospects for arms control and disarmament remained a secondary, derivative feature of these sets of interactions, boundaries, and opportunities as they changed and matured over time. That in 1963 several modest agreements could be explicitly reached with the West--the hot line, the limited test ban, the undertaking not to orbit nuclear weapons, and the subsequent announced mutual cutbacks in production of fissionable material for military purposes--described the limits of the possible if not the desirable in Moscow's military-political outlook toward the West.

To go beyond these statements to the realm of specific prediction is hazardous in the extreme. There is no general rule of thumb one can apply to historical prediction and, a fortiori, to predicting the behavior of Soviet Communist leaders. Our analysis convinces us that one must look at each event that arises in its full historical context to read sense and meaning into it. We are thus much more confident of the usefulness of our method of approach than we are about the applicability to the future of our specific detailed findings.

At the same time, our analysis suggests the basic kinds of information a policy analyst or planner ought to have available to him in order to make intelligent judgments about Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament at any given time. We believe it probable that the crucial factors we isolated and studied will continue to operate, and moreover that their relative saliency to Soviet arms control policy may also persist.

We have stressed throughout the study the difficulties created by the highly ambiguous nature of the relationship between the Soviet drive for some kind of détente on the one hand and concrete measures to moderate the arms race on the other. One plausible way to view the two, for instance, is as points on a continuum that runs from relaxation of tensions to arms control and perhaps disarmament. How far the Soviet leadership is prepared to go from the atmospherics of détente to concrete arms control measures depends on factors that no Westerner can exactly measure. Perhaps we may even be not too far from the truth if we move into the post-Khrushchev era with the operating assumption that to achieve significant arms control will continue to depend on the optimum configuration of our four factors--a high degree of saliency of the measure to Soviet military-strategic imperatives; a high degree of responsiveness on the part of the West and either a submissive Peking or, conversely, a Peking sufficiently hostile to force Moscow into serious entente with the United States; a high degree of economic pressure; and collective backing in the Kremlin for such a policy.

Nevertheless, nothing could be more treacherous than the blind assumption that such an arrangement of factors will in fact produce the predicted results. If history repeats itself, it is usually in a particular way one could not have foretold. Policy-makers may use with profit the tools analysts have fashioned, supplemented however by that indispensable quality that brings to policy the judgment and wisdom this subject so urgently requires.