WHY AND HOW TO USE MORE LOCAL CONTRACTORS IN AFRICAN - ARAB PROJECTS

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M.I.T.
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The Business Management for
Economic Development Project
Center for International Studies
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The Business Management for Economic Development Project documents cases of sincere attempts, whether successful or not, to achieve a level of external contributions to the general development of the host economy optimal to the internal benefits a business must have to succeed in a developing society. Internal benefits are those that accrue to the firm only, and external contributions are benefits to other parties. Examples of business activity that might combine internal and external benefits include 1) spreading technical knowledge and innovation, 2) creating commercial linkages that promote new business development and/or structural improvement in the economy, 3) generating foreign exchange earnings or savings, 4) creating local employment, 5) creating local management capability, 6) contributing to greater income equality, 7) facilitating credit formation and saving in the host economy, 8) promoting products and projects that meet the development priorities of the host government, 9) reducing to a minimum the local external costs of company operations. Local conditions will determine which of these activities should have the highest priority.

We look to several organizational settings for relevant examples: indigenous businesses, subsidiaries of international businesses, parastatal agencies that own or promote business operations, and of course, public policy-making agencies.

These studies should be most useful to management training programs for people who will operate in underdeveloped economies, whether they be "Third World" countries, or dependent and lagging sectors of industrial societies. Directors and instructors of management programs in underdeveloped areas, as well as government officials and some business leaders, have indicated a need to train management personnel to be more sensitive to the economic development needs and opportunities of the host environment. An expansive view of management education, that includes a concern for the external effects of business operations, might reinforce the commitment of individuals and enterprises to promote economic development on a general basis, and might facilitate public policy-making and administrative effectiveness on the part of those who have to define and defend the national interests with respect to both the domestic and international business sectors.

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Introduction

Once it was thought sufficient to call the developed countries rich. Now, it has widely come to be recognized that financial wealth and development are distinct phenomena. It is appreciated that genuine development entails the expansion of a country's capacity to increase its productivity from factors of production that are under its own control. Selling oil or other finite extractive resources even for high prices, or economic assistance even under terms of Arab generosity, or borrowed capacities from the most advanced transnational corporations, or windfall resources, or playing host to someone else's productivity, cannot be the basis of real economic development. At best such things can only help a country get started or move faster. Ultimately, real development is, to some extent, self reliant development.

Thus, how a country carries out its development program may be as important as what is contained in it. Whether it involves forestation or administration, or whether it promotes health or harvest, where there are local resources they should be used, or they will disappear. If a conscious effort is not made to promote the use of local enterprise, national organizations, indigenous technicians and managers, they will not come into being. After billions of dollars
will have been spent to build roads and bridges, schools and offices, ports and railways, and what not, Africa will still be lacking road builders, construction companies, technical experts, and people with the managerial know-how to keep development going and make it serve local needs and interests.

All this seems to be terribly obvious, but it is the most neglected aspect not only of the development promoted by African-Arab Cooperation, but by almost all the other development promotion operations going on in Africa, and for that matter, in much of the Arab world as well. As we are presently proceeding, the African and Arab elites are likely to perpetuate the dependency and underdevelopment that now characterizes their economies, and their descendant peoples throughout the world will continue to find themselves exposed to abuse.

The political and technical elites are taking the easy way out. They are all going on commission in showpiece partnerships while the real technical work and the experience belongs to those who come from the already developed world. After another ten or twenty years of this, Africa and the Arab world will have a well entrenched aristocracy of leisured figureheads, with foreign people and institutions providing the only assurance of sustainable productivity, and all the university graduates clamoring for guaranteed jobs in either statal, parastatal or even private bureaucracies. By then the debt burdens of the "Third World" (there will no longer be any pretense at calling it a "developing" world) will bind the underclasses to a low grade existence without realistic hope of eventual relief. Grand opportunities will have been lost.
What Use Is Now Being Made of Local Enterprise?

Virtually none!

The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa has committed $283m to thirty-nine development projects in Africa. Other Arab sources have committed an additional $100m to these same projects, and the rest of the international development-assistance community will put in at least an additional $930m to help co-finance them. And, as a result of the expenditure of all that money, unless there is a change from the pattern of project implementation that has existed until now, not a single African enterprise will have been created, expanded or made more competitive as a result.

Whose fault is this? Both the donors and the recipients. This is a point to which I will return. For now it is important to note only that the existing pattern is not warranted. Twenty-seven of these projects involve rather large scale and complex operations, but have some functions that existing African enterprises and organizations are competent to perform, at least to some degree. The remaining twelve projects seem amenable to being completely implemented by local agencies. But to date, despite a late and faltering effort and one or two near-connects, the ABEDA has yet to use an African firm. The first two ABEDA financed projects that will utilize even a regional firm or expert in charge have been approved only very recently, in late 1978, and are both located in devastated Uganda. A textile mill will be implemented by an Egyptian firm and an Arab agronomist will head a poultry project.

It does not disparage the significant contributions of the Arab Technical Assistance Fund to point out that substituting Arab experts for European or American ones does not advance African de-
velopment as we are defining it here. Opportunities to expand existing resources or to help create them are being missed.

We should clearly note that the ABEDA is not alone in this failure. The African Development Bank had almost as dismal a record in implementing the first one hundred ten of its projects. When I examined that record in 1976, and perhaps it has not changed since that time, I found that only six of the twenty-two firms on its roster (of over two hundred) that seemed to be African owned had received any contract. Only one had a contract in the implementation phase. The other five were involved in pre-investment feasibility studies and the like. None of these six contracts had been awarded before 1975, eight years after it began its investment operations.

The record is also alarmingly poor among the development oriented institutions and programs that are associated with the United Nations. A study done in 1976 by the UNDP concerning Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries revealed that among the nearly fifty thousand firms and institutions that are on the rosters of approved bidders for contracts from the major UNDP financed agencies only three hundred nineteen were from developing countries. Of these only twenty-nine had actually received any contract, even on a no-bid basis (with a collective value of only $1 m) and only four (perhaps included among the twenty-nine) had won competitive bids (for a value of only about $.5 m).

All these are capital sources that are controlled by the countries of the Third World.

Why Have Arab Investors Made Such Little Use of Local Organizations?

Any one of a complex mix of factors could produce this result. The factors are of three types: 1) psychological, 2) procedural, and 3) realistic.

1. Psychological: This is the least important of the types of factors involved, but important nonetheless. Both the donors and the recipients are conditioned to believe that the human and organizational resources needed to implement their development projects competently, efficiently, and quickly, do not exist locally or within the broader region.

Their bias is not one of placing no value, philosophically, on using and/or building up local resources. Indeed, the common African and Arab experience of external intrusion, exploitation and humiliation conditions them to think in similar terms about once again becoming the subjects of their own history. However, the political elites and even the technocratic officials of the development agencies tend to share a number of ties to the developed world, and share also a number of very basic beliefs that work to disadvantage local enterprises and to favor ones from the industrialized world; they believe that the international companies are all highly competent, that these companies will assign only highly competent and experienced personnel to their projects, that such African companies and technically trained people as exist are inexperienced, that a very high level of formalized education and training is crucial to successfully doing the tasks involved, and that if the qualified people and companies existed locally or within the region, these officials would already know about them.
When I have asked officials of these lending institutions why they fail to award more contracts to local experts and institutions, after proclaiming the non-existence of such resources they often talk about the colonial complex that made Africans and other ex-colonized people have little faith in their own institutions. ABEDA officials have even stated to me that despite the great row that was made about the Arabs not distributing their funds through the African Development Bank, many delegations of African officials express to them a preference that the funds not go through the ADB, which they claim is too slow, too inefficient, and too politicized.

An official of the Arab League mentioned to me that there are strong sentiments among Arab as well as African leaders to regain control over their own resources. They remember the colonial period. But they have little confidence in the small institutions that exist at the national level. Perhaps the Arab states should take a lesson from Mohammed Ali, he said, who made many modernizing innovations and achieved enough power to alter the world balance. He acquired advanced technology by hiring individual technologists, not whole organizations.

Officials of the African Development Bank, like those at ABEDA, have spoken to me about "an inferiority complex" that still influences too many decisions.

Dr. Ayari, President of ABEDA, has also expressed concerns about the attitudes and perspectives that dominate African development programs, and perhaps also his own institution, which may be retarding progress toward genuine development, but he relates this
more to the types of projects that are supported rather than the way they are implemented. "There is no innovation, whatsoever," he has stated to me, "we are reproducing the system, only applying what we learned in the (Western) universities...the elite with whom we are talking in Africa today, they come from the same sources, with the same education." This orientation leads them to emphasize cement factories and the like, complains Ayari, and "from the donors to the receivers, all of us are biased by what we consider as the mode of consumption today...the one idea is to look like a North American city or a European city. This is a worldwide fact. It is wrong, but it is a fact."

2. The Procedural Factors: The way in which not only the Arab and the African, but most international financing institutions operate makes it difficult to utilize local institutions and experts on any grand scale. The most important aspect of this is the insistence on "arms-length" relationships with the project implementers. It is rare that capital sources other than the transnational companies themselves provide direct management or other technical services during the implementation phase. At that point they emphasize monitoring and evaluation almost exclusively. The contracts to implement the projects are awarded through international competitive bidding. The procedures used to certify the bidders never involve any outreach effort to identify and certainly not to help create qualified competitors from the developing world. The lists of firms approved by the World Bank, or the Caisse Centrale, or U.S.A.I.D. or even Chase Manhattan Bank are the same as for the UNDP, the ADB or the ABEDA.
The preference to invest only in projects and not in more
general development programs may also bias the implementation
operations against local firms. Program support would presumably
allow more flexibility in carrying out the program. It is clear
from the documented experience of the UNDP financed programs that
local contractors from developing countries will get almost all
of their contracts through non-competitive bidding, if they get
them at all. In any case their share of the market has been quite
small—less than 5%.

It is noteworthy that the UNDP study concluded that "the great-
est single obstacle to the formation and growth of consultancy ser-
vices in developing countries is probably the irregular and in-
sufficient volume of demand." It is precisely the demand side
of the picture that the lending agencies such as the ABEDA, ADB
and UNDP systems can influence with the least amount of interference
by the industrialized world.

I wish to quote another passage from the UNDP report because
it reveals what is both a cause and a result of the limited oppor-
tunities for contractors in the developing countries:

(Para.152) The international organizations normally use either
rosters...or directories of consulting organizations published
by professional associations or private firms to prepare a
"long list" of firms which may provide the type of consultancy
services required for a specific assignment. Published direct-
ories are usually available for consulting organizations in de-
veloped countries. A roster of consulting organizations is the
only means, for practical purposes, of identifying consultancy
services in developing countries. (Para 153) The data available
from seven agencies indicate that consulting organizations
from developing countries account for only 6.6 per cent of a
total of 4,840 consulting organizations on the roster...The im-
portance of being on the roster is far more important for a con-
sulting organization of a developing country than for individual
experts or training institutions...No conscious and systematic
efforts have yet been made to identify consulting organizations
in developing countries by major international organizations."
I can add my personal experience to the evidence that the major international development finance organizations, including those controlled by Arabs and by Africans, have not seriously attempted to use local engineering and other consulting firms. I personally inquired in the libraries of the World Bank, the U.N. and the U.N.D.P. for directories and other listings of African and Arab enterprises and organizations that might be relevant for the implementation functions of projects supported by these institutions.

At the World Bank there was the usual array of directors of American firms, and the Bottin directory of French firms. One would find no trouble in getting information about British firms, and there was even the 1966 Egyptian Stock Exchange Yearbook and a few Commercial Directories of other Middle Eastern countries. But for non-Arab Africa only the telephone and a few chamber of commerce annuals. These also give more information on European firms in Africa than local ones. The French language sources were more numerous than the English ones, and contain titles such as: "Afrique Industrie : Ficher industriel de l'Afrique noire," or "Annuaire des entreprises et organismes d'outre-mer," or "Societes et fournisseurs de l'Afrique noire," or "Les 500 premières sociétés d'Afrique noire," but if you look inside these directories you find only information about French firms with but few exceptions. Firms I know about are not there. Even for a country like Algeria, despite the socialist character of its economy, there are local firms which go neglected in the Annuaire.

The situation at the United Nations is worse. Few of the directories I found at the World Bank are there. There was
a directory of directories at the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations. In this bibliography of directories one discovers that there is a Kenyan Registry of Manufacturing Firms, or a Trade and Commercial Index for East and Central Africa. But you will not find the registry or the index itself.

The United Nations has recognized the need for technical cooperation among developing countries, of course, and sponsored the conference in Argentina on that subject. But the Directory of Services prepared for that conference itself reveals something of the problem—lack of seriousness about the issue not only by the conference organizers but the participating governments as well. The questionnaires that were sent around from which to develop the directory were filled out by some ministry mid- to low-ranking official who gave minimal attention to it. One can judge this from the results. For Nigeria, to take one important example, there are only two listings as sources of technical services—Ahmadou Bello University (not even the several other universities that would be relevant, such as Ibadan, Nsukka or Lagos) and the Center for Management Development at Lagos (not even the one at Ibadan.) Nothing about the hundreds of businesses that would be relevant, and nothing about even how to make contact with the thousands of individuals who could provide services.

Nothing in these libraries would tell the inquirer anything about the capital structure, the amount of assets, the experience, the principal owners and staff of any of the private businesses, or even the major statal and parastal organizations in the African countries.
If an American company wants to do business abroad, it can inquire with the U.S. Department of Commerce and receive more information on Nigerian firms, importing agents, suppliers, potential partners, whatever, than you can find at the ADB or the ABEDA. Perhaps for a starter these institutions should make a formal request for a copy of the information on such firms and people that is readily available to an American businessman.

3) Factors of Realism: The objective reality is that the character of the development programs being supported by the Arab and African institutions do not favor local organizations. Despite the lack of any overall development plan for the region or its sub-regions, the bulk of investment has gone into essentially infrastructural and industrial projects of a rather large scale. Cumulatively, the ABEDA has devoted about three-fourths of its loans to projects that are explicitly of this nature, and even some of the projects in the agricultural sector involve some infrastructure work, such as fishing port developments and pumping stations for polder projects, etc. These types of projects favor large, established firms, especially if the project is carried out as a whole or in very large component parts by a single organization.

Much the same picture can be seen in the experience of the African Development Bank. I examined the first one hundred and ten projects in 1976 and found that the bulk involved projects that relate to public utilities, such as power and telecommunications, and transport and other basic facilities. Many of these projects were supervised by government ministries, but all of them, with but
one exception was implemented by non-African firms. Five contracts had been awarded to African firms or individuals for pre-investment functions.

It is not clear that any existing African firm could have handled any of the public utility or transport projects in their entirety. The one contract awarded to an African firm went to a Senegalése road builder who may have been given only a portion of the whole project. It does seem likely that there are a number of African firms that can handle portions of road projects, or the installation of telephone and power lines. African firms have probably performed some of the functions in each of the following type of projects which the ADB had already supported by 1976: timber processing and marketing, installation of power and telecommunication lines, the digging and widening of canals, paper milling and marketing, textile plants, tourist development programs, etc.

A number of agricultural projects might have been handled entirely by African organizations, such as feedlot development, horticultural projects, etc. There were a number of projects in the ADB pipeline in 1976 that would also seem to be amenable to African contracts—projects such as: dairy farming and processing; horticultural operations; field and processing operations for cocoa, cotton, sugar, rice, palm, maize, salt; and various irrigation schemes.

This situation is not something the officials of these institutions are not aware of. Dr. Ayari, for example, told me in Nov. of 1978: "I fully agree with you that we have not been endeavoring at all in seeing what the African expertise can offer us. Probably not that much; I dont want to exaggerate the actual status of African expertise in certain sophisticated areas of production. But,
nevertheless, you have medium size corporations and enterprises in Africa today who would like to try to act. I for one am ready, totally ready, but somebody has to push us, for sure, to build up a list of African contractors in all fields...They will have to be among the best...I am not asking them to be better than the Germans or the Americans...but deliver good services, seriously managed...there is no reason I shouldn't do it." He felt that a number of countries already offered a reasonably developed market for finding such capabilities, but he also asked a crucial question which I in turn pass on: "Why should...an Arab banker have to go fetch in Africa? Why are the Africans not coming to us themselves?"

What Evidence Is There That African Enterprises Can Be Created If They Do Not Already Exist?

Most of the functions of the independent African governments are run by Africans. So too are the operations of the regional, sub-regional and national development banks. The same is true for the Arab states, the Arab League(s) and the various investing and banking institutions that Arab states have fairly recently established. But it was the established wisdom of the colonial administrations that neither Africans nor even Arabs were ready to handle these functions when the colonial governments were forced to relinquish their control.

Nothing in the prevailing assumptions of the Western world prepared one to believe that Egyptians could operate the Suez Canal, Algerians could establish and successfully operate SONATRACH, that Kuwaitis could establish a Development Fund that would match the competence of the World Bank, or that Nigerians could run
a Nigerian Petroleum Company, or that Tanzanians could run a Tanzanian National Insurance Company or National Development Corporation. The prevailing opinion in the United States is still that Afro-Americans are not ready to participate in foreign policy debates. None of these things would have happened if the pace had not been forced.

International businesses operating in Africa have also had to be forced to bring Africans into more senior and managerial positions. But they did so when it became evident that continued access to these countries required it, although, to be sure, there were and are still a lot of "window dressing" appointments to high level positions that have virtually no responsibility. In general, the pattern of indigenization has started with the positions dealing with personnel relations or public relations, and come last of all to control financial functions. But the point is that most of the Africans who have been put into positions of real responsibility were thought by the international businesses in question to be not yet ready for it. Yet the performance has been good. Some training and preparation is necessary, of course, but the important preparation is actually doing the job.

The Business Management for Economic Development Project which I direct at M.I.T. has made a number of studies of African business and management development. Our study of management development in Kenya found that Africans made rapid progress where the determination existed that they should do so. Until the period of the mid-1960s, for example, almost all the clerks in Kenyan banks were Asians. It was said that Africans did not have the mentality
for this rather simple function, but one crucial to the success of banks. But pressures for African advancement convinced both the government and the banks that Asians should not be given a monopoly on these functions, and Africans were found to be able to perform them well. African advancement in the banks then went ahead. Barclays had already operated a training school in Nairobi which it then expanded to accommodate African candidates. The National Grindlays Bank aggressively brought in African Junior Management Cadets through a collaboration with the local high schools.

Africans moved ahead in other business sectors as well. The Mombasa Oil Refinery attained full Kenyanization at the on-site supervisory levels within a short period of time. Kenya had acquired control through nationalizing some of the holding of Cal-Tex, Shell-BP and Esso. The General Manager remained expatriate for some time, but he saw fit to declare that the Kenyan takeover had been "very cordial" and that those "who actually run the refinery are all Africans. They could blow up the place! But, they are competent."

We found that the career paths of Kenyan senior managers, those holding the top positions of General Manager, Managing Director or Departmental Heads, could learn to handle these responsibilities as quickly as expatriates, if not more quickly. These people were only slightly older than the junior level managers--40 years instead of 35, on the average. This tends to be about ten years younger than their expatriate counterparts and than similar African managers in other parts of Africa, such as Nigeria. All the Africans
in our Kenyan study were the first generation of their families to occupy such positions. Almost all had been to university but had not necessarily trained for a business career. Generally, Africans have acquired their managerial experience in government administration which does not always or even often impart entrepreneurial instincts. Some countries are more noted than others for the natural entrepreneurial orientations of their populations, and Kenya, like Nigeria, is one of these.

Kenyan experience also exhibits some of the problems of the "colonial complex" we have already mentioned. The KENATCO, for example, was started by Kenyan drivers in a cooperative effort, with financial support from the parastatal Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, but it brought in expatriate management under which the company floundered. Subsequently its top management was Kenyanized and it prospered. The Kenyan General Manager told us, "these expatriates were rejects from other firms." He, and other African managers, sharply criticized the training programs that the international firms established. "You get an expatriate who never tells his junior anything. Expatriates couldn't care less. They left you to survive or perish." Under the Kenyan manager of KENATCO a vigorous training program was successful.

Another firm which demonstrates the possibility of bringing in African managers at a rapid pace is the Bata Shoe Company which is noted throughout Africa, indeed much of the developing world, for being one of the real leaders in indigenizing their operations. This company essentially trained its managers and wholesale operators on the job.
The study *African Businessmen* by Marris and Somerset published in 1965 about Kenyan businessmen also indicates that formal business or even other formal schooling is not absolutely necessary for business success. These were rather small businesses and craftsmen. But about a third of those businessmen who had no training were running successful operations. About a third of those whose training had been for some other business or career were also able to make a success of their business. This proportion, about a third, also held up for those running industrial type operations who had no training.

A study of African entrepreneurship throughout the continent published in 1971 by the World Bank did note that there was little evidence that small scale artisanal entrepreneurs develop into larger industrial operations, even in this respect there is some hope: "...one can find almost everywhere African businessmen who have started with extremely modest means and have managed, largely by dint of their own efforts, to develop enterprises which, though small in absolute sense, are still rather impressive by comparison with their modest beginnings. Undoubtedly the percentage of Africans already engaged in business that have a real capacity for development into entrepreneurs capable of operating on a larger scale and in accordance with more modern methods is very small. If effective programs for promoting African private enterprise are to be developed, the necessary means for singling out the relatively small percentage of businessmen capable of development must be found." 3.

This study noted that in Nigeria a survey done in 1965 showed that in Lagos alone there were nearly three hundred locally owned firms that employed over ten people, twenty-two that employed over one hundred workers, and sixty that had capital assets over £20th. The educational level of this group of businessmen was quite low--
only about 40% had any education at or beyond the secondary level. The firms concentrated in sawmilling, furniture making, printing, garment making, rubber processing and the like.

Nigerians are also very active in construction. There are said to be thousands of contractors in the federal, state and local registers; and in the Northern Region alone, which has been one of the less developed regions of the country, there were eleven construction firms that could carry out contracts of over £N 25,000. Six Nigerian contractors had turnover of between £N 500,000 and £N 2m. In the city of Ibadan the author of the World Bank study found two contractors that had employed as many as 3,000 workers at one time. These were firms clearly able to undertake road and bridge construction.

None of these firms have made entry into the registries that are used by the development finance institutions of concern to us.

What Is To Be Done?

Those genuinely interested in promoting the development of Africa will have to undertake and promote the undertaking of strenuous efforts to locate and perhaps to create indigenous institutions that can carry out all phases of development projects.

One needed step in this direction would be to compile a list of existing enterprises that could be useful in performing the functions of development projects. This will not be something that can be accomplished quickly because the basic data is not easily accessible even at the local level; but a start can be made.
A more far reaching, but more immediately possible activity would be for the development finance institutions to themselves help to bring into being one or more general-management-service firms that could be an umbrella organization to group subcontractors, to attract trained managers and technicians from the international firms and from government posts where their skills may not be fully utilized. This is a proposal I have made to the African Development Bank and to the East African Development Bank, and it should be made to the ABEDA as well. Help to launch an African owned firm of this type! The starting point may be to host a conference of existing construction, engineering, manufacturing and other related African owned firms in order to communicate to them the market possibilities and to assess the opportunity to federate some of them into production units of larger capacity and territorial scope.

The organizational form of a general-management-services firm could vary considerably—from a subsidiary of one or more of the Development Banks to an independent company with or without governmental shareholding from one or more African countries. The services offered by such a firm would include general, that is overall, managerial responsibility for project implementation in technical fields. It would have to have staff trained and experienced in business administration, law, accounting, and specific engineering fields. Its own permanent staff would most likely best be generalists, for the most part, with more specialized people and subcontractors brought in as needed. The firm would have the same full responsibility for proper project performance that the interna-
tional firms have—to coordinate the activities of subcontractors and consultants, to handle suppliers, to carry out financial control and contract compliance operations, to assure quality control and the satisfaction of all legal requirements. In time such a firm may build up its own direct construction and/or other engineering capabilities if it is unable to start out with such. The firm could enter into partnership arrangements with interna-
tional firms to fill out its capability, but the objective would be to develop its own capabilities as broadly as it can competitively do so.

The advantage that such a firm would have over the existing situation derives not only from the value of having indigenous institutions directly in control of project implementation that are not bound to the constraints inherent in government bureaucra-
cies. Such a firm would also be appealing to African technicians who are already trained and experienced, or those currently being trained, who would find it more attractive to work in an institution that operates in many localities, and that is not so subject to local political pressures, as the government and parastatal positions often are.

The role of the ABEDA and other development finance institutions would be: 1) determine the market potential for such a firm, 2) identify existing firms and communicate to them the opportunities afforded by their combination in this fashion, 3) provide the necessary working capital to get them started, and 4) provide the initial market they need.

In any case, these institutions should begin to take seriously the need to build up indigenous project implementation capacities.
End Notes

1. The following are monographs and papers of the Business Management for Economic Development Project, M.I.T.


