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AND POLITICAL
STABILITY
IN THE USSR

Dina Rome Spechler

CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02130
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Dina Rome Spechler

Tel-Aviv University
Visiting Scholar
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Visiting Scholar
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

and

Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

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The last decade and a half has witnessed an extraordinary resurgence of Russian nationalism in the USSR. Expressed first in literary, artistic, and scholarly works and in the dissent of intellectuals, it soon became a mass phenomenon, both welcomed and encouraged and at the same time carefully monitored and curbed by portions of the political establishment. Unlike the previous upsurge of Russian nationalism, that which occurred during World War II and the immediate postwar years, this one was not initiated from above, by the top leader or leadership, but from below, by discontented citizens and concerned elites. Also unlike the Russian nationalism of Stalin's day, the contemporary movement has to a significant extent been aimed at fundamentally altering official policies and values.

It is the contention of this essay that this widespread, sustained expression of intense Russian nationalist sentiment, the orientation of much of this sentiment against the political and ideological status quo in the USSR, and the high-level support which manifestations of this sentiment have received, have major implications for the stability of the Soviet political system. After indicating what is meant by the terms "political stability" and "nationalism," the essay will provide a brief chronological account of the Russian nationalist movement. Drawing on the results of interviews with recent emigres, as well as on samizdat and legally published Soviet sources, it will then survey and analyze the major trends and groups in this exceedingly diverse movement and discuss the destabilizing implications of the ideas the nationalists advocate. In order to assess the political significance of the movement, the essay will attempt to determine the degree of influence it has had and is likely to have. A

* I would like to acknowledge with thanks the extremely competent research assistance I received from Ida Isaac of Tel-Aviv University.
concluding section will relate the developments and phenomena analyzed to the stability of the Soviet system in the future.

The Concept of Political Stability

Political stability is not a concept whose meaning has been widely agreed upon or extensively discussed in the literature of political science. Moreover, the discussions which do exist tend to be of limited value because they often fail to distinguish between the causes of stability, the indicators of stability, the results of stability, and stability itself. However, what does seem to be common to most definitions of stability and what, given the generic meaning of the term, should properly be regarded as its essence, is continuity or persistence over time. Moreover, it is the persistence of order or structure, not of disorder or anarchy, which is meant by stability. A stable political system, in other words, is one whose basic character or "critical components" persist for long periods of time without fundamental alteration or are altered gradually, without marked discontinuities. These components include the principal political institutions, the basic laws and administrative structure, the dominant political values or ideology, and the distribution of power among the major political institutions and groups. A stable system is one which has the capacity to absorb shocks and overcome crises without a breakdown in the regime's capacity to govern or maintain order, and without a major alteration in the character of the system resulting from such a breakdown. It is therefore of necessity a system in which the regime is regarded as legitimate by all politically significant groups. In a stable system pressures for change are expressed in an orderly fashion, legally and peacefully, through institutional structures, rather than violently, in violation of the law.
In such a system demands for change generally are not aimed at the basic
character of the system. Demands for non-incremental or systemic change, if
made at all, are put forward only by politically insignificant social forces
or groups. 7

It is helpful to conceive of stability and instability as two ends of a
continuum. Any political system at a given point in time might, in theory,
be placed at some point on the continuum, closer to or farther from the pole
of stability. Destabilizing factors or forces are those which are likely to
move the system in the direction of instability, i.e., factors or forces which
tend to incite large-scale or frequent disorder, encourage expression of
radical demands for change on the part of significant social groups, or in
some other way lead to major, discontinuous systemic change. The presence of
destabilizing factors does not ipso facto imply that the system will undergo
sudden radical change. Whether it does depends on the relative strength of
those factors vis-à-vis countervailing stabilizing factors.

The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism

Definitions of nationalism are many and varied and often quite
contentious. 8 What is meant by the term in the context of this paper is
identification with and loyalty to one's national or ethnic group and the
desire to promote its interests as one perceives them. 9 This generally
implies either concern for the preservation of the group's existence and
identity (hence its culture and traditions) and/or interest in the expansion
of its influence, power, or prestige. A nationalist movement is a series of
actions to achieve one or more of these goals on the part of individuals or
groups who share them.
The resurgence of Russian nationalism began in the mid-1960's and was manifested almost immediately on four different levels: underground, in legal literature and scholarship, among political elites, and in organizations with official patronage. In 1964 a secret Russian nationalist revolutionary organization, the All-Russia Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON) was founded. In 1965 the art historian and novelist Vladimir Soloukin began to publish a seminal series of literary works glorifying religious and cultural aspects of the pre-revolutionary Russian past. Soloukhin's most famous and influential work, "Letters From the Russian Museum," was published in the literary journal Molodaia gvardiia in 1966, and this journal soon became the principal mouthpiece of Russian nationalist sentiment. The publication of Soloukhin's articles was followed by the proliferation of scholarly works on Russian architecture, sculpture, art, and iconography, as well as works by scholars designed to popularize and arouse interest in Russia's cultural and religious heritage. In the same year that Soloukhin began to publish works with nationalist themes, Valerii Skurlatov, a high official in the Moscow Komsomol organization, distributed among activists in the Central Committee and Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol a document entitled "Rules of Morality." Glorifying "the Russian race," this document spoke of "the cosmic mission of the Russian people" and Russians' "duty to [their] ancestors" to preserve their racial purity. The nascent Russian nationalist movement was greatly aided and encouraged by the formation in 1966 of the All-Russia Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK), an officially sponsored, voluntary "public" organization led by self-styled establishment "Russites." The All-Russia Society for the Preservation of Nature and the Rossiia Literary
Club, founded soon after, were likewise officially approved and controlled by establishment Russian nationalists.¹⁶

For a short while the movement was allowed to flourish on all four levels without hindrance, the leadership uncertain or in disagreement on whether to restrain it. Soon, however, curbs began to be imposed, first on underground activity, then on the most extreme expressions of Russian nationalism in legal publications. VSKhSON's founder, leader, and chief ideologue was arrested in 1967 and his organization disbanded.¹⁷ The Fetisov group, authors of a blatantly chauvinistic, anti-semitic program glorifying the Slavic race, were arrested the following year.¹⁸ Molodaia gvardiia was authoritatively condemned in 1970, its Chief Editor dismissed in 1971.¹⁹

After these restrictive moves, legal expressions of Russian nationalism became more moderate, with individuals whose ideas were more overtly in conflict with official ideology or values forced to express themselves in samizdat and eventually silenced or sent abroad.²⁰ Thus an essay entitled "A Word to the Nation," whose plea to safeguard the purity of the Russian race was very much in the spirit of Skurlatov's "Rules of Morality," could not be circulated openly by 1971. It appeared in that year in samizdat, signed anonymously by "Russian patriots."²¹ In the same year, a former VSKhSON member, Vladimir Osipov, finding legal journals closed to him, created a samizdat publication entitled Veche. Devoted to an ethical-religious brand of Russian nationalism, Veche was suppressed three years later.

Solzhenitsyn's 1974 "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which expressed grave concern for the fate of the Russian people and urged that minority groups be
allowed to secede from the USSR, was probably a primary cause of the author's expulsion from the country in that year.\textsuperscript{22}

What is most remarkable about these curbs on Russian nationalism, however, is how limited their effect has been. Since its inception, the movement has steadily gained momentum, acquiring larger and larger numbers of supporters. Membership in VOOPIK reached 1 million a year after it was founded and now exceeds 12 million.\textsuperscript{23} Suppression has only resulted in the appearance of new groups and periodicals to replace the old. When \textit{Veche} was closed down, Osipov briefly published a new, more religiously oriented journal, \textit{Zemlia}, and when Osipov was arrested, still another \textit{samizdat} publication with a similar outlook, \textit{Moskovskii sbornik}, appeared. Religio-philosophical seminars and study groups with a Russian nationalist orientation began to be organized in 1974 in Moscow, soon afterward in Leningrad and Kiev. The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights in the USSR was formed in 1976 with the aim of improving the status of Russian Orthodoxy. A wave of arrests of Russian nationalists in 1979-80, including the leaders of the Moscow Religio-Philosophical Seminar and the Christian Committee, was followed by the organization of a Russian nationalist Christian women's group, the Maria Club, in 1980.\textsuperscript{24}

What is most important, Russian nationalist ideas, if articulated more circumspectly and less stridently, are now expressed more and more openly and more and more frequently in official forums. Neither \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} itself nor its Russian nationalist contributors have been silenced. The number of journals which regularly print works with Russian nationalist themes has grown steadily,\textsuperscript{25} and at least one mass circulation newspaper, \textit{Sovetskaia Rossiiia}, can be characterized as a mouthpiece of the
movement. Major newspapers such as Pravda and Literaturnaia gazeta sometimes open their pages to nationalist contributors, and several large publishing houses are known for their Russian nationalist orientation. The "ruralist" trend has had an increasing impact on Russian literature, and is increasingly devoted to the issue of the physical and spiritual survival of the Russian people. Russian nationalist art is exhibited to millions of viewers in official galleries.

**Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Regime**

For the purposes of this paper, the Russian nationalist movement may usefully be depicted in terms of the relationship or distance between each of its components and the Soviet regime. One can position the various groups or groupings in the movement on a continuum, with those who are most opposed to the regime and its values on one end and those with the closest links to the political establishment on the other:
## RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS AND THE SOVIET REGIME

### Chief Concern

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<th>Relation to the Regime</th>
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### Establishment Nationalists
As can be seen from the above diagram, there are two principal tendencies within the Russian nationalist movement. One is primarily concerned about the spiritual well-being and physical survival of the Russian people as a distinct ethnic group. It sees the Russian people as undergoing a profound spiritual and demographic crisis because its values, culture, and traditions are disappearing. It therefore seeks a revival of Russian Orthodox religious values, Russian culture, and/or the traditional, pre-industrial Russian way of life. The other tendency is primarily concerned with preserving or enhancing the political and/or military power of the Russian nation, vis-à-vis both other national groups within the USSR and the rest of the world. This tendency generally regards the Soviet regime as the actual or potential representative and protector of the Russian people and is thus in favor of strengthening Soviet state power, both internally and externally. Adherents of the first tendency are mostly to be found on the upper portion of the above continuum, closer to the pole of opposition to the regime, adherents of the second tendency on the lower portion. However, it is important to note that there is by no means an absolute dichotomy between the two tendencies: ideas characteristic of one are often articulated by adherents of the other. Thus individuals and groups located near opposite ends of the continuum have sometimes expressed very similar sentiments.

It is significant that among those nationalists closest to the pole of opposition, only one group, the All-Russia Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON), was from the outset militantly opposed to the regime and dedicated to its overthrow. Nearly all other nationalist groups were at least initially interested in finding a modus vivendi with the authorities. What is more important, nearly all, on the basis of their
political experience, initially believed that their ideas could be acceptable, even appealing to at least some portions of the political establishment.

Solzhenitsyn's first work with a clearly nationalist message was addressed not to opponents of the regime, but to the Soviet leadership itself, and its plea for more investment in the areas settled by Russians may, in fact, have had an impact on official policy. Only after his expulsion from the USSR, when he edited the volume From Under the Rubble, did Solzhenitsyn begin to express absolute, principled opposition to Marxism-Leninism because of its godlessness.

Veche likewise began by proclaiming its loyalty to and support of the "great Soviet power" and its opposition to the cosmopolitan human rights movement. It defended the regime's foreign and nationality policies and insisted (in an article by Chief Editor Osipov) on the importance of maintaining Russian rule over the non-Russian areas of the USSR even though they had been conquered by force. Only when Osipov found himself and his journal increasingly harassed and persecuted did he become persuaded that a Russian cultural and religious renaissance would require substantial liberalization of Soviet political life, including guarantees of constitutional rights and freedoms. Only then did he establish links with the human rights movement and become in his own eyes part of the illegal opposition.

Osipov's commitment to a revival of Russian Orthodoxy and his stubborn refusal to submit to official censorship implied of necessity that there would be a certain tension between his journal and at least some portions of the political establishment. Similarly, the various Russian Orthodox study groups and clubs which have been organized outside the framework of the
officially sanctioned church have eventually found it necessary to operate clandestinely. Dedicated to a reintroduction of religious values into the lives of the Russian people and unwilling to limit themselves to publication in official organs, they have been looked on with considerable suspicion by the guardians of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. However, these groups have generally refrained from adopting positions on political and ideological issues. This is particularly true of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, which has made every effort to work within the system, using exclusively legal methods and channels to assist believers.35

More successful in finding a modus vivendi with the regime are the "ruralist" prose writers.36 Their primary concern is the fate of the disappearing Russian village, which they regard as the repository of the finest values and traditions of the Russian people, the source of their spiritual strength and the key to their physical survival.37 This concern appears to be either shared by or highly useful to very well-placed persons in the political establishment.38 For this reason, these authors appear to have no difficulty in publishing their work. Some, like Soloukhin, are believed to have particularly close ties to the establishment. Soloukhin and the outspokenly nationalist artist Il'ia Glazunov are believed to have been influential in persuading the authorities to accept the formation of the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.39

Moving down the continuum, closer to the regime, one comes to a group of writers and publicists who, while holding more controversial views, have made even more strenuous efforts to achieve a modus vivendi with the authorities. They have, in varying degrees, made it their objective either to justify Russian nationalism in Communist terms or to justify Communist power in
Russian nationalist terms -- i.e., in terms of what the Soviet regime has accomplished or can accomplish for the Russian people. For this reason they have been described as "national bolsheviks." These include the members of the Molodaia gvardiia group, the authors of the stridently nationalistic essays for which the journal was officially reprimanded in 1970, and others who have written in the same vein. ⁴⁰

Very close to the political establishment and in many cases well inside it one finds a large assortment of writers, publicists, and officials whose Russian nationalism expresses itself in the form of extreme chauvinism, anti-semitism or general xenophobia, and/or fascism (the latter a combination of racism and authoritarianism or neo-Stalinism). The "Rules of Morality" circulated by Komsomol official V. Skurlatov represented this tendency, as do the writings of Russian nationalist theoretician Petr Palievskii and the anti-semitic diatribes of Central Committee researcher Iurii Ivanov, official propagandists Vladimir Vagon and Evgenii Avasaev, and literary critic Vadim Kozhinov. ⁴¹

Within the political establishment there are also numerous relatively moderate Russian nationalists in whom Russian and Soviet patriotism often tend to merge. Most of them subscribe to no coherent doctrine. However, they make it their business to provide patronage, support and official protection to Russian nationalists of all kinds, particularly those who would enhance Russia's political and military might. ⁴²
Russian Nationalism and Political Stability

Russian Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism

In some sense the sheer existence of a Russian nationalist movement with broad appeal among the Russian masses (up to now chiefly urban youth), intelligentsia, and political elite is itself an indicator of serious instability in the Soviet political system. For however close the ties between certain nationalists and the political establishment, however hard some of them have labored to achieve an ideological and political modus vivendi with the regime, there is an inescapable contradiction between some of the basic tenets of Russian nationalism (indeed, of any brand of nationalism) and Marxism-Leninism. The very fact that the essence of nationalism is concern for the preservation and well-being of a single nation places it in opposition to the internationalist or supranationalist orientation of Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism can make no more than a temporary, pragmatic alliance with nationalism; ultimately it seeks to overcome and eradicate it. Whatever their private sentiments may be, the Soviet leaders have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to internationalism, i.e., to the well-being of all working people, on an equal basis, regardless of nationality, and to the eradication of national differences. This commitment and the progress they can cite toward achieving it are among the most important justifications they claim, both for the existence of the Soviet system and, in effect, for Russian rule over non-Russians. The very fact, then, that there is a widely held body of sentiment which rejects internationalism and posits the interests and future of one nation as its central concern is a sign that one of the most basic, system-legitimizing
values in Soviet political life is being rejected and hence that the system contains a significant element of instability. 46

In this context it is particularly important to emphasize that, as the previous section of this essay made clear, Russian nationalism is not by any means a movement composed exclusively of dissidents, of individuals far removed from and without hope of influencing the political establishment. An astute observer of the Soviet political system has stated that political stability in the USSR is to a significant degree contingent upon community of assumptions or worldview among political and other elites. 47 This community or unity has been essential in making the Party impervious to political opposition, in insuring continuity of doctrine and basic policy direction, and in sustaining popular acceptance of and support for Party rule. The spontaneous resurgence of Russian nationalism among the political elite, part of which remains strongly internationalist in its orientation, has already done a great deal to shatter this unity, dissolve this community, and hence to destroy one of the main sources of political stability in the USSR.

The contradiction between Russian nationalism and official ideology, the challenge Russian nationalism presents to official political values and basic systemic tenets and hence its threat to systemic stability, becomes even clearer when one considers the fact that a substantial portion of the Russian nationalist movement specifically and in some cases quite explicitly denounces Marxism-Leninism and its central doctrines or objectives. Of course this is more true of those whom the regime has persecuted -- VSKhSON, Solzhenitsyn and his circle, some contributors to Veche. However, even many of the "legal" Russian nationalists view Marxism-Leninism as an alien import which has done more harm than good to the Russian people. Many -- both dissidents and
"legals" -- seek an alternative source of values, which they tend to find in the pre-revolutionary, pre-industrial past and in religion. Rejecting the official doctrine that it was the October Revolution and the radical transformation it accomplished which brought salvation to an oppressed Russia, they seek to preserve as much continuity as possible between the way of life of the Russian people in the present and that of their ancestors in the past. Some openly praise the Tsarist regime; others denigrate the notion of class struggle in Russian society, lauding the so-called reactionary elements in pre-revolutionary Russia or denouncing collectivization and the destruction of the Russian peasantry which accompanied it. Many explicitly oppose both industrialization and scientific and technical progress, the two goals which, along with socialism itself, constitute the central objective and ideal of Marxism-Leninism. Industrialization, they claim, destroyed the Russian village and the values and culture it nurtured. The scientific and technological revolution has left a spiritual vacuum, which official ideology has not filled. The urbanization which industrialization and scientific and technological progress have fostered has had a devastating effect on Russian fertility, threatening the very existence of the Russian people. Above all, many Russian nationalists, even many closely linked to the establishment, seek to return the Russian people to their traditional religion, which they see as the spiritual foundation of the nation. They strongly condemn Marxism-Leninism's hostility to religion and plead for a much greater role for the Orthodox Church in Russian society. This is indeed quite fundamental dissent, reflecting the existence of forces which are not reconciled to basic values of the system.
If the resurgence of Russian nationalism is in itself a sign of instability in the Soviet political system, the movement also contains the potential for generating further, more serious instability. Its destabilizing effects may arise from its impact on both Russians and, indirectly, on non-Russians. Let us consider the latter group first.

Russian Nationalism and the Non-Russians

To anyone who makes a comparative survey of the political situation in the numerous multi-ethnic states which exist in the world today it is immediately apparent that the USSR has been quite successful in containing and alleviating ethnic tensions. In particular, by contemporary international standards, there is in the USSR relatively little minority protest, especially violent protest, against the ethnic majority and the system dominated and imposed by it.

There are a number of reasons for this. Very probably one of the most salient is the nature of Soviet nationality policy and practices up to now. Indeed, it may be argued that official nationality policy and practices, although unable finally to "solve" the nationality problem, have nonetheless constituted one of the key stabilizing forces in the Soviet political system. The official commitment to the equality of all national groups which was discussed above has been one important component of that policy.54 Another has been the care taken by the regime throughout most of its history to condemn and restrain Russian nationalism. The Soviet leaders have been extremely sensitive to the danger posed by Great Russian chauvinism, its potential for disrupting the frangible multinational edifice on which the Soviet system rests.56 Hence they have firmly denounced such chauvinism and to some extent have even denied the Russian people some of the official
recognition and opportunities for national self-expression extended to other ethnic groups in the USSR. Most important, the Soviets have carefully pursued what might be described as a concessionary and compensatory nationality policy. While they have allowed the non-Russian peoples little autonomy in handling political and economic affairs and have vigorously suppressed overt expression of nationalism on the part of non-Russians, they have granted the minority nationalities a very considerable degree of administrative autonomy and extensive opportunities to develop their own cultures and employ their own languages. Moreover, although they have given most non-Russian nationalities little opportunity to participate in the governance of the USSR, they have accorded the largest of the minority groups, the Ukrainians, a very significant role in ruling and administering the country. In addition, they have compensated the non-Russians generally with extensive symbolic representation at the center and with very substantial economic benefits.

It is the possibility that the rise of Russian nationalism may substantially alter this carefully devised and pursued nationality policy that, above all, renders the movement a significant threat to political stability in the USSR. Such a situation might come about in a number of ways. In the first place, should the regime simply appear to endorse the extreme racist and chauvinist views of some of the Russian nationalists, this would be a major deviation from previous policy and would, in and of itself, be highly provocative to the non-Russian peoples.

It is true that the most blatant expression of Russian nationalist racism up to now was published illegally in samizdat. This was a denunciation of "random hybridization" of the races in the USSR on the grounds
that it would lead to the biological degeneration of the Russian nation. However, the official press has echoed such sentiments. A contributor to the journal *Voprosy istorii* approvingly discussed the views of Russian scholar L.M. Gumilev, who argued that since ethnically mixed marriages result in genetically inferior offspring, and hence in inferior states and social institutions, intermarriage between Russians and others would lead to national self-destruction. Moreover, it was a high Komsomol official who circulated a manifesto demanding sterilization of Russian women who "give themselves to foreigners.

Equally provocative to the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR are Russian nationalist paeans to the greatness of the Russian people, their "healthy" civilization, and their superior national spirit or soul, some of which have likewise appeared in the official press. It is not only VSKhSON members and other dissidents, but a well-known literary critic with excellent establishment connections, speaking openly at an officially sponsored seminar, who has insisted that the Russian people have a special exalted mission, a unique "word to say" to all other peoples. If the chauvinism and xenophobia expressed in *Veche* are more extreme than what appears in works which pass the censor, *Molodaia gvardiia, Moskva*, and other organs of the official press are known for their fierce anti-semitism and hostility to non-Russians generally, especially Soviet Asiatics and other non-Slavs. References to Russia as the "first among equals" among the nations of the USSR are becoming more and more frequent in the mass media, and history lessons in non-Russian schools apparently are increasingly stressing the contributions made by Russians to the development of the USSR and belittling by their silence those made by non-Russians.
Expression of views of this sort has already had significant political consequences. Knowledgeable observers claim it has played a major role in triggering and intensifying outbursts of minority nationalism.\textsuperscript{67} Apparently it has generated considerable inter-ethnic tension in the Soviet armed forces.\textsuperscript{68} If the authorities allow arrogant sentiments like these to be articulated more often in official forums and in so doing become increasingly identified with Russian nationalist ideas, the resentment which at present is directed primarily against Russians themselves will more and more be turned against the regime and the system.

Should Russian nationalist views have a direct impact on policy, the political consequences are likely to be even more serious. Consider, for example, nationalist demands that the regime permit a revival of the Russian cultural, religious and military-patriotic heritage. To a certain extent, these demands have already had an impact: they resulted in the creation of the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, whose members visit museums to view Russian artistic treasures, help to restore icons, and take trips to important Russian battlefields, all under official auspices. The more the regime indulges demands of this sort, however, the more it will create for itself an acute political problem. The more it gives free reign to the cultural, religious, and historical quest of the Russian nationalists, the more it will find itself pressed to be equally tolerant of minority nationalisms expressed in similar quests. But this it has been and is likely to be most loath to do.

Even if the tenets of Russian nationalism contradict those of Marxism-Leninism, on a practical level most Russian nationalists have been supportive of the Soviet state and system or have at least sought and usually
achieved a *modus vivendi* with them. The same is not true of most minority nationalism, however. Efforts to revive and develop Russian culture have been efforts to promote a culture which has always been the dominant one in the USSR, a culture which the regime has urged non-Russians to adopt as their own -- a culture the dissemination of which has been highly useful to the regime as an instrument of political integration and domination. Thus such efforts, while contradictory to official ideology, have not generally been directed against official policy. Similarly, interest in Russian Orthodoxy is interest in a religion which is the cradle of the dominant culture and a religion which has actively cooperated with and supported the Soviet state. Hence the regime has not always found such interest objectionable. In contrast, efforts to revive and develop minority cultures and religions have usually been directed against the Russifying thrust of official policy. Similarly, celebration of the deeds of Russian heroes -- of explorers and generals who helped the Russian empire expand -- has implied approval of the perpetuation of that empire. Praise for non-Russian military and political figures, on the other hand, has generally implied praise for resistance to Russian domination and advocacy of a major change in the political status quo. Such praise, therefore, has been and is likely to be regarded as politically subversive and hence unacceptable.

Thus the more the regime indulges Russian nationalism and its search for spiritual roots and historical continuity, the more it will establish a double standard. The activities of the Russian nationalists are likely to become a model for non-Russians, but their aspirations to imitate the model will be repressed. Such discrimination among nationalisms in favor of the Russian variety will undoubtedly arouse intense resentment against the regime on the
part of non-Russians. Indeed, it has already become a major issue, capable of arousing strong passions, in the increasingly assertive dissent of minority nationalists. Such resentment and such passions do not augur well for political stability in the USSR.

Still more potentially inimical to political stability is the possibility that the regime might abandon its compensatory and concessionary nationality policy in response to Russian nationalist pressure. If the demands made by Russian nationalists are heeded, the political strength of the Russians would be significantly increased at the expense of the non-Russians. This would undoubtedly mean that the politically crucial Russian-Ukrainian partnership in ruling the country would be dissolved or greatly attenuated. It would probably also mean that even the limited, yet symbolically significant, non-Russian presence at the center of the political system would be noticeably reduced.

Equally serious, Russian nationalist influence on policy would very probably result in a major reduction in the economic benefits enjoyed by the non-Russians. There are three possibilities in this regard. One current of thought within the Russian nationalist movement favors a drastic decrease in the pace of economic growth in the USSR. Those who take this position argue that a high level of economic growth can only be sustained at the expense of Russian interests, since it is only or primarily Russians who constitute a suitable labor force for industrial development. Thus it is Russians, already the most urbanized of the major nationalities, who would be taken from their native villages and resettled in large industrial centers. This would have (as it already has had) a drastic effect on their culture, their values, and their fertility -- i.e., on their identity and survival as an ethnic
If the regime were to comply with the demands of the nationalists who argue in these terms, the living standards of all Soviet citizens would decline or cease to improve, and non-Russians would surely feel the pinch as much or more than Russians. Alternatively, there is another school of thought within the movement which sees a major increase in Soviet military might, accompanied by a more forcible and expansionist foreign policy, as redounding to the glory of the Russian people. Their program would inevitably result in a major shift of resources away from consumption into the military sector. As with the case of a low-growth policy, the living standards of all citizens would be negatively affected, those of non-Russians as much or more than those of Russians. Moreover, if some Russian nationalists had their way, there would be a significant transfer of resources from Russians to non-Russians. A higher proportion of well-paying jobs in the non-Russian republics would be preserved for Russians, and there would be a major shift in the allocation of investment and consumption resources from non-Russian to Russian areas. Official efforts to reduce economic disparities among the national groups and republics would be ended, and special efforts would be made to develop Russian agriculture and improve the living conditions of the Russian peasants.

There could be no better recipe for vastly increasing existing tensions between Russians and non-Russians in the USSR than a political and economic program of this sort. The lack of positions open to non-Russians in the Party and state apparatus is already an important grievance of minority elites. The perceived prosperity of Russians relative to non-Russians is likewise already widely resented. As it is, many non-Russians believe that the Russians are exploiting them. Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians,
Latvians, and Lithuanians have tried to demonstrate to the regime that their republics contribute more to the central budget than they receive. There are increasing signs of conflict between Russians and other groups over economic development funds. Such conflicts are likely to intensify even if there is no change in present allocation policy, since both the need for resources on the part of some of the major non-Russian populations and expectations that the need will be fulfilled have been growing rapidly. (It has been pointed out that the extraordinarily high birthrate among Central Asians means that enormous capital expenditures will be required in the coming decades simply to clothe, feed, house and employ these peoples at current levels. At the same time, the past efforts of the Soviet leadership to equalize regional development and provide jobs for native cadres have generated a revolution of rising expectations among both masses and elites. Up to now the regime has been able to justify its failure to achieve its stated goal of equal development on economic and military grounds. These justifications are likely to seem far less compelling in the future. They will thus be of little avail in persuading non-Russians to accept less-than-equal benefits.

At present the struggle for consumption and investment funds from the center is waged more among republics than against the center. Should the rise of the Russian nationalist movement result in a policy which blatantly favors Russians and the RSFSR over all other ethnic groups and areas, one can expect that this would unite non-Russians against the regime which implemented such a policy. For this reason the tensions which would be generated by abandoning the compensatory policies now pursued would have most serious
consequences for the Soviet regime and system. Even if those policies have up to now been implemented only to a limited degree, even if they represent intention and public commitment more than fulfillment, a change in the status quo would be extremely destabilizing.

Similarly likely to generate such tensions and hence similarly potentially destabilizing would be a move on the part of the regime to withdraw or substantially reduce the concessions it now makes to minority aspirations for autonomy. There is a strong tendency within the Russian nationalist movement which wants the Soviet state to adopt a more repressive approach to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Adherents of this tendency desire a more powerful, centralized state, which will facilitate greater Russian control over non-Russian areas. They admire the expansionist, imperialist policy of the pre-revolutionary Russian state and urge its Soviet successor to impose similarly undiluted Russian rule on the non-Russian subjects of the empire. Some even seem to be critical of Soviet federalism, which they would prefer to replace with a unitary Soviet state dominated by Russians. Others call for the incorporation into the RSFSR of other republics which have large Russian populations -- Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, the Tartar and Bashkir ASSR's, Karelia. At the very least, these Russian nationalists are determined to preserve the Russian empire intact and would firmly repress what one of them calls the "zoological nationalisms of the borderlands" which endanger the unity of the USSR. Nationalists of this ilk are highly enthusiastic about Russian colonization of non-Russian areas of the USSR and view the natives who oppose it as "hotheaded" and reactionary. Some are likewise eager to see the
non-Russian peoples thoroughly Russified, although they do not generally favor intermarriage.  

Some adherents of this "statist" tendency would deprive the non-Russians not only of much of the administratively, cultural, and linguistic autonomy they now possess, but also of much of the liberty accorded them in the post-Stalin era. Most of the nationalists who favor expansion of Russian control and influence over non-Russians are also neo-Stalinists who favor the use of force and terror to repress minority resistance to their program.

There can be no doubt that if ideas such as these were to influence official policy, the result would be highly explosive and the stability of the Soviet political system would be very seriously jeopardized. If the compensatory aspects of Soviet nationality policy even now are deemed inadequate by many non-Russians, the concessions now granted to minority aspirations for self-determination are widely regarded as even less satisfactory (albeit not insignificant). Centralization of political and economic decision-making is already a major grievance of non-Russian elites, who feel that they and their interests are inadequately represented. Lack of political autonomy is likewise widely resented by minority elites. The very compensations already accorded these elites -- the extensive opportunities for educational advancement and training -- will in the future render more and more of them increasingly capable of administering the affairs of their republics on their own and hence increasingly discontent with the constraints placed upon them. Already some of these elites have begun to call for very substantial political change. Forty prominent Estonian intellectuals wrote an open letter to Pravda in October, 1980, for example, demanding that the Estonian people be granted "the final word on the destiny of their land and
people. If the degree of autonomy accorded non-Russians is significantly reduced, one can expect to hear similar and even more radical demands voiced more and more frequently.

Russian settlement outside the RSFSR is also a highly sensitive political issue. Present levels of Russian immigration from the RSFSR into non-Russian areas have resulted in major anti-Russian riots and mass demonstrations. On a number of occasions thousands of citizens have marched in the major cities of Central Asia and the Baltic states, demanding that the Russians leave their republics. In some instances the demonstrations were so violent they have to be put down by Russian troops. Even high-level officials with much to gain by cooperating with the central authorities have begun openly to complain about the influx of Russians into their regions. There is every reason to expect that minority resistance to any significant increase in the scale of Russian colonization would be even more massive and difficult to control.

The picture is similar with regard to Russification. Even present policies, involving not only tolerance of native cultures and language use, but also expenditure of large sums on promotion of non-Russian literature, art, and language instruction, are deemed insufficient by many non-Russians. Recent efforts by the regime to expand Russian language instruction and somewhat curtail the use of local languages have caused thousands to sign petitions and take to the streets in angry protest. Even the symbols of Russian domination (as opposed to the substance) have been the targets of non-Russian violence.

Should official policy come to be guided by Russian nationalist views, one could expect that protest of this sort would be very greatly
intensified. Demands for major systemic change would surely be voiced with
great frequency, as the non-Russian peoples became convinced that a one-party
police state with a highly centralized economy and administrative structure
dominated by Russians could never meet their needs or serve their interests.
The amount of anti-regime violence would probably escalate significantly as
increasingly confident, nationally conscious elites began to give political
direction to what previously had been periodic anomic upsurges in anti-Russian
sentiment. A repressive response to such protest, which would be very likely
on the part of a regime swayed by Russian nationalism, would probably only
incite more violence and more widespread demands for systemic change.

Should a process of this sort be set in motion, one might well begin to
see extensive non-cooperation with the authorities on the part of
non-Russians, both masses and elites. Since non-Russians are playing a
steadily increasing role in the Soviet labor force generally and in the
scientific and technical workforce in particular, this would probably result
in a substantial decline in productivity and hence in a significant reduction
in economic growth. The use of non-rational or non-economic criteria in the
allocation of investment in response to Russian nationalist demands would
probably have the same effect. The work of Soviet economists indicates, for
example, that the country's agriculture will suffer very greatly should
Russian nationalists succeed in preventing redirection of Russian rivers to
supply Central Asia with water. Should Russian nationalist pressure lead
the regime to avoid major investments in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the
regions in which the main bulk of new recruits into the labor force will be
located in the coming decades, Soviet industrial performance may likewise be
quite adversely affected. A generally worsening economic situation resulting
from these factors would be likely to deepen minority discontent and thus intensify the destabilizing impact of Russian nationalism on the Soviet political system.95

Russian Nationalism and the Russians

The destabilizing effects of the rise of Russian nationalism are likely to be felt primarily through the impact of the movement on official policy and non-Russian reactions to that policy. But it could also have an impact on the stability of the Soviet political system through its influence on the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of the Russian population of the USSR.

Let us remember, first of all, that portions of the Russian nationalist movement are highly critical of the Soviet system. They condemn it and its leaders for having destroyed the basis of Russian identity and sacrificed the Russian nation in their drive for economic and military power and societal reconstruction. If repeated often enough, this criticism could help to undermine the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of many Russians. Should this occur, it would be of enormous political significance, since it is the Russians' acceptance of and support for the Soviet system which have constituted one of the most important stabilizing factors in Soviet political life. A weakening of the system's legitimacy among Russians would be more likely to occur if the Russian nationalist movement is frustrated in its efforts to influence policy and many Russians come to see the regime as highly unsympathetic to their needs and interests. Hence, paradoxically, even if the movement is a political failure, it may be a significant destabilizing force.

In addition, should the rise of Russian nationalism not only increase Russian self-awareness, but also encourage Russian arrogance, chauvinism, and hostility toward non-Russians, the consequences for the stability of the
Soviet political system could be most serious. High-handedness on the part of Russian officials toward non-Russians is already a widespread and deeply resented phenomenon. Incidents of Russian violence against non-Russians are likewise even now not infrequent. The spread of Russian nationalist ideas about Russian superiority and entitlement to greater economic benefits could encourage both sorts of behavior, as could Russian nationalist xenophobia and calls for repression of minority nationalism. By inciting Russians against non-Russians, Russian nationalism could help to make life in the USSR intolerable for the latter. The probable result would be similar to the consequences likely to flow from Russian nationalist influence on official policy: radical political protest by the minorities and large-scale minority violence directed against the regime which tolerated such behavior. In the coming decades the need either to locate a considerable portion of new industry in labor-rich Central Asia and Transcaucasia or to send Central Asians and Transcaucasians to industrial sites in the RSFSR is likely to result in significantly more contact between Russians and non-Russians than now exists. This will render the potentially destabilizing impact of Russian nationalism all the greater.

**Russian Nationalism: A Stabilizing Force?**

A discussion of the potential impact of Russian nationalism on the stability of the Soviet political system should not ignore the fact that the movement is by no means united on all important issues. If some of the ideas voiced by certain Russian nationalists were to become the basis of policy, they would probably tend to increase support for the regime and system among minority groups. Some nationalists, for example, oppose Russian settlement outside the RSFSR on the grounds that the dispersion of the Russian people
will lead to its disintegration and ultimate extinction as a distinct ethnic group. Russians, they argue, should reconverge on the Russian Republic, where they would become a more compact ethnic group and would be able to develop greater self-consciousness as a nation. Similarly, there are Russian nationalists who advocate political and economic decentralization, and others favor universal guarantees of freedom of expression and religious worship. Some explicitly stress that every ethnic group should have the right to cultivate and express its unique values and identity. Most significantly, there are even Russian nationalists who believe the Russian rule over non-Russians is imprudent or immoral and gravely threatens Russian cohesion and self-preservation. They would allow most minority groups to secede from the USSR so that a truly Russian state, ruled exclusively by and for Russians, could be established.

It is unlikely, however, that views such as these could ever influence official policy. In the first place, they are expressed by only a tiny handful of members of the movement, most of whom are now in exile and all of whom are located on the uppermost part of the Russian nationalist continuum presented earlier. That is, these are nationalists who could not achieve a modus vivendi with the regime because their ideas constitute a direct challenge to the three most central principles of Soviet political practice: Party rule, Russian political dominance, and the power of the Soviet state. At most these nationalists -- former VSKhSON members, Solzhenitsyn and his circle, Osipov and some Veche contributors -- could have an effect through their impact on the thought and behavior of Russians themselves. Their ideas could help to discourage Russian arrogance and chauvinism and thereby aid in the reduction of interethnic tension and minority resentment of Russian
rule. It would appear that at least one representative of this "coexistential" trend in Russian nationalism has indeed exerted considerable influence on certain segments of the Russian intelligentsia. This is, of course, Solzhenitsyn. However, there is little indication that Solzhenitsyn's ideas appeal to the Russian masses, and it is by and large his interest in reviving Russian culture, religion, and village life -- not his political views or attitudes toward non-Russians -- which have gained currency among Russian intellectuals. Thus although in theory the "coexistentialists" could have a stabilizing impact on Soviet political life, in fact it is unlikely they will do so.

**Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics**

We have seen that the dominant trend in Russian nationalism constitutes a destabilizing force primarily because of its potential for rousing the non-Russian population against the regime should that trend succeed in influencing official policy. The importance of this force thus depends to a significant extent on the likelihood that it will indeed have an impact on policy. How can we gauge that likelihood? Two lines of inquiry or sets of questions suggest themselves. First, what indications are there (if any) that Russian nationalism has already found sympathy at the top; what has been the stance of the regime toward those Russian nationalist ideas and demands which have provoked and are likely to provoke non-Russian discontent? Second, how influential is this more provocative trend in Russian nationalism within the political establishment; how likely is it that the new leadership will be swayed by or compelled to make concessions to it?

**The Soviet Regime and Russian Nationalism**

The new General Secretary has not yet given much indication of his views regarding Russian nationalism. Nor has the new regime taken distinctive
policy initiatives which clearly reveal its position on this subject. At this juncture, therefore, any analysis of the impact of Russian nationalism on top-level thinking and decision-making must focus on the Brezhnev regime, during whose tenure the movement's resurgence occurred.

The position of the Brezhnev regime and of Brezhnev himself toward Russian nationalism was highly complex and more than a little ambiguous. It appears that there were considerable differences of opinion on this matter within the Politburo. With regard to Brezhnev personally, some believe that he was himself a Russian nationalist, others that he was a firm opponent of Russian nationalism, and still others that he has found it necessary or desirable to tolerate the Russian nationalists, to concede to them, and/or to cooperate with them and lend them his support. Finally, there are those who argue that he has found it useful to take a centrist position between the Russian nationalists and their opponents, balancing off the two groups against one another. In fact, there is probably some truth in each of these interpretations.

There is certainly evidence that the regime as a whole and Brezhnev in particular regarded certain manifestations of Russian nationalism as quite dangerous and thus firmly opposed them. Attempts to evade Party control in order to express Russian nationalist ideas were invariably suppressed: publication in *samizdat* or abroad, formation of groups or committees without official approval or supervision, organization of religious observance or study outside the aegis of the official church. There were also certain Russian nationalist views which, when expressed too explicitly and stridently in an official forum, were pronounced unacceptable. A series of articles which appeared in *Molodaia gvardiia* between 1968 and 1970 were condemned by Brezhnev personally at a special Politburo session in the fall of 1970. An authoritative article in *Kommunist*, published soon after, indicated that their non-Marxist approach to pre-revolutionary Russian history
(an approach which diminished the significance of the Revolution and the achievements of the Party), their blatant chauvinism (which could antagonize non-Russians), and their manifest neo-Stalinism (which could lead to a revival of personal dictatorship and large-scale terror) were what made them unacceptable. Brezhnev emphasized, too, that their extremely positive assessment of the role of religion in Russian society -- their attempt in effect to propose that Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church serve as the main source of inspiration and values to contemporary Russians -- was intolerable.112

What the regime's move against Molodaia gvardiia did not make clear, however, was whether it was the ideas expressed in its pages, the extremely strident and explicit form in which they were expressed, or the expression of them in a journal known for its close ties to the establishment, which rendered them beyond the pale. Official policy after 1970 indicated that the attempt to rediscover, revive, and rehabilitate even the most reactionary aspects of the Russian past would be acceptable if it were carried out in ways which were not excessively provocative. Assertion of Russian distinctiveness and uniqueness, commendation of Stalin's methods of rule, and praise for Russian Orthodoxy as an institution and source of values would likewise be permissible if expressed discreetly, with restraint, and in forums which did not seem to indicate that these ideas reflected the position of the regime. Instead of speaking in glowing terms about specific Russian heroes who contributed to Russian expansion at the expense of non-Russians, nationalist writers learned they must confine themselves to abstract generalizations about the need "to preserve what was positive in the historical past."113 They must not openly extol the deeds of the Tsars, but they might indirectly commend "faithful service to the Tsar and Fatherland" and praise the "positive historical role" played by the Russian princes in the formation of the Russian state.114 They could not condemn the
Revolution, but they could describe the period of Ancient Rus as a uniquely heroic time, in which the contemporary moral ideal of the Russian people was formed.\textsuperscript{115} Russian nationalist writers could not glorify the Russian national soul, but they could speak admiringly of the special "spiritual values acquired by the [Russian] people in their thousand-year history."\textsuperscript{116} They must not defend the terror of the 1930's, but they might insist on Stalin's greatness and justify nearly every other aspect of his rule.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, they must not present Russian Orthodoxy as the basis of the spiritual strength of the Russian people, but they might quietly suggest that modern Russian society suffers because the influence of the Church has declined.\textsuperscript{118} Russian nationalists were free, in other words, to make their ideas heard, so long as they did so in moderation and in legally approved forums, yet without the appearance of speaking for the regime.

To insure that these ideas did not seem to represent the dominant line or policy of the Party, the regime saw to it that they were periodically criticized.\textsuperscript{119} Brezhnev himself was among the critics.\textsuperscript{120} However, extremely zealous criticism of the nationalists was proscribed along with extremely zealous nationalism. Thus when the Acting Head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, Aleksandr Iakovlev, followed up the Kommunist critique of Molodaia gvardiia with a much stronger, far more thorough and detailed condemnation of the offending articles and others like them, he had great difficulty publishing this piece. When it finally appeared after almost a year had passed, Iakovlev was dismissed from his post and sent off to Canada to take up the considerably less prestigious and less powerful position of Soviet Ambassador there.\textsuperscript{121} This suggests that at least some portion of the leadership, perhaps Brezhnev himself, was either sympathetic to the nationalists or found it politically useful to see to it that they were allowed to express their views.
Moreover, throughout the last decade the Brezhnev regime made many concessions to Russian national pride and ethnic feeling. Indeed, it seems to have been attempting to coopt Russian nationalism and manipulate it for its own purposes. In contrast to its predecessor, this regime not only did not oppose the formation of voluntary societies for the preservation of Russian historical and cultural monuments, it provided them with official recognition and sponsorship. It revived the Stalinist modus vivendi with the Russian Orthodox Church which Khrushchev's aggressive anti-religious campaign had largely shattered. Tolerance of the Church was explicitly urged in the press, and the government devoted considerable effort to the regilding and remounting of Church crosses. Prestigious official facilities were granted for the performance of drama and the exhibition of works of art with Russian nationalist themes. Russian nationalist symbols and images also frequently appeared in the official media, especially in Komsomol organs. Even Tsarist Russia and its conquests were sometimes lauded in mass propaganda, including that directed to the non-Russians.

Representatives of minority groups were encouraged or required to accord the Russians lavish praise and homage. Brezhnev himself paid special tribute to the Russian people, albeit in more understated fashion. He stressed the "special historical role" of the "great Russian people" and of the Russian Republic in the development of the USSR and described the RSFSR as the "first among equals" among the union republics. It would seem that the regime not only tolerated, but was actually encouraging the growth of Russian national self-awareness and the expression of Russian ethnocentrism.
What may be of even greater significance, official policies on a number of important issues were very similar to some of those advocated by Russian nationalists. These issues include the demographic balance, the distribution of political power, economic and administrative organization, resource allocation, language policy, and minority rights and freedoms.

The regime cautiously took a number of steps to try to increase the birthrate among Russians and reduce that of the Central Asians. In addition to exhorting Russians to have more children, it encouraged scholarly investigation of ways of promoting differentiated birthrates in different republics and regions; announced a policy of encouraging two- and three-child families, rather than larger ones, so as to equalize the birthrates of the various republics and nations; and offered inducements to Central Asian women to enter the labor force. 129

The political power of Russians vis-à-vis other ethnic groups was enlarged in the Brezhnev years. The proportion of second secretaries in the non-Russian republics who are Russians is now higher than it was under Khrushchev. Russian domination of the central government apparatus is now even more complete than it was in the Stalin era. Even Ukrainians, to whom Khrushchev allotted an important role at the center, have been increasingly excluded from positions of power in the Kremlin. 130 Control over the army, in Khrushchev's day to a significant degree shared with the Ukrainians, is now much more completely in Russian hands. 131 Russian power has been reinforced by a pronounced tendency in the Brezhnev period to concentrate more and more economic decision-making in Moscow and establish greater central control over all regions. 132
There has likewise been a notable tendency to favor the RSFSR in the allocation of investment resources. Almost from the very moment he came to power Brezhnev began to urge that the Party devote more attention to the agriculture of the large, long-neglected non-black earth zone of Central Russia. His efforts bore fruit in the April, 1974 resolution of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers to undertake a "total restructuring" of the agricultural system of the region through massive land reclamation. As a result of this decision, there was a significant slowdown in investment in rural areas in other union republics. The growth in investment in the non-black earth zone was at least twice as large as that in the USSR as a whole during the 11th five-year plan (1976-1980), while total agricultural spending fell markedly in comparison to the previous plan period. Since the climate in other areas, such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, is far milder and more favorable for agriculture, the opportunity cost of this investment may have been higher than the returns it will yield. Nonetheless, the regime has committed itself to invest heavily in this historic Russian heartland through at least 1990. Major investments were also made in Siberia throughout the 1970's, while diversion of Siberian rivers to poorly irrigated Central Asia was repeatedly delayed. Higher priority was given to another diversion plan which would benefit Russian agriculture. The ratio of total per capita investment in the RSFSR to the mean for the other union republics increased sharply in the period for which the comparison has been expertly computed (1965-1975). Moreover, articles in the official press through the end of the Brezhnev period indicated that the regime was prepared to take additional, even more far-reaching measures to transfer resources from the non-Russian peoples and republics to the Russians and the RSFSR.

The nationality policy of the Brezhnev regime also resembled the
preferences of Russian nationalists in some important respects. One of these was the strong emphasis on linguistic Russification. In 1978 the Council of Ministers secretly adopted a set of measures designed to greatly intensify and accelerate the teaching of Russian to non-Russians. These measures were reinforced by the recommendations of a major conference on the Russian language held in Tashkent the following year. The new program extended compulsory instruction in Russian down to the kindergarten level (instead of the sixth grade) in the non-Russian republics and significantly increased the time allocated to such instruction at all levels. The regime's strong-handed approach to manifestations of local nationalism was another element in its policy which Russian nationalists have favored. The leadership did not hesitate to use force to suppress demonstrations on behalf of minority rights and freedoms and summarily dismissed republic Party secretaries who displayed "laxity" in controlling such nationalism.

The congruence between certain policies of the Brezhnev regime and some of the demands and proposals of Russian nationalists does not by any means indicate that the regime as a whole was fully or even largely in agreement with them. It was undoubtedly quite cognizant of the destabilizing potential of Russian nationalism and is therefore extremely wary of it. This is suggested not only by the fact that the Politburo as a group and Brezhnev personally strongly criticized some of the more explicit expressions of Russian nationalism, but the additional fact that two full members of the Politburo, Polianskii and Shelepin, were dismissed from that body apparently for too openly patronizing Russian nationalists and promoting Russian national interests. Insofar as the regime acted in accord with the spirit of Russian nationalist
ideas, it clearly avoided extreme measures: it did not eliminate the union republics or place new restrictions on their sovereignty; it did not abolish the Council of Nationalities or remove all non-Russians from the Politburo; it did not cease to invest in non-Russian areas or withdraw central government subsidies from minority cultural institutions and programs; it did not employ coercion or even strong incentives to try to limit the Central Asian birthrate or prevent intermarriage of Russians and others. Most important, it did not abandon its public commitment to internationalism -- i.e., to equal treatment and ultimate integration of all national groups in the USSR. Moreover, even those of the regime's policies which seem to reflect the views of Russian nationalists were not necessarily adopted as a result of their influence or the impact of their ideas. Each of these measures, if taken in isolation, could be explained on other grounds. However, taken together, they do seem to indicate a pattern of acceptance of key Russian nationalist arguments -- those regarding the importance of Russian demographic, political, linguistic, and cultural dominance and the desirability of promoting the economic prosperity of the Russian homeland. Given Brezhnev's own ethnocentric pronouncements, it can probably be inferred that he was to some extent personally sympathetic to or inclined to agreed with these arguments. Well-informed observers believe that this was also true of a significant number of his Politburo colleagues. Given that an influential opponent of Russian nationalism was silenced because of his excessive ardor; given, too, the regime's general tolerance of Russian nationalism and efforts to coopt and manipulate it, one can
surely conclude that powerful members of the leadership, probably including Brezhnev himself, saw both the need for making concessions to the movement and even the utility of being identified with it to a limited degree. Perhaps they hoped to contain and channel it, to prevent it from becoming in its entirety what some of its members had already become -- a frustrated, alienated opposition. Perhaps, too, they hoped by associating themselves with it in measured ways to win a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their numerous Russian constituents which their internationalist ideology had failed to gain for them.

Russian Nationalism and the Future of Soviet Politics

How much influence is Russian nationalism likely to have in the future? Is its impact on policy likely to increase, remain at its present level, or diminish? As was stated above, too little evidence can be gleaned from Andropov's pronouncements and policy initiatives to give us a good sense of his views on the subject. The meager evidence we do have suggests that, like Brezhnev, the new Secretary General holds highly complex and ambivalent opinions on the matter. On the one hand, he seems to be extremely sensitive to the problems engendered by the existence of the Russian nationalist movement and concerned to deflect minority hostility away from the regime. On the other hand, he appears to be in agreement with some of the more provocative Russian nationalist ideas and prepared to make concessions to their proponents. It is not clear, however, that his personal inclinations, even if one could gauge them, will be decisive. Of at least equal significance for any effort to assess the
probable future impact of Russian nationalism is an examination of the strength of the movement within the political establishment, i.e., among the political elites who comprise the chief constituency of the new leadership, whose opinions that leadership will be constrained and inclined to heed, and from whom that leadership has been and will be drawn. Also important to such an assessment is an analysis of the factors which explain the appeal of Russian nationalism to those elites and an evaluation of the likelihood that those factors will persist.

There is good a priori reason to assume that Russian nationalism has won few enthusiasts among the Soviet political elite. One would not expect that an ideology which rejects fundamental system-legitimizing values would be attractive to those who represent the system, to individuals and groups whose livelihood, status, and power -- perhaps even physical survival -- depend on the preservation of that system. Nor would one anticipate that the governors and administrators of the USSR would readily embrace doctrines that are likely to antagonize much of the population which will soon constitute a majority in the country. Yet it is apparently no exaggeration to say that Russian nationalism has permeated the entire political establishment. Knowledgeable emigres report that its adherents are to be found in all major institutions at all levels, and in all major groups within the establishment. They maintain that the movement is so well organized that it
is appropriate to describe it as a political party: the "Russian Party" is the name that many nationalists themselves use. They assert that the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiia is not only dominated by, but is in effect an organ of this party, and the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK) is the party's organizational base. 145

Although VOOPIK is bureaucratically a part of the Ministry of Culture, each of its numerous local branches is reportedly headed by a KGB official. For this reason the "Russian Party" is not only described as closely linked to the KGB; the two organizations are depicted as coming increasingly to overlap. 146 It is not simply that the KGB wishes to control the movement, which is surely true. Many police officials are apparently eager to encourage Russian nationalism because they view its authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies as a useful counter to pressures for liberalization, expansion of minority rights and increased contact with the West. They see it, in other words, as a force which, if potentially disruptive, can also help to promote order and discipline in Soviet society. 147

Russian nationalism also seems to be highly influential in those organizations which not only share with the KGB responsibility for maintaining order and discipline, but which also are charged with mobilizing, inspiring, and socializing Soviet youth. These are the Komsomol, the paramilitary voluntary society (DOSAAF), and the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces (MPA). 148 The movement is openly supported at the highest levels in these organizations: its adherents include the First Secretary of the Komsomol, B.N. Pastukhov, many members of the Komsomol Central Committee, 149 and the head of the MPA, General A. Epishev. 150 Russian nationalism is regarded by officials who deal with youth as helpful in inducing participation
in the large economic development projects which the regime periodically launches. It is viewed as useful in encouraging patriotism, loyalty and devotion to the Soviet state and system. It is increasingly recognized in official circles that Marxism-Leninism has failed to interest and excite the younger generation, and that Russian nationalism can serve as a kind of substitute ideology -- one which is capable of exploiting incomparably deep-seated feelings and prejudices.

This ideology appears to have numerous adherents in the military, too. Some claim that Russian nationalist influence is confined to the ground forces. However, other observers have found sympathy for and interest in the movement in nearly all of the other branches. There is reason to think that Russian nationalist sentiments are widely held in the officers' corps, which is almost entirely Russian (with a sprinkling of other Slavs). In general, officer corps tend to be breeding grounds for nationalist ideas, especially belief in the need for a strong state. Moreover, an elite, socially segregated institution nearly all of whose members belong to a single ethnic group would be likely to be susceptible to an ideology which stresses the superiority of that ethnic group. In the Soviet case in particular, the rise of China as a major (or the major) military threat to the USSR appears to have encouraged the spread of Russian nationalism, and the military is thought to have been greatly concerned about that threat. Members of the "Russian Party" are believed to include some of the highest ranking generals, including the three First Deputy Ministers of Defense (Marshalls Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff; Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces; and Sergei Sokolov, the First Deputy Minister for General Affairs), as well as
former Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Marshal Vasilii Chuikov. The latter was one of the founders of the Russian national movement and the honorary chairman of VOOPIK.\textsuperscript{157} All of these individuals are full members of the Central Committee. Their reported Russian nationalist inclinations are explained by one observer as stemming at least in part from their fear that, as a result of recent demographic trends, non-Russians will penetrate the leadership of the military.\textsuperscript{158} Russian nationalist doctrines would justify their desire to preserve the High Command as a Russian bastion.

Substantial portions of the state and Party bureaucracies also seem to have come under the sway of Russian nationalism.\textsuperscript{159} As one might expect, the movement appears to be strongest in those sections concerned with the affairs of the Russian Republic: the government apparatus and provincial and city Party committees of the RSFSR. Officials of the RSFSR government bureaucracy who are reputed to be Russian nationalists include the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic, Mikhail Solomentsev.\textsuperscript{160} A high official in the Moscow City Party Committee, Vasilii Knotop, and many of the RSFSR obkom secretaries have similarly been identified as strong supporters of the "Russian Party," while Viktor Grishin, the First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and a full member of the Politburo, is described as a limited backer.\textsuperscript{161} Perhaps because they represent Russian areas and deal exclusively with the problems of Russians, the officials who staff these "Russian sections" apparently tend to see themselves as defenders of the interests of the Russian people. In addition, the fact that they must win the backing of Russians in order to implement the policy of the Party impels them to promote Russian interests and advertise their behavior in
nationalistic terms. What is probably most important, the personal interests of these officials and the views of Russian nationalists often tend to coincide, rendering the former natural allies of the latter. RSFSR obkom secretaries, for example, are reportedly greatly concerned that recent demographic, economic, and social developments are eroding their political base by depopulating the Russian countryside. They therefore applaud Russian nationalist calls for measures to revive the Russian village and promote the prosperity of Russian agriculture.

It is not, however, only among officials responsible for Russian affairs that Russian nationalism finds support. The appeal of the movement appears to be quite strong among numerous Party officials whose work is not specifically concerned with the RSFSR, but who are themselves of Russian origin. There are indications, for example, that Russian nationalist sympathizers occupy very high posts in the Central Committee apparatus. Emigres who have had extensive contact with the Cultural Division of the Central Committee describe the long-time head of that division, M. Shauro, as a patron of the nationalists. There is evidence that Ivan Kapitonov, the Central Committee secretary in charge of the local Party committees, plays a similar role, as does candidate Politburo member, Mikhail Solomentsev, who was a Central Committee secretary before being appointed Premier of the RSFSR. Kapitonov and Solomentsev were the only two Soviet leaders to participate in official ceremonies in honor of the 600th anniversary of the Russian victory in the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, an event to which the nationalists attach great importance.
It is difficult to know for sure just what it is that explains the appeal of Russian nationalism for leaders and officials like these, whose roles do not clearly impel them in that direction. Undoubtedly what is most important for many is the sheer fact that they are themselves Russian and hence share the anxieties, prejudices, and concerns which render many Russians susceptible to nationalist doctrines. Like Russian military leaders and obkom secretaries, they are surely aware of the unfavorable demographic trends of recent years and may fear that these threaten the position of Russians in the USSR. The rise of militant minority nationalism probably exacerbates their fears, making them receptive to chauvinistic and xenophobic doctrines. Dissident physicist Sakharov maintains that like some KGB officials, many high-placed apparatchiki fear the results of detente and seek in authoritarian nationalism an antidote to Western influence and its potentially liberalizing impact. They may also share with some military leaders fear about the possibility (or inevitability) of armed conflict with China and hence welcome the patriotic message of Russian nationalists. It may also be that the cohort of officials who are now assuming leadership positions are more patriotic than Marxist-Leninist. Many of them joined the Party during World War II, probably less out of ideological conviction than the desire to serve their country in a time of exigency. However, one suspects that for these officials, too, threat to personal interest is a major reason for embracing Russian nationalism. It has been suggested that the Russians who control the central Party and state apparatus are concerned that impending loss of majority status will undermine the justification for the
Russians' near-monopoly of political power and will thus make it necessary to include more non-Russians in the leadership of the country. Russian nationalism apparently bolsters and rationalizes their determination to maintain the political status quo and protect their individual and collective positions.

At the same time, there is evidence of a widely felt need among Party officials to strengthen their authority and the Party's by broadening the basis of their legitimacy. Encouraging and identifying with Russian nationalism may be a way of doing this. Underlying this strategy is undoubtedly the consideration that the movement seems to have very broad popular appeal, both actual and potential. An indication of this appeal is the size of the membership of the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, one of the few completely voluntary organizations in the country. Although citizens are in no way pressured to join or rewarded by the authorities for joining, more than 12 million had done so by the mid-1970's. The estimated 50 million members of the Russian Orthodox Church -- more than a third of the Russian population -- constitute an even larger group which is widely regarded as being particularly sympathetic to Russian nationalist ideas. Moreover, many knowledgeable observers (probably including many Soviet officials) view most if not all of the entire Russian population as potentially receptive to Russian nationalist appeals. If they are correct, that alone could account for sympathetic interest in the movement on the part of those who govern and administer the USSR.
There is good reason to expect the influence of Russian nationalism to increase in the foreseeable future. Most of the factors which explain its appeal within the political establishment seem likely to become even more salient. Given the Soviets' need for Western technology, which they themselves acknowledge, links with and dependence on the West are likely to grow. As they do, the desire for an antidote to this process will probably become more intense and widespread. As the non-Russians become more urbanized, their ethnic self-awareness and political militance are likely to increase, generating a chauvinistic reaction among more and more Russians. If economic problems become more acute and growth rates decline, as is widely predicted, the need for a mobilizing tool will grow. If Soviet foreign policy continues on an expansionist course -- as growing Soviet military might will enable and encourage it to do -- international tensions will mount and the need for a device to inspire patriotism will increase. The demographic picture is certain to become even more unfavorable to the Russians, generating among Russian commanders and politicians an even more intense need for an ideology which will justify the exclusion of non-Russians from positions of power. As Russian nationalists perceive these developments, their own militance is likely to intensify. With every concession the regime makes to them, their demands are likely to grow, increasing the pressure on the leadership to grant them even more.
It cannot be said that Russian nationalism faces no significant opposition, that there are no important groups or trends against which it must struggle. It seems clear that within the ranks of the Party, especially the Party apparatus, there are numerous Marxist-Leninist ideologues, sometimes described as "orthodox," "purist," or "fundamentalist," who view the doctrines of the Russian nationalists as a grave threat to the very foundations of the Soviet system. These are principled internationalists, who oppose the survival of the Russians as a distinct ethnic group. They are located primarily in the Central Committee's ideological and propaganda sections, which they control, and they are well represented in the ranks of those whose function it is to supervise and direct Soviet culture (e.g., Party organizers assigned to work among intellectuals; Writers' Union officials; journal and newspaper editors; and establishment literary critics). Up to now, at any rate, they have by no means been politically marginal: their leader and Politburo representative for many years was the Party's chief ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, who is widely regarded as having been one of the most powerful men in the country. They are believed to control the most authoritative Party organ, \textit{Kommunist}. 

There are others who seem to oppose Russian nationalism as much or more on pragmatic grounds as on principle. They apparently recognize its destabilizing potential and/or view it as a major hindrance to the development of what they regard as a vitally important cooperative relationship with the
West. While they do not seem to constitute a coherent political group, many of them occupy very high positions in the government and Party apparatus. 178

Some observers even contend that the influence of Russian nationalism has declined since the early 1970's. The evidence cited for this assertion is the more intense persecution from 1973 on of such nationalist dissidents as Osipov, Solzhenitsyn, and other religious nationalists, and the removal from the Politburo in 1973 of the nationalists' chief reputed patron, Polianskii. 179 It may be argued, however, that increased repression of Russian nationalist dissidents does not constitute a move against Russian nationalism per se. Rather, it reflects a growing determination on the part of the regime to prevent any and all political activity outside the supervision and control of the Party -- a constraint which these dissidents did not accept. As for the dismissal of Polianskii, we have seen that Russian nationalist influence has apparently penetrated the top leadership through other supporters.

With regard to the future, one can almost certainly rule out the prediction that the regime eventually will be completely controlled by Russian nationalists and internationalism will be completely abandoned. 180 This seems very unlikely in view of the obvious utility of an internationalist ideology in governing a multinational state. However, given the range of powerful institutions in which Russian nationalists and their sympathizers are well-entrenched; given, too, that the appeal of Russian nationalism within the political establishment is likely to grow;
one can expect that Russian nationalism will be a very significant political force with even greater impact on policy in the years to come.

Conclusion

Russian nationalism has already become a destabilizing factor in Soviet political life. It has led many Russians to reject key elements of official ideology, to embrace alternative values opposed to those which legitimize the system, and to condemn the system for its impact on the Russian people. It has created fundamental divisions within the Soviet political elite. Most important, it has apparently begun to influence the behavior of Russians and the policies of the regime in ways that are deeply resented by non-Russians.

Yet although the influence of Russian nationalism is likely to increase, and in so doing to have an even more destabilizing impact, this does not mean that the collapse of or sudden radical change in the system is necessarily imminent. However strong that influence may become, one can assume that powerful forces will be at work which will counter, contain, and reduce its destabilizing effects. Political scientists often stress that sheer persistence over time, the demonstrated ability to overcome serious internal and external challenges, tends to make a regime legitimate and hence stable. This factor has been a very significant cause of regime legitimacy and political stability in the USSR in the postwar period and is likely to remain so. Equally important stabilizing factors, both in the past and in the future, have been the leadership's firmness, political savvy, and will to survive. Even a regime in which fervent Russian nationalists play a leading
or dominant role is likely to be governed above all by its determination to remain in power and its knowledge of what is necessary for that purpose. It is likely to be even more unhesitating and thorough than the present one in the suppression of dissent. Moreover, even a regime of this sort is likely to recognize that extreme measures to implement a Russian nationalist program could be dangerously provocative to non-Russians. For this reason, one may expect that at least some residue of the current regime's concessionary and compensatory nationality policy will persist, exerting a stabilizing influence. A combination of firmness and pragmatism, in other words, is likely to accompany and restrain ideological zeal. Under normal conditions, this will probably be sufficient to dissuade minority elites and masses from attempting the sort of massive and sustained violence which could lead to revolutionary change.

What one can predict is that as the influence of Russian nationalism grows, the Soviet system will move more and more toward the pole of instability. There is likely to be a significant increase in the radicalism, scale, and frequency of systemic dissent on the part of non-Russian elites, and among ordinary non-Russians more frequent, more widespread instances of sporadic mass protest, including violent protest, involving larger and larger numbers of people.

The impact on the economy of greatly increased elite and mass disaffection among the minorities may be very significant owing to widespread passive resistance and indifference at the workplace. At the same time, one may well see a decline in productivity resulting from application of non-rational or non-economic criteria in the allocation of investment, jobs, and places in educational institutions. This will aggravate the negative
effects of other serious problems and constraints expected to impinge on
economic performance in the coming decades. Without considering the probable
effects of Russian nationalist influence on policy, economists tend to concur
that a radical decline in the overall growth rate and the rate of growth of
per capita consumption will occur in the 1980's and possibly well
beyond. This decline is likely to compound the destabilizing impact of
Russian nationalism. It will make it harder for the authorities to sustain
the welfare colonialism which has been essential to political stability in the
past.

The regime's failure to reproduce the economic achievements of previous
decades may also promote discontent and disaffection among many Russians,
despite the appeal its more nationalistic program is likely to have for
them. Thus not only among the minorities, but on the part of Russians, too,
there may be a substantial increase in dissent, unrest, and violence. The
prospect of increased minority violence, sure to anger and incite many
Russians, makes such a possibility all the more likely.

Ethnic tensions are likely to become even more acute than they are now
or than they would be without the influence of the Russian nationalist
movement. One can expect to see the polarization of Soviet society along
ethnic lines, which is already occurring, to take place at a much faster rate
than it would have in the absence of Russian nationalist influence. It will
be much harder for the regime to control and govern such a society. Not only
will law and order be more difficult to maintain. Nearly all important
institutions can be expected to function less smoothly and efficiently, as it
will be harder for Russians and non-Russians to work well together. The army
will surely be affected, for in the coming decades it will have to absorb a
much larger proportion of non-Slav recruits and place many of them in hitherto all-Slav combat units. The state and Party apparatus, especially in non-Russian areas, will suffer from increasing tension and hostility between Russian and non-Russian officials and between Russian bureaucrats and apparatchiki and the non-Russians they administer and supervise. All this will reduce the regime's ability to handle the many economic and other problems it will have to confront. Measures essential to the welfare of society as a whole will be harder or impossible to implement, since both Russians and non-Russians will veto moves which would require cooperation or closer contact between them. 182

Finally, developments of the sort outlined above will make it much harder for the regime to weather crises. Should there be a very sharp economic downturn, accompanied by negative growth and decline in living standards, or should the USSR become directly involved in a major war, i.e., should the regime demonstrate an unusual degree of incompetence or vulnerability, elite dissent and mass violence might reach such proportions that they could not be controlled. They could well be transformed into armed rebellion and sustained insurgency. A possible (although by no means inevitable) outcome of such a process could even be political collapse or radical political change.

2. See, for example, the discussion in Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches," 449-63.

3. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines stability as resistance to sudden change, dislodgment or overthrow and/or constancy of character or purpose.


5. Ibid.

6. Commonly accepted indicators of political stability include low levels of deaths from political violence and the absence of assassinations, insurrections, riots, and/or intergroup violence (Ibid.)


11. *S liricheskikh pozitsii* (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1965). Soloukhin is widely recognized as one of the "founding fathers" of the Russian nationalist movement. Some even feel that his *Vladimirskie proselki* (1957), which extolled the beauty of the Russian countryside, helped to spark that movement. (See John B. Dunlop, "The Many Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism," *Survey*, XXIV [Summer, 1979], 28.)


20. The conflict between Russian nationalism and official values will be analyzed below.

21. This document is translated in *Survey*, XVII (Summer, 1971), 191-199.


24. The Moscow Religio-Philosophical seminar was organized by a cinematography student, Fr. Aleksandr Ogorodnikov. Its *samizdat* journal, *Obshchina*, was suppressed almost as soon as it appeared (1974). Both Ogorodnikov and another of the group's leaders, Vladimir Poresh, were arrested in 1979-80. The Leningrad seminar was founded in 1975, and at least until 1979-80 published another *samizdat* journal, 37. One of the organizers of the Leningrad seminar was Tat'iana Goricheva, who subsequently helped to create the Maria Club. The Christian Committee was founded by Fr. Gleb Iakunin, Deacon Varsonofyi Khaibulin, and Viktor Kapitanchuk. Khaibulin and Kapitanchuk were previously linked to *Veche*. On the Maria Club see articles by Vadim Nechaev in *Russkaia mysl',* July 17, 1980, p. 4; August 14, 1980, p. 6. On all these groups see John B. Dunlop, "The Russian Nationalist Spectrum Today: Trends and Movements" (paper presented at the 13th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Asilomar, California, September 20-23, 1981) p. 2.

25. The journal which, along with *Molodaia gvardiia*, is most closely identified with the movement is *Nash sovremennik*. Other journals which frequently contain Russian nationalist writing include *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, Moskva, and *Ogonek* in Moscow, *Avrora* and *Neva* in Leningrad, and *Volga*, *Pod'em*, *Sibirskie ogn'i*, and *Sever* in the provinces. (See Mikhail Agursky, "The New Russian Literature," Research Paper no. 40 [Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, July 1980], pp. 20-21.)
26. This paper's circulation in 1975 is estimated to have been 2.7 million
(Edward Allworth, "Ambiguities in Russian Group Identity and Leadership
of the RSFSR," in Allworth, ed., Ethnic Russia in the USSR, p. 24.)
27. These are Sovetskaia Rossiia, Molodaia gvardiia, and Sovremennik.
28. See Agursky, "The New Russian Literature" and Catheine Theimer
Nepomnyashchy, "The Search for Russian Identity in Contemporary Soviet
88-97.
30. Its program called for "the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship" and
the establishment of a theocratic regime headed by a Church Council or
Synod. (Vserossiiskii sotsial'no-khristianskii soiuz ozvobozhdeniiia
naroda [Paris: YMCA Press, 1975], pp. 61, 73-74.) At least one of
VSKhSON's leaders, Evgenii Vagin, was a monarchist. (Dunlop, "Many
Faces," 21.)
31. Enders Wimbush, "The Russian Nationalist Backlash," Survey, XXIV (Summer,
1979), 43-44; Roman Szporluk, "History and Russian Nationalism," Survey,
XXIV (Summer, 1979), 17.
32. Alexander Solzhenitsyn et al., From Under the Rubble (London: Collins and
Harvill Press, 1975.)
33. "Bor'ba s tak nazyvaem 'russofil'stvom' ili put' gosudarstvennogo samoubiistva," Veche, no. 7, pp. 4-9. Also see Vladimir Osipov, Tri otnosheniiia k rodine (Frankfurt: Posev, 1978), pp. 112-47; "Russkoe reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa," Veche, no. 6, pp. 7-8.


36. The best known of the numerous "derevenshchiki" include Fedor Abramov, Valentin Rasputin, Viktor Astaf'ev, Sergei Zalygin, Vasilii Belov, Evgenii Nosov, and Boris Mozhaev.

37. See, for example, Fedor Abramov, "O khlebe nasushchnom i khlebe dukhovnom; Vystuplenie na VI s'ezde pisatelei SSSR," Nash sovremennik, no. 9 (1976), p. 172.

38. This point will be discussed further below.


40. The offending essays were Viktor Chalmaev, "Velikie iskaniia," Molodaia gvardiia, no. 3 (1968), pp. 270-95; M. Lobanov, "Prosveshchennoe meshchanstvo," Molodaia gvardiia, no. 4 (1968), pp. 294-306; Viktor Chalmaev, "Neizbezhnost'," Molodaia gvardiia, no. 9 (1968), pp. 259-89; Sergei Semanov, "O tsenostiakh otnositel'nykh i vechnykh," Molodaia gvardiia, no. 8 (1970), pp. 308-20. Literary critic Anatolii Lanshchikov, who vigorously defended these articles in and out of the pages of Molodaia gvardiia; the editor responsible for their publication, Anatolii Nikonov; and the like-minded editor who replaced
him, Anatolii Ivanov, are likewise members of this group, as are many other Molodaia gvardiia contributors, such as the prose writers Mikhail Alpatov and Sergei Vysotskii and poets Valentin Sorokin, Vladimir Kotov and Valentin Sidorov. Many other writers and publicists might be described as national bolsheviks. These include Petr Proskurin, Nikolai Iakovlev, and Valentin Pikul.

41. Attitudes of this sort are also frequently articulated by such writers as Ivan Shevtsov, Vasilii Smirnov, Iurii Seleznov, and Dmitrii Zhukhov.

42. These nationalists will be discussed in detail below.

43. The actual and potential appeal of Russian nationalism among various sectors of the Russian population and political elite will be discussed below.

44. The most recent authoritative affirmations of this commitment are contained in the Central Committee resolution on the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, published in Pravda, February 21, 1982, and the report by Andropov to the joint ceremonial meeting of the Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet on December 21, 1982, which was likewise devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR (Pravda, December 22, 1982).

45. The nearly universal acceptance of the nation state as the primary unit of allegiance in international relations has made it politically possible (although not unproblematic) for the Soviet leaders to place the interests of their countrymen above those of the citizens of other states. It is much harder for them to justify preferential treatment of Russians within the USSR.

46. For recognition by a Soviet critic, writing in the official press, of the


50. Abramov, "O khlebe nasushchnom," p. 172. On the moral superiority of the Russian peasantry to the ideologically well-versed Party cadres sent out to destroy their way of life see the discussion of the works of Vasiliii Belov by Mikhail Lobanov in Oktiabr, no. 10 (October, 1982), pp. 179-86. Lobanov describes Belov as "an echo of the Russian people."


52. "About religion," Molodaia gvardiia contributor Anatolii Lanskshchikov declared in a meeting of literary critics in Moscow in 1969, "I say openly: if we would deny the role of Orthodoxy, I do not know what would remain in Russia." ("Iz literaturnoi zhizni: Na seminare literaturnykh
"If the Russian people wish to regenerate as a great ethnic group again," a Veche contributor wrote, "they must ... return to the Orthodox Church and its ethnic culture." (N.V., "Otryvki iz dnevnika," Veche, no. 4, p. 43.) The poet Valentin Sorokin implicitly compares the Communists who destroyed the crosses on Russian churches with the Tartars who beheaded Russian warriors: both were equally enemies of the Russian people. He is quoted in E. Safonov, "Otsvety togo bol'shogo ognia," Moskva, no. 6 (1977), p. 214. Also see Mikhail Agursky, "Contemporary Russian Nationalism — History Revised," Research Paper no. 45 (Jerusalem: The Soviet and East European Research Centre, January, 1982), p. 16.

The stress on egalitarianism has been greater and lesser at various times — greater during Lenin's lifetime and Khrushchev's rule, less in the years immediately following World War II and the past decade.

55. The period of the Second World War is a notable exception. As for the immediate post-war period, it is true that there was a considerable measure of Great Russian chauvinism embodied in Stalin's policies at that time. However, it is also true that Stalin took a number of steps during that period to restrain such chauvinism. See Wimbush, "The Russian Nationalist Backlash," 38.

Even Stalin once warned that Great Russian chauvinism "constitutes the chief danger threatening to undermine the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples in the Russian proletariat." (Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question [New York: International Publishers, 1942, p. 156].)

57. Russian nationalists have pointed out that there is no Russian branch of
the CPSU and hence no section of the Party which might defend and promote specifically Russian interests. ("A Word to the Nation," Survey, XVII [Summer, 1971], 196.) Similarly, there is no separate union republic capital for the RSFSR which might serve as a political symbol of Russian nationhood and there is no Russian Academy of Science to encourage research into Russian history and development of the Russian language and culture. Russian nationalists also stress that Russian culture began to be suppressed at a time when official encouragement was given to the development of other national cultures, and the Russian Orthodox Church was attacked long before Islam and the religions of other nationalities. This, it is claimed, substantially hindered the development of Russian self-awareness. (See, for example, Igor Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation - The Nationalities Question in the USSR" in Solzhenitsyn et al., eds., From Under the Rubble, pp. 94-97.)


59. See Bialer, Stalin's Successors, pp. 219-20, 222-24.

60. Non-Russians are heavily represented in the Party congresses and the Supreme Soviet, especially in the Council of Nationalities. More than one-third of the voting members of the Central Committee in recent years have been non-Russian, and non-Russians are frequently allowed to speak at Central Committee sessions. (See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979] pp. 365, 370-71, 456-57, 463.) On the "welfare colonialism" of

On the priority given to natives in filling most jobs in the non-Russian republics see Michael Rywkin, "Religion, Modern Nationalism, and Political Power in Soviet Central Asia," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XVII, no. 2 and 3 (1975), 278-79.


64. The most notable of these is Chalmaev, "Neizbezhnost'," pp. 264, 266-68. Also see the discussion of the novels of V. Ivanov in V. Oskotskii, Roman i istoria. Traditsii i novatorstvo sovetskogo istoricheskogo romana (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1980).

65. The speaker was Anatolii Lanshchikov. ("Iz literaturnoi zhizni," pp. 505-6.) Similar ideas are expressed in the VSKhSON program (Vserossiiskii Sotsial'no-Khristianskii Soiuz, p. 61) and the writings of Gennadii Shimanov, "Kak ponimat' nasu istoriu" (Keston College Archives), p. 9 (the latter cited in Yanov, The Russian New Right, p. 123).


70. See, for example, "Word to the Nation," 196.


72. See Mikhail Agursky, "Le'umanim v'kivunim shonim" ("Nationalists and Different Directions"), Ha'aretz, March 3, 1982.

73. Siberia and the Russian North are cited by some nationalists as areas to which more investment funds should urgently be allocated. (Solzhenitsyn, Letter to the Soviet Leaders, p. 27.) Others stress the need to devote more funds to Central Russia. (Proskurin, Imia tvoe, nos. 13-16.)

74. Proskurin, Imia tvoe, nos. 13-16.


76. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 357.


78. See Matthews Pavlovich, "Ethnic Impact of Russian Dispersion In and Beyond
the RSFSR," in Allworth, ed., Ethnic Russia in the USSR, p. 301.


80. Rapid development of heavy industry required allocating investment funds to regions which already possessed substantial industrial infrastructure, such as Moscow and Leningrad, or the resources necessary for such industry, such as Siberia and the Urals. The threat of invasion and aerial attack argued for locating industry in the rear of the country, i.e., in the RSFSR. But some of the chief newer industries being emphasized today, such as chemicals and electronics, do not require an extensive nearby resource-base, and the interior is just as accessible to nuclear missiles as the borderlands. (See Ralph S. Clem, "Economic Development of the Russian Homeland: Regional Growth in the Soviet Union," in Allworth, ed., Ethnic Russia in the USSR, pp. 210-11.)


84. See Wimbush, "Russian Nationalist Backlash," 44-45.

85. Veche, no. 7, p. 2.

86. Veche, no. 6, pp. 9-10.


88. Semanov, for example, praises the purges and terror of the thirties, as
a turning point in the struggle with the wreckers and nihilists. He goes on to emphasize that nihilism is still present in the USSR and must still be fought. ("O tsenostiakh otnositel'nykh i vechnykh," pp. 319-20.) Chalmaev praises Russian generals who conquered the borderlands by force and used the most brutal of methods to attain their goals. ("Neizhbezhnost'," p. 269.)


90. On large scale disturbances in Uzbekistan in 1969, at which demonstrators shouted "Russians, get out ...!" until troops arrived, see Reddaway, Uncensored Russia, pp. 402-3. A mass demonstration in Dushanbe, Tadzhikistan in the mid-1970's involved 13,000 people and also could be suppressed only by calling in the army. (Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Empire," [paper presented to the 13th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Asilomar, California, September 20-23, 1981], pp. 17-18.) In the fall of 1980 thousands of Estonian high school students in several cities staged demonstrations demanding freedom for their republic and departure of the Russians. They, too, had to be suppressed by force. (Ann Sheehy, "Estonian Language Olympiad Instituted for Pupils of Russian Schools in Estonia," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 66/82 [February 10, 1982], p. 2.)

Party was removed for his opposition to the Virgin Lands program, which required extensive immigration of Europeans, especially Russians (Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament Boston: Little Brown, 1974, p. 121. These episodes of elite protest are cited in Bilinsky, "Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Empire," p. 41.


93. In May and July, 1969, for example, dissidents in Grozny, the capital of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in the North Caucasus, twice attempted to blow up the statue of the Russian General Ermolov, who is known as "the conqueror of the Caucasus." (Reddaway, Uncensored Russia, p. 403.)


95. Joseph Rothschild makes an interesting distinction between systemic instability on the one hand and stability on the state level on the other. He argues that discontent on the part of national minorities tends to lead them to challenge the legitimacy of the state structure, i.e., its multinational character, and thus gives rise to instability on the state level. It does not, he claims, tend to result in challenges to the legitimacy of the political system and hence in systemic instability.
("Political Stability in Poly-ethnic Communist States," lecture delivered to meeting of the Israeli Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Haifa, Israel, June 1, 1982.) This may be correct in most instances. The Soviet case, however, is an exception to this rule. The Soviet leadership has always sought to legitimize the system in large part on the grounds that it is uniquely capable of establishing just and harmonious relations among people of different nationalities. As a result, the perceived failure of the system to accomplish this tends to lead discontented minorities to question the legitimacy of that system as well as the legitimacy of the state structure. Socialism and one-party rule are challenged because they are perceived as responsible for the injustice inflicted on minority groups in the Soviet state.

96. See, for example, Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, pp. 358-59.


98. See Wimbush, "Russian Nationalist Backlash," 44.


100. Solzhenitsyn, "Repentance and Self-Limitation," in Solzhenitsyn et al., From Under the Rubble, pp. 135-143; Vserossiiskii sotsial'no-krashtianskii soiuz, pp. 64, 73-74.


103. Solzhenitsyn, Letter to the Soviet Leaders; Theodore Shabad, "Solzhenitsyn Asks Kremlin to Abandon Communism and Split up Soviet

104. See discussion below.

105. For evidence on this score see Agursky, "Hagolem hatasiati kam al yotzro" ("The Industrial Golem Turns on Its Creator"), Ha'aretz, February 5, 1982; "Nitzim v'yonom nusach hapolitburo" ("Hawks and Doves Politburo Style"), Ha'aretz, February 7, 1982; "Le'umanim v'kivunim shonim" ("Nationalists and Different Directions"), Ha'aretz, March 3, 1982.


110. Politicheskii dnevnik, II, 702.


117. See Proskurin, "Imia tvoe," no. 13, p. 9; no. 14, p. 42; no. 16, pp. 12, 15.


119. See, for example, S. Kaltakhchian, "Internatsional'noe edinstvo sovetskogo naroda," Pravda, October 2, 1981, pp. 2-3; Iu. Surovtsev, Secretary of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union, "Vospitanie slovom," Pravda, August 17, 1982, p. 3.


122. Originally given the status of "public organizations," they were granted fuller recognition and endorsement in 1976, when they were placed under the protection of the Ministry of Culture and their activities were authorized in formal legislation (Pravda, October 31, 1976.)

123. See Izvestiia, January 26, 1974, p. 6 and October 2, 1975, p. 6.

124. Konstantin Simonov's Russkie liudi was performed at the Malyi Teatr in Moscow in 1975-76, and 400 of the intensely religious and nationalistic paintings of the artist and self-styled "Russian patriot" Il'ia Glazunov were shown to the public at Moscow's Manezh Exhibition Hall in 1978.

125. The Chechen-Ingush of the Northern Caucasus are exhorted to praise the Tsarist general who conquered the area. (Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples* [New York: Norton, 1978], pp. 163-64.)


128. Ethnocentrism has been defined as belief in the superiority of one's own ethnic group. It may be distinguished from chauvinism, which is militant and boastful devotion to and glorification of one's ethnic group or nation. (See *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*.) The regime does not encourage or tolerate chauvinism.

130. This is particularly true of the Central Committee Secretariat, which has been exclusively Russian since the removal of Vitalii Titov and Nikolai Podgorny in 1965. Cf. Bialer, Stalin's Successors, pp. 219-20.

131. Under Khrushchev the Minister of Defense (Malinovskii), the Commander of the Moscow Military District (Moskalenko), and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (Pavlovskii) were Ukrainians. All these positions have been filled by Russians. (Bilinsky, "Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Empire," p. 34.)


136. Spechler, "Regional Developments in the USSR," p. 159.

137. Under discussion were use of prices, taxes, and central budget allocations for this purpose. See, for example, Litvinova and Urlanis, "Demograficheskaia politika," pp. 38-45.


139. Ukrainian Party Secretary Petro Shelest was dismissed in May, 1972, Georgian Party Secretary Vladimir Mzhavanadze in September, 1972, and Armenian Party Secretary Anton Kochinian in November, 1974. On the use of force against minority protesters see note 90.

141. The non-black earth zone project, for example, may be viewed as part of a much larger national effort to reclaim land which was undertaken throughout the country. (FBIS - Daily Report, Sov-78-15, January 23, 1973, vol. III, no. 15, p. T1.)


143. This might be expected from a Great Russian charged with holding together a multinational empire.

144. The appointment of Geidar Aliev, First Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan Party Organization, to the post of First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and to full membership in the Politburo may be an indication of Andropov's desire to propitiate minority elites, whom he perceives to be resentful of inadequate representation and influence at the top. This is suggested by Andropov's one major speech on nationality issues, which emphasized the need for "proper" representation of all nationalities at all levels of the Party and state bureaucracies. This speech, given in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, also condemned national arrogance and national exclusiveness and stressed the importance of removing mutual distrust among the nations and nationalities of the USSR. At the same time, however, it endorsed Russian colonization of non-Russian areas (euphemistically described as "multinationalization" of those areas), hailed the importance of linguistic Russification, and called on
non-Russians to "address special words of gratitude" to the Russian people, without whose assistance the non-Russians' present achievements would not have been possible. (Pravda, December 22, 1982.) Some observers believe Aliev's promotion was the result of a commitment made to him before Brezhnev's death. (New York Times, May 9, 1982.)

145. Elena Klepikova and Vladimir Solovyev, "The Secret Russian Party," Midstream, October, 1980, pp. 13-14, 18; Agursky, "Hagolem"; "Nitzim"; Yanov, The Russian New Right, p. 13. Interviews conducted by the author in 1978-1983 with politically well-connected Soviet intellectuals who left the USSR in the 1970's confirm the observations of these emigre scholars. While the characterization of a given individual or group as Russian nationalist is not one that is based on hard or completely indisputable evidence, there was considerable agreement among the interviewees on the pervasiveness of Russian nationalist views in the political establishment and on the portions of that establishment in which Russian nationalists have become influential. One might argue that the fact that many of these emigres are Jewish made them particularly sensitive to expressions of Russian nationalist views and inclined to exaggerate the influence of those views. However, there is no reason to think that Jews would be more sensitive than other minorities on this score. If the establishment appears to non-Russians to be dominated by Russian nationalists and Russian nationalist views, that is in and of itself of great significance for the stability of the Soviet political system in the years to come.

146. Interviews with Soviet emigres; Klepikova and Solovyev, "The Secret Russian Party," pp. 13, 16. Also see Wimbush, "The Russian Nationalist
Backlash," p. 45.


152. Thus the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia describes the purpose of VOOPiK as "the utilization of monuments in the task of the communist upbringing of the people." (Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1971, 3rd edition, V, p. 458.)

153. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 90. Literary critic Anatolii Lanshchikov, a frequent contributor to the Komsomol journal Molodaia gvardiia, explained the journal's nationalistic orientation by saying, "We seek a lost ideal. Our youth is not finding an ideal. That worries even the Komsomol Central Committee." ("Iz literaturnoi zhizni," p. 505.)

154. Agursky, "Hagolem."

Nationalism," p. 15.


158. Agursky, "Hagolem."


160. Agurskiy, "Klokochushchii vulkan," Russkaia mysl', September 18, 1980, p. 13. Other reputed Russian nationalists who have held high government posts in the RSFSR include V. I. Kochemasov, a deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; Mikhail Iasnov, Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Iurii Melent'ev, Deputy Minister of Culture of the RSFSR; and N. V. Sviridov, a leading member of the republic's Committee for Publications. (Dunlop, "Many Faces," p. 31; Agursky, "Nitzim"; Yanov, The Russian New Right, pp. 55-56; Vanderheide, "Ethnic Significance of the Non-Black Earth Renovation Project," pp. 220-221.)


167. Soviet sociologists have openly called attention to the fact that Russians may soon be a minority. (Roman Szporluk, "Why Some Soviet Sociologists Are Alarmed," New York Times, August 27, 1977.)


169. See Klepikova and Solovyev, "The Secret Russian Party," p. 17. The reason why the Politburo waited three years, from 1968 to 1970, before criticizing Molodaia gvardiia may be that heightened tension with China during that period made even the journal's extreme chauvinism appear useful.

170. See Pospielovsky, "Ethnocentrism," p. 134


172. See Whitney, "Crisis In Ideology."


174. See, for example, Meerson, "The Influence of the Orthodox Church," p. 112; Smith, "Soviet Said to Punish Party Aide." The Russian nationalists themselves make this point in their efforts to persuade the
political elite to support them. (Chalmaev, "Neizbezhnost'," p. 281.)

Other indications of the appeal of Russian nationalism include the turnout of more than a million people to view the exhibits of Glazunov's paintings in 1978-79 and the enormous popularity of Vasilii Shukshin's nationalistic film Kalina Krasnaia. (On the latter see Smith, The Russians, pp. 463-64.)


176. It was reportedly Suslov's intervention which made it possible for Iakovlev to publish his diatribe against Russian nationalism. (See note 121 above.) (Smith, "Soviet Said to Punish Party Aide.")


178. Interviews with Soviet emigres; Agursky, "The New Russian Literature," p. 8; idem, "Hagolem." Agursky also places the leaders of the Party organizations in the non-Russian republics and much of what he calls
the "military-industrial complex" in the camp of the enemies of Russian nationalism. ("The New Russian Literature," p. 15; "Klokochushchii vulkan," Russkaia mysl', October 9, 1980, p. 11; "Hagolem.") However, the former do not, as a group, wield significant power in Kremlin decision-making. The evidence adduced regarding the latter suggests that it is only certain Russian nationalist views, such as the demand for slower industrial growth, which military leaders and defense executives tend to oppose. As Agursky himself acknowledges, many Russian nationalist ideas, such as the desirability of a powerful, centralized state, are supported by this group.


182. Ethnically conscious and aroused Russians, for example, are likely to resist the importation of non-Russian workers into the labor-short RSFSR.