ARMS CONTROL AND LOCAL CONFLICT
VOL. II

ANTICIPATING CONFLICT-CONTROL POLICIES
The "CONEX" Games as a Planning Tool

by
Lincoln P. Bloomfield with Cornelius J. Gearin
and
James L. Foster

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION--A NEW SERIES OF
PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL EXERCISES

The following is a report of four professional-level political exercises--CONEX I, II, III AND IV--conducted by the Arms Control project of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies. This report was prepared under the sponsorship of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official views of that agency or any other department or agency of the U.S. Government. These simulations of hypothetical crisis and pre-crisis problems were designed to supplement and broaden our on-going research on the problem of what we christened "local conflict," with particular reference to the issues that might face the United States in the early 1970's, and the range of alternative strategies and policies open to it at a time when both the world and the role of this country are undergoing change.

For the past five years, my principal collaborator, Miss Amelia C. Leiss, and I, along with our associates in the Center's Arms Control Project have focused our research on the developing regions of the world, with special attention to the problems of security, arms, arms control,
and U.S. policies concerning these issues. Our studies of regional approaches to the disarmament and arms control problem* led us in 1967 to a more comprehensive approach to the problem of controlling "local conflict," which we defined as real and potential small wars in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Our concern was with arms and arms control problems, but also with the entire range of policies that might be open to the United States, to international organizations, and possibly to others, for dealing constructively with instability and minimizing violence and possible escalation in the developing regions.

Our probe into this larger dimension took the form of a "Design Study,"** (the acronym of which was ACLIM). Its emphasis was on policies aiming at preventing, containing, and terminating conflict in those areas. The United States by its very nature as a wealthy and "satisfied" power has been acting as if it has a generalized interest in stability in the world, and these were the very conflict situations that most persistently seemed to threaten that interest. But the United States was evidently not doing all it could either to understand the problem, or to act upon it. The United States sometimes seemed single-mindedly opposed to any turbulence, even when it arose from legitimate popular grievances--surely a travesty on earlier American traditions.


And a policy of supporting the status quo was not proving outstandingly successful in achieving the basic U.S. goal of a more durable and stable world environment. At the same time untrammeled violence in the world automatically puts civilization itself potentially at risk, given the colossal potential destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals.

We concluded that the price for successful policies that reduced both violence and the possibility of superpower involvement would be a far more intensive, purposeful, and timely overall official strategy of conflict control. But because of the distortion that a policy of simple anti-violence creates, such strategy must build on a more profound understanding of a number of fundamental elements of the problem where U.S. policy has been weakest: the revolutionary nature of change in much of the world, not all of which is hostile to U.S. interests; the need for better early warning, i.e. recognition, of local conflicts; a more relaxed view of provisional outcomes of such conflicts and less of a cold war "box-score" approach; better ways to profit from the lessons of past conflict; more and better use of multilateral instrumentalities; and greatly improved orchestration of American policies, including policies involving arms control and arms transfers.

At root, what in our view was needed was a new official determination that, rather than waver between the undesirable alternatives of unilateral military intervention or retreat into isolationism, this country's interests would be best served with respect to the great majority of local conflict situations, both internal and interstate, by purposive efforts to prevent, limit, or terminate conflicts. The latter we saw as a policy not of neo-isolationism or irresponsibility, but of a determined and responsible shift to emphasis on non-military agencies of action, on multilateral rather than unilateral political modes, and
at times on national abstention rather than involvement, preferably but not necessarily accompanied by an understanding with the Soviet Union about what I have called "Spheres of Abstention."*

When that Design Study was completed, it was clear that the reasoning briefly sketched above generated several acute dilemmas, above all the still unresolved tension between an older policy that called for action to secure outcomes favorable to the U.S. in multiple local conflicts around the world, even at the cost of unilateral military intervention; and the growing disposition of the American people and their government to minimize costly and sometimes counter-productive unilateral American military intervention based chiefly on ideological grounds. This was the central policy problem we wished to explore further.

A related issue of concern, especially in terms of arms control policy, involved the flow of arms from the developed to the developing countries which are the central figures in the small wars being fought in this epoch. A separate effort within our Arms Control project took the form of a major effort to assemble data about arms transfers and assess their significance for policy.**

It seemed to us that it might be possible to gain some insight into these vital clusters of issues of policy for the 1970's by subjecting our tentative conclusions to hypothetical situations in which, through simulation, pressures for and against U.S. unilateral intervention, and reactions to various arms inputs into conflict situations, were experimentally generated. The professional-level

* Ibid., Ch. 12.

** That effort, which was under the supervision of Miss Leiss, is separately reported on in Amelia C. Leiss with Geoffrey Kemp, et al., Arms Control and Local Conflict, Vol. III, Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, M.I.T., Center for International Studies, C/70-1.
political-military gaming device, or PME, in which I had a hand in
developing but which we had not employed for several years, appeared
uniquely suitable as a way to examine some of the notions that emerged
in the Design Study about possible future situations of incipient
local conflict. The situations would of course be wholly hypothetical.

My own efforts had been initiated in 1958 and continued from
time to time during the decade that followed. They built on a technique
developed by the Social Science Division of the RAND Corporation in
the early 1950's--the so-called "Cold War games"--in which teams of
professionals in the field of foreign affairs simulated the reactions
of governments to hypothetical crisis situations in a series of moves.

Each of the subsequent series of what we originally called
"political games" was mounted in conjunction with other ongoing
research. The first two games (POLEX I and POLEX II) were executed
in 1958 and 1960 as part of the Center's United Nations Project which
I then directed. In 1962-63 I ran four games, POLEX-DAIS I through
IV, to explore potential uses of international military forces under
different conditions of disarmament. In 1963-64, in DETEX I through
III, Barton Whaley and I experimented with the PME to study deterrence
problems featuring naval strategic weapons systems.**

Political-military games have been used to date for a number
of purposes, mainly educational. But for the serious policy analyst
the game has been used 'provocatively,' to educate him about some possi-
bilities in future policy areas he may not have thought of or taken

* See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Report and Analysis of Political
Exercise, September, 1958, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.,
December 1958 (ditto), and Political Exercise II - The U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. in Iran, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., December,
1960.

** See L. P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political Exer-
seriously before. We increasingly used this form of gaming as a device to artificially subject simulated U.S. decision-makers to strains and pressures designed to shake policy thinking out of old molds, or free attention to hitherto unconsidered alternatives.*

After our DETEX series we concluded that the PME so far had in general been more valuable for generating new hypotheses than in testing old ones. For policy analysis past PME's were, at best, a form of organized brainstorming, with serendipity the hoped-for chief value. Thomas Schelling (who collaborated with me in designing the 1960 model) and I have long agreed that policy and behavioral inferences should be treated generically, that is, as relevant to classes of action, rather than as telling one very much about the particular area problem or place. The latter is, more than anything else, a device to mobilize the people and the psychic and intellectual energy required for the game.

In the series reported on here our intention was to apply this technique to analysis of issues of U.S. decision-making concerning involvement in local conflicts, and of the possible effects of conflict-control inputs on the course of local conflicts. As stated above, I was convinced that games at a professional level would be a good way --perhaps the only good way--to look at possible future local conflict situations with a particular view to the dilemmas inherent in U.S. policy toward these conflicts. Also very much in our mind was the secondary purpose of seeing if we could improve the technique, methodology, and theory of the PME.

*77% of 72 government officials who responded to a questionnaire survey reported that participation in M.I.T.'s PME's had broadened their sense of alternative strategies and policies available to the U.S. in certain kinds of crisis situations. See Richard E. Barringer and Barton Whaley, "The M.I.T. Political-Military Gaming Experience," Orbis, Summer, 1965.
On September 11 and 12, 1968 with CONEX I, the first game in the series, the M.I.T. Center for International Studies resumed its activity in the development of professional-level policy-type political military exercises. The second game, CONEX II, was like the first also held at M.I.T.'s Endicott House in Dedham, Mass, on December 6 and 7, 1968, and CONEX III also took place there, on March 28 and 29, 1969. In CONEX IV, held on September 17-19, 1969, we used as an experimental variable condition the CASCON system we were also currently developing.* Because of the technical requirements of that exercise, involving computers not only for CASCON but for game communications as well, it was held in M.I.T.'s Center for Advanced Engineering Studies in Cambridge, Mass.

What follows describes and evaluates the four senior professional exercises in the CONEX series. For the convenience of the reader whose primary interest is conflict control and arms control policy—as is that of the report's authors—Chapter II sets forth the policy inferences drawn generally from the games. The primary evidence supporting these policy notions is found in the game results, specifically in the game actions and outcomes that tended to uphold or to disconfirm the policy hypotheses which we subjected to the games. In framing these policy inferences we have drawn liberally on the opinions and reflections of the approximately 125 or so professionals who participated in this series, and whose own policy ideas stimulated by the games we elicited both at the post-game Critique Sessions and in post-game questionnaires. By promising them anonymity so they could freely role-play in the games, I and my colleagues are unable to thank them except generally, which we hereby do.

Chapter III spells out the theoretical base for the games, in the form of a number of hypotheses about policy behavior which we assigned to each team's predicted behavior and performance in each move period of each game.

Chapter IV reports on the gaming technique itself as we modified it in this series. Each innovation we introduced is described, followed by a critical commentary on the results achieved. In Chapter V we spell out the crucial data-gathering and analysis techniques with which we sought to identify and calibrate the ever-elusive individual and group decision process that in the "black box" of team discussion transforms our scenario "inputs" into policy "outputs." Chapter VI represents some comments of my own, inescapably personal, on the validity of the "free game" as now restructured by us, seen as a research tool.

In Appendix A may be found the "scenarios"--the hypothetical policy problems chosen as appropriate to illustrate and illuminate the more general policy dilemma of concern, with a brief summary of the game "events." The situations gamed were of course wholly fictitious, although real place names were used for the purpose of realism. The Appendices also contain several questionnaires we administered along with their results, other forms and schedules, and some general comments by participants.

A word about nomenclature. I had toyed with a rather pretentious title or subtitle for this report along the lines of "The PME Comes of Age." I do believe the CONEX series has helped the PME to mature and take its place as a form of controlled experimentation even while retaining the creative values derived from interaction among trained and seasoned experts based in turn on the sense of involvement that role-playing produces.
But I decided against the title for quite another reason. The label "PME" should now, I submit, be retired and the older label "political exercise" resurrected. The emphasis of U.S. foreign policy in fact is not—and should not—be predominantly (or even one half) military.* Our own policy argument favors a vigorous quest for a more varied, diverse, and imaginative array of policies that ought to be brought to bear in timely fashion in working toward the goal of helping to avert or resolve local conflicts without violence, and without escalation to possible nuclear war (while otherwise living with such conflicts in a more relaxed way). The proper name of the game should be "Political-Economic-Psychological-Communications-Intelligence-Military Exercise" (or PEPCIME). For short I suggest Political Exercise, or POLEX or even PE, though here for convenience the familiar abbreviation "PME" will be employed.

* * * * *

* In part—but only in part—this change in terminology is needed to clarify the very real difference between "war games" and the former PME, which was usually in fact a politico-diplomatic game. The distinction is made moderately well in Andrew Wilson's provocative report on the gaming state of the art entitled The Bomb and The Computer (New York: Delacourt, 1968). A plug for the distinction was made by Senator J. William Fulbright when he wrote in The Arrogance of Power (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 43:

It would be a fine thing indeed if, instead of spending so much of their time playing 'war games,' political scientists were asking how it came about that we have had for so long to devote so great a part of our resources to war and its prevention, and whether we are condemned by forces beyond our control to continue to do so.
The work undertaken in the current study has centered on two major tasks which can be summarized as:

I. Analysis of policy implications and dilemmas posed by conflict control measures identified in the ACLIM model, with the purpose of recommending policy measures, and

II. Evaluation of U.S. interest in control of particular kinds of conflict and the extent to which specific arms control and disarmament measures would increase or diminish the U.S. ability for local conflict control.

We sought to attack these objectives through (1) the use of the political gaming technique reported in this volume, and (2) making an intensive study of arms transfers and their control, reported in Volume III of this study.

In undertaking these two lines of inquiry, we sought in addition to integrate and subsume such insights as we were able to acquire on two related areas:

1. Extra-regional Factors, e.g., (a) the effects on the control of local conflict of changes in Sino-Soviet, U.S.-Soviet, and U.S.-Chinese relations; (b) the changing role of the former metropolitan powers and of Europe generally as a factor in the control of local conflict; (c) the anticipated effects on, and acceptability to major powers of various possible regional arms control agreements.

2. (To the extent possible) Instrumentalities of Conflict Control, e.g., (a) those political and economic institutions most conducive to controlling limited conflict, i.e., whether individual nations exert greater influence on parties to a conflict than various kinds of international organizations; (b) the effectiveness of the preventive role of both peace observation and peacekeeping efforts;
(c) the relative potential of the United Nations and regional organizations in controlling limited conflict; (d) the relationship of peaceful change procedures to short-term conflict controls.

Chapter II of this volume, deriving in the first instance from game evidence, substantially covers (a) and (b) of 1 above. (a) through (d) of 2 above are also dealt with in Chapter II. Volume III on arms transfers includes coverage of subparagraph (c) under task 1.

In a closely-related effort we sought to improve the ACLIM conflict model developed in our earlier study.*

* * * * * * * *

In confronting these challenging tasks I was fortunate to be able to assemble as collaborators a small but extraordinary group of bright, inventive, and theory-oriented younger social scientists. The charge I gave to all of us was to try to connect up the political game, as it had stood for a decade or more, with the developing body of social science theory and experimental methods. The challenge was vigorously accepted, and in all the planning and execution of the CONEX games reported on in detail in the pages that follow I have personally and professionally greatly profited from our continuing dialogue and dialectic.

Two of my associates deserve special thanks. John D. Steinbruner was my principal academic colleague in our broad effort of experimentation with games to learn more about local conflict control; much of the improvement in the game model and in our methodology

is due to his efforts, and his separate report on the student EXCON games can be read with profit.* Cornelius J. Gearin, co-author of much of this report, served with high competence as my closest collaborator in designing and mounting the CONEX series. Much of the work accomplished represented his own personal effort. Even while successfully pursuing an advanced degree at M.I.T., he worked on a volunteer basis virtually full-time as an indispensable deputy to me in the senior-professional CONEX series, bringing to the entire effort a combination of extraordinary field experience, mature judgment, healthy skepticism, and great operational skill and energy. Much of any accrued credit must go to him.

James L. Foster, a student in our Graduate Political Science Program, concentrated during the project on the problem of converting game phenomena into observable and measurable data, and in the course of the four senior games moved steadily toward a method of data-handling and analysis that holds great promise. He also contributed substantially to this report. Helping him in monitoring and analyzing game data were Christopher Arterton, R. Lucas Fischer, Keith Smith, and Cheryl Christensen—also graduate students in Political Science, and Kirk Thomas. Robert R. Beattie worked full time on the development of the CASCON system which is reported on separately, but somehow also found time to take responsibility, with high efficiency, for the complex communications operations in CONEX I, II, and III, (and also served as our live link to the interest and related work of Harold Guetzkow, then of Northwestern University, whose friendly challenge was the goad I needed to seek to make the "free game" into better social science).

Throughout this research I have greatly benefited, as I always do, from the comments and views of my associate Amelia C. Leiss, and also from those of Jacob S. Refson, Harold E. Fischer, Geoffrey Kemp, and John H. Hoagland, all of whom under Miss Leiss' direction have been intensively investigating the arms transfer problems, and also from William A. Platte, who has been most helpful while pursuing his graduate studies.

Numbers of my academic colleagues gave generously of their time both at the games and in advising on the scenario preparation, particularly Myron Weiner and Robert I. Rotberg.

I could not end these acknowledgements without recording the warm and encouraging support—and active game participation—of the Director of the Center for International Studies, Max F. Millikan, whose tragic death as I write this Introduction has deeply grieved us who have long followed his sensitive and statesmanlike lead.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
CHAPTER II

POLICY INFERENCEs AND CONCLUSIONS

What follow are some impressions and observations, directly
stimulated by CONEX games, concerning U.S. foreign policy and strat-
egy, arms transfers and controls, multilateral options, and the U.S.
decision-making process. The author takes full responsibility for
these impressionistic statements, although he has drawn liberally on
the suggestions of his associates and of the participants in the
games. I wish to emphasize that these games provide no particular
evidence of actions being taken by the U.S. Government or any other
government. What can be suggested by political exercises are more
general issues, probabilities, and clues as to style and posture of
decision-making concerning classes of problems the future may bring.
At best, they may uncover remediable flaws in assumptions and pre-
conceptions, weaknesses in crisis or pre-crisis strategy, and
structural difficulties of policy-making. These comments, then, are
not so much about the CONEX games, or about the precise areas gamed,
as they are about policy in general in the light of the games. They
also represent our own notion of hypotheses about present or future
U.S. policy that may be said to have been generated or at least
stimulated by the CONEX games.

15
A. THE POST-VIETNAM NON-INTERVENTION SYNDROME

All four CONEX games supplied unequivocal confirmatory evidence of the strength and pervasiveness of the "Post-Vietnam syndrome." Seven similarly constituted teams of qualified, experienced American experts and personalities in political life reacted to hypothetical situations in virtually identical ways. In these simulated situations (which the participants described as very realistic) there was a powerful indisposition to see the United States become directly involved at the present time with its own military forces in local conflicts. On the same evidence one can surmise that only a clear and present danger will override these fears of getting involved in another such situation, at least in the immediate future.

1. Two M.I.T. games on Africa with senior participants, six years apart, dramatize the change in U.S. attitudes. In 1963 a comparable game (POLEX-DAIS II) ended with "U.S. power" directly engaged in central and southern Africa, in open confrontation with "Soviet" power and thoroughly enmeshed in local violence. CONEX III in the spring of 1969 also ended with clear prospects for Soviet gains, a sharp radicalization of a previously moderate "African state," and an accelerated crisis involving the "White Redoubt" that could reach deeply into sensitive U.S. domestic areas. But unlike the 1963 game, in CONEX III two teams simulating U.S. decision-makers remained steadfastly unwilling to see American power directly involved, firmly committed to using multilateral agencies for such external involvement as might take place, and determined not to engage U.S. military forces. Faced with an accelerating African blowup, the U.S. stance, if not "neo-isolationist," could by contrast with 1963 be described as at least "totally non-unilateral."
2. The phenomenon has several identifiable elements:

a) an initial disinclination, essentially visceral, to see the United States directly involved in any new conflict situation in the developing world; b) a generalized disinclination to see U.S. military force used for interventionist purposes, accompanied by increasingly relaxed acceptance of some violent change in the local status quo; c) substantially increased sensitivity to U.S. public opinion and far less glib certainty that U.S. interests as perceived by experts can be acted upon by "manipulating" U.S. opinion.* The actions of U.S. teams in the whole series revealed an awareness of the constraints imposed by public sentiment against new U.S. force commitments and involvement in local conflicts in the absense of a clear threat to U.S. vital interests, even if some "adversary" gain is possible.

The result of these three steps is typically a fourth:

d) a reassessment of the degree of U.S. vital interests involved.

The interesting point is that this systematic reassessment grows out of feelings of limitations on the effectiveness of U.S. policy, rather than from an a priori analysis (or from any new evidence about the external world). A final element observed in the process is e) abandonment of the recently popular "worst case" assessment of implications for U.S. interests assuming the greatest possible Soviet or Chinese gain accompanied by corresponding losses of U.S. prestige, power, investments, or other assets. The "worst case" assessment that does then take place is in terms of U.S. domestic opposition, high costs (if not economic then "social" and "opportunity" costs), probable ingratitude on the part of those helped, and increased unpopularity among at least some sectors of world opinion.

* A belief rather surprisingly still heard in the spring of 1969.
The CONEX participants did not articulate a new or coherent world view that related development, revolution, Communism, violence, and U.S. interests in ways markedly different from the past two decades. What they did do, as knowledgeable scholars and experts faced with hypothetical situations of conflict, was to act as though they shared some or all of the attitudes sketched above. The evidence appears to support a more general intuition that, at least for a time, the United States will define its interest pragmatically and rather narrowly, area by area, in specific political, economic, or defense terms, rather than in sweeping strategic-global or ideological terms.

3. By itself, a strategy of non-intervention does not add up to a creative or dynamic policy, either in games or in real life:

a) A nation's most "important" international decisions traditionally involve military action. Once that is ruled out, a quantum jump downward in priorities typically takes place. Policy-makers make an automatic distinction between the application of military power on the one hand, and political, economic, psychological policies on the other (activities characterized by some CONEX participants as "fiddling"). The result is a distortion of the diplomatic process.

b) Having rejected unilateral military intervention, the tendency of Americans may be to retreat into hand-wringing rather than search for imaginative alternatives. All of our current games underscore the chronic difficulty the United States may experience, once it decides not to use its own military forces, in deciding on any purposeful action whatever. But if the United States is not willing to use its military power directly to intervene in many local conflict situations that may upset a local or
regional balance, this country may nevertheless still have to act; United States interests may still be involved, or a larger peace may be threatened, or longer-term stability may require that the roots of the conflict be dealt with through peaceful change procedures.

c) Put differently, a decision not to intervene, whatever its other merits, may sometimes leave a dangerous vacuum. Many Americans evidently hope that it will be filled by some evolutionary outcome of the development process (rather than by communism, as was feared for two decades). The possibility that at least in some cases a local conflict may nevertheless threaten a larger peace defines a broad U.S. interest in conflict-prevention, and lends urgency to improving two elements of U.S. policy that are traditionally weak: a conflict-minimizing or controlling approach; and multi-lateral substitutes for American (or Soviet) power vis-à-vis local conflicts.

B. CONTROLLING CONFLICT

4. In order to influence events in ways that are consonant with broadly defined U.S. interests, a decision not to intervene militarily needs to be accompanied by non-military measures that are likely to deal effectively with conflict-generating pressures. This desideratum is not likely to be met if the U.S. continues to address seemingly low-intensity problems purely in traditional terms. My colleagues and I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere the urgency of this interest, along with suggestions for more systematically giving effect to such a goal in the form of a "strategy of conflict control." Logically such a strategy calls for utilizing multiple agencies of action, U.S. and other, aimed at tranquilizing local
conflicts, or at least furnishing substitutes for U.S. unilateral military intervention in order to prevent, contain, or terminate conflicts.*

In other words, far from being the ultimate decision, the decision against unilateral military intervention ought to be regarded as only the preliminary to other equally—or more—important decisions in the political, economic, social, psychological, and multilateral spheres. There is an undiminished need for treatment of acute symptoms, i.e., actions toward de-escalation, separation of combatants, peacekeeping devices, aid to regimes enjoying popular support, control of arms shipments, and the like. There is an even greater unfilled need for longer-range remedies that are addressed to causes. At the highest levels of U.S. decision-making both still labor under serious deficiencies.

a) The central difficulty is that, even while objectives and priorities may seem clear, orchestrated, integrated, and sufficient U.S. conflict-control measures do not necessarily follow. Even the urgent "band-aid" function is a hit or miss affair and generally comes late, when conflict-prevention options have shrunk, rather than early when timely action might be taken across a far broader front if the will to do so exists. The longer-term strategic problem grows in part at least out of the U.S. decision-making style (see below).

b) In CONEX I the local internal need for political reform was paramount; in CONEX II it was internal political problems of both sides that eventually provided the real motive for hostilities.

CONEX I illustrated chronic U.S. difficulties in using trade and aid policies as explicit instruments of conflict-control. In CONEX III and IV the economic element stood out but without being ever "implemented" massively in the games (as perhaps a military action decision might have been). The U.S. teams did not specifically seek to deal with, let alone ameliorate, the really determinant internal problems, even while stressing the need for diplomatic and economic initiatives. The results argue, however, for just such concentration--and for competent social science research aimed at better understanding of such processes for conflict-controlling purposes."

c) The "revolutionary development" type of community-building programs are of equal importance with military activity. Modernization and nation-building devices should be at the top of the local conflict-controlling agenda even when the situation looks military. Perhaps the future U.S. order of priority ought to be the reverse of that followed in recent times--and in some of these games. First consideration should perhaps be given to policy means such as economic, political, and psychological, aimed at removing the major causes of conflict. Only if all else failed should military steps even be considered, with the possible exception of controlled military assistance.

d) This issue obviously has a major ideological component. My associates and I have been using "control" in the sense of preventing, containing, and terminating violent clashes that may threaten a larger peace. But it is evident that such a

* The "most salient finding" of another recent study of conflict outcomes was of "the importance of socio-political strength as represented by the variable of public morale, determination of leadership and stability of government. . ." James B. McQueen, "A Statistical Analysis of Some International Confrontations--Implications for Arms Control," Arms Control Special Studies Program, University of California, Los Angeles, 1968.
policy is futile if genuine popular aspirations are suppressed in the name of anti-violence, and that some turbulence in the short run may be the only assurance of longer-term stability in today's world. Thus to "control" a conflict, far from suppressing it, may imply allowing certain things to take place that previously the United States might earlier have considered unacceptable as a threat to U.S. interests or an open invitation to Communists to meddle or take over.

e) This prescription calls for a more objective judgment, in the longer lens of U.S. history, about the proper attitude of this country toward revolutionary movements that have demonstrable popular support. As Chalmers Johnson has written, "One of the lessons to be derived from a social system analysis of revolutions is that they never occur as a result of forces beyond human control. Creative political action is the specific antidote to revolutionary conditions."* U.S. abstinence can in some situations be both conflict-controlling and in the longer run more likely to produce the genuine stability we seek as a rich and satisfied nation.** Admittedly the choices can be agonizingly hard (witness the tradeoffs involved in leaving alone the Nigerian Civil War and not identifying the sides as "ours" and "theirs" thus making it part of a worldwide conflict; high human costs are entailed on both sides of that ledger).

** Robert D. Crane quotes a Shan leader as warning the U.S. (through him) not to fall into the Chinese trap by opposing resurgent nationalism in South East Asia, saying "I wish you would tell your people that we are in the middle of a revolution to create our own new world. It will not be Communist, but we can succeed only if there is no outside intervention." "Revolutionary Regionalism," The Reporter, May 2, 1968. Reprinted in Survival, September 1968, p. 291.
5. The CONEX games highlighted areas where positive policy steps are indicated:

   a) The United States, in denying or trying to avoid the military option, typically tries to affect those factors over which it presently has influence, rather than seeking to create alternative avenues of influence over events. "U.S." teams are reluctant to treat seriously with very "radical" regimes. Some Americans seem to assume that bona fide diplomatic or economic agreements with leftist regimes in the third world are either too risky, or politically unacceptable at home. Those Americans may still believe that a foreordained alliance must exist between the United States and the rightist side in such quarrels. Perhaps one of the healthiest exercises for U.S. policy regarding local conflicts in the 70's would be a fresh appraisal of the whole notion of "sides," with a conscious attempt to break away from stereotyped, automatic side-taking that objective analysis may show to be non-rational in terms of U.S. national interests, U.S. history, or the imperatives of conflict-control. The guiding principle should be to apply U.S. influence, pressure and resources wherever U.S. conflict-control interests warrant.

   b) A U.S. retreat from a posture of support for governments in power so long as they are anti-Communist might well require opening and maintaining good communications channels with all parties to a potential conflict, including political forces far to the left, and Soviet "clients," instead of concentrating exclusively on the government in power while other forces build up. It may involve trying to broaden unpopular right-wing governments. The United States has of course frequently tried to do this (sometimes fairly ineffectively if pre-1949 China, Vietnam, and CONEX I are samples).
c) Such an approach must involve a search for middle-ground democratic alternatives. In several historic instances (such as the above) this policy has been founded more on a wistful *a priori* faith in the existence of democratic-centrist "good guys" than on evidence of the existence of a viable centrist force. Where middle classes are weak and polarized politics customary, the potential for conflict is high. Any genuine conflict-control policy must in the pre-crisis phase cherish and invest heavily in such fragile democratic centers as exist, if necessary supplying help to people on the inside who have the best chance of combining needful change with the values of political freedom or, at a minimum, non-enmity to the United States. After moderates fall (as in the Dominican Republic) or are purged (as in Cuba, China, even Vietnam) it may be too late to use any but military measures to influence the situation—if one wants to.

d) The most extreme option for a long-term conflict-control policy is to compete with left-wing extremists in calling for the overthrow of self-destructive undemocratic governments. Short of this, a possible strategy where a moderate center does not exist would be to come down firmly on the side of a liberal constitutional order, and to set up and finance a non-Communist movement to bring it about. In an age of competing Titoism, Fidelism, Maoism, etc. the United States might consider influencing or even working with non-communist extremists, rather than automatically acting as their enemy. Other suggestions include "buying off the Junta," or, when action fails, working up an alternative multilateral frame such as an ad hoc coalition to rule. What all these possibilities have in common is an attempt to break out of a mold in which U.S. policy may have become stereotyped without commensurate political gains, and with increasingly dubious advantages for U.S. economic interests.
6. A strategy of conflict control (like a strategy of intervention) is of course constrained by the limits of the situation, whether public opinion, geography, local conditions, resources, or whatever:

   a) Many were struck at CONEX IV by the severe limits on the American ability to influence the situation, even though the United States aim was only to isolate and tranquilize the conflict (and even though one of the two U.S. teams made a determined effort to employ the data from our local conflict analysis through the computerized CASCON pilot model). Even if the United States consciously adopts a purposeful conflict control strategy, it is in many ways harder to implement decisively than a decision to use troops. The political problem is exemplified by the enormous difficulty in securing support for an adequate economic aid program. And the lack of American success in requiring virtually any of its key allies or dependents to implement basic reform measures (from land reform and political democracy in South Vietnam to tax equalization in Latin America) makes one skeptical of our ability to press to fruition fundamental reforms in the internal affairs of any nations. One can only say that making such steps a precondition for American support has never really been tried.

   b) In part at least this is a function of the timing of policy. The traditional policy of postponing the formulation of a coherent conflict-avoidance policy until forced to do so by the emergence of a crisis can leave us with no real options other than unilateral military intervention on the one hand or impotent withdrawal.

on the other. This apparent procrastination may be attributable to saturation of the decision-making process with high priority problems, or to a natural desire to gather more information in the face of the grave consequences of precipitate action. In any event it does serve to reduce the number of conflict-preventing options available to the United States in the early stages of a dispute.

c) The non-military instruments of influence—political, economic and psychological—are almost invariably much slower-acting, and at the same time require longer-term information and analysis of a gradually evolving situation. One cannot really expect a game to throw much light on the strengths and weaknesses of alternative longer-term preventive strategies. Nonetheless, it is a reasonable conclusion that in the absence of preventive strategies there are very few options of either a non-military or a multilateral sort available after the crisis has become manifest. Concentration in early phases of conflict on internal political processes, and above all on democratic reforms, should stand high on the list of conflict-control targets in developing countries.

7. The games dramatized a persistent tendency inherent in some local conflict situations for the United States to be drawn in. Policies should be designed to avoid a situation in which (as in Vietnam and, for that matter, World War II) U.S. forces do eventually fight, under unfavorable conditions, and worst of all against this government's better judgment and soberer intentions:

   a) In our game design we hypothesized that this tendency varies directly with perceived increases in Soviet or Chinese involvement. Even without that, the very spread of American investment and personnel abroad ensures a prima facie local interest even when Washington decides against making that interest operational.
b) The large number of American residents abroad requires U.S. embassies to draw up contingency plans for emergency evacuation of Americans and/or their dependents. Some U.S. "emergency" actions such as military assistance and evacuation of U.S. nationals carry risks of unwitting and unwanted direct U.S. involvement. As in Stanleyville in the Congo in 1964—and in two of the CONEX games—the U.S. intervenes unilaterally, with the possibility of unforeseen consequences, by flying planes in to airlift out Americans. The humanitarian arguments are self-evident. But it might not be wholly outrageous to ask how the United States would feel if at a time of enlarged rioting in Harlem, Washington, or Detroit a fleet of British or Soviet (or, under not totally imaginary future circumstances, Puerto Rican) planes were to arrive suddenly to evacuate blacks or whites, with armed personnel to oversee the process.

8. Finally, in carrying out a conflict-control policy U.S. interest in minimizing violence and maintaining stability sometimes clashes with the interests of the parties to that conflict—often including allies or aid recipients of this country:

a) Almost by definition U.S. interests are simply not identical with those of its local friends. Three of the CONEX games illustrate how a relatively weak LDC that is revisionist in terms of territory may be likely to seize the initiative in a pre-crisis situation and find ways to commit the larger powers against their better judgment.

b) A participant in CONEX II felt that the game confirmed an hypothesis held for some time: "If a small country feels its vital interests and prestige are at stake, it is as likely to engage in conflict if isolated from allies than if supported by friends and allies." One reason Israel went to war in 1967 was
because it no longer trusted the Western powers to put enough diplo-
matic and military pressure on the Arab countries to desist from war.
This raises a question that today seems premature, but may become
of paramount importance in the next two to five years, namely--

C. "AFTER NEO-ISOLATIONISM, WHAT?"

9. Having vigorously espoused a purposeful strategy of
conflict-control for the United States, it is clear on the basis of
massive historic evidence that there are occasions when in the
absence of an effective collective security system the need exists
for a great power to counterbalance an aggressive or expansionist
power. This is bound to remain true even if those occasions are
fewer and less clearcut than U.S. policy has until recently supposed:

a) If the Vietnam war had been in fact a case of
Chinese expansion into the whole southeastern portion of Asia with
a chain reaction spreading west and east, the United States and its
allies (in the absence of effective collective security mechanisms)
would have been justified in opposing it in the name of a larger peace.
Similarly, if attack by Russian military forces in the Arab world
had been the real issue in 1956-58 the United States would have
been justified in the misconceived "Eisenhower Doctrine" for the
Middle East. Under those circumstances the lesson of the 1930's
would have been correctly learned and applied.

It will be clear that I believe neither of those situations
was correctly perceived by the United States. But it remains true
that world peace depends in the end on either a better international
mechanism for collective action,* or on the capacity of great powers to act as the prime counterforce when the balance of power is in fact seriously threatened. The toughest recent problem for the United States has been the discovery that its responses to presumed upsets of the balance might have been inappropriate and even damaging to the international fabric. The toughest future problem may well be for it to have the courage and will to act when it is not only appropriate but indispensable to do so. In a world system that still depends on multiple balances of power for stability, it must remain a contingent possibility for the United States to weigh in with its incomparable power on the rare occasion when a vital balance—and thus world peace—is likely to be fatally upset.

b) It would be useful if the President could evolve a set of goals and priorities for the United States so that American policy-makers could distinguish between the latter contingency, and the great majority of local situations where direct U.S. intervention would probably not serve either United States or world interests. Future small wars are not likely to fall into only one or two categories such as "vitally important" or "insignificant," but will fall somewhere along a scale between the two extremes. The ability to classify conflicts in this way will enhance the policy-maker's task of selecting means appropriate to the end.

c) Complete disavowal in advance of unilateral military intervention in a local conflict reduces the influence that can be

*Many Americans appear to favor a new and more indigenous regionalism, particularly in South East Asia, and U.S. withdrawal may provide the reality and impetus this still seems to lack. Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo recently advocated such arrangements, saying "After Vietnam, I do not think the American people will ever again consent to involve their troops in Asia. ... The Americans must now think of themselves, and I don't blame them." Quoted in New York Times, January 6, 1969.
exerted on disputants and other interested parties. Although the United States may wish to avoid overt involvement in a conflict, it may be desirable on occasion to leave that option open as a deterrent. The possibility of American intervention, however implausible, could be a decisive bargaining tool for conflict control. Absolute abstention by the United States not only creates a great power vacuum but also relieves a potential aggressor of even a contingent threat of American retaliation thereby reducing the cost of hostilities.

D. GREAT POWER RELATIONS

10. Great power relations are central to the question of how important and dangerous local conflicts become to the world. In part this is because they often determine whether, how, and how long the parties can fight. A crude symmetry may be developing between American and Soviet desires, at least in some areas, to restrain Third World states from generating international violence (though not internal violence). However imperfect, this is the central possibility on which to construct a peacekeeping and conflict-minimizing strategy for the 1970’s. (In CONEX IV Soviet cooperation was selected by two U.S. teams as the prime available mechanism for conflict-control.) As before, there is a need to distinguish between avowed long-term Soviet goals and pragmatic or tactical actions, whether in the Middle East, in South East Asia, or in controlling the arms race.*

*In recent times Moscow has both reaffirmed its worldwide commitment to the "national liberation movement" (see e.g., commentator V. Mayevsky in Pravda, June 19, 1968), and its opposition to armed uprisings by Communists to seize power in underdeveloped countries (Pravda, September 15, 1968).
a) There is, in both games and reality, a decreasing disposition to view incipient local conflicts automatically as U.S.-Soviet competitions in which one must be the winner and the other the loser (although note below the special effect of Soviet arms inputs). The world, in short, is decreasingly an arena in which the U.S. reputation, and world peace itself, necessarily depend on the day-to-day boxscore of relative influence across-the-board.

b) The games reinforce reality, at least for this analyst, in suggesting that U.S. policy is correct in seeking to maximize incentives to Moscow to pursue a tranquilizing policy, however superficial common interests may seem at a given time. Indeed I can think of no higher goal of policy than to make it easier for Moscow--and Peking as well--to follow a conflict-limiting course of action in ambiguous and therefore potentially explosive areas of the world such as the Middle East, South East Asia, Latin America, and ultimately southern Africa.* The longer-term goal should be to make the parallel interest in conflict-minimizing more durable and eventually "strategic-level."

11. But there also remains a clearly competitive aspect to the superpower relationship. In all the games, local crisis-management arrangements between Washington and Moscow seemed to work fairly satisfactorily. But also implicit in at least two of them was the threat of a Soviet-U.S. confrontation if things got sufficiently out of hand--or if Soviet activities seemed to Washington sufficiently threatening. Where U.S. interests conflict with each other, as in the southern Africa problem-cluster, a Soviet and/or Chinese advantage

over the United States and the West generally appears to be built in. The advantage, emphasized in CONEX III, takes two forms:

a) A propaganda advantage simply by virtue of all-out opposition to the white minority-ruled regimes of the region (in real life mitigated by the racism of some Russians), in contrast to U.S. caution and balancing of interests, economic in the case of South Africa and Rhodesia, allegedly strategic in the case of Portugal.

b) The Soviet carrot-and-stick technique involving an implied threat of direct intervention to acquire other desirable things from the United States (an ABM halt in CONEX III, a German Peace Treaty in the series of Berlin crises under Khrushchev, U.S. missile sites in Turkey, a non-invasion pledge in the Cuban missile crisis, etc.). An additional Soviet factor (which in CONEX III had a marked effect on "South African" reactions) was its potential for a force-in-being, which could have great significance given the geopolitical realities of the southern African region.

c) The instability of local governments in much of the developing world makes them especially vulnerable to externally-supported insurgency. The Soviets/Chinese can work both sides of the street by using the rebels or the threat of rebellion as an incentive for an LDC to grant concessions to the U.S.S.R. or China, while posturing as the sponsor of progressive reform.

d) The United States does not seem to be able or willing to exploit Sino-Soviet competition in the developing world. But in certain circumstances it could be more cost-effective to influence the outcome of a conflict by advancing reforms in the true interest of the inhabitants of the region while helping preserve them from foreign domination, than to support a weak regime in a counter-insurgency campaign.

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e) The abortive—but momentarily startling—"British" threat of unilateral military intervention in "Rhodesia" in the course of CONEX III, however implausible, served as a reminder that other powers than the Big Two, including their allies, can initiate the use of force in the LDC regions, force that under some circumstances could serve as triggers to potential superpower conflict.

12. CONEX IV underscored the triangular U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relationship in Asia. In CONEX IV "China" became increasingly aware that the U.S. was not a very active presence in the South Asian area while a conflict was polarizing between Peking and Moscow. In the end "China" wished to invent, so to speak, a United States to balance Soviet pressures in Asia.

If this seems far-fetched, one has only to recall that there has been some evidence in the past that the Soviets have privately desired to keep NATO strong, or at least present, to balance the growing possibility of a powerful Germany. The balance of power still so dominates state policy, whatever the ideology, that the U.S., even in pursuing a conflict-controlling policy, will inescapably represent a paramount makeweight to the extent that other great powers act as though they have interests in local conflict situations. Inescapably the only surrogate for American power in that equation would be a strengthened multilateral mechanism whose prime purpose was to exclude the direct participation of all great powers from local conflicts, while cooperating in accepting Third Party involvement.

E. THE MULTILATERAL OPTION

13. The "multilateral option" remains possibly the most important for pre-crisis management and conflict control, but
at the same time one of the most elusive and discouraging. The needs growing out of all four CONEX games were clear and obvious:

a) In CONEX I the situation called for border-sealing, observation and reporting, coastal patrol activity, arms embargoes, and (as in Vietnam) possibly neutralization under international guarantees. It was self-evident that multilateral machinery could play an important role—but not evident that it is currently capable.

b) The proximate casus belli in CONEX II was a grievance concerning disputed borders. Elementary conflict-control considerations called for suggesting, sponsoring, or urging some form of joint or third-party border control in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. If the United States, as in this hypothetical instance, prefers regional to global mechanisms for such cases, it is in order to find ways of massively strengthening such organizations' capacity to do vital jobs of this sort. At the same time effort must be focused on eliminating some of the deeper causes of conflict.

c) CONEX III suggested an expanding preference for U.N. action as crisis deepens. The need seems widely understood for a readily-available, mobile U.N. peacekeeping force to cauterize the elements of the southern African complex of infections as they flare up. But such a capability now has to be invented afresh every time. This game served as a further illustration (if one were needed) of how such a capability would serve U.S. interests—and how under-developed it is today.

* For a recent analysis and prescription along these lines see the Panel Report of the UNA-USA Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's, April, 1969 (which reflects many of my own views).
14. The difficulties of using multilateral instruments are not new and require no great elaboration here. But some positive points inspired by the games are worth making:

a) The first is ideological. The United States tends to search for multilateral frameworks for action it thinks necessary, yet the organizations are increasingly resistant to the superpower lead. I believe that the reason is neither tactical nor parliamentary, but a reflection of the notion that has been permitted to grow that the great powers cynically use all diplomatic agencies to advance their ideological predispositions. For this country, those critical of the U.S. assert that we use the U.N. and OAS to support the status quo against change, even legitimate change.

The charge is of course a distortion. But in order to take full advantage of multilateral diplomatic and other international machinery we must persuade other members of international political organizations that the United States is sincere in its desire to minimize conflict while accepting and even encouraging needful internal and external changes in the status quo. In this connection one principle of international peacekeeping that seems increasingly persuasive is that of using multilateral machinery to insulate i.e., "neutralize" a conflict area from external interference while processes of change work themselves out internally. A more relaxed U.S. stance toward the latter process is far more feasible -- and potentially constructive -- if in the meantime significant external interference is coped with -- as it never could be in Vietnam. Harrassed officials argue with some justice that the OAS (or U.N. or whatever) is weak, refractory, unsympathetic, inefficient, etc. But it may also be that the process is a circular one. The U.S. needs to persuade others that its resort to multilateral agencies is neither a cover for planned unilateral military intervention, nor aimed at shoring up repressive and unpopular military dictatorships. (One suggestion is that contingency plans laid in advance by appropriate international bodies might
make more politically acceptable such insulation procedures.)

b) There is no doubt of the very low priority the multilateral capability in fact enjoys in the higher levels of great power policy, apart from official rhetoric (and frantic efforts to get international peacekeepers onto the scene in specific crises). This may seem a harsh indictment, particularly to the special parts of the U.S. Government where positive efforts have been persistent. But in terms of larger U.S. strategic perceptions one must conclude that, over and above Soviet rigidity, the United States has never really assigned a significant priority to genuine improvements in multilateral peacekeeping capacity, and still shows no signs of doing so.

The reason for this may lie in the highly selective nature of U.S. interests in such a capability. The United States has a demonstrable interest in multilateral peacekeeping for Africa and the Middle East, an interest that may at times verge on the desperate. But the United States has also traditionally rejected this approach for much of Southeast Asia, as well as for Latin America and the Caribbean. Until this inner tension, growing out of partial and selective acceptance of an international potential, is resolved it seems unlikely that the United States can or will put sufficient influence and resources behind U.N. peacekeeping to make it possible to contemplate a serious improvement in that capability.

c) A third point goes to the nature of the international "community" itself. In CONEX III the "Zambian" government, after accepting a U.N. observer force, decided not to admit that force after a more "radical" regime took over. By then U.N. observation had become virtually the only string in the U.S. policy bow. The international system has sadly retrogressed since the early 1960's when Dag Hammarskjöld refused to withdraw the U.N. Congo force every time Messrs. Lumumba or Kasavubu alternatively announced its ejection. As long as the rule persists of unlimited power to the "host government" to refuse admission and to eject U.N. observers at will, this
vital capacity can remain at the mercy of one side to a quarrel who in a real-life situation could be the least responsible and the most "guilty" of the parties involved.

d) Another international "structural" difficulty is that the U.N. has yet to find an answer to the question of how the international community can and should relate to internal conflicts in which there is an international interest. It has recently seemed that virtually the whole array of "third-party" mechanisms the world has developed are useless when it comes to the most intractible conflicts of all--those not involving a clearcut invasion of one country by another. This calls for a major effort to apply international law to the new situation in ways that will command the respect of the majority of nations while adapting to dynamic change. The "peaceful change" field is in urgent need of serious rethinking.

e) Yet another is that by its very nature the U.N. is a blunt instrument, exposing conflicts to large numbers of countries, generating publicity, and mixing any new item with other quarrels nations bring into the U.N. with them. Diplomats typically prefer not to go that route if they believe they can deal with a situation in camera or in their vest pockets.

f) CONEX IV's failure to use the U.N. involved in part the absence of China from the U.N. In part it reflected genuine concern as to how effective U.N. action could be, including action under the Security Council NPT "guarantee" resolution. But as in real life it reflected the preference of individual nations and leaders. There is invariably someone who does not wish U.N. machinery to be invoked, usually someone from a country with a "special position" in the area. In CONEX IV it was the "U.K." In real life throughout the 1950's it was France in both Indochina and North Africa (a France
that, in Dean Acheson's retrospective words, "blackmailed" the United States into supporting its positions.* In the Suez pre-invasion summer of 1956 it was Secretary Dulles' persistent preference for private diplomacy. All these reasons were, in the light of later history, poor ones, entailing political and human costs (wars in many cases) outweighing any conceivable political embarrassment or messiness so feared by the cautious diplomat. If the United States had followed its deeper instincts in all these cases and had not put first its European allies' aberrant and self-defeating colonial policies, the outcome for all would have been better. To the extent that in the thermonuclear age U.N. action does nothing but isolate a conflict from great power involvement, to that extent it is a uniquely valuable instrument of conflict control and serves high U.S. interests.

g) CONEX II showed once again that, as one player put it, "prospective opponents, departing from the same given set of facts, can subjectively give them such opposite interpretations that each becomes convinced the other intends to attack and acts accordingly." The prescription is surely to take positive steps towards affording to the local adversaries a better capacity to exchange information concerning intentions in order to prevent miscalculation through misperception. The United Nations (or the United States, having learned this lesson as a party to U.S.-USSR deterrent relations) can well offer to act as a traditional diplomatic intermediary where the information-perceptions problem seems acute.

h) The final point has to do with timing: As with non-military policy options in general, delaying until a full-blown

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crisis the use of such machinery is likely to rule out a wide spectrum of possibly constructive policies.* Beyond this, the very existence of a crisis is likely to render the construction of effective multilateral machinery either impossible or unpersuasive because the direct interests of external powers may have already become so apparent.

15. The prospects for regional organizations as either peacekeepers or peacemakers continue to look dim. In both CONEX II and III some consideration was given to "OAU" action, and the "OAS" became a salient feature of crisis-management in CONEX I. If "radical" (or other) African governments are not going to want the U.N. even when some international presence is deemed important (or would accept it only if its purpose is to coerce the whites), the only alternative for pacific settlement may be the OAU. U.S. planning for the next 10 to 15 years, instead of remaining dissuaded by present OAU weakness, should take into serious account the possibility of enhanced future OAU activity and capability, and might consider constructive measures now to relate such activity to the U.N. framework.

16. Another alternative not to be ruled out, under conditions of regional disunity and U.N. incapacity, would be ad hoc peacekeeping organizations that might not be paralyzed by the parliamentary obstacles of the United Nations, nor disqualified by the parochial interests of the OAU. The crucial attribute of legitimacy would be accorded by acceptance of parties to the conflict. Participation could be elicited by the same combination of appeals to special interests and humanitarian impulses that have characterized previous peacekeeping efforts. The measures adopted by such a temporary coalition

* See Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., for an analysis of the inverse relations between multilateral options and the stages of conflict.
could run the gamut from influencing public opinion, through the threat of economic measures, to the employment of military forces for peacekeeping purposes.

F. THE ROLE OF ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL

17. Two CONEX games involved situations in which questions concerning the supply of conventional arms were key elements in the actions that parties to a local conflict took, or could take.*

One feature of arms transfers has in recent history been fairly predictable: "Socialist" (revolutionary) states seek help from the U.S.S.R. and, to a lesser extent, from China, whereas "status quo" states seek military assistance from a variety of sources.

a) Moscow typically arms clients who have revolutionary proclivities (e.g., UAR, Algeria, earlier Indonesia) while hoping that no destabilizing interstate violence will ensue, with the West following with arms, usually in lesser quantities, for the "status quo" state that feels threatened as a result. Sometimes this works to prevent conflicts from worsening. But at times the United States supports a "status quo" state whose objective is direct retaliation against the source of insurgent support. While the United States can, of course, seek to moderate its client's actions, the large number

*The discussion in this section is based on impressions drawn from the CONEX series. For a substantially more systematic analysis and for findings concerning arms transfer policies and problems, see Leiss, with Kemp et al., Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, op.cit.
of other sources of weapons gives the client the alternative of seek-
ing a less constraining supplier. Thus any "balance" the United
States tries to strike is only temporary, and may have minimal
influence on immediate events.

b) The effect of Soviet arms aid, whatever Moscow's
motive, is to equip "revolutionary" states to fight wars. At the
same time, Western suppliers have, perhaps inadvertently, equipped
"status quo" states in the Third World to achieve their own political
ends, which in CONEX II meant irredentism for "Morocco," i.e.,
precisely the kind of locally destabilizing violence-making that U.S.
policy, in the large, abhors.

c) As one real-life episode after another demonstrates,
actual hostilities appear to frighten the Soviets into a tranquiliz-
ing posture and even the betrayal of their clients (as in the Middle
East in 1956 and again in 1967, not to mention in some political
games). However, the stages that precede their retreat are nerve-
wracking and dangerous, as Moscow's local clients and this country's
local aid recipients play "chicken." The policy implications,
including those for arms control, are depressing. If a "status quo"
state (particularly one that, like South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan,
or "Morocco" in CONEX II is really committed to altering the status
quo) is given weapons that permit punishment of the "revolutionary"
state, the latter will seek further to improve its capability, thus
setting off an arms spiral. If the "status quo" state cannot retaliate
against the sponsor of subversion, it may well be overthrown by the
agents of the impervious sponsor.

d) As in previous games, in CONEX IV a basic differ-
ence surfaced in the way the two superpowers used the supply of arms
in local conflict situations. Both U.S. teams and "India" calculated
that no arms aid was required to cope with the "Indian" internal problems or with "Pakistan." Both U.S. teams said they would consider aid if there was a need. The "Chinese" part of the game was too short, and too "nuclear," to raise the arms aid issue. Both U.S. teams unhesitatingly employed curtailment of supplies as a way to discipline (i.e., deter) a prime arms recipient ("Pakistan"). "Moscow" used its supplier position to enhance its political and economic influence initially in "Pakistan" and later with a substantial package of arms aid to "India" as well. Two points stand out: First, the United States supplied or withheld arms in part on the basis of their military effect. The "Soviets" appeared never to have made these calculations. Second, the "Soviets" used arms aid as a carrot to induce favorable policy decisions, while the "U.S." used it as a stick to punish for bad policies.

e) Local "arms races" may go through several stages, each of which throws the U.S. policy dilemma into sharp relief.

(1) With conflict at modest levels, the United States tends to see arms aid as part of its general influence policy; competition tends to create a local balance, which may be temporarily stabilizing.

(2) The "arms race" intensifies, with the United States sometimes—though not always—dragged along reluctantly, and a step behind the Soviets. (3) A crisis develops and weapons may become quantitatively or qualitatively different; the United States suddenly focuses on arms as the primary local problem. (4) The United States is then either fully dragged in, or disengages, in the process losing such control as it had over the situation.

18. The CONEX series may helpfully illuminate the process from the standpoint of recipient states—a considerable advantage of serious role-playing by qualified professionals, even though Americans:
a) Local parties were prepared to pay a high political price for the kind of military and moral assistance Moscow currently furnishes. Yet the recipients did not want to be dependent on one superpower.

b) A "status quo" state feels threatened by the arms acquisition of a "revolutionary" state. However, its prime sensitivity in this kind of political atmosphere may be to covert aggression (e.g., insurgency) abetted by the "revolutionary" state behind its increasingly powerful military shield, rather than to an all-out conventional assault. Because of increasing domestic turbulence and an inability to deal effectively with an insurgent threat, the "status quo" state may be tempted to punish the revolutionary state directly for its indirect action. The "status quo" state may, therefore, seek superiority in high technology-high firepower weaponry so as to carry military retaliation quickly and decisively to its adversary and avoid punishment in return.

The "revolutionary" state, on the other hand, does not necessarily contemplate direct, overt attack against the "status quo" state. Instead, the objective may be to maintain a force that will deter the "status quo" country from direct retaliation for the "revolutionary's" covert aggression within the "status quo" state. The "revolutionary" state's response to arms purchases by the "status quo" state (which may seek arms from any and all sources) is usually to demand at least compensating arms from its Soviet/Chinese sources; thus the arms spiral continues.

From the American standpoint, the result can be to be forced into a posture of political commitment to a regime, or strategic commitment to an area that the United States may not have intended.
It is this dynamic process that relates arms transfer policies to the "involvement" and "commitment" problems.

c) Another insight concerns the relationship between arms and the central issue of political stability. The most significant aspect of the arms transfer phenomenon in CONEX III was that weapons were irrelevant to the central problem—an LDC's political instability. In CONEX III, arms were sought by the LDC to buy time until a deterrent capacity could be developed against a feared attack from a neighbor; but (in CONEX III at least) the neighbor was not really contemplating attack. And in any event it was internal, externally-supported opposition from right and left that proved the LDC's undoing.

d) CONEX II illustrated another aspect of local conflicts: the close relationship between internal cohesiveness and interstate quarrels. "Morocco" pressed its irredentist claims against "Algeria" in part to placate elements within "Morocco." "Algeria," too, saw hostilities as a homogenizing influence in its domestic situation. In any event "Algeria" had been relatively unmoved by "Moroccan" arms and force expansion and only moderately disturbed by troop movements. But when the "Algerians" were apprised of attacks in "Algiers" by emigré groups operating out of "Morocco" that affected the stability of their regime, they responded without delay with air strikes into "Morocco." Their military and diplomatic actions clearly demonstrated their sensitivity to activities directed against their political control.

19. In the face of this admittedly fragmentary but nevertheless instructive evidence, what is suggested for U.S. policy?

a) If no imbalance exists in a conflict-prone area, creating tension that the United States may be asked to resolve,
U.S. policy clearly prefers limiting the supply of arms. The U.S. position is clearly more focused on stability rather than instability; but is it effective, either in controlling conflicts or in acquiring influence? If it is not, are other options any better?

b) Theoretically it is open to the United States to try to gain influence through an open-handed arms policy. This would probably: a) accelerate local arms races; b) tempt Moscow to match U.S. inputs, thus acquiring new Soviet commitments it may not want, in a mirror-image of the recent U.S. dilemma; and c) create even more dissatisfied clients for the United States when, in crisis, the United States would typically work for restraint. It seems a poor policy option.

c) But, as a CONEX II participant said, "abstinence from activities that contribute to an arms race is not a sufficient means of limiting conflict unless you are in a position to obtain a positive response from the opposing great power (U.S.S.R.) fairly early in the game. If you delay too long in making a response, you lose credibility . . . , discourage your client, and may actually precipitate a conflict by making him believe he is in a corner and must strike first." A corollary to this is a lack of confidence in the means for rendering assistance to developing countries beset by externally-supported insurgencies. The whole gamut of counter-insurgency techniques has been challenged by experience in Vietnam. It is no longer obvious how an outside power can assist in counter-insurgency without either supporting undeserving regimes, becoming bogged down in essentially local socio-political conflicts, or escalating the conflict into a test of great power wills.

d) More to the point, U.S. arms transfer policy can not be a choice between abstention or unlimited supply. It must also
include consideration of transferring selected capabilities to a
developing country in order to forestall bizarre or provocative
acquisitions. Arms supplies in CONEX III were marginal to the main
issues; but their role escalated those very political issues.
Although arms transfers could not have solved the fundamental prob-
lems of the LDC, the right package might have bought enough time for
longer-term solutions to work.

e) Under the circumstances, even given the scope of
U.S. security commitments around the world, it would seem that a
highly selective arms transfer policy approach, region by region,
and state by state, is called for. Only on the basis of such ad hoc
judgment can detailed policies be rationally developed that take ac-
count of the chain of arms transfer/influence/commitment/involvement.
The prime reason why a non-generalized policy can be thus advanced
is our knowledge that the Soviet Union and China, like the Western
colonial powers before them, are unlikely to win a lasting commanding
position by becoming the sole arms supplier to a society or culture
that places prime value on cultural identity, nationalism, and poli-
tical, economic and cultural independence—like so many LDC's.

f) Once U.S. interests are redefined region by region
and state by state, several general principles apply. A policy of
matching a "revolutionary" state's "esoteric" weaponry should be
avoided. Where the United States decides that its interests are
served by assisting a government whose stability is threatened, its
arms transfers should be directed essentially to the end of internal
security, limited of course by willingness to pay the price of
a stronger commitment to that country with respect to any external
threat it may face. At the same time the United States can avoid
being put in a position wherein it must compete for influence or
control in the non-radical LDC but is excluded from competing in the radical LDC.

20. Our impression based on the CONEX series is that arms supply is not a very useful instrument of short-run conflict control, and that it at present does not seem to affect underlying national motives of recipients, particularly if they are "revisionist" states:

a) CONEX reinforced our impression that for the early 1970's the United States is likely to prefer stopping open-ended competition for influence through arms, even at the price of loss of influence in various places, to involvement that could develop out of arms-supplying.

b) In CONEX II the U.S. team used in effect a unilateral embargo in an attempt to prevent intensification of a local conflict. This, however, produced two essentially negative results:

(1) The LDC immediately began to shop elsewhere for arms. Its conscious aim was to diminish the influence on the hitherto most-relied-upon supplier by stimulating competition among other major weapons suppliers—a not unfamiliar sight.

(2) As one of our colleagues put it, "arms transfers previously negotiated and set in motion can abet violence." And thus a unilateral (or even multilateral) arms embargo at the crisis point proved useless in preventing hostilities.

Nevertheless, unilateral U.S. arms controls can have two positive effects: damping down war inclinations or in any event
keeping the fighting relatively brief, and minimizing the risk of more direct U.S. involvement by curtailing the arms-commitment interaction. In fact, the United States could probably make it more difficult for its allies to go to war, either by keeping them on a very short logistical rein (as South Korea); delaying the shipment of commercial arms (as to Israel); or applying strong political influence. All this involves a substantial political price the United States may not be willing to pay, including (in CONEX IV) that of driving "India" toward the Soviet Union, and "Pakistan" toward China--and perhaps in the real world Israel toward nuclear weapons. The United States must in every case weigh short-term gains against long-term costs. The price of pushing for multilateral arms transfer agreements might in fact be the least costly for the United States of the 1970's.

c) It was notable in CONEX III that, by refusing to play the arms game the U.S. teams made it difficult, if not impossible, for an LDC to play the United States off against the Soviets. U.S. abstinence from the arms-supply contest may of course have the negative effect of limiting U.S. control options. But perhaps the best of both worlds can be found by relying on other alternatives, e.g., a friendly France to keep the West's hand in the game; regulating the superpower input of arms into conflict regions by bilateral agreement; or, best of all but most difficult, negotiating multilateral recipient, or supplier-recipient, arms-limitation agreements region by region, a process in which the role of regional organizations could become crucial. (South Africa, of course, is a special case, given its indigenous resources.)
21. Some arms control levers were, however, used to good effect in the games:

   a) Further evidence was generated concerning the prime role that control of spare parts can play in moderating the level of conflict and even terminating it, in short-run terms.

   b) Pre-crisis arms transfers are more likely to provide leverage to suppliers than in-crisis transactions. But U.S. policy typically applies controls on arms for conflict-regulating purposes later rather than earlier in a crisis. By then, except for controls over spare parts and POL, U.S. policy may not be very influential (the exception would be MAP's that are conflict-limiting).

22. In more general terms, realistically available alternatives seem to be: 1) an explicit or tacit restraining agreement among arms suppliers; 2) encouraging others (e.g., "Europe") to play the leading role in arming LDC's who feel threatened by revolutionary or expansionist neighbors; 3) letting the Soviets have the field; 4) developing multilateral peacekeeping and collective security arrangements to substitute for the present system. 4) is ideal, but not too probable for the foreseeable future. 1) is worth working hard for. 2) may in practical terms serve U.S. interests well in the period ahead; an increasingly united Europe can be envisaged as a "balancer," i.e., counterweight, in much the way Britain was vis à vis Europe in the 19th century. Short of multilateral arms controls and/or improved international security machinery, someone must work to preserve equilibrium. If the United States is tired of the chore, Europe might well be next best, hopefully with Soviet cooperation.

   In this connection the impact on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations of arms transfers to less-developed countries, although of crucial importance, may not be the most difficult problem for United States
policy-makers to solve in the 1970's. Control of local conflict in a truly bipolar world would require agreement between only two powers. In a world of fragmenting alliances, of recalcitrant clients, and of aggressive pursuit of national objectives, detente between the United States and the Soviet Union will not eliminate the issue of international arms transfers. As the potential for local conflict develops, the United States will be forced to formulate new policies for its control. These policies must not only reflect changes in the balance of power, but must also account for new weapons technology, new military tactics, and radical changes in traditional political, economic and psychological factors.

23. Finally, there is the question of what the benefits are to the United States of the majority of arms transfers. Obviously they include the security of the small state; foreign exchange; base rights; commerce; friendship; and so on. As for influence, do arms in fact buy very many of these things, and do they outweigh U.S. conflict-controlling desiderata for the 1970's? Based on assumptions of rationality, U.S. policy has attempted to control events (such as in the Middle East) by controlling arms inputs as means of influencing outcomes. But it seems clear that we need new types of incentives to change the outcome preferences of potential belligerents. "Positive" incentives to change outcome preferences must be devised to augment or replace the "negative" incentives of arms transfers.

One possibility is U.S. financing of joint economic operations which offer lucrative benefits as long as cooperation is maintained. The ECSC, for instance, was created as much to insure French-German political cooperation as for mutual economic benefits. Joint offshore oil exploitation, major water-power-irrigation projects and the like are possibilities, although requiring very large investments and operating in a relatively long time frame.
24. The nuclear element in CONEX surfaced when "India" decided to build a weapon, not for specific military purposes, but to arouse popular support at a time of dangerous internal disruption. The obvious question is posed: How much longer before the Arab war of attrition against Israel forces the Jerusalem government to do the same, not necessarily as a usable weapon (though perhaps), but as a trump card that the leadership must assure its people will be played before they are intolerably decimated? How much of a Chinese threat, during a period of American military stand-down in Asia and the western Pacific, before Japan does the same, again not because it makes such strategic sense (it evidently does not, any more than for Israel) but for internal political reasons? How much improvement in the capabilities of the various "liberation" movements in southern Africa before Pretoria does the same?

These questions are basically rhetorical because answers are not evident or easy to come by. It would be facile to urge stern pressures on all three to ratify the NPT (which we believe should be exerted), and on ourselves to take the matter of guarantees more seriously than some of the statements implied at the time the NPT was up for ratification.*

It is difficult to think of a better reason for mobilizing resources for some systematic planning and predicting about these probable situations and U.S. reaction thereto if the NPT is violated; if a nuclear threat is made; if a threatened party seeks to invoke the Security Council guarantee; if our current assumptions turn out

to be fallacious; etc. Reluctance to do contingency planning on such sensitive matters should be overcome by the realization that nothing would be worse for the United States—or for non-proliferation—than either to believe that the guarantee is firm and have it turn out that we only meant it to apply vs. China—or to discount the guarantee and then find that the Soviet Union—or we—were deadly serious when faced with a problem of enforcement.

G. U.S. PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING

25. The evidence is overwhelming that there is a close relationship between the game decisions of serious professionals and experts, and the real-life process. This is notably the case when, as in the CONEX series, emphasis is placed not on crash "go-no-go" war-or-peace options, but on the far more subtle and complex planning of national policies and postures in the light of circumstances, in some cases not under pressure at all. Our revised analytical techniques were particularly geared to looking at the process of planning and decision-making in the game setting, and we have high confidence, reinforced by overwhelming opinion of the scores of professional game participants, that real-life was being reflected all too faithfully in the games.

26. The conclusion is inescapable that U.S. decision-making machinery may be inadequate to deal with the problems it faces in the contemporary world. A majority of participants seem to share a kind of visceral awareness that the U.S. decision-making process labors under some inherent difficulties. These difficulties include strong preconceptions, the inability to handle information flows efficiently, the tendency to procrastinate in face of uncertainty,
and the extraordinary difficulty of even establishing criteria for
decision-making. A notorious and persistent problem has been the
inability to anticipate consequences adequately. Above all the
question is whether the process is able to handle with foresight
and imagination—or even with adequate data—the extraordinary changes
in the environment, both domestic and foreign, since the time both
attitudes and machinery were initially shaped.

a) One of the few innovations in modern analytical
techniques is the identification and comparison of costs and benefits
of apparently incommensurate objects. CONEX suggested how difficult
it will be for American policy-makers in the 1970's to assess the
potential costs, both economic and social, of contingency plans for
the developing world. Unpredicted shifts in the economy, sharp
changes in public attitudes, major social problems, and significant
international developments can affect the efficacy of any plan.
The perishability of such plans argues for a systematic, continuous
review not only of proposed methods, but also of the acceptability
of their costs.

b) Two structural weaknesses may fairly be indicted.
One is the dominant role traditionally given in top-level decision-
making, at least in the post-war years, to the diplomatic and mili-
tary elements of the U.S. Government. It is almost as if one believed
that, by virtue of being at crisis pitch, a complex problem somehow
concerned only these two categories of policy. We tried in CONEX I

* Speaking of the escalating U.S. engagement in Vietnam,
the former Vice-President of the United States recently acknowledged
that "None of us in the Johnson administration realized the full
meaning of that commitment." Hubert H. Humphrey, quoted in the
and III to see what midnight NSC-type crisis management (and pre-crises management as well) might look like if one deliberately built into the top policy crisis-handling structure additional inputs from sources representing U.S. urban programs, domestic opinion, and economic costs. The results were difficult to measure; but the relevancy of such inputs on a par with the diplomatic and military seems convincing for the period ahead. Even while uncertain as to the effect of the CONEX I and III cost briefings as a measurable variable on the actions of one team, one distinguished participant subsequently recommended that the President and Cabinet should have immediately available data on the cost and other implications of alternative courses of action, in order to be able quickly to assess specific military actions and to forecast the impact of certain actions on the U.S. economy and upon domestic conditions.

c) This decision style has, however, its own "costs." The typical mode of role-playing decision-makers, forced to consider a pre-crisis game situation, is to find most compelling the constraints on action: every innovative course of action might make the situation worse, or expose the U.S. to too public a role, or involve the wrong countries (if someone suggests U.N. prophylaxis). Micawberism takes over, and the slogan is watch and wait. Often this works out, since mercifully not all the many disputes become conflicts, and few of those become wars. But even when an incipient conflict is patently dangerous and ominous, the simulated decision-makers characteristically focus on costs attached to U.S. actions rather than benefits. Put differently, it is easier to count the costs of doing something than the benefits of a potential payoff (whereas later the cost of not having prevented conflict may become prohibitive and disastrous outcomes can begin to be compared with favorable ones). Thus few risks are run early in the planning process even though a far greater menu of options is

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available early for potential conflict control than later when governments typically act. The point adds to the general impression that the problem for American policy is deeply structural and not one to be dealt with by a simple White House directive.

d) This relates to the problem of timing and "early warning." In studying the phenomenon of simulated pre-crisis decision-making I am struck by the persistent difficulty even in a game of attracting the serious attention of people with worldwide perspectives to a conflict situation before it becomes acute. In such a game this is not, as it is in real life, a constraint of time; in the time available the "decision-makers" have this problem alone to focus upon. But what one observes is an inclination not to face up to implications until they become clamant. This may be another way of saying that forward planning is a difficult and abstract exercise, a fortiori for people whose chosen style is day-to-day operations. This is hardly a new insight, but it is not consoling to restate it.

e) The rapid pace of change and the extent of its effect on contingency planning will make imperative a frequent review at the highest level. This will require in turn an improved system to coordinate foreign and domestic policy. Both requirements dictate revisions in the policy planning process. The CONEX games showed that ad hoc planning groups can surface problems, but are hard-pressed to perform in-depth evaluation on short notice, or to create innovative strategies for complex situations. The process of situation appraisal clearly needs some "mechanization" in order that high-level generalists can quickly call up the facts, experience, and wisdom that are relevant.* The process of decision-making also needs more

*For one type of approach, see Robert R. Beattie and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, CASCON—A Computer-Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflict, op. cit.
"mechanization" so that all of the influential factors can be incorporated into the judgment, and the activities of all of the participating agencies properly synchronized, all of course as aids to the indispensable human imagination.

f) The consensus process has been criticized by more than one American President as something to be guarded against, even to the point of naming one of his advisers to act as Devil's Advocate. Only if this goes deep enough will it produce not only different assessments and predictions, but different assumptions as well. In order to surface every option it is particularly important to have someone--preferably someone who can reflect the views of the younger generation--who will make the argument for the extremes that are normally discarded in the consensus process.* Innovation and originality will be virtually excluded if policy consensus patterns continue to involve people who are invariably comfortable with one another's assumptions.**

g) The mariage de convenance that emerged in CONEX III between "Zambia" and "South Africa" vs. "Rhodesia" was highly unexpected to many participants (and to some, but not all, of the area experts). In the circumstances, however, it seemed plausible, and even skeptics felt that it represented a real possibility under

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* A Gallup poll in early 1969 found that "persons in their twenties were chiefly responsible for the growth in the isolationist viewpoint since 1967," a viewpoint that itself was at its highest point since World War II. New York Times, February 23, 1969.

** A crude but useful corrective would be to post on each office wall the 13 hypotheses about policymakers' and conflict managers' perceptions and misperceptions assembled by Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, XX (1968), 454-479.
certain conditions of the evolution of South Africa in conjunction with Communist encroachment. As in other games, that which seems wildly improbable to the operator focused on today's realities can suddenly acquire plausibility when other circumstances are projected forward. This unexpected turn in CONEX III underscores the imperative need to encourage (rather than forbid) improved contingency planning in the political-military realm. Perhaps the prejudices against it would be overcome if it was not viewed as an attempt to predict the details of future events (which of course is impossible), but as a mind-stretching attack on assumptions that tend to emerge from the consensus process in staffing out U.S. foreign policy. (Some participants in all the games in this series recommended political gaming as perhaps the best form of alternative-exploring and assumption-testing in the planning process.)

h) Not only has contingency planning sometimes been ruled out in U.S. policy planning. Worse still, many of the tools by which American business, industry, technology, and education have been seeking to revitalize the United States in the last third of the 20th century are still seen by some foreign policy operators as either an inappropriate and unwanted "theoretical" challenge to artful intuition (or they have not heard about them at all). The weakness is magnified by a congenital indisposition to concentrate resources early, to act on early warning, or to act preventively before it is forced by the fear of violence. All in all, short of significant reforms both in attitudes and in priorities, the outlook is discouraging for this nation's ability to play in the years ahead.
the creative role required by the very fact of U.S. unwillingness to intervene unilaterally in local conflicts.

i) This in turn suggests a special feature of U.S. conflict-control policy relating to communications and intelligence. It is sometimes held that the task of high-grade diplomatic representation abroad has become meaningless, given high speed communication plus the ability of White House and State Department officials to jet in in a few hours. But this downgrading can damage the quality of reporting and analysis, a task that is particularly vital where the United States enjoys bad relations abroad. It is fair to say that U.S. decision-makers may not usually be in possession of a confident assessment of such terribly tangled issues as the one delineated in CONEX III (or, for example, that in mainland China). It would seem more important than ever that this country have particularly good diplomatic agents, political analysts, and intelligence capabilities in both kinds of situations—the complex African one and the inscrutable Chinese one. The U.S. national interest surely calls for a more dispassionate and non-moralistic policy of ensuring high-quality U.S. diplomatic presences particularly where there is enmity and where the stakes for this nation could suddenly become very high.

j) In the foreign policy-making process one has always observed the clash of roles between the area specialist and the generalist whose first concern may be the President's flexibility. The CONEX games support my impression that in initial stages of decision-making the area expert dominates consideration of policy toward a local conflict in "his" region vis-à-vis those without his area expertise (but with possibly sounder judgment, analytical ability, etc.). Later this domination will decrease as others get read into the problem and top-level decisions approach. But the pattern of
influence, once established, tends to carry in some ways right through to the end.

If this sounds critical of the special pleader for U.S. action in a remote area, it should be balanced against the game-reinforced conviction that intense knowledge of and feel for the local scene is indispensable to intelligent policy formulation. (This is why crisis games using untrained people may teach much about human attitudes, but little about world politics. It is also why even great powers may act stupidly if they have no reliable and informed independent judgments available to them about the local scene.) However, it must be said that some other games in recent times have shown how ill-conceived a national policy decision can be if it is dominated by the myopic "localitis" of Washington area experts or diplomats on the ground. If the U.S. policy goal is to become more selective about the international commitment of American power and prestige, the expert perspectives of the specialist must be taken *cum grano salis*. (One imaginative critic of foreign policy who participated in CONEX I suggested that this indicates a need for outsiders to take more part in the policy process in order to ask relevant questions and in general to help the nation keep its options open).

k) Finally, the CONEX series powerfully reinforced our belief that a perfected CASCON system might be made very useful as an aid to the memory and the imagination of decision-makers in the face of local conflict situations. A key question in CONEX I was what unilateral conflict-controlling measures were appropriate for the Phase II stage of conflict (pre-hostilities) in an insurgency situation where a weak but rigid military government rules. It would have been useful to the teams to be told what had worked
and what had not worked in Iran, in Venezuela, in Cuba, etc. If the players had available a list of policy measures in cases with comparable factors they might have tried other policies, with better results both for the United States and for the longer-term peace and security of the region.
CHAPTER III

"PREDICTING" POLICY BEHAVIOR

A. THE THEORETICAL BASE

In CONEX I, III and IV, the principal research focus was on decision-making with regard to potential U.S. "involvement" in local conflict situations. In CONEX II, and to a lesser degree in CONEX III and IV, we were also interested in the effect on war-planning and war-making policies of parties to a local conflict of specific arms transfer and other conflict-control policies of the United States and others.

As outlined in Chapter I, our earlier ACLIM Design Study surfaced a number of propositions about U.S. policy toward local conflict situations in the years ahead based on our analysis and on the cases we had studied. The research question we wished to expose to the gaming technique concerned the interaction of pressures in the U.S. decision-making process with regard to intervention and non-intervention in local conflict in the developing regions in the decade ahead. The gross issue of involvement vs. non-involvement is of wide contemporary interest. But involvement and/or intervention can take many forms. Some of the major options Americans will
face if intervention is decided upon are unilateral vs. multilateral, and military vs. non-military, as well as some other choices; we wanted to study the way Americans may make those choices, and the futuristic setting of a game seemed a good way.

We had a number of other prime research interests. We wished: 1) to determine whether a group of American role-players in an experimental setting who are considering a case of local conflict will act differently if they are required to conduct their analysis and frame their decisions in an environment of explicit "cost-consciousness" (CONEX I and III), or when they have available to them an automated aid to the memory and imagination (the CASCON pilot system in CONEX IV); 2) to learn more about what happens to the values, operational premises, and perceptions of role-playing "decision-makers" as the intensity of a crisis grows more severe, and particularly as Soviet or Chinese involvement appears to grow; and 3) to generate policy questions or proposals concerning the improvement and orchestration of conflict-controlling policies and systems.

Numbers of hypotheses are of course available about U.S. decision-making toward local conflict; I essayed an hypothesis in the ACLIM report about U.S. behavior in the recent past. It took the form of a kind of branch logic tree which U.S. policy seemed to follow in the life of a local conflict, given certain data. (Others

had some reservations about this thesis, so it is identified here as mine.) My own hypothesis (supported by data from past conflicts and of course not necessarily still valid) was this:

U.S. interests as a general rule favor stability and are opposed to violent conflict. U.S. interests toward local interstate wars outside Europe usually converge with international norms in favoring conflict control. But this is not the case where vital interests (such as direct Soviet or Chinese advantages) appear to be at stake. Toward most internal wars, U.S. interests derive from strategic concerns (regional security, U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, modernization). Rather than invariably being subordinate to conflict-control policy, they tend to depend on pragmatic assessments of probability of success, accessibility of the area, and the actual need for U.S. intervention. If Communist take-over does not appear to be a prime issue in internal conflicts, the United States is not likely to perceive a primary U.S. interest as to which faction wins. But, both where the United States is relatively indifferent to outcome, and where it is committed to victory for a given side, the crucial independent variable inhibiting U.S. willingness to manipulate rather than suppress both internal and interstate conflicts is a perceived danger of great-power intensification (see Figure 1).

For future conflicts a variety of other hypotheses emerged from our past and current research; numbers of crude hypotheses about predicting U.S. behavior can be constructed, for example, from the "no-more Vietnams" sentiments currently emerging—but also tempered by past themes of "unavoidable responsibilities" to at least some extent.

Clearly, to elicit the most possible data it was necessary to design a number of hypothetical situations in which the U.S. was likely to be torn between competing impulses. Such situations should, we felt, at least expose the pros and cons of choices between trying to arrange things so that the U.S. controls the political and
Figure 1
MODEL OF U.S. POLICY PREFERENCES AND ACTIVITIES TOWARD LOCAL CONFLICTS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

INTERSTATE CONFLICTS

ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL, U.S. POLICY
BUT IF
THEN U.S. POLICY

US CONSIDERS STATUS QUO INTOLERABLE

PREVENTIVE EFFORTS
DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, ARMS CONTROL

OUTBREAK

NO DIRECT SOVIET OR CHINESE ADVANTAGE FROM CONFLICT—SUPPRESSION

SUPPRESSION, TERMINATION, USE OF INTL. ORG

DIRECT SOVIET OR CHINESE ADVANTAGE FROM CONFLICT—SUPPRESSION

U.S. DISFAVORS SUPPRESSION OR INTERVENTION

SERIOUS DANGER OF GP INTENSIFICATION

GO TO INTL. ORG

TERMINATE

NO SERIOUS DANGER OF GP INTENSIFICATION

TERMINATE ONLY ON FAVORABLE TERMS

TERMINATE

GENERAL PREFERENCE FOR CONFLICT:
PREVENTION SUPPRESSION TERMINATION

PREVENTIVE EFFORTS
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL

SETTLEMENT

PRIMARY U.S. INTEREST IN WHO WINS

POSSIBLE U.S. INTERVENTION

SERIOUS DANGER OF GP INTENSIFICATION, OR INACCESSIBILITY, OR LOW PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

NO SERIOUS DANGER OF GP INTENSIFICATION, AND ACCESSIBILITY, AND HIGH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

TERMINATE ONLY ON FAVORABLE TERMS

NO U.S. INTERVENTION

US CONSIDERS STATUS QUO INTOLERABLE

SETTLEMENT

NO STRONG U.S. INTEREST IN WHO WINS

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

PHASE OF CONFLICT
P-I DISPUTE
P-II CONFLICT
P-III HOSTILITIES
P-IV POST-HOSTILITIES

PREF MILITARY
PREF HOSTILITIES

P-II CONFLICT
P-III HOSTILITIES
ideological outcome of a conflict—in many ways the model of the 1950's and the 1960's—and a policy of either violence-minimizing regardless of outcome or of outright abstention from any involvement. For distribution we elected hypothetical areas where a priori assessments of U.S. interests were deemed to be high, low, and medium.

Our overall research objectives required that we design games in two basic parts, with the first part set early enough so that the United States had a substantial range of options open to it, and the second part exigent enough to test some of our fundamental hypotheses about competing policy pressures.

In all the games the data needed to throw light on our research questions would, we assumed, be derived from systematic observations of the behavior of professional players simulating United States and LDC decision-makers, plus analysis of their game deliberations and actions. The inputs into their teams which we, the game designers, controlled, were the scenario-problem which provided a baseline, and the game-generated information. The outputs from their teams were their decisions about the extent of involvement or non-involvement in the case of the two U.S. teams, and about internal and external conflict in the case of the simulated LDC teams.

More precisely, for the U.S. teams the main independent variables were recent U.S. experiences of involvement, as reflected in present U.S. public and official opinion; the perceived degree of "Soviet" or "Chinese" involvement in and/or potential gain from the situation; and the scenario information defining the case. For the U.S. teams the principal dependent variable would be their decisions about U.S. involvement. (For one team—U.S. Blue in I and Green in III—a special independent variable would be the
unannounced cost briefings, and for U.S. Green in CONEX IV it would be the availability of the experimental pilot CASCON system to make data on relevant past conflicts speedily and handily available to decision-makers).

For the LDC team the main independent variables were the internal situation it was "given" in the opening scenario, the political and military forces available to it, and the policies of its chief neighbors, friends, enemies, and arms suppliers. These could vary as a function of such scenario and game elements as arms transfer policies, superpower or great power competition, peacekeeping and peacemaking pressures, global or regional arms control or disarmament agreements, and the like.

The principal dependent variable for an LDC team was its decisions about governing, about assistance from others, and about attacking or resisting others.

In CONEX II, unlike CONEX I, the principal research focus was not on U.S. decision-making with regard to involvement, but rather on the effect on war-planning and war-making policies of parties to a local conflict, of specific arms transfer and other conflict-control policies of the United States (and possibly others).

In general terms, this meant asking about the effect on conflict potential of certain kinds of arms transfers, e.g., whether certain weapons or weapons systems were inherently more provocative than others, in the sense of moderating or intensifying an ongoing conflict.

From an experimental standpoint, however, it meant asking as the principal question: "What is the effect on the perceptions and actions of parties to a hypothetical local conflict of arms
control (and other conflict control) measures taken by the U.S. and others?" Most specifically, the question posed was: "What is the effect of such measures on the way those parties perceive their prospects, such perceptions taking the form of changing intentions and felt capabilities on their part, how deterred they feel, and how deterred they feel the other side is?" Our working hypothesis was that something might be learned about the way people generally react, by observing a group of Americans role-playing the leadership of arms recipient countries in conflict, with full awareness of the limits of reality in so doing. Our first task here too was to develop in advance specific hypotheses concerning their predicted behavior, and devise ways of calibrating game effects.

Our secondary research concern in CONEX III and IV--arms transfer policy problems--required the positing of some of the same hypotheses addressed to the effect on conflict potential of certain kinds of arms transfers, e.g., whether certain weapons or weapons systems were inherently more provocative than others in the sense of moderating or intensifying an ongoing conflict.

The sources of hypotheses for this particular game problem--arms inputs in a local conflict--presented a special problem, since the professional literature is virtually barren except either impressionistically or in terms of specific cases. It must be said that the work done in our project, particularly the current study of arms transfers, represents the prime source for such hypotheses; those used in CONEX II, III, and IV either came from that source or from our earlier ACLIM Design Study.

In CONEX II some data bearing on these questions basic to our overall research might, we assumed, be derived from systematic observation of the behavior of knowledgeable Americans simulating
"Algerian" and "Moroccan" decision-makers, plus analysis of their game deliberations and actions. The inputs into their teams for this kind of "arms transfer" game were the Scenario-Problem, which provided a baseline, and the game-generated information both about arms and the political environment. The outputs from their teams were their decisions about peace and war. Put differently, the main independent variable in such a game would be the military forces initially available to the parties, with a subordinate independent variable the initial likelihood of the sides being able to sustain hostilities (i.e., availability of re-supply, spare parts, ammunition). As before, these could all vary as a function of such scenario and game elements as arms transfer policies, superpower or great power competition, peacekeeping and peacemaking pressures, global or regional arms control or disarmament agreements, and the like.

The principal dependent variable would be the military policy decided on by the "parties," i.e., their decisions about peace or war. The specific form of this output would be in team calculations regarding exchange ratios, in team perceptions as to how deterred both the team and its adversary were, and in general as a sense of the way the team perceived its prospects in a potentially military conflict situation.

A further methodological complication in CONEX II was the desirability of having a U.S. team play in the game, and for this a different set of behavioral and policy hypotheses was needed. The U.S. team in CONEX II was instructed to pursue a deliberate strategy of conflict-control. At the same time, their representation of a likely official American view in the early 1970's of an intensifying local conflict situation would naturally also engage them in some of the choices an unconstrained U.S. team--or Government--might face in such a situation. Thus, within limits, in CONEX II, as in all
the CONEX games, the U.S. team could be used for further examination of various general propositions generated by the ACLIM Design Study about U.S. policy toward local conflict situations in the years ahead.

For all four of the games—indeed for any PME—the chief intervening variable is of course the simulation itself—the dynamic process of discussion, dissension, and consensus in the playing teams which in effect "translates" into the output variable the input material. By definition, the input material is incommensurate with the final output, being usually stated in different terms; the "black box" in which the translation process takes place is primarily the human interaction within the decision-making simulation. (The methodological issues involved in using the PME for so seemingly refined a hypothesis-examining experiment, and the devices we have developed for dealing with those issues, are discussed in the next three chapters.)

B. HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS

To achieve our research purposes it was necessary to structure the exercise to enable relevant hypotheses to be related to the behavior of individual teams at specific times in the game. As reported in the next chapter on methodology, part of our experiment was learning the number of hypotheses that could fruitfully be examined in this kind of game. By the second game we had learned that it would be useful to assign specific hypotheses not to the game as a whole but to individual teams for each move period. By the third game we had learned that too many hypotheses overload the data-monitoring system. By the fourth game we had learned that
many of the hypotheses should be carried over from one move period to the next, while attempting to measure the changes in reaction to them over time. Finally, some hypotheses proved "non-testable" for technical or other reasons.

Having said this, it is rewarding to report that we have data on some hypotheses for all four games or at least three (which in the case of the "U.S." teams would mean five to eight "runs"). For others this is not the case. In all cases the results for similar hypotheses are reported in combined fashion.

It is axiomatic that PME's may not be able to "test" policy hypotheses in a way that has provable validity for policy-making. What game performance does is support or disconfirm on the basis of game evidence only hypotheses addressed to real-life policy and behavior. The question of how valid game results are in predicting official behavior is of course widely disputed. Here I emphasize only that our results are spoken of not as hypothesis-testing, but in terms of examining them in the light of game evidence.

There is, however, a limited sense in which general inferences can be drawn, even using the notoriously unscientific and free-form PME. In my opinion a good senior professional game can come close to "realism" in the sense of modelling with fair fidelity the current decision-making style and process. (In fact in these games this seemed true to the extent the players, in the opinion of observers, were more "realistic" than "imaginative".) In Chapter VI the reasoning that lies behind this assertion is elaborated.

The exercises were designed to permit evaluation of most of the hypothetical propositions by more than one method. In addition to analysis of team documents which reflect group decisions, all discussions were monitored via closed-circuit television in an
effort to identify the most influential factors involved in the decisions. Tape-recordings of group discussions were analyzed to resolve or clarify ostensible contradictions between real-time observation of discussions and analysis of documents. Further evidence was adduced from participant comments during the plenary critique and their responses to a post-exercise questionnaire. To be sure, none of these techniques provides irrefutable evidence about the complex propositions that were examined. But given that these hypotheses were derived from an extensive historical review of local conflict, the conclusions about them derived from this series may be fairly considered to support (or disconfirm) the evidence of other independent research.

The following observations, then, are drawn from the written record of team decisions and moves, embodied chiefly in the "strategic plans" each team drew up; observations of game behavior; review of the questionnaire statements of participants; and the taped records of deliberations of the teams, as well as the taped record of the final Critique sessions. It should be reiterated that all these hypotheses grew out of our conflict-control studies at M.I.T.

The hypotheses and results are divided into three sections, the first on U.S. foreign policy with emphasis on conflict control, and the others on arms transfers and arms controls.

1. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Local Conflict

1) Preventive policy measures are more available early in a crisis than late, but the United States does not take full advantage of them.

Evidence from CONEX I and III supports this rather depressing hypothesis.

In the first part of CONEX I the Green U.S. Team employed
certain preventive measures, chiefly relating to internal local politics, along with some diplomatic and unofficial activity. U.S. Blue employed some internal political conflict control measures and made some military preparations, but employed very little diplomacy and no unofficial measures. Neither team made an effort to employ international organization machinery, economic measures, or major psychological action. By the third part of the game U.S. Blue was employing urgent diplomatic methods in a situation of rapidly shrinking U.S. options.

Some preventive measures were thus brought to bear in the stage corresponding to Phase II of our ACLIM model. But in retrospect the effects were not very impressive. The reasons appear to be 1) that the U.S. teams did not analyze the kinds of measures that might be useful, and 2) they did not invest anywhere near as much energy and capital as in the past nations have focused on the option of military intervention. Perhaps a more basic reason is that at a very low level of hostilities (similar in some ways to Vietnam pre-1962) the U.S. does not perceive a real problem requiring new policy departures. Existing structures are assumed to be able to handle the problem, and this avoids hard choices as to definition of objectives, acceptable outcomes, trade-offs with other policies, etc. Comments on this finding, as well as others, are embodied in Chapter II.

In CONEX III the opening scenario depicted a relatively low-level crisis in southern Africa, and all indications are that both American teams perceived the situation in that way. During Move Period A both teams adopted strategies that were limited both in scope and extent of "American" involvement, despite the fact that they recognized a valid U.S. interest in limiting regional conflict. Both teams abjured military intervention by the United States, but in addition they both also declined to commit other "American"
resources at this stage. They appeared to be unwilling to take any initiative until the crisis was more clearly defined, a posture underscored by their numerous requests for more information about the situation. Their discussions clearly demonstrated that at least simulated decision-makers are reluctant to act early in a crisis even when they agree that an intensified conflict would be inimical to their interests.

Whether there were in this case constructive conflict-control measures available to the "American" teams that they did not use is an open question. Team members might argue that any suggestion other than the measures they adopted, or other alternatives, were not worthy of consideration. One may equally argue that they did not know of other options or, knowing of them, were very unsure of their efficacy. Our impression is that they seemed intent on keeping options open despite the risk that events might move so rapidly that opportunities for influencing the conflict might be lost. In subsequent move periods both U.S. teams also seemed unwilling or unable to innovate. As the crisis intensified, they discovered that failure to act had not really kept options open but rather had left them with fewer alternatives. One team became so frustrated by this trend that at the end of the second move period it suggested another complete review of American policy in order to re-evaluate its earlier decisions.

Neither American team could be called particularly "short-sighted," with Blue calling for such a complete reevaluation, and Green consistently avoiding any precipitate action that might have adverse long-range consequences. On the other hand, it might be argued that "American" failure to become involved more directly itself represented a course of action that could have very serious long-range consequences. The Green team tried quite consciously to
implement some programs directed at solving fundamental problems in "Zambia" in order to preclude greater ultimate aggravation. Their choice of devices might be questioned, but their intent was clearly to deal with this conflict on a more substantial level than the hypothesis implies.

On balance, neither U.S. team seriously considered many alternatives that conflict-control theory suggests might have been useful. All of their policy suggestions were traditional devices to which they themselves ascribed a low chance of success. Their behavior does not demonstrate that they overlooked many feasible options; but it does tend to confirm the proposition that American decision-makers are reluctant to commit major resources early in a crisis.

2) In the period ahead, American decision-makers confronting an incipient local conflict situation* will opt for non-involvement, or for a conflict-control policy over the alternative of "winning" to the extent that they do not perceive a clear threat of Communist takeover or have a vital interest in the political outcome.

With few qualifying exceptions, the responses of seven "U.S." teams in the CONEX series strongly supported this hypothesis, and went further to imply that even a heightened Communist threat might not reverse the U.S. determination not to become directly involved as a party.

The teams differed slightly on this score in CONEX I. The Green team was not focused on non-involvement as firmly as the Blue team, which was very committed to such a posture on the grounds that

*"conflict" = a dispute of potential or actual military nature.
a new extensive external commitment would endanger the U.S. social fabric by forcing postponement of urgent internal investments. In the course of the game the Green team became more unilaterally involved in the local scene than the Blue team.

The crucial factor for both teams was the degree of external Communist non-involvement. Blue made it clear from the outset (a unanimous position within the team) that it would not condone external interference, while committing itself rather firmly to non-intervention under any other immediately perceived contingencies.

However, some participants concluded from the game that the United States might be much less prone to intervene militarily, even in the face of a likely Communist gain in the U.S. backyard, than our hypothesis seems to suggest. This could be because U.S. decision-makers are in fact more sophisticated about what local Communists are or may become than the hypothesis suggests—or they may be more prone to see ambiguity even when it is stretching a point to do so.

As for conflict-controlling policies, in the first part the Green team adopted specific conflict-controlling measures such as pressures on the Junta and the withholding of recognition, in order to achieve a more pacifiable situation. The Blue team adopted less explicit conflict-controlling measures apart from urging a broadening of the Junta. In general, the U.S. teams did not place the explicit emphasis on conflict-control measures which the hypothesis presupposed.

The initial position adopted by the United States team in CONEX II also tends to support the hypothesis. Barring any obvious Soviet gain and/or vital interest in the outcome, the team tried to
stabilize the situation by preventing hostilities between "Morocco" and "Algeria." Its assumption regarding the conflict was that the Algerians could be restrained by the Soviets and the Moroccans by the U.S.

In CONEX III both American teams initially opted for minimal involvement, with emphasis on non-military multilateral means of conflict control. Even when the possibility of a Communist takeover in "Zambia" became likely, neither team was moved to recommend unilateral U.S. military action of any kind. Their discussions seemed to suggest that if the United States did not become involved, the U.S.S.R. might reciprocate and the danger of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation would be diminished.

Despite the increase in potential Soviet gain in the later move periods, both "U.S." teams wanted to avoid a contest with the U.S.S.R. Even when the risk of domestic strife in the United States was increased, neither team seemed willing to accept what they considered the graver risk of U.S. involvement in hostilities that might eventually require American military activity.

The Blue team did move further along the involvement scale than its counterparts when it agreed to U.S. participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force. What is not clear is whether both teams' aversion to military intervention was attributable to a lack of confidence in this alternative, or whether they simply could not justify the cost of such a venture in terms of controlling a conflict in this area. Neither team seemed convinced that the United States had a vital strategic or economic interest in southern Africa.

Early in the exercise both teams realized that a Communist takeover in "Zambia" could increase the probability of intervention by neighboring countries. But when the "South Africans" appeared to adopt a conciliatory position late in the exercise, and the potential
for interstate hostilities declined, both American teams indicated that
the most pressing problem had been solved. Neither seemed distressed
by the expansion of Soviet influence in the area, and although the
American teams increased both their concern for and attention to
Soviet activity, neither team seemed willing to accept much risk in
order to frustrate Soviet ambitions. CONEX III would seem to suggest
that while Soviet activity anywhere will doubtless attract more U.S.
attention than comparable activity by a lesser power, in the near
future the United States may be less willing then before to compete.

In CONEX IV both U.S. teams were exceedingly reluctant
to establish objectives or related strategies which included or might
lead to U.S. intervention in the conflict. Members of the U.S. Blue
team, in fact, expressed on three occasions as a basic objective
avoidance of any U.S. commitment to or involvement in the conflict.
While the Green team did not explicitly state this objective, its
debate over strategies to achieve satisfaction of its objectives
indicated a strong preference for avoiding any direct U.S. involvement
at that time. For example, in discussing the importance of the
objective of strengthening the "Indian" government, the Green team's
chairman objected to its inclusion as an objective (he included it
in the team's briefing as a "low priority" objective) because he felt
that the "United States" had no means for satisfying the objective,
and attempting to satisfy it might lead to direct U.S. involvement.

In terms of strategies neither team mentioned any action
which represented direct unilateral U.S. involvement in the conflict.
Both teams mentioned military options only once. In both cases,
the military contingency was considered a future option only for use
in a considerably worsened situation. In neither case was the
military option included in the final team briefing of move period A.
Both teams proposed declaring U.S. support of the "Indian" government and opposition to any external involvement in the "Indian" problem. But neither team was willing to go beyond this or to make an explicit commitment, and neither team included this in their policy briefing.

In terms of U.S. policy strategies, the general preference for non-involvement if at all possible, and for multilateral, non-military action if involvement is necessary, is clearly borne out. There were only two references by the Green team and one reference by the Blue team to the option of unilateral U.S. involvement during the entire move period that opened the game. For neither team was unilateral U.S. action included in the policy briefing at the end of the move period. On the contrary, both teams continually expressed a preference for policy options meant to avoid either unilateral or military involvement by the United States. It is interesting to note that the frequency with which such preferences were expressed declined in the second half of the move period, especially for the Blue team. That is, as the game progressed, as the conflict situation worsened, and as available policy options diminished, it apparently became less practical to focus on the preference for avoiding unilateral and non-military policies.

In summary, both U.S. teams were strongly in favor of no direct U.S. involvement especially of a unilateral or military nature. Several members of the Blue team, in fact, believed that this should be the basic objective of U.S. policy, not just one criterion for choosing among alternative policy strategies.

Our hypothesis asserts that the U.S. teams would opt for non-involvement or multilateral, non-military involvement insofar as a "Communist takeover" was not perceived as a clear threat. The data indicate that, at least in an ambiguous situation such as this one,
the desire for non-involvement supercedes the desire to avoid significant Communist gains. In this case, Communist takeover of the central "Indian" government was not the primary perceived threat. Instead, Communist gains, especially in the form of significant Chinese Communist gains vis à vis a weakened Indian government and in the secessionist states, were considered a highly probable outcome of the conflict from the outset on the part of both U.S. teams. However, in spite of this, the U.S. teams were unwilling to intervene or to make strong commitments which might have led to direct involvement in opposition to the Chinese threat.

Both teams established as a priority objective the isolation of the conflict from external exploitation. In response to this objective, the Blue team proposed first the strengthening of the "Indian" government, but was not explicit as to the means of accomplishing this except for one suggestion of a coalition government. A second proposal was a strong U.S. declaratory policy in support of the "Indian" government, but the team was unwilling to couple this with a commitment of direct support. Ultimately, the team focused on bilateral "U.S.-Soviet" diplomatic policies to pressure other "interested parties," especially "China" and "Pakistan," to remain uninvolved. However, the exact form of this bilateral effort (or its probable effects) was never spelled out during the game, though it remained a primary focus of the team's policy-making throughout.

The Green team, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis, both within the team discussion and in the policy briefing, on the use of economic assistance and declaratory policies as a means of isolating the conflict. Economic assistance as a policy lever was suggested in the forms of food aid to secessionist areas and areas
cut off from supplies due to the conflict, and in the threat of cutting off aid to "Pakistan" if it became involved. However, the Green team also proposed bilateral U.S.-Soviet diplomatic efforts to restrain third parties—a position it would increasingly rely on as the game progressed. In short, neither U.S. team was willing to risk direct involvement even at the expense of significant potential "Chinese" gains.

In move periods B and C, the real-time monitoring data was separated into two more or less equal time spans because the move periods were so long. In this way we could determine any significant changes in the teams' discussions between the early and later parts of the move period.

With respect to preferences for non-involvement, such a change over time is quite apparent for both teams. In the first part of the move period the scenario conditions begin to worsen for the "U.S." In response, members of both the Blue and Green teams referred repeatedly to the objective of avoiding any U.S. commitment or involvement; for the Blue team the number of references to this objective was more than twice the frequency of the first move period. For Green, this is the first time that this objective is proposed. Yet, in the second half of move period B the frequency for both teams has diminished to a single reference to this objective.

One possible conclusion to be drawn is that as the conflict was perceived increasingly to threaten to expand to interstate hostilities, the objective of non-involvement became less realistic as a priority. It should be noted that the frequency of occurrence of the objective of "preventing expansion of the conflict" increased significantly for both teams in the second half of the move period.
3) If the Soviets or Chinese take sides and their gain becomes manifest, the U.S. concern with a favorable political outcome will overtake its violence-avoidance objective and the U.S. will directly oppose, if necessary through unilateral military intervention, unless fear of nuclear escalation supervenes.

One of our most striking results comes from this combined hypothesis, which in one way or another was exposed to all seven "U.S." teams. The findings, particularly in CONEX III and IV, indicate that even perceived increased Soviet or Chinese gain may not overcome the profound U.S. impulse toward conflict-avoidance.

The issue of clear Soviet gain never became relevant to CONEX I, both because of the relatively low threat that appeared to be posed by Soviet power in the area, and because Control never presented the U.S. teams with afait accompli of a Communist takeover. (In this connection, the Green team believed in retrospect that Soviet potential was so low there was little the Russians could have done to change the basic Green strategy.)

The U.S. team attitude in CONEX II took a remarkable turn in a late move period when 'Soviet' activity was shown to increase markedly. The team position indicates that, although still concerned about hostilities, its members discounted both the threat of Soviet involvement and the saliency of U.S. interests in "Morocco"; rather they returned to their earlier strategy of non-involvement. They seized upon a muddy "Canadian" proposal in the U.N. as an acceptable alternative to unilateral U.S. action, virtually ignoring the Soviet area arms stockpiling, the requests for arms from friendly countries in the region, even the "Algerian" air strikes into
"Morocco." They also encouraged a French-Moroccan connection, thereby further weakening U.S. regional ties, despite the very provocative character of the weapons (Mirage V) offered to the "Moroccans." These actions tend to contradict the hypothesis.

In CONEX III both the "Soviets" and "Chinese" naturally aligned themselves with anti-white groups in southern Africa. Eventually the U.S.S.R. sided not only with the liberation movements but also with the "Zambian" government against its neighbors. Despite these developments, neither American team was dominated by considerations of "who wins?" Powerful pressures from within the "United States" contributed to this unwillingness to take sides. In short, although the potential for Soviet gain from the conflict was perceived by both U.S. teams as increasing throughout the exercise (see Appendix D2), it was not considered to be of such magnitude or as a sufficient threat to the United States to justify direct opposition. Most of the available evidence indicates that U.S. team abstention did not result from a fear of escalation. The Americans did see a possibility for substantial Soviet gains in the region but, as suggested earlier, they did not automatically equate these gains with American losses. Both teams were very concerned about the potential for inadvertent escalation inherent in the propinquity of Soviet and American naval elements. They either did not fear, or did not believe in longer-range problems that might be associated with expanding Soviet influence in a volatile area.

But the most powerful motive for remaining uninvolved was apparently a preference for conflict control over outcome-influence. Therefore, the null hypothesis would seem to have been substantiated in this exercise, and the basic hypothesis might be revised to
eliminate the qualification "... to the extent that they do not perceive a clear threat of Communist takeover." All of the available evidence indicates that even when the risk of "takeover" was accepted as being significant, neither group was prepared to "go it alone" in Africa. (The nuclear escalation proposition was not tested.)

In CONEX IV similarly the hypothesis was put into serious question. In what was one of our more surprising findings, we found the U.S. teams in fact willing to accept significant Soviet gains in South Asia rather than having the U.S. directly involved in the conflict in order to oppose those gains. The primary "U.S." goals in period C were prevention of hostilities and avoidance of direct U.S. involvement. A common strategy throughout the game to implement the first objective was reliance on the Soviet Union and Soviet-U.S. bilateral diplomatic efforts (especially on the part of the Green team). This willingness to cooperate with Soviet efforts, or at least not to oppose them, continued in period C, even though the perceived threat of Soviet gains increased significantly for both teams during periods B and C. That is, the United States, given its overriding concern for non-involvement, appeared willing to accept the possibility of Soviet gains rather than become directly involved in the conflict in order to oppose those gains.

There were several instances in period C when the U.S. teams refused to provide the local conflict participants with an alternative to greater reliance on the Soviet Union. "Pakistan" first asked the U.S. for arms aid to deter an increasingly belligerent "India." When the U.S. teams refused, the "Soviets" offered arms to "Pakistan." Subsequently, the "U.S." failed to respond to a "Pakistani" request for a strong U.S. declaration against an "Indian" provocation of war (though the U.S. green team did respond at the very end of the game),
forcing reliance on the "Soviets" or "Chinese."

The U.S. teams had previously declined to give arms to the "Indians," and avoided taking a strong position against the early covert "Chinese" involvement in India or against the later implied Chinese nuclear blackmail. In the latter case, the U.S. teams proposed indirect responses such as invoking the NPT, asking for a world-wide moratorium on nuclear testing, and muted behind-the-scenes warnings to the "Chinese." Ultimately, the "Soviets" capitalized on this U.S. equivocation by presenting a package-deal to "India" of arms transfers and guarantees against "Pakistani" or "Chinese" intervention.

In terms of "Chinese" gains, though the evidence is not unequivocal in general this hypothesis was not supported by the policies of the U.S. teams in CONEX IV. This conclusion, obviously, is subject to the definitions of the terms "gain" and "directly oppose" used in analyzing the data. However, the really significant shift in "U.S." policy-making toward a focus on "Chinese" intentions and actions and to formulation of means of restricting "Chinese" actions came, not with the perception of manifest Chinese gains from the conflict, but rather with the increasing threat of direct "Chinese" intervention and particularly with the threat of "Soviet-Chinese" hostilities.

The perceived threat of Chinese gains was quite significant from the outset of the game, yet neither U.S. team was willing to undertake strong measures to oppose Chinese policies. An example of U.S. tolerance of indirect Chinese involvement was the U.S. teams' response to persistent cues throughout the game that China was supplying arms to Naga, to Bengal, and to other dissident elements in "India." As part of a general statement that this type of behavior
was unacceptable to the United States, "China" was asked to stop. But these transfers, like the Naga and Bengali insurgencies, were not perceived as matters sufficiently critical to warrant a direct U.S. response. Given the overweening U.S. desire for non-involvement it is probable that no one felt any alternative action would be effective anyway.

A different picture emerges from the U.S. teams' response later in the game when a joint Chinese-Pakistani or a Chinese-supported "Pakistani" military intervention in "India" became increasingly probable. This threat of direct Chinese intervention, unlike the threat of Chinese gains from covert involvement, inspired in large part a stiffening of "U.S." policy in opposition to Chinese policies. U.S. efforts to secure a U.N. censure of Chinese and Pakistani actions, to gain Soviet cooperation in preventing outside intervention, to convene a great power conference to stabilize the situation (emphasized by Green), and to convince the "Chinese" through direct communications of U.S. unwillingness to accept direct involvement, all took on a greater urgency and immediacy. Furthermore, the U.S. teams proposed such military preparations as pre-positioning of forces in the vicinity of India, as a show of force in opposition to the threat of external intervention.

It is interesting that significant potential "Chinese" gains were perceived by both U.S. teams from the outset, but the objective of non-involvement remained salient until the threat of a "Pakistani" or "Pakistani-Chinese" intervention became probable.

However, an interesting corollary must be added here. The Blue team alone proposed the objective of "keeping India democratic" (twice during the discussion period but given low priority in policy briefing) during the first move period. In the first half of move
period B this objective was referred to even more frequently by the Blue team. This objective was not necessarily directed against a Communist takeover or significant gains in India, but would refer to that eventuality. Yet in the second half of this move period, with the situation worsening, this objective was mentioned only once. The Green team referred to it once in the first half and not at all in the last half of the move period.

4) As U.S. perceives increased potential Soviet/Chinese gain, it will continue to seek non-military means to control conflict, but will begin to shift focus to Soviets/Chinese.

While the previous hypothesis was not supported, this lesser version (referring to the object of U.S. attention) was, although not necessarily as a stimulus to counter-action.

In CONEX II the U.S. team apparently did not perceive an increased Soviet gain in Move period B, and this hypothesis was not checked until subsequent periods (when it appears to have been corroborated). In that move period the U.S. team did not seem concerned that the "Soviets" were likely to increase both their assistance to "Algeria" and the scope of their support for liberation movements to the south. In Period C, as the potential for Soviet gain became clearer, the "U.S." did tend to focus more on the "U.S.S.R." It is not clear whether the U.S. team was stimulated by the sudden qualitative change in Algerian acquisitions, or by the higher visibility of the Soviet presence. The written record seems to indicate that the U.S. team was first concerned about the weapons transfer, then alerted to the Soviet threat.

This proposition was strongly supported during CONEX III. Our special "perception" questionnaire analysis (see Appendix D-2)
indicates that as the exercise progressed both teams perceived an increase in both "Soviet" involvement and potential Soviet gain. Message analysis shows that as this trend became clear both teams devoted proportionately more of their time and attention to this problem. When "Soviet" activity and visibility was increased in the later move periods, the American teams became more apprehensive, though there is no evidence that they were completely distracted from other issues.

In the early phases of CONEX IV, the essential source of the conflict, and policy problem, was the internal disorders in one country that threatened to encourage external involvement. Under these conditions we have hypothesized (see hypotheses number 2, 5, 6) U.S. preferences for non-involvement or multilateral involvement, non-military policy means, and conflict-control objectives without critical concern with "outcomes" (i.e., with "winning" in some sense). However, when competing great power involvement in the conflict becomes visible, and when the threat of Soviet or Chinese gains begins to increase significantly, we have hypothesized that the United States will increasingly focus on the great power competition as the critical problem and will become more concerned with "outcomes" ("winning" in the sense of preventing Soviet or Chinese gains at the expense of a local U.S. ally). We expected the "United States" to continue to seek non-military means of conflict-control, but we also expected a greater U.S. willingness to become involved in the conflict at least to restrain, deter, or block "Soviet" or "Chinese" advantage taking.

The implications of this hypothesis were in large part corroborated by the data, although the qualifications to its appropriateness are consistent with our other hypotheses. The
questionnaires indicate that both teams perceived a high threat of "Chinese" gains from the outset, and this increased during the second move period. The monitors in general indicated some increase during Period B of the perceived threat of Soviet gains, although all monitors indicated a lower perceived threat from the "Soviet Union" than from "China" (this continued until the last period of the game). Furthermore, all monitors indicated a much higher perceived Chinese involvement in fomenting and exacerbating the conflict until the final move period.

It is true that as perceived Chinese gains and involvement became more salient the focus of attention shifted toward China. Further, it is true that the "United States" continued to pursue objectives and strategies which were non-military and conflict-controlling even though this shift took place. However, as the focus shifted we expected the "United States" to see the conflict more in traditional Cold War terms and to be more willing to become involved, albeit non-militarily. Yet neither U.S. team showed any significantly greater inclination to become involved in the conflict than before. This is consistent with our conclusions that, in the period ahead, the dominant "U.S." operating objective will be to avoid direct involvement in any local conflict even when significant Soviet or Chinese gains are threatened.

Whereas this hypothesis generally was corroborated in the case of "China," with respect to the "Soviet Union" the evidence is less clear. In Period B both U.S. teams perceived an increasing threat of Soviet gains. However, there was not a shift in attention toward policies to inhibit Soviet actions. In fact, both teams considered cooperation with Moscow as critical to their objective of conflict avoidance. This was particularly true of the Green
team, which emphasized bilateral U.S.-Soviet policies to restrain "China" and "Pakistan." The Blue team rejected the policy option of bilateral U.S.-Soviet action during the second half of Period B because of its concern with Soviet advantage-seeking. Yet even the Blue team counted on Soviet cooperation in the U.N. and generally, against China, and did not consider means of restricting Soviet action.

A number of additional conclusions are possible when these findings are compared to the teams' selection of specific policy objectives and strategies. We assumed that the increased threat of Soviet or Chinese gains would result in greater U.S. concern with "outcomes." There were some indicators of outcome preference in terms of the stated objective of retaining a "democratic India," at least on the part of the Blue team. However, this preference was stated primarily in reference to a discussion of the costs and benefits of direct U.S. involvement to aid the "Indian" government in settling its internal domestic problems, rather than as a response to the Chinese threat.

The outcome of a democratic India as a policy objective of both teams appeared again in the first half of Period B, but had virtually disappeared in the second half of that period, and never reoccurred in Period C. Similarly it was in these later periods that the threat of potential Chinese, and finally Soviet, gains and direct involvement became most salient. That is, the salience of a specific political outcome preference decreased as the Chinese and Soviet threats of gain and involvement increased. This might be interpreted as negative evidence for our hypothesis, although this particular objective is not necessarily a good indicator of outcome preference. What this ambiguous finding does suggest is corroboration

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of the hypothesis in light of the fact that the U.S. teams shifted their focus from the Indian domestic political problem to the problem of threatened Chinese intervention and nuclear blackmail and, later, to the threat of direct Soviet-Chinese hostilities. The principal "U.S." concern, therefore, became the prevention of Chinese intervention and, later, of "Soviet-Chinese" conflict rather than the outcome of the Indian political conflict.

A more relevant indicator of the shift in policy focus to the Chinese (and later the Soviet) threat was the shift in the last two move periods away from the objective of preventing the expansion of the conflict to the level of interstate hostilities. That is, as long as only Chinese gains, but not direct Chinese involvement in the conflict, was the threat, the U.S. remained concerned with the political outcome in India. However, when Chinese and Soviet direct involvement in the conflict and thus the potential of great power hostilities became visible, U.S. attention shifted almost exclusively to concern with China and the Soviet Union.

In period C perceived Soviet gains continued to increase, but, what is more significant, perceived Soviet involvement increased substantially. It was not until this latter period that both U.S. teams rejected the hoped-for Soviet cooperation and began to emphasize means of restraining the Soviet Union as well as China. In a similar fashion, the earlier focusing on inhibiting Chinese actions was consistent with U.S. perceptions of high "Chinese" involvement in fomenting the conflict from the outset.

It is apparent that the critical factor hypothesized (the threat of Soviet or Chinese gains) while important, was not the primary factor which triggered the significant shift in U.S. policy
focus from the local participants to the competing great powers in Asia. The real shift in focus came rather with the increasing threat of direct Soviet-Chinese hostilities stemming from the incipient India-Pakistan hostilities. When this threat became salient there was a major shift in the objectives and strategies of both U.S. teams.

5) In the event of U.S. involvement, the dominant argument will favor non-military means.

This hypothesis is strongly supported by three games. In CONEX I the U.S. Green team relegated military considerations to the background, there to remain unless a "Communist takeover" took place. The U.S. Blue team placed its emphasis on non-military considerations but at the same time made theoretical estimates of what might precipitate a military situation. Later in the game military possibilities entered Blue team deliberations (focusing on the right-wing Junta in power and not directly on the left-wing extremists threatening a takeover). In the final part the U.S. Green team sent a small military force to evacuate U.S. nationals (but not for explicit outcome-influencing purposes). In general the hypothesis received some positive evidence from game results.

In CONEX III neither U.S. team proposed direct military intervention in the conflict. The U.S. Green team did propose in its initial plan using economic aid as a means of relieving domestic discord in "Zambia," and subsequently reiterated its intention to rely on technical and financial assistance. The U.S. Blue team appeared to be a little more willing to intervene in the conflict than the Green team, but also favored non-military means. In both teams American diplomatic and economic policies were not regarded
as intervention in African affairs. Rather, both teams wished to influence the outcome of the conflict by methods that would minimize American involvement. Their clear preference for non-military means is best demonstrated by the paucity of discussion on this issue during the exercise—and the frequent references to it in the post-exercise questionnaires. Many participants commented after the exercise that the "Americans" never seriously considered any level of military intervention.

Non-military methods were treated as a given by most participants. But despite this aversion to employing American military forces as a conflict-control device, the Blue team eventually agreed to commit U.S. military aircraft, first as a logistical asset for a United Nations Observer Group, and finally to evacuate American nationals from "Zambia." Neither course of action was deemed to constitute military intervention by the Blue team, which specifically promised the "U.S.S.R." that the "United States" would not employ military forces in "Zambia." The available evidence of CONEX III supports the proposition that Americans greatly prefer non-military means of controlling local conflicts.

In CONEX IV, the only forms of direct U.S. action considered by either team were arms transfers and the use of economic aid as a policy lever. The emphasis was on threatening to cut off "Pakistan" from receiving both forms of aid if restraint was not forthcoming. However, given the facts that other parties (especially China) could well replace U.S. aid, resulting in a loss of U.S. influence in "Pakistan," and given a general unwillingness to provoke a worsened situation, neither U.S. team chose to carry out these options. While no "U.S." intervention took place it is very likely from the above that it would have been non-military and indirect had
intervention taken place.

It is very difficult to say under what conditions the U.S. might have intervened but, quite gradually, both teams were moving away from their early insistence on non-involvement and toward more direct forms of involvement. However, the military preparations and maneuvers proposed in the second half of period B and during period C were, at least initially, meant as a display of U.S. resolve rather than as the first stage of military involvement.

In period A no one on either team proposed unilateral U.S. involvement. In the first half of period B only one person, (and only once) proposed such involvement. Both U.S. teams, on the contrary, in these earliest periods referred frequently to avoiding any unilateral or military involvement. However, the number of proposals for unilateral and military measures increased in the second half of period B and in period C—though they never made up a significant number of proposals. On the other hand there were an increasing number of suggestions for increasing the visibility of U.S. military force. Mobilization of forces, placing a naval force in the Indian Ocean, and readying a force to be stationed in South or S.E. Asia—but not in India—were all proposed. That these were meant as initial steps to direct military intervention is questionable. In each case they were proposed in the context of asserting the need to avoid unilateral and military conflict but still intending some show of U.S. resolve and concern with the outcomes of the conflict.
6) In the same situation the dominant U.S. argument will favor multilateral over unilateral means.

CONEX I, III, and IV supported this hypothesis, although subject to the weaknesses of international organization. In CONEX I the Green team registered a multilateral preference strongly and clearly. Blue also indicated a preference for a multilateral approach, but saw some need for unilateral action to galvanize multilateral machinery. In later moves, Blue pushed still harder for multilateral machinery. The evidence generated is essentially positive for this hypothesis.

Early in CONEX III both American teams expressed a strong preference for multilateral conflict control means over unilateral action. There is no indication that this tendency reflected either a desire for a "fig-leaf," or was a device for avoiding a decision about United States involvement. The Blue team was especially disposed to seek United Nations and regional action, even though its expectations were not optimistic. Neither team discussed alternatives in terms of multilateral versus unilateral American action; the "Americans" were so intent on minimal United States involvement that an explicit assessment of the relative merits of unilateral-multilateral action was never conducted. Even in the later stages of the exercise when the probability of effective multilateral action was severely reduced, the Blue team was still placing principal emphasis on this device. The final Green team position expressly disavowed unilateral military action, and included a policy of support for the U.N. observer group. Both teams were pessimistic about the utility of such Observer Missions, but continued to pursue such solutions as preferable to increased American involvement.
Paradoxically, neither team pursued other multilateral possibilities that offered at least as much potential for conflict control as the United Nations. When the Organization of African Unity announced its intention to dispatch military units to "Zambia" during the final period, the Americans neither saw an opportunity for influencing the direction of events, perhaps through Ethiopian or other friendly channels, nor did they seem to feel that arrival of external African forces in "Zambia" might trigger a pre-emptive strike by the white states. These attitudes might be explained by disbelief in the scenario; by an inability to deal with the very high levels of information load that characterized the later periods; or by other factors not indicative of a specific decision to ignore the OAU. But there was little discussion of multilateral alternatives other than the United Nations, and post-exercise comments suggest that the preference for multilateral means was limited to the United Nations. In all events, the general preference for multilateral means over unilateral U.S. action seems to have been substantiated.

In CONEX IV, both teams focused on the utilization of multilateral policy means as the primary response to a threat of external involvement in the "Indian" domestic situation. Both teams also determined that bilateral U.S.-Soviet policies to isolate the conflict were their most available and effective policy lever. This was, in fact, the major diplomatic means proposed by the Blue team, and became the priority policy means defined in the Green team's policy briefing. The Green team also proposed use of U.N. machinery and the convening of a great power conference to resolve the dispute, though it was concluded that these were not as efficacious as bilateral U.S.-Soviet measures. This latter strategy did not gain precedence during the first move period but became an important element of the
Green team's policy discussion in later move periods.

The Blue team focused on two alternatives: bilateral U.S.-Soviet diplomatic efforts to quell the conflict, and use of the U.N. to bring pressure for restraint on the participants. The Green team focused on bilateral U.S.-Soviet arrangements.

There were other interesting differences between the teams with respect to relative changes in policy preferences during the move period, and to disagreements over strategy within the teams. For example, there was considerable disagreement within the Blue team over the bilateral nature and possible outcome of U.S.-Soviet bilateral diplomatic efforts. It was feared that such efforts would result in U.S. involvement and other third party involvement in the conflict, and would provide an entrée for the Soviet Union to gain from the conflict. Consequently, the priority policy option of this team became the use of the U.N., though U.S.-Soviet bilateral efforts remained important in the policy briefing because of the perceived possible ineffectiveness of the U.N.

The Green team, on the other hand, disagreed over the use of the U.N. because of its perceived ineffectiveness and the fear of drawing into the conflict many outside parties. Therefore the Green team relied throughout the remainder of the game on bilateral U.S.-Soviet diplomatic arrangements and a proposed conference of great powers as a means of isolating the conflict.

These preferences for multilateral, non-military policies were expressed within a context of rapidly deteriorating conditions in South Asia and an increasing probability of Pakistani and/or Chinese intervention. Though we cannot equate Communist takeover with significant Chinese or Soviet gains in India, such a perceived threat
was the only relevant related factor in the game. During period B both teams indicated that significant "Chinese" gains from the conflict were very probable. In spite of this, and in spite of the "Soviet" unwillingness or slowness in cooperating in bilateral or U.N. measures to isolate the conflict, neither U.S. team seriously considered unilateral or military involvement as a means of preventing "Chinese" gains.

7) Individuals will perceive ambiguous information as to the extent of Communist involvement in extremist movements in terms of the relative strength of "No More Munichs" (domino effect of not resisting "aggression") or "No More Vietnams" (slippery slope of unilateral intervention) images they carry in their heads.

This hypothesis is of course impossible to examine on a group basis. The data employed here are individual comments by participants. The evidence from CONEX I and III is somewhat inconclusive, perhaps because personal belief structures can not be made entirely explicit in team discussions.

In CONEX I the "no more Vietnams" syndrome was clearly operative in the formulation of objectives and the development of strategy in both the "U.S." teams. This group of players saw the "no more Vietnams" impulse in U.S. public opinion as both immediately more important, and as the direction in which that opinion was tending. The process of policy-making was largely dominated by this sentiment, and in their responses to the questionnaires three quarters of CONEX I participants mentioned Vietnam as influential. Some close to the thinking of the younger generation were particularly strong in emphasizing that the argument of opposing communism
would in their view henceforth be less automatically acceptable as the basis of legitimacy of U.S. policy. In the Green team there was some discussion of the potential domino effect in a Communist take-over in the region, but this sentiment failed to be reflected in the team's strategy and actions.

In CONEX III it was likewise not possible to correlate individual attitudes toward extent of Communist involvement in extremist movements with their preconceptions about the relative dangers of appeasement and unilateral intervention. Questionnaire analysis indicates that most individuals discerned increases in "Soviet" and/or "Chinese" involvement as the exercise progressed. Unfortunately, we were unable to clearly identify individual positions on the intervention-abstention dichotomy in order to compare them with perceptions, because the paucity of discussion of possible effects of intervention versus abstention made it impossible to detect individual biases. It may be that the issues were not discussed in this way because neither U.S. team construed Communist involvement with African extremists as a serious threat to American national security. It may also be that the teams were not persuaded that American intervention in an African conflict was relevant to the threat. Both of these views were espoused by individuals and appeared in team decisions in varying degrees. But neither individual statements nor group decisions permit correlations of entering biases with attitudes toward extent of Communist involvement.

The tentative present conclusion that can be drawn about this hypothesis is that it was not possible to assess the effect of "Vietnam" or "Munich" syndromes on individual perceptions; that there were differences in these perceptions; but that these differences were not very significant, especially in the later move periods.
Finally, the Blue team observed a slightly greater threat from "Communist involvement," but the difference was not so striking that it could be attributed to a fundamental cleavage in basic attitudes. (We did not expose this hypothesis to CONEX IV.)

8) In the event of hostilities, unless the outcome is perceived as representing a clear-cut Soviet/Chinese gain, the U.S. will give the highest priority to the hostilities-termination objective. The U.S. will employ political and diplomatic means to stop the fighting.

The evidence is not strong enough to draw a confident conclusion.

In CONEX II the hypothesis was supported by U.S. behavior which was confined to a Hot Line response to a Soviet message. There was no evidence of any intention to intervene unilaterally either in a military sense or otherwise. The U.S. continued to rely on diplomatic means to solve the problem, and appeared to give first priority to hostilities termination.

During the inter-state "hostilities" phase of CONEX III there was no plausible chance for a victory that would represent a clear-cut Soviet gain. (The level of hostilities was very low.) Even the replacement of a moderate "Zambian" government by a radical, left-wing group was not regarded by the "Americans" as an unmixed blessing for the Soviets. In the absence of a prospect of Soviet gains, both American teams did emphasize hostilities-termination objectives. They employed almost exclusively political and diplomatic means to avoid wider hostilities.

In CONEX IV we could not test this hypothesis directly as overt hostilities did not occur in the context of the local
conflict situation. Hostilities did occur between "China" and the "Soviet Union" in the form of a border clash. In the latter case the U.S. teams did employ diplomatic efforts in an attempt to cool off and terminate the Soviet-Chinese hostilities. In terms of the incipient "India-Pakistan" hostilities, the evidence indicates that the priority U.S. objective was the prevention of interstate conflict, and that political and diplomatic, rather than military, means were the priority strategies.

9) The U.S. confronted with local conflict situations increasingly focuses as the crisis intensifies on the party with which it has friendly relations and (as a corollary) tends to reject or ignore conflict-control measures directed toward other parties.

The game evidence as to this hypothesis is mixed but generally supportive.

In CONEX I the "U.S." teams very clearly focused on the "right-wing Junta" as ostensibly the best means of reforming the local situation, and may have missed opportunities to control the conflict better by feeling freer to treat with the "left-wing extremists."

Although the "United States" in CONEX II did not focus on the "Moroccans" in the first move period, it certainly gave credence to this hypothesis as the exercise progressed: as the level of tensions rose it increasingly ignored the "Algerians" and concentrated on Morocco.

Evidence to support this hypothesis is very scanty in CONEX III. As the "conflict" increased in intensity both teams persevered in primarily multilateral strategies. The Green team was more persistent in this regard than its counterparts, but neither team
focused exclusively on one party to the conflict. This may suggest a difference in policy outlook between those situations in which the United States has an established relationship with one side in a conflict, and those cases where the United States feels itself bound by no prior obligations.

CONEX I, II and III were characterized by a local conflict stemming from domestic political disturbances in which the primary players were competing domestic political groups or neighboring minor powers. In those games we found that the "U.S." increasingly concentrated its attention on one of the domestic political groups and/or on one of the local national disputants. This process was the result of a conscious or unconscious effort on the part of the U.S. teams to maximize their influence on one participant as a means of effecting conflict-control.

In CONEX IV the evidence does not indicate that this habit of focusing policy attention on one participant in order to influence conflict-control outcomes was a significant aspect of the policy-making process. However, this does not mean that the hypothesis is invalid. Rather, the nature of the conflict situation determines, in large part, the appropriateness of the hypothesis. For the scenario conditions of the first three CONEX exercises the hypothesis was substantiated; for CONEX IV, a modification of the hypothesis to reflect the quite different conflict conditions leads to several interesting conclusions from the data.

The scenario for Move Period B actually included several interrelated conflict situations which made focusing on one participant difficult. A more relevant hypothesis for this game is that in a situation of incipient conflict at several levels—*intra*-state, local interstate, and between great powers—the U.S. will focus on
the conflict level which threatens the use of highest magnitude of force.

In the initial move period the primary immediate problem was the Balkanization of "India." The U.S. teams, however, focused on the potential threat of "Pakistani" intervention and the possibility of significant "Chinese" gains (including support of secessionist states and/or support of a Pakistani invasion) which might result from the "Indian" domestic disruptions. The source of the problem, therefore, was the "Indian" domestic upheaval. Consequently, the emphasis in terms of objectives and policy strategies was to find indirect means of bolstering the "Indian" government and of providing incentives for "Pakistani" and "Chinese" non-involvement.

In the second move period, the threat of interstate hostilities became markedly increased. As a result, the focus of the search for conflict-control devices turned increasingly away from bolstering and influencing the Indian government, and toward more direct means of influencing "Pakistan" and "China" for purposes of securing their restraint. The record shows decreases, from the first half of Period B to the second half, in reference to the objective of "strengthening the Indian government," and the increases in reference to the objective of "preventing expansion of the conflict." The emphasis in policy strategies, by the second half of period B was turned to use of the U.N. (by Blue), bilateral U.S.-Soviet efforts to restrain Pakistan and China, and the threat of cutting off military aid to Pakistan as an incentive for restraint.

By move period C a complicating factor of an incipient Soviet-Chinese conflict appeared. The focus of attention at that time almost entirely overlooked the still troubled Indian domestic situation and the U.S. teams' desire for a favorable solution of
that problem. Instead, the policy emphasis turned to attempting to communicate directly with "Chind" and the "Soviet Union" to quiet their fears. In addition, pressure was applied to "Pakistan" for restraint, not so much to protect India as to prevent Chinese support of a Pakistani invasion which might have led to Soviet-Chinese hostilities.

10) All things being equal, a U.S. team in which cost constraints are explicitly emphasized is less likely to opt for unilateral or military involvement.

This hypothesis was tested via the provision of an experimental U.S. team in CONEX I and III. I was ambiguous, but III more conclusive in its validation.

In CONEX I the U.S. Green Team decided at the outset against unilateral intervention on grounds of excessive political costs, and thus never really explicitly considered economic costs. The experimental team (U.S. Blue), however, asked about economic costs even before it received its special briefing. The evidence is thus ambiguous as to the effect which this variable had on the Blue Team. The Chairman of the Blue Team reports that he was considerably influenced (even to the point of recommending that this become a standard part of top-level decision-making for the future). A majority of members of Blue considered direct action, irrespective of economic costs or other constraints, aimed at regulating external support and level of violence to enhance possibilities of a peaceful solution. In terms of actions, the experimental (Blue) Team, while it had earlier developed contingency plans for unilateral U.S. intervention, did not implement them in the end. It was the Green Team rather than the Blue Team that moved to rescue nationals (with Blue still asking about budgets).
It may be that the problem gamed was too small-scale for cost considerations to be salient except in a marginal sense, and that resource constraints operate only in the case of large U.S. overseas commitments while lesser commitments are more likely to be influenced by the presence and strength of more purely political constraints. This is supported in CONEX I by the fact that considerations of domestic political stability and support were on balance far more crucial to both teams than economic costs.

The proposition appears to have been substantiated in CONEX III. The effect of the cost briefings, which consisted of an explicit evaluation of the potential costs of alternative courses of action, presented to the experimental (U.S. Green) cannot be precisely determined. Nevertheless, it is demonstrable that Green behaved differently from the Blue team, whose decision-making did not include formal consideration of costs. Obviously those differences in behavior could be attributed to many other factors. But there is circumstantial evidence to the effect that the experimental variable was influential. At the time, the Green team did not appear to be powerfully impressed by the briefings. But the evidence does indicate that the Green team was more ambivalent about all issues than the Blue team, and was generally less "aggressive" than its counterparts. These differences were most noticeable in the final move period when the Blue team (which had opened the exercise disavowing unilateral military action) was tempted to conduct an evacuation of American nationals, whereas the more pragmatic Green team refused to accept such risks.

This is especially interesting in view of two other comparisons. As the exercise progressed, the preferred options for the Blue team dwindled to a few, but the Green team continued to
explore the possibilities of numerous options. And the Blue team concluded the exercise by taking a high risk action, while the Green team refrained from any dangerous act. Furthermore, questionnaire analysis indicates that the Green team began the exercise quite concerned about Soviet involvement in the conflict, but did not grow much more concerned as Soviet visibility increased. On the contrary, the Blue team was more euphoric about the Soviet role in the first move period, but became very concerned by the end of the exercise. As indicated earlier, the dramatic shift in attitude by the Blue team could be attributed to other factors. But it does conform to our theoretically-grounded expectation that a team making decision with a less-structured process, compared to one that is constrained by systematic analysis of one form or another, will perceive the same information in a more impulsive, less "rational" fashion.

We were sufficiently impressed by this finding to have been encouraged toward further investigation of the effect on foreign policy decision-making of stylistic changes (e.g., CONEX IV). (Parenthetically, it should be noted that additional evidence in support of this hypothesis was derived from our simultaneous "EXCON" student-level experiments, reported on separately.)

11) All things being equal, a group of American decision-makers who employ a consciously systematic process of analysis such as CASCON, will behave differently than a group which does not.

This very preliminary experiment was performed only in CONEX IV, and its principal significance is reported on separately.*

*See Beattie and Bloomfield, op. cit.
The evidence from CONEX IV is not unnaturally rather sparse.

Though there were some differences in the conduct of policy formulation between the two U.S. teams, there is no evidence that this was due to the availability of CASCON. The Green team (which employed CASCON) made very little use of its capabilities and made few references to the output they received. The system was not fairly tested in that the members of the team did not make extensive use of CASCON. Its potential for improving the process of systematic analysis of conflict situations must await its use by personnel trained to exploit its capabilities. A tentative conclusion from this single experience is that personnel specially trained in the use of such computer capabilities and more aware of the data available will be required before a significant effect on policy-making will result.

2. U.S. Arms Transfers and Control Policy

12) U.S. arms transfer policy toward conflict situations proceeds from the assumption that a local apparent balance in military inventories is stabilizing, i.e., likely to avoid hostilities, and invariably aims at affecting capabilities defined in terms of weapons destructiveness.

The evidence from five "U.S." teams in CONEX II, III, and IV is ambiguous.

In CONEX II the U.S. team believed that relative military capabilities precluded either adversary from achieving a conclusive victory, and thus assumed that withholding arms that could upset the balance would prevent hostilities. Once the U.S. team was satisfied that neither side had a significant military advantage,
it saw the problem as one of "limiting arms supply." This position supports the above hypothesis. However, there is no evidence that the U.S. team was prepared to maintain balance by transferring just those weapons that would not change capabilities; it wanted to stop all arms transfers. In Move Period B some support was given to this hypothesis, analyzing the reported French and Soviet transfers in terms of effects on capabilities. Earlier moves do not disprove the hypothesis, because the U.S. team may have concluded that a moratorium on arms shipments would leave capabilities in a state of balance. It does imply that in this situation the "U.S." players were prepared to sacrifice any leverage on "Morocco" that might accompany arms supplies, in favor of stopping the arms race. Perhaps a new hypothesis is thus generated to the effect that currently the U.S. may increasingly prefer stopping a local arms race to the advantages that might accrue in the form of arms in gaining influence.

There is no evidence from CONEX III to support this proposition. To the contrary, the null hypothesis was vigorously supported. Both teams saw what was portrayed—a significant military advantage for the Rhodesian-South African axis—and regarded this imbalance as less volatile than an area arms race. Neither team was prepared to supply arms to the "Zambians," even at the cost of permitting the Soviets to gain considerable influence, preferring a ban on arms shipments to all in the area. In the face of intransigence on the part of suppliers, e.g., South Africa to Rhodesia, Peoples Republic of China to insurgents, U.S.S.R. to Zambia, both teams settled for merely issuing protests. Neither team attempted to offer inducements to suppliers to refrain from transferring weapons (Italian helicopter production for example, could have been diverted to NATO countries, if necessary at U.S. expense, or French MIRAGE V fighter-bombers might have been sold to "Zambia" instead of "South Africa").
In any event the "Americans" were faced with three problems that were susceptible to military aid, but declined to resort to either direct or indirect assistance in order to solve them. First, the "Zambian government" was unable to maintain order in terms of enforcing its will within its own borders, even though faced by violent challenges from left-wing groups possibly supported by the "white redoubt" and the white minority, especially in the copperbelt. "Zambian" military and police resources were clearly inadequate to the task of controlling these dissident groups. Second, the "Zambians" were unable to secure their own borders against transgressors from Rhodesia and/or Southwest Africa, or to prevent the "liberation front" groups from moving out of Zambia to attack targets in neighboring countries. Finally, the "Zambians" were vulnerable to attack by the superior air and ground forces of their neighbors. While a moderate government was in power both American teams were vague, in both their discussions and their communications, about U.S. willingness to aid Zambia with any of these problems. After the takeover by "radical left-wing" elements, the arms transfer issue was almost ignored. The U.S. Green team especially saw Zambian military weakness in the terms described above, but nevertheless refrained from attempting to aid the "Zambians." This was somewhat surprising in view of their determination to render economic assistance which would be adversely affected by the hostilities they predicted.

This proposition does not appear to be valid for all cases. It might be more accurate to say that in any conflict situation, United States arms transfer policy will be based on the assumption that major changes in the status of arms inventories are destabilizing.

As for criteria of destructiveness, since both American teams avoided the issue of arms transfers almost completely, there is
no direct evidence to support the hypothesis. Indirectly, it is evident that the "Americans" were much more concerned about "Soviet" transfers of highly destructive systems such as SU-7 fighter-bombers than they were about other arms transfers that in fact might have had a more significant effect on military capabilities, e.g., surface-to-air missiles accompanied by Soviet technicians. Unfortunately the arms transfer issue never became salient enough during CONEX III to accrue sufficient evidence on this question.

The data from CONEX IV do not provide a basis for accepting or rejecting this hypothesis. However, the data do allow us to make several important propositions about arms transfer policies in conflicts similar to our "Indian" scenario.

In this first move period the Blue and Green teams each proposed arms transfers to "India" (brought up only once by both teams), though the nature of the arms was not specified. Yet in neither case did arms transfers get much consideration, nor were they proposed in the teams' final policy briefings. Implied in the proposals was the intention that greater "Indian" capabilities would reduce the external threat, especially "Pakistan." However, a number of considerations overruled the use of arms transfers. First, such transfers would indicate a commitment to the "Indians" which the U.S. teams wanted to avoid. Secondly, transfers to "India" would only be perceived by "Pakistan" as provocative and, therefore, might increase the probability of interstate hostilities. Finally, U.S. transfers to "India" would very likely be matched by transfers to "Pakistan" from other nations.

In sum, arms transfers were not considered to be a useful policy tool at any time during this game. This was not the result of considerations of the local balance of forces. Any increase in
arms aid was perceived to be potentially more destabilizing than any existing arms imbalance. Furthermore, an overriding desire to remain uninvolved in local conflicts stemming from domestic political instabilities precluded a willingness to supply arms to one or more participants in the dispute.

On the other hand, both U.S. teams discussed briefly the possibility of terminating arms supplies to "Pakistan" that were continuing under existing agreements. This proposal was, at least in part, related to calculations of relative capabilities insofar as it would reduce "Pakistan's" ability to sustain military action against "India." However, the proposal was intended as a threat to "Pakistan," to be carried out only if "Pakistan" invaded "India." It was hoped that such a threat might help restrain "Pakistan," but implementation of the threat was perceived more as a conflict-terminating device than conflict-avoiding. Neither team considered this a particularly efficacious policy, because other suppliers would likely replace U.S. aid and it would result in a loss of U.S. influence over "Pakistan's" policies.

13) In a local situation of a slow "arms walk," the U.S. will limit arms transfers to items necessary to "maintain balance."

Examined only in CONEX II, the evidence is inadequate. The two-year increase in force levels and inventories depicted in the initial scenario apparently satisfied the U.S. team that a balance existed between "Morocco" and "Algeria." Their assessment of a Soviet low-risk policy encouraged them to believe that the balance would not be upset. Had they been shown a marked disparity in capabilities, e.g., if the "Moroccans" had no anti-tank weapons,
perhaps they might have sought to redress the imbalance with arms transfers. But since the U.S. team elected not to ship arms at all, we do not know whether they would have selected just items necessary to maintain balance.

14) In a period of detente, the U.S. will give prime emphasis to regional stability, and to the criteria of political and economic development. It will therefore stress economic and political conflict control measures in addition to arms "balance."

In CONEX II the United States team certainly stressed regional stability through diplomatic and economic initiatives. However, it did not specifically seek to ameliorate the internal political problems of either party to the conflict. Since it was these pressures that eventually proved the real motive for hostilities, the U.S. oversight was critical.

15) Suppliers will follow the maximizing principle of equating marginal costs to marginal benefits.

Since in CONEX II the "U.S." opted for an arms embargo, there is no evidence relevant to this hypothesis.

*The definition of "balance" was in this case the fairly subjective one made by the playing teams. The M.I.T./C.I.S. Arms Control Project has developed substantially more sophisticated and rigorous criteria for applying this concept. See Leiss, Kemp et al., Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, op. cit.
16) An equivalent change in capabilities will be perceived as more threatening if done suddenly than over time.

This hypothesis was examined in CONEX II and strongly supported. Although the quantities and types of military equipment which were to be transferred were very similar to the acquisitions of the preceding two years, the U.S. team saw these short-term transfers as an escalation in the arms race. Earlier complacency displayed by the "United States" about arms build-ups in North Africa was replaced by sharp concern over the effects of weapons shipments.

17) External suppliers who are fearful of the consequences of a local war fought with their arms may try to exercise control over future conflict, not by withholding arms, but by a process of rationing and selectivity and more direct involvement in the military affairs of the recipient state.

This hypothesis was clearly contradicted by "U.S." behavior in three games.

In CONEX II, despite a vague threat to reassess its position, the United States team remained firmly convinced that a unilateral arms embargo was preferable to rationing. Further, it did not wish to increase "intimate involvement" in Moroccan military affairs. On the contrary, it warned the "Moroccans" that further aid and support would not be forthcoming in the event of conflict and suggested that "Morocco" should resolve its dispute through appropriate means.

In CONEX III there was also considerable evidence to suggest that the null hypothesis is true. Both American teams periodically alluded to the possibility of supplying weapons, but neither ever did.
They invoked a de facto embargo on arms transfers despite the risk of alienating the "Zambians." There is no evidence that they tried to control conflict by selectively affecting recipient capabilities. It is unclear whether this abstention was attributable to a conviction that arms would not help, or to a view that arms transfers constituted a positive danger.

The evidence from CONEX IV is somewhat equivocal but generally tends to contradict the hypothesis. In period B, with the conflict intensifying, the number of references to the use of military aid increased markedly as compared to period A. This was particularly true of the Blue team in which considerable disagreement arose over military aid policies. This disagreement applied equally to proposals for cutting off aid to "Pakistan" and for increasing aid to "India." The latter was not considered appropriate at that time as it would have resulted in greater apparent U.S. involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, it might have been viewed as provocative by the "Pakistanis," and it was believed that this would quite probably make the latter more dependent on China or the Soviet Union in order to match U.S. arms sent to India. Similarly, an arms embargo on "Pakistan" would probably make the Pakistanis more dependent on China or the Soviet Union in order to match U.S. arms sent to "India." Similarly, an arms embargo on "Pakistan" would probably have made it more dependent on China or the Soviet Union as sources of arms.

The primary concern with the arms transfer issue for both U.S. teams was on the question of supplying "Pakistan" rather than "India." There appears to have been an assessment by both teams that India did not require any additional military assistance to deal with its internal problem. Similarly, it was believed that the Indians could cope with any attack from "Pakistan." Furthermore,
it was considered unlikely that "Pakistan" would invade without significant Chinese support and encouragement and as long as the Indian domestic problem could be kept under control. Finally, the implied nuclear threat to "India" from "China" was seen by the U.S. teams as something only their own and Soviet nuclear power could deter.

In their communications with "Pakistan," both U.S. teams used the threat of cutting off military supplies, spare parts and POL, and eventually their termination, as political devices to pressure Pakistan not to launch an attack on India. This might have affected "Pakistan's" ability to sustain an attack once started, but this threat was not based on an assessment of opposing capabilities meant to avoid hostilities. Similarly, in period C, when the "Pakistanis" asked the U.S. for arms aid against growing "Indian" belligerence, the U.S. teams' proposed response was to expand the proposed arms embargo to all of South Asia and to pressure "India" for restraint. In sum, the "United States" did not choose to manipulate arms transfers as a conflict-avoidance technique, except to hold out a threat of withholding arms if hostilities occurred. Nor did the U.S. attempt to become directly involved in the military affairs of recipients. To the extent that actions were taken concerning arms transfers, they appear to have been almost exclusively politically motivated rather than designed to give the recipient an enhanced or reduced capability to pursue a military objective.

On the other hand, the "U.S.S.R." used military aid as a primary means of enhancing its influence in the South Asian area. In the offers of arms to "Pakistan," either the "Soviets" assumed that these arms would not affect "Pakistan's" calculations of military outcomes against "India," or they believed they were capable of
controlling Pakistan's decisions, or they didn't care. The most
blatantly political use of arms transfers was the "Soviet" offer, late
in the game, of a whole package of appeals to "India" including
increased arms aid. In the absence of any indication that "India"
had some specific requirements at the time, this general blanket
offer can only be seen as a political ploy.

18) The U.S. will be more concerned by the
qualitative dramatic character of proposed
transfers than it was by either an "arms
walk" or by a sharp quantitative increase
in conventional weapons.

This hypothesis was supported by team behavior in CONEX II.
Even though U.S. team members realized that the "Algerian" acqui-
sition of air-to-surface missiles would not really change relative
military capabilities, they were obviously more concerned than in
prior periods. Evidence of their increased concern is displayed by
their shift in assessment of the causes of conflict from "Moroccan
irrendentism" to "Algerian activism." The "U.S." was sufficiently
aroused to suggest that if the trend continued, the U.S. would feel
obliged to reconsider its policy of withholding arms shipments from
the parties to the dispute in the event of hostilities with Algeria.
Paradoxically, the U.S. team remained convinced that despite the
withdrawal of support, it could influence the "Moroccans" to desist
from hostilities. At the same time it also reversed its earlier
stand on support for "Morocco" in the event of an Algerian attack,
possibly because of what they thought it portended for Soviet
intentions.
3. **Arms Recipient Behavior**

19) An LDC does not make cost-effectiveness calculations or use other "rationalistic" tools in making arms purchase choices. When hostilities break out an LDC will become less "rationalistic" in its decision-making.

There is little good evidence for this proposition, possibly because it may be a defective hypothesis for PME-exploration purposes since it is based on cultural-economic differences which may be impossible to reproduce in an all-American game, however knowledgeable the role-playing. We examined it only in CONEX II. There is no evidence in the first move period of systematic analysis of choices by either LDC team. Their plans may have been logical and correct, but they were not based on an explicit ordering of costs and results.

But neither was there evidence of increasing irrationality in decision-making by the players. What appears to us as inconsistency may be logical for the country concerned. While the "Moroccan" ground attack against an "Algerian" air base seemed hasty and intemperate, it may have been the product of careful analysis of alternatives (the tapes are inconclusive).

Thus there is no direct evidence to support this hypothesis. Our inability to detect a change in decision-making style may be attributable to imperfections in the methodology noted earlier, or to unrealistic role-playing. (Nevertheless, if "irrationality" is indicated by inconsistency, then the "Algerian" team became increasingly less rational after hostilities commenced: in the last two move periods they changed their position three times on conditions precedent to cease-fire negotiation).
20) A "revolutionary" state will attempt to gain military superiority over an adversary "status quo" state to maintain the former's revolutionary image, and also for spin-off in terms of internal security capabilities, without being unduly concerned at the prospect of an arms race.

The hypothesis appeared supported in CONEX II in that the "Algerian" team asked for a package of weapons that would give it clear-cut superiority over "Morocco." This military superiority was intended to convey an impression of invulnerability and thereby deter "Moroccan" aggression. The "Algerians" saw the external threat as a menace to internal stability. They indicated a desire to sponsor a revolution in Morocco and wanted to be sure that they could not be punished by the status quo state for instigating an insurgency. However, there was little evidence to corroborate the hypothesis that weapons are required for internal security in a revolutionary state; since armed insurgency was not depicted as a problem for the "Algerians," their indifference to this problem is understandable.

21) Non-communist Soviet or Chinese arms recipients tend to feel confident that they can trade Soviet or Chinese aspirations for bases or influence against arms and political support without jeopardizing sovereignty or independence.

The evidence from three games, even given the inter-cultural problem, is strongly supportive of this hypothesis.

In CONEX II there was a tendency for the "Algerians" to seek Soviet military assistance and to assume it would be provided. It was not possible to discern whether they were seeking to exploit
Soviet desires for bases/influence, or whether they believed that the Soviets had to help them in order to save face. There was more corroboration of this hypothesis in Move Period B. The "Algerians" in that and subsequent periods felt that the Soviets would trade guns for bases, and seemed confident of their ability to make a "good deal."

When the "Soviets" explicitly turned the screws another notch by demanding overflight and naval facility rights and suggesting a "goodwill visit" by the Soviet fleet, the "Algerians" accepted with alacrity. The "Algerian" behavior seems to be relevant to the hypothesis about exploiting Soviet desires for bases, and supports the proposition that the trade-off remains apparently favorable even when the Soviet price goes up.

In CONEX III this hypothesis was strongly supported by evidence obtainable from message analysis and real-time coding of discussions. Risk of excessive Soviet/Chinese influence never seemed to outweigh the felt need for assistance. Both the moderate and radical "governments" understood that the "U.S.S.R." was playing its own hand in southern Africa but seemed willing to trade some influence for assistance (although the moderates were more cautious than their replacements). Neither "government" explicitly pursued a strategy of playing off the Soviets against the Chinese (and it appears that Chinese capacity to help was seriously doubted), nor did the "Zambians" attempt to use Soviet aspirations for influence as a lever to restrain the "Soviet"-supported "liberation front" groups.

This hypothesis was most clearly supported in the final move periods when the "Zambians" were sorely beset by internal difficulties (for example, secession of southern provinces), and Soviet support...
in the absence of an American commitment seemed their only defense against retaliatory attacks from "Rhodesia/South Africa." The "Zambians" understood the dangers of trading influence for support by the U.S.S.R., but they neither believed that the influence would be excessive nor that it was a threat to their sovereignty. They continued to seek alternatives to a Soviet monopoly, but did not seem dismayed by their lack of success. Part of their euphoria may be attributed to the "radical" character of the new "government" control specified for them, partly to the absence of "Soviet" explicit demands, and partly to the ostensible success of "Soviet" threats in influencing "South African" retrenchment in the game.

In CONEX IV the "Indian" team was not really faced with the hard choice between greater Soviet (or American) influence in exchange for increased arms. It was the team's conclusion that its present military position was adequate to deal with its internal situation and with possible "Pakistani" or "Chinese" invasion (though the team was somewhat less certain of the latter issue). Consequently, "India" decided that it was not necessary to request greater arms aid.

However, the team's policy discussion revealed a consciousness of the trade-off between greater external influence in "India" and increased arms aid. It was suggested that "India" should avoid requesting new arms transfers even though "India's" capability vis-à-vis a joint "Chinese-Pakistani" invasion was problematic. In the team's final policy statement it was concluded that "India" would not even confront the question of arms transfers until after a "Pakistani-Chinese" invasion had occurred. Under this contingency "the Indian government would probably be forced to reconsider its
present decision not to seek any increased military assistance from the external powers." That is, "India" was extremely reluctant to request more arms from either the Soviet Union or the U.S., even under the worst possible contingency. A primary reason was the feared increase in external influence on "Indian" affairs.

In the second move period there was little new evidence presented that could add to the conclusions drawn for this hypothesis for period A. "India" did not seek arms aid from the Soviet Union even given the import of the Chinese nuclear threat. The only proposal for arms aid made within the Indian team's discussion in this period was for the purchase of ABM's from the "U.S." This was the only specific arms request considered by "India" during the game and it was rejected. In conclusion, the Indian team was loath to request additional arms support from any outside source, even when the conflict situation became increasingly threatening. "India" never considered an arms request to the Soviet Union, and in fact shifted its focus of seeking external support away from the Soviet Union and toward the U.S. as the conflict intensified during period B.

In period C the "Chinese" nuclear threat to India was further complicated by "Soviet-Chinese" border hostilities which threatened to expand. The Indian team viewed the external threat as a primary source of forging domestic unity among the dissident "Indian" factions and it exploited the external threat for that purpose. In terms of a direct response to the Chinese threat, the "Indians" did not even consider arms requests from either the "Soviets" or the "U.S." during this move period. They again held out the threat of developing an independent nuclear capability--through a news leak--but did not yet intend to carry out that threat. Their basic response
was to seek a U.S. nuclear commitment against China and great power support through the U.N. to restrain China, a policy which retained Indian independence of action.

In short, "India" viewed the interstate conflict as a means of securing its national integrity and independence; it was unwilling to sacrifice that independence through greater reliance on external powers in such bilateral arrangements as arms transfer agreements.

22) Non-communist Soviet and Chinese arms recipients will seek to play off various suppliers against one another.

Team behavior in three games strongly supported this hypothesis.

In CONEX II the "Moroccans" sought arms from the United States, France, and the U.S.S.R., and made sure that the"U.S." knew about the request to"France." The"Moroccans"continued in Move Periods B and C to seek military support from multiple suppliers, and apparently intended to diminish the suppliers' influence by stimulating competition.

This proposition was also strongly supported in CONEX III. The "Zambian" team consistently rated the extent of Soviet involvement and potential gain lower than did their "U.S." counterparts. Even when the Zambian concern moved from "indifference" to higher levels, the team continued to seek assistance from the"U.S.S.R." If their only objective had been material assistance from the "Soviets," their behavior might be explained by the"American"unwillingness to provide weapons and military equipment, which in effect forced the "Zambians" to deal with the"Russians."
In fact, the team not only continued to seek help from others such as the United Kingdom, France, and Algeria, but throughout the exercise tried to use "Soviet" activity as a lever to elicit American support. It is equally true that the Zambian team regarded arms transfers primarily as a political factor, having acknowledged early that they were incapable of matching their neighbors' military capability in the short run. The "Zambians" understood the limits of their capacity to employ advanced weapons systems, and did not seek weapons calculated to redress the imbalance with the "Rhodesians" and "South Africans." Rather, they tried to improve their military capability to maintain internal security and to protect their borders from small incursions. Their primary purpose for soliciting arms was still to use these transfers as evidence of political support, on the assumption that big power support would deter the "white Africans" more effectively than incremental changes in their own capabilities. They realized in turn that their best chance to obtain this support would result from big power competition for regional influence. Both Zambian "regimes" sought to avoid undue influence by arms suppliers by broadening the base of their support. They made a point of publicizing their military assistance agreements both for maximum political benefit and as a means of stimulating competition.

In CONEX IV, because the "Indians" chose not to make any new arms transfer requests, there was no effort to play alternative suppliers against one another. On the other hand the "Soviets," but not the "U.S." were willing to use arms aid as a policy lever to increase their influence in the South Asian area. They offered additional new arms aid to "Pakistan" and at the end of the game offered a package deal to "India" which included arms. The "U.S."
had been unwilling to be played off against the "Soviets" in "Pakistan"; on the contrary, both U.S. teams threatened to cut-off aid to "Pakistan." It is problematic whether the "U.S." would have competed with the "Soviets" in supplying "India" had the situation worsened and "India" requested arms.

On the other hand, the Indian team considered it critical that present arms aid which was part of existing arms agreements be continued. Furthermore, "India" was very anxious to gain a Soviet and U.S. commitment to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of India. In this connection, it was interesting that "India" was far more concerned with such a Soviet commitment than a similar U.S. commitment. During the team policy discussion, the U.S. was prominently mentioned only once with regard either to arms aid or a political commitment to India, while the Soviet Union was repeatedly referred to concerning these issues. Similarly, in the teams' final policy statement the Soviet Union was given chief prominence as a source of external support. In conclusion, the "Indian" team was wary of requesting further Soviet (or American) military aid, but considered the Soviet Union, not the U.S., to be its most important source of external support at this early stage of the conflict.

23) Incremental or marginal changes in military capabilities are not likely to alter substantially mutual perceptions, deterrence, or intentions.

The evidence in three games was unclear, probably because PME's do not well depict such marginal or incremental capabilities changes.
In CONEX II one team was impressed by its adversary's rumored acquisition of arms and equipment. Like the Israelis in 1967, it sought to counter the adversary's build-up, thereby contradicting the primary hypothesis about perception of marginal change. On the other side of the ledger, the "Algerians" did not feel that the "French" offer of arms to "Morocco" represented a significant change in relative capabilities, and showed an apparent lack of concern (although their reaction may be attributed to skepticism about the credibility of the rumored deal). When the "Algerians" were subsequently offered their own package of arms by the "U.S.S.R." they cited the aforementioned unconfirmed French-Moroccan deal, but did not indicate that the "Soviet" offer would either change relative capabilities or appear provocative to the "Moroccans."

CONEX III supplied insufficient evidence to warrant comment.

In CONEX IV the hypothesis can be discussed in reference to the introduction of a nuclear threat, which suggests validation of the reverse hypothesis.

During period B the "Indian" team shifted its policy attention increasingly away from the "Indian" domestic situation and toward the Chinese threat--particularly the latter's nuclear threat. The domestic situation was still considered manageable.

The threat from "Pakistan" was not believed to be critical, given relative military capabilities. However, the blatant "Chinese" nuclear threat posed serious problems. This Chinese threat, of course, did not represent a change in "Chinese" capabilities, but did indicate an unexpected willingness to exploit nuclear forces which had
been avoided in previous South Asia crises.

This nuclear blackmail did result in significantly altered perception of the conflict and altered conceptions of deterrence and of relationships, especially concerning "Chinese" intentions. It also resulted in a major change in "Indian" policy preferences. Most interestingly, the earlier reliance on the Soviet Union shifted to greater attention, in the policy discussion, to the kinds of assistance that the U.S. could provide.

Whereas "India" had not discussed new arms aid in detail in period A, there was considerable debate during period B over the merits of requesting ABM's from the "U.S." This was proposed as a response to the Chinese nuclear threat, but ultimately the team determined not to make the request to the "United States."

A more prominently considered response to the "Chinese" threat was the rapid development of an independent nuclear capability that could then be used as a counter threat to China. However, as with the ABM option, the development of a nuclear device was not accepted as policy at that time.

The Indian team ultimately avoided a change in "Indian" military capabilities as a response to China. Instead, a strong declaratory policy calling for "Indian" unity against any external intervention or nuclear threat, and for international condemnation of the use of nuclear blackmail, was implemented. Further, a request was sent to the "U.S." for "assurances" that it would not tolerate Chinese nuclear blackmail. However, a news leak from "New Delhi" held out the threat of "Indian" development of an independent nuclear force if China carried out its ICBM test flights over Indian territory. In short, "India" chose to rely on its own devices in order to maintain
its independence of action, even though the external threat was intensifying.

24) An equivalent change in military capabilities will be perceived by others as more threatening if accomplished suddenly than over time.

Again, the evidence is slim, and mixed.

In CONEX II there was no evidence that the "Algerian" team regarded prospective "Moroccan" acquisitions as more threatening than the equivalent buildup during the preceding two years. But the Moroccan team's reaction to the "Soviet" offer to "Algeria," especially before receiving the "French" offer, does tend to support the hypothesis. The "Moroccans" appeared quite concerned about relative capabilities before they were apprised of the "Soviet" offer to "Algeria," and even more concerned after the report. They felt sufficiently threatened in this Move Period to implement that part of their "strategy plan" that called for deploying forces eastward, preparing to call a U.N. Security Council meeting, and planning a reserve call-up.

In CONEX III the data was insufficient.

In CONEX IV we could not test this hypothesis directly because there were no significant changes in capabilities on the part of any of the participants to the conflict. The sudden emergence of the Chinese nuclear capability as a salient aspect of the conflict certainly altered the "Indian" perception of the Chinese threat. The "Indian" responses to this threat have been described above. However, this did not represent a change in Chinese capabilities, and it is difficult to determine an equivalent force acquired over time with which we could compare "Indian" responses.
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25) In assessing the threat posed by changes in the size and/or inventory of a potentially hostile force, a state will base its estimates on the capabilities of the weapons systems in that force and, in particular, on the capabilities of the new acquisitions.

There is some evidence from CONEX II that the "Moroccans" based their requests for military assistance on a conscious attempt to match "Algerian" capabilities. The types of equipment requested by them suggest a short-term attempt to upgrade their ground (not air) forces in relation to "Algerian" force characteristics. Analysis indicates that the team felt that the proposed "Soviet" arms transfer would change Algerian capabilities, but does not reveal how the subsequent "Moroccan" requests fitted this change. However, their concurrent search for substantial air and ground weapons systems leads us to suspect that they were trying to acquire the kinds and quantities of weapons best suited for fighting the "Algerians," but the available record does not substantiate this.

There is insufficient evidence available from CONEX III to comment on this proposition. The "Rhodesians," "Portuguese" and "South Africans" were not completely free players (they were "cells" in CONTROL), so their reactions to "Zambian" acquisitions were strongly influenced by game-administrative considerations. Furthermore, their deliberations were neither observed nor tape-recorded, so that there is no way to corroborate the few implications of concern for Zambian acquisitions that appear in their messages. Moreover, there were so few changes in the capabilities of the "white redoubt" during the exercise that the issue was never very prominent in Zambian discussions. Finally, the "Zambians" were so convinced of their own inferiority that they concentrated on deterring aggression by eliciting support from powerful states outside.
the region.

The CONEX IV evidence relating to this hypothesis is necessarily inferential given the lack of saliency of the arms acquisition question. Our basic conclusion is drawn from what was, in fact, not said about ongoing arms transfers. Though no major arms transfers took place during periods A or B, transfers to both "India" and "Pakistan" continued as a part of earlier arms agreements. None of these was considered by "India" or the U.S. teams as affecting military relationships in the short-run, and "India" did not request cessation of either U.S. or Soviet transfers to "Pakistan." Furthermore, the "Indian" team believed that it could deal militarily with a "Pakistani" intervention, a consideration which also implied an ability to deal with the increases in "Pakistan's" capabilities arising from continued arms aid to the latter. In short, present arms traffic was not considered by "India" to be a short-term threat and not only did "India" not react strongly, but it did not view a "Pakistani" invasion as an imminent threat.

26) An LDC faced with the short-term prospect of an unfavorable military balance will rigorously seek to redress it and, in extremis, will pre-empt.

Team behavior in CONEX II tended to support the hypothesis, with its urgent request to "France" for quick delivery of ground forces equipment, and its strong riposte to the Algerian air strike on terrorist bases on the Moroccan side of the border.
CHAPTER IV

INNOVATIONS IN THE "FREE GAME" TECHNIQUE

A. BASIC ISSUES

The political-military exercise (or what I now prefer to call political exercise) form employed in the CONEX series was an adaptation of the model originated by the RAND Corporation, developed by the M.I.T. Center for International Studies, and currently also used by the Joint War Games Agency (see Chapter I for details of that history).

The format of CONEX I, III, and IV was a relatively free but nonetheless structured role-playing game in which three teams of American scholars and experts in regional affairs, U.S. foreign policy, military strategy, and public opinion were organized to simulate typical groups of contemporary policy-makers. Their inter-active decisions moved the game forward in ways we hoped would expose our policy hypotheses to systematic scrutiny. For purposes of experimentation explained below, two teams were constituted as similarly as possible (U.S. Blue and U.S. Green). The third playing team in those three games portrayed the leadership of the "country" involved in the local conflict.
A "control" team steered the game in order best to bring out answers to our research questions. Control reserved the right to override or block any team move which was unrealistic or preempted the experiment, while refraining from interfering with the interaction between the teams. However, in order to intensify the level of crisis Control, on the basis of the research design planned in advance, arbitrarily advanced the situation in time between move periods. The Control Team was under the direction of the Game Director and Deputy Director, and included experts who simulated, on a quasi role-playing basis, other critical international actors in the problem, e.g., "Soviet Union," "China," "South Africa," "Pakistan," etc., plus U.S. domestic press and public opinion, and the United Nations. In addition to these quasi-playing "cells" the Control Team represented "Nature," and all governments except the United States and the LDC in question, as well as factions and opinion within all countries.

CONEX II was organized somewhat differently, since its emphasis was on arms transfer problems and thus on interaction between parties to a local conflict rather than primarily on the dynamics of U.S. decision-making. In this kind of game the principal teams must be those representing the parties to a local conflict. It was an open question in CONEX II whether for game purposes it might not be better to pre-program U.S. "conflict-control policy" so that it could be fed into the teams systematically, as against providing a more dynamic game quality by having a live U.S. team. We opted for the latter, both to capitalize on any imaginative policy suggestions, and to continue with our experiment of subjecting U.S. teams to situations that would test their "indifference curves" regarding conflict outcomes.

In CONEX II we wished to focus on the military forces
available to the local parties as the main independent variable, with a subordinate independent variable the likelihood of the sides being able to sustain hostilities, as a function of availability or re-supply, spare parts, ammunition, etc. These variables were in turn functions of such things as arms transfer policies, superpower or great power competition, peacekeeping and peacemaking pressures, global or regional arms control or disarmament agreements, and so on. The principal dependent variable would be the "military policy" followed by the parties.

We realize that the primary methodological difficulty with this approach would be the fact that PME's are notoriously resistant to "micro" changes in tactical elements of a simulated situation; simulated--or real--top-level decision makers are just plain unlikely to focus on marginal changes in numbers, types, or dispositions of weapons. This is of course a relative concept, and what looks marginal to the United States could be crucial to an LDC. But even so, small numbers of aircraft or tanks would not be likely to produce a full-scale change in the perceptions of top political leaders. Of course a major arms control or disarmament agreement would change the situation significantly, making smaller quanta of weapons increasingly significant. (It would be interesting to run two parallel local conflict games, identical except for specifying in one of them the existence of regional [or other] arms control agreement.)

In planning the CONEX series the first step was to define our research questions with maximum precision and then identify the hypotheses about policy and behavior we wished to examine in the game crucible, so to speak. One possibility was to use the same hypothetical problem three or four times in order to begin to accumulate evidence
about responses that approached statistical respectability. The other major alternative was to vary the problem each time while retaining the same general research questions. Feeling that the state of the art did not support the kind of rigor implied by the first, and also because our policy interests suggested a spread of areas, we opted for the second.

The choice of illustrative topical problem areas to use as locales for the games was determined by our research purposes. For the first of our research questions, i.e., the focus on U.S. decision-making regarding local conflict and its control, we chose for the three games problem areas representing high, medium, and low assumed a priori national interest. The general areas chosen were the Caribbean Area (CONEX I), Southern Africa (III) and South Asia (IV). For the second research question that focused on arms inputs and reactions, i.e., CONEX II, the area could be of either low or high presumed U.S. interest, and still be interesting for our research purposes. Where the United States was presumed a priori to have high interests, the U.S. would typically have a measurable—although finite—amount of control over the detailed actions of its friends, chiefly by controlling the flow of military hardware. Superpower relationships would strongly influence such a problem. For CONEX II we opted for a pair of local adversaries where the U.S. had no major a priori commitment to outcomes sufficient to overcome its initial conflict-controlling preferences, but where at the same time there was sufficient inherent potential for Cold War polarization, or for outcome preferences, to test the relative strength of various U.S. policy elements at each stage of an intensifying conflict. For this we chose as illustrative a hypothetical renewed conflict in North Africa.
The materials on which the games were based were 4 Scenario-Problems, usually running anywhere from 10-20 pages, in which an imaginary "history" was written carrying the local situation from the present time to the date specified for the game. The latter was generally set at one or two years in the future--far enough off to make plausible an intensification of the present situation, but not so far as to presuppose basic changes in other elements, e.g., known personalities, superpower relations, world conditions, etc.

Every effort was made to develop scenarios that were authentic and plausible, particularly given the expertise of the players. An accompanying paper entitled "The World Scene" portrayed plausible developments in the U.S. and elsewhere, varying these where a particular game was focused. Generally the external situation was held as constant as possible for the dates we specified (1971 or 1972) so that the U.S. teams could focus on the local situation.

Additionally, background papers were prepared defining the military forces of all major powers and regional countries as of the 1971 or 1972 dates, as well as a more detailed military assessment of the forces of the countries directly involved. (While the players also found in their notebooks background papers on U.N. membership and procedures, maps of the region, and in the case of CONEX IV economic data, the extensive military data was probably a bit out of balance and contributed to the expectation—which we firmly intended to overcome—that these were indeed political-military exercises and not—as we wished them to become—"political-economic-social-psychological-intelligence-military").

The games each started with an orientation session in which the Director laid out the purposes and ground rules, but withheld, for example, details on the comparative U.S. teams or
(in CONEX I and III) the unannounced cost briefings. The Deputy Director then briefed on procedures, communications, and operations (see sample game schedule in Appendix B).

The teams then convened for an initial move period of two to three hours, at the end of which they were required to produce a document embodying their assessment of the problem, team objectives, alternative strategies, the preferred strategy, detailed policy moves of a political, diplomatic, economic, military etc. character, anticipation of contingencies, and actions the team would take in response to those contingencies.

After the initial team planning session each team was apprised by Control of developments arising from the decisions of the other team as well as relevant actions of other "governments." The teams then met to discuss these developments, evaluate their impact on the situation, and revise their strategy as necessary. Team decisions and other moves were made in writing on standard message forms, (in CONEX IV via computer—see below) in the form of abbreviated instructions to "agencies" of their governments, communications with other "governments," public statements, requests for information, etc. Teams were also able to request from Control face-to-face negotiations with other "governments" (see below). The games ran to three to five move periods, ending with a plenary critique session directed toward the improvement of the PME technique as a research method, and the exposure of significant policy questions, problems, and suggestions.

All the games in this series ran for two full days including one evening (plus in CONEX IV a briefing on the CASCON system the previous afternoon). This particular format is by no means ideal, for it brutally overworks the Control team, which must make in an
hour or so—or late at night—game decisions and scenario projections for which the Joint War Games Agency Politico-Military Division, for example, normally allows a full day. Three days would be greatly preferable. The present format represents a compromise that enables extremely busy individuals to leave their work completely (which most of them could not do for, say, a week), with the additional advantage that they can focus single-mindedly on the problem under scrutiny. Role-playing is thus maximized, but the pressures generated are admittedly severe.

B. METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

This project sponsored, under Professor John Steinbruner's direction, a series of experimental games with students as players. That series was entitled "EXCON." It had the primary purpose of trying out methodological innovations in the "free game" technique, as well as applying more rigorous theoretical standards, all for possible use in the senior games.* Some earlier experimentation along these lines had been done in PLANEX II—a game put on by students in my Graduate Political Science Seminar on "U.S. Foreign Policy: Plans and Strategies."**

Several interesting innovations were involved in those prior "pilot" games, among them: the posing to the game of specific

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hypotheses; the use of multiple U.S. teams (in the pilot games there were up to three U.S. teams, with no adversary team); unannounced introduction of explicit economic cost considerations into the deliberations of one team; extensive pre-programming of Control moves; U.S. teams as purely advisory; and systematic gathering and analysis of game data with audio-visual techniques, which also facilitated monitoring of team decision processes.

Some interrelated objectives motivated these innovations in the PME design, but all of them fall under one general research design objective: to facilitate the use of PME's as an experimentally-controlled research technique while retaining the unique benefits of the PME. We wished, in other words, to make political gaming more of a social science research tool without losing either the serendipitously-revealed policy insight, or the interest of expert and senior professional personnel in the nature of the exercise.

These somewhat conflicting objectives--increased experimental control, and retention of the interesting policy aspects of "free play"--have, we feel, been reconciled to a large degree by three interrelated categories of innovations, which create a "hybrid PME."

Some of these game design innovations that had been experimented with in the EXCON series were further experimented with in the CONEX games, while others were adapted or modified, and some were dropped. The principal experimental changes we made in the former PME model were as follows, along with the results of each:

Experimental Controls
1. Explicit hypotheses about policy and behavior were formulated and used as the base for game design and for data-gathering. In CONEX I we had six general hypotheses about U.S. reactions to new
local conflict situations. In CONEX II, III, and IV we assigned specific hypotheses to the predicted behavior of each team for each move period. In CONEX II we assigned 20 separate hypotheses to predicted U.S. team behavior across five anticipated move periods, 14 to one LDC team, and 15 to the other--a total of 49 hypotheses in all. The hypotheses used in CONEX III and IV represented a refined and shortened version of hypotheses, with the number reduced from 49 used in CONEX II to 31 in CONEX III, and 22 in CONEX IV, 16 of which were assigned for real-time monitor coding (see below). Another improvement was to flag in advance those hypotheses whose data source would be the team documents, the questionnaires, and the real-time activity. Some hypotheses were eliminated for which the previous games had supplied no good data.

**Results.** There remains little doubt that the best basis for designing a political exercise in the realm of research or policy analysis is a set of precisely formulated questions to which the form and procedures of the exercise are then arranged to conform. Good experimental technique suggests that such questions can best be posed as hypotheses about behavior, policy, or whatever, with the game results regarded as evidence in support or disconfirmation of the hypotheses. It is of course true that there is not an exact connection between hypotheses about policy behavior and game evidence, and it is not absolutely necessary that predictions be made in advance as to what the players' reactions will be. Our conclusion, however, is that it makes for a far more meaningful experiment.

Enumeration of hypotheses early in the planning phase of a PME as the basis of exercise design has the added advantage of rationally determining the appropriate level of conflict to be gamed, apart from permitting far more control over game inputs, thus
enabling better measurement of the input-output relationships relative to one's policy hypotheses.

In CONEX II there was clearly an excess of hypotheses to be tested in the allowed time. Attempts by the game designers to pre-program events that would enable several propositions to be tested in rapid succession over-burdened the system, e.g., the "Ethiopian-Libyan" arms acquisition was discounted by the "Algerians" as irrelevant because the level of crisis had already risen so high that the "Algerians" could not refocus on a longer-term problem. Especially late in the exercise events were occurring so quickly the teams could not adequately analyze the impact of a given event on their situation. This inability to cope with large quantities of new information is of course a well-known phenomenon of all decision-making, and thus is realistic; however, for analytical purposes it was difficult to test all the relevant hypotheses.

The separation of the move periods into distinct sets of predicted policy events provided a means for comparing the relevance of a specific input to differing environmental conditions, or allowed for measurement of the impact of variable inputs constituting a change in environmental conditions. This facilitated preparation of the scenario and background material by providing parameters for situations most conducive to evaluating these propositions. It also provided guidance to the Control staff in the planning and formulation of responses to team messages. During the exercise these hypotheses were useful as reference points for Control when decisions had to be made about the pace and direction of the exercise. Finally, selection among the many hypotheses of key propositions to be watched for enabled the real-time monitors to selectively observe the relationship between input and team decisions.
2. For purposes of more rigorous data collection, measurement, and analysis the CONEX series followed a pattern of less interaction among teams, and more pre-programming at least of the general trends of events. This modified pre-programming of Control inputs took the form in CONEX I and II of draft prefabricated follow-on parts to the Scenario-Problem, with corresponding diminution in free-play by Control. In CONEX III and IV we tried to correct for some over-rigidity that we felt might have been introduced into I and II by excessive pre-structuring, and concentrated on simply being prepared in advance for several major contingencies (e.g., in CONEX III and IV the game design took into account the possibility of hostilities or no hostilities; in CONEX IV it anticipated a possible change in focus from internal to external, i.e., to China or Pakistan or both, and an internal situation improved or worsened). We formulated hypotheses in advance for both types of contingencies. In all the games the second move period (B) scenario advance was pre-programmed, except for minor details. Also, in CONEX III and IV some pre-planning of "Soviet" moves was done (and in CONEX IV "Chinese" moves as well) in order to better coordinate the segmental unfolding of Soviet (and Chinese) strategy in accordance with our research purposes and with the generally predicted profile of game interactions (see #18 below). In this way also the number of key variables could be better controlled.

Results. The PME has always been peculiarly vulnerable to a rather baffling trade-off between the desire to conduct a carefully controlled experiment—which means that all inputs to the teams are planned in advance to emphasize specific hypotheses and faithfully adhered to throughout the game; versus the value of maximizing the imaginative results that should flow from the players' free expression of their intelligence and inventiveness
through the game—which means that Control must acknowledge and reward their cleverness (and punish them for their failures). A related value is that of sequential interaction of teams, which at best can expose hitherto unexplored pathways or alternatives.

Two solutions are in fact available to this vexing methodological issue. As to the trade-off between a research design to carry the game into successively worsening situations, as against the feeling of teams that, despite their best efforts, they cannot win, it seems satisfactory to start the game with some firm hypotheses but have in hand additional hypotheses relevant to several branch alternatives that develop as a result of interaction between the playing teams. This still leaves the psychological hazard of U.S. teams tending to believe in a pre-programmed game that nothing they did could have made it possible for them to win (and, as a corollary, if Control had not intended the game to get worse they could have won). Actually in real life the U.S. does not have control over these situations to the extent it may wish to, and certainly has not mastered a conflict-control approach adequately to support the assertion that if its actions had been allowed to be implemented the situation would have been reversed. On the other hand, not enough is going to be learned about this shortfall in U.S. policy-making if U.S. teams and players are allowed to believe that the only reason that the U.S. came out badly is that "Control fouled them up." The suggested answer lies not in changing the game design, again, but in not revealing to the teams the intention of Control if the objectively perceived outcome of interaction between the U.S. and other teams is in fact a worsened game situation.

In this spirit, we compromised at the start of this series. In CONEX I Control conveyed to the playing teams the
prefabricated Part II scenario essentially unchanged except for details added to conform to specific steps the teams had taken. This cost nothing in spontaneity, since it merely reflected a good prediction of what the teams would probably do. But when it came to Part III of the game, Control's methodological courage failed. We decided that it would cost less in psychic anguish than it would achieve in methodological rigor to let the last move period resume in a way that would be plausible and recognizable to the players, rather than conform to our original research objective of postulating to the U.S. teams the hypothetical situation of "another Cuba" in existence.

In CONEX II we also compromised, constructing a pre-planned game format, but within its boundaries permitting a maximum of team free play. The pre-programming had the exclusive purpose of ensuring that the game would move at specified points toward a) a hostilities situation, and b) a post-hostilities situation, in order that we might be able to test hypotheses concerning behavior in each that were generated by our arms transfer research currently underway. This we did, although it was not necessary for Control to introduce anything artificial since, given the initial scenario, the two LDC teams through their interactive moves entered into "hostilities" without any prodding by Control. The balance struck in CONEX III and IV between completely free play and rigid pre-programming seemed to us a reasonably good one, and we were able to trace the games along the lines of the rough schema embodied in the pre-game design. (See Figure 2 for a crude schematic representation of our pre-game plan for CONEX IV.)

There is not enough evidence at hand yet to judge with finality the limits of pre-programming—or of free play—defined in
terms of an overriding single value (or even a clear definition of what that value is). Our considered opinion at this time favors continuing to allow a range of "free play" for the teams insofar as the details of policy and team interactions are concerned. But this is to be allowed only within the general pathways charted in advance on the basis of the research questions, and of the hypotheses that spell out those questions. My own belief is that while our hybrid may not be entirely satisfactory, it represents a reasonable solution to a difficult "two-value" problem that balances between quite different objectives.

3. In CONEX I, III, and IV two U.S. teams played simultaneously (but never in contact with one another). We made every effort to ensure that they were similarly constituted for comparative purposes.*

Results. We are fully convinced of the value of having more than one "U.S." team in a PNE, if only as a generalized confidence check that the behavior of a single U.S. team is not totally idiosyncratic. In CONEX I, III, and IV we risked serious problems in having two U.S. teams interact with a single protagonist "state." If the U.S. team policies diverged significantly it would present difficulties to Control in defining a single U.S. position to other participants, thus requiring the playing of two games simultaneously, or else forcing the U.S. teams (or one of them) to modify their positions. We were quite uncertain as to how well we would be able

*That they did not differ substantially in relevant attitudes or perceptions was demonstrated by the results of pre-game questionnaires (see Appendix D-1 for a sample) or by the empirically observed team responses.
to introduce such Control responses, Adviser inputs, and other team moves, as previous experience had suggested that this amounts to playing two games and places an inordinate strain on a single Control operation.

As it turned out, both U.S. teams in CONEX I, III and IV made similar fundamental responses in the face of the assigned problem. We were able to demonstrate in parallel columns sufficient essential similarity of the strategic moves by the two teams so that virtually all Control responses were identical and did not require adjustment to differences between Blue and Green. (One explanation for these similarities is that all teams were instructed to formulate a "realistic" strategy. It would be interesting to use duplicate teams in another game in quite a different way, with one playing a "realistic" strategy and the other an "imaginative" one.)

4. An independent variable condition was applied to one "U.S." team of each pair. In CONEX I and III we introduced without announcement a focus on "cost-consciousness" in one U.S. team (Blue in I, Green in III) through the device of special briefings on cost constraints (economic, opportunity, and social) and resource allocations involved in a range of possible U.S. policies toward a hypothetical local conflict situation. Also in CONEX I and III an economist member was added to the experimental U.S. team to press for consideration of costs and systematic analysis. In CONEX I, in addition to the presentation of economic costs, Amelia Leiss devoted the first Blue team briefing to "costs and benefits" that might be entailed in adopting various conflict-control policies.

In CONEX IV the special variable was the availability to the U.S. Green team (but not to U.S. Blue) of the experimental CASCON Pilot System—a computer aided system for storing, retrieving
and analyzing data on local conflicts.* A special hypothesis was developed to examine the comparative responses of the two teams.

Results. (The substantive findings of this hypothesis are reported in Chapter III). The introduction of "cost-consciousness" into one U.S. team in CONEX I and III, apart from being an interesting experimental innovation, represented our view that this kind of briefing ought to be introduced into real-life NSC-level U.S. crisis and pre-crisis decision-making as a matter of general policy prior to the undertaking of new commitments, however modest the latter may seem at the time, so it was interesting to us on its own merits.

The experiment was imperfectly executed in CONEX I because in the interval before the final part of the game the Control team decided not to push the situation to an "insurgent" takeover which was previously planned in order to confront the players with a "Cuban" type of problem. Since when we reached that point in the game the strategies of both U.S. teams and third team added up to a local situation slightly short of a complete overturn, Control decided to restructure the problem for the final move period to show the local area still under siege, rather than lost to the insurgents. Some of the staff believe that this decision tended to reduce the impact on Blue of the costs briefing. At the same time, numbers of players reported themselves to have been influenced by both briefings—conflict-control, and economic costs of possible direct involvement.

In CONEX III the "cost-consciousness" briefing, under the scenario circumstances, did not seem to the chosen team a cause for significant changes in its attitudes or policy. Most players in both

*For detailed report on the use of CASCON in CONEX IV, see Beattie and Bloomfield, op. cit.
games thought this was because no circumstances could be conceived in the area in question in which economic costs for the U.S. could ascend to anything approaching intolerable limits. But in both cases the chosen U.S. team was in any event disinclined to intervene unilaterally. However, we are not convinced that this necessarily proves the experiment a failure. A similar briefing at the same simulated (or real) level in the late 1950's might have brought the same reassurances from a group of U.S. planners looking at Vietnam; it may be that the introduction of this kind of "worse case, cost/trade-off" type of briefing into national security discussions comes ten years too late.

It may also be that we were unable to detect how influential these briefings really were. We did not pre-test the experimental team to establish its proclivity for involvement prior to the cost briefing, and therefore cannot say with certainty that the players' attitudes were not affected, and post factum testimony by the subjects is insufficient to establish the "null hypothesis." (However, as the "U.S." teams were very similarly constituted random individual differences should have averaged out.) Another aspect of this experiment that remains unclear is the extent to which team attitudes would have been influenced if the briefings had been more explicit about the social and political costs within the United States.

In CONEX IV, the single variable difference (the CASCON program) under the scenario circumstances did not seem to cause the Green team to make significant changes in its attitudes or policy. Some players on Green testified later that CASCON was a source of reassurance to them that their policy analysis and chosen course were appropriately grounded in relevant historical experience.
impression is that both U.S. teams were in any event disinclined to intervene unilaterally so measurement between the teams is inconclusive.

However, CONEX IV was not a fair test of a working CASCON system. The CASCON system was by no means well-integrated into Green's operations, nor was it flexible or sophisticated enough at its present experimental level to provide ready answers to the questions a policy-maker is likely to ask in high-speed crisis situations. An improved CASCON system with well-trained operators and well-briefed policy officers could make a substantial difference in the style of decision-making, and very possibly in its breadth and imaginativeness as well.

5. A major innovation was to break away from the all-out, short-fuse, high-threat, unexpected political-military crisis situation, and try to learn to what extent the PME could be used for the pre-crisis situations so crucial to our analysis of policy needs regarding control of local conflict. We thus planned all the games as two-stage, with the first move period depicting a pre-crisis situation calling primarily for planning; and the second and subsequent moves reflected a crisis situation involving decision-making. If the latter involved hostilities of one sort or another we were also interested in examining hypotheses about post-hostilities policy. (In CONEX III and IV, though the design anticipated a possible hostilities stage, it did not occur.) To improve our capacity to analyse these stages we made the move periods fewer and longer.

Results. It has been commonly assumed in the past that the PME technique does not lend itself to simulation of a non-crisis,

slow-speed situation. Experience has indeed indicated that some minimum degree of atmospheric tension and pressure is necessary to foster the kind of role-playing that contributes importantly to successful PME's. At the same time, the very nature of the CONEX experiment required that significant effort be devoted to pre-hostility phases of conflict (Phases P-I and P-II in our ACLIM model). We are as interested in the estimates that people are likely to make in advance of possibly becoming involved in a Bay of Pigs or Dominican Republic or Vietnam type of situation, as we are with the decisions finally made at the moment of crisis.

The evidence is persuasive to us that political-military games can fruitfully be used for simulated situations short of all-out conflict or high tension crisis. There are nevertheless still two limitations: first, the expectation of sophisticated gamers that, even if a PME starts out in a pre-conflict or planning phase, "the crisis will come"; most games—including ours—tend to prove them right. Second, it is still moot how useful the professional-level PME is for a totally non-crisis situation, given the invariable tendency of players—and policymakers—to temporize (or become bored) unless a situation is very demanding. The answer seems to be a two-part game in which "something" happens, but not necessarily the military phase games have come to expect.

The only difficulty we experienced in CONEX I is that Part II (of three parts) was too much a continuation of Part I; and as a consequence the Green team became somewhat bored, having fixed its posture in the first move period. In retrospect, we should have introduced the Part III (intensified crisis) scenario at that time in order to move matters along to the ultimate crisis.
There was no particular structural difficulty in keeping the subsequent games moving into successive stages. There seemed no particular sense of artificiality to the majority of the players in the time jumps between the move periods; artificially advancing time in short increments involving several days did not pose any serious problems.

After CONEX II we concluded that intervals between move periods must be at least two hours if new scenario projections sensitive to team actions are to be drafted, reproduced, and distributed. At the same time, long breaks between move periods for the teams drastically reduce the time available for deliberation and discussion in any multi-move exercise. Our solution in CONEX III and IV was substantially lengthened team move periods, which represented a definite improvement, (although at the expense of the possibly desirable move periods E and F to look harder at hostilities and post-hostilities). We ended up with only three move periods in CONEX IV. However, by introducing and exchanging some relevant information and decisions during a move period, the effect can be of a larger number but without the additional transitions.

A technique employed in earlier PME's at M.I.T. was revived with good effect in CONEX III and IV. This was to instruct the teams to deliver an oral summary briefing at specified times in the move period so as to eliminate long delays while drafting of position statements took place. These oral presentations were scheduled at intervals so that the entire control team (and Observers as well) could monitor them on closed-circuit TV. Control was then in a position to get to work preparing for the next move period well before the present one ended. The result was to make the Control
move periods relatively short once again, thus keeping the playing teams busy and engaged, while not short-changing the drafting and reproduction process.

6. To focus better on the individual elements going into the U.S. teams' decision process, and consistent with the pre-crisis emphasis of the games at their start, in the first part of the games the "U.S." teams acted as special, high-level ad hoc task forces, confining themselves to planning desirable strategies, and in essence doing contingency planning. Each team was asked to assess the situation, evaluate the alternatives available, propose a specific strategy calculated to achieve a favorable outcome, and plan for likely contingencies. It was asked to reach a consensus on each task through group discussion, with individuals afforded an opportunity to express their personal exceptions to group decisions. The "third" teams were free to pursue an unconstrained strategy based on their members' professional awareness of the forces influencing real-life decision-makers. As the conflicts intensified, the U.S. teams reverted to the more traditional format of senior policy advisers to the "President" in a decision-making mode.

We prepared in advance and gave to each U.S. team member a fairly detailed written description of his role, indicating that each specialist was not precisely a specific "cabinet officer" or "agency representative," but had a broader mandate based on the subject area as a whole, responsible for ensuring that in every phase of the group discussion such aspects were fully considered. In the latter part of the exercise, while he did not represent any individual, each was specified as the senior official in a policy-making group chaired by the "President," authorized to commit his "Department" and its subordinate agencies to participate in programs and to decide upon
and perform the tasks required to implement those programs. For better role-orientation of participants, as well as to clarify the different modes of organization of the U.S. teams, the "Presidents" were asked to call on each member at the outset to describe his assigned role and to make an informal opening comment concerning his perception of the situation.

**Results.** The restructuring of the U.S. teams in the first move periods as "advisory task forces" was realistic, given the pre-crisis atmosphere of those early stages. It also coincided with the methodological desirability of decoupling the team from "Presidential" pressure and influence in order that the individual inputs into collective decision-making could be appropriately analyzed. By the same token, however, in the crisis situation later in the exercises it made sense to organize the U.S. teams as "policy officials" at the N.S.C. level.

The written role descriptions and the initial team briefings by participants were both useful devices to underscore the varied input elements we wished to identify in the U.S. teams, particularly in CONEX I in which we experimented with specific roles in the U.S. teams focused on scientific, technological, and developmental aspects of U.S. policy, in addition to the usual ones.

**Organization**

7. We broke up the collegial Control Team, traditional in the free PME, and located the Game Director and his Deputy (plus the Control Intelligence-Liaison Officer, who kept in touch via intercom with the team ILO's) in physically separate quarters from the "Control experts," but connected through intercoms.
Results. Expeditious Control decisions and operations in the CONEX series were facilitated by this separation, and we found it an aid in reducing undesirably impromptu Control actions, encouraging intra-Control interaction for "game dynamic" purposes, and making the game more efficient by reducing the number of those who take part in Control decisions. This modification is in turn a logical concomitant of the pre-structuring of the game, and of our basic desire to minimize Control "free play." Finally, under the severe constraints of a 48-hour PME a small group of staff experts dedicated to implementing decisions is preferable to a collegium of "peers" prepared to debate decisions.

8. Control included "cells" of quasi-role-playing experts, in some cases of two individuals each, simulating reactions and adding inputs representing significant "countries" that might otherwise have been made full playing teams, but in this way constrained within the general strategy of the game design. In CONEX II and III a full-time "chief of staff" was assigned to coordinate their efforts, enabling the Director and his Deputy to concentrate on overall game management. In CONEX IV the Deputy Director performed this additional function. As recommended after CONEX II, the Game Design Plan was distributed to Control Group members a week or so in advance.

Results. The use of "semi-role-playing" Control experts as intelligent instruments of the Director's policy decisions (as opposed to autonomous teams) was very successful. The experts accepted this role, and their inputs to the situation were both well-coordinated and relevant to the experiment. Two-person "cells" in Control, such as the "Rhodesian-South African-Portuguese" cell, or
the "United Nations" cell, afforded many of the advantages of playing teams but did not confront the Game Director at each move period with surprises and novelties with which Control would have to cope. Given competent experts, this format is highly recommended for professional political exercises.

Given this format, the "Chief of Staff" job, with the function of assigning and coordinating Control Expert inputs on the basis of information coming out of the teams, worked well and enabled the Director coherently to monitor the exercise as a whole, putting him in a position to approve the Control experts' inputs, but without having to give the process detailed supervision. It also facilitated the Control operation to distribute the Game Design Plan and initial Scenario to the Control staff several days in advance of the exercise, thus permitting the experts to assemble reference material, detect weaknesses, and propose changes before the exercise, particularly since game planning sessions prior to the games do not include all of the key people, some of whom in the past have had difficulty with either the scenario or their roles.

9. In order to restore an environment of realistic contact that helps to balance increased structuring of the PME, Control experts who represented "Soviet" and other inputs were permitted to negotiate directly face-to-face with the playing teams in order to facilitate the latters' decision-making, if there were a good reason to do so.

Results. In CONEX I the success of the game as a source of usable data was dependent on allowing the semi-role playing Control experts to engage in highly limited and controlled direct contact with playing teams. We are now convinced that our general return in this series to some limited face-to-face negotiation between teams or between teams and Control "cells" was useful and should be continued.
Properly limited and controlled, such direct contact can, we believe, speed up the game, as well as satisfy the felt need of participants to have some influence over events— that is, to be part of the game and not a "black box," yet without loss of experimental controls. The effect is to give playing teams the feeling that they are receiving information from an authentic source rather than as part of Control's faceless written machinations. (This capability was in fact underused in both CONEX III and IV).

It can be seen that I have substantially modified my earlier view that face-to-face game "diplomacy," while all right for classroom and teaching purposes, was unnecessary and time-consuming in "senior" games and should be prohibited. At the same time, in a professional, policy-type PME whose chief emphasis is on internal decision-making there still appears to be no good reason to encourage more general face-to-face simulated diplomacy involving U.S. teams, mock U.N. sessions, and the like. It should be limited to filling the need for rapid or "authentic" communication of positions where this serves game design purposes.

10. In CONEX III and IV a form was placed in each team room on which any individual could register his comment or dissent to a team position representing a partial consensus (see Appendix E-I).

Results. The function of this form was described for all participants in the Operations Plan and reiterated during the pre-exercise orientation, but they were not in fact used. Failure to employ the "dissent form" does not mean that all team decisions were adopted unanimously. It does seem to indicate that the group decisions were sufficiently broad to encompass the positions of all team members, and it suggests that the search for compromise solutions remains an integral part of at least game decision-making.

11. In CONEX III the opposition element in the fictitious LDC government was specified in advance by name, and some Control messages sent to him alone.
Results. In general, it serves the purposes of sophisticated PME's to identify and be able to deal separately with "dissident" components of "governments" simulated by playing teams, if those elements are significant enough to be crucial elements in top-level decision-making by the "government" team. In CONEX III, given the postulated scenario situation, it was a realistic and appropriate thing to do.

Communications

12. Requests for information could be relayed to Control from each team's Intelligence-Liaison Officer to Control's ILO. In CONEX III and IV information requests from teams received in the Intelligence-Liaison officer net, rather than being delayed until acted upon, were immediately ruled on by the Game Director or Deputy Director as to whether they could be answered in the time available, and the requesting team notified of what it could expect. The purpose was to avoid situations in which teams made their moves dependent on information that might or might not arrive in time to be acted on in the move period.

Results. The immediate feedback to teams to predict the likelihood of their receiving answers to their move period information queries enabled them to proceed under fewer misconceptions as to the probable or early receipt of information that might affect their decisions.

13. Team or Control moves in the PME have always been required to be written on a message form provided (See Appendix E-2). Usually the message has been typed on a ditto master or stencil, which was then carried to the Message Center, run off, and distributed. An innovation introduced in CONEX III to speed up game communications was to have the team or Control typist prepare moves not on stencils, but on ordinary paper. If the message was priority it could then be thermofaxed or xeroxed directly in the team headquarters or Message Center and a single copy immediately hand-carried to the action addressee. Subsequently, a stencil could be made directly by contact in the thermofax machine and run off immediately, in sequence, or later, depending on the type of message.
Results. The establishment of a priority for each message, and the development of special handling procedures for each category facilitated the administrative process. It spread the typing and reproduction load over a longer period, and assured that the most important messages were delivered first. Contrary to our expectations, the teams did not abuse the priority system; approximately 35% of all team communications in CONEX III were identified as "URGENT" and some of these messages were handled in a routine manner.

14. In CONEX IV we innovated further by supplying a capability for high-speed inter-team communications in real-time (or close to it) using consoles attached to the M.I.T. CTSS (Compatible Time-Sharing System) based on the IBM 7094 Computer. A program was written enabling consoles to be slaved to a master console, designating user consoles as "Control," "U.S. Blue," "India," and so forth, causing a time record to be imprinted on all messages, as well as consecutive internal numbers, and permitting messages to be buffered, i.e., stored in the computer disc until the recipient console was free, and then sending it. Our intention was to employ this computer-based net for urgent communications such as simulated Hot-Line messages.

(An additional and welcome feature was provided by a commercial supplier who for demonstration purposes loaned free of charge several light-weight portable consoles that connected directly to ordinary telephone instruments and did not require special data-sets.)

A CTSS expert worked with us prior to and during the game, and helped to prepare an instruction form that, after a two-hour briefing session the day prior to the game, enabled each team's secretary to type messages directly onto the keyboard of her team's console, as well as receive. Thermofax or Xerox copies were made immediately of computer-sent messages so team members could deal with them without delay.

One slaved console in the Message Center was reserved for special use as target for a closed-circuit TV camera, the picture from which was displayed on monitor screens located both in the
Director's office and the Observers' Lounge.

Results. Except for one breakdown of the computer at a crucial time, the experiment was an unqualified success (to the point where non-priority messages were being sent by computer). Properly controlled, it can make for exciting and efficient communications in a short game when time—and response time—is of the essence.

15. For greater realism in the sense of minimizing team consciousness of Control, any team message intended for another team and transmitted by Control was distributed on the color-coded paper of the originator rather than on the white Control forms, as was done in CONEX I.

Results. There is no positive evidence to support our contention that transmission of messages on paper color-coded to the originating team enhanced the reality of the exercise. But there were no complaints as in CONEX I that the recipient was confused about the source of a message, which suggests that this innovation reduced the potential for ambiguity.

Data Collection

16. We established the practice of remote-control monitoring of all teams by closed-circuit TV for ease of observation by the Control group, and for data-monitoring in real-time by qualified graduate student analysts. We also taped the team discussions for later analysis of research hypotheses. The real-time monitors used the video monitoring to identify the team member speaking so they could correlate his interventions over time. In CONEX I and II they also marked the interventions so the speakers could be identified on the tapes. The Game Director and his Deputy in CONEX III and IV had available in their headquarters a remote TV monitor with 3-way
audio and video-switch capability so they could quickly follow all team actions when needed. In those games also the graduate student real-time monitors in addition assumed the function of briefing the Game Director and Deputy both to alert Control to problems and trends, and to deliver a quick summary of team deliberations from time to time. Control also had a TV picture of the computer messages.

**Results.** It is clear that the remote-control monitoring of teams by closed-circuit television greatly facilitates the task of the Control team, while minimizing the disruption of team operations. The taping of the audio portion of their deliberations is useful for more comprehensive data analysis—though not as useful as we originally believed, mainly because of the greatly increased use we found we could make of the graduate student "real-time" monitors.

It contributed to the Game Director's effectiveness to have available a separate three-way TV and audio monitoring capability in the office he shared with the Deputy Director and Control "Intelligence-Liaison" Officer, as well as a separate TV monitor picturing the computer message traffic in CONEX IV.

The graduate student real-time data monitors proved able to double in brass in providing quick summaries of the mood, attitudes, and probable actions of the team each was monitoring, in addition to the analysis each student was doing on the basis of the hypotheses assigned to "his" team for each move period (see Chapter V). The Control experts also found the television capability useful as a means of rapidly assessing the team reaction to their particular inputs. On several occasions the experts were able to preclude erroneous interpretations of their messages because they had overheard the team discussion and could clarify the original text. The experts could also anticipate questions and begin preparation of appropriate replies.
before the query was actually received. The real-time monitors assisted in these processes by alerting Control to forthcoming question or obvious misconceptions.

17. In CONEX III a questionnaire was devised that was meant to determine each game participant's perception of the relative involvement of the "Soviet Union" in the game situation, and of the relative prospect of "Soviet" gains. This questionnaire had been administered before the game and following each move period. In this manner, we could determine any changes in these perceptions that might be caused by the circumstances of each move period. By referring to the scenario changes of each period we could make at least some tentative inferences as to the change in perceptions of "Soviet" goals or intentions by "U.S." decision-makers caused by specific circumstances or relative changes in circumstances.

Essentially the same questionnaire form was used in CONEX IV, with "China" added to the "Soviet Union." (A sample form is found as Appendix D-2, along with the results of both games). In CONEX IV, however, the real-time monitors were assigned the task of completing the form.

Results. The administration of pre-exercise and post-move period questionnaires to assess shifts in player perceptions of "Soviet" involvement in CONEX III proved to be a very useful device. It enabled Control to determine individual reactions to specific inputs, or to a series of inputs related to this issue; i.e., it provided a cross-check of real-time monitor impressions of whether the players saw "Soviet" moves as Control intended they be seen. There was a positive correlation between Control intentions and player perceptions. Since both the extent of Soviet involvement and its possible "gains" were increased very gradually and never did
reach a very high level, we cannot say precisely what impact these factors have on U.S. team decision-making. But analysis of the questionnaires does seem to suggest that a group of American role-players were very sensitive to the Soviet role in this situation. Our analysis also suggests that the influence of one variable can be more effectively traced in a PME by employing multiple methods of measurement. The questionnaires by themselves may not be very powerful evidence. But when combined with the results of real-time monitoring and message analysis, they add considerable strength to the hypothesis-testing process.

While the CONEX IV change in procedure had certain disadvantages in that we no longer had direct measures of individual perceptions, we gained several important advantages. First, the CONEX III technique, while being a "direct" measurement, did not provide a clear-cut means of aggregating individual responses, or in making reliable inferences as to the relationship between individual perceptions and formulation of the team's policy position. That is, when other variables could not be controlled, the question of the relationship between the perception of "Soviet" or "Chinese" goals and intentions and individual policy preferences (as well as team policy formulation) was still ambiguous.

Secondly, the relationship of specific scenario inputs to changes in individual perceptions could not be directly inferred. The questionnaire was administered only at the end of the period. But in the course of a move period, a large number of factors changed. This difficulty could be overcome only by utilizing some measure of individual or collective team perceptions at the time when specific inputs relating to "Soviet" or "Chinese" actions or
intentions were received by the teams.

We reduced these two difficulties by having the monitors indicate their understanding of the team perceptions of "Soviet" or "Chinese" behavior whenever a particularly significant message relating to such behavior was received by the teams (the significance of the message was determined by the individuals representing the "Soviet Union" and "China"). In each case, a time lag of about fifteen minutes after the message was received was allowed so teams had the opportunity to digest and respond to the message.

18. We administered a special pre-game questionnaire in CONEX IV in order to expand and compare data obtained by Amy Leiss in a prior non-M.I.T. game at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Results. Appendix G contains the detailed results. The comparative analysis of responses to this questionnaire by professional experts and graduate students indicates several interesting propositions. There were significant differences in the responses of these groups. As compared to the professionals, the graduate students considered the United States far more willing to become involved in local conflicts. Yet, in terms of policy preferences, there was no statistically significant difference between the personal willingness, within these two groups, to intervene in such conflicts. This method provides an interesting description of the varying conceptions of U.S. policy-making among those highly familiar with the policy process, and those studying it.

19. The chief instrument of data collection, measurement, and analysis in the CONEX series was the "real-time" monitoring of team deliberations that took place during the game. The methodological basis for this, the experimental devices used, and the results obtained are spelled out in the next chapter.
Planning for the present series of PME's began almost two years ago, in a spirit of pioneering enthusiasm coupled with the uncertainty facing any group experimenting in previously uncharted areas. We had a dual purpose: using the PME to explore and test hypotheses concerning U.S. policy in local conflicts, derived through our present and past research; and exploring the possibilities for making the PME a more rigorous experimental research technique. These purposes were not necessarily mutually exclusive, but efforts to discover a means for satisfying them simultaneously proved to be frustrating at times. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, modification of game designs was a continuous process throughout this series of games in order to reconcile these dual purposes. This self-conscious process of development necessitated searching for and experimenting with new techniques, particularly in the effort to derive an appropriate method of data collection and analysis.

Previous use of the PME or "free game" emphasized open-ended, imaginative responses by the teams to scenario conditions of unusual policy interest. Some value was attached to the games as a training device; the primary purpose however was to gain policy insights on the general kinds of problems typified by the scenarios as well as to uncover imaginative responses to troublesome policy issues. As long as
the focus of interest was on policy outcomes, data collection amounted
to assembling game documents and monitoring plenary sessions. Analysis
took the form of general qualitative judgments on the relationship be-
tween the scenario (and the general class of conditions typified by
the scenario) and the teams' policy decisions.

However, a more ambitious purpose motivated our present series of
games--to open and analyze what had previously been the "black box" of
the PME, the decision process within the teams. We hoped to reveal
and determine the nature of causal relationships between scenario in-
puts (conditions of conflict situations) and the teams' policy outputs,
or decisions. In other words, we were interested not only in what the
teams decided but also how and why they reached a particular policy
decision. We also wanted to discover, if possible, the nature of
certain operational principles involved in the process of foreign
policy decision-making. That is, our initial purpose was not only to
determine the effects on policy of specific changes in the variables
(considered by us to be most critical) involved in the local conflict,
but also to discover the effects of variations in the policy making
process on policy outcomes.

Obviously this new direction in the use of the "free game" required
significant changes in data collection and analysis methods. Analysis
of the team decision process was thus necessary but it was not
clear what aspects of that process should be isolated for analysis or
how they should be isolated and measured.

THE CRITERIA FOR SELECTING A DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE

In seeking to bring the PME more in line with contemporary
social science research, we tried to isolate those aspects of simu-
lations of policy processes which were least subject to distortion
of reality, given the constraints of simulations. Underlying much of
the criticism of the PME has been the lack of a theoretical model which would establish the correspondence between the PME simulation and the on-going policy processes of the "real world." The "free game" had been organized around a limited set of prescribed rules; the "control" group determined scenario changes during the game and the appropriateness of team operations and policy moves. In other words, the "realism" of game conditions had been determined while the game progressed by the ad hoc decisions of the control group according to implicit models of reality they carried in their heads.

Given the lack of good theoretical models of "reality" it would have been presumptuous of us to formulate a theoretical framework for the PME which we claimed corresponded to reality. Instead, we concluded that the aspect of the game participant's behavior which corresponded most consistently with his professional area of competence (and the behavior of those whose roles were simulated in the game) was, in fact, the process by which the individual arrived at policy decisions. It was doubtful that the individual's decision processes differed significantly between operational routines (with which he was intimately familiar) in the "real world" and in the games. The information received and the situation itself (particularly the peculiarities of any artificially created, temporary, small decision group) may differ from "reality," but the basic processes by which the individual interprets the situation and formulates related policy preferences should closely conform to "reality."

The basic source of validity in the PME was arrived at on purely methodological grounds; the choice corresponded happily to our essential policy research interests as well. That is, we wanted to discover how policy evolved from variations in a number of factors in local conflicts. Using the individual as the unit of data analysis we could attain this goal, and without losing our previous sources of data on general team performance. Team documents would
remain the primary source of interpreting aggregate team behavior. More specific analysis of policy responses to particular changes in the local conflict situation would be based on data gathered from individual policy responses within the team's policy discussion and not indicated in the written documents.

There was an additional advantage to making the individual participant the unit of analysis. When only two U.S. teams faced a single set of scenario conditions, we had only two cases on which to make policy inferences relative to our research hypotheses. By analyzing responses of individual team participants we increased the number of "cases" quite substantially at little extra cost. Furthermore, we would have better information to explain why a particular team did or did not, in fact, behave consistently with the policy responses postulated by our research hypotheses.

Having determined the individual as the unit of analysis, we still faced the problem of how and what to measure concerning the individual's behavior in the context of the PME. Proper experimental methodology dictates rigorous laboratory controls to isolate the effects of one variable so that a single research hypothesis can be tested. If we had decided that this design was consistent with our research purposes, the problem of data collection and analysis would have been much easier. For a large number of cases (many U.S. teams in a single game or a number of games with the same scenario) we could have simply tested for the statistical significance of the differences in policy decisions (as indicated by game documents) among the U.S. teams given the differences in conditions faced or information received. Or we could have coded the team documents and policy discussions in terms of the responses to changes in a particular variable and analyzed them in similar fashion.
However, for reasons indicated in the previous chapter we chose not to impose the restrictions of typical laboratory experimentation. Consequently, team members were not randomly selected, teams were not isolated from one another, a large number of variables were allowed to vary simultaneously, only two U.S. teams were confronted with a single scenario, and a rather large number of hypotheses were formulated for testing. For these reasons typical data collection and statistical inference methods simply were not appropriate.

Without rigorous experimental controls the most important data requirement facing us was the need to determine which specific scenario input variable was, in fact, causally related to a particular stated policy objective or strategy proposal. Obviously, there was no direct means of relating changes in scenario inputs (the independent variable) to team policy outputs, or policy decisions (the dependent variable). Determining this relationship required analysis of the effect of an intervening variable, the decision-making process with the teams. That is, we had to determine which among many input variables was perceived by individual team members to be most relevant at any given time and how this perceived relevance was translated into policy preferences.

A method of "real time" monitoring for coding simultaneously these three variables was difficult enough to find; aggregating this data raised further problems. Team discussions within a move period of several hours consisted, of course, of policy proposals made by individual team members which were then debated and often not explicitly accepted or rejected (if at all) until the final team policy position was determined at the end of the move period. In many cases events had so changed that proposals made earlier in the period were no longer relevant at the period's end. Therefore, aggregating individual policy preferences for the entire move period to represent
team preferences for the move period was not necessarily valid. The correspondence between individual preferences and ultimate team policy as indicated in its documents was further reduced by the fact that one or two individuals (especially the "President") often had a disproportionate influence on ultimate team policy decisions.

Ultimately, we based our search for a data collection technique on four criteria. First, with the unit of analysis being the individual team member, we had to compile the total of individual policy proposals. Secondly, we needed a measure of the relevance and degree of importance of the scenario inputs to the individual policy preferences. Further, we required a means of aggregating the individual team member's policy proposal, to facilitate analysis of the team decision process for each move period and to assess the team's generalized preferences (multilateral versus unilateral policy preference, etc.) relative to our research hypothesis. Finally, in aggregating the data we wanted to preserve the specificity of individual policy proposals--our unit of analysis. It was only at the individual level that the relationship between the independent variables (scenario inputs) and the dependent variables was explicitly made. It was this problem of aggregation that has been most vexing in analyzing the data for previous games.

THE EVOLUTION OF REAL TIME MONITORING TECHNIQUES

On the basis of our experience in the experimental games conducted before the start of the CONEX series, we decided to employ graduate students using closed-circuit TV to monitor the teams. In addition we planned to make tape recordings of team discussions as a permanent information file of game proceedings. In CONEX I--our initial experiment with serious data collection in a "senior" PME--we intended the real time monitoring to be primarily a means of identifying the time
of occurrence and general nature of team actions. With this inform-

ation we would refer back to those incidents on the tapes and then
analyse them carefully after the game. Confident of relying on the
tapes, we could experiment with real time coding forms. The resulting
product was overly-ambitious in intent, demanding considerable effort
on the part of necessarily inexperienced monitors. However, we
learned a number of important lessons from this initial effort. We
devised a coding form which was intended to be as comprehensive as
possible in collecting and categorizing data. Comprehensiveness was
necessary because, unlike later games, the specific research hypo-
theses for each move period had not been pre-established and given to
the monitors to guide their data search. We hoped that the real time
analysis plus the general outcomes of the game would reveal policy
insights which could then be more carefully investigated in post-
game analysis. Furthermore, we hoped to be able to gather data in a
form that would allow analysis both in terms of basic decision processes
and in terms of the relationships between specific scenario inputs and
the policy preferences stated by team participants.

A number of difficulties in real time monitoring and in post-game
tape analysis were revealed in CONEX I. It became clear that real-
time data collection methods aimed at exhausting the information
provided by team discussions were not possible, and on the other hand
reliance on post-game analysis of tapes was extremely time-consuming
and expensive. Furthermore, the coding form used in CONEX I relied too
heavily on subjective interpretation of team discussion to categorize
specific policy proposals according to its component parts (strategy,
objective, interpretation of the situation) as an initial form of data
aggregation for hypothesis testing. For instance, the interpretation
of specific scenario conditions was seldom explicit in the policy pro-
posals and had to be inferred by the monitor and rather rapidly.
Finally, because we could not be comprehensive in collecting data (not
all of the teams' discussions could be coded) we had to identify those elements of the discussion which were most directly relevant to our research hypotheses.

Corrections for these problems were especially important before undertaking CONEX II because we had decided to rely more heavily on real-time monitoring given the constraints of post-game analysis of tape recordings. To facilitate real-time monitoring it appeared, on the basis of the CONEX I experience, that we could not simultaneously satisfy the above mentioned four criteria of an appropriate data collection technique. (See Appendix C for Monitor Coding Forms)

For CONEX II we believed that less had to be demanded of the monitors. However, we wanted to retain as much of the specificity of individual policy proposals as possible in the coding form. Also required was a methodologically appropriate means of aggregating specific policy proposals into more general policy categories for purposes of analysis. In the end, the technique used compromised all of these criteria but did represent several important improvements which enhanced progress to more satisfactory techniques in later games.

Several game design changes in CONEX II facilitated improvements in the real-time coding technique. Most importantly, there was greater "pre-programming" of the sequence of scenario inputs for each move period. An explicit set of conditions relating to a specific research question was thus provided. In related fashion, the number of research hypotheses was reduced, and the specific hypotheses related to each move period were designated. In this manner we simplified substantially the work of the monitor. He was responsible for coding only that part of the discussion that was directly related to the specific hypotheses in question. The coding form was revised to make the coding process less subjective on the part of the monitor in interpreting the relationship between specific policy proposals and the general policy preferences referred to in the research hypotheses. We employed a modified scaling technique in which we tried to retain
some specificity in the coding of policy proposals without forcing
the monitor to indicate the particulars of each proposal.

Each hypothesis was represented on the coding form by a series
of more specific propositional statements which stood for possible
alternative responses to the key issues involved in the research
hypothesis. These propositions represented gradations from kinds
of policy statements most supportive of each hypothesis to those
most contrary to it. In effect, these scaled propositions were
categories of statements. The specific policy proposals were assigned
on the basis of which categorical statement it most closely repre-
sented in terms of the policy issue involved. Aggregation of the
policy responses was limited to totalling the relative frequency for
each category in the scale, providing an indication of the relative
preference for or against the hypothesized policy preference.

For CONEX III we further simplified and refined our data analysis
techniques. The over-precise pre-scaling of propositional statements
related to our research hypotheses in CONEX II was replaced by a set
of simple unmarked scales. The crucial issue (or issues) involved
in each hypothesis was broken down into its most extreme opposing in-
terpretations—that is, its most "positive" and most "negative" in-
terpretations. These polar opposites were then juxtaposed on a ten-
point scale. If the hypothesis included more than one issue, then
a corresponding number of scales was used. (The data Tables from
CONEX III are found at the end of this chapter.)

For instance, in move period A, hypothesis number one for the
U.S. teams was broken down into three issues. One of these was the
preference for multilateral versus unilateral policy options. A
strongly expressed preference for multilateral policy means would
appear at one extreme end of the scale, and for unilateral policies
at the other extreme. The monitor was instructed to interpret
stated policy options (and objectives where relevant) both as to relative preference for one or the other general type of policy, and as to the "strength of conviction" of each stated preference. The "stronger" the conviction, the further toward the end of the scale would the policy statement be noted.

This technique greatly improved our ability to aggregate individual policy preferences for the entire move period to indicate the general team preferences. With policy proposals coded in terms of common policy orientations, aggregations in the form of frequencies of occurrence of statements generally in favor of or in opposition to hypothesized policy preferences had a validity which would not have been true of aggregating frequencies of occurrence of policy proposals for previous methods. This technique indicated how much agreement or disagreement there was on key issues, how wide the disparities in opinion were, and how both of these factors changed over the course of the game.

However, while we made gains in terms of increased ease of real-time coding and greater facility in aggregating general policy preferences, there were losses in terms of the specificity of the content of policy proposals as coded, and of the explicitness of the relationship between changes in scenario conditions and changes in policy preferences.

The loss in specificity of content of policy proposals was the result of translating specific policy preferences (e.g., use of a UN peacekeeping force) into general policy preferences (e.g., multilateral policy means). This limited the possible policy inferences that could be drawn, and eliminates the kinds of specific data necessary to qualify judgments about the research hypotheses from analysis of the data. Another related problem is that translating specific proposals into general policy preferences is not always a straightforward
process. For instance, the category of "willingness for U.S. involvement" in the conflict (period A) was highly sensitive to the kind of involvement considered. One team was totally unwilling to get directly involved in any way but quite willing, it seemed, to become involved in behind-the-scenes bargaining, indirect economic aid, support of UN force involvement, and various other attempts to influence the participant governments.

The relationship between specific scenario changes and changes in individual's policy preferences had to be inferred from the conjunction in time of such changes. That is, the change in the scenario conditions between move periods, as indicated in game documents, was assumed to be the cause of any change in interpretation of those conditions leading to modifications in policy preferences during the succeeding move period. The institution of longer move periods in CONEX III meant that the possibility of more than one significant variable input being interjected in any move period, or more than one significant change in the same variable input, was increased. Even if this was not the case, the generally increasing "heat" of the conflict over time tends to change the interpretation of significant variables corresponding to changes in policy positions. However, our coding scheme was not originally designed to be sensitive to time changes within a move period. These factors make relating policy preference changes to specific information input or environmental changes more difficult. In other words, when aggregating a team's policy preferences for a particular move period, changes in individual preferences appear during the period as inconsistencies or erratic or ambivalent responses to a particular variable input (which also may have changes).

The data collection technique for CONEX IV represented a major revision of the previous methods. Our intent was to overcome the above mentioned primary problem of aggregation made evident by the CONEX II
and III experiences while retaining as much as possible of the benefits of those earlier techniques. In CONEX II we had tried to simplify the real-time monitoring form and to retain as much of the specific content of individual policy proposals as possible. However, while satisfying these objectives, the overly structured coding form meant a loss of information, and aggregation was difficult except in the most general manner. These problems were the result of predetermining specific policy positions on the coding form relative to our research hypotheses. When proposals were made which did not directly correspond to those designated policy positions they were not coded. It was difficult therefore to infer the relationship between the number of references to those few very specific policy positions and the final policy outcomes for the team as a whole. The technique used for CONEX III was intended to reduce the discrimination among the specific statements of each individual, while greatly facilitating the important task of aggregation of individual responses to the level of the team as a whole. To do so, the issues of interest in data collection had become generalized policy preferences (e.g., multilateral versus unilateral policy means) rather than specific policy strategies (e.g., use of UN peacekeeping force versus use of U.S. military advisers).

The real-time coding methods used in CONEX IV, we believe, have resolved the short comings of the previous efforts and adequately satisfy our initial four criteria of an appropriate data collection method. Basic to these revisions was an increase in the number of real-time monitors (two were assigned to each U.S. team), and greater reliance on these monitors for an increased variety of data sources. The monitors were not only entrusted with the task of coding team discussions relative to our research hypotheses, as before, but also were responsible for completing "perception" questionnaire forms (which had been done directly by game participants in CONEX III). Furthermore, the monitors made periodic summary analyses of the teams' discussion throughout the game—a task previously relegated to post-game reviews of tapes.
and team documents. (The "Perception" Questionnaires are found in Appendix D-2.)

The coding scheme developed broke with the essential format of the earlier techniques. The coding forms were "open-ended" rather than being structured in terms of the research hypotheses. That is, the form did not include specific policy objectives or strategies to be watched for, nor did it include general categories of policy preferences by which specific policy statements were interpreted.

Instead the form was divided into three sections with each form representing a policy statement of one team member. In the first section, the monitor indicated the policy objective to which the policy proposed was related. When the related objective was not explicitly stated, the monitor was instructed to use his judgment in inferring the implied objective if the connection were fairly clear-cut. The second section of this form asked for a paraphrase of the policy alternative, or strategy, expressed by the individual players. The third section of the form was for indicating the scenario input or assessment of the crisis situation to which the policy objective(s) and strategy(ies) were related.

For the first time, therefore, we had a form which makes explicit the relationship between the independent variables (scenario inputs), the intervening variables (the decision-making process involving the interaction of individual perceptions and policy preferences) and the dependent variables (policy outcomes). The technique places great weight on the individual perceptiveness and interpretive skill of the monitors. However, the use of two monitors for each U.S. team gave us a reliability check. Furthermore, by coding the briefing session as well as general team discussion we have a means of comparing aggregated frequencies of occurrence of various objectives, strategies and assessments of the situation to actual statements of final team policy. That is, we have a means of comparing the results of the only avail-
able aggregation technique--frequency counts--to final policy formulation--the factor which aggregated data purports to explain.

Aggregation of individual policy proposals is made easier by the fact that usually a relatively limited number of policy objectives and strategies are proposed during the course of a game. Secondly, the proposals of the two U.S. teams were quite similar--a fact interesting in itself. We did not code the policy proposals in terms of general categories of policy, nor were they related to the research hypotheses during the process of data collection. Instead, post-game analysis involved grouping the specific proposals (as paraphrased on the monitor forms) into more general policy categories, and this was now possible without loss of specificity in the individual proposal (the tables of aggregated data for CONEX IV are found at the end of this chapter). The importance of retaining this specificity is indicated by brief comparison of the hypothesis testing sections of the CONEX III and CONEX IV reports. The amount and quality of the data for testing hypotheses, making policy inferences and setting forth the proper qualifications to both has been greatly improved.

There was an additional innovation in data collection for CONEX IV which involved a modification of a technique used in CONEX III. Several of our research hypotheses involved the relationship of the "U.S." perceptions of "Soviet" or "Chinese" involvement and potential gains in the conflict to the willingness for "U.S." direct involvement. In CONEX III a questionnaire had been devised which was meant to determine each game participant's perception of the relative involvement of the "Soviet Union" in the conflict situation, and of the relative prospect of "Soviet" gains. This questionnaire had been administered before the game and following each move period. In this manner we could determine any changes in these perceptions that might be caused by the circumstances of each move period. By referring to
the scenario changes of each period we could make at least some tentative inferences as to the change in perceptions of "Soviet" goals or intentions by "U.S." decision-makers caused by specific circumstances or relative changes in circumstances.

Essentially the same questionnaire form was used in CONEX IV, with "China" added to the "Soviet Union." This time however the real-time monitors were assigned the task of completing the form. While this change in procedure had certain disadvantages in that we no longer had direct measures of individual perceptions, we gained several important advantages. First, the CONEX III technique, while being a "direct" measurement, did not provide a clear-cut means of aggregating individual responses to make reliable inferences as to the relationship between individual perceptions and formulation of the team's policy position. That is, when other variables could not be controlled, the question of the relationship between the perception of "Soviet" or "Chinese" goals and intentions and individual policy preferences (as well as team policy formulation) was still ambiguous.

Secondly, the relationship of specific scenario inputs to changes in individual perceptions could not be directly inferred, as the questionnaire was administered only at the end of the period. But in the course of a move period a large number of factors changed. This difficulty could be overcome only by utilizing some measure of individual or collective team perceptions at the time when specific inputs relating to "Soviet" or "Chinese" actions or intentions were received by the teams.

We reduced these two difficulties by having the monitors indicate their understanding of the team perceptions of "Soviet" or "Chinese" behavior whenever a particularly significant message relating to such behavior was received by the teams (the "significance" of the message was to be set by the individuals representing the
"Soviet Union" and "China"). In each case, a time lag of about fifteen minutes after the message was received was allowed so the teams had the opportunity to digest and respond to the message. Therefore, we not only had more observations during the course of the game, but also we could directly infer the relationship of significant "Soviet" or "Chinese" inputs to changes in "U.S." perceptions of their action (the originators did not code their moves).

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

First, in general terms, we feel that changes made over the series of games have been necessary and sufficient for the development of a much improved data collection and analysis technique. Of course no degree of experimental control could provide the basis of very scientific measurement of game inputs and outputs; indeed, a high degree of control would remove the quality of PME's which distinguish it from other research techniques. Within those constraints and those of time and money, a real-time coding method has proven quite appropriate for our purposes. Given an explicit set of hypotheses for each team move period, and controlled inputs, monitors are enabled to relate these inputs to decisional outputs of the teams.

The method used in CONEX IV was we believe particularly successful in satisfying our original criteria for an appropriate data collection technique. The real-time monitors were able to code all specific policy proposals in each move period. The relationship between scenario inputs and policy preferences is explicitly indicated on each coding sheet representing one policy statement by an individual team member. Categorizing and aggregating this raw data was left to post-game analysis. In this way we have a relatively exhaustive set of the relevant game data which can be categorized in whatever manner desired in analyzing the specific research hypotheses. This flexibility for manipulating the data provided by this method
is its greatest benefit.

It must be kept in mind that this data remains in large part subjective. The relationship of a proposed policy strategy to policy objectives (desired outcomes) or to scenario conditions is often only implied and must be inferred by the monitor. One the other hand, often in what appears to be only a statement interpreting scenario information lies an implied policy response, and it is up to the monitor's discretion as to its proper coding notation.

Some of these problems are reduced by the fact that we now have a reliability check on data collection with the use of multiple monitors. However, it ought to be said finally that precise measurement of variables is neither appropriate in the PME nor is it a prime objective. Our concern is rather to develop general hypotheses about foreign policy formulation under varying conditions, and to experiment with them sufficiently to make their relevance more than mere speculation. They remain unproven hypotheses; but we have at least some basis for arguing their relevance. Games do not encompass all of the elements of the real world, only a limited set of these elements. We are not trying to determine what will happen if a "real world" crisis occurs that corresponds to the game scenario. We are instead interested in what relevance certain variables in conflict situations may have to the policy choices considered and then chosen. Our limited objectives support the use of analytical techniques whose sophistication is limited by the means, and desired ends of our research. In sum, then, this appears to represent a useful means of testing the perceived relevance of variable scenario inputs to policy outcomes that hopefully supplements the more "macro" analysis of final team "policy positions."
CONEX III REAL-TIME MONITORING DATA
Table 1

Raw Data U.S. Teams: Move Period A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. interests are not involved</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to any U.S. involvement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for unilateral involvement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to any use of military policy means</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression if appeased will only spread</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capabilities balance is violence avoiding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:** Along the ten point scales are indicated the number of individual responses made by members of each U.S. team according to the relative preference for the policy option or interpretation shown at the ends of the scale. Numbers above the scaling line represent the responses for the Blue U.S. team; numbers below the line refer to responses for the Green U.S. team.

**Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. Teams**

1. In the period ahead, American decision makers confronting a local conflict situation will opt for non-involvement, or for conflict control policy featuring non-unilateral, non-military, multilateral means of involvement over the alternative of "winning" to the extent that they do not perceive a clear threat of Communist takeover.

2. Individuals will perceive ambiguous information as to the extent of Communist involvement in extremist movements in terms of the relative strength of the "No More Munichs" (domino effect of not resisting "aggression") or "No More Vietnams" (slippery slope of unilaterally bogging down) images they carry in their heads.

3. U.S. arms transfer policy toward conflict situations proceeds from assumption that a local apparent balance in military inventories is stabilizing, i.e., likely to avoid hostilities.
### Table 2

**Aggregate Data U.S. Teams: Move Period A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Blue Team</th>
<th>Green Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. interests are not involved</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to any U.S. involvement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for unilateral involvement</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to any use of military policy means</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression if appeased will only spread</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capabilities balance is violence avoiding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:** The numbers along the scale represent the aggregated totals for each team within the scale intervals 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 respectively (derived from Table 1). Again the responses for each interval for the Blue U.S. team are given above the lines, and for the Green U.S. team below the lines. The prepositions scaled and the related hypotheses are the same as in Table 1.
### Table 3

**Raw Data U.S. Teams: Move Period B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for military policy means</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for multilateral policy means</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of escalation dominant decision factor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to any use of military policy means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for unilateral policy means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of escalation is intensified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries that U.S. should seek to influence to gain control of conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Rhodesia</th>
<th>Rebels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Blue</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Green</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:** As in Table I, the number of individual responses by members of each team are indicated along the scaling lines, with the totals for the Blue U.S. team above the scaling lines, and for Green U.S. team below the scaling lines.

**Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. Teams:**

1) Hypothesis #7: In the event of U.S. involvement, the dominant argument will favor non-military means.

2) Hypothesis #8: In the same situation the dominant U.S. argument will favor multilateral over unilateral means.

3) Hypothesis #10: U.S. foreign policy decision-makers confronted with local conflict situations increasingly focus on one party to the conflict as the crisis intensifies, and as a corollary the decision-makers tend to reject or ignore conflict-control measures directed toward other parties.
### Table 4

**Aggregated Data U.S. Teams: Move Period B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for military policy means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong preference for unilateral policy means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat of escalation dominant decision factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:** The raw data from Table III have been aggregated for each proposition within the intervals 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 respectively. The interval 4-6 is referred to as the "indifference range." Again the totals for each interval above the scaling lines represent the Blue U.S. Team and those below the lines represent the Green U.S. Team. The propositions scaled and the related hypotheses are the same as in Table III.
### Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. Teams:

1) Hypothesis #20: If Soviet gain becomes manifest, the United States will directly oppose unless fear of nuclear escalation supervenes; and

Hypothesis #23: The final determinant of U.S. action is perceived danger of escalation involving the Soviet Union.

2) Hypothesis #21: If Soviets (Chinese) take sides, U.S. concern with who wins dominates policy.

3) Hypothesis #24: All things being equal, a U.S. team in which cost constraints are explicitly emphasized is less likely to opt for unilateral or military involvement.
Table 6  
Aggregated Data for U.S. Teams: Move Period C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Threat of (nuclear) escalation dominant concern**

- No threat of (nuclear) escalation: 7, 13
- Dominant concern—non-Soviet ally "winning": 4, 2
- No concern about who "wins" conflict: 2, 5

**Preference for multi-lateral means**

- Preference for unilateral means: 15, 1

**Legend:** The raw data from Table V have been aggregated for each proposition within the intervals 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 respectively. The interval 4-6 refers to the "indifference range."
Table 7

Raw Data for Zambian Team: Move Periods A, B, and C Inclusive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Move Period</th>
<th>Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Move Period A</td>
<td>3 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Period B</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Period C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND: The scaled numbers represent the individual responses of Zambian team members which reflected an interpretation of the situation relative to the propositions shown at each end of the coding scale. The measured intervals along the scale indicate relative bias for one or the other interpretation. The three scales referring to specific move periods relate the single set of propositions noted on the first scale.

1 Hypothesis #18: Non-communist or Chinese LDC clients tend to feel confident that they can trade Soviet or Chinese aspirations for bases or influence against arms and political support without jeopardizing sovereignty or independence.

2 This graph relates to hypotheses #15: Incremental changes in military capabilities are not likely to alter substantially mutual perceptions, deterrence, or intentions; and #16: An equivalent change in military capabilities will be perceived as more threatening if done suddenly than over time.
### Table 8: Preference for Unilateral versus Multilateral Policies, U.S. Teams: Period A to C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for unilateral involvement</th>
<th>Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</th>
<th>Preference for multilateral involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raw Data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Period A</td>
<td>2 5 5 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Period B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Period C</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Aggregated Data                      | Scale: 0 1 3 4 6 7 9 10     |                                    |
| Move Period A                        | 12 1 22                      |                                    |
| Move Period B                        | 1                            |                                    |
| Move Period C                        | 1 1                          |                                    |

**Legend:** The raw and aggregate data relating to the hypotheses listed below for Move Periods A, B, and C (see Tables I, II, V) are grouped to demonstrate the change over time of each U.S. team's preference for multilateral versus unilateral policies. Again the responses of the Blue U.S. team are indicated above the scaling lines and those for the Green U.S. team are below the lines.

**Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. teams:**

1) Hypothesis #2: In the period ahead, the U.S., confronting a local conflict situation, will opt for non-involvement or for a conflict-control policy, featuring non-unilateral, non-military, multilateral means of involvement, over the alternative of "winning," to the extent that it does not perceive a clear threat of Communist takeover; 
2) In the event of U.S. involvement, the dominant argument will favor non-military means; 
3) All things being equal, a U.S. team in which cost constraints are explicitly emphasized is less likely to opt for unilateral or military intervention.
Table 9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Raw Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Move Period A</th>
<th>Move Period B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 1 1 2 15</td>
<td>2 1 2 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5 2</td>
<td>1 1 2 5 5 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aggregated Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Move Period A</th>
<th>Move Period B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 2 17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:** The raw data and aggregate data relating to the hypotheses listed below for Move Periods A and B (see Tables II & IV) are grouped to demonstrate the change over time of each U.S. team's preferences for the use of military policy means versus opposition to such means. Again the responses of the Blue U.S. team are above the scaling lines and those for the Green U.S. team are below.

**Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. Teams:**

1) **Hypothesis #2:** In the period ahead, the United States, confronting a local conflict situation, will opt for non-involvement, or for a conflict-control policy, featuring non-unilateral, non-military, multilateral means of involvement, over the alternative of "winning," to the extent that it does not perceive a clear threat of Communist takeover; and

**Hypothesis #9:** All things being equal, a U.S. team in which cost constraints are explicitly emphasized is less likely to opt for unilateral or military intervention.
Table 10  Relative Importance of the Threat of Escalation: U.S. Teams Periods B and C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat of escalation dominant decision factor</th>
<th>Raw Data</th>
<th>Aggregate Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

LEGEND: The raw data and aggregate data relating to the hypotheses listed below for Move Periods B and C (see Tables IV, VI) are grouped to demonstrate the change over time of the perceived significance of escalation on the part of each U.S. team. Again the responses of the Blue U.S. team are above the scaling lines and those for Green U.S. team are below the lines.

Relevant Hypotheses for U.S. Teams:

1) Hypothesis #8: In the same situation the dominant U.S. argument will favor multilateral over unilateral means;
2) Hypothesis #20: If Soviet gain becomes manifest, the United States will directly oppose unless fear of nuclear escalation supervenes;
3) Hypothesis #23: The final determinant of U.S. action is perceived danger of escalation involving the Soviet Union.
CONEX IV REAL-TIME MONITORING DATA
### Table 11

**POLICY OBJECTIVES OF U.S. TEAMS MOVE PERIOD A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Policy Objectives</th>
<th>Label of Policy Objective</th>
<th>Blue Team</th>
<th>Green Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Strengthen Indian central government.</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>4 (A-B)</td>
<td>4 (-1) (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>3 (B)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 (-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Prevent expansion of domestic conflict across national borders.</td>
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Table 14: Policy Strategies of U.S. Teams Move Period B
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CHAPTER VI

THE "POLEX" AS A RESEARCH TOOL

THE "FREE GAME" IN THE PAST

We were all very much aware of the pitfalls of using artificial "games" as a device to test hypotheses about foreign policy decision-making. In fact, the impetus to revive our M.I.T. exercises grew out of a special research concern for the methodology of political-military gaming. I felt very keenly that the time had come, and was in fact overdue, to overhaul the all-man crisis model that we had christened the PME. It was not that the PME was unsatisfactory; on the contrary, it had admirably fulfilled the very limited purposes assigned to it by RAND, by M.I.T., and by the Joint War Games Agency of the Defense Department which since 1961 had been conducting political crisis games modeled largely on the RAND–M.I.T. PME. The trouble was that the assigned purpose of the exercises looked increasingly imprecise, as did ways of determining results.

In all previous games the purposes had deliberately been stated in general and tentative terms, and methodologically they were unmeasurable. There had been what seemed sound reasons for this lack of rigor. In 1958, when I started these games in a serious way at M.I.T., it seemed desirable to state our research purposes in a way
that honestly reflected a number of constraints: our ignorance of the PME technique; our uncertainty as to the directions in which it would go; and our open-mindedness as to unknown values that employing the technique might reveal. We thus stated that we were testing its value "as a possible device for use in teaching, training, or even in an operational sense. . . ."*

In the POLEX II exercise in 1960, in which Thomas C. Schelling was a valued collaborator on the design, we became a little more explicit, saying: "We wished to go a step further and see if we could learn more about the value of the game technique as a source of insights into possible alternatives, both political and military, which might be available to American foreign policy."**

In that game we introduced the presence of military players who could provide the game with a capability of simulating military events. The military advisers' combined and interactive experience made for a kind of verbal wargame that could complement the moves of a diplomatic and political nature. This seemed to many to reflect the mix to be found in real-life U.S. security decisions. It was this format and conception that was in effect frozen for the decade to come (and incidentally well after it became counter-productive to approach even hypothetical crises as though they were "50%" military.

In the series of PME's that followed, we continued to speak of our purposes in tentative terms. We still placed the highest premium on serendipity--the stumbling upon unanticipated knowledge

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about policies, about U.S. decision-making behavior, or about strategic options that would be generated out of the sequential interaction of teams composed of knowledgeable government officials and scholarly experts. And in fact we did acquire serendipitous knowledge. Players returned to their desks in universities or the State Department or Pentagon or wherever with a sense that they could no longer be quite certain that their preferred approach to an area, or problem, or potential crisis was necessarily the best one, or would work, or had been sufficiently thought through. On the contrary, the exercises exposed planners to "worse cases"—to contingencies they might earlier have considered and discarded as implausible or undesirable, or which the consensus/clearance process had washed out. Finally, by posing the decisions at the "Presidential" level, experts and institution-bound officials were encouraged to see problems in the round (apart from the additional bonus of putting together officials and specialists who otherwise might never share viewpoints).

These early PME's forced elaboration of in-game planning for a number of useful things such as design of U.N. forces in situations for which no contingency plans existed* (although there was of course no good reason such plans could not have been drawn up outside a game). Early PME's startled U.S. Soviet specialists by forcing on them the realization that pressures on Moscow by its "allies" could be real and exigent. It did this by the role-playing method, which in turn gave to the objective scholar a vivid sense of how Politburo members might feel in the face of such pressures. Above all, it provided an occasional educational experience of a very high and possibly lasting order to officials, both civil and military. They consistently reported that the games had improved their understanding of the problems of

* L. P. Bloomfield with others, Four Political-Military Exercises, C.I.S., M.I.T., April 1963 (loan copies only).
top-level decision-making, including the problems of services and agencies other than their own.

But each presumed virtue of the "free-play" PME reflected a possible vice. 1) It was an expensive form of education. 2) The policy lessons drawn could not legitimately be applied to a specific country, since the artificially-contrived scenario set up a hypothetical situation that might never happen in real life. 3) Some officials grasped much too enthusiastically at the straws the game provided, sometimes rushing back to Washington to revise contingency plans on a very dubious basis indeed. 4) It was true that the PME employed responsible officials and specialists to simulate the topmost level of decision-making by the United States and other governments. But it was still a simulation by people who in real-life operated below that top level. The issue of validation was--and is--the most unsettled of all. Who was to say that men would respond to real-life pressures the same way they responded to laboratory pressures, however dramatically the latter seemed to reproduce reality, and however high the apparent fidelity? 5) The PME exposed U.S. plans and strategies to the hostile and antagonistic will of others, as my fellow-umpire at POLEX I, Paul Kecskemeti then of RAND, put it. This tension continuously confronts U.S. players with the possibility of "worse" outcomes instead of the comfortable best commonly built into policy assumptions. But the "others" were invariably Americans who, however steeped in Sovietology or whatever, were to an indeterminate degree culture-bound. 6) Perhaps the most basic criticism of the PME that no amount of rationalization could overcome was of a general character: as a policy research device the PME remained unproven because untested, given its highly unscientific nature at the present state of the art. Above all, the lack of rigorous experimental controls made it impossible to conduct a controlled test of specific hypotheses except
in the most general way.

Inevitably the question had to be faced: is it worth doing? Will the benefits outweigh the costs? Can the investment per game produce more returns if applied to other methods of research? I hope it does not seem defensive to observe that even before seeking to meet the last point head-on—which we have done—there was a plausible response to several of these critical observations. 1) Perhaps $5000 or so (the average direct cost today of a senior M.I.T.-type PME) is not too much to spend to "educate" to a more sophisticated and less dogmatic approach to their specialty a couple of dozen influential members of the U.S. foreign policy community. 2) If Game X tells one nothing very useful about the probable action of Country Y in situation Z and may even be dangerously misleading, what it can do is teach something useful about a general class of instances of which Country Y is merely a useful example for game purposes, or a generic problem such as local conflict and its control. 3) In the absence of any systematic politico-diplomatic contingency planning, it is natural for even an inferior kind of forecasting to fill the vacuum; nothing could argue more strongly for overcoming the contemporary official prejudice against contingency planning. 4) While it was clearly a game and no one got killed if a U.S. Team leader "pushed the button," it has been a source of perpetual fascination—and comfort—to me that time after time U.S. teams faithfully correspond in their behavior to the real-life actuality of official-thought-under-pressure-in-time-of crisis. College freshmen in comparable classroom games might get bored, declare all-out war, etc. But it is a confirmed fact that

* I believe it was Col. James Adams, formerly of the Joint War Games Agency, who spoke of games generating "synthetic histories" of probable future developments.
players in professional games do not. On the contrary, however presti-
gious or inventive or critical of official policy, professionals in
PME's uniformly tend to resemble official prudence—and official
temporizing, caution, inaction, conservatism, bureaucratic paralysis,
even obtuseness in the face of challenging crisis situations. The
reasons are undoubtedly complex; without going into them in detail,
the point here is that such situations, in real life and in games,
are often fantastically complex and intractable.* 5) Americans,

* In games used to study risk-taking, psychologists Siegfried
and Susan Streufert at Purdue University have inadvertently illustrated
the great difference in usefulness for policy research purposes between
risk-taking experiments with undergraduates and games with professional
players mindful of real-life consequences. See "Risk-Taking in Military
and Economic Decision-Making: An Analysis via an Experimental Simulation,"
Technical Report No. 16, November 1968. But at the same time see the
view of Bernard Brodie, who writes that "Experienced persons agree
that one simply cannot reproduce among the players in a gaming environ-
ment the kind and degree of emotional tension and feeling of high respon-
sibility bound to be present in the nuclear era among decision-makers
in real-life crises, where decisions have to be made about whether and
by what means to fight a war. In games, erroneous moves are free of
penalties of the required magnitude; the appropriate degree of fear or
dread on both sides is thus only dimly imagined, and feelings of anger
or hostility may be exaggerated in importance." Escalation and the
I disagree with this in the case where professional players are used
in a well-designed and well-run game. For contrary evidence see the Her-
manns' report of research at Northwestern University. As described
by E. G. McNeil in The Nature of Human Conduct (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1965):

"A Northwestern University research team recently used mathematically
controlled simulations to play groups of live decision-makers against
the events which led to the outbreak of war in 1914. By using a
psychological test, the investigators divided their subjects into
separate groups—one group that more or less matched the personalities
who made major decisions in the 1914 crisis, and one group that did
not match. Each group was divided into decision-making teams to
however well trained, are not Russians, Chinese, or Israelis. On the evidence, a team of scholars and experts can go a long way toward faithfully simulating the general policy behavior of another government. But of course there is no inherent reason why the PME should be an American monopoly. GENEX I (which I directed in May of 1965 at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, at the friendly insistence of its Director, Jacques Freymond and with the help of Jean Siotis and A. J. R. Groom) was an American-style PME with non-American players; it is pleasing to report that Siotis and Groom have gone ahead admirably with additional European PME's.*

*See e.g. "CONEX I, A Simulation of a Middle Eastern Conflict Situation; Nottingham, March 25-27, 1966," by A.J.R. Groom and Michael H. Banks.
The final criticism—the weakness of the PME as a tool of sound experimentation adhering to minimum scientific canons—was by far the most challenging one. For the first generation of gaming we were, I think, justified in designing "free games" in which the point was to present the players with a tremendous crisis problem, and simply turn them loose in order to "see what would happen." For one thing, it was the tool itself that represented our main preoccupation. Second, we assumed that human players would respond only to a high-intensity crisis situation. Thus if nothing "happened" spontaneously it was accepted that the way to build fires under temporizing Americans was for the "Control Team" to turn up the heat. Thus in a highly improvised and spontaneous way the game managers of traditional PME's felt free to worsen the scenario situation, to introduce new events elsewhere in the "world" to complicate the lives of harrassed American "decision-makers," and generally to inflict on them unimaginable catastrophes, all in aid of forcing them to make unpalatable decisions (or to do nothing and pay a high price for this inaction). The Control team thus improvised throughout, and its interventions were unplanned, unmeasurable, and possibly unrelated to the main strategy, however imprecise, of the game designers.

At the end of such games several things usually took place. The participants sometimes had startling insights about qualities and depths they had not plumbed before in their familiar problem areas, and this seemed the best reason to keep experimenting. But as often as not the U.S. teams felt badly cheated by the Control team as plan after plan, ploy after ploy, strategy after strategy was ruled by a malevolent "Nature" as having failed, run afoul of disaster, or been trumped by an adversary. (Curiously, the "Soviet" team in early PME's seemed to end up feeling euphoric, convinced that they have played their hand cleverly, that the Americans have fallen into their trap,
and that the eventual outcome would confirm that history is on their side.) Clearly, these were random, unplanned, and unmeasurable phenomena. In short, without a more purposeful research strategy in which game design and structure was subordinate to the experimental variables under study, it was not possible to use the PME for serious research purposes. The very real values of the PME as a political-psychological art-form were not enough to offset a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the PME as social science.

THE POLEX AS THEORY

In seeking to revive—and reform—the PME, the critical judgments of our fellow social scientists about its unscientific lack of rigor were listened to with the utmost seriousness. In the current project my colleagues and I determined to try to meet that challenge. At the present stage in the current research some tentative observations about this process can be made. For reasons that seem good to me, I feel they should be stated as personal judgments.

1. Fellow social scientists have often observed that the PME seemed to generate interesting hypotheses about foreign policy and strategy that were worth following up with more conventional study techniques. At the same time, they argued that the games, by very definition, could in no sense be considered valid tests of policy hypotheses. On the first point, I think they are right, and much too little has been done in the way of analyzing past games to see what additional work they might suggest.

It is generally accepted by careful scholars that games cannot test policy hypotheses. I feel that this assertion may be
too dogmatic. But to make a case for that experimental value of
the PME, it is first necessary to confront the fundamental critical
judgment that the PME is "unscientific." If the purpose of all
experimental social science is to test specific hypotheses about policy
or decision-makers, then this criticism is devastatingly valid. The
PME, whatever its acknowledged power as both a teaching aid and as a
heuristic device in research, still lacked the theoretical base
that is common to sound experimentation in virtually any scientific
field, natural or social. The latter means a number of things.*

In its simplest terms it means a) that the game needed to
be regarded primarily as an experimental medium; as such, it was
something to be approached armed with explicit hypotheses; its use
would be as a source of data that would either confirm or disconfirm
the basic propositions of the experimenter. This point seems to me
indisputable, and in the present series we have sought to conduct
ourselves accordingly.

b) The issue is really what kind of hypotheses can thereby
be tested. The PME can be used to test propositions about the pre-
dicted behavior of individuals or groups who simulate official
decision-makers. On the other hand, I think it may be a long time
before the PME, however improved, can readily test substantive
propositions about foreign policy. (One of my associates, R. Lucas
Fischer, suggests that what it can do at best is "examine" them,
and I have accepted this formulation).**

* See e.g., Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry—Methodology

** R. Lucas Fischer, "The RAND/M.I.T. Political-Military Ex-
ercise and International Relations Theory," C.I.S., M.I.T., A/69-11,
September 1, 1969.
c) An element of sound social science method is of course replication. This could be either of events, or moves, or teams, or games. The effort would be to duplicate the experiment to enable some statistical analysis to be attempted, rather than being dependent on data based on the unique One. Again, the point is well-taken. Replication has long been the ambition of those who put on PME's. Unfortunately, it was invariably sacrificed in the early competition for scarce "policy-gaming" resources, in which the highest value was placed on trying out the technique on as wide an as possible a range of problem areas. Moreover, although there are some fairly well-accepted guidelines, it was—and is—not easy to find an irrefutable scientific canon that tells one the exact number of replications that make for scientific respectability. However, we have sought to replicate, within practical limits, in the CONEX series.

2. Another valid element of criticism on grounds of scientific rigor was the PME's characteristic failure to identify in precise terms the salient variables involved in the experiment. This presented special conceptual difficulties. The very heart of the professional-level PME is its believed capacity to come closer to constituting a believable, albeit reduced, model of the real-life system of top-level decision-making than any other available method or tool. It was the very absence of an available and believable comprehensive verbal theory or computer model of high level U.S. foreign policy decision-making that made the PME look so interesting. In place of the non-existent mathematical or electronic model, one substituted the knowledge and experience and routines that resided inside the heads of the players (and nowhere else). The mystery of the process remained unreached; but the process itself was somehow being approximated.
But the latter point should not have continued to serve as an excuse not to be more explicit as to just what independent variables the game designer was introducing, through his scenario problem, into this implicit model, what precise dependent variables one was looking for in the way of specific kinds of policies, choices, or actions produced as outputs of the teams, and (most elusive of all) what "intervening" or "transforming" variables were identifiable in the process that converted input into output. It would, moreover, be particularly instructive if we could control one independent variable for comparative and, hopefully, measurement purposes. Here my colleague Professor John Steinbruner took the lead, both in clarifying the general concepts at issue and in developing an actual design for a game that would do just that.* It must be added that games, however scientific, can never connect up exactly the inputs with outputs. We believe, however, that we have taken a good look at the "bone structure" of the process.

3. The final major injunction on the part of fellow social scientists critical of the earlier PME was that we must "connect it up" with the on-going body of social science theory. PME's, we were told, should be designed so as to take specific account of cognate theoretical constructs such as those found in game theory, small-group dynamics and behavior, cultural anthropology and social psychology, and international relations and foreign policy theory (if the latter can be said to exist), as well as other forms of simulations and games.

This point seems to me to have partial validity. We clearly

needed more precise theoretical awareness along with more acceptable
design criteria. We have in fact from the start drawn on psycho-
logical theory in terms of team sizes, role specification and the
like. The relationship of the PME to mathematical or economic game
theory is a distant one, but the PME draws modestly on decision
theory, with the PME bearing essentially the same relation to rational
utility-maximizing as does real-life crisis decision-making, no more
and no less. My own belief is that there is nothing yet about PME's,
 apart from the fact that scholars run some of them, to warrant empha-
sizing this particular connection (although John Steinbruner's
experimental EXCON series of games in our project took a substantial
step in this direction).

In a sense the same thing can be said of decision theory.
In its present form, the latter is only now finding interesting
applications to specific cases of foreign policy decision-making.
Existing models—"rational," "bureaucratic," "organizational," or
whatever—are very imperfect approximations of reality, and still in
the process of acquiring the necessary explanatory and predictive
powers. As with game theory, models based on decision theory
represent a still crude approximation of the real thing. It remains
a valid question whether players in games act in ways that decision
theories can explain and perhaps predict.

The most highly valued quality of the PME is that profes-
sional players act essentially as they act in real life. Surely real
life offers a far richer source of data for the validation and
elaboration of such theories than the small and deliberately fore-
shortened microcosm that is the PME. On the other hand, real life
data are difficult to come by. If the parallax, so to speak, between real life and the PME can be corrected for, then the PME may be a valid source of data for the elaboration and controlled testing of decision theories. James Foster, John Steinbruner, and C.J. Gearin took the lead in developing techniques of data identification, specification, and elucidation, along with appropriate instruments and measurements, that may help better to relate the PME to decision theory.

4. There is however one major theoretical dilemma that so far has left a high barrier between even our CONEX series of games and the ideal experimental situation. So long as teams are permitted to interact dynamically with one another, conditions are going to be generated in the game that were not necessarily in the design plan. Even if the Control group limits itself to implementing its own agreed and previously calibrated game research design, the interacting teams may move the game away from that design, and the price of keeping that from happening may be to undercut the dynamic role-playing process that models the reality we seek to capture.

This trade-off, commented on in detail elsewhere in this report, has not been resolved in games involving scholars and experts (although Steinbruner's EXCON series reverted satisfactorily to one-team, one-move games in which students responded solely to the game designers' pre-programmed moves). In the CONEX series I feel we have come a long way to the application of canons of experimental science to the PME. But the latter remains a hybrid in the sense that every variable is not at all times under the experimenters' control. The search is still on, then, for ever better experimental methods to minimize deviations from the planned pathways of game behavior while not allowing the reaction to drop
below "critical mass," so to speak, and thus lose its dynamic quality.

Let me sum up my view. Where reference to related bodies of theory enables one to design an improved form of PME with rigor, elegance, and measurable results, we must be eager to see them brought to bear. But I perceive a danger in excessive scientism. It would in my opinion be a shame to distort, for the sake of fidelity to often imperfect and even dubious theory, the values that already inhere in the PME, above all the phenomenal "reality" it reproduces at the professional level. The latter in turn requires life-like scenario situations, a continuing air of plausibility, and a minimum of temperature and pulse-taking of the expert players involved. At the same time I now believe, on the basis of the CONEX series, that far more rigor and methodological self-consciousness on the part of the game designer is mandatory if his research effort is to be intellectually coherent.

Perhaps the final point to be made about the proper relation of the PME to behavioral theory is that the PME in its present form still represents a form of theory-building more than it does a source of explication and validation of existing theory of foreign policy, international relations, or psychology.
APPENDIX A

GAME HISTORIES

CONEX I
CONEX II
CONEX III
CONEX IV
CONEX I

THE HYPOTHETICAL CRISIS

SCENARIO AND MOVES

The scenario problem we chose for CONEX I was a deteriorating situation in a Caribbean area "country" which was likely, given ambiguous information of Communist involvement, to face players simulating the "United States" with complex policy problems relevant to our principal research questions. It should be emphasized that the situation portrayed was of course entirely fictitious, and that the moves by players represented their own individual responses to wholly hypothetical circumstances.

Scenario

Criteria for designing the scenario were several. We wanted not to constrain U.S. options that players might feel were plausible or desirable to pursue under the circumstances. The Vietnam memory was made fresh by setting the time in 1969, but with the United States no longer bogged down indefinitely (by specifying a cease-fire). Economic pressures were kept visible (the surtax remained) but not predominant, except in terms of competition with exigent domestic needs. We prophetically specified a Nixon victory after the latter
had campaigned, as had Humphrey, on a platform of the United States not being a policeman of the world but having certain ineluctable responsibilities. Finally, the Soviet Union was kept relatively flexible.

The scenario time when the game opened was February 3, 1969—that is, five months after real time. The hypothetical situation portrayed was that of the regime in a Caribbean area country increasingly showing itself unable to succeed, being squeezed between right and left extremists in the face of economic deterioration. It was "reported" that a military coup had taken place, and that local politics were now polarizing as young people, students, and junior officers became disaffected. The "Junta" was requesting both recognition and aid from Washington.

The two U.S. teams were asked to prepare a planning document with recommendations to the "President" during the first part of the game; the I-Team was asked to take steps to implement a strategy of take-over as soon as possible.* U.S. Blue had cost briefings, but not Green.

Part I

At the end of Part I the Green team presented a strategy paper that in summary did the following. It estimated that the local situation was deteriorating and that, at worst, a new base for subversion and the forcible overthrow of constitutional governments in Latin America and the Caribbean might evolve. The Green team

*The special message form for Part I had spaces for: Estimate of the Situation; Objectives; Alternative Strategies Considered; Preferred Strategy; Moves (Political, Military, Economic, Psychological, etc.); Contingencies Anticipated; and Policies to counter the contingencies.
could see a potential serious threat to U.S. security. But the heart of their position was the multilateral preference: "world opinion in general and opinion in Latin America in particular dictate that no precipitous action be taken and that any action taken must have a multilateral basis." In this spirit Green designated as its priority objectives the development of Caribbean security arrangements and a local regime able to meet the needs of the people. It determined to press the Junta to broaden its political base, and to withhold recognition while consulting Latin American countries. No military intervention was planned unless there were a Communist take-over. The main emphasis was on multilateral instrumentalities, although the latter's main value was seen as supportive of policies favored by the United States.

Blue was gravely concerned at the possibility of a new Vietnam kind of involvement. They made early calculations as to what intervention could entail, but saw no need for it at the time, believing that the Junta could control the insurgency. They felt strongly that an extensive American commitment in the region would endanger the U.S. economy or at a minimum force postponement or cut-backs of domestic social programs they were committed to carry out, and were satisfied that the local situation did not jeopardize short-term U.S. security interests. In the longer term, however, they saw fundamental regional stability threatened by the absence of appropriate internal reforms. They, too, preferred a multilateral solution, but judged that U.S. willingness to intervene unilaterally would be required to galvanize the multilateral approach (a very common event in PME's). They perceived their priority objectives as protecting desirable processes of change in the region while minimizing U.S. intervention. They determined to broaden the Junta, while developing
appropriate military contingencies against the possibility of an insurgent take-over. They would try to avoid unilateral intervention, but were prepared to face the use of American power against both left and right extremists in the area.

The I-team, with a strategic and tactical approach calculated to confuse, disarm, and even paralyze liberal American impulses and reformist hopes, concentrated on trying to mask its take-over with a popular front facade. It promised the ousted national leader a high post if he would join, appealed to the U.S. Government for support, and set up a "Committee for the Defense of the Constitution" (CDC) as a front through which to operate. Meanwhile a Communist member of the I-team hard-core liaised with the Soviet Union.

(Control decided at this time to rule against the possibility of the leader acceding to American desires that he return to power via the Junta, and also decided against permitting him to accede to the I-team's invitation. Both these decisions were taken in the belief that while plausible, they would preclude an easy solution to a problem that looked more difficult and complex for both Americans and insurgents.)

Part II

Part II moved time ahead five months. The Part II Scenario worsened the existing situation, but without any drastic changes. Local politics were polarized still further, with growing disaffection not only on the part of students, but of increasing numbers of junior military officers as well. The Junta was failing to perform effectively, and the country's economic position was specified as deteriorating badly.
Green's strategy in the face of the Part II Scenario rested on the belief that the popular front ploy of the extremists could be converted to American purposes. Basically, the only strategic alternative considered by Green rested on its best assumption, that is, a return to power of the ousted liberal leader, now in exile. Green did not specify any particular fall-back position in the event of unfavorable contingencies, but did "alert" units of the U.S. fleet.

During this period Blue made the decision that if the Junta refused to broaden itself, it would intervene to install a moderate government, and deployed military forces in readiness. Blue worked hard for a multilateral action, both to support any necessary intervention, and for observation of an election which would follow. Undoubtedly as a result of the "cost-consciousness" briefing given to Blue, in its planning it costed out its options, priced out as $66 to $71 million per year for economic and military aid, and a half to $2 billion annual cost in the event of intervention.

In this move period the Soviet "team" sent a message to the United States making mildly threatening deterrent sounds with regard to a possible U.S. intervention in the area.

The I-team in this period perceived the situation as working directly in its favor as the foundations of the Junta further eroded. But since the latter could not be overrun in a pitched battle between guerrillas and loyal army units, the essence of I's strategy was to build up pressures and rapidly intensify them to the point where the Junta's nerve would break, or its power to resist be so reduced that it could be overthrown. It planned on this basis six sequential courses of action to be implemented on January 20th: 1) To bring in and put on the air a new and powerful radio broadcast station with good reception in all of the country, but located in a neighboring country.
2) A revolt by defection of at least three national army posts, brought about by infiltration of the crucial junior officer corps. 3) A series of air strikes from a temporarily occupied air-strip in a nearby, but unpoliced area, using six AD-4's and T-5's procured through the international black market. 4) Sabotage actions to isolate the capital. 5) Large-scale demonstrations and terrorist actions, with maximum use made of student and labor organizations as "unarmed shock troops"; 6) A coup against the Palace (also against the national radio) with disaffected units arriving at the Palace ostensibly to reinforce the guard but then capturing it. Basic to success was a strengthened clandestine infrastructure to provide good command and control.

**Part III**

Part III of the Scenario specified that the time was January 15, 1970. (As indicated earlier, Control was torn in the overnight planning session between its original plan to have the Junta overthrown by the left-wing extremist insurgency movement, the confronting the United States with a fait accompli situation, versus keeping the keeping the play relatively continuous on the basis of the players' own strategies and confronting them with a sharply worsened situation—the rebels attacking and the capital under siege—but with the Junta still in power, and both sides appealing to the United States for help and support. Control opted for the latter.)

In the final Scenario segment, Control had still not let the ousted leader "return to power" on either side. The OAS was specified as not having acted decisively, although in the face of the new, rapid deterioration it was announced that the OAS Permanent Council had agreed to send a three-man good offices committee. Above all, Control had not permitted a centrist third force to emerge.
locally, which would of course have been the hope of the United States Government (as it always is in such situations). In order to focus the problem on the political and strategic aspects of any decision to act in order to affect the outcome (or not to act), Control told the U.S. teams that military action would not be required to evacuate U.S. personnel in the area since both sides assured their safety.

The I-Team sent a message to Washington assuring it that the CDC was independent and free of outside influence, would respect private and foreign property, and would protect foreigners. At the same time the I-Team formed a provisional government and asked the ousted liberal to assume its Presidency.

The Green U.S. team decided to send a Presidential emissary to see the liberal leader and all local factions, but without a very clear indication of what the outcome might be. (Control subsequently kept the "emissary" from arriving). Before it had received the above assurances, Green decided to evacuate American dependents from the area, dispatching several C-130 aircraft for this purpose along with "sufficient infantry force to accompany the aircraft to secure the assembly point and embarkation." The United States also announced that this in no way constituted any intervention.

Blue in its first query after receiving Part III of the Scenario asked about fiscal 1969 and 1970 budgets, a possible reflection of the economic briefings it had received. The Secretary for HEW resigned in opposition to creating a "second Vietnam" with consequent cuts in U.S. domestic programs. Plans were developed to evacuate Americans. Also, Blue explored the possibility of prompting the Junta to ask Washington to intervene. In the end, however, Blue did not act.
The game thus ended with the insurgent group well on the way to taking over locally; the Green team, which had earlier disfavored intervention, about to land American troops for evacuation purposes (although this might have been cancelled as a result of the assurances received in the game); and Blue, which had earlier made plans for intervention, in the end opting against it. The I-Team was confident that if the United States attempted to intervene militarily to organize an orderly transition of government, the CDC would be able to win an election.
locally, which would of course have been the hope of the United States Government (as it always is in such situations). In order to focus the problem on the political and strategic aspects of any decision to act in order to affect the outcome (or not to act), Control told the U.S. teams that military action would not be required to evacuate U.S. personnel in the area since both sides assured their safety.

The I-Team sent a message to Washington assuring it that the CDC was independent and free of outside influence, would respect private and foreign property, and would protect foreigners. At the same time the I-Team formed a provisional government and asked the ousted liberal to assume its Presidency.

The Green U.S. team decided to send a Presidential emissary to see the liberal leader and all local factions, but without a very clear indication of what the outcome might be. (Control subsequently kept the "emissary" from arriving). Before it had received the above assurances, Green decided to evacuate American dependents from the area, dispatching several C-130 aircraft for this purpose along with "sufficient infantry force to accompany the aircraft to secure the assembly point and embarkation." The United States also announced that this in no way constituted any intervention.

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CONEX II

ARMS AND CONFLICT IN NORTH AFRICA

SCENARIO AND MOVES

As explained in Chapter II, the scenario-problem we chose for CONEX II was intended to illustrate a general class of issues involving arms transfers and conflict control policies on which we at M.I.T. are conducting research. It should be emphasized that the situation portrayed was of course fictitious, and that the moves by players represented their own individual responses to wholly hypothetical circumstances.

Scenario

The initial situation we devised for game purposes postulated increasing tension between "Algeria" and "Morocco" in July 1970. The United States was portrayed as beset by the same kinds of social problems as in 1968; e.g., urban deterioration and racial disaffection. Phased withdrawal from Vietnam and concomitant reduction in draft calls had eased campus strife, but had not freed sufficient funds to reflect major change in domestic problems. The Soviet Union had continued to expand its presence in the Mediterranean and appeared to regard Algeria as a staging area for support of revolutionary
movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Arabs and Israelis were described as remaining on the brink of open hostilities. Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had been ratified by most of the world and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were engaging in strategic arms limitation talks, the flow of weapons and military hardware to the developing world had continued unabated.

We chose to assume for research purposes a "Morocco" that was politically unstable as a result of a lethargic economy and the slow pace of political reform. The "King" was relying on the military to balance his political opposition and consequently had permitted a sizeable build-up in force levels and equipment. The "Moroccan government" characterized its domestic opposition as the tool of Algerian aggression. The "Algerians," with a less volatile political situation but equally depressing economic prospects, emphasized the threat of Moroccan irredentism to its coveted mineral resources. The Algerian President appeared to be torn between the need for Soviet assistance and internal dissatisfaction with Soviet influence. Scattered violence during a constitutional referendum in Algeria was attributed to an emigré group sheltered by Morocco. The Algerian armed forces were depicted as being quantitatively superior to Morocco, but qualitative problems appear to equalize capabilities. Most Algerian military equipment had been supplied by the U.S.S.R., whereas the Moroccans were equipped with U.S., U.K., French and Soviet weapons. Both sides increased their force levels and inventories from 1968 to 1970, especially in armor and aircraft.

Move Period A

Move period A lasted approximately 2-1/2 hours, and represented the same amount of real time. During this first period the "Moroccan" team began by requesting additional weapons from the Soviet
Union, the United States, and France, and then sought to arrange meetings with Algeria, U.S.S.R., the U.S., and other Arab nations. It expressed a desire for better intelligence concerning Algeria, and reiterated a request for aircraft and tanks from the United States. The Moroccan request for a "summit meeting" with Algeria was relayed by Control.

The "Algerians" limited themselves to inquiring about Moroccan deployments, and membership in the U.N. Security Council. Their initial plan advocated support of revolution in Morocco ("foment unrest and dissidence") while avoiding overt hostilities. Despite an avowed intention to assume a defensive posture militarily, the "Algerians" approved reinforcement of border forces and solicited large quantities of military equipment.

The "United States" team's first statement regarded potential hostilities between Morocco and Algeria as a threat to world peace, and explicitly "viewed with concern the growing influence" of the U.S.S.R. However, Moroccan irrendentism was accepted as the primary cause of conflict, and the U.S. team advocated strong pressure on Morocco. The U.S. team evaluated the military situation as a stalemate, and consequently sought multilateral agreement for an arms embargo.

Move Period B

Move period 3 lasted approximately 3-1/2 hours. It began with the "Moroccans" being apprised by Control of a possible shipment of arms from the U.S.S.R. to Algeria, the "Algerians" being informed of a possible French-Moroccan arms deal, and the U.S. team being notified of both eventualities. Simultaneously all three teams were informed that the Arab League would not arbitrate the dispute. The
"Moroccans" rated to this information by soliciting U.S. official reactions to the reported Soviet-Algerian deal and inquiring what the U.S. would do to offset a possible Algerian advantage. The "Algerian" team reacted to news of a possible French-Moroccan arms deal with skepticism, but directed its ambassador to Paris to express disapproval to the French. The "United States" team reacted by telling the "Moroccans" that the U.S. opposed the rumored deal with France, advocated a negotiated solution of the border dispute, and looked with disfavor on the Moroccan request for U.S. weapons. The U.S. team also conveyed to the "U.S.S.R." and "France" that an arms build-up in North Africa would force the U.S. to "reassess its own position."

Midway through the move period the "Moroccans" were informed of a French offer to them of military equipment in exchange for mineral exploration and development rights. The "Moroccans," discouraged by the United States, jumped at the French offer and asked that delivery be expedited. They responded to the Algerian rebuff of their offer to meet at the summit by dispatching the Moroccan "Foreign Minister to Algiers while protesting Soviet military assistance to the "Algerians." They reacted to a U.S. C.I.A. report of Algerian military activity near the border by planning a reserve call-up, deploying large forces to the East, and repeating their urgent request for French weapons.

The "Algerians" were simultaneously informed of a specific Soviet offer of military assistance, which they accepted with alacrity. They also asked the "Soviets" to exert pressure on the "French" to block an arms deal with Morocco, and sought assurances that the U.S.S.R. would protect Algeria against U.S. intervention. Finally they agreed to a meeting with Moroccan representatives to "clarify the present situation." At the end of this move period the "Soviet Union" weaseled on its offer of military aid to Algeria and appeared to up its price for arms shipments.
The United States team early in the third period tried to use the United Nations, NATO, and routine diplomatic channels to solicit European, African and Soviet support for an embargo on arms shipments. Later the United States decided to use a special envoy to emphasize Washington's desire for arbitration of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute, and the necessity of limiting arms shipments to the disputants. The American envoy was instructed to announce that the United States had suspended all arms transfers to Morocco. The United States suggested to Algeria and Morocco that all military forces be withdrawn from their respective borders, and requested all available sources to provide information about border deployments. In a series of moves late in Period B the Moroccans instructed their military forces not to intrude into Algeria in the north "except... when in hot pursuit," and to conduct a delaying action if attacked in the south (apparently under the impression that Algerian troop movements had trespassed into Morocco). The Moroccans then went shopping for arms in London, Marseilles, Geneva, and Prague, and reiterated to the French their desire for assistance. In a more predictable vein, the Moroccans rebuked the United States for its contacts with dissident political elements and expressed disappointment with U.S. failure to back Morocco against unprovoked aggression from Algeria "backed by the U.S.S.R." The move period concluded with a face-to-face meeting between the chairmen of the Algerian and Moroccan teams. This meeting was inconclusive.

Move Period C

Move period C began after dinner and lasted two hours. Calendar time was advanced six days with several new developments portrayed. All teams were informed that the U.A.R. had transferred to Algeria six Tu-16 Badger medium bombers with Kennel air-to-surface
missiles. The "Moroccans" characterized this event as the "first indication of interjection into the situation of a long-range strategic threat." The "Algerians" accepted the shipment and alluded to it in a press leak. They also indicated their willingness to pay the Soviet price for arms shipments, that price to include a goodwill visit to Algerian ports by a squadron of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. The "United States" suggested that the U.S.S.R. and France support OAU arbitration of the controversy, and "noted with concern" the Egyptian Badger deployment. Then the Algerian team was informed by Control that an emigré group suspected of terrorism in Algeria was operating overtly from Rabat. The "Algerians" asked their Ambassador to clarify the role of the Moroccan government.

At midpoint in this period the "Moroccans" were apprised of increased pressure from indigenous groups using the issue of irredentism as their political focus. Simultaneously the "Algerians" were informed that their emigré group in Rabat was probably connected to the Moroccan dissidents agitating for a more aggressive posture toward Algeria. At the same time the United States team proposed to Algeria and Morocco that both sides pull back military units 10 miles from the border, and suggested international observer forces in the disputed areas. The "Algerians" ignored this proposal, while the "Moroccans" rejected both suggestions on the grounds that the Moroccan people, especially the military, would not accept withdrawal from the border area. The "Moroccans" reiterated their request for U.S. military aid and stressed the fact that the Soviets were backing the Algerians; the "Moroccans" also renewed their request to the French for military assistance. The United States team was informed that rumored French and Soviet arms shipments were not expected to produce an "appreciable increase in the combat effectiveness of either side."
Late in period C the U.S. received a message from the "Soviet Premier" denying Soviet intentions to foment an Algerian-Moroccan war, but indicating that Soviet assistance to "progressive states" in North and Sub-Saharan Africa was necessary. This development had a startling effect on U.S. perceptions. The United States team, while discounting the impact on Algerian military capabilities of Soviet arms transfers, was more focused thenceforth on Soviet rather than Moroccan or Algerian activities in the area. By the end of the move period, the "United States" was prepared to tell the Moroccans they could "count on our efforts to discourage the use of force by the Algerians," and to tell the world that "the U.S. would feel obliged to reconsider its present policy of withholding arms shipments from the parties to the dispute."

Move Period D

Move period D began the following morning (December 7), with game calendar time advanced one day from the previous period. All teams were informed of several developments that appeared to heighten tensions. First, the Soviet Union sought to "warehouse" in Algeria, ostensibly for Egyptian and Syrian use, large quantities of modern Soviet ground force equipment. It was reported that Canada had circulated a draft resolution in the U.N. calling for an embargo on arms shipments to the Mahgreb region, withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, reduction of Soviet and American fleets in the Mediterranean, and OAU border supervision in the disputed area. Simultaneously the Algerians were informed that, apparently as a result of their recent requests for Soviet weapons, Ethiopia and Libya were now asking for considerable quantities of modern U.S. equipment. The United States was apprised of a new Moroccan request
for quick delivery of sophisticated U.S. aircraft (A-4, F-5, and C-130) with modest quantities of ground forces equipment.

The "Moroccans" quickly rejected the Canadian proposal for an arms embargo, and registered growing concern with the Algerian build-up. "Algeria" belatedly reacted to Moroccan troop deployments by threatening Morocco, appealing for expeditious shipments of Soviet weapons (both the items previously earmarked for Algeria and the "warehouse" inventory), and expressing disapproval of the Canadian proposal. In a remarkable turnabout, the "United States" expressed qualified approval (not including reduction of the Sixth Fleet) of the Canadian U.N. draft; suggested a U.N. Security Council meeting within 48 hours; queried USUN regarding the predicted General Assembly alignment on this issue; and asked Ethiopia to exert its influence on the OAU to reactivate the latter's 1963 peacekeeping machinery. The "United States" also sent a Presidential message to both "Algeria" and "Morocco" advising a mutual troop pull-back and caution--but ignoring Morocco's request for military aid.

The "Algerians" failed to react to the reported arms build-up in Libya and Ethiopia. The "Moroccans" displayed impatience with a "French" offer to provide high performance aircraft and repeated their request for quick delivery of ground forces equipment. In mid-period all teams were notified that three acts of terrorism had occurred in Algiers and that an Algerian emigre in Rabat was publicly claiming responsibility. Simultaneously the "Moroccans" and "Algerians" were informed that several of the latter's clandestine groups in Rabat had been discovered by the Moroccans.

"Algeria" responded to apparent Moroccan support of emigre terrorists by conducting air strikes against suspected terrorist bases on the Moroccan side of the border, breaking diplomatic relations

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with Morocco, and deploying additional ground forces to the border and seeking an emergency meeting of the OAU. In short order the "Moroccans" retaliated by launching a punitive raid into Algeria to destroy an airbase, mobilizing their armed forces, employing guerrillas against Algerian airbases, and seeking both U.N. and OAU intervention in the conflict. In the midst of these events the "Americans" and "Algerians" were notified that a small Soviet naval force was en route to Algiers, and also that UAR-marked Soviet aircraft would immediately begin delivery of short-range (30 miles) tank-mounted rockets to Algeria.

The "United States" reacted to the hostilities by seeking an immediate meeting of the U.N. Security Council (but dismissing the Canadian proposal as too complex); warning both "Algerians" and "Moroccans" of the possible consequences; encouraging the French President to act as an honest broker; and urging Moscow to cooperate with Washington in the U.N. The "Soviet" response was typically ambiguous, agreeing to support cessation of hostilities between Algeria and Morocco, but demanding a reduction in the size of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The "Moroccans" continued a propaganda and military build-up culminating in orders to Moroccan guerrillas for an attack on TU-16s that had been delivered to Algeria during Move period C.

This train of events stimulated a burst of activity by "Algeria," which produced a spate of press notices and messages defending its actions and soliciting UAR, French, and Soviet support. As the move period closed the "United States" employed the Hot Line to protest Soviet naval movements and arms shipments to Algeria, in a message clearly representing American concern that Algerian-Moroccan fighting might escalate and involve the security interests of the superpowers.
Move Period E

The *E Move Period* lasted approximately two hours, and depicted a situation seven days later than the preceding period. A new Moroccan government under great internal pressure from a coalition of military and intellectual groups continued to mount attacks against Algerian forces near the border. The "Algerians" retaliated with air and ground attacks, but neither side appeared to have a significant advantage in the fighting. Initiatives in the U.N. had failed, but diplomatic efforts continued on several fronts. Soviet naval units had departed Algeria for an unknown location in the Western Mediterranean. Neither France nor the OAU seemed capable of effective conciliatory action. Finally, the "Soviets" sent Washington a Hot Line message containing a proposal for resolving the Algeria-Morocco conflict along the following lines: immediate cease-fire; withdrawal of forces to a pre-hostilities line; and a Four-Power conference on arms limitations during which all arms shipments would be halted. The U.S. team was told that the "JCS" had expressed their opposition to closing the U.S. Navy base in Kenitra, Morocco.

Reacting to this general situation, "Morocco" acted to reduce the level of its domestic strife, while increasing pressure on Paris to provide military assistance and chiding the U.S. for lack of support. The "Moroccans" also indicated that they would observe a cease-fire and would withdraw their troops from the northern sector, but would not give up ground in the south. "Algeria" initially announced its opposition to any cessation of hostilities until all Moroccans had been expelled from Algeria, and asked the OAU, the UAR, and the Arab League for help. Subsequently it protested to Moscow the most recent Soviet proposal in the U.N., while asking for a speed-up in promised arms deliveries. The Algerian team informed the OAU that it would accept
a cease-fire and reciprocal withdrawal of forces. The United States team responded affirmatively to the Soviet proposal, but complicated things somewhat by adding conditions precedent to full agreement. It also called upon the Moroccans to accept the terms of the draft Soviet-U.S. proposal promising economic assistance for post-hostilities Moroccan development.

**Move Period F**

The final Move period F lasted only 30 minutes. It projected time forward three weeks, depicting a post-hostilities situation. The U.N. resolution sponsored by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (but introduced by others) was reported to have failed to pass the Security Council except for its cease-fire provision. Officially Algeria and Morocco had ignored the U.N. resolution, but had in fact ceased fire. The Moroccans withdrew from their salient in the north, but continued to occupy the disputed area in the south. The Algerians maintained their salient in the central sector and began to receive arms shipments from the U.S.S.R. Both sides suffered modest casualties during the brief war. Neither side had put on a particularly impressive military performance, and both were unable to sustain an offensive.

Faced with this situation, the Moroccan team decided to hold what it had, and to begin preparations for recovery of the Algerian salient. It elected to seek military assistance from the U.S., France, and the U.S.S.R. The Algerians also reacted with a marked lack of remorse, promising themselves a "third round," and continuing to press the U.S.S.R. for new military equipment while vowing to persevere with clandestine operations inside Morocco. The United States was unaware of these Algerian and Moroccan policies, but indicated an interest in a "policy of flexible arms supply" in order to maintain balance between the disputants. Washington also advocated new programs of economic and political modernization in Morocco, and the game ended.
CONEX III

CONFLICT IN AFRICA

SCENARIO AND MOVE PERIODS

Scenario

When CONEX III began, each participant was provided a scenario describing hypothetical events in southern Africa beginning in 1968 and ending in February 1971. This chronology of significant developments focused on one country (as it happens, Zambia) to illustrate the general problem being studied. It should be emphasized that the situation portrayed was of course entirely fictitious, and that the moves by players represented their own individual responses to wholly hypothetical circumstances.

"Zambia" was described as beset by several problems: an economy too dependent on copper mining controlled in part by foreign interests; a relatively new and inexperienced government striving for a progressive nonaligned status; deep-rooted ethnic and racial divisions; strong political opposition from groups whose loyalty to the central government and sources of financial support were suspect; and armed clashes with its neighbors who were energetically carrying out reprisals against guerrillas based in Zambia. The
white-ruled Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa, were said to be under attack by black "liberation groups," but growing in military capability for both counter-insurgency and interstate conflict.

The rest of the World Scene was portrayed as unchanged in any major way. United States involvement in Viet Nam had declined substantially, but the expected "Viet Nam dividend" had failed to materialize in either the financial or social sense. The Soviet Union continued to exercise its "legal right" to support liberation in the developing world while insisting upon socialist obedience in Eastern Europe. Western Europe had not resolved its political or economic problems, but was quite active in the arms trade to the Third World. The north and central African states were described as being immersed in their own affairs and unable to exert effective influence in southern Africa.

As the exercise opened, "Zambia" was confronted with a serious financial crisis which preceded the first national election since independence. Government curtailment of development programs as a check on inflation provided the Zambian "political opposition" with a lively issue for the campaign. As the campaign progressed, the level of "violence" grew and the incumbent party charged the opposition with collusion with Rhodesia and South Africa. On this note the "Government" cancelled the elections and instituted a series of repressive measures calculated to regain control of its southern provinces. These tactics incited unrest among several ethnic groups within the country and stimulated its neighbors to threaten intervention on behalf of the white minority.
Move Period A

Move Period A lasted approximately four and one half hours and represented the same amount of exercise time. It was devoted to evaluating the situation and preparing a strategic plan. The only major developments prior to completion of the team plans were Soviet and Chinese allegations of a "planned attack" by Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa against Zambia, plus assurances of support for Zambia; and a series of moves by the "Zambian government" that were calculated to restore internal security, solicit external support, and deny responsibility for liberation movement activities. The initial "Zambian" plan stressed restoring order within Zambia, avoiding occasion for international hostilities by reducing support for liberation movements, and strengthening the Zambian defense capability against overt attack. The "Zambians" intended to continue their support of the guerrillas, but at a less provocative level. The U.S. Blue Team saw the situation in terms of the impact in America of a racial war in southern Africa. It did not forecast a U.S. versus U.S.S.R. strategic confrontation, emphasized use of political and diplomatic methods to avoid hostilities, and abjured the use of U.S. military power with the possible exception of a small grant ($2 million) for internal security equipment. The U.S. Green Team decided upon "quiet but active diplomacy" which stressed bilateral relations with all concerned parties. It did, however, indicate a willingness to render aid to Zambia "perhaps even military equipment and technicians if requested."

Move Period B

Move Period B lasted approximately seven hours. It began by projecting exercise time forward seven days to March 4, 1971. Control issued a series of messages and press releases that depicted
a slight reduction in tension between Zambia and her neighbors, but a significant increase in the extent of Soviet and Chinese support for the liberation movements in neighboring countries. The peaceful reassurances of the South African and Portuguese governments were somewhat offset by press reports of large military buildups near the Zambian borders. The "Organization for African Unity" issued bellicose statements, but showed signs of political disarray. Domestic pressure increased in the United States for support of Zambia in the face of white aggression, and the European press almost unanimously condemned the "white redoubt" for warmongering. Within "Zambia" the scenario projection showed a rise in violence in the "copperbelt," labor resistance to government austerity measures, and an intransigent attitude on the part of guerrillas in Zambia. Both U.S. teams were warned by "Rhodesia" of the possibility of a coup in Zambia that would enfranchise a radical leftist regime. Late in the move period the "Zambians" requested U.N. Security Council consideration of a resolution that complained of indirect aggression by Rhodesia and South Africa. As the move period progressed, the level of guerrilla activities in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese Territories was sharply accelerated. The internal dissidence in Zambia was also increased with the addition of a threat from the right wing. As the move period closed, all teams were informed that the U.N. Security Council had approved the Zambian resolution.

During Move Period B, the "Zambians" concentrated their efforts in three fields: enlisting United Nations assistance in protecting Zambia against incursions by Rhodesian and South African ground forces; acquiring an air defense capability by soliciting assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and Algeria; and walking the tightrope between the militant factions in Zambia. The "Zambians" tried desperately to preclude international hostilities.
by restraining the liberation movements on the one hand, and by involving as many extra-regional powers in the conflict as possible on the other.

The United States Green Team was content to watch for signs of a possible U.S. versus U.S.S.R. confrontation in southern Africa and to use the United Nations as a conflict control mechanism. It also showed interest in providing the anti-aircraft weapons requested by "Zambia" and in furnishing economic and technical assistance to it, but did not act on either proposal. The U.S. Blue Team also seized upon the U.N. route and was quite active in promoting implementation of the Zambian resolution, e.g., soliciting support in the Security Council, specifying types and quantities of logistic support that the "U.S." would provide, and recommending on composition of the U.N. observer group. The Blue Team was even more concerned than its Green counterparts about the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet naval confrontation. As the move period came to a close, it revised its basic strategic plan to include as a contingency the rumored coup against the local government. It indicated that if the external threat became imminent the United States would offer "defensive weapons and a much more public posture of support." It also proposed to reconsider the transfer of anti-aircraft weapons to Zambia in the event of renewed overflights by Rhodesian and South African aircraft. As its final act in this move period, the Blue Team directed the "Secretary of State" to lead an interagency reappraisal of United States policy toward the Southern African region in order "to assure in the future that our undertakings will be confined to our intention."

Move Period C

Move Period C began at 0900 on the second exercise day and lasted until 1200. Another seven day lapse of time was prescribed at
the opening of the move period. Control specified the following events as having transpired in the interlude: the local leader resigned and was replaced by his deputy, a radical; the "Zambian" government reversed its stand on the liberation groups and promised full support for these anti-white insurgents; racial violence erupted in several areas of Zambia; and a squadron of MiG-21 aircraft piloted by Algerians arrived in Lusaka. The United Nations Observer Force, which had been accepted by the former government, was held in abeyance pending clarification of the new regime's attitude. The South Africans and Rhodesians increased their state of military readiness, but did not appear to be preparing for a major offensive. Both the "U.S.S.R." and the "Chinese People's Republic" expressed approval of the new Zambian government and promised both military and economic assistance.

The Z-team reacted to these developments by requesting surface-to-air missiles, combat aircraft, and military personnel from the Soviet Union, and by tightening their internal security. The United States Blue Team proposed moving the U.N. group to Zambia immediately. The U.S. Green Team approached the U.S.S.R., South Africa, and Portugal counseling restraint and advising reliance on the United Nations. It communicated with the new Zambian government promising recognition to a "responsible" regime, warning against support of guerrilla operations against Zambia's neighbors, and advocating cooperation with the United Nations.

At this point, the "U.S.S.R." employed the Hot Line to inform the "United States" that it was providing anti-aircraft missiles and helicopters (but not bombers) to Zambia, but that it would not employ Soviet military forces unless the U.S. or Great Britain intervened in Zambia. The Soviets also pointed to increasing tensions in the Middle East, and suggested that the best way to alleviate international conflict would be for the United States and the Soviet Union
to dismantle their respective anti-ballistic missile systems and pursue limitations on strategic offensive systems. The "Zambians" were unaware of this Soviet initiative. They responded to an earlier message from the United States by declining for the moment to accept a U.N. observer group, and chiding the United States for failure to provide the requested anti-aircraft weapons. In this message and in a subsequent press release, the "Zambians" emphasized their need for military assistance and their intention to seek it from many sources. They also stressed the racial nature of their conflict in public and private statements, culminating with a suggestion that American blacks form "volunteer units" for service in Africa. The "Zambians" called for military forces from several African nations to operate under Organization of African Unity aegis in Zambia. Finally, the "Zambians" requested that the Soviet Union set up a "massive air lift" in order to avoid the requirement for supply routes through Rhodesia.

The United States Green Team employed the "Hot Line" to respond to the Soviet message. They agreed to pursue the ABM suggestion, expressed concern over Soviet naval units near southern Africa and the Middle East, and strongly urged "working through the U.N." Simultaneously, it alerted the Congress and NATO to the intensification of the African crisis. Toward the end of the move period the Green Team replied to the Zambian message by reiterating support for a U.N. observer group and promising to study Zambian requests for military aid. The U.S. Blue Team sought assurances from the United Kingdom that British forces would not intervene in Zambia. Before receiving a reply from the U.K., the Blue Team assured the "U.S.S.R." that neither U.S. nor British forces intended to conduct military operations in Zambia. It advocated suspension of all arms shipments.
to Zambia, citing South African and Rhodesian denial of aggressive intentions as justification. It agreed to pursue ABM and SALT negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and urged the Soviets to elicit Zambian agreement for U.N. observer group deployment.

Move Period D

Move Period D began at 1330 and lasted two and a half hours. Exercise time was projected two days forward. Control capitalized on prior team moves to intensify some aspects of the crisis while simultaneously reducing tension in other areas. Major developments depicted as the move period began were: secession of a Zambian province from the central government; assurances by the South African and Portuguese governments of their peaceful intentions toward Zambia; a ground and air strike by Rhodesians against a guerrilla camp in Zambia that may have been unauthorized by Salisbury, but resulted in several non-combatant deaths; widespread and severe racial disorders in the United States in reaction to this incident; the dispatch by several African countries of military forces to staging areas in Tanzania for employment in Zambia; intense domestic pressure on the President of the United States to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. over Zambia in order not to jeopardize SALT and Middle East negotiations; and finally, an increase in Soviet commitment to and presence in Zambia. The U.S. teams' reliance on the United Nations was complicated by Soviet and Zambian opposition to the observer group and a Canadian-sponsored movement for a large U.N. peace force which would intervene in Zambia.

The Z-team reacted to this situation by concentrating on internal security and using Soviet aid to build up its military capability. The U.S. Blue Team persisted in its attempts to obtain Zambian agreement for the deployment of a U.N. observer group. It
continued to be loath to employ U.S. military power to resolve the crisis. Even when the British government fell over the issue of failure to intervene in Zambia, the Blue Team was only willing to "discuss" the matter. Paradoxically, as its final act the Blue Team directed the Secretary of Defense to evacuate American nationals from Zambia, thereby accepting grave risks of U.S. involvement. The U.S. Green Team appeared to be equally unwilling to intervene in Zambia. It even questioned the necessity for evacuation of American nationals by U.S. military forces. Its final assessment of the Zambian crisis reaffirmed its original strategy of reliance on diplomacy to avert "wide-scale hostilities."
CONEX IV

CONFLICT IN SOUTH ASIA

SCENARIO AND MOVE PERIODS

Scenario

When CONEX IV began, each participant was provided a scenario describing hypothetical events beginning in 1969 and ending in June of 1972. This scenario problem focused on internal difficulties hypothesized as happening in one country in Asia to illustrate some of the general problems we were interested in studying. It suited our research purposes to look at conflict control problems growing out of essentially internal conflict, and by mutual agreement it had been decided that this game would take South Asia as its general locale. India happened to be the real country chosen to use for illustrative purposes; it should be emphasized that the situation portrayed was of course entirely fictitious, and that the moves by players represented their own individual responses to wholly hypothetical circumstances.

The World Scene was portrayed in the opening scenario as unchanged in any major way. United States forces were substantially out of Viet Nam, but the expected "Viet Nam dividend" had failed to materialize. The Soviet Union continued aid to India but with
indications the price for continuation or increase would increase. Moscow had sought diligently to secure an influential position in Pakistan and Burma, while Soviet military assistance to Hanoi and Pyonyang continued to be extensive, and some new model MiGs had gone to India along with spare parts. But apart from the increasingly mobile Soviet fleet, we showed no substantial Soviet military presence in South or South East Asia. In general the Soviet posture in Asia the scenario depicted was one resembling that of the U.S. in the early 1950's, searching for means to contain China while trying not to offend local sensibilities, with roughly the same degree of success.

SEATO was considered virtually a dead letter after the bulk of U.S. forces were posited as having left both South Vietnam and Thailand, and the prospects of a generally neutralized South East Asia was already beginning to complicate the Australian policy of replacing Britain as a naval and air presence in the Straits region. The scenario showed a Burma that had reentered the world with the overthrow of the Ne Win regime by a group of followers of U Nu.

We postulated for the early 1970's a change in Pakistani politics, with left-wing radicals having acquired considerable strength. Although there had been no outright breaks in relations, the Pakistanis have moved away from the Soviets and toward the Chinese, but as a consequence, Pakistan had not kept pace with India in the modernization of her armed forces. In order to redress this situation, the Pakistanis in early 1972 approached both the United States and the U.S.S.R. about a substantial increase in military assistance. As of June 1972, neither government had committed itself.

From 1969 until 1972 we reported intensive efforts by Moscow, and less openly by Washington, to encourage indigenous regional
groupings for security purposes. While a number of countries expressed willingness (Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and more recently Indonesia), the two key anchor countries—Japan and India—remained holdouts.

The detailed situation presented to the participants described hypothetical events in "India" between 1969 and 1972. The "Congress Party" was depicted as losing its grip on the national situation, characterized by increasing activity on the part of radical parties and the postponement of development plans. Economic problems were mounting at a time of increased political participation and growing division of authority in the federal system between the center and the states.

From 1967 to 1972, the scenario stipulated that "President's rule" had been established ten times in seven states. The scenario further said that the Congress Party had failed to win a majority of seats in the fifth national election in 1972, with major gains going to Hindu militants and Communists. We specified that a coalition involving the Congress Party and the Janata Socialists had formed at the center, and also in the West Bengal parliament. We postulated two simultaneous crises breaking out in May 1972. The first was in West Bengal, accompanied by strikes and disorders, the employment of Indian troops, and the eventual withdrawal of the Janata Socialists.

In Nagaland we postulated a coalition government which was increasingly in touch with the insurgents and which seemed to support raids into neighboring Assam. On May 4, 1972 President's rule was declared in Nagaland and immediately denounced by the Chinese and the Pakistanis. Chinese aid continued to be observed in skirmishes that took place with the army.
On May 15 the crises were stated to have merged. A government in exile was announced in free Nagaland, and was recognized by both China and Pakistan. The Congress government fell in Bengal and a "united front" took over; President's rule followed shortly. The government of India claimed that some Naxelite insurgents were captured in Bengal with Chinese small arms, and the government then clamped down on Calcutta where sabotage was becoming rife. Delhi announced that a special session of Parliament would be held, and the scenario specified that a new coalition with the Samukta (United) Socialists was formed. For political reasons the central government was required to reassert the primacy of Hindi as the national language, and South India predictably reacted sharply to this with disruptions in Tamilnad.

In an atmosphere of wartime emergency in New Delhi a new ministry was formed. The general consensus was that democracy in India was fundamentally threatened, with repercussions that might well affect peace in South Asia. The government of India requested U.S. economic aid and possibly military assistance. It was believed by observers that a military coup was possible, and when the game opened "Chinese" troop movements were being reported.

Move Period A

The "government of India" (G.O.I.) team came up with a plan involving more forceful reforms. They evaluated their position in Bengal as satisfactory, and considered the possibility of moving more troops in Nagaland. Their belief was that the south of India misunderstood the language policy. They expressed fears that China and Pakistan would take advantage of the situation, and hoped for Soviet support, preferably publicly-proffered, as well as U.S. aid.
They were prepared to line up the Third World against the Pakistan claims of support for independent Nagaland. They reviewed their military preparedness against an estimate that Pakistani intervention in Kashmir would represent "a far greater threat to the security" of India than Chinese intervention.

U.S. Green urged "Pakistan" to cool it, and asked all Western arms suppliers to help to "isolate the situation from outside intervention." Green characterized the efforts they would undertake as "diplomacy to insure non-intervention by neighbors" and a "humanitarian" policy of civilian help and multilateral assistance. Green felt it might have to ask the aid-givers to apply leverage on Pakistan; it also contemplated asking the U.N. Security Council to respond if a Chinese threat materialized. Green approached the Soviet Union, asking its cooperation specifically through the United Nations. Green estimated that India could hold out and, while worried about Pakistan's rationality, felt the Pakistani threat might unify India. The major possible political change was seen as the result of a military take-over. Green discounted any overt Chinese intervention, while expecting Soviet cooperation. Green's objectives were to isolate the conflict; prevent overt hostilities involving India and Pakistan, or India and China; prevent further Chinese exploitation of the situation or a permanent Chinese position in a separatist Bengal or Nagaland; and keep India united and functioning, "recognizing that we can not intervene directly in the Indian situation." Green wished to minimize the repercussions in Southeast Asia and, finally, wished to keep India democratic and to prevent any major increase in Soviet influence (but viewed the Soviet Union as a partner in the situation).

Green considered the alternatives and came up with "a heavy bias against any unilateral U.S. action, and an equal initial bias
against military action, even on a multilateral basis." Green wished to pursue this policy in concert with others, including the Soviets, the aid-givers, and Burma. Green considered the pros and cons of using the U.N., including the possibility of a Congo-type operation, but at that point put it to one side. On the economic front, urgent consultations were planned with a view to quickly forming a consortium. In addition, urgent consultations were scheduled with the IMF and the IBRD to ease India's internal financial situation and free funds for their defense.

U.S. Blue estimated the Bengal situation as not terribly threatening, but saw the Naga problem as less tractable. Blue felt the G.O.I. could probably hold out, but would be likely to request help through the U.N. to discourage external intervention.

Blue's objectives were to "minimize the chance of open hostilities between any of the Great Powers" by maintaining effective political unity in India with a focus on Bengal; continuation of the democratic processes in India; and continuation of India's economic development.

Move Period B

Time was advanced 88 days, and the projected scenario portrayed further internal deterioration despite tranquilizing efforts of the part of G.O.I. and the United States. The Soviet Union had increased its unilateral, economic, and military assistance activities, and also rattled a few ICBMs in the direction of China. China denied interfering in the situation and scored any talk of going to the U.N., actively seeking to frighten both India and Burma from taking that route. Communal tension within "India" was shown as rising, with the Nagas in the process of besting an Indian army that was now unable
to reduce the level of instability with existing force levels. Kashmir was shown as tense. The G.O.I. won a vote of confidence, but was under steady political attack at home.

Early in the move period "India" issued an appeal to the United States to put a stop to Chinese nuclear blackmail and reconsider its own policy. The Indian team perceived a threat, not from Pakistan, but from China, and deemed that the United Nations would not be a useful route for dealing with the latter.

U.S. Green was determined to avoid the spread of the problem to the international arena, and resolved to dampen any speculation of unilateral or military intervention even to the point of denying that any military assistance had been requested. Green's motto was "restraint," with which an appeal through the United Nations would, in its view, be consistent. It urged India to be calm, and sought to keep cool itself in the face of India's appeal. It endeavored to get the United Kingdom to take the lead in the United Nations, but actually was quite reserved about the possibility of going to the United Nations at all.

In the course of the move period "Pakistan" hit the United States hard for what it characterized as American passivity, and prophesied a collapse of India in a tone designed to warn the United States to remember who its friends were. In this connection U.S. Green considered warning Pakistan that further unfriendly acts would result in a stoppage of U.S. aid.

U.S. Blue saw the situation as serious but felt that it could be contained without military action involving great powers or serious damage to U.S. interests. U.S. Blue decided that it would give military assistance through the United Nations, and estimated
that the Soviet Union would continue to be cooperative if no U.S. gains were seen to be accruing. Blue made some cautious estimates of the possible reaction of Congress and of the Presidential candidates to a reiteration by the "President" of past assurances of U.S. concern over any nuclear threats to India. In the face of "Pakistan's" emerging policy, Blue warned that country that the "United States" would react against an attempt to exploit the Indian situation, in the meantime pushing the notion of U.N. observers.

Blue's strategy on the political front was to go to the U.N. Security Council. On the bilateral front it would seek to preclude outside interference, working with the Soviets, and warning the Pakistanis. Blue proposed to advise the G.O.I. on its domestic developments most conducive to peace (with detailed policies concerning ethnic and other internal matters).

Blue felt the United States should not intervene militarily, while considering providing some military assistance, particularly for humanitarian purposes. U.S. military forces, it felt, could be deployed so as to minimize external aggression, but anything beyond deterrence was considered remote (Blue felt caught between campus radicalism and the Wallace movement in the United States).

On the economic front, Blue thought in terms of food aid and increased economic assistance, but did not see this as particularly useful in the short term.

Throughout, Blue emphasized the U.N. Charter. It considered "worst cases" of U.S.-Soviet action against the CPR, or U.N. military action. Blue operated on the assumption that if India collapsed, China and Pakistan could achieve their territorial objectives.
"China" called on all Southeast Asian ethnic minorities to revolt in the Naga style. The "Soviets" meanwhile reassured the United States, but rejected the possibility of U.N. peacekeeping, while hinting at the possibility of their own military counter-action to the Chinese ICBM test.

By the end of the move period U.S. Green, which had initially focused on coordination with the U.S.S.R., felt as a result of bilateral meetings that mutual action would be difficult to arrange. The favored Green position, rather than a U.K. initiative in the United Nations, was a multi-nation conference in London (largely to assuage Soviet sensibilities). Green initiated a low-level alert of U.S. forces, stopped military assistance shipments to "Pakistan" while soliciting other aid givers to follow suit, and requested the assistance of Asian nations in persuading India, Pakistan, and China to cool down the situation. U.S. Green's suggestion to other Western arms suppliers was that shipments to states in the region be suspended, without calling it "an embargo" but delaying actual deliveries and controlling the supply of POL. Green issued a virtual ultimatum to the "Pakistanis" concerning military assistance, and warned that security guarantees would be implemented and "immediate U.S. action" would be taken if the Pakistanis crossed the frontier.

By the end of the move period U.S. Blue took the following actions. They told the "Indian" government that out of concern with the danger of external intervention, Blue was exploring with key countries, particularly the Soviet Union, the possibility of a U.N. Security Council resolution warning countries to refrain from provocative actions, and stating that the Council "would have to act immediately" in the face of aggression or a threat of nuclear attack against a non-nuclear weapons state. Blue reassured Pakistan that it
saw no threat emanating from India, and thus no justification of Pakistani action; Blue was prepared to consider the possibility of additional military assistance to India. Blue urged common action through the U.N. Security Council on the Soviets, and reiterated that it had no evidence of the likelihood of direct overt military action by Peking against India. Blue tried to make clear through all available channels to India American concern and determination concerning threats to India, while telling the "Pakistanis" that the United States was not prepared to alter its current policy not to sell lethal end-use items to Pakistan.

"U Thant" sent a personal representative to India while urging Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations. "China" moved to reassure the parties, but launched bitter attacks on the United Nations (in what sounded like a Chinese version of its own "Korean syndrome").

Move Period C

Time was advanced three days. The scenario depicted an attempt on the life of the "Indian Prime Minister," a worsening of communal riots in "India," a halt to electioneering in the U.S. Presidential campaign, and rumors that a special Pakistani mission had arrived in Peking.

U.S. Green played down United Nations involvement in the problem, and concentrated on United Kingdom action, and on the parties to the conflict. Green continued to advise "India" to cool it along its borders, while seeking out the "Chinese" for talks at Warsaw.

U.S. Blue similarly sought out the "Chinese" at Warsaw, while warning the "Pakistanis" again that the United States would cease military assistance shipments, using this threat to try to
pacify India.

The "Soviets" secretly offered additional aid to the Pakistanis for the sake of restoring the regional arms balance. "India" made a statesmanlike approach to Pakistan on communal matters, while considering the possibility of going ahead to develop its own nuclear weapons. "India" told "U Thant" he was not needed, and that India would accept U.N. observers if Pakistan and China did the same. India continued to resist United States urging of Security Council action regarding the Chinese ICBM. The Soviet position was depicted variously as involving secret Soviet demarches to China—and the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive atomic strike against Chinese atomic facilities.

"Pakistan" showed restraint, but asked the United States for arms assistance, a credible security guarantee or, at a minimum, resolution of the India-Pakistan dispute.

Later in the move period two "Soviet" divisions crossed the Ili Valley border of the Chinese People's Republic, to the tune of Soviet requests to India to collaborate, and reassurances to both "India" and the "United States" that the action was a rebuff to Chinese attacks.

U.S. Blue took the position that "if India ever has evidence of nuclear aggression against India, or the threat thereof, we would consider appropriate deployment of U.S. forces to a position supporting India should this prove necessary." Blue saw the Chinese-Soviet hostilities as strictly a border clash, which it urged Moscow to limit (the same action was taken by U.S. Green).

The government of "Pakistan" changed in the absence of any satisfactory U.S. response to its appeals (although U.S. Green had just assured Rawalpindi that the "U.S. Government" supported Pakistan's territorial integrity and "would react with the utmost urgency" if the latter were in danger). On this note the move period ended.
APPENDIX B

TYPICAL GAME SCHEDULES

DETAILED GAME SCHEDULE (CONEX I)
MASTER GAME SCHEDULE (CONEX IV)
## ANNEX A (CONEX I SEQUENCE OF EVENTS) TO EXERCISE DESIGN PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAL TIME</th>
<th>CONTROL (WHITE)</th>
<th>U.S. TEAM GREEN</th>
<th>U.S. TEAM BLUE</th>
<th>&quot;I&quot; TEAM (PINK)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1300-1315</td>
<td>READ &quot;CABLE AND CLIPPING&quot; FILE</td>
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<td>READ &quot;CABLE AND CLIPPING&quot; FILE</td>
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<td>CONTINUES PREPARATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
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<td>1315-1330</td>
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<td>RECEIVES BRIEFING FROM ACLIN ANALYST</td>
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<td>CONTINUES PREPARATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300-1400</td>
<td>PREPARES TO BRIEF CONTROL RE PLAN</td>
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<td>1400-1430</td>
<td>BRIEFS CONTROL</td>
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<tr>
<td>1430-1530</td>
<td>&quot;PRESIDENTS' WILL BE TAKEN ON TOUR OF EXERCISE AREA BY MANAGER AND WILL CONSULT WITH DIRECTOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>1430-1630</td>
<td>INFORM US TEAMS OF THOSE INSURGENT ACTIONS WHICH OCCUR DURING ACTUAL TIME</td>
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<td>IMPLEMENTS STRATEGY</td>
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<td>1530-1600</td>
<td>OBSERVES TEAM GREEN</td>
<td>PRESENTS RECOMMENDATIONS TO &quot;PRESIDENT&quot;</td>
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<td>1600-1630</td>
<td>OBSERVES TEAM BLUE</td>
<td>PRESENTS RECOMMENDATIONS TO &quot;PRESIDENT&quot;</td>
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<td>REAL TIME</td>
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<td>U.S. TEAM BLUE</td>
<td>&quot;I&quot; TEAM (PINK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1600-1630</td>
<td>SERVE TEA</td>
<td>COMMISSIONS OUTLINE PLAN TO WRITING</td>
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<tr>
<td>1630-1645</td>
<td>BRIEFS &quot;I&quot; TEAM ON US STRATEGY AND RESULTS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>1630-1700</td>
<td>RECONSIDERS PART II IN LIGHT OF TEAM ACTIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1730-1800</td>
<td>EARLY DINNER FOR ADMIN PERSONNEL</td>
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<td>1830-1930</td>
<td>DINNER FOR ALL</td>
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<td>1930-1950</td>
<td>CONTROL IS BRIEFS RE INSURGENT STRATEGY FOR PART II</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930-1940</td>
<td>TEAM REASSEMBLES READ BACKGROUND MATERIAL DEPICTING CHANGED SITUATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940-1950</td>
<td>MONITOR TEAMS PRESIDENT CHARGES TASK FORCE WITH NEW MISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950-2100</td>
<td>ASSESS &amp; DISCUSS NEW SITUATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940-1950</td>
<td>DIRECTOR BRIEFS &quot;PRESIDENTS&quot; RE PARAMETERS OF PART II STRATEGY</td>
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## ANNEX A (CONEX I SEQUENCE OF EVENTS) TO EXERCISE DESIGN PLAN

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<tr>
<th>REAL TIME</th>
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<td>1950-2045</td>
<td>INFORM US TEAMS OF I-TEAM ACTIONS WHICH OCCUR DURING REAL TIME</td>
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<td>2100-2115</td>
<td>OBSERVE TEAM GREEN</td>
<td>TASK FORCE RECOMMENDS REVISED STRATEGY</td>
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<td>TASK FORCE RECOMMENDS REVISED STRATEGY</td>
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<td>2115-2130</td>
<td>DIRECTOR BRIEFS &quot;I&quot; TEAM&quot; RE PART III</td>
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<td>2045-2100</td>
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<tr>
<td>2130-2200</td>
<td>END PART II</td>
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<td>2200</td>
<td>END PART II</td>
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<td>CONTROL MEETS AND REVISES SCENARIO FOR PART III ADMIN. PERSONNEL SECURE GEAR AND PREPARE FOR PART III</td>
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<td>PLANS STRATEGY FOR PART III</td>
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<tr>
<td>2300</td>
<td>TYPE AND RUN OFF</td>
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<td>11 Sept 88</td>
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<td>0900-0920</td>
<td>BRIEFS PRESIDENTS RE PARAMETERS OF DECISION</td>
<td>READ REVISED SCENARIO AND CLIPPING FILE</td>
<td>READ REVISED SCENARIO AND CLIPPING FILE</td>
<td>READ REVISED SCENARIO AND CLIPPING FILE</td>
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### ANNEX A (CONEX I SEQUENCE OF EVENTS) TO EXERCISE DESIGN PLAN

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<td>BEGIN MONITORING</td>
<td>&quot;PRESIDENT&quot; CHARGES TASK FORCE WITH MISSION</td>
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<td>DISCUSS REVISED SITUATION</td>
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<td>DISCUSS REVISED SITUATION</td>
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<td>1030-1050</td>
<td>SERVE COFFEE</td>
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<td>1100-1115</td>
<td>OBSERVE TEAM GREEN</td>
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<td>1115-1200</td>
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<td>COMMIT TO WRITING</td>
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<td>1130-1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>LUNCH FOR ALL</td>
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<tr>
<td>1300-1330</td>
<td>PARTICIPANTS REVIEW EXERCISE MATERIAL AND COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES</td>
<td>CONTROL SETS UP CRITIQUE AREA AND PREPARES FOR PLENARY SESSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-1500</td>
<td>PLENARY CRITIQUE: EXERCISE EVENTS EXPOSED, DISCUSSED, CRITICIZED</td>
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<td>1500-1630</td>
<td>PLAYERS AND CONTROL EXPERTS ARE ORGANIZED INTO FOUR DISCUSSION GROUPS TO CONSIDER FOUR SELECTED ASPECTS OF LOCAL CONFLICT DECISION-MAKING: CONTROL DISMANTLES ADMIN. APPARATUS</td>
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<td>PLENARY CRITIQUE SESSION</td>
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<td>1800-1930</td>
<td>RECEPTION</td>
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CONEX IV MASTER SCHEDULE
(Subject to Change)

**DAY ONE**

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<th>Time</th>
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<td>Orientation</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>Teams Read</td>
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<td>Lunch for all</td>
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<td>1200</td>
<td>Brief Control</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>Control Projection</td>
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<td>Dinner for all</td>
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**TEAM MOVES**

**DAY TWO**

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<td>Brief Control for Teams</td>
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<td>Lunch for Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Teams review Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Reception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TEAM MOVES**

- Bring sandwiches in for Control and Typists
APPENDIX C

REAL-TIME MONITOR CODING FORMS

CONEX II
CONEX III
CONEX IV
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soviet offer does not represent significant changes in threat as it does not require change in capabilities.</th>
<th>Soviet offer does represent significant changes in threat as it does require change in capabilities.</th>
<th>French offer does not represent significant changes in threat as it does not require change in capabilities.</th>
<th>French offer does represent significant changes in threat as it does require change in capabilities.</th>
<th>Rapid change in capabilities increases threat.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Must spend whatever necessary to match increases.</td>
<td>Must spend whatever necessary to over-compensate.</td>
<td>Need not match increases.</td>
<td>Need not respond to increases.</td>
<td>Costs too great to compensate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis B-1:** Increment or marginal changes in capabilities will not likely alter substantially mutual perceptions, deterrence, or intentions.

**Hypothesis B-3:** In assessing the threat posed by changes in the size and/or inventory of a potentially hostile force, a state will base its estimates on the capabilities of the weapons systems in that force and, in particular, on the capabilities of the new acquisitions. If that estimate leads to the conclusion that these new capabilities will be effective within a short time frame (1-3 years), the state will seek urgently to match or counter these new capabilities. In this situation, the state will seriously contemplate and/or take the following step among others: increasing the proportion of its resources (GNP and foreign exchange) devoted to defense and, in particular, to systems acquisition.

**Legend:** Monitor indicated the team member making a policy proposal relevant to any of these propositions by use of that member’s initials. Following the initials was indicated the strength of intensity with which the proposition was made, on a scale of 1 to 5 (lowest to highest). This was done for each policy proposition offered during the move period which was relevant to the hypotheses in the margin.
REAL TIME CODING FORM

TEAM _______________ MOVE PERIOD____ Coder ______
TAPE BEGINS __________ ENDS __________ REAL TIME ______

HYPOTHESIS

| | | | | | |

COMMENTS:

HYPOTHESIS

| | | | | | |

COMMENTS:

HYPOTHESIS

| | | | | | |

COMMENTS:
Team Member Initials ______
Clock Time ______________
Move Period ____________

Specific Policy Objective (OK to paraphrase)

Specific Policy Option Preferred or Recommended (OK to paraphrase)

Check if position is a dissent from consensus to team □

Monitor Comments:
  Relevant Hypothesis # if known □

(high) □

(low) □

Intensity with which position held □
CONEX IV Questionnaire

Team ____________
Monitor ____________
Move Period _______ Time ____________

The perception of the team about Soviet and Chinese policy toward the situation in India at this point in CONEX IV is that:

1. Moscow is
   - Behind the trouble
   - Deeply engaged in advantage-seeking
   - Moderately engaged
   - Not very involved
   - Interested in conflict control
   - Not involved

2. Peking is

(Please put an x at the appropriate point on both scales)
The perception of the team about the prospect of Soviet or Chinese gains in the region of the present conflict at this position in CONEX IV is that:

3. Prospect of Soviet gains are
   - Very threatening to team interests
   - Moderately threatening to team interests
   - Not very threatening to team interests
   - Not at all threatening to team interests

4. Prospect of Chinese gains are
   - Very threatening to team interests
   - Moderately threatening to team interests
   - Not very threatening to team interests
   - Not at all threatening to team interests

(Please put an x on the appropriate point on both scales.)
Specific Policy Objectives Proposed by Members of U.S. Teams

0-1) Prevent expansion of conflict across international borders:
   1a) prevent Pakistani invasion
   1b) prevent direct Chinese support of or involvement in Pakistani invasion or other use of force
   1c) prevent Chinese involvement in Burma which is directed at exploiting Indian situation (especially through Kachins as proxy). Or any spill over of Indian turmoil into Burma
   1d) prevent Indian attack on Pakistan

0-2) Isolation of Indian domestic conflict from external exploitation (including, especially, increased external influence in new "independent" states seceded from India):
   2a) prevent exploitation by Chinese
   2b) prevent exploitation by Pakistanis
   2) prevent exploitation by Soviets

0-3) Prevent disintegration of India as a single, sovereign, political entity.

0-4) Strengthen Indian government in order for it to deal more effectively with its external threat (not necessarily to re-absorb the secessionist areas).

0-5) Minimize the impact of Indian domestic turmoil (and its eventual outcome on S.E. Asia as a whole—with special interest in its influence on Burma).

0-6) Keep India democratic—to retain it as a model of "democratic development" in the LDC's.

0-7) Prevent Soviet direct involvement in the area.

0-8) Prevent Chinese direct involvement in the area.

0-9) Avoid major power conflict and threat of nuclear escalation.

0-10) Avoid any U.S. commitment or involvement.
Specific Policy Strategies Proposed by Members of U.S. Teams

P-1) Unilateral U.S. involvement to restrict domestic or interstate conflict and to terminate it if possible.

P-2) Use of economic assistance as policy leverage:
   a) threaten to cut-off aid to keep outside interested parties uninvolved
   b) threaten to cut-off aid to force change on Indian government
   c) increase aid to India to bolster central government

P-3) "Conference" (or united action) of Great Powers (and other interested countries) to determine general solution or, at least, a common policy in dealing with problem.

P-4) Use of UN for purposes of conflict control:
   a) get Security Council resolution on Negaland and to keep outside powers removed
   b) get General Assembly resolution, if Security Council cannot or will not act, to restrict scope of conflict.

P-5) Joint U.S.-Soviet policy to isolate conflict:
   a) joint U.S.-Soviet Union policy against CCP exploitation
   b) but restrain Soviet beligerence against CCP

P-6) Unilateral U.S. military involvement in support of Indian government, against both internal and external threats.

P-7) Direct warning to China and Warsaw Pact (as a unit) not to try to exploit Indian situation.

P-8) Strong U.S. declaratory policy:
   a) in support of Indian government - aimed at reducing external threat to India
   b) against expansion of conflict - including Soviet-Chinese hostilities
   c) against Pakistani invasion
P-9) [food problem in Bengal] U.S. food airlift, or sealift, of food to Calcutta - Bengal (related to objective of avoiding disintegration of India)
   a) multilateral emergency aid provisions

P-10) Coalition government in India to include disaffected groups, groups fomenting secessionist movements etc.

P-11) Avoid unilateral U.S. action except under most extreme and unforeseen conditions.

P-12) Avoid military action either unilateral or multilateral
   a) but place forces on alert

P-13) No options available to satisfy objective and objective may have to be minimized in importance as to policy priorities.

P-14) Through declaratory policies of U.S. and Indian governments, minimize the importance of secessionist movements or even successful secession by such Indian states as Bengal and Nagaland as means of reinforcing Indian governments prestige-power.

P-15) Strengthen Indian government so that further disintegration is prevented. Means of avoiding further external exploitation of Indian domestic turmoil.

P-16) Greater communications with CCP to ascertain common interests in restricting conflict but also to make it clear the U.S. will not accept further intrusions by CCP.

P-17) Do nothing yet; situation not critical.

P-18) Use of military aid:
   a) increase to India
   b) cut-off from Pakistan to restrain her

P-19) Unilateral or multilateral declaratory policy against use of nuclear blackmail:
   a) invoke NPT
   b) propose world-wide moratorium on nuclear testing.
APPENDIX D-1

CONEX I PRE-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS
CONEX I

PRE-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE

Name: __________________________

[NOTE: This questionnaire is for statistical data-gathering purposes only and no attribution of opinions will be made to individuals.]

1) It is becoming clear that for members of the Communist bloc there are some situations in which nationalist impulses will conflict with adherence to international communism, i.e., responsiveness to influence of Soviet Union or China. For such situations arising in the future, to what extent would you predict that the actions of the following groups of Communist leaders would be characterized by "nationalism" or "communism". (Indicate by checkmark.)

**East Germans:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>(Blue)</th>
<th>International Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Czechoslovakians:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>(Blue)</th>
<th>International Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

281
North Vietnamese:
Nationalist (Blue) 10 5 0 5 10

Poles:
Nationalist (Blue) 10 5 0 5 10

Cubans:
Nationalist (Blue) 10 5 0 5 10

Latin American Guerrillas
Nationalist (Blue) 10 5 0 5 10

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2) In your view, how important is this distinction in degrees between "nationalist" and "communist" in a "socialist" state?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important (Blue)</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Green)

3) Please indicate the importance of the following areas of the world to U.S. interests, in your opinion. Indicate your judgments by putting the code letters on the scale, placing the most important at the top of the scale and the others in their relative positions.

- a = Europe
- b = Middle East
- c = Sub-Sahara Africa
- d = South Asia
- e = Southeast Asia
- f = East Asia
- g = Latin America

Most Important

Blue ranked Latin America
#2 on average

Green ranked Latin America
#3 on average

Least Important
4) Would you please summarize in a phrase or two what in your judgment ought to be the major objectives of the United States in Latin America. Please indicate their relative importance by numbering them 1, 2, 3, etc. If you think two or more are of equal importance, please give them the same rank.

1. 

2. 

3. 

5) Following are a series of statements about the instruments of policy in Latin America. Please indicate whether you tend to agree with one or the other of the opposing statements:

1) A: When facing the hard choices in Latin America, the United States will have to use or support the use of military force against any serious guerrilla movements. Social and economic progress can occur only if political order is established first.
B: A hard-headed view of realities of Latin America must recognize a primarily military policy against guerrilla movements as an unwise short-term strategy which is self-defeating in the long run. Stable political order can be established only on the basis of social justice.

I tend to agree with A ____________

I tend to agree with B ____________

I agree with neither A nor B. Rather, I think:

ii) A: With limited time and resources, the United States cannot help but emphasize military aid over social and economic forms of aid in dealing with Latin American governments threatened by communist-backed insurgents.

B: In dealing with the problem of Latin American governments threatened by communist-backed insurgents, the United States must give greater emphasis to economic aid and to political reform than to the application of military force.

I tend to agree with A ____________

I tend to agree with B ____________

I agree with neither A nor B. I think:
iii) A: It is not realistic for the United States to insist on advanced political democracy in Latin America since prevailing levels of literacy, employment skills, and social integration provide an insufficient basis. We often have no choice but to back the strong man.

B: United States policy in Latin America discredits the values of American democracy when it forges alliances with strong-armed military dictatorships.

I tend to agree with A ____________

I tend to agree with B ____________

I agree with neither A nor B. I think:
SUMMARY OF PRE-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

The questionnaire was designed to measure:

1. perceptions of nationalist motives in communist governments and revolutionary groups
2. emphasis on the importance for U.S. interests of a particular area of the world
3. conceptions of U.S. objectives in Latin America
4. basic attitudes toward the use of military force as an instrument of policy in relation to other instruments such as economic aid.

Regarding number 1 (Questions 1 and 2), the teams were remarkably similar in their perceptions. The Blue team did consistently perceive more nationalism in Communist leadership groups than did the Green team but the differences between teams were very small with notable disagreement arising only over Poland and East Germany.

The conclusion is suggested that there was no significant initial differences between the teams in tendency to ascribe nationalist motives to communist-affiliated radicals.

Regarding number 2 (Question 3), there was no difference, with nearly everyone on both teams putting Latin America second or third.
Regarding number 3 (Question 4) the objectives fell as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Blue</th>
<th>Green</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote economic and social development</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote local democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote political stability in area</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote government friendly to U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote U.S. security</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here there is some indication that the members of the Blue team gave more emphasis to political democracy and to economic and social development than did the members of the Green team. The differences are not sharp.

Regarding number 4 (Question 5). The members of both teams showed considerable desire to avoid the sharp choices and to write in some middle position. They also avoided the force-oriented responses. There were no differences between the teams here.

The general conclusion suggested is that the questionnaire demonstrated that the teams did not differ at the outset in the respects tested. This strengthens the argument that any differences in their decisions were due to the experimental differences introduced according to the game design.

(A contrary position could be built around: 1) differences in question #1 with respect to the Poles and East Germans; 2) the fact that the Blue team is consistently to the nationalist side on these scales; and 3) differences in mentioning democracy and economic development as American objectives in Latin America. This implies a suggestion that the Blue team had a more liberal, less security minded view at the outset.)
APPENDIX D-2

"SOVIET/CHINESE PERCEPTION" QUESTIONNAIRE

CONEX III QUESTIONNAIRES AND COMMENTARY

CONEX IV QUESTIONNAIRE AND TABLES
CONEX III

Questionnaire

(To be administered by team ILO at close of each move period)

Team ____________________________________________

Participant _____________________________________

Move Period Just Ended ____________________________

In my judgment, Soviet policy toward the situation in Southern Africa can be characterized as:

(Please mark an x at an appropriate point on the scale)

_________________________ Behind the trouble

_________________________ Deeply engaged in advantage seeking

_________________________ Moderately engaged

_________________________ Not very involved

_________________________ Interested in conflict control

_________________________ Not involved
The prospect of Soviet gains in the region from the present conflict are in my opinion:

(Please mark an x at an appropriate point in the scale)

- Very threatening to U.S. interests
- Moderately threatening to U.S. interests
- Not very threatening to U.S. interests
- Not at all threatening to U.S. interests
USES AND EVALUATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE IN CONEX III*

The extensive list of hypotheses, for the examination of which CONEX III was designed, required a number of distinct procedures in order to collect as much relevant data as possible. In addition to information gathered in real-time monitoring, team documents, analysis of tape recordings of team deliberations, and game post-mortem analysis by game participants, a questionnaire was administered before and at several pre-determined intervals during the game. The purpose of the questionnaire was to capture the relevant perceptions of the game participants concerning the role of certain critical factors in game play which could not be otherwise obtained, factors that related to U.S.-Soviet competitive/cooperative relationships.

The "perceptions" questionnaire was related to three interrelated hypotheses concerning the nature of "typical" U.S. decision-maker's perceptions of local conflict situations. One hypothesis was: "American decision-makers confronting a local conflict in the period ahead will opt for non-involvement over the alternative of ensuring a preferred local political outcome until they perceive a clear prospect of Soviet gain." A second hypothesis was: "As American policy-makers perceive an increase in potential Soviet gain they will continue to seek non-military means to control conflict, but will shift their focus to the Soviets." Finally, it was hypothesized that: "If Soviet gain becomes manifest, the U.S. will oppose the Soviet policy unless fear of nuclear escalation supervenes." (Our methodological hypothesis was of course that some insight could be gained about these propositions by evaluating the perceptions of experts simulating the reactions of real-life decision-makers.)

*By James L. Foster
In order to dramatize a situation in which these conditions obtained, the game scenario depicted a clearly rising level of Soviet involvement. As the game progressed, indications of potential Soviet gains from the conflict were presented; these did not necessarily correspond to "losses" to the United States.

From the team documents and from monitoring of team discussions, we were able to determine what the teams wanted to do, and, to some extent, what factors motivated their policy preferences. The problems remained of determining what perceptions of the scenario events were left unexpressed, and of determining the degree of agreement among team members as to the importance of the relevant perceptions which were expressed. That is, was agreement on a policy that was consistent with the research hypotheses for that move period actually related to (and related similarly among all team members to) perceptions of adversary policies which were also consistent with our hypotheses?

A questionnaire was designed which included two questions with the responses to be indicated along two ten-point scales. The first question asked the respondents to indicate the degree to which they perceived the Soviet Union to be "behind the trouble," i.e. the promoter of the conflict situation. The second question asked the respondents to indicate their perception of potential Soviet gains from the conflict.

The resulting data were analyzed in two ways. First, the individual scores for each team were aggregated and a "team" score was depicted by the arithmetic mean of those scores. From this can be shown the initial differences between the teams as to the perceptions in question, and the differences in change across each move period. More precise calculations of these team "differences" can be shown by this method but the appropriateness of such calculations are suspect, as will be discussed below.

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An alternative method of analysis was used that was more sensitive to the difficulties in aggregating scores on a questionnaire of this type. It is doubtful that the respondents wanted to indicate their perceptions as precisely as the scale intervals indicate. It is much more likely that they were responding in more general categories of "high," "uncertain" and "low"; that is, in terms of gross probabilities of Soviet intentions and possible outcomes. Consequently the scale was divided into three parts with the middle of the scale (intervals 5 and 6) indicating an "indifference" range, or range of "lack of (immediate) saliency" of the issues involved. It was assumed that a respondent marking within this interval was cognizant of the relevance of the issue, but was either uncertain or unsure or unconcerned about its present meaning. Therefore, team averages between 5.0 and 6.0 are considered within the "indifference" range. Averages below this range are interpreted as indicating that perceived (probable) Soviet hostile intentions or potential gains are of "low significance." Above the indifference range they are perceived to be of increasingly "high significance."

In interpreting these data it should be understood that several problems with the questionnaires may detract from the efficacy of the findings. First, the questionnaire was not pretested. The penalty for this oversight is that both questions include some ambiguous language, and these ambiguities cast doubt on the comparability of team perceptions. For example, each player might define "Soviet gain" differently; or the American teams might see an increase in potential gain as directly proportional to an increase in involvement, whereas the "Zambians" might not accept a linear relationship. This difference in perception could be attributed to a misunderstanding about what constitutes a gain; it would have been preferable for all respondents to share a common definition and differ on their opinion of how much gain is likely.
Secondly, aggregating individual scores and determining a team average (arithmetic mean) for each period is suspect. It is very doubtful that the respondents wanted to indicate their perceptions as precisely as the scale intervals suggest. It is much more likely that they wished to opine in grosser terms such as low, uncertain, high. Therefore, the aggregation of scores into team averages may not accurately reflect the shifts in individual perceptions, because the precision imputed to the statistics is probably not justified. Aggregation of these scores may also be suspect on another more fundamental basis: cumulation of individual attitudes does not necessarily equal the group attitude. Averaging unweighted scores; i.e., treating them as equal, does not take into account obvious differences in individual influence and/or knowledge. It is possible that the perceptions which influence group behavior are confined to a few people who, through position (e.g. team chairman) or expertise (e.g. area specialist), exert a disproportionate share of influence. Finally, these questionnaires were administered at the end of a move period. This means that considerable discussion of a group decision intervened between the presentation of the situation (evidence of involvement or gain) and the completion of the questionnaires. The opinion expressed in the questionnaire may indicate an individual's post facto rationale for the decision rather than an appraisal of the facts.

Despite these imperfections in the design, administration and analysis of the questionnaires, this analytic tool proved useful, if not conclusive. As a corroborative device it complemented and qualified other methods.
Given the methodological problems involved, what conclusions can nevertheless be provisionally drawn from these questionnaire data?

1. An important conclusion reflects on the analysis of other game data, and of other hypotheses as well, in that the pre-game administration of this questionnaire indicates that the two U.S. teams were not so similar as originally was believed. That is, the perceptions of Soviet policy by the U.S. teams, before the game began, was substantially different; the Green team expressed considerably greater concern both with perceived Soviet involvement and Soviet "gains" from the conflict than was expressed by the Blue team (see Table III). Furthermore, the Green team was less homogeneous than the Blue team; the individual scores of the Green team were much more widely distributed than those of the Blue team. However, though the teams were not identical in their original positions on these issue-variables, their differences do not appear to be so great that comparison on relevant decision-making dimensions is impossible. Nor is there any evidence that either team was extremely prejudiced or badly informed.

2. In terms of the general trend of the team average scores, a number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. It should be said first that both U.S. teams "saw" correctly that which was being depicted: The initial scenario was very ambiguous about Soviet involvement, and both teams tended to withhold judgment (Table I). At the beginning of Move Period B, Soviet visibility was increased, but potential Soviet gain remained unclear. Both teams shifted noticeably to the right on the first question, but moved less sharply on the second. In subsequent periods the extent of Soviet involvement was marginally increased and potential Soviet gain made gradually more explicit. Both teams followed the cues quite well. Although there is little significance to the small shifts from period to period, it is apparent that the trend of perception follows the scenario.

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The "Zambian" team did not share "American" perceptions. Its members remained at or near the indifference point throughout the exercise, and at the end of Period B reversed the trend by shifting toward the lower pole on both questions. Both their low initial score and the move period B shift could to some extent be attributable to one individual whose score was very much lower than his colleagues (Table II). But even if the Zambian scores are adjusted to discount this individual's skewing effect, their perceptions of Soviet involvement/gain were consistently lower than their American counterparts. This observation may suggest that a developing country--or rather experts role-playing that country--are more euphoric about Soviet activity (even if their rhetoric is impassioned) than American "foreign policy-makers" bemused by the Cold War. In this case the questionnaire helped to explain an apparent inconsistency between the "U.S." and "Zambian" teams arising from analysis of game messages reflecting team decisions. The "Zambians" persisted in seeking help from the Soviets whom both U.S. teams had identified as stirring up trouble in southern Africa. This paradox is, we can conclude, probably attributable to differences in definition of Soviet gain between the "Americans" and those role-playing "Zambians." Seen from the "Zambian" perspective, the potential for Soviet gain increased only slightly throughout the exercise, for the simple reason that the "Zambians" shared a number of goals with the Soviets. This was especially true during Move Periods C and D when the moderates were replaced by radicals in "Zambia." The Americans to an extent tended to see extension of Soviet influence and/or exacerbation of the conflict as a zero-sum game in which Soviet gain equalled American loss. This rationale is primarily indicated by analysis of the team discussions, and is substantiated by the trends shown in the questionnaire.
3. A more concrete analysis of team changes over time is based on the division of team average of scores for each move period into three "ranges" of "high significance," "indifference," and "low significance." Before the game began, the U.S. Green team's scores were the only ones above the indifference range (Table III). It is also of interest that the perceived threats of Soviet involvement and Soviet gains were more or less equivalently ranked at this stage by each team. However, unlike the other, "Zambia" indicated a somewhat greater concern about possible Soviet gains--as should be expected of an LDC (and area experts simulating"Zambian"perceptions).

These issues reached the "high significance" range for"Zambia"by the end of period A, with a particularly strong increase in the threat of Soviet involvement but an interesting smaller increase in the perception of Soviet gains. In period B, however, there was an actual decline in the average scores back to the indifference range for"Zambia" on both issues.

In this latter period both U.S. teams showed a sharp increase on both issues, although the Soviet involvement threat appears to have been more significant. The largest decline in the"Zambian"averages, on the other hand, was on the very issue of Soviet involvement. As the perceived threat of Soviet involvement and potential gains went up for the U.S. teams, the perception of threats went down for the"Zambian" team. In short, there appeared to be an inverse relationship between the "U.S." perceptions of the Soviet threat and that of experts simulating LDC perceptions.

This same inverse relationship continued in period C, though it was not so marked. Here, all teams showed increases; but the U.S. teams' average increases were relatively small, whereas the"Zambian"
increases were quite significant. Further, the increases on both issues were virtually equivalent for both U.S. teams, whereas the major 'Zambia' increase was again on the issue of Soviet involvement, with a surprisingly lesser concern for potential Soviet gains from that involvement.

Period D showed some inconsistencies in the above-noted inverse pattern. The Blue team indicated further significant increases, while the 'Zambia' and Green teams remained relatively equivalent to their previous positions. The lack of changes for the Green team may be partially explainable by the fact that its average had already reached a very high level.

4. An hypothesis is thus generated that the perceived fortunes of a weak, externally threatened LDC relative to the position of the U.S.S.R. are inversely related to the perceptions of the United States, and U.S. policy responses to perceived potential or actual Soviet gains in a conflict will be viewed quite differently by the LDC's involved, even though an LDC may be trying to 'play off' the U.S. and U.S.S.R. This has obvious and important implications for policy in that the critical time periods to offer, deny, or negotiate aid will be seen in quite different lights.

5. This conclusion about perceptions of Soviet policy by an LDC, based on the lower average scores for 'Zambia' in each move period as compared to both U.S. teams, may have to be somewhat qualified when we consider changes in team scores. Though 'Zambia' did have lower scores, both of its scores increased more than those of the Green team, and its score on question A increased almost as much as that of the Blue team. It appears from this that the 'Zambian' team was much more concerned about possible direct Soviet involvement than about potential Soviet gains. A possible inference is that it may require more and
stronger "cues" to trigger significant apprehension about the Soviets, but once triggered it is no less salient.

6. Another, surprising conclusion arises from the "Zambian" teams concern about possible Soviet gains. The "Zambians" had attempted during the game to gain a considerable Soviet arms support. The price for such aid, that is to say, the Soviet gains, would take the form of increasing Soviet influence in "Zambia" and some loss in independence. However, the questionnaire indicates that after the start of the game the "Zambians" perceived a substantially greater threat from Soviet involvement than from possible Soviet gains (note the difference in total changes for the game on the two issues on Table IV). The real-time coding data also indicates a surprising lack of concern about the outcome of various forms of Soviet involvement. Those role-playing an LDC in this game, when faced with apparent U.S. unwillingness to provide significant aid, seemed prepared to pay a very high price for Soviet assistance.

7. It is interesting to look at the total changes for each team for the entire game, apart from the absolute levels for each move period. The scores for all teams increased significantly consistent with the game scenario. However, the increase in the average scores of the Blue team (from pre-game to period D) was twice as great as that of the Green team. The total change for Blue was 2.8 points on question A and 2.3 points on question B; the scores for the Green team were 1.2 points and 0.8 points respectively. In every period except pre-exercise, the Blue team saw the potential for Soviet gain as greater than the Green. The Green team concluded the exercise in a much less bellicose stance than the Blue.
These observations help to describe differences in team behavior. The differences in attitude may be attributable to another intervening variable which was interjected in order to test another hypothesis. The Green team was subjected to two cost-benefit briefings designed to make their decision-making more systematic than their Blue counterparts. Given their entering assumptions about Soviet activity and potential gain (perceptions that prevailed throughout the exercise), there is a strong suggestion that their behavior was affected by their decision-making style as influenced by the special briefings.

8. In comparing the relative significance of the two issues measured, it is interesting to note that concern for Soviet involvement in the conflict was greater for all three teams for all move periods except for "Zambia" in the pre-game test. Furthermore, the difference in team averages between the two issues increased for all teams over time, indicating that the difference in perceived significance of the issues was increasing with greater focus on Soviet involvement in the conflict.

9. We can now draw a conclusion regarding our third relevant hypothesis. (The first two are discussed in Chapter IV). All three hypotheses imply that perception of Soviet gain is more significant for U.S. policy than perception of Soviet involvement. Moreover, the increased threat of such gains was assumed to lead to increased U.S. involvement. However, in CONEX III, perception of Soviet involvement appeared to dominate discussions, assuming greater significance than perceptions of Soviet gains (even though the latter perceptions were becoming increasingly significant). Finally, these increases did not lead to greater U.S. involvement, nor, for that matter, to any significant change in U.S. policies.
Table 17

GROUP SCORES ON CONEX III QUESTIONNAIRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOVE PERIOD</th>
<th>PREGAME</th>
<th>PERIOD A</th>
<th>CHANGE FROM LAST PERIOD</th>
<th>PERIOD B</th>
<th>CHANGE FROM LAST PERIOD</th>
<th>PERIOD C</th>
<th>CHANGE FROM LAST PERIOD</th>
<th>PERIOD D</th>
<th>CHANGE FROM LAST PERIOD</th>
<th>TOTAL CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1: 5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2: 5.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. BLUE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1: 5.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2: 5.7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. GREEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1: 6.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2: 6.3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SCORES ARE AVERAGE (ARITHMETIC MEAN) OF INDIVIDUAL SCORES
Table 18

INDIVIDUAL SCORES ON CONEX III QUESTIONNAIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>PRE-GAME</th>
<th>PERIOD A</th>
<th>PERIOD B</th>
<th>PERIOD C</th>
<th>PERIOD D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZAMBIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BLUE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREEN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

304
Table 19

TABULATE BY TEAM FOR EACH MOVE PERIOD

(average to one decimal point)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRE-GAME</th>
<th>PERIOD A</th>
<th>PERIOD B</th>
<th>PERIOD C</th>
<th>PERIOD D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1:</td>
<td>27) 5.4</td>
<td>31) 6.2</td>
<td>28) 5.6</td>
<td>38) 7.6</td>
<td>38) 7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2:</td>
<td>28) 5.6</td>
<td>30) 6.0</td>
<td>29) 5.8</td>
<td>32) 6.4</td>
<td>33) 6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1:</td>
<td>41) 5.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>53) 7.6</td>
<td>57) 8.1</td>
<td>61) 8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2:</td>
<td>40) 5.7</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>48) 6.9</td>
<td>51) 7.3</td>
<td>56) 8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 1:</td>
<td>48) 6.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>55) 7.9</td>
<td>57) 8.1</td>
<td>57) 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q 2:</td>
<td>44) 6.3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>47) 6.7</td>
<td>49) 7.0</td>
<td>50) 7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The perception of the team about Soviet and Chinese policy toward the situation in India at this point in CONEX IV is that:

1. Moscow is
   - Behind the trouble
   - Deeply engaged in advantage-seeking
   - Moderately engaged
   - Not very involved
   - Interested in conflict control
   - Not involved

2. Peking is
   - Behind the trouble
   - Deeply engaged in advantage-seeking
   - Moderately engaged
   - Not very involved
   - Interested in conflict control
   - Not involved

(Please put an x at the appropriate point on both scales)
The perception of the team about the prospect of Soviet or Chinese gains in the region of the present conflict at this position in CONEX IV is that:

3. Prospect of Soviet gains are
   - Very threatening to team interests
   - Moderately threatening to team interests
   - Not very threatening to team interests
   - Not at all threatening to team interests

4. Prospect of Chinese gains are
   - Very threatening to team interests
   - Moderately threatening to team interests
   - Not very threatening to team interests
   - Not at all threatening to team interests

(Please put an x on the appropriate point on both scales.)

Monitor comments:
Table VII

U.S. TEAMS' PERCEPTION OF SOVIET/CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN FOMENTING CONFLICT (as seen by monitors)

U.S. GREEN TEAM

U.S. BLUE TEAM

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Table VIII U.S. TEAMS’ PERCEPTION OF PROSPECTIVE SOVIET/CHINESE GAINS IN REGION OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT (as seen by monitors)

U.S. GREEN TEAM

U.S. BLUE TEAM

Time by move period

scale: perceived degree of gain

scale: perceived degree of gain
APPENDIX D - 3

SUMMARY OF POST-QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

CONEX I, II, III, IV
SUMMARY OF POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

Answers to Yes or No Questions (substantive comments have been made use of in the body of the Final Report)

1. U.S. Involvement

Did the game teach or suggest any particular conclusion to you about special problems the U.S. may have in the future if unilateral intervention in local conflict becomes a distinct possibility?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONEX I</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Control of Local Conflict

Did the game teach or suggest anything to you about the priorities, relative order of implementation, or types of actions available to the United States as a means of influencing the outcome of local conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONEX I</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **U.S. Decision-Making**

Did the game teach or suggest anything to you about U.S. decision-making participation, processes, or constraints when the situation is a pre-crisis local conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONEX I</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>77</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Did the game teach or suggest anything to you about the role of arms, arms transfers, arms embargoes, etc., as a means of minimizing (or abetting) violence in LDC's?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONEX I</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[did not deal with arms transfers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Political-Military Gaming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The game was</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very useful</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly useful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very useful</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to me in my professional career
APPENDIX E-1

PARTICIPANT DISSENT FORM
Participant Comment or Dissent to Team Decision
(to be filled out at end of move period in question)

TEAM

__________________________________________

PARTICIPANT

__________________________________________

MOVE PERIOD

__________________________________________

"I do not fully agree with my team's decision on

__________________________________________

for the following reason:"

[Please give to Team Secretary, who will deliver to Game Director]
APPENDIX E-2

STANDARD MESSAGE FORM
CONEX STANDARD MESSAGE FORM

Originating Team Number ________ Restrict distribution to addressee(s)
Clock Time (24 hour) ________ No restriction on distribution within game

FROM: ____________________________
TO: ____________________________
REF: ____________________________

TEXT

For Message Center Use Only

Document Number: __________
Distributed To: Green Blue Pink All (circle)
Time Distributed: __________
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APPENDIX F

A COMPARISON (by A. C. Leiss)
DIFFERING VIEWS OF U.S. POLICY ASSUMPTIONS ON CONFLICT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by

A. C. Leiss

In August 1969, my class at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy took part in a political game, built around a crisis in southern Africa focussed mainly on Zambia. In September 1969, the forth in a series of professional-level games (CONEX IV) conducted by Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield was held at M.I.T., with a scenario that depicted internal conflict in India and potential worsening of Indian-Chinese and Indian-Pakistani relations. In both games, a questionnaire designed to assess assumptions about U.S. priorities was administered to participants before and after the exercise. Five of the questions were similar or identical in both instances. This memorandum will report on the responses of the two groups. (The exact text of the questions used is appended.)

The Fletcher students were primarily first and second year graduate students, approximately half of them on leave from the armed forces* for graduate training; the CONEX IV participants were senior scholars and experts in foreign policy, military strategy, and public opinion.

I. The first question dealt with the proposition that the U.S. would intervene in a developing world conflict if it deemed that U.S. security would be threatened by the likely outcome. The two groups held widely differing views:

*Primarily June 1969 graduates of the Air Force Academy being sent on for an M.A. before taking up active duty.
II. The second questions asked whether the U.S. was likely to intervene if it felt its economic interests would be threatened by the likely outcome:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unrecorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEX IV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEX IV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. The third question asked whether the U.S. would intervene if it felt that indigenous communists would benefit from the likely outcome:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unrecorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEX IV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEX IV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This option was not offered CONEX IV participants.
** In both games, some participants did not fill in a questionnaire or left particular questions blank. In this question in CONEX IV, some words were omitted through typographical error, leading several participants to note that the question was too ambiguous to answer.
IV. The fourth question asked about U.S. intervention in the case of likely Soviet or Chinese benefits. In the student game, the question was put in terms of Soviet and/or Chinese gains; in CONEX IV, the questions were asked separately:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Agree</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Disagree</th>
<th>Unrecorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.U.-CONEX IV</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-CONEX IV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.U.-CONEX IV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-CONEX IV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. The fifth question that was common to the two games dealt with the style rather than the content of U.S. policy. The proposition was that, given ambiguity about the outcome of a developing country conflict, and given great time pressure, the U.S. would act on the assumption that the worst possible outcome was the most likely:

To summarize, before the game, the views of the two groups were:
Thus, before the game began, a majority of the students accepted the propositions that the U.S. would intervene to defend its security interests or to preclude a gain by local communists or the Soviet Union or China; and more students agreed than disagreed that the U.S. would intervene to protect its economic interests and that the U.S. would act on worst assumptions rather than not act at all.

Large majorities of CONEX IV participants rejected most of these propositions. The notable exception was on U.S. action in terms of a Chinese gain, where the 57.9% of CONEX IV participants near the 61.1% of the students who thought the U.S. would intervene if faced with Soviet and/or Chinese gain.

The post-game responses are equally interesting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>CONEX IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Communists</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Gain</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Gain</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the percentages of agreement and disagreement are smaller for the post-game responses (owing in large measure to the relatively large number
of students who did not complete the post-game questionnaire), most of the students who registered opinions continued to support the propositions concerning U.S. security interests, U.S. unwillingness to tolerate victories for local communists or the Soviet Union and/or China, and U.S. preference for action over inaction. On the issue of U.S. intervention to preserve economic interests, the students were evenly divided between agreement and disagreement.

A majority of the CONEX IV participants after the game continued to reject all the propositions except that concerning U.S. intervention to prevent a Chinese victory. Whereas before the game a majority had felt the U.S. would intervene in these circumstances, the group was evenly split after the game.

As noted above, the large number of participants who failed to answer some or all questions on the post-game questionnaire makes it difficult to reach conclusions about the specific impact of the games on perceptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Points Change In Agreement</th>
<th>Points Change In Disagreement</th>
<th>Total Change</th>
<th>Points Change In Unrecorded</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stud.</td>
<td>CONEX</td>
<td>Stud.</td>
<td>CONEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loc. Comm.</td>
<td>-22.2</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-22.2</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sov. Gain</td>
<td>-22.2</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
<td>+15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin. Gain</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>+10.8</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, in the case of the students, the increase in unrecorded views could explain all of the decrease in agreement on security as a motivation for U.S. policy, and all of the change in recorded views on economic interest as a motivation. But on the other question, at least some of the change exceeds in magnitude the change that might be attributable to unrecorded opinions.
On U.S. concern over local communist gains, for example, at least part of the decline in agreement has to be seen as a shift to uncertainty (i.e. no opinion). The fluctuation in views on possible Soviet and/or Chinese gains is a similar, even stronger phenomenon. And increased uncertainty also appeared about the style of U.S. decision-making.

The case of CONEX IV participants is more complex. The changes noted in the questions about U.S. security and economic interests and indigenous communist gains can be explained wholly by the increased number of unrecorded views. On all the other questions (on the Soviet Union, China, and U.S. style) there was a decided shift in opinion--toward disagreement in the first two of these and toward agreement in the latter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change (Excluding Possible Effects of Unrecorded Views)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also differences between the two groups in the intensity with which opinions were held and the effects of the game experience on that intensity. The participants were given a 10-point scale, from -5 to +5 with (in the case of students) 0 representing No Opinion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
<th>+4</th>
<th>+5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-game Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-game Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-game CONEX IV</td>
<td>2 1 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-game CONEX IV</td>
<td>3 1 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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On the issue of security, the movement in opinion during the game was in the same direction in both groups—for the students, toward less strongly held agreement; for the CONEX IV participants, toward more strongly held disagreement.

On the question of economic interest as a prime U.S. concern in
developing-world conflicts, the students' views prior to the game were made up of relatively strongly-held agreement and low-level disagreement. After the game, the views of those in agreement were moderated toward uncertainty, while those in disagreement were somewhat more diffuse in the strength of their opinion. No trend resulting from the game experience is discernible among CONEX IV participants.

Similarly, no strong uniform trend appears for either group on the question of U.S. concern for gains by local communists. However two students were sufficiently uncertain to register "no opinion" ("0") on the post-game questionnaire. Only one student had registered the weakest agreement (+1) and none the weakest disagreement (-1) prior to the game; in the post-game questionnaire, five students recorded opinions in this weak disagreement-no opinion-weak agreement range.

Pre-game student views on U.S. action in the face of probable Soviet or Chinese gains showed two thirds in agreement (11 students). But seven of these eleven fell into only the weak agreement (+1) category. Only one student had no opinion and two recorded weak disagreement (-1). After the game, there is the suggestion that disagreement was reinforced whereas agreement was weakened by a movement toward "no opinion."

CONEX IV participants were asked separately about U.S. action given the prospect of Soviet and of Chinese gains. In both cases, the participants appear to have shifted their views from weak agreement toward weak disagreement.

On the question of U.S. style, both students and CONEX IV participants demonstrated a wide scattering of views from great disagreement to great agreement, with the latter somewhat more likely to hold more
moderately disagreeing views. The game appears to have moderated the views of both groups toward weak disagreement or agreement and, in the case of the students, no opinion.

Too much substantive significance cannot be attached to a comparison of the shifts in the views of the students and the CONEX IV participants. The games dealt with similar types of problems but developed quite differently in detail. For example, in the students' game, the Soviet Union played a much more activist conflict-manipulating role. In CONEX IV, China became a major factor.

Nonetheless, the limited evidence does suggest that views were significantly moderated and in some instances changed by the game experience.

Despite these apparently substantial differences in outlook among the two groups, their basic game strategies were not dissimilar, although the "styles" were in sharp contrast:

In the student game (where the students were not constrained to act as they felt the U.S. government would but could act as they felt the U.S. government should), the U.S. team pursued a policy of no direct unilateral U.S. involvement of any sort. Late in the game, the U.S. team began to explore U.S. involvement in a multilateral (U.N.) action to stabilize the situation.

In CONEX IV (and previous CONEX games), the U.S. teams pursued a policy of no unilateral U.S. involvement and a search for multilateral (U.N. and joint U.S.-Soviet) action to contain the conflict.
A. **Student Question:** In the face of conflict in the developing countries, the United States will intervene directly if it perceives its own security to be threatened by a likely outcome.

**CONEX IV Question:** In a situation of conflict in a developing country, the U.S. is likely in the years immediately ahead to intervene militarily: a) if it perceives the likely outcome as threatening.

B. **Student Question:** In the face of a conflict in the developing countries, the United States will intervene directly if it perceives its economic interests to be threatened by a likely outcome.

**CONEX IV Question:** In a situation of conflict in a developing country, the U.S. is likely in the years immediately ahead to intervene militarily: b) if it perceives the likely outcome as threatening major U.S. economic interests.

C. **Student Question:** In the face of a conflict in the developing countries, the United States will intervene directly if it perceives that the likely outcome will favor indigenous Communists.

**CONEX IV Question:** In a situation of conflict in a developing country, the U.S. is likely in the years immediately ahead to intervene militarily: c) if it perceives the likely outcome as favoring indigenous Communists.

D. **Student Question:** In the face of a conflict in the developing countries, the United States will intervene directly if it perceives that the Soviet
Union and/or China will benefit from the likely outcome.

**CONEX IV Question:** In a situation of conflict in a developing country, the U.S. is likely in the years immediately ahead to intervene militarily: d) if it perceives the likely outcome as favoring the Soviet Union; e) if it perceives the likely outcome as favoring China.

**E. Student Question:** Given the above situation a conflict in the developing world in which the situation is ambiguous as to likely outcome and as to who potentially will benefit and given the need to act quickly or lose the capacity to influence events, the United States will act as though the worst possible interpretation is the most likely.

**CONEX IV Question:** If the potential outcome of such a conflict in a developing country is ambiguous, but if it appears that the U.S. must act quickly or lose the capacity to influence events, the United States will act as though the worst possible interpretation is the most likely.
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