WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UN-

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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INTRODUCTION

This collection of brief essays, written in connection with the United Nations Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grows out of a suggestion originally made to the author when he was associated with the Department of State. It was suggested that appraisals of the future utility and prospects of the UN might benefit from a privately-made estimate of the climate in a few key Western European states whose approach to the UN seemed from a distance to vary in significant ways from that of the United States, particularly as a consequence of the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956.

The present study was prepared following a brief visit to Western Europe in the summer of 1958 by the writer in his capacity as Director of the UN Project. In the course of this trip intensive discussions were held with a number of individuals chosen for their capacity to illuminate the general tone of policy and planning in six Western European countries. Those conferred with included senior officials in the governments, certain key personalities in political life, such as party leaders and members of parliaments, and a number of leading journalists, publicists, and scholars. The purpose was to lay a basis for attempting to understand the present trends and discernible prospects bearing on possible uses of the UN as an instrument of free world policy in the period ahead.

As a sampling of opinion, the views reported herein are clearly in the category of "élite" rather than popular. They are presented here not in the
form of "field report" but as a series of essays drawing on information and impressions received during the trip against a background of general foreign policy and performance, particularly in the UN setting. Above all, it is significant that these people were interviewed, not in the diplomatically exotic and politically unique setting of United Nations headquarters in New York, but in their native habitats, so to speak, where perspectives grow out of the national setting and above all out of the ineluctable realities of domestic politics. By design, a majority of those interviewed were not "UN experts."

Others have explored the public behavior of some of these nations in the UN, and the detailed record is available for those to whom it is of primary interest. The hope in the present endeavor is to try to capture a glimpse of the spirit of policy and planning regarding the UN against as wide a political backdrop as possible, and from this to deduce trends and tendencies if they could be described. Such an "overview" must necessarily be both unscholarly and incomplete. Its value can lie only in such intuitions as it evokes and in the linking of political insights which might otherwise remain isolated.

It is convenient but not wholly accurate to entitle this study "Western Europe." The area covered is, more precisely, "Little Europe" or "The Six" or "The European Community", plus the United Kingdom. This grouping of seven, now joined in the Western European Union, has an explicit territorial, political, and economic significance, and the only difficulty is in choosing a meaningful label for it. The one we have chosen is "Western Europe."

1. Aside from the documentation of the UN itself, studies of national UN policies and performance, generally up to 1955, of Britain, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany are or will be available in the series of National Studies on International Organization currently in process of publication by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.

2. Luxembourg has been omitted from the present study.
Iberia—Spain and Portugal—constitutes a different tradition and politically is a separate story. Austria is technically neutral. Switzerland is traditionally neutral. Ireland has demonstrated its independence of any regional generalities since its admission to the UN in 1955, urging upon the 1957 General Assembly session a distinctly "non-NATO" proposal for disengagement and voting, against the West, both in 1957 and 1958, in favor of discussing the matter of Chinese representation.

The papers which follow are thus designed to speak for themselves and only for themselves. For that matter, one of the beliefs confirmed by this inquiry is that generalizations about even the limited area dealt with are made only at the risk of obscuring important political truths. A distinguished French diplomat who wrote on the same subject in 1948 did speak in such generic terms. He said:

For a European, the United Nations is principally a means of preserving peace... For a European the United Nations is principally considered in relation to the idea of security, which constitutes his primary concern. The failure of the experiment of the League of Nations, in which Europe at one time placed its hopes, has left the European skeptical of international organizations... The European believes that a large part of the activities of the United Nations must be concerned with European problems not only in the interest of Europe, but in the interest of world peace. 3

The reference to the League of Nations is still a valid one, in the sense that Europe—Western Europe—was the chief protagonist in the League but today is only one of many players in the drama of the United Nations. If countries rate the UN in terms of their own relative importance in its scheme of things, it was inevitable that the UN should have been downgraded alongside the European memories of the League; this psychology persists as a specific element in, for example, the French view of the UN.

But history has overtaken M. Fouques-Duparc's estimate in other ways. The countries of Western Europe in this age evaluate the UN above all according to the way they themselves diagnose the great convulsions that are taking place in the underdeveloped and anticolonial areas of the world whose problems and interests have increasingly come to dominate the proceedings of the world organization. This being so, the appraisals of the UN in the six countries under discussion range along a spectrum which is graded according to the fashion in which each country perceives the whole ensemble of tensions that characterize European-Afro Asian relationships. By this method France and Belgium and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom are located along one end of the scale. At its extreme, the view of the UN here is one of stern criticism which tends to comprehend not only specific grievances but also the whole organization and its works. The country concerned is felt to be the victim of the UN's fifteen year trend toward doctrinaire anticolonialism and Afro-Asian ascendency and specifically, in the case of France and Britain, victim of the specific injustices and stupidities visited on their policies by the UN--and, let it never be forgotten, the U.S.--in the Suez crisis of late 1956.

No single country, not even France, which entertains this view to a remarkable degree, exactly fits this stereotype. Aspects of it have of course been visible in New York since 1945 and increasingly with the passage of time. It is of greater interest that on their home grounds the countries that partake to a significant extent in this view tend to exclude the UN from a place of any real significance in their forward planning--planning not only with respect to future relations with the underdeveloped countries, but also planning with respect to other uses of the UN such as its para-military potentialities in situations of limited hostilities, particularly where the great powers need to be excluded if peace and security are to be restored.
At the other end of the scale, in striking contrast, are West Germany and Italy, which have become noncolonial powers and are finding their new status to be profitable both politically and economically. With only a slightly imaginative effort, one can see the Netherlands—once freed of the diplomatic incubus of West New Guinea—in an equivalent posture of at least open-mindedness to new possibilities in the UN that might be of value to present and future national and free world interests. As a phenomenon of political change, the transition of European powers from "colonial" to "noncolonial" needs more study than it has had. To one observer it is as though emancipation from the category of "colonial power" had removed a species of political scales from the eyes of a nation as it looks afresh at its future relationships with the underdeveloped and anticolonial countries of the non-European world. By contrast with France and Belgium, imagination is given relatively uninhibited play at this end of the spectrum as at least some responsible national leaders and planners consider how the UN might be used to further Europe’s relationships with the world of Asia and Africa and Latin America, as well as how it might play a more effective role in the unending propaganda battle between East and West.

England, while still playing out her ancient role as a colonial power, at the same time possesses certain political qualities which might work toward greater future flexibility and accommodation in making use of the UN than is apparent today. Perhaps the most interesting case, as suggested, is the Netherlands, which is in transition. Many of her thoughtful leaders are now looking beyond the limits of the present to the day when West New Guinea will no longer be a centerpiece of Dutch activity in the UN. With important domestic considerations helping to shift the balance, it is almost predictable that Holland will
venture beyond her allies in the search for a new role for the UN that is responsive to political and economic requirements of the world she has seen changed so drastically since World War II.

This image is easily overdrawn. The UN is not a major factor in the foreign policy schemes of any of the Western European countries except at moments of acute crisis, such as Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958, or except with respect to a particular interest that at a given time may assume important national proportions, such as the issue of Indonesia for the Netherlands or, perhaps in the near future, Berlin and reunification for the Germans. But the UN is not a self-starting mechanism. Output is intimately related to input. Much may depend on the extent to which these states, rich in diplomatic energy and political inventiveness, come to see uses for the UN which bear on their emerging interests. Compared with the essentially defensive role these countries have traditionally played in the UN, a role of positive and creative leadership could yield very different political consequences for both the world organization and the Western alliance.

A few other generalizations can be ventured. Certainly one is safe in saying that throughout Western Europe the UN seems distant, even remote, from the average person. Paradoxically, in nonmember Germany the local UN associations are probably more vigorous than in the five other states which are members. Such private organizations are less active in Italy and the United Kingdom, dormant in France, and nonexistent in Belgium.

It can also be generalized that American policy toward Communist China, specifically regarding its seating in the UN, is opposed by virtually all shades of political opinion in these countries. The concession which our closest allies annually make to American opinion in the vote to postpone discussion of this matter in the General Assembly is a wasting asset the overall political cost of which is increasing.
A final generalization rests on somewhat less firm ground. The UN is a significantly partisan issue only in Britain. Yet elsewhere as well as in Britain it receives its most vocal support from the opposition parties, usually Socialist, and from the intelligentsia; conversely, the most vocal criticism comes from the political right. In all of these countries the government is, at least nominally, conservative, but does not always reflect with fidelity the sharply critical view of the UN found on the extreme right. This political phenomenon can be explained in a number of ways. For one thing, the government is required to govern, which usually serves to exclude rather automatically the extravagances of extremism. For another, the civil servants who carry on the day-to-day formulation and execution of policy tend to adopt a more pragmatic and realistic view of their problems which, while it often seems to exclude the capacity for imaginative long-range planning, does usually come to sensible terms with the operative situation, whether in the UN or elsewhere.

The other side of the coin is that the out-of-office advocates of greater uses of the UN are vulnerable to the process of transformation which often changes the reformer into a steward of the status quo once he finds himself entrusted with political responsibility. The Socialist parties of Western Europe command an estimated 100 million votes. Their leaders speak today in terms of more imaginative and constructive uses of the UN, specifically in building bridges between Europe and the world to the South. But only their accession to political power would demonstrate whether other national interests which to many of their compatriots define the UN in terms of hindrance and obstacle, if not as an enemy, remain overriding. Further changes in the colonial relationships could of course end in eliminating one vital sector of
of the European problem in the UN; but its legacy will however persist in residual tensions between Europe and the Afro-Asian nations, and it has yet to be shown whether doctrinaire "internationalism" can transform these relationships, in or out of the UN, any more successfully than it was able to do under the postwar Labor regime in Britain.

The Suez episode, discussed here with respect to each of the six countries, did not alter leadership attitudes in England and France so much as it crystallized the growing sense of betrayal by the UN (and the US) in surrendering the fundamental Western position to Arab-Asian nationalism. As suggested in the first essay, the British perhaps learned a lesson from the Suez fiasco that is still in process of being digested. The French, however, appear to wish only to satisfy themselves that others have now come to appreciate the rightness of the unsuccessful French attempt to stem the tide of Arab nationalism.

At the other end of the spectrum Italy and West Germany profoundly deplored the British-French action as setting back tragically a process of developing new-style relationships for which each of those countries today sees itself as a principal agent. Certainly in Western Europe as a whole the military and diplomatic disaster of Suez inspired many with a new sense of importance and indeed urgency on behalf of creation of a true European community. And in the militarily indefensible and politically modest Netherlands and Belgium (although not yet in the France which is at the moment seeking rather single-mindedly to reestablish her self-image of grandeur) there is an explicit acknowledgment that to be part of a strong and united Europe is also to reestablish the balance in the UN vis-à-vis the Afro-Asian bloc (as well, it might be added, as the balance in NATO vis-à-vis the United States).
There is no attempt here to summarize all of what follows. The reader will be able to draw his own conclusions from this report. He will learn that opinion is far from unanimous, that beneath attitudes of certainty and self-righteousness there may reside obscure feelings of frustration, of humiliation, even of guilt. He will see images of Hitler and Munich transferred to Middle East nationalism with the inevitable result of a certain amount of political and spiritual confusion. One is tempted to borrow the words of Matthew Arnold in epitomizing "colonial" Europe's current role in relation to the UN: "Wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born."

Certainly there is an overgrowth of bitterness and of political anachronism that seems to stifle the kind of creative impulses which are now flowing into the movement for European unity.

Still, beneath the surface there are some symptoms of a longer vision, perhaps as part of the larger European framework, which must in time come to terms with the new political world that history, even now changing the face of Europe, is in process of creating out of the old. There are dangers. The pace will be different for each country, and the virus of nationalism may re-infect once again its ancestral European host. If the Arab world, in the words of Nasser, represents a role in search of a hero, France looks to some like a hero in search of a role, and Italy and Germany could once again come to know that process.

The capacity of Europe to make effective use of the UN in the years ahead is a function of the UN's capacity to advance what Europe conceives to be its interests. In the final analysis of course Europe's interests can only be interpreted by Europeans. But at the same time the position of the United States is central to the whole process. The American role in the UN has in part been
defined by the defensive posture of its European allies on colonial issues. Our task has been conceived, correctly in the author's estimation, as one of seeking to moderate the pace and tempo of the non-Western revolution which we hitherto have seen as being played out against the backdrop of a relatively static Europe. Both the American and the European roles may be changing. Our UN policies and stances have often appeared to the Europeans as basically unsympathetic to their interests, but without eliciting the political profit from the non-European world which our policies presumably deserved. New stresses and strains as between ourselves and our Western European allies in the UN will almost predictably arise when the moratorium ends on the Chinese representation question, doubtless soon after a Labor government attains power in Britain.

In any event, the immediate future holds promise only of transition and of fresh definition of European interests in the light of unfolding realities. For these several reasons it is doubly important that European policy once again acquire confidence in the stability and vigor of American leadership, both within the Western coalition and in the UN. Europe, even while recovering its sense of identity and inventing new forms of political action, will require in the period ahead far more of an American effort to understand, to look ahead, and to lead.
THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

Five days after the Dumbarton Oaks conversations were concluded in Washington in the fall of 1944, the following observation was made by Great Britain's foremost newspaper:

The mere existence of a quarrel, or of the grievance of some small State against a mighty neighbor, will concern the Council only in the unlikely event of peace appearing in peril. The organization will exist rather for security as such than for justice as such, and will, it seems, leave less doubt on this point than did its Geneva precursor.¹

British wartime expectations about the UN tended to place considerably more emphasis on security than on justice, perhaps because experience had made Englishmen skeptical about such thorny abstractions as international "justice" compared with their more ingenuous cousins across the sea who were to write this notion into the Charter at San Francisco the following year.

Expectations as to security were of course to be dashed on both sides of the Atlantic as the Cold War came to block Western hopes for a new international order of stability and peace-keeping machinery. But for the British the kind of UN that did in fact substitute for their hopes was especially unsatisfactory. The real-life UN seemed to them to represent a forum dedicated to hasty and ill-advised alterations in relations between the West and the world of former and present Western dependencies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This trend went far during the first eleven years to confirm earlier British misgivings toward an organization in which those

¹ London Times, October 12, 1944.
relationships, and in particular British colonial rule, were to be subjected to what seemed to them fundamentally irresponsible and unconstructive public criticism.²

This fact should be taken in conjunction with another one even more basic to an understanding of Britain's attitude toward the UN. Unlike any other country of Western Europe, in England the UN is a serious domestic party issue. This assertion is tempered by yet a third fundamental fact. The British public—except at moments of genuine crisis—can only be described as bored by the UN. Yet this popular indifference serves to encourage the attitudinizing on the UN issue that has become characteristic of partisan discussions. The partisan cleavage in its present form did not begin with Suez; but Suez was the event which posed the issues on a wide national basis.

What underlies this curious situation, and what is its meaning for the future of the UN? Let us consider first the larger context in which British-UN relations acquire meaning.

Britain, the UN, and History

The British outlook, so far as the UN is concerned, is a function both of the British past and the British future. Britain today is at a critical junction point between the two. New directions for British policy are becoming visible, but the vision is obscured, as in all history, by the continuing momentum of what has gone before. In her responses to the changing world Britain today finds herself circumscribed by her past but mindful of

a newer order of things. Her imperial role is all but gone, her strategic brotherhood with America is still strong but shaken, and her internal order—especially the collection of traditional ways and institutions lumped under the label of The Establishment—is undergoing relentless alteration. She is already exploring some of the newer pathways, collaborating with yesterday's colonies within an unrecognizably new Commonwealth, moving toward hitherto unacceptable economic ties with the European continent, and reversing one hundred and eighty-two years of history by declaring with every new diminution on Christmas Island her independence of the United States.

All of these elements have a profound bearing on Britain's relations with the UN. The categories of the past have up to now made the UN, for Britain, a place where Europe collided with the anticolonial world in a losing battle, the cruelest feature of which was the sense of American pressure that ruled out any real chance of holding fast against the tide. So long as the American alliance was the cornerstone of British security—as it still is—and Europe and the Commonwealth the prime foci of British political strength—as they still are—the UN has had little to offer Britain of positive interest. The Churchillian vision of world unity built upon the pillars of effective regional association, all under the stately direction of the Great Powers, has yielded to the various realities of the postwar world, no single one of which could be defined as consonant with the traditional British vision of the world and her place in it.

Britain has thus been torn between the agony of a defensive retreat from her old colonial areas and the preoccupying network of new relations with the Commonwealth, the US, and Europe. But even this last set of issues impinged on the UN picture at many points. For example, relations with
India require acute attention to the UN setting which India and its fellows find as congenial for their purposes as Britain finds it often uncongenial. Britain's estimate of the UN has more and more reflected an unsureness about the directions in which she is actually moving. This is often concealed from the naked eye because British policies in the UN, like those of the United States, have tended to reflect the older strategies while time and events could do their work of eventual modernization.

The "Basic" British View of the UN

Winston Churchill was speaking for many of his fellow countrymen when, nine months after Suez, he said, "It is certain that if the UN General Assembly continues to take its decisions on grounds of enmity, opportunism or merely jealousy and petulance, the whole structure may be brought to nothing."

Hugh Gaitskell, in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard shortly after Suez, said on this very point that recommendations of the General Assembly carry powerful moral obligations for all nations "provided these are taken by really large majorities." Such numerical majorities are of course the very features of the UN scene which British critics of the UN


most deplore as meaningless and often downright harmful. With the British landings still in the headlines, Mr. Gaitskell asserted in the same lecture that force is illegal, even as a last resort, if it is not in actual defense against armed attack. 5

It is instructive that about five weeks before the Suez attack Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, in addressing the UN General Assembly, described the reality of the UN with a balance that is only now returning to English political comment:

> But so far as the United Nations in its present state of development is concerned, it is unfair to blame it as an institution for its shortcomings. Any blame there may be must be attributed to the member states who collectively constitute the strength or the weakness of the United Nations.

At the same time, Mr. Lloyd epitomized the keen British sense of injustice about the UN which was to be actually experienced only a month later when Hungary and Suez became politically juxtaposed:

> And, above all, if there grows up the belief that the Assembly has two standards, one for the law-abiding, one for those who are influenced by its views, and another standard less stringent for those who treat it with indifference, the Assembly will never build up its authority in the world.

Selwyn Lloyd on the eve of Suez was perhaps more representative of the overall British view of the UN than were the spokesmen for the two parties after Suez. This conclusion is supported by interviews held with leading government and non-governmental figures, on the basis of which it is possible to sketch out several composite sets of beliefs and attitudes toward the UN


which could be said to represent elite opinion in Britain toward the UN. These may possibly offer clues to responsible British attitudes toward the UN which may be expected in the period immediately ahead. The composites are three: first, a basic British attitude, and second and thirdly, conservative and liberal-socialist attitudes.

The first, overall, composite draws on present governmental thinking, moderate Conservative party opinion, and an important segment of Labor party opinion. It would not comprehend the detailed views of party ideologues such as Gaitskell or Hailsham, or of isolated intellectual circles, or of dedicated professionals in the UN field; but even among these some of the fundamental attitudes are shared.

The overall composite confirms what modern British history surely suggests: that the basic British approach toward the UN is above all pragmatic, not theoretical or abstract or idealistic. "Does the UN appear to be serving British interest well or badly?" is the prime question. The US of course has occasion to ask itself the same question with respect to American interests. But by contrast to the rather less sentimental British frame of mind, American policy toward the UN is seen by the British as doctrinaire and slogan-ridden. (This difference was once summed up by the English anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer when he observed that the US approaches institutions as though they were machines, to be developed through tinkering and the application of the laws of mechanics. The British view institutions as though they were trees: works of nature whose growth is organic, to be brought along only by judicious watering, pruning, and, above all, patience.7)

Along with its pragmatic frame of mind, a strong strain of isolationism persists in the British outlook (strong enough to have produced after the Dunkirk evacuation and the fall of France the perverse reaction of "Thank God now we can get on with it ourselves.") Against the background of modern British diplomatic history, this isolationist strain produces a nostalgia not only for remembered British greatness but also for the remembered capacity to play an independent role of "balancer" in the international configuration of power. And indeed a realistic understanding of the role of power in world politics strongly conditions Britain's skepticism about the increasing role of the UN General Assembly, sustains her attachment to great power (as opposed to parliamentary) diplomacy, and magnifies her sense of frustration in the face of declining ability to act independently of America and of Europe.

Seen this way, the limitations within which Britain must tailor her policies to those of her allies, limitations exemplified by the UN and indeed by the whole network of mutual relationships with the US and Western Europe, represent an obscure form of humiliation forced upon Britain by her desperate need for economic viability and by her inability to meet the material requirements for successfully applying military power in the contemporary world.

Within this general framework British leadership displays three major characteristics: a grudging acceptance of the UN not only as a political necessity but also, at least in its origins, a profound concession to the idealistic Americans; a nostalgia for a more independent role, creating a frame of mind which both subconsciously and, on occasion, explicitly resents a coequal role for those only recently portrayed as "lesser breeds without
the law"; and perhaps most significant in the actual day-to-day operations of international society, a deep-seated conviction that Britain is profoundly-right in her basic foreign policy attitudes, and that consequently the most important if not the only function of the UN is to "educate" others about the rightness of the British course. If this complex of attitudes can be summarized, perhaps it would add up to agreement with the aphorism of Lord Palmerston one hundred and ten years ago that England has no perpetual friends and no natural enemies, but eternal interests.

It is here that the picture needs to be differentiated. For although perhaps all shades of opinion in the center of the "leadership" spectrum share to some degree the latter point of view, its relevance to the range of problems commonly denominated "colonial" requires that more detailed distinctions be made.

**View from the Right**

In the right hand side of the spectrum, perhaps unanimously in the high ranks of the civil service, even among those who will permit themselves words like "lunacy" and "schizophrenic" when speaking of Sir Anthony Eden at the time of Suez, one finds the most articulately expressed attitude of complete certainty in the rectitude of British colonial policy, and equal certainty that its critics are ignorant, misguided, or even vicious. 8

8. As the Marquess of Salisbury recently stated it in print, "...to most Englishmen, the record of Britain in the colonial field during the last century ranks as one of great achievement; and their only doubt is not whether the pace of constitutional advance has been too slow, but whether it has not been too fast; whether these peoples have yet quite grown up; whether they are really ready for independence; and whether, for them, independence may not mean the end of liberty." *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 405.
supreme confidence behind this conviction produces what might be called a "reform school" theory of the UN, in which the latter is seen above all as a means of edifying others as to what Britain considers right and proper in the realm of colonial policy. Put another way, it is the theory the UN is useful only to the extent that it enables the United Kingdom to convince others of the correctness of her case and the need to support it. The emotional intensity of high Government officials in justifying British overseas rule on grounds of moral philosophy—the goal of freedom for the individual, but not necessarily for the "state"—is matched only by their irritation with those who may not view it in the same light and who therefore require "education." The British task, in this view, is to get its ideas across primarily to its allies but also to others. Thus, where criticism continues to outweigh approbation, as with colonial issues in the UN setting, that organization loses its value as a prime instrument of policy for Britain.

Of those conferred with, only one administrator of a British trust territory admitted to finding any positive value in the UN's operational concern for dependent territories. This value, albeit grudgingly expressed, was in terms of "keeping the administering authority up to the mark" through having to submit periodic progress reports to the UN. This official added that UN visiting missions to trust territories have been useful educational experiences for, e.g., Indian members, giving the latter an opportunity to see the problems at first hand, the consequence of which is sometimes to moderate their otherwise abstract polemics. But on balance, even this official could see no contribution to the welfare of the territory itself either by the UN or indeed by the whole apparatus of international concern.
This is not too different from the assertions by other government officials that the UN is a purely negative force in colonial affairs, having the dubious value of educating the anti-colonial nations as to the nature of responsibility and reality. The interesting thing is that precisely the same statement was privately made by a former member of the Labor shadow cabinet.9

The Conservative party, recognizing that the British public while perhaps bored with the UN is possibly somewhat better disposed toward it than the immediate post-Suez reaction indicated, tempers its criticism by asserting the desire to make the UN work as an effective instrument for carrying out (British) foreign policy. At the moment, the UN is seen almost unanimously in conservative circles as a "hindrance" to British policy. Nonetheless, the UK must use it as best it can. Since the UN is a failure when it comes to protecting British security interests—Foreign Office officials in private conversations state flatly that "no account" is taken of the UN in considering British security interests—one might look for major British efforts to strengthen and improve the organization toward this end. On the contrary, there appears no likelihood of a British move in this direction from the Tory side, perhaps because the latter's somewhat emotional sense of political estrangement from the UN is fortified by a realistic awareness of the difficulties of strengthening the UN in the ways it favors. The difficulty of initiating reforms in the security field are underscored by the

9. The theory of the UN as an "inciter to riot" in colonial areas, a theory advanced by, inter alia, South African and Belgian publicists, is at least in part apparently shared by the group which prepared Britain and the United Nations, op. cit., see p. 267.
change in postwar power relations which, as pointed out elsewhere, make modern Britain a "consumer" rather than a "producer" of security. 10

Responsible Conservatives now say that outright hostility to the UN is to be found only in fringe groups in the right wing of British politics, and certainly such hostility is not generally typical of governmental thinking. One of the leaders of the Conservative party privately counts only 12 "die-hard Suez men" in the House of Commons, and insists that the UN is not really a party issue. At the same time, ever since Suez it has been extraordinarily difficult, to take one example, to secure Conservative signatures on petitions and public letters in favor of the UN. The only readily available Conservative well wishers tend to be considered "dissidents" by party regulars. As one Tory politician put it, the anti-UN wound of Suez has temporarily healed, but it could reopen at any time. Still, the Eden tradition of international conference diplomacy remains strong, despite its author's aberrations in 1956. Equally strong is the impulse to seek the light at the end of the international tunnel. Among the Tory constituency one can find a significant stratum in the English middle class which reacts uneasily to what seem to be anti-UN policies and attitudes. If some British minds operate on the basis of Real politik, there are active women's groups, for instance, which function as at least a potential restraint, not to say corrective.

But having said all this, one must still conclude that in its planning the Government places a very low priority on the UN in the unfolding of British foreign policy in the period ahead, discounts almost entirely its value in the fields of security, and tends to consider it a positive menace in the realm of colonial affairs. Even in the area of pacific settlement of disputes, Foreign Office officials confess privately that Sir Gladwyn Jebb's extraordinary "speech offensive" in the US in 1950 and 1951 in favor of enhanced peaceful settlement

10. Ibid., p. 46.
powers for the UN not only was—as we know—a tactic to offset the negative British position on the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, but—which was till a matter of curiosity—reflected no genuine official interest in augmented pacific settlement activity, and has not been followed up at all.

View from the Left

The stereotype on the left-hand side of the spectrum is considerably more complicated. For one thing, the assertions of a party out of power frequently bear no resemblance to its policies once it is required to take over responsibility. More intrinsically, Labor party attitudes on the subject of the UN divide between the "softs" and the "toughs" far more than within Tory leading circles. And finally, the Labor party is intimately involved with the internationalist commitments which both Socialism and the intelligentsia in general have characteristically made in our time. Rightist critics in England no less than elsewhere tend to lump together the whole ensemble. Their allegations are familiar ones on the European scene: the left-wing has "captured" the British UN Association, and the UN is sponsored only by the "socialist intelligentsia."

In fact, the British UN Association was bitterly divided over the Suez action and still includes many staunchly right-wing elements, which, according to a leading member, carry equal weight with the leftists in the Association councils. Certainly one hears few echoes amidst the disillusionment of the postwar years of the position asserted in 1946 by a Laborite Minister of State, that Britain is "determined to use the institutions of the United Nations to kill power politics."

The Labor party itself is divided as between the intelligentsia and Transport House, perhaps not so sharply as in Harold Laski's time, but enough to identify Mr. Gaitskell as representative of the "softs" and Aneurin Bevan--his putative Foreign Secretary--as leader of the "toughs." Foreign policy in Great Britain tends to become national and not partisan, but Aneurin Bevan is not necessarily Ernest Bevin; he is more of a Lloyd George, and is expected by many to be significantly more parochial in his outlook toward Europe and, it is deduced, the UN. Thus, what will probably give definition to Socialist policy is the likelihood that the more tough-minded and nationalistic Labor leaders will dominate the internationalist wing in a future Labor Government.

Still, Aneurin Bevan, on the record, is by no means anti-UN: "It is in the United Nations and its Charter that the chief hope for peace lies." In the same article Bevan spelled out a philosophy which would indicate greater
use of the UN to cultivate the areas with the closest economic ties to Britain, probably at the expense of relations with areas without such ties, e.g., the United States. It is entirely possible that a Labor Government will pay for greater support of the UN in the coin of lessened conformity with American policies. In reverse, this is the stratagem of which the US stood accused in British eyes at the time of Suez, and indeed throughout the entire Middle East argument.

It was mentioned earlier that high civil servants and Conservative politicians alike rather completely discount the capacity of the UN to affect British security except perhaps in an invidious sense. But the putative Defense Secretary in the Labor shadow cabinet, George Brown, is regarded as "tough" on security issues; he is considered most unlikely to encourage UN "interference" with British vital strategic interests if and when he takes office.

A curious sequence of events at the time of Suez complicates further the image of Labor party attachment to the UN and may explain some of its paradoxical features. In the early hours of the Suez crisis the Labor "Shadow Government" issued several public declarations, none of which mentioned the UN Charter. The pacifist wing of the Party, profoundly uninterested in the security provisions of the Charter, nonetheless was quick to remedy the early omission and to invoke other Charter provisions in order to establish potent and "objective" moral and legal grounds for opposing the Government at a moment when British troops were under fire. The Tory counterreaction was, for this as well as for other reasons, hostile to the UN. In the words of

one Labor party official, his party is consequently "stuck" with supporting the UN and its Charter, whatever their defects.

This should not be interpreted as denying the sharpness of policy differences between Government and Opposition. It does, however, throw light on another feature of British—and European—policies toward the UN: widespread popular ignorance of the facts about the UN and consequent public vulnerability to prejudice and bias. According to one Labor party leader, many in England who had never before even heard of Article 51 of the Charter immediately became experts and quoted it in extenso in justifying the Government's action in Egypt in 1956. In its own way each side became both the inciter and the victim of what Canning once called "the fatal artillery of public excitation."

Whatever the sequence of events and whatever the motivation at the time of Suez, clearly the Labor party is inclined to a decidedly more "liberal" view toward the UN's potentialities. (Indeed, some Labor spokesmen privately express concern that the US, for all its genuflections to the UN and the role of law in the world, is actually hostile to the UN.) The genuine differences in attitudes spring from a number of profound differences in the way the two sides tend to view such fundamental questions as the decline of British power and overseas rule, the true nature of the indigenous forces at work in the Middle East and Africa, and the morality of continued "colonial" rule of overseas possessions. If the Socialists are, loosely and selectively speaking, the heirs of Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Lloyd George, the Tories share the legacy of Burke, Disraeli, and Winston Churchill. The American alliance is prized by the Conservatives above all, it would seem, for its assurance of solidarity among the dominant powers of the West, with an
Implicit philosophy perhaps best expressed by Plato when he wrote

Is it not a simple fact that in any form of government revolution always starts from the outbreak of internal dissention in the ruling class? The constitution cannot be upset so long as that class is of one mind, however small it may be.

In this frame of mind every deviation by the United States in support of the non-Western forces of the Middle East and Africa is seen as a betrayal of one's class, certainly the most deplored of all classic social crimes in England. Labor's spokesmen believe history to be on the side of the anti-colonial movement, however much they may regret its excesses and the personalities such as Nasser who are riding its tides. They believe, for example, that Britain cannot and should not remain as a foreign presence in the Middle East, and consequently they see the UN as a useful agency in helping to usher Britain out of the region with minimum loss and national humiliation. More than that, they wish to see established more durable and "democratic" relations with Middle East countries, in the process rejecting the black-and-white conservative portrayal of Nasser as the "enemy" and the pashas as the "friends."

It should not be supposed that a UN role for the Middle East is purely a partisan issue. Even apart from more recent developments ending in UN action in Lebanon and Jordan, Viscount Montgomery, for example, recommended in May of 1957 that the UN General Assembly should guarantee the territorial integrity of the Middle Eastern countries, thus relieving Britain of further military responsibilities. 13 But a sharp demarcation line does exist

between the two positions. (There is a curious imbalance between the "realism" that many British believe they show with respect to Communist China and their dominant attitude toward other revolutionary forces at work in the noncommunist world. In the same month—February 1958—when a poll in the US showed 66% opposed to seating Communist China in the UN with only 17% in favor, the British figures were 51% in favor and 21% opposed.)

The lines are perhaps sharpest when it comes to viewing the UN as an agency for large-scale economic planning and operations. Labor explicitly urges that the UN be used as the prime instrument for the financing of economic development of underdeveloped countries. At the least it should be used to channel bilateral aid to the recipient. Conservative opposition to this philosophy is depicted by Labor as evidence of the Tory anti-UN bias (although it is reminiscent of the similar reluctance of the US Republican administration, which since the time of Suez has certainly never been accused by the British of having an anti-UN bias). Thus the Labor party is on record in favor of SUNFED, expanded UN Technical Assistance, and similar multilateral undertakings. But it appears to be doctrinaire with respect to the program, not necessarily with respect to the framework. The UN is the best way, but next best would be a Colombo Plan framework expanded to accommodate the US and wider Commonwealth representation.

If Britain is in a minority position in the UN today, and if indeed the West as a whole will be in a minority position tomorrow, the pro-UN spokesmen see such positive programming as essential to maintain and develop political support. This attention to the positive possibilities of the UN, given

Unpublished British poll. (There was an interesting shift of opinion on this matter shortly after Suez, both inside and outside the Government. Some of those strongly opposed to US policy seemed to become aware of the hazards in buttressing further the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN. There is, however, evidence that criticism of US policy once again predominates.)
constructive Western policies, finds favor in independent British thinking today. As The Economist put it:

"The UN is the best world forum we have. To flout it, or worse, to boycott it, would be to turn down innumerable opportunities of exerting influence.... It may be easier for a nation that finds itself condemned by the great majority of its fellows to shed some of its illusions.... What would be inexcusable would be to pretend that the assembly does not exist and to throw away the opportunities it offers for aligning national policy with the policies of as many other nations as possible—or at least, when that course is barred, for explaining national policy with sincerity and patience to a unique audience whose members, whatever else divides them, have a general interest in peace."

Suez, the UN, and the US

The conclusions which many responsible (and irresponsible) Britons drew from the UN's performance in the dual crises of October-November 1956 had a special poignancy in the light both of the earlier expectations and the already disturbing realities about the UN. The frustration of the Suez attack was, to many, final proof that British security was deemed irrelevant by the UN (to say nothing of the US) even when the most profound vital British interests were at stake. And if security was ill-served, justice fared even worse, in British eyes, when one compared with the clamant international pressures on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw, the unwillingness of the UN similarly to punish the Soviet Union for her transgressions in Hungary.

On this last score it is by no means as clear in Britain as, say, in France, that beneath the fierce talk there existed a real willingness to

15. The Economist, December 1, 1956, p. 760.
send a UN force into Hungary in response to the appeal of the short-lived Nagy Government, with the possibly fateful consequences fear of which deterred the US from following such a course.

But even if the Hungarian comparison still being made by responsible Britons is taken purely as a debating point—which is what it essentially is—the confusion of factors which brought about the cease-fire and withdrawal from Egypt still encourages many British to assign the blame first of all to the UN (and secondly to the US.) Those who should know say that Harold Macmillan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was "single-handedly responsible" for the Cabinet decision to abort the Suez operation, on the ground of a potentially disastrous run on sterling. It is impossible to assign an accurate weight to this factor compared, for example, with the effect on Washington of Soviet threats—which few Europeans took seriously—and the consequent effect on the UN of Washington's determination to end hostilities. But whether completely rational or not, the UN is seen by those who supported the Suez operation as the primary villain.

What of the acute break with multilateralism, however temporary, that Suez represented? Could it happen again? In Tory circles one will travel far to find any serious questioning of the moral and political worth of the Suez operation; only the tactical failures are feelingly criticised and deplored. Self-doubt may lurk beneath, but on the surface one often finds the inevitable surrogate for self-doubt—assignment of blame to the U.S. Actually, the defections within the Commonwealth at the time of Suez represented an even more traumatic psychic wound; and perhaps for that reason are rarely talked about. Indeed, officials concerned with Commonwealth Relations say that Suez, as such, was never discussed in Commonwealth meetings afterward,
and by the middle of 1957 the defects of the UN Charter could be discussed among the Commonwealth Prime Ministers with only the most oblique reference to the events of 1956.\textsuperscript{16}

Mention has been made of the readiness of senior government officials, in private conversation, to apply the language of psychopathology in speaking of Sir Anthony Eden's attempted solution by force. (Foreign Office officials, incidentally, are prepared to swear under oath that the UK Delegation to the UN in mid-October 1956 was totally in the dark with regard to Mr. Eden's military plans. Since various dates for such action were publicly rumored from time to time during that period, this is taken to mean that the UK delegation had no knowledge of any firm plan nor of the timing of the proposed operation.) In the political center this opinion is not uncommon, and indeed influential journalists predict freely that if it were realized that at least in theory Britain can get along without Middle East oil, it will be appreciated that even if the oil "lifeline" is again jeopardized Britain would "never do it again." On the Labor side, it is considered unthinkable that a Suez could happen under a Socialist Government. But a former Socialist Cabinet official significantly added to this prediction the ironic words: "without American support." On balance, one is inclined to go along with a wise European journalist who concludes that the British have "learned far more" from Suez than the French, (who continue to blame the US without any very evident self-doubts).

One consequence of the Suez experience is an unmitigated private bitterness and hostility on the part of some Conservative leaders toward the US

Secretary of State. The reasons for this have been voluminously reported and documented elsewhere. Curiously enough, Labor leadership, even while applauding the American dedication to "principle" in opposing the Suez action, appears equally critical of Mr. Dulles but on different grounds: his lack of appreciation, in their eyes, for the psychological niceties of a mutually sustaining relationship. The reference made earlier in this paper to the generalized British sense of loss and diminution of stature, even among "internationalist" circles, is underscored by a high Opposition figure's rather plaintive observation that Mr. Dulles speaks with genuine flattery only of Germany. This top-level Labor view sees the Anglo-American entente as fundamentally unsatisfactory because the US is able to act alone and the UK is not.

Europe and the Regional Formula

British attachment to regional arrangements as a prime basis for multilateral security was of course reflected in Mr. Churchill's wartime proposals that the UN should be built upon the "legs" of regional organizations. Churchill spelled this thought out in 1948:

...there should be several regional councils, august but subordinate... these should form the massive pillars upon which the world organization would be founded in majesty and calm.  

This proclivity has always been in the background, during a period when reliance on the UN very quickly gave way to reliance on US power. But now even the latter poses some question. British defense planners have been recently letting it be known that in the light of new Soviet military capabilities

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they do not feel they could count on America's willingness, when the chips were down, to apply her nuclear power in defense of what might appear to be predominantly British interests. It is of more than passing interest that Mr. Duncan Sandys, Mr. Churchill's son-in-law and presently Defense Minister, was the first secretary of the European movement. Taking strategic uncertainty about American power together with the disillusionment about the UN as a security instrumentality, British eyes may increasingly turn toward Europe as the natural partner in defense during the years ahead; at the moment, this is the view of only a minority on the Conservative side.

In this tendency British advocates of a greater "Europe" have not only overcome the historic British view of the continent and especially France as the traditional enemy (as late as 1935 British coastal artillery personnel readily explained to this writer that their guns were laid in a way to fulfill their primary mission—defense against France). They have also overcome their own earlier argument that commitments vis-à-vis the Commonwealth prevented closer association with the European Movement. According to prominent Conservatives today, the economic viability of Britain and her Commonwealth relationships remain as governing priorities; but there is no longer a sure sense that involvement with Europe would automatically conflict with those priorities. Indeed, some suggest that the Commonwealth argument was primarily a rationale for inaction, now found to be unnecessary. While the British-sponsored Free Trade Zone failed to come into being, concessions by the Common Market nations have the same effect at least temporarily in terms of reconciling the Commonwealth preferential tariff system with British relationships with the European venture.
Labor attitudes toward Europe, regionalism and the UN, are quite different. Being less enthusiastic than the Tories about NATO as a prime framework for future British security, Socialist leaders oppose the use of European regional machinery for activities in underdeveloped countries on the ground that such machinery is tainted by association with NATO. But, more basically, Labor has displayed little enthusiasm for the concept of Britain as a part of "Europe" because without Socialist government in power throughout Europe the Socialist program in England might be jeopardized. This was particularly the case from 1947 to 1950 when the Labor Government was in office, but it still conditions the Labor position. Labor spokesmen concede "Europe's" growth in popularity in Britain, particularly by contrast to the UN. Yet their approach to Europe is still hesitant and reluctant, and perhaps on balance this is the attitude of the majority of Englishmen. One shrewd Labor politician characterized the Conservative position as a combination of disillusionment with the Commonwealth and distrust of the US, combining to produce a love affair with Europe on the rebound. This is, as noted, a partial truth only.

One possible development for the future is an evident interest, particularly in the Government, in the possibility of forging organic links between regional organizations in the non-Communist world. This concept is superficially reminiscent of Secretary Dulles' suggestion along these lines at the NATO meeting in December 1957. Mr. Dulles at the same time disclaimed any

intention of creating a world network in competition with the UN, but no such dilemma disables the British. To the extent that the notion of "interdependence" is accepted, Britain is still looking for congenial international frameworks for the controlled development of that concept. The background of this trend is worth summarizing: an inclination toward regional rather than global approaches to security; a sense that Britain is in a permanent minority position in the world and must—as at times in her past—live with dignity and style, however unpopularly, within that role rather than necessarily seek ways to change and somehow adapt to the majority position; and a consequent discounting of the UN as a useful agency for advancing British interests.

Regionalism and Commonwealth have, in the general British view, proved their worth to British interests, and, beyond that, they have proved their worth in doing some of the jobs the UN was set up to do. Officials of the Commonwealth Relations Office believe that quiet diplomacy "within the family" has been more effective with respect to Kashmir and Indian-Pakistani-South African relations—both long-time UN cases—than the more public type of diplomacy in the UN which, in their eyes, has exacerbated both matters.

As for regionalism, Foreign Office planners are particularly struck by the possibilities of the kind of inter-regional "interdependence" cited above.

Britain and the Future of the UN

Perhaps because a whole range of British political and strategic estimates are undergoing a major evolution, however quietly, British vision regarding the possible future uses of the UN to advance her interests tends to be somewhat clouded. There is a profound silence on this subject today, extraordinary by contrast with the drastic suggestions employed by many Britons after Suez
to vent their load of frustration and humiliation. It did not take very long for informed people to regain their sense of the limitations in reform that are imposed by political reality.

There are, however, some substantive issues that do arouse British comment. The burden of national security falls heavily indeed on modern Britain, and for this reason she looks with fairly intense interest and hope to the continuing disarmament discussions held under the auspices of the UN. Here, if anywhere, the UN has a positive appeal and value to British interests. Elsewhere in the realm of security little creative thinking is being done, perhaps because even apart from basic skepticism toward the UN as a security agency, there is a built-in resistance to half-way and unsatisfactory procedures that would nonetheless tie British hands for the future. British lack of enthusiasm for the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950 carried with it the premonition that, as actually came to pass in 1956, it might be invoked against Great Britain. Today it is referred to in Conservative circles as "diabolical."

For the same reasons, there is no enthusiasm such as one can find, for example, in Canada, for a permanent UN force akin to UNEF. UNEF itself has come to be valued surprisingly highly, but the national habit of pragmatism and of ad hoc solutions to problems as they arise persuades many responsible British in and out of government that the existence of a standing UN force would constitute a "temptation" to the "irresponsible" nations to use it, perhaps at the expense of the "minority" in which Britain chooses to see herself. On the other hand, the UK gave generous support to President Eisenhower's proposal to the UN Emergency Assembly in August 1958 for a "stand-by" UN peace force, perhaps because no satisfactory future could be seen for the British

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troops flown into Jordan the month before. Beginning with the referral of the Palestine impasse to the UN in 1947, Britain has now had several experiences, some happy and others, like Palestine, highly unappreciated, of UN substitution for British power in liquidating untenable commitments. Indeed the persistent feeling that the UN failed really to take Palestine off the British back strongly conditions London's reactions to proposals that the UN "take over" Cyprus, for example.
In nonconservative and nongovernment circles, however, there are frequent proposals for greater use of international instrumentalities. The Economist has advanced some particularly thoughtful suggestions for a system of "select committees" which could bridge the gap between the overworked—but invaluable—Secretary General and the quite unmanageable Assembly.²⁰ But, as even Mr. Gaitskell pointed out, the future of the UN depends not on changes in machinery but on the policies adopted by the leading democratic powers.²¹

Regarding the Secretary General, the Tories are convinced that Mr. Hammarskjold was definitely prejudiced in favor of Egypt in the 1956 crisis. From this they conclude that the way to avoid having any Secretary General act ultra vires is to return to the long-favored, time-tested concept of limited, controlled diplomacy, which in the UN can only mean the Security Council. (Students of British diplomatic history will recall the model of self-effacement set in the League of Nations by Britain's one contribution to the post of Secretary General: Sir Hugh Drummond.)

Others, however, see great value in the Secretary General's role, one publication comparing it to that of a titular feudal monarch empowered with, at a minimum, Bagehot's sovereign's "right to warn."²² Further to the left, one finds appeals for an expanded role for the SYG in his indispensable role of "third-party" in deadlocked disputes.

²⁰ The Economist, April 13, 1957, p. 110. See also the extremely penetrating articles about the UN in that issue, also the issues of December 1, 1956, and January 26, March 16, March 30, September 14, and December 28, 1957.

²¹ Hugh Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 37.

On the evidence, one may well look for movement in British policy in the direction of greater regional and interregional affiliation perhaps at the serious expense of the UN. It can be anticipated that British planners, in seeking to fabricate more stable ties with the new nations of Africa and Asia, would look first to the Commonwealth and second to expansion of Colombo Plan type programs, perhaps accompanied by informal consultations with Europe, the US, and even the new groupings that are emerging in the form of a greater Arabia, the Mahgreb, Black Africa, etc. In this type of development the UN is seen as playing only a minor role so long as Britain regards herself and is regarded as a colonial power. In time, as that label becomes not only obsolescent but obsolete, Britain may discover that she shares unexplored interests with a far greater number of nations than at present. But the tide is still in the other direction, and the trend toward a lessened British commitment to global organization was significantly symbolized in a little-noticed unilateral British action in April 1957, quietly but sharply restricting still further the terms of her acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.23

But events and the British genius for accommodating to history are also working their ferment in other directions. This evolution becomes accelerated as thoughtful British leaders come to realize that the new patterns of change may not unfold in either an orderly or a leisurely way. As the world plunges from one crisis to another there may be a quickening of the British sense of shared interests and a consequent inclination to make more dynamic use of British diplomatic skill and other resources in a world forum. The British Government in the late summer of 1958 suddenly displayed extraordinary interest in having the United Nations "take over" the problem of Jordan, a position

that a few years ago would have been unthinkable. Jordan is symbolic of the kind of impossible problem facing a nation whose commitments have long since outrun her resources and many of whose notions of international politics are today as deficient strategically as they are brilliant tactically.

The future relationship between Britain and the UN comes to rest, then, on two fundamental propositions. First, among the countries of the white "European" West, national estimates of the utility and capabilities of the UN tend to vary in direct proportion to the political incubi which the country may still be carrying in the form of overseas colonies and dependencies. Second, circumstances alter cases; Jordan--and Kuwait and Bahrain and Aden and ultimately the whole British position in the Near East--may well be deteriorating to the point of eventual disaster. The application of Western force is neither acceptable nor indeed effective in stemming the trend. An international organization that includes both sides may well become indispensable to build the kinds of bridges with the newer nations that Britain came in the past to build with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, and Malaya--all once as virulently nationalistic and anti-British as the Arab nations.

If these things happen, perhaps the UN will be seen to have significantly new uses and new positive values for Britain, interpreted in the vocabulary of her own fundamental national interests. The time may not be far away when British rather than foreign planners seriously consider the possibilities inherent in, for example, UN trusteeships for the remaining British protectorates around the periphery of the Arabian peninsula. As the London Observer remarked in July 1958, in asserting the indispensability of the UN,

The very Powers--and the very Foreign Ministers--who have criticised it most strongly, are only too glad to turn to it when their own policies have reached an impasse.
Or, as The Economist commented a month later,

...if the Foreign Secretary has been reconverted to faith in the over-riding authority of the United Nations, almost anything is now possible.  

This is an overstatement. To his own party at Blackpool Prime Minister Macmillan justified Britain's "rescue operation" in Jordan in a tone that echoes back into a less baffling and frustrating age. "So long as the veto in the Security Council remains," he said, "there must always be occasions when the great powers cannot evade their duties." But he went on: "They must prevent aggression while there is still time. Then, having completed that immediate task, they must hand it to the nations of the world for collective action." It may be anticipated that in her own way Great Britain will adjust her vision of the United Nations to the larger vision now developing with respect to her place in the new world of the second half of the twentieth century. One can assume with equal safety that the two visions will vary as little as is realistically possible from the directives that have governed British foreign policy for a century, set down in 1869 in Gladstone's famous letter to Queen Victoria.

England should keep entire in her own hands the means of estimating her own obligations upon the various states of facts as they arise; she should not foreclose and narrow her own liberty of choice by declarations made to other Powers, in their real or supposed interests, of which they would claim to be at least joint interpreters; it is dangerous for her to assume alone an advanced and therefore isolated position, in regard to European controversies; come what may it is better for her to promise too little than too much; she should not encourage the weak by giving expectation of aid to resist the strong, but should rather

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seek to deter the strong by firm but moderate language from aggression of the weak; she should seek to develop and mature the action of a common, or public or European opinion, as the best standing bulwark against wrong, but should beware of seeming to lay down the law of that opinion by her own authority, and thus running the risk of setting against her, and against right and justice, the general sentiment which ought to be, and generally would be, arrayed in their favour. 26

THE CONTEMPORARY BELGIAN VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

Two prime thrusts of Belgian foreign policy shape the Belgian outlook regarding the UN.

One is the product of modern Belgian history, beginning with a "permanent neutrality" guaranteed by the Great Powers in the treaties of 1830-39 that ended in German violation of that neutrality in the First World War, with a cost to Belgium of approximately seven billion dollars for her unwilling involvement. In the early interwar years Belgium's dependence on the new principle of collective security under the League of Nations was presumably reinforced by the equilibrium established by the Locarno Treaty. But by October 1936, gravely concerned by the possibility of new involvement with Germany as a consequence of the Franco-Soviet Treaty, Belgium denounced her military alliance with France, and in this mood took comfort from Germany's guarantee to her the following hear of her inviolability if she remained "neutral." When war broke out in September 1939 Belgium mobilized, but proclaimed her neutrality. But the collapse of the European and world-wide security system in the face of renewed German militarism terminated, for Belgium, in four years of
enemy occupation. Add to this history a new cycle of commitment and hope in the United Nations of 1945 followed by profound disillusionment with its capacity directly to protect Belgian security, and the result is a rather overpowering cynicism toward international relations and especially toward the capacity of the Great Powers, on whom Belgium yet remains utterly dependent, to order their affairs to Belgian satisfaction.

The "betrayal" of Belgian neutrality, combined with a sense of having been "burned" by dependence on the League, produces a highly ambivalent reaction toward the Great Powers and toward the UN.

The two historic poles of the Belgian attitude toward the UN are represented in statements by perhaps her foremost international spokesman, M. Paul-Henri Spaak. In 1948 he was able to write that

when a recommendation has been adopted solemnly by the General Assembly... the duty of each of those nations is to bow before the decisions of the Assembly, even if it has opposed the recommendations, even if it believes that recommendation to be contrary to its own interests.1

Nine years later, in the weeks after overwhelming UN majorities—not including Belgium—had voted for the cease-fire and withdrawal of Western forces from Egypt, he wrote:

...it seems to me that never before has the insufficiency of the UN as at present constituted stood out so clearly... I believe that it has never come so near to the brink of failure...2

So far as relations with the Great Powers are concerned, Belgium sees in the retrospect of her lugubrious history that she has been an unwilling pawn in a far larger game. But she sees with equal clarity that her fate will inescapably be determined by countries larger, richer, and more powerful than

herself. Here cynicism combines with realism to give a special impetus to Belgian participation in the greater European movement, building outward from Benelux to the Common Market and, eventually, European political integration.

The other thrust in the Belgian outlook toward the UN is based on her role as a colonial power. This set of attitudes combines the Belgian position as administering power in both the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi with the pervasive Belgian characteristic of commercial acuity. As perhaps the dominant theme of Belgian participation in the UN during the past twelve years, this is treated below in some detail.

The UN and Vital Belgian Interests

With regard to the basic security problem of Belgium growing out of her special position in geography and in history, there is little argument among responsible Belgians with the proposition that the UN per se is irrelevant to Belgian security now and in the foreseeable future. There is greater argument between liberal and conservative forces in Belgium about the other thrust of her UN policy, centering on the colonial issue. Unlike England, neither of these issues is fought out on party lines, and indeed the parties themselves are officially indifferent to the UN issue. Neither is there any detectable difference regarding these matters as between the Walloons of Southern Belgium and the Flemish-speaking population of the North, however perceptible may be other social and economic tensions between them.
Yet beneath the surface there is a more profound similarity with the English picture. As in England, the domestic forces hostile to the United Nations tend to cluster on the conservative side, in both government and business. The forces most sympathetic to Belgian membership and participation in global organization are to be found in "liberal-socialist" circles, in nongovernmental organizations, workers' associations, and the like. But the latter does not add up to "popular support," for by all the evidence the population at large is not very interested in the UN. The Belgian UN Association has no real popular following. (It would seem that the US and possibly Western Germany are the only Western countries where such organizations do enjoy fairly significant public interest, not to say support.)

Nonetheless, one senses that there may exist a greater reservoir of popular sympathy and support for the UN than the characteristically negative attitudes within Government and conservative leadership circles would indicate. Certainly outside those circles one can find a less predictable reaction than the one elicited from many responsible Belgians who, if one touches them and says the words "United Nations," most commonly produce a single automatic reflex response: "Congo." This conditioned reaction has one prime meaning in such circles: the UN, whatever it is or is not in other fields, is above all an embarrassment and obstacle to Belgium with respect to her colonial policies. What more than one independent observer refers to as "the enlightened part" of the Belgian government has, to be sure, made use of the UN on occasion in more positive contexts. Even on the most sensitive point, leading personalities such as Pierre Ryckmans, former Governor General and often critic of the UN, have sought to instruct the Belgian people about the changing nature of colonial relationships, specifically vis-à-vis the Congo.
But the more common view, particularly in the center and right, has been, first of all, an acceptance of Belgium's general obligations under the Charter; second, an unwillingness to have those obligations extended; third, a generalized suspicion of the UN as it came to do precisely that; fourth, a confusion, particularly in parliamentary circles, between the obligations rather grudgingly accepted in connection with the trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi and the far more permissive obligations imposed by Chapter XI of the Charter with respect to the Congo; and fifth, a conviction, shared above all with France and, to a lesser extent, Britain, that the dynamics of African nationalism and the spread southward of Islam constitute a prima facie menace to Belgium that must be fought rather than compromised with.

The Colonial Issue

Let us become more specific. The basic reaction to the contemporary UN in official and conservative Belgian circles gives the colonial problem undisputed primacy as a touchstone of attitudes and performance. As indicated, "UN" means above all "Congo." Belgium, it is insisted, must be "left alone" to develop the Congo "toward independence." But if the process goes too fast, so runs the argument, the Congolese will in their unsophistication turn to the East for their future orientation. Like the British, Belgian officials in private conversations paint a picture in which they see themselves as the adults and their critics, including the US, Asia, and in fact the entire UN majority, as immature and irresponsible. Belgium is proud of its "creative work" in Africa and the "great job" it is now doing. It is "grown up enough" to know what the Congo needs, and wants no interference; the UN "should keep its nose out."

3. A Belgian view at variance with the type of conservative position referred to in this section is found in La Belgique et Les Nations Unies, prepared for the Carnegie Endowment by L'Institut Royal Des Relations Internationales (New York: Manhattan, 1958). This work treats comprehensively the history of Belgian participation in the UN 1945-1955.
Without making a detailed analysis of the values to Belgium of her colonies, a few facts are clear: 1) It is the Congo rather than Ruanda-Urundi which excites Belgium's political and commercial nerves in the UN context. Ruanda-Urundi is poor, over-populated, and dependent on Belgium, which makes up its annual deficit. On balance, the cost of administering it is a heavy financial liability for Belgium. 2) The Congo, on the other hand, has a favorable balance of trade with Belgium (technically, with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union) by a ratio of almost two to one. 3) The Congo is one of the leading uranium producers in the free world. 4) Belgium has not used her African colonies for purposes of "colonization," despite her own population density (291 per square kilometer in 1955) which is the highest in all Europe except the Netherlands and the Saar, and higher even than Japan, India or China. Thus no colon problem such as bedevils the French in North Africa complicates the almost purely economic basis for Belgium's Congo relationship. As the official British commentary on investment opportunities in the Belgian Congo observed: "The Belgian business man is a keen judge of a bargain, and will not allow national sentiment to outweigh his economic sense."

Moving into the center of the political spectrum, "liberal" conservatives hold that since the Congo and Belgium are inseparable, the former will become independent but "associated." Leaders of this stripe can be found urging the Government to accelerate the development of the Congo, pointing to the disastrous results of the past French stance of immobilisme. Even in these ranks the view is commonly held that the UN has been an obstacle to Belgian aims in the Congo, and it is likely that this is the popular impression as well. It is rare that

2. Ibid. p. 53.
one hears the admission, made privately by a former Belgian delegate to the UN, that UN debate has had the very useful effect of forcing on the administering authority an annual examen de conscience, the value of which he esteemed rather highly.

This "centrist" view of colonialism must not be taken as primitive or unfeeling. Apart from the often elegant intellectual rationales advanced from the professional ranks, some substantive suggestions of value often emerge here. One leading Belgian administrator urged that the role of the International Labor Organization be expanded in respect to dependent territories. He sees the ILO, and not the UN, as both technically and legally competent to promote and administer "international controls." Such Belgians are strongly influenced by the phenomenon, often observed by others, that Latin American and Asian delegates in the ILO, usually representing technical ministries rather than the foreign offices, tend to be far more "responsible." The crucial argument is that such representatives are often willing to discuss some of their own "dependent peoples" (aboriginal populations, etc.) in the ILO, while refusing such reciprocity in the UN proper on the grounds of interference with their internal affairs.

Moving across the center to the political left, the conditioned reflex of "UN-Congo" is, of course, not to be looked for, and indeed is vigorously refuted. Most Belgians, it is said here, do not understand the implications of the issue, and only the limited leadership circles of government and business give the Congo place d'honneur in their image of the UN.

Yet even here one does not necessarily find an undifferentiated defense of the present UN. As one Belgian elder statesman put it, the anti-colonial countries that are coming to make up the UN majority are prejudiced, suspicious, and immature,
and no one would pretend otherwise. But they also bring to the UN forum new
enthusiasms, open-mindedness and good will (two of which qualities other Belgian
statesmen would not be likely to ascribe in this connection). This offers an
opportunity which the West has neglected, particularly vis-à-vis India. Here
there is a curious admiration for India for having become the "strongest" part
of the UN by playing the "UN game," a game in which common rather than national
interests are presumably pursued. The West, concluded this venerable and
honored Belgian, should exploit India's desire to strengthen the UN as its--
and our--main hope for peace. It must be said that this view of the UN, pro-
pounded by at least one significant figure in each of seven Western European
countries visited, is far from the thoughts of those responsible for policy
in the West today.

The announcement by the Belgian Government on January 13, 1959, of new
measures leading to self-rule and, "without undue haste," eventual independence
for the Congo, will be watched by the growing anticolonial majority in the UN
with suspicion based on past attitudes and on their inability to monitor and
accelerate the process through the political machinery of the UN itself.

The Impact of Suez and Hungary

The colonial issue in its turn furnishes a meaningful backdrop against
which to consider Belgian reactions to the dual crises of late 1956. As in so
many other European countries the Suez landings split Belgium sharply, although
not, as in England, along party lines. The first reaction inside the Foreign
Ministry was one of "not taking sides." This was not surprising in the light
of two other factors. For one thing, Belgium has significant commercial interests
in Egypt, and, as suggested earlier, rates her commercial position very highly
in the national scheme of values. For another thing, the traditional ties to

8. The obvious qualifications to this assertion are made explicit in "The United
Nations and the Indian National Interest," by Sudoreshan Chaula, Center for
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958.
France—racial, social, linguistic, political—have undergone a profound change since 1940. Since that time the Belgian attitude tends as much to criticism as praise for her larger sister to the south. There were certainly those who hoped for French success in Egypt, and these were of course the ones who saw in the UN’s political counteraction the height of injustice and, when contrasted to the Hungarian picture, bitter irony. When M. Spaak returned to Belgium after the crisis had passed he told his friends that in his view the UN offered nothing to hope for and everything to fear. Yet the very failure of France to succeed in Suez was also taken in Belgium as final proof of French impotence. Since that time the categories of ties with France have become reduced still further, to the point where many Belgians limit them to the cultural field alone.

Spaak and other responsible Belgians drew public attention vigorously to the contrast between the UN action in Suez and its failure to force compliance in Hungary. But as in England this line seems to have been more rhetorical than real, however genuinely felt, since the last thing Belgium wishes is to provoke a European war with Russia.

The European Movement

It is in Europe—and NATO—rather than in universal world organization that Belgium finds the new promise for her security.

For three years, from 1945 to 1948, Belgium experimented with a new and short-lived form of "neutrality," seeking to play a conciliatory role between East and West and avoiding rigid positions on East-West issues. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 put a period to this illusory neo-neutralism, and thenceforth Belgium's leaders saw clearly the necessity of joining in alliances based on the right of collective self-defense envisaged in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Brussels Pact in the next month, and the
North Atlantic Treaty of April of the following year were the initial milestones of the new Belgian policy. Yet while the postwar Soviet Union looks to Belgium like a "new Hitler in disguise," the indefensible Belgian strategic position places a high premium on "bridging the gap between East and West." This gives Belgian policy toward "Europe" a curious symmetry when Belgians speak of the European movement as a new focus for this other vital Belgian interest. The third and perhaps most compelling attraction of a larger European community is as a place where Belgium, as a small nation, can pursue her special identity, both in her natural region and in the UN as well, as part of a larger and more authoritative political personality.

Regarding the values which Belgium, taken as a whole, sees in federation with Europe, views across the political spectrum do not show any marked differences, either in themselves or as angles of vision on the Belgian future attitude toward the UN. Attitudes toward NATO are decidedly more partisan than toward Europe as such, with liberal opinion accepting the whole idea of NATO only grudgingly, while more conservative opinion assigns to its future a considerably higher priority than that of the UN.

Belgian conservatives carry the same power-orientation into their approach to Europe. Belgium, it is said here, is anxious to become part of a federated Europe in order to multiply its world influence, including a more powerful voice in the councils of the UN. This is of course a reprise on the theme of Belgium as a power whose influence is, or at least should be, far larger than her modest size and military strength would suggest.
Regarding the Europe-UN equation, liberal Belgian circles tend to see Europe as a serious partner in concrete economic and political tasks, while assigning to the UN a more abstract context in which the goal is "human progress." A former Socialist Deputy turned this around by saying that while Belgium often was required to say or do something "negative" in the UN, the task of "leading" the European movement offered a constructive and positive challenge. And inevitably the economic benefits of integration loom large, specifically in widening the free market for Belgium's important output of manufactured goods. (Here the contrast is especially marked with Italy, for example, where many small producers perhaps irrationally fear the effects of outside competition, and consequently oppose the whole trend of European integration.) The strength of Belgian motivation is illustrated by the sharpness of private Belgian criticism of France for her "archaic chauvinism," seen as endangering the whole structure of Europe so long as France continues to treat integration as a "pawn" in her internal political game.

US Policy

Mr. Dulles is admired by the Belgian Foreign Office to a considerably greater extent than elsewhere in Western Europe. Where he is criticized outside the Government one senses that it is psychological rather than political—a reflection of the more generalized resentment felt all over Europe as American "culture" seems to press in, and also because of a "sinister image" cast up by earlier defects of US foreign policy. But on one score both Belgian political wings seem united: US policy toward Communist China is "stupid," and Peiping should have her proper seat on the Security Council. It is difficult to sort out the bases for this view, which is well known to American
diplomats, except to note the obvious one of anticipated trade. But at least some of its strength may result from such estimates as that of one of Belgium's leading retired statesmen, who was recently told by both Policy and Yugoslav diplomats that Mao Tse-Tung is considered by their governments the best hope for the independence of Communist countries. Mao, according to this line, is fighting Stalinists in China but is weakened because he "can't open his window on the Pacific." Despite Belgium's support, in September 1958, of the General Assembly's decision to postpone the Chinese representation question for another year, it can be assumed that Belgium will go along with any future effort to break the moratorium and vote Peiping into the UN if and when the political atmosphere becomes more propitious than at present.

Elsewhere in the UN scene, the chief criticism of US policy remains the traditional one—the US should use its influence far more than it does to moderate the anticolonial forces that have come to dominate the UN proceedings.

Planning for the Future

Belgium is so preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the UN's weakening effect on her hold upon the African territories that her UN policy is largely characterized by defensiveness and negativeness.

Despite the efforts of some of her intellectuals and certain liberal leaders, and despite the admirable long-term plans her Government is advancing for the Congo, it is not an exaggeration to say that Belgium as a whole is still living in an earlier political age in which the ruler-ruled relationship colors the pattern of European-non-European relations. That age may be giving way to a new era far more quickly than the average Belgian knows or wishes. But until the new dynamics of Euro-African relations come to be grasped by the Belgian majority, her stance in the UN will continue to have the nature of a rear-guard
action. From the time the UN Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73(e) of the Charter (now the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories) was established, Belgium took the position that it was unconstitutionally created by the General Assembly. That it should place "political" questions on its agenda made it totally ultra vire so far as Belgium was concerned.

Other administering powers have shared Belgium's misgivings about the Committee, and its career has been fairly stormy. But since 1952 Belgium has refused to participate in the Committee, thus joining a still tiny group of states—the USSR, the Union of South Africa, and, during the first years of life of the UN Commission on International Commodity Trade, the United States—who, because they did not agree, would not take part in discussions in bodies of which they were regularly constituted members.

The chief gross prediction, therefore, with respect to Belgian participation in and use of the UN, is that its tone and its capacity for constructiveness will change in direct ratio to larger changes in the way Belgium views her relations with those nations rapidly forming a numerical majority in the world. Until this shedding of the old political skin, so to speak, new directions in the Belgian-UN scheme would seem to be very limited.

Within this rather limited context, how do responsible Belgian leaders sum up some of the possibilities they now see?

The business community, not unexpectedly, is enthusiastic about the growing amounts of statistical information the UN is making available on world trade and related subjects of practical use to businessmen, traders, and colonial administrators.
Conservatives feel the UN can do more in the settlement of "small" international disputes, and to this notion Foreign Office officials add the theme of the moral power of UN recommendations—those, that is, which do not prejudice Belgium's colonial position.

Some Social Christian leaders have taken a particular interest in former French Premier Faure's proposal for disarmament via the control of the budgets of the major powers. In one of the few such suggestions heard in Belgium, they entertain the possibility of utilizing such savings for the financing of economic development of underdeveloped countries, or, more originally, for expanded exchange programs. (Belgium has had notably good results in her participation in international exchanges of persons.)

It is only a small minority that seems to look ahead to greater use of the UN for enhancing Belgium's contacts with the neutral nations of the world, and an even smaller group that appears dedicated to the proposition that Belgium, as a small country, is in a good strategic position to take initiatives in the UN that might profoundly influence the policies of the superpowers.

Perhaps the most original argument advanced here, and one which by no means yet appears to be a meaningful part of the Belgian prévision of the future of the UN, takes as premise the history of American pressure upon Europe to unite, and asks why the US does not now apply the same quality of statesmanship and political pressure upon the members of a larger community—the UN—to move in the direction of greater supranational powers. That this remains the view of only a tiny minority of Belgians may be ascribed to a number of factors already cited. It goes without saying that such a premise for policy presupposes not only a different kind of world than the one we
have today, but a very different Belgian strategic view of the world, of her role in that world, and of the utility of the UN in achieving Belgian purposes.

In foreign policy, however, events sometimes have the capacity for altering the seemingly unalterable. Britain came to favor a UN presence in Jordan in 1958. In the General Debate in the 1958 General Assembly Belgium, through her Foreign Minister, suggested that the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, then inflaming the peace of Asia, be put "under the protection of the United Nations."

The implications of such a proposal are not often spelled out, nor is its price made explicit. If more authoritative powers are ever given to the UN it will doubtless happen not out of acceptance of any blueprinted theory, but as the consequence of an urgent political need which even those most unsympathetic to the organization's defects and turbulences feel at the time to be overriding. 9

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THE CONTEMPORARY DUTCH VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

Like other nations of mid-twentieth century Europe, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has vivid memories of earlier ages in which its world-wide influence far exceeded its proportions on the map of Europe. Unlike some nations similarly diminished by history, the Dutch today deploy a merchant fleet that in tonnage ranks sixth in the world.¹ But despite its continuing sea-going tradition the Dutch Empire has all but vanished in one generation, except for West New Guinea and, in the Western hemisphere, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Both the latter were given autonomy in 1954. The other remaining chapter of Dutch colonialism—West New Guinea—remains unsettled, for reasons which are touched on below. But it is fair to say that the Dutch position in the UN in the past two or three years has been associated, in many foreign eyes, with her continuing dispute with Indonesia over the territory the latter seeks to acquire under the irredentist label of West Irian.

That the "UN image" of the Netherlands may be a rather faulty one is attested to by the small and almost irrelevant part the New Guinea problem plays in the over-all Dutch order of things, including the vision of the UN which some of her thoughtful and responsible leaders hold. Her role as a

participant in the new "Europe" is far more central to Dutch foreign policy planning. The Netherlands has a long and in many ways astonishing history of leadership in the cultural, artistic, religious, commercial, and legal movements that made Europe the undisputed centerpiece of Western civilization for four hundred years. But as a nation of 11 million in a world of billions, the Dutch have also been in the forefront in seeking to submerge ancient narrow nationalisms and move into a new phase of history. Neutral and uninvolved in European wars from 1850 to 1940, the Dutch have taken the lead in concrete projects for international cooperation and peace.

Benelux was foreshadowed as early as 1930, with the Oslo Agreements, followed by the Ouchy Convention of July 1932, reducing tariffs as among Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (although these arrangements were temporarily dropped in 1938). Today in Benelux the Netherlands already has unique experience in regional arrangements which tend to minimize the significance of national boundaries. That experience was reflected in the approval which the States-General, the Dutch parliament, gave in 1952 to constitutional amendments making the Netherlands one of the first countries to provide constitutionally for the formal yielding of authority to supranational organizations.

Far from being oblivious to the retrograde influences of the postwar years, the Dutch perceive the world around them with realism. The tradition of international legalism dies hard in the home of Hugo Grotius, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 that foreshadowed the League of Nations system, and the continuing seat of the International Court of Justice in Mr. Carnegie's ornate Hague "Peace Palace." But there is a third quality, synthesizing both Dutch realism and Dutch dedication to superior European and world-wide order, which gives the Netherlands a special place and a special opportunity. Like three
of the other smaller powers, Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, which frequently furnish a disproportionate amount of leadership in the UN by their capacity for inventiveness and for constructive solutions, the Netherlands is almost unique, certainly among the remaining European "colonial" powers, for the kinds of ideas and policy proposals that some of her leaders are now generating and could, a fortiori, generate if only the West New Guinea issue could be removed from her agenda of preoccupations. The Dutch capacity for constructive planning is by no means based on theoretical grounds. Savagely mutilated by Germany in the Second World War, living with a population density of 800 to the square mile--the highest in the world--and accustomed to nationwide exertions to hold back the sea, the Dutch seem almost historically destined to give at least a degree of leadership in the long and painful catalogue of man's experiments to learn to live together in relative harmony.

**Dutch Interests and the UN**

Foreign Ministry officials are explicit in their definition of Dutch national interests: their small nation is, like Belgium, wholly "interdependent" with the Western powers. This alone identifies the overriding national interest in the defense of the free world against communist aggression. From this it logically follows that the Netherlands must follow and support the principal policies of her large and powerful allies. In the UN this means general support for the latter--with the exception of the US policy toward the exclusion of Communist China. In pursuing these objectives, senior Dutch officials see the UN as highly useful in exposing Soviet policies to the rest of the world, and they attach higher importance to the UN for this quality than perhaps for any other.
Perhaps the most striking theme in the specific relating of the UN to Dutch interests is a reflection of the proud instinct for special identity which echoes through Dutch history. The UN is seen as a useful framework within which the Netherlands can distinguish itself from other countries of equivalent size and nature, such as Denmark and Norway, by participating in UN agencies which give concrete and politically symbolic expression of wide Dutch interests. The UN regional economic commissions are prime examples: the Economic Commissions for Latin America (on which the Dutch sit because the Kingdom of the Netherlands is "partially situated" in Latin America) and for the Far East furnish a Dutch "presence" in the areas, particularly Asia, which in some ways transcends in significance to the Dutch the colonial holding itself on which such membership is based. (The Caribbean Commission, not part of the UN system, provides continuing Dutch presence in yet another area.)

But other Dutch interests impinge on these formulas. The attachment to a rule of law in the world which some American statesmen routinely proclaim, has, as suggested earlier, a more genuinely meaningful connotation for the Netherlands. The profound disillusionment attributed
to Foreign Minister Lans arising from the UN's "betrayal of ideals" in its handling of the Indonesian case has deeper roots in an exaggerated belief in the possibility of a legal order in the here-and-now. This has two implications for relations with the UN: the official Dutch view is strongly colored by the collapse of extravagant expectations; and the Foreign Minister who holds this view appears to be several steps behind many of his compatriots in the Hague in their assessment of the future possibilities of the UN.

With the Second Chamber—the popularly-elected house of the States General—fairly evenly divided between the Catholic and Labor parties, and with the country fairly equally divided between Protestants and Catholics, there is a surprising consensus on these matters. The Labor party view is not profoundly different from that of the Government, but does contain some variations. In the view of some of its leaders, the UN, despite what it "did to the Dutch" in Indonesia, is above all useful for contacts with underdeveloped countries. This in turn is related to the conviction that the Cold War has become chiefly political and economic, and calls in turn for primarily political and economic strategies. Having said this, a typical "elite" Dutch view would conclude that the UN is not a meaningful instrument of Dutch national policy, but that the world situation would probably be worse without it. This lukewarm attitude rests, in the case of one distinguished statesman, on the curious but consistent ground that the UN is "weaker" than the League, by which he meant that the League "respected law" (and also had a good
secretariat).

On the Labor side it seems equally believed that the UN affords opportunities so far not fully exploited to keep the adversary out in the open—by which it is meant that Communist China as well as the USSR should be visible. An interesting supplement to this view sees the "reformatory" quality of the UN as bearing equally on the peaceful evolution of the Middle East: the Arabs are now being required to live within the "Charter symbols."

Dutch "third parties" are in some ways historical anomalies. But the leader of one who was asked to form a Government only a few years ago managed to sum up some of the themes touched upon by others. Agreeing that the present Foreign Minister regards the UN as a complete political failure, he regards this as an even stronger reason for building up the UN's economic program. Agreeing that Dutch—and other—expectations were unrealistically high, he recommends that expectations be limited and that in a mood of patience the UN can be seen as having kept such tinder boxes as Korea and Israel relatively stable over rather long periods. Rejecting the concept of the UN as a legal order, he regards it as an instrument of collective diplomacy. Finally, the Dutch should finally abandon their preoccupation with the colonial issue in the UN and, "having no foreign policy of their own," might most effectively contribute to world peace and order through the economic and technical programs of the UN system. This last theme is explored in more detail below.
The New Guinea Question

At the Hague in 1949 the Netherlands and Indonesia agreed to settle within a year this issue which remained unresolved in the process of transferring sovereignty over the former Netherlands East Indies. It was not settled, and it will be recalled that on Indonesian initiative the UN debated this matter for four years (1954, 5, 6, 7). In 1955 the General Assembly expressed hope for the success of negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The next year an Afro-Asian resolution establishing a Good Offices Commission failed to get a 2/3 vote. In 1957 a proposal inviting the two parties to resume negotiations received 41 votes to 29, with 11—including the US—abstaining, but failed because it did not secure a 2/3 majority. During that debate the Dutch reiterated their view that "there could be no question of a transfer of sovereignty... without consultation of the inhabitants" who, at an "appropriate time," would be accorded that right of self-determination. But—and it is this which Indonesia and her supporters find wholly frustrating—at present, "with the exception of a very small group, the population is incapable of expressing its political will."

2. General Assembly Resolution 915(X) 16 Dec 1955.


4. GAOR, 850th mtg., 25 Feb 1958, para. 13
In the last debate held by the UN--1957--Indonesia just as consistently maintained that "West Irian" was a part of Indonesia "just as it has been part and parcel of the Netherlands Indies before the transfer of sovereignty."5

Thus the deadlock continues, and this is the issue which preoccupies the Netherlands in the UN and which preoccupies many UN members when they think of Dutch UN policy.

In the Hague, it does not take much probing to arrive at a strikingly different perspective on the problem.

According to highly reliable information, important elements within the Government have in recent years urged on the Foreign Minister the notion that the Dutch should be prepared to accept a trusteeship agreement for West New Guinea with the administering authority either the Netherlands or the UN itself, the latter under the still-unused provisions of Article 81 of the Charter. According to this account, Mr. Luns rejected the proposal but agreed that other members of the Cabinet might be consulted. This was unsuccessful, presumably because of Mr. Luns' known disapproval.

One highly placed independent observer believes that the present intransigent Dutch policy rests on support from only a minority at the top of the Government. Others can be found who agree with this observer's estimate that a majority in the Dutch parliament would be prepared to vote for a change in the policy except for a fear of appearing unpatriotic.

Privately expressed Foreign Ministry views acknowledge that the Dutch New Guinea policy sorely handicaps the Netherlands in its quest for a wider political role in the UN. They do not acknowledge the existence of acceptable solutions in the foreseeable future. One high official discussed the case in tones of

5. GAOR, 861st Mtg., 27 February 1957, paragraph 3.
extreme frustration, basing his pessimism on the demonstrated inability of the UN, in Dutch eyes, to "guarantee the execution of agreements" with Indonesia. This is of course an echo of persistent grievances, among them the quick Indonesian substitution of a unitary government for the federation scheme envisaged by the Hague Round Table Conference in the fall of 1949 at which agreement was reached for transfer of sovereignty. The degree of discontent with Government policy should not be exaggerated, although it is real. Many Dutchmen—but certainly not all—continue to resent deeply Indonesia's "repeated failure" to abide by international agreements, not to mention more recent Indonesian attacks on Dutch economic interests (see below).

The issue is by no means closed. Some leaders of the Labor party consider it to be an international question—precisely the acknowledgment denied by the Government in UN debate—and that an international solution, short of giving the territory to Indonesia, should be sought. (In early October 1958, a Labor motion was introduced in Parliament asking the Government to reconsider its policy, and inquiring whether a trusteeship solution would be deemed acceptable. The Government asserted its belief that no such solution would be acceptable to Indonesia and the motion was withdrawn.) On the other hand, another Labor party leader, acknowledging that West New Guinea was retained by the Dutch "in order to get a 2/3 vote" in parliament for the transfer of general sovereignty to Indonesia, sees no short-term solution and believes Dutch public opinion to be sharply divided now on the issue. It may well be that the lack of unanimity within the Labor party on an alternative policy is the greatest single obstacle to a change in national policy.

A minority party leader stated what appears to be an evident fact in the Netherlands: Dutch relations with Indonesia are still close and, on the personal level, good. From this he concluded that the UN can only hinder still further these relations, exacerbating as it does the political differences.
But the same individual strongly urged a UN trusteeship for West New Guinea and estimated that the Government could secure a 2/3 vote in parliament for any solution except one making an Asian power the Administering Authority.

On balance, one can conclude that West New Guinea is not a major issue in the Netherlands but is by now generally viewed as an incident in Dutch international relations for which any solution would probably be acceptable, short of gratifying the desire of Indonesia to acquire this piece of real estate. Rumors circulating late in 1958 suggest that an alternative arrangement may be developing with Australia (which administers the remainder of New Guinea as a UN trusteeship). Under this reported scheme, joint Australian-Dutch development programming for the whole of New Guinea will pave the way for eventual Dutch withdrawal and Australian assumption of responsibility for the whole island, which will thereby be heading for future existence as a unified and independent country.

That Dutch retention of the area rests on an almost purely political basis which could under proper circumstances lend itself to a reasonable solution is further attested by its negative economic importance. In the period 1954-1956 the Dutch made grants to West New Guinea totalling $50.3 millions, offset by a $7.1 million excess of loan repayments over new loans. Indeed, Holland is still paying heavily for the whole transformation in the Indies. In her speech from the throne on September 16, 1958, Queen Juliana announced a budget

deficit for 1959 of $347 million, double the previous year's. She attributed this financial deterioration primarily to "developments in Indonesia," developments which arise from the continuing assault on Dutch interests in Indonesia carried out under the banner of "West Irian," and which in 1958 resulted in the loss of $1.25 billion of Dutch investments and the expulsion of 40,000 Dutch citizens from Indonesia.

This subject should not be dropped without at least a reference to the other colonial issue in the UN that has helped to shape the picture the Netherlands holds of the UN—and vice versa. The award of autonomy to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles in 1954 ended a chapter of dispute within the UN Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories—and the General Assembly—centering on the Dutch refusal since 1951 to transmit information to the UN on the two territories. The Dutch position had been that the territories were in fact self-governing in the field of economic, social and educational affairs, and that the territorial governments were opposed to further reporting to the Secretary General in these fields. This contention was hotly disputed by numbers of the anti-colonial members of the UN.

When the constitutional changes were completed the Netherlands so reported, and under American and Brazilian sponsorship the General Assembly

in 1955 passed by a vote of 21 to 10, with 33 abstentions, a resolution endorsing the cessation of reporting. This chapter now appears to be closed.

Economic and Social Interests and the UN

With a long and honorable history of religious tolerance and the provision of asylum for political and religious refugees, the Dutch have been disproportionately active in the postwar institutions designed to assist displaced persons and other refugees. The Netherlands provided the first UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in addition to furnishing continuous financial support for this and other refugee organizations. In 1957 the Netherlands was one of only four governments contributing cash to the UN Refugee Fund.

The other theme has already been adverted to at several points above. This is the Dutch vision of the UN as the agency for the technical and economic development of underdeveloped countries.

The availability of surplus Dutch technicians who used to work in what is now Indonesia provides a thoroughly practical reason for intense Dutch interest in the UN Technical Assistance programs. The statistics of Dutch contribution to UN voluntary programs show that whatever the reasons, the Dutch have carried more than their share. In the period 1954-1956 Dutch contributions to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance were the


highest of any European country except France and the UK and were 2/3 of the Soviet contribution. The Dutch contribution to the UN Children's Fund was exceeded in Europe only by France, Sweden, and the UK; the total of Dutch voluntary contributions was surpassed only by those of the big two in Europe. In 1957 the Dutch contribution to UNTAP was $974,000, the sixth highest among the entire UN membership and exceeded only by Canada, France, the USSR, the UK, and the US.

Dutch motivations in this field are both powerful and varied. For one thing, the Dutch economy is, roughly, 50% dependent on foreign trade. For another, it is virtually impossible for a country of this size to maintain the necessary machinery of its own to operate bilateral programs; virtually all available funds would go for overhead. The Netherlands experienced great difficulty in estimating correctly the size of its Pakistan program (originally 2 million guldens, eventually 1 1/2 million more in order to complete it) and as a result decided not to start any new bilateral programs. The availability of skilled technicians has already been mentioned. And a final source of motivation which should never be underrated derives from powerful religious and ethical impulses which find satisfaction not only in sponsoring aid but in favoring the use of multilateral channels to the greatest extent possible.

In recent years the Dutch have moved out ahead in a highly controversial direction: support of SUNFED—the long-proposed Special UN Fund for Economic Development—despite the continuing opposition of such a Fund's foremost prospective contributor—the United States.

The Dutch see a large-scale UN program of developmental financing as perhaps the major contribution the organization can make to the improvement of conditions in the underdeveloped area and, ex hypothesi, to the denial of the neutral areas to communism. There is no partisanship evident in this position, and the Government has vigorously pursued its objective. At the 1957 summer session of the UN Economic and Social Council the Dutch were among the strongest proponents of a resolution urging the Assembly to establish SUNFED immediately and to set up a preparatory committee to work out the practical details.\[13]\ In 1958 the Dutch sought to use the Special Technical Assistance fund voted the pre-

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vious fall—the American "Substitute" for SUNFED—to gain experience "useful to a future financing organ conforming to the SUNFED plan."

They were defeated when the preparatory Committee adopted a more conservative course advocated by the United States. There is an unconfirmed report that the Dutch Government was recently on the verge of attempting to bring the situation to a head by actually putting up a very substantial sum of money, a move designed at least in part to show the United States that it would not necessarily be the sole large contributor. According to this report, the plan was finally vetoed on the grounds that it would be a futile posture in the face of unyielding American opposition to the whole SUNFED scheme.

In any event, Dutch Government officials are now taking heart from signs of greater multilateral aid. The Labor Party, of course, goes well beyond this view and vigorously advocates an exclusively multilateral approach. According to two of its leading figures, the whole contemporary notion of large-scale bilateral aid is an "American mistake" which now is going to make it possible for "the Russians to outbid us." Taking as premise the urgency of strengthening Western relations with Asia, one such spokesman sees multilateral aid as a means of taking the economic issue "out of the Cold War." Another advocates basing such aid on purely technical rather than political guarantees.

Even those Dutch politicians and other leaders who can see some good in

certain types of bilateral aid seem to favor the multilateral variety
for these reasons and because "resentments are less," "problems of sov-
erignty do not arise," and "it develops a sense of common responsibility."
Traditionally efficient, the Dutch could be expected to insist with equal
fervor on effective and economical administration and controls in what-
ever type of international programs may develop.

Dutch Security, The EC, and the UN

Dutch leaders agree that their country is today completely depend-
ent on NATO although they believe the UN can "maintain order" in the
Middle East. The interest in NATO is far from grudging, as it is in
some other Western European countries. NATO is "vital for Dutch security"
but more than this, it "brings the U.S. close." Great pride goes into
the assertion that in Europe the Dutch are "the only ones fulfilling
their NATO commitments." "Tough" on communism, the Dutch offer little
support for the kinds of disengagement plans so far advanced, and one
frequently hears criticism of President Eisenhower for "going too far"

The security picture should be viewed in the light of an incon-
trovertible and, for an American, rather refreshing fact: Holland is
certainly the most pro-American nation in Europe today, whether be-
cause of obvious similarities of national character, or by association,
as it were, with the British who, to many Dutchmen, are their "fellow:
Anglo-Saxons." But even in the Netherlands there appears to be growing
resentment at some aspects of American culture and politics. Mr. Dulles
is disliked, but also admired and trusted for his "cleverness" vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union. The US, particularly in more conservative circles,
is "childish" in its gyrations on colonial issues in the UN. Such circles feel that "colonial" is not necessarily a bad word. And at least in June 1958, there appeared to be nothing short of unanimity that Communist China should be seated in the UN.

Senior government officials confess that their continuing vote for a moratorium on the question of seating Communist China in the UN has been a concession to the U.S. and does not reflect genuine Dutch feeling. The Netherlands so voted once again on September 23, 1958. The apparent internal compromise is to seek to develop the closest possible economic relations with Peiping but to follow the policy of the dominant Western ally in the political arena.

For Western Europe, Suez was a painful test of conflicting loyalties. For the Dutch the problem was considerably less. Basically pro-British, "as the only Anglo-Saxons on the Continent," the Dutch have also been outspokenly pro-Israel in considering Near Eastern issues, an orientation which one observer attributed largely to the close identity the Dutch Reformed Church feels with ancient Jewry and the Old Testament. Whatever the reason, this bias has undoubtedly hurt the Dutch, (as it has hurt the Americans), in their attempts to cooperate with the Arab powers. There seems little argument in the Netherlands with the proposition that Secretary General Hammarskjold has been "too pro-Egyptian" in the recent Near Eastern crises, and again, one must weigh the effect of this attitude against the Dutch urge to better Western relations with the Arab-Asian grouping, primarily through economic means. It is apparent that even if West New Guinea should be-
come neutralized as a political obstacle to Dutch-Arab-Asian relations, Dutch Middle East policy will still carry some painful dilemmas.

A number of the themes referred to above converge in the views of responsible Dutch leaders regarding the European movement. As suggested at the outset, no country offers more uniformly enthusiastic support for European integration than the Netherlands.

Government policy is quite unequivocal on this score but does not appear to make the sort of sharp connections—or contrasts—between commitments to "Europe" and those regarding the UN which one finds elsewhere. One leading politician, however, sees a stronger Europe as specifically strengthening the Dutch position in the UN. Another reported that a prime world figure from one of the Arab states recently told him that the Middle East is waiting eagerly for Europe to "come back," not as individual countries but as "Europe." Yet this same Dutch personage believes that, in the overall, it is the UN and not Europe that can provide the fruitful across-the-board contacts with the underdeveloped countries on which future free world relationships will strongly depend.

The Future

Dutch public opinion, like public opinion throughout the Western community, is basically indifferent to the UN. The average Dutchman is perhaps annoyed by what seems to him the UN's role in relieving the Netherlands of her East Indies and the treasure and prestige attaching
thereto. This is a fairly unhistoric view, and more seriousness accompanies criticism of the UN as a "haven for irresponsible nationalism," again a common theme among the colonial administering powers of Western Europe.

At the same time there is, as indicated, acute interest throughout the country in those UN programs which seem to represent practical solutions to problems of special interest to the Netherlands—problems of refugees, technical assistance and, now, the financing of economic development in the underdeveloped countries.

There are other themes in the Dutch forward estimate of the UN's values to the Netherlands and the West. The UN, it is felt, can and should play a decisive role in certain—but not all—aspects of the political and propaganda struggle. Dutch planners and political leaders seem agreed that in the cold war the UN can do far more for the West if only we would develop better, more sophisticated tactics. (This is also a theme of which Italian leaders are acutely mindful.) The Chinese representation problem is obviously not far from their thoughts.

In addition, some spokesmen look ahead to greater and more definitive UN involvement in the Middle East, in Kashmir, and in other disputes within the non-communist world. There is no great hope for the success of disarmament negotiations within the UN, and even on the Labor Party side there are urgent suggestions for more NATO consultations—meaning specifically with the US—with a view to forming common Western policies toward UN issues particularly in regard to colonial questions. This is of course an oblique reference to the US habit of abstaining in the UN
on the issue of New Guinea as well as the new US policy of aid to Indonesia.

But the chief thrust of Dutch policy, as it regards the UN, comes back to the economic potential. If the UN can do far better by us in the Cold War, if "better Western tactics" are needed, this means above all a concerted Western approach to neutral and underdeveloped countries through the medium most of these countries favor--the UN--by means of a new, bold, large-scale program of multilateral economic development financing. Many Dutchmen put this issue on the same plane as questions of war or peace.

In the summer of 1953 the Netherlands became the first government to pronounce itself formally on the subject of a general conference to review the UN Charter, a matter which according to Article 109 was to be debated by the Assembly two years later. The Dutch set up a National Commission consisting of distinguished citizens in and out of the government to study the problem and make recommendations.

When the US sought, later in the same summer of 1953, to stimulate widespread national and international attention to the problem of Charter Review, the Dutch were already hard at work (and already had some reservations about the prospects for success). Before very long, while the Department of State was still, so to speak, circling in the orbit in which Mr. Dulles' initial thrust had--against the judgment of some of his advisors--propelled it, those leading the Dutch review had concluded that nothing would come of it at this particular stage of history. Their efforts have thus turned to other projects for enhancing the pro-

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pects for world community and for greater access in the East-West conflict, largely by the use of available UN machinery, however imperfect. If the issue of West New Guinea were to be eliminated as a factor for myopia in the Dutch vision of the UN, there seems little doubt that an even higher order of analysis and imagination about the constructive and profitable uses of the UN might be anticipated from the Netherlands.
THE CONTEMPORARY WEST GERMAN VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

The Federal Republic of Germany is not a member of the United Nations. It is, however, the most important Western state to remain outside the doors of that organization. The likelihood is that Western Germany will remain outside so long as two parts of that country, like Korea and Vietnam, lie on opposite sides of the de facto truce line between East and West. But the German presence in Western diplomacy is being increasingly felt. Its economic potential and performance have once again won for it a leading place in the European economy; and its foreign policy orientation must continue to be a matter of the most acute concern to the United States, to Europe, and to world peace.

This brief inquiry was made on the assumption that, despite Germany's absence from UN councils, any survey of the Western European outlook regarding the United Nations would be incomplete without some reference to the Federal Republic. In the retrospect of a brief investigation of the contemporary German view of the United Nations, this premise appears to have been well-founded.

German Membership in International Organizations

The Federal Republic of Germany is today a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Payments Union, the Western European Union, the European Coal and

* Henceforth referred to as Germany.

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Steel Community, the Council of Europe, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe. In addition, it is a member of the new European Economic Community—the Common Market—as well as the European Atomic Energy Community—EURATOM.

In addition, however, Germany is a member of all of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and maintains an observer at the seat of the United Nations in New York. German participation in the United Nations proper is two-fold. In the first place one might put the activities of the German observer in the corridors of the United Nations and in other diplomatic settings in New York. The German Foreign Ministry values highly the fact that its observer mission is on good terms with the United Nations Secretariat and plays an active part in affairs in New York. The other major aspect of participation takes the form of financial contributions to the budgets of the voluntary programs of the United Nations. Here again German officials take pride in the fact that their country is contributing "in every way it can" short of being a member of the United Nations, and follows the policy of attempting to increase its contributions each year.

The contributions made by Germany to UN technical assistance and relief agencies tend to support this attitude (although the actual dollar amounts are perhaps smaller than German pride in them would seem to warrant.) In the period 1954-1956, the German contribution to the UN expanded program for technical assistance (UNETAP), compared with the contributions of members of the United Nations, was as great as that of Turkey and greater than Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Japan. Its contribution to the ordinary technical assistance fund (UNTA) was greater than that of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, and its grant to UNICEF was twice that of Belgium and the same as the contribution
made by Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and New Zealand. In 1957 Germany's contribution to the UN program of technical assistance was 12th among a list of 84 contributing nations. (In July of that year Germany subscribed a further 100 million to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.)

In Bonn one hears the statement that Germany might make a far greater contribution to multilateral economic development and other programs out of its foreign currency reserves. An interesting debate centers around the actual availability of this reserve (see below), and the writer is not qualified to evaluate the merits on either side. A more self-evident argument for continued modesty in German international financial efforts would seem to arise from the refugee situation. The Federal Republic is still receiving a quarter of a million refugees each year from East Germany, and the problem of adequate housing, despite large-scale building programs, remains entirely acute and tends to color the morale and sense of well-being of both the man in the street and government officials alike.

German Attitudes Regarding the United Nations

The recently appointed German permanent observer to the United Nations said upon his arrival in New York on August 23, 1958: "The German people place their hope in the United Nations." Senior Foreign Office officials insist upon the great importance to Germany of a strengthened United Nations, based on the assumption that the UN can be "nothing but useful" to Germany.

particularly in its capacity to illuminate the Western positions in the cold war. (On this count both German and Italian officials are strikingly preoccupied with the possibilities of using the United Nations for propaganda purposes. They assert frankly the view that their senior Western partners are wasting admirable propaganda opportunities which arise continuously in the United Nations to create a better popular international image of Western policy. Since both countries were innovators in modern propaganda theories and techniques, this emphasis is not surprising. It does, however, imply a danger of clouding their judgment on the possibility of serious negotiations and programs in the United Nations, a danger not unfamiliar in some similarly unbalanced American approaches.

Another clue to the kind of interest which the United Nations arouses in Germany may be found in the relatively strong position of the German UN Association, which, unlike some of its counterparts in other Western European countries, appears to be quite active. Officials of both the German government and the Bundestag go out of their way to deny the existence of any real opposition to the United Nations in Germany and stress the fact that the young people have become "far more politically-minded" and are strong supporters of the United Nations in consequence. This is taken as a most hopeful sign since, as they frankly state, the relative apathy and ignorance of German youth helped to pave the way for Hitler. (Other observers, however, believe that German youth was more politically-minded during the Weimar period than since 1945, and that the present generation, more matter-of-fact and less susceptible to ideological concepts, is as a consequence more sympathetic to international organizations.)

One parliamentarian who is extremely active in the UN Association and speaks throughout the country on this and related subjects says she receives extraordinarily intelligent and interested questions on her speaking tours, particularly from student and worker groups. (It might be of interest to survey the membership of UN Associations in various countries including the United States, classified on the basis of age, economic and social
standing in the community, etc. The interest and participation of students
and workers in Germany would seem to present a strikingly different picture
than the one we are familiar with in the United States.)

These relatively optimistic and positive indications of public interest
and support obviously do not represent a reliably significant sampling of
national opinion. The Washington correspondent of an influential German week-
ly recently wrote that since the United Nations has tended to become an in-
stitution of power politics "this situation does not seem to open promis-
ing possibilities for Germany so much as to carry new threats." It can be
assumed that hostility to the United Nations can also be found in some more
conservative quarters in Germany as well as in circles which favor a more
detergent policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist world.

On purely objective grounds one must conclude that, as one high official
put it, the UN "seems distant to Germany." As in other Western European
countries, the young people of Germany have been far more deeply gripped by
the appeal of the European movement (although as the possibilities of poli-
tical integration seemed recently to recede, a wave of disillusionment appeared
to be setting in.)

Differences of opinion between the major political parties is revealed
specifically in attitudes toward concrete matters such as reunification and
relations with the Middle East (see below). But the general impression of
partisanship on this score seems comparable to that experienced in several
other Western European countries, where differences are a matter of shading
or degree rather than being of a more fundamental nature. Social Democratic
(SPD) leaders portray themselves as "more progressive" toward the United Na-
tions than the dominant Christian Democrats (CDU). One high government

official suggested that the SPD tends to emphasize the United Nations as a "political device" while the government realistically concentrates its energies on NATO. Another government official, denying that there is any substantive difference between the parties, suggested that the SPD is "more active" on the subject of the UN because it is not so busy.

But the differences may not be entirely nonexistent, and German views of the UN could well be affected by the future complexion of the German government. On this score, Adenauer's victory in the 1957 general election assures the CDU/CSU some fairly long-term prospects, with little likelihood of another general election before 1961. Few Germans are willing to predict an SPD victory in the foreseeable future. It seems generally acknowledged that the party lacks strong leadership and tends to be dominated by doctrinaire socialists. In any event, a number of independent observers believe that if the SPD did win office it would promptly forget its current doctrines on such subjects as disengagement and neutralism.

The 1959 crisis over Berlin had the effect of stiffening West German opposition to recognition of the East German regime in any form and to softening of the Western position that bases reunification exclusively on free elections in East Germany. Before the new Soviet move in 1958, some important members of the CDU were beginning to question the "rigidity" of governmental policy on the subject of reunification as well as in other areas which might have a bearing on the general German outlook toward the United States, the United Nations, and Western Europe. At the moment German foreign policy is so dominated by the personality and will of Chancellor Adenauer that it is not easy to envisage the kinds of changes in policy, if any, which would be made by his successors (among whom the names Erhard and Gerstenmaier seem to stand out).
The basic themes involved in German attitudes toward the United Nations are two—the United Nations and the problem of reunification, and the United Nations and relationships with the neutralist and underdeveloped countries. The significance of German relations with the United Nations emerges most sharply under these two headings.

The United Nations and the Problem of Reunification

The problem of reunification lies, of course, at the heart of the German foreign policy ensemble today. In German eyes it is the acid test for such schemes for "disengagement" and neutralization of Germany as the now-modified Rapacki plan, and is at the center of the whole range of issues arising from relations with the Soviet Union and with the West. The preponderant position within the government, reflecting the current policies being followed by Chancellor Adenauer, flatly discourages consideration of proposals for neutralization and, consequently, disengagement. Whatever may be hoped for, Germany in this view is simply too big and too significant in the European scheme of things ever to be "neutral." Government officials appear to be realistic about the Soviet Union and its power, and their attitudes coincide with the common lines of policy followed by both administrations in the United States toward this issue. In this sense, official German policy favors the present status quo pending some evolution (or revolution) which would drastically change the bases of the power relationship. (On the other hand, Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet pact should never be entirely forgotten by the West, particularly when the Soviet Union chooses to display its recollection of this history. 6)

Other Germans, particularly within SPD circles, do not necessarily go along with the present policy. One highly placed independent observer believes that "the ice is cracking under the surface," and that if only more men of finesse and imagination were brought into the circles of power—probably only after Adenauer departs the scene—a new position might be formulated which reflects "true German interests" rather than general Western interests. In this view, Germany is "too agreeable," "too anxious not to cause trouble." The possibilities of unification appear to be hopeless only because the Western position is so "rigid." Reunification will come about only through a long-term disengagement action without conditions, and which involves other evolutions within the Soviet orbit. The West should, it is felt, have made a prompt counterproposal to the Polish Foreign Minister when he made his original proposal for disengagement in the fall of 1957. It is fair to say that the above represents the view generally held by German intellectuals.

On the other hand, highly placed government spokesmen see little realistic possibility for the achievement of German objectives of unification and genuine security so long as the Western position depends upon free elections. The United States has hinted at a modification of this position, but in the view of the dominant German personalities there should be absolutely no "give" on this. For all the talk about reunification, West Germany obviously chooses a divided Germany over a unified one vulnerable to Communist penetration, unprotected by the West, or barred from exercising freedom of choice in selecting her friends.

Germans are rarely explicit about this and prefer to base their case on the rationale that if Germany goes, the free world is lost and therefore the present

German position must be the basis for Western policy. One is struck here, as elsewhere in the German scene, by the implicit egotism of German policy and the keen sense of the potential political leverage the importance of Germany to the West might one day afford to German diplomacy. Nowhere articulated, this attitude may well be expected to become more overt with the passage of time (as it has tended to become again explicit in the other once-great continental power—France).

Senior government spokesmen refer to the United Nations in this connection in two ways. First, a United Nations army might conceivably provide security by replacing the present British, American (and theoretically French) forces. But until the time when this is a genuine possibility, the status quo must be preserved. While the Soviet Union has rather surprisingly suggested a UN presence in the proposed "free city" of Berlin, Soviet policy in general defines the limits of any use of the UN as an instrument for changing the status quo in Germany in ways which would leave Germany free to rearm and to be allied with the NATO powers.

The United Nations also has become involved in the past, abortively, in the German reunification problem, and may well again. (It will be recalled that, on German initiative, the three Western Powers brought to the 1951 General Assembly session a request for the appointment of an impartial international commission under UN supervision to carry out a simultaneous investigation in both parts of Germany to determine whether conditions existed for the holding of genuinely free elections. The Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Poland. Although the Western part of Germany was of course open to the

9. General Assembly Resolution 510 (VI) of 20 December 1951.
commission, it was barred from the Soviet zone in Germany and concluded that there was little prospect of being able to pursue its task.) In the opinion of some Foreign Ministry officials, Western Germany is "helped" every time the question of unification is discussed in the United Nations, and unquestionably the Germans find it convenient to have others willing to represent German policies before a world-wide audience. But some of the same officials see great risk in extending such debates to the details of reunification; the great danger is that the bedrock issue of free elections will be confused and blurred by the intervention of neutralists with schemes for "bridging the gap." Thus, while assertions of the Western position are welcomed, United Nations intervention in the matter of reunification and indeed in any issue affecting German security is believed to be extremely dangerous to both German and Western interests. The Germans are naturally alarmed at the prospect of debate in the United Nations on reunification with Germany unable to take part in such debates without Western agreement to comparable participation by the German Democratic Republic. In such a situation the West Germans tend to display uncertainty as to the attitudes of the Asian-African group and are in general dubious about the value to Germany of any conceivable action by the United Nations. Almost as an afterthought, some of these officials throw in the suggestion that it would be most unhealthy for the United Nations itself to take on another insoluble problem. Again, developments with respect to the status of Berlin could conceivably force a reappraisal of this view. If the Soviet Union repudiates the Potsdam Agreement, the West may face a choice between direct negotiations with the GDR, or seeking political modalities through the United Nations for continuation of the present multinational regime for Berlin.
Relations with Asian-African Countries

This is the other paramount issue that arises in connection with German "nonparticipation" in the United Nations, and here the lines are rather sharply drawn. One side—which includes a number of government people—expresses private satisfaction with the considerable advantages Germany derives from her present position as a non-Member. These advantages are obvious: Germany, unlike her Western European and American allies, is not forced to choose publicly between Europe and the Asian-African bloc on the many issues where this choice arises in the United Nations. Germany can thus be "neutral," and can stand aside, helping out where it appears possible, particularly on questions arising out of colonial issues or bearing on relations between European countries and their former colonies. The German observer can thus "do a great deal for the free world behind the scenes." As with a number of other German positions, the current policy is felt to be both "easier" for Germany and also working to the advantage of the larger alliance and Western community as a whole.

The other side of the argument holds that the advantages of nonparticipation for Germany are exaggerated and carry a taint of immorality. While it is better to have no Germany in the United Nations than to have two Germanies, Germany, in this view, should be "courageous" enough to take stands on issues that arise in the United Nations even as among friends.

The rather peripheral nature of the relationship between the United Nations and the politically urgent questions of reunification, German security, and relationships with allies and with the Arab world (see below) go a long way to explain why, in the words of one rather cynical high official of the German Press Ministry, the United Nations seems terribly distant to Germany. It also
makes it possible for an equally high official in the Foreign Ministry to claim that the German attitude toward the United Nations is extremely "positive." He asserted that while both bilateral and multilateral approaches to political and economic problems are necessary, the multilateral approach is vital above all in the role which the Secretary General can play in providing a mediatory element between otherwise irreconcilable sides in the kinds of conflicts the world confronts today.

Germany, the United Nations, and the Underdeveloped Countries

Germany sees herself as allied to her Western European partners but at the same time occupying a different category so far as colonial issues are concerned. This distinction has two roots. In terms of colonies, Germany is once again in a "have-not" kind of position compared with Britain, France, (and the United States.) This time, instead of agitating for the return of her overseas colonies—as he did in the inter-war years, Germany is exploiting her new "have-not" status, much as the Italians are currently doing, and hoping for the rewards that such political continence deserves. Germany is also the loser of a war only thirteen years ago in which its partners were the victors. It is not strange that some of the criteria which responsible Germans set up to judge international political actions tend to differ from those elsewhere in the Western alliance. In the view of some reputable Germans, the United States was the only country that lived up to the standards of the UN Charter in the Suez episode. At the time of Suez the German government itself may have been unwilling to say anything in public against the French and the British, but according to Germans today the general public, and particularly the students, were highly indignant at the "immoral" action of their primary Western partners.
This could of course be explained in psychological terms of the moral virtue of the former sinner who has hit the sawdust trail. But as a political fact it has profound significance, particularly as Germany looks out to the South over the heads of her European partners. The Middle East is once again a target of serious German attention (as it is of that other purged pariah in the NATO camp--Italy). As though it needed to be justified, German activity in the Middle East is characterized by some German officials as based upon the fear that, in the absence of an energetic policy, the Egyptians and other Arabs would do business with the German Democratic Republic which also has technicians and know-how. Obviously the German interest in world-wide markets for her manufactured goods has an important place in the equation. The seriousness which Germany attaches to its Middle Eastern policy today provides at least a partial explanation for German official resentment over British and French "stupidity" in trying to turn the clock back in the fall of 1956. The same irritation with this outmoded way of doing business with the Arabs was also apparent in the early summer of 1958 in connection with the American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan: perhaps no Western European country was as openly critical in its press as Germany.

It is against this background that the German approach to the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East should be viewed. Some leading figures in the Foreign Ministry insist that Germany's interest in the underdeveloped countries is not essentially a "commercial" problem and that Germany does not need markets, but is really "acting for the West" from her highly favorable position as a country recently "defeated by the colonial powers." Thus unencumbered by the colonial incubus, Germany is in a position to rebuild the bridges between North and South which have been shattered or are now hanging
by a thread. Whatever the motives, Germany "feels strongly" the need to make as large as possible a contribution to the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. A fund of 50 million Deutschmark has been set up for bilateral programs, and it is now reported from Bonn that $100 millions is to be diverted from the domestic reconstruction field to the financing of capital goods exports to underdeveloped lands. Current policy is to press for better political coordination by NATO in order to enable the representatives of the OEEC member countries to coordinate their economic activities. But some officials feel strongly that while NATO may be useful to firm up political objectives, it is not useful as an instrument for aid (as was proposed by the French government a few years ago.) Rather, the United Nations (or alternatively, the OEEC) is seen as the most fruitful vehicle for conveying Western aid to the underdeveloped, particularly in allaying the suspicions of recipient countries.

Here the foreign exchange reserve, cited by some as adding up to $30 billion Deutschmark, is a key issue. As indicated above, one side suggests that since there are "no savings" in Germany, the reserves would have to be replaced if used for economic development. The other side challenges the point of view that sees Germany as a poor country with recovery only in the industrial sector, and even within the government it is privately suggested that Germany could contribute far more heavily than it has so far to multilateral programs, raising the additional sums from banks, floating public loans, etc. An SPD Deputy suggested that at least his party would make better use of the currency reserves, whether they could actually be expended in this way or not, and by

nationalizing industry or through some other undisclosed measure of economy could make significantly more funds available for foreign aid.

Perhaps the most perceptive journalist consulted, one who is often called the "Walter Lippmann of Germany," acknowledged that the idea of greater economic aid was indeed growing in Germany but that it rested on a far more strategic basis than the one commonly advanced. The fundamental question about Africa in the German mind is whether French policy will undermine the chances for successful future relationships. (This was prior to the fall elections in 1958 in which France's African territories, except for Algeria, were given the option of immediate independence.) Germany, said this observer, does not want to be in the position of "financing French colonialism"; so long as there is genuine uncertainty about where French policy may be taking the West in Africa, Germany will "hold back." (The French idea of a "EurAfrica" in relationship with the Common Market is, he insisted, not popular in Germany.)

Conclusion

It can be readily seen that the United Nations plays only a secondary role in German thinking, partly because Germany is not a member of the organization, but also because one of her overriding preoccupations—the cluster of issues around unification and German security—does not seem to lend itself to adjudication or any other form of settlement within the United Nations barring a profound change in Soviet policy (or, as indicated, perhaps in Western policy too). Again, one must interject a caveat in the face of new communist challenges to the Western position in Berlin. On the other hand, the second preoccupation—relations with the Middle East and underdeveloped countries in general—has a direct bearing on the United Nations and its capabilities; the
Germans are making use of existing UN machinery and many of them would like to see it used to a considerably greater extent.

The United Nations is seen as a possibly significant means to assist in the achievement of the German objective of reaching out, over the heads of its European allies if necessary, to the world to the South where visions are today arising of renewed German prestige and renewed German markets for her future productive output. Those who take the United Nations seriously—and there seem to be a surprising number of Germans, particularly among the young people, who have pinned their flag to this mast—see equally well that in the absence of German membership, and given Germany's continued dependence upon American military aid for her own security, the future not only of Germany but of the United Nations depends upon the capacity of the United States to keep the free world together and to add to the strength of that free world a significant portion of the now neutral and underdeveloped areas of the world. The dual possibilities of a wholly independent German policy toward the latter, disassociating herself from the West in order to gain an advantageous national position, or of a new Rapallo with the Soviet Union, are today clouds no bigger than a man's hand. But any Western policy that chose to ignore either would be fatuous. The United Nations is today important to Germany primarily on the first count—for the additional avenues it provides toward the achievement of better relations with the underdeveloped countries. The legitimacy of this policy can hardly be challenged. But American interests and indeed Western interests as a whole could conceivably benefit if Germany's partners themselves collectively or even individually matched the vigor and insight which this particular German policy reflects.

II. Some American observers were quick to note the absence of priority for free elections in Chancellor Adenauer's reply of November 17, 1958 to Soviet proposals on peace treaty discussion. See New York Herald Tribune, November 18, 1958.
THE CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

In taking the Italian outlook as a part of the general Western European view of the United Nations, two rather basic provisos need to be made.

First, Italy became a member of the United Nations in December 1955. The commonly-heard reference to the "first decade of the UN" involves a major segment of modern diplomatic and political history from which Italy, except on ad hoc occasions, was totally excluded.

Secondly, Italy, taken as one of the European "six" plus Britain, is a case apart in ways that transcend the particular differences in policy and outlook between, say, France and the United Kingdom, or Belgium and the Netherlands. The Italian difference rests largely on economic grounds, but these are of such an order that a foreign policy is in a real sense still a luxury for postwar Italy. Italy is a "half-developed" country and, as such, faces economic and social problems of the first magnitude.

The Italian economy today is making great strides forward. Real national income rose over 5% a year from 1950 to 1957. Industrial production rose by 45% between 1953 and May 1958. Italy's gold and dollar

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1 On February 22, 1951 Italy became a participant of the Trusteeship Council without vote by virtue of her role as Administering Power in Somaliland under the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the General Assembly December 2, 1950. The Trusteeship Council revised its rules of procedure to enable Italy, as a nonmember, to designate a representative and take part on a limited basis.
reserves are well ahead of France's. Major efforts are underway to reduce the sharp economic disparity between the depressed agricultural South and the industrialized North. But a few statistics are suggestive of the remaining problem: In 1956 per capita energy consumption in the UK was 5.03 metric tons of coal; in Belgium and Luxembourg it was 4.34; in Italy it was 1.12. Infant mortality rates in 1955 were 20.1 deaths per thousand in the Netherlands and 25.7 in Britain; in Italy: 48.6. Current literacy figures are not available for Italy, but per capita news print consumption in 1956 was 3.6 kg for Italy, while it was 19 kg in the UK and 10.2 in France.

It is thus clear that Italian diplomacy and policy toward the rest of the world through the UN needs to be refracted through the glass of domestic problems and internal attitudes in the search for clues that might illuminate the future. Neither the record of past performance in the UN—in this case negligible—nor the comfortable stereotype of a common "Western" mentality, drawn only too often in the American image, supplies the insights we seek.

The Italian World View

Baron Sonnino, one-time Italian Foreign Minister, adopted for himself and Italy the motto Alliis licet: tibe non licet—others may: you may not.

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3 UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957, p. 322.
4 Ibid., p. 38.
5 Ibid., p. 633.
This self-denying ordinance has again limited Italian freedom of policy in the period since World War II. And it is the new impatience with such a policy of restraint that forms one of the themes of relevance to this examination.

Italy is in transition and is today questioning, if not actually rejecting, what some Italian leaders now call the "old shell" of the postwar de Gasperi policy. The postwar period has ended and such a policy is, to some influential policy makers, "outdated and insufficient." One turning point may well have been the elections of May 25-26, 1958, in which the Christian Democrats retained their power but only as part of at least a moderate leftward shift in which the Italian Socialist Party gained nine additional seats in parliament while the rightist parties moved toward oblivion.

The leftist and activist inclinations of President Gronchi have frequently been remarked on abroad. They were recently supplied a powerful catalyst in the person of Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, and today, even more than before, estimates of the new Italian "dynamism" tend to be personalized. But the dynamic forces that may be moving Italy toward a greater nationalistic quality in her policy run deeper than personalities. Italy has recovered sufficiently from the disasters of the last war to be looking once again for a role in the world. The men in power are, in this view, expressions of the times and of the national mood. The dangers of neo-nationalism may well lie in attempts by the Italian government to interpret this new discontent by over-reacting against Italy's previous "subservience" to Western policies. Italy may have been "cut down to size" by the war and "re-educated" to international cooperation, but the new signs of national confidence and
impatience concern more than one thoughtful Italian when he speculates on the directions in which the nation may be led by a new ferment of nationalism.

Another relevant theme has to do with tensions within the Western alliance. Italian feelings toward France are historically ambivalent. Italian foreign policy is generally aimed at supporting France as a counterweight to growing German strength within the alliance, and this is particularly true with respect to the Common Market. At the same time, the accession of de Gaulle in the late spring of 1958 gave many Italians pause. (Some feel that Fanfani gained a majority only as a result of the Liberal Party's loss of strength in the light of the Gaullist coup.) A former Italian Defense Minister, in listing to this writer his version of contemporary dangers, started with the "Napoleonic phase" of Russian aggression and ended with French "militarism." (Britain too has enjoyed a certain amount of Italian mistrust, particularly from the political right, since the Ethiopian sanctions in the thirties.)

These attitudes contribute to the same trend discussed above. A senior official in the Foreign Ministry privately fears that Italy will be motivated to a more active international role in the next year or so by concern that France will otherwise gain a preponderant position in Western Europe. The US is enormously popular, but the same argument speaks of "unrest with the American lead", as well as these other tensions, pulling Italy out of her hitherto tranquil political orbit and into a path of activism with objectives that are yet obscure.

This leitmotif of contemporary Italian political forecasting is worth
looking at rather closely. Italy has been a "good soldier" but sees others successfully practicing a species of "blackmail" which leaves the faithful retainers far behind in terms of attention and assistance. The new leadership feels keenly the need for "parity" with the Big Three of the West (although an issue can still be made in Italy over the old pre-World War I debate as to whether Italy should be the "smallest of the big" or the "biggest of the small.") Moreover, since other NATO members such as France are seen to be adopting individualistic courses of action, such moves as the Italian attempts at rapprochement with Nasser tend to be justified to questioners in such comparative terms. ("Germany extended credits to Nasser—why shouldn’t we?") There were of course earlier reflections of this attitude in negotiations leading to the Trieste settlement of October 5, 1954, with some vocal Italian elements complaining that the US paid far more attention to Tito’s wishes than to Italy’s.

Personalities in the Fanfani government gave additional momentum to the natural tides of events. Fanfani, as his own Foreign Minister, made a direct impact on the Palazzo Chigi as well as the Quirinale, and much was heard in Rome of his personal "clique" in the Foreign Service—the so-called "Mau Maus" who are known to sympathize with left-wing trends in the Democratic Christian party, and were recently alleged to have executed an anti-NATO purge in the Service.6

Unquestionably Gronchi has also been an innovator in developing the hitherto honorific role of President, particularly in foreign affairs. Western

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memories are green of his earlier calls for an "opening to the left" which by implication would involve collaboration with at least the PSI--the Nonr Socialists. The latter have moved toward ostensible "autonomy" of the Communists, and only time can tell what a government dominated by a socialist coalition will mean for Italian foreign policy. Any Italian who takes his country's helm today should be watched for signs that they will develop into significant agents of history.

What is not often said about the new mood is that Italy's domestic problems are such that nationalism could only be an escape from their exigencies. A noted Italian journalist whose cynicism about Italy's future is exceeded only by his hostility toward the Church as the arch-enemy of Italian social and economic progress sees Italy, however nationalistic, as the tail of the European dog, unable to change its foreign policies even if it wished to. He depicts Italy as in a prerevolutionary situation similar to that of Russia in 1905, and sees the "feudal barons" such as Enrico Mattei, whose E.N.I. oil interests constitute an "extra-state" with its own foreign policy and parliamentary deputies, in the process of "taking over" as the state disintegrates. This gloomy forecast exaggerates to the detriment of credibility but is nevertheless consistent with other diagnoses in its profound contempt for the capacity of the Italian people to make the judgments about foreign policy necessary to sustain its ostensibly democratic character. A senior Italian diplomat complained to the writer that the United States fails to understand that the "people" are not intelligent; the Soviet leadership rightly considers the people to be "idiots" and conducts its foreign policy on this assumption. This comment bears on the frequent
Italian emphasis on the UN as a propaganda agency. But it also suggests that Guiseppi Mazzini and Carlo Sforza are not necessarily reliable guides to the contemporary Italian political mentality.

The General Italian View of the UN

Italy, as noted, has no real diplomatic tradition as a member of the UN although it has been a member from the beginning of the UN Specialized Agencies, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, and of course NATO and the European regional organizations. (Rome is the seat of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, as it was of the prewar International Institute for Agriculture.)

But the distinctive features of the Italian view of the UN cannot be accounted for solely by reference to Italy's unhappy years outside the gates, barred time and again from the Soviet Union's first veto of Italian admission in 1947 until the package deal of 1955. To be sure, Italy chafed under these perennial blows to Italian pride. In the eyes of the cognoscenti the stature of the UN declined in Italy during this period also as a consequence of the way in which the former Italian colonies question was handled, and because of the failure of the Security Council to appoint a Governor for the putative "Free Territory of Trieste." Certainly Italian opinion was not immune to the more general reaction to the abortion of the UN's prime role as the Cold War moved the security focus away from the UN and toward Europe itself. 7 (It is of more than psychological curiosity that Italy, according to her prime public opinion tester, "cared" more about the UN when her ambitions for membership were still unfulfilled; she was more interested in

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7 A detailed account of Italian relations with international organizations, including the UN, up to 1955, is contained in the forthcoming publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Italy and the United Nations.
becoming a member than she has been since the day of fulfillment.)

Yet there is a still more basic element in the Italian view of the UN. Italy has its own very special reason for adopting an ambivalent approach to the UN and its relation to Italy's future. One of the chiefs of the Foreign Ministry summed it up blandly: Italy has "great respect" for the UN, but the new requirement that Italy take a public position on every issue "creates problems." (It is of course precisely these problems that some leaders in Western Germany seem happy to avoid by virtue of Germany's continued exclusion from the UN's council chambers—but with continued access to the rest of the diplomatic paraphernalia the UN furnishes.) This dilemma is at the heart of the Italian problem in the UN. Italy's foreign policy thrust, particularly in economic terms, is once again toward the south, along the African littoral of the Mediterranean basin. In the UN, issues between this revolutionary region and Western Europe tend to be transformed into painful political barriers between the two regions.

A former chief of UN Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, while displaying the typically optimistic symptoms of the UN diplomatic brotherhood, sees positive virtues in the UN. It cannot solve major political issues but is useful above all for "educating new countries." It is a "college for everyone." It forms needful common opinions, and one is therefore justified in being optimistic. Still, having to stand up and be counted creates "difficulties" for Italy. The "technicians" who acquire responsibility for major economic and technical assistance programming need better "political sense." And the West is remiss in failing to exploit intelligently the opportunity the UN offers to establish contacts with the rest of the world. The Russians,
on the contrary, have seen this opportunity clearly and have succeeded in making effective use of it.

The top civil servant dealing with problems of European organization turns this estimate about slightly. "Italian policy" is an obsolete conception; one is either for East or West, or one is a blackmailer. The UN becomes important precisely because it is a stage for the battle and also the scoreboard for its progress. So far the West has a majority, but it is in process of being lost. The communists are "poor diplomats" but are winning in the use of the UN for propaganda purposes. The UN structure must be defective because it seems to magnify the West's shortcomings and the Russians' advantages, but the important point is propaganda. This is an art, it is implied, at which Italians have been known to excel but at which the Western democracies tend to fumble. Italy is seen to occupy a slightly independent position as a nation possessing unique advantages in the UN, such as pro-Arab proclivities and close ties to Latin-America. The awareness of such a distinction makes Italian concern with Western "propaganda failures" in the UN uncommonly frustrating.

Soviet experts tend to regard the UN in a somewhat specialized light, and those in Italy are no exception. A former communist activist who is now an influential member of one of the more conservative parties considers the UN to be a "danger to the peace." If it is useful, its value is for propaganda. But on balance neither the UN nor, for that matter, NATO can develop the necessary political counterstrategy to world communism. The government's leading Soviet expert somewhat shares this view, finding the UN ineffective with respect to major decisions that must be taken but "helpful"
to the West in some cases. (Lebanon was a case strongly in point in the summer of 1958). Both these opinions would tend to confirm the conclusion of a shrewd observer of Italian politics that Italy as a nation may not be very interested in the UN but is acutely conscious of its propaganda value. And all of the views cited above would confirm the feeling of the editor of an important Christian Democratic newspaper that in Italian eyes, the major role for the UN increasingly resides in its efforts to keep the peace in the Middle East — the prime target for renascent Italian overseas interests.

As in many other countries, Italian Government planners tend to make sharp distinctions between political and economic affairs in directing Italian participation in international organizations. Italian policy won a modest success when Italy joined the UN Security Council in 1958. But to some observers outside the Government the single-minded drive for a Security Council seat reflected the "anachronistic prestige policy" which sees such matters exclusively in terms of "discrimination." True Italian interests, some feel, call for an important role in the Economic and Social Council and not the Security Council. One finds this hard to argue with in terms of the logic of over-all Italian policy toward the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and elsewhere.

Suez, the UN, and the US

If popular sentiment in Britain and France castigated the US and the UN—often without distinction—for interfering with their efforts to destroy Nasser in October 1956, in Italy the reaction was largely the reverse. Reference has already been made to strains of anti-British and anti-French sentiment in the Italian international outlook. It is hard to say to what
extent these prejudices underlay the criticisms of the Suez adventure made in some Italian circles. Just prior to the Israeli-Anglo-French attack, Italy negotiated with Egypt for oil rights in the Sinai peninsula. Certainly the British-French assault on the very object of Italian courtship served to magnify a latent hostility which was already considerably exacerbated by the repressive French policy in Algeria. Italy was hurt by the Suez decision, in which she of course had no part, and many Italians were intensely critical, particularly as necessary oil supplies were jeopardized.

Some organs of the CD and Social Democratic parties and the relatively small conservative parties (Liberal, Radical, Republican) supported Italy's NATO partners. But significant CD elements, including Fanfani and Gronchi, plus of course the Nenni Socialists, were opposed. Some Italian newspapers took an anti-Nasser and pro-British line, but many Italians dismiss not only the supporting newspapers but also the Foreign Ministry's pro-British sentiments as wholly unreflective of Italian public opinion. It is of interest that public opinion polls at the time of Suez indicated that the popular reaction was more an expression of support for American policy than of antipathy to Britain and France. In this sense, the general support for the UN's role could be interpreted as essentially a reflection of pro-Americanism. A senior Italian diplomat commented that ten days after the attack most Italians felt that a larger war had been averted by the US-UN reaction. This has only to be compared with the lack of such an appraisal in France, for example, to suggest the gulf between the two national estimates of both that situation and of the validity and effectiveness of a policy of force in dealing with Arab nationalism.
But the general reaction was surprisingly mild, with many — as in the United States — expressing at least private sympathy with the attack on Nasser. A former cabinet minister who is ultraconservative in his views characterizes US policy as "stupid" and as having opened the way to Soviet penetration. At the other end of the political spectrum a professional internationalist believes that if the action had been pulled off quickly and successfully it would have won Italian approval. As it was, some Italians interpreted it as a sign of general Western weakness, of US "uncertainty," and as an indication to Europe that the UN should no longer be conceived of as capable of acting in the interests of the West.

That Italy, however divided her reactions at the time, has drawn the appropriate lessons from the Suez episode was perhaps most revealingly displayed in the Lebanese crisis of the early summer of 1958. General reactions appeared to favor almost any UN solution. High government officials were unanimous in their relief that the UN became involved from the start, in their apprehension with unilateral US and British intervention, and in their eagerness to see Italy—as a country with no colonial "connections or ambitions"—contribute significantly to a UN force in the area. One of the chiefs of the Foreign Ministry privately went far beyond current Western thinking and policy by advocating a genuinely international UN force, i.e., not composed of national contingents, arguing by illustration that a "UN carrier" could have delivered light observation planes to Lebanon in 24 hours, whereas Italy could not do so even when requested by the Secretary General.

The Italian view of the UN, not unlike the French view, tends to make a
strong identification between the UN and American policy. Estimates of the worth of the UN to Italy depend to some extent on appraisals of the state of American leadership. The US unquestionably continues to enjoy widespread popular support in Italy, where anti-Americanism is at a minimum. Competent observers have noted an even further decline in anti-American criticism in Italy in the last few years, attributed by some to the complexity of policy-making in the West since Stalin's death, yielding in turn a greater tolerance for the Americans who face these dilemmas responsibly. But the Italian political elite retains a questioning attitude that is not untypical of general Western European opinion at comparable levels. There is the inevitable feeling that American power is not matched by experience and maturity. In a fairly restricted circle of conservative thought "excessive US anticolonialism" is blamed for Nasser and the "loss of North Africa" every bit as much as in Belgium, Britain, and France. The US is seen as "weak," "not supporting its strength," and endangering, by its policy of "hope" toward the Soviet Union, an Italy entirely dependent on US power. Another increasingly powerful element, referred to earlier, smarts under the political restrictions attending the role of "Washington's best follower" and is coming to view Italy's benefits as incommensurate.

Even the most balanced and friendly observers privately express their concern with the American "lack of direction and initiative." Like other Europeans, they feel that "constructive criticisms" of American policy have been ignored by their mighty ally, with the result of encouraging "unconstructive aspects" of the same critical spirit.

As elsewhere, the most specific manifestation of this attitude in terms
of UN policies centers on the question of seating Communist China. US China policy is not supported by either the political left or the political right, the latter largely for the familiar reasons of hoped-for trade. Responsible governmental officials indicated privately that Italian dissatisfaction with US policy may result in an Italian vote in the next year or two in favor of seating.

Estimates about popular sentiment toward the UN vary widely. Some Foreign Ministry officials speak of "widespread public support," others of lack of public enthusiasm based on "ignorance" of the UN, particularly before Italy's admission in 1955. Others agree that the war made the Italian people basically "indifferent" to all international organizations. But in still another respected opinion the UN is "favored psychologically" by Italians generally despite Italy's historical antipathy to anything labelled "collective security" and also despite the "traditionally cynical bent" of her people.

(The Italian Society for International Organization--the equivalent of UN Associations elsewhere--is almost entirely supported (4/5 of its budget) by direct Parliamentary appropriations of public funds. At the same time it operates as an independent organization, and only in the last few years has lost its Communist members from a board still widely representative of all political factions.)

Any references to the Italian public need to take into account what may be a greater gap between the well-informed and the uninformed than exists in any of the other countries surveyed. A leading student of public opinion who is perhaps in the best position to know concludes that, except for leadership groups, the general public is almost wholly ignorant of the UN
and sees it as something "distant" and "in the hands of Americans."

According to his findings, the public paid very little attention to world affairs even at the time of Suez.

Europe and the UN

Another student of Italian public opinion characterizes public opinion toward the UN as "rational" while public opinion toward the European movement is "emotional." Certainly if there is any foreign policy issue that has succeeded in engaging the support and deep commitment of not only Italian youth but Italian intellectuals as well, it is the movement for European integration. The Italian risorgimento of the last century supplies a meaningful analogy for new efforts to unite neighboring political entities.

Clearly, Italy, like Germany, displays a willingness to go a considerable distance cheerfully for the sake of European unity, and tends publicly to attribute greater supranational qualities to existing and planned European agencies than, for example, the French. Italian deputies are often elected on the "European ticket," and all but the Communists voted for the Common Market. (The Nenni Socialists abstained but voted for Euratom). Political, economic, and social benefits are expected from integration. ("Business expects the Common Market to save it from nationalization.") Of course, even discounting the Italian proclivity for political quips, some doubting voices are heard, and in particular regarding the Common Market. ("The whole theme in Italy is avoidance of internal competition; how can it accept external competition?"; "Italian monopolies like FIAT fear the Common Market"; "Big business will do all right but medium-sized business and agriculture will suffer"; "The Socialists abstained because they plan to change its
complexion when they come into power"; etc.) But the Common Market has a major role to play in Italy's immediate future, and the European movement in general enjoys vigorous interest and support in Italy; the polls show widespread public acceptance of the specific prices that must be paid for integration.

Yet in Italy, unlike Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, no connection seems to be made between the UN and a major development of the European role. No one could be found who thought in terms of integration as strengthening the Italian position in the UN. Whether or not this is because Italy's participation in European organization far antedates her UN membership, Italian leaders do not envisage a European community as of value for "matching" other external blocs, as do, for example, the low countries. As Italians see it, European participation relates primarily to internal problems, and this focus is entirely understandable in a country with two million unemployed and other pressing domestic problems which have a chance of being eased by association on a wider economic basis.

At the same time, some Italian planners look beyond Europe—that is to say, away from it. Italy's solutions may lie not in Europe but in the Mediterranean, and here a number of Italians believe that UN membership, rather than being an embarrassment, could perhaps become an advantage. The last section of this paper examines this theme.

**Economic Uses of the UN**

Italian planners are divided as to the "multilateralization" of aid to underdeveloped countries. UN machinery is of course used to finance Somaliland
under Italian trusteeship (Italy gave $15 million in aid to Somaliland in the period 1954-6, as well as $1.5 million to another former Italian colony, Libya.\(^8\)) The Pella Plan may be dead, but other multilateral avenues are under exploration for making more palatable the needful contributions by the Western nations of capital assistance to underdeveloped countries.

There is another side to the argument. One senior bureaucrat thought any elaboration of existing UN programs would lead to an increase in Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Since Arabs tend to see any sort of governmental aid as political, the suggested solution was a greatly enhanced role for private enterprise. The most extreme argument of this nature sees economic aid through the UN as a way of arranging for the United States to finance the "enemies" of the West.

Italy has favored the SUNFED concept as a way of supplementing the kind of developmental capital which the International Bank has so far been unable to furnish. The interest in multilateral forms of economic aid is a continuing one. It needs to be repeated that the Italian economy is a "dependent" one to a degree unknown by her Western partners, and that Italy, as a "half-developed" country, is intensively vulnerable to the fluctuations of international economic policies.

Perhaps because Italy is in this ambiguous economic position, her long-range economic policies are still in process of creation. Some Italian officials profess to see virtues in both bilateral and multilateral forms of economic assistance but nonetheless recall that even the modest Italian contributions to the UN Technical Assistance program came under political attack at home. (A total of $500,000 was contributed in the period 1954-56;\(^8\)

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in the same period Italy also contributed $100,000 to UNICEF and $1 million to UNKRA; the 1957 technical assistance contribution—the lira equivalent of $112,000—is actually smaller than the contribution of such UN members as Uruguay, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Ukrainian S S.R.) On balance, Italy will doubtless be on the side of multilateralism although her own contributions will be modest.

Italy, the Mediterranean, and the Future

Any political assessment of the Italian view of the uses of the UN for the present and near future comes to rest in the area of "colonial" policy—apostrophized because in Italy the term is used pejoratively.

Out of Italy's role as a defeated nation, and above all out of her loss of the three African colonies, have emerged opportunities and ideas for political and commercial relations across the Mediterranean that are essentially denied to all her allies save the other vanquished nation—Germany. Out of this setting has come the economic adventuring of Enrico Mattei and his government energy exploration monopoly in the Mid-and Near East, carrying with it such innovative relations with oil producing countries as the 75:25 ratio Mattei negotiated with Iran. Also out of this situation one can discern portents of a new mediatory role for Italy as between Europe and Africa, a role toyed with musingly by high government officials in private, if deprecated publicly. Those who know President Gronchi best believe that he would "jump at" the opportunity for Italy somehow to mediate the tensions that block better European relationships in the Near East and Africa, e.g. Algeria,

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9. Ibid., p. 458. For detailed treatment of this subject see the forthcoming Carnegie Endowment study referred to in footnote 7.
relations with Tunisia and Morocco, issues with Egypt. These are tensions which
in Italian eyes hinder a more rapid fulfillment of Italy's—and the West's—proper destiny in the age now begun. Italian planners realize that Italy is
inescapably identified with Europe. But they are impatient to see the end
of the Somaliland Trusteeship in 1960 in order to present Italy to the
members of the Arab-Asian-African world even more persuasively as a simon-
pure noncolonial power.

The specific impulses which urge Italians into a major African role go
beyond the intimations of destiny which can be sensed beneath the surface of
Italian policy. Italian commercial interests are alert for markets in
Egypt and the Middle East, and Italy's official pro-Arab policy was heavily
underscored by the personal gestures of friendship made by Mattei and Fanfani to
Abdel Gamal Nasser, still the arch-enemy of their next door neighbor and
ally. According to public opinion experts, among the general population the
lower classes tend to be pro-Arab, the upper classes pro-Israel. The official
policy of pro-Arabism is not a sentimental or emotional one but is based on a
calculation of Italy's economic interests.

The economic motive is not, however, the whole story. Italian trade
with the Middle East appears to loom large, particularly in the minds of
major Italian manufacturers, and there is much talk of Italian "economic
penetration" in the Middle East (in much the same vein as the talk of large-
scale markets in Communist China). But such trade is only roughly 5% of
Italy's total external trade and is small compared to trade with her
European partners. Actually, the political component is equally influen-
tial in defining the Italian role in the underdeveloped world and, by extension
in the UN. Italy's geographic position involves strong historic ties with people across mare nostrum. Some thoughtful Italians conceive the Middle East to be the most dangerous area in the world because it lacks an identifiable status quo and is therefore highly unstable. The need to keep peace in the area is felt acutely, and by simple logic the UN appears to many responsible Italians to offer the best promise of maintaining peace and security there. Italian leaders may pursue a more dynamic role in the area than some of their partners might at least privately wish for, but, as with the parallel West German penetration, such activity can be and is publicly ascribed to a wish to improve the position not only of Italy but also of the entire Western alliance. In several statements made in late July 1958, then Premier Fanfani coupled affirmations of support for his allies with the assertion that Italy, with a knowledge of the Mediterranean area "that goes back into the millennia," would be in a position to talk to Africans without arousing suspicions "because since long, we have no possessions to defend or to extend." 10 Italy is in the front lines of the Western alignment, but

At the same time, Italy has no colonies and therefore is in a better position to show interest in the national aspirations of other peoples, without arousing distrust and suspicion. 11

This serves well as a statement of the contemporary Italian theme. It does not necessarily have to lead to a sharp break with either Europe


or America. Indeed, it comes close to American policy and seems to this writer somewhat better attuned to the realities of the age than the attitudes that predominate in France. There is a growing role in the world for the "middle power," particularly one that can pioneer pathways that the great powers may discern but are somehow unable to take. Italy may well create precedents for a new style of European approach to Africa. At its best, the Italian move is designed to demonstrate that the West is capable of genuine understanding of the new nationalism, and that a self-respecting and dignified partnership with the West is available.

Idealism is strong in the Italian regime, and, as Signor Fanfani has written, "Our aim is not to die in a bloody war against Communism. Our aim is to outlive Communism, to build a better society that will make Communism seem old-fashioned and sterile." If this idealism does not apply specifically to the way Italians view the UN, it nevertheless makes it possible for them to perceive practical uses for the organization in the period ahead, particularly in the categories of propaganda, politico-military measures under international auspices to stabilize the Middle and Near East, and contacts between Europeans and non-Europeans in a setting where the former can at any rate seek to create an identity of interests, if not a common interest.

The dangers of a national policy that appears to combine cynicism with idealism are too familiar in Italy (and elsewhere) to require elaboration. Machiavelli and St. Francis are essentially incompatible, and ultimately one must triumph over the other. Italian political cynicism often reflects simply a style, and in this sense is a facade. But it may be more than this.

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in the current foreign policy setting, Italy accepts her contemporary role, but with regret; above all, she considers the two prime antagonists—the US and the USSR—to be something less than intelligent or morally superior to their various allies. No one speaks much any more of the danger of a new Italian imperialism, or fascism, or communism. Certainly the present evidence counter-indicates any real possibility of these contingencies materializing. But another latent possibility—neutralism—should at least be reckoned with in Western planning. Italian national interests continue to center on the Western alliance for defense against Communist military aggression. But as that particular form of danger seems to recede, and as internal subversion becomes minimized through economic and social progress, other strong Italian interests may acquire increasing importance. Some responsible Italians see the role of NATO changing as the result of possible new agreements between the Soviet Union and the US and do not want Italy to be caught napping by the change. Balancing the nostalgia for a really uncommitted role is, however, a sense of realism which may allow for greater elasticity in Italy's concept of her role in the West but not, at this reading, anything that could be called positive neutralism. Much will depend on the impact of the common market on the Italian economy, and on the complexion of the Italian government.

The pull to the South will remain strong, and will doubtless increase. This can significantly affect the interpretation which Italy places on the UN and its capabilities, for here above all the potentiality of the UN is growing, rather than diminishing, as its membership becomes ever more weighted with new African states and as these states and their political brethren continue to see the UN as a place where their own interests demand to be
served. Issues of colonialism, economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, technical aid, and trade and commodity regulation are all current and potential UN problems on which Italian interests can be expected to diverge in particular ways from Europe and the US. In another dimension of Italian interest, the UN can be seen as a prime political and even military agency to keep the instabilities of the Southern Mediterranean region from breaking out into uncontrollable violence. The present profile of Italian foreign policy is not clear as to its purposes, and will not be until the goals of that policy become more apparent. Certainly the Common Market will loom larger in Italian policy and planning than the UN in the period ahead: Italy is serious about Europe. In the UN, Italy will continue to follow the American lead not because it wishes to but because it must, while at the same time trying to help loosen up Western policy regarding Red China, East-West trade, and the like. Italy will continue to play what she conceives to be a special role vis à vis Latin America and, particularly, the Middle East, and is intensely serious about the UN role with respect to the latter. If Italian planning and policies do not yet spell out the full implications of this range of prospects, no estimate of the future made by an outsider can afford to discount them.
THE CONTEMPORARY FRENCH VIEW OF THE UN

Introduction

This paper, like the others in this collection, seeks to explore the essence of France's attitude and outlook toward the UN. Toward this end, it takes as its primary sources the thinking of some prominent and influential Frenchmen rather than the record of French action and pronouncements in the UN. The technique followed in these conversations, as elsewhere in Europe, was designed to set France's UN participation in as broad a framework as possible. It was hoped that under these conditions appraisals about French-UN relations might reflect political reality, undistorted to the greatest extent possible by the prism of the UN itself. By setting the analysis within the larger ethos of French policy, it was also hoped to gain historical depth.

If it is presumptuous so to characterize a brief study which is based upon a handful of conversations, however illuminating, it is doubly so when the nation in question is undergoing a prolonged crisis. It can be argued that crisis may have indeed become the norm, but there are varieties of crises. Each period of post-revolutionary French history has made its own compromise between the perpetually available extremes of Jacobin democracy and one or another form of Bonapartism. If the Gaullist period through which France is now passing is serving to sharpen some French qualities and highlight

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certain political instincts, at the same time other characteristics which may have greater long-term validity are submerged under unaccustomed unanimity and unity.

For one example, the classic French mode of rationalism and political logic, however precious or unrelated to political realism, is missing from the mystique which today animates French policy. To be sure, the contemporary mystique has its own brand of rationalism, as when with a single stroke General de Gaulle destroyed the immobilisme which has hitherto paralyzed French policy toward Sub-Sahara Africa, coming to terms in a breath-taking initiative with Black Africa's political drives. Yet with all admiration for the only political figure capable of having restored a sense of national coherence and purpose in 1958, one still reserves judgment as to the accuracy of analysis at a time when, according to the policy's very author, "face to face with the greatest perils, the only salvation lies in greatness."¹ Amidst his own eloquence de Gaulle quotes with high approval Chamfort: "Men of reason have endured. Men of passion have lived."² This could well be a paraphrase of the younger Oliver Wendell Holmes; but to a top-ranking Italian diplomat it "sounds like Mussolini," and it frightened half to death other prominent Europeans with whom the writer talked.

French policies under de Gaulle are turning out to be more liberal and more faithful to France's international commitments than many such European observers had dared—or perhaps wished—to hope. Large numbers of Frenchmen appear to agree with the General's conviction that a nation can do nothing without a firm sense of its own destiny and place in history. Implicit in the Gaullist thesis is the argument that while France may have been committed to actions vis-à-vis the United States or NATO or the European Community under the

2. Ibid., p. 301.
Fourth Republic, it is only by restoring French self-respect and dignity that these commitments can be meaningfully acted upon. If this argument is sound and, if the infusions of grandeur really do constitute a needful stimulant and not a dangerous intoxicant, one would be entitled to conclude that but for this very process there could be no hope for either a healthy France or a successful Europe. The test, as it was with President Eisenhower in the United States in 1952, is two-fold. The nation must be reunited, even at the cost of alienating the most dedicated pre-election supporters; and the unpopular and inconclusive war—whether Korea or Algeria—must somehow be liquidated with honor. DeGaulle has already registered impressive successes on the first count. The triumph of the entire political experiment continues to depend on what he can do in Algeria.

The basic elements of France's contemporary international outlook were not created by de Gaulle. As they had once before in 1940, circumstances again created de Gaulle in 1958. With or without him, two overwhelming facts determine French relations with the wider world, including specifically the UN, at this stage in her history.

First is the cumulative experience of defeat, starting in 1940 and still not ended, an experience unknown in precisely the same form by any of her allies or, for that matter, by any of the recently vanquished. France may have accepted, however painfully, the defeats of French arms in Indochina and of French policy in French India, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Saar. But she cannot accept the ensemble which they represent when one adds Algeria to the roster. Humiliation and a sense of national loss are bad enough but can be endured, as the British have shown. Compounded with frustration, the effect is corrosive and, as with the psychologically undefeated Germans in the 1920's, can be deadly. "Defeat is never so galling as when no battle has been fought."

crystallized the trauma of postwar France, and out of this profound disturbance comes a whole complex of attitudes of xenophobia and chauvinism which the disaster at Suez spectacularly crystallized. Algeria is a symbol carrying vastly more weight than even its own perplexities rationally warrant. And out of the whole sequence of events has grown an appraisal of the international scene which differs markedly from our own and renders suspect any seeming meeting of minds with respect to such problems as the Near East, to take the most egregious example.

At its extremities this view sees all nationalistic movements in colonial territories as "communistic" and intolerable. The "revolution of rising expectations" is regarded as a slogan for blackmail of the West. France "understands" the forces at work, but, in the words of a high official of the Independent Party, she is "determined to defend the white race and civilization against communism." A sympathetic view of the claims which this contemporary revolution makes on Western society for a larger share of
political and economic power is, to some leaders of the French right
(and to a certain portion of the center and the left), nothing short of
treason to the cause of Western civilization.

One is tempted to describe the second major backdrop for French attitudes
toward the UN in terms of the weaknesses and ultimate collapse of French parlia-
mentary democracy. Much could be said here with the clear recollection that
the only true majorities in the Fourth Republic's deplorable Assembly were
formed around foreign affairs issues. But the more profound fact for our
purpose is the racial memory of France, so to speak, which carries the dual
image of Hitler and of Munich into the present but applies it not so much to
Soviet Russia as to Nasser and the tangled skein of relationships centering on
Middle East nationalism. In a simplified popular version of this
attitude, firmly fixed by the Suez experience, Nasser "stole" the "French" canal
company, Nasser helped the Algerian rebels who are still "killing French boys,"
Nasser is "Hitler," and those who are "appeasing" him are the "men of Munich"
who are now being opposed by the "new men" of France who are "anti-Munich."
This thesis would above all apply to American policy, which is "soft" and
"uncertain," and to the United Nations which for these purposes is a dangerou.
"extension" of American policy.

Many other things could be said about what at the outset I called the
ethos of the contemporary French world outlook as it affects the UN and the
Western world's prospects in that organization. Above all, one could point
to those Frenchmen who do not share the myths and racial terrors which grip
some other Frenchmen (see below). France, says her leading student of public
opinion, still thinks in terms of the 19th century and is pained and shocked
when her partners do not back her up across the board. In the words of the
editor of the most widely read paper in France, French chauvinism is a disease arising from the recent experiences of war and occupation, and the "primitive" reaction France is displaying is a phenomenon of the political right only; de Gaulle will keep the anti-US and anti-UN by-products "under control." One of the ablest and brightest of the grands commis in the Quai d'Orsay who have kept France's foreign relations afloat through the numbing discontinuities of recent years predicts a left-wing reaction within one to two years, accompanied by one of France's periodic times of political "density."

Still another Frenchman recently noted that "the fundamental paradox of the French situation is that democracy cannot be defended against fascism without the help of the Communists." The issues of 1789 have yet to be settled in France, and it is entirely clear that the issues of 1945-58 have not by any means been played out. Another kind of regime will give rein to tendencies that are now suppressed or at any rate repressed. This is the warning that affects every element of the analysis which follows.

The French Image of the UN

The way responsible French leaders view the UN depends on yet another historic memory: France's paramount position in the League of Nations. In many important ways the League was an instrument of French foreign policy. An influential view of the UN, on the other hand, sees an organization "set up by the United States" as "an instrument to carry out its wishes." As a battlefield between the US and the Soviet Union, the UN has the same depressing effect on Frenchmen that it has on Americans, but French reactions have additional

4. Ibid., p. 41.
dimensions. The memory of Munich sharply defines the French sense of repetition, leading to the logical conclusion that the UN is failing as the League failed in analogous circumstances. If the UN is an extension of the US, neither is "helping" the French position. After the ultimate proof of this insight in 1956, when both the US and the UN "failed" France in Suez--and Hungary--nothing remains but at best passive indifference, at worst active hostility.

Even the partisan alignments around the UN have collapsed: if the French left sustained the League as a device for arbitration of international disputes, fighting its battles with the political right on this ground, the commitment of the Socialist party to a repressive Algerian policy succeeded in destroying the possibility of major partisan support for the UN. To be sure, public support for the UN continues to come from certain sectors of the French intelligentsia. Here also the tradition of concern for an international regime of law persists, but it has gone underground since Suez.

Some Frenchmen, while styling themselves civilisé, have always distrusted the word "culture" as a Germanic concept. But the notion of culture is implicit in French suspicions of any proposed extension of UN activities and powers. The UN, "run by the English-speaking," has an "Anglo-Saxon style." Any elaboration of that bureaucracy means, to many Frenchmen, the progressive elimination of French cultural influence—of la civilisation française the superiority of which both as an intellectual style and a political mode remains unquestioned by Frenchmen at large.

Other kinds of explanations for the negative and often hostile French attitude toward the UN can be found. One of the few senior M.R.P. politicians to come out on top in the 1958 political revolution believes that anti-UN attitudes, particularly on the part of le Général stem from an almost abstract devotion to democracy. If the French people so elect, the argument runs, de Gaulle
will opt for European community, possibly even for Atlantic Union, which would also be "democratic." But the UN involves governments, not peoples, and is therefore "not democratic." The Gaullist view of the UN can only be guessed at since it has never been really articulated. The limited evidence available suggests that de Gaulle is not genuinely interested in anything outside of France's alliance structure. It also suggests that the Great Power directorate -- so long as it includes France -- is the most congenial mode for expressing the grandeur of France, and clearly favors the Security Council over the more populous bodies.

Summing up some of the arguments, the UN seems "distant" to most Frenchmen, while Europe seems closer. The UN is invariably identified with the US, and both are currently unpopular. France rates the UN lower than the League because her own status there has diminished. But these are insufficient explanations for widespread active hostility, and equally widespread absence of planning for a more effective and persuasive French -- and Western -- policy in the UN. Underlying these sentiments is a moral stance which developed throughout the years of debate in the UN about French North Africa and came to a climax with the Suez fiasco. A man who led the French General Assembly delegation several times sees the UN as attempting to judge France in the fashion of a court. The UN's "moral standing" in France is low because the French have learned that they cannot place any "trust" in it. To France the UN is, in the words of a shrewd Swiss observer of French affairs, a "ship adrift" without Western influence. The latter theme recurs time and again; the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship), at whose hands France has admittedly taken a rather consistent pounding, is dangerous because it is "un-European." The theme of US relations re-enters here. The US
may be "pro-French" but it has brought about disaster because of its failure to support France "all the way" for fear of alienating the growing Asian-African grouping. American efforts to moderate the anticolonial positions receive no credit whatsoever.

These critical attitudes and estimates come to rest finally on the fundamental differences between French and American appraisals of the nationalist movements in formerly dependent areas. The remedies suggested grow out of the divergent diagnoses of the problem. In the long run, according to current French doctrine, the American policy of "appeasement" will only succeed in "losing" the Asian-Arab-African world. Strength is the only thing the Arabs understand. This proposition rests on two major assumptions American policy has generally rejected: unyielding defense of the status quo is the path to "victory"; "compromise" is the path to "defeat." The September 1958 referendum offering immediate independence to all African dependencies except Algeria represented a profound deviation from the earlier French doctrine, and it is a tribute to the Gaullist magic that France accepted this volte-face. But the underlying philosophy of the status quo powerfully affects the spirit in which France continues to estimate the present and future value of the UN.

This is not the entire story. Even in its present state of political hypnosis, France contains many thoughtful people who will supply correctives to the severity and intransigence of the more general view.

In one view, if the UN has betrayed the moral values by which the West lives, it still can be used to "advance those values" in the world. It is in this sense a useful tool, although on balance it remains something to be "put up with," and certainly not an asset. Another figure in the political center
wishes to see the UN strengthened and wants it to "succeed." In this view, only the "ignorant" identify the UN with the US without differentiation, and the leadership elements who encouraged this twin prejudice at the time of Suez were motivated by considerations of "party politics."

An official of the M.R.P. approved on behalf of his party the "principles" of the UN, and the "historical necessity" of its existence. But the difficulty is in practice. A high foreign ministry official merely confirmed his membership in the international brotherhood of diplomats concerned with UN affairs when with massive understatement he allowed that criticism of the colonial powers in the UN constitutes a "problem." But the problem goes beyond procedure or practice, even in these milder statements. One thoughtful politician likened the UN General Assembly to l'Assemblée Nationale, with all the invidious comparisons this connoted. The UN, he concluded, is too wrapped up in short-term politics and tensions for even "liberal" Frenchmen to look ahead rationally to its possible future uses, such as—my suggestion, not his—helping to bridge the gap between Europe and Black Africa.

The political party receiving the largest share of votes in the November 1958 French elections was not even in existence in the previous summer when the conversations were held which form the basis for this report. From the moment of de Gaulle's investiture in the frenetic final week of May 1958 the traditional parties in France in many ways ceased to exist. Since 1956, when Guy Mollet took his stand on behalf of the Socialists, all parties save the Communists and Radical Socialist remnants who follow Mendès-France have been officially committed to a strong national policy toward Algeria. There is thus no real political opposition in France, especially since the failure of the left to forestall de Gaulle's accession to power. As de Gaulle himself invents new formulas with regard to
Algeria, new lines may come to be drawn. Until then, France presents a novel surface appearance of political harmony, and one seeks in vain for "issues" as between parties all of whom—with the exceptions noted above—were "in the government" through the period until the formation of the Cabinet in January 1959.

Having said this, one can still make some general observations based on views not of the party "leaders," many of whom have suddenly become political corpses, but of some party functionaries and executives. The UN as such is not a party issue in France, particularly since the great majority of Frenchmen ignore it as a factor in any way affecting their lives and fortunes. The spectrum of partisan differences is thus limited. The Socialists are conceded to be more "internationally minded," but to some observers even they have already lost their distinctive flavor and have become bourgeois and conservative. Their sympathy with the predominantly bourgeois class of colons in Algeria is even heretically ascribed to "class" ties. We have mentioned the Mollet version of Nasser as Hitler and Suez as Munich. The UN takes its definition from this vision: "If the United Nations is to yield systematically before the desires of dictators, and require, on the other hand, that it be obeyed untiringly by the democracies, then it is no longer an organization worthy of its international character." Mollet's Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, drew the picture even more finely:

Some think the international organization could modify the Algerian problem. I must say that while France is prepared to set forth the problem it never will accept orders. There is no question of our leaving the UN. We feel that the Charter is necessary and we intend to make it work to our advantage.

Though France greatly desires to adhere to international rules, it does not accept the idea of one-way rules, which some observe and which others merely interpret to their own advantage.

The default of the French Socialists as the classical European advocates of greater internationalism has thus assigned that role elsewhere in the political left. A leading political spokesman of the M.R.P. explains general French hostility to the UN as due to the fact that the Communist party tends to "talk about it." The standing of the UN would be higher, as in the case of the Korean War, if the Communists opposed it. (On the other hand, the chief permanent official of that party hastened to add that "everyone accepts the principle" of UN membership, and that the political center was "less suspicious" of the UN than the actively hostile right.) Perhaps only the followers of Pierre Mendès-France—which category included many of the brightest young minds in France—have any enthusiasm for the notion that the UN can and should serve as an instrument for the development of more effective relationships between the West and the remainder of the world. The Foreign Ministry official who privately—and sympathetically—voiced this belief agreed that day-to-day developments in the UN still appear to most other Frenchmen as contrary to French interests.

A senior official of the Independent and Peasants Party, whose leader—Antoine Pinay—is de Gaulle's chief economic lieutenant, described his party as "patriotic" but not "nationalistic," extremist party spokesmen like Duchet to the contrary notwithstanding. He forecast, presciently in the light of events, a realignment in which the "new conservatives" would emerge as a party resembling the British Tories, more nationalistic and more devoted to free enterprise than previous alignments of this order. One can assume that such a grouping would sustain the general French antipathy for the UN as presently constituted. If one accepts the forecast of a new coalition on the left, post-de Gaulle, still many perceptive French observers would see a continuation of
present policies regarding the UN, with only the possibility of a greater official interest in expanding the UN's technical and economic programs.

Appraisals of French popular attitudes toward the UN, as contrasted with elite or official or party attitudes, find common ground in the conclusion that the UN is "not popular" with the French people, that the public is "indifferent and ignorant"—although not necessarily hostile—and that, above all, the French people consider the UN as "unfair" to France, specifically as it "helped totalitarianism" by its dual responses to Suez and Hungary. The public does not support the UN because it "doesn't care" and is preoccupied with internal problems.

The French UN Association, once active in many French centers, is now dormant; it certainly does not seek to influence the Government as in the US and, to some extent, Britain.

The leader of the powerful Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies explained that his committee is fully aware that the US must lead the free world, and that "it can do this only within the UN framework." But he added that this educated view must be modified in practice by the conviction that the average Frenchman, while perhaps willing to accept the UN as the price for American leadership, expects that his government will pay no more attention to that organization than it absolutely has to.

His summation was that France attaches the greatest importance to the US and none at all to the UN.
Suez and Hungary

Estimates vary as to the impact of Suez and Hungary on France's broad attitude toward the UN. One of the leading Parisian editors asserts that only a minority was actively anti-UN at the time of Suez. (In a Swiss journalistic view, French newspapers were a prime factor in "prejudicing" the French people in that period.) There is some evidence that the "younger responsibles" do not go along with the predominant reaction. One specialist believes that the US is more blamed for frustrating French designs at Suez than the UN, whose role is "forgotten." But a Frenchman of great prominence claims that the whole experience is not forgotten and "will never be," given the "fact" that the Algerian question would be "solved" by now if the US and UN had not "propped up" Nasser. (France, says this personage, is now "proven" to be vindicated since the US and other Western powers "now see" that France was "right.") An Italian diplomat who was in Paris at the time felt that the French were "unanimously" furious with the UN for damaging French "honor." He sees French hostility to the UN as having increased markedly since Suez.

A rightist politician believes that Suez may be over with but that it "poisoned" trans-Atlantic relations for a long time to come; Suez was the "cross-roads" of the entire Western position vis-à-vis the Middle East, and the so-called humanitarian attitude of the US and UN contributed to a new Munich in which the "patriotic" French people will never understand the suppression of their policy.

That this opinion was not unanimous is attested to by the admittedly lonely voices who deplored the French Suez adventure. Ironically, some intellectuals who were anti-American prior to 1956, largely because of American support for NATO, were made pro-American by this country's stand in the UN.
at the time of Suez. Yet those who feel that the US-UN stand may have averted a widespread and possibly unmanageable war are almost wholly unrepresentative of the great majority. It cannot be concluded yet that France as a nation learned anything from the Suez episode, in the way that a growing number of their collaborators across the Channel have, however grudgingly.

As for Hungary, a guess can be hazarded that a majority--possibly a large majority--of Frenchmen would have enthusiastically supported Western intervention at the time. The UN is condemned in other countries, including the United States, for not having done a "damn thing" in Hungary, in the words of a leading French politician with long UN experience. But there are not many other countries of which it can be said that while there was no bloodshed in the near civil war situation in May of 1958, blood did run in the streets of Paris in October 1956. There is little or no support for the view that Western crossing of the de facto truce line between East and West to support the Hungarians might have precipitated all-out warfare, despite the fact that the same Frenchmen often resist other lesser moves on the grounds of provocation of the Soviets. One does not look for logic here, or even a sense of political responsibility. The emotions of France were profoundly touched by the Hungarian uprising and its brutal suppression, and the dignity of the West is permanently impaired in French eyes because it did not do what at the time it felt it must.

The US and the UN

Closely related to these popular sentiments is the body of French attitudes toward the US. Reference has already been made to common strictures on American policy. The latter is invariably described as being characterized by
incertitude, specifically regarding the Middle East and, most particularly, how to deal with Nasser. The UN, in this view, is even more of an image of American foreign policy, since it reflects in its succession of criticized actions the "vacillations" of US policy.

It was of course not vacillation by what was in a sense the unexpected certitude of American policy at Suez which left France resentful and suspicious. At a different level it is the relative consistency of American attitudes of anticolonialism which baffles and even infuriates the French. It is surprising that this irony should be lost on the French for the US has compromised its own "principles" more than once in the UN in response to French pressures. But logic actually counts for nothing in the argument. The US, says a high Quai d'Orsay official, should act like the "great, strong, rich power it is, instead of seeming to be ridden with fear" of the Soviet Union and uncertainty how to deal with Middle East nationalism, postures which end in encouraging chantage--blackmail--from these "enemies of the West." Many others in the right and center of the French political spectrum share the view of the urgency of a bold display of American power. But the dilemma for American policy is underscored when a left-wing intellectual criticizes with equal vigor US incertitude but this time because we do not settle down more consistently on the other side of the fence, that is to say, in the direction sought by those few who approve of the basic American interpretation of the drives behind contemporary Arab and other non-European nationalism.

Perhaps the soundest conclusion is that French attitudes toward the US are ambivalent. Students of French public opinion believe that French anti-American attitudes stem largely from disappointment with our failure to lead the kind of counterrevolutionary crusade many Frenchmen sincerely and even passionately believe is the only sound policy to be followed. Rationally, American and
French interests are seen to coincide, at least in the Atlantic area. While it may be misleading to say, as one official did, that only the "uninformed" criticize the US, a certain oscillation can be detected between the two poles. Anti-Americanism has doubtless diminished since the fall of 1956, but it remains a chronic victim of the French weakness for blaming French troubles on foreigners. In this the French are of course members of a far wider human family.

The UN, Europe, and French Security

France has today the very guarantee her policy was dedicated to seeking throughout the interwar years prior to 1939. The United States unequivocally guarantees French independence, and perhaps for this reason France feels freer to maneuver within the coalition than she might if less sure of her position. The UN as a security instrumentality impresses France even less than her allies, particularly those Canadians and others who are actively thinking through the security assets of the UN in limited military situations where great power intervention might be disastrous. Her most UN-oriented civil servants discourage the UN force idea by using the budgetary argument so familiar in British--and, for a time, American--Treasury circles, as a means of frustrating political action (although allowing that an ad hoc UN force "might" be useful in certain carefully defined situations.) Europe, on the other hand, has not only security potentialities for France but represents a profound political nostalgia, perhaps as a substitute for earlier French attachment to the League of Nations.

Some Socialists and centrists see the European movement as a source of non-military security to France. But at the currently weightier end of the political scale there is little resemblance to the Dutch insight that creation
of a European Community would strengthen France's position in her UN contacts. Such an estimate would need to have for its premise a reduced vision of French stature, and this is a vision few Frenchmen appear to have accepted. Still, Robert Schuman and other advocates of European Community have advanced the argument that France's interest lies in seeking to unify European politics to remedy the disequilibrium in the UN which gives disproportionate strength to the "prejudiced" and "fanatical" blocs now "riding rough-shod" over the "weak and divided" Europeans. For a time after the shock of Suez, particularly given the UN's part therein, it seemed as though the French would embrace Europe with a new intensity, on the rebound, as it were. "Old style French nationalism" may have disappeared at the moment when all but the extreme right voted for the marché commun. It may be true, as claimed by a right-of-center politician, that all but Communists, Mendèsistes, and "ultras" are genuinely pro-NATO and pro-European integration. But the Gaullist presence has raised new doubts and created new hazards to the fulfillment of this trend insofar as it requires sacrifices by France, other than those sacrifices aimed at restoring "greatness." It remains to be seen whether the devaluation of the franc and removal of certain import quotas in late 1958 means that France is prepared to abandon significant elements of her traditional protectionist policies.

In the absence of lucid statements of policy from the primary source, de Gaulle's real attitudes are generally derived from political gossip or, at best, deductions from rather slender evidence. The former asserts that de Gaulle dislikes Monnet--"M. Europe"--and that Soustelle is opposed to the

9. Thomas J. Hamilton commented from Paris in July 1957 that "the majorities in the French Assembly in favor of ratifying both the common market and the Euratom treaties were larger than they would have been but for the Suez crisis and the attitude of the United States and the United Nations." New York Times, July 16, 1957.
concept of European inter-ration. The latter suggests that French economic impulses regarding meaningful European integration are really inconsistent in fact and in promise with, for example, the liberal economic policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Pro-integration forces in Europe, in the Netherlands, for example, take heart—or half-heart—from the General's apparent willingness to leave economic and financial-policy matters to Antoine Pinay, who is "teachable." The devaluation of December 1958 was perhaps most significant because it was done in cooperation with France's European partners.

The cynical French journalist's interpretation of all French foreign policies as determined by domestic political maneuverings is applied, mutatis mutandis, to European policy. Most Frenchmen are basically "indifferent" to this subject (except for "periodic moments of passion" as with E.D.C.). European policy has thus been "manipulated" by its opponents as a pretext to attack the "hated" Pied Piper of the liberals and intellectuals, Pierre Mendès-France.

As Americans interpret the French national interest, nothing merits a higher priority than some form of marriage with Germany within the context of "The Six," and the rapid restoration of Europe's capacity to wield political, economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural power through a new-found unity. The French view, however, operates at a lower level of abstraction, where it continues to suffer from traditional anti-Germanism, concern with Empire, conventional economic doctrines and practices, and the nationalism for which de Gaulle has been the catalytic reagent. The situation is full of irony. In rejecting with hauteur the notion of utilizing international organization as one of the possible means for cultivating the political strength needed to enable France to play the great power role she desperately clings to, she thus holds back from what may be her only alternative to continued weakness.
and ultimate isolation. General de Gaulle believes that without a renewed quality of pride in French policy, cooperation within the European framework is impossible. His choice of Germany's Adenauer over England's Macmillan in the negotiations on the proposed Free Trade Zone in late 1958 proved to some that the theory was sound and boded well for Europe as a whole. But France's gamble with history is plain when one perceives that the very quality of pride with which she is to be rejuvenated may also be the barrier to accession to a more durable role in the world.

**Africa, Colonialism, and Underdevelopment**

In any discussion of the issues involving the UN and colonialism, relations with the Asians and Africans, and the economic development of underdeveloped countries, all roads lead to Algeria (just as for Belgium they lead to the Congo). Perhaps this is one reason why so many otherwise intelligent French leaders automatically equate anticolonialism with communism. The successes of anticolonialism's historical sweep have, in the eyes of many leading Frenchmen, spelled a major communist victory. If Europe is completely "thrown out" of Africa (i.e., Algeria) it means "the end of the free world." A "few more Nasser" and NATO is finished. Inherent in the argument is the assertion that the whole process was preventible, and here lies the most profound difference in interpretation as between France and the United States. US policy toward Indonesia and Egypt, asserts a senior Foreign Ministry official, opened the floodgates for "communism" in both instances. Why, he bewailed, cannot the US emulate the French and British, who "directed the world" in the 19th century?

In the Ministry of Overseas Territories there is greater acceptance of the inevitability of independence for France's African territories. France is caught between her territories and the UN, and the pressure to cease the transmission of information to the UN for what have now become "autonomous" regions comes not
from the metropole but from the "political leaders within the territories."
There is a clear recognition here that, whatever additional autonomy and
self-government may be accorded to the colonies, their ambitions will not
be satisfied short of independence. If the Gaullist referendum under which France offered independence (and immediate severance of French economic relations) represented a new triumph for French colonial policy, it may still be true, in Renan's ironic phrase, that "institutions are destroyed by their triumphs."

The process got out of hand at once when Guinea was elected to UN membership at the close of the General Assembly session in 1958, before France could implement its second thoughts about "complete" severance of ties. It was compounded when Ghana and Guinea announced their putative merger while the latter negotiations were still underway. Other territories which opted to remain in the French union may have their own second thoughts. "Non-Frenchmen" are once again endangering the development of what seems to France an entirely rational and even, to some, dangerously generous policy. A vigorously liberal French publicist expressed his confident belief that the African blacks, unlike the Arabs, are "practical" and "not in a hurry." Their emancipation may take "50 years," so the obvious procedure is for both sides to "cooperate" in the meantime. And a senior French Africa affairs specialist urges that in this process France and Belgium might well cooperate in joint appraisals and even actions, instead of continuing to function in "water-tight compartments" in Africa.

But the new UN Economic Commission for Africa arouses the profoundest misgivings. The same fonctionnaire fears the kind of "bureaucratic" international intervention implicit in the new UN body, and predicts that local forces—not "France"—would resist such intrusion. The ECA will, he predicts, find Africa's needs far greater than it had anticipated, with "everything demanding a priority," and with the recipients expecting the one thing the UN cannot supply: new
capital. France will go along out of a kind of motivation her friends might well ponder. According to this official (one of France's ablest) the UN's effort will do a number of salutary things. It will illuminate the problem for the rest of the world. It will show that Western rule was not the cause of economic and social underdevelopment. And it will show les sous-développées how they have benefitted from the free market. (Officials concerned with UN affairs are more tolerant of the ECA's chances of success, but only if it remains "technical" and entirely free of "political passions."

In the sister Ministry of France of France d'Outre Mer the approach is different. France, it is agreed, will participate in the ECA, although without enthusiasm. But Ministry officials have urged such participation on the Government on "realistic" grounds: the UN and its agencies are "here to stay," and, moreover, can be an "advantage" for France in her relations with Sub-Sahara Africa. Other Frenchmen are, it is held, beginning to sense this, on the practical ground that France simply cannot afford the investment of financial and human resources needed in Africa over and above the even higher priorities required with respect to metropolitan France and, of course, Algeria. France, in this view, confronts the alternatives of help from the US, the UN, or "Europe." If the UN will "help," France ought to agree readily to her participation. Even Government circles are beginning to react against the defeatist sort of isolationism found in so-called "Cartierism," which writes off Africa because France must confine major capital investment to her own needs. Algeria must come before Black Africa, but this cannot of course be admitted publicly to the latter.

French politicians rarely express the sort of balanced view just elaborated. Some speak in terms of the classical mission civilisatrice, whether explicitly
or not, when they continue to advocate a "joining of the races" in a "Commonwealth," nevertheless governed by force, when necessary, as something the Africans "understand well."

Spokesmen of parties closer to the center and even slightly to the left may agree that certain "forces" are at work in the underdeveloped countries which cannot be ignored, and that France should not walk out of the UN. But the conviction persists that nationalism, particularly in the Mediterranean basin, "opens the door to communism." (No one ever commented as to what doors nationalism in France might open.) Even further to the left, furnishing one of France's most fascinating political paradoxes, the possibilities of using the UN as a "bridge" to the underdeveloped countries is often rejected on the ground that "bridging the gap" is equivalent to "unconditional surrender." France, it is announced, will "never" leave Africa.

That French opinion regarding underdeveloped and anticolonial countries is filtered through the prism of Algeria is quite evident and does not require further elaboration here. For that matter, it is probably preferable to treat the Algerian question not at all than to treat it inadequately. French sensibilities have of course been newly shocked by the US abstention on a resolution calling for negotiations leading toward independence, which barely failed to pass in the closing days of the 1958 General Assembly. What can be said is that despite the dementi of Quai d'Orsay officials, even in private, there exists an obvious connection between France's agonizing entanglement in North Africa on the one hand, and on the other the French vision of the UN as a possible agency for economic development of underdeveloped territories (or indeed for any other constructive purpose). Another point to be made here is that French justifications for retention of Algeria are tending more and more to emphasize its
international nature, not in the sense which France rejects in the UN, but in terms of the mutual needs of "Europe" and Africa, and in particular the value of newly exploited Sahara oil resources for the "European and Atlantic communities." Finally, there is the growing realization, especially in senior civil service ranks, that while "France must stay in Algeria"--an assertion few French outside of extreme left-wing circles will debate--if reforms are not quickly consummated elsewhere in Africa the moderates throughout French Africa, including Algeria, will be irrevocably buried under extremist pressures. To a few, this leads once again to the possible uses of the UN in advancing such reforms, through technical and even financial assistance. But even they see no possibility of a French initiative in this direction.

Noncommunist intellectuals have no solution to the dilemma of Algeria, but perhaps because of this they tend to speak not of solutions but of what will be necessary "after the war ends." What will be necessary, they say, will be a rethinking of long-range French policy toward the Arab world and also the rest of the formerly colonial regions to the south. Few signs exist that these long-term issues will be faced up to until, one way or another, France's travail in Algeria moves into a new and somehow less hopeless stage.

Conclusions

The great gulf which separates the French view of the UN from the American view is illuminated by recent findings about US public attitudes toward the world organization. In all US cities surveyed, community leaders were broadly in favor of the UN and its objectives. The most frequent criticisms of the UN were that it is, if anything, too weak, and considerable support exists for increasing its power. Soon after Suez and Hungary, 77%

11. Ibid., p. 15.
of those Americans interviewed felt that the UN was doing a good or fair job, and 85% believed that it was very important to "try to make the UN a success." Comparable figures for France show that important segments of French opinion hold markedly different views.

Some bases for the negative and resentful French spirit toward the UN and--with the possible exception of some of the Specialized Agencies--its works, have been suggested in this brief paper. Algeria is a key factor. But what Algeria really does is to concentrate in a single focus the whole complex of issues on which France has fought a losing battle, whether political or military, since World War II. The UN is one of several major symbols of the receding French world position. In the French appraisal of the forces of status quo and revolution in the former and transcolonial world, the UN--and US policy as well--often fall into the category of hindrance rather than help. Like the South Africans, the French have been moving toward the policy of stating their case in the UN rather than walking out of the Assembly as they did in 1955 over the issue of Algeria. But it still seems a minority position in France which acknowledges profound changes in the African status quo, distinguishes Arab nationalism from communism, seeks through Europe or elsewhere a higher form of world order and world law, and interprets the present day UN as at least a potentially helpful agency vis-a-vis the non-Western world, specifically through economic, social, technical, and technological cooperation. The present quest for national grandeur may succeed at the expense of relative isolation from regional and global trends toward greater integration (and possibly even at the expense of French security itself).

12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. To be published in a subsequent paper within this series.
14. According to a dispatch from the December 1958 NATO meeting in Paris, "Responsible French editorialists stated bluntly that France would not co-operate in the installation of missile bases here, permit the stockpiling of nuclear weapons under U.S. control in France or integrate her tactical air defense forces under NATO command until her political conditions had been met." Boston Herald, December 19, 1958.
If the present apolitical interval in French history is succeeded by a new alignment, if after de Gaulle the more characteristic tendencies of French politics come to life once again, the presently submerged themes may well reassert themselves as they become associated with power and the capacity to act. It is doubtful that the General can entirely end the oscillation which he prefers to describe as "swinging perpetually between drama and mediocrity." More than perhaps any other country of Western Europe, French policy and planning toward the external world faithfully mirror domestic attitudes and the strategic and tactical interactions of French internal politics.

France may have enduring national interests, but historically these are subject to profound reinterpretation in the light of changing domestic pressures. It is this very quality, combining intransigence with the capacity for major political bouleversement, which enables Charles de Gaulle to try to reassemble the French sense of identity, and which might enable a successor regime to move in directions which the present, for the best and the worst of reasons, chooses to leave to the future.

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