THE PEACEFUL
AND
THE VIOLENT ROAD

A LATIN AMERICAN DEBATE

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If you ask any Latin American Leftist what is the main subject of debate within the Latin American Communist and non-Communist extreme Left today, he will invariably name the issue of the Peaceful or the Violent Road to Socialism.¹ And he will explain that in this debate the old-guard Communists loyal to Moscow stand for the Soviet policy of the peaceful road, whereas the Castroites and that pro-Chinese Communists are for the Chinese and Cuban policy of the violent road, that is, for armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and urban terrorism.

Actually, matters are not quite as simple as that. In theory, the Chinese and Cubans do not deny the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, although they will actually hasten to add that there has as yet been no instance anywhere of such a transition.²

¹ This is an expanded version of a talk given at the Airlie House Conference in Warrenton, Virginia on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control on September 2, 1965.

² Fidel Castro, in his speech to the Havana Congress of American Women on January 16, 1963, as reported by El Siglo (Santiago de Chile), January 18: "We do not deny the possibility of a peaceful transition, although we are still waiting for the first such case. But we do not deny it, since we are not dogmatists."

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in its "Proposal concerning the General Line of the International Communist
The Chinese do not ask for the abandonment of peaceful political activity; they only demand that Communist parties should pursue a policy of "walking on two legs", i.e. of preparing for both eventualities, for violent revolution as well as for peaceful transition. The Cubans, too, are not dogmatic. Although incessantly stressing the need for armed action, they were perfectly willing and even eager to let their supporters work for a peaceful advent to power in both Chile and Brazil in 1963-64, in Chile through a presidential election and in Brazil through the gradual infiltration of the left-of-center Goulart government by extremists.

As for the Russians, although they insist on the feasibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, they have never declared this to be the only possible or permissible road. They do not say whether

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Movement," June 14, 1963, quoted from William E. Griffith. The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964), p. 269: "In specific historical conditions, Marx and Lenin did raise the possibility that revolution may develop peacefully. But, as Lenin pointed out, the peaceful development of revolution is an opportunity 'very seldom to be met within the history of revolution.'

As a matter of fact, there is no historical precedent for peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism."

3 "The proletarian party must prepare itself for two eventualities—while preparing for a peaceful development of the revolution, it must also fully prepare for a non-peaceful development." (Ibid., p. 269.)

4 The Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of violent revolution was first revised, and declared no longer valid, by the Twentieth Congress
the peaceful road or the violent road will prevail in a majority of
countries. But as regards Latin America, even the most eloquent

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 (see
N. S. Khrushchev's Report to the Party Congress, the speech by A. I.
Mikoyan to the Congress, and the Congress resolution on Khrushchev's
report.) The current Soviet ideological manual, Fundamentals of
Marxism-Leninism, 2nd revised ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publish-
ing House, 1963), p. 503, states: "While noting that a real possibil-
ity of a peaceful revolution has appeared, Marxists-Leninists are at
the same time aware of the fact that in a number of cases a sharp ac-
centuation of the class struggle is inevitable. Wherever the reac-
tionary bourgeoisie has a strong army and police force at its disposal,
the working class will encounter fierce resistance. There can be no
doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the overthrow of the
bourgeois dictatorship will inevitably take place through an armed
class struggle."

The same Manual (p. 505) also declares that "the revolutionary
parties of the working class strive to master all forms of struggle,
peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and non-parliamentary, so
that they may be ready at need to resort to the one most in accordance
with the situation and the interests of the working people."

In theory, the policy advocated by the Soviets thus does not
appear to differ greatly from that advocated by the CCP CC in its
"Proposal Concerning the General Line." But in practice, communist
parties which enjoy the benefits of legality (and even some clandestine
ones) are often reluctant to make preparations for an armed struggle,
since it would be difficult if not impossible to keep this secret. The
leaders of the Chilean Communists have openly rejected the dual policy
of "walking on both legs." At their Twelfth Party Congress, held in
March 1962, their Politburo member Orlando Millas declared: "There is
talk of a policy of 'the two legs', of moving at the same time along
advocate of the Peaceful Road, Chilean Party Secretary Luis Corvalan, is anything but confident in his predictions. All he asks is that the possibility of the peaceful road should not be denied for some countries—specifically, of course, for his own.

The Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese views thus do not seem to be so far apart that a compromise should be impossible. Why, then, the long-drawn-out, angry debate, which shows no sign of calming down, and has already led to a number of expulsions, splits, and secessions?

In order to understand this, one must first of all rid oneself of the notion that the "Peaceful Road" is a policy imposed on the Latin American Communist parties from the outside, that is, dictated by the Soviet Union. Given the disintegration of discipline in the international Communist movement, the Russians are in no position today to

two lines, one the peaceful road and the other the violent road. We hold the theory of two lines, two different legs, to be pernicious, because it makes you limp, and we prefer to walk with two equal legs which belong to one sole Marxist-Leninist body." (Hacia la Conquista de un Gobierno Popular, Documentos del XII Congreso Nacional del Partido Comunista de Chile (Santiago, 1962), p. 12.)

In December 1962 Luis Corvalan admitted that the violent road taken by the Cuban revolutionaries "is also, speaking in general terms, the most probable road in other countries, perhaps in most of the countries of the continent. But there can be no certainty that all of them will take that road." (Nuestra Epocha, the Spanish-language edition of the World Marxist Review, December 1962).
impose policies on Communist parties. What is more, they actually do not insist on the Latin American Communist parties following the Peaceful Road. While stressing the viability of the peaceful transition to socialism, they are making it clear that it is up to the individual parties themselves to decide whether the conditions for such a transition are given in their country. It is not the Russians who are pressing the Latin American Communist parties to keep to the peaceful road; it is these parties themselves, or at least their overwhelming majority, who reject the Violent Road, because it is contrary to their traditions and their interests.

The Communist Parties of Latin America lack a vigorous revolutionary tradition. Apart from the 1932 rising in the Central American republic of El Salvador, which was sparked off but not actually led by the Communists, and the 1935 insurrection of Luis Carlos Prestes in Brazil, there have only been some instances of communist participation in risings staged by non-communist groups. And from the Popular Front period of the Thirties onwards, the history of these Communist parties has been one of the most extraordinary opportunism. Communist parties have indiscriminately cooperated with dictators and with democratic parties of the Right as well as of the Left. Sometimes they have split into two parties with opposing policies, one collaborating with a dictator and another with the democratic opposition, only to
reunite after the political situation had changed.  

In spite of all their efforts and their extreme tactical elasticity nearly all the Latin American Communist parties—Chile being the one notable exception—have failed to build up a mass following; they are mostly composed of small cliques of intellectuals and a handful of trade-union bureaucrats, without any substantial base among the workers. I would suggest the following reasons for the docility of the Latin American Communist parties and for their lack of success in an area where social conditions would appear to favor the spread of communism.

The Latin American communists' traditional lack of dynamism would seem to be due to the fact that right up to the end of the 1950's Latin America was a very minor front in the campaign for world domination waged by the international Communist movement. Before the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in 1957, the Soviet Union was strictly a land power, and a land power situated literally at the opposite end of the globe from Latin America. It would not have been in a position to afford military protection to any communist

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government in the Western Hemisphere. What is more, even the largest of the Latin American countries were militarily, politically, and economically too weak to be a factor of any importance in the determination of Soviet state policies. Hence the Soviet leaders' lack of interest in Latin America, which was bound to have a demoralizing effect on the leadership of the Latin American communist parties. Their status in the hierarchy of world communism was low; little was expected of them; and they thus gradually became accustomed to opportunistic policies of dubious alliances for small gains.

There was a brief stirring of Soviet interest in Latin America around the time of Stalin's death, but the establishment of a Soviet zone of influence in the area only became possible with the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in 1957, which put the Soviet Union into the position of being able to retaliate directly—or to threaten to retaliate—against the United States in the event of an American attack on a Soviet base in the area. Very shortly after the Soviets had developed the ICBM, Latin America became one of the major Cold War fronts. By that time, however, the Communist parties of the area had already degenerated into small political machines hiring out their services to dictators and democrats, military and civilian,

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7 For this lack of interest, which became apparent as early as the nineteen twenties, see Victor Alba's Esquema historico del Comunismo en Iberoamerica.
conservative and middle-of-the-road politicos. They could be of little help to the Soviet Union, which thus turned to other forces for assistance in its drive to establish itself in the Western Hemisphere.

The numerical weakness of the Latin American Communist parties and their lack of influence outside a restricted sector of the intelligentsia, would seem to be due mainly to the fact that the organizational principles and techniques of the international Communist movement are not effective in the specific conditions of Latin America. The organizational formula of the Communist parties is extreme centralization and rigid discipline. But abstract loyalty—to an organization or an idea, as opposed to loyalty to an individual leader—is poorly developed in Latin America. "Organization men" are scarce in Latin America, and political parties based on ideologies, as well as trade unions, cooperatives, and similar bodies are more difficult and tend to be far less efficient than in Europe.

Furthermore their Marxist credo has led the Latin American Communists to concentrate their organizational efforts on industrial labor. Unfortunately for them, this group constitutes a privileged stratum of the Latin American proletariat and is hardly a revolutionary element. Nor have the Communists been able to make much headway among the urban sub-proletariat of the shanty-town slums of the great cities.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Even in Chile, where the Communists are far stronger and more effective than in other Latin American countries, the Christian Democratic
Most shanty-town dwellers come from the countryside; the city offers them far better living-conditions and prospects than their former life as agricultural laborers or tenant-farmers.  

Candidate Eduardo Frei ran ahead of the Socialist-Communist candidate Allende in the shanty-town districts of Santiago and Valparaiso in the presidential election of September 1964. In the Peruvian presidential election of 1963, a majority of the shanty-town vote in Lima went to a rightist candidate, the former dictator General Odria. In the Venezuelan presidential election of 1963, the shanty-town vote in Caracas favored a right-of-center moderate, Arturo Uslar-Pietri. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, State Governor Carlos Lacerda, a fervent anti-communist, has successfully wooed the shanty-town dwellers by the implementation of an impressive program of school-building and electrification.

For a study of the mentality of the shanty-town dwellers of one Latin American big city see Frank Bonilla: "Rio's Favelas," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Coast South America Series, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Brazil), 1961. Bonilla comes to the following conclusions: "Thus the favelado, however unrealistically, does not feel hopelessly trapped in the favela. He sees the chances for escape of his children as good. But the apparent faith in the possibilities for economic and social advance is not matched by belief in the potential benefits to come through political action. Nearly half of the favelados said there is nothing to be gained by political activity . . .; about the same proportion of skilled workers said they attach little or no importance to their political opinions and activities. Thus neither the skilled worker nor the favelado is highly politicized; the skilled worker differs politically from the favelado chiefly in his participation in an organization (his union) that is set up to defend his interests.
On the other hand, the Latin American communists have on the whole neglected work among the peasants and agrarian proletariat, who are very much an underprivileged group. The fateful decision to concentrate on urban areas was taken as early as the nineteen-twenties, when the Comintern rejected the Peruvian Mariategui's proposal to base communist activities in Latin America on the Indio, which would have introduced the potent stimulant of racialism into communist propaganda by presenting the struggle for communism as a struggle against the descendants of the white invaders from Europe. Since then, there has been much talk among Latin American communists about the need for a "worker-peasant alliance," but little attempt to proselytize in the villages. As the communist parties grew more and more opportunistic, they became less and less inclined to sacrifice cadres in the suicidal work of propagandizing in the countryside. The word "suicidal" is no exaggeration. In many Latin American countries the big landowners (caciques as they are called in Spanish Latin America, coronéis as they are called in Brazil) make the law in their domain. They not only control the municipal police but often also have a retinue of cutthroats for extra-legal work. It is no coincidence that law-abiding Chile is the one Latin American country in which the Communists have been able to build up a substantial following in the countryside. In that country, the municipal police were abolished by the anti-oligarchical dictator Carlos Ibáñez in the nineteen-twenties, and replaced by a centrally controlled police corps, the Carabineros. The landowners were thus deprived of one of the main pillars of their
authority. Since then, their political control over the rural areas has gradually weakened, a development which has benefited not only the Communists and Socialists but also their democratic rivals, the Christian Democrats.

But who are the Latin American Communists' competitors on the extreme Left, who stand for a policy of violent revolution, guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism? These are nationalists swayed by fierce hatred of the United States. Like the Communists, they are an urban group, composed mainly of middle-class intellectuals with a high proportion of university and high-school students; unlike their communist rivals, they have made untiring efforts to win the support of the peasantry, which have so far met only with very limited success. In the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a power willing and apparently able to dispute United States domination of the Hemisphere caused these extreme nationalists to proclaim their allegiance to the Soviet ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Most of them, however, refused to join the discredited, opportunistic Communist parties, preferring either to form their own wildly extremist movements or to form revolutionary left-wing

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10 Such as the MOEC (Movements of Workers, Students and Peasants) in Colombia, the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) in Venezuela and Peru, the "14th of July" movement in Santo Domingo, the "13th of November" movement in Guatemala, and the EPG (People's Guerrilla Army) in Argentina.
groups within existing democratic parties. Nor can they be described as fellow-travellers in the European sense of the word, i.e., as people who blindly follow the Soviets wherever they go. Their allegiance to the Soviet Union is dependent on that power's belligerence vis-à-vis the United States; any weakening of the Soviet attitude is regarded with high disfavor by these Latin American nationalists and tends to bring them closer to the Chinese side. This, of course, has been especially the case since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

China, however, has one great failing in their eyes: it is too weak to be a useful ally in the struggle to wrest control over Latin America from the United States. In spite of their disappointment and disillusionment, they can therefore hardly afford a complete break with the Soviet Union. What they would really like is not a Chinese victory in the framework of the international Communist movement, but the adoption of the tough, belligerent Chinese line by Soviet foreign policy.

The Chinese can thus depend even less than the Russians on using the Latin American nationalists as their instrument. In order to establish really dependable groups, they have therefore resorted to a policy of splitting away pro-Chinese elements from the official Communist parties and establishing Communist parties of their own. Such splits have so far occurred in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the leaders of the new pro-Chinese Communist parties are mostly hardened, unimaginative Stalinist party bureaucrats unlikely to develop much initiative. Their chances of success are small. In Brazil, for instance, the pro-Chinese Communist
party failed as miserably as the official pro-Soviet party of Luis Carlos Prestes when confronted with the military coup of March 31, 1964.

The really dynamic elements in the Latin American extreme Left are the nationalists, and these look to Cuba far more than to Peking or Moscow for guidance and leadership. Indeed the Cubans, specifically Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, are the prototypes of the Latin American extreme nationalists, or Jacobin Leftists, as Robert J. Alexander terms them. In his book *Guerrilla Warfare*, published in 1960, Che Guevara formulated the three theses which form the basis of Castroite political theory: (1) The people in arms can win a war against the regular army. (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for revolution exist; the guerrilla nucleus ("foco") can create them. (3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for the armed struggle.

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11 See Robert J. Alexander's *Today's Latin America*.

12 In *Castroism, Theory and Practice* (New York, N. Y.: Praeger, 1965), Theodore Draper rightly points out that as a theory, Castroism is too rudimentary to be called an ideology, and should rather be considered as a mere program for action.

That same year, in his speech on July 26, 1960, Fidel Castro himself issued the call: "The Andes mountain range shall become the Sierra Maestra of all South America." Since then, Castroite groups have made numerous attempts to implement Guevara's thesis that revolutionary conditions can be created by the activities of a guerrilla nucleus. Most of these have failed, but in at least two cases, in Venezuela and Guatemala, guerrilla fighting has now been going on for years without the government forces being able to force a decision.\footnote{In Les Temps Modernes Régis Debray gives the following list of guerrilla activities since 1959: Argentina 1959, Paraguay 1959, Santo Domingo 1960, Paraguay 1962, Colombia 1961, Equador 1962, Venezuela 1962, Peru 1961, Peru 1963, Argentina 1964—all unsuccessful; Venezuela 1963, Colombia 1964, all still continuing, and Bolivia 1964 (rightist). To these must now be added the very serious 1965 outbreak in Peru, which seems likely to develop into a prolonged guerrilla war. Strangely enough, Régis Debray fails to mention the Guatemalan 13th of November Movement, whose guerrilla bands have been in the field since 1962. This omission may possibly be due to political divergencies between the Castroites and the Guatemalan guerrillas.}

With the exception of the Communist Party of Venezuela, which has adopted the Castroite line, the Latin American communists have rejected Castro's call to action, and ever since, the heated debate between the proponents of the peaceful road and those of the violent road has been going on. The terminology of the debate is somewhat...
obscure, and often unintelligible to outsiders. Take, for instance, the use which the Communist parties have made of the term "National Liberation Front"—a cold-war slogan meaning the formation of a united front of Communists and non-Communists against "American imperialism." The Latin American Communists have used this formula to justify the continuation of their accustomed policy of opportunistic alliances with political groups of the most diverse tendencies. To build a broad National Front means, in their interpretation, to water down one's program so as to make it acceptable to moderates and even conservatives. Although the National Liberation Front is allegedly directed against the United States, it has served the Communists as an excuse for cooperation even with pro-American groups, the assumption being that in the course of time these groups would be weaned away from their allegiance.

The Castroites have accepted the formula of the National Liberation Front, but they insist on this Front having a radical program and being restricted to those political forces which are really willing to go out and fight in an armed struggle for the installation of a new regime of the Cuban type. The Communists object that a radical program would scare away the "national bourgeoisie," and thus the debate has been narrowed down to the subject of the "national bourgeoisie," of its role and position and whether it is a worthwhile ally.

The term "national bourgeoisie," in Communist language, signifies all those Latin American capitalists who have no links with American monopolies and whose existence is threatened by the activities of
American capital in their country. As far as Latin America is concerned, this concept seems to me to be a mere figment of the communists' imagination. I do not believe that there is in Latin America any sizeable group of capitalists so antagonistic to the United States and so threatened by the activities of American monopoly capitalism that they would be willing to unite with the communists and Castroites in a life-and-death struggle against the United States.

The Castroites would thus appear to be perfectly right in their assertion that the "national bourgeoisie" is not an important element in a "national liberation struggle." But the Communists are less

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15 The Soviet manual Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, p. 416, gives the following definition of the term "national bourgeoisie": "The arbitrary rule of the foreign monopolies impels also part of the bourgeoisie in the Latin American countries to take an anti-imperialist stand. As in other countries, differentiation is taking place within the bourgeoisie, which is becoming increasingly differentiated into a national bourgeoisie (mainly a petty-bourgeoisie, and a middle bourgeoisie connected with industry) and a big bourgeoisie, part of which is directly linked with foreign monopolies and, together with the latifundia-owners, serves as the mainstay of U. S. imperialism in Latin America. The fundamental economic interests of the national bourgeoisie increasingly conflict with the policy of U. S. monopoly capital. The aggressive course of the North American militarists also enhances the anti-imperialist moods of the national bourgeoisie, which does not want any war."

16 Although the Castroites do not go so far as to deny the existence of the "national bourgeoisie," or to reject it as an ally,
concerned with the factual existence of the "national bourgeoisie"
or with its potentialities as an ally than with the mere use of the
term as justification for moderate policies.

Take, for instance, the attitude of the Communists in Guatemala.
In that country, the 13th of November Movement, a small non-communist
group led by young army officers who had staged an unsuccessful mili-
tary rising in 1960, took to the hills and started a guerrilla cam-
paign in February 1962. In the spring of 1963, the Communists very
rashly allowed themselves to be drawn into a united front, the Frente
Unide de Resistencia, with this group, but the alliance was never a
happy one. It is now breaking up, because the 13th of November
Movement which is doing the actual fighting has adopted a radical

they insist that its cooperation must not be bought by concessions in
matters of basic importance.

17 This was clearly indicated in an article by the Communist
party leader Hugo Barrios Klee in the March 1964 issue of the World
Marxist Review: "But at present the guerrilla movement does not, by
itself, determine the political situation in the country. If the
democratic forces are effectively to shape the course of events it is
necessary, as was said earlier, to form a broad anti-imperialist, anti-
feudal front relying on the actions of the masses . . . . Neither the
best of programs, no matter how theoretically sound, nor any isolated
actions by a band of courageous men, no matter how courageous they may
be, can take the place of long and painstaking work to organize the
social army of revolution, the struggle of the masses, including the
most diverse social strata, led by the working class . . . ."
program envisaging a socialist revolution in Guatemala. The Communists, on the other hand, have published a somewhat hysterical document in the April 1965 number of the World Marxist Review. They say, in part:

The complexity of the situation is also due to the fact that conditions vary from area to area and that resistance to the dictatorship varies accordingly as to forms and methods. In short, our Party and the other democratic forces have to act with the greatest flexibility, using every means at their command to promote the revolutionary struggle--forming legal organizations wherever possible and organizing a broad movement of the masses.

The armed struggle is spreading, even though its impact on the political development of the country is not decisive as yet. Its progress could have been greater had there been no anti-communist bias against our Party in the discussions going on within the movement. The unfriendly tenor of the discussions makes a calm dialogue difficult.

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18 The political views of the 13th of November Movement are described at length in two articles in Huberman and Sweezy's Monthly Review May-June 1965. The new program rejects collaboration with the national bourgeoisie and demands an immediate socialist revolution. It thus goes even farther than the Castroite program as described by Régis Debray in Les Temps Modernes. Consciously or unconsciously, the 13th of November Movement appears to have adopted Trotskyist positions.
The point at issue is the character of the Guatemalan revolution and its immediate aims. We Communists maintain that the present revolutionary struggle bears a national-democratic character and that all who aim at freeing the country from the rule of the semi-feudal oligarchy and the U.S. imperialists should join in it. We believe that the national bourgeoisie, the radical small bourgeoisie, and the middle classes generally can and should play a progressive role and contribute to the liberation struggle of our people. Those comrades who think differently and have evidently fallen for Trotskyist provocation hold that our revolution must be a socialist revolution, and that the regime to be established immediately after its victory must be a workers' and peasants' government, that is, one debarring all other social strata from the revolutionary bloc. In line with this, they call on the workers everywhere to seize the factories and on the peasants to take over the landed estates and set up "organs of state power." Since the political struggle in Guatemala has not yet attained a stage at which these appeals can be carried into practice, they are utopian and, worse still, objectively provocative. If those who hold such views prevailed on the revolutionaries to take this road, the outcome would be sad, reaction has ample opportunities for retaliation. These people have also taken advantage of the polemic in the world Communist movement to aggravate differences in our country and to attack our Party.
This is clearly the language of people who are afraid and desperately anxious to find their way out of a dangerous situation.

A regional conference of the 22 Latin American communist parties which was apparently held in Havana last November does not appear to have brought about a basic change in the attitude of these parties. The conference was obviously sponsored by the Russians, and the mere fact that they got the Cubans down at the table with the pro-Soviet communist parties, excluding the pro-Chinese splinter groups, was a diplomatic triumph for them, although strangely enough they have not taken full advantage of it: neither the name of the place where the conference took place, nor the list of its participants has been announced in any official party publication. The communiqué, published only in Pravda 19 announces "active support for those who are at present being widely persecuted, as for instance the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan and Haitian fighters," but it does not contain the universal call to arms for which the Castroites are pressing, and it avoids mention of the central issues now being debated within the movement in Latin America, such as the peaceful or the violent road, the national liberation front policy and the role of the bourgeoisie.

Since the conference, there has been a marked increase in guerrilla activities in Venezuela and Colombia, and a new guerrilla front has been opened in Peru. In Venezuela, Italian Communist Party couriers carrying

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the sum of $320,000 have been intercepted by the police. Since it is unlikely that the Italian Communists themselves have put up such a large sum to support the Venezuelan struggle, one may assume that the money is of Russian origin. Over the years, the Russians have spent many millions in economic and military aid to Cuba without being able to persuade Castro to take their side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. What he demands is support for his policy of armed revolution in Latin America. In giving some money to the guerrillas, the Russians may now at long last have found the only way to appease him and to bribe him to cover over to their side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. If this were true, Moscow would, however, still be playing a double game. The Moscow-controlled World Marxist Review continues to publish statements by Latin American Communist parties warning their followers against adventurism and foolhardy romanticism. If anything, these warnings, which are clearly directed against the Castroites, have become more frequent and more urgent since the Havana conference.  

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20 Such warnings are contained in statements by Latin American communist spokesmen in the following issues of the World Marxist Review: February 1965: Brazil, Argentina. March: Panama, Ecuador. April: Brazil, Guatemala. June: El Salvador. In its February issue, World Marxist Review also published an article on guerrilla warfare by the Spanish Republican General Enrique Lister, who clearly polemicized against the Castroite theory of the "guerrilla nucleus": "There is much talk nowadays to the effect that a revolutionary situation can be developed from a particular 'center.' In some cases attempts are
The situation in the Latin American communist movement may thus be characterized as one of confusion and disarray. With the Castroites pressing for action, the Russians adopting an ambiguous attitude, and a number of Communist Parties confronted by rival, pro-Chinese organizations split off from their own ranks, the entire movement appears to be in danger of disintegration.

made to prove this in practice. This claim is refuted by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of this form of struggle, and is disproved by revolutionary experience. A revolutionary situation cannot be created at will. No 'center' or 'centers' can in themselves create a revolutionary situation." Another passage in the same article appears to be directed against the Venezuelan guerrillas: "Another lesson we have learned--and Spain is no exception--is that one must be able to call off guerrilla warfare in good time, must 'trim one's sails' and tack before it is too late, when it becomes evident that the method chosen is not the best one and may exhaust the revolutionary vanguard." On the other hand, the January issue contains an appeal by the Central Committee of the Paraguayan Communist Party "calling upon the people to prepare themselves for a general uprising against the Stroessner dictatorship." A Venezuelan statement in the June issue insists that "the army is unable to crush the guerrillas." A Bolivian statement in the July issue announces the secession of nine of the 44 members of the Central Committee to form a rival (pro-Chinese) party and admits that the secessionists have considerable strength in three departments, and have been able to set up parallel organizations in six of the 14 departments where the Party has regional committees.