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THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL:

The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa

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At the meeting on May 8 on the ACDA Regional Study, it was agreed that a background paper pulling together available data from open sources would be a useful aid in preparing the section on the role of military assistance in the arms problem which appears in the outline (III, A, e) for each regional study.

The attached paper was written during the summer of 1963 by Miss Catherine McArdle of our graduate political science program. She met with some obvious difficulties in securing information, particularly in such areas as Soviet and French military assistance to Africa. But with the thought that such special data could be further pursued as necessary, I felt you would want to have the benefit without delay of this otherwise thorough and careful analysis.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
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Note

Throughout the paper, the following abbreviations have been used:

FY	Fiscal Year
MDA	Mutual Defense Assistance
(2)	References to item cited in the Bibliography

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The Role of Military Assistance in the Problem of Arms Control:

The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa

I. Introduction

One of the most significant, yet least studied phenomea of postwar international relations is the emergence of an extensive, ever-growing system of global military assistance. In an age characterized by revolutionary changes in all phases of war and diplomacy, primary attention quite rightly has been focused on the more general and radical developments of the time --- the uses and effects of nuclear weapons, the development and institutionalization of far-reaching military alliances, the problems and pitfalls of cold war confrontation. When considered at all, the extension of military assistance by the major powers has been thought of as merely a special case, a secondary manifestation of these larger trends. Yet the nature and scope of postwar military aid programs, particularly those extended to the developing nations, has had significant consequences for the level of world armament and tension, for the balance of both political and military power within states, within regions, and between the major blocs.

The extension of military assistance, to be sure, is hardly a new development. One need only glance over the diplomatic history of the 19th and early 20th centuries to find instances in which powerful nations have provided arms, equipment, training, and economic subsidies to other nations or groups fighting or fearing a foreign invasion or domestic insurgency.

Since 1945, however, military aid has taken on new, more complex and far-reaching aspects. In quantitative terms, there has been a tremendous expansion in the scope of such aid, directly paralleling the rise in the number of national entities. In every region of the world, but particularly in the Middle East, in Latin America and in Africa, more nations are now receiving more foreign military assistance and subsidies than ever before in history.

Qualitatively, the postwar changes have been of even greater import. Arms assistance to the developing nations no longer appears to be a highly volatile, short or even medium term element of national policies. Although, as with economic aid, some changes and cutbacks have been occasioned by political developments, donor states now seem committed to relatively long-term programs of increased formalization and institutionalization. Similarly, the type and range of aid extended has shifted. Assistance programs, particularly those of the United States, now encompass not only the provision of basic material and services necessary for the establishment and annual maintenance of armed forces, but also the direction and planning of future improvement and development in military capabilities. Third, a major change in emphasis seems to have taken place with respect to the goals of assistance efforts. Few of the developing states are sought as present or potential military allies, capablecapable of adding significantly to the armed strength of donor nations against an actual or expected enemy. Primary purpose now seems rather to develop military client states, to build up military-political strongholds through which to preserve or upset regional balances, or to maintain favored regimes against internal subversion or revolt.

In consequence, any examination of arms control proposals with respect to the developing areas must take full consideration of the role of

military assistance, with respect not only to the absolute level of regional armament, but also to the interests and commitments of both the aided nations and the major powers. The attempt will be made here to sketch out a basis for such consideration, to describe the nature and scope of military assistance programs in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, and to suggest the significant problems these programs pose for any future regional arms control arrangements.

II. General Considerations

Before these regional descriptions can be fully understood and interpreted, however, consideration must first be given to some of the significant difficulties and restrictions involved in the study of military aid. The nature and magnitude of these problems is such that great care and circumspection must be exercised in the drawing of any conclusive results.

The first and most obvious problem to be faced is that of restricted and/or incomplete information. Military assistance traditionally has been the most sensitive area of foreign policy, one in which public announcement and debate were fraught with grave consequences for both donor and recipient nations. In the postwar era, this degree of sensitivity is the same, if not more critical. Even in the West, where the practise of public accountability brings somewhat more information to light, the pressure of competitive co-existence, of "security" consciousness, and of instantaneous global communication all tend to make military assistance one of the most accepted but least discussed national policies.

Too, within this general atmosphere of restriction, great variances exist in the amount and type of information available about the five major

military aid programs. Due to annual Congressional review, American military assistance efforts are relatively well publicized and examined. Until recently, however, the amount of yearly grants to individual nations was not made public: the magnitude and nature of aid to certain states is still classified. The British government publishes some specific figures but now summarizes many assistance allocations under two general headings, aid for Commonwealth members and that for other states. Country breakdowns for French and West German military assistance are almost non-existent. Perhaps the most public data is available with respect to Sino-Soviet military aid since at regular intervals the U.S. State Department publicizes both the amount and type of assistance tended by the bloc. This information, however, is still classified for a period of time, and cannot always be considered complete.

Even when the precise amount of an assistance grant is know, little can be said with surety about the specific type and characteristic of granted arms and equipment. Still less is (and seemingly can be) known about the relative value or "price" ascribed by the donor nation to various end items or technical services. To take only the best case, the general principles of American pricing policy have been officially reported. In-service equipment is to be valued at its actual production cost - that is, without procurement or warehousing charges; while those end-items drawn from "excess" or "obsolescent" stocks are to be priced at their "fair value", a price "not less than rehabilitation costs and scrap value or market value if ascertainable."[1] The valuation of individual equipment, however, is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense and is not made public.

A third difficulty of far greater complexity is the precise determination of what constitutes military assistance. There seems little question

that the direct provision of military goods and services should be so classified: yet even such aid can have both a military and an economic cast. In recent years, the United States has stressed the contribution made to economic development efforts by the use of military grants for "civic action" projects. In the tradition of the American Corps of Engineers, certain equipment and supported forces are programmed for developmental functions, road construction, communications engineering, and public health improvement.[2]

A second component of military aid would seem to be equipment sales or loans, although these two factors are rarely considered in these terms. In addition to their grant aid programs, all Western donor states make certain quantities of new and obsolescent equipment available for sale to the wealthier or more-dissatisfied developing nations. Although available data is minimal, prices reportedly range from those somewhat less than simple production costs to those approximately equal to scrap value plus refitting charges.[3] The more infrequent loan arrangements usually involve little or no costs to the recipient state beyond normal maintenance fees, full ownership and refitting responsibilities remaining with the donor.[4]

Still greater definitional problems arise with respect to certain types of military-tinged economic assistance, provided principally by the United States and the United Kingdom. The first type, generally referred to as "defense support", "budgetary assistance" or more recently as part of "supporting assistance", has been extended to nations which in the donor's opinion "do not have the economic means to support the sizeable armed forces... essential to their own and the common defense."[5] Such assistance may take the form of direct subsidies as the British grant to Jordan, or of a grant-com-

modity combination (the latter to be resold locally) as in the case of American supporting aid to Turkey. The specific uses of this aid are determined jointly by the donor and recipient and vary greatly from country to country. Examples culled from the American experience are to build roads, improve sanitation facilities, and to raise the general level of literacy or technical training as well as to defray the costs of non-supported troops.

The second, more complex type is that entitled "special assistance", in the past a particular characteristic of American programs. According to official statements, aid of this kind is provided for three purposes: first, to maintain economic and political stability in countries where the donor nation has strategic political interests; second, to secure access to overseas bases; and third, "to provide an alternative to excessive dependence on Sino-Soviet aid."[6] In consequence, the specific uses of such aid have often been far more related to the economic development efforts of recipients than to their military capabilities. Examples of aid employment range from the financing of Congolese and Jordanian imports to the subsidizing of certain Egyptian and Ethiopian educational programs.

Perhaps all that can be said about such aid forms is that they can and are subsumed under the general rubric of military aid. It may be true, as several observers have noted, that, particularly in past American programs, the label "military" has been applied somewhat indiscriminately in an effort to highlight the urgency of a particular request or to gain greater Congressional and public approval.[7] Too, items such as base support are clearly more related to the military programs of the aid-giver than to those of the state aided and perhaps would be better included under the domestic military budget.

However, it also seems clear that a large portion of this aid merely exemplifies the acknowledged principle that in the long-run, a country's capacity to defend itself against external attack or internal subversion is closely and inherently related to the state and level of its economic and social overhead capital base. Budgetary support may permit a nation to more intensively pursue both military security and social development: road construction and public works may secure both improved military and civil transportation and communication. For analytic clarity and greater public accountability, it undoubtedly would be preferrable to draw more precise distinctions. Yet the possible military as well as economic implications of such assistance over a period of years cannot be denied, and deserves consideration here as a significant aspect of military assistance.

Perhaps the most difficult problem of all, however, is to evaluate the effect of military aid upon the recipient nation. Few analytic schemes of any type have been advanced for assessing the role and value of military assistance. Only two of these offer any possibility for rigorous quantitative examination: the models proposed by Charles Wolfe and the broad systems analysis approach currently employed by the Department of Defense.[8] Both schemes, however, contain significant limitations, stemming from their policy orientation. First their principal focus is on the value of assistance from the viewpoint of the donor nation: only minimal consideration is devoted to its implications for the aided state. Second, their effective use requires data of a nature and extent not available or appropriate to a general overview of military assistance patterns.

Qualitative analysis, even at its best, can provide few conclusive answers in this regard. The ramifications of assistance are so complex and

the range of possible consequences so great, that any attempt at relatively precise estimation becomes enmeshed in a tangle of conflicting conditional statements and highly qualified judgments. Too, the restrictions of incomplete information concerning both internal and regional conditions makes definitive evaluation extremely treacherous, if not impossible.

A few more specific considerations may indicate the difficulties in assessing even the military effects of foreign military assistance. The analyst's first task is to determine the extent to which a given quantity and type of aid will strengthen or improve a national military capability. Before such an analysis can be attempted, he must possess a relatively clear picture of nature and state of the military establishment. Among other factors, he must consider its level of armament and equipment, its patterns of training and organization, its condition of physical and morale preparedness.

The analyst then must consider whether aid is and will soon be appropriate to these conditions. Relevant questions might include these three: Can the granted equipment be employed and maintained by national forces given their physical abilities, their present skills, and their capacity for training in the immediate future? Is this equipment practicable or suitable for the particular environmental conditions? To what extent are additional supporting facilities or equipment required?

Still further complexities exist with respect to determining the impact of assistance on a nation's capacity to counter external or internal aggression. This task is perhaps easiest when the nation is or has been engaged in action, when the effects of assistance are most readily apparent.

Even such situations present analytic difficulties. A small amount of assistance at the proper moment may have disproportionately large effects, resulting either from its scale-tipping properties or from its symbolic representation of foreign political interest or commitment.

Assessment of effects in a time of tension or non-action is by far the most difficult. Most simply stated, deterrence after all exists largely in the eye of the beholder, in the "enemy's" estimate of the nation's capacity and will to counter his attack or to inflict unacceptable damage. Too, assistance as a sign of foreign political commitment again may be a crucial factor. Further, the nature and extent of assistance indeed may exacerbate the tensions it has been designed to meet. It may occasion heightened military buildup by the other side - or allow for further repressive measures resulting in increased internal agitation and disturbance.

The nature of these difficulties, therefore, precludes the possibility of any assessment of the impact of the various military assistance efforts, although this unquestionably merits future investigation and study. The attempt here will be limited to a general discussion of the amount and type of assistance provided by the major donor nations to the developing states of the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

III. The Regional Role of Military Assistance: The Middle East

A. Introduction

Of the three regions under study, the area in which postwar military assistance has played the most significant role has been the Middle East, the region bound on the east by Pakistan and on the west by Egypt. Great Power strategic assistance to this area is hardly a postwar phenomenon: British

aid to dissident elements of the Ottoman Empire during World War I is just one of the more well-known examples. Three new developments, however, have contributed to the increased importance and magnitude of present military aid. First has been the rise of Arab nationalism, stressing de facto as well as de jure independence, particularly in matters of foreign policy. A second factor has been the emergence or rebirth of intra-regional conflicts and arms races, Arab against Arab, and Arab against Israeli. Most significant has been the third, the desire of both major power blocs to find indirect, non-nuclear means to secure their strategic interests and influence in the area.

All five leading donor nations provide military assistance to one or more Middle Eastern states, the primary efforts being mounted by the United States, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the United Kingdom. Each aid program will be examined in turn with respect to its historical development, its general policy goals, and its specific country allocations.

B. American Military Assistance

1. General Considerations

Since 1945, the largest and most comprehensive program of military assistance to the Middle East has been that provided by the United States. Although not approaching the massive grants extended in Europe and the Far East American efforts in this area have far surpassed those of any other nation both in terms of the number of states aided and the magnitude and duration of assistance efforts. It is also to be noted that they have greatly surpassed American programs in both Latin America and Africa.

American aid involvement in this area dates,from the immediate postwar period and the United States' first steps toward assuming Britain's traditional

Table I: Regional Distribution of American Military Equipment/Training Assistance FY 1947-1963

(in millions of dollars of appropriations)

Region	Total FY 1947-1955	FY 1956	FY 1957	FY 1958	FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963	Totals**
Europe	*	301	261	639	377	364	544	371	238	15,718
Far East	2,019	686	686	657	665	564	782	849	685	8,180
Near East and South Asia	1,504	227	352	521	404	255	448	411	443	4,933
Latin America	46	12	28	56	52	67	54	72	71	482
Africa	4	*	*	9	12	13	25	35	33	138
Other	683									927

* Data not available

** Discrepancies due to rounding, and de-obligation arrangements

Sources: Totals FY 1947-1955, (59) August 25, 1963 IV, p. 6.

Annual figures and final totals (15) FY 1956-1961, (18) pp. 166-8.

Table II: Regional Distribution of American Defense Support/Special/Supporting Assistance FY 1949-1962

(in millions of dollars of expenditures)

Region	FY 1949-52	FY 1953-57	FY 1958	FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	Totals
Europe	11,462.4	3,087.3	92.7	96.8	51.4	69.3	43.7	14,903.6
Far East	444.3	2,993.8	687.3	565.1	550.1	530.0	293.4	6,063.9
Near East and South Asia	830.7	1,528.7	295.5	379.8	341.7	315.8	285.5	3,977.7
Latin America		72.4	31.4	34.8	29.6	59.0	95.2	322.4
Africa		36.8	30.7	68.8	123.7	104.2	55.7	419.8

Source: (17) December 31, 1962, p. 35.

role in the Middle East. Equipment and training aid was provided first in limited quantities to Iran during Soviet occupation of its northern territories, and then in substantial amounts to Turkey in accordance with the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The nature of the early Turkish program in fact foreshadowed many later American programs. Assistance was granted to deter, rather than to meet, external agression or internal subversion, and was concerned not only with modernizing the Turkish army but also with strengthening Turkey's economic base through budgetary assistance and public works construction. In 1951, the number of aided countries was brought to 3, with the conclusion of a military assistance agreement with Saudi Arabia.

The greatest expansion of American Near Eastern efforts came in the period from 1954-1958. First, the conclusion of the Southeast Asia (SEATO) and Middle Eastern (Baghdad) defense treaties brought Iraq and Pakistan within the scope of American aid. As major allies - indirect and direct - each began receiving substantial quantities of arms, training and military-economic support. In 1956 Afghanistan became an aid recipient, limited amounts of special and training assistance being extended in an effort to provide a counterweight to Soviet military credits.

More significant expansion occurred after the events of Suez. The rising tide of regional tension occasioned increased aid appropriations and shipments for the Baghdad pact nations and increased assurances of assistance and support for "all" Middle Eastern states under the Eisenhower Doctrine of early 1957. Only a month later Jordan began receiving at first emergency and then continuing support for its armed forces and its economy in the face of border threats and internal disturbances. Finally the events of 1958 resulted in further aid increases for Turkey, Iran and Jordan. Although the

Iraqui program was terminated, a further country, Lebanon, was added to the area program.

Since 1958, the basic pattern of American military assistance in the Middle East has changed very little. From 1959-1962, some attempt was made to counter Sino-Soviet efforts by extending limited quantities of special assistance to their major client states, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Revolutions in the latter three states in 1962-1963 led to further, small-scale programs of aid and training help.

2. Country Programs

On first examination, the specific country allocation of American military assistance seem to reflect a welter of variant purposes and programs. One approach to clarity, however, lies in consideration of their relationship to the major policy goals which the United States has pursued in the Middle East since the end of World War II. As in other regions, the paramount American aim has been to secure the area against Soviet or Communist penetration, whether sought by external attack or by internal subversion. A highly related end has been to promote the internal development and continuance of regimes friendly to the West or, at the very least to foster the growth of internal political stability and a non-hostile atmosphere. Finally the United States has tried to encourage the striking of a viable regional balance, to discourage the spread or intensification of regional conflicts, both those among Arab states and those of the Arabs against the Israeli.

Although, as in all areas, there have been some wide divergences between principle and practise, the twelve country programs of American military assistance seemingly can be described and compared in terms of the

particular emphasis given one or more of these general policy goals. Four distinct and quite different program types seem evident; the first exemplified by assistance efforts with respect to the directly and indirectly allied periphery states, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. Primary American purpose here has been to develop and strengthen military capabilities against the "double threat", against direct Sino-Soviet attack and against subversion or infiltration across the common border.[10] The amount of supporting assistance as well as direct equipment/training grants received by these three nations has been massive, far exceeding that to any other country or group of countries in the area.

Of all, the Turkish assistance program has been by far the largest, in terms not only of the thirteen year total but also of annual aid appropriations. This is hardly surprising in view of Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Alliance, and its continuing need for substantial allied support to effectively participate in the defense of NATO's right flank. Moreover, in the opinion of many, Turkey is the keystone to Middle Eastern defense. It appears to be the only nation in the arc with at least the potential military and economic capacity necessary to effectively deter or resist direct Soviet attack for any significant period of time.

Equipment and training assistance to Turkey has been directed primarily toward modernizing and strengthening the Turkish armed forces. There have been two distinct phases in the program, the first stressing the development of Army mobility and effectiveness. During the years from 1947-1957, Turkey received substantial shipments of field weapons, artillery, tanks, trucks and motor vehicles as well as significant grants for necessary military

Table III:

American Military Equipment/Training

Assistance to the Middle East

FY 1950-1963

(in millions of dollars of appropriations)

Country	Totals FY 1950-1963	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963
Afghanistan	1.1	1.6	.004	.126
Iran	434.0	75.9	53.1	69.7
Iraq	46.1	*	.036	.085
Jordan	16.9	3.5	3.9	5.6
Lebanon	8.3	.2	.052	.087
Pakistan	classified			
Saudi Arabia	classified			
Syria				.005
Turkey	1,682.7	180.3	179.3	167.9
Yemen				.010
Area undistributed	508.7	77.5	55.4	49.4

* - less than $50,000.00

Sources: (21) for FY 1961, p. 15.

(18) p. 177.

Table IV: American Supporting Assistance to the Middle East

FY -1962

(in millions of dollars of expenditures)

Country	Totals FY 1952-1957	FY 1958	FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962
Afghanistan	*	5.2	16.1	5.3	9.2	31.1
Iran	102	6.5*	3.0*	69.4	22.0	44.0
Jordan		30.9	43.2	50.0	45.0	37.0
Lebanon		.9	12.5	12.5		
Pakistan	300	50.0	95.	90.	95.6	25.0
Turkey	453	70.	100.	82.	90.0	58.0
UAR Egypt	*		2.		.700	20.0
Syria						9.0
Yemen				3.0	4.0	6.8

* - incomplete data

Sources: Totals (29) p. 175.

Annual Figures (16) and (18) FY 1959-1963

training and base development.[11] Construction also was begun on Turkish facilities for the production of small arms and ammunition. Although more limited, some quantities of naval and air force equipment were delivered. Under various agreements, Turkey received several World War II vintage destroyers and submarines and an undetermined number of conventional and jet aircraft.[12]

The second phase of the Turkish program dates from 1957 and includes several significant NATO-directed additions to the continued efforts for Army buildup. An unreported quantity of tactical nuclear weapons have been shipped to Turkey, chiefly including the Honest John and other small ground-to-ground missiles. Major aid for Turkish air defenses has been extended in the form of newer attack aircraft, earlier F-86's being replaced by F-104 G's, and of the ground-to-air Nike and Hawk missile systems.[13] Until recent removal began, Turkey was also one of the two continental sites of a number of Jupiter MRBM's.

The specific nature and goals of American supporting assistance for Turkey have varied widely. A major road construction project was completed in 1958: U.S. grants played a major role in the building of some 17,000 miles of highway.[14] A substantial proportion of all grants has been devoted to financing needed commodity and capital goods import. Further specific uses has included the support of agricultural experimentation, of hydroelectric projects, of public health education and of resource development, especially coal mining.

The Iranian and Pakistani programs have been somewhat different in both purpose and scope. In Iran, again the prime focus of American aid has been

the modernization and strengthening of the Army. This has been done, however, more for purposes of internal security than for even relatively self-sufficient defense against external attack, and has been carried out in coordination with programs focusing on the Iranian Gendarmerie.[15] A substantial proportion of total arms shipments have been in the form of ground weapons (including some anti-tank missiles), communications equipment, trucks and other motor vehicles. In recent years, Iran has also received a number of newer aircraft, particularly jets, and some air-to-air missiles.[16]

The uses of American supporting assistance in the past were as varied in Iran, as in Turkey. The largest portion of aid funds was directed toward the financing of commodity imports and other forms of direct and indirect budgetary assistance. Under the new Kennedy policy, however, this type of aid has been phased out during the past two years.

American aid policy with respect to Pakistan has been formulated in somewhat broader terms, in an effort to create at least a potentially effective multi-service capability against external attack on the eastern edge of the Northern Tier.[17] Pakistan has been tendered large shipments of light tanks, trucks and communications equipment as well as numerous small arms and conventional ground pieces. Through Britain, the United States has also supplied a number of naval vessels, including six re-fitted destroyers.[18]

Major program emphasis, however, seems to have been focused on air force development. Although the specific details of all aid to Pakistan are classified, Pakistan seems to have received at least three major shipments of relatively new jet aircraft, including light bombers and some "high performance" craft.[19] Under the 1961-1962 program, too, delivery was made of an unreported number of air-to-air missiles.

From FY 1955 through FY 1961, Pakistan also received a significant amount of defense support aid. Although specific uses varied widely, the primary objectives of this aid were to provide budgetary support through the financing of needed imports, particularly commodity goods. Phasing-down and termination of this type of aid was effected during FY 1962 and FY 1963.

Aid to Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia represents a second type of American military assistance to the Middle East. The principal goal of these programs is to aid pro-Western or generally friendly regimes in the maintenance of internal stability, particularly with respect to the dangers of subversion and infiltration. Assistance efforts, therefore, have been quite limited in comparison with those in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and have been directed far more towards the training of existing forces and the provision of smaller ground equipment.

The largest of the three programs has been that to Jordan, where, during the last five years, the United States has begun to assume some of the traditionally British responsibilities for military equipment, training and force support. Special crisis assistance was granted first in 1957, and then on a larger scale in 1958, when King Hussein's rule was threatened by Syria and Egypt. Quantities of small ground equipment were delivered, together with some more sophisticated weapons, including twelve Hawker-Hunter aircraft purchased from Great Britain. Extensive grants also were allocated for budgetary support and the financing of various imports.

Continuing assistance since 1958 has reflected much the same pattern. Direct equipment and training aid has been relatively limited in quantity, and had been directed mainly toward army maintenance and gradual modernization. Far

larger amounts have been appropriated for supporting assistance and have been appropriated for supporting assistance and have been used chiefly to finance approximately one-half of Jordan's total foreign imports.[20]

The military assistance program for Lebanon has been quite similar in nature, although more limited in scale. The crisis of 1958 resulted not only in the landing of 14,000 American troops, but also in the extension of financial and special equipment aid. Rushed arms shipments were comprised mainly of small weapons for the then 8,000 man Lebanese armed forces, but also included a few aircraft and small naval craft.[21] Since 1960, however, Lebanon has received no further supporting assistance and only "token" amounts of training and equipment assistance.

Very little has been revealed publicly about the specific scope or nature of the program in Saudi Arabia, since all of the relevant data has been classified since its inception in 1951. Begun at the time of the Dhahran airbase agreement, this assistance is perhaps better described as indirect base support. Official explanation, however, has always been that it is for internal security training purposes and the program has been continued even after the termination of the base agreement in 1962.[22]

Representative of a third type of aid program is the assistance extended to Afghanistan and Yemen. Here the explicit purpose of aid is to provide "an alternative to excessive dependence on Communist aid."[23] The largest proportion of grants has been in the form of supporting assistance for various requested direct military aid in the past, only limited amounts have been allocated for direct equipment or training services.

Begun in 1956, the Afghanistan program has been the larger and more comprehensive of the two. During the first years, only supporting assistance was granted. Three projects absorbed most of these funds: the establishment of Ariana, the Afghan national airline; the construction of Kandhar civil airport, and the development of a large road system, linking Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.

Direct military aid began in FY 1958 and generally has emphasized training, rather than equipment provision. A large percentage of total allocations has been employed to bring Afghan officers to the United States for special military education programs. The primary purpose of this aid, however, is underscored by the fact that, while almost all of Afghanistan's military aircraft and equipment is of Soviet origin, these officers have received intensive flight and air-technical training in American jets and special English language and "military political" instruction.[24]

Aid to Yemen, dating from FY 1959 has reflected the same pattern of supporting assistance, although in considerable smaller degree. Only in the past fiscal year, was an extremely limited training program initiated.

Although far less clearly, recent American aid to Iraq might also be considered under this general heading. Prior to 1958, as a Baghdad pact member, Iraq received significant amounts of direct equipment assistance, largely directed toward the strengthening of its 50,000 man army to meet threats of boarder forays and internal subversion.[25] After the July revolution, the new regime immediately severed all American assistance ties. Small programs of direct and supporting aid, however, were resumed in the early 60's and have been increased slightly since the February revolution of this year.

A fourth, mixed type of aid policy has been pursued by the United States with respect to Egypt and Syria. Assistance to these states has been minimal: since 1950, only extremely limited amounts of supporting grants have been extended and almost no direct equipment aid. The scope and character of this assistance has evidenced the conflict between two major American policy goals. On the one hand, the United States has attempted to keep open at least a token support channel in opposition to massive Soviet arms credit. On the other, however, a continuing policy principle has been to discourage any further intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the time of the Tripartite Declaration in 1950, the United States has at least publicly declared its opposition "to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel" and has generally sought to avoid all but "balancing" involvement.[26]

Assistance to Israel has also reflected this American aim of at least partial regional stabilization. Save during the first year of independence, Israel has received virtually no military aid grants, either in the form of special or equipment support. At various times, however, in an attempt to offset the increased level of Egyptian-Syrian armament, the United States has concluded direct sales agreements with Israel for certain specific weapons. Recently, the Kennedy Administration seems to have taken a new position of Israeli support and has recently permitted the state to purchase - at reduced costs - approximately $25 millions in surface-to-air Hawk missiles designed for anti-aircraft defense.[27]

C. Sino-Soviet military assistance

1. General considerations

The second major source of military assistance to the Middle East has been the Sino-Soviet bloc, principal donor states being the Soviet Union itself and Czechoslovakia. Bloc military aid programs in this area are considerably newer than those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Prior to 1953, the bloc evidenced little interest in aid of any type and maintained a relatively cool and distant approach to particular Middle Eastern states.[28] "With the launching of the new economic offensive", however, new emphasis was placed on aid to the developing nations, particularly the provision of military aid to the more advanced, "politically promising" states. A prime focus of attention was the Middle East, arms agreements being concluded with Egypt in 1955, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen in 1956, and Iraq in 1958.

Bloc aid programs seem to have differed from Western efforts in other respects as well. First Soviet arms assistance generally has not been extended in the form of annual programmatic allocations. Although possibilities for future review and revision exist, most assistance has been tendered under direct bilateral agreements, stipulating the provision of a certain quantity of equipment, training and maintenance assistance over a specified time period. Too, only arms credits have been extended, due with two to three per cent interest in from eight to ten years. Repayment is not to be in cash, but in basic raw materials and foodstuffs.

Perhaps the most significant difference, however, lies in the

seeming uniform goals of bloc assistance. All five of the nations aided had repeatedly sought and been refused Western, particularly American aid.[29] At the time Soviet arms were offered, each state was also party to a major conflict with an important American ally, or with a pro-Western Middle Eastern regime. Afghanistan had long been dispute with Pakistan over Pushtoonistan; Yemen, with the United Kingdom over the West Aden Protectorate. Alarmed by the conclusion of the Baghdad pact, Egypt and Syria also had just suffered the Gaza and Lake Tiberias setbacks in their continuing campaign against Israel. Iraq's new regime had renounced the royal alliance with Jordan, assistance ties with the United States, and later its commitment to the Baghdad pact.

2. Country Programs

It is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise scope and nature of Soviet military assistance efforts, since the details of arms agreements are secret and total amounts are officially reported simply as commercial transactions. Western reports vary widely as to the value and type of equipment provided. Considered by some to be conservative estimates, U.S. State Departments show the following totals for all aid agreements through June 1961:[30]

Table V: Soviet Military Assistance to the Middle Eastern Nations through June 1961.

(in millions of dollars)

	Military	Economic
Afghanistan	107	217
Egypt	315	624
Iraq	188	216
Syria	128	178
Yemen	27	44
Regional totals	955	2,379
Global totals	1,793	4,092

Source: Cited in (4) for FY 1962, p. 703.

Aid to Egypt has been the most extensive and diversified of all Soviet military assistance. During the first year of the Soviet-Egyptian agreement, Egypt reportedly received between $200-$225 millions worth of direct equipment aid.[31] Specific end items delivered were alleged to include approximately 100 MIG 15's and 17's, 40 LL-28 medium bombers, 300 T-34 heavy tanks, 2 destroyers, 6 submarines, and a "substantial" assortment of rocketlaunchers, bazookas, artillery and armor pieces. The events of the Suez campaign, however, resulted in the loss of much of this equipment. Approximately one-third to one-half of the aircraft as well as one-half of the ground equipment was destroyed or captured.[32]

With few exceptions, direct arms aid since 1957 has followed approximately the same patterns. During 1958-1960 Egypt received further shipment of similar or more modern equipment, field weapons, tanks, including

some heavier T-54's, submarines, naval craft, and airplanes, a sizeable number being MIG 21 supersonic jets and TU-16 bombers. The most important equipment innovation has come in the last two years with the delivery of an unknown number of Soviet-made rockets and missiles, most recently, the SA-2 ground-to-air missile.[33]

Perhaps the most significant aspects of Soviet military aid, however, have been those programs designed to develop Egyptian production facilities, aid generally provided under the heading of economic and technical assistance. Since 1956 the Soviet Union has participated in the establishment of an experimental nuclear reactor and has provided training for Egyptian nuclear physicists in Moscow. Two years ago, Egypt's first munitions factory was completed and reportedly has been supplying arms to both Egyptian forces and to revolutionary groups in certain other Middle Eastern and African states.[34] Recently, too, Egyptian leaders have boasted that Egypt now has the capacity to produce limited quantities of jet aircraft, submarines and missiles.[35] While some Western doubts exist as to the validity of these claims, it is certain that such present or potential programs would have necessitated substantial amounts of Soviet equipment, technical services and financial support.

Past Soviet bloc assistance to Iraq and Syria has been somewhat similar in nature, although not in extent, to the direct equipment, thanks,

field arms and vehicles. Credits to Syria were extended for more similar purposes, although during its union with Egypt, Syria did receive some larger quantities of small weapons and transport vehicles. It is not yet clear, however, what aid policy the Soviet bloc will pursue in the future with respect to the new regimes established in both countries in early 1963.

Afghanistan since 1956 has been the recipient of increasing amounts of Soviet bloc military assistance. Arms have come from five bloc states; the USSR and Czechoslovakia have extended the largest credits, with supplementary amounts being supplied by East German, Poland and Hungary.

The primary focus of equipment aid has been the development of an Afghan air capability, to oppose that established in Pakistan through United States' assistance. Under the initial agreement, the Soviet Union provided 11 MIG-15's, 2 helicopters, and a "gift" transport plane and the Soviet personnel necessary to fly and maintain them. During the past eight years, the total number of delivered aircraft has risen to 100, of which approximately 70 MIG-15 and 17's are now in operation and being flown by Soviet-trained Afghan pilots.[37] Other equipment aid has been chiefly in the form of small arms and artillery pieces.

A portion of bloc economic and technical assistance credits has also been used for military support purposes. In 1956, the USSR undertook

reconstruction of Kabul airport and later began construction of a second airfield.[38] A continuing program has also been that focused on development and maintenance of roads linking Afghanistan's major cities with the Soviet border.[39]

The smallest amount of past Soviet military assistance has been that extended to Yemen under an agreement concluded with the royalist government in 1956. During the first two years, the USSR and Czechoslovakia provided at least seven shiploads of arms, primarily comprised of tanks, self-propelled guns and other small field equipment. Relations with the regime, however, became somewhat strained after 1960 and no further arms deliveries were reported.

The Soviet position vis-a-vis the new Yemeni regime is reported to be considerably more favorable. Since the September 1962 revolution, there have been repeated reports of new arms shipments provided both directly by the Soviet Union and indirectly through Egypt. The USSR also has concluded a major agreement with the new government concerning the construction of a large jet airport near Sana. Long sought by the Soviets, this field reportedly will be designed to allow Soviet aircraft easier access to African and Latin American air routes.[40]

D. British military assistance

1. General considerations

The third major source of postwar military assistance to the Middle East has been the United Kingdom. Although considerably smaller in size and narrower in scope, British programs have most resembled those of the United States, in the extension of both equipment/training aid and

military-economic supporting assistance. Too, particularly since Suez the two states have pursued similar assistance goals, the strengthening of friendly governments against both external and internal threat and the preservation of at least some state of regional stability and balance.

Britain's present role in Middle Eastern military affairs is vastly different from that which it has played in the past. During the 19th century, British aid and forces were used to support and protect the Ottoman Empire against both Russian expansionism and French imperialism. After the Turkish Armistice in 1918, the United Kingdom emerged as the paramount power in the Middle East, the acknowledged protector of the region as well as the holder of three major mandates. British forces based at Suez and British military commands in most of the states dealt with all problems of external defense and any serious internal disorders. Even when progressive degrees of independence were granted its mandates, indigeneous armies generally were still equipped and trained by Britain and functioned often under direct British command, only as police or auxiliary forces.[41]

Significantly restricted by postwar economic conditions, and the rise of Arab nationalism, Britain at present provides exclusive assistance only to its traditional protectorates, the small states and sheikdoms on the Persian Gulf litoral. Moreover, since 1956, all other assistance efforts - in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey - have been carried out in coordination with the United States. In the latter three countries, British aid has assumed an explicitly complementary or supplementary function.

2. Country programs

The precise details of British military assistance programs are particularly difficult to ascertain, their nature and scope being rarely discussed as openly as similar American efforts. Consequently, the attempt here will be only to describe general aspects with particular emphasis on the more publicly-reported post-Suez programs.[42]

By far the principal recipient of military aid, both pre-and post-Suez has been Jordan, long a major concern of British Middle Eastern policy. British assistance has been extended in two distinct phases. From 1946-1956, the United Kingdom was almost the exclusive source of all aid to Jordan, beset by economic and military problems resulting from the creation of Israel. Direct equipment and training aid was provided for the strengthened Arab Legion, as well as increasing amounts of budgetary support for the financing of imports and the stabilization of currency.[43] All aid ceased, however, in 1956 when King Hussein severed these aid ties, and expelled the remaining British officers from the country.

No further assistance was provided until the crisis of 1958 when Anglo-Jordanian relations were resumed, and special emergency aid in the form of troops, equipment and grants was extended. Although the size of British grant aid is substantially larger than before, Britain now shares almost equally with the United States in assuming responsibility for the further strengthening of Jordanian forces and the provision of annual budgetary subsidies.

Similar crisis assistance was provided to Lebanon from 1958-1960.

Table VI: British Military and Supporting Assistance to the Middle East.

(in thousands of pounds)

Country		FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963	FY 1964	Totals FY 1959-1964
Jordan	milit	50.	34.5	576.4	646.	636.5	43.	1,986.4
	supp	2,200.	510.	2,500.	2,360.	1,500.	1,500.	10,570.
Lebanon	milit	15.	20.	33.				68.
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman	milit	300.	20.	5.3	477.	290.	290.	1,382.3
	supp	400.	693.	947.	1,058.	1,270.	1,335.	5,703.
Persian Gulf Security Force	milit	393.5	451.	578.	648.7	795.	1,092.	3,958.2
Turkey	milit	2,170.	439.5				1,170.	3,779.5
CENTO	milit						363.	363.
	supp	330.	710.	717.9	90.7	115.9	85.	2,049.5
SEATO	supp	300.	413.	485.	40.	40.	50.	1,328.
All military assistance - worldwide				70.	95.	98.5	118.0	381.5

milit = military

supp = support

Sources: (1) and (2), II, for FY 1959-1964.

British aid in this respect was explicitly supplementary to that extended by the United States and largely took the form of training and maintenance aid to the Lebanese air force.[44]

Britain also has extended a significant amount of military assistance to her allies under the CENTO and SEATO pacts. In recent years, Turkey has been the recipient of several British warships. Some have been provided on loan, others, directly transferred with major refitting costs borne by Britain. Aid to the CENTO nations in aggregate now takes two forms: supporting aid, principally technical assistance provided since 1958; and direct military aid, begun only this year. British support for SEATO member states has only been in the form of technical project aid.

Little data is available about British military aid to a former Baghdad pact member, Iraq. Under a treaty concluded in 1956, on the same day as the Pact itself, Britain agreed to furnish Iraq with equipment and training for its airforce in return for continued use of certain Iraqui bases.[45] Shortly after the 1958 revolution and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqui arms agreement, Britain announced that she would continue to provide Iraq with some direct military assistance.[46] The precise nature of this aid or the amount given, however, has not been reported. A similar announcement was made after the revolution of this year.

Some British grant aid has also been provided to the oil-rich Persian gulf sheikdoms, long under the direct protection of British troops. Principal semi-dependent recipient has been the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, which has been supplied both equipment aid for its British-trained

forces and what might be called "supporting assistance" toward the "capital and recurrent costs of the Sultan's armed forces."[47] Substantial aid has also been directed toward the strengthening and improvement of the Persian Gulf Security Forces, and of Kuwait's small forces.

Although principally relevant to an earlier era, the role of British assistance in the Arab-Israeli conflict also deserves some mention. During the first phase of the period from 1947-1955, British arms assistance in the form both of grants and sales went primarily to Egypt and the Arab states: some British arms, newly supplied were used by Arab League forces in 1948.[48]

From the time of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 until 1955, Britain with the United States attempted at least in part to play a balancing, restraining role in the context of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Similar or identical end-items were sold to the two major disputants, Egypt and Israel, as, for example, the sale to both countries of two World War II vintage destroyers in 1955.[49]

Since the time of Suez, Britain's role in supplying arms to either Egypt or Israel has been relatively minimal. Israel has purchased some further equipment, including two S-class submarines delivered in 1960.[50] There have been no reports of further aid or sales to Egypt.

E. Other Military Assistance - French and West German

Information with respect to the nature and the extent of French and Western German military assistance programs is extremely limited and in the later case, only recently made public. All that is known is that both nations are providing some amount of military assistance to Israel.

French military aid to the Israelis began in the early 1950's, although it did not assume significant proportions until September 1955.[51] There is considerable evidence to demonstrate extensive French assistance at the time of Suez and the close coordination of Israeli and French forces, particularly during the Sinai campaign.[52] Since 1956, however, available data suggests only that France is the main supplier of Israeli defense equipment, including a number of jet Super Mysteres which have been so successful against Egyptian aircraft.[53] France is also reported to be aiding Israel in nuclear research and in the development of the thermal reactor at Dimona.

West Germany is reported to be providing only training to Israeli soldiers in Bundesrepublik camps and special centers. A recent statement by a Bundestag member denied that any armaments had been sent to Israel itself and asserted that West German efforts were being carried on with the knowledge and at least qualified approval of the United States and the other NATO allies.[54]

IV. The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Latin America

A. Introduction

Military aid to Latin America constitutes the second largest component of postwar aid to the three developing regions under study; in quantity far less than that to the Middle East, but far surpassing that to Africa. Until recently, however, due to a number of significant, situational differences, the precise role which military aid played in Latin American military affairs was a unique one and almost beyond

comparison.

During the postwar period, Latin America was largely a backwater of international military relations, long under the exclusive protection, if not the domination of the United States. Unlike the Middle East, the threat of direct attack from without the region was generally considered a highly improbable event: few of the nineteen republics made any substantial contingency plans or preparations. In comparision to both the Middle East and Africa, the degree of direct intra-regional conflict was also quite limited. Although there were numerous border disturbances, inter-nation disputes, and quasi-arms races, no state prepared on any large scale for local wars.[55] The major military threats in Latin America were those of internal revolt and insurrection. These frequent insurgencies, however, were generally the result of exclusively internal political disputes in which the armed forces themselves often took a leading, partisan part.

Events of the past three years have added new, more comparable dimensions to the role of military assistance in Latin America. The emergence of Cuba first as a nation substantially aided by the Soviet Union, and then as the locale for Soviet bases has forcefully injected the problems of Big-Power military confrontation and competition into the area. Too, a new aspect of intra-regional tension and conflict is evidenced by Cuba's relations with its neighbors, both directly and by virtue of its position as an exporter of revolution.

Examination here will focus mainly on the long-standing American programs and the changes in scope and extent that these have undergone.

The discussion of Soviet efforts in Cuba and through Cuba in the rest of the hemisphere will of necessity be general due to the lack of definite public information available. Limited attention also will be given to the role of other aid donors in armament sales to Latin American states.

B. American Military Assistance

1. General Considerations

By all standards, the most extensive military assistance to Latin America has been that extended by the United States, for most of the post-war period the exclusive source of all grant aid to this area. Annual programs have been small, generally averaging less than five per cent of all American military aid efforts and have been diffused widely among the Latin American Republics. Their significance for postwar "arms and politics" in Latin America, however, has been far disproportionate to their absolute size.

American military assistance programs actually date from World War II and before. During the 1920's and 1930's, the United States extended arms purchase privileges and military missions to a number of Latin American states in an effort to offset European, particularly Axis military and political influence. World War II occasioned further American assistance: approximately $500 millions were provided to eighteen states in the form of Lend-Lease grants, direct equipment aid and economic support.[56] A special Inter-American Defense Board was established in 1942 to deal with broad organizational questions of hemispheric defense, the problems of equipment standardization, and the channelling of American monies.

Despite Truman Administration efforts, however, the first major

postwar programs of aid were not begun until after the start of the Korean hostilities. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, aid was to be granted to Latin America "in accordance with defense plans which require the recipient nations to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."[57] Subject to the general coordination of the revived IADB, these plans were to provide for the development of collective strength against external attack and internal aggression, for the protection of vital sea lanes and communication lines, and for the availability of strategic bases and access to essential materials. Nations specifically allied with the United States for these purposes were to receive direct equipment and training assistance: all Rio Treaty signatories were to be permitted to purchase American equipment on a reimbursable basis.

From 1952-1958, American assistance to Latin America was carried on with little or no change in this general framework. Twelve Latin American nations became eligible for direct equipment aid under bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreements; Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in 1952, Brazil, the Cominican Republic, and Uruguay in 1953, and Nicaragua, Guatamala, Haiti. amd Honduras in 1954 and 1955. During the period, the United States provided approximately $195 millions in diversified equipment and training assistance and transferred some 81 ships to Latin American countries under grants or low-cost reimbursable sales.[58] The principal focus of this assistance was to strengthen and modernize the twenty army batallions, the twenty-one air squadrons and the assorted

naval units which the twelve states had committed for potential hemispheric defense functions.

In the late 1950's and particularly from 1959 on, the scope and nature of American military assistance to Latin America underwent substantial change and redefinition. Some revisions were the result of Congressional action. In 1958, the Moore Amendment was passed, placing renewed emphasis on the "hemispheric defense" function of grant arms and equipment and seeking to prevent their use in civil strife or in regional conflicts.[59] More far-reaching was the decision of Congress in 1959 to place a ceiling on military aid funds for Latin America.[60] For FY 1960, appropriations for equipment aid were not to exceed $67 millions, the amount allocated in FY 1959 and beginning in FY 1961, the maximum amount was not to exceed $57.5 millions annually.

Other changes reflected United States efforts to secure and demonstrate hemispheric solidarity and strength in the face of the Cuban threat. The scope of the military aid program was extended by special training aid agreements to include the remaining eight Latin American states - Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

The most significant changes, however, were those made in the general objectives of military assistance programs in this area. The underlying reasons for these changes, as well as their general dimensions are perhaps most forcefully set forth in this year's Summary Presentation:

> Military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented to hemispheric defense prior to 1960. As

> it became clear that there was no threat of significant external aggression, emphasis shifted to strengthening internal security capabilities for use against Castro-Communist activities or other internal disruptions or banditry, and to civic action projects designed to further economic and social development. Limited assistance is also given for such activities as harbor defense, coastal patrol, and surveillance.[60]

Secretary of State Rusk, speaking recently in more qualified tones, also mentioned the effects of "the rapid development of sophisticated weapons systems" and "the change in the world system" on previously-held concepts of hemispheric security.[61]

Consequent to these goal changes, the specific nature of aid programs has changed radically. Concern for internal stability has dictated greater emphasis on developing and equipping small mobile forces, trained in counter-insurgency techniques. Equipment provided is now substantially more in the form of small ground weapons, communications equipment, transport vehicles, and small naval craft. Civic action programs are supported by the provision of men, equipment, and training. Since FY 1961, eight new engineering battalions and seventeen new medical units have been established and equipped and have been employed as much as 80 per cent of time-in-service for community betterment projects.[62] In total, internal security assistance and civic action support are said to account for 90-95 per cent of all military aid allocations in Latin America.[63]

2. Country Programs

As has been suggested above, American military assistance programs for individual Latin American countries bear a far greater

resemblance to one another than is the case with respect to the Middle Eastern and African programs. Some distinctions, of course, do exist: aid is greater to countries directly allied than those receiving only training assistance, to countries with large diversified forces than to those with relatively small single arm military establishments. On the whole, however, the degree of similarity is strong and permits of further general comment.[64]

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of military aid to Latin America has been its relatively limited scale particularly in contrast to that of the Middle Eastern program. Of the nineteen past or present recipients of American military assistance, only one, Brazil has received over $70 millions in aid, and this as a result of a base rights agreement. Too, five of the twelve MDA allies as well as all of the eight training agreement states have received less than $10 millions in aid. On the whole, over the thirteen year period, American assistance appropriations have averaged five per cent or less of total Latin American military budgets: in no country have "local military units receiving U.S. military aid constituted more than 1/6th of total personnel strength."[65]

Moreover, there seems also to have been some effort to maintain a general regional balance in aid grants. States traditionally concerned with each other's military power have not received widely differing amounts of assistance. In the case of Chile and Peru, the difference has been only $13 millions over the period, although economic factors have resulted in a somewhat greater discrepancy - $25 millions - between aid to

two present border disputants, Peru and Ecuador.

Further differences between Latin American programs and those in other regions lie in the specific type of aid extended. Supporting assistance has been of minimal military importance in Latin America. No Republic has received defense support: under bilateral assistance agreements, each country has been responsible for organization and operational support of those of its forces receiving equipment or training aid. Special assistance has usually assumed the form of emergency non-military aid, as, for example, relief for flood or earthquake damage or temporary budgetary difficulties.

Training assistance, particularly since 1959 has received special emphasis in Latin American programs. The presence of both military training missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in a number of countries has been for the purpose of increased local training and supervision. Too, the percentage of Latin American officers and enlisted men participating in special training programs outside of their own countries is far greater than Latin America's proportionate share of the military assistance budget. In the early 1960's this disproportion reached a new high, due particularly to the increased programs for counter-insurgency training at Canal Zone bases.

Table VI: Regional Distribution of Programmed American Training Projects for Fiscal Year 1963

(in number of trainees)

Region	Training in the U.S.	Overseas Schools	Total
Europe	2,518	535	3,053
Near East and South Asia	4,686	428	5,114
Latin America	3,044	2,642	5,506
Africa	485	77	562

Source: (4) for FY 1963, pp. 414-415.

A third unique feature of American military aid policy towards Latin America has been the relative importance of direct reimbursable equipment sales. By the end of FY 1959, Latin American countries had been allowed to purchase approximately $140 millions of excess military equipment, a quite substantial figure when compared with that for other regions.

Table VII:

Annual Military Sales by Classification

(in millions)

Class	FY53	FY54	FY55	FY56	FY57	FY58
NATO	2.6	6.5	4.1	7.9	18.7	24.1
Defense Support Nations	8.9	3.4	1.0	2.4	.8	.8
Latin America	9.7	8.7	12.3	8.4	13.2	18.1
Others	19.7	51.8	231.8	102.1	100.5	34.6

Source: (19) I, p. 142.

With respect to direct sales, too, some efforts have been made to preserve inter-nation balance. Perhaps the first example of this was the sale in 1951 of two destroyers to each of the ABC nations, long concerned with the level of one another's naval armament.[66] Similar balanced sales to these three countries were made in 1959.

Turning to the specific programs for the twelve MDA allied states, by far the largest recipient has been Brazil, one of the few Latin American countries with the beginnings of naval and air forces as well as a relatively large army. Assistance to Brazil has been characterized by two distinct phases. From 1952-1957, Brazil received relatively small amounts of equipment and training aid, directed principally towards strengthening its naval and air position vis-a-vis Argentina as well as toward improving its coastal defense capability.[67] Several World War II

vintage naval vessels were transferred or sold at low prices: a quantity of aircraft and air training equipment was provided to supplement goods produced locally.

A significant change in the scope and nature of aid to Brazil took place in 1957, after the conclusion of the Fernando de Noronha agreement. In return for providing the missile tracking site, Brazil demanded and received substantial aid increases, both in the form of enlarged grants and expanded purchase credits.[68] Primary emphasis has again been placed on naval and air equipment. Four destroyers, four submarines, and a number of jet fighters have been directly supplied while other naval craft and planes have been loaned or sold.[69]

Armament status vis-a-vis other Latin American states has also been a major factor in the provision of military aid to two other coastal defense states, Chile and Uruguay. One of Chile's main concerns has been its relative naval strength with respect to that of Argentina and Peru. In 1951, she purchased two destroyers for this purpose and in 1959 received two additional destroyers and two submarines under MDA grants. Recent programs, however, have been directed more toward the provision of aircraft and transport vehicles and the construction of roads and other social capital projects.[70] Assistance to Uruguay has been somewhat similar in nature but considerably smaller in scale.

Peru and Ecuador have also been the recipients of substantial proportions of all military aid to Latin America. The Peruvian program in fact has been the third largest in size, again with considerable amounts allocated for the strengthening and modernization of naval and

Table VIII: American Military Equipment/Training Assistance to Latin American States FY 1950 - FY 1963

(in millions of dollars of appropriation)

Country	Total FY 1950-1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963
Argentina		1.4	2.2	1.8
Bolivia	.9	1.7	1.4	4.1
Brazil	121.6	24.2	22.8	13.0
Chile	40.8	7.6	8.3	8.9
Colombia	26.0	3.8	9.8	10.0
Costa Rica		.1	.5	.5
Cuba	10.6			
Dominican Rep.	6.2		.9	4.0
Ecuador	17.0	2.3	2.3	4.4
El Salvador	.2	.2	.8	1.6
Guatemala	1.5	.3	2.9	2.5
Haiti	2.2	.5	1.2	.5
Honduras	2.1	.1	1.0	1.5
Mexico		.3	.3	.5
Nicaragua	1.6	.6	1.8	1.3
Panama		.1	.8	.5
Paraguay		.1	.5	1.4
Peru	30.8	3.9	10.0	8.5
Uruguay	21.8	4.5	1.8	2.2
Venezuela		.050	.9	1.3
Undistributed	2.4	2.1	1.7	2.2

Source: (21) for FY 1961, p. 18.

(18) p. 178.

air forces. Since 1952, Peru has been given a number of naval vessels including three destroyer escorts, four submarines and smaller coastal craft, and has received an unreported quantity of aircraft and air training equipment beyond the twelve well-publicized F-86's.[71] Aid to Ecuador has been considerably less diversified and smaller in scale due, at least according to official explanations, to American concerns about the inability of its economy to absorb equipment.

The course of military assistance programs in Colombia has been markedly uneven. Relatively large amounts of aid were granted from 1951-1953 when a Colombian unit was sent to fight with United Nations' forces in Korea. When it became apparent that U.S. equipment was being used to solidify the rule of strong man Pinilla, however, arms shipments were severely limited in nature.[72] With the restoration of civilian government and especially since the start of the Alliance of Progress, assistance programs were once again resumed and substantially increased in size. In the last two years large sums have been allocated for road construction and other civic action projects.

Similar changes have characterized the aid program for the Dominican Republic. Aid efforts began in 1952 and were greatly expanded after the conclusion of a missile tracking station agreement with Trujillo. When the use of granted equipment for repressive action against the civilian population became dramatically evident, assistance was first suspended in 1958 and finally terminated in 1960. The overthrow of the Trujillo regime and the establishment of a more democratically-oriented junta brought resumption of aid grants, first on a small scale in FY 1962 and

in considerably larger amounts in FY 1963.

Full assistance termination is presently in force with respect to two of the original twelve MDA allies. The case of Cuba is so well known as to necessitate little comment. All shipments of military equipment to the Batista government were halted in March, 1958 and an embargo on all private American shipments. Assistance to the Duvalier regime was at first restricted, then suspended, and finally terminated in late July of this year. Programmed allocations for Haiti have been redistributed among several other Latin American states for civic action programs.[73]

Small and quite diversified aid has been extended to the remaining two MDA allies, Nicaragua and Guatamala. Perhaps the only aspects of note were the efforts at the time of the Guatamalan crisis in 1954. Nicaragua, under Anastasio Somoza, received increased deliveries of ground equipment, including some tanks and armored vehicles which were deployed along the Guatamalan border. After the overthrow of the Arbenz regime, Guatamala's new government received some quantities of arms for stabilization functions.

Assistance to the remaining eight Latin American Republics largely has assumed the form of shipments of training equipment and the assignment of training personnel. The largest recipient to date has been Bolivia, where some of the funds have also been used for road construction and maintenance.[74] Argentina has also received a larger proportion of this aid, as well as having recently purchased several submarines and a number of jet fighters.

C. Soviet Military Assistance

Soviet military assistance has played a major role in the Latin American military situation only since 1960 when large scale aid was first extended to Cuba. Little public information is available concerning the precise nature and scope of Soviet aid and the arrangements under which it has been granted, allowing only for general comment here.

Prior to the initiation of aid to Cuba, Soviet military assistance efforts in the Western Hemisphere were extremely limited in scope and number. In 1954, after repeated attempts to gain assistance from the United States, Guatamala under the leadership of Jacobo Arbenz concluded agreements to purchase an unreported quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia. Approximately 1900 tons of weapons, reportedly mainly field and small arms equipment, were delivered to Guatamalan ports before the Arbenz regime was forcibly overthrown.[75] A second Soviet effort came in 1956 when an offer of military purchase credits was extended to Argentina, purportedly in an attempt to divert Argentina from further purchases of British equipment.[76] Although the offer was rejected, the nature of the proposed Soviet program was significant. Credits were to be extended for the purchase - at lower-than-production costs - of a TU-104 jet transport, and an undisclosed number of MIG-15 jet fighters and LL-28 turbojet bombers.

Soviet military assistance was first extended to Cuba during 1960. The Castro government at this time was sorely pressed for the armaments necessary to equip its re-mobilized army and militia groups. Stocks of

American equipment, stored by the Batista regime had been exhausted: the steadily deteriorating state of Cuban-American relations as well as Cuba's growing dependence on Soviet economic assistance gave little promise of immediate or future American military assistance or of the lifting of the American embargo on private shipments. Too, arms purchases from various European nations were no longer possible since Cuba had been unable to pay for earlier purchases.

Substantive offers of military assistance were made first to Raoul Castro during his visits to bloc countries in July of 1960. According to best reports, at this time, the USSR and Czechoslovakia offered to provide Cuba with unspecified but "substantial" quantities of MIG fighters, heavy Stalin tanks, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, artillery pieces and light field weapons in addition to the standard program for training equipment and military technicians.[77] After the rapid acceptance of these offers, shipments began in the late summer of 1960 and increased in frequency after new pledges of Soviet military support for Cuba. By December of 1960, bloc countries had shipped approximately 28,000 tons of military equipment, valued at 50 millions or more, including "sufficient" equipment to outfit and support the newly-increased 45,000 man armed forces and 200,000 man militia.[78]

Equipment shipments to Cuba continued in the same pattern throughout 1961 and the first months of 1962, with only some fluctuations in frequency. Major changes, however, occurred in the spring of 1962 when the first Soviet missiles arrived in Cuba, followed by substantial numbers of MRBM's and smaller surface-to-air missiles.[79] The supply of

more conventional weapons was also increased, largely in the form of more anti-aircraft guns, medium and heavy tanks, and field artillery. The ranks of Soviet "advisors" and "technicians" was also expanded to approximately 17,000 men.

The events following this buildup need little comment here. What was clear from the events of the fall of 1962, however, was that little or none of these more sophisticated weapons constituted direct military equipment aid to Cuba itself. Soviet technicians/troops seem to have been (and still to be) in exclusive control of all 500 or more Nike-type missiles still remaining and of the major portion of the 3,000 anti-aircraft shore installations, and of the 100 or more MIG fighters.[80] Throughout the crisis and its aftermath, the involvement of Cuban forces, save on the highest levels, seems to have been minimal.

The precise nature and direction of future Soviet military assistance to Cuba seem at present unclear. No further substantial arms shipments have been reported since January, 1963. The level of Cuban armament seems to have remained at the same level, although there have been reports of increased amounts of training activity.

Even less information is available about the supply of military equipment and support from Cuba or through Cuba to other revolutionary groups in Latin America. Such Soviet-sponsored aid has been reported to take two forms: covert material support, largely financial in nature, and special training in guerilla warfare and subversion techniques.[81] Little or no direct arms aid is said to be extended since most armament

needs for revolutionary activity can be readily filled on the open market in most Latin American countries.

The actual recipients of this covert assistance and training have not been definitively reported in the public media. Some accounts indicated that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons from all over Latin American received special training in Cuba in 1962, 200 of these being from Venezuela. There have also been some indications of Cuban involvement in the recent disturbances in Peru - reports of some Czech-made weapons and of the delivery of Cuban monies to the insurgent by courier. Although much is suspected, however, on the whole there is little detailed evidence with respect to the extent and organization of this "export of revolution."

D. Other Military Assistance

A third major element in the level of Latin American armament is the substantial quantity of equipment sold to the Republics by the European states. Although not strictly considered under the heading of military assistance, these sales have often been made at reduced costs and have been concerned with modern equipment not available from the United States.

The largest source of military sales to Latin America has been the United Kingdom. British sales agreements have been concluded at various times with most of the Republics but have been most frequent with respect to Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. All totalled, between 1950-1959 these countries purchased 114 Meteor jet fighters and Camberra jet bombers, and some 25 odd naval vessels, including two aircraft

carriers.[82]

Coordination of British sales policy with American assistance policies has been slight and at times, non-existent. In 1954, at the height of the Guatamalan crisis, British arms were sold and delivered to the Arbenz regime. A similar situation prevailed with respect to sales to Batista during the summer and fall of 1958. Sales to Cuba continued until early 1960 when the United States brought substantial pressure to bear on the United Kingdom and effected the halt on the delivery of fifteen jet fighters promised to the Castro government.[83]

Other major arms-selling nations have been Italy, France, Sweden and Belgium. On the whole, however, these countries have made only commercial agreements and have not offered significant price reductions.

V. The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Africa

A. Introduction

Military assistance to Africa constitutes the most recent and in some ways the least significant component of all military aid to the developing areas. Parallelling the pattern of African political development, extensive assistance efforts did not begin until the late 1950's and have attained substantial scope only during the last three years. Too, in contrast to programs in the Middle East and Latin America, the quantity of aid has been quite limited in terms both of the amounts extended to the region as a whole and of the sums received by the various African states. Further, the end-items and training service furnished largely have not been of a large-scale or highly sophisticated nature: smaller, conventional ground and support equipment have been the major elements in all assistance allocations.

In many respects, however, military assistance to the African states has had consequences far more important and far-reaching than considerations of scale and duration would suggest. The African forces, equipped and trained through foreign military assistance, are new capabilities, the first national and, in the case of some new states, the only indigenous military bodies ever established. The eagerness of these states to acquire arms as a mark of their nationhood and an aid for regional prominence (as well as their general international position) has led to increasing foreign involvement in African military affairs, with at least eight nations providing equipment or training assistance. Although relatively low in comparison to other regions, the resulting

level of armament has had a profound impact on the African political balance, effecting not only the course of various inter-nation disputes and conflicts but also the outcome of internal political battles and the revolutionary campaigns in the remaining colonial territories.

Within the limits of extremely restricted data, this discussion of military assistance to Africa will focus on the aid provided by four major "types" of donor nations. Most attention of necessity will be given to the aid extended by the United States, the Sino-Soviet bloc and the principal former metropolis, the United Kingdom and France. Some note, however, will also be taken of the activities of certain other nations, principally Belgium, West Germany, Israel and the United Arab Republic.

B. American Military Assistance

Once again, by far the largest and most significant amounts of military assistance tendered by a single nation has been those provided by the United States. Begun in 1953 with the extension of military aid to Ethiopia, the American program has steadily increased in scope and magnitude so that by FY 1963, approximately $138 millions had been appropriated for 15 African nations. (See earlier charts.) American efforts in Africa, however, have differed from those in other areas in two respects. From the very first, the military aid program has been officially designated as only for purposes of internal security and stability. Accordingly, the type of assistance extended has been generally in the form of small-scale conventional equipment for ground and support forces. A typical fiscal year breakdown was this for FY 1962:

Table IX:

Functional Breakdown of American Military Assistance to Africa, FY 1962

(in millions of dollars)

Fixed charges		5.1
Supply operations and nutritional surveys	2.3	
Training	2.8	
Force maintenance		3.8
Spare parts	2.4	
Attrition	1.0	
Other consumables	.4	
Force improvement		21.5
Aircraft	.9	
Ships	.6	
Tanks, vehicles and weapons	5.4	
Missiles		
Electronic and communications equipment	1.3	
Special programs	11.2	
Other	2.0	
Total		30.4

Source: (4) for FY 1963, p. 543.

Table X: American Military Equipment/Training Assistance to African States, FY 1950-1963

(in millions of dollars of appropriations)

Country	Totals FY 1950-1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963
Cameroon			.284	.037
Congo (Lpville)				3.378
Dahomey			.104	.054
Ethiopia	37.116	13.6	11.734	11.349
Ghana			.005	.207
Ivory Coast			.120	.152
Liberia		.8	1.803	2.027
Libya	3.645	.7	.721	2.102
Mali		.6	.243	1.258
Morocco	classified			
Niger			.104	.049
Nigeria			.004	.325
Senegal			2.476	.515
Tunisia	classified			
Upper Volta			.108	.046
Area Undistributed	4.931	9.6	16.759	11.670

Sources: (21) for FY 1961, p. 22.

(18) p. 177.

Table XI: American Supporting Assistance to Africa States

(in millions of dollars of expenditures)

Country	FY 1958	FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962
Algeria					.334
Cameroon				1.919	2.997
Congo (Lpville)				2.369	.177
Ethiopia	1.301	1.912	.100	4.765	
Guinea			2.100		3.800
Liberia		.635	2.375	3.200	
Libya	15.000	15.000	15.000	14.021	9.000
Mali				2.903	.399
Morocco	30.000	44.847	50.840	40.000	30.000
Samalia		.650	1.680	2.903	.399
Sudan	.422	19.499	10.000	7.301	
Tanganyika				.341	.205
Togo				.988	.300
Tunisia	15.000	20.085	20.000	25.000	10.000

Sources: (16) FY 1959-1961.

(17) FY 1963.

Within this general framework, however, there have been wide variances in the nature and scope of the aid programs for particular countries. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the substantially larger proportion of total aid grants received by the North African states and Ethiopia. Although a partial explanation lies in the fact that these nations have been independent for a longer period, a far more crucial factor has been the fact that each is the site of a major American military installation. The desire of the United States to secure continued access to these bases has led to the provision not only of larger quantities of assistance, but also of more sophisticated military equipment and of more extensive training and supervisory services.

Although all relevant data is classified, reports suggest that the largest country programs have been those extended to Morocco and Tunisia, from the time of independence in 1956. Assistance to Morocco, the site until recently of four airbases and a naval communications center, has constituted the greater proportion and has been characterized by two distinct phases.[85] From 1956 - FY 1959, only special supporting assistance was tendered: under the terms of the renegotiated base agreements, Morocco received more than $90 millions in aid.[86]

In 1959-1960 an additional program of direct military aid was initiated, focused mainly on the provision of small arms and motor vehicles for ground force use. Under the impact of changing Moroccan-American relations and the extension of Soviet military assistance, however, the nature of American efforts underwent significant revision.

The direct aid appropriation for FY 1963 was greater than the total of all previous end-item and training allocations and provided for the granting of a number of jet aircraft and increased pilot training services.[87]

The nature of the American military aid to be extended in the future - that is, after the final termination of the base agreements - is as yet unclear. Recent remarks, however, suggest that under expected conditions, the total program of equipment and supporting assistance will be subject to considerable phasing down.[88]

American military assistance to Tunisia has been far more limited in scope and has been chiefly in the form of ground equipment. Although both programs were begun at the same time, the nature of the American commitment in Tunisia was and in many respects still is significantly different. According to reports, assistance initially was granted with considerable reluctance and under threats by President Bourguiba to turn to "other" sources for desired arms.[89] Despite certain difficulties, with respect to Algeria and the Bizerte incident, arms assistance has continued and increased, and an American training mission has remained in residence. Significant quantities of supporting assistance also were provided from 1956-FY 1961, but have been phased out gradually during the past three years.

The largest known beneficiary of American assistance has been Ethiopia, the locale of an important communications base. Since the signature of an MDA treaty in 1953, the government of Hailie Selassie has been extended a highly diversified program of equipment and training

aid, the most varied of all the African programs. During the first phases, assistance efforts focused primarily on the modernization and mobilization of the small Ethiopian Army. In later years, additional grants or no-cost loans have been provided for the acquisition of a number of small naval vessels and a few modern aircraft including some F-86 jet fighters.[90] Supporting assistance to Ethiopia also has been relatively extensive.

Libya has also been a major recipient of United States military assistance to Africa. American efforts have stemmed not only from the agreement concerning Wheelus Air Force Base concluded in 1954, but also from certain Anglo-American guarantees offered upon Libya's attainment of independence under U.N auspices in 1951. Both direct military aid primarily for ground forces and substantial quantities of supporting and budgetary assistance have been extended.

Assistance to two other states, Liberia and the Sudan, has been similar in purpose, though not in extent to that tendered these four states. In Liberia, the United States maintains Roberts Airbase and has a "strategic" interest in the port of Monrovia, improved and enlarged by American forces and funds. Direct military aid did not begin until after the conclusion of an MDA agreement in 1959, and has largely been in the form of ground equipment and some small naval craft. An American training mission is also in residence.

The Sudan has received relatively large amounts of special supporting assistance in return for the granting of over-fly rights and landing privileges at Kharatoum. Little direct military aid has been tendered due in large measure, to the activities of the

United Kingdom in this respect. Too, as in all of the "base support" states, the supporting program is being phased down and replaced with more direct development assistance.

Military assistance to the remaining African states, primarily those in sub-Saharan Africa, purposefully has been extremely limited in nature and scope. Official pronouncements have repeatedly emphasized that the primary needs of these states are economic not military and have stressed American opposition to increased armament levels and the development of intra-regional arms races. Too, despite repeated African requests, the United States has steadfastly maintained that the main responsibility for free world military assistance to Africa rests with the former metropole states, principally Britain and France. American programs are conceived of as being

> primarily designed to manifest U.S. interest in helping to maintain law and order in volatile situations which threaten the stability of the emerging nations.[91]

The specific states to which the United States extends assistance fall into three broad categories, the characteristics of each having obvious impact upon the extent of aid efforts. The first group are those nations still receiving substantial quantity of military training and equipment aid from their former metropoles, specifically certain of the newer Commonwealth states, many of the French Community members and associates, and the Congo Republic (Leopoldville). Equipment and supporting assistance to this class has been largely supplementary in nature and has been relatively closely coordinated with metropole programs. Ghana,

Nigeria and Somalia comprise the second category, states which have found metropole aid to be unwelcome or too limited in extent. With respect to the first two nations, the United States has provided small quantities of direct military aid while the program towards the last has been exclusively in the form of supporting assistance. American policy towards the third class of states, the major recipients of Soviet bloc arms credits, has varied. Guinea has been granted supporting assistance while refused direct military aid: Mali on the other hand has received relatively large quantities of equipment and training help as well as increasing support aid.

Almost without exception, however, the type of equipment and training assistance provided has been for the development of small ground forces to meet minimal defense requirements. End-items furnished have been reported to be principally light weapons, motor vehicles, electronic and communications equipment with small quantities of liaison helicopter and transport aircraft.[92] Requests for more sophisticated weapons have been repeatedly and often denied. To cite only one example, when Nigerian Prime Minister Bolewa in 1961 asked for the grant of a jet fighter squadron, Secretary of State Rusk stressed the unsuitability of such equipment for Nigerian defense needs and pointed out that the cost of such a squadron and its annual maintenance approached, if not equalled, the cost of education five million Nigerians.[93]

C. Sino-Soviet Military Assistance

In comparison with that extended by the other major donor nations, Sino-Soviet military assistance toward Africa has been relatively limited

in scope and in magnitude. Africa as a whole did not become an important focus of bloc aid activities until 1958; military assistance did not constitute a significant component of bloc programs until the early 1960's. Although direct equipment and training help has now been extended to at least 6 states and several revolutionary groups, current reports estimate that total bloc military assistance has not exceeded a level of $25 millions.[94]

Sino-Soviet efforts in Africa have been quite similar to those in the other two regions, with only slight differences in emphasis. Assistance has been tendered to those states which have been denied Western aid or have become dissatisfied with the amount received. Too, the largest proportion of assistance has been concentrated in several key states. Such saturation efforts have been designed not only (or principally) to develop client states but more importantly to provide dramatic examples of Soviet generosity and interest.

Further, the form of bloc aid has remained the same. Although relatively more "gifts" of arms have been provided, most assistance has been in the form of credits, repayable in raw materials or foodstuffs at a low rate of interest. Significant amounts of economic and technical assistance usually have accompanied or preceeded direct military help and have often been allocated for quasi-military or "supporting" projects. Since that time, however, there have been no further bloc arms shipments to independent Algeria.

Of the sub-Saharan countries, Guinea has been the focus of the greatest and most concerted bloc assistance efforts. Military credits, chiefly Czech and Soviet have been furnished under agreements concluded

in 1958 and 1960, following Guinea's refusal to join the French Community and its failure to secure arms from the United States. Assistance has taken several forms. Over $1 million in direct equipment supplies has been provided, comprised chiefly of ground weapons and vehicles for Guinea's 3,300 man armed forces but with a limited quantity of MIG 17 jet fighters and transports and other larger-scale equipment.[98] Substantial training and military-technical projects also have been carried on by the relatively large cadres of bloc technicians. Further aid with military implications has been for the construction of a civil airport and for the development of a national airline.

Moreover, in the past, Sino-Soviet aid has been channelled by and through Guinea to the rebellious forces in the Republic of Cameroon.[99] Although available data is limited, reports indicate that these forces received not only direct arms aid but special training in Guinea itself from both bloc and Guinean instructors. To cite but one example in 1962 the U.S. State Department alleged that at least one faction of the U.P.C. forces engaged in terrorist activity in Southwest Cameroon had received terrorist and guerilla training from Chinese Communist technicians based in Guinea.[100]

At present, future of Sino-Soviet aid to Guinea remains somewhat in doubt. The deterioration of Guinean-bloc relations has lead to a significant curtailment in all assistance efforts and the withdrawal of a number of technical advisors. No new arms shipments have been reported in a period of over a year and none now seem expected. The country's partial rapprochment with the West and the increasing amounts of Western

economic and supporting aid received would seem to indicate that Guinea now is seeking more diversified sources of assistance.

Quite similar to saturation efforts in Guinea was the brief program of bloc military assistance extended to the forces of Patrice Lumumba during the first stages of Congolese independence.[101] Direct aid particularly during the Kasai campaign, was provided in the form of ground and air transport services and equipment, some quantities of "small arms" and the "advisory" efforts of a number of bloc technicians. More indirect and limited assistance was reported to have been given by Czech officers and technicians serving with the Guinean component of the UNOC force.[102] All bloc efforts in the Congo, however, were terminated after Lumumba's capture and imprisonment, although there were numerous allegations of Sino-Soviet assistance (by way of the U.AR.) to the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville.

With respect to bloc programs in the four remaining states, the Sudan, Mali and Ghana, very little specific information has been publicly reported. After rejecting an offer of bloc assistance in 1956, the Sudan concluded an arms agreement in 1959 and by the end of FY 1961 had received somewhat less than $1 million in military aid.[103] Bloc military assistance to Mali reportedly has been on a considerably smaller scale and has been comprised mainly of small field equipment. Under the economic and technical aid program, however, Mali has received some relatively modern aircraft, twenty reportedly in all.

Of the four, Ghana has been tendered perhaps the largest total quantity of direct and indirect military aid. Equipment aid has been

relatively varied in nature and has included a number of newer Soviet-produced aircraft. Development funds have been committed to the construction of a major shipyard and to the development of the national airline, Ghana Airways Corporation.[104] Recently some dissatisfaction has been voiced with respect to the quality and operation of certain types of equipment acquired from the bloc. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this was the fact that in August of this year, the Soviet Union agreed to take back at no cost four of the eight Ilyushin-18 planes provided to the Ghanian Air Force in 1960.[105]

Perhaps of greatest current importance, however, is bloc assistance to Somalia, and the role it is playing in the Republic's recent dispute with Kenya and the United Kingdom over the fate of Kenya's Northern Frontier district.[106] Somalia's leaders have been in frequent consultation with the Chinese Communist military mission stationed in Mogadishu. Reports indicate the Government has requested and is being granted further assistance for the protection of the Somalis in the Frontier district.

D. Metropole Military Assistance

The second largest component of military assistance to Africa has been that provided by the three former colonial Powers, Britain, France and Belgium. Most of this aid has been concentrated in the sub-Saharan region, in states which although now independent, have retained military and police ties with their former metropole. As the United States, all three nations have extended both direct military, particularly training aid, and some military-tinged supporting assistance.

Of the three, British military assistance has been the most diversified and the best publicized. British aid in a sense predates the emergence of independent African states: to a greater degree than the other metropoles, the United Kingdom equipped and trained native forces in all of its dependencies, particularly those on the eve of statehood. At present, in addition to efforts in the semi-dependent countries and remaining colonial possessions, military assistance is accorded to two broad classes of states, African Commonwealth members and nations in which the United Kingdom has long standing strategic interests.

The largest proportion of British military assistance has been extended to the independent Commonwealth states, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and Uganda. Although there have been significant differences in nature and scope, the general pattern of assistance has remained the same. After the grant of independence each has received substantial quantities of initial equipment and training aid to strengthen new national forces. Barring political difficulties, assistance efforts on a somewhat reduced scale have been continued. Whatever the state of relations with Britain, however, each retains the Commonwealth privilege of sending officers to British military and staff training colleges.[107]

Ghana, the first state to attain independence received substantial assistance until 1961. Together with Canada, the United Kingdom equipped, trained and provided operating cadres for Ghana's reorganized ground forces and new jet air force.[108] In 1959 some small naval craft were transferred by Britain: several minesweepers, seaward defense boats and

Table XII: British Military Aid to African States, FY 1959-1964

(in thousands of pounds)

	FY 1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Ghana	not reported					
Nigeria	500	500	not reported			
Sierra Leone		not reported				
Tanganyika				200.		
Uganda					220.	30
Comm. Milit Aid			168.5	332.5	681.5	1,682
Libya	23	177	41.8	94.5	107.	79
Sudan	402	135	50.8	600.	60.	13
Somalia				60.	250.	100
Mali				80.		
Milit Assistance (general)			70.	95.	98.5	118.0

Sources: (1) and (2) II. Fiscal Year 1959-1964.

Table XIII: British Grants in Aid to African States

(in thousands of pounds)

	FY 1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Ghana	not reported					
Nigeria			867	900	1,013.7	103.0
Sierra Leone				1,500	1,000.	500.
Tanganyika				1,733	4,567.	1,900.
Uganda					874.	895.
Libya	3,250	3,250	3,250	3,250	3,250.	3,250.
Somalia	700	684	1,200	1,450	1,100.	1,225.

Sources: (1) and (2) II. Fiscal Year 1959-1964.

corvettes. British and Canadian officers also held key positions in the Ghanian armed forces during this period.

The deterioration of British-Ghanian relations and Ghania's decision to seek other sources of arms aid has had a significant effect upon British aid efforts. Although detailed public information is minimal, reports indicate that direct British and Canadian aid is considerably more limited in extent and nature. Some training activity is still carried on by Canada, but all foreign officers were replaced by Ghanian nationals in 1961.[109] Supporting assistance for military purposes is also said to have been reduced.

Somewhat similar difficulties have marked recent military aid to Nigeria. During its final steps toward independence, Nigeria received relatively substantial amounts of equipment, training and force support grants. In 1960, a mutual defense agreement was signed, providing inter alia for an enlarged direct assistance program, particularly with respect to the new Nigerian air force. Popular opposition and political pressures, however, led finally to the termination of the agreement in January of 1962.[110] Some limited British assistance has continued, premarily in the form of specialized training and some sales arrangements.

British assistance continues to the newer Commonwealth states, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and Uganda. Little has been reported concerning the exact nature and extent of this aid; presumably it has been subsumed under the heading of Commonwealth military assistance and has been less extensive than that first tendered Ghana and Nigeria. Speculation may

also be ventured that at least some British aid for Tanganyika and Uganda has been channelled through the consultative East Africa Defense Committee formed in 1961 and presently including representatives of these two states, Kenya, and Zanzibar.[111]

Note also should be made of British aid policy toward a former Commonwealth member, the Union of South Africa. Although almost no direct aid has been extended, British sales to South Africa have been relatively large and have been the source of most of South Africa's equipment, particularly its naval vessels. Despite protests from the other African Commonwealth states and a recent change in American sales policy, the United Kingdom has reaffirmed its decision to continue such sales.[112]

Extensive military assistance has been provided to three non-Commonwealth states, Libya, the Sudan and Somalia, all nations with longstanding British military ties. Of the three, the Sudan, formerly a British "protectorate" and still a member of the sterling area has received the largest quantities of direct equipment and training assistance. Through grants and low-cost sales, particularly in 1961, Sudanese forces have been equipped with a number of jet aircraft, armored vehicles and ground transports, as well as conventional small arms and field equipment.[113] British officers and technicians have conducted numerous training and military-technical programs.

The United Kingdom's efforts in Libya date from the establishment of British bases before independence and since 1951 have been closely

coordinated with those of the United States. Heavy emphasis has been placed on the training of officers and enlisted men: at least £ 40,000 has been appropriated annually for British training missions since 1961.[114] Direct equipment aid primarily has been an American responsibility, with Britain contributing some supplementary material for ground and naval forces. Somewhat greater sharing has been effected with respect to budgetary support; since 1959, the United Kingdom has granted £ 3,250,000 annually for this purpose.

Somalia, composed in part of the former colony of British Somaliland, also has received quantities of military aid and some military-tinged supporting assistance. Very little is known about this nature of this assistance except that it has been undertaken in concert with the United States and Italy.[115]

British assistance to other African states has been quite limited in scope and has been included under general appropriation for military assistance and training. Only one direct allocation has been reported in the recent past: in FY 1962 £ 80,000 was appropriated to cover the cost of a "gift of aircraft" to Mali.[116]

Due to the almost total lack of information available, only general comments can be ventured concerning French military assistance in Africa. France's recent efforts have been second only to those of the United States in scope: at present military ties exist between France and 13 African states. As was the case with recipients of British aid, all of the nations formerly were French colonial dependencies.

The specific nature of these military arrangements has varied according to the status of political relations with France. The seven full members of the Community have received perhaps the most extensive aid, providing for full equipment and training and often the direct services of French commissioned and non-commissioned officers.[117] Under bilateral agreements concluded in March 1961, the four Entente states also have received not only economic and cultural assistance but also military aid for the establishment of their armed forces.[118] The Republic of Cameroon and Togo have been tendered assistance under special agreements finalized in 1960.

Only fragmentary data exists concerning the specific direction of French military aid programs. The framework of the general U.A.M. as well as of the more limited Central African Defense Council has provided for a loose system of mutual defense assistance supported by French cooperation and advisory services.[119] One member state, Mauritania, has received increasing amounts of French assistance in consequence of its dispute with Morocco.[120] Assistance to the Republic of Cameroon has been oriented particularly toward the requirements of defense against recurrent terrorist attacks launched by rebel forces based in and aided by Guinea.

A similar information problem exists with respect to Belgium's principal military aid program, that to the Congo. The history of past Belgian private and semi-public aid during the Congo crisis is as yet not totally clear and is still far too tangled to permit more than general note. Since the final unification of the Congo, Belgium reportedly has

supplied some quantities of direct aid to the Central Government and was one of two nations requested to render troop training assistance.[121]

E. Other Military Assistance

Four other countries - West Germany, the United Arab Republic, Israel and India - have provided military assistance to one or more of the African states. Although these efforts have been relatively limited in comparison to those of the major donor Powers, they have had a not inconsiderable impact on the level of African armament and military activity.

Of the longest duration have been the military assistance programs of Egypt. Principal recipients of this aid have been the neighboring North African states or groups, with the largest proportion being extended to the Algerian rebels prior to independence. From the very beginnings of the movement, Egypt provided direct equipment aid to these forces and established special training courses at its military colleges for rebel officers and men.[122] Egyptian efforts also helped secure financial grants from the Arab League, that granted October 1958, totalling £ E 12,000,000. Small amounts of military assistance have also been provided at various times to Tunisia and Libya, the latter country in 1959 reciving a limited quantity of air-training equipment and services.[123]

The nature and extent of Egyptian assistance to other African states is relatively unknown. Some assistance was accorded the Sudan during the Egyptian campaign to bring that country within its sphere of political influence. Somalia has received direct equipment aid, dating

from the period before independence. Reports also have indicated U.A.R. assistance to the Gizenga regime and past aid offers to the various Casablanca states under the now moribund plan to establish a joint military high command.[124]

The Federal Republic of Germany recently has undertaken a rather extensive program of military assistance for seven African states, Nigeria, the Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, the Malagasy Republic, Ethiopia and Libya.[125] According to a recent statement, all have requested aid to reduce dependence on assistance from the former metropoles and the United States: West Germany, however, has consulted with its NATA allies concerning each request and has operated "always in agreement with the former colonial power and with the United States."

Assistance, budgeted for about $40 millions over 1962 and 1963 has taken several forms. Training missions have been established in each country: some officers and men also have been brought to West Germany for specialized instruction. Certain of the seven also have received "supporting" equipment aid, weapons, vehicles and communications gear.

The assistance tendered by India and Israel has been limited exclusively to technical training services. Israel has established pilot training schools in Ghana and in Cameroon and recently has been asked for troop training assistance by the Congolese Central Government.[126] Under bilateral agreements, India has provided flight instructions and training equipment to both Ethiopia and Ghana.[127]

FOOTNOTES

N.B. Numbers in parentheses refer to entries in Bibliography.

Designation FY followed by two numerals refers to fiscal year dating:
For the United States, those beginning in July;
For the United Kingdom in March.

1. (11) p. 1012. Also (4) for FY 63, p. 514.

2. (5) for FY 64 statement by General Maxwell Taylor, p. 61.

3. With respect to American sales programs, although there are occasional reports in the press, the details and destinations of all sales are kept classified to avoid "embarassing" the country concerned. (4) for FY 63, p. 618.

4. Loc. cit.

5. (5) for FY 64, p. 61.
On the general problem of "what's in a label", see (32) p. 4. (37) p. 7, (40) p. 66 and (48) p. 188.

6. (18) p. 64.

7. (32) p. 4.

8. (37)

9. It should be noted that the official definition of the Near East - South Asia area includes several nations not so defined within the context of this discussion, notably Greece, Cyprus, India, Ceylon, and in the past, the Sudan. According to our definition, the Middle East includes Afghanistan, Egypt (UAR), Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, Bahrein, Muscat, Qatar and Trucial Oman.

10. (3) for FY 62, p. 142.

11. The material discussed here is drawn from four major sources: (5), (15) and (18), (21) and (36).

12. (36) p. 219.

13. (21) for FY 58, p. 25 and (15) for FY 64, p. 731.

14. (21) for FY 57, p. 7.

15. (13) pp. 1204-1205.

16. (21) for FY 61, p. 15.

17. (48) p. 178.

18. (36) p. 103.

19. (5) for FY 63, p. 731.

20. (3) for FY 63, p. 598.

21. (14) p. 1245. (on force strength)

22. (3) for FY 63, p. 581.

23. (18) p. 60.

24. (4) for FY 63, p. 582.

25. (13) p. 1209.

26. Contained in document collection in (31) p. 126.

27. (59) June 29, 1963, p. 3.

28. (38) pp. 150-156.

29. (11) p. 360.

30. (27) p. 48.

31. (10) p. 723.

32. (55) p. 366.

33. (59) July 24, 1963, pp. 1-2.

34. (46) p. 94 and recent statements by Senators Javits and Keating, (9) for FY 64, p. 347.

35. (59) July 24, 1963, pp. 1-2.

36. (10) pp. 713-714, (41) p. 368.

37. (5) for FY 64, p. 65.

38. (10) p. 651.

39. (21) for FY 61, p. 18.

40. (59) July 30, 1963, p. 1.

41. (42) p. 67.

42. Material for this discussion drawn largely from (1) and (2).

43. (33) p. 375.

44. (1) and (2) II, Section C for FY 59-61.

45. (29) p. 57.

46. (42) pp. 185-187.

47. (1) for FY 61, p. 62.

48. (49) p. 132.

49. (36) pp. 164 and 217.

50. (38) p. 221.

51. (36) p. 217.

52. (38) p. 201.

53. (29) pp. 104-107.

53a. Latest incidents (59) July 24, 1963, p. 2, and August 1, 1963, p. 2.

54. Statement by Hans Merten, quoted in (59) June 16, 1963, p. 1.

55. (40) p. 211.

56. (28) p. 7.

57. Quoted in (40) p. 199.

58. (56) p. 393.

59. (45) p. 337.

60. (18) p. 60.

61. (5) for FY 64, p. 20.

62. Ibid., p. 915.

63. Ibid., statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, p. 62.

64. Material discussed here drawn largely from (21), (36), (45) and (56).

65. (21) for FY 60, p. 34.

66. (21) for FY 52, p. 8.

67. (56) p. 388.

68. (59) February 10, 1957, p. 2.

69. (56) pp. 387-389, and (29) p. 121.

70. (4) for FY 63, p. 621.

71. (56) p. 386.

72. Ibid., p. 382.

73. (5) for FY 64, p. 921.

74. (4) for FY 63, p. 977.

75. (45) p. 446.

76. (10) p. 715.

77. (40) p. 268.

78. Ibid., p. 270.

79. Reports in (59) from February 1963 to the present.

80. Ibid., August 5, 1963, p. 3.

81. (51) p. 34.

82. (56) p. 393.

83. (40) p. 269.

84. See above, p.

85. These bases were established in the immediate postwar period under base rights agreements negotiated with France. Upon attainment of Moroccan independence, these were renegotiated for a 7-year period, scheduled for termination at the end of 1963. In 1960, however, American-Moroccan agreement was reached to return one of the bases to Morocco at that time.
(4) for FY 63, p. 566.

86. (16) June 30, 1960, pp. 26-27.

87. (4) for FY 63, p. 567.

88. (5) for FY 64, statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, p. 59.

89. (46) p. 63.

90. (4) for FY 63, p. 566. It is perhaps revealing to note that American military assistance to Ethiopia has been one of the most vehemently attacked aspects of the total foreign aid program. Perhaps the most tenacious critic has been Representative Otto Passman of Louisiana who has "uncovered" the use of the 7-86's to frighten recalcitrant Ethiopian tribesmen and the expenditure of $3.1 millions to convert a seaplane tender into a personal yacht - flagship for the Emperor. Loc. cit.

91. (5) for FY 64, statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, p. 59.

92. Ibid., p. 1065.

93. (44) p. 40.

94. (24). Also (4) for FY 62, p. 419 and p. 1221, and (5) for FY 63, p. 215.

95. (4) for FY 62, p. 419 and for FY 63, p. 545.

96. (46) p. 96.

97. (50) p. 411.

98. (24)

99. (46) p. 95.

100. Cited in (44) p. 205.

101. Discussion of background and diplomatic maneuvering see (34) pp. 52-58.

102. (46) p. 95 and pp. 209-210.

103. (24)

104. (4) for FY 62, p. 419.

105. (59) August 25, 1963, p. 38.

106. (58) August 27, 1963, p. 9.

107. (49) pp. 229-230.

108. (46) p. 98, Equipment details, (47) p. 516.

109. (47) p. 109 and (59) July 30, 1963, p. 28.

110. (52) p. 294.

111. (47) p. 162.

112. (59) August 2, 1963, p. 3.

113. (46) p. 94.

114. (1) and (2) for FY 59-64, Part II.

115. (46) p. 90.

116. (1) for FY 62, II, p. 8.

117. (46) p. 99.

118. (39) p. 297.

119. Loc. cit.

120. (46) p. 93.

121. (59) August 25, 1963, p. 22.

122. (26) pp. 110-113.

123. (47) p. 503.

124. (26) p. 141.

125. (59) June 16, 1963, p. 1

126. (26) p. 104 and (59) August 25, 1963, p. 22.

127. (44) p. 190.

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N.B. The following abbreviations are used for frequently-cited references:

FY Fiscal Year

Hearings Committee hearings on various bills relating to military assistance. Prior to 1961 the general title was The Mutual Security Act; since 1961 various titles have been used, but the most common is the Foreign Assistance Act or in the case of the Appropriations Committees the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

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Foreign Affairs Committee

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