SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Decade Under Khrushchev 1954-1964
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by

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Economic Factors and Soviet Arms Control Policy

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

One of the early (and more cynical) explanations of the predictive powers of the Delphic Oracle had it that a vapor issuing from a cleft in the floor in the cave probably intoxicated the Pythian priestess. Later investigation discovered that there was neither cleft nor gas, so ruled instead in favor of trance. The interpreter of the complexities of Soviet foreign policy well might yearn for either method—intoxication or convulsion—as a short-cut to deciphering the acts of the Kremlin's occupants.

When it comes to mastering the relative forces that shape United States foreign policy, the scholarly detective work involved, though demanding and even mysterious in its own ways, benefits inestimably from the fact that after a decent interval sometimes one can interview the significant participants. They can be asked what they intended, which elements in the government favored which policies, and how it all came out in the process of decision-making.

The student of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy has none of these aids available to him. Typically, he makes educated guesses based on his deep immersion in the history and literature of Soviet affairs. If he wishes to be "scientific," he faces a massive and generally discouraging task of detection, the purpose of which is to reconstruct reality as best he can from fragments of circumstantial evidence. In doing so he runs multiple dangers: he may choose the wrong data; he may assume erroneous relationships among the data; he may interpret the data incorrectly; and it may turn out that he posed the wrong questions initially. Also he faces four special hazards. First, the field has already been extensively mined; second, the historical perspective we work with is short indeed; third, the data is by its nature all derivative and the evidence circumstantial; and fourth, if the most treacherous of all ventures in political analysis is to assess motivations, surely the second most treacherous is to make guesses, however educated, about the future. No wonder that, without being able to interview the participants, and not quite daring to substitute intoxication or trance for genuine research, he is more than usually tentative about his findings.

Against the background of that general cautionary note, our venture here is aimed at learning more than we now know about the interest of the contemporary Soviet Union in various forms of arms
control and disarmament measures. (Those two quite different things are generally lumped together in the report under the loose phrase "arms control." But when we refer to disarmament we mean measures that significantly lower the levels of arms; when we speak precisely of arms control measures we mean steps aimed at reducing the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or miscalculated war, or at reducing the frightfulness of nuclear war if it should break out.) At a minimum we wish to understand better why the Soviet Union behaved as it did over the past ten or so years in dealing with this range of issues. At a maximum we would like to see if it is possible to put ourselves in a better position to make predictions about the forces that tend to favor or inhibit a serious Soviet approach to measures of arms control or disarmament.

Our approach in its essence is to identify the chief factors, both internal and external, that we believe go into the formulation of Soviet arms control policy; to study those factors as they have interacted from 1954 to 1964 with periods of high and low apparent Soviet interest in arms control; and thus to see if it is possible to discern in more general terms the configurations of factors related to Soviet interest in certain forms of limitations on the arms race.

This approach involves making a basic assumption that ought to be made explicit at the outset. It is that Soviet arms control and disarmament policy, as overtly expressed in diplomatic forums and in propaganda organs, represents only the surface manifestations of the truth; in an admittedly Freudian vein we have labeled these overt expressions "manifest" policy. In the same metaphor, we see these only as clues to understanding the latent policies beneath. For Soviet interests in steps aimed at directly affecting the arms competition with the West can no more be deciphered only from the speeches made by Russian diplomats than the shape of an elephant can be deduced by grasping its trunk. As the fabled blind man guessed he was dealing with a snake, so the analyst of arms control needs to adduce far more than the sometimes misleading cast of Soviet manifest and overt diplomacy and propaganda in order to deduce the reality of Soviet interests. Thus we see Soviet attitudes toward arms control and disarmament as a function of the perceptions, action plans, and expectations of Soviet leadership concerning domestic and external affairs.

We are assuming therefore that the relevant context of Soviet arms control policy is to be found in several key underlying factors: externally, the military-strategic situation, and the general foreign policy situation, featuring not only the more traditional view to the West of Moscow but increasingly the view to China; and internally, the pressures generated by the state of the
Soviet economy; and the state of agreement or dissent among the Soviet leadership.

Our task as we have seen it is to reconstruct as best we can from the available evidence and with the benefit of hindsight the motivations behind Soviet shifts in manifest arms control policy. This means in effect calculating in retrospect the sum of pressures, perceptions, goals, and expectations that add up at any given moment to define Soviet interests. Soviet interest in arms control is, we assume here, a product of factors at least some of which we can analyze. What were they and how do they help to explain (or obscure) the alterations that took place on the surface of Soviet policy?

In terms of what impulses actually moved Soviet leaders of the time, what their purposes and expectations were, in short, what they really believed, the data available to us (that is, the manifest signs of policy) represent only the small visible fraction of the iceberg of Soviet strategy and motivations. Given the general nature of Soviet policy in the period it is impossible to determine with any assurance the relationship between the key factors in the manifest Soviet policy—drive for détente with the West, accompanied by dramatic shifts in the Soviet negotiating posture on questions of disarmament and arms control. They were obviously related. But analysis is profoundly complicated by the complex nature of the interaction between them.

Increased recognition of the dangers in a nuclear war underlay the détente strategy. Disarmament and/or arms control might in that sense have seemed a rational means to lessen the dangers of such a war. But since a conciliatory stand on disarmament had the additional virtue of helping to reduce tension in general, it might have been viewed purely as a tactic to support the détente strategy with no real intention of accepting significant international inspection or other controls. Conversely, a lessening of East-West tensions would have a feedback effect into the arms competition, tending to abate it at least in the West. In sum, then, the same factors that may have impelled Moscow toward East-West measures of arms control also worked for a general softening of Soviet policy toward the West and vice versa, and we cannot be certain of the exact relationship. What we can do is to examine such evidence as is available in order to form some judgments.

If we were to follow a rigorously scientific method, we would probably seek to construct a model of sorts from the several variables we have identified as operating. We would make certain assumptions about the interaction among them, and a general hypothesis about the probable effects of such interaction. Proof
of the validity of the model would presumably emerge after the study is completed. In our acute sense of insufficiency concerning the possibility of definitive findings in this area we have deliberately refrained from tying ourselves to such a rigorous framework. In fact at the outset of our analysis we are not asserting any particular hypothesis about the relative weights of the factors or even about their effect on policy. At the end we shall not be able to say with authority that any given constellation of underlying factors at any given time is likely within a given range of probability to produce a given result in terms of arms control policy.

Another mind, perceiving our method along with its profound cautions, might prefer to assert the hypothesis we have refrained from making, to the effect that Soviet interest in arms control is likely to be high when the underlying factors are in a certain constellation or conjunction. It is not difficult to formulate such a hypothesis: "Soiifet interest in significant measures affecting the arms competition between the Soviet Union and the West is likely to be high when a détente strategy predominates in the Soviet foreign policy orientation; when no genuine military or strategic breakthrough favoring the Russians is visible on the horizon; when Western strategic superiority is accepted as inevitable and permanent; when no political end-runs such as Egypt in 1955 and Cuba in 1960-62 look overwhelmingly tempting; when China (and here the model becomes a bit blurred and uncertain) poses a sufficient threat to force Moscow to face westward (but it could also read 'when China is discounted as posing no physical threat'); when the Kremlin leadership elite is united around a policy; (but, conversely, it could say: 'when a bold disarmament move represents a way to demolish internal opposition'); and when the economic 'burden' of armaments is excessive (but here it should be noted that rational Western calculations of what a 'burden' constitutes are not really applicable)."

If one were bold enough to construct this model for analytic purposes, undoubtedly it would throw into relief the interaction of factors and manifest policy for each of the periods we have studied, and at the end it would give us a framework around which to draw conclusions. By deliberately not tying ourselves to such a model, however, we regain lost flexibility that may be essential to avoid the pitfalls of a mechanistic approach, even at the cost of some lost rigor. Even without calling our research scheme a model we remain mindful of complementarities among and within factors, their relative weighting, and their varying significance as indicators. As a scheme, ours is neither traditional Kremlinology nor the model-building of systems analyses. Hopefully, it has sufficient flexibility and rigor for our purposes here. And
we are certainly asserting the modest proposition that the inter-relationship of our factors at times when Soviet arms control activity ran high may not be devoid of significance.

So far as our time-span is concerned, the same kinds of caveats must be asserted as with respect to the factors. The historian's attempt to impose a scheme of his own upon history is of course always to some extent artificial, misleading, and even dangerous. History does sometimes cooperate to create natural boundaries of time, and Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev, by his emergence to a position of predominance in the Soviet Union by 1955 following the death of Stalin, supplied a natural starting point for our analysis. By his unceremonious removal at the hands of envious, resentful, and equally ambitious colleagues in the fall of 1964 he provided the needful final punctuation mark, reinforcing our sense that we had in fact dealt with a self-contained "period" in time. By the device of looking back at what we can now call the Khrushchev decade from the vantage point of the sudden end of that era, 1955 seen from 1966 acquires depth, breadth, and meaning; so do the other landmarks of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy in the Khrushchev era.

The most important thing that can be said about the decade in question is that it has been one of phenomenal movements of change. But the second most important thing about it was the presence of powerfully fixed elements that set rigid limits to change. There is paradox and irony in this extraordinary period of struggle between forces of change and forces defying change, because it was not except in a literary sense a struggle in the classic mode between nations representing status quo and revolution. In this decade there were revolutions struggling to be born, so to speak, in both the Soviet bloc and the West as well as to the South. Indeed, both sides had status quos of their own to protect and revolutions to foster in the other's camp.

In classic terms the nuclear weapons revolution brought the United States and the Soviet Union to have a stake in and even crudely to share an "established order" of sorts; and both came to find common ground against a new threat to their established order—China. Both had to face the policy consequences of the most transforming revolution of all—the end of general warfare as a rational means of resolving differences. Both grappled with the end of monopolistic positions within their alliance structures when nuclear standoff bred the revival of politics around the world. As nuclear warfare came to look like a nonzero-sum enterprise, the prime antagonists—the United States and the Soviet Union—had to become the prime collaborators if any steps were to be taken to moderate the arms competition.
The forces of inertia were almost as strong as the forces of momentum working for change. There was a perceived need on both sides to change in some way to the ground rules of the conflict, however protracted that conflict might be. But the accumulated history of political warfare a outrance between Communists and capitalists left a towering obstacle to any such move. The pluralistic features of both societies--one pluralistic because pluralism was cherished, the other at least crudely pluralistic in spite of itself--set tight internal political limits to the freedom of maneuver of those in either camp who would innovate, with powerful men on both sides ready to pounce at the first sign of major concessions. And the infernally complex nature of the arms problem itself posed inhibitions both of a technical and an intellectual nature to otherwise simple solutions. In addition it rendered almost insoluble the old and traditionally thorny task of calculating and equating national power by giving appropriate weights to non-comparable features of terrain, power, weapons, targets, and the like.

A final complication of the landscape we have sought to map is its shifting internal quality. We may assert our belief that Soviet interests in arms control measures might best be assessed by correlating with the manifest and overt expressions of that interest--or disinterest--the underlying factors of foreign policy, Soviet assessments of the West and of China, internal Soviet consensus or dissensus, economic pressures, and developments in the military-strategic field. Any one of our three slices of history reveals interesting interconnections between these several factors. But the most crucial fact is that over time all of them were in motion; not one of them remained fixed and constant through the Khrushchev decade. All not only shifted; all interacted one upon the others, feeding back on the system and in turn altering it. (Indeed, the research tool that suggests itself for predictive value building upon our analysis is the analogue computer.)

In our work, then, we have approached the problem of Soviet interests by first outlining briefly the manifest expressions of arms control policy in the form of negotiations and propaganda, without either accepting or rejecting the face value of these expressions; second, seeking to look beneath surface policy to analyze the key relevant contextual factors that we believe underlie arms control and disarmament interest as revealed in the manifest policy; third, drawing certain limited conclusions for each of the three periods; and fourth, attempting to pull together at the end our findings and conclusions.

* * * * *
A number of individuals contributed to this study. Working on it full-time during the whole period of research were Walter C. Clemens, Jr. and Franklyn Griffiths; contributing on a part-time basis were Fritz Ermarth, John Hoagland, Peter Kenez, Paul Marantz, and Joseph L. Nogee. Occasional consultants were Franklyn D. Holzman, Herbert Levine, and Marshall Shulman.

The division of labor in the research phase involved concentration by Walter Clemens on the negotiations and foreign policy aspects plus supervision of research assistance, while Franklyn Griffiths concentrated on the propaganda and political uses of disarmament and internal Soviet politics. Fritz Ermarth contributed the economic inputs, John Hoagland the military-strategic data, and Joseph Nogee the negotiating history for the 1962-1964 period.

When it came to drafting chapters of the report itself, Clemens prepared the initial version of Chapter III and Griffiths Chapter IV and both contributed to Chapters II and V. The undersigned served as over-all supervisor and editor and drafted certain sections of the report. Indispensable substantive and intellectual contributions were made at all stages of the study by Donald L. M. Blackmer, Morton Gorden, and Alexander Korol, and the editing process was generously assisted under acute pressures of time by Jean Clark. Judith Tipton and Lisa Walford helpfully assisted at all stages with the typing, production and administration.

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The year 1955 was a turning point in both the style and content of Soviet postwar disarmament diplomacy, following a frigid—and occasionally superheated—spell since 1946. In the 1954-1956 period, and particularly in the spring of 1955, the Soviet Union astonished not a few observers by announcing a series of apparent concessions that in several important instances represented a clear acceptance, at least verbally, of positions that for years had been vainly advocated by the Western powers.

The 1955 Soviet disarmament concessions were of course not made in a vacuum; they took place in the period of Soviet glacial thaw that followed Stalin's death. The atmosphere in which they were advanced reflected the process of internal "de-Stalinization" that came to a peak at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. It reflected revised notions about the relations of "socialist" states within the Communist bloc. And it reflected a basic reappraisal of the hard external line that since the end of the war had helped sustain an unprecedented state of international tension. The origins of the altered climate dated back to Stalin's death in 1953, and they were incipient in modifications of Soviet policy as early as 1949. As it turned out, the "spirit of Geneva" ebbed quickly after the Conference of Heads of Governments in July 1955. But many of the factors that led to the Summit persisted, continuing to impel both Moscow and the West toward renewed attempts to modulate their conflicts and regulate their armaments.

The primary change in position in the 1954-1956 period was a significant shift toward accommodation with the West. For the first time since the cold war had set in, Soviet behavior suggested at least the possibility that Moscow sought and perhaps expected to bridge the gap separating its disarmament positions from those of the West. For the first time it was at least plausible to debate whether in fact East-West agreements on arms control were possible. The trends in Soviet policy were away from the Stalinist proclivity for sweeping and immediate measures that were crudely aimed at crippling the West militarily, and away from antagonistic propaganda designed to set the "masses" against the Western governments. The style of Soviet disarmament diplomacy became more conciliatory, less evasive, and more apparently oriented toward a
narrowing of East-West differences instead of their "exposure."

Moscow's new proposals explicitly endorsed many of the principles and specific details espoused by the West. If Moscow did not accept aspects of the Western program, the Soviet proposals nevertheless showed greater apparent feasibility than in Stalin's time. Moscow seemed then to accept the Western concept of comprehensive disarmament in stages while at the same time showing a new interest in a wide range of partial measures to safeguard peace and curb the arms race. Even on the delicate issue of inspection Moscow showed a new willingness to consider at least some international controls. Formal Soviet recognition of the clandestine-weapon problem indicated a new readiness to weigh the hard realities and implications of nuclear technology.

At the same time, even in the proposals advanced on international inspection and enforcement, the Soviet position remained ambiguous in some respects and restrictive in others, for example, in limiting inspection to unspecified "objects of control." The Kremlin's comprehensive disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955 posited a timetable that seemed unrealistic to Western observers. Moscow persisted in advancing proposals that would benefit only one side militarily, such as the early liquidation of overseas bases. Even more fundamentally, while Moscow may have perceived a certain "moderate" trend of opinion in the United States, its historically antagonistic expectations regarding the West were probably greatly reinforced by the calculation that the "moderate" Western forces were unlikely to prevail.

Which of these two opposing forces in the Soviet outlook had more potential strength cannot be measured. For the West did not after May 10, 1955 explore either the possibilities or ambiguities in the Soviet démarche, but shifted the axis of Western proposals toward various inspection measures and investigation of the technical problems of control. In September 1955 Washington placed a "reservation" on its previous disarmament positions. In the light of all this it seems fair to conclude that the full measure of Soviet policy was never actually taken.

It may of course be that the Soviet leaders had no intention of following through on any of their arms control proposals. Perhaps these proposals were purely tactical, serving the political purpose of promoting a détente and inhibiting Western armament, particularly in West Germany, by relaxing tensions. Or perhaps some—but not all—Soviet leaders argued successfully that nothing would be lost and much gained if the West were to accept the 1955 proposal. The fact is that we shall never know for sure.
At a minimum, however, the May 1955 change in Soviet arms control policy, even if meant as a tactical device at the time, became elongated over the years, at least suggesting the possibilities inherent in a strategy of limited adversary collaboration.

B. Manifest Soviet Policies

1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance

The principal evidence of change in manifest Soviet policy was supplied by Moscow's proposals of September 30, 1954 and May 10, 1955. In both proposals, particularly the latter, the Soviet government made major departures from its prior negotiating positions on disarmament. The trends initiated on these two dates were sustained by further conciliatory moves in March and July 1956.

a. September 1954 to May 1955: Oscillation. The shift in manifest Soviet policies toward arms control can be dated from September 30, 1954 when Andrei Vyshinsky announced to the U.N. General Assembly that the Soviet government was now willing to negotiate on the basis of the principles laid out in the so-called Anglo-French memorandum of June 11, 1954 which Moscow had previously spurned. Since the Western memorandum provided for conventional and nuclear disarmament to proceed in stages, Vyshinsky's statement implied that Moscow had dropped its traditional insistence upon the unconditional prohibition of all nuclear weapons regardless of conventional arms reductions or control measures.

This ostensible concession was retracted in February, only to be made again in March and expanded in May 1955. TASS on February 18, 1955 carried a statement proposing the immediate destruction of all nuclear stocks, the freezing of conventional forces and military budgets as of January 1, 1955, and the convening of a world disarmament conference forthwith. Thus when the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) reconvened on February 25, 1955, Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, by insisting on priority for the position stated by TASS, appeared to renege on the position originally presented to the Assembly.

On March 11, 1955, however, Moscow again seemed to return to its previously stated willingness to negotiate on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. The details were spelled out in a Soviet proposal of March 18, 1955 that was in many ways similar to the French elaboration of the plan originally introduced by the Western nations on March 8. The Soviet and Western plans appeared
to be in agreement that (1) the disarmament program should begin with a freeze on military forces and spending; (2) reductions of military manpower and conventional armaments should take place in two stages; (3) production of nuclear weapons should halt at the end of the first stage (Western proposal) or at the beginning of the second stage (Soviet proposal); (4) following the latter two stages there might be a reduction of forces to the minimum levels needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. obligations; and (5) "existing" stocks of nuclear materials would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

This set of proposals seemed to constitute a wide framework of consensus potentially broader than any East-West agreement since 1945. There were important differences, which Western proposals in mid-April of the same year helped to bridge. But the Soviet démarche of May 10, 1955 seemed to go still further toward narrowing the gap between East and West.

b. May through December 1955: Soviet Démarche and U.S. "Reservation." The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were particularly significant in three respects. First, they acknowledged that, as the West had been insisting for years, hidden nuclear stockpiles were an undeniable possibility in the contemporary world; this effectively put an end to Soviet demands for a simple uninspected ban on nuclear weapons. Second, although they constituted a comprehensive package, the May 10 proposals also embodied the seeds of a partial measures approach which became increasingly explicit in the remainder of 1955 and an ostensible principle of Soviet policy in March 1956. And third, they represented a movement toward Western positions on some of the details of disarmament, particularly in terms of the inter-relationship between disarmament and security, that was nothing short of dramatic by contrast to the glacial pace of negotiations until then.

Specifically, the Soviet May 10 proposal adopted the Western position on force levels, the timing of nuclear disarmament, and the principle of a single control organ. It also accepted the Western view that the base period for the initial freeze should be 1954 rather than 1955. At the same time the major East-West differences on inspection and control were still unresolved. Questions of control were in fact discussed in a separate section of the May 10, 1955 document, which argued that international distrust did not presently permit states to allow international inspection of industrial and other facilities basic to their security. An agreement that purported to authorize such inspection would "create a false sense of security" because
"there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. . ."\(^1\)

Clearly an inner contradiction pervaded the Soviets' May 10 démarche, growing out of their acknowledgment of the clandestine weapon problem coupled with a call at the same time for complete nuclear disarmament under what might or might not be adequate international control. Moscow offered two approaches in an apparent effort to overcome this dilemma. First, the May 10 démarche began with a "political declaration" listing the major cold war issues and calling for their early resolution in order to "create the requisite conditions for the execution of a broad disarmament program" with "international control over its implementation." Second, the May 10 statement on control proposed the establishment, during the first stage of conventional reductions, of static control posts to guard against surprise attack. These would be established "at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and in aerodromes" in the territory of the states concerned. These posts would be supplemented by the single control organ with expanding powers and unlimited access to the objects subject to its jurisdiction.

Without wholly facing up to the many political and technical difficulties raised by its new proposals, Moscow implied that confidence-building measures—including measures to guard against certain types of surprise attack—would create a climate in which unrestricted inspection might either be allowed (though this was never specified by Moscow) or—more likely in the light of increased good will between states—become superfluous.

The seeds of the partial-measures approach that Moscow pursued increasingly in the next two years existed in the comprehensive program espoused on May 10, 1955 not only in the surprise attack posts but in another measure proposed for the first time by a great power: a nuclear test ban, to be implemented in the first stage. The May 10 proposal posited that the test ban would be supervised by an international commission reporting to the General Assembly. (However, Moscow's position evolved in 1955 and 1956 to deny the

need for special machinery to inspect a test ban.)

The May 10 initiative involved other unresolved problems. One was its timetable, calling for only one year per stage. Another was its proposed liquidation of all overseas bases in 1956 and 1957. Also it postponed many vital details for a world disarmament conference to be called early in 1956. Finally, all measures of "prevention" and "suppression" regarding violations of the agreement were entrusted to the veto-ridden Security Council.

Despite the difficulties, the Soviet demarche of May 10, 1955 appeared an oasis in the barren desert of ten years' disarmament negotiations. The response of the Western negotiators indicates the degree of at least verbal consensus that seemed suddenly to have been achieved. For example, United States delegate James Wadsworth on May 12 said he was "gratified to find that the concepts which we have put forward over a considerable length of time . . . have been accepted in a large measure by the Soviet Union." Further exploration of the meaning of the May 10 proposal was put off as the Western delegates in the DCSC moved, over Soviet opposition, to suspend their deliberations on May 18, 1955 until after the Heads of Governments Conference expected in July.

The chiefs of state met in Geneva in July from July 18 to 22, 1955. They discussed disarmament, European security and Germany, and cultural and economic exchange programs. On the first topic, Premier Bulganin introduced a modified version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal, dropping its "political declaration," its statement concerning clandestine weapons, and some of its less feasible features, such as the two-year timetable and the proposed liquidation of foreign bases. But some troublesome changes were also made. The most egregious of these was an additional specification that non-great-power armed forces be limited to 150,000 to 200,000 men--a provision obviously directed against the recently developed NATO plans to build a 500,000-man Bundeswehr. (The May 10 proposal had said that limits on the forces of smaller powers would be fixed early in 1956 by a "World Disarmament Conference.")

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2United Nations Document DC/SC.1/PV.48, p. 43.
At the Summit meeting there was actually no real negotiation on disarmament. In fact, in Geneva the Western heads of government made no reference to the positions they had advanced and debated earlier that spring in the DCSC, nor did they reply to Bulganin's amended version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal except to assert that static control posts were insufficient to guard against surprise attack. Instead the Western leaders spoke in terms of control measures, each advocating an approach that would, they said, lead later to disarmament. President Eisenhower thus made his surprise "Open Skies" proposal for aerial inspection of the Soviet Union and the United States. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden pushed for an experimental zone of arms limitations and inspection in Central Europe; French Premier Fure espoused budgetary controls of armaments.

The various issues and proposals dealing with control of armaments were soon overshadowed by the chief item of contention at the Summit: European security and Germany. Moscow proposed that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be replaced by an all-European security pact within the framework of which the presumably neutralized Germany might be reunited. The West, however, refused to disband NATO and insisted that Germany should be reunited only on the basis of free elections and a free hand in foreign and military policy--conditions that Moscow quickly rejected.

Disarmament negotiations continued when the DCSC reconvened in New York late in August of 1955. Each delegation continued to press the basic line taken by its government at Geneva. On September 6 Harold Stassen announced that his government was placing a "reservation" on all American "pre-Summit" disarmament positions. He and the other Western delegates still espoused the control measures advocated by their governments at Geneva but called for additional research to overcome the difficulties of control alluded to in Moscow's statement of May 10.

From October 27 through November 16, 1955 the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva wrestled with the same issues discussed at the Summit conference in July. They finally admitted what the heads of government had not: that such new "spirit" as existed in East-West relations was not adequate to resolve divergent positions on European security and Germany, on economic and cultural exchange--and on disarmament and its control.

c. 1956: Détenue and Partial Measures. The Summit meeting of 1955 was followed up by a series of letters between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin which was kept up throughout 1956. Premier Bulganin's letters were particularly interesting for their
circumspect and "reasonable" tone, and their emphasis on agreements already reached and on the common interests of the two superpowers. In letters of January 23 and February 1, 1956, for instance, Bulganin called for a United-States-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation.

The major Soviet arms control proposal in 1956 was introduced in the DCSC on March 27, 1956. It was notable first for its emphasis on conventional rather than nuclear weapons disarmament; second for its explicit advocacy of a "partial measures" approach; and third for its detailed provisions for inspection—not just over "disarmament" but over-all conventional armaments. The first part of the Soviet proposal provided for limiting and reducing conventional armaments and armed forces to the levels specified in the May 10 document but in two rather than the three years proposed earlier. The control provisions were somewhat more specific and far-reaching than Moscow had proposed in 1955. Ground control posts were again suggested, but with the clarification that they would be enumerated in a special agreement that would also extend to the signatories' foreign bases. The control organ again was to have unlimited access to all objects of control, now spelled out as "military units, stores of military equipment and ammunition; land, naval, and air bases; factories manufacturing conventional armaments and ammunition." Since no ban on nuclear production was contained in the Soviet proposal the problem of dealing with clandestine nuclear production did not arise. The 1956 draft even seemed to take a step toward the "prior positioning" of control by specifying that the control organ would be established within two months of the convention's entry into force and one month before the first reductions began.

The March 1956 proposal outlined a scheme for a zone of arms limitation and inspection in Central Europe that was similar to the 1954-1955 Eden Plan and the Rapacki Plans of 1957 and 1958. "Both parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them" would be included. First, ceilings would be placed on foreign forces in the zone. Second, the stationing of atomic formations and weapons in the zone would be prohibited—a move obviously designed to thwart U.S. plans for NATO. Third, "joint inspection of the armed forces and armaments" in the zone would be instituted.

The March 27 proposal also called for agreement on three partial measures, not contingent on progress in other problems of disarmament:

"1. To discontinue forthwith tests of thermonuclear [sic] weapons."
"2. To ensure that no atomic weapons are included in the armaments of troops in German territory. The states concerned shall take the necessary measures to carry out this provision within three months.

"3. To reduce the military budgets of states by up to 15 per cent as against their military budgets for the previous year."¹

The preamble of the Soviet document stated the hope that the proposed reduction of conventional weapons would "facilitate . . . agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination. . . ." Soviet delegate Gromyko took the line that the Soviet Union was proposing a "different approach" to the disarmament problem since the linking of conventional and atomic disarmament "has been a serious trouble on the way to agreement."²

This generally conciliatory Soviet public posture on disarmament questions continued when Gromyko on July 12, 1956 appeared to accept the ceilings proposed by the Western powers in March 1956 of 2,500,000 men for Soviet and United States forces and 750,000 men each for Britain and for France. Moscow said it was prepared to agree to these levels "as a first step," provided the West agreed to follow this in a second stage with reductions to the lower levels that Moscow had endorsed at the 1955 Summit. The Soviet "acceptance" was also within the context of a larger program that included a ban on the testing and use of "atomic" and "hydrogen" weapons, a ban on the production of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all nuclear stocks.³

After the Disarmament Commission adjourned on July 16, 1956 President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin resumed their correspondence. Most of the letters concerned nuclear testing, the Soviet Union urging an immediate test ban without inspection, which it held to be superfluous.⁴

On November 17, 1956 Moscow sent Washington a declaration attacking alleged imperialist plots in Hungary and Egypt, which closed, however, by presenting a modified version of the May 10, 1955


²Doc. DC/SC.1/PV.73, p. 11, March 27, 1956.


⁴Ibid., Documents Nos. 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, and 184.
proposal thus returning to advocacy of nuclear as well as conventional disarmament. This document would later serve as the basis for the Soviets' opening position when the DCSC met again in 1957. The declaration defined for the first time the territorial limits in which Moscow would permit armed photography—a zone 800 kilometers to the east and west of the line where NATO confronted Warsaw Pact forces in Europe—but failed to indicate when this variant of "Open Skies" might come into effect.1

In 1956, however, neither side addressed itself directly to the other. Dual and even quadruple monologues were the result. "Interim sparring" is Bechhoefer's apt term for the disarmament proceedings in the latter half of 1955 and throughout 1956, while both sides groped toward the positions adopted during the "intensi- fied effort" begun in 1957.2 Certainly until the United States completed its announced reappraisal of policy in mid-November 1956 the many exchanges of views could have been only "debates, even among our allies, and not true negotiations."3

2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament

Not quite in lock-step but rather with some cultural or technical lag, Moscow's manner of manipulating the disarmament issue outside the negotiating forum came to parallel the shift in the content of Soviet disarmament proposals. The possibility, the necessity, indeed the alleged achievement of a significant relaxation of East-West tensions emerged as the dominant themes in Moscow's propaganda line in 1955.

These themes evolved however somewhat spasmodically. Soviet mass communications did little toward the end of 1954 and during the first months of 1955 to reinforce the conciliatory impression made by Vyshinsky on September 30 at the United Nations in his agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Anglo-French disarmament memorandum. Rather, Soviet propaganda adhered to a hard line

1 Ibid., I, pp. 721-729. In October 1955 Molotov had stated that aerial photography could be considered during the final stage of a comprehensive disarmament program.


3 Ibid., p. 325.
damage on the USSR. Painful experience in a half-century of warfare
made the Russian people and probably also their leaders especially
sensitive to the possibility that the Soviet economy and society
might be obliterated by the new weapons.

The Kremlin's policy response to the implications of nuclear
weaponry in 1954-1956 was two-fold. First, the foreign policy
line summed up in Khrushchev's 1956 pronouncements on peaceful
coexistence and the non-inevitability of war reflected a desire to
advance Soviet interests in such a way as to reduce the possibility
of military encounters with the West, and particularly with the
United States. Second, the disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955
marked, for the first time in the post-war period, an apparent
Soviet readiness to consider whether Soviet security might benefit
directly from limited arms control agreements over and above any
relaxation of East-West tensions or political settlements that
might be achieved.

And yet, although this response to the advent of nuclear weapons
was undoubtedly stimulated in part by the Soviets' awareness of
their immediate strategic inferiority to the United States, Moscow
also presumably recognized at some point in 1954-1956 that it had
achieved substantial progress toward a credible minimum deterrent
and thus toward genuine mutual deterrence. This new situation was
most promising for external policies of controlled risk based on
the significant improvements in Soviet strategic power which Moscow
began to look forward to in this period. Thus, while new restraints
in foreign policies and an incipient interest in partial measures
of arms control followed from the new Soviet strategic outlook, a
desire not to restrict Soviet freedom of action prematurely with
limited arms control agreements may have reinforced Moscow's
antipathy to agreements with the adversary. The Soviet reading of
the military-strategic ledger in this period resulted, then, in
contradictory influences on Soviet interests in arms control and
disarmament. What were the facts?
a. Stated Military Doctrine. In the early months of 1955, as Bulganin and Khrushchev ascended to power, a broad restatement of military strategy was made in the Soviet press, in which the outmoded "basic operating factors" of the Stalin years were replaced by modern strategic doctrine based on nuclear weapons and new delivery systems. 1 There were probably three main reasons for the open publication of a revised military doctrine:

(1) First, there can be no doubt that a revision had already occurred among higher levels of the Soviet military community, and there was a pressing need to educate the lower levels of the military establishment and, to some extent, the populace.

(2) Second, the Bulganin-Khrushchev faction, which apparently enjoyed strong military support, had successfully employed the issue of military preparedness in its attacks on Malenkov, charging in particular that the Malenkov faction had failed to make necessary investments in the defense industries and armed forces, leaving the Soviet Union open to surprise attack. 2 The resurgence of energy among military editors, which took the form of modernizing public expressions of policy, reflected to some extent an increase in the prestige and influence of the armed forces as a result of the Malenkov ouster.

(3) Third, these published doctrinal revisions represented a long overdue response to the defense "new look" formulated in the United States during 1953 and 1954, with its substantially increased emphasis on strategic air power. It is essential to bear in mind that in the United States the President's budget message of January 1954 (for FY 1955) called for the "creation, maintenance, and full exploitation of modern air power." Of the total $29.3 billion proposed in that message for the three services, the Air Force was to receive $11.2 billion, or about 38 per cent, representing for the first time in the postwar years a definite departure from the relatively equal allotment of funds

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1 See, for example, Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Soviet Military Posture as a Reflection of Soviet Strategy, RAND Research Memorandum RM-2102 (Santa Monica, California, March 24, 1956). See also Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger).

among the services. Consequently the Strategic Air Command became in the first two years of the Eisenhower administration a primary instrument of U.S. military strategy and national policy. It is against this background that the published Soviet strategic doctrinal revisions of 1955 must be considered.

The appearance of new Soviet strategic aircraft in 1954 and 1955 gives clear evidence that the Soviet military establishment had initiated major programs for the development of strategic nuclear-armed aviation as early as 1950. Therefore a revision in military strategy must have actually occurred at a high and secret level of the military establishment even under Stalin. The publication of changes in early 1955 in military doctrine was probably intended mainly to revitalize the lower ranks of the armed forces.

b. Strategic Forces in Being. Chart II.1 provides a comparison of the strategic forces actually operational in the year 1955. The United States held clear superiority in the capability to deliver nuclear weapons over great distances. The B-36 heavy bomber, a few hundred of which were still in the SAC inventory, was capable of carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load a distance of some 10,000 nautical miles. Supplemented the B-36 was the new B-47 medium bomber, then being delivered in substantial numbers to SAC (see Chart II.1) and, in conjunction with forward bases and aerial refueling, representing a long-range, high-speed, and high-payload nuclear capability.

In contrast, the Soviet operational force in 1955 was still based mainly on the aging TU-4, a copy by the Tupolev design bureau of the B-29A, with performance characteristics similar to the original piston bomber. It was generally assumed that some 700 of these aircraft were still available to the Soviet Air Force in 1955. Although constituting a force that required a definite plan of counteraction, the low speed and low payloads of the TU-4 rendered it a comparatively low-grade threat.

In final development or early production, however, were three new high-performance strategic jet bombers--the Tupolev TU-95 long-range turboprop bomber, the Miasishchev M-4 turbojet heavy bomber, and the Tupolev TU-16 medium jet bomber. With the exception of a relatively few TU-16's in the Soviet Air Force inventory, none of these aircraft had reached true operational status. Through the skillful use of secrecy and deception, however, the Soviet government successfully created an illusion of operational capability in strategic

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Chart II.1
Strategic Force Levels, 1955

Sources: collected unclassified data. See next page.
Sources for Chart II.1 and for All Following Charts and Tables

aviation that finally triggered the "bomber gap" debates of mid-1955 in Washington.\(^1\)

On May 13, 1955 the U.S. Department of Defense issued the following official release:

The Soviets have recently elected to expose some new aircraft developments in air parade formation over Moscow. These observations establish a new basis for our estimate of Soviet production of the heavy jet bomber (Type 37) Myasishchev M-4 and of the medium bomber (Type 39) Tupolev TU-16. There has also been an appearance of the turboprop bomber (Tupolev TU-95) and a new all-weather fighter has appeared, as expected. This knowledge is evidence of the modern technology of the Soviet aircraft industry and advances which are being made by them.\(^2\)

In rehearsals over Moscow prior to May Day a flight of eight M-4 heavy bombers had been observed on one day, and on the following day a flight of ten. Numerous TU-16 medium jet bombers were also seen in the rehearsals as well as the new turboprop TU-16, which appeared in a single copy. On May Day of the previous year (1954) one M-4, believed to be a prototype, had been observed. The sighting of a possible 10 to 18 aircraft apparently prompted the announced revision in estimates of Soviet bomber strength. (It should be noted that the degree of revision was not stated, leaving the way open for exaggerated conjectures.)

The appearance of these various aircraft on and around May Day 1955 was followed by several articles in the Soviet press by Defense Ministry officials who warned in effect that the Soviet Union now had at its disposal the weapons systems necessary "to anticipate a surprise attack and to strike before the aggressor can take advantage of his own preparations for an initial strike."\(^3\) Several of these statements were published on May 8, 1955, two days prior to submission of the first major new Soviet disarmament proposals of the postwar period.

\(^1\)See, for example, Stewart Alsop in New York Herald-Tribune, May 16, 1955; also in ibid., May 27, 1955.


\(^3\)Marshal A. M. Vasilevskii in Izvestia, May 8, 1955.
On July 3, 1955, just two weeks before the opening of the Summit Conference, the Soviets staged an elaborate air show at Tushino Airfield outside Moscow. For several weeks in advance of the show flights of new military aircraft appeared daily over Moscow, apparently to convince foreign observers that Soviet strategic nuclear capability was a reality. It seems likely in retrospect that every available aircraft of the three main types was put into the air for these displays. The appearance of even relatively small numbers of these aircraft at Tushino did in fact serve to convince many Western observers that the United States was in immediate danger of losing its air supremacy. Consequently, by skillful deception the Soviets were able to approach the Summit Conference at Geneva with what appeared to be an intercontinental nuclear delivery capability.

c. Strategic Weapons in Development. In 1955 the new B-52 intercontinental jet bomber, the world's most advanced strategic weapon system, had completed its development cycle and was in full-scale series production, leading to initial deliveries to SAC late in the year. Throughout the remainder of the 1950's the SAC B-52 force was to remain the prime strategic deterrent to Soviet aggression.

In contrast with the highly competent management of its strategic manned bomber program, the American missile and space efforts in 1955 were somewhat diffuse. The best efforts in ballistic missile development were being made by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, which, on the basis of V-2 technology, was to complete development of the reliable short-range Redstone ballistic missile. The Air Force, with primary responsibility for long-range strategic delivery, until 1955 had concentrated primarily on the development of air-breathing cruise missiles such as the Navaho supersonic ramjet and Snark subsonic turbojet. It seems likely that failure of the United States to concentrate on a unified ballistic missile program during the 1950-1955 period offered still another reason to the Soviets to place increasing effort in this direction and so accomplish a technological leapfrog in the arms race.

In January 1955, shortly after a thermonuclear warhead of reduced weight had become available, a development contract was issued in the United States for the Atlas ICBM. In September 1955, at least partly in reaction to heightened U.S. awareness of new

\[1\] See Interavia, August 1955.
Soviet weapons programs, the Atlas program was placed on a priority basis.1

On the Soviet side, all three new strategic aircraft had undoubtedly completed their development cycles and were in series production. As force level estimates for 1963 indicate, however, the two long-range aircraft, M-4 and TU-95, were apparently never mass produced, leading to a possible conclusion that the promise then apparent in the Soviet ballistic missile effort led the leadership to conserve its resources in order to concentrate as much manpower and industrial capacity as possible on strategic missile programs.

Concerning the Soviet rocket program, the various events of August to November 1957 indicate clearly that several different Soviet missile and space programs must have been established and in operation during 1955. The key events from which an estimate of this kind must be dated are: the successful firing of multi-stage ICBM in August 1957; the launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957; the launching of Sputnik II (with an 1,100 pound payload, indicating substantially higher thrust of Soviet vehicles) on November 3, 1957; and finally the showing of the medium-range ballistic missile SHYSTER (NATO designation) in Red Square on November 7, 1957. Although the Soviet rocket program as a whole had begun in earnest immediately following the surrender of Germany in 1945, it is likely that the most promising MRBM and ICBM programs were placed on a crash basis in 1955. The strongest evidence for this is the reallocation of scientific and technical manpower in 1955 noted by Korol.2 It is apparent then that even in 1955 the Soviet ballistic missile program was achieving substantial success. By early 1956, for example, the Soviet leadership was openly claiming a nuclear missile capability. In a speech before the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Marshall Zhukov said:

Soviet armed forces, due to the constant attention of the party and government in securing the defense capability of the nation, have been completely reorganized. They now have diverse atomic and nuclear weapons, mighty guided missiles, among them long-range missiles. They are in possession of a first-class jet air force capable of solving any problem that might arise

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in the event of aggressive attack. The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody and does not intend to attack anybody.¹

While the total volume of the defense effort, measured in current rubles, remained roughly stable in the 1953-1956 period, its composition seems to have altered radically. (See Part D, Section 5, for further details of the Soviet economic situation in this period.) In 1952 the Soviet Union was arming to meet what was perceived to be an immediate military threat. Thus the maintenance of large ground forces, the procurement of conventional equipment, and the expansion of tactical air power accounted for a high proportion of the defense budget, although, to be sure, feverish efforts in the area of nuclear weapons technology and long-range aircraft were being made. But since the threat was immediate, much emphasis had to be placed on the available weapons systems. After 1953 the immediacy of the military threat to the Soviet Union declined appreciably, and the need to procure existing weapons systems was correspondingly reduced. At the same time, within a total defense effort that declined only marginally, expenditures on the development of advanced strategic delivery systems, mainly manned aircraft at this point, and nuclear weapons probably increased somewhat.

There is reason to believe that in 1955 or 1956 the Soviet Union intensified its development program of intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile systems. Thus, between July 1955 and December 1956 total employment in Soviet research and development institutions increased by a startling 23 per cent. Total defense expenditures did not reflect the crash effort in the missile field because military manpower costs and the procurement of conventional weapons seem to have been concurrently reduced. These efforts were visibly rewarded by 1957 when the Soviet Union began serial production of MRBM's and successfully tested an ICBM.

A decade of vigorous research in missile technology, initiated by Stalin after the war, had opened the prospect of turning the strategic balance against the United States. If it were true (which proved not to be the case) that the Soviet Union was moving into a position of military parity with the West and would perhaps soon surpass the West in some respects, this development could have tremendous advantages as a backdrop for political and economic warfare. No less important to the Soviet perception of its own security requirements, the threat of force might also be needed as a last resort to maintain order within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

¹AP from TASS, February 20, 1956.
d. Implications for Policy. The development of the Soviet strategic outlook in 1954-1956 that rested both on increasing Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence and on the expectation of a breakthrough in strategic nuclear weapons, had many implications for the Soviet position on arms control and disarmament.

1) Comprehensive Disarmament. The Anglo-French proposals of April 1954--espoused by Washington, accepted by Moscow as a basis for discussion in September 1954, and then partially incorporated in the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955--envisioned extensive nuclear and conventional disarmament carried out in two stages, calling for but not spelling out the nature of a third stage of general disarmament. Stopping short of a third stage, the net effect of either the Western or the Soviet proposals would have been to transform the military balance so radically as to leave virtually unanswerable the question of which side would profit the more strategically.

For example, the elimination of nuclear weapons, proposed for late 1957 in the Soviet plan, would eliminate the basis of Western deterrence policy, but it would also strike at the key area in which Moscow expected to achieve superiority. Such uncertainties, combined with the as yet unresolved questions of inspection and control, the fixing of ratios, etc., as well as Moscow's assessment of Western intentions, must have made comprehensive disarmament appear unfeasible in 1954-1956 if not undesirable from the standpoint of military-political bargaining power. In any event, Moscow's intensive rocket development program and its willingness to export arms to the "third world" did not assume an early abatement of the arms race, and Soviet readiness to rely on limited numbers of prototype long-range bombers indicated an expectation that Western inspectors would not soon uncover Soviet military weaknesses.

We must conclude that so far as the military-strategic outlook was concerned, Moscow did not regard comprehensive disarmament to reflect vital Soviet interests in the 1954-1956 period.

2) Partial Measures. The Soviet attitude to partial measures in this period was somewhat different, and it can even be argued that the several agreements reached in 1963-1964 had their origins in 1954-1956. What the Soviets term "partial measures of disarmament" and what some Westerners call "arms control" appeared to receive serious consideration from the Soviet leaders for the first time in the postwar era in 1954-1956. The May 10, 1955 proposal included such measures as part of the comprehensive disarmament program that was put forward, and later in 1955 and 1956 Moscow showed an increasing willingness to
negotiate them separately. This new approach to partial measures seemed to dovetail with the Soviet strategic outlook, as indicated by the various partial measures of conventional and nuclear disarmament espoused by Soviet diplomats in 1954-1956.

a) Reductions and Limitations of Conventional Forces. Clearly the military systems of both nations would have been profoundly altered by the reduction to 1.5 million men envisaged by both Western and Soviet proposals of April and May 1955. However, Moscow's ability to agree in principle to reduced ceilings for Soviet armed forces was aided by military moves in progress, which were to be accompanied by reductions in Soviet ground forces by some 2 million men in 1955-1956, while Western forces had already been drastically cut immediately following the Korean Armistice. Although Soviet forces would have suffered a larger proportional cut than American forces, the 1.5 million ceiling would probably have compelled the United States to shut down many of its foreign bases. The Soviet Union in contrast could have kept its demobilized soldiers in reserve training more easily and moreover would remain geographically closer to probable areas of East-West conflict.

Reductions of British and French forces to the 650,000-man level proposed by the West and endorsed by Moscow would have entailed little sacrifice for London and Paris. But Bonn's proposed Bundeswehr of 500,000 men would, as we have pointed out before, have been seriously curtailed by Moscow's summit proposals to limit the forces of smaller powers to 150,000 to 200,000 men.

b) Liquidation of Foreign Bases. This step, a common theme in postwar Soviet propaganda and policy, would have deprived the Western alliance of its major support deriving from United States conventional and strategic forces in Europe and around the Soviet periphery. Moscow already planned in 1955 to withdraw from Austria, Porkkala-Udd, and Port Arthur and claimed to have eliminated all its foreign bases, though many remained in East Central Europe. The West was thus urged to reciprocate by abolishing some or not all its foreign bases.

c) Arms Limitations, Disengagement, and/or Neutralization in Both Germanies and Neighboring (East European) States. Hints in 1955 by President Eisenhower and in the Eden Plan of Western interest in such measures were well received by Moscow. If executed they could have resulted in American withdrawal from the continent, a strategic desideratum that might even justify the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Central Europe. Similarly, prevention of West German rearmament might have compensated for withdrawal of Soviet influence in East Germany, a vulnerable outpost difficult to control.
d) Fixed Control Posts to Inhibit Surprise Attack.
It is likely that the installation of such posts would have helped to allay Soviet anxieties about a first-strike from the U.S. Strategic Air Command bases surrounding the Soviet Union. Perhaps of even greater future importance would be the inhibiting effect of such controls on a possible offensive initiated in the future by a rearmed West Germany. The sites proposed for these posts did not include missile launching stations from which future Soviet threats could be made, and the proposal was faulted by the West in part on this ground. Nevertheless, since at least significant factions in the Soviet debate on strategic theory discounted a missile attack without an accompanying buildup of conventional forces, there is no reason to assume on that ground alone that the proposal was not serious.

e) Limitations on the Stationing of Nuclear Forces.
Such limitations in practice would have frustrated Western plans to emplace tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe to offset Soviet conventional forces; they would have also rendered impossible the nuclear armament of West Germany. Moscow, for its part, could have retained on Soviet territory its bomber and, later, missile forces targeted on Western Europe.

f) A Nuclear Test Ban. Whether Moscow actually wanted a ban would depend on the state of the nuclear weapons art in both East and West. In 1955 it probably seemed to be a question that could be resolved later, given the likelihood then that Washington would probably oppose a test ban until a control system could be devised and unless limitations were also placed on conventional forces. In any case the Soviet Union was rapidly catching up to and in some respects surpassing the United States in the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and could look forward to the day when--from a position of parity if not superiority--it could afford to halt testing.

g) Ban on Nuclear Weapons Production. So long as Moscow lagged behind the West in important areas of nuclear weapons procurement and deployment such a ban was obviously unthinkable. Moscow's 1955 proposals staged the "cutoff" on nuclear weapons production slightly later in the disarmament process than in Western plans. In 1956 Bulganin rejected any such cutoff that was not part of a larger disarmament program since it would "legalize" existing nuclear weapons of which the West still had more than Moscow. And, as we have seen, Moscow went on record in May 1955 with the statement that the international confidence necessary for Moscow to admit foreign inspectors in the near future was wholly insufficient to support the degree of inspection required to ensure a ban on nuclear weapons production.
h) Limits to Partial Measures. The basic limitations on Soviet interest in these partial measures included those that interfered with Moscow's desire for East-West détente and those that adversely affected the material and ideological support required to keep Communist governments in power and to sustain the dynamism of anticapitalist forces in the underdeveloped countries and in the West. In addition certain political and military conditions presumably would have had to be fulfilled before Moscow would enter into any partial measure. The limits set thus included at least the following:

(1) No measures that weakened the Warsaw bloc more than NATO. This ruled out Eisenhower's proposal for mutual aerial photography of the Soviet Union and the United States, which would have provided the West with much more new intelligence than it did the East. Moreover, United States bases abroad were not included in Washington's proposal.

(2) No inspection or controls in excess of the disarmament immediately planned. This condition also ruled out the "Open Skies" proposal, since the West portrayed it only as a "gateway" to disarmament. Similarly, French proposals for elaborate machinery to check "financial disarmament" probably struck Moscow as an intrusion not justified by the anticipated result.

(3) No staged disarmament without a defined timetable. The West should have no opportunity to stop midway in the disarmament process, for example, at some moment when its intelligence requirements had been satisfied.

(4) No limitations on Chinese forces without Peking's participation. This at least was Moscow's position at the well-publicized Summit and Foreign Ministers Conferences. But on several occasions in the Disarmament Subcommittee Soviet delegates proposed limiting Chinese forces to the same level suggested for United States and Soviet forces.

In surveying the evidence we have assembled under the Soviet military-strategic outlook in 1954-1956, it is evident that certain asymmetries in the military balance, summarized in Table II.3, exerted a very strong limiting influence on the range of measures which Moscow could regard as being both advantageous for the Soviet Union and acceptable to the West. From the military-strategic point of view only the most marginal of measures would seem to have offered Moscow any immediate interest or practical expectations. These, as we have suggested, may have included ground controls against surprise attack, limitation on the stationing of nuclear forces,
Table II.1
SOME MILITARY ASYMMETRIES IN 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The West</th>
<th>The Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expectations for gradual changes in the military environment.</td>
<td>Expectations of sudden improvements in the Soviet position vis-a-vis the West.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on SAC and nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>Reliance on conventional forces with Europe as hostage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak military intelligence and security.</td>
<td>Strong military intelligence and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic dependency on foreign bases.</td>
<td>No strategic dependency on foreign bases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

measures to inhibit West German rearmament, and perhaps at some future point, a nuclear test ban.

Soviet appreciation of the possible advantages of such measures seems to have been a by-product of the new realism of the post-Stalin Soviet military-strategic outlook, enhanced by a doubtless worrisome sense of Soviet strategic inferiority to the West. But if present weakness could have prompted a Soviet interest in détente and possibly in arms control agreements the expectation of strategic parity or even superiority probably set severe limits to sustained interest in such moves. Nonetheless, on the premise that the Soviets, like the West, prefer to negotiate from strength rather than from weakness, the prospect of ICBM's in inventory could at least arguably have made Moscow more confident of its longer-range ability to negotiate with the West on favorable terms.

2. The External Political Situation.

What did Moscow expect to achieve with its shifts in foreign policy manifested in the détente of 1955 and in the Twentieth Party Congress line? In adopting a more conciliatory foreign policy toward the West and in taking a more "reasonable" approach to disarmament and arms control was Moscow seeking merely to attenuate the struggle with the Western powers and thereby to lower the danger of war? Or did Moscow now perceive an additional interest
in cultivating those in Western governments who were more favorably disposed to agreements with the Soviet Union? These are some of the questions that arise in considering the political factors which influenced Soviet conduct in these formative years of a new approach to the West.

a. Structural Change in Foreign Policies. The developments in 1954-1956 in both the Soviet negotiating position and in Moscow's political use of the disarmament issue were part of a more pervasive but not unprecedented shift from a relatively antagonistic to a somewhat more relaxed and manipulative line in Soviet foreign relations generally. During the first postwar years Stalin had chosen to emphasize foreign policies based on a view of the world characterized by the struggle of two irreconcilably opposed camps. Realization of the counterproductive consequences of such a posture led to some moderation of harsher policies in 1949 and to official recognition in 1952 that "contradictions" within the non-Communist camp could be profitably exploited by such devices as the Communist-led peace movements. Nonetheless up to the time of Stalin's death in the spring of 1953 the Kremlin's official view tended to portray the world in terms of a simple dichotomy: the world of socialism versus the world of imperialism. Intermediate political forces and opinions were not openly recognized to any great extent between or within these two camps. There were no neutralist tendencies in Western Europe to warrant significant Soviet policy change. Western "ruling circles" were seen as uniformly antagonistic to the Soviet Union and committed to a relentless struggle to reimpose the capitalist order. Nehru and those like him were essentially the "agents of imperialism," as was Tito. Such was the basically unworkable view from Moscow when Stalin died.

Significant alterations had taken place in this world view by the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Recognition of diversity within the non-Communist world (and to some extent within the Communist world as well) was at the heart of the new Soviet efforts to manipulate and persuade rather than coerce, to accumulate indirect influence rather than struggle for direct control. The 1954-1956 period marked the first major phase of this change. In 1955 the Summit Conference and the pronounced détente that accompanied it symbolized the first series of Soviet moves to attenuate the basic

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two-camp struggle of Stalin's years and to promote the development of what Palmiro Togliatti in April 1954 characterized as exploitable "intermediate" forces.

International moves by Moscow in this period almost uniformly reflected the changed orientation. The signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 14, 1955 was entirely consistent with an intensified and as it turned out, long-lasting desire to exploit neutralist and anti-American sentiment in Western Europe. Khrushchev's pilgrimage to Belgrade in May-June 1955 suggested a new sense of sophistication about the hitherto anathematized diversity within international communism (and may well have also sharpened latent Sino-Soviet antagonisms). At this time also Moscow and the Western European Communist parties were seeking to tap new sources of mass sympathy and support within Western societies, as later evidenced in Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress pronouncement on the "peaceful transition" to socialism and in the new prominence assigned to peace fronts in Soviet strategy.

Finally, the striking disarmament move of May 10, 1955 reflected both the recognition of "healthy forces" within Western leadership groups and an intensified interest in their cultivation to reduce the risk of thermonuclear war. It must be borne in mind, however, that this and other conciliatory gestures of the period were consistently reinforced by displays of Soviet military power. The annual May Day parade featured repeated overflights of prototype intercontinental bombers whose appearance had profound repercussions in American military circles. And the Soviet answer to Germany's entry into NATO was to cancel the wartime treaties of friendship with London and Paris and to form the Warsaw Pact a week later. These seemingly contradictory moves suggested a strategy aimed at building an atmosphere in the NATO countries inimical to the continuation of harshly anti-Soviet policies. The saliency of Soviet military power would give pause to whatever "aggressive forces" in the West might be weighing an attack on Soviet territory. More to the point, it would increase dissatisfaction with the policies of men like Secretary of State Dulles and German Chancellor Adenauer, identified by Moscow as its chief enemies for their assumption of unremitting struggle between the two sides. The military consequences of such antagonism, the Kremlin made clear, should cause anxiety in America as well as Europe. If, on the other hand, the West steered a more moderate course, the Soviet government pledged reciprocation. In Bulganin's words, Moscow would "support those . . . elements which show a desire to ease international tension and maintain peace."  

1 New Times, No. 21 (May 21), 1955.
This relaxation of frontal pressure on Western Europe and the pursuit of indirect advances generally in relations with the West was accompanied by the initiation of the drive for influence in the economically underdeveloped world. The start of this campaign was signalled by Nehru's visit to Moscow in June-July 1955. Simultaneously there was an intensification of the tendency of the Communist parties in the third world to enter into collaboration with the "national bourgeoisie" they had so long treated with enmity. Moscow's new focus on the emerging nations was also reflected in the Czech arms shipments to Cairo, initially negotiated in the summer of 1955, and in the Khrushchev-Bulganin Asian tour later that year as the Soviet Union became the first power to detonate a hydrogen bomb from an aircraft. Thus, as Soviet policy toward the West adopted a more cautious and complex mixture of blandishments and threats, Soviet political expectations centering increasingly on the erosion of Western influence in the new states and the expansion of an anti-Western "zone of peace" that would lay the basis for new additions to the Soviet camp.

In short, the pendulum movement observed in Soviet foreign policy in the interwar years and in 1945-1947 was occurring once more. In 1955, for the first time since 1919, there was in Moscow a "serious expectation of having the socialist camp emerge as the leader of mankind in the near future." The path to victory, as in the 1920's was expected to lead through the East and only from there to the West. Little noticed in 1954-1955, however, the changes in Soviet strategy toward the West and the "third world" were helping to create a long-term danger to Soviet interests in a politically hostile and ultimately a militarily threatening China. No doubt the Kremlin still hoped in 1955 to keep China within a Soviet-led Communist camp--a wish that helped to motivate the termination in 1954 of unfavorable economic relations that Stalin had imposed on Nationalist and subsequently Communist China. However, the Sino-Soviet ideological differences that followed the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956 were probably in the air as early as 1955. Although the nature of Peking's influence on Soviet policy in 1954-1956 is not clear, one can at least speculate that Moscow's desire to move effectively into the tiers monde was quickened by the realization that Peking could also vie for leadership in Africa and Asia, as was demonstrated at Bandung.

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b. The View to the West. While the expansion of Soviet power and of international communism was seen increasingly in terms of an extended historical process, in the short term simultaneous collaboration and struggle with a heterogeneous adversary became somewhat more possible. As we have seen, the broad foreign policy trend of 1954-1956 to seek out and exploit differences of interest and opinion—"intermediate forces"—in the non-Communist world included a new Soviet political interest in the disarmament and arms control issue to influence decision-making in the West. This change in the Soviet approach marked a significant step in the development of Moscow's willingness to collaborate with its Western adversaries to deal with the threat posed by contemporary armaments.

When the Soviet leaders looked to the West in these years, they are likely to have seen exploitable opportunities in differences existing within the leadership of each major Western country including the United States, and between the various NATO governments. To a lesser extent, new advantage may also have been perceived in the exploitation of differences between Western European governments and their populations, especially in France and Italy. A hostile and uncompromising foreign policy line toward the West would diminish the various Western leadership divisions, causing the divergent groups to rally around the flag in defense against the Soviet threat—as must have been brought home to Moscow by German entry into NATO on May 9, 1955 via the Western European Union after long years of the cold war. On the other hand, a less antagonistic foreign policy line might well exacerbate Western elite differences, lower the military and political pressures from the West, and facilitate local Communist advances in Western Europe.

The Soviet press gave an indication, albeit in flamboyant language, of the Kremlin's view of differences within the "ruling circles" in Washington. ¹ On the one hand there were the "madmen"

who backed "positions of strength"—Dulles, Nixon, Senators McCarthy
and Knowland, Admiral Radford, General Gruenther, and the Pentagon
as a whole.1 Opposed to these "aggressive" forces were influential
men who took a more "sober" approach to foreign policy—such as
Adlai Stevenson and Senators George and Mansfield.3 President
Eisenhower, although he received some criticism, was not linked
among the "madmen" or the "healthy forces." Later in 1955 Moscow
characterized Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal as well intentioned
and "sincere" but subject to abuse by those around the President.
The appointment in March 1955 of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant
to the President for Disarmament Affairs was termed a maneuver to
divert public attention from the U.S. government's policy of
conducting a frenzied arms drive.4

1 See A. Trianin and G. Morozov, "Podgotovka i propaganda
atomnoi voiny—tiagchaishee prestuplenie protiv cheloveshestva,"
Kommunist, No. 8 (May), 1955; Iu. Arbatov, "Imperialisticheskaia
propaganda SShA—ugroza miru narodov," Kommunist, No. 7 (May), 1955;
"Dalles vastaivae na gonke vooruhenii . . .," Pravda, May 27, 1955;
A. Alexayev, "The U.S.S.R. Disarmament Proposals—A Major Contribu-
tion to Peace," International Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955; and edi-
torial, "On the Eve of the Four-Power Conference," International
Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955.

2 Sh. Sanakoyev, "New Type of International Relations," Inter-
national Affairs, No. 1 (January), 1955; M. Slavyanov, "Firm Founda-
tion of European and Universal Security: The Warsaw Conference,"
International Affairs, No. 6 (June), 1955; Y. Lebedev, "Adlai
Stevenson on U.S. Foreign Policy," New Times, No. 27 (July 1), 1955;
editorial, "On the Eve of the Four-Power Conference," International
Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955.

3 "Zaiavlenie senatora Dzhorzia," Pravda, May 19, 1955; "Ameri-
kanskii senator o soveshchanii," Pravda, June 18, 1955.

4 For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, April 1, 1955,
26), 1955.
In addition to opportunities for a political use of the disarmament-arms control issue in relations with the United States leadership, Moscow also perceived important exploitable differences between Europe and the United States, among the NATO governments generally, and within European societies. Many of these differences Moscow attributed to "farsighted" European tendencies toward independence from Washington. The Kremlin probably hoped for an even greater impact of its soft line in Europe than in the United States by reason of the keen interest there in disarmament and an end to the cold war, in the Austrian settlement, in independence from American policies, in trade with the East, and also because of organized pro-Soviet peace fronts and Communist parties, especially in France and Italy. Even after ratification of the London-Paris Accords strong voices in France and the Federal Republic opposed West German rearmament.

The Soviet media pointed to "irreconcilable contradictions, overt and covert [that] are growing both inside each capitalist country and between them [and that] undermine the military and political agreements of capitalist states from within." Manipulation of these conflicts, Moscow may have hoped, would throw uncertainty into the NATO alliance and maximize the pursuit of policies independent of U.S. direction, which in turn would limit the policy alternatives open to Washington.

c. Implications for Policy. In place of the traditional Soviet efforts to expose Western "hypocrisy" in the disarmament negotiations and to provoke mass opposition to Western foreign policies with simplistic slogans to ban the bomb, the Soviet leadership showed an increasing interest in directly manipulating influential opinion in Western countries. Soviet political exploitation of the disarmament issue in 1954-1956, in conjunction with other moves for a relaxation of East-West tensions, assumed a more sophisticated form, seeking to obscure East-West antagonisms

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and to encourage the development of moderate opinion in and around the Western governments, especially in the United States.

In this way Moscow evidently hoped to influence Western decision-making to favor a number of inter-related Soviet policy objectives: (a) to deprive the more antagonistic elements in the Western policy line toward the Soviet Union of their justification; (b) to dissolve the social and political basis of Western willingness to use nuclear weapons; (c) to destabilize and demobilize Western military alliances and specifically to undermine the position of American foreign bases; (d) to neutralize the ability of the United States to make political use of its military force in keeping NATO together; (e) to discourage Western commitment to an all-out arms race; and (f) to inhibit and prevent West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thus, Moscow could hope to influence the moral and physical base of Western security by political action short of agreements.

That the May 10, 1955, and subsequent Soviet disarmament moves were aimed at influencing Western decision-making at a high level was strongly suggested by Soviet propaganda restraint in the following months. Instead of hammering away at signs the West was reevaluating its previous stand, Soviet propaganda stressed the positive prospects for détente and the desirability, if not immediate possibility of disarmament. Even the U.S. "reservation" of September 1955 was not played up in Moscow's multilingual journal International Affairs and was hardly noted in the official organ of the Cominform, and then only toward the end of the year. In contrast to the line of these public media, however, Soviet diplomats in the DSCC and at the October Foreign Ministers Conference sharply criticized the West, particularly Washington, for not standing behind its pre-Summit proposals. And the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 heard Khrushchev himself accuse the West of reneging after Moscow accepted its position on forced levels in May 1955.

Soviet propaganda restraint was presumably based on the assumption that a hostile propaganda of exposure would have had the effect of neutralizing any tendency in the Western leadership to seek some accommodation with Moscow. At the same time the Kremlin may also have been curious to wait and see what policy line was forthcoming from the West, rather than foreclose some favorable change by aggressive Soviet actions.

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1 For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, November 25 and December 30, 1955.

In addition to the question of how to treat the Western posture on disarmament there was the problem of presenting the new Soviet line, not only to the Communist world and the developing countries but to the West. A poignant note was sounded by one Soviet publication which noted that at the Helsinki Assembly convened by the World Peace Council in June 1955 "many speakers expressed regret that the new Soviet proposals were still not sufficiently known in the West." As it was, this gathering had unexpectedly been postponed in April, apparently to take the new Soviet line to the West into account.

The changes in the Soviet approach to disarmament and arms control in this period complicated the tasks of Communist propaganda and agitation in that the Kremlin now sought to impress a number of quite different audiences, some of whom would respond favorably to simplistic slogans while others could be influenced if at all only by a more sophisticated appeal. Thus, while Moscow's new gradualist approach to controlled prohibition of nuclear weapons and its new recognition of the problem of clandestine storing of nuclear weapons had direct meaning for Western governments, these changes were counterproductive for the traditional World Peace Council agitation for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons (manifested in the Vienna Appeal of January 1955), and did not translate readily into attractive and self-evident propaganda propositions on which to build peace organizations in the West and the "third world." Consequently Moscow at times pursued contradictory themes in its negotiating and propaganda line on specific measures, comprehensive and partial.

1) Comprehensive Disarmament. As indicated, the major comprehensive plan put forward by Moscow in 1954-1956 was that of May 10, 1955, which was reiterated at the Summit. While such a sweeping measure might seem suitable only for mass agitation, the fact that it seemed to accept some major elements in the West's negotiating position made the May 10 draft useful for appealing to more influential opinion in the West. Out of the complex staging of the May 10 proposal Soviet propaganda usually seized on the issue of conventional force reductions, stressing Moscow's willingness to accept precisely those levels called for by the West. In the Soviet view propagation of comprehensive disarmament (and eventually of GCD) in the East-West negotiations and at the United Nations would also serve to condition the international political atmosphere, identifying the Soviet Union with the cause of peace in the "third world" and promoting public awareness of the disarmament problem.

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if not pacifist attitudes, in the NATO countries. In addition, Moscow could pursue the "fight for peace" involving the mobilization of peace fronts under the slogan of general disarmament, while under this cover it could slowly begin to explore the possibility of measures to control the military environment with the United States.

2) Partial Measures. While some of the partial measures which Moscow advocated in 1954-1956 could communicate directly to Western leaders at least some degree of interest in coming to terms on certain arms controls, Soviet proposals seemed generally designed to aggravate differences within NATO, especially in connection with German rearmament and Bonn's full participation in the Western alliance.

(a) Ground Control Posts and Regional Arms Controls. The Soviet proposal of ground control posts to prevent surprise attack lacked ready mass appeal, and the main Soviet interest here was probably to encourage Western governments to recognize a mutual interest in avoiding the outbreak of war, if not yet in entering into joint measures to this end. This proposal may also have represented an attempt to lower the apparent Soviet military threat to the West by indicating a desire to stabilize the military environment. We may also speculate that in addition to the military-strategic desirability of having observers at SAC bases around the Soviet perimeter, the implementation of the ground control proposal would have reflected a Soviet political interest in reassuring the West against conventional attack in Europe, since Moscow certainly did not need such an agreement to learn of a mobilization in the open societies of the West.

In addition Moscow may have hoped for a certain disruptive impact upon NATO. With West Germany now a member of the alliance as of the day before the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, Moscow had a new interest in finding and exploiting points of difference between Washington and Bonn. Relatively feasible arms control measures affecting the European region offered a means to this end. The ground control post proposal might have some appeal to the United States leadership for military reasons, and would become more relevant in future years. But it would remain disadvantageous to the West German Government, owing both to the hardening effect of such measures on the status quo in Central Europe, and to the limitations they would place on Bonn's freedom of action in the military and political spheres.

Discussion of the disengagement issue with the West also offered Moscow certain political advantages. Coupled with the Soviet political use of intercontinental air power and the increasing deployment of Soviet MRBM's against Western Europe, indications of Soviet interest in disengagement helped to undermine
the United States influence in Europe. From the point of view of popular propaganda, Moscow's support for disengagement offered a means of mobilizing against NATO anti-American, anti-German and neutralist sentiment in Western Europe and Britain. In particular, disengagement seemed to present a reasonable alternative to West German rearmament and to NATO plans (announced in December 1954) to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

A less feasible measure, however, was the Soviet proposal of an all-European security pact to replace the military alliances of East and West. From the Soviet point of view, however, propagation of this measure clearly followed from the Kremlin's rising interest in obscuring the "two-camp" struggle between East and West. Like Soviet fraternization at the Summit with the leaders of the adversary states, and the new affability of the Soviet leaders at diplomatic receptions in Moscow, the proposal to dissolve the opposing military alliances reflected the new Soviet interest in moderating the East-West confrontation, allowing somewhat less anti-Soviet opinion to gain influence in the West, and in reducing the external pressures which helped to maintain the unity of the North Atlantic alliance.

(b) The Nuclear Test Ban. An issue on which Moscow could appeal both to influential opinion in the West and to mass sentiment throughout the world was the problem of nuclear testing. A number of events in 1954-1955 had dramatized the problem--the "Lucky Dragon" incident of March 1954, the February 1955 announcement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the unexpected contamination from Strontium-90 as a result of nuclear testing, and the April 1955 opposition of the Bandung Conference to nuclear testing. Moscow sought to capitalize on this popular sentiment and in 1955-1956 began to put itself forward as the chief exponent of a test ban. In this the Soviet Government clearly sought to enhance its international image, and to stigmatize and inhibit Western testing. Perhaps the most clearly directed pressure was aimed at the British hydrogen bomb program, especially against the first British thermonuclear test early in 1956, when Soviet proposals called for the prohibition of thermonuclear rather than nuclear testing. Although the test ban problem had acquired leadership interest in both East and West by 1957, on the whole it remained politically somewhat novel in this earlier period and was more energetically exploited by Moscow as an agitational issue.

Having considered Moscow's view of the West and its political interests in proposing certain arms controls to Western governments, we may surmise that Western conduct in the months following the May 10, 1955 proposal resolved any doubt that Moscow might have entertained about the readiness of the "moderate" forces in Western governments
to enter into meaningful disarmament measures with the Communist states. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the Soviet leaders also perceived in the revision of United States positions in 1955-1956 an indication of a somewhat more serious approach to the whole problem of arms control and disarmament. Khrushchev's experiences at the Summit probably sharpened his awareness that Western leaders, above all Eisenhower, also recognized the suicidal nature of nuclear war and would probably do all they could to avoid such war. At the same time, even though the pax atomica was expensive and dangerous to maintain, it precluded Western efforts to "roll back" the Iron Curtain and would deter Western attempts to interdict the Soviet entry into the "third world." In this perspective there is no prima facie reason to assume as some have done that the Soviets necessarily drew from the growing nuclear stalemate the conclusion that disarmament agreements were essential or possible. What is likely, given the shifting tides of strategy and outlook, is that a more rational and therefore reasonable negotiating position on control of armaments was put forward, much as it had increasingly been in the West, out of a new sense of urgency and seriousness of the problem but without great expectations for agreement.

3. The Economic Factor

What economic incentives may have reinforced the Kremlin's interest in lessening East-West tensions and in reducing military allocations of men and material? Were there arms control measures that would be economically as well as militarily advantageous?

The evidence suggests first of all that economic pressures of a sort that would have provided Moscow with an urgent motive in 1955 to pursue disarmament agreements with the West did not exist. What was present, however, was an economic situation in which significant relaxation of tensions would allow the Kremlin to divert resources to a concentration on weapons systems of possibly decisive future importance while saving on both funds and manpower required for present defenses.

a. The Economic Burden of Soviet Defense. As can be seen from Chart II.2, the absolute level of Soviet arms spending in 1955 was approximately equal to that prevailing in 1952 at the height of the defense efforts during the Korean War. While arms spending was visibly lower in 1953, 1954, and 1956 than in 1952 and 1955, the rough stability of the volume of total possible arms spending over this period is probably the most significant feature of the data. In 1953 and 1954 the Malenkov leadership announced reductions in the planned level of the defense budget, as did Khrushchev in 1956. In terms of actual reported expenditures and total possible arms
Chart II.2

Estimated Soviet Defense and Space Expenditures 1950-1964

A. Possible total defense and space expenditures
B. Official reported defense expenditures
C. Estimated military manpower costs (pay and subsistence)
D. Possible total weapons and space systems development and procurement (A-C)

For sources and explanation of data see Appendix to this chapter, p. 61
spending these reductions were less than dramatic. The 1956 budget cut made by Khrushchev, who only the previous year had chided Malenkov for neglecting defense, was larger in volume and percentage than the reductions of 1953 and 1954. These minor deviations in the defense line probably reflect more the convolutions of the post-Stalin struggle for power than thoroughgoing disagreements on basic policy. Both Malenkov and Khrushchev seem to have been interested in the stability and perhaps retrenchment of the defense budget. (Soviet production data suggest that in 1953 and 1954 the output of tanks, military transport, and artillery was cut in favor of the production of tractors and other civilian machinery. The use of defense plants for the production of consumer durables such as refrigerators suggests that airframe production for tactical craft may also have been reduced.)

On the basis of what we see when we look back Moscow probably expected that the costs of the defense effort would not rise beyond a tolerable level since increased outlays on advanced weapons procurement could be counterbalanced with cuts in military manpower and conventional weapons procurement. On the other hand, it is possible that Soviet leaders underestimated the costs of defense in the missile age that they were soon to enter. In reducing military forces by over 2 million men in 1955 and 1956 Moscow may have not thought only to make "savings" that would pay for rising investments in military technology; the transfer of the demobilized soldiers into the economy was also probably thought of as a productive asset in a period when the demographic effects of World War II would begin to create labor shortages, although in 1954 the industrial labor force was still rising. The consequences for the economy of this large-scale transfer of scientific manpower to the defense industry, which began during 1955 and 1956, were not yet apparent.

The Kremlin possibly failed to appreciate the extent of the cost differential between developing prototype long-range bombers (and later, ICBM's) and procuring them in large numbers. Or it may have planned to rely largely on prototypes, the exact number of which would be shrouded in secrecy, rather than on mass production of these fearful and expensive weapons.

But on balance, given that costs of defense generally have to be unbearable to outweigh political gains in the typical Soviet calculus of benefit, it cannot be said that the burden of defense weighed heavily on the Soviet economy in 1955, as a determining factor in the minds of the nation's leaders, and we believe that changes in Soviet policy were due primarily to other factors. To engage the West in a full-scale arms race for the future might,
however, have seemed in 1955 to pass the threshold both of economics and of strategy. And in fact the Soviet Union was not forced to make significant sacrifices of other goals in order to maintain the defense effort at its prevailing level. Indeed, in the years 1954-1956 Soviet industry appears to have grown at the most rapid pace seen in the 1952-1962 decade.\(^1\)

Stalin's successors inherited an agricultural situation marked by virtual stagnation. Owing to increased attention to incentives and especially to the supply of greater amounts of capital to agriculture, in 1955 the leadership could expect marked improvements in the near future, if not exactly at the present. The hopes of the regime centered principally in the Virgin Lands Program, under which large areas of marginal farm land in Siberia and Central Asia were being brought under the plow in order to raise total grain output. The program depended on massive inputs of machinery that were made possible only by the reduction of conventional weapons production after 1953, but it required less capital investment than other approaches to agricultural progress.

Substantial improvements were being made in civilian living standards largely owing to Malenkov's "new course," which, although it did not proceed to the point of altering the basic predominance

\(^1\)Professor Abram Bergson's studies of Soviet national income indicate that the proportion of GNP devoted to defense in 1955 was about the same as in 1950 before the Korean War rearmament got under way. (Bergson's figures were 10.9 per cent in 1950 and 10.3 per cent in 1955, but they appear to be based on the official budget, which is an understatement of total defense outlays.) The diversion of resources to current military production during 1950-1952 sharply retarded the growth of civilian machine production, which in turn cut into Soviet investment capabilities. The growth of civilian industry was thus retarded. After 1953, although the level of military R&D probably rose and the output of some advanced aircraft may have increased, much plant capacity and current material supply were diverted to the production of civilian machinery. The growth rate of civilian machinery output increased from about 7.5 per cent per year in the years 1951-1953 to about 16 per cent in 1954-1956, and aggregate civilian industry from slightly over 9 per cent to slightly over 11 per cent per year in the same periods. Owing to an increased capacity to emplace new equipment in industry, industrial labor productivity (output per employee), a cherished indicator of progress to Soviet planners, increased in 1954 and 1955 at about twice the rate of the previous three years.
of heavy industry, had infused sufficient new investment into the consumer industries to produce impressive relative increases in the output of consumer durables and food. A significant role in raising living standards was played by the release of inventories of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954.

Thus Khrushchev made the best of two possible worlds in 1955 by temporarily raising the defense budget—a source of gratification to his military constituents, hard-line elements in the party, and some plant-managers and scientists—and by promising more food as well. The still rapid Soviet growth rate permitted living standards to increase absolutely even while heavy industry and defense retained or even increased their share of the economic pie.

The tone and content of the Twentieth Party Congress early in 1956 indicated that the Soviet leadership was highly pleased with the current growth record of the Soviet economy, relatively confident that growth would continue to be rapid, and highly sensitive to the manifold implications of Soviet economic performance for the achievement of its international goals. The future military potential of the Soviet Union, its prestige in the eyes of neutrals, and the respect it received from opponents were seen to hinge very greatly on economic growth; peaceful economic competition with capitalism was becoming the most active front of the cold war. At the same time Soviet leaders appreciated that broad secular trends were acting slowly to retard the growth rate of the economy, as evidenced by the relatively conservative goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan relative to the Fifth. They were therefore concerned to keep the claims of defense on the resources of the economy from increasing significantly.

b. Implications for Policy. We can now inquire whether there were in fact any economic reasons why the Soviet Union chose to demonstrate a serious interest in disarmament and arms control measures in 1955. Two alternative explanations are plausible. They hinge not so much on the general level of arms spending and the condition of the economy but on the point in time at which the Soviet leadership decided that a missile breakthrough was distinctly possible and that they should proceed in its pursuit. If the decision to proceed with missile development on a crash basis were taken late in 1954 or early in 1955, it could be argued that the Soviet Union would have been interested in disarmament discussions aimed primarily at promoting détente with the West, on the theory that relaxation of tensions would allow the Soviet Union to concentrate its arms effort on systems that would come to fruition only after several years.
By avoiding the necessity of procuring existing weapons systems, the possession of which even in large numbers might not alter the current strategic balance significantly, the Soviet Union could develop advanced systems without detracting from economic growth. Certain kinds of arms control and disarmament agreements would not endanger this objective since rocket development could continue under the rubric of space exploration. Agreements to limit possession or testing of nuclear missiles were extremely remote in 1956. Even if such agreements were actually reached, however, Moscow might still withdraw at a propitious moment in its R & D program, especially if it had a substantial lead over the West.

But if it is assumed that the Soviet leadership did not decide until late in 1955 or early in 1956 to exploit the revolutionary implications of the missile technology under development (an assumption supported by the previously described dramatic increase in R&D employment between July 1955 and December 1956), another explanation of Soviet behavior at the negotiating table may be advanced. Until the missile breakthrough became a reasonable certainty the chances for the success of Soviet strategy must have appeared uncertain though hopeful, since the absolute superiority of the United States in intercontinental aircraft was large and growing despite talk of a bomber gap. To overtake the United States on this front would have been not only expensive but less than fruitful strategically since the developing air defense systems in the West were tending to increase the number of bombers required to inflict even marginal damage, and it was probably not considered economic to step up production of bombers, particularly in the light of promising missile developments. While the Soviet Union was the vastly inferior competitor in the bomber race, an arms control agreement—or period of détente—that reduced the margin of American superiority was economically as well as militarily attractive because it would buy an increased measure of security without increased economic sacrifice.

Two additional economic advantages of détente, although marginal in importance, should be noted. First, the long-term credits to finance the import of Western machinery would be much easier to obtain in an atmosphere of relaxed East-West tensions. Such trade, the Soviet Marxist view suggests, would also be useful in building a material base for peaceful coexistence. Second, the still prevalent view among Soviet economic spokesmen was that the capitalist economies might collapse without defense spending or, short of that eventuality, that the latter would benefit less from defense savings than would a planned socialist economy.)
Combinations and variations of the various alternative explanations of Soviet behavior may be suggested. Soviet leaders may have perceived the implications of missile technology early in 1955 but may have been hesitant to proceed with its development on a crash basis because they were not sanguine about the costs involved, in which case a final strenuous attempt to achieve a favorable disarmament agreement would have appeared a reasonable course. They may also have felt that any agreement could be structured so as to preserve their nascent missile lead while diminishing American superiority in manned aircraft.

What we have called manifest Soviet arms control and disarmament policies in 1954-1956 were, we believe, intimately connected to the strategic posture, present and planned, of the Soviet Union. This connection we see as part of a more broadly orchestrated political and diplomatic offensive growing out of the changing perceptions of Soviet leaders as to the best way to protect the security of the nation and at the same time to advance its international objectives. In this sense, while the over-all allocation of economic and human resources was an internal part of the strategic outlook, economic factors in the narrower sense were probably not of vital importance in conditioning Soviet policy on arms control and disarmament in 1955. (Moreover, if we are correct in our belief that the cost of the arms race was underestimated and the prospects for Soviet growth overestimated in 1955, Moscow was without the strong economic incentives to cut back defense expenditures that it faced in later years.)

4. The Internal Political Situation

A key factor in determining the shifts in the Soviet approach to arms control and disarmament was of course the arrival of a new leadership in the Kremlin. In certain respects, the military-strategic, external political, and economic factors enumerated above were present, albeit to a lesser extent, in Stalin's day. What had changed most was the Soviet decision-makers' perception of those factors and their reactions to them. Molotov, Stalin's close associate, continued to advance Stalinist views on foreign policy in 1955, deriving contrary conclusions to those drawn by Khrushchev in observing the same situation.

The zigzag in Moscow's external relations from September through May 1955 particularly on the disarmament issue, seemed to correspond with the changing power positions of Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev. The intraparty struggle seems to have proceeded in three stages. First, from Stalin's death to Malenkov's removal in February 1955 Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and others attacked and defeated the Malenkov-Mikoyan line featuring
the "new course" in domestic economic policy, involving possible limitation of investment in defense and heavy industry together with tendencies to compromise in external relations. In the fall of 1954 there had been signs of a Malenkov-Khrushchev alliance against Molotov on foreign policy issues, including relations with Tito and possibly the disarmament move of September 30, 1954 and the settlement on Trieste in October 1954. However, a sharpening of the Soviet foreign policy line took place between November 1954 and February 1955 that strongly suggested a rapprochement of Khrushchev and Molotov with others for the purpose of ousting Malenkov. As a consequence, in February 1955 Moscow seemed to retract its negotiating offer of September 1954.

Second, after Malenkov's removal a grouping composed of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Bulganin, and conceivably Malenkov seems to have been formed, as Khrushchev evidently led an attack against Molotov in February-April 1955. In this period the Soviet position on disarmament returned to the more conciliatory position of September 1954. By the end of April 1955, following Soviet moves toward an Austrian settlement, the publication of Tito's criticism of Molotov in the Soviet central press on March 9, the promotion of eleven top military men, and the progressive Soviet change of its negotiating position in the disarmament negotiations on March 12, it seemed that Molotov's resistance had been broken. Late in April 1955 a decision was apparently taken by the Presidium to discuss Molotov's attitude at the forthcoming July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. At the same time, however, Pravda and Kommunist reminded Khrushchev (not by name) that the Central Committee Secretary was chosen to execute the decisions of the Central Committee, suggesting that an alliance had coalesced to check further direct advance by Khrushchev.

Nonetheless in the following weeks until the July plenum and the Summit Conference, the third period of the intraparty struggle, Khrushchev apparently preserved sufficient latitude to make a powerful attack on Molotov's position. By proposing and making foreign policy concessions Khrushchev may have been able to provoke debate and decisions within the Presidium that had the effect of isolating Molotov. By May 1955 the point had evidently been reached where the new foreign policy line could go ahead on all fronts, in effect locking Molotov out. This was formally confirmed at the July plenum, when, with the new foreign policy line at its peak, the decision was taken to convene the Twentieth Party Congress. The shock of de-Stalinization that was to meet the delegates there had in fact been preceded by significant progress in the "de-Stalinization" of postwar Soviet foreign policy. It was doubtless no accident that one effect of the new foreign policy moves to strengthen
the "moderates" and weaken the "aggressive circles" within Western elites was to isolate and weaken Molotov and the more inflexible proponents of a two-camp struggle within the Soviet elite.

Stalin's successors needed a breathing space in which to carry out their factional struggle and stabilize a new rule. This meant that his proffered détente had to be persuasive to the West, which had demanded "deeds" of Moscow. Khrushchev's regime might be thought to have been too unstable even in the summer of 1955 to carry out major agreements with the adversary. But already in May there were major concessions in Soviet policy toward Austria and Yugoslavia and in Moscow's negotiating position on disarmament. Khrushchev's policies, somewhat in the Bolshevik tradition, were "all out": They ventured much to gain much—but all the bets were hedged in the sense that even losses would not be inordinately painful.

Tension relaxation of this sort was not only a "policy." To some extent it was a process taking place that Khrushchev tried to channel. The modernization of Soviet society—a function of industrialization, urbanization, and education—created pressures for greater freedom and prosperity internally. Although no mechanism exists by which these pressures could directly affect the Kremlin's policy, Stalin's successors have stressed their devotion to the domestic and external issues most salient to the Soviet public—prosperity and peace. While public opinion can still be molded and even disregarded, the pervasive modernist tendencies in Soviet life reinforce the other forces militating for a liberalization in Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand, it still remained very much in question whether the Soviet regime and the international Communist movement could withstand the psychological-political impact of a long-term disarmament treaty and/or détente, and whether disarmament or détente might not vitiate the élan and the very raison d'être of communism. Even if we assume that Khrushchev faced up to this question we can only conclude that the potential repercussions of a possible disarmament treaty may have seemed in 1955 far too hypothetical and remote or, if they were actually faced up to, were probably dismissed in the face of Khrushchev's general optimism about the future of Soviet communism.

To sum up, the line that triumphed in May and July 1955 was more dynamic and expansionist than Malenkov's but more flexible and subtle than Molotov's. It evolved from the interaction of experience and experience, doctrinal residue, and the new top men's personal manner of perceiving and acting. One of its prime
characteristics was ebullient optimism about the future of the Soviet Union in world affairs. This optimism was a function of all the factors mentioned, as perceived by the new leadership: military equality or superiority vis-à-vis the West, "contradictions" in the West, opportunities in Asia and Africa, and expectations of Soviet economic growth and capitalist economic decline.

D. The Rise and Decline of the "Spirit of Geneva"

Despite the apparently narrowing differences on disarmament in the May, 1955 negotiations, and despite the "Geneva spirit", it was clear half-way through the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference that both sides were still in fact taking opposite stands on basic questions. The reservation placed in September 1955 on all U.S. pre-Summit Conference disarmament positions made the differences explicit, and the rancorous Foreign Ministers meeting in October rendered the coup de grâce.

What were the factors pro and con that worked to promote and then subvert the movement toward détente and disarmament? We can sum them up briefly, starting with the factors that favored agreement.

First, the virtual impossibility of achieving invulnerability to nuclear attack, the desirability of curbing nuclear production and proliferation, the fear that the opponent might make a technological breakthrough—all these expressions of a revolution in military strategy imparted a greater urgency to progress toward stabilizing the military environment. The desire in Moscow and Washington to avoid a nuclear holocaust was reinforced by increasing demands from the emerging nations of Africa and Asia to resolve East-West differences, halt the arms race, and stop nuclear testing.

Within the two alliance structures, proponents of Bonn's participation in NATO delayed East-West summit talks until ratification of the London-Paris Accords in April-May 1955. Some in the West argued that talks could then proceed from strength and without the danger of the debacle that befall the European Defense Community project. On their side, Soviet negotiators were presumably confident that Communist unity would not suffer from East-West negotiations. The ferment that was to be stirred by the February 1956 CPSU Congress had not yet weakened Moscow's influence in Peking and Eastern Europe. Soviet optimism about the growth of the socialist camp and "anti-imperialism" in general tended to outweigh cautions concerning the possible repercussions of détente. The Warsaw Pact, formalized in mid-May, offered "parity" in negotiations with NATO.
Finally, the "spirit of Geneva" was in large part a function of the new leadership in both Moscow and Washington. Khrushchev and Bulganin in Moscow, Eisenhower and Eden in the West were new men in those offices; they brought a new spirit of conciliation to East-West relations.

On the negative side, the same factors that implied the desirability of curbing the arms race made it extremely difficult to do so. Nuclear production had already reached a point where hidden caches of atomic weapons could evade inspection. The fear that the adversary might even achieve a technological breakthrough was accompanied, especially in Moscow, by hope that one's own scientists might overturn an unfavorable balance of power. While the West hoped to improve its position in Europe by the new Bundeswehr, this development produced increased anxieties in what soon was formalized as the Warsaw Pact. And aside from these dynamic factors, the existing military situation in 1955 embodied many asymmetries that made it hard to find equivalent strengths to trade off in disarmament agreements.

These factors, in combination with the uncertainties of future technological development, meant that an extremely complicated formula would be needed to persuade both sides that their security could be enhanced by some package of arms limitation or reduction. Comprehensive disarmament, it is true, could blot out the unique strengths of each side, but the political prerequisites for such extensive measures were lacking. The superpowers were not entirely ready for partial measures such as a test ban or surprise-attack controls because of technological and political uncertainties as yet unresolved.

For another thing, ideological conflict, suspicions reinforced by historical experience, and continuing political disputes all conspired to undermine and impede East-West détente. The range of conflict appeared in the issues that one side proposed and the other rejected for discussion at the Summit Conference: liberation of Eastern Europe and an end of international Communist subversion, suggested by the West; the seating of Peking in the United Nations and the return of Taiwan to Communist China, advocated by Moscow.

Although Moscow and the West agreed to side-step these issues at the Summit Conference, the problem on which most debate turned was (and remains) the most immediate source of Soviet-Western conflict: Germany and European security. Western insistence on "allowing" West Germany—-or a reunified Germany—-to join NATO was diametrically opposed to Soviet demands that Germany be neutralized as the price for possible reunification. The ill-feeling resulting from this
encounter vitiated whatever impetus toward disarmament seemed to flow from the "spirit of Geneva."

The formal unity on both sides was to some degree in doubt. In the West it rested on persuasion and compromise of diverse interests; in the East it sprang from the fact of Communist rule in each country. Washington's flexibility in dealing with Moscow was sharply circumscribed by the objective of obtaining West German rearmament, and as this goal became more an accomplished fact, Soviet policy toward Germany was a basic factor hardening lines between the alliances.

And finally, the new heads of government, while more flexible than their predecessors, had by no means altered the fundamental objectives of their countries. Moreover, both had to contend with powerful conservative forces within their own societies.

As to the proposals themselves, they were characterized by greater realism and feasibility on both sides. Comprehensive proposals struck a more reasonable balance than ever before in the staging of conventional and nuclear disarmament. Although both Soviet and Western proposals in 1955 envisioned the complete destruction of nuclear weapons prior to complete disarmament, mutual recognition that their elimination should follow drastic conventional cuts foreshadowed the positions endorsed by both sides in 1962 and 1963 on the need for a nuclear umbrella throughout the disarming process. Both Western and Soviet comprehensive proposals in 1955 focused on the rough equivalent of what appeared as Stage II in the later general and complete disarmament plans—an aim that some analysts now regard as more feasible than Stage III.

Partial measures proposed in 1955 also reflected a greater sophistication and foreshadowed an increasing East-West concern to inhibit surprise attack, halt nuclear testing, prevent frictions along the frontiers in Central Europe, and maintain high-level communications particularly in times of international tension. Increasing awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons spread, and of the complexities as well as the importance of international inspection, was now shown by Moscow.

In short, the new realism shown in manifest Soviet arms control policies correlated positively with the new acknowledgement in Soviet strategic thinking of the importance of surprise nuclear attack, and with such manifestations of the importance now attached to disarmament as the issuance of a new journal late in 1954, International Affairs. (This journal, printed in many languages, showed a more sophisticated propaganda approach to non-Communist
audiences and has reflected over the years, especially since 1959, a more serious consideration of the problems of disarmament.)

But on the negative side, neither side had really done its homework. United States negotiators in March and April 1955 made proposals beyond their probable capacity to deliver, given the review of American disarmament policy begun only in March 1955 and not completed until mid-November 1956. Basic research and analysis of inspection procedures to control a nuclear test ban, budgetary limitations, and other disarmament measures were seriously deficient—a fact repeatedly stressed by Western representatives in the latter half of 1955. The major Western response to the May 10 démarche—the "Open Skies" proposal—was designed by experts in psychological warfare. Eisenhower's decision to present it was not taken until after the Summit Conference had begun and Bulganin had offered a more feasible variant of the May 10 program.¹

Soviet disarmament positions seemed no better prepared than Western ones. When examined, the proposal of May 10, 1955, for example, revealed an inner inconsistency in that it called for comprehensive disarmament by 1958, while at the same time emphasizing that sufficient confidence to permit agreement on the inspection of nuclear disarmament did not exist. A further indication of Soviet uncertainty in this period occurred earlier in 1955, when Pravda and Izvestia on March 16 and 20 defended the uncompromising Soviet proposal of February 25, apparently oblivious to the more conciliatory position adopted by Gromyko in negotiations on March 11 and 18. Lack of realism and a portent of future difficulties were reflected by the absence of a major power, Communist China, at the negotiating table; Peking's participation, Moscow warned, was essential to any large-scale agreement.

What comes clear about 1955 is that if it in fact revealed the first glimmer of hope that the ideal of international agreement to reduce and limit arms represented a national policy instead of a purely utopian dream, by the same token the conditions were insufficient either to generate a spirit of urgency about it or, more importantly, to overcome the negative weight of past conflicts, continued hostility, unresolved disputes, mistrust of intentions, and the general inertia that characterize a traditional mode of response. Thus the turning point was at best a partial and inconclusive one.

Our analysis has suggested that certain features of the Soviet May 10, 1955 proposal, notably its practical concern over surprise attack, as well as Moscow's belated public recognition of the facts of life about nuclear stockpiles, could be construed as reflecting "sincerity"—always being careful to define "sincerity" as a serious intent to negotiate on a measure, and not necessarily a repudiation of international ambitions or an intention to negotiate a genuine political settlement. By these standards we can provisionally conclude that in 1955 the new Soviet leadership probably wished to "do something" about the arms problem to a degree that it had not previously.

But we have tried to emphasize that Soviet disarmament diplomacy in this period—as always—is subordinate to the larger Soviet overview of the place of the Communist movement in history, the prospects for advancing its fortunes, and the choice of optional strategies for so doing. Soviet disarmament policy cannot be viewed, as disarmament sometimes is in the West, as autonomous, representing an imperative, whether strategic or moral, before which all other goals and strategies pale. The interplay between disarmament and security—or politics—remained crucial for both sides.

The relevance of this axiom is that the apparent preference of Soviet leaders in 1954 and 1955 for détente in East-West relations grew at least in part out of new calculations about the unacceptability of general nuclear war; and that the disarmament and arms control measures proposed by Moscow were governed in turn by the basic decision to seek détente. But the interconnection between détente and disarmament meant that if détente was possible without surrendering on sensitive and vital points regarding inspection (that is, penetration and intrusion) the Soviets were not about to jeopardize their system for an abstract concept of arms control. On the other hand, if some arms control steps would create or reinforce a relaxation in the West, their price might be acceptable. But arms control was possible only if it were essential to achievement of the grand strategy.

The shift in manifest Soviet disarmament policy, then, was subordinate to the larger shift in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's most pressing concerns were to avoid the military calamity of nuclear war and the political liabilities of the hard Stalinist line. A virtue could be made of necessity by advancing a conciliatory position that "disarmed" the West politically and figuratively if not militarily and literally.
The Kremlin seemed to assume that while détente was both possible and desirable, disarmament, though desirable in some forms, was not so readily attainable. At the same time, the evidence suggests a Soviet calculation that a "reasonable" position toward disarmament, even if spurned by the NATO allies, would tend in the long run to strengthen the moderates who wanted to soften the West's stance vis-à-vis the Communist camp. Demonstrations of Soviet military strength (bomber flights and H-bomb tests) mixed with assurances of peaceful intent would foster such "sober" thinking in the West.

Soviet proposals for partial measures in 1955 and 1956 probably seemed more feasible and certainly less risky to Moscow than the more sweeping disarmament proposals. Of course, some measures seemed in the interest of both sides, while others were obviously of unilateral advantage. Demilitarized zones and control posts, for example, were advocated or endorsed by the West as well as Moscow. Although a source of potential political dangers, they could work to Soviet strategic advantage by guarding against surprise attack from forward United States air bases. If the West agreed to such measures, Moscow perhaps would have stood behind its proposals. Other Soviet proposals such as an all-European security system or the prohibition of nuclear weapons on German soil, while advantageous to Moscow, were clearly unacceptable to the West and therefore had potential only as propaganda. Soviet appeals to reduce troop levels proportionately and to liquidate foreign bases accorded with Moscow's military planning, but were infeasible then for the West. The major United States proposal—the "Open Skies" plan—was rejected by Moscow on the ground that it constituted "inspection without disarmament" and would pinpoint targets for SAC.

In looking at several specific factors that tend to underlie Soviet policy, we have suggested an interaction between internal intraparty shifts and the external quest for détente. We have suggested further the lack of apparent connection between economic factors and serious motives for cutting arms, although the achievement of a relaxation of East-West tensions was a prerequisite if Soviet military personnel were to be drastically reduced and Soviet deterrence to depend on prototype instead of mass produced long-range bombers.

Perhaps the most significant underlying factor behind Soviet strategy was the military. If the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons acted as a brake on Moscow's willingness to go all the way in war or in an arms race, the future prospects of potent new strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems must have had a
contrary effect at the same time. Communists may be conditioned not to succumb to temptation. But where temptation took the form in 1955 of an ICBM capability only two years away, the strategic outlook must have looked dynamic enough to make Soviet leaders hesitate to foreclose the possibility of a new trump card of this sort. But here, as we have warned, it should be kept in mind that the prospect of improvement in the strategic balance may have contributed to the possibility that the Soviets could later negotiate from strength—including negotiations on arms control measures.

A series of complementary conditions can thus be assumed to have stimulated the shift in Soviet foreign policy and especially in Soviet policies toward arms control, which in practice interacted to produce a common orientation. The prime determinant was Moscow's acknowledgment of the policy consequences of the possibility of a surprise attack and nuclear holocaust. This consideration was reinforced by the desiderata for checking or neutralizing Western strengths (manifested by the ring of SAC bases, West German rearmament, and plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons in Europe) while maximizing present and expected Soviet advantages (in the form of medium and intercontinental missiles). These combined strategic reasons for avoiding direct conflict with the West were paralleled and buttressed by the political judgment that the harsh two-camp struggle of the late Stalin era had only strengthened Western unity and foreclosed opportunities to exploit contradictions within and between NATO governments and between the West and the emerging nations. The gains from the new Soviet strategy were expected to outweigh the political dangers to the élan and the unity of the Communist movement.

The sine qua non for these basically optimistic calculations was the manner in which Stalin's successors, Khrushchev in particular, perceived and reacted to the problems and opportunities confronting the Soviet government. The new line was not the automatic product of historical forces but resulted from "voluntarism" as well as "determinism."

Of course there is no way to determine with assurance the outcome that Moscow anticipated would follow from its 1955 proposals. The very complexity and far-reaching nature of the May 10 comprehensive program (not to speak of the expected Western response) must have made the consequences of its implementation seem rather hypothetical. It remains entirely speculative whether, if confronted with Western acceptance in principle of the May 10 package, Khrushchev would have been prepared to make reasonable compromises that were necessary for agreement. In fact because United States disarmament proposals were virtually withdrawn after Moscow threw down the gauntlet on May 10, the extent of Soviet willingness to put away swords and to struggle with political and economic means was not fully measured.
What can be said is that the strength of the many factors in the Soviet and international picture favorable to détente and arms control in 1955 have proved to be surprisingly long lasting, persisting through bouts of cold war, and enjoying at least partial fruition in 1963. For Moscow and the West the 1955 negotiations can be said to have laid the groundwork for technical improvement in disarmament proposals, both comprehensive and partial. More important, they may have helped to cultivate the frame of mind in which adversaries could collaborate in containing their potential for military conflict, looking forward to a day when a more profound consensus might exist between the parties, and when the multiple factors behind the disarmament and arms control policies of both sides might converge to favor serious agreements.
Sources and Explanation of Data for Chart 2

Line A represents an estimate of possible total defense and space expenditures developed by J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington, 1962), passim, and pp. 39, 40. It is known that the official defense budget grossly understates actual Soviet outlays on defense inasmuch as it fails to encompass the bulk of military R&D, some advanced weapons procurement, and some installation costs. Godaire's estimate involves addition to the official defense budget of (1) official outlays on science, much of which are known to go for defense purposes, and (2) certain unexplained residuals in the Soviet budget, arbitrarily reduced to reasonable limits. It is not possible to distinguish civilian from military space research. As regards absolute magnitudes of the Soviet defense effort in given years, the accuracy of Godaire's estimates is highly problematical. His assessment of relative magnitudes, that is, the shape of the curve, appears to be closely suggestive of reality. In most years Godaire's estimates parallel the official defense budget; a sharp upward deviation in 1958 and 1959 is confirmed by a sharp decline in the growth of civilian machinery output as a result of a presumed diversion of resources to defense. See Rush V. Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace, "Industrial Production in the USSR," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, op. cit., p. 120.

Line B depicts the official Soviet defense budget as realized and announced at the end of the fiscal year coextensive with the given calendar year. As a rule, the official published annual defense budget is slightly lower than the official planned budget announced at the beginning of the fiscal year. Since the official realized defense budget for 1963 and 1964 has not yet been published, planned expenditures for 1962, 1963, and 1964 are shown by a dotted line. Official realized defense expenditures are from Godaire, loc. cit., p. 37. These figures are available for some years also in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR under "Finansy i Kredit." Planned expenditures for any year are available in the published budget, which usually appears in December or January.

Line C represents the estimated costs of Soviet military manpower (pay and subsistence) and is a product of military man-years, from Godaire, loc. cit., p. 43, times an estimate of the average cost per man (1,090 new rubles) derived by Abraham S. Becker, Soviet National Income and Product: The Goals of the Seven-Year Plan, RAND Memorandum RM-3520-PR (Santa Monica, 1963), p. 139.
Line D represents possible total "weapons and space systems development and procurement" outlays and is derived by subtracting the cost of military manpower (Line C) from possible total defense and space expenditures (Line A).
CHAPTER III
FROM SPUTNIK TO CUBA: 1957-1962

A. Introduction

The "spirit of Geneva" marked the high point of a movement from both sides to reduce international tensions and, the danger of war. By October 1955, however, the Foreign Ministers meeting smothered all hope that any of the underlying issues between Moscow and the West could soon be resolved or that tensions would abate.

Many of the manifestations, objectives, and determining factors of Soviet policy during 1954-1956 persisted in the years to be covered in this chapter--the period prior to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Many of these factors were sharply modified, however, and some were virtually transformed. Moreover factors that seemed to play no role in 1954-1956 intruded and came to weigh heavily in Soviet policy.

Moscow's stated position and propaganda on the disarmament issue sustained or amplified many of the patterns that had emerged during 1954-1956. But significant changes could be noted as well. Tacit East-West arms control became a fact. Experts' talks on purely technical aspects of arms control were inaugurated and produced agreements. Joint agreement on the principles of a balanced and controlled program of comprehensive disarmament was achieved. One regional arms control agreement was signed.

Had Soviet objectives and expectations altered? Again only informed speculation is possible. We continue to face the problem of unraveling an interest in arms control agreements from a desire, perhaps transitory, to lessen international tension. Further, while the manifest policies of each side often seemed to move toward major agreement, as on a nuclear test ban, the curves of apparent interest never quite intersected, and the question always remained whether either side was ready to make the concessions necessary for a compromise agreement.

The years from 1956 until the Cuban affair and its aftermath are significant for the refinement that took place in Soviet thinking on the technical and political implications of arms control; for the growing awareness in Moscow that international politics may be seen as a nonzero-sum game in which collaboration as well as competition can be advantageous to adversaries; and for the profound changes that came increasingly to militate for radical change in Moscow's approach to maintaining its security and ideological interests.
The 1954-1956 period can readily be viewed as a "round" in which Moscow and the West sought to reduce tensions and the danger of war. The years 1963 and 1964 may be similarly regarded, as both sides stepped back from the brink they approached late in 1962. The years from 1956 to 1962 are much more difficult to categorize, for several reasons: one is the longer time span under review; another is that the intensive moves of one side toward détente rarely coincided with comparable movements from the opposite side. More basically, whatever soft notes could be heard were almost drowned out by hard notes in the policies of each side that made it almost impossible to determine which theme, if any, predominated.

Several ways of looking at Soviet policy during the 1956-1962 period can be hypothesized, and each could find some validation in the record. First, Moscow's policy can be depicted as a linear if zigzagging curve leading continually toward détente and arms control. Second, this course can be regarded as a march, with occasional retreats, toward overpowering the West from a position of strength. Third, the "round" approach, in which Moscow's policy can be viewed as an alternating hard and soft line, reflecting a possible ambivalence about whether to seek to dominate or collaborate with the West. Fourth, Soviet policy can be viewed as pursuing a hard and soft line simultaneously, using each one opportunistically to deal with the exigencies of time and place.

Such an analysis is the more difficult because, as Marshall D. Shulman has pointed out, both the left and the right syndromes of Soviet behavior may be used for offensive or defensive purposes. A militant direct line could serve as a mode of revolutionary advance or as a way of imposing constraints on the adversary. A manipulative, more flexible style could be employed (as in 1955) to undermine the unity of the opposition while promoting an advance by other means.

Our perspective on the years from 1956 to 1962 is probably too short to determine whether Soviet policy was moving inexorably toward détente with the West or, at least in the Kremlin's hopes, toward a power position from which it could dictate to the West. We can say with confidence, however, that Soviet policy and its policy on arms control in particular manifested both hard and soft, left and right tendencies. Further it may be argued plausibly that at moments one or the other mode of behavior seemed to predominate but that usually both could be found. This

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simultaneity of apparent opposites may have reflected ambivalence in the outlook of the Kremlin leadership, divisions among the leadership, a response to a complex international and domestic situation—or all of these.

But above all, it should be reiterated that this period of widely differing policies has been brought together in a single chapter primarily for convenience of presentation.

B. Manifest Soviet Policies

1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance

   a. An Overview. Prior to analyzing the various measures put forward by Moscow from 1957 until 1962 it may be useful to outline the major subjects of negotiation during those years and the forums in which the negotiations took place.

   The U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) was the main venue of negotiations in 1957, when, from March to August, its final session was held. While Moscow initially put forward some comprehensive proposals, the major focus of the negotiations was on a series of partial measures that could be implemented without great delay. The State Department has termed this round of negotiations "the intensified effort," reflecting in part the fact that the United States had finished in November 1956 the basic policy review it had begun in March 1955.

   The year 1958 was notable because it marked the first unilateral test suspension by any country and because this was followed later in the year by a de facto three-power moratorium on nuclear testing that persisted until 1961. 1958 also witnessed the first East-West conferences of experts, meeting on the subjects of a nuclear test ban and the prevention of surprise attack—issues the West hoped could be dealt with as technical rather than political aspects of arms control and disarmament. The first of these meetings produced one of the first East-West agreements of the postwar era in the form of a statement defining the kind of system needed to control a test ban.

   Technical and political talks on the test ban problem continued in 1959, during which period Moscow also made a rash of proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Of great political importance, Chairman Khrushchev laid before the United Nations General Assembly a plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD), but accompanied it with alternative proposals for partial measures.
The year 1960 saw both sides discuss GCD in a Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, while negotiations continued among the three nuclear powers on the test ban issue, and France began the tests that would bring her into the nuclear club. Both sets of negotiations faithfully reflected the deterioration in East-West relations following the U-2 incident and the abortive Paris Summit Conference.

Test ban negotiations continued in 1961, but the Soviets became increasingly intransigent, a portent that they would soon break the moratorium that had existed since 1956. But even while Moscow prepared to test a 50-megaton bomb, Ambassadors McCloy and Zorin on September 21, 1961 reached a joint U.S.-Soviet agreement on the principles to guide future disarmament talks.

The General Assembly late in 1961 endorsed a proposal of the three nuclear powers that an Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meet in Geneva early in 1962, composed of eight neutral states in addition to the five Communist and five Western states that made up the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960. The Conference of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) convened in Geneva in March 1962 without France, which refused to take part. Earlier in the year the Geneva conference on the cessation of nuclear testing, which had had well over 300 meetings since 1958, met for the last time. Its members then gathered as a subcommittee of the ENDC, where the nuclear powers continued their deliberations on a test ban.

The zigs and zags in Soviet negotiating stance on comprehensive and partial disarmament measures in the various negotiating forums from 1957 to 1962 will now be outlined in more detail.

b. Comprehensive Disarmament. In the period from 1957 until 1962 Moscow brought forward four different versions of comprehensive disarmament, all of which purported to deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and all of which spelled out the steps to be taken through a third and final stage of complete disarmament down to the level of police forces needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. Charter obligations. None of the comprehensive proposals advocated by Moscow from late 1956 until late 1962 seemed to offer a promising basis for East-West agreement. The problems common to all of them were:

Inadequate inspection procedures, especially in the refusal to allow verification of existing armaments.

An inflexible and probably unrealistic timetable of four to five years.
Provision for the elimination of overseas bases in the first or the second stage of disarmament.

United Nations peacekeeping forces subject to great power veto.

The Soviet proposals between late 1956 and August 1957 were particularly striking for the manner in which they backed off from the inspection procedures Moscow had endorsed in 1955 and early 1956. The subsequent Soviet proposals of 1959-1962 had in common the structural defect that they would radically alter the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons one way or the other. Khrushchev's proposals to the United Nations in 1959 put off nuclear disarmament until Stage III. The Soviet proposals of June 1960 and March 1962, however, would have reversed this priority and destroyed all nuclear delivery systems in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.

Some narrowing of the differences between the East and West resulted from shifts in Soviet policy in 1960-1962. Moscow has shown some awareness of the need for an international inspectorate to affirm that conditions are ready for the transition from one stage to another. Most important, perhaps, Moscow recognized in September 1962 the desirability for the nuclear powers to retain a limited number of nuclear contingents after the first stage of disarmament.1

c. Partial Measures. In retrospect we can see that 1955 marked a turning point from which a major trend can be dated—a trend toward a more sophisticated propagation of partial measures, many of them relatively negotiable in terms of agreements compatible with the military-strategic interests of both sides. Indeed Khrushchev's address to the General Assembly in 1959—after proposing GCD—advocated five partial measures and went on to reaffirm the May 10, 1955 proposals which he said "outlined a specific scheme of partial measures in the field of disarmament." The Soviet government was still convinced, the Premier added, that the May 10 proposals "constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally

1A revised version of the Soviet draft treaty that incorporated this and most of the Soviet proposals since March was circulated by the U.N. Secretariat on September 24, 1962 as U.N. Document A/C.1/867. However, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin demanded that the West first agree in principle to the nuclear umbrella concept before discussions began on its details. See ENDC PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22.
A wide range of partial measures was espoused by Moscow from 1956 to 1962. Khrushchev's 1959 address to the United Nations mentioned five such measures that the Kremlin frequently endorsed in this period:

1. The establishment of a control and inspection zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned.

2. The establishment of an 'atom-free' zone in Central Europe.

3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign States.

4. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty.

5. The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another.\(^1\)

Here we shall single out two sorts of partial measures for special emphasis: regional arms controls and a nuclear test ban. These were the partial measures backed most consistently and with the most apparent interest by Moscow; by focusing on them we shall also be able to provide a framework for discussion of related matters--nuclear-free zones, and surprise-attack measures such as control posts.

1) **Regional Arms Controls and Surprise Attack.** As noted in Chapter II, Moscow responded warmly in 1954 and 1955 to the Eden Plan and brought forward on March 27, 1956 a Soviet plan for the creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments. A more radical formulation of these ideas was circulated in Soviet notes to the Western governments on November 17, 1956--at the height

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\(^2\)As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 1459.
of the Hungarian uprising—specifying that all foreign bases should be eliminated in two years but also accepting the principle of aerial inspection in Europe.

Variations of the March and November 1956 Soviet proposals were reintroduced by Soviet diplomats at the DCSC and in notes to Western governments in the first half of 1957; Moscow again warned Bonn that arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons would preclude German reunification.¹

Various East European governments began also to make disengagement proposals with the effect of reinforcing Soviet positions. A "Balkan zone of peace" without atomic weapons and joined in a mutual security pact was proposed by Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in September 1957.

The Rumanian initiative was followed by a similar Polish move. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed his plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in a speech to the General Assembly on October 2, 1957. This first version of the Rapacki Plan suggested the creation of a nuclear-free zone to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies. Nuclear weapons would be neither manufactured nor stockpiled in this zone; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited. The four great powers would guarantee these provisions by a "broad and effective control" comprising ground and aerial inspection. The plan did not propose merging NATO and the Warsaw Pact but argued that the "system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of a broader disarmament agreement." No provision was made for a reduction of troops in the zone.

A second version of the Rapacki Plan was brought forward by the Polish Foreign Minister at a press conference in Warsaw on November 4, 1958. Rapacki indicated that the revised plan was intended to meet the Western objections to his initial proposals.² A two-stage plan was now suggested: first, a freeze on existing

¹The following analysis of Soviet bloc and Western proposals and commentary is based largely on documentation in Eugene Hinterhoff, Disengagement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1959). For a convenient summary and chronology of disengagement proposals, see his Appendix 10, pp. 414-442.

²For these objections see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 936, 1023-1025; Hinterhoff, op.cit., p. 229.
nuclear weapons in the zone; second, a reduction of conventional forces and, simultaneously, complete denuclearization of the zone. Both steps would be strictly controlled.

The novelty of this revised Rapacki Plan has been exaggerated by some analysts, for numerous Soviet statements backing the Rapacki Plan in late 1957 and earlier in 1958 had already advocated not only denuclearization but also withdrawal of foreign troops from the zone.¹

The utility of ground control posts in Central Europe was stressed again by Soviet negotiators at the surprise attack conference that met in Geneva from November 10 to December 18, 1958. Moscow made clear that these posts would be to little avail if not linked with other steps to reduce concentrations of forces in Central Europe. The Soviet government therefore proposed (a) a reduction in the foreign armies on the territories of European states and (b) not keeping modern types of weapons of mass destruction in either part of Germany.²

Another manifestation of Soviet policy toward Central Europe came on November 10, 1958—the same day the surprise attack conference opened—when Khrushchev announced that the occupation of Germany must be ended and West Berlin converted to a free city.

The reaction of the West to the Khrushchev stick and Rapacki carrot was negative, however, and the Soviet response was to present still other proposals and to lift, temporarily at least, any semblance of an ultimatum on Berlin. From December 1958 to September 1959, variations on the Rapacki and free city plans were put forward in talks by Khrushchev with Philip Noel-Baker, Carlo Schmid, Field Marshal Montgomery, and Hugh Gaitskell; in Mikoyan's press conference in the United States; in addresses to the Twenty-First Party Congress; and finally in the Soviet GCD proposal at the United Nations in September 1959.

But even before the May 1960 summit, statements by Washington, Bonn, and Paris made clear that the West was not willing to negotiate a settlement of the German problem on terms even close to those advocated by Moscow. As a consequence, while Moscow, Warsaw,


and other East European governments continued to affirm their support of disengagement, these affirmations lost much of their plausibility after 1960. Their proposals came at moments when they could have some propaganda potential although their immediate negotiating value was questionable. Thus while Moscow was preparing to test a 50-megaton bomb in a show of strength over Berlin it asked the General Assembly (on September 26, 1961) to consider a variety of measures including nuclear-free zones initially in Central Europe, then in the Far East and Africa.\(^1\)

China had deferred comment on the original Rapacki Plan until December 19, 1957, when Peking announced its support of the Soviet Union's recent peace proposals including a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.\(^2\) In addition the Chinese welcomed the TASS proposal of January 21, 1958 that the Middle East be turned into an area free of nuclear and rocket bases. On several occasions in 1958 Peking indicated a reserved and qualified interest in the proposal of an atom-free zone in the Far East. But Peking took umbrage at Khrushchev's emphatic statement on January 27, 1959 that a "zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone, can and must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin area."\(^3\) The most restricted Chinese endorsement of the denuclearized zone concept came on April 18, 1959, when Chou En-lai advocated an area of peace and free from atomic weapons "throughout the whole of East Asia and the Pacific regions"--an implication that only part of China would be included,\(^4\) and hardly Sinkiang--where nuclear energy facilities are known to be located.

On May 26, 1959 Khrushchev revived the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. On July 11, 1959, he proposed a nuclear and missile-free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic area. Moscow also endorsed at this time the demands of some African statesmen that Africa be made a nuclear-free zone to prevent French atomic testing in the Sahara.

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\(^1\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 496-504. Poland introduced a slightly revised version of the 1958 Rapacki Plan into the ENDC Committee of the Whole in March 1962, but the proposal was not given formal consideration due to procedural wrangling.


\(^3\) *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.

\(^4\) Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.
In the one contemporary example of formally agreed demilitarization of a significant territory the Soviet Union, United States, and ten other countries with interest in Antarctica on December 1, 1959 signed an agreement to use that territory "for peaceful purposes only." The parties obligated themselves not to build military bases there, carry out maneuvers, test weapons, or carry out nuclear explosions.1

2) Nuclear Test Ban. If disengagement may be characterized as an arms control problem that is predominantly political, the problem of halting nuclear testing is one that has been complicated by intricate technological factors. But its political ramifications were global in scope both because of their relation to the nth-country problem and because they reflected pressure from world public opinion.

To summarize the complicated story of the test ban negotiations, we can focus on the major alternatives presented in terms of U.S. interest in effective controls and Soviet requirements for secrecy and military security: (1) a comprehensive test ban; (2) a partial ban with a moratorium on underground tests; (3) a partial ban with no restriction on underground tests.

First, the several Western versions of a comprehensive treaty were unacceptable to Moscow because of the extensive control measures proposed. The Soviet versions were turned down by the West because they offered too little control. Western insistence on technical reliability was interpreted in Moscow as stalling or as a desire for espionage, while Soviet resistance to intrusion raised fears in the West that Moscow might cheat.

The second hope for a compromise agreement seemed to lie in a limited test ban accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing, during which control systems were expected to be improved so that seismic disturbances could be detected and identified with minimal or no intrusion. A number of obstacles prevented such a compromise.2 First, the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1957 treated a

2Of course many other problems remained to be solved even if East-West differences were reconciled on the moratorium. As Eisenhower and Macmillan made clear March 29, 1960, their agreement to a moratorium was conditional on progress in the negotiations concerning the composition of the international control organ, its voting procedures, and so forth.
test ban as a separable measure but the West did not. Therefore the West turned down the Soviet proposal of June 1957 for a two- or three-year moratorium on all nuclear testing with international control posts on U.S., U.K., and Soviet territory. Second, after the West accepted the idea of a separate test ban in 1958 and a phased (that is, limited) test ban in 1959, the West tended to advocate a much shorter moratorium than was acceptable to Moscow. The Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of March 29, 1960, stated that the moratorium had to be of agreed duration. Moscow on May 3, 1960 proposed a limited ban with a four- or five-year moratorium, but the West on September 27, 1960 advocated a moratorium of 27 months and on March 21, 1960 a moratorium of three years. Third, after Moscow resumed nuclear testing in 1961, the West turned down the very concept of a moratorium not formalized by treaty. Therefore the Soviet proposals of November 28, 1961 and August 29-September 3, 1962 for a limited test ban with moratoriums of indefinite length were summarily rejected. Fourth, when some momentum toward East-West agreement existed in the spring and summer of 1960, it was interrupted by political and military developments extraneous to the negotiations. Fifth, measures that one side would have found acceptable at one moment were proposed prematurely or too late. Thus the two- or three-year moratorium proposed by Moscow in 1957 corresponded with a position acceptable to the West only in 1960 and early 1961. And the four- to five-year moratorium advocated by Moscow in late 1961 and 1962 was not much longer than the three-year measure proposed by the West prior to the resumption of Soviet testing in 1961.

The third alternative was a limited test ban without any limitation on underground testing. This was offered to Moscow by the West on April 13, 1959, on February 17, 1960, on September 3, 1961, and on August 27, 1962, but it was not accepted until July 25, 1963.

2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament

a. The Appeal to the West. Soviet diplomacy sought maximum publicity for its proposals. The propaganda importance Moscow attached to its disarmament campaign is seen from the large number of changes in the Soviet line that were announced not in the negotiating chamber but in more public arenas. To give just a few examples, Moscow's acceptance in 1957 of the principle of inspection over a nuclear test ban was first stated by Khrushchev in Finland before Zorin could reverse the Soviet stand in the DCSC. The Rapacki Plan was announced in the General Assembly in 1957 and modified in a press conference in 1958. Moscow's proposals for nuclear-free zones in 1959 were generally expounded far from any negotiating chamber. Khrushchev's GCD proposal was made to the
General Assembly in 1959. The Supreme Soviet announcement in 1960 of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces was communicated to all the parliaments of the world and to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ostensibly to obtain reciprocal action in other states. The General Assembly was the forum for Gromyko's announcement in 1962 (and 1963) that Moscow endorsed a "nuclear umbrella" principle.

Soviet propaganda to the West from 1956 to 1962 generally continued the emphases inaugurated in 1955, stressing the possibility and desirability of disarmament and East-West détente, the need for reasonable compromise on East-West differences, and the benefits to all interests from a reduction of international tension and military expenditure.

"Restraint" rather than "exposure" was the usual way of dealing with Western disarmament positions. Moscow often claimed that Western intransigence was the main reason why disarmament negotiations had failed. But when compared with Soviet propaganda of the Stalin period or even with the treatment of other themes during the 1956-1962 period (such as Western policy toward the underdeveloped nations or Western military strategy), Soviet criticism of Western arms control policy was relatively restrained and mild. The apparent concern of Soviet propaganda on disarmament was less with attacking the West than with projecting to Western and third-world public opinion the image of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving country with which productive negotiations could be conducted.

This general picture must be modified, however, to take account of a certain hardening in Soviet disarmament propaganda at many moments from 1956 to 1962—usually in connection with some new manifestation of East-West tension. Such was the case in late 1956 and early 1957 (Hungary and Suez); in mid-1958 (Lebanon and Quemoy); mid-1960 (the U-2 and the Paris summit); and 1961 (Berlin and related events). At these moments publications such as International Affairs, the World Marxist Review, and the Soviet daily press took a much tougher line toward the West. Soviet propaganda also registered its concept of the "good" by reference to "evil." Thus, depending on the exigencies of time and place, certain Western leaders were singled out for personal attack, for example, John Foster Dulles, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, along with strategists such as Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, and Maxwell Taylor.

The most drastic innovation in Soviet propaganda to the West from 1956 to 1962 was a reversal of the traditional position on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist society.
Beginning in 1959 the arms race was no longer depicted as a necessary crutch for a "degenerate capitalism." It was portrayed rather as an obstacle to the kind of growth that Japan and Germany, relatively unburdened by defense expenditures, enjoyed. This argument was adumbrated in a colloquium published in May 1958 by International Affairs and an article in Kommunist of August 1959. The stage was set for Khrushchev to reassure American businessmen in his September 1959 trip to the United States that they stood to gain from a redirection of industry from war to civilian production.  

b. The Appeal to Anti-Capitalism and Anti-Imperialism. There was another side to the coin presented to the West, for Soviet policy regarding East-West détente and disarmament had to be rationalized for the benefit of party workers in the Soviet Union, Communists abroad (especially in China), and the non-Communist revolutionaries of the emerging nations. This rationale emerged in stages. In 1956 Khrushchev denied the fatal inevitability of war and proclaimed the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. In 1957 it was announced that the opponents of peaceful coexistence were "anti-party." Later in 1957 it was argued that Sputnik showed that the balance of forces was swinging in favor of the socialist camp. The economic benefits of disarmament for the developing countries and for the socialist economies were also reiterated. In 1959 and 1960 the argument that disarmament was economically feasible for capitalism was also addressed to the readers of Kommunist and to the Supreme Soviet. As in 1954-1956, the Kremlin posited the existence of "sober forces" in the West who knew that peace was necessary; now it was added that some of them recognized that it could also be profitable.

The years 1959-1960 saw the Kremlin initiate important changes in ideology as well as propaganda to justify both its image of a heterogeneous adversary and the utility of collaborating with certain elements in the Western "ruling circles." Opponents of "capitalism" and "imperialism" were now told that peaceful coexistence and disarmament constituted the best means for pursuing their objectives. There was no alternative to peace except war; but peaceful coexistence meant "struggle" as well as "cooperation." By economic competition socialism would triumph; disarmament would bring savings that socialist and developing countries could utilize to better advantage.

1 The major Soviet work on the economic consequences of disarmament has been I. Glagolev, ed., Ekonomicheskie Problemy Razoruzheniia (Moscow: Akademia Nauk, 1961).
than capitalist economies. And disarmament would remove the physical instruments by which the capitalists held back the tide of social change. New documents were published to demonstrate that Lenin himself advocated that socialist diplomacy should try to strengthen the moderate elements in the Western bourgeoisie. Other aspects of Lenin's views, such as the inevitability of imperialist wars, were termed not applicable to modern conditions.  

C. Factors Conditioning Soviet Policies

The qualitative changes in Soviet policy in 1954-1956, it was argued in Chapter II, rested ultimately upon a number of optimistic expectations by the new leadership in the Kremlin: that the strategic balance would soon shift to their advantage; that this gain could be acquired without detriment to Soviet economic growth; that contradictions in the West could be successfully manipulated; that vast opportunities existed in the underdeveloped countries for Soviet penetration; and that Soviet communism could spread its influence quickly and effectively by means short of force.

These optimistic assumptions became the foundations for the quantum jump Soviet arms control policy took in 1954-1956. In the years from 1956 to 1962, however, the bases for these calculations disintegrated, one after another, militating in favor of an eventual reappraisal and reformulation of Soviet policy to accord with new realities. In part the world had changed in 1956; in part the Soviet perception of the world had become more realistic. Both sets of changes impelled Soviet policies toward more radical adjustments than were apparent from late 1956 to mid-1962.

In this period of transition what relative weighting ought we to assign to the factors we have identified as possible determinants of Soviet arms control policy? We begin with those that appear to have exercised a more decisive influence, turning then to those that exerted an important but more marginal role. In the first category we would rank Soviet calculations about the East-West military balance, the opportunities and problems in dealing with the West, and the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations. Among


2 Speech by Khrushchev in Bucharest, Pravda, June 22, 1960.
the marginal factors we would include the economic burden of defense upon the Soviet economy and the role played by the Russian opponents and supporters of Khrushchev's policies. In considering each factor we shall try to weigh both its positive and its negative impact in bringing arms control policy closer to accommodation with the West.

1. The Military-Strategic Outlook

The years from 1955 to 1962 witnessed a continued evolution in Moscow's view of the strategic situation and its implications for Soviet policy, based on the profound changes in Soviet strategic doctrine in 1953-1955. Before discussing elements of change, we note several constants in the Kremlin's perspective from 1955 through 1962 because they may go far toward explaining the persistency of some features of arms control policy. These constants can be analyzed in terms of immediate, medium-range and long-range planning.

For the immediate future, Moscow seems neither to have feared an imminent attack from the West nor to have planned one against the West, despite some talk on both sides about pre-emption. It doubtless calculated that an atmosphere of détente would help to lower the danger of a nuclear initiative from the West. Since central war was not expected, medium-range planning could emphasize the political effects of Soviet military posture rather than actual fighting capacity. Prototype rather than mass-produced weapons systems could therefore be relied on and minimum deterrence might suffice. But this strategy meant that Soviet military secrecy would have to be maintained against the foreign observation sought by the West as the price of arms control agreements. For the long term Moscow seems to have feared the spread of nuclear weapons, war by accident, a last-ditch capitalist reflex action, or catalytic war by a "revanchist" Germany, or an ambitious China. These considerations militated for agreements on certain forms of arms control.

Within this framework of continuity three stages in the Kremlin's perception of the military-political environment may be noted: from 1955 to 1957 Moscow expected that the general military balance would soon turn to favor the East; from late 1957 to 1960-1961 the Kremlin showed confidence that, at least for "world opinion," the Soviet Union was the equal or better of the West militarily; from 1961 to 1962, Soviet confidence seemed to wane as the Kennedy Administration dismissed in theory and fact the possibility of a "missile gap" favoring Moscow. Underlying these perceptions were important developments in Soviet strategic thought and the East-West military balance.
a. Soviet Strategic Doctrine. Throughout the 1956-1962 period Soviet military thought generally took account of traditional power factors as well as the facts of the nuclear age that had been officially acknowledged in 1954-1955. If questions of arms control policy were left to military men alone, they might have decided that Moscow should not reduce or limit either its nuclear or conventional forces. But important differences of emphasis emerged between and within Soviet political and military elites. Khrushchev sought to rely on nuclear-rocket forces and reduce conventional forces including the air force and navy. A secret session of the Central Committee in December 1959 (shortly after Khrushchev's return from Camp David and Peking) approved a one third cut in the total number of Soviet forces. The proposed reduction set off another round of strategic debate between two groups: first, the economy-minded politicians versus the marshals, and also, the "conservative" versus the "radical" marshals; Defense Minister Malinovsky managed to hold a middle position, but inclined to the conservative viewpoint.

The practical outcome of the debate in 1960 was that the troop reduction favored by Khrushchev was begun, only to be halted in midstream by East-West tensions in the summer of 1961. Khrushchev's preferences were also manifested in the creation in May 1960 of a fifth branch of the Soviet armed forces—the strategic rocket forces. However, Khrushchev's suggestion to transfer demobilized soldiers into a territorial militia was not carried out, perhaps because the marshals feared it would serve to justify further cuts of military personnel.

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The strategic debate continued after 1960 and was partially reconciled in the publication in 1962 of *Military Strategy*, the first over-all treatment of Soviet strategy since 1926. The basic orientation of the 1962 treatise followed the thrust of Defense Minister Malinovsky's address to the Twenty-Second Party Congress. The book's editor, Marshal Sokolovsky, had been retired in 1960, perhaps because of opposition to Khrushchev's radical confidence in wonder weapons. The articles collected in the book reflect a compromise between the radical and conservative schools but leaned toward the latter. In Garthoff's words,

The "Khrushchev doctrine," with its stress on deterrence, has been modified to meet more fully the requirements seen by the military for waging nuclear war should one occur. The compounding of these divergent professional views has required both ready forces to meet the contingency of a relatively short and largely intercontinental war (envisaged by the 'radicals') and forces to meet a protracted general war with extensive land theater campaigns (expected by the 'conservative' majority).  

Many conclusions of the Sokolovsky treatise had direct implications for Soviet arms control and disarmament positions which will be considered below. It must be remembered, however, that the book's views may have suggested the views of the Kremlin's military advisors, but not necessarily the precise opinions of the political leadership. The book was not a complete guide even to the military's thinking, since its impact on foreign audiences had to be considered.

b. Forces in Being. The objective military balance in strategic nuclear weapons between East and West is difficult to measure even when most of the raw data is available because the overall analysis would have to take into account the warhead yield, vulnerability, penetrability, reliability, and accuracy of the many systems involved.

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3 The following study is based largely on comparatives of Soviet and Western forces made by John H. Hoagland and presented graphically in the attached tables and figures. The work is derived entirely from unclassified estimates in recent years. Heaviest reliance has been placed on the many estimates recently made public by the U.S. Department of Defense. The method used here in making these comparisons has been to consider only the number of vehicles in operational status. This approach is believed to provide a reliable if only approximate index of the strengths of both sides.
The facts of the military balance as they can now be reconstructed are sketched in Charts III.1-III.4. Throughout the 1956 to 1962 period the West enjoyed a commanding lead in numbers of medium- and long-range bombers. In 1957 and 1958 the Soviet Union began serial production of MRBM's. Comparable American Jupiters and Thors were not produced in such numbers because the U.S. deterrent was to be based more on long-range bomber and missile forces. Despite talk of a "missile gap," the only moment when Moscow may have had more ICBM's on launchers than the United States was in late 1959 and early 1960. Even at that time, the Strategic Air Command delivery capability far outweighed the total Soviet capacity to strike North America.

By early 1961 it probably became possible for both sides to estimate that U.S. productive capacity would in the near future provide a vastly superior ICBM force and eliminate the deep-seated Western fears that had characterized 1959 and 1960. This turn-around was made possible mainly by the accelerated production of Minuteman, representing a new technology that was a final payoff to the difficult post-Sputnik U.S. military development effort. The first Minuteman test launching occurred on February 1, 1961, and the first two Minuteman flights totaling 20 missiles were declared operational in December 1962. The Minuteman force has grown very rapidly, as Chart III.4 indicates. This rapid mobilization, coupled with broader public dissemination by the United States of its comparative force level estimates, probably helped precipitate the Cuban missile adventure. Possibly the Soviet leadership tolerated a knowledge of actual Soviet force levels held secretly within the U.S. defense community, but this was more difficult when these levels were also published before a world audience.

Throughout the entire period since Stalin's death up to the Cuban missile crisis America's strategic capability to attack the Soviet Union exceeded Moscow's ability to strike the United States. Since the mid-1950's and especially since 1959, however, the Soviet Union has possessed a minimum deterrent capable of inflicting great and perhaps "unacceptable" damage on the United States. And if the West chose to exaggerate the extent of Soviet power Moscow did not object and seemed even to encourage such estimates.1

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1See, for example, Marshal Zhukov's boast of "diverse atomic and nuclear weapons, mighty guided missiles, among them long-range missiles," at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 and the Sokolovsky claim of Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons. TASS, February 20, 1956 and Soviet Military Strategy, op. cit., pp. 296-297.
Chart III.1

Medium-Range Bombers

- Chart III.1
  - B-47
  - Badger Blinder

Chart III.2

Long-Range Bombers

- B-36, B-52, B-58
- Bison, Bear

1 See references given after Chart 1, Chapter II, p. 24.
2 Ibid.
Chart III.3
Land-Based MRBM/IRBM Forces

- Jupiter, Thor
- IRBM, Sandal, etc.

Chart III.4
ICBM Forces

- Atlas, Titan, Minuteman
- All Soviet ICBM Systems

1 See references given after Chart 1, Chapter II, p. 24.
2 Ibid.
Soviet secrecy, however, proved to be somewhat counterproductive to the extent that it goaded the U.S. effort to overcome nonexistent bomber and then missile gaps.

Soviet R&D programs concentrated not only on the perfection of long-range delivery systems capable of lifting heavy pay loads but on the development of high-yield warheads, culminating in the 1961 test of an H-bomb of over 50 megatons. By 1962 Moscow claimed to possess nuclear weapons of 100 megaton yield. Khrushchev as well as Western analysts publicly doubted the military utility of such warheads, but their sobering effect on the minds of men may have had great political utility in the Soviet view. Quite to the point, "deterrence" is rendered in Soviet Russian as "terrorization."[ustrashenije."

The one area in which objective Soviet military might has been unquestioned--its ability since the mid- to late-fifties to attack Western Europe with large numbers of medium-range bombers and (later)missiles--also had heavy psychological overtones. At low cost to the Soviet Union, Europe served as insurance against American pressure on the Soviet Union. The Cuban episode clearly showed Moscow's interest in acquiring a military posture important for its psychological effect along with its military utility.

Why Russia chose not to mass-produce its ICBM's is a key question about which we can only speculate. Did the decision reflect economic pressures (discussed below)? Faith in the adequacy

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1Soviet Military Strategy, op. cit., p. 354. For a fuller documentation of Moscow's exaggerated claims during the period studied, see the introduction to ibid., pp. 24-27.

2Khrushchev, speaking to the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Germany, declared that 100 megaton bombs were too large to be employed safely in Europe and that this yield represented the militarily useful limit of such weapons. (Pravda, January 17, 1963.)


of a minimum deterrent? Technological difficulties in producing more refined systems? The expectation of a quick-fix such as Cuba or 50-megaton warheads seemed to offer, to "even" the East-West balance? A preoccupation with Europe? Or was it a combination of these and other factors?

Whatever the reason for the relatively low number if ICBM's Moscow actually produced the distribution of these weapons between East and West clearly made it in Moscow's interest to propose in September 1962 that both sides reduce to "an agreed, strictly limited number" of nuclear delivery systems—the Gromyko "nuclear umbrella" proposal.

In regard to Soviet ground forces in this period, their role was highly valued by Soviet strategists, as the Sokolovsky volume made clear, especially in the "broken-back" aftermath of a nuclear exchange. They have nevertheless borne a large share of the reductions in over-all manpower of Soviet armed forces since 1955, as indicated in Table III.1. During the 1950's, however, the Soviets carried out a complete modernization of their ground forces. Yet the Soviets continued to lack in most forms of strategic long-range mobility. Consequently their ground forces were tied to the Eurasian land mass.

Actual force levels are difficult to determine. Numbers or sizes are only relative indicators of absolute military strength. The size of the ground forces seems to have been fairly constant at between 2.2 and 2.5 million during the period of 1957 to 1963. Available information does not indicate any significant downward trend in ground forces in spite of the announced cuts in military force levels in 1955, 1956, and 1960. The 1956 cut was apparently executed; the 1960 cut, on the other hand, appears to have been started but then halted in 1961; the conclusion is that while in 1955 and 1956, the Soviets did reduce their ground forces since then the level has remained fairly constant except for a brief reduction in 1960.

The total size of Soviet armed forces throughout the 1955-1962 period, however, exceeded by far the level which Moscow proposed for the initial stage of GCD. Thus, Soviet forces in 1955 totaled over 5.7 million and were reduced to their lowest point in mid-1961—3 million men. (The level that Moscow endorsed for the first stage of GCD varied between 2.1 million and 1.7 million men.)
| Year | Ground Forces | Total Armed Forces | Announced Soviet Reductions of Total Forces | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | Total | Divisions | East of Urals |
|------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|
| 1945 |               | 11,365,000         |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1948 |               | 2,874,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1955 | 3,200,000     | 5,763,000          | 640,000                                  | 175   | (Many at reduced strength) | 33 total | 22-31 |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1956 |               | 2,500,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1957 |               | 2,623,000          |                                          | 175   | (Many at reduced strength) | 22 4-7 | 22 4-7 |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1958 |               | 3,623,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1959 | 2.35-2,500,000| 3,623,000          |                                          | 175   | (Many at reduced strength) | 22 4-7 | 22 4-7 |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1960 | 2.24-2,500,000| 3,623,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1961 | 3.000,000 (July)| 3,000,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1962 | 2.2-2,500,000 | 3,600,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1963 | 2.0-2,200,000 | 3,300,000          |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |
| 1964 | 2.0-2,200,000 |                 |                                          |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |       |           |

Table III.2
COMPARISON OF NAVAL MISSILE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>First reports of modified Z-class conventional long-range sub to carry three short-range, surface-launched missiles.</td>
<td>First reports of modified Z-class conventional long-range sub to carry three short-range, surface-launched missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Nine Polaris subs operational with total of 144 missiles.</td>
<td>Approximately 6 nuclear-powered subs in construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12 Polaris subs operational with total of 192 missiles. Subs 1-5, Polaris A-1, 1200 nm; subs 6-18, Polaris A-2, 1500 nm; subs 18-41, Polaris A-3, 2500 nm.</td>
<td>18 Z-class missile subs in operation. Approximately 10 nuclear-powered subs, &quot;some&quot; carrying short-range, surface-launched missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>30 missile subs, conventional and nuclear.</td>
<td>Total 142 fleet ballistic missiles short-range and surface-launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>FUTURE By late 1960's 41 Polaris subs operational with total of over 650 missiles, range 1500-2500 nm.</td>
<td>Continuing development and production of sub-launched ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III.1 above also suggests the withdrawal and reduction of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe since 1957, an important point in analyzing the feasibility of various disengagement schemes for the Soviet Union. The great majority of Soviet forces in East Central Europe have been concentrated in East Germany.

c. Implications for Policy. Aspects of Soviet military doctrine taken along with the changing balance of power probably suggested to Moscow the desirability of two kinds of arms controls: those that would reduce the danger of surprise attack, accidental or catalytic war, or escalation; and those that would reduce certain Western advantages toward parity with Soviet strength. These desiderata, however, were probably to some extent vitiated by the expectation and then the achievement of a psychological environment of overall Soviet military superiority vis-à-vis the West from 1956 until about 1962. Then, from 1960 to 1962, Moscow's waning military posture in relation to the West seemed to dictate desperate Soviet efforts to reestablish parity or superiority rather than serious efforts at détente or arms control agreements with the West.

Before proceeding to consider in detail Soviet interests in a nuclear test ban, disengagement, and GCD during the 1956-1962 period, some general comments on the Soviet approach to arms control arising out of Soviet military doctrine are in order. If the conclusions of the Sokolovsky treatise were fully shared by the Soviet political leadership, a number of conclusions followed for Soviet arms control policy:

First, the official compromise reached between the contending military factions in favor of balanced forces might suggest that if Moscow entered a disarmament program the Kremlin would have preferred that it offer "balanced" reductions of both conventional and nuclear forces rather than trying to eliminate first one or the other. 1

Second, without disarmament huge expenditures would be needed to sustain balanced forces. Because of Russia's economic situation in recent years (analyzed later in this chapter) this prospect was not a bright one to the political leadership even in 1962.

Third, the Sokolovsky treatise also suggested that the most likely scenario for the outbreak of global war is a surprise attack by the West. Since the role of surprise attack in the initial stage

1 The Soviet GCD proposal of 1962 was more balanced in this respect than its 1959 or June 1960 predecessors.
of a war can be crucial, and Soviet forces must be ready to pre-empt Western plans for aggression. A nuclear war would wipe whole countries from the face of the earth. All these considerations may have prompted the Kremlin to welcome safeguards to prevent surprise attack, especially since Moscow may have been unable fully to pre-empt.

Fourth, escalation of limited wars was still regarded as likely, but for the first time in Soviet writing the Sokolovsky book stated that Soviet forces must prepare for such conflicts. "Soviet military strategy must study the methods of waging such wars too, in order to prevent their expansion into a world war, and in order to achieve a rapid victory over the enemy." 1 While such a view did not imply specific disarmament measures, it pointed to an emerging philosophy of broad restraints and arms controls. The relative absence in Soviet strategic writing of discussions of "controlled response" strategies—except to assert their futility—probably reflected a gap in Russia's military capability rather than any a priori preference for "massive retaliation."

Fifth, continuing a Khrushchev theme of 1960, the Sokolovsky volume argued that tactical and strategic bombers were being replaced by missiles, but added that their "replacement may take a long time." For the present they could be used side-by-side with missiles and even be armed with air-to-ground missiles. 2 A "bomber bonfire" conducted by both Washington and Moscow might be acceptable to many marshals as well as to Soviet politicians.

Sixth, no naval authors contributed to the treatise, but the book conceded that in a war with the United States the Soviet navy would play a greater role than in the past. Its first task would be to destroy enemy carriers and then submarines, although the U.S. Polaris threat was specifically minimized. 3 In accordance with the logic of the Sokolovsky volume and, probably more important, with Soviet naval weakness vis-a-vis the United States, 4 Moscow's GCD plan of 1962 proposed immediate liquidation of all submarines (atomic-powered and otherwise) and all surface ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

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2 Ibid., p. 54.
3 Ibid., p. 55.
4 See above, Table III.2.
Finally, the Sokolovsky volume recognized that the instruments of nuclear attack were superior to defenses against them, and that the best defense is pre-emption. Nevertheless the book called for the development of active air defense based mainly on ABM complexes, and of civil defense. If Soviet theory did not yet appreciate the destabilizing influences an ABM system could have on the total military environment, the force of economic determinism may nevertheless have kept Moscow from attempting to develop an effective defense against American missiles.

Against this analysis of the shifting military balance and trends in Soviet strategic thinking, we may now examine the Soviet posture in the East-West negotiations to estimate the Kremlin's military interests in comprehensive and partial measures of disarmament.

1) Comprehensive Disarmament. Our earlier review of Soviet negotiating behavior in this period indicated that none of the Soviet proposals for comprehensive disarmament offered a promising basis for East-West agreement, unlike those of May 1955 which had the merit of corresponding at least somewhat to earlier Western proposals. The comprehensive Soviet plans of 1957, 1959, and early 1960 contained major characteristics that would have seriously threatened the East-West military balance. Moscow's March 1962 plan offered some improvement over earlier Soviet proposals but it too contained many one-sided "jokers," offered inspection only "over disarmament," and made little provision for adequate peacekeeping arrangements in a disarmed world.

As it was amended in the spring, summer, and fall of 1962, however, the Soviet GCD proposal came closer to offering an adequate basis for future negotiations. Since the 1962 proposal, particularly as amended by September 1962, constituted the most feasible Soviet program for GCD in the period under review, it merits closer examination.

There were a number of ambiguities in the 1962 GCD proposal that indicated a lack of serious attention to its consequences. Some of the ambiguities would even redound to Western military advantage, as witness some possible effects of implementing Stage I:\[2\]

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1\(\text{Ibid.}, \) pp. 56-58.

2\The following analysis is based in large part on Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Disarmament and European Security} (2 Vols.; London, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 44 ff.\]
1. The overall force ceiling proposed suggested that the reductions for NATO countries other than the United States would be of the same proportion as for the United States itself. The logic of this was that the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries would be reduced by the same percentage as applied to the Soviet Union. Since the percentage reduction of Soviet forces to a level of 1.7 or 1.9 million men would exceed that of the United States, the Soviet plan in effect discriminated against the entire Warsaw Pact.

2. The Soviet 1962 plan specified that the reduction to 1.7 or 1.9 million men should apply to civilian as well as military personnel in the armed forces. In that event U.S. forces should have been numbered at 3.6 and not 2.6 million men. Nevertheless, Mr. Zorin in the negotiations said that U.S. forces were to be reduced about 35 per cent, which would correspond to a reduction of the U.S. level exclusive of civilian employees.

3. The plan proposed that all submarines—not just those that could fire missiles—should be classified as nuclear delivery vehicles and therefore be abolished in Stage I. This view stretches military facts to the point of naiveté in order to demand the abolition of the one class of naval weapons in which the Soviet Union is predominant in numbers, if not in quality.

4. Moscow's refusal to specify the number of strategic delivery vehicles in the "nuclear umbrella" also suggested a lack of clarity, deepened by the fact that Moscow's plan did not propose to abolish any nuclear explosives in Stage I. These could be delivered by commercial airliners, military transport planes, and interceptors, all of which were not restricted in the Soviet plan.

The three most basic issues raised by the Soviet GCD plan as amended in September 1962 were: (1) the implications of the nuclear umbrella scheme; (2) the enhanced role of conventional forces; (3) the necessity of an international enforcement and peacekeeping machinery.
1. Soviet acceptance of the nuclear umbrella principle in September 1962 and extended in 1963 was an advance when measured against the June 1960 and March 1962 position that all strategic delivery systems should be abolished in Stage I. It seems evident that any agreement to this principle would have to specify both numbers of vehicles and megatonnage to be permitted. Assuming such an agreement, the disadvantages of the principle for the West would have been: (a) the consequent need to rely on massive retaliation instead of graduated deterrence; (b) lowering Western strategic forces more than Soviet; (c) encouraging the development of ABM systems (since the permitted number of missiles might be sufficiently small to be intercepted); and, (d) increasing the role of conventional forces in which the Warsaw Pact countries would, as discussed below, enjoy superiority in Europe.

The possible advantages of the nuclear umbrella for the West were that it might (a) stabilize the arms race and encourage both sides to think of their relationship in other than competing strategic terms; (b) limit the number of explosives that might be detonated in case of an all-out war; (c) imply a system by which other states were kept from building up their nuclear-missile capability.

2. The drastic reduction of strategic nuclear forces would increase the importance of conventional forces in East-West relations. This would, however, work against the West, since the Soviet plan would have forced the withdrawal of American forces from all overseas bases. The Warsaw Pact would have been left in Stage I with a numerical superiority in Europe of about 500,000 men, and half the remaining NATO forces would have consisted of poorly armed Italian, Greek, and Turkish contingents. U.S. troops would have been far removed from the danger zone of Central Europe, but Soviet troops would have remained relatively close. Communist countries could have trained their civilians in militia and other reserve units more effectively than the Western democracies. Finally, the withdrawal of American forces plus Western reliance on a U.S. "nuclear umbrella" stationed outside Europe might have seriously fragmented the NATO alliance.

The disadvantages of the Soviet GGD plan for Moscow were that it proposed a larger percentage cut for Soviet troops than for the U.S., and the withdrawal of foreign forces from foreign bases, which might weaken Soviet influence in the people's democracies.
3. The impossibility of enforcing the abolition of nuclear weapons and the permanent fact of unorthodox delivery systems made nuclear disarmament possible (at least for Stages II and III) only assuming that an international force could deal with any remaining secret nuclear force. While the United States had not taken an explicit stand on nuclear arms for a United Nations force, Moscow explicitly refused to consider arming U.S. peacekeeping forces with nuclear weapons and, more important, insisted upon their being subject to great-power veto, even in Stage III.

In favor of the Soviet position was the argument that under the "nuclear umbrella" the great powers could deter one another; second, that an international peacekeeping force would be used mainly to regulate disputes between smaller states thus saving the superpowers from head-on confrontations in marginal areas.

It can only be concluded that the Soviet position on GCD, even as amended in 1962, was primarily designed for its propaganda effect rather than for its negotiability. In Bechhoefer's words, Moscow pursued a "two-pronged" approach: it sought the propaganda gains of advocating GCD; at the same time it moved "in the direction of partial measures that might be capable of immediate negotiation."

2) Partial Measures.

a) Regional Arms Control and Surprise Attack. The Kremlin's strategic interests in Central European disengagement cannot be divorced from the political repercussions of such a measure. In the event the West accepted some version of the Rapacki Plan, U.S. and British forces would probably have to retire from the continent and the threat from German "revanchism" would be substantially reduced. For Moscow the threat of surprise attack, escalation, accidental or catalytic war--possibly involving tactical nuclear weapons--would be reduced. These strategic desiderata would probably have been judged by Moscow as justifying whatever loss of Soviet political influence occurred in Eastern Europe. After 1957 more than twenty Soviet divisions were concentrated in Eastern Germany but only two or three in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. The most serious loss of Soviet influence would be in East Germany, but that country was already an economic and political liability and its possible defection from the socialist camp may have appeared a small price to pay for the neutralization of all Germany. The

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1Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 324.
popularity of Communist institutions in other parts of Eastern Europe was increasingly staked on a kind of "new course." Soviet forces, in any event, would remain not distant even if they withdrew from Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, and disengagement would not affect the Soviet-based strategic forces that held Western Europe hostage against the United States.

If, on the other hand, the West refused disengagement, Moscow could still pose as the champion of peace, still tell Peking that it opposed nuclear proliferation to Germany as well as China, and still sow dissension among and within the Western governments. Eastern Europe would still remain psychologically and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union against the threat from a revisionist West Germany, and, at the least, Communist propaganda for disengagement would tend to complicate Western efforts to station NATO forces in Germany and develop the Bundeswehr. The existence of divergent views on disengagement among the Western elites probably encouraged Moscow to continue its affirmations of support for various versions of the Rapacki Plan.

We conclude that Moscow has, at least since 1956, favored arms limitations in Central Europe, which, though potentially dangerous to Soviet political influence there, would have admirably promoted Soviet strategic interests. It would seem that if the political risks of disengagement were high for the Soviet Union, the West should have been more interested in such measures, in spite of the strategic and political complications for NATO. The revised Rapacki Plan of 1958 went far even toward accommodating Western complaints about the strategic imbalance that would result from merely denuclearizing the zone. But while there was a trend toward feasibility in Soviet-endorsed disengagement proposals, we cannot pass judgment here on whether some variant of the Eden or Rapacki Plans may have been negotiable, for many strategists and political analysts in the West have argued the case pro and con, and the ultimate judgment on such matters would involve major assumptions about the role that Germany should play in NATO. What is clear is that by 1959 the governments in Washington, Bonn, and Paris had demonstrated an almost complete lack of interest in further discussion of disengagement in central Europe. After 1959, therefore, even though Moscow might still have been willing to negotiate on regional arms control in Central Europe, its proposals could be only for propaganda purposes.

b) Curbs on Testing and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
A number of military considerations militated for a cessation of nuclear testing, if not a formal treaty. One probably constant objective of Soviet policy was to prevent or impede the spread of nuclear weapons, whether by wider establishment of U.S. bases on
foreign soil or by acquisition or development of nuclear weapons by
nonth countries. Soviet propaganda and negotiating behavior endeavored
to create a climate inimical to wider deployment and proliferation
even if no moratorium or treaty were signed.

Many examples may be cited. The early 1956 emphasis on
banning thermonuclear tests was probably aimed at complicating
Britain's plans to test a hydrogen bomb. A more serious Soviet
concern has been to keep nuclear weapons out of Germany, and Soviet
test ban proposals have usually been paralleled by additional plans
for denuclearization programs. France's entry into the nuclear club
seems to have been treated by Moscow as a foregone conclusion, but
Soviet propaganda backed African protests against French plans to
test in the Sahara. And by the establishment in Dubna in 1956 of
a research center for peaceful uses of atomic energy Moscow may
have hoped to sublimate, as it were, the aspirations of the
Communist countries for nuclear military power—especially China.

For Soviet anxieties about nuclear proliferation to Germany
were probably matched or surpassed by Moscow's desire to keep
nuclear weapons from China, and the entire burden of Soviet pro-
paganda against nuclear proliferation in the West could also be
used to justify the Kremlin's denial of military assistance to
Communist countries, above all, to China. This argument was
Whatever the facts about the alleged Soviet agreement in 1957 to
provide China with a "new defense technology," Moscow does not
appear to have been anxious to deliver to China the wherewithal to
produce an atomic bomb or even to place nuclear-rocket weapons
in Chinese hands. By June 1959, in any event, the Soviet Union
apparently refused China a "sample atomic bomb and technical data
concerning its manufacture."1

Early in 1959 Moscow agreed that the first article of a draft
test ban treaty should allow all countries to accede, thereby
dropping an earlier position that the test ban treaty should be
limited to the three existing nuclear powers. Further, the
differences in Soviet and Chinese statements during 1959
concerning the nature and desirability of a nuclear-free Far
East suggest that Moscow was pushing Peking toward a commitment
the latter sought to avoid. Finally, on August 25, 1962 the
Soviet government is reported to have notified China that it would
enter into a nonproliferation agreement with the United States
that had been proposed by Secretary of State Rusk. (Press reports
in 1964, however, indicated that Moscow had turned down a U.S.
proposal in August 1963 to act jointly to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons.)

1The withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960
certainly injured China's industrial and technological capacity, thus
at least indirectly affecting Peking's nuclear program.
As for the value of further testing to enhance the strategic balance, it could have produced changes in the crucial ratios of yield-to-weight and fission-to-fusion. Improvement of the yield-to-weight ratio would permit lighter and smaller warheads for a variety of military purposes, such as allowing rockets of moderate thrust to deliver warheads of higher yields. By reducing the fission-to-fusion ratio it would be possible to develop weapons with little or no radioactive fallout. Any efforts to develop an ABM capability would also have required some nuclear-rocket testing.

By the time Moscow proposed a moratorium on all testing in March 1958 the Soviet government may have concluded that its lead in rocketry, and perhaps in nuclear weapons development as well, might justify a ban on all testing. First, since the Soviet Union could shoot larger payloads into space Moscow may have reasoned that it should strive to inhibit warhead miniaturization by the United States. Second, a test cessation would slow down the development of nuclear weapons of limited explosive yield, minimum radiation effects, and high mobility, thus inhibiting the development of improved tactical weapons for possible use in limited war, especially in Europe. Soviet theory, it should be noted, stressed the virtual impossibility of fighting a "limited" war with tactical nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union for its part has shown only modest interest in carrying on underground testing, since it relied more on massive retaliation than on gradual response. All these considerations help to explain Moscow's refusal during the period to accept a partial test ban that permitted underground testing.

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1 The total number of tests and the megatonnage exploded from July 16, 1945 to September 24, 1963 has been calculated by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, based largely on AEC data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tests</th>
<th>Megatonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and U.K.</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that the U.S. and U.K. test total is double the Soviet, with megatonnage less than half suggests the relative emphasis of the West on large numbers of low-yield weapons and of Moscow on lesser numbers of higher-yield weapons. (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November, 1963, p. 44.)
By 1961 another situation had developed. Although the Soviet Union retained superiority in the ability to lift heavy payloads into space, the United States was producing far more nuclear delivery systems than Russia; this fact more than the Berlin crisis probably lay behind Moscow's decision to resume testing in 1961. After the 1961 Soviet tests in September and October a panel of experts appointed by President Kennedy to evaluate Soviet progress agreed that "although the United States retained an overall lead in nuclear weaponry, the Soviet Union had made important cuts into the American leads and might have surpassed the United States in certain categories of weapons." The evidence suggested that the 1961 tests had allowed the Soviets to reduce weight-to-yield ratios, increase the absolute yield of warheads, reduce the size of the fission trigger, and test new weapon designs under simulated combat conditions.

After the Soviet test series Moscow claimed on November 6, 1961 that because the West had conducted about two and a half times as many tests as the Soviet Union, the latter had the "full moral right...to redress the balance." Publicly announced totals at that time were: United States, 176; Britain, 21; France, 4—for a Western total of 201 compared with 86 for the Soviet Union. But President Kennedy stated on November 8, 1961 that the Soviet Union's total megatonnage tested was about 170, whereas the U.S.-U.K.-French total was about 126.

Following the U.S. and Soviet tests in 1962 Washington's appraisal was that the strategic balance still favored the West. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs testified in January 1963 that a comprehensive test ban would be in the U.S. national interest for four reasons: First, if nuclear testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union continued there would be increases in the efficiency of higher yield weapons and the United States lead in light, high-yield weapons would diminish. Second, the trend with unlimited testing would be toward equality in strategic nuclear forces. Third, continued testing would give Moscow the opportunity to match, in time, the West's more diversified arsenal of tactical weapons. Finally, greater nuclear proliferation would result from unlimited testing.

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4 Testimony of Paul H. Nitze before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Forces, U.S. Senate, in hearings held January 24-30, 1963.
If Moscow's concern to halt nuclear testing was motivated partially by a desire not to pollute the atmosphere, this desideratum was clearly subordinate to military concerns because the Kremlin repeatedly rejected Western proposals that would have stopped atmospheric testing but either allowed underground testing to continue or prohibit it, provided intensive inspection schemes were established.

Moscow's interest in a test moratorium in 1958 had flowed from a confidence that the Soviets were "ahead" in key areas and that a suspension of testing would keep the United States from making important improvements in its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. This calculation failed to take into account the great numbers of nuclear delivery systems produced and deployed by the United States, which turned the "missile gap" against the Soviet Union. Attempting to redress the balance, at least psychologically, Moscow proceeded in 1961 to explode warheads much larger than any tested by the United States. Although some observers doubted the utility of such large warheads (or at least the ability of U.S. rockets to lift such heavy payloads), the Soviet Union appeared to achieve a kind of parity once more with the United States.

The importance of the 1961 test series in Soviet eyes--either militarily or politically, or both--was reflected in a Soviet statement following the 1963 Moscow treaty to the effect that neither side "gained" from the partial test ban, but that if either party benefited, it was the Soviet Union, which possessed much larger warheads than the United States.

It is impossible to know with certainty whether or not Moscow genuinely sought a test ban prior to 1963. The burden of available evidence suggests that the Kremlin sought at least a de facto cessation of nuclear testing as early as 1957 and probably would have agreed to a test ban treaty then, provided intrusion by international inspection could be kept to a low level. The 1957-1961 trend toward a narrowing of East-West differences was spurred by concessions on both sides and by technological improvements that facilitated control of a test ban with minimal intrusion by inspectors in foreign territory. The greatest stumbling block was the issue of underground testing, and the West had a greater interest than Moscow in such testing and was more insistent on effective control than Moscow. The political price and loss of strategic secrecy decidedly created major difficulties for Moscow.
2. The External Political Situation

A distinct correlation between the shift in Soviet arms control policy and a broader turn toward softer modalities in Soviet foreign policy as a whole could be observed in 1954-1956. From 1956 to 1962, however, the basic patterns of Soviet foreign policy were more complex and their impact on Soviet arms control policy more difficult to discern. It seems useful to recall that Soviet foreign policy throughout these years was increasingly engaged in a two-front campaign. Its successes and failures on one front would naturally interact with and affect its policies on the other front. Soviet arms control policy--because of its far-reaching military, political, and other implications--was naturally caught up in this two-front struggle.

As we turn to consider the Kremlin's "view to the West" and its "view to the East," therefore, we must remember that the problems on both fronts impacted simultaneously on policy-making in Moscow.

Further, as we look at Soviet policy on these two main fronts we should bear in mind that the general picture that emerges was profoundly influenced by the strategic problems facing the Soviet leadership, and by economic factors which we have yet to consider. The foundations on which the Soviet government had believed itself able to negotiate from strength were rapidly being eroded in 1960 and 1961, thereby introducing a note of desperation into Soviet relations on both fronts not seen during the immediate post-Sputnik years or indeed during the 1955 period.

a. The View to the West. Two interlocking assumptions characterized the Kremlin's world view in this period, especially after 1959. The first was expanding awareness of diversity among the Western elites, accompanied by the growing belief that "compromise" need not constitute betrayal to the Soviet cause but rather a useful way of promoting it. Both can be seen as having contributed importantly to Soviet policy on arms control and disarmament, and in fact the Kremlin's image of the West came to be a weightier determinant of that policy in the period under review than it had been in 1955.

The Kremlin's "real" perception of the West and the "official" Soviet image of the adversary continued to play a decisive role in the formation of Soviet arms control policy, as it had in 1954-1956. In order to strive even for détente, not to speak of arms controls, the Kremlin had to believe that moderate forces in the Western leadership might respond favorably to Soviet initiatives.
As Moscow viewed the role played by hard-liners close to the centers of power in the West, the Kremlin was probably doubtful about the possibilities of far-reaching disarmament measures with the West (on the assumption Moscow wanted such measures), but remained hopeful that East-West détente was relatively feasible. Nevertheless, Soviet disarmament policies were generally keyed to appeal to influential opinion in the West, especially to those who might exert the most direct influence on policy. The aftermath of the 1955 Summit Conference indicated to Moscow that Eisenhower was a man of peace, surrounded however by advisers who kept him from following his natural inclinations toward conciliation of East-West differences. The East European uprisings in 1956 soured Soviet relations with the West for a time, but demonstrated that even the United States would not act with force to "roll back" the Iron Curtain. Paradoxically, but none the less strikingly, Moscow and Washington even found themselves supporting the same side in the Suez crisis in 1957 and, increasingly, India against China. Washington's response to the Lebanon crisis in 1958 and, later that year, the Soviet pressure on Berlin indicated that the West intended to "hold fast," regardless of talk about a missile gap.

By mid-1959 the Soviet government had intensified its manifest and probably its real commitment to negotiation and compromise with the West. Behind this inflection in Soviet policy lay a number of probable factors—Mikoyan's personal observations while visiting the United States in January, the deepening rift between Moscow and Peking, the apparent self-confidence that underlay the new Seven-Year Plan adopted early in 1959, the passing of Secretary Dulles in May. Reflecting the new accent in Soviet foreign policy, Moscow intensified its effort for an East-West summit meeting (which might produce symbolic as well as tangible results). On June 20, 1959, Moscow is said to have refused China nuclear weapons assistance. On July 27 the first of a series of Lenin documents on cultivating the "pacifist" bourgeoisie were passed to the press, the importance of which reference is discussed below.

Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 seemed to reinforce the Soviet line that negotiations were possible with the West. On October 31, 1959, he told the Supreme Soviet: "To put it bluntly, under peaceful coexistence states must meet each other halfway in the interests of peace." Khrushchev supported his argument by pointing out that the West had made concessions in dealing with socialist states, even though Western governments were opposed to socialism. ¹ Again, in announcing

¹CDSP, No. 44, 1959, p. 3.
a unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces on January 14, 1960. Khrushchev stated before the Supreme Soviet:

While in the U.S.A. we became convinced that the most farsighted statesmen, businessmen, and representatives of the American intelligentsia... want not a continuation of the arms race and further exacerbation of nerves but tranquillity and peace.1

The distinction between "sober-minded" and militaristic forces in the U.S. "ruling circles" was painted even more vividly elsewhere in the Soviet press.2

In April 1960, on the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, CPSU Presidium Member Otto Kuusinen affirmed the existence of both moderate and aggressive forces in the West. He declared that a variety of factors had caused differences of opinion to develop in Western "ruling circles":

The dichotomy in influential bourgeois circles is unquestionably significant for the success of the struggle for peace. Even in his time, Lenin pointed out that it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we deal with representatives of the bourgeois camp who gravitate toward a military solution of the question or with those representatives of the bourgeois class who gravitate toward pacifism...3

At this same time the Soviet publication New Times produced an article giving a partial presentation of the 1922 Lenin documents on the Soviet disarmament and peace program made at the Genoa Economic Conference, published the previous year in Lenin Miscellany (available only in Russian). Although some communists were presumably aware that these documents envisaged a purely instrumental use of a conciliatory disarmament posture in order...

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1Ibid., No. 2, 1960, p. 8. Khrushchev added: "Any sensible person in the West who is a stranger to aggressive aspirations will reason approximately thus: 'Why should we increase our armed forces when the Soviet Union is undertaking a drastic reduction of its armed forces?'


3Pravda, April 23, 1960.
to split Western elites, the New Times article in 1960 took them as evidence of traditional Soviet commitment to negotiated disarmament and coexistence.1

After going out on a limb regarding the potential of the Camp David spirit, there is some evidence that Khrushchev was embarrassed by Eisenhower's acceptance of personal responsibility for the U-2 flight. Nonetheless, while Khrushchev chose to break up the Paris Summit meeting, he indicated that the Soviet Union was not rejecting all negotiations, and added that it would be desirable to hold negotiations in six or eight months when the international atmosphere had cleared and the United States had elected a new president.2

The Kremlin seems to have viewed Kennedy's advent to power with cautious optimism, and probably preferred it to a Nixon victory.3 The December 1960 Statement of 81 Communist parties4 and the January 6, 1961 address by Khrushchev explicitly included statements that peaceful coexistence was favored by a definite section of the Western bourgeoisie—a section that Khrushchev said must be "used."5 These assertions, of course, probably had as much to do with the Sino-Soviet dispute as with the Kremlin's view of the West or of Kennedy in particular, but it is significant that Moscow continued to make them in the months following the U-2 incident.


2N. S. Khrushchev, statement, CDSP, No. 20, 1960, p. 5. In his speech in East Berlin after leaving Paris, Khrushchev was willing to state: "If we can't get a working agreement or the settlement of disputed international issues with the present leaders of the U.S.A. or with the president who takes over from Eisenhower, we'll wait until the president after that." Ibid., No. 21, 1960, p. 4. See also: Editorial, "The People Demand: Curb the Aggressor and Ensure Lasting Peace," World Marxist Review, No. 6, 1960, p. 5; and Editorial, "A Policy of Perfidy," International Affairs, No. 6, 1960, pp. 3-4.


4The Sino-Soviet Dispute, op. cit., p. 189.

5CDSP, No. 4, 1961, p. 11.
The year 1961 was not propitious for Soviet recognition of "moderates" in the West. The new Kennedy administration came out with an increased defense budget; backed a major Soviet defeat in the Congo; allowed an invasion of Cuba with U.S. support; gave no ground in a Vienna meeting with Khrushchev; and matched or exceeded Soviet shows of force in Berlin. At the same time Moscow's relations with Albania and Communist China grew more strained as their polemics intensified. All these events conspired to limit the Soviet freedom of action in dealing with the West on problems of arms control, although as we have noted there was some conciliatory Soviet behavior on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles in September 1961. Thus, Khrushchev told the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961 that it would be "the gravest of mistakes" to imagine that "the imperialists have been brought to their senses." 1 And yet, in lifting the December 31, 1961 deadline for a Berlin settlement, he conceded that the "Western powers" had shown a "certain understanding of the situation... and were disposed to seek a settlement." 2 Moreover, in antagonistic language he emphasized his main theme that Western leaders were taking a more reasonable approach to foreign relations. 3

The ambivalence in Khrushchev's remarks in October 1961 proved to be almost symbolic of the vacillation and drift already noted in Soviet foreign policy generally in 1962. Moscow seemed unsure whether to emphasize a militant or a conciliatory line in dealing with its adversaries to the East and to the West. This vacillation was reflected in disarmament talks, whether Moscow accepted in principle and then rejected an agreement on its proposal to ban war propaganda. Similarly, Soviet media and spokesmen alternated in presenting an image of a homogeneous or heterogeneous adversary in the West.


In March 1962 the CPSU turned again to publishing Lenin's views on manipulating elite differences in the West with the use of the disarmament issue. This move, it should be noted, paralleled the opening of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. Kommunist also came out in March 1962 with an article signed by A. Arzumanyan, which obliquely referred to the desirability of exploiting elite differences in the West. And in April 1962 Pravda and Izvestia also printed photographs of the 1959 documentation, and added new archival materials on the decision-making process for the Genoa conference in 1922. In May 1962 the Soviet line toward Yugoslavia warmed again, an indicator of a possibly more manipulative and softer orientation in Soviet policy generally. As noted earlier, the months of June and July also saw United States-Soviet agreements on scientific cooperation in outer space and, more importantly, on Laos. They also saw an exceptionally clear statement of the need to differentiate in dealing with Western elites, which appeared in the Soviet journal for the world communist movement.

At the same time, however, Khrushchev's election speech of March 10, 1962 had threatened the United States with a new "global rocket" capable of evading American warning systems and "invulnerable" to anti-missile missiles; the Berlin issue continued to be agitated by the Soviet press; and, as the decision was made in the summer of 1962 to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Soviet press stressed the existence of a war danger arising from United States provocations in the Caribbean. This ambivalence in the Kremlin's private and public image of the West was not to be resolved until after the Cuban missile crisis, when Moscow seemed to have concluded that the United States was militarily strong and politically resolute, but also stood ready to cooperate in reciprocal actions to keep peace and minimize tensions, and, where possible, enter specific agreements of arms control.

On balance, the image the Soviet leadership held of the West had gained much in sophistication and was deepened by personal contacts. The decline in black-and-white dichotomies in the Soviet

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3 See, for example, Pravda, May 17, 1962.

view of the West had great importance for the prospects of détente and arms control. Increased contacts between statesmen, scientists, students, and the like reinforced the broad desire on both sides to minimize tensions which could lead to war. Of special significance for arms control, Soviet writing on this subject increased both in quantity and quality since about 1959, and showed a much greater familiarity with Western publications than in previous times, and rapport grew in certain areas of discussion between Soviet and Western writers on arms control and military strategy.

The Kremlin continued to perceive both hard and moderate elements in the Western "ruling circles," whose relative weight could be modified by Soviet behavior. What was new, however, was the increasing public and ideological commitment which the Soviet government made to working with moderates in the West. It became increasingly important for the Kremlin to be correct in its calculation that the capitalist adversary would agree to modulate the cold war and make reasonable compromises with the Soviet camp. For if this calculation proved wrong, all the skeptics in Peking and those in Moscow could hold it against First Secretary Khrushchev and his associates. The Soviet leadership, in this sense, had an increasing stake in proving the viability of "peaceful coexistence." This strategy, we have seen, denoted both "struggle" and "cooperation." If the one aspect did not strike pay-dirt, fulfillment of the second might compensate.

b. The View to the East. There was little evidence that China played any significant role in the decisions which brought on the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1954-1955. But as early as February 1956 and certainly by the second half of 1957, the state of Sino-Soviet relations became a key determinant of the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy generally and toward arms control in particular. The period under study was one of steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, precisely in those areas which would most affect arms control policy, most prominently featuring steadily increasing Chinese opposition to Soviet détente and disarmament policy.

The inducements toward accommodation with the West resulting from the Chinese political and--in the long run--potential military threat seems to have been much more decisive than the restraints which flowed from Moscow's interest in keeping its most powerful ally within the fold.

The Chinese date the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations from the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, while Moscow dates it from the Chinese ideological attacks of April and June 1960. One Western analyst sees the dispute as virtually irreparable after
the summer of 1959 (subject however to a shift of leadership). In any event, Moscow appears after 1959 to have decided to run whatever risks would be involved in pursuing its own course toward the West regardless of Chinese opposition. Although there were moments of lessened hostility, divergent power political interests, ideological differences, and personal frictions moved Sino-Soviet relations almost inexorably toward an open rift.

According to Peking Moscow had been "correct" until 1956 in calling for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and China supported this view. But at the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev had stated Russia would stop testing if other nuclear powers followed suit, and stressed that implementation of "such measures could pave the way to agreement on other more intricate aspects of disarmament." (At the DCSC on March 27, 1956, Khrushchev's lead was followed by Gromyko's proposal for a hydrogen bomb test ban as a partial measure which could be implemented without inspection.) In Chinese eyes Khrushchev "divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament. Subsequently [the CPSU leaders] were wrong on certain issues and correct on others, and we supported them in all their correct views."2 And while Chinese objections to the ideological revisionism of Khrushchev were probably more muted in 1956 than Peking later suggested there can be little doubt that the Chinese leadership was dismayed at the vigor of the Soviet Union's economic and political march into the third world, especially since it was literally at China's expense.

Despite this early evidence of a Soviet interest in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the Chinese leadership decided in 1956 to depend on a transitional military strategy which required heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. Chinese hopes for Soviet nuclear assistance may have been fanned by Moscow's 1955 plan for sharing Soviet experience in the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the Communist bloc. By mid-1957 ten Chinese scientists were engaged in research in high-energy physics at the Joint Institute in Dubna. A research reactor and cyclotron, which the Soviet Union promised China in 1955, finally began operation in mid-1958.3

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The strengthening of Khrushchev's personal position and the intensified Soviet commitment to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line which followed the removal of the "anti-party group" in 1957 took place at the same time as the Soviet Union demonstrated its new military might by the successful launching of an ICBM in August and Sputnik I in October 1957. These dramatic feats suggested to Peking that the time had come for a more forward political strategy by the Communist camp; it turned out that Peking drew more radical conclusions from these successes than Moscow. For Mao Tse-tung, the ICBM test meant that the balance of forces had shifted in favor of the Communist camp; the East wind was now prevailing over the West wind. Soviet statements on the other hand averred only that the balance had turned in favor of the Communist bloc. The evidence suggested that Peking, convinced that the over-all strength of socialism outweighed that of imperialism, "was not hesitant to jump the gun on Moscow in an effort to exploit the full significance of these developments in order to further Chinese aspirations."\(^1\)

At the same time, Peking may have been encouraged at least temporarily to exercise restraint in its relations with Moscow by a Soviet commitment that, Peking later implied, bound Moscow to help China develop nuclear weapons. The primary source is a Chinese statement of August 15, 1963:

As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September.\(^2\)

Although there was little sign from the Chinese-Soviet scientific and military negotiations of late 1957 and early 1958 that Moscow had agreed to assist the Chinese with a nuclear military capacity, we do know that a large delegation of Chinese scientists headed by the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was in the Soviet Union from October 18, 1957 (three days after the pact is supposed to have been signed) to January 18, 1958 and that during

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this period agreement was reached for joint Soviet-Chinese scientific research in 1958-1962 on 122 different items. Later reports indicated the key fields in this research would be physics and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.\(^1\) A hint that military matters were also involved in these negotiations came on November 6, 1957, when a high-level Chinese mission left for Moscow without prior publicity. Mao Tse-tung was also in Moscow in November and conferred with Khrushchev. Although different emphases in speeches by P'eng Teh-huai and Malinovsky on November 27, 1957, suggested that Moscow had not yet committed itself to providing nuclear weapons to China,\(^2\) the Chinese Foreign Minister in May 1958 gave the first public indication that his country planned to produce nuclear weapons. A possible Soviet aid commitment in late 1957 or early 1958 might have taken the form of initiating (or intensifying) Soviet scientific and technological assistance to the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Such a commitment might well have been ambiguous, qualified, and long in term; it might have been tied to the 122-point scientific cooperation program agreed on in January 1958.

Soviet reluctance to aid China's nuclear program was no doubt deepened by Peking's independent course in domestic and foreign policy as dramatically manifested in August-September 1958 in the bombardment of Quemoy and the initiation of the "great leap forward." The date of June 20, 1959 assigned by China to Moscow's refusal to provide a sample bomb is consonant with the Soviet stress at that time on nuclear-free zones to which Peking was responding coolly. The timing of the refusal is also consistent with the Soviet broadcast to North America on June 12 assailing the "Washington claim" that the test ban under negotiation could not be trusted because China would not be a signatory. The broadcast accused Washington of persisting in this refusal "in order to have an excuse for getting out of all kinds of international agreements."

After the Sino-Indian border conflict of September 1959, and Khrushchev's visits to Camp David and Peking, the Chinese began increasingly to criticize Khrushchev's pursuit of East-West détente and disarmament. In February 1960 the magazine China Youth called disarmament an "impractical fantasy" since the imperialists would never disarm themselves. In April 1960 came the Chinese broadside entitled "Long Live Leninism!" Imperialism had not changed since

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\(^1\)Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 102.

\(^3\)International Service, Moscow, June 14, 1959.
Lenin's day, it was asserted, and to attempt to negotiate disarmament or a relaxation of tensions was to mislead the people. 1

The U-2 incident seemed somewhat to vindicate the Chinese image of the West. But Moscow continued in the following months to uphold its view that some members of the Western "ruling circles" took a sober and reasonable approach to East-West relations. Khrushchev now recalled Soviet specialists from China, sharply reduced Soviet trade with China, and reportedly tried to overthrow the Albanian leadership.

Following the attempted settlement at the 81-party meeting in Moscow in November 1960 there was an apparent lull in Sino-Soviet relations in 1961. This was shattered, however, at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress in October when Khrushchev denounced Albania, later breaking off diplomatic relations with Tirana. From March to September, 1962 another outward lull seemed to prevail—a period of curious ambivalence in Soviet policy.

In late August 1962, however, according to Chinese sources, Moscow informed Peking of a decision to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons:

On August 25, 1962, two days before the United States and Britain put forward their draft treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government notified China that U.S. Secretary Rusk had proposed an agreement stipulating that, firstly, the nuclear powers should undertake to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear countries, and that, secondly, the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing them, from seeking them from the nuclear powers or from accepting technical information concerning their manufacture. The Soviet Government gave an affirmative reply to this proposal of Rusk's.

The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the Soviet Government, on September 3, 1962, October 20, 1962, and June 6, 1963, stating that it was a matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear

weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but that the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism, and that we would issue statements to make our position known.  

As a kind of corroboration of Peking's assertions, People's Daily charged on September 12, 1962 that the United States was obstructing the progress of the ENDC by demanding on-site inspections. But the article went on to indicate a deeper concern. The U.S.-U.K. statement on testing, said People's Daily, declared that the "treaty would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. . . . The reason U.S. ruling circles are so interested in preventing what they call nuclear proliferation is not secret. . . . Washington is anxious to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons." People's Daily went on to say that "only a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the unconditional destruction of all existing nuclear weapons can prevent a nuclear war. . . . The discontinuation of nuclear tests . . . should under no circumstances become a means by which the United States may achieve and maintain nuclear superiority."  

Did Moscow—as Peking alleges—inform the Chinese leadership on August 25, 1962, that it would sign a nonproliferation agreement with the United States? The Soviet rejection of the comprehensive and partial treaty alternatives proposed by Washington on August 27, 1962, gave no such clue. But, as we shall see, the Soviet negotiating position did shift slightly on August 29 and September 3, 1962, and Moscow's subsequent advocacy of the "black box" idea and the return to three on-site inspections quota in the winter of 1962-1963 suggested that the Kremlin may have sought to move the test ban talks from a standstill.


2New China News Agency, Peking, September 12, 1962. This policy statement crowned a series of declarations on disarmament in which nuclear test cessation was generally made dependent on the banning of nuclear weapons. See Zoppo, op. cit., p. 385.
On balance, one is left with the impression that the "nuclear war" problem and the "Chinese comrades" problem were proceeding for the Soviet on parallel tracks, as it were, and that what in fact was happening during this period was that the Soviets continued to give paramountcy to the "threat of war" problem, but perhaps were becoming increasingly uneasy at the growing potential threat to the East. This took concrete form in adding to the urgency behind Moscow's interest in obtaining an end to nuclear testing and to nuclear spread. Consciously or not, the Kremlin's sense of common interest with the Governments of the industrialized and status quo nations of the West was no doubt deepened as the Weltanschauung and strategy favored by Peking parted from that of Moscow. If a choice had to be made, it appeared increasingly that Moscow would prefer to alienate China than to forego opportunities for policy successes in the West—especially if they helped to keep China from obtaining nuclear weapons or if they undermined the "dogmatist" line on the unchanging nature of imperialism in the international Communist debate.

c. Implications for Policy. The major objective of Soviet disarmament policy in the period 1956-1962 remained, as in the 1954-1956 period, the promotion of the Soviet Union's security interests, with or without the enactment of East-West agreements on arms control. But there was this decisive difference: after 1956 the Soviet regime realized it was locked in a serious engagement on its eastern as well as on its western flank, and that a 'hard' or 'soft' move on one front would react and interact with events on the other. Before considering Moscow's political interest in various measures we should consider the role that Soviet arms control policy could play in the over-all thrust of Soviet foreign policy in this period, first in dealing with the West and then in the international Communist movement.

1) In Dealings with the West. How did Moscow's disarmament policies tie in with the increased bargaining power accruing to the Kremlin from the alleged "missile gap?" While there was no simple "post-Sputnik offensive" pushing inexorably to force a Western retreat, there were soft and hard facets in Soviet policy, both of which sometimes served offensive and at other times defensive functions. Similarly Soviet arms control policy could function either in a basically soft, a hard, or a combined soft and hard policy for either an offensive or defensive objective. Examples may illustrate the diverse ways in which arms control proposals served Soviet purposes.

First, at times when Moscow employed primarily soft modalities to relax East-West tensions, arms control proposals served to strengthen the peace-loving image of the Soviet Union, to relax tensions, and to help persuade moderates in the West to move their governments toward détente. Such was generally the pattern from 1956 to mid-1960.
When Moscow reverted to a harsher line and to threats to obtain political objectives, Soviet disarmament proposals could provide a soft alternative, to suggest that acquiescence to Moscow's political demands could be rewarded by an enhancement of peace and improved control of dangerous situations. Thus pressure for a German peace treaty was accompanied in November 1958, by another version of the Rapacki Plan, which offered a reasonable appearing arms control arrangement that could parallel a political settlement of the German problem.¹

Third, arms control policy could be a soft tactic designed to thwart a tough Western response to hard modalities of Soviet foreign policy. Thus when Moscow was on the defensive over Hungary and was engaged in a limited offensive regarding Suez, the Soviet declaration of November 17, 1956 laid down a detailed disarmament program, presumably to remind all of Moscow's peaceful intent even while Soviet tanks roamed Budapest and Soviet volunteers were threatened for intervention in Egypt. Again, while the West endeavored to strengthen its defenses in Germany in late summer and early fall 1961, the Soviet government proposed a number of partial measures at the General Assembly to provide a reasonable solution to dangers in Central Europe. This stratagem differed from the parallel use in 1958 of Khrushchev's ultimatum and the Rapacki Plan in that by September 1961 there was no imminent prospect of a negotiated settlement, while in 1958 such a resolution was not foreclosed. Similarly Moscow's moves to resume nuclear test ban negotiations after the 1961 Soviet series of tests were obviously aimed at making it more difficult for Washington to resume testing. (The West also moved to resume test ban negotiations but eventually used the negotiations as a justification for more U.S. tests, since the Soviets turned down an effectively controlled ban.)

Fourth, arms control policy could itself be a hard modality in a general program designed to intimidate the West and show Moscow's displeasure over Western policies. Several instances suggest the point: breaking off DCSC negotiations in September 1957; resuming but quickly breaking off the Ten Nation talks in 1960 after the Paris Summit Conference; insisting in 1961 that the Soviet test ban proposal be accepted or that the test ban talks be submerged in GGD negotiations; refusing to approve a Soviet-sponsored ban on war propaganda in 1962 after U.S. troops moved into Thailand and after German Defense Minister Strauss wrote that

¹The revised Rapacki Plan was announced on November 4, 1958, while Khrushchev's demand for a "free city" of West Berlin came on November 10, 1958.
the Bundeswehr should be armed with nuclear weapons.

Fifth, Soviet arms control proposals could keep both hard and soft modalities open to the Kremlin. Thus GCD was promoted at a World Congress in Moscow in 1962 even while Soviet negotiators in Geneva claimed to accept a neutralist sponsored test ban proposal.

Sixth, arms control policy sometimes was little affected by turns toward the left or right in over-all Soviet policy. Thus some progress continued to be recorded in test ban negotiations following the 1960 summit debacle, although GCD talks at the Ten Nation meeting were visibly affected. One explanation might be that Moscow wanted an agreement on nuclear testing and therefore decided to ignore all histrionics. It could also be that the Soviet Union had political reasons for keeping open this one line of East-West negotiations in which some hope for progress existed. Such progress might make a desired impression in Washington, Peking, and even in Moscow.

Finally, the diverse ways in which Soviet arms control proposals could serve the over-all thrust of Soviet policy are suggested by the times and manner in which GCD was advocated: in September 1959 as a means toward détente; in June 1961 as a way to prevent further progress on test ban talks; in September 1961 (the McCloy-Zorin agreement) as a basis for further negotiations; in 1962 as a device for promoting mass agitation while weighing other alternatives, both hard and soft.

The most common function of Moscow's arms control policy, however, was to control the political climate to promote Soviet strategic interests, which usually dictated an appearance of reasonableness and feasibility. This appearance was essential where Moscow's proposals aimed at East-West agreements or at a reduction of tensions that might achieve results similar to an agreement. In this spirit, the Soviet proposals most likely to strike the West as reasonable were partial measures on matters of mutual concern such as those involving surprise attack, nuclear testing, and tensions and armaments in Central Europe (of special concern in London and Paris if not in Washington).

1The Strauss article however was written so long before that it could only have been a pretext. Moscow's reneging on the war propaganda item may have been motivated in part by a desire to maintain a tense atmosphere that would help rationalize imminent increases in Soviet food prices.
The proposals themselves during 1956-1962 could be interpreted as addressing themselves to specific strategic threats. From 1956 through 1958 Soviet policy (with Polish assistance) worked hard to promote disengagement or other partial measures that would frustrate the West's plan to station nuclear weapons in Germany. In 1958 Moscow proposed an end to testing just after a Soviet test series had ended and Western tests were to resume. The nuclear-free zone proposals of 1959 and 1960 were clearly aimed at frustrating U.S., French, and possibly Chinese plans to test or station nuclear weapons in the Balkans, the Baltic, the Far East, and Africa. The 1958 Surprise Attack Conference and subsequent negotiations provided an opportunity to publicize the dangers flowing from the ring of overseas U.S. air and (later) submarine bases. Throughout the 1956-1962 period vocal Soviet support for a nuclear test ban allowed Moscow to put pressure on the West to cease testing even while Moscow itself tested, assuming an air of righteousness. And some of Moscow's most reasonable appearing partial measures were put forward in September 1961 while the West was attempting to strengthen its defenses in Germany.

2) In Dealings with the Communist Countries. Arms control policy also functioned in this period as an instrument for Moscow vis-à-vis the international Communist movement, one that can best be understood in light of the contrast between Soviet communism's long perspective on revolution today and the Comintern's naive exhortations in the 1920's that exposure of "capitalist hypocrisy" in disarmament negotiations should incite to revolution.

The relevant issues under this heading thus relate not so much to Moscow's long-range calculations about revolution in the West but to its more immediate problems of preserving Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, keeping the Chinese Communists within the Soviet fold (or, failing that, blunting their challenge to Moscow's leadership in the Communist movement), and promoting Soviet influence in the developing countries. All three tasks, it should be noted, concern more the preservation than the extension of Soviet power. The first and second tasks, moreover, relate not only to ideological desiderata but also to the safeguarding of Moscow's security from threats along its Western and Eastern frontiers. However, the interest of Soviet state security and the existence of the regime in Moscow are deeply involved in the maintenance of Soviet influence in the international Communist movement and, to a lesser extent, in the movement's expansion.

The years from 1956 to 1962 saw the emergence of profound threats to Soviet hegemony in that movement, arising in large part from the manner in which de-Stalinization took place. The
softer line in Soviet foreign policy had the effect of exacerbating these dangers by encouraging polycentrism in Eastern Europe and antagonizing the Chinese. Arms control policy can be seen as having helped to trigger such dissension within the movement but it was also a way, no matter how ineffective, of dealing with it.

Moscow's difficulties with Peking, like those in Eastern Europe, reflected a movement toward autonomous thought and action. But while the East European regimes sought merely to go their own way, Peking sought to rival Moscow for leadership in international communism.

The impact of Sino-Soviet relations exerted a decisive influence on Soviet arms control policy after 1956. Here we shall suggest only the political use to which Moscow put its arms control policy in dealing with the problems arising from its relations with Peking.

The problem of whether Moscow should aid China in acquiring nuclear weapons was obviously a delicate one between "fraternal" parties of such stature and with a long history of discord. A successful test ban treaty between the existing nuclear powers might be expanded to include China. Early in 1959 Soviet negotiators in Geneva agreed that the draft test ban's first article should have a clause permitting accession by other states. Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East were a crude means of exerting pressure against China's nuclear program and probably infuriated Peking. But at least Moscow could claim that it was also opposing nuclear proliferation to Germany and other countries.

The Soviet Union would have liked to perpetuate China's military and political dependence upon Moscow. This was one reason why the Soviet Union might not want China to acquire nuclear weapons but also why Moscow might offer limited aid to Peking in order to encourage Chinese reliance on Soviet assistance.

China's dependence upon the Soviet Union was reinforced at the United Nations and at disarmament negotiations where its interests were ostensibly represented by Soviet delegations. Moscow occasionally demanded that China be seated at the negotiations and maintained in widely publicized statements that no agreement could be binding on China without her participation. In the actual negotiations, however, Soviet diplomats were generally willing to speculate on the kinds of force levels that China should accept.
Perhaps the main political use that disarmament policies served in Moscow's relations with Peking was to counter the Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological "revisionism." Soviet disarmament policy was one source of Chinese displeasure. But Moscow tried to turn the issue around and use it against Peking by showing that it was incorrect to insist that Lenin's 1916 dicta on disarmament should guide Communist policy when capitalism no longer encircled socialism and when the atomic bomb did not respect the class principle.

Whether the needs of Soviet state security and Moscow's role in the Communist movement could be effectively upheld against the Chinese threat by reliance on arms control and collaboration with the West was another matter. What arms controls would be effective—a test ban, a nonproliferation agreement, GCD with a "nuclear umbrella" for the superpowers? The more feasible arms controls seemed also the less promising as ways of keeping China from membership in the nuclear club. Or should Moscow continue to fight a two-front struggle, hoping that Soviet military and economic prowess would deter the not-too-aggressive West and suffice for many years before the somewhat more aggressive Chinese became a great military power.

These were questions to which Moscow may not have given a firm answer in 1956-1962. But the evidence suggests that the Chinese pressure goaded the Soviets increasingly toward attempts at arms controls and disarmament propaganda which would impede if not check the Chinese military and ideological challenge.

Bearing in mind these many uses to which arms control proposals and propaganda were put, let us consider the Soviet political interest in comprehensive and partial measures, as the Kremlin may have judged it.

3) Comprehensive Disarmament. Soviet propaganda for GCD has apparently aimed at creating a peaceloving image for the Soviet Union in the West, the developing countries, and perhaps domestically. The penchant for all-out disarmament may also have reflected a reaction to criticism from China as well as a diplomatic tradition going back to the 1920's, an ideological propensity for total solutions, some lack of sophistication about the skepticism with which such propaganda is viewed in the West, and may even have been prompted by the need to come up with a diplomatic sensation for Khrushchev's 1959 trip to the United Nations.
The Soviet regime may have sought the best of all possible worlds by what Bechhoefer has called a "two-pronged" approach—-one prong seeking the political advantages of advocating an idealistic program of drastic disarmament, the other working toward partial measures that might be capable of immediate negotiation. 1 If so, however, the Kremlin seems in this period to have alienated many of those in the East as well as in the West whom it sought to impress. If the Soviet regime sought to use its GCD stand with its implicit opportunities for a propaganda of exposure to minimize Chinese criticism of Soviet détente policies, the Chinese response was to attack more virulently "illusions" about the "warless world" before the overthrow of capitalism. And if the Soviet Government hoped to use its comprehensive proposals only as a preliminary propaganda blow before proceeding to more manageable topics, the poorly thought-through nature of the Soviet GCD proposals could only engender skepticism among Western leaders endeavoring to discern Soviet intentions. While the grounds for this skepticism were partially removed by the McCloy-Zorin agreement in 1961 and, more important, by modifications in the Soviet program in 1962 including the nuclear umbrella principle, Moscow's reluctance to spell out the details of such principles still left Western observers with a most cautious attitude toward Moscow's policy on GCD.

Perhaps the best audience for Moscow's GCD propaganda was in the "third world," where the Kremlin could seek to offset competition from the West and from Peking by utilizing, inter alia, grandiose promises of the benefits that would result from great power disarmament. Agreement on Soviet disarmament proposals would allegedly lead to the elimination of foreign bases and to the destruction of the qualitative advantage of military power by which the imperialists still resisted the quantitative strength of oppressed peoples; and it would halt the nuclear testing that threatened their health. In addition, Moscow promised what China could not—at least so plausibly—a huge transfer of its defense funds to the development programs of the new nations.

These protestations concerning the advantages of peaceful coexistence and disarmament were qualified by the Soviet position that the achievement of a disarmed world and the establishment of peacekeeping forces under the Security Council were in no way to impede the "struggle of peoples who are struggling for their

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independence and social progress."

While at least a perfunctory support of GCD is to be expected at all negotiations, heavy or exclusive emphasis on GCD has generally been a signal that Moscow is not ready for serious negotiations in areas of possible agreement. Such, we conclude, was the situation in 1961 when Moscow wanted to merge the test ban talks with GCD negotiations. And such was the situation in 1962 when Soviet policy drifted, uncertain whether to pursue a hard or soft tack toward the West.

4) Partial Measures.

a) Regional Arms Controls and Surprise Attack. Arms control policy has served Soviet purposes in Eastern and Central Europe in a number of ways. First, Moscow's disengagement proposals played on European fears of German "revanchism." The various modifications of the Rapacki Plan, especially in 1958, in ostensible response to Western objections, cultivated the impression that Moscow was quite willing to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe if only the West would halt its plans for making the Bonn republic a forward base for another Drang nach Osten. Similarly the Soviet proposal in 1959 to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans helped to reinforce a sense of political and military dependence upon Moscow to guard against any threat from NATO forces in Turkey or Greece.

Second, promotion of disengagement and denuclearized zones by Polish, Bulgarian, and Rumanian leaders allowed the East Europeans some semblance of autonomy in the world arena. Polycentrism of course was increasing in spite of Moscow. But the Kremlin could probably have restrained the "people's democracies" from making arms control initiatives had it wanted to. The fact was, however, that Soviet and East European interests seemed to coincide on regional arms control proposals and it cost the Soviet Union little to allow Rapacki, Zhivkov, and others to act in concert with Soviet diplomacy. In fact a greater role for the bloc countries was needed to attain parity of Communist representation

\footnote{1}{Probably, to protect the left flank against Peking, Khrushchev made clear on January 6, 1961 that wars of national liberation were still unavoidable, because imperialism would not give way voluntarily. Even Khrushchev's December 31, 1963 proposal to prohibit the use of force in international disputes left an escape clause for wars of national liberation and for China's recovery of Taiwan by whatever means were needed.}
with the West, achieved when East European delegations took part in the 1958 technical talks, the 1960 Ten Nation Committee, and the ENDC in 1962.

The Soviet posture of favoring a test ban and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to West Germany helped to justify Moscow's refusal to give the bloc countries nuclear weapons or technical assistance other than for peaceful uses. And, as suggested earlier, Soviet proposals for nuclear-free zones in the Far East, Balkans, Baltic, Africa, and other parts of the world offered a crude means of pressure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as well as inhibit nuclear tests by China and the West.

b. Ban on Nuclear Testing. The larger goals of halting nuclear proliferation and achieving a strategic balance favorable to the Soviet Union could be promoted by effective diplomatic and propaganda support for a test ban whether or not an East-West agreement were reached. In this respect Soviet support of a ban on nuclear testing had greater potential appeal than the "ban the bomb" slogan of earlier years because the test ban issue could be portrayed in a manner that would appeal both to the "masses" and leaders in the West and the neutralist camp.

The test ban issue offered perhaps the best vehicle for continuing East-West negotiations on a topic of broad political interest. Such negotiations could promote détente and weaken Western advocates of an arms build-up and forward strategy. There was obviously much support for a test ban in the West, as the 1956 election campaign in the United States suggested and the 1958 moratorium on testing demonstrated. A conciliatory Soviet position on nuclear testing could thus offer a powerful instrument to intervene in the domestic political process in the West. This theoretical goal, as it turned out, was far from fulfilled because of the wide publicity given to Soviet recalcitrance on the issue of control and on-site inspection. Breaking the test moratorium in 1961 was especially damaging to Moscow's peaceloving image in the West. Even the 1961 Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned States offered a mild rebuke. And the 1961 General Assembly resolution against nuclear testing was implicitly addressed to Moscow as well as Washington.

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1 The Soviet campaign to promote disarmament was generally popular in Eastern Europe, where economic hardship, dislike of Soviet occupation, and fear of renewed war combine to produce strong antimilitaristic tendencies among the population. Popular skepticism about Soviet motives, however, reinforced the need for plausibility in Soviet proposals.
Moscow's 1961 test series nevertheless helped to clarify the nature of Soviet propaganda objectives. Soviet peace propaganda was combined with the projection of a powerful and even terrifying image of Soviet military capacity, as demonstrated by Moscow's announcement that it would explode a multimegaton weapon in October 1961. The Soviet Union may have felt compelled to demonstrate again that it was the military equal or superior of the United States, enabling Soviet peace propaganda to continue on the basis of negotiating "reasonably" from a position of great strength.

At the same time that Soviet propaganda for a test ban hoped to neutralize "aggressive elements" in the West it probably served to isolate opponents of détente in the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev and his supporters could cite technical data to argue that a test ban was in Moscow's strategic and economic interest. They could draw upon the prestige of Soviet scientists who stressed the health hazards of further testing. They could also point to the moratorium to which the West agreed in 1958 as proof of the possibility of limited collaboration with the adversary. Finally, Soviet negotiating behavior demonstrated to hard-liners in Moscow that the Khrushchev government was not going to agree to a test ban that permitted extensive or intensive intrusion in Soviet society or opened to the West important areas of military secrecy.

So far as the resumption of nuclear testing by Moscow in 1961 was concerned, in addition to the military reasons we have mentioned, the new tests probably offset criticism of Khrushchev's version of peaceful coexistence from his opponents in Peking and in Moscow, which intensified after the U-2 affair, the Bay of Pigs, the first Kennedy military budget, and tension over Berlin in 1961, and supplied the incidental psychological benefit of demonstrating Moscow's capacity to build and fire 50-megaton bombs.

3. The Economic Factor.

Moscow's interest in arms control, it was argued in Chapter II, derived little impetus from 1954 to 1956 from economic considerations. The Kremlin seems rather to have made excessively rosy calculations about the future rate of Soviet economic growth and the savings possible through reliance on advanced military technology instead of conventional forces and massive inputs of personnel. From 1956 to 1962 the grounds of this optimism faded, one after another, presenting Moscow by 1961 or 1962 with strong economic incentives to reduce military spending, either directly by East-West agreement or indirectly as a by-product of international détente.
The decisive year marking a turning point in the Soviet economy's ability to sustain the arms race appears to have been 1958. From Stalin's death until 1958 the economic burden imposed by defense generally fell as defense expenditures stabilized or declined and economic growth continued at a rapid rate. Beginning in 1958 and 1959, however, the absolute magnitude of the Soviet arms effort increased dramatically; at the same time the rate of Soviet industrial growth began to fall, thereby heightening the relative burden of defense spending although its absolute weight remained roughly constant. Further, by 1961 the political and military worth of an arms race with the West had itself become questionable, because the United States was demonstrating that it could outspend and outproduce the Soviet Union in developing an arsenal capable of a "graduated response" to most forms of strategic and conventional warfare.

Thus, the economic incentive since 1958 to reduce defense spending was reinforced in 1961 by recognition that Moscow could not for the foreseeable future win any decisive victory in an arms race with the West. Moreover the burden of defense spending was impeding Soviet advance in what Khrushchev designated in 1959 as the main arena of East-West competition--economic growth. The lag in Soviet growth was preventing Moscow from fulfilling its promises of consumer affluence from becoming the model for other countries to emulate, and--of lesser importance--from using foreign aid freely to influence the developing countries. The reasons for the decline in Soviet growth, to be sure, included many factors in addition to military expenditures, but if that one item could be substantially reduced an accelerating effect might result.

a. Soviet Defense Expenditures. Very critical developments for Soviet arms policy seem to have taken place in the period 1955-1957 in the realms of both technology and defense spending. In 1955, the Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership rather ostentatiously increased the defense budget, in part for political reasons. Thereafter the official military budget fell off to 1957 and remained stable until 1961. Both total possible defense spending and total possible weapons systems development and procurement also indicate a trough in 1956 and 1957. Yet this was the very period when the Soviet Union was undertaking the
research and development that led to the missile achievements of 1957.

It is unlikely that Soviet expenditures on advanced weapons development declined in the years 1956 and 1957 after being increased in 1955: they probably remained stable or slightly increased. But total defense spending and even weapons procurement as a whole fell from the 1955 peak because of sharp cutbacks in military manpower and procurement of conventional material.

Thus the Soviet Union entered a revolutionary phase in the development of weapons technology, one that held out prospects for eventual strategic superiority over the United States, under the banners of budgetary conservatism. Whether or not sharply accelerated spending was anticipated for the immediate future is difficult to determine. But the conservative nature of the early phase of ICBM development suggests that the original concentration was purely on prototype development and that the difficulties of advancing from prototype to operational force were not adequately appreciated. At the same time one could argue that the Soviet leadership was unwilling to commit resources to a program for the development of an operational system until concrete and, incidentally, politically valuable test achievements had been registered. In any case, the Kremlin was probably confident that an economic short cut to strategic superiority had been found, since missile technology rendered the manned intercontinental bomber obsolete.

In 1958 and 1959, total defense and space spending rose very steeply mainly, it appears, as a result of allocations to advanced weapons development. At this point the principal objective was probably to translate prototype ICBM development into an operational capability, a task which may well have proved more costly and difficult than had been previously anticipated. At the same time, considerable resources were probably devoted to expanding IRBM forces already technically operational. While the Soviet Union succeeded in this period in covering European targets with intermediate range missiles, intercontinental striking power grew more slowly than Moscow had hoped and more slowly than most Western observers thought to be the case at the time. Rapidly rising weapons development and procurement outlays outstripped the savings that were produced by cutbacks in conventional arms production and military manpower. In short, it became clear in 1958 and 1959 that missile technology was not a cheap road to strategic superiority, but the Soviet leadership probably continued to regard as bright the prospects of eventually achieving superiority. In the meantime, the Soviet Union was profiting
around the world from the propaganda impact of the missile gap which was widely thought to favor Moscow.

The planned reduction of Soviet armed forces by one-third announced by Khrushchev in January 1960 was justified by the First Secretary on the ground that modern technology permitted Soviet firepower to be increased even while the number of men under arms decreased. He indicated, as Soviet spokesmen had when Soviet manpower was reduced in 1956, that the demobilized soldiers would make a valuable asset to the nation's productive capacity. He also made the suggestion (not backed by Soviet military leaders) that the demobilized men might be trained in a territorial militia. Such a force, if established, could as in China be useful for organizing labor for projects in the remote regions of the country.\footnote{Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army," Orbis, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Winter 1964), pp. 778-799, and "The Soviet Militia in the Missile Age," Orbis, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 84-105.}

In 1961 the Soviet Union announced the first explicit increases in defense spending since 1955, ostensibly as a response to the accelerated strategic build-up launched by the Kennedy administration. In relation to the previous official defense budget, the increases of 1961 and 1962 were quite impressive. On the "total-possible-spending curve, however, they appear as little more than a continuation of the post-1958 trend. It is probable that more than the first Kennedy budget (Fiscal Year 1962) and tension over Berlin in 1961 was behind the continued increase of Soviet arms spending: Moscow probably realized that the missile-gap illusion could not last much longer. The Kremlin probably also perceived sometime in 1960 or 1961 that the imperatives of missile technology would force the Soviet Union to abandon its initial ICBM programs in favor of more sophisticated, second-generation systems. All this worked for continued increases in arms spending; it might be accurate to say that the Kennedy budget merely provided the motivation for making these increases public.

b. Defense and Economic Growth. Ascertaining the weight of defense as a component of Soviet gross national product (GNP) is one of the more hazardous aspects of national income study of the Soviet economy. As might be expected, estimates vary with the methodology employed. Most estimates are consistent,
however, in ascribing a decreasing weight to defense as a component of Soviet GNP over the past decade. It is probably safe to say that while defense accounted for 15-18 per cent of Soviet GNP in 1952, the range in 1962 was closer to 10-12 per cent.

Most indicators point to a gradual trend of deceleration in the growth rate of Soviet industry from the mid-fifties through 1962 and beyond. Soviet claims show an average annual growth rate of 13 per cent for the years 1950-1955 and of slightly less than 10 per cent for 1955-1962. A reliable Western index, published by Greenslade and Wallace, indicates an average annual growth rate of 10.1 per cent for the earlier period and 8.7 per cent for the years 1955-1961. More specifically, the Greenslade-Wallace data show that the growth rate of Soviet industrial materials production fluctuated between 11.5 and 10 per cent from 1954 to 1958. In 1959 it was 9.9 per cent; then declined in 1960, 1961 and 1962 to between 5.5 and 6.8 per cent per year. 1

Thus the very dramatic increases in the absolute magnitude of the defense effort that occurred between 1958 and 1962, owing to the rapid growth of the Soviet economy over the past decade, did not reverse but only temporarily arrested the prevailing trend for defense to decline as a component of GNP. If one could simply define the economic burden of defense as its percentage of GNP, this burden was unquestionably less in 1962 than it was in the early fifties.

In the sense it is employed in this discussion, however, "economic burden" has other less precise implications to denote the kind of defense effort which might motivate the Soviet leadership to pursue certain international policies. The question we are concerned with addresses itself to the subjective priorities of the regime; the burden of defense can only be gauged in relation to the urgency of competing claims upon available resources; defense as a percentage of GNP does not convey these subjective connotations of the concept of burden.

Maintenance of a rapid rate of industrial growth was probably the Soviet government's most urgent economic priority in the period under review. The policy of concentrating resources on the growth-oriented branches of industry remained substantially intact through the past decade in spite of variations in emphasis.

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1 See Appendix, Table 5.
on the "heavy-industry line." Examination of the industrial growth record with reference to the changing level of defense spending proves informative in two respects. First, the performance of industry, in a broad sense, conditioned the relative burden of alternative claims on resources such as defense, consumption, housing, and agriculture. If industrial growth slowed, the claims of other sectors became relatively more burdensome since industrial growth was an overriding priority. Second, the defense effort may have exercised a direct retarding effect on industrial growth by cutting into resources available for investment and, in the very short run, by diverting current material supplies and skilled labor away from civilian machinery production.

Some retardation in growth rate had been expected by Western economists because of objective economic factors. As the stock of capital expands the burden of depreciation adds additional strain on the investment resources of the economy. The capital output ratio for the economy as a whole had been increasing as larger percentages of annual investment must be allocated to such nonproductive targets as housing and administrative facilities. Sources of rapid increments to the urban working force were drying up, at least temporarily. While there were still large areas of Soviet industry where borrowed technology could fruitfully be applied, the possibilities for gaining sudden and rather effortless advances in productivity through technological borrowing became more restricted than in earlier stages of industrialization and the burden of indigenous non-military industrial research has increased. Of no mean importance has been the progressive obsolescence of Soviet planning and administrative formulae for directing the further growth of an enormous and already advanced industrial economy. For these and other reasons, equal percentage increments to gross industrial output were not as easily achieved in the 1956-1962 period as formerly. Thus there was a secular trend toward a declining industrial growth rate independent of the defense burden. But this trend acted to increase the defense burden in a subjective sense insofar as allocation of additional resources to industry would have spurred growth and the regime found the retardation of growth contrary to its interests.

Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that the higher defense outlays of recent years, both in magnitude and the quality of resources they represented, have had a direct retarding influence on the industrial growth rate, at least in the short run. In the periods 1951-1952 and 1958-1959, when sudden and sharp increases in defense spending were observed, the growth of civilian machinery output showed a distinct retardation,
undoubtedly because current inputs were diverted to military production. In the same periods, the portion of investment going to equipment and instrumentation in the economy as a whole showed a distinct decline, contrary to the long-range trend in the Soviet and other industrial economies. The defense effort was certainly responsible in part for the deceleration of Soviet industrial investment in recent years and thus must be assigned some direct causal role in the overall industrial slowdown. It must be noted, however, that the direct impact of the defense effort on industrial growth was limited to the years 1958-1960. Civilian machinery output increased markedly in 1961 and 1962, suggesting that the defense acceleration announced in 1961 was very largely a continuation of the post-1958 trend rather than another sudden spurt.

c. Consumer Goods Production. Despite the ideological approval of "goulash communism" in the post-Stalin period, levels of popular consumption were probably the least pressing issue among the several economic objectives constantly in the minds of Soviet decision-makers in the 1956-1962 period. The welfare implications of communism receive heavy stress in ideological prognoses; but the concrete policy of the present is to maintain the rapid growth of industry and to solve the agricultural problem, and thereby to assure an affluent future for the Soviet people. There have been frequent flurries of attention to consumer problems in the years since Stalin's death, and in 1957 the regime undertook a massive campaign to solve the housing problem, one of the sorriest aspects of the Soviet welfare record. While a great deal of housing construction was undertaken, the campaign fell far short of meeting Soviet minimum sanitary standards for urban housing and seems to have expired by 1961.

In 1960, after Khrushchev's visit to the United States, there were indications that a consumer campaign reminiscent of Malenkov's "new course" was to be launched. Moscow promised rapidly to overtake the West both in industrial and consumer production, and in fact the years 1958-1960 saw a steadily rising percentage of total state investment going to consumer industries. In 1961, however, this percentage began to fall and the traditional emphasis on heavy industry appeared unimpaired, probably reflecting a decision toward the harder line in foreign policy from mid-1960 to the Cuban crisis. Between 1950 and 1955 the growth of personal consumption was about 7 per cent per year. After 1955 improvements were markedly slower, probably about 4 per cent in 1960, even less in later years as industrial growth has slowed and agricultural production has stagnated.
While the welfare concern of Soviet leaders was doubtless genuine, their ideological predilections and relative immunity from popular pressures tended to make improvements in the Soviet standard of living largely a function of industrial and agricultural progress, which remained the immediate, practical preoccupations of the regime.

d. Implications for Policy. Soviet optimism about the course of the arms race seems to have been deflated by 1961. The absolute costs of the defense effort were probably rising faster than had been expected, and its detrimental effects on the economy were now being felt. For example, the expansion of the petro-chemical industry upon which progress on the agricultural front depended heavily, was undoubtedly jeopardized by the diversion of quality materials and skilled manpower to defense production. Operational ICBM forces were coming on the scene at a somewhat slower pace than had been originally anticipated. Most important, the increased defense efforts of the United States had transformed the pursuit of superiority into a race merely to keep the strategic gap from widening. Moreover, the technology of modern weapons, with its long lead-time factor, was forcing Soviet planners to make allocations on the basis of increasingly uncertain future expectations.

The unpleasant reality seemed to be that even strenuous efforts could not in the foreseeable future purchase Soviet strategic superiority via technological development. Merely to acquire a viable posture of minimum deterrence would require great expense. It appears that both the multimegaton explosions of 1961 and the Cuban escapade in 1962 were conditioned by frustration on the missile-production front and were intended partly to recapture the psychological advantages of the post-Sputnik period as well as to uncover the key to genuine strategic superiority.

The relations between national economic power and war capacity have long been acknowledged by Soviet spokesmen. The "permanently operating factors" doctrine that prevailed from 1942 until 1953 or 1955 emphasized the importance of economic resources to mobilize and sustain a long, drawn-out war effort. But the acknowledgment by Soviet strategists since 1955 of the role of surprise attack in the opening moments of conflict placed a different accent on the economic capacity needed. As the Sokolovsky treatise put it in 1962, the criterion became the ability of technology and industry to provide powerful and modern peacetime forces-in-being for successfully meeting the critical early phases of war.
The ability of the country's economy to mass produce military equipment, especially missiles, and to establish superiority over the enemy in modern weapons are the material prerequisites of victory. The ability of the economy to assure the maximum power to the Armed Forces for dealing an annihilatory blow to the aggressor in the initial period of the war will be decisive for the outcome of a future war.

The Soviet economy's ability to match or even keep up with the West in armaments development and procurement was in grave doubt by 1961 and 1962, when resources devoted to defense helped to depress the rate of overall Soviet economic growth—the source of long-term strength and welfare. From 1956 to 1958, the "economic burden" of defense had been hardly noticeable; by 1959 it had become more onerous but seemed justified by its potential "payoff"; by 1961 however it served to reinforce other factors also militating for a slowdown in the arms race—either by arms control or by détente that altered Western defense policies.

It should be noted that the economic factor did not seem to have a bearing on the strong interest which Moscow showed in certain partial measures prior to 1961. By 1961 the overall line of Soviet foreign policy was hardening, and the economic incentives toward a reduction of arms spending could not override what appeared to be urgent requirements imposed by the international situation to increase defense spending. Only in 1963—in a period of relaxed tensions—could the economic incentive become effective in reinforcing other factors militating for détente, arms control, and East-West trade.

4. The Internal Political Situation.

The years from 1955 to 1962 saw several strong challenges to Khrushchev's leading position in the Kremlin power structure. In order to analyze the kinds of internal pressures upon the First Secretary and (after 1958) Premier that may have shaped Soviet policy toward arms control, and, more broadly, toward the Western world, a word should be said about the domestic interests which may condition Soviet moves toward agreements with the West.

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The contending forces include broadly, (1) those forces most likely to favor disarmament and/or détente and (2) those most likely to oppose it. Some of the elements in these groups may consciously collaborate, such as military and industrial leaders, but others can work without coordination but for a similar goal, for example, the consumers and scientists in favor of cuts in the defense budget. During periods of international tension the demands of the consumers may be delayed. Thus Khrushchev has explicitly blamed various East-West crises for the raising of food prices, the deferral of income tax reductions, and other inconveniences to the Soviet citizenry. In moments of international conflict the demands of the second group already closer to the levels of power would naturally carry the more weight, and during a crisis their support would be especially important for the Party leader to maintain.

It appears likely that the elements in the second group exerted greatest pressure during times of high international tension; but that Khrushchev, in general, has preferred—for reasons of internal and foreign policy—to damp such tension. If possible, he probably would have wished to help satisfy the demands of the consumers, assuming that the industrial growth of heavy industry could be sustained at the same time. With this structure in mind let us turn to an analysis of the consolidation of Khrushchev's power in the 1956-1962 period and the challenges to it from within, the main ones coming in 1957, 1960, and possibly in 1962.

Although Khrushchev was the most powerful figure in the Soviet Union by mid-1955, he still had not secured complete dominance over the party Presidium. When revolution erupted in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, largely as a result of Khrushchev's secret speech condemning Stalin, his position was greatly weakened. During the last months of 1956 and the first months of 1957 Khrushchev's power declined while the position of Malenkov and Molotov improved somewhat.1

During the first half of 1957, relations between the Soviet Union and the West were at low ebb, but this had little to do with Khrushchev's weakened position and was mainly a consequence of events in Hungary and Egypt. In June 1957, Khrushchev's

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opponents united in an attempt to remove him from power. That this was a "stop Khrushchev" movement and not a coalition united by agreement on either domestic or foreign policy can be seen by the fact that Malenkov and Molotov, with their opposing policies, were able to join forces. Although out-maneuvered in the Presidium, Khrushchev was able to force his opponents to allow the Central Committee to make the final decision. Khrushchev had previously used his position as First Secretary to pack the Central Committee with his own supporters, and as a result, five members of the opposition were removed from the Presidium (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, and Shepilov) and one demoted to alternate status (Pervukhin). In their place nine full members were added, all of whom had close ties to Khrushchev.

Of special interest for Soviet policy toward the West, the ousted "anti-party group" was denounced for opposing the "party" policy of peaceful coexistence. However, no sharp impact could be noted on Soviet arms control policy. Shortly before the power struggle Khrushchev had agreed to the principle of inspection of a test ban, and no radical alteration in arms control policy took place until late August when Moscow refused to negotiate further in the DCSC.

The defeat of Khrushchev's opposition and their ouster from the Presidium marked the beginning of a new period in Soviet politics. Khrushchev's authority was bolstered still more by the removal of Zhukov in October 1957, Khrushchev's assumption of the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers in March 1958, and Bulganin's removal from the Presidium in September of that year.

As Khrushchev consolidated his personal power and increasingly imposed his will on the Presidium, he relied less on the Central Committee. After 1957 and up to just before Khrushchev's ouster the Central Committee declined just as it had earlier under Stalin. Agendas for the Central Committee came to be announced in advance, and sessions given wide-spread publicity like party congresses instead of being conducted in private as they were during a time of more "collective" leadership.1

At the same time, the policies of the Soviet Union, both foreign and domestic, often appeared vacillating and contradictory, indicating indecision at the highest levels. Some Western analysts expressed the opinion that these changes were due to the continued existence of strong limitations on Khrushchev's power. Though Khrushchev greatly increased his personal power in 1957, his position was still not entirely secure at any time until his removal in 1964. Even then, other members of the Presidium had a certain amount of independent power and Khrushchev was forced to take this into account when formulating policy.

At the time of the collapse of the 1960 Summit conference, when many observers in the West speculated that Khrushchev was under strong pressure from a hostile opposition group, it was being suggested that Marshal Malinovsky was sent to Paris with Khrushchev in order to watch his moves. So far as can be ascertained, however, the high point in military influence was reached in the months immediately following the defeat of the "anti-party group" in June 1957. Zhukov threw his support to Khrushchev. But with the defeat of the "anti-party group" and the elevation of a number of his supporters to full Presidium membership, Khrushchev opted to oust the man upon whom he had depended, doing so in a series of moves in October-November 1957.

It appears in retrospect that Khrushchev cultivated the military from 1955 until 1957 by concessions that, it turned out, could easily be retracted--the raising of one officer to a high party post, a temporary increase in defense spending, a relaxation of Party indoctrination procedures in the armed forces. Undoubtedly the military favored strong measures to repress the Hungarian uprising and, generally, to bolster the nation's defenses in every way. But there is no evidence that the military sought to alter Khrushchev's strategy of détente with the West, although it seems likely it opposed the theory and practice of "collaboration" with the enemy. The five members of the "anti-party group" ousted in June 1957 were charged with opposing the peaceful coexistence line, but Zhukov's subsequent denunciation was on other grounds.

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In the autumn of 1957, following the removal of Zhukov, a new period in party-military relations began. The new Defense Minister, Malinovsky, never attained membership in the party Presidium. The military lost much or most of the limited autonomy and influence over policy it had been able to gain in the 1953-1957 period. As indicated above, obligatory political study for officers was reinstated, the role of political officers was increased, Party organizations in the armed forces were expanded in size, and military commanders were once again required to submit to criticism at Party meetings. ¹

In this period from 1957 to 1962, party-military relations were marked by a divergence of opinion on two major issues. The first of these issues was the continuing conflict over Party control of the armed forces. Party leaders tended to believe that the armed forces, like all else in Soviet society, must be under the close supervision of Party officials. The military, on the other hand, sought greater autonomy in the everyday administration of the armed forces, and resented political controls as a slur on its ability and loyalty. Friction between Party officials and military officers had existed since the first days of the Red Army, and there was no reason to expect that it would be resolved in the foreseeable future. But no matter how much the military resented Party supervision, it was clear that after Zhukov's removal the military was able to do little to lessen it.

The second overt issue exacerbating party-military relations in this period was the conflict over the proper size of the armed forces. In January 1960, Khrushchev made a major speech on military strategy in which he outlined his views on atomic warfare and proposed to reduce the armed forces, which then stood at 3,700,000 men, by 1,200,000 over the next two years. It is hardly surprising that this was opposed by the military. The proposed reduction threatened the privileged positions of many officers. In addition, aside from considerations of self-interest many of the more conservative military leaders seemed to think that Khrushchev's radical reliance on military technology was endangering state security and therefore opposed to the proposed reduction of ground forces. A kind of compromise resulted: the reductions were begun (only to be halted in mid-stream during the 1961 Berlin crisis), but

Khrushchev's suggestion of transferring demobilized soldiers to a part-time militia never materialized. In any event it was rumored that opposition to the proposed force reductions hurled two officers into temporary retirement: Konev from his post as commander of Warsaw Pact forces and Sokolovsky as Commander of the Soviet General Staff.¹ Both men, however, soon returned to responsible posts.

The role of the military generally and of Malinovsky at the Paris Summit in the determination of Khrushchev's foreign policy has been aptly summarized by Raymond Garthoff:

> On the whole, the military leaders, to the extent that their advice is solicited, continue to display the same degree of general conservatism as did Zhukov. This conservatism has meant an opposition to moves of accommodation or partial withdrawal (as in their favoring armed intervention to preserve the Hungarian base). It also has meant an opposition to "adventuristic" aggressiveness which threatens unnecessarily to risk a general war. Regrettably, Malinovsky personally is perhaps somewhat less of a moderating influence in this latter respect than was Zhukov (not as a humanitarian or friend of the West, but as a coldly calculating military planner).

> There are no indications of significant restiveness on the part of the professional military leaders, though there have been points of friction over various decisions of the political leadership directly limiting the armed forces.

> The reversal in 1961 of the troop cuts begun in 1960 and the resumption of nuclear testing in 1961 were no doubt welcomed by many military leaders. But these were basically political decisions taken mainly in response to the changing international situation, and not necessarily in response to pressures from the military. While the military—even after Zhukov's ouster—probably exerted a weight to retard or even reverse movements toward détente, its position was still subordinate to the party leadership, whose views it had to carry out, albeit reluctantly and with some foot-dragging.


²Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
To sum up, we conclude that Khrushchev's position may well have been less stable than its outward appearance. He was probably forced to act in some respects as a broker, trading off conflicting interests. The impact of support or opposition from within the Party or the military to Khrushchev's views constituted a marginal factor that, at moments such as the summer of 1960, may have combined with other forces to throw Soviet policy one way or the other. While we doubt that he was actually "chained" at the Paris Summit Conference following the U-2 affair, it does seem likely that at least some of his demeanor was directed toward placating those who might have been saying, "we warned you."

There is as yet no evidence that some of Khrushchev's domestic foes were allied with Peking, although their views might sometimes gain weight by reference to Peking's. If such evidence comes to light, however, it would reinforce the contention that Khrushchev did have to cope with powerful critics whose views never came to public attention during his administration. And some new light on conflicts within the Kremlin may one day help to explain the Cuban adventure in 1962.

If the domestic political factor is weighed against the other determinants of arms control policy in the period its role seems to have been quite marginal. Soviet foreign policy generally and arms control policy in particular were basically a response by the top Kremlin leadership to the international situation. Possible critics, whether of the "Stalinist" or liberal variety, could hardly organize any effective opposition, especially after 1957. Domestic pressures for peace and consumer prosperity could be catered to when conditions permitted or deferred on grounds of an international crisis. At the same time, no "external foe" was needed to legitimize the Khrushchev government as it had been in the case of Stalin; public opinion, such as it was, welcomed the relaxation of terror and promises of goulash communism. And while the Soviet people welcomed their government's ostensible campaign to ensure peace, a patriotic response could be counted on if the Kremlin warned of hostile machinations against the socialist fatherland. The ideological identification of peace, prosperity, and revolution as defined between 1956 and 1961 served to justify whatever twists and turns the Soviet leadership chose in pursuing its external relations.
D. The Period in Retrospect

As suggested at the outset of this chapter, Soviet policies toward the West from 1956 to 1962 could be depicted in terms of four simplified models. Each of the four hypotheses suggested could be partially but probably not convincingly supported by empirical research. First, there was no inexorable movement toward live-and-let-live, as demonstrated by the Cuban adventure if not by pressure on Berlin and elsewhere. Second, there was no unbroken "post-Sputnik offensive," because Moscow made serious moves toward improvement of East-West relations at many moments during these years but especially in 1958-1960. Third, there was no clear alternation of hard and soft modalities, because the two often operated simultaneously, most obviously, for example, when pressure began in late 1958 for a German Peace Treaty or again in 1962, when great ambivalence characterized Soviet policy. Fourth, it would be most plausible to argue that a hard and soft line generally functioned simultaneously, but this would beg important questions concerning the overall thrust of Soviet policy. This argument would offer a reminder of the tactical flexibility available to Moscow, but say little of its strategic objectives.

What emerges is a complicated picture whose basic ingredients were limited but significant evolution in the contours of Moscow's negotiating position on disarmament; more profound alteration in the ideological underpinnings of Soviet foreign policy generally; and qualitative transformations of some of the foundations upon which Soviet foreign policy rested, the implications of which were only hinted at prior to late 1962 and 1963. In looking at these five or six years we form the impression that the several peaks and valleys of apparent Soviet interest in arms control did not wholly reveal the variety of forces at work on Soviet strategy in general. After 1956 Soviet arms control policy seemed to move in upward or downward directions until 1962, but without any quantum jump such as that dramatized on May 10, 1955. Although some of these subsequent trends were significant in themselves and some might be termed qualitative, the salient fact about the years from 1956 through 1962 was that the superstructure of Soviet policy was not adjusting to changes in its base.

Perhaps then the most significant developments lay in the changes in that base of Soviet policy toward arms control—in its military, political, and economic determinants. Moscow's view of the East-West balance of military power, with the opportunities and limitations it implied for Soviet foreign policy, seemed to
undergo dramatic alteration, moving toward and then away from high optimism. A similar but probably more marginal influence resulted from the rise and subsequent decline of the Soviet Union's economic prospects. The most significant factor to enter into the Kremlin's view toward its relations with the West and toward arms control arose from the profound challenge—military as well as political—from Peking. Other elements in the base of Soviet arms control policy—Moscow's image of heterogeneity in the West and the Kremlin's confrontation with domestic political pressures—continued to play an important role as they had in 1954–1956 but, despite fluctuations in the nature and weight of these two factors, they did not change so radically as the other determinants.

The most visible impact of these forces was seen in changes in the Soviet propaganda line toward the West and in the ideological rationale by which Moscow justified its policies to critics of peaceful coexistence and the world without arms espoused by the Kremlin. But the cumulative effect of the military and other determinants of Soviet foreign policy was not fully demonstrated until 1962, when, after months of ambivalence and apparent drift, Moscow pursued first one and then another radical course designed to improve both its security interests vis-à-vis the West and its ideological position in the Communist movement.

A prime purpose of virtually all Soviet disarmament proposals lay in the attempt to control the international environment, usually by appealing to the sober forces in the West to turn their governments toward accommodation with Soviet positions. In addition—a new element since 1955—they were also intended to help fend off China's ideological-political-military threat to Moscow's position in the international Communist movement and to Soviet security generally.

At the same time Moscow had a strategic interest in seeing some arms control proposals enacted. The Soviet GCD program was not well thought out, and Moscow appears to have calculated its strategic impact inadequately (although advocacy in 1962 of the "nuclear umbrella" principle portended a turn toward greater realism). Some measures in it, however, were very strongly in the Soviet interest, such as the liquidation of overseas bases, while propaganda on this point might help to complicate U.S. retention of those bases. Disengagement in Central Europe, with safeguards against surprise attack, was probably perceived as being so strongly in the Kremlin's strategic interest as to justify the political risks entailed. A cessation of nuclear testing in all environments and by all powers was surely seen as having great strategic utility, provided only that the moment was not ripe for
another round of Soviet tests that could yield long-lasting advantages (as in 1961). Similarly, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and technology ranked high among Moscow's strategic desiderata, although the chances for their attainment seemed rather remote.

However, although the only promising area of negotiations remained the test ban, the negotiations from 1956 to 1962 in fact laid a basis for future progress along a broader range of issues. The United States-Soviet agreement in 1961 on the principles that should guide future negotiations represented a considerable narrowing of the gap. These theoretical advances were partially translated into the GCD treaties both sides introduced in 1962, although the chasm between them still loomed large, especially regarding what Moscow termed "inspection over armaments." The progress toward future agreement on regional arms control in Central Europe was less perceptible.

In sum, general and complete disarmament was obviously little more than a long-range possibility and therefore had only propaganda value for the present. Disengagement may have been believed possible until 1958 or 1959, by which time Washington, Bonn, and even Paris came down firmly against it. A nuclear test ban seemed to have strong support from Western officials beginning in 1958; but the high price the West demanded in terms of inspection, its reservations that a ban would depend on progress on other matters, and the Western proclivity to introduce new scientific data into the negotiations may have cast doubt upon the West's ultimate intentions.

The greatest movement toward narrowing East-West differences came on the test ban issue. Each side seemed to believe the problem warranted concessions to the other's viewpoint. The West sought ways to reduce the amount of on-site inspection needed, and Moscow accepted specific inspection procedures--although acceptance was sometimes retracted. Technological improvements promised that national inspection systems could minimize or eliminate the need for international controls, perhaps even on underground tests. But although the two sides came tantalizingly close to agreeing on a moratorium on underground tests and a treaty banning all others, their respective interests never coincided in the period.

Finally, a general trend could be observed toward greater East-West understanding. Both sides also began to do their homework more effectively. Soviet writing on disarmament began to show much greater familiarity with Western strategic thinking,
especially after 1959. The Pugwash, Dartmouth, and other informal opportunities for informal discussions appeared to have a visible impact, with both the "nuclear-umbrella" principle and the "black-box" system, which Soviet diplomacy espoused in 1962, originating in such discussions. Although Moscow's new line on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist countries was politically motivated, the very process of arguing this point brought Soviet economists to a less dogmatic approach to the market economy.

Moscow's propaganda treatment of the disarmament issue from 1956 to 1962 generally continued the more restrained and reasonable appearance it had acquired in 1955, with emphasis less on exposing or pressuring the capitalist West than on persuading it that détente and disarmament could be in the interest of both sides. Even at the moments when Soviet propaganda media stumped for general and complete disarmament, the argument was pitched mainly to "all sober men" in the West rather than to the "oppressed masses" who were earlier urged to struggle against their rulers.

The two radically, even qualitatively, new elements that entered Soviet propaganda around 1959 dated at least from 1956, but both came into full bloom in 1959, probably in connection with the worsening state of Sino-Soviet relations.

The first innovation was directed to the West. Peaceful coexistence and disarmament, the West was now assured, meant money in the pocket. Disarmament, the Communist line averred, would bring not catastrophe but abundance—even to capitalist economies. It would also ensure peace, without which other values had no meaning. Furthermore, as Moscow had long stressed, trade with the Soviet Union would expand Western markets.

The other innovation concerned ideology as well as propaganda. Opponents of "capitalism" and "imperialism" were now told that peaceful coexistence and disarmament constituted the best means for pursuing their objectives. There was no alternative to peace except war; but peaceful coexistence meant "struggle" as well as "cooperation." By economic competition socialism would triumph; disarmament would bring savings that socialist and developing countries could utilize to better advantage than capitalist economies. And disarmament would remove the physical instruments by which the capitalist held back the tide of social change. Lenin preached this same message, and new documents were published to demonstrate his view that socialist diplomacy should try to strengthen the moderate elements in the Western bourgeoisie.
In this period of transition what relative weighting ought we to assign to the factors we have identified as possible determinants of Soviet arms control policy? We begin with those that appear to have exercised a more decisive influence, turning then to those that exerted an important but more marginal role. In the first category we would rank Soviet calculations about the East-West military balance, the opportunities and problems in dealing with the West, and the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations. Among the marginal factors we would include the economic burden of defense upon the Soviet economy and the role played by the Russian opponents and supporters of Khrushchev's policies.

Of all the elements shaping Soviet arms control policy, military considerations appear to have been the most decisive in this period, both in moving Soviet policy toward arms control and in setting limits upon the extent of such movement. This judgment does not contradict the argument that arms control was first and foremost a supporting means of Soviet foreign policy rather than of Soviet military strategy; for the immediate purpose of arms control policy was to affect the political environment and in that way indirectly to regulate the strategic situation. But the motivation behind Moscow's concern to shape the political situation arose most urgently from the Kremlin's perception of certain military factors.

Moscow's optimistic assumptions of 1955 and 1956 regarding the strategic balance were fulfilled in 1957 when the world had cause to talk of an incipient missile gap favoring the Soviet Union. Soviet confidence rode high until 1960-1961, when the United States reversed the alleged missile gap both in theory and practice. Moscow's propensity to negotiate on disarmament seemed to follow a "U" curve: from 1955 to 1959-1960, while self-confidence still reigned, the propensity to negotiate seriously was relatively high. From 1960 to 1961, while confidence waned—for military and other reasons—Moscow showed less interest in immediately feasible measures, although it did push GCD. In 1961 it tried to cash in on the last vestiges of the missile gap myth by renewed pressure on Berlin. It sought to counterbalance the mounting number of U.S. ICBM's by developing and testing giant nuclear warheads in September and October of 1961. Another desperate attempt to attain both the image and the reality of parity with the West came when missiles were shipped to Cuba in 1962. Only after that venture failed did Moscow seem to reconcile itself to a position of at least temporary strategic inferiority (braced, however, by a quite credible minimum deterrent) and resume serious arms control talks with the West.
While Moscow's view of the overall strategic balance passed through these stages, the Soviet Union continued as in 1955 to seem to fear surprise attack, accidental war, catalytic war, and escalation—especially as a result of forward moves by Bonn or Peking. Similarly, the Soviet government became seriously concerned about nuclear proliferation to Germany and China. All these concerns underlay the mounting Soviet interest in regional arms control in Central Europe, ground control posts, and a ban on nuclear testing that might lead to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology.

For these reasons it appears that the prime motivation behind Soviet interest in a nuclear test ban was strategic: to prevent the United States from surpassing or overtaking the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons; to halt the development of U.S. tactical weapons and their stationing in Central Europe; and to prevent before it was too late the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Bonn and Peking.

Military considerations were also key restraints on Soviet willingness to sign a test ban. The right moment had to be found when Soviet security vis-à-vis the West would best be maintained by a freeze or end to nuclear testing; and—a more constant concern—a formula had to be found that both prevented the United States from continuing underground tests and avoided the necessity of intensive foreign inspection of Soviet nuclear and other military facilities. Even after the revelations of U-2 reconnaissance, the Soviet Union still prized the military security that kept its weak as well as strong points from enemy intelligence.

Another military restraint on arms control policy generally was the apparent opposition of some Soviet marshals to cuts in Soviet ground, naval, and air forces and their probable opposition to steps that might alienate China and blur the image of an evil capitalist adversary in the West. The role of such opposition, while marginal in itself, could become decisive when combined with other pressures working against East-West détente and accommodation in arms control.

The second decisive influence on arms control policy stemmed from Moscow's perceptions of the West. Khrushchev assumed that there were elements in the Western leadership who could be persuaded or coerced into accepting his version of peaceful coexistence even if it implied an expansion of the socialist camp and contraction of the capitalist. The Soviet government,
as noted, worked out an elaborate justification, quoting from newly found scripture, for attempting to collaborate and make compromises with the Western governments even while remaining ideologically hostile and "struggling" against them.

Did the Kremlin believe its own line about the malleability of moderate forces in the West? It is difficult to correlate precisely the emphasis in Soviet media on a heterogeneous adversary with the emergence of a more conciliatory approach toward Moscow from different NATO governments. It appears that the Kremlin's expectations concerning a possible improvement in East-West relations rose after Dulles' death in May 1959 until they were dashed by the U-2 incident a year later. A period of waiting set in to see which way the new administration in Washington would move, but the first Kennedy defense budget, the Bay of Pigs, the confrontation in Vienna, and the shows of force over Berlin probably indicated to Moscow that the new government intended to be firm. In general it appears that Soviet propaganda concerning the West's disposition to compromise persisted without much regard for the apparent maintenance at times of a hard line in the NATO countries.

The Kremlin's continued assertion that Soviet policy could and should come to terms with moderates in the West ran a much greater risk for Khrushchev and associates after 1956 due to Peking's mounting criticism of this approach. The stakes became higher as Kremlin ideologists promised that peaceful coexistence meant both struggle and cooperation with the West. If neither aspect of Soviet policy proved successful, Khrushchev's--in Moscow as well as in Peking--would be strengthened. The impact of Moscow's actual and public image of the West upon Soviet disarmament policy was therefore of paramount importance.

However, it appears likely that the Soviet leadership did in fact become increasingly sophisticated about Western politics. Whether moderates were presently in the Western saddle or not, the Kremlin seems to have assumed that they existed, that they could be strengthened, and that cooperation as well as competition would be possible with them. This fundamentally optimistic view generally persisted from 1955 to 1962. But the events of 1960 and 1961 must have raised serious doubts in Moscow about how close the moderates were to the levers of power in the West, and Khrushchev said as much at the October 1961 Party Congress.

The third decisive influence on arms control policy was China, which had played no visible role in the 1954-1956 shift in Soviet policy. From 1956 and especially 1959 the state of Sino-Soviet
relations grew steadily more strained. Peking, although it gave some ostensible support to the Soviet Union's leading position in the Communist movement in 1956-1957, showed increasing disdain for the style and content of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Disarmament was a particular grievance and represented the opposite side of another sore spot—Moscow's refusal, made explicit in 1959, to give China a sample atomic bomb or technical data. The events of September 1959 sparked an intensified Chinese attack on the "illusions" of those who talked of a "warless world."

The Soviet Union, while it would have preferred to keep China within the fold, seemed little restrained by China's criticism. Shortly after 1957, when Peking has claimed that the Soviet Union agreed to a pact on a new defense technology with China, Moscow's diplomats made some of their most far-reaching concessions in the test ban negotiations. At the same time, concern over China seems to have spurred the Kremlin's attempts to halt nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation. Moscow's intensive propaganda in 1959 of nuclear-free zones correlated positively with China's charges that Moscow refused in June 1959 to provide her with a sample atomic bomb. The Kremlin endeavored to meet the Chinese ideological challenge in many ways, one of which was to argue more intensely the possibility and desirability of peaceful coexistence and disarmament not as a tactic but as a strategy.

Although the main thrust of Chinese criticism functioned to drive Moscow into more serious efforts at accommodation with the West, the effect of Peking's challenge to Khrushchev was also to strengthen his domestic foes who opposed his personal style, his tendency to cut back conventional forces, and his commitment to inaugurating goulash communism.

Thus a new element had to be weighed by the Kremlin. The optimistic expectations of 1955 seem to have made little allowance for the possibility that Moscow's most powerful ally would threaten the Soviet position in the international Communist movement and pose a long-term danger to Soviet security. The Kremlin's decision to respond to this threat not by appeasement but by efforts to curb Peking's nuclear program and to rebut its ideological challenge exerted a decisive influence upon Moscow's arms control policy from 1956 to 1962. Whatever umbilical cord still joined the two "fraternal" parties was not severed, however, until 1963. Apparently the hope of keeping China's support somewhat restrained Soviet arms control policy until Moscow's final decision to sign a partial test ban treaty.
An influence that could not be crucial in itself but which functioned to reinforce the trend of the more decisive considerations just listed was the mounting cost of the defense effort relative to the overall functioning of the Soviet economy. The Kremlin's calculations on both these counts seem to have been excessively optimistic in 1955 and even as late as 1959. The absolute cost of the defense effort soared after 1958, at the same time that general economic growth began to decline. The slowdown in the overall growth rate was due to a number of factors one of them being the increased burden imposed by the human and material resources devoted to defense. Even so, the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 proclaimed that socialism would triumph over capitalism in economic competition. But Soviet expectations were still too rosy. By 1961-and 1962 the rate of growth slowed still more. Moreover, it began to appear in 1960 and 1961 that the Soviet Union had no imminent prospect of surpassing the United States militarily let alone in over-all industrial production, especially if Soviet resources continued to be allocated and used in their present pattern.

Khrushchev's marshals were arguing for a "balanced" military structure, which meant heavy outlays for all kinds of military forces. Expected savings by concentration on nuclear-rocket forces would thus be precluded. But the effort to match the United States in the arms race was becoming an effort just to keep the strategic balance from widening further to Moscow's disadvantage, and it was impeding progress toward making the Soviet Union a model of rapid industrial development and consumer affluence. When Soviet economists began to talk about the blessings that disarmament might bring to all economies of the world, they may well have had the Soviet Union uppermost in mind.

Had there been a prospect of radically increasing Moscow's bargaining power by greater investment in defense, or had there been an imminent military threat to Soviet security, the increased drag that military spending exerted on economic growth would not have been a serious influence on Soviet strategic planning. But coming at a time when other pressures militated increasingly for arms controls with the West, the promise of economic savings from curtailment of the arms race had increasing appeal to Soviet policy makers. At least by 1962 but probably several years earlier the economic factor loomed much higher among the forces favoring a limitation of armaments than it had in 1955. Its effect was that of a multiplier that buttressed and perhaps deepened the influence of the military and political considerations.
During this period Khrushchev's world view and his personal style were the dominant factors in the determination of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. By comparison with Stalin, he relied much more on persuasion than coercion. The thaw and fluidity that entered many aspects of Soviet society after Stalin's death made it virtually impossible for any one man or even any central elite to rule by fiat.

Whereas Lenin and Stalin left such matters to their foreign ministers, Khrushchev apparently took great personal interest in propagating Moscow's disarmament policy. The main lines of Soviet disarmament policy probably followed his preferences, although the details may have been left to functionaries.

The extent to which Khrushchev's preferences could prevail depended, however, on his ability to cope with forces within Soviet society that opposed or favored greater moves toward détente and disarmament. He had to mobilize a certain amount of support for his views on measures such as arms control that could have far-reaching implications for every facet of Soviet society. He could generally count on a popular response from the Soviet public and much of the intelligentsia who wanted peace, prosperity, and political liberalization. Further, some plant managers and party leaders may have wanted to free resources from arms for investment in heavy or light industry and agriculture.

From other groups closer to the levers of power there was probably general resistance to any lessening of Soviet defense efforts and to more intimate relations with the capitalist foe. Many party leaders would oppose any extensive collaboration with moderates in the West, alienation of China, or political liberalization in the Soviet Union. Military leaders would oppose any weakening of defenses. Certain plant managers and scientists with a vested interest in defense production would likewise oppose a slackening of military investment. The influence of this "second" group would be combined and multiplied at moments when the West seemed recalcitrant (demonstrating the infeasibility of détente and disarmament); at moments when the military balance seemed to turn sharply in the Soviet Union's favor or in its disfavor; and at moments when Peking threatened to challenge Moscow's position because of Soviet revisionism.

Although no precise correlation can be determined between these domestic influences and fluctuations in arms control policy, it is probable that these marginal domestic influences on Kremlin policy, linked with the other four factors that have been enumerated, helped to bring on a somewhat tougher orientation in Soviet foreign policy from the U-2 incident in 1960 until the Cuban
gambit in 1962. But even within the framework of this partial hardening of the Kremlin's line, as we have noted, some concessions in the disarmament negotiations continued to be made, and Khrushchev's ideologists deepened their commitment to the possibility and desirability of disarmament.

The combination of military, political, and economic forces shaping Soviet foreign policy in the period under review seemed on balance to militate strongly for a policy that would function either to gain a quick-fix by which Soviet power could again try to match or surpass the West's, or to enter a breathing space of relaxed tensions with the West that de-emphasized military competition and political struggle. There was probably strong support from all the hard-line elements who influence Soviet policy for attempting the first of these alternatives. Perhaps some way to achieve their goal would have to be attempted before serious efforts at the second alternative could be undertaken. In any case, the success of a détente policy would depend also upon reciprocity in the West, and although Washington's intentions to resist Communist expansion were quite manifest in 1960-1961, the willingness of the Republican and Democratic leaderships to forego a forward strategy were not yet entirely clear to the Kremlin. For all these reasons the 1962 Cuban adventure would be decisive: its failure proved the infeasibility of the first alternative; its aftermath showed the practicality of the second.

While the key determinants of Soviet foreign policy militated increasingly for structural change in arms control policy as well as in other areas of East-West relations from 1958 to 1962, there was relatively little alteration in fact in Soviet disarmament policy by comparison with the qualitative changes of 1954 and 1955. The stage was set for a new round—of "struggle," of "cooperation," or of some new synthesis of the two.
CHAPTER IV

A. Introduction

This chapter seeks to determine the nature of the Soviet interest in disarmament and arms control during the last two years of the Khrushchev regime. In so doing it should provide an understanding of some of the factors that will condition the approach of the new Soviet regime to the problem of East-West security agreements.

The period in question saw agreement between the superpowers on several partial measures, mostly marginal in significance compared with the unresolved issues of armaments, but by no means unimportant. The limited nuclear test ban treaty, the hot line, the U.N. resolution opposing orbiting of nuclear weapons, and the tacitly agreed cut-backs in the production of fissionable materials--these supply a series of new landmarks on the otherwise barren plain of post-war arms control negotiations.

B. Manifest Soviet Policies

1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance

   a. Moves on the Test Ban and GCD. Shortly before the Cuban missile crisis erupted, Moscow shifted its position on two central issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after rejecting two alternative test ban proposals put forward by the United States on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a moratorium on underground testing "while continuing negotiations on the final prohibitions of such explosions." A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961, but with the provision that inspection over the underground test moratorium could take place only in the context of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Moscow's August 29-September 3 position seemed no longer to be contingent upon GCD measures being enacted, but Soviet representative Kuznestsov clouded the issue on September 5 by reiterating
Moscow's support for its stand of November 28, 1961. In any event the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture on principle because--after Soviet test resumption in 1961--the West would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium.¹

The other shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took place during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21, 1962:

Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.²

Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of the disarmament program. But during the brief third session of the ENDC in November and December Soviet spokesmen refused to clarify the Gromyko proposal until it was accepted "in principle" by the West.³

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was not followed by any immediate or dramatic shifts in Soviet positions on the test ban, GCD, or collateral measures in either the United Nations General Assembly or the ENDC. At the General Assembly meeting in New York the Soviet government continued to attack Western proposals for a partial test ban or a comprehensive ban with on-site inspection. A more positive chord was sounded on December 5, 1962, when the United States and Soviet Union announced agreement on certain measures of cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.


³ ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22. However, on March 27, 1963 the Soviet delegate elucidated for the first time that Moscow would permit inspection of the missile launch pads. ENDC/PV.114, March 27, 1963, pp. 39-40.
The Soviet position on a nuclear test ban was formally modified for the first time since September when on December 3 and 10, 1962, Moscow publicly espoused the idea of automatic seismic stations—"two or three"—on Soviet territory—to control an underground test ban. Delivery of the sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the Soviet Union would have to be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft, but Moscow would be prepared to agree to servicing by foreign personnel. A short time later, on December 19, Khrushchev announced Moscow would accept "two to three" on-site inspections per year for the control of a comprehensive test ban treaty, thereby returning to a position first held in 1960. However, Washington insisted that the minimum number of inspections acceptable to the United States was between eight and ten. The resulting impasse led Moscow to break off tripartite talks that went on in New York from January 14 to 31, 1963. On April 1, 1963 the Western powers at the ENDC reduced their demand from 8-10 to 7 on-site inspections, but in the following month the debate degenerated to the point where the Soviet negotiator declared that it was "a sheer waste of time."

b. Limited Agreements and the "Spirit of Moscow." While the test ban negotiations showed little prospect of success the ENDC discussions on other arms control items in the spring of 1963 appeared equally inauspicious. The five Communist delegations attacked the Nassau agreement of December 1962, plans for U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation, the Franco-German treaty of cooperation of January 1963, and U.S. overseas bases—particularly

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1ENDC/PV.90, December 10, 1962, pp. 13-27. This idea had originated at the Tenth Conference on Science and World Affairs ("Pugwash") in London during September 1962. The Soviets subsequently made private approaches to the United States on this matter in October and November at the General Assembly and Geneva. It was mentioned favorably by Radio Moscow on November 10, (Domestic Service, 0025 GMT) and by the Soviet negotiator at the ENDC on November 13, 1962.

2Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1239-1242.


those serving Polaris submarines. A number of Soviet proposals were aimed directly against these Western positions—a declaration "On Renunciation of Use of Foreign Territories for Stationing Strategic Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons," a draft nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, and a proposal for declaring the Mediterranean a nuclear-free zone.

It was against this background of hostile negotiating behavior in the ENDC that Moscow was negotiating a direct communications link with Washington as well as a test ban agreement. Evidence of progress on the hot line was indicated on April 5, when the Soviet delegate declared that his government agreed to the United States proposal "immediately, without waiting for general and complete disarmament." While the hot line agreement of June 20, 1963 was being prepared, private talks on a test ban treaty were proceeding among unofficial representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. The Western governments were able to announce on June 10 the scheduling of a "high-level" conference of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow on July 15.

Khrushchev announced on July 2 that in the forthcoming three-power talks in Moscow the Soviet government was interested in concluding a partial test ban agreement. Modifying the Soviet position of August 29—September 3, 1962, Khrushchev dropped the qualification of an (uninspected) moratorium on underground testing but now called for the simultaneous signing of an East-West nonaggression pact.

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1ENDC/PV.147, June 21, 1963, p. 49.
4ENDC/PV.118, April 5, 1963, p. 52.
While circumstantial evidence suggests that Khrushchev had opted for a test ban agreement even before his July 2 statement, and may have recognized that a partial ban held the greatest prospects of success on both sides, it was not yet entirely clear that the nonaggression pact issue might not be used by the Soviet leadership to scuttle agreement at the last minute, especially as Sino-Soviet negotiations were also in progress in Moscow. Khrushchev publicly confined himself to the "hope" that a nonaggression pact would emerge from the test ban negotiations. The three-power negotiations began in Moscow on July 15 as scheduled, and after the first day Moscow let the non-aggression pact issue drop to the background, although it was clear that the final communiqué would have to make some mention of it. The negotiations thereafter were friendly and business-like. The main problems were the withdrawal clause and the question of depositaries for the treaty. These were solved with relatively little difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the former being overcome by a circumlocution. On July 25 the treaty was initialed and on August 5, 1963 it was signed.

The impression of détente generated by the limited test ban treaty pervaded the brief fifth session of the ENDC, which met through the month of August, but there were no basic changes of position on the part of either the Soviet Union or the West. Moscow continued to plead the case for a nonaggression pact and GCD. But Soviet negotiators also advanced the various collateral measures proposed by Khrushchev in his speech of July 19, including a cut in military budgets, a reduction of forces in both Germanies and measures to prevent surprise attack.

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1 Moscow ceased jamming the Voice of America broadcasts in May and June 1963 and signed the hot line agreement on June 20, 1963, as indicated above. Khrushchev publicly commended President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10 in Pravda of June 15, 1963; further, in June 1963, the Soviet publication New Times singled out the fact that Secretary of State Rusk on May 29, 1963 had supported the proposal of a group of United States Senators for a partial ban as being in the interest of both countries. New Times, No. 23, 1963, p. 32 (Russian edition, June 7, 1963).


4 ENDC/PV.152, August 16, 1963, p. 38.
New Soviet moves were, however, made at the Eighteenth General Assembly meeting in New York in the fall of 1963. On September 19 Mr. Gromyko further modified the Soviet position on a "nuclear umbrella," conceding that a limited number of nuclear missiles might be retained through the end of the disarmament process. In addition the Soviet Government at the same time reversed the position it had taken on June 20, 1963 in the ENDC and assented to a joint Soviet-American agreement not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.\(^1\) Subsequent U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle on this matter was endorsed by U.N. General Assembly resolution on October 17, 1964, calling upon all states to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons in space.\(^2\)

Other signs of limited movement in Soviet positions on arms control in this period were evident as the year 1963 drew to a close. At the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference in Vienna the Soviet Union accepted some safeguards to ensure that fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes by aid recipients, and at the United Nations the Soviet Union joined the United States in an agreement on certain legal principles governing the exploration and use of outer space.\(^3\) In fact the latter agreement, which was approved by the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on November 22, failed to contain several Soviet principles—such as the prohibition of nongovernmental activities in space—which had been objectionable to the United States. On December 13 Mr. Khrushchev announced a unilateral reduction in the Soviet military budget and the possibility of a cutback in Soviet armed forces. And on December 31, 1963 he addressed a letter to all heads of state urging an agreement on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes—a proposal of questionable value but obviously aimed at least in part at China.\(^4\)

Another East-West agreement came on April 20, 1964, when—after an unpublicized plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in

\(^1\)\textit{Pravda,} September 20, 1963.


February—private negotiations among Washington, London, and Moscow led to unilateral pledges by the three governments to cut back production of fissionable materials.

c. Hardening of the Line in the ENDC. In the ENDC session that commenced on January 21, 1964, however, Soviet negotiators vigorously rejected the new United States proposals for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles and for a reduction of Soviet and American strategic bomber forces. Instead Moscow laid major emphasis on GCD (including its concession of September 1963 on the "nuclear umbrella"), the destruction of all bombers, reciprocal budgetary reductions, and a nonaggression pact. Moscow argued that the United States proposal on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons could not be taken seriously until the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) project was abandoned; the Kremlin also refused to dissociate from other partial measures the proposal of ground control posts against surprise attack. By March 1, 1964 Mr. Gromyko was publicly charging the West with responsibility for the lack of progress at the ENDC, and an undertone of recrimination continued to be evident in Soviet statements until the end of the session on April 28.

We might sum up the period from September 1962 to mid-1964 as one of extraordinary movement toward agreements on the fringes of the disarmament problem. However, the Soviet approach to East-West agreements for arms control and disarmament reflected a notable duality between public and private negotiating posture. Publicly Soviet representatives continued in the negotiations to pursue lines of conduct that often seemed to undermine the possibility of agreement, while privately Moscow proceeded toward specific understandings with the United States.

2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament

Soviet propaganda treatment of the arms control and disarmament issue, in common with Soviet negotiating behavior in the ENDC, seems generally to have been antagonistic to the West even when private talks between Moscow and Washington were proceeding favorably. The outstanding exceptions to this rule arose in connection with the test ban and the understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, when Moscow exhibited definite propaganda restraint.

1Izvestia, March 2, 1964.
The limited shift in Soviet policy on the test ban issue on August 29-September 3, 1962, at the ENDC was described by Pravda on the following day as "opening the way to agreement." New Times on September 8, 1962 described the move in similar terms. The Soviet willingness to agree to a limited test ban cum moratorium was affirmed by Khrushchev in a speech on October 1, 1962. The possible significance of the Soviet move of August 29-September 3 is suggested also by a subsequent Chinese charge that the Soviet Union notified Peking on August 25, 1962, that it had agreed to a U.S. proposal to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear powers and that non-nuclear powers should refrain from seeking to buy or produce atomic weapons.

In the aftermath of the Cuban episode Soviet propaganda stressed the opportunities for U.S.-Soviet agreement on the test ban and other arms control measures as a result of Soviet concessions. Indeed the same day that Khrushchev announced that Russia's missiles were being withdrawn from Cuba Moscow stated the U.S. and Soviet positions on a test ban were "close." The Soviet proposals for "black box" controls and, later, for three on-site inspections were emphasized, as was the nuclear umbrella offer of September 1962. However the West's negative response to these proposals and Washington's plans for a NATO nuclear force were sharply criticized.

Moscow's propaganda increasingly noted that within the United States government there were opponents of any compromise. In breaking off the private three-power talks in New York on January 31, 1963 on the grounds that the West was not "showing good will," Moscow, citing Edward Teller and Nelson Rockefeller, emphasized that the United States administration was under "strong pressure" not to conclude a test ban agreement. The American test resumption soon thereafter was assailed as an attempt to poison the atmosphere at Geneva, and it was implied that this move was due to pressure from the "right."

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1Pravda, October 2, 1962.
3TASS in English to Europe, October 28, 1962, 1611 GMT.
4TASS in English to Europe, December 4, 1962, 1748 GMT.
While the ground was being prepared for the partial test ban treaty in private talks among the three powers, the Soviet propaganda line on the ENDC was basically antagonistic. The tendency in the period December 1962 to February 1963 to imply that the Kennedy administration did not have a free hand in negotiating a test ban was subordinated in March and April to an antagonistic propaganda attacking "aggressive" Western moves outside the negotiating forum. The good faith of the Western negotiators in Geneva was questioned in charges of "procrastination." Although Soviet propaganda obliquely indicated that Washington might favor a test ban, Moscow generally stressed the West's refusal to consider "constructive" Soviet proposals at the ENDC. Particular attention was given to the negative Western response to the Soviet proposal of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean, again with the explicit references to Polaris and to possible MLF deployment.

A less hostile approach to the West characterized Soviet propaganda from June to October 1963. After Khrushchev's favorable comments of June 15, 1963 on President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10 and Khrushchev's proposal of a partial test ban at Berlin on July 2, Soviet statements began to play down United States "aggressiveness" and instead indicated a recognition that the governments with which they were negotiating were under pressure from "militarist 'ultras' and the big war monopolies" not to enter into agreements or move toward a détente. The signing of the hot line agreement was termed a "bright spot" in the work of the ENDC and proof of Moscow's good will in seeking agreements with the West.

With the initialing of the test ban treaty on July 25, 1963 and the subsequent debate on the issue in the United States, Soviet propaganda emphasized two main themes: The agreement furthered a relaxation of tensions and created favorable conditions for the

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1Editorial, "Vicious Circle," New Times, No. 15, April 17, 1963. On this occasion Moscow noted that "influential elements" were exerting pressure on the Kennedy administration not to sign a test ban.

2See, for example, "The Test Ban Talks," New Times, No. 29, July 1963.

3Izvestia, June 22, 1963.
solution of other East-West problems, and it "exposed" the "reactionary" groups in the West that were most opposed to agreements and détente. By contrast Soviet media said relatively little about the majority of "sober-moderate" individuals and groups that supported the partial test ban. The treaty was seen as a means of "tying the hands" of those in the West who were most vociferous in their opposition to the "socialist" states, while at the same time the "forces of peace" had been strengthened. In this connection Soviet commentators emphasized that American political leaders were showing an increasing understanding of the need for policies of coexistence rather than policies of force. This view complemented the other main Soviet propaganda line to the effect that a start had been made toward a relaxation of tensions and the step-by-step negotiation of other outstanding East-West problems.

Soviet domestic propaganda on the test ban made the point that the relaxing effect of the test ban on the international situation inhibited the formation of new multilateral NATO or European nuclear forces. It was also asserted that the Soviet negotiating proposals that accompanied the test ban had provoked

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1 See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0310 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 5, 1963, 0600 GMT; and TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1619 GMT.

2 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, April 18, 1963, 1400 GMT.

3 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 12, 1963, 1900 GMT; Krasnaia zvezda, August 16, 1963.

4 On July 26 in a Pravda interview Khrushchev proposed that further efforts be devoted above all to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact; as additional measures he proposed the freezing or reduction of military budgets, implementation of measures to prevent surprise attack, reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in East and West Germany, and a Soviet-Western exchange of troop representatives between forces stationed in Germany. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT.
"a tense struggle" among the NATO powers. \(^1\) Noting the line-up of the NATO members on the issue of a nonaggression pact, Moscow added that this struggle was "going on not only inside NATO but in every Atlantic country." \(^2\) The Federal Republic of Germany was consistently portrayed as the chief obstruction to further East-West agreement and on occasion as "blackmailing" the United States to this end. \(^3\) French opposition to further East-West agreements was also stressed. \(^4\)

Perhaps most interesting, however, was the Soviet propaganda treatment of the resumption of underground testing by the United States almost immediately after the limited test ban was signed. It is understood that Soviet news agencies were directed not to publish a statement by Professor J. D. Bernal, president of the World Peace Council, charging that the United States test resumption was "an affront to humanity" and "a direct blow against the spirit of the agreement." Soviet media appear to have continued the moratorium on propaganda opposing the United States underground test until October 12, 1963, when in a broadcast to Italy the tests were criticized by Moscow as not being in the spirit of the limited test ban treaty. \(^5\)

As in the Bernal case, Radio Moscow played down the fact that the United States government did not feel ready to push for a treaty on banning bombs in orbit, although it would agree to a U.N. resolution to that effect. \(^6\) Soviet propaganda on the

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\(^1\) Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.

\(^2\) Ibid. The division on a nonaggression pact at the NATO Council session in Paris late in August 1963 was reported as follows: the United States, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Italy for the pact; the Netherlands, Portugal, and Iceland for it but with reservations; France, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey opposed to the pact and even to East-West talks about it.

\(^3\) See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.

\(^4\) See, for example, Moscow in English to eastern North America, August 12, 1963, 0030 GMT.

\(^5\) Moscow in Italian to Italy, October 12, 1963, 1900 GMT.

\(^6\) See Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963, 0600 GMT. TASS in English to Europe, October 17, 1963, 1759 GMT.
resolution indicated it had been received with "indignation" and "disappointment" by Senator Goldwater and "the most aggressive-minded elements of U.S. military quarters."

On October 21, 1963, as talks on East-West problems continued between Washington and Moscow and as Khrushchev continued to seek to convene a conference of the international Communist movement to excommunicate the Chinese, TASS released the first major threat to the West since the test ban was signed—a warning that the NATO talks begun on October 11 to set up the MLF could obstruct progress toward further East-West agreements. TASS emphasized that the Western powers could not verbally oppose the spread of nuclear weapons while in practice seeking to supply them to the Bundeswehr.

This slight hardening of the line was also reflected in new activity by the Communist peace fronts, which had been dormant since the "World Congress of Women" in Moscow in June 1963. Thus Khrushchev's October 25 warning against allowing détente to lead to the "moral and spiritual demobilization of the forces of disarmament" was followed by "Peace Week" (November 17-24) in France and the Warsaw session of the World Peace Council (November 28-December 1). The latter called for renewed mass actions, emphasizing a comprehensive test ban, opposition to nuclear proliferation including the MLF, nuclear-free zones, and the mobilization of "pressure" on the ENDC to progress toward a GCD treaty.

Khrushchev's December 13 announcements of a cut in the Soviet military budget and a possible unilateral force reduction were characterized by Soviet media as tension-reducing moves designed to influence the MLF discussions at the Paris NATO Ministerial Council session of December 16 and 17. Khrushchev by the end of the year was speaking in terms of agreements by "mutual example."

As the ENDC resumed in January 1964, Moscow proposed a series of partial measures that were advertised as facilitating GCD. By March, as the Soviet Union began again to seek support for a world Communist conference and as the ENDC settled down to

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1 TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 1433 GMT.
2 TASS in English to Europe, October 21, 1963, 1213 GMT.
unproductive discussion, Mr. Gromyko attacked the West for barring all progress in Geneva while Radio Moscow asserted that the Soviet draft GCD treaty was "the only plan" that could form the basis of negotiation.

On April 20, 1964 the joint declaration of intent to reduce production of fissionable materials was announced and characterized by the Soviets as "a major new step toward easing international tension." No further agreements, formal or informal, took place in the arms control area during the remainder of the period before Khrushchev was deposed, and Soviet propaganda continued to stress Western obstruction in the ENDC.

C. Factors Conditioning Soviet Policy

By mid-1961 the optimistic outlook that underlay the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1954-1956 had been profoundly eroded. Despite Soviet advances in rocketry, the West had held fast and had gone on to outstrip the Soviet Union in numbers of ICBM's. Despite the enticements and threats that emanated from Moscow, the NATO alliance had shown considerable cohesion, even allowing for de Gaulle's independent course. By contrast the one-time Soviet "bloc" had fallen into a state of severe disarray, with polycentrism in Eastern Europe and a profound rift in Asia. Despite Soviet blandishments, the emerging nations remained part of a "third" and not a Soviet world. Finally, fulfilling Western but not Soviet forecasts, the rate of Soviet economic growth began seriously to falter--in part because of the arms race--after 1958. Had the attempt to emplace Soviet missiles in Cuba succeeded, at least the military picture would have been more to Moscow's liking, and perhaps the other problems enumerated would also have been favorably affected. The failure of the Cuban gambit therefore resulted in a serious narrowing of the foreign policy alternatives open to the Kremlin.

The same factors that induced a shift in Soviet arms control policy after Cuba also set limits on how far that policy might go: the problem of present Soviet strategic inferiority and the outlook for some new technological or territorial breakthrough; the presence of what Moscow termed "sober" and "aggressive" forces in the West; the unremitting pressure from Peking for a stiffer

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1 Moscow in German to Germany, March 10, 1964, 1245 GMT.

2 Pravda, April 23, 1964.
line toward "imperialism"; the extent to which the Soviet economy could sustain arms competition with the United States and benefit from a slackening of defense expenditures; and finally, the balance of power and opinion among the Kremlin leadership. Taking each of these problems in turn we shall see their interaction and impact upon the Soviet approach to arms control after Cuba.

1. The Military-Strategic Outlook

We found considerable evidence, both in terms of the Soviet strategic position at the time and in terms of the prospective ICBM capability, that in the 1955 period military considerations strongly influenced Soviet arms control policy, apart from the general recognition of the altered nature of strategy, due to nuclear weapons, that underlay a basic reappraisal of the future. We found that in the 1957-1962 years the Soviet propensity to negotiate fluctuated with the confidence the Soviet leaders derived from their strategic power: with high confidence they tended to negotiate more earnestly; with waning confidence their interest in negotiation seemed to fall off; and with gathering acceptance of at least temporary strategic inferiority they began to take negotiations more seriously again. What data regarding the military position was central to Soviet policy in 1962-1964, and what can we conclude about its relevance to Soviet arms control policy in this period?

a. Strategic Forces in Being. Chart IV.1 shows the approximate gross strategic force levels for the United States and the Soviet Union as of August 17, 1964. Charts III.1-III.4 showed the development of Soviet and United States ICBM forces, long-range bombers, land-based MRBM/IRBM forces, and medium-range bombers since 1950.

As Charts III.1-III.4 indicated, the variety and quantity of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles increased substantially over the eight-year period since 1955. Although the notion of the "missile gap," diligently fostered by Moscow, had been exploded by 1961, it was nonetheless true in the post-"gap" period of the early and mid-1960's that the Soviet Union had the unquestioned capacity to deliver nuclear weapons on target in the United States.

By 1963 the Soviet strategic force was built primarily on ballistic missiles (ICBM's, IRBM's, MRBM's), secondarily on missile-carrying submarines, and third, to a much smaller

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1 See Table III.2.
Chart IV.1

Strategic Force Levels, 1963

For references see references following Chart I, Chapter II, p. 24
degree, on strategic aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles. 1

The approximate numbers of all these forces in 1963 are displayed in Chart IV.1. As has been indicated, 2 the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force has grown slowly, and a site-hardening program may be required to make this force a credible deterrent.

b. Strategic Weapons in Development. Moscow appeared in the mid-1960's to have a number of options in the further development of offensive weapons systems. These included the following in particular:

Improvement and enlargement of the Soviet ICBM force by deploying a larger number of hardened second-generation ICBM's or by developing an ICBM delivery system for the high-yield warheads under testing since 1961.

Modernization and enlargement of the ballistic missile-firing submarine fleet.

Statements of American officials show little concern over a Soviet weapons-in-space program or any significant development and deployment of an anti-ICBM system. Consequently, given the slow but steady rise reported in Soviet ICBM and submarine-launched weapons, it is assumed here that improvements and numerical increases in the latter systems represent the most likely course of action for the Soviet Union during the next few years. Consequently, although drastic technological innovation in the weapons field is unlikely, it is certain that the Soviet Union's strategic deliverable megatonnage, invulnerability, and flexibility will increase throughout the 1960's, particularly if their missile-submarine capability is improved and expanded.

c. Implications for Policy. How then were these facts of the military-strategic outlook translated into policy during the period of our concern?

Clearly because of its strategic inferiority Moscow sought to gain maximum political advantage from the military force it had or might have. Thus the bold but relatively sophisticated Soviet political use of military force as seen in the performance of


2See Charts III.3 and III.4.
Soviet space rockets, the Soviet 61-megaton nuclear blast in October 1961, and Khrushchev's various claims about a "fantastic new weapon," a "global rocket," and a 100-megaton bomb--seems to have been designed in large part to amplify the concern of American leaders for United States vulnerability in the event that modern weapons should be used; this aim emerges rather clearly from Khrushchev's speeches of the period.1

After the decisive failure at Cuba and the resultant resignation to military-strategic inferiority, other factors bearing on Soviet security grew in importance. For one thing there was an intensified interest in averting any continued deterioration of the Soviet strategic position. This concern implied policy moves to inhibit further increases in United States nuclear strength, the consolidation of the NATO alliance through the multilateral nuclear force (MLF), and the spread of nuclear weapons to West Germany. It also implied steps to deter Chinese progress toward a strategic capability. Moreover, barring a successful strategem on the Cuban model or a technological breakthrough, the necessity to live with decisive United States strategic superiority made certain forms of arms control a more palatable policy alternative for Moscow. Thus, in modifying the relationship with the chief adversary by means of both détente and limited arms control measures Moscow could hope to alter by political means a strategic balance that had shifted steadily to Russia's disadvantage.

Here we shall consider the extent to which Soviet strategic interests would have been served by the propagation and/or signing of comprehensive and partial disarmament measures advocated by Moscow after Cuba.

1) Comprehensive Disarmament. The modification of the Soviet GCD program (first in 1962 and then again in 1963) to allow for a strictly limited number of nuclear delivery systems to be retained by the Soviet Union and United States through the disarmament process meant that--were the basic plan implemented--the United States would have been brought down to the same level of missile systems as Russia, while all other aspirants for the nuclear club would be excluded from membership. Thus, the one country stronger than Russia would be made weaker while the Soviet

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1See, for example, his speeches of March 16, 1962; December 12, 1962; and January 16, 1963. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, March 16, 1962, 1500 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT; and New Times, No. 4, January 30, 1963 (supplement).
advantage over all other states—including China and Germany—would be frozen. Moscow thus appeared to move closer to the U.S. idea of "stabilized deterrence" long criticized by Soviet spokesmen. It can also be speculated that the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet relationship in 1962-1963 prompted the Soviets to require the retention of a deterrent force to offset Chinese manpower superiority. Finally, Soviet inability to rely upon Chinese conventional support against the West probably increased the incentives to retain a nuclear deterrent to the end of the final stage of disarmament.

The Soviet view of a disarmed world was modified again in July 1964 when Khrushchev suggested that an international peacekeeping force be established under the Security Council from contingents provided by neutralist, Western, and Communist powers—excluding the five permanent members of the Security Council. While this move was part of Moscow's attempt to reinforce its position in the United Nations financial crisis, it also indicated a mounting concern to limit violence in the emerging nations. Like the nuclear umbrella, the U.N. force could be used by but not against the two superpowers.

Although neither of these modifications in the Soviet stand made GCD appear more than a remote possibility, both of them probably reflected greater realism in the Soviet strategic outlook. In a manner that was reminiscent of the injection of the ground control proposal into the disarmament package of 1955, Moscow may have aimed at controlling the immediate situation by communicating to the United States a Soviet interest in moves to stabilize the military environment to mutual advantage.

2) Partial Measures. The four limited arms controls into which Moscow entered in 1963-1964 were essentially preventive in nature, and did not seem to upset either the existing military balance or the strategic R&D plans of either side. Nonetheless, they did mark a change in the strategic relationship of the two chief adversaries, and signified some willingness on both sides to refrain from undertaking destabilizing developments of the arms race.

a) The Limited Nuclear Test Ban. Soviet atmospheric testing in 1961 and 1962 apparently yielded Moscow significant advances in nuclear warhead design, to the extent that the Soviet government could later assert with some degree of credibility that it possessed "all the necessary requisites for maintaining

our defense potential at the proper level that is or may be required by the situation." Although Moscow was willing indirectly to acknowledge that the United States possessed the advantage in underground testing, the Soviet leadership apparently decided that underground testing offered only marginal gains at relatively high cost. As for further atmospheric testing, a key objective here would have been to develop ABM systems. Quite apart from the practicality and expense of an all-out competition in active defense with the United States, Moscow may have believed as of 1963 that it possessed the advantage in high-yield warheads which made it advisable to forestall the potentially adverse effects of additional American testing, such as refinements in the penetrability and reliability of United States ICBM's.

b) The Hot Line. The Soviet interest in this measure would seem to have arisen in part from the realization after Cuba of the need for a rapid and reliable form of communication in crisis management with the United States. Here Moscow seems to have been moved by a desire to stabilize the military environment by providing a safeguard against the possibility of accidental war.

c) The Understanding Not to Orbit Nuclear Weapons in Space. While this measure did not provide for inspection and was thus open to evasion, it marked in common with the test ban a Soviet interest in closing off possible avenues of weapons development. As in the case of ABM's, the orbiting of nuclear weapons would introduce an element of instability into the military-strategic picture the precise effects of which would be difficult to calculate. Confronted with the uncertainties and cost of such a program, Moscow may have perceived an interest in not provoking and possibly inhibiting United States moves in this direction. Moreover the informal nature of the measure made it possible for Moscow to pursue such objectives without the cost of inspection and with freedom of action to proceed with an orbiting program if circumstances required.

d) The Parallel Announcement of Intent to Reduce Fissionable Materials Production. In common with the previous measure the parallel announcement of a cutback in fissionable materials production did not create formal restraints on Moscow.

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2Moscow in English to Britain, November 14, 1962, 2000 GMT.
As in the case of the limited test ban, a central Soviet interest in this measure was probably to inhibit the development of ABM systems, given that the production of high-yield warheads necessary for anti-missiles would require substantial supplies of fissionable materials. Moscow's primary interest here was probably to exert a restraining influence on further increments in United States strategic strength.

Soviet willingness to enter into the test ban, bombs-in-orbit, and nuclear production cutback agreements suggested a judgment that Moscow's military strength was sufficient to back its foreign policies in conditions of détente and that no technological breakthrough was imminent for either side.

2. The External Political Situation

Forcing Moscow as it did to live with an adverse strategic balance, the failure at Cuba destroyed the basis of a further political-military offensive against the Western alliance. On the other hand, the responsiveness of the Kennedy administration to the conciliatory element in the post-Cuba Soviet policy line and the existence of mounting centrifugal forces in NATO offered Moscow increasingly good reasons to seek a détente and even certain agreements with the West. However, the view to the West also conditioned the Soviet approach to arms controls by an awareness that the balance of forces within NATO made all but the most limited East-West agreements improbable. These constraints and opportunities emerging from the outlook to the West were matched by conflicting influences on Soviet policy arising from the conflict with China. Khrushchev's apparent readiness to rupture relations with the Chinese rather than make the domestic and foreign policy changes demanded by Peking seems to have prompted him toward an accommodation with the West. However, in seeking to free his hands to deal with the situation on the East, Khrushchev also made himself more vulnerable to criticism from orthodox Communists. Thus the external political situation exerted a contradictory effect on Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament.

a. The View to the West. The appearance in 1959 of esoteric Lenin documents stressing an instrumental use of the disarmament-peace issue both to split Western elites and to strengthen the less anti-Soviet elements within them, and the amplification of these materials in 1962 and 1964 coincided with Soviet policy statements on the theme that it was "not a matter of indifference" whether Moscow had to deal with aggressive and uncompromising
Western leaders or with those who took a somewhat more moderate approach to East-West relations. This approach to the West was also accompanied by a rising tendency to distinguish between the attitudes toward the Soviet Union of various groups and individuals in the Western capitals.

In looking to Washington after the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet statements suggested that Moscow perceived a sharp struggle in progress between conflicting leadership groups, and indeed Khrushchev described the resolution of the Cuban crisis in terms of Soviet manipulation of exploitable differences within the top United States leadership:

Among the ruling circles of the United States there are politicians whom one rightly calls mad. . . . Is it not clear that if we had adopted an uncompromising position it would only have helped the camp of the rabid ones to utilize the situation to inflict a blow against Cuba and to unleash a world war? For the sake of justice, it should be observed that among the leading circles of the United States, there are also people who evaluate the situation more soberly. . . .

Khrushchev also chose to emphasize the entirely novel "sobering" effect which this brush with thermonuclear war had had on both the United States leadership and the American people generally. Whereas at the Twenty-Second Congress in October 1961 he had advanced the line that the United States elite was not yet sufficiently "reasonable" in its understanding of the foreign policy consequences of modern weapons developments, he began after the Cuban crisis to advertise that there were those in the United States government who now seemed to understand what

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was at stake.¹

At the same time Khrushchev made clear his belief that President Kennedy was not entirely a free agent as far as East-West security agreements were concerned, noting that "the Soviet Government takes into account the complexity and many-sidedness of the problems facing various states, displays the necessary restraint, and adheres to constructive views. But we strongly emphasize that there are problems of first priority whose solution brooks no procrastination..."² As indicated earlier, this perception of the political situation in Washington continued to appear intermittently in Soviet views on the West in the months prior to the initialling of the limited test ban treaty on July 25, 1963. By that time, however, Khrushchev had gone out of his way to comment favorably on President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10,³ and Pravda had come out with a new and very clear statement of the need to distinguish between various groups in Western capitals:

In our time, in connection with the possible consequences of thermonuclear war, there has been a marked intensification of the struggle between two tendencies among the bourgeoisie: the aggressive adventuristic tendency and the moderate-sober one. After all, world war has become essentially unthinkable for the imperialist aggressor. . . . Communists and all the progressive forces are interested in strengthening the moderate-sober tendency in bourgeois policy, which is dictated by an understanding of the pointlessness of thermonuclear war. . . . The problem is, while not allowing war to be unleashed, at the same time to use the existing situation to the maximum in the interests of the struggle for world socialism.⁴


²Speech of December 12, 1962, loc. cit. See also Khrushchev's letter of December 19, 1962 to President Kennedy concerning the test ban (Pravda, January 21, 1963).


During the U.S. Senate debate and hearings on ratification of the limited test ban the Soviet media provided a great deal of evidence that Moscow perceived sharp distinctions between the "reasonable" individuals supporting the treaty and the various "madmen" that were said to be at work in the United States political system. This distinction was voiced again by Khrushchev in December 1963, soon after the Soviet-American expression of intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, at the moment when he announced a reduction in the Soviet military budget and a possible troop cut:

I would like to believe that the sensible forces in the United States, those who think realistically and realize the responsibility of their country for the fate of the world, will show the will and find the means to rebuff the aggressive militaristic circles, the "madmen," and thereby bar a dangerous development of events which would inevitably involve both the United States and other countries.¹

As Khrushchev spoke favorably of President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Senator Fulbright early in 1964, a new group of Lenin documents was released almost simultaneously with the announcement of the Soviet, American, and British intent to reduce production of fissionable materials.² These new materials sanctioned more clearly than ever before Soviet policies designed to enhance the influence of the "sensible forces" in the United States leadership.

The preceding evidence clearly associates Moscow's differentiated view of the chief Western adversary with an instrumental use of the arms control and disarmament issue throughout 1962-1964. Before proceeding to detail the implications for policy, however, we are bound to ask whether Khrushchev stressed the existence of manipulable differences in the West because he believed they existed and should be used as a rationalization to persuade hard-liners in the Kremlin to go along with East-West agreements that would enhance Soviet security. The distinction is an important one, for a primarily manipulative and disruptive approach to arms control would indicate the transient nature of agreements,


²Pravda and Izvestia, April 12, 1964; Pravda, April 22, 1964.
whereas an attempt to rationalize a direct security or economic interest would suggest a somewhat more substantial basis for Soviet interest in agreements.

First of all, it is unlikely that Moscow perceived the existence of individuals and groups in Washington that consistently represented "reasonable" and "aggressive" "forces" and "tendencies" in the United States political system. The Soviet leaders presumably had the wit to recognize that on specific issues individuals would vary in their willingness to compromise--as one member of the so-called "Executive Committee" of the National Security Council observed after the American decisions had been taken on the Cuban missile crisis, rather than "hawks" and "doves," there were only "'dawks' and 'hoves'." The fact that Soviet references to United States "aggressive circles" often cited individuals who were clearly on the margins of the American political system suggested that Moscow had come to the understanding that its difficulties with the United States sprang from considerably more informal and elusive influences at work in American politics than suggested by the phrase "the aggressive circles of U.S. imperialism." Gromyko, for instance, implied that some United States political leaders took an anti-Soviet line because their "political careers" were built on anticommunism.1

Nonetheless, in surveying the long-term development of Washington's approach to the Soviet Union it is likely that the Soviet leaders in 1962-1964 recognized that certain individuals tended to represent those political processes or tendencies that Moscow sought to encourage or inhibit as the case may have been. Thus Gromyko presumably saw Secretary of State Rusk as a reasonable man in comparison with Secretary Dulles. Khrushchev doubtless recognized that aggressive and uncompromising Soviet policies toward the West and in the "third world" would tend to revive the influence of those in the United States who continued to think like Mr. Dulles. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders may have expected--although they were unlikely to have been wholly united on this point--that President Johnson and his advisers would continue to act with a degree of "reason" and restraint as the Soviet détente posture gradually deprived the American decision-making process of reasons to do otherwise.

1Speech of December 13, 1962 to the Supreme Soviet. TASS in English to Europe, December 13, 1962, 1645 GMT.
There is thus likely to have been a certain ambivalence in the Soviet approach to dealing with the United States leadership on arms control in 1962-1964. Some Soviet leaders, possibly those of less conservative mind, may have regarded the manipulative use of the arms control issue as secondary to the direct satisfaction of Soviet security interests by means of agreements. Other members of the Soviet elite, on the other hand, may have seen the instrumental value of arms control to split and weaken the adversary momentarily as the primary advantage of the limited agreements of the period. Still others presumably rejected the notion that significant distinctions could be drawn between Western leadership groups, and were opposed to concessions and agreements with what they regarded as a consistently aggressive adversary.

Khrushchev’s justification for arms control concessions and agreements in terms of their political utility seems to have served a rationalizing function against orthodox Communist criticism. At the same time differentiation between various influences at work in United States decision-making allowed Moscow to adopt a more realistic policy based on the recognition that, however much the two United States presidents were interested in certain limited measures that were also of interest to Moscow, they also had to carry with them a good proportion of the “American Establishment”—top-level administration officials, Congress, the Pentagon, the government bureaucracy, the opinion-making and politically active financial interests.

To round out this picture of the Soviet view of the West, we may note that before the Cuban crisis Khrushchev is likely to have recognized that a political struggle was developing in West Germany as Adenauer’s retirement drew nearer. To paraphrase the esoteric Leninist line of this period, referred to above, it could not have been “a matter of indifference” to Khrushchev whether he had to deal with Strauss and others, who were rumored to favor independent German possession of strategic nuclear weapons, or with Erhard and Schroeder, who tended to take a somewhat more moderate line. Khrushchev may have reasoned that under conditions of détente and the reduction of the “Soviet threat” the Erhard-Schroeder tendency would become more influential.

In addition to the desirability of a foreign policy posture calculated to influence the political balance of forces within the United States and West German leaderships Moscow was also confronted by mid-1962 with the development of significant differences between the major NATO allies. Differences between France and the United States had gathered momentum after 1958, and had intensified in 1962 as Washington began to press the initial version of its
proposal for a MLF. Differences within NATO were also manifested in the Franco-German treaty of cooperation of January 1963 and, in the same month, the French veto of British participation in the European Economic Community. At the same time, there were indications of Anglo-French differences on the "special relationship," specifically concerning the Skybolt missile, which was cancelled at Nassau in December 1962.

In addition to potentially manipulable differences within the various Western leadership groups, Moscow is likely to have perceived exploitable differences of interest and opinion between the NATO governments. However, apart from the limitations which the German problem and the French nuclear program placed on Western interests in arms control agreements, the extent to which Moscow could attune its policies to the openings in the West was significantly influenced by Chinese opposition to Khrushchev's foreign policy line.

b. The View to the East. Broadly speaking the interaction between the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Soviet approach to East-West relations might be characterized as follows: As antagonisms with China intensified, pressure was exerted on Khrushchev to secure his Western front, essentially by taking a more conciliatory approach to the United States. But of course as Khrushchev sought to lower tensions with the West, Chinese attacks on his policy of restraint only served further to inflame the Sino-Soviet relationship. Regarding East-West security agreements in particular, it is less clear what effects the Sino-Soviet rift might have had on the attitudes of Soviet leaders. Those who were of a slightly more conservative cast of mind may have considered East-West agreements inappropriate before a sustained attempt--undoubtedly involving a harder policy line toward the West--had been made to heal the breach. Others, possibly Khrushchev among them, may have viewed arms control agreements as a way of intensifying Chinese alienation and thus reducing effective Chinese political pressure.

To throw light on some of the restraints which China placed on Soviet relations with the West, it may be useful to consider the possible effects on Soviet policy of Chinese and Albanian attacks on Khrushchev's key proposition that Moscow's foreign relations should be oriented to the promotion of "sober-moderate" thinking in Western "ruling circles."

Following the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961 Albania stepped up its criticism of Khrushchev's approach to the West, charging that the Soviet premier had "almost completely
halted the struggle to unmask American imperialism, hoping, it seems, that in this way the imperialist government of the United States would become peaceful. 1 Similar attacks on Khrushchev's policies continued throughout 1962, with special exception being taken to his August 1962 statement on economic integration referred to above. Here again the Albanian Party criticized the alleged belief of the Khrushchev group that in following an "opportunist" line of conciliation toward the Western governments they would make them "peaceable" and "sensible" and thus create conditions for a rapprochement. 2

The Soviet response to these and also to more veiled accusations from the Chinese following the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict was to reject the allegation that it had "hopes of persuading imperialism," countering that, owing to changes in the balance of power, "imperialism" had ceased to be the dominant force in determining the course of international events. 3 This seemed to be a reasonably safe line to take. But, as we have seen, Khrushchev accompanied it with references in December 1962 and June 1963 to responsible political leaders in the West and to the desirability of mutual compromises with Western governments. As the test ban agreement drew near, the Soviets began to reply

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3Boris Ponomarev, "The Victorious Banner of World Communists," Pravda, November 18, 1962; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, November 18, 1962, 0600 GMT. Kuusinen, however, emphasized Khrushchev's "force of persuasion" in the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, November 22, 1962, 0920 GMT. See also, Khrushchev's speech of December 12, 1962; Moscow Domestic Service, December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT.
to Chinese criticisms more directly. Noting on July 14, 1963 that China had criticized Khrushchev's view that President Kennedy "had displayed a certain amount of good sense, a reasonable approach in the course of the Cuban crisis," Moscow now asked, "do they seriously think that all bourgeois governments are completely devoid of reason in all their affairs?"

By April 1964, with the publication of the new Lenin materials on Genoa, Khrushchev seemed to be actually defending President Kennedy against Chinese attack. Asserting that the representatives of the United States had "not been deprived of good sense when it is a question of life or death for their state," he referred to President Kennedy's American University speech and added: "I have been criticized for praising this speech of Kennedy's. But we must not take a primitive approach to events, we must not feel that we are clever and all our opponents are fools." In the same spirit he made favorable comments about President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and Senator Fulbright.

Whatever benefits Khrushchev might have been reaping from his policies, the Chinese, by dint of personal attacks on him for his relations with the adversary, had maneuvered him into the tactically weak position of appearing to defend "U.S. imperialism" against doctrinally pure arguments advanced by another Communist party. In so doing the Chinese were seeking not so much a revision of Khrushchev's view of the Western adversaries as a change in Soviet policies for dealing with the West. For as we have seen, the thesis of the existence of "sober forces" in the West and Khrushchev's advocacy of an instrumental use of disarmament and

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2 Pravda, July 14, 1963. To this the Chinese offered the impeccable reply: "There is no reason that can transcend class."

3 "Rech' tovarishcha N. S. Krushcheva," Pravda, April 7, 1963.

4 Ibid. See also, "0 nekotorykh storonakh partiinoi zhizni v kompartii kitaia," Pravda, April 28, 1964.
arms control served as a rationalization for the very modifications and restraints in Soviet foreign relations to which Peking objected.

In order to attenuate the atmosphere of two-camp struggle and to promote a degree of "sober-moderate" thinking in American policy-making, the Soviet Union seems to have found it expedient to avoid heavy doses of "anti-imperialist" propaganda. Further, Moscow limited the extent of its material support to "national-liberation" movements in the third world, for Communist-aided violence in the underdeveloped countries—like hard-line "anti-imperialist" propaganda—could revive the perceived Communist threat for the West and help to reconstitute anti-Soviet sentiments within Western elites. In so doing it would tend to neutralize any "demobilizing" effects that Moscow might have achieved as a result of its détente-negotiation policies. A final external area of restraint was to be found in Western Europe. By May 1964 the efforts to lower the Communist threat and the imposition of curbs on the "revolutionary" activities of Communist parties in the developed countries had reached the point where collaboration with the leadership of Europe's socialist parties became an instrument if not a goal of Moscow's policy.¹

On these various aspects of the Soviet approach to the West the Chinese leaders clashed with Khrushchev. In practical terms Khrushchev could not have it both ways, conciliating Western governments while pressing an antagonistic "anti-imperialist" line in the rest of the world, since the latter course would serve to alienate Western leadership groups, to reunite them in opposition to the Soviet threat, and to throw Khrushchev back onto the military-political and economic problems that had driven him to seek a limited accommodation with the West in the first place. Although Khrushchev opted to break with Peking rather than to persist in a vain offensive against the West, Chinese attacks on Khrushchev personally evidently sought to mobilize internal opposition in the CPSU to his foreign policy line. Thus the pressure from the East may nevertheless have restrained any tendency on Khrushchev's part to come to terms with the West on security agreements.

c. Implications for Policy. From the foregoing it is apparent that the makers of Soviet decisions on arms control and disarmament continued to find themselves in a political situation

of some uncertainty in 1962-1964. While in looking to the West Moscow perceived certain basic interests in agreement, the Kremlin presumably recognized that the political situation in the various Western capitals severely restricted the areas in which the Soviet interest in arms control could be satisfied. And while ideological pressure from Peking may have been responsible for some of the restraint in Khrushchev's approach to East-West security agreements, the growth of an antagonistic China eventually possessing a credible nuclear capability and vying with Moscow for influence in the "third world" strengthened his interest in coming to terms with the West.

In opting for a rather sobered relationship with the West after Cuba Khrushchev found that the need to revise Soviet positions so as to expand the areas of possible agreement heightened his vulnerability to attacks from defenders of Communist orthodoxy. This was particularly so when Moscow sought support for a world Communist conference with the apparent purpose of ostracizing Peking. This was a factor which may have contributed to the slight hardening of the Soviet line toward the West in October 1963 and more emphatically in March 1964. As we have suggested although China was unable to prevent Khrushchev from entering into the limited agreements of the period, pressure from the East may still have had some inhibiting effect. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that Khrushchev regarded the arms controls of 1963-1964 with their highly political overtones as a means of creating an international climate in which the Chinese foreign policy line would appear anachronistic.

Given these influences from Peking and the West narrowing the scope of possible agreement, Khrushchev sought to turn to Soviet advantage the opportunities available in the West. In adopting an increasingly conciliatory stance toward Washington after Cuba, he endeavored to diminish the Western sense of a Soviet threat and to neutralize United States leadership opinion which favored a line of unyielding antagonism to Moscow. The Kremlin's interest in influencing the American decision-making process by means of arms control policy was strikingly demonstrated, for example, by Soviet propaganda restraint first on United States underground testing after the limited ban was signed, and subsequently on the manner in which both sides ultimately declared their intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.

A TASS broadcast of August 30, 1963 reported a commentary in Krasnaia zvezda to the effect that the Pentagon "curiously" was presenting the new program of underground testing as "an attempt to strengthen the positions of the supporters of the test
ban treaty," since the test resumption was aimed "to meet the demands of certain Senators for guaranteeing the security of the United States when the treaty becomes operational." Several days later Pravda made a similar observation. This Soviet action and, more positively, the cancellation of the Bernal condemnation (referred to above in Part B), which would have injected a note of antagonism into the international climate, indicated Moscow's wish not to complicate the President's effort to deal with internal interests that were opposed to the agreement.

Similarly, the Soviet willingness to accept without public comment an "expression of intent" not to orbit nuclear weapons in space when an "agreement in principle" had presumably already been achieved (See Part B), also suggests that a strong interest existed in cultivating a moderate attitude within the United States government to East-West relations. But in this connection one may speculate that the outcome of the no-weapons-in-orbit agreement might have hardened internal Soviet opposition to further Soviet-American understandings, and was thus perhaps a factor contributing to the slightly more conservative foreign policy line that began to appear in October 1963.

The political aim of the measures achieved was to deepen the sense of East-West relaxation desired by Khrushchev in dealing with the Western alliance as a whole. In particular, the reduction of the apparent Soviet threat could have been expected to further the disarray within NATO, especially in the deterioration of relations between the United States and France, which seemed to have a momentum of its own. In addition to creating a climate of opinion inimical to the establishment of the MLF, a détente might complicate French efforts to develop its force de frappe, and would amplify sentiment in Britain favoring abandonment of the independent British deterrent.

In the light of this general Soviet approach to arms control and disarmament in the period we can proceed to consider separately Moscow's political interest in comprehensive and partial measures, including those on which agreement was not reached.

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1 TASS in English to Europe, August 30, 1963, 0618 GMT.

2 Pravda dispatch from Washington as reported by TASS in English to Europe, September 3, 1963, 1624 GMT.
1) Comprehensive Disarmament. It seems reasonable to suggest—and the Soviet commentator Valentin S. Zorin has all but done so—that the Soviet propaganda campaign on GCD, which continued intermittently throughout the 1962-1964 period, was closely related to the Soviet interest in cultivating Western leadership groups. Soviet commitment to the "struggle" for GCD via the Communist front organizations, and indeed the generally rather recriminatory Soviet propaganda line on the Geneva negotiations, served as a cover, albeit an imperfect one, against orthodox Communist criticism of Moscow's moves for a détente and limited agreements with the West. Certainly without its advocacy of GCD the Kremlin would have been harder put to defend its moves on partial measures during the 1962-1964 period.

In addition, Moscow had an interest in GCD as a useful political backdrop for Soviet negotiating moves on less far-reaching measures that were of more immediate significance to both the United States and the Soviet Union, and the negotiation of GCD also offered the Kremlin a means of introducing new measures into the dialogue with the United States. The nuclear umbrella was a case in point, since in introducing the concept into the discussion of GCD Moscow sought to communicate an immediate common interest to American leadership. Thus while GCD did not hold ready appeal for influential opinion in the West it could provide Moscow with a direct means of influencing the atmosphere in which the implications of limited arms control agreements were discussed by the various Western leaderships.

On a more routine level Soviet sponsorship of GCD served the various Moscow-oriented peace movements as a tool to mobilize support for Soviet policies in the West. Similarly, it was emphasized by Soviet propagandists to promote the image of a progressive and peace-loving Soviet Union to the populations of the developed and underdeveloped countries alike. In connection with the latter Moscow sought to gain influence by championing the cause of increased economic assistance as a result of disarmament.

2) Partial Measures. Aside from foreclosing certain moves in the arms race, the effect of the limited test ban treaty on the Soviet strategic situation seems to have been largely political.

The agreement served to lower the military threat from the United States, and thus of course to reduce the Soviet strategic disadvantage. While it could have little direct military relevance for China, the test ban did raise political obstacles to Peking's nuclear program. Even more to the point perhaps, the agreement served Soviet strategic interests by dividing the United States from France and inhibiting West German development of a nuclear capability either independently or by transfer from the United States. Similarly, by lowering the level of East-West tension the limited test ban had the effect of undermining Western efforts to create a strategic threat to Moscow in the form of the MfI.

The political as well as the military objectives behind the other limited agreements of 1963-1964 have been discussed above. We think Moscow also had strong political reasons to advocate, if not sign, other measures that it proposed in this period. Thus, negotiation of a non-aggression pact would promote Soviet interests in the light of differences among the NATO allies on this point; agreement on this measure would lower the perceived Soviet threat and deepen the relaxation of tensions for similar disruptive purposes.

Similarly, stabilizing moves in Central Europe such as measures to prevent surprise attack, the gradual removal of foreign troops from both Germanies, and the exchange of troop representatives among foreign forces stationed in both Germanies would help to solidify the status quo in this region while avoiding the greater risks of the Rapacki plan as such, especially for the Ulbricht regime. In achieving these limited but relaxing measures Moscow would satisfy its interest in obstructing West German acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Other Soviet proposals of partial measures in this period seemed to be primarily of agitational interest to Moscow. The call for the prohibition of stationing of nuclear delivery vehicles or servicing facilities on foreign territories was clearly aimed at raising popular opposition in Western Europe and the Mediterranean to the deployment of United States Polaris submarines. Similarly, the traditional demand for the abandonment of foreign bases was aimed at destabilizing American missile and bomber facilities abroad. In view of its appeal to the "third world" agitation of this proposal also served to counter Chinese attacks on the Soviet coexistence line in the various Communist front organizations.
3. The Economic Factor

a. Soviet Defense Expenditures. After 1957, estimated military expenditures started rapidly to increase: by 1962 defense outlays were about 40 per cent higher than in 1957 (see Chart IV.2). In 1960 and 1961 an attempt may have been made to stabilize defense outlays but it was abandoned perhaps in response to the first Kennedy budget. The principal cause of this observed increase in spending was undoubtedly the accelerated effort in the development of rocket technology in general; ICBM's received great and increasing emphasis, while IRBM's and tactical missiles probably retained an important place in the Soviet advanced-weapons program.

Antimissile technology may also have played an increasing role in escalating the costs. The development of advanced aircraft, while de-emphasized in Soviet military doctrine, in all likelihood continued to play a role throughout the current period although one of decreasing importance. The proportion of total defense outlays devoted to the procurement of conventional equipment for the ground forces was certainly much lower in the 1958-1963 period than in earlier years although the Soviet Union continued to devote some attention to the improvement of its conventional armaments. In the 1962-1963 period the commanding objectives of the Soviet defense effort were probably (a) to develop and place in serial production a second-generation ICBM system, an effort begun before first-generation systems became fully available; and (b) to advance the development of a missile-submarine capability.

Very little can be said about trends in total defense outlays in 1963 and 1964 on the basis of data yet available. If the published defense budget is any indication, total spending may have stabilized in 1963 and perhaps even declined slightly in 1964.

b. Economic Impact of the Soviet Arms Effort. The impact of the defense effort in the Soviet economy is very difficult to measure. Despite the dramatic increase, the weight of the defense expenditure as a share of GNP was probably lower in 1962 than in 1955 or 1952. A 10-12 per cent range appears reasonable for 1962 when hidden spending above the published budgetary level is taken into account.

Apart from its relation to GNP, however, the "burden of defense" should be evaluated by its effect on the rate of economic growth generally and in terms of real resources denied to other sectors of the economy. In 1961-1963 a broad deceleration from the rapid growth rates of the mid-1950's was apparent in most
Chart IV.2
Estimated Soviet Defense and Space Expenditures, 1950-1965


B. C plus science outlays.

C. Official reported defense spending.

D. Godaire's cost of military manpower.

E. "Becker's" cost of military manpower.


G1-G2 Becker's military manpower costs, plus other defense (budget), plus science, plus remainder, including statistical discrepancy, in 1958 and 1965. Ibid.
sectors. In industry—the priority sector for the Soviet economy—the slowdown was marked.1 In agriculture, after the bumper harvest of 1958 a series of mediocre years followed and finally the catastrophe of 1963. It appears to have been increasingly recognized, especially in 1963, that better and stable harvests were dependent upon irrigation and the expansion of the chemical industry and thus required the allocation of additional investment resources. In regard to consumption the regime's policy was to allow moderate improvement to follow the growth rate of the economy as a whole. With the general economic slowdown, growth of consumption appeared almost to have ceased, consumer goods output rising only 5 per cent in 1963.

Although the broad slowdown in the Soviet economy may have been in part a product of trends unrelated to defense production, since growth is one of the most urgent priorities of the Soviet regime we may speculate that the need to divert valuable resources to armaments, even though the percentage of GNP devoted to defense may have declined, has become increasingly burdensome. It is likely that the need to allocate increasing resources to arms has been at least partially responsible for the stagnation of other sectors of the economy. Clearly the channeling of engineering and other trained personnel to the arms effort has tended to restrain civilian technological progress and inhibit the maintenance of existing plants. Military production has also cut into civilian machinery production; this in turn has hampered investment, which is increasingly dependent upon the supply of new machinery. In 1963 the machinery supply component of Soviet investment plans was not mentioned in plan-fulfillment data, suggesting a large margin of underfulfillment. Similarly it is likely that expansion of the chemical industry, a priority since 1958, was restrained by the Soviet arms effort.

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Further evidence that the arms burden was felt to be placing pressure on the Soviet economy was suggested by the appearance in March 1962 of statements in the Soviet media implying that President Kennedy had intensified the United States commitment to the arms race. Such statements were apparently made to justify diverting "considerable funds" from Soviet economic development to arms.1

By April 1964 Khrushchev, for political reasons that will be considered later, pointed explicitly to an inhibiting effect of military expenditures on Soviet agriculture and consumer goods production:

 Doesn't the need to support the defense might of the USSR at the present-day level hinder the raising of the well-being of the people? With all straightforwardness I reply: Yes, it hinders it. Rockets and cannons--these are not meat, not milk, not butter, not bread, and not kasha. If it were not necessary constantly to strengthen the might of the Soviet armed forces, we could sharply raise the living standard of our people, make it in the very near future the highest of the world.2

More precise relations between armaments and the overall deceleration of the Soviet growth rate are not easily determined. It is probably accurate to suggest, however, that the burden of military expenditures on the economy has in general increased in recent years and has consequently impinged increasingly on other goals of the Soviet leadership. In short, there can be little doubt (a) that the Soviet arms effort since the late 1950's has inhibited the capacity of the regime to counteract trends that were causing deceleration of the economic growth rate, and (b) that reduction or at least stabilization of arms expenditures would have some favorable effects on growth.

c. Implications for Policy. There is evidence to suggest that the reduction in the Soviet growth rate and conflicting demands on scarce resources have generated internal conflicts on foreign

1 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, March 11, 1962, 1400 GMT; and election speech of A. Kosygin on March 14, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, March 14, 1962.

policy. It is useful to consider the possible relations between Khrushchev's efforts to deal with domestic economic problems and the foreign policies of detente and limited arms control that he pursued in the period under consideration.

By 1962 Khrushchev's attitude on resource allocation was to some extent consumer oriented. In this respect he differed from "some comrades" who had "an appetite for metals that could only unbalance the economy." Given the very low probability that the adverse strategic balance could be easily reversed, and given his propensity to resist major increases in resource allocation to armaments, it was not surprising that Khrushchev in March and April 1962 proposed an intensified Soviet commitment to policies seeking to exploit differences within Western elites. By June-July 1962, following the major food-price riots near Rostov on June 1 and the decision, apparently made in the summer of 1962, to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev with seeming reluctance affirmed that Soviet arms expenditures would have to be continued at the expense of investment in animal husbandry and consumer goods. Subsequently the thaw in the Soviet policy line immediately after Cuba, with its emphasis on rapprochement with the "sober-moderate" tendencies in the American leadership, was definitely associated with renewed but apparently unsuccessful moves on Khrushchev's part to stress the domestic consumer economy. For the moment, however, he succeeded in a major reorganization of the party and in making further gestures toward a test ban agreement.

Rather than accelerate a very costly arms race in which the lead of the opponent was considerable, Khrushchev apparently chose in the immediate post-Cuban relaxation with the West to moderate

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3 Speech to Cuban students in Russia, June 3, 1962 (*Pravda*, June 4) and speech at Grivita Rosie Plant in Rumania, June 19, 1962 (*Pravda*, June 20), both cited in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XII, No. 6 (June 1963), and *Pravda*, July 6, 1962 (speech to military academy graduates).

4 Although Khrushchev affirmed the primacy of heavy industry at the November 1962 plenum, it was not without complaints about those who cried "steel, steel!" Linden, loc. cit.
the arms race, to stabilize—if not to reduce—Soviet arms expenditures, and to promote the growth of the consumer economy. This last objective was reflected in a renewed emphasis on the theme that the economic achievements of the Soviet Union represented its greatest contribution to the "world revolutionary process."

In the following months Khrushchev was evidently forced to retreat on his line of limited rapprochement with the United States and on his domestic economic program. As we noted earlier, following the Soviet test ban concessions of November and December 1962 Moscow canceled the three-power test ban talks at the end of January 1963. In his election speech of February 27, 1963 Khrushchev pleaded with his electors to "give us time" in providing consumer goods and openly stated that the "enormous funds" required for the Soviet military program "reduces and cannot help but reduce the people's possibilities of obtaining direct benefits." The trend of events against Khrushchev seemed to be strengthened in March 1963, when the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR (VSNKh) was established. The creation of this organization centralized planning and evidently neutralized some of the advantages Khrushchev gained through the November 1962 party reform. The chairman of the Supreme Council, Dimitri Ustinov, previously for some two decades had been directing Soviet armament industries.

As the East-West détente deepened following the signing of the limited test ban treaty and the understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons, Khrushchev sought to return to the defense of his domestic economic line. At the December 1963 plenum heavy emphasis was placed on an ambitious program for the development of the chemical industry, and a cut in the Soviet military budget was announced. And at the open plenum of February 1964 Khrushchev attempted to argue the point that growth in the chemical industry and agriculture would strengthen Soviet defense capability.

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1Pravda, February 28, 1963. See Pravda, January 7, 1963 editorial comment on the defense burden: "Bearing such a burden is no easy matter; the Soviet people are quite often obliged to deny themselves necessities."


3Speech of February 14, 1964 to Central Committee plenum, Pravda, February 15, 1964. Khrushchev used an elliptical technique in making his point by referring to Western views that "the Soviet Union has been forced to reduce its arms and armed forces because of difficulties in economic development. Attempts are also being made to propound the theory that the Soviet Union is incapable of simultaneously developing its economy and strengthening its defenses."
Toward the end of April 1964, as has been indicated, Khrushchev came more directly to the point in opposing the maintenance of high levels of Soviet military spending. Having asserted that "certain ruling parties and leaders of the biggest capitalist states" were coming to recognize that force could not be used to settle international disputes, Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet defense budget stood in the way of his plans for the development of agriculture and light industry. ¹ This statement, which we have cited above, appeared in the Party's theoretical journal shortly after the publication of new esoteric documents advocating a foreign policy of compromise and the joint announcement of intent to reduce the production of fissionable materials.

In the following months, as the East-West détente continued, Khrushchev gave increasing emphasis to consumer goods. Shortly before he was removed he called upon Soviet economic planners to place "the satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual requirements of men at the forefront in working out the long-term plan for developing our economy."² This may well have been interpreted by the heavy industry and military interests as an open bid for popular support for a Malenkovite "new course" in economic policy.

It seems reasonable to conclude that during the period under review the pressure of the arms burden on the Soviet economy was a contributing factor in Khrushchev's pursuit of both détente and perhaps even a long-term attenuation of the conflict with the United States. In seeking a détente Khrushchev evidently sought to reduce the military threat to the Soviet Union from the West; in reducing the military threat he must have hoped to be in a stronger position to press for among other things a reduction of the Soviet military budget and thus eventually a more rapid expansion of the civilian economy.

In addition to such budgetary relief as might follow from a détente with the West, Khrushchev's apparent desire to avoid increasing the burden of Soviet military spending seems to have been directly related to three of the four arms controls achieved in 1963-1964. As we have seen, the limited test ban, the statement of intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, and the joint announcement of readiness to reduce fissionable

¹Khrushchev, "O mire i mirmom sosushchestvovanii," loc. cit.
²Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 2, 1964, 0600 GMT.
materials production reflected an interest in foreclosing new and costly developments in the arms race. Insofar as these measures succeeded in closing off the remaining major avenues of weapons development for East and West, their effect over time may give some satisfaction to the Soviet desire for relief from the economic burden.

4. The Internal Political Situation

While in recent years there had been a tendency on the part of Western observers to regard Khrushchev's position as unassailable, his abrupt removal suggested that significant independent political power resided in the institutions that he formally controlled. One can speculate on the possible parallel between the internal political struggle of 1954 and 1955, which led to Malenkov's downfall, and the circumstances in which Khrushchev operated in 1962-1964. As we have seen, both men were committed to unsuccessful domestic policies tending to stress light industry and some increase in consumer investment. But where Malenkov failed to secure the kind of détente that in his view the "new course" and the external political situation required, Khrushchev made some progress in the form of arms control agreements. Without stretching the point, the parallel might be kept in mind both in looking back for the sources of internal opposition to Khrushchev's foreign policy line and in attempting to calculate their effect on his ability to enter into agreements.

a. Possible Sources of Opposition to East-West Security Agreements. As we have pointed out, Khrushchev throughout this period seems to have been engaged in a running battle with the so-called "metal eaters"--the proponents of continued emphasis on investment in heavy industry--and the representatives of the armaments industry and possibly some of the military establishments as well. These groups were essentially technocratic and "statist" and, in the opinion of some, dominated the economy with the exception of agriculture.¹

In this connection it may be significant that the fall of Khrushchev was presaged by the publication in Pravda of a letter indicating that the Ministry of Finance had refused to comply with the decentralized planning decisions and the introduction of

profit-based accounting.\textsuperscript{1} Moreover, shortly before the appearance of Khrushchev's "new course" statement on October 2, 1964, the Soviet military press apparently expressed an opposing view.\textsuperscript{2}

Accordingly part of the military establishment, if the events of 1954 and 1955 are any indication of a characteristic attitude to a "new course" for the Soviet economy, may have combined in some manner with the technocrats before Khrushchev's removal in actively resisting his attempted modifications in domestic and foreign policy.

In opposing Khrushchev's economic moves the "statist" opposition as a whole may have sought to inhibit or restrain his accompanying efforts to establish a modus vivendi with the United States. In this they presumably reasoned that the greater the apparent reduction of the external "threat," the more easily the internal economic changes desired by Khrushchev could be effected. It may reasonably be assumed that Khrushchev's opponents believed significant shifts in Soviet resource allocation would institute the moral and physical disarmament of the Soviet Union in the face of what they perceived to be an essentially unchanged and aggressive United States.

In this context, it was not wholly surprising that the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, implicitly attacked the Khrushchevian theme that "sober-moderate" groups were emerging in the United States leadership and condemned proponents of "pacificism" and the "abstract negation of war" within the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{3}

These remarks were made at difficult moments for Khrushchev (February 1963 and 1964) when, as has been suggested, he was under strong pressure to desist in his moves to reduce allocations to defense.

\textsuperscript{1}Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 1964.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3}Speeches of February 22, 1963 (Pravda, February 23, 1963) and February 7, 1964 (Krasnaia zvezda, February 9, 1964). On the former occasion, Malinovsky emphasized that "time has taught the imperialists nothing," and warned: "It must not be naively supposed that the imperialists have laid down their arms. The events we are witnessing today show that not everyone has yet learned to assess soberly the balance of forces that has taken shape on the international scene. . . ."
In February 1963 Khrushchev seems also to have been engaged in a struggle with Frol Kozlov, a powerful figure in the party Presidium and Secretariat, who apparently tended to favor sustained investment in heavy industry. Kozlov's disappearance from the political scene in April 1963 due to a stroke may have assisted Khrushchev in moving for a test ban agreement. In February 1964 Khrushchev clearly acknowledged that he differed with members of the party on matters of foreign policy:

We must not deny the paramount importance of economic construction in the socialist countries and oppose it to the class struggle against imperialism. To do this is to confuse different concepts.

The implication seemed to be that certain party members regarded the foreign affairs corollaries of Khrushchev's economic program as contrary to correct foreign policies oriented to the struggle against "imperialism."

In view of the report that it was Suslov who delivered the main attack on Khrushchev in October 1964 we can guess that he was one of those who tended to oppose Khrushchev's line of conciliation and limited agreements with the United States. Quite apart from concern for the practical problems of Sino-Soviet and international Communist relations that continued to rise throughout the 1962-1964 period, Suslov was no doubt voicing a more widespread sentiment in the CPSU to the effect that Khrushchev's policies of elite manipulation were unpalatable. The fact that there is a tendency throughout the international Communist movement to view coexistence in a tactical and instrumental light underscores the likelihood that opposition

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1 Linden, loc. cit.


within the Soviet Communist Party may have been substantial where "permanent arms control agreements with the United States were concerned.

In addition to probable internal opposition to prolonged détente and Soviet fraternization with the adversary, resistance may also have been focused on Khrushchev’s efforts to restrain the "anti-imperialist" propaganda along with his use of tactics of "national liberation." The fact that the Bernal condemnation of United States underground testing after the partial test ban was transmitted and then rescinded further indicates the existence of differences of opinion, since Bernal could hardly issue and then broadcast such a statement on his own initiative. Similarly the tendency—perhaps most clearly associated with Mikoyan— to emphasize Soviet arms shipments to new states and to assert that Soviet general disarmament proposals would not disarm the new states, suggests that continuing concern existed within Soviet leadership over the issue of armed national-liberation (although Mikoyan could well have been attempting to cover the left flank against Chinese criticism). Reported Soviet arms shipments to Congolese rebels after Khrushchev’s removal, also strongly implied the existence of internal opposition to his relative restraint on the national liberation issue.

Above all, opposition to Khrushchev’s approach to East-West relations must be interpreted in terms of relations with China and the connected problem of the erosion of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and over the nonruling parties. It was crystal clear that energetic pursuit of the Khrushchev line on coexistence and arms agreements served to sustain Sino-Soviet antagonisms, to create conditions favoring the further disintegration of Soviet influence in the bloc, and to aggravate the divisions within the international movement. Given Khrushchev’s apparent inability to cope with these problems in 1963-1964, it would hardly have been surprising for some Soviet state and party officials to have altered their attitudes from preferring a détente that was at best left unconsolidated, toward definite resistance to arms control agreements.

1 See, for example, speeches of March 14, 1962 and July 2, 1964; TASS in English to Europe, March 14, 1962, 1957 GMT, and Pravda, July 3, 1964.
b. The Influence on Policy of Internal Differences. In the light of the potential forms of opposition to Khrushchev, the continued publication in 1962-1964 of archival materials on the 1922 Soviet disarmament and peace proposals at Genoa seems to have reflected an effort on Khrushchev's part to legitimize and broaden consensus for his innovations in relations with the West. In March and April 1962 those who were less well informed about the nature of the Genoa documents were asked to accept them as evidence of literal commitment on Lenin's part to the pursuit of disarmament agreements and the kind of coexistence being sought by Khrushchev. This was at a time when Khrushchev seemed to be attacking Kozlov's base in Leningrad by associating himself personally with an effort to unseat Spiridinov (one of Kozlov's associates) from the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The success of this move in April, accompanied by the return of Kiri-lenko to the Presidium, may have eventually given Khrushchev sufficient influence to take steps on the test ban and possibly on the spread of nuclear weapons in August and September 1962, while at the same time preparing the Cuban missile venture. The November reform of the party also seemed to mark a further advance for Khrushchev.

However, this progress was apparently not made without loss of political bargaining power. Although Khrushchev retained some latitude in foreign policy, criticisms of anti-Stalinism appeared early in November; the November plenum emphasized the priority of heavy industry; and Khrushchev himself led a new assault on freedom in literature and the arts. By March 1963 Khrushchev had announced that advances in consumer goods production were to be postponed in favor of defense and heavy industry, the establishment of the VSNKh had centralized some of the organizational advances of the November 1962 party reform, and the internal climate seemed generally less favorable for East-West arms control agreements. Nonetheless private talks on a test ban continued, an agreement on satellite cooperation was signed with the United States on March 20, and on April 5 the proposal for a direct communication link with Washington was accepted in principle.

In April 1963 the internal political picture apparently improved for Khrushchev and with it the prospects for arms control agreement. On April 8 Pravda in a routine advance printing of the May Day slogans failed to note that Yugoslavia was "building socialism." Shortly afterwards Kozlov disappeared from public

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1Linden, loc. cit.
view, reportedly due to illness, and on April 11 Pravda set the May Day slogans right. The implied reassertion of the moderate line in foreign affairs was soon followed by Khrushchev's criticism of what had in effect been Kozlov's demand for increased investment in heavy machine building equipment.

Further, Ponomorev, normally associated with a conservative line on foreign affairs owing to his primary concern for international communism, on the Lenin Anniversary called for "sensible agreements" with the moderate Westerners. In May a further agreement was signed with the United States (on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy), and in June a further strengthening of Khrushchev's position was reflected in the appointment of Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Khrushchev seemed to have sufficient leverage to rebuff the Chinese and to enter into the test ban agreement with the United States. It is to be noted, however, that he preferred to avoid concessions on inspection.

With the signing of the test ban Khrushchev proposed several partial measures that he considered susceptible to East-West agreement.2 From the internal standpoint he probably stood to gain from any one of them since all were essentially political undertakings without direct impact on Soviet force levels. Most attractive would have been a nonaggression pact or a military budget freeze. The latter would presumably have given Khrushchev some support in the internal political struggle, and the former, by strengthening the détente, might have had a favorable effect on his domestic economic policies. As it was, however, Khrushchev emerged with an understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, which could have helped Khrushchev directly only in restraining those who favored offensive Soviet military use of space.

In the meanwhile Sino-Soviet relations had continued to deteriorate, and the Soviet harvest had proven catastrophic.

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2As indicated, these included a nonaggression pact; a freeze on military budgets; measures to prevent surprise attack; a cut in foreign troops stationed in both Germanies; and an exchange of troop representatives among the foreign forces in both Germanies. It is noteworthy that at the ENDC in August the Soviet negotiator tied the control post proposal to progress on other measures.
Thus as Khrushchev began to move in October 1963 for a conference of the Communist parties, the balance of internal political forces may have begun once again to swing against Khrushchev. Although the effort to convene a conference soon ended in failure, Khrushchev's line on the chemical industry and agriculture was emphasized in December, when he announced a cut in the military budget and a possible Soviet force reduction.

By 1964 Khrushchev was speaking of East-West arms control agreements in terms of "the policy of mutual example." This approach may have been in deference to what he considered to be President Johnson's political position, but it also suggested certain restraints on Khrushchev's ability to enter into formal agreements. No doubt those responsible for the Soviet armaments industry, some of the military and the advocates of the primacy of heavy industry had to some degree been alienated by the budgetary cut and by Khrushchev's accompanying demand for substantially increased investment in chemicals. The party conservatives may have become concerned by Peking's aggravation of the Sino-Soviet differences to the point of border disturbances and by Khrushchev's failure to cope successfully with the situation. Those responsible for agriculture were doubtless perturbed by the disastrous harvest of 1963. Thus, by the time of the February 1964 plenum and the renewed commitment of the CPSU to an international Communist conference of excommunication, Khrushchev was again pleading for resources for light industry and agriculture and for a foreign policy line of conciliation toward the West.

In these circumstances Khrushchev's decision to proceed with publication of the Genoa materials, his participation in the joint announcement of intent to reduce fissionable materials production, and his intensified commitment to consumer welfare at home, suggested that by April 1964 he may already have been proceeding toward political isolation. Even if Kuusinen had not died in May, depriving Khrushchev of needed support in both Presidium and Secretariat, it seems doubtful that Khrushchev could have surmounted both his internal opponents and the sharpening external pressure from China and entered into major arms control agreements with the West.

In view of the many constant factors in the international and Soviet domestic scenes one should not expect Khrushchev's removal to mean the wholesale repudiation of his policies. What

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might be expected, however, is the pursuit of a somewhat more contradictory set of external policies. Where Khrushchev seemed to seek the conciliation of the West even at the expense of other policies, the new regime may seek a détente to conciliate the West while taking a stronger "anti-imperialist" line in relations with the rest of the world. For reasons that have already been considered, this would be an essentially unworkable policy, and when Moscow pursues unworkable policies one may expect to find continued internal differences within the Soviet leadership.

D. The Soviet Interest in Agreements and Détente

In surveying the Soviet approach toward arms control and disarmament in the 1962-1964 period, it is evident that Soviet policy entered a new "round" of efforts to relax East-West tension and to see whether the United States and the Soviet Union could establish a less dangerous modus vivendi. The evidence we have been able to assemble leads to several broad conclusions about Soviet policy during this period: (1) that Khrushchev and his associates may have had a qualified interest in agreements over and above those that were reached in 1963 and 1964; (2) that they showed signs of interest in arms control agreements even prior to the Cuban venture; and (3) that they were possibly, although not certainly, interested in a long-term attenuation of the conflict with the United States. Although from the vantage point of the last months of 1964 the most recent "round" does not appear to have been terminated, Khrushchev's removal suggests that the Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament throughout the 1962-1964 period was shaped by a contradictory process in which the factors that moved Moscow in the direction of détente and limited arms control agreements with the United States were opposed by factors representing a line Soviet policy could not cross.

Of the factors we analysed, next to the fluctuation of internal differences on foreign policy, the Soviet perception of the adverse military balance and what to do about it seems to have been the most important factor conditioning the conduct of the Soviet leadership in 1962-1964. When it came time to translate the implications of the strategic balance into foreign policy, however, the military factor could not be divorced from the economic determinants of Soviet behavior and the limitations that they imposed on Soviet choices. Thus, while considering the strategic balance to be of fundamental importance in determining Soviet conduct on the arms control and disarmament issue, it was
only slightly more significant than the economic factor. Next we would rank the political opportunities and constraints that the West placed before Moscow, and finally the political and potential military pressures that China mobilized against Khrushchev.

The desire to achieve short-term political gains from a manipulation of the international atmosphere apparently did not predominate in the Soviet pursuit of a détente and of limited arms control agreements during Khrushchev's last two years in the Kremlin, and Soviet policy toward arms control in this period may have been based more firmly on enduring national interests than were the previous, possibly "tactical," Soviet attempts to achieve a détente in 1955 and in 1959-1960. The precise extent to which Soviet policy in 1962-1964 was based on long-lived and less escapable conditioning factors, however, was a function of the distribution of power within the Soviet leadership, which in turn was influenced by the other conditioning factors we have mentioned. Khrushchev, for instance, presumably found it more difficult to deal with internal resistance to his domestic economic policies and to his interest in further limited arms control agreements with the United States after the partial test ban treaty, when the failure of the Soviet harvest in 1963 was forcing him simultaneously to negotiate an enormous purchase of wheat from the chief adversary. Under such circumstances the internal opposition to Khrushchev's policy line may have had some success in advancing alternative policies. In view of the close interaction of the various groups of factors on Soviet decision-making, our comments on internal differences on foreign policy and on the relative weighting of the factors as a whole follow a consideration of the other sets of factors that influenced Soviet choices.

By mid-1962 the Soviet leaders were confronted with the prospect of virtually permanent strategic inferiority and of a faltering Soviet growth rate that seemed to require some form of reallocation of resource priorities to the detriment of heavy industry and defense. Here were two problems of long-term significance that Soviet investment and output could not simultaneously resolve, and that may have given the Soviet interest in an East-West détente a long-lasting character. These factors were accompanied by strong political pressure from the Chinese; the advent of a United States administration that was possibly more interested than its predecessors in seeking out new and more stable relations with Moscow; and a growing disunity among the NATO powers.
Basically there were three alternatives for Soviet policy as a result of these factors. Moscow could seek to rectify the military balance by entering into a costly arms race with a wealthier opponent, which would require problems of Soviet economic growth to be given second place, and a more antagonistic Soviet posture toward the West in order to justify domestic sacrifice, which in turn would serve to blunt Chinese hostility if not to reduce it altogether. Alternatively, Moscow could seek to alter the political character of the strategic confrontation so as to mitigate the Western military advantage. The effort to achieve a détente and possible limited agreements to consolidate the reduction of the threat from the West would presumably in turn strengthen the resolve of the Kennedy administration to reciprocate in seeking new East-West relations; it would, however, involve a repudiation of the Soviet association with the Chinese Communists, and thus to some extent a repudiation of "conservative" communism in Soviet domestic and foreign policy generally.

Finally, Moscow could seek to circumvent the problem of Soviet strategic and economic deficiencies by attempting to gain an immediate increment in Soviet strategic power by the redeployment of existing forces. If successful, the internal pressure for sustained levels of Soviet military expenditures would presumably slacken and thereby allow some redirection of resources to lagging sectors of the Soviet economy, particularly agriculture; in relations with the West, however, restraint would have been recommended in view of the detrimental effect on the Soviet economy of the reinforced United States commitment to the arms race that might be expected to follow. Thus while a sudden shift in the military balance in Moscow's favor could be expected to blunt "conservative" criticism at home and from the Chinese, Moscow would have had strong interests not to proceed to a new bout of cold war, possibly focusing on Berlin, but to negotiate and possibly make significant concessions in a settlement of East-West problems.

In Cuba the Soviet leaders sought the third alternative. With the test ban and the accompanying East-West security agreements Khrushchev pursued the second alternative. And with Khrushchev's removal the Soviet leaders seemed to shift slightly in the direction favored by the proponents of the first alternative, although how far and with what constancy remains to be seen.

The failure in Cuba underscored the improbability of either offsetting United States strategic superiority or gaining political advantage of that sort from Soviet military strength. Cuba may thus have legitimized some of the pressure Khrushchev exerted
for reallocation of Soviet resources away from defense. At the same time the rise in United States missile strength in 1961 and 1962 and the advertisement of the military balance by the Kennedy administration served to emphasize the depressing effects of Soviet military and economic weakness on a continued foreign policy offensive. The failure in Cuba moreover sharpened the significance of opportunities offered by the political situation in the West. The psychological impact of the Cuban confrontation seemed to favor a positive American response to a Soviet endeavor to stabilize East-West relations so as to avoid similar clashes in the future. Similarly the growth of centrifugal tendencies within NATO, in part the result of Khrushchev's efforts over the years to reduce the appearance of a blatant Soviet "threat" to the West, rose in importance in the Soviet perspective after Cuba, conditioning Soviet policy to the pursuit of a relatively deep East-West détente that would allow full play to the disagreements among the various Soviet adversaries in the West.

From Khrushchev's point of view, seeking relief from both strategic adversity and economic scarcity, Soviet interest in a détente might have been relatively enduring. For only over time could a relaxation of East-West tensions blunt the threatening edge of Western strategic superiority. Only over time could a stabilization and possibly then a mutual reduction of military budgets be promoted in the hope of gradually achieving a measure of reallocation of Soviet resources to the chemical and light industries generally.

Apart from an interest in a détente, however, military, economic, and foreign political factors may also have inclined Khrushchev toward specific and limited East-West security agreements. Apart from seeking to achieve a more profound détente by virtue of agreements, Khrushchev evidently had definite military and economic interests in limiting the further development of the arms race. Apart from the obstacles that the partial test ban agreement placed in the way of increases in the strategic capability of Soviet adversaries in West Germany and China, its effect, together with the other Soviet-American agreements of the period, was to suggest a reciprocated interest in cutting off very expensive developments in the arms race, both defensively in the case of the antimissile missile, and offensively in prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons in space. In view of the relatively limited prospects for the future development of the arms race, the limited agreements that were reached in 1963 and 1964 presumably reflected a Soviet interest both in a gradual reduction of military budgets and in maintaining an international political environment suitable
to this end. But from Khrushchev's point of view the few partial measures that were achieved probably represented the maximum that was politically possible in the way of East-West agreements during the 1962-1964 period, despite the pressure on him to produce results once he had made the option for a turn to the West.

Turning now to consider the internal differences over foreign policy, it is clear that the declining Soviet growth rate, Khrushchev's inability to cope with the agricultural problem, and particularly the 1963 harvest must have stiffened internal opposition to his foreign policy line within the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's opposition, insofar as it was readily definable—we may cite the party and state officials concerned with heavy industry, elements of the Soviet military establishment, the arms industry, and senior party members concerned with ideological affairs—presumably tended to feel uncomfortable in a détente and to resist or inhibit policies to prolong it, inclining specially against East-West agreements. These groups and individuals evidently resisted Soviet concessions to reduce the external "threat" from the West as assisting the realization of Khrushchev's resource reallocation programs; they may have found the restraints and compromises involved in Khrushchev's policies of elite manipulation unpalatable, and they objected to a prolonged East-West détente and Soviet fraternization with the chief adversary. International inspection would be very difficult for them to tolerate. They probably considered East-West arms control agreements inappropriate because of their aggravating effect on Sino-Soviet relations and on Soviet efforts to cope with dissidence in Eastern Europe and with differences within international communism more broadly. These groups were presumably relatively receptive both to the Chinese attacks on Khrushchev personally and to Chinese criticism of the domestic and foreign policy programs Khrushchev was pursuing.

In retrospect it seems that Khrushchev prevailed over this varied internal opposition to the extent of entering into the test ban agreement and in rebuffing the Chinese in the negotiations that took place in Moscow at the same time. Khrushchev may have gained this latitude by the sudden illness of Kozlov in April, following rectification of the May Day slogans referred to above. By October 1963, however, Khrushchev seems to have consumed a good deal of the political capital he had gained in April. Internal opposition to his foreign policy line may have mounted following the rapprochement with the United States, the sharp increase in the bitterness of Sino-Soviet relations following the test ban, and Khrushchev's inability to cope with the Chinese by means of a conference on their excommunication that he sought to convene in September-November 1963.
By the end of the year the need to obtain wheat from the United States had compounded Khrushchev's problems to the extent that in February 1964 he seemed to be under severe pressure not to cut the Soviet military budget as he had begun to in December 1963, and therefore not to proceed with investment in the chemical industry and agriculture as he clearly desired. Nonetheless Khrushchev evidently preserved sufficient strength to enter into the reciprocal cutback in fissionable materials production, this being his last major move in the arms control field before October 1964.

As the new regime has shown signs of seeking to resolve the conflict with China, we may assume that the internal distribution of forces within the Soviet leadership has hardened for the time being to exclude arms control agreements with the West, at least until efforts have been made to resolve the conflict with China. At the same time the economic, military, and foreign political factors in relations with the West will continue to influence the Soviet leaders in the direction of an accommodation with the West.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Decade in Retrospect

The ten years ending with the limited test ban agreement of 1963 and Khrushchev's ouster a year later constitute a distinctive chapter in the evolution of both Soviet foreign policy and Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament. The ascendency of Khrushchev by 1955 coincided with a number of epochal developments affecting the basic outlook of Soviet foreign policy: the end of the West's nuclear monopoly and the imminence of both the missile and space ages; accumulated Stalin-fatigue in the Soviet Union; a U.S. President devoted to creating a new "spirit" in East-West relations; new vacuums in the "third world"; and the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet rift. The composition of the United Nations was about to be irrevocably altered; and under the monolithic facade of international communism there were surging eddies of polycentrism that would swell into a current of rebellion against Soviet hegemony. But of all the forces creating an environment for wholesale changes in Soviet policy the most significant was the growing conviction on both sides that general thermonuclear war was not to be permitted.

These opportunities and problems in the international field registered a sharp impact upon Soviet foreign relations in general and on Soviet arms control policy in particular. For at least two years--1954 to late in 1956--the mood was one of rising expectations, of experimentation, and of optimism. The expectations derived primarily from the Kremlin's calculation that Moscow had achieved something like atomic parity with the West, and that with an all-out research and production effort on ICBM's the military balance would soon shift further to Soviet advantage. The willingness to experiment grew out of recognition of the danger of surprise nuclear attack, stimulating in turn an interest in measures that would prevent both central war and limited wars that could escalate, and measures that would avert nuclear proliferation. The optimism showed in Moscow's confidence that it could pursue a political and economic offensive aimed at expanding the "zone of peace" and contracting the capitalist camp while avoiding general war. In all this Moscow displayed little or no awareness of the rifts soon to arise within the Communist camp.

The whole tone of Soviet policy toward arms control and disarmament shifted in 1954-1956 along with the rest of Soviet foreign policy. The move was away from heavy-handed "exposure" tactics of
the Stalin era to the cultivation of a "reasonable" and conciliatory appearance in the style and substance of Soviet disarmament proposals and propaganda; toward accommodation with Western positions and the adoption of partial-measures approaches instead of the "ban the bomb" slogans of the late-Stalin period.

At a minimum it appeared that the shift in arms control policy was aimed at undermining the West's will and ability to maintain its defenses. But the increased feasibility and realism in Soviet policy suggested there might also be a qualified but growing Soviet interest in enacting certain measures that might reduce the danger of surprise attack, impede German rearmament, and freeze research and development of nuclear weapons at a moment favorable to the Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1960, even after the world began to talk of a "missile gap" in Moscow's favor, the manifest Soviet interest in various partial measures, particularly a cessation or ban on nuclear testing, continued.

1955 was a time when multiple opportunities seemed to be opening up for influencing events to conform to the revised desires and expectations of Soviet leaders. But even by 1956 the limits to their prospects were beginning to appear. By 1959 a sense of reality was returning and, as the decade matured, a protracted morning-after set in. 1955 may have marked a sharp decline in the paranoia so long characteristic of the Soviet outlook; but it left a dualism in that outlook that bordered on the schizoid.

The reasons were several. One was that by the very nature of the situation the desires and expectations of the Soviet leaders were essentially contradictory, and each had the effect of setting in action a countervailing force. Even in inner Soviet reasoning one senses internal tensions. For every reasonable measure of agreement with the adversary to warm up the atmosphere, save money, or forfend the threat of later annihilation there was always a new argument against appearing weak, or a danger on a new flank, a new difficulty raised by the enemy, or a new temptation to exploit.

From 1954 to 1961 the Soviet Union thus endeavored to relax tensions with the West even while seeking to bury it by economic and political competition. It tried to keep China within the Soviet fold even while refusing it nuclear weapons and on occasion restraining Peking's military and foreign policy. It endeavored to avoid a showdown with either Washington or Peking while maintaining and increasing Soviet influence to the east and to the west and to the south as well. Détente with the West was the logical policy expression of the renewed "peaceful coexistence" doctrine, implying
"struggle" short of major war while the zone of Communist influence expanded. But détente contributed to erosion of the leading strings from Moscow to the satellite capitals both in the east and west. Agreements that controlled China's force levels or inhibited its capacity to test nuclear weapons were desirable from the standpoint of Russian national security; but disarmament propaganda had the effect of further alienating an increasingly militant Peking.

If in 1955 détente was paramount, the opening opportunity to leapfrog the northern tier of U.S. treaty states and penetrate into the African vacuum at the same point in time was close to being paramount. If in 1959 and 1960 the spirit of Camp David and the GCD line were highly functional to Soviet strategy, the chance to consolidate a new client state 90 miles off the coast of Florida was too good to miss. If in 1961 Moscow's touted missile lead proved to be by and large non-existent, nevertheless the exigencies of keeping East Germany in camp required the most serious risks to be run in Berlin that year.

Arms control policy had a greater or lesser role to play in all these operations, either neutralizing forces inimical to Moscow or in cultivating sentiment favorable to the Soviet government. Indeed, disarmament in some form may have been the logical policy expression of the new appreciation of the non-utility of general nuclear war. But it ran afoul of accumulated suspicion of the West, the tempting political uses of the threat of force, the powerful military factions in the Soviet Union, and the extraordinary functional difficulty in arriving at formulas that satisfied both the Western need for reassurance and the Soviet wish for secrecy. If in 1962 the more sophisticated Soviet leaders had marked, absorbed, and digested the contemporary American school of strategy featuring minimum deterrence and the arms control doctrine, the chance to drastically revise the strategic equation with an end-run via Cuba proved too tempting.

But the narrowing of alternatives open to the Soviets was not just a product of their own schizoid view of things. From 1956 to 1961 the bases of Soviet optimism were undermined one after another by events not of their own immediate making. First, the Polish uprisings and then the Hungarian revolution of 1956 shook the foundations both of the empire gathered by Stalin and of Moscow's leadership in international communism. Following these shocks came a more profound threat—ideological, political, and even military—from Peking, creating for Moscow even as early as 1957 the classic spectre of a two-front struggle. The Western front was proving unyielding in the face of Soviet pressure on Berlin, and the military and economic power of the West during the rest of the 1950's grew stronger and more integrated despite the autonomous course steered by Paris after 1958.
Undoubtedly Moscow marked well the new and potentially disastrous political fissures opening in NATO as the 60's began. But the overriding reality was that by 1960 Washington was about to reverse such missile gap as there may have been and this at a time when a downturn in the Soviet economy made the relative weight of military expenditures more onerous. Finally, the attempted leap into the "third world" had reaped little fruit: the emerging nations appeared as little susceptible to Soviet as to Western influence. As for arms control and disarmament, failure of the 1955 approach, Western disinterest in disengagement, and the start of the ICBM and space races all reinforced the growing sense of the unreality of the debate, culminating in Khrushchev's 1959-1960 initiative in proposing sweeping general disarmament. The 1958 technical talks and the moratorium on testing seemed vastly overshadowed.

By 1961 and 1962 the Soviet government thus seemed to be faced with some new choices to make. Given its narrowing alternatives, what policy course could it realistically pursue? Could it seek accommodation with both Peking and the West? Should it concentrate on internal or external development? And what arms control measures, if any, remained relevant to its still-changing strategic and political circumstances? The 1961 joint principles statement represented surprising consensus. But other pressures within the Kremlin seemed to militate for short-cuts to redressing the strategic balance vis-à-vis the West, first by the testing of a 61-megaton bomb in 1961 and then by the Cuban missile gamble in 1962. It must have seemed that only from a position of power would the problems on both eastern and western fronts prove more amenable to solution on Soviet terms. While Soviet diplomacy stalled for time, Moscow's apparent interest in partial disarmament measures seemed to decline as the Kremlin increasingly returned to the propaganda of general and complete disarmament.

The failure of the 1962 Cuban venture to yield an improved bargaining position for the Soviets again narrowed the alternatives but this time seemed to indicate with new clarity the desirability of at least a temporary accommodation with the West. This option was made the more feasible by Washington's apparent willingness to forego a more aggressive strategy designed to exploit the Soviet retreat; by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations; and by the economic difficulties that pressed hard on Russia in 1963.

In 1963 many of the essential conditions for serious Soviet interest in arms control agreements in fact came together. Moscow possessed a minimum deterrent braced with some 50-megaton bombs, but had no prospect of attaining superiority over the United States.
Washington indicated its willingness to collaborate with Moscow to keep the peace and control the arms race. No rapprochement seemed possible with China. A success for "peaceful coexistence" could help Khrushchev internally. Economic incentives were strong to lower defense spending by such moves as a ban on nuclear testing, keeping the arms race from outer space, and slowing the production of fissionable materials.

The Khrushchev decade had begun with Moscow confident that it was riding a tide of history and would soon vanquish capitalism in political and economic competition. It ended with Moscow apparently pleased just to stabilize the military-political situation with the West and cut losses within the international Communist movement, accepting, at least up to Khrushchev's removal, the consequences of the defection of China.

B. Soviet Interest in Arms Control

To draw specific conclusions regarding Soviet interests in arms control during the Khrushchev decade, we have to return to the assumptions with which we began this analysis. With those assumptions as a starting point, we analyzed in depth several forces that we felt underlay Soviet interests in arms control. Broadly speaking, we looked at the changes over time in the strategic-military situation, in the external political outlook, and in the economic and the internal leadership situations. Our findings center chiefly on these factors and their interaction as determinants of Soviet interest—or disinterest—in arms control measures in the decade under study.

A few explanatory words should be said about these factors and the relationship between them. Although we have treated them in similar fashion, and even have ventured to rank-order them in accordance with our estimate of their relative saliency as determinants, they are not in fact completely comparable. The first three factors—military, external political, and economic—represent both objective situations with which Soviet leaders must deal and policy goals for which arms controls might be instrumental or functional as appropriate means. This pertains particularly clearly to the first and second factors.

The desire for military security represents a constant and fixed goal of the Soviet Union; Soviet policy must adapt to and try to influence the military-strategic balance that prevails at any given time. It seems apparent to us that arms control and disarmament measures take their primary meaning from the way in which they serve the security goal by altering the military situation.
Apart from their value in serving the political end of detente in foreign policy, the changes in Soviet arms control policies in 1954-1956 appeared to constitute the beginnings of a trend toward greater feasibility and realism and, more basically, of an awareness that adversaries could share a common interest in limiting their military competition and containing possible military confrontations. Thus it is our judgment that of the several determinants the military-strategic factor stands out as the primary force accounting for continuity and change in Soviet arms control interests during the Khrushchev decade.

The second factor likewise represents a fundamental objective of Soviet policy: the manipulation of the external political environment to serve the broad ends of Soviet strategy. Arms control policy in the period was a flexible means of attaining political objectives, whether through propaganda that would psychologically disarm others or through measures to improve Soviet political prospects by actually affecting the military dispositions of others. Arms control and disarmament policy was in the period a potent support for the strategy of détente vis-à-vis the West; there disarmament was presented as a way of ensuring peace and prosperity. To the Communist world it was justified in these terms and also as the best means of advancing the cause of revolution—but by peaceful means. Soviet arms control and disarmament policies were thus aimed at inhibiting the arms race, controlling international tension, preventing Western unity, dealing with the mounting challenge from China, and winning support for Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and in the underdeveloped countries.

The economic factor enjoys a more distant but still functional relationship with arms control policy. Significant arms reductions can obviously have a direct feedback effect upon the domestic economy. But for the period in question we would rate as considerably lower in importance than the other factors any incentive that may have been supplied for serious arms controls by the slowly mounting drag of military expenditures upon the Soviet economy. The economic situation may be said to have probably constituted a marginal incentive to détente and arms control, especially after 1961. We have made the point that the notion of Soviet defense costs as 'burdensome' requires correction to account for the totalitarian ability to mobilize, force sacrifices, and suppress demand.

The fourth factor, that of political struggles among the Soviet leadership, is of a different order. The first three factors are normally treated as though they represented an objective reality somehow independent of the perceptions of the Soviet leaders. This would be a valid approach if one could assume that
the leaders all perceived reality in the same way. But since the Soviet elite has in the past decade demonstrably not been monolithic in its view of things, the operation of the other factors must be qualified by a specific examination of the internal political controversies in the USSR. The internal power struggle has therefore to be considered as a separate influence on arms control policies even though from a purely logical standpoint it is not parallel with the other factors considered. We believe that the manner in which the contending Soviet elites perceived the world situation and attempted to act upon it on occasion exerted a strong influence upon the specific arms control policies followed.

One more thing must be said about the four factors and the way in which we have treated them. For the period under review—1954-1964—we believe these four make sense as determinants of Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament measures. It might even be inferred from our analysis that one could predict the future course of Soviet arms control policy by analyzing the particular configuration of determinants in 1954-1964 under the assumption that a similar constellation of factors at a future time might produce comparable results in terms of Soviet interest in certain types of arms control or disarmament. That may be true. But the warning is self-evident: the way these particular factors interacted in this period will not necessarily recur.

With these caveats in mind as well as our summary rank-ordering of the factors operative in 1954-1964, we now proceed to more detailed conclusions about their significance for Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament.

1. The Strategic Situation

Of the four main factors we have studied, the military-strategic factor best accounts for both the stability and the fluctuations in Soviet policy toward arms control. Moscow's deep concern to avoid central war and its acquisition of a credible minimum deterrent generally account for the fixed elements among Soviet interests and policies on arms control, while the changing balance between Soviet and U.S. strategic forces appears to have been the key factor in inducing the shifts in Soviet arms control policies throughout the decade.

Two factors of the kind the Soviets like to call "permanently operating" shaped Moscow's evaluation of the changing military balance: the recognition of the potential destruction nuclear war could inflict; and Soviet acquisition of an effective minimum
deterrent to create a functioning balance of terror—mutual deterrence. Neither of these strategic constants operated in Stalin's time. Both were characteristic of a new realism in Soviet strategic thinking, a coming to grips with the restraints as well as the opportunities of the atomic age. This realism spilled over into Soviet arms control thinking as well, most significantly in the realization that in certain circumstances security might be served by limited agreements with the adversary over and above propaganda alone. Some of the purely military elements in the picture were these:

a. The Disutility of War. The first of these two factors to become constants in the Kremlin's outlook was the belated recognition in 1954-1956, in Soviet military thought, of the decisive role that surprise nuclear attack could play in modern war. Despite occasional bravura assertions that only capitalism would perish in a nuclear exchange, Soviet political thinking also acknowledged an awareness that central war under modern conditions would destroy Communist as well as capitalist society. Since a nuclear first-strike could be decisive to the whole course of the war and not just to a single operation, it behooved Kremlin policy to make greater efforts to control the military-political environment so that the West did not attack the Soviet Union on grounds either that it was weak or that it was soon to overtake and bury the capitalist system. It therefore served Soviet interests to pursue a political-military line that both lowered manifest danger to the West and raised the threat of crushing retribution. The first aim could be partially effected by a reasonable posture in arms control negotiations, while the second led Moscow to maintain an impressive military machine, which the Kremlin warned could pre-empt Western plans for aggression.

As for limited war, the Soviet government appeared genuinely concerned that such a war might escalate or that another power such as Germany or China might by catalytic action involve the great powers in a direct confrontation. It thus may not have wished to give carte blanche in the Formosa Strait, and declared Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1959. Such concerns seem in part to have underlain a whole series of Soviet arms control proposals, from ground control posts to symbolic acts such as a nonaggression pact or a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In part but not entirely for propaganda purposes, Soviet theory also belittled the chances of containing a war fought with "tactical" nuclear weapons. (The political motivations for all these moves are discussed below).
Throughout the decade Soviet policy makers generally sought to avoid or at least keep under control conflicts that could lead to war. Soviet interests were to be promoted primarily by political and economic competition, thereby making a virtue of the necessity of avoiding war. While Moscow occasionally showed its big stick, it tended to speak softly. At times the Kremlin dealt out threats and ultimata, but only in Berlin and Cuba in 1961 and 1962 did Moscow approach the brink—and then only when desperate to redress its diminishing bargaining power, and in the process evidently making a serious miscalculation of the probable U.S. response under President Kennedy. In order to avoid great power confrontations Moscow tended to limit its actual support to national liberation movements far below the level suggested by its propaganda. The objective of controlling East-West tensions to avoid war was served generally by the very existence of arms control negotiations. More specifically, it was served by cultivating personal contacts with Western leaders and—eventually—by a direct communications link with Washington.

b. Mutual Deterrence. A second "permanently operating" factor in Moscow's strategic outlook was the confidence that the Soviet state, for the first time since 1917, possessed the means decisively to deter attack upon it. The potential destruction that could be wrought by surprise nuclear attack had changed the "laws of war," but the equally striking fact was that in 1953-1955 the Soviet Union developed hydrogen as well as nuclear bombs plus the means to deliver them to Europe, to SAC bases around Russia, and at least on one-way missions—to the United States itself. Throughout the decade the actual number of U.S. bombers and ICBM's capable of striking the Soviet Union far outnumbered the Russian strategic delivery vehicles that could reach the United States, but the Soviet government possessed a credible minimum deterrent from about 1954, the magnitude of which was vastly exaggerated in the Western and Soviet press at least until 1961. Further, a very large number of Soviet medium-range bombers and, later, missiles held Western Europe hostage. Not by accident the concept "deterrence" is rendered in Russian as "terrorization." Soviet confidence that the West did not plan or want war was reinforced by personal contacts with Western leaders and visits to Western countries.

Feeling relatively secure against calculated attack by a nuclear power, and basking in the bright haze of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" legends, the Soviet government shed much of the paranoia of Stalinist times. At the least Moscow's new deterrent allayed long-standing fears arising from Russian vulnerability. But it also raised Moscow's political strategy to a new level of
importance because there was now a diminished belief that the West would respond to Moscow's political-economic offensive by military intervention—at least not by attack upon Soviet territory.

Depending on how "minimum" the Soviet deterrent appeared to the West, the Kremlin could also press for political concessions. Furthermore in disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union could consider dispensing with arms—present or potential—not considered essential to preserve the Soviet minimum deterrent, provided of course that the West reciprocated or had already eliminated such equipment. Moscow could now approach the negotiations with a **quid pro quo** to match Western concessions, in contrast to the wholly negative Soviet stance when confronted with the Baruch Plan in 1946. Finally, Moscow's realization that both sides acknowledged an effective balance of terror helped Khrushchev to revise Lenin's 1916 dictum that disarmament was neither possible nor desirable so long as capitalism endured; peaceful coexistence was now dictated by "life itself."

c. The Strategic Balance. Interacting with the Kremlin's acknowledgment of mutual deterrence in East-West relations, the changing nature of the military balance precipitated certain specific Soviet interests in achieving some concrete forms of arms control. We judge that the Kremlin's interest in achieving such measures was relatively high from 1955 to 1960, low from 1960 to 1962, and highest in 1962-1964. In the first period the seemingly high Soviet interest in arms control appears to have been based upon an expectation of significant improved relative strength and the bargaining power this would carry with it **vis-à-vis** the West. The low point occurred when Moscow's military and political advantages were being rapidly undermined and the Kremlin leadership sought by desperate measures to regain them. But when after the Cuban debacle Moscow had resigned itself for the time being to reliance on a minimum deterrent much smaller than U.S. strategic might, the Soviet interest in arms control measures reached a high point in the decade under study.

Closer analysis of this pattern reveals more concretely the strategic rationale behind Soviet interests at different times. From 1954 to 1960 Soviet strategic expectations were high, even though the United States far outnumbered the Soviet Union in strategic delivery vehicles—mainly bombers. It appears that for a time in late 1959 and early 1960 Moscow may have had a slight lead in the number of ICBM's on launchers. In any event the Soviet Union was far ahead of the United States from 1957 through 1964 in the development of powerful boosters capable of shooting large payloads into space. The Kremlin obviously intended to exploit this situation in political bargaining; but
Soviet interest was also evidenced in advocacy of the kinds of arms controls its diplomacy championed from 1955 to 1960—reductions of conventional forces and a nuclear test ban. Given secondary attention but nonetheless reflective of strategic interests were measures regarding bases and calling for disengagement in Central Europe.

The first step in implementing that strategic interest was reduction in conventional forces. A large infantry was no longer necessary to hold Europe hostage, and Soviet armed forces were unilaterally cut from over 5 million to just over 3 million men from 1955 to 1961. The Soviet bases in Austria, Porkkala-Udd, and Port Arthur were eliminated in 1955. By 1960 Khrushchev went further: he talked of the obsolescence of surface naval vessels and bombers as well as of large ground forces and pointed to the economies their reduction would allow while at the same time Soviet fire-power actually increased due to nuclear technology. Soviet official statements in 1956 and 1960 also noted the economy's need for the manpower resources resulting from demobilization. In 1960 a fifth branch of the armed forces was formed—the Strategic Rocket Forces. Khrushchev's "atomic fetishism," as the Chinese called it, was only partially checked by the influence of more conservative marshals who insisted that "balanced" forces be maintained, armed of course with the latest weapons.

From 1955 to 1960 Moscow often called on the West to reciprocate in the reduction of armed forces (and the elimination of foreign bases), and Soviet disarmament proposals stressed such measures. The point most stressed by Soviet propaganda about Moscow's May 10, 1955 proposal was its endorsement of Western-proposed force levels of 1 to 1.5 million men for the United States, Soviet Union, and China. Such a measure would have forced greater reductions upon Moscow than upon Washington, but it would have effectively forced U.S. troops to withdraw to a "Fortress America" by the end of 1957. (Complete nuclear disarmament was to begin in mid-1957 and be completed at the end of the year.)

In the same vein, perhaps because of Moscow's imminent space triumphs, the Soviet proposals of March 27, 1956 dealt exclusively with conventional force reductions, plus the banning of hydrogen bomb tests (just before London planned its first tests) and the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Beginning at the 1955 Summit Conference Moscow also espoused a ceiling of 200,000 men for states other than the big five—a move clearly aimed at thwarting plans for a German Bundeswehr of 500,000 men.
The second principal arms control measure flowing directly from Soviet strategic interests was to halt nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons. By the time Moscow completed its March 1958 test series the Kremlin seems to have concluded that a moratorium on further testing would help to keep what it considered to be its lead in strategic rocketry and prevent refinement of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Since the Soviet Union could shoot larger payloads into space, Moscow was concerned to prevent warhead miniaturization by the United States. A test cessation would also slow the development of small, "clean," mobile bombs for use in limited war. So long as this strategic situation prevailed it was in Moscow's interest to accept a test ban that had these desired effects provided excessive international inspection on Soviet territory were not required.

As to the third set of measures reflecting strategic interests, Moscow endeavored also to keep U.S. weapons from being stationed in other countries and to prevent nuclear spread, especially to Germany and China. In 1955 and 1956, while SAC bases were still a vivid threat to Soviet security, Moscow advocated control posts in air fields and other designated locations, but—in this pre-Sputnik period—said nothing about missile launchers. And the Soviet concern to reduce the general danger of war, economize on conventional forces, drive the United States out of Europe, prevent German rearmament, and capitalize on Soviet medium-range and long-range rockets was reflected by Moscow's almost constant advocacy of disengagement and the denuclearization of Central Europe together with inspection and ground control posts.

The threat posed by China to Soviet strategic interests seems to have been of special concern to Moscow. In the short run China might involve Russia in a war with the West or, at the least, underwrite Soviet efforts for détente, as in 1958-1959. In the long run there was the possibility of territorial disputes and, more important, the prospect of great conventional and nuclear Chinese military power. Moscow tried to keep Peking militarily dependent upon a Soviet nuclear shield based in the Soviet Union and from 1957 to 1959 placated Chinese nuclear aspirations by some kinds of long-term aid in developing a new defense technology.

In June 1959, according to Chinese sources, Moscow flatly refused to provide a sample atomic bomb or technical data required to produce one. Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Moscow's espousal of peaceful coexistence as the highest form of international class struggle were both aimed in part, although with little prospect of success, at inhibiting
China's military pretensions. There is reason to speculate, but as yet no firm evidence that—as charged by Peking—Khrushchev may have sought in 1962 or 1963 to impose with the West a nonproliferation agreement upon China. France's acquisition of a nuclear capability seemed less threatening and more inevitable, but Moscow did what it could to promote nuclear-free zones where France planned to test.

By 1961 most of the bases for the optimistic calculations that underlay the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1955 had been undermined or proved illusory. The salient strategic factor was that while Moscow still possessed a credible minimum deterrent, its political bargaining position was seriously eroded by a sharp and mounting U.S. lead in the production of ICBM's, a lead that was publicized as establishing a real missile gap but this time in Russia's disfavor. The Soviet response could have been to negotiate more earnestly on arms control in order to check the U.S. lead; but Moscow opted instead to kill the test ban talks by trying to link them with GCD, and to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. If the Soviet Union could not produce more missiles than the United States, it chose to test larger warheads than Washington considered a sound military investment. Regardless of military utility, the up to 61-megaton tests were fully exploited by Moscow to terrorize public opinion and in this way to add to the power base on which Soviet diplomacy rested.

After Moscow's tests had been completed, a year of drift and ambivalence in Soviet foreign policy ensued, a year in which the Kremlin appeared unsure whether to strive again for a bold move to enhance its power position or for some accommodation with the West including agreements on arms control. Apparently content with the results of its own nuclear tests, the Kremlin moved in November 1961 and again in September 1962 to ban all nuclear tests with at least a moratorium on underground testing. But Moscow was willing to pay little for such a ban and rejected the principle of even limited on-site inspection until the winter of 1962. The lack of commitment to immediately feasible partial measures was manifested by Moscow's emphasis on GCD in the Eighteen Nation talks in 1962. The Soviet GCD program, however, was made increasingly realistic by a number of modifications, notably Gromyko's endorsement in September 1962 of the principle of retaining nuclear weapons in the disarming process.

But while Soviet disarmament policy stalled for time, the strategic imbalance tilted still more to Russia's disfavor, and the Kremlin decided on another bold move to improve its
psychological and strategic position against the West: the emplacement of missiles in Cuba, which ended in humiliating retreat.

The point of maximum arms control activity came after Cuba. The limited arms control agreements of 1963-1964--the hot line, the partial test ban, the ban on bombs in orbit, the pledge to slow fissionable material production--followed the Soviet failure dramatically to modify the strategic equation via the Caribbean, and all reflected a desire to freeze or at least slow down a race in armaments in which the West was rapidly outpacing the Soviet Union.

The hot line may in part have reflected Moscow's desire to reduce the danger of inadvertent war. Soviet leaders declared that if either side were to benefit from the test ban it would be the Soviet Union since it held the lead in testing huge warheads. Although the Soviet Union could not presently hope to match the United States in ICBM's, to freeze the number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side as Washington proposed early in 1964 would rule out all prospect of parity. What the Soviet Union could accept would be a reduction of forces on both sides toward a common level--the idea of a nuclear umbrella, which Moscow agreed in September 1963 be maintained until the very end of the process of general and complete disarmament. The idea of relying upon a minimum deterrent of the same size as Washington's had become increasingly attractive for Moscow in a world where the United States outproduced the Soviet Union and where Peking and the NATO allies threatened to obtain nuclear forces of their own. However, the interests of both sides would probably require that a minimum nuclear deterrent possessed by Moscow and Washington be accompanied by a nonproliferation agreement accepted by or imposed on the rest of the world.

Because of Moscow's interest in avoiding war and its confidence--at least in 1955-1959--in a "peaceful victory for communism," there may have been more than propaganda in its espousal of general and complete disarmament. In theory disarmament was an appropriate adjunct to the pursuit of the "peaceful offensive" under the changed "objective conditions." However, if implemented it would have deprived the Soviet Union of the extraordinary bargaining power it obtained from the political uses of nuclear weapons through threats, deterrence, and implied actions. Moreover serious disarmament might have had the effect of vitiating Communist élan in many countries.
In any case, there is little evidence that Moscow has regarded GCD as a feasible program actually to carry out in the foreseeable future. All that can be said about it is that with a nuclear umbrella sustained throughout the process some version of GCD, no matter how utopian it seems today, is no longer unthinkable in terms of Soviet security interests.

The major limitations to Soviet interest in arms control were, like the inducements, also military in nature. As long as Moscow enjoyed a lead in the research and development of rockets, the Soviet Union wanted to keep both its strengths and weaknesses veiled by military secrecy. Therefore it rejected aerial inspection except with heavy qualifications and turned down any other form of "inspection over armaments." Further, Soviet production of fissionable materials was behind that of the United States, and Moscow refused to tie a test ban to a nuclear production cut-off; only by 1964 was Moscow apparently ready to announce a slow-down in the production of fissionable materials.

2. External Political Perspectives

The opportunities and constraints which the Soviet leaders perceived as they looked to the east, to the west, and to the south, exerted a powerful influence on their evaluation of both the military and the political uses of the disarmament issue. The Kremlin's perception of the political environment provided above all the basic sense of the possible and the desirable that gave direct guidance to Soviet arms control policy.

The roles that policy toward Western, Communist, and non-aligned states played in the shaping of Soviet arms control interests cannot be directly compared with each other since the arms control problem arose primarily in relations with the West. However, because the Soviet Union was engaged in a two-front campaign and was facing tremendous political and even military challenges from Peking, an opportunity or difficulty on the Western front became doubly significant. The role of the southern front--the "third world"--was marginal but cannot be ignored.

a. The View to the West. A profound change took place in the Kremlin's political perspective in 1954-1956 that conditioned Soviet interests in arms control throughout the remainder of the Khrushchev decade. Soviet policy toward the West from 1954 to 1964 thus endeavored to avoid the mistakes of Stalin's hard line and to capitalize on the opportunities it had previously underestimated. Since the West's political and military unity (including German participation in NATO and the WEU) had been spurred by an
apparent threat from Moscow, the Kremlin now sought generally to reverse this trend by lowering the threat and stressing the advantages of accommodation with the new Soviet line. Whereas Stalin's policies often tended to treat the Western elites as a homogeneous antagonist, the Khrushchev regime recognized diversity within and between the NATO governments and sought to cultivate and exploit these differences, using as a key instrument a more reasonable stance on arms control and disarmament.

A central Soviet objective in arms control policy was to strengthen moderate, "sober" forces in the West who could move their governments away from an arms build-up and a forward strategy and toward accommodation with the Soviet Union. Disarmament propaganda, concessions, and eventually agreements were used instrumentally to isolate the "hards" and strengthen the "softs" in the West, particularly in the United States. Such measures were also used to create propaganda that would put pressure on U.S. overseas base policy, U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, German rearmament, and other aspects of Western military planning. Proposals for disengagement helped to foster anti-German sentiment in Britain and France. Advocacy of a nuclear test ban helped to stir differences between Washington and London on the one hand and Paris on the other because of the latter's lag in nuclear testing. Working in the opposite direction, Moscow's proposal in June 1960 to abolish all nuclear delivery systems in the first stage of GCD was evidently calculated to be welcome in Paris but not in London or Washington, thereby increasing friction among them.

Khrushchev staked much of his entire foreign policy upon the calculation that "moderates" existed in the West and that their hand could be strengthened; this premise had to be defended against critics in Moscow as well as in Peking. Khrushchev may have been chastened several times in the decade by the apparent stiffening of Western policy (as in late 1955, mid-1960, and 1961), but he seemed to assume that a more moderate orientation would eventually prevail.

The "permanently operating factor" in Moscow's view of the external political situation since 1955 has, we believe, been the premise that some kind of accommodation with moderate forces in the West is both desirable and possible. From 1955 to about 1960 this orientation was qualified by the Kremlin's belief that the influence of international communism, guided by the socialist fatherland, would gradually expand while the sphere of capitalism contracted. As Peking posed a more intense threat from 1959 to 1962 and as the "third world" showed by 1961 its resistance to
Soviet penetration, the narrowing of alternatives and the impact of reality intensified for Soviet decision-makers. First in theory, after 1959, and then also in practice, after the abortive quick-fix attempt in Cuba, Moscow's interest in working with moderate forces in the West took on an aspect of collaboration as well as struggle, increasing rather than restraining the Soviet interest in partial measures of arms control and arrangements to preserve peace and the political status quo.

b. **The View to the East.** Whereas there was diversity in the West that could be subject to Soviet political manipulation, Peking presented to Soviet policy a more monolithic front which generally opposed Khrushchev's efforts toward peaceful coexistence and arms control agreements with the West. That opposition ran squarely athwart Moscow's potent interest in maximizing its position of leadership in the international Communist movement, initially by keeping China within the Soviet camp and, as this failed, in keeping ahead of Peking both in the international Communist movement and in influencing the "gray zones". A third set of Soviet interests derived from the military desideratum of preventing Chinese moves that could involve Russia in a war, which in turn involved keeping China from acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly, depending on the priority accorded to one or another of these basic interests, the effect of China could be either to restrain or accelerate Moscow's posture of accommodation with the West.

Moscow at first, from 1956 to 1959, endeavored to mollify Peking's political and military aspirations by adding tough phrases to Communist pronouncements on East-West relations and by offering some assistance in developing nuclear strength. No doubt many Soviet party and military officials found their own reasons to oppose détente and arms control reinforced by the realization that such an orientation was alienating Peking. Even after 1959 a faint hope of rapprochement with the world's most populous nation may have exerted some drag on Soviet policy, if only because it added to other conservative pressures for restraint in moving toward coexistence.

The net result of China's military and political threat was, however, in effect to push Moscow steadily westward, to increase its interest in arriving at a test ban and other agreements to impede proliferation, and to defend in ever stronger terms the thesis that "a world without arms is a world without war." By mid-1959 the die was cast as Moscow tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to China and to rebut forcefully its ideological critique. Even after the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit debacle in 1960 Moscow gave no quarter to Chinese orthodoxy. At Bucharest in
June and in Moscow later on in the year Khrushchev assailed dogmatic insistence that imperialism remained unchanged. The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1962 and the evident abandonment of Soviet hopes of mending the breach probably helped remove the last inhibitions in Moscow to moves toward détente and arms control with the West. The 1963 "Treaty of Moscow" was then used against Peking—even in propaganda to the "third world"— likening the Chinese opponents of the test ban to "madmen" such as Goldwater and Adenauer.

Just as Moscow seemed willing to sacrifice political interests in relations with China in order to pursue détente—and appropriate arms control agreements—with the West, so the Kremlin may have even been willing to risk the probable loss of considerable political control in Eastern Europe in exchange for the high-priority strategic desideratum of neutralizing Germany. But even here there were potential political payoffs. An incidental benefit of favoring German neutralization was its popularity in Eastern Europe. Rapacki's proposals, for example, gave a semblance of autonomy to Polish foreign policy, and their rejection by the West deepened Eastern Europe's sense of dependence upon the Soviet Union. Even more important, the Soviet campaign for disarmament probably won some favor for Moscow among the war-weary peoples of Eastern Europe.

c. The View to the South. The influence of the "third world" upon Soviet arms control policies was also quite marginal and indirect during the decade. Virtually no Soviet security interests have been at stake in these areas, except perhaps that of complicating the maintenance of Western bases or the carrying out of French nuclear testing. The major relationship of this zone to Soviet arms control interest emerged in 1954-1955 when Moscow decided that opportunities for penetration in Africa and Asia could fruitfully be exploited to accelerate the departure of Western colonialism and to win a foothold for communism. The Soviet decision to move into this "gray zone," partly by arms shipments but mainly by political and economic means, increased the importance of desensitizing the West by a conciliatory disarmament posture. The object of winning favor for Soviet policy added to Moscow's reasons for posing as the champion of a test ban, a nuclear-free Africa, the liquidation of Western bases, and the supporter of national independence, (although in 1961 the Soviet government ignored the sentiments of the non-aligned nations meeting at Belgrade and the U.N. resolution appealing to Moscow not to test its giant bombs).
Since 1961 the task of Soviet propaganda has been to persuade the nonaligned nations that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence is more in their interest than either the bellicose ways favored by Peking, or Western "neo-colonialism." To strengthen its revolutionary image the Soviet Union continues to qualify its support for a warless world and the renunciation of force by insisting on the unavoidability and justness of wars of national liberation. In practice, however, Moscow has sought to impose a broad-front policy on the Communist parties in the "third world," and has shown some restraint even in exploiting unstable situations in the new states as in the Congo in 1960-1961 and Laos in 1961-1962. All of this feeds back to the image Moscow wishes to convey to the West, and specifically to the possibility of continued arms control agreements.

3. The Economic Factor.

Our analysis of the decade corroborates the supposition that a powerful centralized government would probably never allow internal economic pressures to dissuade it from policies considered essential to state security. The interaction of economic incentives to seek a reduction of defense expenditures and Soviet policies on arms control demonstrates that such incentives could have an impact on Moscow's negotiating posture only at a time when the Kremlin felt secure from imminent external attack or at a time when it had no prospect of a significant strategic gain from greater investments in defense.

The "economic burden of defense" as defined in this paper does not appear in 1954-1956 to have been a strong force motivating the Kremlin to seek a reduction of defense expenditures. Moscow's general sense that it could triumph in economic competition with the West was, however, an important premise of the softer turn in Soviet foreign policy generally, one which tended to persist even after the optimistic expectations underlying it had cause to falter.

Some economic incentives to reduce military spending existed even in 1955-1958, when Soviet economic growth was continuing at a high rate. Moscow was confronted with a number of scarcities in agriculture, housing, light industry, and in manpower, which could be alleviated by the transfer of human and material resources from defense. These economic factors helped to reinforce Moscow's military interests in reduction of conventional ground forces and the limitation of nuclear testing. More important, an atmosphere of East-West détente was absolutely essential if Soviet military posture were to rely upon a minimum deterrent of prototype bombers and first-generation missiles instead of striving immediately to mass-produce these weapons.
From 1958 to 1961 the economic incentives to cut defense spending increased as the Soviet economy's overall growth rate became slower at a time when the investment required for military and space technological development was soaring. The party's pronouncements in 1959 that Soviet production would soon overtake that of the United States in many areas added to the pressures to keep economic growth at a high rate. By 1961, however, it appeared that Russia's efforts to overtake the United States militarily as well as economically had landed the Soviet Union on a treadmill; the chances for keeping up with, much less surpassing, the West seemed dim indeed. The United States was producing large numbers of ICBM's and other advanced equipment, and the European economies showed strong prospects of integration and dynamic growth that contrasted sharply with the situation in the Comecon countries.

By 1961 therefore Moscow had even stronger economic as well as military reasons to seek a stabilization of the arms race; but it was precisely in 1961 and 1962 that the Soviet government increased its military spending, raised food prices, and took a more intransigent stand on arms control negotiations. This seems powerful evidence that economic incentives by themselves could not be decisive in shaping Soviet foreign and arms control policy.

On the other hand in 1963, when the strategic situation seemed neither so threatening nor so promising as before Cuba, the same economic reasons to reduce or stabilize defense spending could reinforce the weight of the military and political factors in favor of limited arms control agreements with the West. An end to nuclear testing, a promise to keep bombs out of orbit, and a slowdown of fissionable material production could all ease the drag that defense--along with other economic problems--exerted upon Soviet growth. Two additional political and economic goals could also be served by the limited agreements of 1963-1964. First, if a lengthy détente made it possible gradually to lower the Soviet military budget, Moscow might be able to accelerate its economic growth, strengthen its claim to be a model of scientific socialism, and enhance its ability to influence the developing nations. An upturn in Soviet growth would also mean a stronger capacity for an intensified defense effort after the breathing space was over. Second, the goal of greater growth and prosperity could also be served by the long-term trade credits from the West which Moscow might hope to obtain in the improved political climate that followed the arms controls of 1963-1964.

Whether the Soviet economy would soon become stronger and, if so, whether this strength would again be intensively applied to surpassing the West militarily would of course depend upon many variables, including the manner in which a new generation of Soviet
leaders assessed their problems to both East and West. But other measures of arms control might be influenced by the economic factor. Moscow has indicated an interest in some formal undertaking to reduce military budgets. And the time may have been developing for some understanding between Moscow and Washington not to intensify the arms race by efforts to build anti-missile defense systems.

4. Internal Political Factors

Our knowledge about the internal workings of Soviet policy is limited like that of the shadow-watcher in Plato's cave. But the available evidence suggests that domestic political factors have been an important conditioner of Soviet interests and policies in arms control. The way in which the men in the Kremlin perceived arms controls was of course the primary determinant of policy that might be adopted, and if the leadership were divided in its assessment or under conflicting demands from the pressure of other goals, powerful limitations would be set up. Furthermore the peace and disarmament issues became entangled on occasion in the political in-fighting within the Kremlin itself, serving as weapons in the internal power struggle.

Nikita Khrushchev's own perception of the world must have been shared by many of his colleagues since his power was by no means so unlimited as Stalin's. The main opposition to a policy favoring détente and arms control probably came from certain military and party leaders and possibly managers in defense production and heavy industry. Khrushchev's critics saw in his policies threats to various of their interests, or in any event used as a basis of their criticisms the alleged or threatened inroads in defense spending, the preservation of military and economic secrecy, defense against foreign intrusion, or the avoidance of debilitating effects of prolonged détente on the international movement. The loosening of Soviet influence upon China and Eastern Europe as a result of détente with the West would also concern these groups.

The fact that Khrushchev was almost ousted in 1957 and was in fact removed in 1964 offers the most concrete demonstration that his power was not absolute and confirms that the reduction of Soviet armed forces begun in 1960 and Khrushchev's radical advocacy of reliance on nuclear-rocket forces was opposed by many military leaders. There were some countervailing internal forces, but they were less coherent. Certain pressures arose out of Soviet society for a relaxation of international and internal tensions.
and for peace and prosperity, desires that gained momentum with de-
Stalinization and were articulated increasingly by Soviet writers
and some scientists.

There is evidence that the peace and disarmament issue was
used in power struggles within the Kremlin, most clearly in 1955,
in 1957, and perhaps in 1962-1964. Thus Khrushchev gained power
in 1954 by accusing Malenkov of shortcutting defense requirements
but then used the issue of détente to isolate Molotov after Malenkov
was removed. This power-play coincided with a hard Soviet line on
disarmament from September 1954 to February 1955 while Malenkov's
star was falling and Molotov's rising, and with renewed concessions
in the negotiations from March to May 1955 as Khrushchev edged
out his second rival. Again in 1957 Khrushchev accused his
heterogeneous opposition in the "antiparty group" of opposing
"peaceful coexistence."

It is likely that internal power struggles induced some of
the sharp zigs and zags in Soviet arms control policy in 1960-
1962 and may well have stimulated the desperate measures Soviet
foreign policy took to redress its waning power; we do not yet
have enough information about this period, however, to establish
a clear relationship between these moves and the rise and fall
of particular forces in the Kremlin. Following the Cuban fiasco
and the party reorganization of November 1962, internal opposition
to Khrushchev's policies seemed once more pronounced. Kozlov in
particular seemed to be opposing a policy of conciliating the
West and diverting resources from heavy industry. Kozlov's
incapacitating illness in April 1963 coincided with a softer
line signaled by a change in the May Day slogans. The removal
of this critic may have been a key factor that allowed Khrushchev
to agree to the hot line and the nuclear test ban and to break
off negotiations with the Chinese.

By early 1964, however, Khrushchev seemed again to be under
pressure from the defense and heavy industries and from the
marshals not to make reductions in the defense budget or in number
of military personnel (and, we may speculate, to pursue the
development of an anti-missile defense). By this time Khrushchev
was also publicly indicating differences of opinion among party
members over foreign policy. Nonetheless he apparently preserved
sufficient freedom of action to enter into a commitment to cut back
the production of fissionable materials.

On balance it appears that Khrushchev generally enjoyed
sufficient power to carry out far-reaching innovations in foreign
and military affairs and arms control policy, overriding whatever
internal opposition may have existed. Thus Khrushchev engineered concessions to Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia prior to the 1955 Summit Conference; he himself announced in June 1957 that Moscow would accept limited on-site inspection over a test ban; his power determined Soviet entry into a moratorium on nuclear testing from 1958 to 1961. It was Khrushchev who pushed through the reduction of conventional forces in 1955, 1956, and 1960 and the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces; upon his initiative the Soviet military budget was allegedly reduced in December 1963 and the Soviet government stated in April 1964 its intention to slow production of fissionable materials.

Most important perhaps, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line, which had represented a central problem exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations from 1956 to 1964, continued to prevail. In each case Khrushchev had to overcome some domestic opposition and persuade the members of the elite close to the seat of power to go along with his policies. Although the record indicates that he often succeeded, there may well have been occasions when domestic opposition forced Khrushchev to take a harder stand than he otherwise would have preferred—for instance, the refusal in 1961 to stand by the principle of limited on-site inspection and the later insistence that there be no more than three such inspections. At other times internal opposition may simply have prevented a concession the First Secretary wanted in order to spur the arms control negotiations. Such suggestions of "things that never happened" obviously cannot be documented, but they seem inherently possible. In general the domestic political situation seems to have served as a key factor that could either open or close the door to some alternative suggested by external considerations. Usually the door seems to have been open to the policies favored by Khrushchev, but perhaps not always so far as he may have liked. Occasionally he himself was probably forced to slam it shut in the face of internal dissension. And in Cuba he certainly proved to be as hair-raising a gambler himself as any leader of modern times.

The forces and problems confronting the Kremlin after Stalin's death were in a sense larger than the individuals who succeeded him to power. Certainly the high optimism and ebullient style of Soviet foreign policy throughout most of the decade bore the personal stamp of Khrushchev. That there was broad support for his policies was due in large part to the necessity of coming to grips with the hard realities of the nuclear age, economic scarcity, and the existence of enormous problems on the eastern and western fronts. The management of power in the Kremlin will always, until constitutionalism comes, involve an inextricable combination of
high policy and base impulses and tactics of personal ambition and power-seeking. We can guess the primary reasons for Khrushchev's eventual removal in 1964 had more to do with his style and his domestic policy plus his inability to cope with the problem created for the international Communist movement by the Chinese than with the orientation of his policy toward the West. But the squalid and Byzantine style of succession in the Kremlin must leave as "not proven" any attempts to correlate the internal power struggle with rational policy choices.

C. 1965--A Postscript

We emerge with the impression that in the period under review the Kremlin's interests called for at least some tangible measures of arms control to be achieved. The first reason lay in the complementarity between Soviet strategic theory, military posture and strategic expectations, and the Kremlin's proposals which would have preserved Soviet strengths while limiting those of the West. Second, the conflicts of political and military interests between Moscow and Peking gave the Soviet leadership good cause to stabilize relations with the West and to endeavor to prevent nuclear spread. Third, the mounting burden of defense expenditures reinforced the external military and political reasons to seek arms controls, détente, and East-West trade. Fourth, the Soviet leadership appeared at least tentatively to believe that its economic system would allow it to compete better in a disarming than in an arming world. None of these four inducements to arms control could be fully gratified by a mere relaxation of East-West tensions. Only specific arms control agreements could secure the strategic, political, or economic desiderata arising from these diverse factors.

As of early 1965 it was too early to say with assurance whether Soviet policy during the past decade had found a new orientation that might bring it into a generally less hostile relationship with the West. Moscow continued to have strong inducements to move toward the West. The latter could not be readily defeated; an ally against China might be needed; there were increasingly shared interests; and it was not clear that either side was going to win the game with the developing nations. Emphasis on collaboration rather than struggle might prove to be the more useful approach in Moscow's relations with the West.

But how the successors to Khrushchev would view the alternatives could not be predicted. The world of early 1965 still bore family resemblances to that of 1955 in that the
visage of peaceful coexistence could still from time to time be dominated by the familiar earmarks of the older, harsher outlook. The de-Stalinization process could still turn out, like the Sino-Soviet schism, to be reversible in terms of some things that count for the West. Soviet moves toward accommodation with the West could still be interpreted as temporary steps backward to prepare for a subsequent offensive. And comprehensive disarmament— even if qualified by provision for a U.S. and Soviet minimum deterrent—still seemed remote.

Yet other forces continued to work for sobriety regarding the arms race. The implicit threat in the very existence of nuclear arsenals remained. The potential dangers for Soviet policy in the expansion of the nuclear club continued to threaten. The traditional elements of Sino-Russian relations remained implicit in state relations vis-à-vis China, fortified by the differential in their respective stages of development as exemplars of "scientific socialism." And the growth of expectations and habits of modernity on the part of both people and leaders in the Soviet Union could be expected to have at least some effect on policy. In short, many of the same forces that militated for limited arms controls in 1963 were still impinging upon Soviet decision-makers at the beginning of 1965, and the new leaders appeared perhaps even more pragmatic in their approach than the generation that succeeded Stalin ten years before.

Soviet leaders at the start of 1965 thus lived within two general representations of reality. They had to mediate between them as part of the process of retaining power—which makes internal conditions so potent a factor. They once again had to calculate their futures, if only in contingency planning, in terms of the chronic two-front nightmare. The prospects for arms control and disarmament remained a secondary, derivative feature of these sets of interactions, boundaries, and opportunities as they changed and matured over time. That in 1963 several modest agreements could be explicitly reached with the West—the hot line, the limited test ban, the undertaking not to orbit nuclear weapons, and the subsequent announced mutual cutbacks in production of fissionable material for military purposes—described the limits of the possible if not the desirable in Moscow's military-political outlook toward the West.

To go beyond these statements to the realm of specific prediction is hazardous in the extreme. There is no general rule of thumb one can apply to historical prediction and, a fortiori, to predicting the behavior of Soviet Communist leaders. Our analysis convinces us that one must look at each event that
arises in its full historical context to read sense and meaning into it. We are thus much more confident of the usefulness of our method of approach than we are about the applicability to the future of our specific detailed findings.

At the same time, our analysis suggests the basic kinds of information a policy analyst or planner ought to have available to him in order to make intelligent judgments about Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament at any given time. We believe it probable that the crucial factors we isolated and studied will continue to operate, and moreover that their relative saliency to Soviet arms control policy may also persist.

We have stressed throughout the study the difficulties created by the highly ambiguous nature of the relationship between the Soviet drive for some kind of détente on the one hand and concrete measures to moderate the arms race on the other. One plausible way to view the two, for instance, is as points on a continuum that runs from relaxation of tensions to arms control and perhaps disarmament. How far the Soviet leadership is prepared to go from the atmospherics of détente to concrete arms control measures depends on factors that no Westerner can exactly measure. Perhaps we may even be not too far from the truth if we move into the post-Khrushchev era with the operating assumption that to achieve significant arms control will continue to depend on the optimum configuration of our four factors—a high degree of saliency of the measure to Soviet military-strategic imperatives; a high degree of responsiveness on the part of the West and either a submissive Peking or, conversely, a Peking sufficiently hostile to force Moscow into serious entente with the United States; a high degree of economic pressure; and collective backing in the Kremlin for such a policy.

Nevertheless, nothing could be more treacherous than the blind assumption that such an arrangement of factors will in fact produce the predicted results. If history repeats itself, it is usually in a particular way one could not have foretold. Policy-makers may use with profit the tools analysts have fashioned, supplemented however by that indispensable quality that brings to policy the judgment and wisdom this subject so urgently requires.
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