THE UN AND THE US NATIONAL INTEREST

by

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Note: Attached hereto for your information is a copy of a lecture delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., on January 23, 1958. It represents some preliminary and highly tentative thinking about the relation between the United Nations and the US National Interest. The material contained in this lecture will doubtless be considerably revised in the course of the project, but it is sent to you at this time because of your interest in the subject. For this reason, it should not be quoted from without permission.

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Lincoln P. Bloomfield
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Gentlemen:

I propose this morning to use you as guinea pigs. Like yourselves, I have only recently stopped flying by the seat of the pants, so to speak, and in a scholarly setting, have been attempting to sort things out in a reasonably ordered and orderly way. Like many of you, my efforts for some years have been in the realm of tactics rather than strategy. Even policy-planning, in days and years of crisis, tends to become tactical and day-to-day.

My new assignment is to take a fresh look at the relationship between the UN and the US National Interest over a time-span that sees ahead to the next three to ten years. This differs from my previous responsibilities primarily in its longer-range character. But there is another even more profound difference. For eight months now I have been looking out over the Charles River rather than the Potomac, and the contrast is tremendous. You will understand me when I say that much of this past eight months has been a necessary period of brainwashing—in reverse. Or, if you will, a trip through the decompression chamber. In this process some of our better bureaucrats-turned-scholars have gotten a nasty case of the bends, and I'm sure it happens the other way too. Apparently, to change the metaphor, there is a definite gestation period for research, and nature cannot be rushed.

But even now some things are beginning to fall into perspective. It is far too early to announce any final results, so what I am about
to do here today will show how thin is the veneer of scholarly respectability I have been so far able to acquire.

What I propose to do is to share with you some of the perspectives that have begun to take form in a re-examination of the strategic uses of the UN for US foreign policy in the years immediately ahead.

I would like to do this in three stages. First, I shall sketch out the strategic background setting as it seems to shape up in retrospect. Second, I shall attempt to define certain overriding policy objectives of this country for the years directly ahead. Finally, I shall try to match up some present or potential UN capabilities against these strategic imperatives.

The first part—the background or strategic setting—needs to be drawn in with some care. In this field, as in any other, how you frame questions often can determine the answers to those questions. Here I wish to pay special attention to changes in the situation which have posed and will pose special new problems for the United States in this field. This selective background picture divides into five primary facts.

The first fact is the Cold War in the UN and the changes that extraordinary battle has undergone.

From the outset, it became apparent that all nations were going to pursue their own policies and beliefs in the UN on issues they felt affected their vital interests. American interests centered around the desire to see the world settle down in order that we might take up where we left off in 1941. The Soviet Union’s interests were from an international standpoint essentially destructive and revolutionary, and the conflict broke out in the UN at once.
For many people, especially Americans, the conversion from prewar isolationism to full commitment had taken place in the best revivalist tradition. It was enthusiastic, a trifle flamboyant, optimistic, deeply sincere, and overlaid with powerful moral and religious feelings.

The appearance of the global power struggle in the UN came as a profound shock to many. The result has, of course, been a profound and world-wide disappointment in the capacity of the UN to achieve its supposed ends, and a generalized downgrading of the very concept of multilateral collaboration on common problems. But we know now that some of those supposed ends were unrealistic in the extreme. There was no future for the expectation that the qualities of violence, power, and conflicting ideology could somehow be totally eliminated from the world scene. False illusion was in this case followed by equally hollow disillusionment. The UN by its very nature has constituted a well-lit stage on which the great powers have acted out the drama of conflict which goes by the name of the Cold War.

I shall not go into detail. Within a very short time, the two super powers stood in hostile confrontation within the UN as well as outside. This fact alone tended to paralyse all the functions of the UN that depended on cooperation between these two. And if the UN could not force cooperation, neither could it punish lack of cooperation. The UN in essence consists of three things: a number of sovereign states; a written Charter; and some machinery, whose use is purely optional. Now, these three elements can and do fuse into a higher order of purpose and action, but only when leadership is explicitly furnished to define and uphold a specific common interest. The UN by itself was of course incapable of any action to "stop the Russians" or "punish the Russians" which the
US and its allies were themselves unable or unwilling to take.

Even in this stalemate, the principles of the Charter and such machinery as the majority of nations was willing to use were applied to the Cold War. UN action played a significant role in getting Russian troops out of Iran in 1946, in ending the communist guerrilla attack on Greece, and in throwing back the communist invasion of South Korea. In a more marginal sense, the UN was instrumental in terminating the Berlin Blockade and in keeping the spotlight of world condemnation on the Soviets for their rape of Hungary in 1956. It was not much, but it was a faithful mirror of the degree of will and capacity of the powers to take overt action in the growing deadlock.

The presence of the Soviets and the Americans under one roof posed a novel problem for Western diplomacy. It meant that during a period when the US was struggling to organize a world-wide defensive coalition against the communist threat it had to meet and negotiate with its allies in the presence of the enemy. The UN was the one place where we continuously met the Russians in the company of the entire free world. Thus each issue and each vote came to represent a separate test of free world unity. During the period 1946-1952 it was commonplace to achieve/on important East-West issues with only the Soviet bloc in opposition. But as time went on, free-world unity was put under an increasing strain by the growing split between what we might call North and South on issues arising primarily in the colonial field. Still the alliance was held together and even, at times, cemented by Soviet actions such as the Berlin Blockade, the Korean attack, and the generalized attitude of implacable hostility.
Since 1952, however, the visible nature of the communist threat has seemed to change, and the effect has posed acute new problems for the West. Starting with the 19th Party Congress in that year, even while Stalin was still alive, the decision was apparently taken to substitute for the military battlefield the arena of political and economic warfare. The tone and mode of Soviet diplomacy, in and out of the UN, began to change. From an embattled and hostile minority—the classic pose of Stalinist Russia—the Soviets set about to create a new image that had three facets—a successful system of organization and production; a world-wide "anti-war" movement; and a source of verbal and tangible support for countries striving to reduce their political, economic, and cultural dependence on the West. Whether this shift was purely a tactic to buy time until nuclear parity could be achieved is, for our purpose, unimportant. The political effect was profound, and it came at a time when the bipolar political world was itself beginning to splinter. As the purely military component of power became the background rather than the substance of politics, forces within both the two coalitions began to assert their freedom of maneuver and to move toward positions independent of the two leader states: Britain, India, Yugoslavia, Poland, Egypt, perhaps China, Germany—these and others suddenly began to emerge as foci of new leadership and of potentially independent directions. Clearly, the rest of the world was changing, and the UN was changing with it.

This leads to the second great fact in recent history. It has been given a number of names. It is summed up by three of them:
the "Revolution of Rising Expectations," "Neutralism," and the "anti-colonial revolution against the European West." All three forces were rapidly coming to full flower in the great arc stretching from North Africa across to Polynesia. This great rip-tide of nationalism and of explosive economic and social demands flooded in even while Western military defenses were being hurriedly girded against the Soviet military threat. The result both in and out of the UN has been that Western success in mobilizing the non-communist world became increasingly dependent on the stand Western nations adopted on issues of primary importance to the peoples of that third world—issues not of capitalism vs. communism or European settlement, but colonialism, self-determination, economic development of underdeveloped territories, racial discrimination, and the like. The UN Charter calls in one way or another for practically all the things this group of countries seek. We may think of them as hopes rather than legally binding commitments to action. But there are approximately 45 countries out of 82 in the UN today which for one reason or another see these as the crucial issues and which put the US to the test in regard to them with increasing frequency. Often the issue is purely symbolic, as in some of the debates with heavy racial overtones, or in seemingly pious wishes for the ultimate independence of non-self-governing territories. But politically speaking, they can have the force of high explosives. And it is in the UN, above any other place, that these issues take concrete shape in the form of resolutions and action programs in which Russian and American performance is constantly made the measure for a host of other attitudes.

My impression is that this country has done remarkably badly in
this battle, given the many initial advantages possessed by our side. The reasons for this are several. Cheap promises of all-out support are vastly easier for the Russians to make than for us. For one thing, we have to consider our NATO relations on every single colonial issue that confronts us. For another, we take Assembly resolutions very seriously, even though they are not legally binding. The legacy of its own resentment against White Europe is not something America can escape. Also, it must be said that, to some observers, American diplomacy often has seemed inflexibly focussed on the Soviet military threat, paralyzed by economy-mindedness, and incapable of getting off the defensive by offering new and appealing pathways of action to the rest of mankind.

The net effect of this development has been a general deterioration in this country's relations, both in and out of the UN, with the underdeveloped, neutralist, and anti-colonial countries of Asia, Africa, and, to an increasing extent, Latin America.

In this situation, the way we have restructured the UN itself has added to the American dilemma. It was the US that urged an ever greater role for the General Assembly (where each nation, however small, has an equal vote) in order to offset the impotence of the Security Council. This was done largely, if implicitly, to enhance the capabilities of the UN for military collective action against the communist world. But those capabilities have, if anything, deteriorated, inside as well as outside the UN. The Assembly has as a consequence become the prime political forum for that third world which stands aside from the East-West confrontation and pursues its own goals of political independence, economic
improvement, and racial dignity. This then is the second paramount fact about the UN—the conflict between North and South, if you will, which cuts right across the East-West conflict and makes its own powerful demands on American diplomacy and initiative, while offering heaven-sent opportunities for the Soviets to seize and hold the political initiative.

The third background fact is a function of the military situation. It is commonly believed that the anticipated military function of the UN lost its future when the Soviet Union and the US failed to agree on a formula for contributing forces to the Security Council for enforcement action. Actually, given the types of situations in which enforcement action would have actually been considered—Korea, Hungary, Suez—it is clear at once that the lack of a formula, like the use of the veto, merely reflected the overall political cleavage.

In 1950 the US sponsored the Uniting for Peace Resolution under which the General Assembly can recommend the same sorts of emergency action which the Security Council is supposed to be able to order. Advance commitments have been as scarce here as under Article 43.

I would like to suggest that there has been a rather fundamental defect in our thinking about the military uses of the UN. The notion of collective security which looks for an abstract commitment to fight anyone, anywhere, anytime, on call of a majority, is not a legitimate expectation given the present lack of a true world community. Such collective security against the Soviet Union as has been achieved has been through regional and other special organizations where a community of purpose exists, based on a community of specific interests. Even in these, there is no provision for common action against one of its members.
The real-life military situation between the Soviets and ourselves has of course been a growing stalemate, in which the freedom of each side for military action has been steadily narrowed. The political *status quo* of the West is anathema to the Soviets, and the territorial *status quo* of world communism is unacceptable to us. Yet as general war becomes an increasingly unattractive proposition for both sides, the *de facto* line between the two worlds has become relatively inviolate. When it is crossed, as in Korea, the entire world recognizes it as a profound violation of the peace, and counter-action becomes politically feasible. Even India and Egypt voted initially to oppose/communist aggression in Korea. In Hungary, on the other hand, world-wide counter-action was politically quite impossible even if the US had been willing to lead it—which we were not.

The UN military potential has followed the trend of weapons development and military policy among the great powers. The US has, on all the evidence, seemed to adopt a policy of renunciation of force in resolving political differences. Steps that could lead to general war are explicitly avoided. We have applied this to ourselves as a self-denying ordinance, as in the case of Communist China, the Berlin Blockade, the crossing of the Yalu, Indochina, and most recently Hungary. Needless to say, in the Hungarian situation the UN would have been able to "do something" militarily only if the US had itself been willing to "do something" militarily. The decision at the highest level of American government was that we would not take the risk, whatever expectations we may have aroused in the past.

We have also applied this policy to our friends, as in the Suez crisis of 1956. American motives toward the Israeli-British-French invasion
of Egypt were uncommonly mixed. But the President was being entirely consistent in refusing to land himself to a local military action that could lead directly to world war, however great the provocation that animated our allies. A significant result of the Suez fiasco is the realization that both the US—and it might be added the USSR—are actively exercising a veto over military action by third parties that might commit them to an expanding and potentially uncontrollable situation.

This last fact has great significance for US foreign policy, and for the ways it can and should use the UN in pursuit of national policy objectives. This leads to fact number four in the background.

It is often forgotten that apart from the Cold War and the anti-colonial revolution, all nations, like their individual citizens, have their traditional and continuing problems and differences, acting and reacting in the context of an ongoing and dynamic political life. One consequence of this continuation of life as usual, so to speak, is that disputes among nations over territory, boundaries, minorities, trade practices, and the host of other elements that traditionally make up the fabric of international relations have gone on and periodically reached the point where third party intervention becomes necessary. Some cases in point are the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir; the Palestine case, in all its ramifications, including the new issue of the status of international waterways; India versus South Africa over Indian minority rights and racial discrimination; Greece versus the United Kingdom over Cyprus; Indonesia versus the Netherlands over West New Guinea. Each has the potential of "going critical." As Suez illustrated, a non-East-West dispute can very quickly pose life-and-death questions for the entire human
family. The control rods of this particular pile, to continue the metaphor, are now held by an international brigade of UN troops. The chain reaction can start again out there, but the world is meanwhile buying time with the help of a variety of UN instrumentalities for pacific settlement, including UNEF, the UN Truce Supervision Organization, the Secretary General, and Egypt's declarations to the UN about the uses of the Canal. If Kashmir should be the scene of renewed fighting, and if the Soviet Union backed India and we backed Pakistan, the chances of a direct Soviet-American confrontation would be that much greater, given the geography and the stakes. The UN role in all these cases has been accentuated by the American disinclination to become involved in intra-family disputes in the free world. Whenever possible we have preferred to "leave them to the UN." It is among this range of issues, involving primarily non-communist nations, that UN machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes has been brought into play. It is here, for example, that some few steps have been taken to submit disputes to legal adjudication, however feeble these steps may have been. And it is here perhaps that the opportunities for involvement in a general war/become greatest as the chances of deliberate East-West hostilities diminish.

The fifth and final background fact is another consequence of the truism that life goes on, continuously presenting us with problems, inspirations, challenges, and opportunities in areas that have nothing to do with the Cold War, colonialism, or any of the revolutions and religious wars of our epoch. I refer to the whole realm of life where man as man confronts nature as nature. The UN and the specialized agencies have done
me
good and important work in this realm which only time forbids/from
catalog:ir:3 here. As the space age comes upon us, it may well be that
the most important thing the US could do, both as a community of human
beings and as a state seeking to ensure its future security, would be
to press vigorously for a UN regime for the control and utilization
of outer space for peaceful purposes only. Because of time limits, I
can only urge that this fifth fact be kept in perspective as we move on
to complete our analysis.

I have taken great liberties with a highly complex situation in
order to bring out in this limited time what seem to me the prime ele-
ments in the background picture. How do we relate this set of facts to
the development of US policies over the next few years? One prefatory
word is necessary. Unquestionably the very existence of the UN and the
profound impact it has had on worldwide opinion and action have given
a whole extra dimension to the world of diplomacy. For the purposes of
our inquiry here I am going to disregard this dimension and in effect look
at the UN as strictly two-dimensional. My approach is consciously based
on the premises of US foreign policy rather than the premises of the UN
itself. In order that we can get as clear a picture as possible of the
true relationship, we must ask what some of the overriding purposes of
American foreign policy are today, and what help the UN might be in achieving those purposes. This is of course another way of inquiring what the national interest is with respect to the UN.

To keep our discussion relatively simple, I must bypass a great deal of reasoning and argumentation and spell out what I consider our most acute operational policy objectives. For purposes of this argument, I shall stick to those directly relevant to the paramount political and military crisis of our age. If someone else puts other objectives at the top, such as US world dictatorship, or military showdown with Russia, or immediate world government, what follows will lose its validity for him. I shall take advantage of my commanding position here to suggest my own definitions, which are of course by no means all-inclusive. In doing so, I shall try to avoid generalities so far as possible, and shall try to limit objectives to those I believe to be realistic in a foreseeable time span. Prefacing all that follows is the overriding and obvious objective of securing the kind of world in which we can cultivate our own society without fear of harm or disruption from the outside. Everything else falls within this governing purpose.

Objective number 1 for the US, then, is to reduce the generalized threat which Soviet communist power presents to the US and Western Society.

This broad objective has three components: Number 1a is to reduce Soviet capabilities of inflicting intolerable physical damage upon us.

Number 1b is to moderate hostile Soviet intentions.
Number 1c is to limit and if possible reduce the present international support for the Soviet Union.

The remaining three are separate items.

Objective number 2 is to reduce the possibility of a general war developing by a chain of inadvertent circumstances.

Objective number 3 is to find means of limiting warfare if it does break out.

Objective number 4 is to ensure, in the event of general war, that we rally maximum political support to our side, in order that we may fight with clear consciences and have the best chance of organizing the postwar world in an acceptable way.

With regard to la--Soviet military capabilities--the UN has in fact no more to bring to bear than the US and a few others are willing to provide. At the moment it adds up to nothing. In the event of an all-out Soviet aggression, it probably would add up to everything. The question is not really meaningful because of the nature of the UN, which except in limited ways possesses no tangible power or life outside that furnished by its most powerful members. The one concrete utility of the UN in limiting Soviet military capabilities in the foreseeable future lies in the variety of forums it can provide for negotiations on limitation and regulation of armaments. Specifically, the aim is to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack which might overwhelm a nation's retaliatory capabilities. This is the current focus of US policy, and I believe it should be pursued relentlessly and without ever giving up hope.
Realistically, disarmament negotiation may be viewed as, at root, bilateral as between the US and the USSR. But the wide choice of negotiating means and devices should not be discounted. The provision of a neutral UN corridor was most helpful when Russia wanted to talk privately with us about liquidating the Berlin Blockade. On balance the UN can affect Soviet capabilities only indirectly, by furnishing a negotiating vehicle. Objective 1b— affecting Soviet intentions—is more complex. At its least complicated level—military intentions—Soviet policy since Korea seems to have consciously excluded overt military aggression in favor of the far more profitable and acceptable techniques of political and economic warfare. I have heard Secretary Dulles say on several occasions that if it were not for the UN we would be in World War III. I believe he had in mind, at least in part, the deterrent effect of the commitment taken by 82 nations—including the Soviet Union—to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Perhaps the chief significance of this prohibition is the assurance that any warlike act will immediately be brought before 81 other nations who have bound themselves by the same inhibition. I would not compare that deterrent with the deterrent furnished by SAC. But we have seen too many examples of Soviet sensitivity to world public opinion to write it off as meaningless. It is not always remembered that the UN resolution condemning the USSR in Hungary was supported by 15 Afro-Asian states, with none in opposition. The Soviets periodically stumble hard simply because of the difficulty of sustaining a soft line in the UN when the line outside hardens. Soviet troops are still in Hungary, but the Soviet reputation was gravely tarnished at a time its efforts to woo the uncommitted nations were at
a peak. On balance, the existence of the UN is probably a consideration but hardly a prime factor in affecting Soviet calculations with respect to the profitability of military operations.

If, however, we think of intentions in the context of encouraging the evolution of Soviet society into something more tolerable internationally, there are additional dimensions that we may not have fully grasped. The UN certainly cannot significantly transform the nature of Soviet communism. But let me suggest a few ways in which it might create some favorable civilizing influences.

The UN is one of the few continuous contact points between East and West, and this fact may have special new significance in a changing situation. A generation of technicians and bureaucrats is moving into range of real power in Russia. The UN Economic Commission for Europe, for example, has served to expose many of them to an otherwise unavailable vision of the West. At some moment of possible choice in the future it may have been indispensable to maintain bridges such as this. They furnish a way for the West to give continuous assurance that the Soviet Union can be readily accepted into a community of nations as a great power, although not as a messianic and apocalyptic force. At the same time UN membership can have the effect of sustaining and perhaps encouraging the independent identity of such satellites as Poland.

We should thus continue to create alternatives that may one day appear realistic and attractive to the Soviets. With or without the Russians we should continue to work toward institutionalizing areas of common action. We have already done this in many non-political fields such as health and technical assistance, which the Russians, for many reasons, ultimately came to join. In a different sense this is true of disarmament. It may be true with respect to peaceful uses of outer space. Evolution can stimulate evolution, but, conversely, the failure of the free world to grow and mature can be a signal for renewal of the most unacceptable kinds of developments in the Soviet world.
I would not overrate the capacity of the UN to affect the nature of Soviet system. I would say that if Russian Communism is in a period of deep-rooted ferment, the West should not neglect any external influences that may be constructive. The UN, properly viewed and employed, may be one such influence.

There is one final dimension that for convenience I place under the "intentions heading", although it is not directly related.

The UN is a demonstration and testing point for the unity of the free world. As that unity sharpens, Soviet estimates have traditionally seemed to become modified. Conversely, Western disunity encourages the Soviets to calculate their opportunities as more promising. The UN has sometimes become an embarrassment to us when it was used as a place for airing dirty Western linen. It is by the same token a place where the Russians can stimulate Western disunity. The simple answer is for us to pick up our marbles and walk off. This is of course not only wholly undesirable but wholly unrealistic. The net effect, by any educated calculation, would be to leave approximately half the free world in a Russian dominated UN. This is apart from its total unacceptability to the American people, who show consistent support for UN membership in poll after poll. But to live successfully in the kind of UN that has developed, the US must do a number of new things. We must be prepared to go a great deal further than we have with our friends on issues of great political importance to them but only of slight real importance to us. I have in mind essentially procedural issues such as elections or minor budget differences, or composition of committees. These have been the source of perhaps more inter-allied friction than any substantive policy issues except possibly the issues of Chinese representation. On these procedural issues we might better keep US prestige disengaged and save it for the big ones. We should also plan to exist
gracefully in an occasional minority position on some issues where we genuinely differ, rather than insisting on having our own way, or going over the heads of friendly delegates, or threatening retaliation, however subtly. In short, it means more perceptive and more truly democratic leadership on our part, and far less pretended omniscience based, so far as I can see, not on necessarily superior wisdom but at least primarily on greater material strength.

Objective 1c is to reverse or at least limit the trend of international political support for the Soviet Union. This support is coming primarily from the underdeveloped, neutralist, anti-colonial countries and territories of the world. We spoke earlier of some of its causes, and it is not at all clear that actions of ours can wholly reverse this tide until it has run its course.

Nevertheless, it is here that the battle is being fought. I don't think we want to fall into the fallacy of the "belly communism" theory, considering the number of well-fed intellectuals who tend to lead communist movements. But we want to find ways to divert local forces of discontent into constructive channels. To do this, we must furnish incentives for native leadership to harness the blind force of nationalism.
to tasks of building rather than the paths of destruction and hate that are so often followed.

The prime factor here is economic. I would not want to predict our conclusions as to the proper amount of international economic assistance that should be channelled through the UN. But even apart from the vitally important question of financing, there are profound psychological factors involved. Here, as with inter-allied relations, the style and sensitivity of American diplomacy can be crucial. We cannot disregard such subtle factors as the way we handle the legacy of bruised feelings left by centuries of Western claims to racial superiority; or the understanding with which we meet the ambition of Asians or Latin-Americans to catch up, to become industrialized, to be less dependent on a peasant economy that promises only more of the same human misery and poverty.

The UN happens to be the one place where all of these tensions and claims and expectations come into focus in full view of virtually all nations of the world. The uncommitted nations have found their place in the sun in the UN, where the concept of legal equality of states offers them the self-respect and the dignity they seek. And above all it furnishes them with a parliamentary strength that is entirely disproportionate to the amount of real power they command in the world. Their new power is used primarily to bring before the rest of the world the ambitions and grievances about which they feel strongly.

The same opportunities to exploit this situation exist for us and for the Russians. The one which will ultimately succeed is, on all the evidence, the one which most successfully relates his own interests to
their interests, their aspirations, and their goals. What do they seek? Freedom from foreign domination; economic assistance, specifically grants and low-interest loans for economic development, and fair capital investment; protection of their exports from fluctuations in world prices; racial equality; freedom for remaining Western colonial possessions; international recognition of human rights; in short, equality with the rest of the world. Some of these are things we believe in too. Others are borderline. Some are merely vague symbols. Most of these issues present us with exquisite political difficulties both at home and abroad. But if this analysis is correct, it suggests that we have not yet grasped the really crucial significance of the UN as an agency to reach these people on the issues of vital significance to them. In many cases, as with some of the colonial issues, it would be easier if we never had to stand up and be counted as between Europe and Asia or Africa. But since we do, the logic of the situation demands that we find better ways than we now have to identify ourselves with these countries and their problems as those problems become issues in the UN setting.

The unity of the free world, which we discussed earlier in terms of our alliance systems, has a broader meaning here. In the continuing political warfare with world communism the ultimate test of American policy will be its ability to hold together the industrialized half and the underdeveloped half and find new avenues to cooperation and unity. Where the UN provides the only agency acceptable to the latter half, it must be utilized to the utmost.

Objective number 2 is to reduce the possibility of general war developing by a chain of inadvertent circumstances. It may well be that
If general war by design is not a lively possibility, barring a dramatic shift in the power equation, war by inadvertence becomes the chief object of concern for responsible statesmen.

Suez showed the practical operation of this country's determination to minimize risks of general war. But that being so, the most profound significance of US Suez policy has not really been faced up to. It is this: to the extent that we rule out remedies by force for the legitimate grievances of states, to that extent we shall be obliged to find other non-violent means for the solution of those problems. It is a simple problem in physics—as we hold the lid on, the temperature rises, and as the temperature rises the pressure increases. This fact has confounded all past human attempts to outlaw war—all of them failed to provide means for peaceful change so that the dynamics of international political life might be peacefully rather than violently expressed and contained.

It is here that the UN has the most vital task in the future in terms of our security. This country, and I mean its political and intellectual leaders, is going to have to attach a wholly new order of importance to the realm of peaceful settlement of disputes and means for peaceful change. These are now roughly in the same category as Mother's Day and the need for new school houses. No one speaks against them, but our high command has so far, by no means concentrated the same intensive effort here as for our military preparations. Even when our very noses are rubbed in the problem, we so far have not seemed to be able to generate the common sense and the political
muscle that is increasingly going to be needed on this front.

Let me illustrate. With all respect to the President and his Secretary of State, the classic example of American error was, in my judgment, furnished by the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine for the Mid-East. It is not that a US "keep out" sign in the area was not worth posting in front of the Red Army. It is that this was our only real suggestion for remedying a whole set of local situations which were not primarily of the East-West variety and a forcible solution to which we had just foreclosed. The basic sources of violence, starting perhaps with something so specific as the Palestine refugee problem, have been once again passed over, and it can confidently be predicted that the next local explosion will be that much more potent.

There is no question that a crash effort is going to be needed to break through into new ground in the Pacific settlement of dispute and peaceful change every bit as much as in the field of missiles—perhaps more so, because the missiles will be used only when diplomacy fails. If the specific multilateral techniques of war is too important to be left to the generals, peace are surely too important to be left to the legal theorists and the political scientists.

All logic then points to the need for greatly expanded efforts to eradicate the causes of international instability—the political, the economic, and other causes as well. Here the UN offers us a wealth of tested and thoughtfully conceived instrumentalities, and the future may well rest on the initiatives the US takes to move the stubborn political and territorial disputes of the world toward solution by diplomatic, conciliatory, legal, and other similar means. Wholly apart from the Soviet problem, the world is full of situations which if left unchecked
could spell major trouble for us and for world peace as a whole.

Indeed, our motivation in working with great purpose and effort on the chronic causes of instability and friction should not be seen as arising only from the Soviet threat. Granted, in moments of pessimism it sometimes seems impossible for us to justify to ourselves any decent or sensible or humane international act on its own merits alone. But refer back for an instant to the general statement that preceded our catalog of policy objectives. There is every justification for devoting more than the present lip service to the profound problems of international order completely apart from the Soviet-US context. The justification is that these problems threaten our ability to fulfill the internal promise of our own society. Our own role in the world must be more than that of a powerful negative force. Our own development as a people has become dependent on the development of other peoples in the direction of stability and the satisfaction of their government with the territorial status quo. If the threat of small wars mushrooming into big ones gives that continuing task added urgency, so much the better.

Perhaps the most disabling political factor in world peace today, apart from the Cold War, is the colonial problem. Until it is finally liquidated, there will be friction and hatred. Afterwards, to be sure, there will be other problems, such as keeping new weak nations afloat and in the camp of freedom. But if any one thing is true, it is that the unsolicited presence of foreign rulers and military forces on the territory of a nation is guaranteed to bring trouble—whether in Cyprus, or Algeria (or for that matter, Hungary or even Okinawa.) The UN provides the only
agency through which the US can continually keep pressure on its allies to move toward freeing their dependencies, at the same time keeping pressure on the anti-colonial forces to act in moderation, and in general ensuring that this vital process of evolution stays peaceful, moves at a proper pace, and stays out of the hands of those who would cynically exploit it. The role of middleman is at times excruciating. But it is unavoidable for us and indispensable for responsible solutions.

There is a great need for new formulas here that will satisfy these substantive requirements, but will ease the burden on the US, which even more than its allies must keep the overall world situation in focus. There are no "gimmicks" here, but there may be legitimate new modalities, perhaps like the new UN Commission on Africa, which we can use to improve the whole atmosphere of the colonial debate.

Objective number 3 is to find means of limiting warfare if it does break out.

For our purposes here the general military issue has three parts. One is the explicit avoidance of direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the US, which I have already spoken of. Another is the practical problem of keeping such a confrontation within tolerable bounds if it happens. A third is the problem of keeping outbreaks within the non-communist world from spreading into a general war.

Take first the case of East-West hostilities of a local variety. The scope of such hostilities would undoubtedly take its shape from the estimates each side made of the intentions and the capabilities of the other. Given the will to keep such hostilities limited, the UN can then
offer the advantages it did when the US unilaterally decided to resist the Russians in Korea.

These advantages are several. First, the UN furnishes one means of securing maximum worldwide political support. Such support is indispensable to prevent us from isolating ourselves from world opinion and from losing that sense of legitimacy and moral right without which we as a people could not, in my opinion, sustain a military effort. The second advantage is the exploitation of the commitment to assist the Organization in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter. With the constitutional development of the UN this no longer has to mean "action" in the legal sense of Security Council enforcement. Even marginal offers of bases, transit rights—even "a sharpshooter on a camel"—can pay heavy dividends in demonstrating the breadth of international disapproval of a Soviet act of limited aggression. The technical difficulties of a unified type of command are great, but it has been demonstrated that they can be overcome.

The other situation, which seems the more likely one, deals with military hostilities not directly involving the US or the USSR. I have already enumerated some of the likely candidates for this sort of local explosion in the future. I have also made reference to the UN Emergency Force, which literally overnight provided a means of separating the combatants in Egypt and making trained manpower available to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops, and now stands as a guarantor against any but the most reckless renewal of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. This was possible only because a conscious decision was made to exclude great power contingents from the force. In this way the wound was
cauterized and made relatively sterile. Great power participation would at
best have made the force inoperative, at worst precipitated just the
kind of direct confrontation, on the ground, which we wish to avoid.

There are many possible types of UN forces that might move into
such trouble spots before or after hostilities. Their effective utility
probably hinges on the exclusion of the great powers, limiting the con-
flict literally as well as figuratively. Perhaps the most practical way
to bypass the budgetary difficulties, which are great, would be to set
up a training command, possibly renting a Swedish or Swiss training
facility, and, with a small cadre, rotate in and out selected units from
the member countries, which would then be held in reserve at home.
Perhaps the most important point is that we should stop judging the UN and its po-
tential by a sterile and unrealistic image of collective security through
a world police force, an image whose cost is world government which we ourselves
seem to find wholly unacceptable. Realistically, the practical military
contribution of the UN in this age doubtless lies in the kind of limited
"brush-fire" prevention and cleanup squad I am describing. Its impor-
tance may be absolutely critical in preventing or pacifying another out-
burst like Suez.

The force I have in mind is not a fighting force, although it can
defend itself against small scale attack. It is a force in aid not of
full scale military action but of peaceful settlement procedures either
before or after fighting actually occurs. Perhaps it should be called
the UN Corp for Observation and Patrol—UNCOP. We could spend the entire
hour discussing it. It is enough to say that it seems to offer a ready-
made means for dealing with those situations which call for pacification
procedures on the spot but where US or Russian involvement would spell nothing but greater trouble.

Our final objective deals with the uses of the UN in a general war situation. We are prone to believe that general war will mean the end of the UN. This may be so. But if all our weapons are to be brought to bear, the UN umbrella could be a vitally important political weapon for legitimizing and maximizing a US military response just as it was in Korea. Certainly our war planning must not throw away this possibility, particularly if doing so would give the UN to Russia on a silver platter. There may be no post-war world to organize. But we must assume there will be, and we must finally learn the lesson that war is a prelude to the politics of peace, not an end to all political problems. In this connection, I take a very dim view of proposals to expel the Russians and their satellites from the UN on the assumption that a total break is ultimately inevitable. Apart from all the other reasons for keeping contact, exposing Soviet policies to the light, and holding the UN together as a means of conducting the necessary business of nations, the UN could at the very outset of a general war provide a means for according legitimacy to non-communist representatives of the Soviet bloc and thus supply a vital political focus for the political aims of the war.

In conclusion, I repeat what I said at the outset. This analysis is fragmentary and incomplete, and in the time available to me only some
highlights could be touched upon. Perhaps the most that can be claimed for it lies in its suggestions for fruitful lines of action that seem worth exploring. But if it has any validity, it also strongly suggests that we may be prisoners of outmoded ways of thinking about and using the UN.

Perhaps the Suez case of 1956 sums up much of what I have said about our peculiar misuse of the UN and of diplomacy itself. Throughout the period of intense and futile negotiations during the summer of 1956 we rigidly shunned any positive use of UN instrumentalities. Hard as it is to believe in the light of the subsequent disaster, our primary motive in avoiding such use throughout that period was to avoid any possible public discussion of the Panama Canal, by association, as it were. Consequently we relied exclusively on the so-called London group. We thereby insisted on a forum that was unacceptable to Egypt. At the same time we failed to avail ourselves of the wide range of UN possibilities, including appointment of UN mediator, or a UN agent general to operate the Canal in the interim without prejudice, or a joint regime, or at minimum recognition that the Canal had international character. Reasonable proposals with heavy UN support could conceivably have altered Egypt's intransigence. When the British and French finally went to the UN in early October, it was, in retrospect, obviously to clear the way for unilateral action. Only when fighting broke out, did we turn to the UN to stop it. And this was of course the one thing the UN was unable to do in any way apart from its purely moral force, and apart from outside, unilateral action, such as that taken in this case by the Russians and ourselves.
As I have shown, there may be extremely important ways of using the UN that are realistically supportive of our true concrete interests in the period now and immediately ahead. Some of the specific directions I have pointed to must be set against the less useful shibboleths and stereotypes and symbols about the UN that we still cling to, expressed in terms of universal collective security, the "misuse of the veto", the need for rigid US control over multilateral funds and programs, the popularity contest theory, and the persistent expectations about altruistic international behavior. The game is too important and the stakes too big to misuse any instrumentality that offers genuine opportunities to advance our national prospects and the prospects for a tolerable world around us.