GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Adapted from
The Monthly Lecture at International House of Japan*
Tokyo, December 6, 1963

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Identity has to do with how we know ourselves. This is a touchy, elusive, and complicated subject because once you get into it, there is no way of escaping autobiography, others' or your own or, usually, both; and even though they are in fact dealing with it most of the time, autobiography is a subject most inquiring scholars do their best to avoid. It might seem to be a long way from the intricate obscurity of the individual ego to the larger and somewhat more visible designs of the larger arenas in which we live and move - the tribes, classes, nations, parties, governments, societies to which we are attached - but the distance is not so great and the links have come more and more under scrutiny of various kinds in recent years. Politics is a matter of power and power is a matter of authority, and authority, as you here in Japan know better than most, is both an individual and a social matter.

The study of human affairs goes on along lines that shape themselves into a design that looks like a huge funnel. Down at the narrow end, the biochemists and the physiologists crowd the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who are in turn jostled by the novelists, and every so often by a priest, all interested in what the individual is and how he functions. Far out at the wide end, busy armies of

social scientists are feeding great masses of figures and symbols into computers, hoping they will churn out some hint of coherence among some of the larger aggregates of human experience. Obviously we learn much from both kinds of scrutiny; we know now how much more than the Oedipal experience is crucial in the life of every individual and we also know how little the large depersonalized categories still tell us about human society. Both ends are open; the biochemists think they are close to the deep-down place where life begins and who knows where the computer-men and the spacemen will take us. But there is also great movement in from both ends to places too quickly passed by, up and out from the mysteries of cellular life and the individual psyche and down from those draughty open spaces of the large abstractions. All kinds of "new" ground is being "discovered" here as many different lines of vision begin to cross and criss-cross. The place is full of sudden meetings and brief encounters, between psychoanalysts and anthropologists and sociologists and humanists and economists and psychologists and political scientists— with all of them running into some of the old inhabitants who have been here all along, some writers and journalists, even some politicians, but most of all, community and social workers. Some of these brief encounters have led to longer affairs, even to love and marriage, and the result has been inquiry multiplying and growing and taking on new forms as we all go on trying to learn what puts the individual together, how he interacts with other individuals, and how this shapes and is shaped by the social process.

I began, myself, at a point out nearer the widening end of the funnel. As a student of politics and international affairs, I was concerned with the abrasive interaction of nations and classes. It was during one of the largest of these abrasions that I found myself being drawn down toward the smaller end of the funnel in an effort to learn more about the nature and experience of individuals caught up in these collisions. Down there, as it curls away in its disappearing narrowness lie, one supposes, the biochemical secrets of life. Just above them up a curl
or two, hides the single psyche, elusive as a virus, shaping itself out of the instinctual-biological endowments of each individual and the interaction of these endowments with whatever it is that comes by osmosis through the parental membrane and gives each new personality the beginning of the shape of its unique self. And right there is where the individual begins to interact with other individuals; the passage widens and the light gets better and more can be more easily seen. Here to his uniquely-held elements he adds those which he shares with others from the outset, beginning to make up what I distinguish as his shared holdings, or his basic group identity, the social features, or what Erik Erikson has called the "shared samenesses" that are part of his ego identity. These are mainly the things with which every person is quite involuntarily endowed at birth: his ethnic being, his name, color and physical characteristics, the geography of his birthplace, his history and origins, his nationality, language, religion, his inherited value system, his social-economic threshold, and all the impinging circumstances of his time. They are basically the ingredients of the common culture in which he comes as an individual to share.

The function of this basic group identity is to provide an individual with a supporting measure of self-acceptance, self-pride, self-esteem. Some people can derive a sufficient self-esteem out of the stuff of their individual personalities, above, beyond, or often despite, the character or situation of their group. Others depend heavily on their group identity to supply what their own individualities may deny them. Most people need all they can get from both sources. Many men find this need satisfied in one or more of the many other multiple group identities they acquire in the course of their lives, as members of that team, club, school, military outfit, occupation, business or professional group, or whatever. But these secondary sources of self-esteem are adequate only where the conditions created by the basic group identity do not get in the way. This can occur up to a point in a ghetto situation, for example, or wherever a similarly tight homogeneity exists.
But these protective walls of identity have rarely stood long and none forever - even the Great Wall of China was finally battered down. Relationship and interaction with other groups govern in the lives of most people, even in historic periods we think of as "stable," and it is here where the elements of basic group identity become the essential determinants of group self-esteem. This takes place at many different levels and in many different ways, and is influenced by many different conditions. I am suggesting that chief, and probably decisive, among these are the political conditions, i.e., the conditions of power in which the group identity is held. How dominant or how dominated is the group to which the individual belongs, and how, therefore, is he able to bear himself in relations to others? This, I think, is the cardinal question and it is essentially a question of politics or power.

Like health or money, group identity presents no problem when it is an assured given, when the self-acceptance it generates is an unquestioned premise of life. It is only when it is failing to give a man an acceptable basis for pride in himself - or worse, forcing him into a pattern of self-rejection - that it becomes a problem and, sooner or later, a matter of crisis. This is precisely the point at which group identity and politics meet. It is the starting point of much notable history, of many notable lives. This has been a critical point at all times, but never more so than in a time like the present when all power systems are changing, all group relationships being revised, and all group identities being forced to rearrange themselves to meet the transforming circumstances. This is the current condition of all sorts and kinds of men and it is this painful and complicated process of changing group identity that I seek to draw your attention.

We all know groups of people whose history has been distinguished by great changelessness in these matters, sometimes across centuries of time. We also all know people who yearn after this kind of history - I suppose you are not without them here in Japan - but it is getting rather hard to come by. In our contemporary
history, and I need speak only of the events of the five decades-plus of my own
lifetime, swift technological change and a series of wars and revolutions have
transformed the conditions of life in one degree or another for virtually everyone
on earth. I presumably do not need to rehearse or summarize these events here or
spend too much time reminding you of your own involvement in them. Japan's role in
this history has been dramatic and the struggle of Japanese individuals for re-
definition now is hardly less so. By its own power drive in Asia, which it joined to
Germany's in Europe, the Japanese nation created by the Meiji transformation helped
to bring down the Western system of world empires, suffering a crushing defeat
itself in the process. Out of the successive and catastrophic confrontations of
national power and the revolutionary challenges of these decades has come no new
world order but a new power struggle and, thanks to the new thermonuclear weapons,
a fragile power stalemate of uncertain duration. In a world desperately in need of
some new way to organize itself on a global basis, more than half a hundred new
nations have meanwhile been carved out of the shattered empires. It is the sorry and
perhaps the fateful paradox of a too-belatedly triumphant nationalism. Each one of
these new states carries a great burden of backwardness while facing the formidable
demands of modernization, economic development, social change. Creating new systems
of political power and choosing paths for effective and social and economic change
are the great and overwhelming demands of the epoch, greater demands than any nation,
even a great and powerful nation, can meet by itself. It is one of those great
turnings of history, more massive than any ever before know, a great shift in the
power systems by which the world's people are ruled, a great shift in all the cir-
cumstances and environments, a resetting of all the conditions in which people live.
No one is exempt from the changes this history imposes, not even the great masses
of people caught by the turning still in the mesh of their backwardness, certainly
not their children, so many of whom are now going, as so many of their elders never
did, to some kind of school. One way or another, at one pace or another, all are
being compelled to shed old images of themselves and to begin acquiring new ones, to gain new views not only of themselves but of others and of the relationship between them, to begin transforming, in short, the terms of the group identities they inherited from the past.

In these recent years, it was not only the old system of power that came crumbling down, but along with it the whole superstructure of conceptions and self-conceptions, mythologies, and assumptions, all the patterns of superiority and inferiority created over three centuries by Western white Europe to advance and maintain its power over the rest of the world. Japan, which tried unsuccessfully to take over that power in Asia, created and used mythologies of its own in this process and these too have evaporated along with the dream of empire, giving Japan its own peculiar form of the present universal confusion. The fact is that as a direct result of these massive political changes, every person everywhere is faced with the need to redefine who and what he is, all the ex-subjects and all the ex-masters, all who thought they would be "free" if only they could become nationals of a nation of their own, and all who, like the Japanese, found that the "nation" they had had brought them to disaster; all who were "backward" becoming members of modernizing societies, all the ignorant and illiterate of the world now being separated from their children by the great divide of education and literacy, all the women who were thralls now becoming persons, all the members of extended families based on an obsolete ruralism giving way to nuclear families in a massively growing urbanism. It is in settings such as these that I am asking my questions about group identity and political change, and asking them particularly of the young.

The most climactic of these events have been concentrated in the last two decades or so. This is hardly enough time for historians to begin to gather the material they need, much less the perspective, to chronicle the events just passed; hardly enough for other students of society to keep track of things happening, much less find ways of understanding them. But it is enough time for a generation of
young people to become adults and for a new generation of young people to appear. I do not have the figures, but I would assume the world must by now be nearly half-populated by people born after Hitler marched into Poland or after Japanese planes hit Pearl Harbor. The child born that day will have his 23rd birthday tomorrow - a short span of time, but long enough for a person to grow up from childhood to young adulthood, to begin carrying the accumulated burdens of the past and to face the complicated and painful demands of the present and the dimness and insecurity of the future. Most of these young people cannot see things as their fathers saw them - most of the "things" their fathers saw are no longer there. They have to discover themselves in a setting that is largely new and whose shape they must fix themselves.

In few places in the world has this generational difference been more dramatically experienced than in Japan, where concepts of history, or life, of the meaning of being "Japanese" are marked off in a vocabulary that separates age groups by their relationship to the war - the gen sen ha, the gen chu ha, the gen go ha, - the pre-war, wartime, and postwar generations. To be sure no two people seem to agree on many of the important definitions attached to these terms, but I have no doubt that all of you could spell out in rich detail your own experiences as grandparents, parents, or as sons or daughters that would reflect your own parts in this difficult and painful process of change. Out of an accumulation of such experiences, could we get to learn about them, we could begin to identify the elements that compose the group identity called "Japanese" and to see some of the ways it is changing under the pressure of the things that have been happening to Japan and to Japanese in this time.

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There is of course an intimate relationship between the way we see ourselves and the ways in which we see others, and this is where my own inquiry into these matters began. How, in the course of these confrontations, do people "see" each other across their national, cultural, and "racial" barriers? How do these perceptions affect their behavior, the politics and the policies of their governments and their
societies in general? How are these perceptions-of-others shaped, especially by the ways in which people hold their perceptions-of-themselves? And then, how about these views people have of themselves, what are they made of? And what happens to them when they come under the transforming impact of major political change? This was the sequence of questions which began to engage me and which, thanks to my association with the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., I have been pursuing in a series of explorations and inquiries during the last ten years.

The first of these was an examination of American perceptions of China and India. I had had for some time an interest in the history and politics of these relationships. But now I took my questions to a rather different arena—the minds of some 200 American educators, editors, writers, scholars, business and church leaders, public men—all occupying key places in the communications network of the society. I set out to discover what they associated with Chinese and Indians, to trace these associations back in their minds to their origins, and from there back into the mass media, the literature, the school texts, and the history to which they had been exposed. The results of this study appeared in 1958 in a book called *Scratches on Our Minds.* Among many other things, I found a close relationship between the sets of images Americans had developed in their minds about the Chinese and the successive stages of power and powerlessness through which the Chinese had passed during the long period of contact between the United States and China, and located the special source for some of the unique emotions felt by Americans in relation to China in the American missionary enterprise that for a long time dominated the relationship and created the main channels of communication about it. The study of perceptions of India showed, again among many other things, that some kinds of cultural differences are pretty nearly unbridgeable. This work also illustrated how directly an individual's perceptions of another people and another culture are shaped

and colored by his own particular window on the world: the time, place, and circumstances of his encounter, his particular background and education, elements of his own unique personality (an unseen "specter" hovering in, over, and behind all these matters), and the political conditions or power relations at the time when his ideas about this were fixed in his mind. Another thing it showed was that the best-schooled minds are embarrassingly capable of carrying the most flagrant kinds of prejudices and stereotypes, that these can be based on both ample and scanty experience, and that they can be held firmly over years, even a whole lifetime, without ever coming under critical examination.

Another finding richly illustrated in this material was that these stereotypes and the attitudes based upon them (or the attitudes from which they come) occur almost always in pairs, a crowded array of coupled pluses and minuses in the arks of our minds, counterparts of "good" and "bad," or "goodie-images" and "baddie-images" which could be summoned up or dismissed according to need — and in most significant cases, this need would be political. Thus of the Chinese, Americans — and I imagine many other people too, including many Japanese — have an assortment on the one hand of what I called the Marco Polo-Pearl Buck images and on the other the Genghis Khan-Fu Manchu images, the great "goodie"-Chinese who were "wise" and the great "baddie"-Chinese who were "fiendishly clever," the "thrift" and the "miserly," the people with "a great capacity for suffering hardship" and their counterparts with their great capacity for inflicting violence and cruelty. These twin sets of qualities are very useful things to have around in the press of conflict, for when events demand it, one can push the right button and bring to front and center the appropriate set of images and attached emotions. In every case, incidently, one can do this without being wholly false to the reality. The Chinese heroes of the 1940s became the Chinese monsters of the 1950s without having to move very far from the one compartment to the other in anyone's mind. I am sure other examples will occur to you out of our recent common history — the gemutlich Germans to the Kaiser's Germans to the gemutlich
Germans to Hitler's Germans; the totalitarian dictator Stalin to "good old Uncle Joe" to totalitarian dictator; and similar sets of images that we Americans developed about you Japanese - from the pages of Lafcadio Hearn to the roads that led to Bataan and back, in some cases all the way back to Hearn. I repeat, none of these is ever wholly false and some, when precisely and carefully located, are pleasantly or terrifyingly true. That is why they lend themselves so well to the needs of propaganda even when, or perhaps especially when, as in these years these needs have put us all on a kind of flying trapeze swinging in great and dizzying whooshes across the arenas of our contemporary history. I could remark of myself that my own governing images of Japanese were created in China in the 1930s, that my last visit here was in 1945, and that when I came back this time these images were still quite strongly imbedded in the forefront of my mind providing me here with the interesting experience of making certain necessary corrections to meet the needs of changed times and fresher events. This is a matter that calls for great and constant examination and self-examination by everyone, a discipline we need to impose to see more clearly just how we do acquire our images and feelings about others and how we use them in our relationships. I do not mean to suggest that if we do this we will necessarily get along better with each other, much less learn to love each other, but only that it will enable us to be more intelligent about our differences and our hostilities and perhaps to co-exist a bit more reasonably and to enjoy thereby a more tolerable history.

I followed this inquiry with what began as an examination of the impact of world affairs on racism in the American society and developed into a study of the impact of world power changes on Negro Americans and became an examination of the elements of the group identity of Negro Americans coming up for revision under the pressure of great events. One of the things that passed with the Western white empires was the power to maintain the myths of white supremacy which had for so long adorned the superstructure of Western power in Asia and Africa. In the United States this
meant the end at last of the gross paradox of surviving second-class citizenship for Negroes in the American society; the needs of American policy in the changing world, if nothing else, began to force the American society at long last to live up to its own most basic professions. For Negroes in America, what was happening in Asia and Africa on this score provided the spur that increased the pressure they put on the white society to accept in fact the equality of status they professed in principle. But a new kind of pressure by the same token was brought to bear on Negroes themselves.

Negroes in America were subjected for nearly 300 years in ways that all but completely deprived them of sources of self-acceptance and self-pride. Out of the sheerest kind of psychic needs for self-defense, Negroes over this time assembled the elements of a group identity which enabled them to cope with the conditions of their subjection. Now this history of subjection was coming to an end, in no small part through their own efforts. The system under which the Negro lived for so long has been swiftly changing. He is moving out of second-classness into his share of the common first-classness of all members of the American society. The old group personality no longer fits the new circumstances. Everything, or nearly everything, in the old group identity is obsolete or obsolescent. Everything about one's sense of oneself - one's name, color and physical characteristics, one's sense of place in the past and in the present - all of it is thrown into solution and a man finds himself in the almost unbearable state of being without definition in his own mind. This creates a condition of acute group identity crisis. This is exactly the experience through which Negroes in America are passing now, summoning up great resources of courage and resilience to win through to their right to go through this crisis and to acquire a new sense of themselves from which they will, at last, derive the self-acceptance which they have for so long been denied. I spent several years sorting out some of the elements of this experience with individuals going through it, and put
down what I learned in a recent book, *The New World of Negro Americans,* where anyone interested can pursue some of the details as I found them.

Again, there is hardly anyone in the world who is not going through his own comparable experience, and I have been engaged this past year in trying to glimpse in a number of different countries some of the other forms it takes and aspects on which it can be focussed.

Jews in Israel, to take a first example, present a peculiarly dramatic illustration of this interaction between group identity and political change. They are trying to solve in the most directly political way, by creation of their own state, the problems of marginality and rejection of Jews which came to their ultimate crisis in the Hitlerian holocaust. In the setting of a Jewish nation-state, re-established after a dispersion that lasted 2,000 years, all the elements of Jewish group identity come up in the first place for definition, much less re-definition and revision, for all the Jews coming to Israel bring with them not only their many varieties of "Jewishness" but also the many kinds of cultural and physical identities acquired from their centuries of living among so many different kinds of people. Most of the Jews who have come to Israel have come in flight from rejection, persecution, and the threat of extermination, and therefore enter upon this process quite involuntarily. Nearly unique among them are the Jews who have come to Israel as immigrants from the United States. This is a tiny group, its present number coming to not quite 10,000, among the 2,000,000 Jews who now fill the small new state; and it is even a tinier proportion of the 5,000,000 American Jews who remain Americans in the United States.

*John Day Company, New York, 1963,* also scheduled for publication in a paperback edition by Viking during 1964. For an examination of these elements in the setting of a group of Negro and white American college students during a summer's work camp experience in West Africa, see also my *Emergent Americans,* John Day Company, New York, 1961.
Unlike the greater mass of their fellow immigrants, these American Jews joined the Return not in flight but from choice, from a wish and a need to identify themselves as Jews by living in a Jewish society in a Jewish state. There is an element in this choice of a feeling of being rejected, excluded, perhaps even threatened in the American society, at the very least a sense of "outsiderness," of "not belonging." They come to Israel where the existence of a Jewish state guarantees their right to "belong." Yet it is here that they come up against a uniquely ironic block: in all but a very small number of cases, these American Jews in Israel do not want to "belong" in Israel badly enough to give up being "Americans" and to become "Israelis."

Lacerated by the thorns of this contradiction, many American Jews who have come as immigrants to stay have given up and returned to America; those who remain try to live with the double yolk of their group identities and hope it will prove a simpler matter for their children. Involved in this painful dilemma are some of the most fundamental elements linking group identity to politics. These are illustrated by the push and pull of the American promise of an effectively protected pluralism and the more limited American actuality; by the confusions of a remarkably powerful but also remarkably undefined "Jewishness," sometimes ethnic, sometimes religious, sometimes national, sometimes all three; by the power of the Jewish drive for survival, which rested for so many generations on the dream of a Return to Zion and then became a grim struggle in the aftermath of the nearly total destruction visited upon the Jews of Europe. In all their many forms, the group identity crises of Jews in Israel are, more than most, wrapped up in larger political outcomes affecting much more than Israel and many more peoples besides the Jews.

For a second example, consider the situation of the Untouchable in India, subjected for many more generations than the Negro American to a condition of total subordination and debasement. Partly because of the religious sanctions attached to this condition and the absence of any countering credo of free self-assertion,
the Indian Untouchable became a man who accepted his plight to an extent and in ways that the Negro in America never did. Although in certain group juxtapositions in India there is an element of skin-color differences and some of these differences distinguish some Untouchables, there are also dark-skinned Brahmans and light brown Untouchables. The condition is essentially a social-religious one and cuts across the spectrum of physical characteristics found among the peoples of India. But here is this Indian Untouchable now, thrust by the pressures of political change into finding some new basis for his existence. The channels of education, widened by the advent of Indian political independence to bring in more and more Untouchables along with other long-depressed castes and groups, are opening up a new universe to minds clouded by the accumulated ignorance of centuries. The power system in India changed sufficiently to make the Untouchable an ex Untouchable in law, but the society has not yet changed enough to make him an ex Untouchable in fact. The result is that there is a small but steadily growing segment of India's 70,000,000 Untouchables which has begun through education to seek and to win new footholds on a better life. But this has to be done in a society which still does not offer them much chance to exist on a new basis. The educated ex-Untouchable is driven by his education to try to raise himself up and out of the cesspools of his society and on to the open ground where everybody else lives. Out there, however, he finds everybody still living in the main by the rules of the caste system which excluded him and kept him at his subhuman level. He either has to try to break way from caste altogether and therefore from Hinduism, (as Ambedkar's followers have tried to do by becoming Buddhists, even as earlier refugees from Untouchability became Moslems or Christians); or else strive desperately to become somehow part of the system of touchable castes by which the society is still governed. He becomes a man who in one way or another wants to blot out his past altogether, who tries to keep his children from learning anything about their antecedents. He is a man who is trying to reach up from minus to zero, to
reach a point of nothingness where he can try to begin becoming, in the most literal and total way, someone else. I do not know how the situation of the ex-Utontouchable in India compares, say, to the situation of the outcaste Eta in Japan, although I gather that here too his road up and out of his untouchability lies in attempting to erase his past. There can be few identity crises more acute and more total than those which lead a man to try to blot out what he was in order to enable him to become something it is more tolerable to be.

Or consider a contrasting example, the Chinese in Malaya - one of the several groups of people whose status you Japanese tried to take a hand in changing a few years back. Diametrically unlike the Indian Untouchable, the Chinese in Malaya, (indeed the Chinese almost anywhere), is likely to be a man whose sense of his people's Past is one of his great sources of sustenance, providing him with the pride and self-acceptance that his own more immediate circumstances so often deny him. In Malaya for nearly a century, the Chinese retained not only their cultural identity, including their language, but also their nationality as citizens of China. Now the turning big wheels of history have pushed them into a situation in which their strong sense of identification with the China homeland is brought into many different kinds of conflict, and in which at the same time they are confronted with the need to become the bearers of an entirely new political identity, a new nationality called Malayan, or now, Malaysian. They are called upon, moreover, to share this nationality on a not-quite-equal terms with a people, the Malays, whose political dominance they are not as ready to accept as they did that of the British in times past. And if this be a difficulty dilemma for Chinese of middle age or older whose roots lie closer to the homeland past, think for a moment what it presents to the 20-year-old Chinese youth, born in 1943 - when you were in power there - now trying to find his way through the maze of new demands and new circumstances. And just to complicate it further, consider also the fact that the majority of these young Chinese have been educated as Chinese and use Chinese as their primary language medium while a sizeable minority, perhaps as much as a quarter, moved over into the English-language stream.
of education and have come to their young adulthood with minds quite differently filled from those of their Chinese-educated brothers, relatives, or neighbors. For the members of these two groups all the major entities in play carry different burdens of meaning and emotion and need. This is an example of a group identity freighted with the most direct kind of political consequences, for the future of Malaya as a state and of Malaysia as a federation of states depends on the way it is resolved.

An example of a different kind is offered by the Filipinos, a people who have moved through a layered experience, out of Malay origins into three centuries of rule by Spain, a strong in-mixing of Chinese, and nearly a half-century under the Americans. They even had, before becoming the independent Republic of the Philippines, a brief interlude of a few years that might be called their "Japanese period." Each phase of their history opened them in a powerful way to the absorption of whole sets of cultural patterns and characteristics: from Spain many of the essential features of their social structure and their religion; from the Americans the leavenings of American-style mass education, politics, and institutions; and I might add here that some Filipinos attribute to their Japanese "period" some measure of the lawlessness which is such a plague in Filipino life today. Now on their own, they find themselves needing to pull together the cultural and physical strands that have mingled to make them what they are, and to create out of them the design of a sameness, of a group identity that can be called Filipino - a problem similar to that of almost all our cultures that are made up of so many layered parts, yet acquiring uniquely Filipino features. This is not in any literal sense a crisis but a set of gnawing feelings and questions that every young Filipino carries with him into a new adulthood.

Or finally, let me dare, out of a considerable ignorance, a few remarks about the example of the Japanese. This brings us back, I think, to the kind of group identity crisis which is not merely affected by problems of power, i.e., politics, but is essentially political in character. With all due respect to what is assignable to the older Japanese tradition, I do not think it exaggerated to say that every Japanese
alive today is the product in some more or less crucial measure of the changes brought about in Japan after 1868; and that of these changes hardly any was more important than the creation of the new Japanese nation, the organisation of its power and the content and direction given to its national aims. This was essentially modernisation taken on not only to save Japan from domination and/or colonisation, but also to overtake and displace the Western system of power in Asia. In these interests the people were mobilised, the society re-oriented, and the Japanese nation moved through a remarkable series of transformations, challenges, and adventures that led in barely half a century through a succession of victories to the climactic catastrophe of 1945. The defeat in 1945 crushed the nation that was launched in 1868. The survivors have the task of shaping a new nation to take its place, - a rather more difficult task than rebuilding the cities destroyed by bombing. Barely 20 years have passed, a short time, but as I reminded you earlier, time enough for a whole new generation of people to come up. Many of the younger Japanese who have been coming up in this time reached out for something larger than the nation with which to fill their void. Like many others in other parts of the world, they reached in vain. The Communist gods failed them, and so did politically empty pacifism. Even a newcomer-stranger like myself can readily see and hear the signs and sounds of a reviving sense of nation on every side, a sense of national needs, "national interests," - a phrase, I gather, just re-acquiring respectability. Presumably waiting just around the corner is a revival of national armed power to correspond to Japan's gathering economic strength. These portents appear, it seems, along the entire spectrum. At one extreme there is an ultra-nationalist cultism that never entirely disappeared, and extremist religious cults that draw people desperately weary of a lack of clear authority, of emotional insecurity and ambivalence. In the large central area of moderate conservatism the impulses to a revived Japanese nationhood are perhaps most clearly defined. On the so-called "left," almost everything, including the Sino-Soviet dispute, Moscow's seeming conservatism and Peking's atom-bound extremism, is forcing the radicals to
define even socialism in some purely "Japanese terms." Even the Communist Party wages an electoral campaign under the ultra-nationalist-like slogan of "patriotism and righteousness."

One is left mainly with questions. What will the recreated Japanese nation be, from what source will it bring to a new generation of Japanese a new kind of self-accepting self-pride? What new patterns of authority will be established in individual lives, in Japanese families, in the new Japanese nation? What will be the consequences in all of this of the emancipation of Japanese women? What will this mean in the new shape of the family and the new shape of the country's politics? What kind of Japanese culture will be created by a new Japanese affluent society? What mark will the older generation, now still in power, try to put on these new shapes before it passes from the scene? What form of power for the nation? What new role for Japan in Asia, in the world? What shape will be given to these things by the men of sen chu ha age who must in due course begin to occupy the seats of power? What new combinations will today's young people make for themselves out of all these circumstances? To the youngsters now in high school what will it mean, in the coming years, to be Japanese? These and many other questions rise out of the re-shaping of the Japanese nation that is now taking place; and this re-shaping of the nation is, I believe, the heart and core of the making over of the Japanese group identity.

One can look in almost any direction for other examples: the post-isolationist Americans, the post-imperial Englishmen (who invite comparison to the post-imperial Japanese), the post-colonial Africans, the post-Hitler Germans, the Maoist Chinese. Perhaps it is not too soon to begin speaking of the neo-imperial Chinese, as indeed one might speak now of the neo-imperial Gaulists (would be alternative to the post-imperial Frenchmen), or even of the neo-imperial Indonesians. No one is exempt. No one's group identity stands intact, each going through its unique experience, each with its unique character which one can seek to discover and to sort out.
How do we sort it out? Well, to keep the answer simple, we begin by trying to identify the parts and then to see how they fit together. At the outset I listed what seem to me to be the essential elements of the basic group identity: name; color and physical characteristics; culture past (history and origins, language and religion and art and inherited value system); nationality or national consciousness; and finally, starting off from the social-economic threshold, everything that goes into the making of anyone's culture-present with all its concentric and multiple enlargements. For examples let me here again stay with what seem to be the simplest ones. Take the matter of name.

The name one goes by - as individual or in a group - is just about the most elementary form of identity there is, yet even by itself it carries a great freight of meaning and can often dramatically illustrate or even embody the problem or the crisis that is in view. Negroes in the United States, for example, have not even yet come to a firm and inwardly acceptable name to go by. They never have had such a name and this fact alone shows how prolonged and how permanent their group identity problem has been. The term "Negro" has long been a matter of controversy and deep feeling among Negroes and although its acceptance has been a common one in recent years, it has never been a sure one. It shares its place in the vocabulary with other choices, mainly the non-descriptive word "colored," and others. Follow this fact through its history and its complexities, and it will lead you to the heart of the group identity crisis which Negro Americans today are struggling so hard to resolve.

Usually much less critical than in the Negro case, yet enormously illuminating and never unimportant, the matter of name crops up elsewhere, indeed almost everywhere one looks among the changing group identities. In Israel, I found separate pools of meaning forming around the group names "Jew" and "Israeli." Some Jews have come to Israel to be, as they said, "Jews among Jews"; while some young Israelis move toward shedding the identity of "Jew," not only associating it with what they see as the shameful history of the Diaspora, but accepting all the stereotypes attached to it.
during that long period of time. Another example: Jews coming to Israel from many
countries where they had always been denied the common national identity and always
been known as "Jews," become known in Israel - often for simple convenience, but oh
with what irony! - as the "Poles," the "Russians," the "Yemenites," the "Moroccans,"
and so on. In the same way, American and English Jewish immigrants are commonly
called the "Anglo-Saxons." I do not know, even if I had the time to dwell on it here,
if I could convey to you just how sardonically funny that is.

In India some names indicate caste, and some ex-Untouchables trying to lose
themselves by "passing" in the caste society sometimes drop their names and adopt
others which appear to give them another caste identity, a common device of those who
try to shed one group identity by assimilating to another. It has been used by some
Jews and is not unknown here in Japan, I gather, when members of the outcaste Eta
community similarly shed their telltale names. Name-changing of this kind rarely
succeeds by itself in effecting an escape from one group identity to another, but we
all know many examples of the way name changes have accompanied the gradual absorption
of one group into another, as in the Normanization of Saxon England or in the
Americanization of the many groups that came to make up the American nation. These
too, in their time, were part of group identity changes of considerable depth and
magnitude.

I have been much interested to learn a little bit here about the ongoing
difference of opinion about the use of "Nihon" or "Nippon" as the country's name -
and to catch some of the resonances that go with that difference, "Nippon" the harsher
and more muscular word which the militarists preferred to the softer "Nihon."
Especially in the present atmosphere of reviving nationhood, it suddenly becomes much
more than an aesthetic or literary question - doesn't it? - when you have to decide
what letters to sew on the jerseys of your Olympic athletes. "Japan" apparently has
been used in some cases but that is English, and English is hardly nationalistic
enough in games that will herald in their own way the return of this country to the
international lists. In the matter of family names, it is interesting to reflect on the fact that in Japan none but the samurai class had family names until after the Meiji restoration. I wonder what meaning there would be, for anyone trying to learn more about the nature of modern Japanese and their society, in the detailed story of what went into the choosing of and getting used to the names that most Japanese now hold.

In the Philippines, I can add here for comparison, it was only some 25 years before the beginning of the Meiji era that a large proportion of the people acquired their family names, also by fiat from above. The Spanish governor of that time, apparently as a means of tightening control of the population, distributed lists taken sheet by sheet from a Madrid register and ordered parish priests to distribute these names taken from those of the saints. The country itself was named after a Spanish prince and it is a striking fact, apparently little known to people of the present generation, that the name Filipino, right down to the time of the war against Spain and the intervention of the Americans, was applied only to Spaniards born in the Philippines. In the Spanish period the people of the country bore the same name given to the people in the Americas when they were discovered, Indios, carrying on the remarkably long-lived mistake made by Columbus who thought he had landed in the Indies. Indio was a term of subordination and contempt in the Philippines and was rejected by those who defied the Spanish, but not until after 1900 did the people of the country generally take over the name Filipino. The name Indio, used for nearly 300 years, disappeared and as far as I could discover in the minds of those I interviewed in the Philippines, left no trace.

So you see there is a great deal in names, as Shakespeare knew well despite the sweetness of his roses, individual names and group names, names that make some people feel proud, names that make some feel shame, names that are taken for granted, or names vulgarized into expletives used to show anger or contempt or envy. Pursuing names along, you move far inside the margins toward the discovery of some of the inner
content of any group identity. But somewhere along in here, very soon, you come on something that is much less marginal: color and physical characteristics.

There is much about this matter that we know now better than we did, and much we still do not know at all. Color and physical characteristics are the obvious symbols of what has been called "race" and "race," as we all know, has served all kinds of men as the basis of their self-esteem or their lack of it, and has occupied a central place in much of the human story. Our behavior in this respect still commonly ignores what is scientifically known now about "race." Skin color and physical characteristics still dominate the group identities of some men, black men in America and Africa whose blackness became the burden a white-dominated world placed upon them, and some white men, as in South Africa or Mississippi, for whom the element of "whiteness" remains the paramount element in life and whose present group identity crisis revolves around the maintenance of their myths about it. But this is hardly only a matter that lies between "blackness" and "whiteness." It appears with varying intensities along the entire color spectrum, among all shades of men who have attached values to "lightness" and "darkness" in almost every culture and place. These were submerged for a long time in the common subordination of all so-called "non-whites" to the so-called "whites." But now, when that power has been re-diffused among the "non-whites" and the mantling mythology of white supremacy has been so largely pulled away, these older designs come again into view. We become aware of the many ways in which people who writhed under the superiority patterns of the "whites" now apply similarly based (and similarly baseless) superiority patterns of their own to the many shades of color differences among themselves. This is to be seen in India, in the Philippines, in Japan, indeed just about everywhere. It is still the simplest thing for embarrassed people to blame this on the legacy of Western white dominance, but this easy explanation does not often withstand a harder look. In any case, it is clear that in all its varieties and with all its sources, feeling about color and physical characteristics figures in a key way in every group identity. It is more critical in some than in others, but it is never unimportant.
Hardly less critical as a source of self-pride or lack of it, is the matter of a man's history or origins, the whole culture-past out of which he comes, the sources of his myths, his language, his religion, his professed values, his art, of that element - in sum - of continuity with the past which contributes its own peculiar quality of meaningfulness to the individual life. The mix of it plainly varies greatly from group to group, different people using it in widely different ways and with different effect. In one combination, for example, it is part of the explanation for the rather remarkable survival of the Jews as a group; in another it is the key to the strength of the group identity of the Chinese; and in quite another, of the group identity of some Indians. For all three of these unlike groups with their very different histories, this has provided them with sources of self-satisfaction and pride which their other circumstances have so often denied them. In some quite narrowly-defined groups, the whole stock of self-pride is sometimes supplied by group identities centered on the accident of descent itself, as among Brahmins in India who argue, of course, that their descent is no accident, or among any of the hereditary nobilities of Europe or Asia, or their American equivalents such as the descendants of the Mayflower company or the Daughters of the American Revolution. Individuals in these cases use some ancestral distinction to give content to lives that can otherwise be threateningly empty. Contrast these examples with that of the African, one of whose main problems of re-emergence is often the rediscovery and reassertion of his history, of his continuity through more than sheer survival, his possession of a past from which he can reclaim the legacies of pride that the white world, in the main, denied him through the long era of his submergence. Or the contrary example I have already cited, of the six-Untouchable in India who wants to blot out his known past in order to give his children a fresh identity from which they can begin to derive some elementary self-respect.

Closely bound up with history are the elements of nation - nationality, nationalism, national consciousness. I use all three terms because some group identity
arises rise distinctively out of each of these variations on a common area of identity. Political upheavals in our decades produced millions of people who came to be known as "displaced persons," people who suddenly discovered, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, that nationality had become almost the only link between a person and the rest of humanity, and that to be without it was to be cut off from other men, indeed often cut off from life itself. In addition to stateless people in a world of multiplying states, we also now have people, like the Chinese in Malaya or Indonesia, whose problem of nationality has suddenly become a central problem of existence, or the Jews who in Israel are trying to solve their problem by acquiring a nationality distinctively their own. The historically tardy triumphs of nationalism in the last two decades have changed the political face of the world, bringing into being some sixty new nations — some as the product of long struggle, some of no struggle at all. In virtually all of these the first task of the new men of power is to create a new national identity that their fragmented peoples will recognize and accept. In older states the sense of nation, finally, has also become, as in Japan, the object of new gropings for self-definition in a world that is seeking but cannot find the way to any larger kind of coherence.

There is much more, of course, but perhaps this carries us far enough for this occasion into the complexities of our culture-present and sufficiently illustrates both the nature of group identity and its linkages with political change. It is obviously not enough, however, to identify these elements and arrange them in neat boxes, giving a speciously regular appearance to what is actually a confused splatter. No mind, no personality, no individual or group identity ever looks like a set of neat boxes. It is much more likely to look at first glance, much more like a canvas produced by one of those paint-bucket throwing artists who have mirrored for us what it is like to surrender to utter haplessness. But perhaps if we stay with this image, it may be more like a painting by Jackson Pollock whose whirls and whorls so often elusively are trying to mean something and where some quality of shape and color becomes somehow salient. But I do not think the vagueness and confusion need be seen