MASS COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

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One approach to political science is the study of communication. Politics is, after all, a process of interpersonal influence. "Interpersonal influence" is also a possible definition for communication. So these two things are closely interrelated.

A political science book is also likely to be a communication study whenever its approach focuses on the process rather than the outcome of political interaction. If it focuses on how people influence each other rather than what they get out of doing so it is communication study as well as a political science one.

Studies of politics of a kind that could be included in a bibliography on communication start with the ancient Greeks. Among the classic studies are Plato's Gorgias, which considers morality in propaganda; Aristotle's Rhetoric, and John Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1846) which analyze the structure of persuasive argumentation; Lenin's What is to be Done (1902), a large part of which is devoted to a discussion of the role that an all-Russian newspaper might play in the revolutionary politics of the Bolsheviks; Milton's Areopagitica and Mill's On Liberty (1885) which consider the systematic effects of permitting freedom of expression in communication; Dicey's The Development of Law and Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century (1905) which
considers the effects of the ideological context on public actions; Marx's *German Ideology* (1832), and Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* and Pareto's *The Mind and Society* which distinguish the social function from the truth value of beliefs.

While all of these are books on communication, only some of the most recent ones (e.g. Lenin's *What is to be Done*) focus on mass communication as such. The growth of mass media to the point where they dominate the communication system of society is a phenomenon of recent times. Every society has some communication system for man is a communicating animal, but only in the last century have we had the emergence of an extraordinary phenomenon --societies organized around mass media systems.

The growth of mass media has had many profound effects on the quality of life. With the growth of the mass media there have also arisen exaggerated beliefs in the efficacy of the propaganda. A number of factors are responsible for the myth of the all-powerful propagandist. In the period after World War I the extreme right in Germany, unwilling to admit that their nation had been defeated in battle, proposed the myth that German victory had been snatched away from the soldiers by civilian acceptance of allied propaganda. This belief in a "Schwindel" led to much writing about the supposed magical powers of propaganda.

In the United States advertising and public relations men were
disseminating the same illusions since overestimation of propaganda was often useful in selling their own services. Popular writers who have believed their claims have written books about the vast powers of "The Hidden Persuaders".¹

The fallacy in the belief in all-powerful propaganda is brought home forceably whenever we ourselves are committed to the side of the propagandist and wish he could succeed better. An obvious example is civic education. Various studies, for example one by NORC on the effects of a United Nations week in Cincinnati, have emphasized the obvious fact that Herculean efforts seem to have but trivial results in raising the level of education and awareness among the citizen body.²

A key question about the role of mass communications in politics is just how effective are they? A large literature has been devoted to this question. One excellent book is Joseph Klapper's The effects of Mass Communication.³ It summarizes a great deal of what we know. Among the major primary studies one

might list the various works of Carl Hovland and the election studies by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and others.

Let us summarize some of the evidence and some of the conclusions. Both carefully controlled surveys of voters and impressionistic reviews of recent history show that in this country few votes are switched by the mass media in Presidential campaigns. From 1932 for a substantial number of years the American press was overwhelmingly pro-Republican in every campaign. President Roosevelt frequently castigated what he called a one-party press. Yet, every time the Democrats won. Clearly that does not mean that the press has no influence on the character of American politics. If we try to catalogue the relevant effects we would note for example that most people when asked their most important source of news, have until recently always replied 'the press'. (TV is beginning to be competitive.) The press also has a sub-


stantial role in creating interest in political campaigns, in providing people with the information that they use as they argue among themselves, and in determining the issues. It makes a difference to American politics that newspapers carry statements by both candidates (indeed the fact that they do is one of the reasons why the views of the press have so little direct effect upon the vote) in contrast to a situation in a country like Italy where most newspapers are party-committed and hardly ever report the other side. One cannot doubt that if the mass media were non-existent or differently structured our politics would be different. The point we are trying to make is that the effects of the mass media must be conceived much more broadly than simply as persuasion of people to accept the views presented in the media. The mass media have many more subtle and complex effects both through what they say and through their existence as institutions.

An outstanding discussion of an institutional effect of the existence of a press is the argument that Lenin made for an all-Russian newspaper. Some of Lenin's opponents in the Social Democratic movement argued that to establish a newspaper under Czariat censorship was a futile activity for certainly it could not say what they, the Social Democrats, regarded as the truth. What good would it then do? Lenin argued that the mere existence of a Social Democratic controlled national newspaper in Czariat Russia would be a valuable asset politically. It would provide the
basis for an organization. The paper would have to have correspondents in different parts of the country and a distribution network that would provide excuses for traveling back and forth, keeping in touch, etc. What it could say by way of marginal sniping at the regime would be helpful too. The main point, however, was that the newspaper would provide an organizational framework for conspiracy. This is an insight which has also occurred to racketeers in some American cities; they have found newspaper distribution a very convenient cover.

It is certainly not by chance that the history of development of political parties has been to a very large degree a history of the development of the press. Men who wished to create new movements typically set up newspapers to agitate and to provide what Lenin called 'a collective organizer'.

So if we are interested in the role of the mass media in politics we must look at many phenomena besides persuasion.

The studies of voting, particularly those by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and colleagues, have provided the most conclusive demonstration that relatively few minds are changed by an election campaign.

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Nonetheless these studies showed that election campaigns serve many other important functions. They define the issues on the basis of which voters decide how to vote. They mobilize voter interest and partisanship. The public is not the same at the end of a campaign as it was at the beginning even though few people have listened to the arguments and changed their minds. The public has undergone a heightening of political consciousness, a learning by each man of arguments on his own side, in most cases a rededication to the side to which he already belonged. The campaign serves an essential purpose in invigorating the politics of a democracy in which otherwise most people are apathetic most of the time.

Besides persuading people of the things being said, communication has effects on attention, on information, on audience interest, and on actions taken. Frequently a person will change his action without in any way concluding that what he previously thought to be true is false. The woman who buys a new beauty product has not been persuaded to change her beliefs, she has usually merely been informed of an opportunity to better achieve what she wanted to achieve all along.

Political scientists have paid more attention to the non-persuasive effects of communication than have some other social scientists. Perhaps this has been because they were interested
in the ideologies being communicated and their use in power politics, even where persuasion was minimal. For example, Harold Lasswell has long argued the importance of securing exact quantitative data on the distribution in the world of ideological symbols. In the 1930's he initiated the use of content analysis as a device to compare political propaganda in different times and places. This research was continued at the Library of Congress during the second World War and at the Hoover Institute during the post-war years. The RADIR studies at the latter Institution canvassed the political symbols used in editorials in major newspapers in five countries over a 60-year period. They demonstrated such trends as a decline in attention to ideas of property and a rise in concern for welfare.

Descriptive political content analysis thus has an inherent interest of its own. It can permit a society to examine itself and see where it stands on the great controversial issues. Karl Deutsch and others have been concerned, for example, with how much

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attention different countries have paid to each other over time.

Political content analysis can be used for inferential as well as descriptive purposes. It can be used as a means of determining the secret strategies of power holders who are in a position to influence the mass media. It is thus a device particularly well adapted to examining the secret motives of communist and fascist dictators, for they coordinate their mass communications with their total purposes. During the war, contents analysis of broadcasts was used by the BBC in England and the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in the United States successfully to decipher many German military intentions. Today Kremlinology serves the same purpose. Students of Soviet affairs make note of the order in which leaders are named or the appearance or disappearance of set slogans or formulas.

The fact that such analysis of Aesopian language works is testimony to the desire of the dictatorial rulers to communicate at the same time that they desire to maintain secrecy. If their wishes on secrecy and publicity were unambiguous there would be

9 A. L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson), 1959.

no point to Kremlinology. If they were satisfied with total secrecy they would not telescope their intentions in their mass media. If they were solely concerned with communicating they would not hide their messages in obscure formulae.

It is interesting to speculate about the specific reasons which lead the rulers of the Kremlin to engage in an apparently irrational pattern of behavior which ostensibly conceals but actually reveals. Like most patterns of behavior it serves not one, but several mutual reinforcing functions.

First, such behavior conforms to the traditional Bolshevik operational code. The Bolshevik movement is a very conservative one which governs itself very strictly by its past practices and history. It grew up under Czarism. As revolutionary conspirators, then, the Bolsheviks had to operate in Aesopian language. They learned to convey meanings to their comrades within the Party while at the same time remaining as obscure as possible to the enemy on the outside. Though circumstances have changed and the Bolshevik elite are now the rulers of the second strongest power on earth, they still play the game of politics the way they learned it in the secret circles of an underground movement.

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Secondly, they also carry with them from their revolutionary days some crippling taboos on private communication. For example the Russian government is terrified of the mimeograph machine. In their own revolutionary days the Bolshevike used it effectively to communicate illegally and privately. They appreciate its power. So now they have elaborate rules to control it. Every main administration—say Temple University if it were in Russia—has but one central mimeograph office where all work is done. Every stencil is numbered and the number printed out on sheets produced by it. Every time a stencil is used a card recording its number, who used it, when, what for, and in how many copies is recorded on the card. The cards are kept on file with the police. The net result of all of this is that getting something mimeographed is slow and cumbersome. Unless one has a high priority one will have to wait one's turn for several days or a week. As a result there is no easy way to convey information quickly and informally to "invisible colleges" of professionally associated colleagues. It often is just as easy to convey messages to such subgroups through the formal channels of the mass media, e.g. a Pravda article, as through a mimeographed memo.

Note, however, that this is changing. Those informal media which have been invented since 1917 are under less stringent rules than those mimeographed regulations inherited from earlier days. Tape
Recorders can be bought without any special license and are a popular possession among the alienated (e.g. jazz loving) youth. Photo-copying equipment currently presents a horrible dilemma to the Soviet authorities. It could dent their whole system of controls. At a recent American exhibit in the Soviet Union there was a photocopying machine available to the attendees. The Soviet press carried an angry blast at this nefarious violation of Soviet practice, for, according to the attack, people were even sticking their identification papers into the machine.

A third reason why the Russians communicate unavowable messages covertly through the open pages of their public prints is that this procedure provides a testing device as to what is allowed. If something can be said in the mass media without retribution then all readers know that it represents a legitimate position. What is said may provide a guideline to what may be discussed and a guideline as to who is in authority.

It has been said that a totalitarian society is one where whatever is permitted is required. By the rule of this joke any formula that appeared in the press would be a statement one had to make. That was the case in the worst Stalin years. Things have now changed enough to make the joke misleading. The press continues to give clues as to what are allowable statements, but allowable statements are not always required. To-day any policy
A decision in a socialist country requires two official decisions, not one. The first decision is a decision that something is to be decided and who is to decide it. The second is to decide. This has its analogue in a free society where contemporary decision theory is increasingly noting that the recognition and identification of an issue (interest articulation in current jargon) is the most vital part of the decision process. But in a free society that is the freest most unstructured part of the process. Anyone may identify an issue even though only specified officials may decide it.

In a communist country it takes a higher level authority to identify a problem and to phrase the alternatives than to decide on one of them. Only when an issue has appeared in the press is it legitimate to talk about it, and only when a position has been presented there is it legitimate to uphold it. The recent discussion of Liebermanism is an example. The old idea of controlling Socialist production by a market was made a legitimate one to discuss when Lieberman's article appeared in the press. When the Kremlin released that matter for decision they did not know what the outcome of the discussion would be—how far Liebermanism would be permitted, which branches of industry and which factories would adopt reforms and what reforms. But until alternative positions were authorized by appearing in the press no discussion was possible.
In a communist country every decision, being so political, becomes part of the struggle for power. The fact that a formula has appeared in the press is thus not only a clue that it has been discussed and ruled allowable by the powers that be, but also a clue that its advocates were powerful enough to win this permission. It is a clue to who is on top. The analysis by Myron Rush of the rise of Khrushchev provides many examples.\(^{12}\) The struggle over Stalin's succession was largely a struggle for the right to establish certain ritual formulae in the public press. One issue was the capitalization of Khrushchev's title, first secretary, or First Secretary, or as actually run in the press for a long time First secretary. Another was Stalin's title at the time of his death. These trivial issues were, of course, not the facts being fought over. The real battle that was going on behind the scenes, and with no public discussion was over appointments to positions of power. But the press provided signals to middle echelon personnel as to who was winning. The appearance of a pro-Khrushchev formula in a published book, or in Problems of Philosophy, or in Pravda was a sign that his men had taken over enough positions of power to enable him to place the words there in safety.

\(^{12}\) M. Rush, *op.cit.*
Thus the odd combination of publicity and secrecy that characterized Soviet mass media does serve real functions in that particular political system.

Such ambivalence between secrecy and communication is not a new thing in politics. Leo Strauss in various studies has argued that most political theory is primarily Aesopian communication.13 What we read as works of philosophy were written as tracts which for various reasons refrained from saying openly what the author had in mind.

There are many reasons why a political writer may resort to expression in the mass media while still not openly saying what he wishes to convey. It may be that he is writing for a small elite which knows how to read between the lines; he simultaneously conveys a quite different message to the naive reader. He may in his action be expressing his own irrational ambivalence about secrecy and self-expression. He may be protecting himself from prosecution under the law while at the same time carrying on an attack against authority. No complex society can function without

providing ways to communicate directives and persuasion to the population at large and especially to middle echelon cadres of responsible personnel. But many societies are not prepared to admit candidly what it is that they wish to communicate.

If political propagandists often are not ready to openly say what they mean the hearer to understand, it is equally true that they often do not mean to persuade people of what they say. Practicing propagandists are generally aware that the material they put out can have many purposes besides persuading people of its truth.

Psychological warfare studies illustrate this point rather clearly. Sykewar seldom seeks to convince enemy personnel that they ought to commit treason against their fatherland or adhere to the doctrines of the propagandist. When it does attempt such conversion it almost invariably fails. Psychological warfare succeeds only when its objectives are limited and the enemy forces are experiencing defeat. Under those circumstances psychological warfare can be effectively used as an instrument of further demoralization and to secure surrenders. The Nazis provided many illustrations of use of propaganda to intimidate rather than persuade. Edmund Taylor describes how they would broadcast the enemy's menu of the day across the lines simply to prove how well informed and omnipresent they were. Psychological warfare succeeds

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in winning surrenders as Shils and Janowitz have shown only when the primary groupings within the enemy forces have already broken up. The message then provided explains to the defeated soldier how he as an isolated individual can save himself. As in the advertising field psychological warfare works when it provides factual information on the basis of which people will act to achieve their own values and preferences, not when it tries to modify values.

Perhaps the most important political effects of the mass media are not their direct effects on their particular audiences, but the systemic effects of the mere fact that they exist. The growth of the mass media has had profound effects on political participation for example. Some people argue that the media, as contributors to the mass society, have been in part responsible for the growth of alienation. Other people argue that as contributors to modernity, they have been partly responsible for the growth of participation. These two apparently contradictory views are not necessarily completely contradictory. It is conceivable that the development of the mass media and with it the growth of literacy and knowledge of public affairs initially transformed peasant subjects into participant citizens of modern societies, but that at a later state there occurred a saturation of the public with mass media messages of little personal import to the individual.
His reaction to these might be to become less participant than in a society where interpersonal organizations such as political machines, played a larger role in mobilizing people. In short, it could be argued that there is a U-shaped relationship between media development and participation. It may lead first to citizenship to be followed by alienation.

I doubt very much, however, whether that is the case. The argument that the mass media contribute to political alienation is not a very well supported one. It may well be that the mass media cannot serve all the functions that interpersonal organizations such as parties serve but there is no need to believe that their net effect is to undermine such organizations. On the contrary, they probably contribute to their efficacy in some respects, while indeed undermining it in others. Consider the relationship between the mass media and political machines in the United States. Radio and even more TV has probably significantly reduced the power of local political machines. It has certainly reduced the use of rallies and mass meetings. Since Roosevelt demonstrated with his fireside chats that it is possible for a single national leader to be in direct relationship with every citizen, the President's role as a political organizer has eclipsed that of the precinct captain. Furthermore the cost effectiveness of the mass media is far greater than that of more individualized campaign output, at
least for getting information out. TV bills are high per hour, but they are low per person reached.

Nonetheless, the mass media have severe deficiencies in comparison with face-to-face organization. These two modes of communications serve different functions. For maximum effectiveness they must be linked together. This is something that the Soviets have long understood for they not only put out material in millions of copies of Pravda and Izvestia but they also have organized several oral agitators and provide them with arguments to be used in their speeches via a special magazine The Agitator's Notebook (Bloknot Agitatura).

Clearly any effective political leadership makes use of the mass media. While the organization that can best use mass media may not be the precinct machine, an examination of the activities of the national committee will show its efforts to consist of a combination of direct organization with production of material for the mass media. One of the difficulties in establishing effective party systems in newly emerging nations is indeed that the parties do not have easy access to radio, while the press does not play the role that it did in more literate societies in the days before radio and TV.

It has been demonstrated by a number of studies that the greatest political effect of propaganda is achieved by using the
disseminational power of the mass media to get a message out but coupling that effort with organization to get the message acted upon. People seldom act on information received directly from the mass media alone. The voting studies have shown that personal influence is the primary determinant of major political acts such as decisions on how to vote. Katz and Lazarsfeld have coined the notion of the two-step flow of communication in which much of the information comes from the mass media, while the decision as to what to do about that information is determined in conversations with opinion leaders. This is a pattern also found in the dissemination of agricultural information and in communication in various other realms too. UNESCO has conducted a series of studies of how to get peasants to adopt new practices. Their finding has uniformly been that agricultural broadcasts, whether on radio or TV, do get heard and much of the information in them gets learned, but that little action to adopt the new practices takes place unless listening discussion groups are organized. A classic study of this kind was conducted in India by Neurath and Mathur. Parallel villages received the radio message but in some the message was discussed and in others which served as a control, no

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discussion group was organized. Little difference was found between these villages in level of information but great difference in level of adoption.

Such findings raise a significant question for developing countries about their policies of control of radio. The dominant tradition of the press is one of individual freedom even if the ideal is often not lived up to. Except in communist countries and other dictatorships each person with an idea to sell has potential access to a newspaper. The commercial promoter uses the advertising columns, the political promoter establishes his own organ with its editorial columns. Radio and Television, however, because of the limited channels, are in most places treated as a public utility, and either nationalized or strictly controlled. Commercialism is kept down by barring advertising. Political agitation is kept off the air by restricting partisan broadcasting to brief periods in campaigns. This restrictive policy is probably counter-productive both for the development of commerce and for the development of stable political institutions. It forces the institutions, whether they be corporations or parties, to develop without the assistance of the most effective available instrument for getting messages out. The mass media need to be linked to the most important institutions of a society if those institutions are to make their potential contribution. Mass
media linked to political organizations form the basis for political development.

The intimate dependence of modern political party organization on mass media may be illustrated well by efforts to create stable polities in newly emerging nations, but it may also be illustrated by the political consequence of the growth of the mass media in the USA. In the 19th century the press and some magazines already played a significant role in this country. In the period 1800-1830 daily paper distribution was between 8 and 18 per thousand of the population—a figure comparable to that in China today and to be compared with the approximately 350 per thousand in the USA today. Small as this seems, the press was not trivial in impact any more than it is in China. It was already an instrument of political organization. However, the flow of information to individuals was slow. Much of the press consisted of weeklies, and there was nothing at all to compare with radio and television.

Political organization depended above all on personal contact either face-to-face or in the mails. It is interesting that the name chosen for an early organization was Committees of Correspondence.
The growth of the urban political machine in the United States had many causes and so did its decline. Some of these relate to the changing communication system of the country. Among the other causes was the growth of an urban, industrial system in a society ideologically devoted to equality, democracy, and the benefit of the common man. In every society in the early phases of industrialism some system had to be found to get people to accept rewards and incentives to capital while deferring much gratification of the working man and consumer. In the United States this was done in party by the devices of bribery and organization. Industrialists and speculators paid contributions to machine bosses who in turn paid the masses of immigrant working men for their votes by job placements, social service, coal in winter, Christmas baskets, etc. The machines were built by direct personal contact of the precinct captain with those he served, and of the local boss with the captains. We have already noted that the spread of mass media contributed to the decline of the precinct captain along with the decline of local political clubs, parades, and street corner rallies. Of course, the decline of the machine was also due to the end of the need for social service, partly because of rising living standards but also because of the development of social security and social services. These other causes could, however, have destroyed the
American party system altogether. Parties are not mentioned in the Constitution. If the basis of local machine organization had disappeared without the concurrent rise of mass media we might have evolved with industrialization in the direction of a bureaucratic elitist type of government or of a trade union based labor Party. That neither of these things happened is due in part to the fact that the new mass media provided the old political parties with an alternative mode of organization.

One can trace many such political effects of the mass media.

In 1933 William Fielding Ogburn\textsuperscript{17} made a list of 150 effects of the then new radio. We quote the political effects he noted:

94. In government, a new regulatory function necessitated.
95. Censorship problem raised because of charges of swearing, etc.
96. Legal questions raised beginning with the right to the air.
97. New specialization in law; four air law journals existing.
98. New problems of copyright have arisen.
99. New associations created, some active in lobbying.
100. Executive pressure on legislatures, through radio appeals.
101. A democratizing agency, since political programs and speeches are designed to reach wide varieties of persons at one time.
102. Public sentiment aroused in cases of emergencies like drought.
103. International affairs affected because of multiplication of national contacts.
104. Rumors and propaganda on nationalism have been spread.
105. Limits in broadcasting bands foster international arrangements.
106. Communication facilitated among belligerents in warfare.
107. Procedures of the nominating conventions altered somewhat.
108. Constituencies are kept in touch with nominating conventions.
109. Political campaigners reach larger audiences.
110. The importance of the political mass meeting diminished.
111. Presidential "barn-storming" and front porch campaign changed.

112. Nature of campaign costs affected.
113. Appeal to prejudice of local group lessened.
114. Campaign speeches tend to be more logical and cogent.
115. An aid in raising campaign funds.
116. Campaign speaking by a number of party leaders lessened.
117. Campaign promises over radio said to be more binding.
118. High government officers who broadcast are said to appear to public less distant and more familiar.

To-day we could do the same thing for TV. Except for 104, 106, and perhaps 114 we might repeat the same items and add a few speculative ones on which we have little evidence.

People watch campaigns at home together with their families.

They therefore feel less of the passion of a crowd.

They probably want more civil behavior, less hostility by the speaker. Perhaps the "nice guy" gets a better change in politics.¹⁸

Personality as compared to issue stand comes across more clearly than ever.

Politics on TV interferes with people's favorite entertainment programs.

Campaign costs rise.

Third parties have less chance than ever.

¹⁸ Some evidence may be found in my "TV as a New Dimension in Politics," in E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press), 1959.
Statements on networks must deal with more national, less local issues.

Increased pressure on candidates to debate.

Increased role in campaigns by professional media people as against politicians.

The Presidential press conference becomes an arena performance with no room for candid background information.

Newspapers to compete with TV spot coverage have to do more of what TV cannot do.

Increased difference between crisis and non-crisis public behavior. In crisis the TV industry gives round the clock coverage and the public is there on the spot.
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