REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL EXERCISE, SEPTEMBER 1958

by

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APPENDICES
A. INTRODUCTION

When the United Nations Project was set up in the Center in the spring of 1957, it was decided that it would be a useful vehicle for an experiment in so-called "political war-gaming" in which the Center as a whole had long been interested. The UN Project, while perhaps not the only appropriate institutional setting for such an experiment, was felt to have several pertinent virtues, such as its predominantly political focus, as well as the fact that the UN as an institution tends to deal with a series of discrete problems, often in a rather dramatic atmosphere.

It was therefore decided that at an appropriate time the UN project would organize one or more political exercises in which the value of "war-gaming" political problems would be tested as a possible device for use in teaching, training, or even in an operational sense, i.e., as a means of testing, within limits, hypotheses arrived at by more solitary forms of scholarship or policy planning.

1. Preliminary Planning. It was originally contemplated that the game would be run for a two-day period. This was decided to be too short and the final decision was for a three-day game. This was with the full awareness that the RAND Corporation in its analogous experiments in California had conducted one game for a period of thirty days, and had another intermittently underway for at least two years. It was felt that considerations of budget and of personnel and also the highly experimental nature of the endeavor suggested a
modest rather than an extravagant or grandiose approach. Five days was generally believed to be the optimum, but it was acknowledged that the likelihood of securing the desired caliber of specialists would diminish if they were asked to take part for a longer period than three days. The agreed timing also confirmed the desirability of simulating a political-military crisis situation rather than any more leisurely evolution not demanding worldwide responses and action in its early stages. The exercise was scheduled for mid-September, 1958, in order to ensure the presence of academic specialists whose summer vacations would have ended, but who would not yet be involved in fall registration, classes, etc. This first exercise was considered to be of the nature of a "dry-run," at least so far as the Center was concerned, and it was agreed that, generally speaking, the participants would be drawn from the Cambridge community.

In early May of 1958, after consultation with members of the Center staff, the Director of the UN Project prepared a preliminary paper spelling out possible problems which might lend themselves to the political exercise, suggestions as to the possible values of the exercise, and preliminary breakdowns of personnel and space requirements, papers and other briefing materials to be prepared, and so on. This preliminary paper also included a brief section in which the general format of the exercise was previewed, such as the extent of role-playing which could be expected of players, team arrangements, the role of umpires, ground rules with respect to written statements, oral speeches, etc., and, finally, a listing of possible teams and a preliminary prediction of the possible course of events in the exercise.

The preliminary estimate envisaged a three-day game which would start with a one-hour briefing session and two further hours for players to enter into their roles. After lunch on day 1 it was expected that players would
begin to prepare communications, that new objective information would be fed in by the Umpires, and that by the end of the first day a UN meeting would probably have been called for. The estimate of the second day was that teams would meet to review the situation, there would probably be a Security Council meeting in the morning, there would doubtless be a General Assembly session either on that afternoon or the next day, and "diplomatic negotiations" would continue until noon of the third day, after which no new information would be brought in. The afternoon of the third day would be devoted to a "post-mortem" evaluation of the exercise.

The game as played conformed generally to this preliminary format, even to the several UN sessions, which developed fairly naturally out of the situation. The major deviations in the actual game were the lack of a pause after the initial briefing and before moves would be made; the relatively low volume of new objective information introduced by the Umpires during the course of the game; and the lack of a full afternoon for the post-mortem session. In retrospect, in each case the original plan would have been preferable. (See Critique section.)

2. Preparations. The dates of September 10, 11, and 12th, 1958 were settled upon for the exercise. Letters were sent off in May of 1958 to possible participants in order to ensure the availability of trained specialists of high caliber representing various areas of the world. Because of this need the teams themselves were actually chosen before the precise problem was decided upon. This was possible because it was generally agreed that the problem would involve United States foreign policy centrally, would doubtless involve Soviet foreign policy significantly, and, since it was in a United Nations
context, would require teams somehow covering the rest of the world. It was therefore initially decided that there would be 8 teams: United States, Soviet bloc, Western Europe, Near and Middle East, Asia and Africa, Latin America, Scandinavia, and a UN Secretary General-UN Parliamentarian. When the topic itself was chosen, i.e., Poland, two additional teams were added (Poland and Yugoslavia) making a total of ten. In addition there would be two Umpires: Dr. Paul Kecskemeti of the RAND Corporation and Dr. Bloomfield.

The RAND experience had indicated that the "play-back" of the exercise was one of its most important features. It was therefore decided that all moves would be made in writing and that the major teams (Soviet and American) would each have a reporting officer attached whose principal function would be the preparation of a running account of major strategic decisions, major "choice-points," etc. In addition, the M.I.T. members of the three three man teams (Western Europe, Near and Middle East, and Asia and Africa) were asked to prepare a briefer summary within their own team. (As it turned out, those three teams did not function as teams so much as individual countries, and the plan of reporting was not entirely successful.) The two full-time reporting officers were also asked to serve as reporters at the United Nations sessions.

The Center was extremely fortunate in the level of participants which it secured. These included some leading experts and authorities on the various area specialties involved. While for this first exercise it was decided to limit the participation to the Cambridge community, several exceptions were made in the case of individuals who were already working on portions of the United Nations Project, as well as the "UN Secretary General" (Mr. Oscar Schachter, Director of the General Legal Division of the UN) and Dr. Kecskemeti.
Perhaps the most difficult preliminary decision had to do with the choice of the problem. In the earlier planning it had been generally agreed that the problem must enjoy several characteristics: it had to reflect an international crisis sufficiently grave so that governments would predictably react in one form or another over a real-life period of 72 hours; it had to focus on the special areas in which the Center was best qualified, such as Soviet-bloc relations or Asian-African problems; and, particularly if it were a "bomb-line" problem, it had to admit of diplomatic and political rather than purely military treatment, if only as realistic alternatives, or there would be no game.

Among the alternative problems initially considered were: revolt in East Germany, Communist take-over in Syria, an India-Pakistani war over Kashmir, nationalization of the Panama Canal, civil war in the Union of South Africa, Chinese attack on Quemoy and Matsu, renewed Arab-Israeli war, British-Yemeni hostilities, Soviet attack on Yugoslavia, Indonesian attack on West New Guinea, Chinese attack on Hongkong, and a Polish change in regime. Given the criteria specified above, the choices were ultimately narrowed down to three: Kashmir, Poland, and Indonesia. On balance, it was decided that the Polish situation offered a number of advantages, among them the strong capabilities in Soviet affairs in the Cambridge community and the possible usefulness of confronting experts on Arab-Asian affairs, etc. with the problem of a highly dangerous situation in Eastern Europe which is frequently neglected in non-European regional approaches to international political problems.

Due to Dr. Bloomfield's absence in Europe the substantive and administrative preparations were not actually made until mid-July. With the assistance of Mr. Tillman of the M.I.T. Political Science Section, papers were drafted as follows: basic news dispatches delineating the situation on the ground
confronting the participants; a background paper on Poland analogous to the kind of historical, geo-political and economic brief which an American delegate to the UN might be given along with his position paper; a paper entitled "The Armed Forces of Poland and Soviet Forces in Poland" which in three pages endeavored to sum up the best available information on this subject; and a paper entitled "The World at a Glance: September 1959" which in eight pages sought to portray the salient features of the world at game time.

This last requires some explanation. It was felt that playing the game against contemporary time would offer too many distractions, as well as introducing real-life crises which might cut across the controlled situation under study, and would certainly detract from the game's air of verisimilitude. It was believed that to place game time exactly one year ahead of real time would dispose of a number of awkward situations which might interfere with the game, and would also make it possible to use the dates of September 10, 11, and 12 in communiques, etc., rather than introducing a further confusing variation in the dimension of time.

A final paper was entitled "Brief Guide to Functions and Procedures of the Principal Organs of the United Nations in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security." This paper, prepared by Mr. Tillman, summed up briefly the appropriate provisions of the UN Charter and the rules of procedure of both the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to serve as a guide to all participants, avoiding the necessity of special study or research by players unfamiliar with problems of UN procedure.

A final word is needed about the United Nations aspect of the game. It was taken into account that the sponsorship by the United Nations Project might contribute a certain bias toward holding a United Nations session or sessions
in the course of the game. At the same time, it was not felt desirable to
stack the cards, so to speak, in that direction. However, we felt confident
that the kind of crisis envisaged would, in the natural order of things, come
before the United Nations in one form or another, and that we should therefore
be prepared to have one or more UN sessions. If a UN session had not developed
spontaneously we were prepared to utilise the powers of the Secretary General
under Article 99 of the Charter so that upon his initiative a UN session would
materialise.

The plan thus took into account the probability that the game would have
three separate formats running concurrently or consecutively: a bilateral diplo-
matic phase; a meeting of the UN Security Council; and a meeting of the UN
General Assembly. We were fully aware that in the three-day period set aside
for the game it was most unlikely that any one of the three formats could be
comprehensively explored, and that probably none of the three would be entirely
satisfactory as a genuine reflection of reality. But because of the experi-
mental nature of this particular exercise we felt justified in attempting to
comprehend the three formats, however unsatisfactorily, in order to give some
guidance for the future. As the game developed, it became evident that the
three formats we envisaged would indeed materialize and that no special stimu-
lation from the Umpires was required (although if the Jordan issue had not
intruded such stimulation might well have been needed to bring about the first
UN session.)

3. Briefing. The background papers, except for the basic news dis-
patches and the papers which specifically referred to Poland, were distributed
by mail to the participants approximately two weeks before the game commenced.
The covering letter further spelled out the purpose of the game and the ground
rules, and enclosed the list of teams and players, with the existence of the
Polish team hopefully concealed by its inclusion in an Eastern European team
also including Yugoslavia. The purpose of this was to preserve cover
as to the exact nature of the problem (although inescapably some of
the players had developed a suspicion that the problem would center on
Eastern Europe.) The kit included the guide to UN procedures, world situ-
ation paper, and a brochure concerning the M.I.T. estate, Endicott House,
at Dedham (the scene of the game.)

The participants convened at Endicott House at 9:15 A.M. on Wednesday,
September 10th, and the session began with a briefing by Dr. Bloomfield, in
which he outlined the physical arrangements and ground rules, and the follow-
ing additional points. Teams did not have chairmen designated and it was up
to each team as to whether it chose a chairman; or operated by majority rule
or in some other way. The Soviet team was asked to designate one of its mem-
bors to be Communist China. (This turned out to have been a mistake since
Communist China should have been a separate "team" in this game.) He empha-
sized the experimental nature of the game and suggested to the players that
their advice based on the experience would be most useful in determining am-
biguities, errors of conception, gaps in the planning, etc. He further sug-
gested that there would have to be limits on the reality nature of the game,
particularly since detailed intelligence estimates would not be available to
each team and each team must be the source of its own internal intelligence;
the fact that no reference library or documentation would be available; and that
in general the teams could only approximate their bases for decision and negotia-
tion. He described the difficulty in selecting a problem which would be ap-
propriate for the three-day session, explaining that it needed to be sufficien-
tly acute to call for meaningful reactions in a short period of time but at the
same time not so fixed in its possible outcome as to debar political and diplo-
matic solutions and other limited reactions.
This statement by the Umpire was in part designed to discourage the players from precipitating an all-out war response to the situation if other responses appeared possible. At the same time it was not felt desirable to be specific or explicit on this score since "natural" reactions were desired. He finally described the role of the Umpires, stating that while they would be extremely permissive in their rulings as to the plausibility of teams' moves, they would also be available for advice and consultation and might under certain circumstances exercise their authority with respect to plausibility.

At that point the briefing was terminated. The teams found in their individual "offices" the set of news dispatches outlining the factual situation, the background paper on Poland, the background paper on Soviet and Polish military forces, maps of Poland and of Central Europe, as well as copies of the UN Charter. The game commenced immediately. (In retrospect, this was an error, since at least one to two hours should have been set aside for teams to study the papers and determine the basis of their policies and the nature of the strategic alternatives available to them, as well as to prepare adequately for their initial moves. Instead, moves were made at once, and the chain reaction of responses was underway.)
1. Administration and Mechanics. Overhead in preparing for the game was, as indicated earlier, on a modest scale, i.e., a maximum of 3-4 weeks' time of the Director of the UN Project, the same for his secretary, and two weeks on the part of Mr. Tillman. This included both substantive and procedural preparations and probably accounts for the somewhat thin dimensions of the spell-out of the Polish situation. Two entire floors of MIT's Endicott House estate at Dedham, Massachusetts, were used for the exercise. The large meeting room on the main floor was set up for United Nations meetings, the Gun Room was designated the "Delegates' Lounge," a small dining room was assigned as a small conference room (but was not put to use despite the plan to have regional NATO, Warsaw Pact, etc. meetings there.) The dining room was also on the main floor. On the second floor each team occupied a separate room except for four of the one-man teams, which shared rooms (Poland and Yugoslavia, Scandinavia and Latin America). An additional room was set aside for the Umpires, the Administrative Officer, and two (subsequently three) secretaries.

Moves were made in writing, and were technically limited to approximately one paragraph each. (This rule was frequently violated.) The moves were carried by members of the teams to the Umpires, both of whom passed on them. The
Administrative Officer then assigned them a consecutive number in the team series (each team had a letter symbol). One of the secretaries then cut a ditto master which was immediately run off in sufficient copies for each team, the Umpires, and the Master File, and immediately distributed by hand by one of the secretaries. This meant, of course, that when the machinery was running smoothly there might be less than a five minute delay between the drafting of a short move and its receipt in the hands of all teams.

There were times when the moves snowballed and were delayed while one or both of the Umpires was involved elsewhere, and on several occasions a line of people was waiting to hand in or discuss moves. The reproduction machine broke down during the first morning and caused a delay in disseminating several important moves, but this was remedied by afternoon. Indeed, one of the serious departures from realism lay in the wholly unrealistic speed with which all players were made aware of every development.

One complication arose from the rule that all moves be in writing, including reports of negotiations. This rule was not completely observed. When it was, a number of trivial conversations were either reported as having taken place or their substance actually detailed. As the players entered the spirit of the game, a tendency developed for moves to be made that were either trivial or in some cases jocular; even these were for the most part authentic, but were perhaps unnecessary to the substance of the game even though they added appreciably to its flavor.

Another drawback was the failure of the Umpires to embargo moves for a given period of time after the beginning of the game in order for players to develop their strategies and work out their plans. This meant
that within a very few minutes after the beginning of the game, moves began
to flow into "headquarters," and there was very little success until the
umpires called a halt for varying periods in preparation for UN meetings,
during UN meetings, etc.

In view of the physical propinquity of teams and players, negotiations
were far easier to conduct than is the case in real life. This unrealistically
sped up the dimension of time, since an instruction could be given to an
American Ambassador to call on a Foreign Minister, and the entire transaction,
including the call itself, completed within half an hour. Since moves were
delivered immediately, in many cases teams stopped what they were doing and
had the moves read out to them. In other cases, they did not stop what they
were doing and the moves therefore piled up. Another difficulty stemming
from the physical arrangements was the constant interruptions of teams by
visiting "negotiators." There were telephones in each room, but no rule was
laid down until later in the game requiring that appointments be made by tele-
phone. It is not known whether this belated rule was helpful or not. Some
teams conducted their negotiations in the corridors, which had been amply pro-
vided with couches, chairs, etc., but the ease of negotiating with all countries
in the world simply by knocking on a few doors was, in retrospect, far too
great and produced both a lack of realism and an often unmanageable compounding
of demands and calls on the key teams. (On the other hand, the less involved
teams and players suffered throughout from proportionate inattention and ennui.)

The snowballing effect was particularly serious in the case of the Polish
team, originally consisting of one man. During the extensive negotiations with
the Russians the Pole was completely unavailable to other teams. This was
highly unrealistic and thoroughly frustrating to other players. It was therefore
decided to add the Yugoslav representative to the Polish team.
The instructions to the participants regarding role-playing purposely left to their discretion whether they would stay in their roles during such times as meals, after meals, the cocktail hour, etc. Some players stayed in their roles, while others did not. (See the overwhelming view below of the participants that the players should stay in their roles at all times.) Another interesting aspect of the role-playing lay in the tendency of some players to "play-act" as well as "role-act." This is probably desirable and in any event is almost impossible to prevent. But it did consume more time, both in written communications and particularly on the floor of the United Nations, than might otherwise have been the case. On balance, a certain amount of histrionics is doubtless the price that must be paid for authentic role-playing and it should probably not be discouraged.

The game ran from 9:15 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. for each of three days, with a dinner session on the first day, and an informal and voluntary cocktail hour after the close of the second and third days.

(Note: The list of players and their team assignments is found in Appendix A.)

2. The Problem. The problem which confronted the players at the opening of the game consisted of a change in regime in Poland which had commenced exactly one month prior to the game date, i.e., August 10, 1959. On that date Gomulka was presumed to have died, shortly thereafter being replaced by Zenon Kliszko as First Secretary of the Party. Kliszko had been a close associate of Gomulka and was known as a particular target of criticism by the "revisionist" wing of the Polish Communist Party.
The remainder of the dispatches, which covered a bit more than five pages, outlined in graphic journalistic form the 36 hours immediately prior to the opening of the game. The events of that period commenced with a drastic new economic decree in Poland increasing the working hours of employees, calling for codes of factory discipline, new norms of production, and other measures representing a general tightening up. The so-called Production Councils were wholly eliminated in favor of government-appointed managers. Party advisors were assigned to the trade unions, and, because of poor harvests in 1959, the collectivization program was resumed in the field of agriculture.

On September 9th reports began to issue from Poland of meetings of the displaced Workers' Councils and increasing popular unrest. This came to a head with mass demonstrations in Warsaw demanding the appearance of Kliszko. The Warsaw police was called out and subsequently the Warsaw garrison. An independent radio began broadcasting within Poland and police and soldiers broke ranks and went over to the crowd. On the morning of the 9th Kliszko was replaced by Marian Spychalski, the nationalist who had supported Gomulka during the "October days" in 1956 and had since been Minister of Defense. Cyrankiewicz was replaced by Władysław Bienkowski, former Minister of Education, as Premier. The announcement by the Politburo declared that Kliszko had "betrayed the spirit of October" and that Bienkowski would form a provisional government.

On that afternoon, Bienkowski and Spychalski appeared before the crowds in Warsaw. They announced that its wishes would be met, and that since the Kliszko formula had failed "the only real and lasting resource of the Polish Government is the patriotism of the Polish people." Bienkowski announced that the provisional government would summon a conference of leading Polish patriots to agree on a
slate of candidates and make arrangements for the Polish people to elect a national constituent assembly as soon as possible. At the same time he reassured the Soviet Union of Poland's continued warm friendship and indicated that the government contemplated no major changes in its foreign policy.

The government then announced the recall of its ambassadors to the major capitals of the world as well as to the United Nations, and their replacement by representatives of the new "nationalist" regime. The announcement concluded by declaring the government's willingness to enter into any form of negotiations which the Soviets might desire.

In the meantime, the discredited leadership group established itself within the Soviet military perimeter in Legnica and began broadcasting as the voice of the "legitimate peoples' government." Condemning the "counter-revolutionary putsch," the Legnica Poles, under the leadership of Zenon Nowak, former Polish deputy premier and leader of the Natolin faction of Stalinists of the Polish Politburo, called on the Polish army and people to rise against the "usurpers" and publicly appealed to the USSR for assistance to the Polish people in restoring the legitimate government and crushing the "counter-revolutionary clique." Sporadic fighting was reported around the Legnica perimeter, and the Warsaw government called on the Soviet forces in Poland to remain in their agreed areas under the agreement governing the status of Soviet forces in Poland. The Poles warned that continued Soviet troop movements on Polish territory would constitute a "threat to the maintenance of international peace and security." Numerous reports, still unconfirmed, were being received of Soviet troop movements in East Germany as well as the alerting of Soviet garrisons in Hungary. No hostilities of any major dimensions took place between the Soviet troops protecting Legnica and the Polish forces, and the Bienkowski
government appeared to be in full control of all areas except for that around Legnica. The final dispatch issued from SHAPE headquarters in Paris. In it Gen. Norstad ordered all NATO forces in Europe put on a 4-hour alert as a purely precautionary measure, expressing full confidence in the ability of the NATO forces to meet "any contingency."

3. Strategies of Major Teams. (At the initial briefing session the question was raised as to whether the players should consider themselves bound by the dictates of reality in the sense of reflecting to the greatest extent possible the probable reactions of governments, or whether they might feel free to develop what might be called "normative strategy," transcending the probable expectations and capabilities of the real-life players and governments. The consensus was that the "representative" type of strategy should be followed. It is possible that some players felt hampered by this attachment to their real-life counterparts; nevertheless, all participants seemed to join willingly in a serious attempt to reflect probable reality.)

American Team. The basic strategy of the American team was to follow a cautious policy dictated by the primary desideratum of keeping the Polish crisis localized and avoiding Soviet military intervention. The US thus decided early in the game to find ways of assuring the Soviet Union of American disinclination to draw the new Polish regime out of the Soviet power bloc. The US apparently considered that the situation in Poland was optimum so far as American interests were concerned, in that the new Warsaw regime had come into power by legal means, leaving it up to the Soviet Union to make any move to challenge the legality and position of that new government. Finally, the US team's assessment of the situation concluded that since the new government had strong public support, if it survived it might prove to be the most stable Polish government in modern times.
There was a marked difference between the Soviet and American appraisals of the effectiveness of Soviet political counter-action. The US believed that the new regime enjoyed such overwhelming support from the Polish bureaucracy, in addition to the Polish people and army, that the placement of pro-Moscow officials in several key governmental positions would do the Soviets little good.

In its initial discussions of policy in the event of a Soviet military move, the American team concluded that there was no military action it could or would take in response. The underlying rationale for this decision was that it was in the interests of both sides to observe the implicit bomb-line, and to American advantage that it continue to be observed. US strategy was thus focussed on maximizing the political and psychological disadvantages to the Soviet Union, with soft tactics until and unless the Russians moved, and a massive psychwar effort if and when they did.

Psychological means were also to be used in conveying to the Russians a generalized sense of American military capacity. But there was at no time a determination on the part of the American government to use force in the event that the Soviet Union intervened with force in Poland, and, in fact, American strategy was based on the understanding that counter-force would not be used in such eventuality. It is probable that a reversion to the status quo ante, which would of course involve Polish capitulation to Russian demands, would be "tolerable" to the US, certainly as an alternative to American intervention.

The American team therefore played out the game on the basis of a strategy of moderation and of unwillingness to be pressured into more overt counter-moves (as suggested at one point by West Germany). When, later in the game, it became apparent that the protracted and continuous Soviet negotiations with the
Poles might have been simply a cover for massive Soviet re-entry into Poland, the United States did make certain demonstrations of power by alerting the Strategic Air Command and organizing other displays of mobilization and alertness. It seems likely, however, that if such a hardening had indeed led to a military clash with the Russians it would have been in this sense inadvertent, unplanned, and contrary to the explicit strategic directives which supposedly governed US reactions in the situation.

A few other aspects of the American performance were of interest. While the Western European allies of the US were closely consulted, the United States made little effort to cultivate the Asian-Arab-African states, a course which the Russians assiduously pursued. Perhaps one reason was that the neutral rations did not seem to be crediting the US sufficiently for its policy of restraint. Moreover, the Americans, after one secret meeting the first day and another interview on the second day, made little or no subsequent effort to keep in touch with Soviet leadership, even clandestinely. The Americans by and large based their tactics upon the estimates which the Polish representative furnished them.

The American strategy toward use of the UN was to enable the Secretary General to invite a group of high-level neutral observers to Warsaw. This was believed most feasible through passage of a generalized resolution. On the other hand the US did not actively press initially for a UN meeting but went along with the prevailing disinclination, based chiefly on the attitude of the Polish representative, to use UN machinery at that early stage. (The Umpires at that point questioned whether general American strategy might not have called for getting a "UN presence" into Warsaw before the Russians could intervene in order to preclude another Budapest.) US strategy was characterized by a sense
of extreme responsibility for avoiding provocative actions, and by a desire to "help the Poles." This seemed to be accompanied by a frustrating sense of US inability to help the Poles in the event of Soviet intervention without precipitating hostilities with the Soviet Union, and by an optimistic appraisal of the chances for survival of the new Polish regime if matters were allowed to run their course without any overt intervention from either side.

There was an interesting subsidiary development in which the United States sought to put pressure on the Soviets by contacting Peiping through Prime Minister Macmillan and offering, in exchange for Chinese restraining influence on the Russians, a quid pro quo involving a possible seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN and the reversion of the off-shore islands to the mainland regime. This approach was of course immediately made a subject of discussion between Moscow and Peiping, and their strategy became quickly unified even while the Chinese were making interested noises in response to the American démarche.

In retrospect, the American team, in the opinion of many, simulated probable American governmental behavior with a high degree of reality. If the primary purpose of the game had been to test and verify alternative American strategies, much might have been learned by replaying key moves and permitting "normative" as contrasted with "representational" performance.

Soviet Team. The Soviet strategy was based on the prime consideration that under no circumstances could changes be permitted which would take Poland effectively outside the Soviet orbit and the Warsaw Pact. The USSR was determined not to "give up" Poland even under the threat of US attack. Russia was willing to envisage a certain degree of local autonomy in Poland and gamble on being able to contain the domestic political and economic changes (although the Stalinist element in Soviet leadership circles opposed this strategy.) The
Soviets seemed fully determined to resist any interference by the UN or any foreign government until the situation in Poland had been stabilized to its own satisfaction. The tactics which flowed from this strategy called for negotiations with the Poles which would lead toward the reassertion of Soviet authority in Poland while at the same time not frightening them excessively. The Soviets also negotiated with selected neutral countries in order to line up their support, and created a crisis in the Middle East as a diversionary measure which put them in a favorable position to offer Russian support to the Arab countries against possible "Western aggression." (The Poles interpreted the Middle East outbreak as detrimental to Russian interests on the assumption that the Soviets were unwilling to be engaged on two fronts. The Soviet team found this amusing since they had of course secretly precipitated the Middle East crisis by instigating the assassination of King Hussein by an Israeli agent in the pay of the Soviet Union.) Perhaps most importantly, the Soviet team was thoroughly determined to stop at nothing to reassert its control over Poland including the use of force, if necessary, in the event of intervention by the West. (See below the interesting and dangerous misreading of this Soviet determination by practically all other teams.)

One feature of Soviet strategy lay in the programmed restoration of physical controls in Poland through clandestine military reinforcements even during the period of negotiations, designed, with characteristic duplicity, to eventually confront the Poles with a power situation which would leave the latter no alternative but capitulation. Equally characteristically, this strategy had not been thoroughly appraised and appreciated by most other countries. (The US, as indicated earlier, believed the Soviets could not successfully restore control without intervention of a basically greater order.)
Perhaps the crucial feature of the diplomatic phase of the game lay in the protracted negotiations between the representatives of the new Polish regime and the Soviet Union. In these negotiations the Poles endeavored to make it clear that they did not contemplate any kind of hostility toward the Soviet Union and indeed wished to maintain friendly relations. The Soviets presented an ultimatum involving Polish acceptance of certain changes in the Cabinet and a public Polish rejection of United Nations action or intervention. The Poles accepted this ultimatum, but did not actually carry it out with respect to the UN phase. (This may however have been due to a breakdown of communications.)

**Other Teams**

The participation of practically all other countries was minimal compared with that of the two major teams. The British representative was active in consultations with the United States but the latter clearly held the Western initiative in the situation. West Germany was active with proposals for embarrassing the Russians and furthering a liberation policy in Eastern Europe. The Scandinavian governments were characteristically inventive in suggesting uses for the United Nations for ameliorating and stabilizing the situation, specifically by placing a UN presence in Warsaw and also by beefing up NATO defenses in the Scandinavian area. The Middle East teams became active in the discussion of the situation in Jordan, but since this was a diversion from the main theme it is not considered too relevant. The situation boiled down to a very dangerous possibility, which had not yet materialized, of a clash between Russian and American interests in Poland. The neutralist policy of urging moderation and of putting a fig leaf on the situation, so to speak, was entirely characteristic. The role of Latin America was for obvious reasons perhaps the least active in the entire game. Even the United Nations sessions did not bring out a very strong role for those 20 countries.
4. **Summary of Moves.** 201 individual moves were recorded, in descending order of volume as follows: Western Europe-48, United States-40, Soviet Bloc-27, Poland-16, Middle East-15, Scandinavia-12, United Nations Secretary General-10, Yugoslavia-8, Asian-African Bloc-7, Latin America-2; plus 16 moves initiated by the Umpires (a few of which were of an administrative nature.) These do not include moves made in and around the two UN meetings, nor do they include records of all the intergovernmental contacts informally made.

The broad sequence of major moves was as follows: **Day One:** At the very outset the teams initiated moves that might be described as treading water, checking one's defenses, or trying to assume some kind of posture responsive to the situation. Poland emphasized its desire for friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Asian statesmen issued appeals for peace and non-violence. The US government assured the Soviets that it had no military interests in Poland and that it hoped the Soviet Union would also view the Polish situation as purely internal, indicating the American disinclination to see existing military arrangements altered. At the same time the US issued some hints which might be read as suggesting a violent American reaction in the event of Soviet intervention. The UN Secretary General consulted members of the Security Council with a view to a meeting but, as indicated earlier, received a negative response. The Scandinavian states held an emergency meeting of the Nordic Council. The US continued to emphasize publicly its view of the Polish developments as internal. However, domestic pressures began to build up in the United States for a more vigorous stance. Tito approached the Soviets to see if he could be helpful, but for his pains was treated rather cavalierly. American allies in Asia such as the Philippines and Nationalist China announced support for the new Polish government and deplored any possibility of Soviet intervention. The Middle Eastern states did not adopt a pro-Soviet or pro-American position but characteristically looked to their own problems and hoped that the great powers would not take the situation as
Throughout the game troop movements were rumored, particularly within the Soviet bloc, and the United States leaked several suggestions of greater alert activity. Negotiations between the Poles and the Russians began in Moscow on the afternoon of the first day and continued through until the second morning, the Soviet government meanwhile denying any new troop movements which were, however, confirmed by other sources. During the first day teams which were not intimately involved, such as the French, tended to issue moves of a public nature, that is, reflections of press comment and of activity by notable citizens. Other teams tended to become similarly inventive and prolific, often on rather non-relevant themes. Even before the Hussein assassination, the UK looked to its Middle Eastern flank and became very attentive to the possibility of strengthening UN observer groups in and about Jordan. The Voice of America was instructed to follow a soft line in order to prevent outbreak of violence in the other satellites. The Poles declined offers of economic aid and concentrated their attention on their delicate game between the Soviets and the West, with a view to keeping the door open for Western help if needed but at the same time discouraging too great Western intimacy while the possibility existed of a successful conclusion to the negotiations with the Soviets.

The Americans at this point began to order additional alerts for military personnel designed to convey an impression of strength to the Soviets while the Polish negotiations were underway. The Soviet Union meanwhile had sent a high-ranking diplomat to see President Nasser and to reaffirm good relations in that quarter. At this point Bonn, in agreement with the UK and France, approached Peiping to normalize relations (another example of looking to China as a significant factor in a contingent situation where major difficulties
with the Soviet Union might be envisaged.) The Polish situation remained quite firm internally but the line the Poles were taking with the Russians was not entirely consistent with their Western conversations. Meanwhile the Swedes and other Scandinavians were intensively consulting with the Secretary General and with the US with a view to UN intervention in Warsaw. The US continued to discourage Bonn from stirring things up in Eastern Europe, and sought to maintain its tactical objective of keeping the situation calm. Egypt convened an informal meeting of the Afro-Asian delegates to the UN (except for Jordan) and placed it on the footing of a standing group for the duration of the crisis. At this point rumors began to appear of Soviet troop movements into Poland and the mood in Warsaw began to change to apprehension that the Soviets might indeed intervene. However, the Polish delegate returned to Warsaw and the Defense Minister was immediately replaced by the Kremlin's choice.

**Day Two.**

On the second day the UN Security Council was called to meet in the morning, but the continued reluctance of members delayed the meeting beyond the time of its original call. The Chinese Communists made encouraging sounds through the UK to assure the US of Chinese interest in achieving stability in Europe but at the same time insisted that the US make a timely show of its readiness to reach agreement on an even broader agenda of subjects than that proposed by the U.S., namely the entire question of Formosa as well as the off-shore islands and a UN seat. The Afro-Asian nations issued a public statement indicating their belief that a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Polish question was an open invitation to intervention and the use of force. At the same time rumors accumulated of new Soviet troop movements
in Eastern Europe. The Secretary General postponed the UN Security Council meeting until 3:00 on the second day after Poland had made it clear that it would be embarrassed by a meeting in the morning. Meanwhile the Soviet Union approached France and promised to support France's position in Algeria if France supported the Soviet position in Poland. (The Umpires at this point challenged an agreement between the US and the UK to support the Polish suggestion that, in view of the "progress" in the Moscow talks, the UN Secretary General be urged to postpone the Security Council meeting. The Umpires considered this too mild a stand for the West to take and perhaps not reflecting pressures to hold the Russian feet to the fire by virtue of publicity in the UN.) France, reflecting the Gaullist style, urged a secret rather than a public meeting of the Security Council, and NATO issued statements of its full readiness to meet any contingency. The Secretary General remained worried that with the lack of interest in the meeting, events might suddenly move ahead dangerously before UN machinery could be brought to bear.

Suddenly at lunch time on the second day announcement was made that King Hussein had been assassinated by an Israeli national. The rumor (spread by the Umpires) that the Kremlin had instigated this assassination was not in any way exploited by the delegates (although it happened to be true.) The UK and France immediately asked the Secretary General to put the question of Jordan on the Security Council agenda. The meeting, held at 3:00, had two items on its provisional agenda: the situation in Poland (proposed by the Secretary General) and the question of Jordan (proposed by the UK and France.) Premier Khrushchev at once invited the US, the UK, France, Germany, India, the United Arab Republic, and Peiping to a summit meeting on the following Monday. In the meantime the Soviet Union was in fact introducing military elements into
Poland in violation of the Polish-Soviet agreement of 1956, but keeping these both clandestine and on such a small scale that a major violation could not yet be alleged. (In the American view such reinforcements were insufficient to upset what appeared to be clear Polish superiority on the ground.) At this juncture Israel put its army on a 4-hour alert, and the United States urged the Israelis not to attack Jordan and warned of action if they did. The Scandinavians meanwhile continued to be active in pressing plans for long-range economic and technical assistance to Poland as well as a UN presence there. India continued to counsel caution and moderation. The Polish Parliament received the report of the Polish representative on his Moscow negotiations in silence while he reported that the Warsaw Pact remained in force, Soviet-Polish friendship remained unbroken, and, since there had been no intervention from without, there was no need for any outside action. The Deputy Minister of the Interior was then replaced in accordance with the agreement reached in Moscow. The terms of the secret agreement between the Russians and the Poles became known to the Umpires. It included these major points: no UN intervention; no increase in economic aid from the West (the Russians would try to increase their aid); new elections in Poland should be delayed; certain reorganization within Poland (see above); and Soviet armed forces in Poland to be reinforced with tactical atomic weapons. (At the outset of the Security Council meeting the question of the representation of China had been disposed of with only the Soviet Union voting in favor and 9 against, with Saudi Arabia abstaining.)

The meeting focussed on Jordan rather than on the Polish situation after the passage of a Soviet resolution requesting, after unsuccessful attempts to expunge the Polish questions from the agenda, that the order of the agenda be reversed. There was a lengthy (and strikingly true-to-life) procedural debate on the seating of non-members of the Council; in view of the impasse as between
proposals to seat Israel and Jordan, neither was seated. A Canadian resolu-
tion calling for the transfer of the United Nations Emergency Force to Jor-
dan, despite receiving 9 favorable votes, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
(Saudi Arabia abstained.) The US then proposed that the issue of Jordan be
referred to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
The prior Soviet proposal for a summit conference including Communist China
was rejected 2-8 with France abstaining. The American proposal was passed
10-1.

The Umpires issued a statement overnight between the
second and third day stipulating that the General Assembly meeting on Jordan
had been held and had passed by a substantial majority a resolution calling
on Jordan's neighbors to refrain from any action that might upset the equili-
brum of regional peace and security, and asking the Secretary General to
establish immediately a strong observer mission "in the area of Jordan."
The Umpires also stipulated that the Security Council had subsequently met
on the question of Poland, that procedural arguments with respect to the
legality of the agenda item had consumed virtually the entire meeting,
and that a four-nation resolution calling on the Soviet Union to refrain from
any action in the area of Poland that might exacerbate the situation or "affect
the political independence or territorial integrity of any country" was vetoed
by the Soviet Union. A Western motion was then passed calling for an emergency
General Assembly session. It was this session which convened on the morning
of the third day.
Day Three.

At the opening of the third day the Umpires barred any written moves in order to give participants a chance to prepare for the General Assembly meeting. In consultation with the Soviet and Polish teams the Umpires issued a news summary announcing that small-scale fighting had broken out between Russian and Polish troops in Poland, with Soviet officials continuing to deny that any but routine troop replacements had taken place. The Polish attitude was hardening and the latest piece of information was that the Soviets had offered to give full recognition to the Polish regime if the Poles undertook not to accept any UN presence or observation in Poland. The US position also began to harden, but still on the basis of the earlier decision not to initiate military counter-action. SAC was further alerted and rumors were issued of serious United States military preparations. Mr. Nixon and other individuals and groups were officially inspired to call publicly for a more militant policy with respect to Poland, and the US prepared for a finding of Soviet aggression in Poland by directing all government agencies to prepare a program of massive psychological warfare activities in Eastern Europe.

The final phase of the game was the emergency session of the General Assembly on the subject of Poland. A draft resolution covertly instigated by the U.S. and formally submitted by France, Brazil, Norway and El Salvador was debated and ultimately passed. It reasserted the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, viewed with grave alarm the situation in Poland, asked all members to abstain from intervening in the internal affairs of Poland and from military movements in and around Poland, and requested the Secretary General to take measures that he might deem necessary for the preservation of the political independence of Poland. A substitute measure introduced
by India on behalf of the Afro-Asian nations sought to generalize the critical paragraph asking members to abstain from military movements around Poland, and asked the Secretary General to contact the government of Poland and secure any information he could. Unsuccessful negotiations were undertaken in the corridors to attempt to harmonize the two resolutions. The Polish delegate, true to his promise to the Russians, introduced an amendment to strike the clause regarding the Secretary General. This amendment was defeated 50-14 with 17 abstentions, and the Western resolution was then passed 56 in favor, 21 opposed, and 4 abstentions. The game phase of the exercise then terminated.

5. Preliminary Questionnaire. Immediately after the game was declared ended a short questionnaire was circulated. Its results are summarized below as a postscript to the playing out of the Polish problem, particularly in revealing the varying estimates upon which policy was based. This questionnaire was filled out by all participants before the post-mortem session began, i.e., before players might compare notes with each other or hear how others felt or reacted. Six questions were asked.

a. What was the main objective of the US with regard to the Polish situation? The members of the US team answered as follows: to maximize evolutionary change
consistent with avoiding war, to avoid rocking the boat in the hope of liber-
alization, but, if not, to exact a high political cost to prevent the overthrow of the new regime, and to give maximum internal freedom to the Poles without changing the basic alignment of Poland, and to maximize disincentives for the Russians to "pull another Hungary."

The interpretation of American objectives by the members of the Soviet team was fairly similar, except that it went beyond the modest American aims and in one case envisaged a U.S. policy of detaching Poland from the Soviet Union. Others saw the primary American aim as avoiding war or Soviet intervention. The reactions of other teams and players were virtually unanimous in their estimate that the American goal was to avoid war but to maximize the independence of the Poles, at the same time confining the situation to Poland and keeping the Soviet Union from intervening.

b. What was the US's initial estimate of the likelihood of Soviet military action against Poland, and how did this estimate change during exercise?

Three of the members saw it starting out high, and two of these three saw it then going down while the other saw it going up. The other two members of the U.S. team were agreed that it started out as a 50-50 proposition and then increased, and one of them saw it declining again at the end. The Russian retrospect on the American estimate was that it started at a high level and then dropped, although one saw it starting low and then increasing. The other players were practically unanimous in agreeing that the American estimate started out high and eventually declined in some measure.
c. Was US determined to intervene in force in case of Soviet military action against Poland? The answer was virtually unanimous in the negative except for the British representative who saw it as perhaps conceivable, and the Scandinavian, one Middle East representative, one Far East representative, and the UN Secretary General, who answered "probably not." One Umpire thought it was probable, the other thought it not probable but that the US might possibly be "forced" to fight.

d. What was the main objective of the USSR with regard to the Polish situation? The members of the Soviet team were agreed on the need to restore Soviet control. There appeared to be some degree of difference in their willingness to risk war to secure this objective. The Americans viewed the Soviet objectives as the restoration of control over Poland without stimulating resistance or precipitating a war. The Poles felt that the Russians intended to whittle down the new regime and either overthrow it, or, at a minimum, move in at a later time. The Europeans generally concurred in this estimate, and, interestingly, the Middle East and Far East representatives were also quite certain the Soviet aim was to keep control over Poland while at the same time trying to maintain the friendship of the Polish people or to quiet the situation down. Both the Umpires saw the Soviet aim as restoring Soviet rule quickly and perhaps by any means.

e. What was the USSR's estimate of the likelihood of achieving its objective by means of pressures short of war? The members of the Soviet team answered "60-40," "uncertain, willing to try but ready to use force," "fairly good," and "good" in two cases. Four members of the American team felt the Soviet's estimate was sanguine, particularly knowing the soft line
being taken by the U.S., although the fifth member of the American team saw the Soviet estimate as less than 50-50. The other participants seemed agreed that the Soviet estimate of their chances was quite high.

f. Was USSR determined to respond to Western military aid to Poland by opening all-out hostilities against the West? This elicited possibly the most striking revelation from the questionnaire (perhaps because the question was imprecise in defining "Western military aid."). Four members of the Soviet team were unequivocal in saying "yes," and one said he was uncertain. But three members of the American team said, in varying ways, "no," one said not if such Western aid were limited, and the fifth said yes, if the USSR could not cancel out such a possibility by limited means. Eight other participants felt the Soviet Union would definitely or probably not so respond, while only one said yes, one said probably, and one said likely. (Thus the Soviet team was preponderantly clear that, if need be, it would respond by all-out war to Western military aid to Poland, while the American team was preponderantly sanguine that the Soviet Union would not so respond, perhaps projecting onto the Soviet mentality American unwillingness to become involved in a cataclysmic war.) The Poles and Western Europeans seemed equally sanguine. Those whose appreciation of Soviet determination corresponded to the view of the Soviet team were thus limited to at most two Americans, France, Scandinavia, and the UN Secretary General.

On the other hand everyone except one Umpire and the British representative was in complete agreement that the United States would not intervene in force if Soviet military action was taken to restore its rule in Poland.
6. Post-Mortem Sessions. The players then reconvened and, with the help of an agenda prepared by the staff, Dr. Kecskemeti conducted a two-hour post-mortem. He began by comparing this game with those played at RAND. He then asked the Soviet and American teams for their appraisals of their own strategy, followed by general comments as to the utility of the game itself. Most of the points raised were also covered in Questionnaire II which was subsequently sent to the participants and the results of which are summarized in Appendix B. An appraisal of the post-mortem technique appears at the very end of this report. One comment that might be made here, however, is that while the first post-mortem session had the value of being held while the game was still fresh in the minds of participants, the game was perhaps too fresh, and a short period of "unwinding" or possibly even an overnight delay should have been planned before the actual post-mortem began.

The following week an informal discussion was held among the participants from the Center for International Studies, at which three possible uses of the game—teaching, training, and "predictive" or analytical—were discussed. Again, the materials developed in this session are presented somewhat more systematically in Questionnaire II (see Appendix B).

It is clear that a post-mortem phase of the game is crucial and that much might be learned from an adequately planned and conducted post-mortem. Such comments on the Endicott House post-mortem by Prof. Edgar Schein of the M.I.T. School of Industrial Management, who served as a recording secretary at the exercise, are contained at the end of the paper.
C. EVALUATION

(The week after the game ended a questionnaire was sent to all participants. They were asked to comment on the most realistic and unrealistic aspects of the game, its possible uses, and suggestions for improvement in terms of: briefing, player and team assignment, timing, playing rules, and the post-mortems. The detailed results of the questionnaire are summarized in Appendix B. Significant recommendations deriving from it are utilized in the comments which follow.)

1. Uses of the Political Exercise

The principal objective of the Center's political exercise was to learn, through first-hand experience, whether the technique of political gaming seemed sufficiently promising as an adjunct to policy research to warrant its further use by the Center. The experimental and very general nature of this objective dictated that the game itself be modest in scope and brief in duration, with a minimum of staff preparation. Since the objective was, in the first instance, to learn more about the game technique itself, its designers built into it a number of alternative formats (bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the latter in two forms) none of which could be played out to complete satisfaction in the time allotted. The problem selected—Poland—was chosen solely on the grounds of suitability for the experiment and in terms of personnel available, and not because of any specific wish to verify a preconceived hypothesis about the Polish situation and its potentialities. The game was not designed in such a way as to test particular uses, such as teaching, training, "predictive" uses, etc. In terms of its prime objective—the acquisition of additional evidence as to the value of further experiments with the gaming technique—the writer adjudges the Endicott House exercise more of a success than a failure. Out of it some recommendations suggest themselves as to ways of improving on the techniques
we employed. The final section of this paper is therefore a critique of this particular type of game, with reference to specific aspects of the Endicott House exercise that might be done better another time.

However, a few general observations can be made regarding its possible use for particular purposes, such as teaching, training, or as a device for sequential analysis of policy hypotheses and alternatives, such analysis envisaged as an aid to research, planning, or actual policy-making operations. It would of course be presumptuous to make inferences from this single piece of evidence as to the utility of gaming in general, although one may well have some personal impressions as to this.

Reality can of course only be simulated in a game. A single scholar or analyst can also seek to evoke reality. But group operation brings to analysis of a foreign policy problem two prime values: the simple benefit of interaction between several minds; and the more complex benefits flowing from the dynamics of such interaction, as in a role-playing game in which the interaction generates a self-sustaining reaction that develops its own momentum and course, independent of the limits or boundaries with which the analyst starts out. Inherent in this process is the potent value of unpredictability and the equally potent value of exposure to the antagonistic will of another who proceeds from entirely different assumptions. Neither of these values can be derived from solitary meditation or cooperative discussion. In this sense an affirmative answer is possible to the general question "Is political gaming useful?" and this insight emerges as the clearest finding from our experiment.

However, it is recommended that any future exercise should have a specific purpose and, at least at this stage of the art, still needs to be "custom-tailored" to fit the purpose, circumstances, group, problem, available resources, etc. Even our "pilot" game at Endicott House could have benefited from some more precise question than "Is gaming useful?", in order to sharpen the standards of judgment we are now seeking to apply.
The three kinds of uses we have mentioned would have as their objectives in a future game: a) to teach undergraduates, graduate students, or young teachers of international relations more about the dimensions of policy-making and decision-making and the diplomatic process than they can learn from books or lectures; b) to give the diplomatic or military staff trainee a foretaste of the interrelationships and skills demanded under acute operational pressures, that may otherwise seem abstract during his training process; and c) to furnish a check for the research scholar or policy planner against which to measure estimates, plans, and analyses drawn up by more conventional methods. Each of these purposes would involve the posing of questions which the exercise should answer. With such a relationship established between purpose and result, it might be possible, for example, to score the performances of groups or individuals. In this connection, the analogy with purely military war games is an imperfect one. These are relatively easy to score since the purpose is to train personnel and, in doing so, to see which side "wins." Apart from the question of whether anyone "wins" in the field of diplomacy, in a political exercise one tends to be more interested in "seeing what happens." Skill at devising optimal strategies could of course be scored, and, at a more subjective level, skill in actual performance. These would doubtless be applicable only in teaching or training situations.

The use of the game will probably determine its type. The Endicott House type of game is playable in two general ways. One is the way it was played, as a reality game seeking to simulate a real-life situation as faithfully as possible. This kind of game asks, for example: "How would the US Government be likely to respond in such a situation?" This variety would seem to lend itself both to teaching purposes and to the training of apprentices in the field of foreign
relations, i.e., young teachers and scholars, and possibly junior FSO's and military officers. By simulating the actual environment and thereby making the subject matter come alive, the game exposes the student or trainee to a form of reality characterized by pressures and tensions that are real at least for the player, and has its chief value in the personal learning experience for the individual. The crisis type of situation is ideal for the reality game, both for the atmosphere it generates and for the economy of administration inherent in its relative brevity.

A variant of the reality game would be the normative or optimal strategy type of game, in which one or more teams are free to take initiatives and develop responses that are not necessarily characteristic of their real-life governments but seek to improve upon them. Such a game has its emphasis on ideas rather than on simulated reality as such, but uses the environment of simulated reality as the mechanism for subjecting the ideas to test and strain. It asks the question "What alternative strategies might the US follow in such a situation, and which appear to be optimum in the light of the reactions elicited?" Such a game might as well focus on a non-crisis situation. Its purpose would be not to simulate a crisis so much as to carry a policy idea as far as possible beyond the point of genesis by testing it out against a number of divergent personalities and conflicting strategies, some of which may be antipathetic or hostile, using the simulation technique in order to enhance the dynamic quality of group collaboration. The outcome of such a process would not necessarily be that contemplated by the inventor of the idea, and therein would lie its chief value to scholarship or policy planning. The optimal strategy game seems to lend itself first of all to policy research or planning, but might also be suited for the teaching and training of students
at a postgraduate level, with the purpose not so much of exposing the individual to the crucible of policy-making in crisis but rather of developing greater perceptions and skills in the analysis of policy problems.

An analytical or planning purpose will automatically determine the exact nature of the problem around which a game is built. But if the choice of problem is not thus dictated and if the purpose is the more general one of simulation for pedagogical purposes, our own experience suggests that a "bomb-line" problem (such as the Polish situation we posited) tends to restrict severely the options for the policy maker. It thus allows less latitude for imaginative and creative strategies than would a problem of somewhat lesser gravity. By so limiting the options, this kind of game may well also limit the highly valued quality of unpredictability that was mentioned at the outset of this analysis.

Balancing this, however, is the contrary notion that a "bomb-line" type of problem can teach a great deal about the limits of official action, and about the framework of responsibility which perhaps represents the most acute environmental difference between the policy maker and the scholar or student.

In the choice of problem, consideration might also be given to replaying a past rather than a future event, to learn more about "what might have been." Obvious examples are the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956, replayed against a realistic setting but with the US strategy varied to encompass different alternatives.

Because of its special interest to the Center the analytical category of use warrants some more detailed comment. Here the game would be a kind of dry-run "sequential" testing ground for hypotheses and recommendations about governmental behavior and performance that are developed by more conventional methods.
of research or planning. In this sense it might provide the policy researcher or planner with another alternative in the research or planning process, and might be a helpful corrective to the sense of "inevitability" often engendered in traditional research or planning.

It would be highly desirable to have an individual analyst prepare in advance of such a game a written estimate of probable developments and reactions in the given situation. In addition, a parallel analysis might be made by a group utilizing customary research or planning methods of team discussion, conferences, etc. This latter group might or might not try to "play roles" in its discussion, but in any event such role-playing would not reach the point of "critical mass," so to speak, at which roles tend to take over the participants themselves, as in the game.

Such a game would be designed to check out assumptions and conclusions bearing on a given policy situation which were arrived at by the other methods. It could take the form of a straight reality game, a reality game with re-play of alternative strategies by one or more teams, or a modified optimum strategy game with perhaps only the US team permitted to experiment with deviant strategies against realistic performance by all other teams.

Several caveats come to mind at this point. The political exercise, seen as an individual experience, does not seem valuable for practitioners of foreign policy. This kind of operation is their métier and they would not benefit from exposure to a simulated format of diplomatic planning and operation. This is particularly true of a straight reality-type game. The same observation also applies to mature private specialists who are engaged less in developing theoretical models than in attempting to analyze and interpret the reality of international life. But even for the latter the game does supply a personal
kind of experience of self-awareness, as one player phrased it, and of a heightened sense of reactions produced out of the dynamics of the game. It also can increase the scholar's appreciation for the operator's predicament, and for the extraneous issues that tend to impinge on the latter.

A word of caution should also be said about so-called "predictive" uses. The notion itself is obviously fraught with danger in that, although the game is theoretically a source of future estimates, it does inescapably distort reality. Moreover, there is no assurance that the reactions of a group of sane, rational, and presumably thoughtful and well-trained American scholars, however dramatic their role-playing, are necessarily identical with the reactions of other kinds of political mentalities trained in other cultures and subject to other kinds of pressures.

In the Endicott House game some members of the Soviet team found their roles quite difficult to play. It is not clear whether this difficulty is built-in, so to speak, and could be cured only by having actual nationals of the countries concerned act out the appropriate parts. This should perhaps be experimented with. It might also be that something useful about the limitations of our analytical equipment can be learned by studying the difficulties Americans experience in "projecting" into Soviet (or other) mentalities.

It is beyond the competence of this paper to suggest detailed arrangements for carrying out the various types of games discussed above. There is a broad spectrum along which different types of games can be matched up with different kinds of format of organization, personnel, etc. A few general comments follow.

The detailed scope and construction of a game would depend not only on its primary use but on its sub-purposes as well. A "reality" game which sought to teach or train by simulating a UN phase would, for example, require more teams
and personnel than a reality game which aimed at exposing the national decision-making process. In the latter the scope would be narrower, and tend to resemble one RAND game in which only three teams were used—the US, Western Europe, and the Soviet bloc. In this game RAND also set up a "Nature" team which generated information and policy purporting to emanate from the rest of the world. In this case the emphasis was less on generalized interaction than on specific and detailed strategic moves and countermoves as between the three groups. Because of the emphasis on internal policy-making and strategy, and because in this kind of game more material would doubtless be committed to writing, the individual teams would have to be larger than, e.g., the five-man Soviet team at the Center's UN exercise.

Another dimension is depth. Is the purpose to emphasize the group dynamics, that is to say, personal interaction in the game which gives the players—whether students or teachers—a heightened sense of participation and of responsibility, and of having to respond under pressures to events which they might otherwise approach in a more leisurely fashion? The United Nations format is obviously very useful for this purpose since it emphasizes the dramatic quality of diplomacy and the force of personality of the statesmen. Is the purpose to develop better analytical insights into policy making and strategic interaction? Here a non-United Nations format might be better for policy analysis and the testing of strategic hypotheses. This latter remains subject to the caveat that reality and sound analysis might well call for an open mind toward the possibility of UN meetings, even though the format is designed to test policy-making and strategic interaction on a more intimate (thus less multilateral) plane.
One final word has to do with the military aspect of gaming. All the comments in this paper relate to a political type of exercise in which the military component is limited to strategic estimates or, at the most, minor military activity, on the ground, which is not the centerpiece of the game. It is understood that some of the RAND games involve significant military problems, and their experience might be most useful here. One other tack that might be well worth exploring would involve a combination of political gaming and the kind of tactical military gaming being developed through such means as the new electronic simulator at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. A problem of limited war might conceivably be played through successive political and military phases, each utilizing the most appropriate gaming techniques, but each also forming part of a larger whole.

2. The Endicott House Exercise—Critique

In addition to the observations made above, the following more specific comments might be helpful in designing another game of the Endicott House type.

UN Aspect: The plan was to play the game as naturally as possible, with the expectation that the United Nations would doubtless enter the picture under normal conditions but should not be dragged in by the heels, so to speak. On the other hand there was doubtless a built-in bias favoring a UN phase in the course of the exercise. Early planning emphasized that the UN game should not take the form of a so-called "mock UN assembly" such as high school and college students sometimes produce. In the initial briefings it was carefully explained that in any UN session or sessions procedures and rules which might lead to lengthy procedural involvement would be, in the language of the law, stipulated
rather than simulated in detail. As it turned out, this was not wholly possible. Indeed, one of the most intriguing features of the game was that, despite the best efforts of the management, the United Nations sessions developed precisely the kind of procedural wrangles we had thought to avoid. The Security Council session in particular reflected reality to a startling extent. Whether reflecting the proclivities of diplomatists, amateur or professional, or the power of "projection" in playing roles, the result, according to a number of participants, was to give them a keen sense of the reality of the UN as a diplomatic instrument and a sense of the kind of expertise and "intelligence" which is called upon to operate foreign policy in this rather exotic setting.

The question arises whether in any future game the United Nations phase should either be consciously eliminated, as presumably was done at RAND, or whether, as in this case, it should be implicitly planned for while not explicitly requiring that it be held. If the criterion is political reality, United Nations action is of course a highly likely contingency in a crisis-type situation and, if it cannot be accommodated within the format of the game, the exercise will inevitably be less realistic than might otherwise be the case. Yet if it is planned for there may, as indicated, be a slight bias toward using this format where perhaps it might not otherwise be used (although this is rather doubtful.)

A plurality of participants in this particular game found the UN sessions to be the most "realistic" aspect. The UN setting has characteristics which are analogous to the legitimate theatre, and, in both real life and in the game, individual diplomats become actors in the literal sense and the interaction of individuals forms the substance of the proceedings, if only in the eye of the
beholder. This is of course not necessarily the case in customary forms of bilateral diplomatic negotiations. At the same time a political exercise limited to UN meetings is not particularly realistic since it cannot comprehend the kinds of intergovernmental interaction which precede, accompany, and follow such meetings. Arrangements could be made in such a game for negotiations in the corridors, accompanied by the process of seeking and receiving instructions from governments. The requirements would then call for duplicate sets of teams or individuals to play home governments in order to develop realistically the whole ensemble of diplomacy. The writer's conclusion is that the UN format is worth simulating as the centerpiece of a future exercise if the preceding, accompanying, and subsequent diplomacy can also be comprehended. In a sense this was the story of the Endicott House exercise but appropriate changes would have to be made to a) permit more time for preparing for meetings, b) provide home government and delegation staffs, c) allow time for follow-up after meetings, and d) organize teams for adequate world coverage in the light of UN membership. Because of the premium on "play-acting," this sort of game, if it could be done inexpensively, might lend itself best of all to the training of students, diplomatic trainees, etc. (A conference setting of more modest dimensions such as a NATO Council Meeting, might lend itself equally well for this purpose.)

It is conceivable that a three-day exercise could successfully and satisfactorily encompass a bilateral diplomatic game plus either a Security Council meeting or one General Assembly session, but not all three. Equally, such a period might encompass both the Security Council and a General Assembly session (subject to caveats mentioned earlier.) Even the five day period recommended below would be insufficient to do justice to all three. The price we paid in doing none of the three to satisfaction has paid off, it is believed, in learning
Duration and the Time Dimension. Time can theoretically be specified to be on a one-to-one basis, and this was the original intent in the Center's game. (A 24-hour period was actually skipped over the second night of the Endicott House exercise.) As it turned out, a number of players felt that under this rule events moved too fast and game time was actually faster than real-life time. The RAND Corporation is known to have conducted one game over a period of thirty days which simulated six months of world history. A number of the participants in the Center's game have suggested that game time should represent a longer span of real time, e.g., on a 1:2 basis, so moves might be digested, analyzed, talked about, and interpreted (although the suggestion was also made that game time be on a 2:1 basis, the game taking twice as long as the event by virtue of replaying alternatives or holding discussion between moves.) If a realistic length of the game is three to five days, given external circumstances such as budget, availability of personnel, etc., it is probable that either a one-to-one or a 1:2 basis would be the most effective. But if, and here we refer back to the dimension of depth, the purpose is to interpret long-range political phenomena, it would probably be desirable to have the game either run over a longer period of time (as has been done in at least one remarkably successful class-room experiment conducted at MIT in an American Foreign Policy course) or to have a five-day period represent anything up to a year of real time. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to simulate a crisis and the reactions to the crisis, it is entirely possible to learn something from a three-day game, as we have done, but a five-day game would permit the skipping of time in order to advance to a new stage of the problem during the period of the game, discussions if desired, and a longer post-mortem.
The three-day game was deemed unsatisfactory by a few players because certain interesting sub-developments, such as the Jordan crisis, could not be satisfactorily followed through. It seems likely that a relatively short game will inevitably create these frustrations.

On balance, it is concluded that a crisis type game should be allowed at least five days in order to be played out satisfactorily. As suggested above, this might also enable a "time out" at mid-point for analysis and replaying. More importantly, it would provide a half to a whole day for the post-mortem. Several evenings might also be utilized for dinner and informal after-dinner sessions, for the further elaboration of policies, development of diplomatic contacts, etc. A five-day game could also be used to play out a more long-range kind of problem, by having game time on something like 1:6 ratio so that the developments over a month could be envisaged. This, however, requires extensive preparation in advance (or, alternatively, at night) so that the developments in the intervening period can be fully and satisfactorily reported to the participants each morning.

Role-Playing. Players should probably stay in their roles for the entire time. In the first place, this sustains the principal purpose of the game, which is to maximize the interaction of individuals playing roles in a group setting. Any departure from this principle detracts from the primary purpose. It would be theoretically possible to divide the game in half and allow players to step out of role for purposes of analysis and for the development of new alternatives. But on balance—and this was the preponderant view of the players at Endicott House—players should remain in their roles. At the same time, the rules might specify a limit to the histrionics permitted, and should require that moves be stipulated rather than carried out in full, and that minor or irrelevant tactical moves be eliminated.
Teams. The majority of participants in the Endicott House game recommended that assignment of individuals be more specific, e.g., within the American team one player should be Secretary of State, one Congress, one "public opinion," one the Pentagon, etc. Some felt that there should be no individual players but only teams, and also that only the "active" governments should be represented. Certainly it was a mistake to subsume Peiping within the Soviet bloc team, but if it had not been done this way the Communist Chinese team hardly warranted more than one person. Again, each such game probably calls for a design *sui generis*, at least at this stage of the art. It is clear that if the "societal" reaction of press, parliament, public opinion, etc. are desired to be brought out, the teams must be sufficiently large to permit appropriate division of labor within the teams to allow for such specialization. It also requires that the dining room facilities, for example, be appropriate to small gatherings.

As indicated earlier, a "decision-making" game would emphasize the dynamics of interaction *within* the teams as much as that between teams. In this case the possibility of a "game within a game," which perhaps distracted rather than helped the kind of short-term "diplomatic interaction" game played at Endicott House, would become a positive asset. It would, as indicated, necessitate more precise assignment of roles within teams, particularly the role of governmental (team) leadership. A "strong man" would thus lead rather than simply awe or otherwise overwhelm a team.
**Briefing.** The initial substantive briefing should be more detailed. It should spell out in greater detail the developments which have led to the situation and should satisfy the participants that a logical sequence of events has preceded the present situation. Locating the game one year ahead in time was not in itself defective, but a narrower time gap might be more helpful in order to eliminate the possible variables that seem to arise in the players' minds as they look ahead a full year. A period of at least two hours after the initial briefing session should be specified before any moves are permitted, in order to enable the players to absorb the material, discuss their strategy, and to develop a brief written analysis and estimate of their future plans. It is felt that the surprise element is useful and important and that the subject of the game, particularly if it is a crisis situation, should not be revealed to the players prior to the beginning of the game itself. The teams might well be organized before the actual briefing, so that their general policy lines could be spelled out in the light of the world period specified.

**Scope of moves.** A decision should be made in advance as to any limitation on moves, i.e., between strategic and tactical, policy and nonpolicy, etc. If there is no limitation on moves, and particularly if "societal" moves are to be made, the teams must be strengthened so that the reactions from nongovernmental sources can be carefully and realistically developed without hampering the operations of the team as a whole. If the moves are limited to strategic and if the purpose of the game is primarily analysis rather than verisimilitude, such prescriptions should be carefully laid down in advance so that there is no confusion.
Negotiations. Negotiations between teams should be conducted on a more formal basis. Appointments should be requested by telephone, and sufficient time should elapse (except where the game is being deliberately speeded up) for "ambassadors" to call at the State Department, etc. The meetings should be held in separate rooms or corridors, not in team headquarters, and adequate time should be allowed for the negotiators to report back and fully brief their principals.

Moves. All moves should be recorded in writing. A useful suggestion was made that a standard form be used for written moves. The managers of the Endicott House game were reluctant to impose onerous rules upon the participants beyond those which seemed absolutely essential, chiefly because of the experimental nature of the game. In retrospect, however, the task both for participants and for officials would have been simplified if printed forms had been available, both "classified" and "unclassified," for easy recording of moves as well as numbering, distribution, etc. In this connection, the suggestion has been made that players be permitted to dictate their moves into machines. The Endicott House game was a relatively expensive proposition and it is felt that the addition of an even larger typing staff plus additional machinery for dictation would raise the costs beyond an economical point. On the other hand, provision might be made for recording and transcription of original strategic appreciations and of final decisions and appraisals.
Intelligence. One of the chief problems of the Endicott House game was the inability of the game officials to furnish continuous political and military intelligence to the teams, over and above the initial appreciation of the situation which was made available at the outset. This could be cured through a number of devices: a) "intelligence experts" could be attached to each team, with the function of preparing intelligence on the basis of the given situation; this has the drawback of requiring them to invent facts which should be ascertainable objectively; b) the Umpire group could be enlarged so that the Umpires could do a better job of inventing and feeding intelligence to the teams upon request; c) a "Nature" team could be devised, as was done at RAND, both to interject new and unexpected elements into the objective situation and to furnish intelligence on request.

Umpires. The Endicott House experience suggests strongly that the Umpires should be more readily available for two purposes: a) to discuss moves with teams and to assist them in determining plausibility, sequence, etc., and b) to devise new information which introduces further elements of reality into the game (although the Nature team suggested above could absorb this latter function.)

If there is more than one Umpire it is probably necessary that they pass on moves collectively, and it is not easy to envisage dividing up this function. One way to ease the burden on Umpires would be to cut down the number of inconsequential or peripheral moves, and to provide for time lags. On the other hand, realism would also call for a rather large number of communications to have been prepared and received overnight, which again might yield a pile-up on the Umpires' desks. Adding to the number of Umpires would tend to increase the bottleneck aspect (although this was hardly the aspect of the Umpires' operation at Endicott House that detracted most from realism.) On balance, it might be well to
have a single Umpire to pass on the plausibility of moves, and another Umpire who is out negotiating with teams and who, on his return, simply catches up with accumulated moves (this was done about one-third of the time by the two Umpires at Endicott House). A "Nature" team might well be organized with the function of introducing new elements into the situation and supplying intelligence on demand.

One suggestion made was that the Umpires score the teams and players on the basis of the achievement of their goals as well as their performance. If the setting is a classroom this seems quite feasible. With a group of responsible and mature players the former, but not the latter, would seem desirable. If the post-mortem had lasted longer it is possible that collective "marks" would indeed have been assigned to the performance of various teams. This might result in personal discomfort or embarrassment, and it is not certain whether this would be compensated for by adding anything to the value of the exercise.

Post-Mortem. Professor Schein has prepared comments on the post-mortem which I cannot improve upon, and which are spelled out below:

It is my feeling that the atmosphere created in the post-mortem is extremely important for its maximal usefulness as a teaching device. One can consider the post-mortem to have several functions:

1) Tension release, catharsis, self-justification
2) Obtaining of closure on what happened (satisfying curiosity concerning aspects of game not immediately observed)
3) Providing basis for discussion of substantive issues raised by the events of the game (e.g. analyzing the foreign policy of one of the teams)
4) Intellectualizing and consolidating what one has learned, and sharing one's learning with others
5) Objective evaluation of the game for potential future use

It appears obvious to me that the fulfillment of these functions requires that the post-mortem not only be planned carefully, but be carried out with the aim in mind of creating an atmosphere that is conducive to their maximum fulfillment. For example, if one assumes, and this is justified in terms of other exercises like this that I
have seen, that people have a strong need to tell what they did and why, one should allow the early phase of the post-mortem to be a session in which the most people get to talk.

It also appears to me that one must insure that there is adequate time for the post-mortem (a minimum of a whole afternoon), even if this means that the game must be interrupted against the wishes of the players.

To get back to the point about atmosphere, particularly with respect to point 4 and 5 in the above list, it is necessary to handle the group carefully in order to avoid the impression that there is a group norm about something which is in fact not true. What happened was that those people who felt they had learned little found it much easier to verbalize their feeling than those people who may have felt they got a lot out of it but did not know how to say it. Actually, there were nine people who did not make any comment at all, and some effort should have been made to solicit their reactions. Then the chairman might have attempted some summarization and tested it against the feelings of the group as a whole. The situation should not have been left with just a few individuals expressing their own feelings without attempting to find out how much shared sentiment existed about any of the point. Then if sharp disagreements were uncovered which were more than semantic, these should be carefully explored (here the chairman was handicapped by lack of time).

Probably it would be desirable to have different people conduct different phases of the post-mortem. The Umpire would be in a good position to chair the meeting which pertains to the substance of the game, but someone more specifically trained in conducting meetings might be better to get at the various participants' feelings and their reactions to the game.

One should also consider various different strategies for the post-mortem. For example, it need not be the most desirable course of action to conduct the whole post-mortem as a single meeting of all the participants. At some point it might be more desirable to have the participants break up into four or five-man discussion groups to deal with various issues. Such groups would give everyone more of an opportunity to talk, and would enable opinions to be screened in the small group setting before being exposed to the total group (a common technique employed when it is desired to get questions from the floor from a very large audience.)
The players were organized into teams as follows:

**US Team:** Francis M. Bator (MIT)
Daniel S. Cheever (Harvard)
Max F. Millikan (MIT)
Ithiel de S. Pool (MIT)
(Seth P. Tillman, Recording Secretary)

**Western European Team:** (including UK and "Old Commonwealth," France, W. Germany, Benelux, Austria, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Greece)

Karl W. Deutsch (Yale)
Stanley H. Hoffman (Harvard)
William L. Letwin (MIT)

**Soviet Bloc Team:**
Alexander Dallin (Columbia)
David B. Gleicher (MIT)
Alexander G. Korol (MIT)
Marshall D. Shulman (Harvard)
(Donald L. M. Blackmer, Recording Secretary)

**Poland:** Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski (Harvard)

**Yugoslavia:** Adam B. Ulam (Harvard)

**Near and Middle East Team:** (including Arab League states plus Tunisia and Morocco, Iran, Pakistan, Israel)

Daniel S. Lerner (MIT)
Albert J. Meyer (Harvard)
William R. Polk (Harvard)

**Asia and Africa Team:** (including all Asian and African states from Indonesia and Japan west to West Africa, except Arab States, Israel, Iran and Pakistan)

Sudershan Chawla (Muskingum College)
Rupert Emerson (Harvard)
Benjamin H. Higgins (MIT)
Latin America: Juan de Zengotita (Foreign Service Institute)

Scandinavia: (including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden)

Norman J. Padelford (MIT)

UN Secretary General-UN Parliamentarian: Oscar Schachter (United Nations)

Umpires: Lincoln P. Bloomfield (MIT)
Paul Kecskemeti (RAND)

Shortly after the game commenced it was found necessary to make the individual country assignments within teams explicit, even though some of these were of course already understood:

Karl W. Deutsch W. Germany
Stanley H. Hoffman France
William L. Letwin UK and Commonwealth
A. J. Meyer (subsequently changed to Daniel Lerner)
Alexander G. Korol Communist China
Sudershan Chawla India
Benjamin H. Higgins Uncommitted Countries
Rupert Emerson Asian SEATO Members

When it came to the Security Council meeting, the representation of three countries postulated to be members of the Council in 1959--China, Canada, and Japan--was assigned to individuals carrying more general game assignments. Messrs. Emerson, Higgins and Chawla of the Asian-African team were respectively assigned the roles of China, Canada, and Japan.

On the third day, the detailed representation of individual governments by individual players had to be spelled out in order to ensure 81 votes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letwin</td>
<td>UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffman</td>
<td>France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsch</td>
<td>Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Bloc</td>
<td>USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Rumania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulam</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casorowski</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lerner</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polk</td>
<td>UAR, Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Pakistan, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chawla</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higgins</td>
<td>Japan, Thailand, Burma, Ceylon, Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerson</td>
<td>Indonesia also Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latin America: 20 Republics
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE II

a. Most realistic and most unrealistic aspects of the game.

Most realistic aspects in order of frequency of response: United Nations sessions (9), the haste and tension of crash judgments and decisions (5), diplomatic activity (4), the situation as defined (4), the basic strategic choices of the large teams (3), the role-playing (2), the press comments and leaks (1), and the sense of responsibility engendered (1).

Most unrealistic aspects in order of frequency: foreshortening of time and space (4), the non-UN diplomatic negotiations (3), the UN proceedings (2), the general air of unreality of the game as a whole (2), the inactivity of the less-involved nations (2), the latter trying to "get into the act" and keep busy (1), lack of intelligence (1), the artificial obligation to create a UN problem (1), the role-playing (1), the multiple role-playing (1)*, the limited flow of information on events (1), the inability of teams simultaneously to negotiate and communicate (1), the lack of opportunity to establish policy perspectives in advance (1), and the exaggerated impression conveyed of national unity (1).

b. Possible uses of the game. Eight categories were suggested, calling for answers of "not useful," "somewhat useful," "very useful." The results are given below in the order in which participants found a particular category to be "very useful."

* Presumably this applied to the need to assign several roles to individual players.
As a way of heightening emotional awareness of political and diplomatic issues: very-19, somewhat-6, not-1.

As an aid in thinking through the diplomatic process in detail and getting a better "feel" for it: very-18, somewhat-8, not-0.

As an aid in giving the scholar better insights into problems of the operational man: very-16, somewhat-7, not-3.

As an aid in giving a better "feel" of personal relations in the diplomatic process: very-8, somewhat-11, not-6.

As a teaching aid: very-7, somewhat-16, not-1.

As an aid in giving the operator a better insight into planning alternatives: very-6, somewhat-15, not-3.

As a research tool to provide ideas and data about politics and diplomacy: very-4, somewhat-13, not-9.

As a way of generating intelligence about actual future situations: very-0, somewhat-16, not-10.

In replying to the last question one respondent thought the game "downright dangerous" as a way of attempting to generate factual prediction. Also, the responses regarding use as a teaching aid contained numerous qualifications. Some general comments were that the uses of the game depend on the quality and caliber of personnel, and that the game in general is extremely useful as an aid to self-review and to accelerate thought processes, as well as to derive insight into decision-making under time pressures and work overload and insight into that which members of the other teams took for granted and which did not necessarily turn out to be valid. One commented that actual apprenticeship, such as assignment to the US Mission to the UN, is more valuable...
for officials (although at the same time five felt that it was "very useful" for giving the operator a useful insight into alternatives.) In this connection, one suggested that more "diplomatic" and fewer "academic types" would improve the game—again surprising in view of the rather strong feeling that the operator was perhaps the least one to need this kind of exposure to fast-moving events in a position of responsibility. According to some other general comments, the game has some predictive utility for officials, teachers, and students and it might well be useful to crank problems of this sort into an experienced group to see if some order of future estimates might be derived. It has some pedagogical utility for students and young officials. Its most relevant use is for teachers and specialists, for purposes of teaching and study. It is a useful teaching device for a mature seminar.

3. How future games might be improved This is perhaps the most complex of the sets of questions asked, with the most variation in replies. In the order in which they appeared on the questionnaire, the categories are as follows:

(1) Initial briefing. 12 ranged their answers from "satisfactory" to "excellent." 6—more time needed to digest the brief, 2—more background desirable on the crisis itself, 1—more detail should be given on the ground rules, 1—more detail should be given on the distinction between normative versus realistic strategies, 1—the objectives of the game should be more clearly emphasized, 1—more detailed briefing should be given on communications procedures.

(2) Selection of teams and assignment of players. 5—satisfactory, 5—players should all be organized into teams rather than play as single individuals, 5—teams should represent only the governments which will be active
in the game, with other countries represented by "nature" or the Umpires.

3- Communist China should have operated as a separate team, 2-the Polish team should have been larger, 2-there should have been more advance meetings of the teams, 2-the Asian-African players should have been divided into anti-Communist and neutralist categories (in effect this was done in the course of the game), 3-there should be no more than one country per player;

2-for the diplomatic aspect the team should be small, for the decision-making process the teams should be large, and the game should opt for either of these modes, 1-each teams should be formed spontaneously; main teams should be larger; teams should all be one man each; there should be more players; inactive players should be detailed to the main teams; and "Senior" participants should be on the main teams and not on unimportant or peripheral teams.

(3) Role Assignment: Should it be more general or more specific? On the large teams should the individual members be assigned different roles by the Umpire or not? 1-Assignments should be more specific, 3-satisfactory, 2-Assignments should be less specific within teams in order to avoid the development of "sub-games"; 1-each-no individual statesman should be portrayed but rather the teams should play an institutional role; there should be a leader for each team; assignments should be left to the teams.

(4) Timing Rules: Would you change the manner in which time was defined, or the rules pertaining to time? 9-satisfactory, 4-time should be skipped, 3-game time should represent a longer stretch of real time; 7 thus shared the general view that in three days a significantly longer period of real time should be represented; but 2 thought the game too rushed, recommending that game time be 2:1 to real time; 1-each-the game should be broken down into separate periods with intervals between; the time to prepare for UN sessions
was too short; the players should stay together more during a 24 hour day; the time at the start should be slow and should then be speeded up; there should be less playing time and more evaluation; there should be more time for bilateral diplomacy and only one UN meeting; the Umpires should use their discretion more; the problem should be a more contemporary one, i.e., the one year gap was too long between real time and game time; and the General Assembly debate should be shorter.

(5) **Playing Rules:** Would you change these (either having replays, or having moves made more formally, or informally, etc.)? 6--satisfactory, 6--moves made more formally, 3--replays would be useful, 2--replay various alternatives, 2--there should be better rules regarding the need to publicize separate moves; 1 each--there should be more "noise" and intelligence deriving from the Umpires; there should be more informality; special forms should be devised for making moves; there should be better information available to the Umpires; peripheral tactical moves should be eliminated; an experiment should be made in following each play with a post-mortem and each post-mortem with a replay and then a post-mortem following the replay; diplomatic negotiations should continue during UN sessions; and each player should write out his strategy at the beginning, as well as the gains and losses he expects; at the end of the game the Umpires should score the players on the basis of actual gains and losses, as well as performance.

(6) **Should players be required to stay in roles or should they be permitted to slip in and out of role when they see fit?** 13--players should stay in role, 7--should slip in and out of role, 3--should be allowed to "call time", 1 each--should not be in roles at "relaxing" times; should avoid "play acting" (the question was raised by several as to whether any such rule would be enforceable); and there should be frequent out-of-role discussions.
(7) Should the rules concerning how players may contact each other be changed? Should conferences be held privately in separate rooms? 12—there should be more formal consultation, held in separate rooms, 6—satisfactory, 2—if possible, everything should be done in writing, 2—all consultations of any kind should be reported.

(8) How should adequate involvement in the game for all be insured—or should it be? (There are some obvious cross-references here to (2) above.)
10—it was satisfactory, 5—team organization should be limited to the countries or areas likely to be involved in the game itself, 5—teams or countries not realistically involved should not be involved artificially, 3—the UN sessions helped to involve everyone, 3—"nature" should represent the non-involved countries, 2—the Umpires should introduce new events to involve idle players, 2—the inactive players should be detailed to the main teams, 1—additional multiple roles should be assigned.

(9) How should the post-mortem be organized to insure maximum benefit to players? 12—allow more time, 4—more pointed questions should be directed to participants to elicit the decision points, alternatives contemplated, intelligence appraisals, etc., 4—each team should report on the main moves it has made and the main insights it has gained, 3—it should be long enough to discuss all key moves, 2—separate substantive post-mortem and procedural debriefing should be held, 2—it was satisfactory; 1—each—individual teams should have their post-mortems first, then report the main points to the group as a whole; there should be detailed replaying of moves; more reflective time should be allowed before the post-mortem; the post-mortem should consist of cross-examination by one team of another; the debriefing questions should be circulated in advance; everyone should have a chance to be heard; and there should be a better agenda.
Finally, general comments were asked for, and they included some concrete suggestions. The questionnaire should be used as the basis for group discussion in the post-mortem. The Umpires should evaluate more the impact of moves, and stimulate more interaction. Analysts should predict the game in advance in order to correct the feeling of "inevitability," and in order to test the sequential play against their own analysis. Some diplomatic "play" should be continued during the UN sessions in order to keep the world going on, so to speak. There should be more Umpires for greater checking on the plausibility of moves. There should be a dictaphone in the office so delegates could "talk off" the moves they make. There should have been an additional working period at the end of the second day. There should be another game on American policy toward the United Nations, held toward the conclusion of the United Nations project at the Center.

Some final comments might be of interest: The game "shakes up one's ideas" about problems and decision factors even though it cannot completely duplicate reality. The game was "excellent" (3 such answers). "Stimulating and enlightening." "I replayed moves and alternatives in my mind for days afterward." "It was a vivid and illuminating experience." "Well managed, thoughtfully played, and realistic." "It gave me a keen sense of intellectual stimulation, mainly at the post-mortem." "You done good, fellas."