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STATIC AND DYNAMIC FRANCE

Problems and Prospects of French Urban and Regional Studies

by

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INTRODUCTION

The studies on which this monograph is based began in 1954--the eventful year in which France defeated E.D.C., the treaty creating a European Defense Community proposed by French initiative four years earlier, and the year in which a new French census was taken. These two events, apparently quite disparate to most observers, seemed to this writer rather directly related. Living in France during 1954-55, he was able to detect a false note in the sociological assumptions about regional France then being put forward by French statesmen and scholars to "account for" the political decision that rejected E.D.C.

Two major issues were raised by the Great Debate over E.D.C. that preoccupied French statesmen during the four years leading to a negative decision, and have continued to preoccupy French scholars in the ten years since that decision was taken. These issues were and are:

(1) What is regional France really like, when we move from the imaginative concepts created by gifted writers to the unimaginative facts reported by census data? (2) Once we establish a data-based analysis of regional France today, how does this analysis improve our understanding of French political behavior with respect to national issues (e.g., elections) and international issues (e.g., treaties such as E.D.C.)?

These two issues have remained at the center of our attention in the decade of sequential studies that are brought together in this monograph. We began with a close analysis of the E.D.C. defeat and the explanation of this event put forward by French statesmen and scholars.
This effort was sponsored by the Institut d'Etudes Européenes in Paris--supported jointly by M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies and the Sorbonne's Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques--under the direction of this writer. Its product was a book which demonstrated, quite conclusively, that explanations of French political behavior in terms of French regionalism were bound to be wrong because their assumptions about French regions were inaccurate. The book proves that the basic propositions about regional sociology and political decision in France were demonstrably false.¹

This negative finding--with positive indications that data-based analysis of census results would produce new insights into the French sociopolitical process--motivated us to undertake strict statistical analysis of the 1954 census coupled with case-studies of the "unexpectedly dynamic" southern regions of France in 1960-61, when this writer was residing in that area as a Visiting Professor at Aix-en-Provence and Nice. Support for these studies was granted by the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Unfortunately, the case-studies made by this writer were lost in transatlantic transit, but the statistical analysis of 1954 census data under Dr. Morton Gorden produced results of sufficient interest to warrant a 1961 report to the Joint Center.²

On the basis of this 1961 report, the Joint Center decided to support a continuing 1962-63 study that would help maintain our doctoral candidate,

¹. See D. Lerner & Raymond Aron, France Defeats E.D.C. (Praeger, 1957). A French version was published as La Querelle de la C.E.D. (Colin, 1956). A digest of these findings appears as the first of the "Case Studies" presented in Part III of this monograph.

². D. Lerner & M. Gorden, "Static France and Dynamic France" (mimeograph, 1960).
Howard Rosenthal, in France. His purpose was to obtain and report 1962 census data, while making several fresh "case-studies" of regional France. The comparison of 1954 and 1962 census data in Part II and the case-studies of Poujadism and Communism in Part III were done by Rosenthal. The present report was edited by Gorden; general supervision of the research and reporting has been under Lerner.

The present report takes us much deeper into the analysis of the issues on which our researches began to focus a decade ago: (1) the sociology of regional France; (2) its relation to national and international French politics. On the issue of regional sociology, comparison of the eight-year periods terminating in the census data of 1954 and 1962 has proved fruitful. We have been able to show that during the initial postwar eight-year period (1946-1954) the modernization of regional France was associated, not with the conventional imagery of "natural regions," but with the growth and spread of "urban regions." The latter have spread in flat contradiction—at least in the southern regions defined by Toulouse and Marseilles and Nice—to the conventional imagery of the lazy meridional and the easygoing midi that have long been assumed in French regional studies.

During the second eight-year period (1954-1962), we show that French modernization has passed completely out of the realm of conventional regional psychology (based on climate and character) into the realm of modern urban-regional studies (based on urbanism and mobility). Indeed, the new data show French urbanization to have grown so rapidly that a sufficient urban base now exists to make further modernization inevitable.
The mass media now reach everywhere in France. As a result--our report poignantly notes--some old village people still wear black clothing to continue the traditional "cult of the dead," most young village people wear colorful shorts and slacks to initiate the modern "cult of the living." What our present report suggests, though it cannot prove, is that French urbanization has reached its "critical mass" in many regions. The mass media and cheap transport are carrying on from there. These make villagers "urbane" without urbanizing them. They teach villagers how to look and act like urbanites without making a permanent change of residence.

That French villagers now look like urbanites is a matter on which we can only report our visual impressions. That they now act like urbanites, however, is a matter on which we have decisive data. Behavioral indices are the crux of behavioral science and we therefore focus our data-reporting on the figures which show "homogeneity" growing throughout the 90 Departments of France. That the mass media are spreading even more rapidly through rural than urban France (according to our 1962 census data) reveals how effectively the modernization process--or what we have called the "homogenization" process--is at work. That "urbanized" farmers do better than "traditional" farmers--as indexed by our agricultural productivity scores--augurs the continuing urbanization of the rural population.

We come, then, to the view that France is undergoing the major transformation from a predominantly rural-agricultural society to a predominantly urban-technological society. On the historical side, this means that urban exploitation of the peasantry is gone. The era
of the "delicious ten-cent omelette" is over in regional France. Nowadays, the omelette will surely cost more than ten cents; and it may not be delicious. The French peasant has learned double-entry bookkeeping, and he is determined to come out on the black side of the ledger, however this may affect his image among "the others." Besides, now that he has machines to run and tend, he hasn't "time" for fooling around with casse-croûte. Far more important--now that his wife wants a Singer sewing-machine, his daughter wants a store-bought skirt, his son wants a scooter, and he wants a car--is how to manage his income taxes. This is the Lerner Law of Agricultural Productivity: as "rate" increases, "charm" decreases.

But are we dealing with other issues than "charm"? As "rate" increases among French farmers, important innovations appear in their political behavior. Here the Rosenthal case-studies of Poujadism and Communism are very much in point. They show that both extremes of the French political continuum--Left as well as Right--now operate independently of conventional regional stereotypes and indeed contrary to current regional hypotheses. It is demonstrably inaccurate, for example, to assert that political extremism is higher in "static France."

Rosenthal documents the contrary assertion in a fascinating way, showing that Poujade's voters are more numerous in the relatively dynamic departments of regional France--those departments in which the recent experience of rising growth "rates" has rapidly increased expectations of future growth. These heightened expectations, when subjected to short-term frustrations, are the source of extremist political behavior such
as Poujadism in regional France.

Equally fascinating is Roßenthal's showing that Communism in regional France has entered an "inertial" phase--maintaining itself by the organizational routinization of existing strongpoints, but adding few new strongpoints by mobilizing and recruiting fresh elements from the regional population. Related to this showing are Lerner's 1960-61 studies of "family socialization" among industrial workers in the southern departments of France. These studies showed that among the younger children of younger industrial workers--those children attending primary and early secondary school in 1961--there was a strong shift of "socialization values" from ideopolitical to socioeconomic standards of judgment and behavior. As compared with older children of industrial workers--those already on the job in 1961--the youngsters put far less value upon "class solidarity" and far more value upon "personal mobility." On such "solidarity" issues as clothing (the famous blue denim of the French worker), collective action (through demonstrations or strikes), and party affiliation (Communist or Socialist) the youngsters were either indifferent or disdainful. Moreover, they reported that their parents encouraged them to ignore "solidarity" activities and focus on "mobility" activities--such as acquiring through education the skills and manners that would enable them to "rise" out of the working class into the higher socioeconomic strata. Independent interviews with the parents confirmed that industrial workers in the southern departments--and especially younger parents among the workers--were consciously socializing their children to downgrade "solidarity" in favor of "mobility" values.

Sic transit gloria proletarii!
With the passage of the sturdy peasant and the staunch proletarian, the sociological structure of modern France undergoes very deep transformation. For two centuries or more—from the centralized regime established in the 18th century to the end of World War II—France was the A/B country par excellence. France A was Paris, urban, industrial, communicative, modern; France B was le province, rural, agricultural, secretive, arrière. This tidy division of the national life into A/B compartments—France A acting in the world by skill and France B supporting it by labor—has been disrupted by urban technology and is being re-shaped by urban communication.

In France today, as our studies show, no regional A/B dichotomy can readily be plotted on the map. The process of homogenization is well advanced—with the result that regional France increasingly looks and acts like Parisian France. The impact on national politics is already evident in the inadequacy of conventional categories to explain recent electoral behavior within France—as in the Poujadist and Communist movements. The impact on French political behavior in the world arena—as foreshadowed a decade ago in the E.D.C. and elaborated by De Gaulle today—remains to be investigated in detail.
PART I

URBAN REGIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRANCE

Modernization in a Developed Country
Regionalism as Social Science
Changing France: Mobility and Urbanism
Urbanism and Modernization
The Spreading Urban Regions
Toward a Regional Science in France
PART I

URBAN REGIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FRANCE*

Modernization in a Developed Country

Regionalism has played a large role in French life and thought. The great "natural regions" acquired centuries ago some distinctive marks which they still bear today—the dairy region of Normandy, the maritime region of Brittany, the wine regions of the Loire and of the Rhone. Only in the 18th century, according to Tocqueville, did the heavy hand of centralized government begin to subordinate the proud traditions of regional differences based on nature—a process completed by the Napoleonic system in the 19th century. The motive of central-

* We wish to thank the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University for a grant in support of the research on which this monograph is based.


2. Presses Universitaires de France, in its series "Que Sais-je?", has published over a dozen regional histories—including Normandy, Brittany, Alsace, Lorraine, Provence, Savoie, Auvergne, Dauphiné—as well as of Paris and Lyon.

ization was fiscal revenue, its method was political control. France was divided into administrative units called departments and ruled by agents of the central authority called préfets. The lines of communication (roads, railways) followed the political chain of command—from prefecture to Paris—with direct communication between departments virtually banned. Until 1871, indeed, "the Departments were forbidden by law to correspond with one another through their General Councils and to enter into agreement to undertake any common purpose."5

The new law of 1871 gave the departments the right to communicate with each other—but only on "questions of common interest which are not political in character" and only after prior notification to the prefect of the departments concerned. Accordingly, the Frenchman remained a political administré. A movement of protest against "strangulation by centralization" promptly took shape under the banner of regionalism. The Provençal poet, de Berbec-Perussis, coined the term in 1874 and it has remained in use ever since. In the next three generations, regionalism developed into an important literary movement and social ideology, based on the notion of a pervasive "vegetal element" in the human life-history: healthy growth occurs


5. R. K. Gooch, op. cit., p. 117
only when roots have been deeply planted in a native soil and the
organism is nurtured in a native climate.

The regionalists directed their wrath against the omnipotence
of Paris, which obliterated natural regional variations by imposing
administrative central standards and impoverished the regions by draw-
ing their youth to the metropolis.

In articulating their protest, the regionalists revived the
ancient ideas of regional differences as determinant of the way of
life. Maurice Barrès, in Les Déracinés, asserted that the cream of
young manhood of Lorraine, by following the road that led to Paris,
had been "deracinated" (cut off from their roots). This process,
repeated through all the regions of France, represented a "devital-
ization" of the "national energy." Once again the regional imagery
of the stout Normand, the dour Breton, the easygoing meridional
gained currency and credence. Marcel Pagnol's prize-winning film
Marius, which dramatized this regional imagery in 1932, is "still
one of the most popular movies in France, especially in the Midi."

REGIONALISM AS SOCIAL SCIENCE

Social science developed in France during the 19th century,
as the image of regional France was being reshaped under the pressure
of centralizing government. A long tradition of social history,
enlivened with the insights of amateur social psychology, was

gradually remade into a more modern type of social science. A major instrument of this change was the comparative study. No longer did the observer focus exclusively on the particularities of a single region; now the array of local diversities was collated and compared. A pioneer of comparative studies was Frédéric Le Play, who devoted much of his life to collecting, classifying and comparing empirical data on over 300 working class families in every European and several Asian countries. Le Play wished to study the impact of industrialization upon the new urban working class. Accordingly, he reasoned, it was necessary to "control" all regional variations. His monumental Les Ouvriers Européens (printed in six volumes, 1855), exemplified the basic concept and method of studying secular social problems within their natural geographical settings. 7

This new conception gave geography a commanding position at the center of social science in France (as compared with economics in Britain and sociology in the United States). The first great schools of "human geography," a distinctively French discipline, were based on the assumption that the most important context for studying people was where they lived. 8 Geography made its impact on each of the social sciences. The "economic geography" associated with Henri Hauser still persists in French scholarship today. 9 The "political geography"

8. See the magistral four-volume work by Maximilian Sorre, a human geographer who, within the past decade, presided over the Centre d'Études Sociologiques in Paris.
initiated by André Siegfried earlier in this century is still the major tradition of electoral studies in current French political science. While no "psychological geography" ever attained professional standing, the strong tradition of regional psychology and géographie sentimentale in French letters was maintained by eminent historians and literary men. French scholars have naturally turned, therefore, to the categories of geography in formulating their problems, ordering their data, and interpreting their findings.

Not until recently has the authority of this position been questioned seriously among French social scientists. Indeed, the effort to re-think the analytic categories inherited from human geography by all the social sciences took shape only during the past decade. In 1951, the senior French historian Fernand Braudel wrote a challenging paper entitled "Geography Faces the Social Sciences." In the following year, the senior sociologists of France, led by Georges Friedmann, convoked their colleagues in neighboring disciplines for a conference on Villes et Campagnes. As indicated by their subtitle, "Urban Civilization and Rural Civilization in France," the conferees were seeking new analytic categories for social research. In particular,

10. André Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous IIIe République (Paris, 1913).


they were seeking to replace the "vegetal" rubrics of traditional regionalism with the behavioral concepts of urbanism.

A profound shift of perspective was involved here. Human geographers had studied climate and rainfall, topography and resources, flora and fauna as principal components of the human habitat—which indeed they were in the agricultural France of long tradition. Contemporary social scientists were more concerned with class structure, religious practice, family organization, occupational distribution, transport and mobility—the psycho-sociological factors which have differentiated the "milieu technique" of the city from the "milieu naturel" of the countryside. In the philosophic sense, this shifted attention from the natural and God-given ecological features of the habitat, apparently fixed and immutable, to the man-made and highly variable institutions and practices which account for social change.

These efforts yielded, in the course of the decade, a number of striking new hypotheses about the changing conditions of French life. Possibly the most important of these was the hypothesis that France could be divided into two parts: France A and France B. France A was dynamic, progressive, adaptive to change; France B was static, traditional, routinized in its perspectives and practices. This dichotomous conception of dynamic versus static France is attractive; it has the elegant simplicity of all ideal types. That "urban civilization" should be radically different from "rural civilization" in France seems natural. In America, as in all modern countries that have lived through and studied the secular process of urbanization,
we know that it alters individuals, reshapes institutions, and transforms a nation's way of life. America and Britain had undergone this transformation by the early decades of the century, completing it in the aftermath of World War I (when the popular song asked: "How're you gonna keep 'em down on the farm after they've seen Paree?"). Continental Europe--from France to Russia--has been undergoing this process during the middle decades of the century, completing it in the aftermath of World War II. The rest of the world has entered into the process of building an urban civilization and will, hopefully without a World War III, complete it during the latter decades of this century.

The process of urbanization, therefore, has been and continues to be crucial. How to reshape a traditional rural civilization into a modern urban civilization is a key problem of this century. Since this process involves the transformation of ways of life and thought for millions of people, there is probably no question more fundamental on the agenda of modern social science. The example of Europe is valuable for analysis and reflection, because the continental countries have not yet completed their process or their thinking about it. France, a nation gifted in dramatizing its public problems, is especially interesting. A key question is why the attractive typology of dynamic France versus static France has produced regional hypotheses that are regularly disconfirmed by the facts of contemporary French life. If we can understand this misfit of theory and reality, we shall be in a better position to understand the process of modernization.
The weakness of the French theory appears to be located in the debate between regionalism and urbanism. We have indicated that traditional French regionalism was based on the apparently permanent features of the natural habitat: climate and weather, topography and soil, flora and fauna. The newer French urbanism, on the contrary, deals with variables produced by changing human activity: authority and power, wealth and income, class and status, culture and personality. A fundamental outlook on the human condition is involved in this shift of research perspectives. Accordingly, the French effort to replace the categories of "human geography" by those of "behavioral science" --and the particular French conflict between regionalism and urbanism-- presents us with a case that is singularly interesting for regional scientists everywhere.

We believe that the French effort to preserve geography while studying behavior breaks down because traditional regionalism has not been effectively reconciled with modern urbanism. Even the recent effort to delineate ideal types of urban and rural civilization does not hold up when these ideal types are matched against the map of France. Some rural areas have proved relatively dynamic, some urban areas have remained relatively static. The degree of dynamism in each region appears to be more closely associated with the behavior of its urban centers than with fixed properties of its natural habitat. This disparity between the God-given regions and the man-made cities is the crux of our inquiry.
CHANGING FRANCE: MOBILITY AND URBANISM

Much has changed in France during recent decades, particularly since the end of World War II. The "natural elements" of climate, soil, habitat which did useful service during the long centuries of the agrarian past no longer explain much. The close-mouthed Auvergnat and the garrulous meridional are nowadays more likely to be conventional stereotypes rather than behavioral descriptions. Climate no longer shapes character, nor does area determine attitude, in most of France. For the plain fact is that nowadays when one talks about the Provençal or Savoyard, often one is talking about people who were not even born or raised in those regions.

Geographical mobility has entered into the lifeways of provincial France. To an extent not even suspected until a few years ago, large proportions of people living in any region of France are likely to have been born or raised elsewhere. The sheer magnitude of provincial mobility was first shown in a study of Auxerre, a small city south of Paris, published in 1950. This old city, originally selected because it was thought to be "typical" of provincial stability, turned out to be a demographic way-station. Very few families had lived there for more than two generations. Of its current population, two thirds had been born elsewhere, and more than half of these came from rural communes. 13 Subsequent studies have shown that Auxerre is, indeed,

"typical"—but typical of the mobility (rather than stability) which has become a normal condition in urban France.

A similar condition of mobility in rural France is demonstrated by studies made during the past decade. In Nouville, a small village north of Paris in the department of Seine-Inférieur, the total population changed very little between 1946 and 1949. However, the actual inhabitants of this village changed by over 20% during these three years. That is, better than 1 out of every 5 people living there in 1946 had moved out by 1949 and been replaced by a newcomer. Since Nouville is located on the old border between Normandy and Picardy, clearly the traditional imagery of those two regions hardly provides reliable guidance on the behavioral characteristics of their present inhabitants.

Recognition that traditional regionalism had outlived its usefulness was forced upon social scientists by Laurence Wylie's study of a village in the Vaucluse, a region in the deep South, traditionally assumed to be immobile, underdeveloped, traditional in every major respect. Wylie showed that there was a very striking mobility in Peyrane and, moreover, that this process had been going on over a considerable period of historical time: "In 1861, the population of Peyrane had been farily homogeneous. There were no foreigners living in the commune, and there were only ten people born outside the Vaucluse. By 1896, there were 26 foreigners and 66 people from outside

the Vaucluse living in Peyrane. Almost 10% of the population was made up of *étrangers*, that is, people coming up from other departments and other countries.\(^{15}\) In the decade since Professor Wylie began his study, mobility in Peyrane has reached startling proportions. About two out of three people living in the village in 1960 were not living there in 1950.\(^{16}\)

Professor Wylie states that "the majority of the people living in the commune were not born there. Most of them are from other towns around Apt, and many come from still farther away--from the poorer regions of the Alps, from Italy, and from Spain. There are Alsatian and Belgian refugees who did not return home after the war, the Breton wife of the farmer who once went to sea, and the Norman wife of the man who once worked in a Rouen cotton mill. The diversified origin of this rural population surprises us because it does not fit into our American stereotype of the European peasant--the naive creature riveted to the same plot of soil which his ancestors have tilled since they stopped living in caves."\(^{17}\)

The situation does not fit French stereotypes either. This order of mobility has rendered the categories of traditional regionalism obsolete. Small wonder that it does not explain much to account for great political decisions in terms of "the Norman character" when over


\(^{16}\) Personal Communication

\(^{17}\) Wylie, *op. cit.*, p. 14
20% of the population of Nouville has moved between Normandy and Picardy, or beyond both, in three years. Small wonder that it does not solve analytic problems to speak of the "static" South, when two out of every three inhabitants of Peyrane have changed their residence within a single decade. After comparing his own results with those obtained in the earlier studies we have cited, Professor Wylie concluded: "The stereotyped differences between the northern and the southern Frenchmen, if they have any basis in reality, are more superficial than fundamental."18

The foregoing should make clear why French regionalism, if it is to give any valid account of the conditions of contemporary life, is overdue for a fairly complete conceptual renovation. Thoughtful social scientists in France have perceived the need and have begun to meet it. The publication of Villes et Campagnes represented a major effort to undermine the primacy of geography, by shifting the emphasis from regionalism to urbanization. The important series of studies we cited on cities and villages in provincial France have shown how to shift the burden of social research from stability to mobility. The newer disciplines of social psychology and regional science seem especially well equipped to be useful. The need for a modern social psychology is obvious. The old French regional geography linked habitat with humor, climate with character, area with attitude—a direct one-to-one ratio that worked only so long as Frenchmen continued to die where they

18. Ibid., p. ix.
were born, work where they were raised, learn what they knew from
their "habitat." Now that Frenchmen are mobile, the ratio is no longer
valid, and often is seriously misleading. To understand the humor,
character, attitudes of living Frenchmen, one must study them under
conditions of mobility--of shifting environment rather than permanent
habitat.

An interesting model is provided by regional science in the
United States. As an effort to make the American social sciences
converge on problems associated with the extremely high mobility of
American life, regional science offers valuable clues to French scholars.
A recent review of work in regional science articulates several lessons,
of which three seem especially relevant to the contemporary situation
in France. First, geography has been reduced to its proper propor-
tion in the array of social sciences. Among the Papers and Proceedings
of the Regional Science Association, geography occupies about the same
order of magnitude as sociology and political science. The contrast
with traditional French regionalism is even more marked when one dis-
cerns that "geography" in this context does not confine itself to
permanent features of the habitat, but studies the shifting spatial
environment of mobile human beings. Second, a very considerable amount
of attention is devoted to topics grouped as "planning." Every reader
of Karl Mannheim's brilliant essay on "Thought at the Level of Planning"
will appreciate how profoundly the planning perspective must alter
the study of mobility in any society. Third, and possibly most important,
the bulk of professional work in regional science is concerned with
economic problems--these constituting nearly two-thirds of the output of American regional scientists in the first five years of their professional publication. 19

The primacy of economic factors in social mobility is fairly evident. People move because they can no longer get what they want where they are, or because they believe they can get more of what they want elsewhere. What people want, usually, is more of the material goods of life. Accordingly, economic analysis takes priority in accounting for the facts of mobility. Since mobility, however stimulated, also involves a total change of environment for the people who move, all the social sciences finally are needed in the effort to comprehend their changing lifeways. American regional science has made an impressive effort to deal analytically with the behavioral manifold of mobility. It seeks to integrate, so to speak, the social psychology of the economic use of space and resources to produce an acceptable code of rational behavior for mobile persons. Such an effort requires new indices of behavior that produce valid knowledge about the new lifeways of mobility.

The next section of this study reports some exploratory efforts to locate such indices in contemporary France. The purpose was to determine whether further systematic work in this direction would be fruitful. Our ultimate concern is to establish indices that would

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bring the full array of conceptual resources in regional science to
bear on the critical problem of understanding what distinguishes
"dynamic" from "static" France--and why. This involves nothing less
than understanding what mobility and urbanism--the lifeways of modern-
ity--are doing to contemporary French society.

**URBANISM AND MODERNIZATION**

If the categories of analysis for social science are to include
the concepts used by the regional analysts, they must be specified in
terms which have operational significance. If, for example, we are
to characterize a region by its "easygoing" laziness inspired by the
hot sunshine, we must as a first step prove that there are in fact
more sunny days and that its mean temperature is higher than other
regions with which it is being compared. Having proved the initial
X, we must then prove the terminal Y: i.e., that the inhabitants are,
in fact, lazier. This may be indexed by some measure of their output
work. If the French regionalists are right, areas where the sun is
most intense should be the areas where the people are not. In fact,
however, the mean temperature and human dynamism in French regions
are not associated in the way the regional characterizations would
have it. The warm South, for example, is one of the most dynamic
regions in France today. It is our finding that regions can be more
clearly defined by operational indices if we do not use nature as
the prime force, but human activity as manifested in the building
of an urban civilization.
It has already been suggested that conventional French definitions of regions have been considerably outmoded by the mobility of population within and between regions. This is not to deny that there are regions in France. It is rather to suggest that regions now are more clearly differentiated by the modern characteristics of mobility and urbanism, which index the life-style of human behavior, rather than the vegetational indices previously postulated. If we are to keep the notion of regions, it is now more appropriate to define them by the elements which characterize the life-style of a man who spends his time there.

The dominant element of French regions today is the presence (or absence) of a major city which spreads its economic values and other behavioral patterns throughout its hinterland area. We have studied a number of indices which characterize and measure the degree of modernization in French regions today. These indices of the modern life-style have been measured and compared in the different departments of France. On all of these indices, there is a close match of modern ways with the level of urbanization existing in each department. These matching patterns spread into the hinterland and form the new basis to characterize regions.

We have taken the measure of such important factors as the amount of electricity used--an index of the supplanting of muscle-power by electro-motive force. We have examined the distribution of radio, television, and cinema capacity--an index of the modern requirement for continuous contact with the "social environment" typically supplied
by the mass media. We have taken such measures of comfort as new
housing and health facilities, and such measures of skill as university
and lycee attendance. We have also measured the degree to which prox-
imity to urban regions is related to the agricultural productivity of
farming areas.

We have taken these indices as a way of measuring the existence
of processes—mainly urbanism and mobility—that deeply affect the way
people spend their time, apply their energy, and shape their thoughts
and feelings. Such processes are significant determinants of the life-
style of individuals. In order to establish the degree of association
between urbanization and other indices of modernization, we defined
urbanization as a simple statistical proportion of population living in
communities of 2,000 and larger. We divided the 90 departments of
France at the midpoint of this measure, the top 45 having the higher
percentage of population living in urban communities, and the bottom
45 living in less urbanized areas.

This simple cutting point was selected after we had tried several
other methods. We found that when we refined the measure by four or
more cutting points, the relationship of our other indices of modern-
ization with urbanization remained fairly constant. In general, the
relationship is direct and monotonic. While some exceptions to this
rule were found by establishing several cutting points, as shown in
the tables that follow, the exceptions did not change the major import
of our results. Since the use of several cutting points only increased
the complexity of presentation without adding value to the data, we
report only those cases where significant variation occurred. In all other cases, the reader can assume that the results remain substantially the same, even when we take four or more cutting points.

The tables below present the data on which we base the conclusion that fundamental aspects of modernization (or "dynamism") in France today are associated more closely with urbanization than with any possible combination of natural regions conventionally used by French regional analysts. Most of our tables present data for the years 1954 and 1962. These indicate that the relationships we are reporting have remained stable over the critical postwar period and continue into the present as a major factor in French development. However, it will be noted that whenever we present data for two years, the more recent year shows a lesser degree of association than the earlier year.

This suggests that even the pattern here presented as the best way of accounting for recent French development is itself in the process of change. This finding, which is documented in detail in Part II, indicates that close and continuing study of modernization in France is likely to provide findings of cumulative importance to the field of urban and regional science.

Our exploration started from the finding that regional hypotheses based on geography had failed to account for the defeat of EDC—a major political decision which had, as both sides claimed, deeply involved the whole French nation. We attributed this failure of analysis to the inadequacy of regional geography as an explanatory
system in contemporary France. Political behavior and social attitudes no longer correspond to regional boundaries, because very many French adults today no longer live where they were born. If they still exhibit attitudes characteristic of their natal region, they do so elsewhere in France. Many of them, doubtless, have reshaped their natal attitudes in ways more suitable to the place where they are living—i.e., getting their education, earning their livelihood, courting their mates, raising their families.

Regional geography failed for reasons which led some scholars to believe that urban-rural sociology might succeed as an explanatory system. We have seen that a group of eminent French social scientists followed this lead in the important conference on "Villes et Campagnes" in 1950. They proposed a new set of categories to account for the changing shape of French society—i.e., "urban civilization" and "rural civilization." While the difference between city and country "types" has long been clear, these categories had not been made the basis for systematic social research in France.

By the time these types were proposed, however, new studies were showing that they had to be severely qualified. Postwar mobility in France was proving to be varied in form and extensive in scope. The northern village of Nourville demonstrated the magnitude of inter-regional mobility. The more central city of Auxerre showed the extent

of intra-regional inter-urban mobility. Wylie's Peyrane, in the south, exhibited all forms of mobility--international, inter-regional, inter-local. Of special interest was the two-way flow of movement between Peyrane and Marseille. The move to the city, which urbanized all modern countries over the past two centuries, appeared to be counter-balanced by movement to the village. Under these circumstances, when many Frenchmen are incorporating both rural and urban experience within their own life history, too dichotomous a polarization of "urban civilization" against "rural civilization" is likely to be misleading. The new mobility, unlike the simple urbanization of preceding centuries, involves a complex and continuous process of inter-communication that reshapes both town and village in a common pattern.

The movement of persons, supplemented by the movement of images through mass media, brings urban and rural "types" into incessant contact. Out of the frictions generated by contact and the adaptations required by coexistence, a homogenizing process developed that tends to reduce and perhaps finally obliterate urban-rural differences. This process culminates in the emergence of an "urban region" such as the Northeast Atlantic coastline of the United States, where, from Boston to Richmond, the majority of inhabitants are in direct daily contact with "urban civilization." Whereas France in 1960 is much less urbanized than the United States, Paris is already the center of an "urban region" that radiates west to Rouen, north to Lille, east to Nancy, south to Dijon. This brings about a fourth
of French territory and a third of French population within the orbit of urban lifeways. Less extensive, but quite shapely, "urban regions" appear to be forming around Marseille and Lyon, the next largest cities after Paris.

The urban region appears to be the major direction that French modernization will take in the future. Accordingly, it is here that we sought our clue to the differences between "static" and "dynamic" France. We hypothesized that rural areas centered upon a "dynamic" city would be more "modern" than other rural areas—regardless of region, climate, soil and other natural geographical conditions. Accordingly, our Tables were constructed to determine the degree of association between urbanism and other indices of modernization. If the correspondence were perfect, high and low urbanism would coincide 100% with high and low modernization, according to the following paradigm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernization</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any cross-tabulation which produced such perfect statistical association among diverse indices would, however, be obvious or suspect. Our real concern was to see whether the diagonal formed by the boxes joining
If electricity consumption is an index of dynamism, then dynamism is
distributed according to urban rather than natural characteristics.

However, dynamism can not be adequately measured by one variable since
there are many more facets to the modern lifestyle.

Another characteristic of modernity is a high level of communica-
tion among the members of a society. An elaborate technology has grown
to support the communications load of a modern society. Radio, tele-
vision, and movie houses carry the main burden of mass communications.
The telephone and automobile facilitate person to person communication.
The existence of modern technology to transport persons and transmit
messages has resulted in increased psychic and physical mobility.

This technology is present in France, and its presence is highly
associated with urbanism. Table 2 demonstrates this with respect
to the mass media, telephones, and automobiles:

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications Technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radios per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. T.H.S.E.D., Annuaire Statistique de la France (Paris):
    television, 1957, vol. 65, 1959, p. 204;
Television per capita
1957
64 36

Urbanism
1954
36 64

Cinema attendance per capita
1954 1960
67 13 82 13

Urbanism
1954 1962
13 37 13 32

Phones per capita
1960
30 20

Urbanism
1962 20 80

Automobiles per capita
1960
Urbanism
1962 78 22
22 73

In addition to the communications technology which transmits messages and transports people, there exist universities and lycees that add still another dimension to the information facilities of modernity. Advanced education is part of modern life and Table 3 makes it clear that its growth is also associated with urbanism.
Table 3

Advanced Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lycée Students</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>among the population</td>
<td>among the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aged 11-17</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More data could be added to illustrate that communications of all kinds focus around the urban areas. Such an exercise would only illustrate more emphatically that the important dimension of communications is well accounted for by urbanism and there is no need to apply historic notions of geography or natural characteristics to account for this salient feature of modernity. The exposure to new ideas, new places, and new modes of thought which are found in the mass media and over the span of the educational experience are directly associated with urban areas.


Many other aspects of modernity were indexed and they too associated with urbanism. The comforts of good health, protection, and shelter are examples. The top half of the French departments included 76% of the doctors and 73% of the dentists (per capita, 1961). New housing construction followed the urban path as well: 80% of new housing was built in the more urban half of the French departments (per capita, 1959).

Examples of dynamism and the advantages of modernity could be multiplied, to illustrate that a modern civilization is an urban civilization, but we have already displayed an adequate array of indices on this point. However, there is one more set of figures with special interest. The urban civilization, which accelerates and develops the industrial aspects of modernity, also spills over into the rural areas to hasten development there as well. Table 4 records the result that agricultural productivity and urbanism are related positively:

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Productivity</th>
<th>Product / Agricultural Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>62  38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38  62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. A reliable and valid measure of agricultural productivity is difficult to construct for purposes of comparison. For the results presented here, we rely on: I.N.S.E.E., Annuaire Statistique de la France, Etudes et Conjonctures, special number (1955), agricultural productivity, 18-19, 34-87.
Data of this kind, multiplied many times, indicate that traditional regional characteristics no longer account for the relevant changes of modern life. Even in the behavior patterns indexed by agricultural productivity, output is less related to the traditional temperament of a region (e.g., its "laziness") than to its proximity to an urban center.

The development of agriculture provides a good example of the spreading dynamism of a city. We know that agricultural productivity rose sharply in France during the decade 1950-1960 and we associate this with the great increase of farm equipment: tractors quadrupled, harvesters multiplied sixfold, milking machines doubled. Wylie's Peyrane also shows how closely associated agricultural productivity is with urbanism, energy consumption and mass media. The peasant Carrette, even though he is regarded as a "primitive" by the other Peyranais, acquired a tractor in the past decade. He doesn't much like the machine, but was driven to it by the shortage of agricultural labor that has accompanied urbanization in the Vaucluse. The historical sequence whereby rising urbanism brings rising agricultural productivity willy-nilly--i.e., without respect to geography, culture, personality--is thus nicely illustrated in the life-history of Carrette. It explains why the Peyrane tractor cooperative, which in 1950 had one tractor and one full-time employee, in 1959 had three of each. By 1961, there were 225 members, a new garage, and a substantial array of farm machinery. It also explains why Carrette--although he still prefers to cultivate behind his horse rather than atop his tractor--is delighted that the higher-voltage electricity used for running
machinery is being installed in the region. Thus, rising urbanism and agricultural productivity historically entrain increasing energy consumption.

The interaction of mass media with this modernization matrix is also vividly illustrated in Peyrane. Carrette does not own a television set, but he is rapidly getting to be the exception rather than the rule—an instance of why the neighbors regard him as sauvage. Television brought Peyrane into the urban media network suddenly and rapidly when a transmitter was erected in the Luberon Mountain two years ago, to relay the Marseille programs to the Vaucluse. Already, two years later, there are thirty receivers in the village—and most of these were bought on the installment plan! Wylie gives a dramatic account of the transformations wrought by these receivers in the traditional lifeways of Peyrane—its cafe society and boules tournaments, social conversation and personal mobility. Wylie characterized the modernizing process in this way:

"Now that Emile Pian has adopted a different attitude toward installment buying he has satisfied another longstanding desire. He still does not feel rich enough to buy a car, but he has bought a scooter, and his wife and he travel about the department whenever he has a day off. In 1950, we took the Plans to call on his mother and sister who live in a farm in the next village; they had not seen each other in months. Now Emile and his wife drive over to see them frequently. Emile likes to swim, but there is no place to swim in Peyrane. He now drives, once a week, to the neighboring village of Saint-Saturnin, 5 miles away, where the government has built a new public swimming-pool.... Before he got his scooter Emile had climbed Mont Ventoux only once. In the last year, he and Madeleine have made the trip twice. The Plans and
...their neighbors have broadened and pushed back their horizons considerably in the last few years."

Wylie’s Peyrane thus exemplifies the regularities exhibited statistically by our data and suggests an explanation for the deviations. The central tendency of these deviations in the less urbanized departments was to increase their productivity, energy consumption and media exposure more rapidly than their population. This suggests that many places in provincial France are rapidly incorporating urban lifeways without becoming cities—or even increasing their own size significantly. Peyrane, for example, shows no substantial population increase in the decade since 1950. But its mobility rate is staggering—two-thirds of its population changed over this same decade. The key seems to be that Peyrane, along with the entire department of Vaucluse, has been incorporated within the orbit of Marseille. It is thus able to modernize rapidly without growing larger. The stimuli and facilities of modernization are diffused throughout the urban region centered upon the dynamic city of Marseille.

Furthermore, these same urban departments are now attracting and creating the largest share of the population increase in postwar France. Of the 45 departments ranked highest in population growth from 1946 to 1962, 36 were also ranked in the highest 45 departments for urbanism. Only 9 of the lowest 45 departments in population growth were in highly urban areas.


A similar picture obtains for smaller time periods within the long period. Thus, the most urban departments have shown the highest increase of population and the least urban departments have shown the least increase of population.

These results are consistent with the hypothesis that "dynamic France" corresponds, not to the traditional natural regions, but to the new urban regions. That population increase is now so decisively superior in the most urban departments, while the majority of least urban departments show the least increase, is a highly suggestive finding. Traditionally, it was supposed, city people barely reproduced themselves and recruited their ever-increasing cohorts from the highly reproductive villages. This appears to be changing. The data on population increase show that the most urban departments are consistently outgrowing the least urban departments. This is probably too great a difference to be accounted for even by the extraordinary increase of rural-urban mobility in France today. For a striking feature of this mobility, as shown in Nouville and Auxerre and Peyrane, is that it involves a two-way traffic whereby the village's loss to the city tends to be compensated.

We suspect that French reproductive patterns may be changing—but this is another problem to be investigated on another occasion. For our present purposes, it is sufficient to know that the most urban departments are increasing their population most rapidly by far. A multiplier effect comes into play at this point, since a place where there are more people will increasingly outnumber, if it maintains
an equal rate of increase, a place that has fewer people to start with. Accordingly, even without any assumption about urban versus rural reproductivity, we can understand why the largest cities in France today are growing the most rapidly. That the rate of increase in French cities now actually surpasses the rate of increase in rural places is suggested by the statistics for 1957. In the column showing excess of births over deaths among inhabitants for the year the highest rates were registered by the largest cities. Only four places showed an excess of 3,000 or more births over deaths, and these are the centers of the four principal urban regions that have taken shape in recent years—Paris, Lille, Lyon, Marseille. The next three highest rates (between 2-3,000) were registered by Rouen, Le Havre, and Nantes—urban centers which form the principal links of the Paris region with Normandy and Brittany respectively. The next highest rates (over 1,000) were registered by 19 places—all of them important secondary cities in one of the great urban regions.*

THE SPREADING URBAN REGIONS

As the large urban center grows ever more populous, it spreads steadily across its own borders into the rural areas. Villages become suburbs. The suburbs expand, interconnect, and finally form a continuous link between the dynamic urban centers of formerly separate areas.

* As the question of urban-rural fecundity is collateral to the central interest of this paper, we included this brief statement only to indicate a problem on which further research is needed.
This produces the urban region. As will be shown on the map of France, the modern areas are mainly in departments which ring the great cities. The urban region of Lyon now encloses Savoie, Haute Savoie, Isère, Jura, Ain, Loire, Allier, and Puy du Dôme. The urban region centered on Marseille now brings Var, Basses Alpes, Hautes Alpes, Drôme, Vaucluse and Gard into the ranks of dynamic departments.

The spreading urban region transforms the daily round of life for those within its orbit. Innovation and change become the rule. The traditional routines of rural existence give way willy-nilly, as we saw in the life of Carrette, to the new urban demands and rewards. The city's presence is pervasive. Consider the paradoxical situation sketched by Wylie: "At present, the number of mushrooms raised in Peyrane is directly proportionate to the number of horses in the stalls of the race tracks and cavalry barracks of Marseille, for these are the only large commercial sources of manure in the region."27 That a rural village must now depend upon city horses for manure may be the last straw!

To show the comprehensive character of the changes wrought within urban regions in graphic form, we prepared a map. Each department's total score was computed by adding its scores on each of nine indices, one representative from each type of index presented in the previous tables. The higher the score, the more dynamic is the department. We then classified and represented the departments according to three groups: high (white), medium (dotted), and low (shaded) dynamism. 27. Wylie, op. cit., p. 25.
When these results are arranged on the preceding map of France, a startling picture emerges. As in Caesar's time, *omnia Gallia in tres partes divisa est*. The three-dimensional structure supplies a useful corrective for the current hypotheses about the regional shape of French modernization. These hypotheses, as we saw earlier, are all dichotomous: dynamic North versus static South; dynamic Perimeter versus static Center; dynamic Northeast versus static Southwest. Although the growth of the South has reversed the North-South dichotomy, these hypotheses reflect some aspects of the real picture. There are more dynamic departments on the Perimeter than in the Center, more in the Northeast than in the Southwest. Indeed, Andre-Philip's notorious line from Rouen to Marseille turns out, as the map shows, to provide the boundary between Northeast and Southwest which most efficiently separates dynamic from static departments on a regional basis.

Yet, each of these dichotomies fails to reflect the critical aspect of French modernization revealed by the dotted departments—those which are no longer static and are not yet dynamic. If we draw another line from Rouen to Geneva, thereby dividing France into three parts, we get a more efficient differentiation of white, dotted, and lined zones. But too many departments are not accounted for even by this trichotomous regional plan. The reason, we submit, is that French modernization is following no plan based on natural regions.
Its course is better traced through the development of urban regions which can grow, regardless of geography, wherever there is a dynamic urban center.

This can be demonstrated by looking at the deviant departments of the map. In the dark zone, there is the dotted department of Loire-Inférieure based on the flourishing city of Nantes. On the Atlantic coast, there is a cluster of dotted departments centered on Bordeaux (Gironde). Another dotted cluster, along the Spanish border, is centered on Toulouse (Haute-Garonne). That these clusters are still dotted may be explained by the low growth of Bordeaux and Toulouse, relative to other cities of their size, during the period 1946-1954. As the growth of these urban centers accelerates, we believe, their surrounding clusters will turn white.

This process is illustrated by the deviant white clusters within another dark zone. The central department of Rhone is based upon Lyon, third largest city of France. The larger cluster on the Mediterranean comprising Gard, Vaucluse, Bouches du Rhone, and spread throughout the South, is centered upon Marseille, second largest city after Paris. The Marseille cluster is of special interest because it deviates consistently from the current hypothesis. It is in the static South. Most of it lies southwest of the Rouen-Marseille line. Only one of its departments is on the Perimeter, the other two being interior. Yet, we find here the largest white cluster in all of France, even larger than the supposedly most dynamic area of the Northeast.
We have already shown, in statistical terms, the process whereby Marseille produced this dynamic urban region centered upon itself. Laurence Wylie's happy decision to study the Vaucluse gives us a rare and comprehensive portrait of how the process works itself out in the daily lives of real people. That a true urban region is growing on the Mediterranean coast—i.e., the natal region of the stereotyped méridionale with his garrulous, indigent, unchanging "character"—is news worth noting by all concerned with the conditions of modernization in contemporary society.

Our conclusion is that this is no freakish occurrence due to the "accidental" presence of the great seaport city of Marseille. On the contrary, we believe that the urban region is the basic pattern of French modernization. The validity of this expectation is heightened by quotation from work done five years ago based on 1954 data. In 1959, we drew a map similar to the one shown in this paper. At that time there were deviant cases in the South, especially the Alpes Maritimes, and in the Rhone region around Lyon. These deviant cases have by now followed our expectation as a comparison of the quotation and the contemporary map illustrate.

"If current (1954) data are extrapolated, the process already at work will accelerate in scope and tempo so that, by the end of this decade, two changes will have appeared on the modernization map of France: (1) the entire Mediterranean will have become a huge modern urban region; (2) this Mediterranean region will have established regular intercourse with a large central urban region centered upon Lyon."
"Consider the data on which this expectation is based. Notice the dark department of Alpes Maritimes. This last deviant region is centered upon Nice, the most rapidly-growing city in France (15.7% increase between 1946-1954 as compared with 11.2% for the second-place city of Nantes). By 1954, Nice was already the sixth largest city in France. By 1970, at present rates of growth, it will be third (after Marseille) or fourth (after Lyon). Either way, Nice is creating an urban region at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean that can hardly avoid merging into the urban region already centered on Marseille. Required for this is the urbanization of the two departments of Var and Basses Alpes."

"Note further that the city of Lyon (Rhône) is ringed about by departments showing the highest rates of urbanization in 1946-54. Here, too, the urban region is spreading rapidly. Contacts between the Lyon and the Mediterranean regions pass through the departments of Isère and Drôme. Both of these are in the highest rank of urbanization as well. Indeed, if we follow the lead suggested and recast the map of France according to levels of urbanization in 1954, a quite different picture already emerges with several surprising elements."

"We note, first, that the Rhône-Mediterranean region is already more consistently white than the region northeast of Paris. It contains fewer departments with a high proportion of people living in places smaller than 2,000 population. The only important exception, in fact, is Basses Alpes. While this department had not yet achieved the highest level of urbanism by 1954, its rate of urbanization
indicates that it will do so in due course."

"We notice, further, a new string of white departments including Herault, Tarn, Haute Garonne. This is the line of communication between Marseille and Toulouse, fourth largest city of France in 1954. With the eastern and western departments of the Pyrenees also white, a new urban region may be in the making here. As the formation of a true Pyrenees urban region would depend heavily upon the dynamism of Toulouse, which, unlike Marseille and Nice, had been growing relatively slowly, this is a more problematical development. It does present a possible direction of future modernization that must surely startle any Frenchman who clings to the familiar stereotypes of the Old Southwest."

Each one of these anticipations from 1954 data had been realized by the end of the decade. The urban regions have spread and interlocked, creating large dynamic areas that form a new basis for regionalism in France.

**TOWARD A REGIONAL SCIENCE IN FRANCE**

We conclude this section of our study by raising more questions than we thought were waiting to be asked—more questions, certainly, than we have the means to answer. While the questions that seem important to us are substantive and concrete, their common tendency is to cast doubt upon the current conventions and categories of analysis from which students of France have tended to draw their answers—when these conventions have not, indeed, inhibited the
asking of relevant questions at all. Postwar France has been undergoing a basic transformation. New perspectives, indeed new assumptions, are needed to deal with the process adequately. Nor is this the first time in French history that an inherited stereotype persisted long after it had outlived its explanatory value, until scholars began to look at the facts without the stereotypical blinders. A good example is J. J. Spengler's succinct subversion of a superannuated supposition about French economic behavior: "Despite France's reputation as a nation of savers, net saving was less in France than in Britain or Germany throughout most of the period 1860-1930." 28

By connecting economic with demographic retardation, Spengler was able to show that psychological, cultural and political factors had all been interwoven into a matrix of social stagnation. 29 This went beyond the conventionalized complaints about the loss of "sain vital" which pervaded social analysis in prewar France. It showed why and how postwar France must make a successful major drive toward modernization or resign itself to a minor place in the European as well as the world scene. 30

Such a postwar drive is in progress. Already, France has made some notable advances in modernization and the process is continuing.


29. Ibid., pp. 594-5.

30. The basic studies leading to this conclusion were made by Alfred Sauvy and, under his direction, by the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques.
This is an exciting sequence to study systematically. From it we can learn much about the actual position and future prospects of France. From it we can also learn much about the general process of social growth, and about the particular form it takes when a relatively modern nation seeks to make a "big push" forward.

We cannot observe this process fruitfully, however, if we are blinded by stereotypes. We can only fail to observe it if we work with the conventional clichés of French regionalism. The notion that the South must be static because of meridional climate and character can only prevent us from seeing that one of the most dynamic regions in France today is, in fact, growing in the South. Inter-regional mobility has made these traditional categories of explanation obsolescent. Nor do we gain much light from the more recent categories juxtaposing urban and rural "civilizations" in dichotomous fashion. Part II will explore this in still more detail. There was once a day when important differences among Frenchmen could be explained in terms of rural versus urban habitat. This was the France of Balzac. Even earlier in this century, a novel like Le Notaire du Havre could portray a way of life peculiar to the provincial city in France and Marcel Aymé could depict the unique features of isolated village life in La Jument Verte. The clarity and charm of these portraits is not lessened by the recognition that Le Havre and Hendaye are no longer what they were. Failure to recognize this, indeed, can only obscure our vision of what they have become.
Needed today are categories of analysis focused upon the changes that are actually reshaping French reality today. How many people are moving? From where to where? Working at what? Earning how much? Producing how much of what? Consuming how much of what? In so doing, how are they changing their style of life—the ways they raise their children? The ways they spend their leisure? The ways they judge themselves and the world around them?

Mobility is the key. People acquire a sense of the new through contact with the new—whether it comes to them via the mass media or they go to it on a used scooter. Through such contacts people acquire new desires—to live in a different place, to work at a different job, to get a better education, to have more of the good things of life. Such desires evoke new ways and new uses of old ways—to own and use a tractor, to visit Marseille on a Sunday promenade instead of a walk in the Peyrane woods, to watch a televised swimming meet from Paris instead of a boules tournament at the local café, to follow another trade than farming, to perceive one’s wife otherwise than as a valuable piece of family property.

The major direction of mobility in France today is the formation of urban regions and their spread into rural areas. Here is where the line between static and dynamic France is being daily drawn—and redrawn. The discussion in Part II will show that the spread of urban lifeways is proceeding even to the point where the urban-rural dichotomy may eventually be lost. Through this process, the old natural regions
are merging into one another. The cities and the villages, once encompassed in an urban region, are interpenetrating each other and merging their interests as well as their attitudes. It is this process which can focus the converging researches now underway in a true regional science that will serve the future needs of French public policy.
PART II

From Regional Diversity to National Polity

The Trend Toward Homogenization

Methodological Appendix
PART II
FROM REGIONAL DIVERSITY TO NATIONAL POLITICS

In post-war France, the pace of change has accelerated with little regard to historic regions or traditional patterns. In Part I, the spread of urban regions was examined and the traditional notion of "static" vs. "dynamic" France was seen to be little more than an anachronistic stereotype. If regional analysis was to be of any value, it had to base itself on urban rather than natural regions. The urban region has existed because the process of industrialization did seem to favor already developed and urban regions over the "static" areas. As a result, there have been wide differences in the standard of living and lifestyles among the regions. By the 1950's, however, this process of diverging regional standards of living had been arrested and probably reversed. On a material scale, there is a slow but definite homogenization of regional standards of living, an assimilation of regional economies into a national economy, and, as we suggest in Part III, an erosion of regional politics by forces which are national in their scope.

In Part II, the concern is to demonstrate the extent to which the homogenization process is altering the behavior of Frenchmen. The new lifestyle is typified by what is happening to one of the traditional groups of French tradesmen, the bakers. A baker, whose occupation would traditionally classify him as a French "petit," has increased his trade by not only selling at the small store attached to the bakery itself, but also by distribution through a number of small grocery stores and by direct delivery to farmhouses. His entrepreneurial returns are spent regularly on weekends by racing a Mercedes from his home.
in Mondragon (a village north of Avignon on the Paris-Marseille highway) to Geneva and back. Most bakers are neither as successful nor as flamboyant as this one, but they are all in some way modern. Their modernity, like the Wanderlust of the Mondragon baker, was disclosed by a sample survey of 115 bakers in the Vaucluse, a department in southeastern France. Only two of these bakers still baked with the traditional wood fire. One was thinking of changing to a factory job. The other charged relatively high prices for specialty products sold to tourists and the local wealthy. One baker who sold only in the small town of Chateauneuf-du-Pape, has already turned to deep freezing techniques. He now has much more leisure than most other bakers.

Regional inequalities in communications are also leveling out. With the TV set, the pinball machine, and the jukebox, the cafe in French villages partakes of the same world as any Joe's Bar. There are more of our Vauclusian bakers who have radios and don't listen to them than there are bakers who are non-owners. Some radio non-listeners are already TV viewers, others complain about the poor quality of government broadcasting after midnight (when work begins for most bakers). Those few who simply will not listen, who lack the empathy necessary to interest, must buy a radio in response to some combination of status considerations and children's demands.

Practically all the bakers have been to Paris at least once, usually in the course of military service. A more striking finding is that almost one-half have had reasons to make a second trip. Teenagers are now taken to Paris on school trips. A major part of the news they bring back

1. The survey will be reported in detail in the author's forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
to the village concerns the self-service cafeteria. For them, contact
with cities reinforces interest in modern economics and cultural products.
Attention is maintained in the small town or village by a heavy flow of
mass media. This situation, coupled with steadily rising cash incomes,
seems to have been instrumental in accelerating consumer demands in areas
of slight urbanization. This acceleration is proceeding rapidly enough
to produce homogenization.

How far modernization of provincial towns and villages has gone and
is likely to go is shown by how the bakers feel about creating and
rearing children. One of the survey questions they found easiest to
answer concerned the possible introduction of female contraceptives, currently
illegal in France. About 90 per cent favored contraception and almost all
elaborated why. While many responses dealt simply with the avoidance of
children or the reduction of poverty, the modal response focused on an increase
in choice and pleasure. Still others considered the problem of contraception
in terms of its beneficial effects on women, perhaps indicating a general
increase in respect for women.

There was a similar consensus that children should not be subject to
corporal punishment and that the influence of the mass media, the motorbike,
and les copains would not be overly dangerous. Direct observation suggests
that corporal punishment is in fact decreasing and that parents in the
Vaucluse have allowed their children to accelerate their contacts with
modernity. In 1939 one rarely saw teen-age girls dressed in heels and
stockings. By 1962 the exception had become the rule.

Note that the Vaucluse is one of the least Catholic departments of
France.
The people of the regions of France are rapidly moving into the Western cultural orbit. Provincial parents and Parisian parents still look rather different in dress, but provincial teenagers and Parisian teenagers are much more similar. As young adults, nearly all of the bakers' sons will no longer live in their fathers' towns or work at their fathers' trade. Only 10 per cent of the current bakers had lived in the same town since birth. Farming was the modal occupational category for their fathers. Only two of 115 bakers want their sons to be bakers. More typical is the fellow pulling strings with relatives to get his son "in" at Pierrelatte, the plant where France will make uranium for the force de frappe. Mobility of this kind has been a key element in the weakening of regional identities.

Politically, de Gaulle's personal predominance makes it rather difficult to speculate on the long-run effects of the process of regional change. Certainly the de Gaulle of the sixties is a very different political animal from the de Gaulle of the postwar R.P.F. The devoted Gaullist militant is much less in presence. Instead de Gaulle has become the outstanding French television personality, a position he has reinforced by Government monopolization and control of television and radio news. De Gaulle complements his TV appearances with tours of the provinces, a technique used successfully since the war by only one other politician, Pierre Poujade. By thus developing a national communications strategy, de Gaulle has built the most national (in terms of geographic dispersion of voting strength) non-Communist political organization.

De Gaulle's success on a national basis seems to herald a possible major consequence of the reduction of French regional differences, the elimination of basically regional parties as important factors in the political system. A party
like the MRP, based largely on local communications systems in Brittany and Lorraine, or like the Independents, concentrated in rural areas, would seem on the wane as parties and populations part of a national communications system move into the old "safe" areas. Time might then look favorably upon the development of a new national party out of the present Socialists, the most nearly national of the non-Communist and non-Gaullist alternatives. Already Gaston Deferre, de Gaulle's announced opponent, must defend himself against running a "campagne à l'américaine." 3

The process of regional homogenization can be documented quantitatively by analyzing the trend in the departmental concentration of various socio-economic indices. We will do this and thereby arrive at some interesting comparisons of the relative progress of homogenization in different sectors (income, transportation, mass media). Having explored the homogenization process, we will relate it to

(1) the observation that urbanization rate is no longer related to modernization rates.

(2) the shift of urbanization away from the northeast to new urban regions in the southeast and southwest of France.

THE TREND TO HOMOGENIZATION

For a single variable, we can judge the extent of homogenization by measuring the "concentration" of that variable among the departments. If one of the 90 departments of France contained the entire population of France, we would say that there was perfect concentration of population.

At the other extreme, if all departments had equal populations we would say that a state of complete equality or complete homogenization prevailed.

Economists have conventionally indexed the degree of concentration by the **Lorenz measure**, which assigns a value of 1 to perfect concentration, a value of 0 to complete homogenization, and intermediate values to the typical cases of partial concentration. We have been able to estimate the Lorenz measure for a number of variables. By charting the behavior of the measure over time, we can evaluate the extent of homogenization.

Just looking at the data at one point in time, however, indicates that substantial concentration exists. Between the top and bottom ten departments, ranked on most consumption and production per capita indices, there is a difference of a factor of two (income) to three or four (doctors). The concentration of gross consumption indices (not "per capita") is, of course, much greater.

The extent of concentration can also be understood from a comparison of the Lorenz measure for several indices for a single year. For the gross indices, the concentration of consumption indices is substantially greater than that of population, a pattern consistent with the concentration of per capita indices.

This concentration has been produced, we suggest, by the process of urbanization and industrialization. In an earlier chapter, it was demonstrated that urbanization was highly related to per capita consumption measures. Even before industrialization the city had a control function in government, trade, and education, and was thereby able to have far greater "per capita"

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4. Details of measurement will be found in Appendix A.
resources than the dispersed rural population. Industrialization initially accentuated this pattern through technological and economic constraints that required a concentration of men and materials.

Today, concentration is less relevant technologically. There has been a sharp decline in the relative costs of transport and communication in consumption as well as production. These economic and technological factors are not sufficient, however, to predict that the pattern of concentration will be reversed. In fact substantial evidence points in an opposite direction. These range from the social psychological, vide the preference of professionals for existing urban environments, to the structural, vide the circumstance that the cost of commuting is borne by the commuter and the state rather than the employer.5

We would nonetheless argue that an important motivational change has taken place in rural France, in which the development of the mass media has necessarily played an important and accelerating part in the reinforcement pattern of communication. In the past 20 years, we believe, rural France has largely abandoned psychic restrictions that limited consumption, curbed productivity, and restrained outward mobility.6 Today, as we related for the bakers, many shackles have been loosed. The rapid decrease in the psychic differences between city man and rural man has permitted the latter to accelerate his consumption relative to the former. This acceleration is synonymous with the decrease in concentration and, hence, in regional differences.


Population nonetheless continues to concentrate. Departments with large populations almost always have large cities (the important exceptions are in Brittany). These cities have, in absolute terms, accounted for most of the increases in population and production. The leaders in population growth are Seine-et-Oise (Paris), Alpes-Maritimes (Nice), and Meurthe-et-Moselle (Nancy). The process has probably been reinforced by increases in the rural propensity to outward mobility where the new wants are no longer satisfied by the old resources. A significant indicator is the endorsement by the Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs (national association of young farmers) of a reduction in the number of farmers. 7

In turn, rural depopulation has meant the elimination of marginal producers and consequent increases in rural productivity while the influx to the cities should have operated to restrain urban wage increases.

What is surprising is that other gross measures do not follow the pattern set by population. Radios, automobile radios, low and high tension electricity, cinema attendance, and gasoline all declined in concentration between 1954 and 1960. 8 There were slight rises in concentration for doctors,

8. For statistical data used in this study, see I.N.S.E.E., Annuaire Statistique de la France (Paris):
See Office National Interprofessionnel des Cereals, Sous-Directeur des Affaires Techniques et Economiques, mimeographed distribution, for bread consumption. See also pp. 21, 22, 24, in Part I.
dentists, and telephones, but these rises were below that for population.

On a per capita basis, there are declines for all of the above measures except for a minor rise in telephones (see Fig. 2.1). While all of the declines on any given variable are quite minor in comparison to the total gap between the highest and lowest departments, the rate of deconcentration is of the same order as the rate of concentration of population, a process most observers would term "rapid." It is perhaps of great importance that the historical trend to concentration has been reversed in France and that this reversal has occurred consistently across a variety of indices.

The pattern of deconcentration is evidenced by the parallel finding that urbanization rate is no longer related to the growth rate of consumption variables. This contrasts with the picture presented in Chapter 1 where the static level of urbanization is shown to correlate highly with consumption. But today there is no dynamic relationship between the same variables. We found no association between the consumption variables and our urbanization rate measures. Table 2.1 contains some typical cases.

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanization Rate and Modernization Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radios per capita, 1954-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Automobile included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2.1. Homogenization in the French Departments, 1954-1960

Per Capita Indices

(For each item, the first bar represents 1954, the second bar represents 1960.)
Doctors per capita, 1954-1960
58  42  
42  58  

Gasoline per capita, 1954-1960
58  42  
42  58  

Part of the lack of association might seem to stem from the pattern of urbanization coupled with net population loss that is occurring most notably in Brittany and the Massif Central. A large component of the high urbanization rate in these areas is rural depopulation which increases the urban percentage even if the cities fail to grow. Yet the same process would also yield increases in per capita consumption of radios, electricity, and doctors, all of which have higher levels of consumption in cities and towns than in rural communes. In fact the demographically declining departments with high urbanization were among the highest in increase in per capita consumption. Therefore, if "dysfunctional" urbanization by rural depopulation was discounted there would even be a slight negative relationship between urbanization rate and consumption increase rates!

In fact the departments increasing most rapidly on "per capita" indices are often the least dynamic demographically, in terms of net population growth rate. Mobility from rural regions to urban regions has contributed to the trend toward homogenization. This is shown in Table 2.2, where the same measures tabulated with urbanization rate
in Table 2.1, are now tabulated with the population growth rate:

Table 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Growth Rate and Modernization Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (1954-1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29   71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71   29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58   42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42   58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38   62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62   38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern of population growth, then, like the pattern of urbanization and the behavior of the Lorenz measure of concentration suggests an increasing homogenization of modernization. Another signpost of changing process is that the pattern of urbanization itself has shifted radically in the postwar period. The census has been taken in 1946, 1954, and 1962. Urbanization rates in the second eight-year interval were unrelated to those in the first (Table 2.1). Part of the explanation for this result lies in an important geographic shift. The immediate postwar period witnessed the reconstruction and repopulation of the heavily damaged Northeast. Reconstruction helped boost urbanization rates along the Channel (Calvados, Seine-Maritime, Pas de Calais) and
along the Belgian frontier (Nord, Ardennes, Meuse). Low urbanization, in contrast, was concentrated west of the famous line from Rouen to Marseille.

The later period, 1954-1962, showed urbanization ordered, not by reconstruction, but by the developing urban regions of France. Of the 34 most rapidly urbanizing departments, 8 were located in a block around Paris, 8 more in a block running through the Alps from Lyon to Nice and Marseille, and 7 in a third block centered on Toulouse. Low urbanization rate had become dispersed geographically. Clearly the old geographic stereotypes about "static" France and "dynamic" France had lost their meaning.

There were also shifts within regions. In the rapidly urbanizing Southeast, urbanization in the Drômes and Vaucluse slowed down from the first period to the second while there was an increase in Haute Savoie and Var. This "balancing" suggests that growth is generalized throughout an entire urban region.

Table 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanization Rate in 1946-54 and 1954-62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1946-1954</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1962 High</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The development of urban regions rather than "natural" regions and the trend toward more equal living standards among the departments cannot

9. Our statistics may accentuate differences in what is possibly a more uniform process of urbanization. However, a more uniform process would only indicate further homogenization.
escape having important consequences for politics. That these ecological changes are but one of many factors affecting political outcomes precludes judging their total effect without considerable multivariate analysis. In certain situations, however, the influence of ecological factors can be assessed rather directly.

Suggestively, one effect will be the homogenization of regional elites into a national elite. On important policy questions, there will be less of a tendency for opinion to follow geography. In Part I it was demonstrated that the vote to defeat EDC in 1955 did not follow "natural regions," but was instead related to urbanization. For highly homogeneous elite populations, even the urban-rural differences no longer appear important.

The absence of urban-rural differences is shown in two surveys conducted by the Institute of European Studies shortly after the defeat of EDC, in 1955. One was of some 400 students at "EDC," the leading French business school, and the other involved 700 leading French businessmen, members of the Patronat. In both these groups, the respondents were classed by place of birth. This variable did not discriminate between supporters and opponents of EDC or any other European-linked issue. While there was a general tendency for the more urban to be less "European" than those born in rural places, in no case was the difference significant. On matters of European policy, neither the present nor

10. Sponsored by CENSIS, M.I.T., and directed by Professor Daniel Lerner.

11. Under Chi-Square at the .05 level. See Robert Nelson, "Regional Studies of the Grandes Ecoles and the Patronats" (internal memorandum).
the future French business elite can be profitably treated in terms of regional attitudinal groups.

Despite a tendency to homogenization, ecological factors will still be very helpful in accounting for political behavior, particularly voting, when they either reflect the dynamics of the homogenization process itself or, as statics, indicate political phenomena of relatively permanent duration.

The dynamic case is nicely demonstrated by Poujadism, an important political movement of the fifties. This movement was directly related to the spread of urbanization and modernization over the entire territory of France. It reached its electoral peaks in regions that contained a substantial rural population but where there was also an urban sector that could contribute to a rapid rise in expectations. The interaction between city and country reflects the possible tensions of an homogenization process.

Communism in contrast is not patterned after the current ecological dynamics but after the statics that accompanied its implantation in the twenties and thirties. Its percentage of the national vote has remained relatively stable, yet it has been favored by demographic trends. There has been high population growth in most of the Communist urban strongholds. Accordingly, Communism, with an ideology vacuous for the modern Frenchman, maintains itself by its organizational strength. The vote is stable, but momentum has been lost.

The end of regional diversity will mean the development of a fully national political system. The detailed analyses of Poujadism and Communism that follow are case studies in the characteristics of the polity.
Methodological Appendix

A. The Measurement of Urbanization Rate

No measure of growth is completely "perfect." We have long been accustomed to expressing growth rates of national incomes in percentages. Yet if we wish to use this measure as a standard of performance, as a bill of health for the economy, the simple percentage measure might be heavily biased against highly developed nations if it could be shown that saturation was inevitable in any economy. Under these conditions we couldn't expect a fully developed economy to grow as fast as one of lesser development, and any rough comparison of percentage growth rates would be misleading.

A case of saturation obviously exists with such statistics as the percentage urban which cannot exceed "100%". The department of the Seine has attained this level and other departments are approaching it.¹ To simply compute the growth rate of the percentage urban would provide a standard of performance highly biased against urban departments. A similar argument can be made against computing the negative growth rate of the percentage rural. A conventional method of eliminating bias is to measure the growth rate as the percentage change in the statistic \[ \frac{u}{100 - u} \], where \( u \) represents the percentage urban.

Nonetheless, one might argue that the measure defined above is biased against the departments of "medium" urbanization (near 50%). However, if one assumes that growth of urbanization follows the "S" shaped sigmoid curve

¹ The Seine was assigned the urbanization rate of the Seine-et-Oise.
where "u" changes slowly in very rural situations and accelerates until a maximum is reached at 50%, followed by a subsequent slowing down -- then the measure defined is an unbiased standard of performance. Our investigations have disclosed that historically urban growth does accelerate in the neighborhood of 50% urban. Furthermore, there is today no significant relationship between urbanization rate (as defined) and the level of urbanization, in conformity with the sigmoid model. We have thus decided to accept percentage change in \( \frac{u}{100-u} \) as a reasonable measure of urbanization rate.

For the percentage urban we have used the percentage of the population living in towns where over 2,000 persons live "agglomerées au chef-lieu." This is the official government definition. While other definitions also based on population ratios (such as the percentage in towns 25,000 or over) would change specific tabulations, they should not change our general conclusions.

For population and the consumer variables, saturation levels are sufficiently distant that ordinary percentage growth rates can be used without significant bias.

B. The Lorenz measure of concentration

Population and the consumption variables are approximately log-normally distributed, where the logarithm of the statistic is normally distributed. Under these conditions, an estimate of the Lorenz measure is given directly as a monotonic function of the standard deviation of the logarithmic variate, independent of the mean. Precisely,

\[
L = 2N\left(\frac{\sigma}{\mu}\right) - 1
\]

where \( \sigma \) represents the standard deviation, L the Lorenz measure, and N the normal distribution function.\(^2\)

PART III

CASE STUDIES

1. Introduction
2. The Defeat of EDC
3. Poujade's Voters
4. The Communist Vote in France
5. Conclusion
PART III

CASE STUDIES

Introduction

The discussion in Part I suggests that the failure of traditional categories of analysis to account for the modernization of France prompted the use of new sets of variables and the identification of urban regions to describe the salient features of France today. In Part II, the behavior of the new variables and their role in eroding traditional regionalism was examined. In Part III, selected case studies demonstrate the power of the new variables to account for political phenomena, especially when they are used in a multivariate framework of analysis.

The defeat of the European Defense Community is illuminated by adding the urban voting pattern to the analysis. Poujadism, examined in the second case study, is seen as an outgrowth of the process of development described in Part II. Though only the first phase of research is reported here, the Communist case study emphasizes the importance of the urban dimension, but only in the context of other forces. All cases emphasize the need for scholars to apply multivariate analysis when dealing with the complex of many forces which interact in the modernizing process.
THE DEFEAT OF E.D.C.

A Case Study in the Regional Analysis of Old French Politics

The defeat of EDC was a major event. For the supporters of European unity it was cataclysmic, for the adversaries it was a decisive triumph. All agreed on the importance of the decision, but few agreed on its explanation. Why the same National Assembly, which proposed the EDC in 1950, rejected it in 1954--this became a matter of intense public debate for several years after the event. Efforts to explain the defeat of EDC turned naturally to regional categories of analysis. But, while commentators agreed that the political geography of France must contain the explanation, they differed sharply in hypothesizing a particular geographical explanation.

In order to test the principal regional hypotheses about the defeat of EDC, we mapped the actual distribution of the votes in the National Assembly by departments. These maps are reproduced in the next pages. Map A shows whether each department voted for or against the EDC, by a relative or absolute majority. Map B shows the departmental distribution without the Communist votes (since the Communists voted a national "line" and thus presumably obscured regional differences). Map C shows the departmental distribution of the 94 Socialist votes. When assembled in this way, the actual distribution of votes proves that each of the three principal hypotheses based on political geography is wrong! The regional
assumption underlying each hypothesis simply does not correspond with the facts.

Each of these hypotheses was advocated by a former French Président du Conseil who had held office during the years of debate over the EDC. Their failure to explain what really happened—i.e., to account for the actual distribution of votes—indicates that public confidence in political geography may be misplaced. It suggests, further, that regionalism may in fact have lost its power as an explanatory system under the conditions of personal mobility and social change in contemporary France—i.e., where they live is no longer the main thing to know about people. We shall consider in turn the three hypotheses, the assumptions on which they rest, and their correspondence with the facts.

The first hypothesis, advocated by former President Joseph Laniel, maintained that French votes on EDC were determined by basic attitudes toward Germany. Accordingly, the regions of France most strongly opposed to EDC were those which had suffered the most from German military power in the past. On this hypothesis the region northeast of Paris, historic route of German invasions, should present a solid bloc of departments voting against EDC. On the contrary, the region was sharply divided. When the Communist votes are eliminated, the division is precisely equal between departments showing a clear majority for and against EDC (12 departments each). The two departments of Alsace were divided, Bas-Rhin voting for and Haut-Rhin voting against. Ardennes was so divided internally as to cast no decisive majority on either side of the question. Marne,
historic battleground against German invaders, voted an absolute majority for EDC.

The second major hypothesis, advocated by former President René Pleven under whose name the EDC treaty was initiated, asserted that the regional line of division lay between the departments of central France as compared with the frontier departments. This hypothesis is akin to the traditional American distinction between the "isolationist Middle West" and the "internationalist" coastal states. It rests on the theory that interior regions form insular political judgments, whereas border regions reflect their constant contact with the outer world in a greater political "internationalism." On many French issues, this theory has some explanatory value. But it is clearly refuted on EDC by the actual distribution of parliamentary votes. As is shown by Map A (p. 67), the tallies for border départements and le Centre were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Departments</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Abstained</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border Départements</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Centre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The facts, then, clearly refute both parts of this hypothesis. The border

1. Against: Allier, Creuse, H. Vienne, Puy de Dôme (absolute majority); Cher, Nièvre (relative majority)

For: Cantal, H. Loire, Vienne (relative majority); Dordogne, Saône, Loire (absolute majority)

Abstained: Charente, Corrèze, Indre
departments of France divided, but with a distinct majority voting against EDC. Hence the "internationalist" perspectives of the border areas, whatever may be the case on other issues, did not operate on EDC. So, too, the "isolationist" departments of the center divided with arithmetical precision. While le Centre is not precisely defined in French political geography, a glance at Map A shows that these proportions shift even further counter-hypothesis (for EDC) if one adds the next "ring" of departments to the central core. We are forced to conclude that if "cosmopolitanism" was the issue, then clearly it was not distributed along regional lines.

The third hypothesis, publicly endorsed by former President Georges Bidault, asserted that the political cleavage on EDC followed the line which separates the "static" south from the "dynamic" north of France. This view, which corresponds to the traditional American distinction between the progressive industrial North and the retarded agricultural South, cannot be made to fit any map showing the actual distribution of EDC votes. The most specific form of this hypothesis was advanced by André Philip, who stated that northeast of the line drawn between Rouen and Marseilles lay dynamic France, southwest of that line lay static France. A look at our maps shows, however, that the EDC vote paid scant respect to this line. Northeast of the line, in fact, two solid blocs comprising 15 departments show an absolute majority against EDC. Southwest of the line, 16 departments voted for EDC. The non-regional shape of the vote is even clearer on Map B, which eliminates the Communist votes. The Socialist deputies, who included M. Philip, distributed their votes in the same non-regional pattern as shown in Map C. The line Rouen-Marseille
Map B

(Without Communists)

- absolute majority for EDC
- absolute majority against EDC
- slight majority for EDC
- slight majority against EDC
- majority abstained
does not account for the voting distribution any better than a line drawn in the opposite direction. But if the Rouen-Marseille line is false, its traverse is meaningless. Nor has any other line dividing regional France according to some dichotomous scheme been suggested that provides a valid and significant accounting for the EDC voting distribution.

**Urbanism and EDC**

As the final bit of data we shall incorporate in this report, we conclude with a look at the old EDC issue in the new terms of urban regions. Since the traditional political geography based on natural regions had failed so completely to explain the defeat of EDC, could the concept of urban regions provide a more satisfactory account of this great national event? We began by simply cross-tabulating the votes of the 90 departments with their rank (1, 2, 3) on urbanism in 1954--i.e., the year of the vote. The result is shown in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanism</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is indeed a startling result, the more so as it is so clear. Contrary to the assumption underlying all the regionalist hypotheses, the rural departments had mainly voted for EDC and the urban departments had

mainly voted against EDC— and the more highly urbanized, the more clearly was their opposition expressed. If EDC divided static from dynamic France, then clearly the division went in the direction opposite to that hypothesized—static France supported it and dynamic France opposed it.

This finding proved such a delightful paradox that we were tempted to close our report at this point. However, curiosity triumphed. Aware that Communist strength massed against EDC would count most heavily in the most urban departments, we recomputed the EDC vote without counting the Communists (as we had done in testing the earlier hypotheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanism</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Urbanism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution in Table 2 shows that the Communist impact was heaviest in the cities, and that this impact probably played a major role in the defeat of EDC. Omitting the Communists reduces the anti-EDC vote from a victorious 47 to a vanquished 29. It is specifically the urban vote against EDC that diminishes sharply when the Communists are omitted—a drop of 10 in the high urban and 6 in the middle urban, as compared with only two in the low urban (i.e., rural).

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2. Ibid., p. 204
There are two lessons at least suggested by these tables. First, urban regions account better than natural regions for the political geography of France today. Second, Communism has developed as an integral part of urbanism in contemporary France. But these lessons, in turn, raise new questions. Why has Communism come to play so large a role in French city life? Are all the conditions which promoted this situation present in the newly-emerging urban regions? Evidence in the last test case points to the changing position of communism in the urban regions. Which are the conditions whose presence or absence changes this situation in the new urban regions that are shaping the future of French life? To these questions we have no final answers. But answers can, and should, be found.
POUJADE'S VOTERS

A Case Study in the Social Geography of New French Politics*

Initiated as organized resistance to tax collection, the following of Pierre Poujade developed into an electoral movement that won 9.2% of the vote and 52 seats in the French elections of 1956. Although invalidations later reduced these 52 seats to 41, the Poujadist deputies, when added to an increased Communist contingent, seriously compromised the parliamentary process in the Fourth Republic.

Poujade, the unknown spokesman of the non-elite, left his transient but damaging imprint on the French political system. A number of social scientists have attempted to analyze his electoral success primarily as a function of social and economic factors, secondarily as a function of the electoral success of various parties in the 1951 elections.2

* This work was supported by the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., and the M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies. In the terminal phase, the author benefited from a Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Computations were made at the M.I.T. Computation Center.

1 Voting percentages in this paper are always based on the number of inscrits (registered voters).

These variant interpretations start from certain commonly-accepted facts about Poujade and Poujadism: Poujade owned a small-town bookstore in one of the poorest regions of France; most of the militants in the movement were also commerçants; the two groups who voted most heavily for Poujade, the commerçants and the farmers, were those most hurt by the postwar economic growth pattern of France in terms of big, concentrated firms; Poujadism won only a small fraction of the votes in the developed high-growth Northern region between Paris and the Belgian frontier.

As a group the commerçants or petit bourgeois had been, especially in the South of France, among the heaviest supporters of the "system" of the Third Republic. In both ideology and policy, the Third Republic had stood for the protection of the small, independent business or farm. In the fifties, these values were under attack, and Fourth Republic politics served to make difficult what might have occurred less painfully. Thus, it was an easy step to portray the Poujadist voter as a traditional creature giving a final, Fascist-tinged outburst at economic forces beyond his control and adaptive capacity.

The implication drawn from such an analysis of Poujadism was that Poujade's voters ought to come from poor areas, in economic and demographic decline, and especially from areas overstocked with commerçants. Such statements are at best, however, half-truths.

The strongest statement of any accuracy along these lines was that Poujade failed to score heavily in the thirty (out of ninety) most modern departments. Stanley Hoffman and his associates acknowledged that, "If it is thus shown that Poujadism hardly succeeded in penetrating the departments with high productivity or high income per capita, one cannot by contrast affirm that it had an outstanding success in the least productive or the most poor departments."

What is interesting is that Poujadism did have great success in transitional departments at intermediate levels of development. But the tendency to think in terms of dichotomous relationships prevented many observers from investigating this phenomenon.

Even in the most rural and agricultural departments, Poujade had considerably greater success in the more "dynamic" departments of this group. These departments, since their population is typically not in decline, have a relatively small percentage of commerçants. Thus, as we shall show, the "commercant" interpretation of Poujadism as a social movement is not consistent with data. In the rural departments, for example, farmers had to vote Poujadist in large numbers for a Poujadist success to occur. The "commercant" interpretation creates the expectation that this would occur in the relatively "static" (non-growth) departments. We may ask why, on the contrary, this happened more often with farmers in the relatively "dynamic" (high-growth) departments.

3 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 196.
More generally, we may rethink the feeling that Poujadism is a vestigial residue of the traditional French "petit," incapable of adaptation to the postwar world. We may ask if the Poujadists, instead of being just passive traditionalists, were not often men making a real and adaptive transition in response to the demands of postwar life in "dynamic" France.

In a fascinating (albeit Marxist-biased) book about French agriculture, Serge Mallet has given a highly concrete example of such transitional activity among French peasants:

2000 peasants of the canton of Ambert [Puy-de-Dome] signed a petition envisaging:

a) The creation of a fixed zone for woodlands.

b) The institution of a society of land management taking responsibility for the administration of all the cultivatable land of the canton and proceeding to a redivision of land by eliminating from the new allotment all absentee owners.

How did H. P., a young Catholic peasant, of reactionary tradition, take the initiative for such a movement? How did 2000 peasants—-in a canton which in the elections of 1956 gave 60% of the vote to the extreme-right Poujadists and Independents—subscribe to such an action against the right of property?4

There is good evidence, then, that Poujadism is not a simple reaction to change elsewhere but is itself a complex process of social change in postwar France. It is worthwhile therefore, before proceeding to a quantitative analysis of voting statistics, to reorient the interpretation of the Poujadist movement in this sense.

Poujadists: Frenchmen in Transition

Viewed from one level, Poujadism does manifest a reaction of traditional values to modernization. To a world of increasing economic concentration and government controls is opposed the tidy community of the boutique and a stable clientele. And of all Western nations, France has been the nation of the small-scale economy.

In the accelerated change of postwar France, the small-scale economy undergoes constant constraint and frequent destruction. Politics, furthermore, only hindered an intelligent cutting of the economic cake. The tax law appeared to favor workers over self-employed in the same income bracket. In postwar France the industrial modern sector played its trump while the old middle classes had no effective political organization.

When, in such an atmosphere of threatened loss of self-employed status, the old tax structure is operated with new vigor, rural France reacts. Poujadism reacted to the whole array of symbols of modernization: the trusts, big business, international finance, Prisunics, concentration of commerce, centralization of consumption, nationally advertised prices, quick changes in product, cooperatives, nationalizations, labor unions, civil servants, administrative controls in agriculture, large cities, experts, Supermarchés, liberalization of foreign trade ("frozen chickens"), technicians, machine production, organization of the movies. To these negative symbols, as protest
became demagoguery, were added a nastier set: "nationalism" in the colonies, Jews, intellectuals, the press, the elite, foreigners, immigrants.  

In this schema of reaction, those most severely affected by modernization, the poorest of the middle classes, put their votes against the Fourth Republic.

Even in this schema, however, poverty and depopulation need not be taken as the basis for the Poujadist votes. It evidently would be equally valid to assume that those areas where the contrast between the modern and the traditional is greatest became the most heavily Poujadist. These areas, as our studies show, are not the poorest and most depopulated.

On this showing, the interpretation of Poujadism as a simple reaction to modernization needs to be challenged. An important concept to bear in mind is that very different latent attitude structures can produce the same "decision" in a forced-choice situation such as an election--some people will vote for Kennedy because he is Catholic while others will vote for him, at least in part, because he opposes federal aid to parochial schools.

For Poujadists, we know that their pre- and post- Poujade electoral behavior was extremely diverse. A public opinion poll of the French Institute of Public Opinion (I.F.O.P.) in March of 1957 gave their probable "post-Poujade" electoral decisions:

5 Descriptive information about Poujadism has been drawn from Hoffman, op. cit., passim.
of every 100 former Poujadist voters roughly 8 would vote Socialist, 5 Radical, 3 M.R.P., 20 Independent, 23 Poujadist, and 5 other parties. (38 did not know or would not respond.) While the absence of the Communists is, as we shall show, related to the geographic distribution of the Poujadist vote in the 1956 election, for the moment we stress only the otherwise heterogeneous character of the movement.

Similarly, while some Poujadist votes may be interpreted as a response to the loss of a business or farm, or to the defense of les positions acquises, many Poujadists were drawn from highly mobile occupations such as transportation. Here is an area where small business has been expanding since the war. Most people who owned trucks in rural areas and small towns left another occupation to do so. These people conceivably voted Poujade because their expectations of upward mobility had been dramatically accelerated.

Analogous cases can be made for the farm population. Many farmers, over-receptive to government and private advertising campaigns, were bold enough to buy tractors that could not be efficiently operated on the small, unconnected plots typical in much of France. When these farmers cannot meet their credit payments and are urged by Poujadist propaganda to vote against "les gros," they are hardly a traditional type. In general, agricultural France has not been unresponsive to technological promise. The expectations

6 Sondages, 19, 3, 1957, p. 11.

7 The point has been documented by Mallet in Les Paysans Contre le Fasé, op. cit., passim. Laurence Wylie gives confirming evidence: "Some of the artisans who have lost their trade are bitter, and Pierre Poujade made the most of this bitterness. Nevertheless they seem to share the pride the French feel in the technological advance of their
produced by technology were much greater than the returns produced by the French economy.

The economic experiences of Poujadist voters then seem to be as diverse as their political histories. There is similar contrast in communications behavior, for, although many of the symbols of Poujadist communications are those of the traditional right, its overall communications structure closely resembled that of modern revolutionary extremism: the combination of "high dissociation from institutions and ideologies with a high degree of interaction among people." The high dissociation of the Poujadists is widely acknowledged. "Sortez les Sortants" ("Throw out the Incumbents") was their slogan. We can easily infer that a high degree of interaction took place. Unlike the traditional French right, the Poujadists were everything but a party of notables or local elite. In fact, the national organization of commerçants opposed Poujade. Thus, Poujadism was denied the normal channels of communication and consequently operated with more direct personal communication than is usually the case for French politics. Only direct interaction, largely facilitated by the introduction of the automobile in rural France, would explain the rapid growth of Poujadism.

The contrasts between Poujadists in politics, economics, and communications nonetheless have a common specification in the

9 S. M. Lipset has noted the "revolutionary" aspect to Poujadist ideology, which he contrasts with that of De Gaulle who identifies much more directly with the conservation of traditional values. See his Political Man (New York, 1959), pp. 152-163.
matrix of social change. This specification in turn explains the geographic distribution of Poujadist voting.

The key to Poujadism as an electoral movement lies in the context of social change from 1946 to 1956. The following elements were important for our purposes:

(1) There was an important movement off the land and into the cities. Not only the Paris region grew rapidly, but also secondary cities with populations around 10,000, 20,000, or above had high increases. At the same time, rural regions surrounding these cities either grew less rapidly or lost in population. The growth of the cities ought to have had two important effects:

First, new life-styles were communicated to the rural population (mass media and tourists had a similar function), thus simultaneously increasing rural readiness to innovate and increasing the expectation that the rural people themselves would acquire the new life-styles. At the same time, non-agricultural incomes rose faster than agricultural; people with the right kinds of businesses in the right kinds of towns were more prosperous than people with inefficient operations in declining villages. Hence, important differentials in satisfactions or returns matched the rapid increase in expectations.

On the one hand, the process just described was unimportant electorally in areas already highly urbanized because only a small fraction of the population came from agriculture or small-town businesses. At the other extreme, in regions without important
developing centers, there were no cities to intensify the imbalance of expectations and satisfactions. Similarly, *grosso modo*, mass media and tourism had made their weakest penetration in these poorest and stagnant departments. Thus, it seems likely that Poujadism would have been most successful in departments near the center of the range of modernization.

(2) At the same time, the political system of the Fourth Republic resulted in a growth of popular dissociation from its institutional framework. Small business and small agriculture did not have representative interest articulation. At the time of Poujade, the national farmers' association was controlled by large-scale investment farming in the Paris and Eastern regions. The government, trying for an increase in economic power, attempted to collect taxes that had previously been left uncollected; hence, the birth of Poujadism as a movement to run the tax-collector out of town.

One group faced higher dissociation than others. Government attempted to control the production of small distillers. Mendès-France launched a large-scale campaign against alcoholism. There had been some bad years. Wine-growers remembered these things when they went to the polls.

(3) Given dissociation, discontent must be channelled electorally. Only the Communist party provided important competition to Poujade as a claimant for the dissociated. The Communist party functions as a massive organization for the expression of urban, particularly worker, dissociation. Thus, the Communists represent an organizational as well as an ideological impasse for
Poujadism in highly urban areas. Similarly, in areas of rural Communism, where dissociation occurred prior to the Poujade movement, we can expect the Communist organization to have prevented Poujadist electoral success.

The preceding points can be summarized before beginning the statistical examination of election results. As a consequence of demographic, economic, and communication patterns, Poujadism should have been most successful in departments at an intermediate level of development or industrialization. Conditional to the major modernization level, two further factors should be important: the strength of the Communist party and the proportion of the population involved in wine-growing.
Poujade's Voters*

The analysis of voting statistics presented here aims at showing the potential relevance to voting studies of three inputs that have not been systematically considered by French electoral sociologists. These inputs include (1) the effects of relative levels of modernization on expectation-reward balance; (2) inhibitory effects of one party's prominence in a region on another party's ability to marshal votes in the region (Communists vs. Poujadists in our case); (3) high electoral saliency of particular issues in particular regions that are tangential to the elite's central image of the electoral campaign (central government communications and the production difficulties in grapes-and-wine regions in our case). It will be shown that these three elements

* Notes on Computational and Statistical Techniques

A. The "average" Poujadist vote is always the unweighted average. This means that departments (or cantons) of unequal population were counted equally. The procedure was adopted because we wished to focus on regional variations. Each department then reflects an "experiment" made under varying conditions; the experimental result is the Poujadist vote.

B. In eight departments, the Poujadists did not present candidates. While in some departments the Poujadists were allied with another party, it was not possible to systematically 'correct' for the absence of a list. Therefore, we scored these departments all as zero. Two factors would seem to account for the absence of lists: (1) Lack of support; (2) Success of older parties in channeling Poujadist sentiment. Neither factor would imply that the zero scores are distortions.

C. The distribution of percent Poujadist vote over the departments is skewed, yet the zero scores preclude a logarithmic or logit transformation. Therefore, in testing for differences between two sets of departments, we computed not only the $t$ Test, which assumes normality, but also a non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney $U$ Test. The $t$ Test results are shown as $p(t)$, while the $U$ Test appears as $p(U)$. 
can be most profitably explored in a multivariate context. Also explicit in the analysis is the inadequacy of single-variate explanations, especially those related to poverty, the decline of regions, and the decline of the petit bourgeois class.

The method of inference here relies on comparing the Poujadist vote in departments that have been placed in dichotomous or trichotomous categories along some dimension. With evident loss of generality, more powerful statistical analysis was deliberately avoided in order to simplify the discussion.

The strength of the Poujadist vote, our findings show (see Table 1), was strongly related to the balance between the agricultural population and the non-agricultural population. In the intermediate departments, in transition between a predominantly agricultural economy and a predominantly industrial economy, the average Poujadist vote was 11.8% as compared to 9.5% in the highly agricultural departments, and only 8.2% in the highly industrial. Similarly, per capita income, urbanism, and population growth all showed the same transitional peak although the peak was not so prominent as that of the occupational measure. While these differences are numerically small, they are quite important at the margin. In those departments where there was only one circonscription (electoral district) and which were, hence, not overly sensitive to the effects of proportional representation, the Poujadists won 35 seats. Only 5 of those seats came in...
departments where the Poujadist vote was less than 10%. Clearly the half "modern"-half "traditional" character of many parts of France had an important influence on the outcome of the 1956 election.

In Table 1, we have also reported the overall effects for the wine-alcohol issue. The potential saliency of the issue to the department, measured as registered wine-growers as percent of the active population also showed important differences in Poujadist voting strength. The 30 departments with the greatest involvement in wine and alcohol production showed an average Poujadist vote of 12.6% as against only 8.3% in the remaining 60 departments. A similar result was obtained for an alternative index, the number of male voters per registered bouilleur de cru. We shall show that the "wine-grower index" gives even greater differences when we eliminate the effect of the percentage of the population in agriculture.
TABLE 1

Major Factors in the Poujadin Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Poujadin Vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Modernization Variates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Per Capita Income. (1955-1956)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Percent Urban. (1954)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Population Growth Rate. (1946-1954)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Wine-Alcohol Variates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Registered Wine-Growers as Percent Active Population. (1954)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bouilleurs de Cru per Xale Voter. (1951)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuation of Table 1 on next page.
Table 1 (Continued.)

Results of Significance Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variate</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>$p(t)$</th>
<th>$p(U)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>Middle &gt; Low</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle &gt; High</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2</td>
<td>Middle &gt; Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle &gt; High</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle &gt; Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.3</td>
<td>Middle &gt; High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.4</td>
<td>Middle &gt; Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1</td>
<td>High &gt; Low</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2</td>
<td>High &gt; Middle</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High &gt; Low</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle &gt; Low</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** For A.1., A.2., B.1., B.2., the departments are distributed 30-30-30 among the High, Middle, and Low groups. For A.3. and A.4., the distribution is 30-40-20.
To test how relative effects operate in strictly rural settings, we can use the estimations of the vote of agriculteurs by department made by Klatzmann. It should be noted that his techniques are very approximate.

Again the departments were divided into three groups of 30 each. The variables trichotomized are population growth, urban growth, and urbanism. In each entry of Table 2, we recorded the number of departments in which 20% or more of the farmers voted Poujadist. The table indicates that for each of the three demographic variables, the intermediate, relatively "dynamic" departments scored higher than the "static," low category departments. Also, the lows were not substantially higher than the highs on any of the three measures, and even were somewhat lower on urbanism. The peaking of Poujadism in the intermediate groups is clear-cut: on population growth 14 out of 30 intermediate departments showed 20% or more of their farmers voting Poujadist against 7 of the 30 lows. For urban growth, if the cutting points between categories are rearranged, and the 30 departments from rank 1 to rank 70 are considered, we find 17 of the 27 departments with a strong Poujadist vote in this group. Finally, on Urbanism, 18 of 27 are in the 45 most urban departments against 9 of 27 in the 45 least urban.

The demographic variables then indicate important differences in the level of Poujadist vote among the farmers. The peasant-farmer is more likely to be a Poujadist voter in an urban than a

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rural department, a reflection, we believe, of the higher expectations and higher access to communications of the urban-region farmer. And, in terms of demographic dynamics, the Poujadist farmer typically comes from a region of intermediate growth rates where (notwithstanding some correction for birth-rate differentials) modernization has made sufficient impact to change the expectation-satisfaction balance. True, our data do not reflect which farmers voted Poujadist. But given the reports of observers like Mallet and Wylie, it is a reasonable suggestion that modernization had made substantial positive impact on these farmers as well as their regions. Social change makes mécontentement possible but not inevitable.

TABLE 2

Poujadism, Modernization, and Agriculture*  

Number of departments in which 20% or more of the farmers voted Poujadist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Departments</th>
<th>High (30)</th>
<th>Middle (30)</th>
<th>Low (30)</th>
<th>Total 90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1954</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth (%) 1946-1954</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism - 1954</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Urbanism is defined as percentage of population living in towns with 2000 or more living in the major agglomeration. Urban growth is defined as the percentage growth rate of the urban population.
So far only the more global hypothesis involving relative economic contrasts has been examined. To proceed to the more detailed propositions, the distribution involving the percentage of the active population in non-agricultural occupations was selected for close examination since the relative strength of rank "middle" was higher in this distribution than in others.

A detailed breakdown of the relationship between "High" Poujadism (defined as 12.5% or more of the registered voters) and the size of the non-agricultural population is given in Fig. 1. One-third of the 24 "High" Poujadist departments occur in the narrow range between 61% and 64% in the secondary and tertiary sectors. But above this slice, a "threshold" of modernization appears to be reached—as there are only 3 Poujadist departments between 65% and 76% and none above 76%. In the range 61-64, 8 of 13 departments (62%) are high Poujadist, yet in the more agricultural departments below 61 only 12 of 42 (29%) are high.

The great difference between the two percentages suggested that highly different circumstances might accompany Poujadism in the two groupings. In particular, the concentration of commerçants has a paradoxically different relationship to Poujadist voting within the two groupings. Naming the 61-64 group " Transitional" and the over-65 group " Rural," we cross-tabulated "High-Low" Poujadism with the number of commercial establishments per 10,000 capita. Table 3A indicates that the concentration of commercial establishments, like Poujadist voting, peaks in the " Transitional" departments. Even within the transitionals, there appears to be
a relationship between commercial density and Poujadism (3B).
But, in the rural departments (3C), the reverse occurs! Those departments with a high commercial density had an extremely low Poujadist vote.

TABLE 3
Poujadism, Modernization, and Commerce*
The numbers in the cells represent the actual number of departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3A Commerce and Modernization</th>
<th>Size of Non-agricultural Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial establishments/10,000 capita</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174-227</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228-348</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3B Commerce and Poujadism</th>
<th>Rurals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial establishments/10,000 capita</td>
<td>Poujadism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174-227</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228-253</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254-348</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3C Commerce and Poujadism</th>
<th>Transitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial establishments/10,000 capita</td>
<td>Poujadism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174-227</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228-253</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254-348</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuation of Table 3 on next page.
Several factors appear to account for this reversal of behavior. In the rural departments high commercial density should result from agricultural depopulation that leaves an over-concentration of small enterprises. This situation, where village life also deteriorates, presents little contrast with modernity and thus a low Poujadist potential. The same phenomenon should occur to a lesser extent with the transitionals, especially in the more rural areas. But to this first factor must be added, for the transitionals, increased concentrations resulting from urban trading centers and the competitive introduction of new and modern forms of enterprise. These additional factors provide the necessary contrast for Poujadianism. In this respect, the results on population growth (Table 3D) yield positive evidence. The rural departments of high commercial density are stagnant with "Low" Poujadianism. The transitionals are expanding and Poujadianist.

The foregoing results lead to no inference about how commercants actually voted. What the results show is that, for rural departments, the market position of commercants was not an important factor in the overall Poujadianist vote. Actually, commercial
concentration, unlike the more general measures of growth, is probably a poor indicator of overall expectation-satisfaction imbalance, hence of Poujadism.

Much more important in determining outcomes in French elections is the competition for votes between various extremist parties. If one extremist party had previously channelled votes based on attitudinal "dissociation" into their electoral coffers in a particular department, it is likely that they would work vigorously to combat any competing extremist party seeking the same "dissociational" votes. This should be especially true for the Communist party, which operates through a permanent organization of committed militants to gain adherents of this type.

To examine the relationship of Poujadist vote to Communist vote, the departments were classified "High" (20% and above) or "Low" (below 20%) Communist vote. Consistent with our hypothesis about the relationship, the average Poujadist vote in the "Low Communism" group was greater than that for "High Communism," 10.7% in the first case and 8.1% in the second. This difference is small, however, and inadequately represents a major distinction. Of the 13 "High Poujadist," Rural departments, only one is also high on Communism. Thus, with one exception, the absence of a high Communist vote was a necessary if not sufficient condition for a high Poujadist vote. (The lack of sufficiency explains why there is not a major difference between the averages.)

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13 T-test not significant, but p(U)<.0002
result is illustrated by Table 4.

TABLE 4

Communism and Poujadism -- Rural Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Poujadism (12.5% and over)</th>
<th>Low Poujadism (Under 12.5%):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Communism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20% and over)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Communism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Under 20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments</td>
<td>N=13</td>
<td>N=29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That a low Communist vote was not a sufficient condition for a high Poujadist vote simply indicates that some departments were low in "dissociation" and, hence, low in extremist voting on both the "Right" and "Left" extremes of the political continuum.

When the same relationship of Communism vs. Poujadism is examined for the 14 transitional departments there is apparently a paradox since the 7 departments with "High" Communism have an average Poujadist vote of 14.3% as against 11.1% in the 7 "Low" departments. The best statement here might be that there was no relationship between the two votes in these departments as the comparable fourfold table (Table 5) shows no distinction and only a low level of significance was reached.\[14\] What explains the

\[14\] T-test not significant, p(U), two-tail, .10.
paradox is that in the transitional departments Communism can have an urban base without competing with Poujadism for rural or petit bourgeois votes. This is confirmed by a study which shows that, for the rural departments, the percentage of Communist vote is correlated with the percentage of self-owned farms and uncorrelated with the number of workers, while the reverse is true in the transitional departments.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{TABLE 5}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Communism and Poujadism -- Transitional Departments} & \\
\hline
High Poujadism & Low Poujadism \\
(12.5\% and over) & (Under 12.5\%) \\
\hline
High Communism & 4 & 3 \\
(20\% and over) & & \\
Low Communism & 1 & 3 \\
(Under 20\%) & & \\
Departments & N=0 & N=6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The results are best demonstrated by those departments that are not only "high" on Communism but also high in commercial concentration (See Table 3A-III. for context). The four transitionals of this type (Allier, Drome, Herault, Vaucluse) were all heavily treated.

Poujadist (respective percentages: 13.8, 14.0, 17.9, 22.1). In contrast the six rurals (Basse Alpes, Ardeche, Creuse, Lot, Lozere, and Pyrennes-Orientales) were all low (respective percentages: 11.4, 12.2, no list, 9.7, 7.9, 8.1).

Drome, Herault, Vaucluse are names that redirect our interest to geographic factors, for these three departments are all members of the communications network presented by the Rhone valley. Indeed, Isere, Gard, and the outlying circonscription of Bouches-du-Rhone complete a belt of "High Communism-High Poujadism." In turn this belt is one of the most dynamic regions of France.

The dual extremism of the Rhone region is indicative of what we have hypothesized to be a general "dissociation" from the existing structure of power ("the system"). The oppositionist character of the region's electoral behavior is fairly consistent in its actual voting record. Its votes consistently weakened the centrist Fourth Republic; in 1962 the region also voted "Non" to the Gaullist effort to stabilize a centrist Fifth Republic.

Among commerants, the most typical voting pattern probably has been: De Gaulle's R.P.F. in 1951; Poujade in 1956; De Gaulle in 1958; and a traditional party (now an "out") in 1962. Yet the Rhone is one of the "dynamic" areas of France. Successful economics apparently is no short-term panacea for oppositionist politics.

To leave the valley of the Rhone for the more rural portions of Southern France, or for Northwestern France, leads to a very

---

16 Data on this pattern will be presented in the author's forthcoming report of a survey of bakers in the Vaucluse.
different picture of the interaction between Poujadism and Communism. In this large block of rural departments, with an absence of "High-High" situations, the Poujadists must be viewed as mobilizers of new discontent in departments that were traditionally anti-Communist. Since the Communists have tended to remain strong in the same rural departments from 1951 to 1956, transfers of Communist votes to Poujadist candidates can only be a marginal factor. If, in the 42 rural departments, the Communist vote advanced from 1951 to 1956 in only 2 of the 13 "High" Poujadist departments, it did so in only 5 of the 16 "High" Communist departments and 5 of the 14 "Low-Low" departments. Elsewhere, in "High" Communist as well as "High" Poujadist departments, the Communist vote was reduced. A factor much more closely allied to the mobilization of new discontent—the Poujadist capacity to benefit from a reduction of abstentions—seems of greater importance, as indicated in Table 6.

TABLE 6
Rural Poujadism and Abstentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in percentage of abstentions, 1951-1956</th>
<th>Poujadism</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change or advance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction less than national mean, 13%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction more than 13%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Until now, our analysis has shown the general characteristics of Poujadist departments in terms of demographic and economic variables, and has shown how the French political structure channelled the electoral expression of the movement. Can we now find a specific issue that precipitated hard votes out of structural possibilities?

Of particular interest are the results for wine-growing. Table 7 reflects how, at both rural and transitional levels of development, the Poujadist vote in departments with over 10% of the active population in wine-growing was some one and one-half times that in departments with a smaller fraction of wine-growers. If only the "Low" Communism departments are considered, for the rural departments, high wine-growers have almost twice the Poujadist vote as low wine-growers.

Clearly, wine-growing represents a crucial dimension in Poujadist voting. There are several reasons to think the relationship is not spurious. First, the wine-growing districts are quite diverse on other measures. Wine-growing departments appear in near-equal proportions among transitional departments and rural departments. There are even urban wine-growing departments (Gard) with large Poujadist votes. The wine-growers are both Catholic (Maine-et-Loire) and laic (Vaucluse). Their populations are both declining (Aveyron) and rising (Tarn). It is unlikely that wine-growing is correlated with a more basic factor. Among the substantive issues that would point to a pro-Poujade, anti-government
### TABLE 7
Wine-Growing and Poujadism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported Wine Growers* (1951)</th>
<th>Active Population** (1954)</th>
<th>Rural Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average Poujadist Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7% N= 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5% N= 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(t) &lt; .01, P(U) &lt; .01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.2% N= 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5% N= 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(t) &lt; .001, P(U) &lt; .01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.2% N= 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.2% N= 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(t) &lt; .05, P(U) &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


vote in wine-growing regions are the production crises linked to government attempts to curb alcoholism and to control the bouilleurs de cru. Finally, both Hoffman and Royer have shown how anti-government propaganda utilized the wine-growers discontent during the election campaign.17

Of the many "issues" in an election, only a few ever become salient to the mass of voters. Apparently the alcohol nexus achieved this order of saliency. There were over 1,000,000 wine-growers in France in 1956. In some departments they were particularly numerous, representing over 25% of the active population in some 15 departments. Obviously, their mécontentement would be communicated to commerçants and artisans dependent on their trade. Given that alcohol production had become an important focus for anti-government sentiment, it was not difficult for Poujade to give this sentiment electoral expression. If Poujade was seized by the devil, it is not unlikely that the devil was incarnate in Mendès-France.

It is interesting how completely Poujadist voting lacks any reference to elite politics. Rather than following the usual communication course flowing out from Paris to the provinces, Poujadism took the reverse. There is strong evidence that problems of the wine-alcohol industry had a dominant role in the elections of 1956, yet these problems were never viewed as central at the time and have hardly been posed as such since. Finally,

the most effective political counterbalance to Poujadism seems to have been Communism, also an extremist movement excluded from the elite "system." Poujadism was another political maze from which the men of the Fourth Republic—in their "house without windows"—found no exit.

**Poujade's Voters: Replication in Isère**

The conclusions we have drawn with the department as the level of analysis would be reinforced if we could find the same effects at the cantonal level. To examine voting at the cantonal level, we have chosen to reanalyze the data for the department of Isère, originally presented by M. Claude Leleu.

The Isère is an interesting case in point. The Poujadist vote was 15.6% and two Poujadist deputies were elected, although Isère is a "dynamic" department containing France's fastest growing city, Grenoble. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from the analysis presented here can be buttressed by contrast with the conclusions drawn from a more classic analysis. M. Leleu observed:

> If Poujadism generally attains its maximum level in the poor agricultural regions and more rarely in the rich regions, ... it is nonetheless interesting to observe that the poorest regions were not those which gave the most votes to the U.P.F.

> Everywhere extremely poor, the South-East of the department is the region the least penetrated by Poujadism. And it is precisely in the most impoverished canton of the department (Bourg-d'Oisans) that the U.P.F. received its lowest percentage for rural cantons (6%).

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19 See n 1.
However, the results found in Table 7 suggest that poverty is not the crucial variable. There we divided the 45 cantons (excluding the cities of Grenoble and Vienne) into three groups of equal size for three indices used by M. Leleu, Non-agricultural Population, Population Growth, and Agricultural Richness. For example, the "High" group on Non-agricultural Population includes those 15 cantons with the highest percentages of the labor force in non-agricultural occupations.

Along the dimensions of population growth and non-agricultural population, the Poujadist vote in "High" cantons is significantly less than in both "Medium" and "Low" cantons. There are no important differences, however, between "Medium" and "Low" cantons. This illustrates that, while Poujadism was basically a rural movement, relative decline was as important a factor as absolute decline. For the "Middle" group—with a stable population between 1936 and 1954—voted as heavily Poujadist as the "Low" group in population decline.

The importance of relative position in producing an imbalanced "want: get ratio" between expectations and satisfactions, and consequently in explaining the Poujadist vote, is emphasized by the results on agricultural richness. Here the "Medium" group, excluded from consideration by Leleu as a result of his poor-rich dichotomy, has the highest Poujadist vote, significantly greater than that in the poorest cantons.

A more valid test of the importance of agricultural richness results when we confine our attention to those 12 cantons that have more than 50% of the labor force in agriculture. In this case, the six richest cantons have an average of 20.0 against 19.1 for the 6 poorest. Although this difference is not of statistical significance, it is a substantial distortion to advocate the counter-hypothesis "Poujadism generally attains its maximum level in the poor agricultural regions and more rarely in the rich regions."

Nevertheless, there is one important factor that is revealed by the study of geography. If we take the 10 cantons that lie totally to the South-East side of a line drawn through Grenoble perpendicular to the line Lyon-Grenoble, we find a Poujadist average of 10.6% as against 17.9% in the remaining cantons.21 Furthermore, we obtain a similar result when only the 12 agricultural cantons are considered--12.9% for the 4 Alpine cantons, 22.9% for the 8 cantons between Lyon and Grenoble.22 These differences, M. Leleu traces to a crisis in the textile industry. But this crisis does not seem to be wholly explanatory when the character of the results is similar between industrial and agricultural cantons. We would hypothesize that Poujadism greatly profited from the relative disparities reinforced by easy communication arising in the creation of the Metropolitan region Lyon-Grenoble.23

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21 p(U) .002, p(t) .001

22 p(U) .025, p(t) .05

23 For the background of this discussion, see D. Lerner and Raymond Aron, France Defeats E.D.C. (Praeger, 1957), pp. 201-208.
In the context of this geographic element, the limits on M. Leleu's criteria of agricultural richness must be recalled. In Isère as a whole, agricultural productivity in 1951 exceeded that of only six other departments while its industrial productivity is among the highest in France. Thus, cantonal variations in agricultural productivity are not likely to be as important for individual expectations as the gross disparity between the industrial and agricultural sections. This disparity, which once again involves "relative deprivation" rather than absolute poverty, is heightened in the Bas-Dauphiné.

The relationship of the Poujadist vote to the Communist vote in Isère should be mentioned briefly. In Isère, as the Communist vote is stronger in the industrial than in the agricultural cantons, it was possible to have large votes for both brands of extremism. While the Communist vote did drop somewhat more in the agricultural than in the industrial cantons, this drop appears very marginal in the Poujadist picture. Drops in abstention, Gaullist, Radical, and M.R.P. votes all seem more important. Thus, Poujadism again appears as a new mobilizer of those who want to vote against Paris while not wanting to vote for Moscow.

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Conclusion

Poujadism, our research indicates, was most successful electorally in those geographic units in the "transitional" sector of economic growth, where a declining rural agricultural community came into great contrast with a rising industrial society. This contrast was illustrated (because heightened) by a transitional crisis involving the production of wine-and-liquor, which resulted in a heavy Poujadist vote in the wine-growing departments. In the less advanced departments, where the incidence of Poujadism was more sporadic, the strength of the Communist vote greatly affected the Poujadist vote. In these less advanced areas, the Poujadist vote was also, but less strongly, correlated with a number of variables that appear to affect the level of expectations as contrasted with satisfactions: the "want: get ratio."

At the cantonal level, study of the department of Isère further suggested that contrast within the communications network of a developing Metropolitan region may have been especially conducive to a high Poujadist vote. Indeed, the Bas-Dauphiné is a portion of a larger region, the Rhone valley, with a uniformly high level of extremist voting.

These results, the author believes, considerably reduce the hesitation found in past studies of the electoral geography of Poujadism as to the effects of absolute and relative levels of economic development. As, it is further believed, the new results were obtained by a significant difference in the methodology
employed, it may be helpful to outline the differences in procedure.

First, as we started with an orientation toward relative economic differences, the centers as well as the tails of distributions were examined for maxima and minima. Thus, we arrived at the conclusion that Poujadist voting was greatest in departments at intermediate levels of urbanization and industrialization. We thereby drew attention to the transitional character of Poujadism. Next, not only was a single independent variable compared to the voting distribution, but also the marginal effects of a second variable were examined for various ranges of the first independent variable. By this technique, we found the importance of Communist voting and wine-growing for the Poujadist vote in the rural departments. The additional information that was produced by these two relatively minor innovations suggests that electoral geography could be raised to a regional science by the application of modern statistical analysis. The continually baffling character of French politics clearly warrants the attempt.
THE COMMUNIST VOTE IN FRANCE

An Analysis of Elements of Regional Variation

As a consequence of the events following the Russian Revolution, the French Communist Party made its debut in 1919. By the elections of 1924, the geographic distribution of its electoral strength was readily apparent. Approximately, the distribution of 1924 has been maintained down to the present despite the intervention of the Great Depression and the World War.¹

An equivalent statement is that, from election to election, the P. C. (Parti Communiste) has neither found a substantial number of new departments where the Communist percentage of the vote would approach the percentage in previous areas of success nor been driven from its by now traditional bastions. In turn, the stability of performance suggests that relatively stable features of the social structure can account for a large part of the variations in strength from one department to another. If, in contrast, the positions of Communist strength had gradually evolved over time, we would be concerned with indicators of social change. But the correct approach apparently involves a search for the milieu in which the P. C. is likely to be successful. Our suggestion is that the appropriate factor to characterize the milieu is found in urbanism and that a high Communist vote occurs from interactions of urbanism with other variables.

Under the hypothesis of interaction, we accordingly stratified the French departments with respect to urbanization and, in each stratum, investigated the relationship between Communist vote and other factors.

¹. For cross-tabulations among various elections, see the Appendix.
Our findings are basically three-fold: first, in highly urban areas, Communist vote correlates well with the percentage of the population not employed in agriculture; second, in areas of medium urbanization, Communist vote correlates well with the percentage of workers; finally, in areas of low urbanization, Communist vote correlates with the percentage of farms that are self-owned. The first two findings document what is known as the "ceinture rouge" (red belt) effect where workers tend to vote less Communist in non-working class quarters than in working class quarters and where non-workers tend to vote more Communist in working class quarters than in non-working class quarters.

Future analysis will attempt to tie these findings together more coherently by an analysis of variance of Communist voting strength. Time will be one dimension in this analysis.

In this forthcoming study, we will additionally attempt to demonstrate that, region by region, Communist voting has declined in France. Nevertheless, the Communist vote at the national level remains a fairly stable percentage of the whole. We believe this to be true because demographic trends favor the urban areas where the Communist vote is now strong.

We would further hope to indicate that the Communist vote is more heavily related to the ecological pattern of the inter-war period than to the current ecological pattern. A lack of adaptation to ecological change plus a region by region decline would in turn suggest that the Communist movement continues to exist more by its "organizational weapon" than by ideological attraction.

To return to the present analysis, we began by asking what environments or milieus ought to characterize high Communist voting. To characterize
In this milieu, sociologists have conducted a long but unsuccessful search for a variable that would correlate highly with the percentage voting Communist. Thus, the P.C. obtains a high percentage in departments with both high and low degrees of religious practice or both high and low percentages of workers among the active population.

The technique of looking for a single variable is bound to fail since it assumes that Communism attracts strongly in a unique type of environment and that, therefore, the closer the actual environment approaches the pure state (say 100% workers or 100% atheists) the higher the P.C.'s percentage. On the contrary, what is obviously true is that Communist electoral success occurs in radically different environments. In contrast to a linear relationship with a single variable, the Communist vote is a function of the interactions of single variables.

This is not to say, however, that we cannot find a common psychic characteristic to Communist voters, whatever their surroundings may be. A brief suggestion would be that the Communist voter everywhere experiences (perceptually) non-participation with regard to the decisions made in the French social system and/or the rewards distributed in that system.²

Once we agree to attach importance to a sense of non-participation it becomes clear that we must investigate the possible combinations of descriptor variables (in opposition to one continuum) which will indicate environments conducive to a sense of non-participation and thereby Communist

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² Of course, the unsatisfied person could abstain as well as vote against the system. A differentiation along this further dimension of voting did not, however, appear necessary to the rather "first-order-of-magnitude" voting analysis contained in this paper.
voting. This with one caveat: the stability of the geographic distribution indicates that the non-participation must be long-run. Discontent of the Poujadist type, for example, arising largely in relation to post-World War II economic change, can be eliminated from consideration.

For such an investigation, the elections of 1956, which occurred relatively close to the 1954 census, were chosen. It is quite justifiable to restrict this introductory investigation to a single election, for, given the stability of the geographic distribution and the stability of the rank-order of the departments among the variables to be used in the analysis, our results are likely to be applicable to most, if not all, legislative elections in the period 1944-1962. For example, even the identification of the P. C. with the Resistance and the relative Franco-Soviet rapprochement of 1945-1947 did not result in a gross change in the geographic pattern for the legislative elections of 1946. Thus, while the general level of the Communist vote may have been elevated by the above factors, it is reasonable to hypothesize that its relative distribution among social groups was largely unaltered. Keeping this hypothesis in mind, we can proceed to locate the social structures favorable to a large percentage for the P. C. in 1956.

A first objective should be to differentiate the departments by some powerful descriptor of the social system that also has some mild correlation with Communist voting. Such a separation would enable us to see if, for an important feature of the environment held roughly constant, a second variable (that need not be the same at different levels of the primary
variable) can describe the structures typically conducive to Communist voting.

Strong candidates for the primary variable are urbanism and its correlate, an index of modernization. Choice of this pair is indicated by:

1) their strength as differentiators among geographic units in a developing nation like France; and 2) the historical association, dating at least since the Revolution of 1789, between urban non-participation and the Left. Tables 1-4 indicate the presence of a mild correlation between both variables and the Communist vote.

The results for 1958 and 1962 have been included to show that the basic tenor of the relationship holds regardless of the election—in each case there is a distinct difference in performance between the most ("1") and the least ("3") urban departments. Nevertheless, it remains to eliminate a substantial number of the deviant cases by finding a second distinguishing variable within each level of urbanism or modernization.

The problem of finding the appropriate second variable will be dealt with only for urbanism. Within the first two ranks on urbanism, it is not

3. The measure of urbanism used here is defined by the Institut National de Statistique et Etudes Economiques (I.N.S.E.E.) as the percentage of the population living in communes with 2000 or more people with residence in the "chef-lieu." The index of modernization has been constructed by Daniel Lerner and Morton Gordon for a forthcoming paper. It consists of a summation of "ranks" on agricultural productivity, radios per capita, and energy consumption per capita (see n.4).

4. In all the tables to follow, where matrix rows or columns are labelled serially, the departments have been grouped into ranks by choosing a segment of the rank-order. Thus "Modernization-1" in Table 1 includes the 27 departments with the highest score on the modernization index. All the voting results are for the "premier tour."
Table 1. Modernization and Communism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODERNIZATION</th>
<th>Over 24%</th>
<th>16% to 24%</th>
<th>Under 16%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Urbanism and Communism--56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBANISM (1954)</th>
<th>Over 24%</th>
<th>16% to 24%</th>
<th>Under 16%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Urbanism and Communism--58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBANISM (1954)</th>
<th>Over 20%</th>
<th>10% to 20%</th>
<th>Under 10%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. All figures indicate the number of departments
Table 4. Urbanism and Communism--62

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Over 20%</th>
<th>10% to 20%</th>
<th>Under 10%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

surprising that the variables relate to economic structure—within rank 1 it is the percentage of the labor force engaged in non-agricultural occupations that sharpens our breakdown; in rank 2 it is the percentage of the labor force classified as workers (Tables 5 and 6). It is interesting that the procedure cannot be reversed. Neither does the non-agricultural percentage separate high P. C. vote from low P. C. vote departments in rank 1, nor does the worker percentage separate in rank 2. This finding is rather striking since the two measures are correlated. At least three possible explanations should be considered.

One possibility is that the results are due to chance. This seems unlikely since Chi-Square tests applied to Tables 5 and 6 showed both significant at the .05 level. Another possibility is that the results are spurious in the sense that a more fundamental variable (also involving economic structure?) can replace the two used here and give a significant breakdown in both ranks 1 and 2. While such a variable has not been found in this research, the possibility cannot be excluded.
Finally, as the third possibility to be considered, the results suggest the following hypothesis: in rank 2 (between 32 and 45% urban) non-workers in the non-agricultural labor force have much less tendency to vote Communist than the same class of people in rank 1 departments. Furthermore, the difference in behavior between rank 1 and rank 2 is much greater for non-workers than for workers. Such a condition may come about because in the small town or village expectations are more easily balanced and participation more readily attained (less anomie) for the non-workers. It may also come about because workers tend to be concentrated in highly urban environments whatever the average level of urbanization while a
substantial tertiary sector must be maintained even in the small communes. (The preceding would be especially true for workers employed in establishments of, say, over 50 persons.) While this hypothesis could account for the results, it will not be tested in this paper.

Before passing to a discussion of the most rural departments, one should note the very good correlation between the workers' percentage in the labor force and the percentage voting Communist at Paris. Also at Paris, a worker is more apt to vote Communist if he lives in a working-class quarter than if he lives in a bourgeois quarter. The first result is likely to be related to the fact that at Paris two of our other variables, urbanization and the non-agricultural percentage of the labor force, are held constant. Thus, the validity of the hypothesis that the Communist percentage is proportional to the workers' percentage (or any single variate hypothesis) seems dependent on first obtaining a sufficiently homogeneous environment. The second result demonstrates another important feature of the environment that must eventually be specified—the degree of segregation and concentration of working class residence.

To turn now to rank 3, the variable chosen has a radically different base than those for ranks 1 and 2, for at a low level of urbanism it becomes natural to focus on agriculture. The rank 3 departments were divided into two groups: one contains those departments in which either "fermiers" (those who rent their farms) represented 50% or more of the farms or "metayers" (share-croppers) 25%; the other group includes the

remaining departments ("propriétaires" in the majority or mixed). The results are given in Table 7, for which the Chi-Square is significant at the .01 level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Over 16%</th>
<th>Under 16%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-owned</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Self-owned</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Agriculture and Communism

The explanation of these results has been ably sensed by Jacques Fauvet:

Les régions de faire-valoir direct sont essentiellement situées au sud de la Loire. Là se trouvent à la fois la plus forte population paysanne, les exploitations les plus petites, le plus faible revenu agricole. À quoi s'ajoutent, sauf dans la plus faible pratique religieuse et le plus bas taux de natalité.

Or, les régions du Centre, du Sud-Ouest et du Sud-Est ont toujours voté le plus à gauche possible: montagnard, républicain, puis radical, socialiste, enfin communiste.

À ce comportement de la petite et moyenne propriété, il peut être proposé deux explications:...

(While a condition for a Communist vote among the farmers may be a general level of poverty, etc., none of the other factors Fauvet mentions gave a 2x2 table significant at the .05 level for the Communist vote in rank 3. Therefore, his analysis of the economic aspects will be omitted.)

...-l'une sociale: la structure égaleitaire de la petite propriété et son ancienneté sont propices aux votes démocratiques, voire révolutionnaires. Bien que possédant ses moyens de travail et ne souffrant apparentemment d'aucune aliénation, le petit propriétaire peut, capitaliste à sa manière, n'en a pas les reflexes politiques.
He subissant depuis plusieurs générations aucune sujétion sociale ou religieuse, rien ne le retient de se porter aux extrêmes, surtout si sa condition économique l’y pousse. Il existe ainsi dans des régions rurales une tradition démocratique ancienne....7

To rephrase Fauvet’s analysis, the level of expectations (especially with regard to democratic participation and its anticipated rewards) are considerably higher in regions where farmers tend to own their farms than in regions where farmers are renters or share-croppers. The failure of succeeding regimes to bring satisfaction to these expectations witnessed a movement leftward from those parties which became identified with power—first the Radicals, then the Socialists. In turn it is interesting that these expectations appear conditioned not by income levels but by the organization of economic communications.

Having now found, for each of the three levels of urbanism, a measure that correlates with the percentage of the Communist vote, we should now conclude by mentioning that none of these three measures gives a breakdown of similar significance when applied to all 90 departments. 8 This fact should not, as it has in the past, cause us to reject these measures into limbo with regard to the analysis of French Communism. Rather, the results cause us to re-emphasize the importance of urbanism in the social environment.


8. The totality of the results are also valid for the elections of 1946, 1951, and 1958. The results are not significant for 1962. Whether this is a result of changes in the distribution of the measures we have been using or a consequence of a major change in voting habits will not be clear until the results of the 1962 census have been published. The appendix contains some relevant tables on these elections.
APPENDIX

A. 1936, 1956, and 1962 compared with 1962—Communist Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956 2: 11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3: 3</td>
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* * * * *

<table>
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<th>Under 10%</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956 2: 12</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3: 0</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
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* * * * *

<table>
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<th>Under 10%</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956 2: 18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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B. Comparison of Results for Urbanism 1

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
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<table>
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</tr>
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<td>Under 20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
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C. Comparison of Results for Urbanism 2

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<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1962</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</table>

D. Comparison of Results for Urbanism 3

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-owned</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Self-owned</td>
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</table>
CONCLUSION

Each of the case studies treats different political phenomena, but each illustrates common themes that have appeared throughout the study. We have noted the failure of traditional categories based on natural regions to account for French development and have seen instead the spread of urban regions and the spread of the modern lifestyle throughout France. The political concomitants of these developments are illustrated by the E.D.C. test case which shows that the urban variable aids in the understanding of the failure of E.D.C. The association of Communism with urban voting patterns in the Assembly played a key role in the defeat.

Still another political concomitant of the spread of urban lifeways is seen in the study of the Poujadist movement. The raising of expectations through communication with an urban region, and the failure to make the process proceed at an acceptable rate are factors in the national movement which surprised political analysts and has not even now been adequately explained.

The pattern of the Communist vote in France is more readily understood when the urban dimension is added. Communist voting is not a simple function of the urban-rural dichotomy, but different levels of urbanism, when combined with other variables, nets a better explanation than can be had by the application of traditional concepts.

In each of the cases, the addition of new concerns for the analyst in the form of the urban variables adds important assets for political
explanation. The work of this study has only begun and is more suggestive than definitive at this time. However, in every case, the expectations which have been fostered by the traditional categories have been disappointing. The continued disappointment is an indication that we are working with false expectations. Changes in modern France require changes in categories of analysis—especially the inclusion of the urban regions as a fact of modernization.

While the urban environment still accounts for much of the present regional variation in France, the sharpness of the rural-urban split is being eroded by a process of homogenization of French standards of living. Although we do not know the extent to which the spread of the urban regions is responsible for the homogenization of France and the spread of the new lifestyle, we are sure they play a substantial role in bringing modernity to a rural population and in erasing regional diversities.

The case studies have demonstrated that accounting for the urban dimension of modern life is crucial for the explanation of important aspects of modern French behavior. They have also shown that urbanism itself is a complex factor. Different levels of urbanism make a difference in behavior patterns. The implications of urbanism can also vary when still other factors are present and operating within the urban environment. The significance of the case studies and of the report as a whole lies in its application of new factors to explain the new facts of modern French life.