THE NEW DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

by

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If there was one thing I learned in quite a few years as a practitioner, it was that the people in the front lines do not particularly appreciate being lectured by armchair tacticians about how to conduct day-to-day diplomacy. The lesson stuck. I would not presume to talk here about diplomatic tactics in detail, except to say that in my opinion Ambassador Stevenson appears to be doing precisely what has needed to be done, and is doing it brilliantly. As one who has nagged in the past for his sort of approach, I am absolutely delighted.

But if the armchair tactician has no real role, there is a very important one for the armchair strategist. I use the military terms deliberately to highlight the difference. In the tactical areas information is scanty, pressures are savage, and hardworking public officials need our loyal— if not quite unquestioning— support in doing the republic's business under trying conditions. In the strategic area, however, there is a never ending need for the planning, the strategic vision, the historical connections which it would be inhuman to expect in the required measure of the men in the foxholes.

Thus a private— or practically private— student of foreign policy can
be emboldened to comment on the events in the United Nations with the hope of illuminating them against a larger backdrop, and in any event to consider them without all of the constraints of official doctrine, for such instruction as that freedom may produce.

I

Rarely in its 16 year history have such dire and portentous things been said about the United Nations. Our friends in the press have always enjoyed the role of Cassandra. But suddenly they have a lot of company. Only a few times in the past has there been such profound contrast between the standard expressions of hope and confidence in the United Nations, and the forebodings about the time of troubles it is facing, and the United States along with it. There were only a few times, but it is useful to remember that there were such times. It would not hurt to lengthen our historical view sufficiently to recall at least three other periods in the UN's short history when the odds all at once seemed to lengthen, and all but a few chronic - or professional - optimists joined the chorus of gloom.

One such time of trouble was the first "Morning After". 1946 was a downward slide into disillusionment, and by mid-1947 the scales had, by and large, dropped off a good many starry eyes. The attendant political pain was intense. Another time of trouble was the unnerving period during the first half of 1950. It began with the communist countries progressively leaving the UN, and culminated in a war. There followed a period in which, among other things, the Soviet
Union did its best to make an "un-person", in the Orwellian sense, of the Secretary General of the United Nations. For what historical consolation it brings, the unilateral liquidation of Mr. Lie was even more comprehensive than that of Mr. Hammarskjöld. The third time of trouble was a more subtle one, and the present one is perhaps most intelligibly seen as an extension of it.

For by the close of the 1955 General Assembly, attentive observers were discerning clear signs of the end of American hegemony and the beginning of a new political configuration in the organization. Stalin was dead for two years, the Bandung Conference had given shape in and out of the United Nations to the interests of 29 nations, and mutual nuclear deterrence was the preferred shape of strategic planning on both sides. Indeed, five years ago this month the United States Government was holding elaborate post-mortems on the general subject of "Where has American leadership in the UN vanished to?" As of 1955 it was fair to say that nothing would ever be quite the same again.

I have indulged in this backward look not because I underrate the new problems - far from it - but because they are not all precisely new. Their roots go deep into the past and, as always, the past has something to teach about the present and the future. This awareness is not necessarily reassuring. But it does mean that we are not entitled to act too surprised and shocked by the more recent unfolding of international political patterns that seem to show up so vividly in the United Nations. It also means that some of the more blatant nonsense that is now being said about the UN has been said before, and with just as little attention to fact and reality.

Having said that, certainly there is a staggering agenda of problems facing American diplomacy in the United Nations. The problem, as always, exists on all
levels from the pinnacle of broad national strategy to the trenches and redoubts where tactics win or lose the battle. What is happening in the United Nations is a problem not only for the diplomat on the ground and on the home desk, but also for the planner and strategist who has only too infrequently succeeded in integrating the United Nations sector with the rest of the national policy pattern.

Out of the multiple problems in this realm, two areas of prime concern stand out: first, the almost tropical growth in political and parliamentary influence of the Afro-Asian states; and second, the campaign by the Soviet bloc to reform the United Nations in the Moscowite image.

II

It has always been true that the United Nations diplomatic scene makes sense only when it is explicitly related to events and forces external to the organization itself. This is the familiar argument, immortalized by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, that the UN is a mirror of the world around it and that if the reflection is ugly the organization should not be blamed. I profoundly believe this to be true. But against it there has always been the complaint by some of Sir Gladwyn's fellow Europeans that the ratio between the United Nations and the outside world is far from a simple one-to-one. This view, in its most critical form, has always castigated the UN as an inciter to riot. According to its doctrine the United Nations, because of its composition and because of its inherent bias, distorts and magnifies to intolerable proportions the colonial issues. On the other hand, the arsonist argument has by no means prevailed in the United States or Scandinavia or in many other areas. It is far more commonly held that United
Nations attention and pressure, particularly in colonial relationships, is not only right but actually improves situations which, if uncontrolled, would produce even less acceptable results.

This issue is by no means a purely theoretical one. If it is true that the Afro-Asian group is using its near-majority position in the United Nations simply to stir up racial and political trouble in the Portugese colonies, and if one were confident Portugal would act with farsighted and enlightened preparations for self government, then we should reexamine our own premises. The evidence is all to the contrary, and we can only conclude that while United Nations debates may encourage unrest, the conditions for unrest were there first. It may be that without the UN, the colonial powers might have hung on a little longer in certain areas. But it is unlikely that the basic contours of the problem would be different.

The revolutionary process that has taken place in the once-imperial world to the south has left a legacy of colossal problems about how the new nations are to be brought into a durable and mutually satisfying relationship with the established order as we know it. The categories of problems involved in the transition to nationhood are familiar ones and some of them are covered elsewhere on the program. Still, the political and diplomatic effects of the process are intimately tied to the substance of the problems. Most of all, the diplomatic task is bound up with the priorities assigned by the countries directly concerned, as they - not we - view those priorities.

The countries we are speaking of all share in varying degree the qualities of being non-European, non-white, politically neutralist, and anti-colonial. I have cited the colonial problem. Many people give equal weight to the problem of gross economic disparity between rich and poor nations. Until the gap
begins to close, no stability is possible between the nations involved, or in any diplomatic forum in which they interact. Unquestionably this issue is paramount, and American diplomacy in the UN has labored for many years to offset our negative attitudes toward multilateral financing of economic development, toward more predictable international commodity prices, and toward the problems of foreign and absentee ownership of resources.

I myself give an equally high rank to the racial issue. If the behavioral sciences have anything to say about contemporary diplomacy it is undoubtedly in this realm of misunderstandings, attitudes and images, hostilities and frustrations. At root, George Kennan is right about the domestic basis for successful diplomacy. For so long as the United States tolerates racism at home, that long will all our bridges to the black, brown and yellow nations be shaky and poorly supported against stress.

The north-south revolution by its very nature poses the problems of statehood itself - of evolving political forms, of relating to regions and integrating in other ways, and again, perhaps most importantly, problems of dignity and of the pride which representatives of new nations have displayed abroad since the first American diplomatic agents refused to bend the knee to foreign potentates.

Clearly, if there were no UN these issues of substance would be the vital stuff of international politics in much of the world. Because there is a United Nations, they come together there and in their totality add up to a new political force which by its numbers and by its pivotal role in the east-west competition confronts the Western powers with perhaps its central diplomatic challenge.

The new arithmetic now comes into focus. The facts about it have become
commonplace. From 10 at the San Francisco Conference, the Afro Asian bloc has grown to 46 (and will soon increase again). From two African states south of the Sahara, there are suddenly 20. Add Cuba, and, sometimes, Mexico, and it comes to very close to a numerical majority. Add the Soviet bloc, grown from 5 to 9, plus Yugoslavia, and only 9 more are needed to make up the crucial and decisive two-thirds in the General Assembly. Another popular way to arrange the numbers is to add together all the underdeveloped countries, i.e. the Afro-Asian group plus, more or less, Latin America. Without the Soviet bloc this hypothetical majority already commands a two-thirds vote, and, with the Soviet bloc added, has a clearly commanding position.

There have been no such exact combinations — yet. But these possible combinations of voting strength furnish the concrete basis for much of the concern about the future of the Western position in the UN. Actually, the numbers can be used to support any side of the argument. In the last General Assembly some votes tended to show that the worst had finally happened — if the worst is a minority position for the United States. The neutralist call for a summit meeting carried over United States opposition, 41 to 37. The American proposal on Arab refugee relief only received 31 votes to 30 against and 15 abstaining — the first time in memory that the United States had not carried its way on that issue to which we contribute the lion’s share financially — and then we lost, 15 to 47, in the final refugee resolution with the unacceptable reference to property rights. The United States was in the minority in the vote on the Mexican proposal to discourage states from using their territories or resources to interfere in the Cuban civil war. It was in a tiny minority in a committee vote on a crucial paragraph on the Cuban resolution. And we could not carry a
proposal to finance the Congo operation even though it cut the share of the poorest countries up to 75%. The measure carried only after the reduction was made 80%.

The same Assembly session, however, can demonstrate the opposite case, who in a pluralistic world could legitimately ask for more decisive support than the US received in such votes as those: 62 to 12 to reject Soviet disarmament propaganda moves in the plenary session; 54 to 10 to require orderly rather than spectacular debates on the RB-47 incident; 53 to 24 to seat the Kasavubu delegation; 81 to 9 to approve the 1961 budget to which the communist bloc objected so vigorously; 61 to 27 for a proposal on Cuba that we could live with — far more, incidentally, than we had much right to expect under the circumstances; and 83 to 11 in a Congo resolution calling for effective measures by the Secretary General, in the midst of the Soviet attack upon him and on the office as presently constituted.

A third set of votes is interesting because of its ambiguity. Here one comes closer to the truth about the divergent interests within the Afro-Asian bloc and the growing fluidity in alignments in general, reinforcing the impression that the present may be a poor time for confident political prediction, whether optimistic or pessimistic. The Afro Asians, alone, still do not hold the parliamentary whip-hand, even though east and west seek their support. In the 41-37 vote on their summit proposal the communists were among the 17 abstainers. The Afro-Asian call for a United Nations referendum in Algeria received 40 votes in favor, 40 against — a fascinating example of the close balance between the forces involved. Time and again the bloc failed to get 2/3 or even a simple majority on such proposals as breaking relations with the Union of South Africa, giving priority to Angola, or adjourning debate on the Congo.
Of course the numbers only tell part of the story. The case for pessimism is incomplete without the slap administered to the United States by the Africans, through the Nigerian delegate, in the matter of the proposed American aid program for Africa. Opinions differ about this: was the American gesture insufficiently followed up by concrete proposals? Was the Nigerian delegate being excessively unkind to us for his own purposes? Or are all American initiatives, however sincere, to be unavailing until the storm has spent itself a good deal more? Here, the armchair strategist can only fall into the traps of insufficient knowledge and Monday morning quarter-backing.

But once again the coin has two faces. It is widely believed that in the crucially important Security Council vote in the early hours of February 21 supporting the UN operation in the Congo and authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to prevent the occurrence of civil war, the Soviet Union shifted at virtually the last minute from expected opposition to abstention. The resolution of course was sponsored by three Afro Asian states, and the episode dramatized the dilemma facing both the Soviets and ourselves. For both powers must balance their diplomatic priorities, and each periodically has to balance its books.

The private citizen can only applaud the important ways in which United States policy has recently improved its posture with respect to the new countries. I have mentioned Ambassador Stevenson's personal success. The whole country stands in his debt for so effectively sensing and acting upon American diplomacy's principal tactical deficiency in New York. But surely planners and headquarters policy makers should share credit for curing
American policy of its most schizoid defect by planting our banner decisively on the side of racial equality and rapid independence. American support for United Nations inquiries into racial disorders in Angola had a remarkable effect, at least in the short-run, on neutralist opinion. And in all fairness, we should also recognize that an important threshold was crossed even earlier when in March 1960 the United States agreed in the Security Council that South Africa's apartheid policy involved the maintenance of international peace and security and was a fit subject for council action.

III

One of the grounds for the Western pessimism about the future of the United Nations stems from growing European irritation with the "irresponsible" majorities that ride roughshod in areas that are traditionally no one else's business. General DeGaulle's extraordinarily virulent attack on the United Nations seemed to underscore increasing European disaffection. Some students of Western unity believe the United States must again face a choice between the Western alliance and the will o' the wisp of African and Asian nationalism. There are many today who will argue that the United Nations can only worsen Western relationships while holding no promise whatever of winning the ephemeral, unprofitable - even hopeless - popularity contest with the Soviets in - or out - of the UN.

This line of reasoning involves several dangerous fallacies. First of all, there is nothing new about the European problem in the United Nations. Some of our Western European allies distrusted and feared UN action, particularly on colonial matters, long before the newer nations developed their present
political strength. Both before and after Suez, United Nations majorities have run against what some European nations conceived to be their vital interests, as well as their right to privacy in colonial affairs. Without documenting the analysis (which I have made elsewhere), I believe that the final passing of the colonial issue in its present form will profoundly transform the European-UN relationship, just as it will transform European-African relations overall. The truth of this is demonstrated by the shadings among Western Europeans on this issue discernible for some years past. The spectrum began with those having least sympathy with the UN and allegedly most to lose from its intervention in colonial matters - France, Portugal and Belgium, with the added French nostalgia for lost hegemony in League days. Mid-point was Britain, where the parties were sharply divided on the United Nations-colonial issue, and Mr. Macmillan's winds of change had rather long since been measured and quietly but irrevocably yielded to. At the far end were countries such as the Netherlands - which but for the West New Guinea issue would have been planning and acting even more positively in the United Nations in such fields as economic development - and Italy, which looked across the Mediterranean in a frame of mind geared to an entirely new and clearly non-colonial era.

The end of the colonial era in Africa will not end the problems for Western diplomacy. It is predictable that they will be numerous and thorny. But the sooner that day comes, the sooner the West, the United States and the United Nations will be relieved of a crippling incubus. One predictable consequence will be the acceleration of the integrative process within Europe. This in turn could lead to a vision some Europeans already hold when they look to the future: a united Europe which once again can have a strong and
constructive voice in the international forum.

From the standpoint of American strategy, another thing needs to be said about Western alliance problems in the United Nations. The end of the colonial problem in its present form will doubtless bring Western Europe and America closer together in their policies toward other parts of the world. There will be an appreciably greater community of interests around the globe than there is today. But until that happens we cannot assume that it is possible somehow to "solve" the problem of splits between America and its allies, in and out of the UN, by applying to global issues the same coordinated strategic planning and thinking that properly underlies alliance programs in the North Atlantic area.

The NATO foreign ministers meeting at Oslo only recently registered their determination to do just this. Surely closer consultations can only be salutary. But it does not alter the central principle involved. The raison d'etre for NATO is a common interest in that area, unquestionably shared by its members. But at least at the present time there is an acute divergence of interests elsewhere, a divergence that goes a great deal deeper than lack of consultation. Common interests in the North Atlantic area simply does not mean that interests are shared everywhere else. The French make very different estimates than the American about what is at stake in Southeast Asia; the British think us childish in our China policy while we consider them naïve; the Belgians consider us unsympathetic in the Congo and we deem them unrealistically nostalgic; and the Portugese believe us to be disloyal— as well as stupid— in Angola, while America reciprocates these sentiments in equal measure.
No single solution exists, in or out of the United Nations, to the task of knitting together the western alliance. Diplomacy can lubricate the points of friction, and in the end the Atlantic community, in divesting itself of colonialism, will survive and flourish. But the task of foreign policy in the meantime is to manage a dual policy - alliance knitting, as well as sustaining an independent American policy towards areas where we feel our policies to be correct. The task of United States diplomats is made no easier by this duality. But no one ever pretended that diplomacy was easy.

How then, preferably with our European allies, if necessary without them, can we work through UN diplomacy to contain the energetic and even unmanageable forces of nationalism and social revolution sweeping across the globe and coming into high relief in the UN? The substantive answers lie beyond the scope of this paper. But the overall prescription is not a new one. If an author can be pardoned for quoting himself, there is no reason to amend words written well over three years ago:

The success of the West in gathering support from these countries has become increasingly dependent on the stands which Western nations take on issues of primary importance to the peoples of that "third world". These have not been such issues as capitalism vs. Communism, or German unification, or liberation of the satellites, but colonialism, "self-determination", economic development, and racial discrimination. Out of the present membership of (99) approximately (63) members for one reason or another see these as the crucial issues and put the United States to the test in regard to them with increasing frequency.*

That this was approvingly quoted in writing by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd persuades me that we are far from alone in this insight. Undoubtedly the United States

* "The UN and National Security", Foreign Affairs, July, 1958, p. 599 (figures updated)
could respond to the political requirements and serve its interests by greatly intensified and positive UN programs in the areas of financing economic development, technical assistance, human rights covenants, racial problems and improved formulas for rapid yet cushioned independence. It has become almost a cliché to call for such politics. But at the same time there is danger in expecting too much of them.

For there is a special, refractory quality to this problem which sometimes seems to render it impervious even to maximum efforts. The reason for this is that the problem has an inherently intractable quality to it. We may have the best will in the world — which I do not really doubt. We may even develop a purposeful strategy and detailed policies to back it up — and here we still have some distance to go in our foreign policy capability. But even so armed, all kinds of disappointment and frustrations are bound to lie ahead. It is going to take a long time to eradicate the traces of resentment, hatred, envy, bitter memory and hurt pride which almost without exception linger in the psyches of the new countries — more exactly, in their leaders. We must learn to live with this, and to concentrate in the short term, the middle term and the long term, on the promotion of enduring relationships based on common interests, shared enterprises and increasingly mature assumption of responsibilities. If we can earn any popularity contests in the process, tant mieux.

For the danger for the majority of the new countries is not that they will go communist. It is that they will not go — period. To the extent that the United nations is a place to engage them in common enterprises, to assist
them in getting up momentum, to the extent that it supplies an educating sense of involvement in the management of international business, a revealing exposure to the problems of others, and a demonstration of the differences between the styles of free countries and police states, and above all to the extent that in our own domestic arrangements we set an example (and incidentally, learn to become properly hospitable) to this extent the United Nations can be a positive factor in American strategy during the difficult period that lies ahead. To the extent we do none of these things, or do them badly, or half-heartedly, or fall into the ancient trap of letting tactics become the master of strategy instead of vice versa, to that extent our fears can be made to come true. To that extent the United Nations can be transformed into a genuine danger rather than what it is now, an opportunity to do some needful things, and a test of whether we are skillful enough to carry it off.

One of the foundation stones of American policy toward the new nations is that they need us - our know-how, our money, our ideology of freedom. But that is not the whole story. We need them quite as much, and we need them in and through the United Nations. The worse things become in the cold war, the more need there is going to be for countries that are not affiliated with either side. This is a compelling argument for keeping these countries truly neutral. Diplomatic planning requires the cultivation and availability of true neutrals who can play a multitude of roles in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in healing breaches of peace. I am well aware that this is precisely the contrary of the view being so vehemently advanced by the Soviet Union. This brings me to the other great constellation of issues - Soviet policy in the UN - which completes the triangle.
It is becoming difficult to pick up a newspaper without reading an editorial alleging that the Soviet Union is seeking to destroy the United Nations. The Soviet onslaught of 1960-61 has shaken us all. But it is not entirely accurate to say that the Russians want to smash the United Nations. It is not carping to ask for a more precise analysis of Soviet strategy, for the difference between destruction and control is a crucial one. It can be argued that the Soviet Union, on balance, is doing better in the United Nations than ever before, and estimates her prospects for political profit in and through the organization as increasingly promising. In this last session of the Assembly, according to one record keeper, the Soviets received the largest vote in history for a proposal they sponsored (29 in favor, with 53 in opposition on a proposal to convene the Congolese parliament within 21 days). Moscow has shown a renewed interest in Secretariat positions. In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Soviet interest in filling her quota considerably antedates same interest in the UN. Most recently there has been reportedly drastic improvement in the quality of the Soviet personnel detailed to Secretariat slots. The improving Soviet position in the UN suggests a more sophisticated explanation for recent Soviet moves to alter the structure of the office of Secretary General than the rather simple-minded one of blind destruction.

The present situation makes better sense when read against a broader backdrop. In essence, the Soviet Union has now applied to the UN the same principles of power and organization that Moscow has applied to all
international institutions in recent years. Beginning roughly with the flight of Sputnik I in October 1957, Soviet leadership has made no secret of its revised assessment of the world equation of power and influence. The strategic reappraisal carried with it the policy consequence that diplomatic arrangements henceforth should reflect the new equation. From that time on, the Soviets have demanded "parity" in one international setting after another, and in several important instances prior to demanding that the United Nations oust Mr. Hammarskjöld and convert the office of the Secretary General into a triumvirate representing the West, Communist bloc, and neutralists, and requiring unanimity for action.

The UN Ad Hoc Committee for Outer Space met for a year without the Soviet representative (and four others) because the composition negotiated in the fall of 1958 did not satisfy the Russians. And its successor Committee has made no headway because the principle - or rather, the successor principle - of recognizing Soviet leadership in the space field by making a Russian chairman of the proposed scientific conference has not been agreed to by the West. The deadlock on the composition of the UN Disarmament Committee was broken only by making it a committee of 99 members. Meanwhile the West had held its nose and actually agreed to the principle of parity at the Foreign Ministers meeting in the summer of 1959. Consequently the ten nation Committee on disarmament that met in Geneva in the spring of 1960, vainly as it turned out, reflected a formula of five and five - a far cry from the three to one and four to one negotiations among the foreign ministers since the war, and the four to one United Nations disarmament subcommittee of the 1950s. Now the Russians have asked for a five-five-five ratio, and one can guess that a
compromise will be negotiated.

So the parity principle has been faithfully reflected in Soviet policy for several years now, since the time when it was discovered that, as the Chinese Communists were fond of putting it, "the wind is blowing from the east rather than from the west". But like so many trends, it took something special to dramatize it. The Congo supplied the requisite drama as well as the conclusive reason for the Soviets to demand the extension of the principle of parity to the office of the Secretary General. The Secretary General had since 1955 been virtually an independent diplomatic power in the Middle East. That process accelerated during and after the Suez crisis when the United States, for one, was delighted to believe that important elements of policy could be left to Mr. Hammarskjöld. And perhaps the straw that broke the Marxist back was not the Congo but Laos in its earlier international incarnation, i.e. in 1959 when the Secretary General followed up the Security Council subcommittee by himself sending and keeping on the scene a presence in the form of successive high-ranking Secretariat officials.

By the interior logic of Soviet doctrine, as the Secretary General became more and more of a political force in world politics in recent years it was thus inevitable that the institution his office represented would require revision to reflect the "realities" of world power. The matter then reached a head in the Congo, where the Russians found they could no longer tolerate the position of independent strength reached by Mr. Hammarskjöld, enabling him for the first time actually to thwart an important Soviet Union policy objective. The death of Lumumba supplied the trigger, and a policy
which undoubtedly reached deeply into ideological depths was announced.

There is, of course, nothing remotely new in Mr. Khrushchev's recent assertion to Walter Lippmann that, while there may be neutral countries, there are no neutral men, and that he would never entrust the security of the Soviet Union to any foreigner.* Maxim Litvinov used to say that only an angel could be neutral and there were no angels. That the security of Russia, whether Soviet or Communist, should be placed in the hands of someone else has always been unthinkable. The historical background thus places in a rather more complex light the assertion that the Russians want to destroy the UN. It also gives a more sophisticated meaning to Mr. Khrushchev's more recent statement that for the United Nations to be an effective medium for settling international disputes, "treatment with very good medicine" must be undergone so that it would not become a "weapon for imposing the will of one state over another".** Finally, it means that American diplomacy faces the task of a battle for control, which in many ways is harder than a defense of the United Nations against its outright destruction.

The Soviets have never pretended to achieve all their objectives at once. In the years when the votes were 55 to 5 - a situation Americans would have enormous difficulty in adjusting to under reversed circumstances - Soviet representatives managed to rationalize their defeats into victories, or at the very least publicly pretended that it did not matter. In more recent years

* New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1961

departing Soviet representatives have tended to be downright euphoric. If the campaign to convert the Secretarist does not succeed this year, next year will do, or the next. Thus speaks a state with a plan, and in the state of mind that Edmund Wilson once described as that of a man going upstairs on an escalator.

The parliamentary ability of the United States to block the Soviet's crude attempt to dump Mr. Hammarskjold and substitute a three-headed monster is not really in doubt. What is truly disturbing is the implication of this campaign for situations in desperate need of nonpartisanship. It is indeed discouraging that the Soviet doctrine of partisanship should become so emphatic at a time when the world increasingly needs third parties in the form of neutrals who can interpose themselves between belligerents, and men who can be trusted by both sides. This development is going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the recent development of patterns of third-party interventions in issues depending on Soviet assent or cooperation. Undoubtedly much thought is going into ways of living with this damaging and disheartening situation.

It is possible, even likely, that compromise plans and arrangements will be suggested, possibly as a follow-up to Mr. Nehru's abortive suggestions last fall. It is possible that some formula for a cabinet-type system, or for elected deputies (reviving an earlier Dumbarton Oaks proposal) or for magnified advisory committees, etc., will be adopted and prove tolerable. Essentially reciprocal inspection, with perhaps some neutral nation participation, may be the pattern for such limited arms control agreements as
can be reached in the near future (which incidentally gives great urgency to the need for rapid technological advance in robot sensing and monitoring devices and systems). The nations themselves may have to revert to a more active role in the investigation and observation of disputes and situation, as under the League of Nations and indeed in the UN under the Lie administration.

But even with the greatest attempt to be reasonable and to acknowledge in symbolic ways the changing realities of the international power order, the underlying principle that is at stake cannot be compromised. Part of the ethical and intellectual tradition of the West is that men can be impartial and fair-minded, even as between nations. Such edifices of international jurisprudence as have been built attest to that conviction. We must, I believe, stand absolutely firm on our refusal to submit to Khrushchev's dictum that there are no neutral men. His assertion that this is true should not be accepted any more than the late Mr. Dulles' equally unhelpful dictum that neutralism was immoral. So long as parliamentary power still lies with us and not with the Russians on precisely this sort of issue, we should guard zealously our stewardship of this one precious advance out of the jungle in international relations, and actively nurture it at every opportunity in places that do not require Soviet assent.

V

There are many other facets of the diplomatic problem in the United Nations that one might discuss if there were time and space. A word might particularly be said about the ability - or inability - of the United Nations as a site
for summit meetings. The performance in the early part of last fall was superficially a tribute to the drawing power of unilaterial diplomacy. But the spectacle of ten heads of state - including one king - thirteen prime ministers, fifty seven foreign ministers, and some other fourteen cabinet ministers of other rank - all present and competing for public attention, holds obvious dangers for the United Nations, and for the kind of accomodations between nations which, when one really gets down to it, is the goal of diplomacy and the road to easement of international tension. I happen to believe that the United Nations can be useful for summit diplomacy, if it is conducted seriously, out of the public gaze, as in fact some of it was conducted this fall in New York. The Security Council under Article 28 can hold periodic meetings with high governmental figures present and can under its rules hold closed sessions. Such a procedure can be invaluable when bilateral channels break down and yet it is important to keep decision makers in touch with one another. But the danger of using the 99 member Assembly for this delicate task is obvious.

VI

There is nothing easy about America's diplomatic task in the United Nations today. If we used to be, as Dean Rusk liked to put it, the fat boy in the canoe, we have slimmed down considerably. Power has become diffused and is likely to become more so. But the metaphor can be varied. To the extent that political corpulence means satisfaction with the status quo, our ultimate objective should be fat Russians, and eventually, fat Chinese. But
the road is a long one and so far they both wear, like Cassius, a lean and hungry look. We can take some comfort from their disparate rate of maturity and from their growing inner tension. One can take more than a little satisfaction from the Soviet doctrine enunciated by Mr. Khrushchev on January 6 of this year that seems to rule out military solutions in the form of what he called thermonuclear and limited wars.

But there is a large joker in the deck of peaceful coexistence, for the same doctrine enthusiastically endorses communist manipulation of wars of national liberation. For the United Nations this can only spell a continuous budget of ambiguous, muddled, and otherwise sticky situations of civil war, indirect aggression, guerrilla war, subversion and the like, all capable of escalating into larger conflicts, and the treatment of which will require the highest order of diplomatic skill whether bilaterally, regionally, or through the United Nations.

The United States had the best of both worlds for a while. It enjoyed the virtuous sense that world order was in process, however slowly, along with the comfortable conviction that it would be pretty much all our way, except for a small handful of outlaws. Things are no longer so simple. Above all, we cannot be sure whether the presently ominous portents and trends in the United Nations scene represent a cycle - like so much else in history - or a spiral, taking us to wholly new and unpredictable diplomatic, military, and institutional places. For what comfort it brings, things have actually been worse before, and everything is subject to change, including programs to impose one system on everyone else. The game is by no means over yet.