JOURNALISTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE

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Foreword

This study by Dr. Lu-tao Sophia Wang is one of a series which examines the development of professions as a key to understanding the different patterns in the modernization of Asia.

In recent years there has been much glib talk about "technology transfers" to the Third World, as though knowledge and skills could be easily packaged and delivered. Profound historical processes were thus made analogous to shopping expeditions for selecting the "appropriate technology" for the country's resources. The MIT Center for International Studies's project on the Modernization of Asia is premised on a different sociology of knowledge. Our assumption is that the knowledge and skills inherent in the modernization processes take on meaningful historical significance only in the context of the emergence of recognizable professions, which are communities of people that share specialized knowledge and skills and seek to uphold standards.

It would seem that much that is distinctive in the various ways in which the different Asian societies have modernized can be found by seeking answers to such questions as: Which were the earlier professions to be established, and which ones came later? What were the political, social and economic consequences of different sequences in the emergence of professions? How well did the professions maintain standards, and how appropriate were the barriers of exclusion? What is the effect on recruitment of the political elite and on their style of politics for specific professions to have high status and others low status? How does it happen that emphasis upon the same professions for achieving the same objectives in modernization can have dramatically
different consequences in different societies? (For example, in both Japan and India the legal profession was encouraged early in order to produce government officials, yet India became a litigious society but Japan did not.)

Other planned studies in the series include the experience of Japan, China, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia. The project has been made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. It will also include a general book on Asia's modernization by the project's director.

Lucian W. Pye
The purpose of the paper is to study of the emergence of the journalistic profession in modern China (1902-1937) and its implications in the transformation of Chinese political culture. Specifically, it will examine the formation of objective reporting as a professional model in modern Chinese journalism and its impact upon interest articulation in politics.

Objective reporting, as a professional model in the journalistic profession, first emerged in the commercial revolution in American journalism in the 1830s. With the rise of the penny press, journalists now believed that news, rather than opinions, should be the main content of newspapers. (1) The invention of news also implied the formulation of two new concepts in journalism. The first was the idea of objective reporting. The second was the liberal pluralistic idea of interest articulation, that is, a recognition that the primary function of newspapers was to be a medium for the people to
articulate their own self-interest and specific interest. (2) These two new ideas reflected the general trend toward democratization in politics and the rise of market economy in American society. To social scientists, the concomitance of these two new values nevertheless poses an interesting question as to whether there is indeed a causal connection between cognitive objectivity and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation. Can we, for example, expect that the rise of objective reporting in journalism promotes the liberal pluralistic interest articulation in other societies?

The answer is not readily available in the current study of modern Chinese journalism, because, while most studies of modern Chinese journalism aptly depicted a clear rise of objective reporting in the first thirty years of the twentieth century, few of them discussed its impact upon interest articulation in modern China. (3)

The idea of objective reporting was first introduced to China by Western businessmen around the middle of the nineteenth century, but, up to the 1911 Revolution, Chinese elite journalists had much more interest in political mobilization than in objective reporting. For example, Liang Qichao, so called the founding father of modern Chinese journalism, approved twists of facts in his advocacy of a technique of "frightening" (hai shu) in journalism. However, after the 1911 Revolution, objective reporting gradually became an important model in the journalistic profession. Mainly because of his
skills of objective reporting, Huang Yuanyong emerged as the most important journalist in Beijing in the first five years of the Republic. By the mid-twenties, the ideal of objective reporting was already well accepted in urban China. Shen bao and Xin wen bao, both the largest commercial newspapers advocating objective reporting, had a circulation of 150,000, seven times over the circulation of the most important partisan press. Da gong bao, often treated as "the New York Times in China", also had a circulation over 100,000 in the mid-thirties.

The success of the commercial press was often attributed to its catering of commercial interest. However, we practically know nothing about whether a liberal pluralistic ideology for interest articulation was in fact formed in the commercial press. There were even some evidences that commercial journalists were negative to the expression of self-interest or special interest in journalism. Chen Leng, the editor-in-chief of Shen bao, for example, was a famous Taoist who believed in "non-action". Both Li Haoran, the editor-in-chief of Xin wen bao, and Zhang Jiluan, the editor-in-chief of Da gong bao, were professed Confucianists who upheld the denial of self-interest as the most important virtue in social life. Hence, there seems to be no definitive relationship between objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in modern Chinese journalism.

It then becomes interesting to examine the roles of these two
values in Chinese political culture in general for an explanation. It was found that, in contrast to the popular view that objectivity was not valued in traditional Chinese culture, the issue of subjectivity versus objectivity was in fact not clearly settled in Confucianism, the dominant ideology in traditional Chinese culture. For example, in the Song dynasty, there was a utilitarian school in Confucianism (gong li pai) which advocated political realism to improve the material well-being of the people. The school was attacked by Neo-Confucianists who, while believing in human inborn altruistic nature, emphasized moral cultivation through the cultivation of subjective willpower as the most urgent task in politics. (4) In the late Song and Ming dynasties, the utilitarian thought was subdued due to the supremacy of Neo-Confucianism, but it re-emerged in the Qing dynasty in a pragmatic school in Confucianism which was similar to John Dewey’s pragmatism in several important aspects. (5) Moreover, even within Neo-Confucianism, which was generally known as a moral philosophy, a controversy developed as to the relative importance of objective learning (xue) and subjective speculation (si) as a method of moral cultivation. (6) In the Qing dynasty, objective learning was further developed into a school of textual criticism, in which objective concepts and methods, such as those to differentiate "facts" from "opinions", or "theory" from "hypothesis", were explicitly delineated. (7) With these concepts and methods in textual research, a few scholars in the school also began to question the validity of Neo-Confucian subjective approach to moral
cultivation and politics. Hence, although subjective willpower was heavily emphasized in Confucian moral philosophy, the value of objectivity was not at all overlooked.

However, in all these objective schools where objectivity was valued one way or another, the pursuit of or the competition between self-interests and special interests in politics was never legitimate. (8) For example, Dai Zhen, a leading scholar in pragmatic Confucianism and textual criticism in the Qing dynasty, attacked Neo-Confucianists' subjective approach to moral cultivation, but, like Neo-Confucianists, Dai also repudiated the pursuit of self-interest. Why was the denial of self-interest so resistable to changes despite the development of cognitive objectivity? Moreover, are these patterns precedents of the lack of causal connection between objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in modern Chinese journalism?

To answer the question, communications scholars have an interesting theory that, in cultural changes, values are not changed at the same rate. Ithiel de Sola Pool, for example, proposed that values in a specific culture be classified according to their different degrees of rigidity and saliency. Lightly held values can be changed easily, but not deeply entrenched ones. (9) Hence, if, in traditional Chinese culture, subjective moral cultivation was a lightly-held value and the denial of self-interest was a deeply entrenched value, then it would not be very difficult for modern Chinese journalists to
adopt the professional model of objective reporting, but it would be quite unlikely that the adoption of the model would automatically promote the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in politics.

The journalistic profession in China during the first three and half decades of the twentieth century seems most appropriate for a study of the relationship between objective reporting and interest articulation. First of all, this was the only period when a neutral and non-partisan press existed and influenced Chinese politics. Secondly, journalists, by the nature of their profession, had to address to the questions of objectivity and interest articulation explicitly. Thirdly, the elite during this period received classical as well as modern education, and thus provided us with an excellent opportunity to compare the influences of the traditional culture and the Western impact. Fourthly, the profession during this period had a great influence on contemporary Chinese elites. The young Mao Zedong, for example, read Liang Qichao’s New Citizen and Chen Duxiu’s New Youth, and confessed their influences on his own political ideology. A study of the profession during this period undoubtedly will further our understanding of objective reporting and the form of interest articulation in contemporary Chinese culture.

There were also disadvantages. The most important one was that, during this period, journalism was not yet a full-fledged profession. Thus, in contrast to professional journalists in
modern countries, many journalists in this period were either part-time or amateurish. Liang Qichao, the founding father of the political press in China, for example, was more of a thinker or a politician than a journalist. Chen Duxiu had a tremendous influence on public opinion during this period through *New Youth*, but he was also more of a thinker or a politician than a journalist. So did Hu Shi who was recognized primarily as a historian and a diplomat. However, since our interest was not only the profession itself, but also cultural transformation, the underdevelopment of the profession offered an excellent opportunity to compare traditional and modern values in their purest forms. It should also be emphasized that I did not intend to study the whole complex issue of China versus the West in the lives of Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu, or Hu Shi, each of whom could be the subject of a book. (10) What I attempted to do was to focus on one aspect of their activities, namely, their involvement in journalism.

In order to set up a base-line of comparison, I shall first discuss the correlation between objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in the light of the sociological analysis of modern professions. The research on the journalistic profession itself consists of three parts. The first part is a historical analysis of the profession. It will trace the origins of Chinese press in the twentieth century back to the traditional newspapers in the eleventh century, and to the modern newspapers launched by Western missionaries and businessmen in China in the nineteenth
century. Then the value of objective reporting in the ideologies of elite journalists will be examined. It was found that modern Chinese journalists could be categorized into three types: subjective advocates, objective advocates and objective reporters. Subjective advocates were journalists who, in order to mobilize support for their political causes, so greatly emphasized the potentiality of emotions and willpower to conquer reality that they did not hesitate to twist or fabricate facts. Objective advocates were journalists who fought for their political causes in journalism and who believed that objective reporting was the most effective means to promote their causes. Objective reporters were those who believed in objective reporting but avoided political participation. Chinese and Western symbols for objectivity, willpower and emotions will also be analyzed to examine how Chinese and Western cultures influenced their styles.

Lastly, I will analyze Chinese and Western symbols for interest articulation used by elite journalists to examine whether the professional model of objective reporting promoted the liberal pluralistic idea of interest articulation.

I shall demonstrate that objective reporting did not promote liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in modern China, because objective reporting as a professional model in modern Chinese journalism was influenced more by Chinese cultural tradition than by the impact from the West. For subjective advocates, the strongest influence came from the
subjective moral approach in the Confucian tradition, whereas the origin of objective advocates and objective reporters could be traced to both utilitarian schools and the school of textual criticism in Confucianism. The influence of Western culture was only secondary. Hence, although objective reporter and objective advocates advocated objectivity, neither of them objectively evaluated the Confucian moral imperative that the search of or the competition between self-interests and special interests in politics was immoral. Politics, thus, remained fundamentally a process of moralization.

The findings are particularly valuable for our understanding of contemporary Chinese political culture. They indicate that, although pragmatists are always capable of correcting the excesses of moral and subjective approach in politics with realism, it is extremely difficult for them to apply objective methods to questions involving self-interests and special interests. Hence, it is unlikely that the limited objectivity in contemporary Chinese culture will promote the liberal pluralistic form of interest articulation until such questions are evaluated objectively.
Some observations on objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in the light of the sociological analysis of modern professions

One way to explain the concomitance of objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in American journalism is to treat both values as two components of secularization in modern culture, that is, a process in which men become increasingly rational, analytical and empirical in their actions. (11) Objective reporting, in its emphasis upon objective facts, involves secularization in cognition. The liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation, in its recognition of the value of pluralism and its belief in rational actions in coordinating different self-interests and special interests, is basically secularization in the normative dimension. From this point of view, objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation are in fact two basic values of modern culture.

However, under the influences of traditional value systems, the processes of secularization are never simple and straightforward. For example, even within the sociological studies of the values of modern professions where the cognitive attribute of a modern profession, that is, the rational, analytical and empirical attitude in solving cognitive problems, is widely recognized, it is not at all clear what is
exactly the normative attribute of modern professions. The underdevelopment of the sociological literature in this aspect was partly due to the discrepancy between the classical assumption that altruism was the norm of modern professions and empirical evidences that altruism was by no means the dominating norm of modern professions. In this section, I will review both theoretical and empirical studies of modern profession to explain that the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation is in fact the normative attribute of modern professions.

A profession, as defined in Western classical sociology, is an occupation with several distinct attributes. It is a full-time occupation requiring esoteric but useful knowledge and skills. It serves the interest of the community rather than the self-interest of the profession. It has a professional association to enforce a code of ethics and to promote the profession. It enjoys autonomy in practice. The greatest enemies of professions are market-orientation and bureaucratization. (12)

Among the numerous attributes of a profession, it was generally agreed that two of them were the most important. The first was cognitive rationality, namely, professions claimed technical competence to perform specific functions. The second was the ethical norm of altruism, namely professions adhered to the service ideal of which the main objective was the welfare of the clients rather than the self-interest of the professional.
These two attributes were thought closely related because both were believed to be results of the division of labor in a modern society. According to Emile Durkheim, for example, the division of labor was accompanied by organization of occupational groups in which individuals were motivated to subordinate the self to the general interest:

"Once the group is formed, a moral life appears naturally...... For it is impossible for men to live together, associating in industry, without acquiring a sentiment of the whole..., without attaching themselves to that whole, preoccupying themselves with its interest, and taking account of it in their conduct." (13)

In another word, Durkheim believed that a professional was altruistic to his clients, because he felt that it was a moral obligation toward his fellow professionals. Thus, he willingly followed the code of ethics to serve the clients so that the whole community would not be damaged.

However, Durkheim's assumption about professional's altruism was not sustained by empirical studies. For example, in comparing businessmen's and professionals' motivations, Talcott Parsons failed to see that businessmen were more selfish than professionals as individuals. (14) In a survey of three professions, Harold Wilensky found that technical competence correlated negatively with careerism, but the correlation was not very strong. He thus suggested that, careerism, a form of professionals' self-interest, was not incompatible with technical competence. (15) In a survey of altruism and expertise in journalism, Swen Windahl also found that altruism
and expertise were actually two independent dimensions. That is to say, expertise in journalism did not keep people away from looking for security and advancement in this field. (16)

Other studies on professions even indicated that the concern of self-interest, rather than altruism, was actually the norm. In a survey of eleven occupations, Richard Hall found that the more professionalized an occupation was in terms of technical competence, the less altruistic it became. For example, compared to nurses, physicians' devotion to public service ranked very low. (17)

As the positive correlation between cognitive rationality and altruism was not sustained by empirical research, some sociologists began to argue for a negative correlation. In a historical study of professions, Magali Sarfatti-Larsons proposed that altruism had already been replaced by the concern of self-interest as the ethical norm of modern professionalism. (18) She argued that, in the great transformation of the market economy in the nineteenth century, professions were also transformed. In the market economy, professions were organized to monopolize knowledge and skills to control the market of their products. The service ideal was only a traditional residue at their convenience to elicit and guarantee buyers' preferences and trust.

Sarfatti-Larsons' radical interpretation revolutionized the Western interpretation of professional norms, but it was not
sustained by empirical data either. Previously, I mentioned Wilensky’s and Windahl’s studies which proposed that the cognitive and normative dimensions were not interdependent. Although Hall’s study provided some data for the argument that the more professionalized an occupation was in terms of technical competence, the less altruistic it became, other studies suggested that the result was more likely an artifact of the complexity of physicians’ functions in a modern hospital than a real description of their motivations. For example, in a study of physicians in a modern teaching hospital, Rue Bucher found that physicians had at least three different functions, patient care, research and teaching. (19) Since those who devoted to research and teaching might not have specific clients, they might appear less oriented to public service.

Bucher’s study is also interesting from another point of view. He suggested that, rather than a homogeneous community, the medical profession was in fact a composite of various segments with different values and interests. For example, doctors who devoted to scientific research often ran into conflicts with doctors who were more interested in teaching. These two then competed with doctors who believed that their prime responsibility was to cure diseases. Thus, decision-making in a modern hospital was a complicated process in which competitions, bargainings and compromises among different segments were very common phenomena.

Bucher’s findings were supported by numerous studies on the.
journalistic profession which had long been divided by conflicting values. In a sociological study, Morris Janowitz found that the profession was divided by two professional types: the gatekeeper, who believed that his prime responsibility was to report news objectively, and the advocate, who believed that journalists should devote himself to direct participation in social reforms. (20) In a study of newsgathering in Washington under the Kennedy Administration, Dan Nimmo discovered that most journalists indeed split between gatekeepers and advocates (both 29%), while the rest were moderates in both ways. (21) Nimmo’s results were almost duplicated in the seventies. John Johnstone surveyed 1300 American journalists and found that the profession was divided into three types, the neutral (34.9%), the participant (29.9%) and the moderate (35.4%). (22)

Then, what is exactly the normative attribute of a modern profession? I believe that Max Weber’s discussion of modern associations offered an inspiring clue to solve the question. To Weber, modern professions were products of Puritans’ attempts to conquer the world so as to prove their salvations in the world beyond. (23) As a consequence, a modern professional association was indeed qualitatively different from a "community", for, while communual relationship was based upon affectual or traditional types of social actions, modern associations were characterized by an "objectification" of human relations with rationality. Thus, Weber clearly repudiated Durkheim’s theory that professionals would be

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"naturally" motivated to commit themselves to the collective goals of the professional community.

However, Weber did not object that some professionals might be motivated by altruistic consideration. He said;

"A social relationship will be called "associative" if and insofar as the orientation of social actions within it rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency. It is especially common...for the associative type of relationship to rest on a rational agreement of mutual consent. In that case, the corresponding action is...oriented to a value-rational belief in one's own obligation, or to a rational expectation that the other party will live up to it." (24)

Hence, Weber believed that modern professional associations actually split into two segments with regard to altruism. While one segment believed in altruism as an absolute value, the other treated altruism as an instrumental value to better one's self-interest. It allowed both segments because the core element of a modern association was not the absolute value or the instrumental value of altruism, but a mutual consent from both parties to the importance of pluralism and that of rational actions in coordinating different values and interests.

With the proper understanding of the cognitive and normative attribute of a modern profession, I shall proceed to discuss the development of modern Chinese journalism. I shall seek to demonstrate that, despite the dominance of the model of subjective advocacy in modern Chinese journalism, objective
reporting emerged as an important professional model and played an important role in Chinese politics in the first three and half decades of the twentieth century.
The development of modern Chinese press

Because of the invention of printing techniques, newspapers had been an important social institution in imperial China since as early as the eleventh century. However, as a tool of governmental control, newspapers in traditional China were never extensively used to transmit information among the people. The modern Chinese press was started by Western missionaries and businessmen in the early nineteenth century. Chinese intellectuals entered the business in the mid-nineteenth century. Subsequently, Chinese press were divided into two distinctive types, the political press and the commercial press. (25) Generally speaking, the political press often ignored the principle of objective reporting in its political advocacy. In contrast, commercial press emphasized objective reporting because news was treated as a commodity. The division continued up to 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party took over China and confiscated all commercial newspapers.

Besides these two types, a third type of modern press was also developed in the early twentieth century by a few exceptional journalists who successfully achieved a balance between the journalistic responsibilities for political mobilization and that for objective reporting. For convenience's sake, the third type of modern press will be named the independent press.

Newspapers (bao) as an institution or a technology, are not new in Chinese culture. (26) As early as the second century,
"metropolitan gazettes" (di bao), a form of private correspondence concerning court activities, were sent from provincial agents in the capital to their superiors in remote areas. In the Tang dynasty, the Bureau of Official Reports (jin zou yuan) was established in the imperial bureaucracy to handle documents from and to the provincials. After printing was invented in the Song dynasty, metropolitan gazettes (jing bao) were printed periodically to be circulated among officials. About the same time, underground newspapers (xiao bao), containing reprints and other unofficial news leaked from the bureau, proliferated. In 1160 A.D., underground newspapers became so annoying to the government that an official pleaded for their suppression. (27) Subsequently, press regulations banning the spreading of government secrets, rumors and obscene literature were found in the criminal codes as well as many other imperial proclamations. Nevertheless, as underground newspapers never disappeared totally, the Ming and Qing dynasties had to authorize provincial and private printing houses to reprint official gazettes in order to counter the underground press.

The official gazettes contained daily accounts of emperors' activities, edicts concerning promotions and demotions in the bureaucracy, imperial proclamations, etc. Being more a tool of authoritarian control than that of political communications, they had nothing to do with the system of "moral criticism" (jian) in the bureaucracy or "public opinion" in the country. Neither were censors known to use any form of mass media to
promote their causes. Gu Xiancheng, the leader of the Donglin faction in the sixteenth century, for example, used personal correspondences to contact his followers across the country. Thus, the total circulation of official gazettes and commercial underground newspapers was probably very small. The exact figures are not known, but it would be reasonable to estimate that they were about the same as the total number of appointed official-gentry, that is, about 0.04% of the total population in the mid-nineteenth century. (28) That would make them about half of the circulation of the modern press in 1908, and 5.3% of the circulation of daily newspapers in 1936. (29)

The first modern Chinese journal, Chinese Monthly Magazine, (Cha-shi-su mei yue tong ji zhuan) was founded in Malaysia by British missionaries in 1815. (30) Its main purpose was to preach Christianity among Chinese. At its final suspension in 1821, the circulation of Chinese Monthly Magazine barely reached 1,000.

From 1815 to 1895, about 40 Chinese and 160 foreign-languaged journals were founded. (31) The most important one was the Chinese Globe Magazine (Wan guo gong bao), established by the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese. (32) Its sponsors included the most important foreign missionaries, diplomats, and other influentials, such as Robert Hart, Allen Young and Timothy Richard. From 1868 to its suspension in 1907, Wan guo gong bao published over 1000 issues, over 369 million pages in total.
Since the periodical was aimed at spreading general knowledge about the West rather than religious preaching, it gradually won a large number of readers among the Chinese elite. Its circulation reached 5,000 in 1897. In the 1898 reform, Emperor Guangxu ordered a complete reprinting of Wan guo gong bao to improve his knowledge of the West. In 1903, it became the most popular periodical in China with a circulation of 54,349.

Chinese entered the newspaper business in 1858. Dr. Wu Tingfang, later the first Chinese ambassador to Washington, founded Zhong wai xin bao, a commercial newspaper in Hong Kong, with a set of Chinese types rented from China Mail, an English paper in Hong Kong. (33) Zhong wai xin bao used the printing facilities of China Mail, and in exchange the owners of China Mail obtained the right to put advertisements in Zhong wai xin bao for free. The first edition of Zhong wai xin bao contained only one single sheet of 15,000 Chinese characters. News had one third of the space, while the rest was all advertisements. Usually it did not run editorials. When it did, parables were used to avoid direct criticism.

Other famous early Chinese newspapers included Hua zi ri bao (1864, Hong Kong), Hui bao (1874, Shanghai), and Xin bao (1876, Shanghai). All of them were commercial. Xin bao, established by merchants in Shanghai, expressed the purpose clearly in its opening editorial:

"In trade, the most valuable thing is communication. Our newspaper will publish everything concerning trade such as
national policies, military news, customs, prices and the
timetables of ship transportations....... In Shanghai, people
speak all kinds of dialects. Trade is inhibited by the
difficulty in oral communications. However, if they read our
newspaper, they will know when and what commodities will be
sold, so that they can go there and examine them......." (34)

It also had an advertisement to sell ads in the paper:

"In order to promote sales, many shopowners spend a lot of
money to print leaflets to be posted on the wall. However,
they are easily destroyed by the wind, the rain or people who
have nothing else to do..... It is better if you summarize your
points to be printed in our newspaper. It costs little, but it
can be transmitted very easily....." (35)

The most important Chinese commercial newspapers were Shen bao
and Xin wen bao, both in Shanghai. Shen bao was founded in
1873 by Ernest Major, a British tea merchant. It was sold to
its Chinese comprador at the beginnig of the twentieth century,
and then to a group of Chinese entrepreneurs in Jiangsu after
the 1911 Revolution. In the late teens, Shi Liangcai bought
Shen bao and, in the twenties and thirties, made it the largest
newspaper enterprise in China. (36) Shi also founded many
satellite businesses, such as the famous Shen bao annals, Shen
bao monthlies, Shen bao mobile libraries, and Shen bao work and
study groups. In 1929, he bought 60% of Xin wen bao's stock.
In 1933, Shi was elected the speaker of the Shanghai Assembly.
However, in November 1934, his career ended abruptly when he
was assassinated by five masked men. The murderers were never
cought, but it was generally believed that Shi was murdered by
the secret police of the Nationalist Party who became
suspicious of his intentions. (37) Shen bao continued to be
published under the management of Shi’s family. It once became
the organ of the puppet government in Nanking during the
Sino-Japanese War. After the war, the paper was returned to
Shi’s family, but was managed by Pan Gongbi, a Nationalist
journalist. Shenbao was confiscated by the Communist regime
in 1949.

Xinwenbao was established by a British merchant in 1891, and
was sold to J. C. Ferguson, the president of the Nanyang School
of Technology in Shanghai. Ferguson hired Wang Hanxi, a
Chinese comprador in the school, to manage the paper. Thanks
to Wang’s talent in promoting circulation and ad sales, Xinwen
bao beat Shenbao in circulation around the turn of the
century. (38) In 1929, Shi Liangcai, the owner of Shenbao,
bought 60% of Xinwenbao’s stock for 700,000 dollars. However,
since the government was appalled at Shi’s ambition of
a newspaper trust, the employees’ union of Xinwenbao managed
to maintain control of the newspaper up to 1937. After the
Sino-Japanese war, Shi’s family regained the ownership of Xin
wenbao which was under the management of a Nationalist
journalist. (39) Xinwenbao was also confiscated by the
Communist government in 1949.

Both Shenbao and Xinwenbao regarded their prime
responsibility to be to cover the news comprehensively and
accurately. In the first editorial, Shenbao stated clearly
that it was aimed at comprehensive coverage of everything
important in China. (40) In 1874, Earnest Major, the owner of
Shen bao, went to Taiwan to cover the story about natives' murders of Japanese. It was probably the first trip that reporters from the Chinese press ever made to cover a news story. In 1881, when Shanghai and Tianjin were first connected with a telegraph line, Shen bao also published the first news ever transmitted through telegraphy in China. In 1912, Shen bao built the first national network of news correspondents in China. Xin wen bao established its own radio facilities in 1922 to receive foreign and domestic news. In 1929, Xin wen bao began to rear carrier pigeons. In 1932, it sent eighty pigeons to transmit news concerning the Japanese attack of Shanghai. In the twenties and thirties, both Shen bao and Xin wen bao each day put out 20 to 30 pages of which about 8 to 10 pages were devoted to news.

Both newspapers were also the best-sellers in China, with sales of 150 thousand in the thirties. About 60% of Shen bao and 45% of Xin wen bao were sold outside the Shanghai metropolitan area. The growth of Shen bao under Shi Liangcai was especially impressive. In 1873, the first issue of Shen bao sold only 600 copies. It increased to about 5000 in the eighties and stayed there up to the 1911 Revolution. After it was sold to Shi Liangcai in the late teens, the circulation grew rapidly. It reached fifty thousand in 1922, a hundred thousand in 1925, and a hundred and fifty thousand in 1926. Xin wen bao sold only 300 copies for the first two years. In 1912, its daily circulation reached about 20,000, almost three times that of Shen bao. It grew to fifty thousand in 1921, over a hundred
thousand in 1924, over a hundred fifty thousand in 1928, and stayed there up to the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937. (44) In the mid-thirties, the total circulation of Chinese daily newspapers was about 3 million, among which, one in ten was either Shen bao or Xin wen bao.

Chinese intellectuals were nevertheless extremely critical of the commercial press because of its catering to commercial interest. Lin Yutang, for example, criticized Shen bao's irresponsibility to its readers because it only filled news into the broken spaces left over from its advertisements. (45) Ge Gongzhen also complained that 80% of the advertisements were for imported goods. (46) It is, however, hard to deny that, with papers were economically successful, they were able to maintain non-partisan positions throughout most of their lifetimes. The initial value of Shen bao estate was about 1600 taels of gold. In 1912, it increased to 120,000 dollars. In 1918, it built a new five-story building containing over one hundred rooms to accomodate new facilities and employees. In 1929, another five-story building was completed. In the thirties, its annual net profit reached 600,000 dollars. It had three new American-made printers which could print over one hundred thousand copies within two hours. (47) The early financial data for Xin wen bao has not been found, but it is well-known that, as early as 1909, Xin wen bao built its own new five-story building, and that in the late twenties, it was sold to Shi Liangcai for 700,000 dollars. (48)
The prosperity of major commercial newspapers in Shanghai also guaranteed above-average salaries for their employees. According to Ge Gongzhen, an editor of Shi bao in the mid-twenties, the monthly salaries of journalists working for large newspapers in Shanghai were as follows (49):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>position</th>
<th>range of monthly salary (in silver dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>manager</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>editor-in-chief</td>
<td>150-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>editor</td>
<td>80-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>special correspondent</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local correspondent</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>translator</td>
<td>50-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>photographer</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proofreader</td>
<td>20</td>
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The significance of these figures can be seen from a national survey of middle-school teachers’ salaries in 1924, which showed that the average teacher earned about 60 dollars, sufficient to maintain himself and a family of five. (50)
The first Chinese political newspaper is Xun huan ri bao, established by Wang Tao in Hong Kong in 1874. (51) Wang once worked as a sculptor for a missionary publishing house in Shanghai. Sympathetic to the Taiping Rebellion, he frequently corresponded with the Taiping leaders. After the rebellion failed, Wang fled to Hong Kong. In 1874, he founded the daily to propagate political reforms. The most important content of the paper was Wang’s editorial on its front page. The newspaper also published a large number of editorials written by Zheng Guanyin, another reform-minded comprador in Hong Kong. Both Wang and Zheng had considerable influence on reformists and revolutionaries in the twentieth century. Mao Zedong was said to read, with tremendous admiration, Zheng’s editorials at midnight to avoid his father’s attention. (52) In 1895, Sun Yat-sen also met with Wang to discuss his memorial to Li Hongzhang. (53)

The reform movement at the end of the nineteenth century politicized Chinese newspapers. From 1895 to 1912, the most famous newspapers were either reformist or revolutionary, while most influential Chinese intellectuals or politicians published some kind of newspapers. They differed from Chinese journalists in the former period in many ways. First of all, they were Chinese elite rather than foreign merchants and their compradors. Secondly, since political journalists were motivated by the urgent need of national salvation, they were much more interested in editorials to promote their political causes than in news. Thirdly, the political press was funded
by donations, and thus was extremely unstable financially. Fourthly, the circulation of the political press was also unstable. A political journal might be extremely popular when its political cause became the issue of the day, but its circulations would shrink immediately when the issue ceased to be the focus of popular attention. Even at its peak, no political periodical ever exceeded 20,000 copies until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.

Among the reformists, Liang Qichao was the most famous. His publications included Zhong wai ji wen (1895), Shi wu bao (1896), Qing yi bao (1898), Xin min cong bao (1902), Zheng lun (1907), Yong yen (1911), Da zhong hua (1915), and Jie fang yu gai zao (1916). He also helped to establish several dailies, such as Shi bao and Shi shi xin bao in Shanghai, and Chen bao in Beijing. All of them were founded by donations from sympathizers of political reform.

Liang began his press enterprise as a part of the reform program under the direction of his teacher Kang Youwei. Believing that newspapers were the most important tool to mobilize support for reform, Liang and Kang persuaded several important officials to fund Zhong wai ji wen in 1895. Without any experience, the quality of Liang’s first journal was extremely poor. The first edition of Zhong wai ji wen contained nothing but a single political essay of several hundred characters. It was delivered free to the subscribers of official gazettes. Liang even had to pay for
Liang's second journal, *Shi wu bao*, established in 1896 in Shanghai, was better than the first. It was a tri-monthly of about thirty thousand characters, containing editorials, digests of Chinese and English newspapers, and other articles. It sold 4,000 copies at the beginning, but its circulation quickly grew in one year to 17,000. In 1897, it became the most popular periodical of the time. However, in 1898, when the reform movement failed, both *Shi wu bao* and *Zhong wei ji wen* were suspended.

Liang then fled to Tokyo and there, in 1898, established his third journal, *Qing yi bao*. It was also a tri-monthly of 30 thousand Chinese characters, supported by reformist Chinese in Japan, and the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government not only took care of all of Liang's daily expenses during its preparation, it also helped to smuggle the journal into China through Japanese companies in the international settlement. In 1901, after the publication of the one hundredth issue, *Qing yi bao* was burned down by a fire and had to be suspended. In 1902, Liang launched his fourth journal, *Xin min cong bao*, a bi-monthly. *Xin min cong bao* represented the peak of Liang's influence on Chinese politics and press. The first issue was reprinted three times. Some of the later issues were reprinted over ten times. Most major cities in China had its dealers. Its readers included most important intellectuals and politicians. Hu Shi praised *Xin min cong bao* which, he said,
gave him a new worldview, while Mao Zedong remembered that he read and re-read some of Liang's articles until he could almost memorize them. (58) The circulation of Xin min cong bao at its peak was estimated at 20,000.

As Liang's personal influence on the Chinese press waned after the suspension of Xin min cong bao in 1909, some reformist journalists gradually transformed themselves into commercial journalists. Di Chuqing, one of Liang's disciples, founded Shi bao in Shanghai in 1904 with 20,000 dollars donated by Liang. (59) From the beginning, Di showed more interest in the paper than in politics. In the editing principles that appeared in the first issue of Shi bao, Di clearly differentiated "political commentary" from "news". News had to be comprehensive, quick, accurate, truthful and impersonal, while political commentaries impartial, important, comprehensive and to the point. (60) Di also invented a short form of political commentary, containing less than a hundred characters directly related to the news. After the 1912 Revolution, Di deliberately kept Shi bao away from Liang's influence. In time, Shi bao became the third largest commercial newspaper in Shanghai with a circulation of about 30,000, next only to Shen bao and Xin wen bao.

Dong fang za zhi, a general monthly magazine published by the Commercial Press, was also established by reformists, and was later transformed into a commercial enterprise. The Commercial Press was originally founded by Zhang Yuanji, a reformist
bureaucrat who lost his official post after the failure of the reform movement of 1898. In 1904, the Commercial Press started the Dong fang za zhi to propagate reform. (61) It subsequently became one of the most popular general magazine in Republican China with a circulation of 8,000. Dong fang za ji was also the most long-lived among its kind. It was continuously published up to 1949 in China itself. In Taiwan, it resumed publication in 1967 and currently remains in publication.

Sheng huo Weekly was another popular periodical founded by reformists. Originally a weekly published by the Huang Yenpei’s Society of Vocational Education in 1926, it was transformed by Zou Taofen, its editor-in-chief, into a political magazine. (62) In the mid-thirties, because of its outspoken anti-Japanese and anti-government positions, it was the most popular magazine with a sale of 155,000 copies per issue. Zou later became a communist sympathizer. At his death in 1944, Mao Zedong praised Zou as a model Chinese intellectual who successfully transformed himself into an intellectual of the people.

Among the reformist newspapers, Shi shi xin bao in Shanghai and Chen bao in Beijing remained loyal to the programs of political reform during the Republican era. Pan Gongbi of Shi shi xin bao and Zhang Dongsun of Chen bao were especially noted for their anti-Nationalist positions during the thirties. Pan joined the Nationalist Party during the Sino-Japanese war. Zhang Dongsun later organized the Democratic and Socialist
Among revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen and his followers established numerous newspapers with the financial support of overseas Chinese and revolutionaries. The most famous of these before the 1911 Revolution included Su bao in Shanghai and Min bao in Tokyo. (63) Su bao was established in the International Settlement in Shanghai under a Japanese title, but its Chinese manager was soon transformed into a revolutionary newspaper. In 1902, Zhang Taiyen, the leader of a revolutionary society in Shanghai, was invited to be the editor. In order to mobilize racial hatred against the Qing government, Zhang published a racist revolutionary treatise "the Revolutionary Army" in the paper. As the paper was in the International Settlement, the Qing government had to bring a lawsuit against the paper at the international court. The government won the lawsuit. Zhang was put in the jail. However, the issue of racial hatred against the Manchus was quickly picked up by Min bao, the party organ of Sun Yat-sen’s the Great Alliance of Revolution in Tokyo, and became the decisive force for the the final overthrow of the Manchu government in 1911.

Min bao was established in 1905, funded by membership dues of the Alliance. It was a monthly, containing about 150 pages per issue. From 1906 to 1909, it was involved in various debates with Liang Qichao on the future of China: "reform or revolution". Partly because of racial hatred of Chinese against the Manchus, partly because of the failure of the
Manchus to meet with Liang's call for reform, Minbao won the debates, and attracted most reformists away from Liang. Since 1907, Minbao replaced Xinmincongbao as the most popular political journal among Chinese with a sale of 20,000 per issue.

Other important revolutionary papers included Shenzhouribao, Minlibao and Tiandobao. Shenzhouribao, established by Yu Youjen in Shanghai in 1907, aimed at arousing patriotism in terms of China's rich culture and long history. It was a 12-page large daily, with a circulation of about 10,000. Minlibao was also established by Yu in Shanghai in 1910. It was the guiding force during the 1911 Revolution. It also cultivated several important journalists in Republican China, such as Zhang Jiluan of Dagongbao and Li Haoran of Xinwenbao.

Tiandobao was established by reformists in 1910, but was transformed by its employees into a revolutionary organ. Famous journalists of Tiandobao included Dai Jitao, who believed that "editors who were never jailed were not good editors", and Chen Bulei, who later became the personal secretary of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Under the Republic, the Nationalist Party had two famous organs, Minguoribao, established in 1916 in Shanghai, and Zhongyangribao, in 1929 in Nanjing. Minguoribao was a daily newspaper founded by Chen Qimei, a revolutionary in
control of the Shanghai Arsenal after the 1911 Revolution. Chen was assassinated soon after the newspaper was founded, but \textit{Min guo ji bao} was published continuously up to 1929. It was not only the vanguard of anti-warlord campaigns, but also a center of the intellectual revolution during the May Fourth movement. (64) \textit{Min guo ri bao} sold about 15,000 copies per issue.

\textit{Zhong yang ri bao} has been the organ of the Nationalist Party since 1929. At the beginning, it had only one reporter and three editors who always felt short of material to fill the two-page newspaper (65). In the early thirties, Cheng Cangpo, a returned student from France, took it over, and began to organize it in a more business-like way. In the mid-thirties, \textit{Zhong yang ri bao} sold about 20,000 copies per issue.

For the cause of intellectual revolution, the most important journal was \textit{Xin ging nien}. It was originally published in 1916 by Chen Duxiu in Shanghai under the title \textit{Qing nien za ji}. In 1917, Chen went to Beijing to take up the position of the dean of the School of Literature and Arts at the Beijing University. In 1918, Chen, joined by five other professors, including Hu Shi, transformed \textit{Xin ging nien} to propagate an intellectual revolution. Their totalistic anti-traditionalism won hearty support from young students, but also furious attacks from conservatives. Chen was especially vulnerable because of his participation in anti-government strikes and the rumors about his misconduct with a local prostitute. (66) In 1920, Chen
left the Beijing University for Shanghai where he was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist.

The Chinese Communist Party found its party organ, Xiang dao, in 1922. Chen Duxiu, the party secretary, was the editor. The circulation of Xiang dao was about 1,000. The party prepared to publish its daily, Xin hua Yi bao, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, but it was not in publication until after the outbreak of the war.

Besides the commercial press and the political press, a third kind of press, the independent press, emerged in the early teens and assumed a leading role in modern Chinese journalism in the twenties and thirties. Like the commercial press, the independent press emphasized objective reporting, but it did not avoid political participation. Hence, with few exception, independent journalists were good at both news reporting and political commentaries.

The first important independent journalist in modern China was Huang Yuanyong. Huang was an associate of Liang Qichao, but, unlike Liang, he believed in objective reporting. Huang’s reports on his interviews with officials, including President Yuan shikai, was among the most reliable primary data for the political events in this period. Other important independent journalists in early Republican China included Cheng Ping and Shao Piaoping. Both were noted for their contributions to the techniques of news reporting and their political
activities.

In the thirties, the most important independent journalists were Hu Shi and Zhang Jiluan. Hu did not publish any news-oriented journal, but, an ardent follower of John Dewey's pragmatism, he was the most articulate in expounding the philosophy of objective advocacy. Hu's publications included seven famous political reviews, such as Mei zhou ping lun and Du li ping lun. (70) Du li ping lun was published in 1931. By 1934, it had 7,000 readers and became economically self-sufficient. (71)

The most influential independent journalist in the thirties was Zhang Jiluan of Da gong bao in Tianjin. In 1926, Wu Dingchang, a banker from Szechwan, and two professional journalists, Hu Zhengji and Zhang Jiluan, bought Da gong bao, originally a well-known reformist newspaper established in 1902, for 50,000 dollars. They declared that it would be a non-partisan independent paper which would be subjected to neither political power nor commercial interest. It would be a public forum for the people, but it would not follow the public blindly. (72) Judging from either the standard of the commercial press or that of the political press, Da gong bao was a success. In 1935, it was able to establish a Da gong bao literature prize of 5,000 dollars (equal to 2,500 U. S. dollars), five times the Pulitzer Prize at the time. (73) In 1936, the annual budget of Da gong bao was 1,200,000 dollars. (74) Its circulation reached 100,000 in 1937, next only to Shen
bao and Xin wen bao. It had the best edited news columns sent by its national network of correspondents. Zhang Jiluan's editorials in Da gong bao were also considered one of the most influential forces in Republican politics. In 1941, Da gong bao won the Missouri award for the most distinguished newspaper in the world. (75) The success of Da gong bao was exceptional, thus providing a good opportunity to study how professional rationality and political advocacy could be balanced in the journalistic profession in modern China.

Having clearly identified three types of modern presses -- the political press, the commercial press and the independent press, I shall proceed to analyze the style and the ideology for and against objective reporting in modern Chinese journalism.
In style, the most obvious difference between the political press and the commercial press was their different treatments of editorials and news. For the political press, editorials were the most important content of newspapers. They were printed in bold-face type and put in the front page of the papers. In contrast, for the commercial press, the accuracy of news was the life of a newspaper. Editorials were often very short and buried in advertisements. Such differences were once described as the "theory of editorials as the eyes of the newspapers" versus the "theory of editorials as the eyebrows of the newspapers". (76) The former argued that editorials were the essence of a newspaper through which one could see its true spirit, while the latter maintained that editorials were a minor but indispensable feature, just like eyebrows on one's face.

The different treatments of news and editorials are good indicators for and against objective reporting. However, as the subject of this paper is the transformation of cultural values, it becomes very interesting to analyze the content of news and editorials to further delineate the styles and ideologies for and against objective reporting. Limited by space, I shall examine only two or three journalists in each category. I shall also analyze rationalizations for these two different styles to examine the influences of Chinese and
Western cultures.

As also indicated in the last section, besides the political and commercial presses, a third type of modern Chinese press, the independent press, emerged and played an important role in Chinese politics in the twenties and thirties. The independent press was similar to the commercial press in its emphasis upon objective reporting, but unlike the non-participatory commercial press, the independent press advocated political participation, and thus formed a style of objective advocacy. In this section, I shall also examine two objective advocates to illustrate the style and rationalization for objective advocacy.

i. The style of subjective advocacy and its rationalization

Liang Qichao's (1872-1929) early involvement in journalism was a typical cause of subjective advocacy. Shi wu bao, the first of Liang's journals, had only one page containing one editorial advocating reforms. Liang's journals were improved later to contain several articles and digests of news, but his preference for long editorials prevailed in all of his publications. In Qing yi bao and Xin min cong bao, Liang's editorials were so long (from several thousand words to scores of thousand) that they often ran serially in several issues. Liang nevertheless attracted Chinese intellectuals because of his beautiful and passionate style. "Even the most stupid person in the world was aroused to uncontrollable crying" (77)
Liang's style was characterized by layers of emotional dramatization which were consummated in an arbitrary conclusion. The style was clear in his first political treatise in 1895:

"Today we have a huge building a thousand years old. Its tiles are disintegrated. Its main beam is broken...... It will definitely fall apart under the attack of storms. However, those people inside are still sleeping and playing as if they hear and see nothing. Even those who know it is dangerous can do nothing but weep deeply. They cross their arms to wait for death. Those who are better try to repair the holes so that they can steal some time. These three kinds of people have three kinds of mind, but when the flood comes, they will all get drowned. Only those who know how to get rid of the broken parts, to buy new materials, and to hire workers to renew the whole structure.... will finally sleep comfortably. The principle of building a country is the same. If the former course is followed, the country will perish. If the latter is followed, it will get strong." (78)

Liang's opposition to objective reporting could be best illustrated by his advocacy of a technique of frightening in journalism, "hai shu", in 1902. "Hai shu" condoned twists or even fabrications of news for the purpose of political mobilization:

"Once we the journalists have decided the goal, it is quite alright that we argue for it to the extreme......People are so used to the old ways that, unless we use some extreme methods, they will not be willing to change.... Therefore, if we like to make people feel the need of constitutionalism, we must frighten them about the need of people's rights. If we like to make them feel the need of people's rights, we must frighten them about the need of revolution.... In a word, we must frighten people about something more extreme than what we desire, then we can get exactly what we desire......" (79)

Some might object to designate Liang an opponent of objective
Liang often advocated objectivity and had a great influence upon several important objective advocates, such as Hu Shi or Huang Yuanyong (81). However, I have to argue that, unlike Hu and Huang who hardly betrayed the principle of objective reporting and who tried to achieve a balance between objective reporting and political advocacy, Liang’s advocacy of objectivity was characterized by frequent oscillations between objective reporting and subjective advocacy. The oscillations reflected Liang’s self-contradictory personality, which, to a remarkable degree, resembled a psychological disorder named "cyclothymia". (82) It is interesting to explore the formation of the emotional disorder in the light of Chinese culture. However, since data about the emotional lives of other journalists are scanty and since Liang’s oscillations could be explained by the ambiquity toward cognitive objectivity in Confucianism, I will focus my analysis on the role of Confucianism in the formation of Liang’s style.

The Confucian ambiquity toward cognitive objectivity was deeply rooted in its theory of human nature. First of all, Confucius believed that human nature was originally altruistic. The innate altruistic human nature was called "ren" (benevolence). (83) However, he was ambiguous as to how to achieve "ren". On the one hand, he indicated that improper environment, such as poverty, inhibited the full realization of the human good nature. (84) On the other hand, he pointed out that human
desires were also barriers to the perfection of human nature. (85) He himself solved the theoretical ambiquity by saying that control of human basic desires was a virtue of the elite, not of the masses (86), but, for later Confucianists who strove for consistency, a choice had to made. In the Song dynasty, for example, Confucianists split into two schools, the utilitarian Confucianism and the anti-utilitarian Neo-Confucianism. The utilitarian school emphasized practical actions to improve the material well-being of the people. It was quickly subdued due to the supremacy of Neo-Confucianism, but the utilitarian concern for the practical (shi) remained a strong sidestream in Confucianism. Yen Yuan, a leading pragmatic Confucianist in the Qing dynasty, was even believed to be very similar to John Dewey in many important aspects. (87)

In contrast, Neo-Confucianism believed that politics is fundamentally a process of moral rectification and that any utilitarian consideration would be a deviation from the fundamental concern. In the Song and Ming dynasties, a subjective metaphysics was also developed to support its anti-utilitarianism. According to the metaphysics, all things in the universe were a unity, because they were all made of two forces, the physical force and the moral force. The human nature is essentially good (ren) because it was imparted from the Heaven as a part of the moral force. However, the good nature was often obscured by the existence of the physical nature which was a part of the physical force. The purpose of
moral rectification was thus to purify the physical force so as to regain the original unity with the heaven. The metaphysics in general tended to repudiate cognitive knowledge of external objects, because it was believed that the original goodness was already residing in human nature. (88)

Utilitarian Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism represented two main Confucian concerns, but the difference between them was never clear-cut, because utilitarian Confucianism never rejected Neo-Confucian theory of moral cultivation, nor Neo-Confucianism rejected the importance of objective knowledge. Zhu Xi, the master of Neo-Confucianism, for example, believed that, objective knowledge about all things in the universe was also essential for the final perfection of human nature. (89) In the Qing dynasty, the tradition of objective knowledge was further developed into a school of textual criticism in which concepts and methods of empirical research were developed and extensively used. The spirit of objective learning in the Qing school of textual criticism could be illustrated by slogans such as shi shi chiu shi (studying facts diligently until you can prove that they are true) and wu zheng bu xing (do not believe anything without enough evidences). (90) The differences between a hypothesis and a theory, or between an opinion and a fact, were also carefully identified. (91) There are certainly many important differences between the Confucian school of textual criticism and the Western sciences. (92) However, if combined with the utilitarian concerns developed in utilitarian and pragmatic
Confucianism, the cognitive training is clearly a positive factor in the formation of objective reporting in modern journalism.

Liang's oscillations between objective reporting and subjective advocacy could be explained by the Confucian tradition, because, first of all, Liang's classical education exposed him equally to the two contrasting concerns. Born in 1872, Liang had been an excellent student of Confucian textual criticism until he went to study with Kang Youwei at 19. (93) Kang Youwei was a leading scholar of Western learnings, but his intellectual activities were fundamentally inspired by Neo-Confucian subjective metaphysics. (94) The clash between these two schools was already very clear when the two first met. At the beginning of their meeting, Liang attempted to challenge Kang with his knowledge of Confucian textual criticism, but he was quickly convinced that Kang was much more profound that he was. (95) Later he described the core of Kang's philosophy as follows:

"My teacher believes that ren is the origin of the world, the people, the country, the family and the morality. If there is no ren, the heaven and the earth would be extinct. Therefore, when our four limbs are numbed, we say they are not ren.... it is because people in the world are like four limbs on the body. When they do not know or love one another, they are not ren. Jen is the mind which can not bear to see the sufferings of others...." (96)

Liang then said that the first priority of K'ang's moral training was in the cultivation of mind and willpower:
"The first educational principle at my teacher Nanhai's Changxing Academy was the need to make up one's mind to pursue a purpose. Confucius said, "If the world were in order, I would not have to bother to change it".... Mencius said, "Without me, who else in the world could put the world in order?" Master Zhu Xi said, "If there are things which have not been achieved in the world, it is because people have not made up their minds to achieve them...." (97)

However, conditioned by his early cognitive training, Liang could not but frequently challenge Kang because of Kang's subjectivity even long after Liang became Kang's disciple. For example, he secretly complained to his classmates that Kang fabricated and twisted data to prove his point. (98) However, since he was so fascinated by Kang's theory of moral cultivation, he immediately excused Kang: "Although K'ang missed several minor points, he was essentially correct." (99) The judgment clearly showed that, despite his dissatisfaction, Liang fundamentally agreed to subjective advocacy.
Secondly, Liang always had a great interest in irrational aspects of life. His understanding of the mind, for example, reflected Confucian emphasis upon the emotional and moral faculty of the mind, rather than the rational faculty of the mind in the West:

"In the world, nothing is bigger than men. In men, nothing is bigger than xin (the mind). Xin seems to work suddenly, for people can do things without knowing that they are doing them....Since there is no way to name the suddenness of xin, I have to call it inspiration....Inspiration occurs when thinking and emotions are at their heights. Under the influence of sudden inspirations, heroes have performed astonishing deeds. General Li Guang shoted an arrow into a rock out of fear because he thought the rock were a tiger. Martin Luthermade best speeches when he was angry......." (100)

Like Neo-Confucianists, Liang also emphasized "sincerity" (zheng), a Confucian concept for willpower, as a method to gain the mystical power of Xin:

"Inspirations are beyond human understanding, but there is a way to get it. It is through the way of sincerity. When a person is possessed with absolute sincerity, he can communicate with the gods. The weak becomes strong, the stupid, wise, the useless, useful." (101)

Elsewhere, Liang suggested another Confucian irrational method to attain the mystical power of xin to do things in full realization that the goals are not achievable (zhi qi bu ke er wei zhi):

"In order to save China, we should follow Confucius and to do things even though we may believe that they are not achievable, because whether things are achievable or not is not determined. If everyone believes that it is not achievable, it will become truely unachievable. If everyone believes it achievable and
acts upon it, it will become achievable" (102)

As indicated by many studies, Later Liang regretted that his early subjective style was an attempt "to help the crops grow by pulling them up" (ya miao zhu zhang). (103) He also demonstrated a great interest in utilitarian and pragmatic thoughts in Confucianism. However, these concessions did not mean that he believed that rationality could solve all the problems in human society. As late as 1922, he still emphasized the importance of irrational actions:

"Life can not be divorced from reason, but reason can not control the totality of life. Besides reason, another important part of life is emotions, which are in fact the motivating force of life. Emotions can be expressed in many ways, among which, at least two ways, love and beauty, are beyond science.....A filial son would cut his own legs to feed his ill parents......Jesus Christ sacrificed himself on the cross out of his love for mankind.... These are all actions beyond rational calculations, but hey are all beautiful philosophies of life and ninety percent of history was created by such mysticism...." (104)

Revolutionary newspapers shared Liang's belittlement of objective reporting. News was often fabricated to promote the political causes. Su bao, for example, fabricated an imperial edict ordering the arrest of returned students so as to ignite racial hatred against the Manchu government. (105) Min guo ri bao was too poor to subscribe regularly for foreign news from news agencies. Therefore, its editor lifted foreign news from neighboring big newspapers. If that did not work out, it could still depend on Ye Chucang, its editor-in-chief, who had the genius of manufacturing foreign news out of his imagination.
The style of subjective advocacy in revolutionary newspapers could also be illustrated by its extreme intolerance toward oppositions. Dai Jitao (1891-1949) of Tian do bao, for example, was twice jailed because in his political commentaries he frequently instigated readers to murder his political adversaries whom he labeled "robbers", "thiefs", "bastards", "dogs", "foxes", "mice", and most interestingly, "transvestites" (ren yao). (107) One of the "transvestites" was Zhang Bingling, a revolutionary who later broke with the Nationalists:

"Fickle and Lascivious Transvestites (shui xing yang hua di ren yao):

"Zhang Binling has cheated people over one hundred times. In the morning he goes to the east and in the evening he goes to the west. He is like a branch which receives birds no matter whether they are from the north or from the south. He is like a leaf which waves in the wind no matter whether it is from the east or from the west." (108)

Dai then declared Chang a "traitor-thief" who "should die".

The influence of Confucianism upon Dai Jitao was not as clear as in the case of Liang because Dai used many Western concepts to justify his style. This is understandable because Dai had very little formal classical education. He started to learn at age 3, but from eight to ten he was sent to serve his father who was jailed for three years for family debts, and hence had very little formal education.
He then went to a Japanese language school at age fourteen and to Japan at age sixteen. According to himself, during the first ten years of his journalistic career, that is, the peak of his journalistic career, he had only a vague idea about Confucianism. However, a deeper analysis of his commentaries discloses that his eulogy of emotions and willpower was fundamentally in accord with neo-Confucian style of subjective advocacy. For example, he once interpreted American spirit of "optimism" (le guan zhu yi) as a willpower to conquer reality:

"Life is a fight. Those who are pessimistic can not fight. Our revolution succeeded because we revolutionaries were optimistic.... If we were frustrated by past failures and became pessimistic, the revolution would not have succeeded. Our ancestor also said, "Everything is achievable if only people have the mind"....Therefore, the last thing we should do is to destroy ourselves by abandoning our ambitions....." (112)

Hence, it is not at all accidental that, once Dai learned more about Confucian moral theory in 1922, he immediately singled out "sincerity" (cheng) as the most fundamental virtue in political life:

"Dr. Sun once said that nationalism, peoples’ rights and peoples’ livelihood were three ways to achieve peace and order in the world, and that knowledge, love and courage were three essential virtues to attain these three goals, and that there was only one way to achieve these three essential virtues, that is, through moral actions of sincerity....Revolutionaries have to select the best and stick to it with all our hearts and minds........ Revolutionaries should never retreat before we reach the goal. The willpower is exactly what we called 'cheng' in traditional Chinese thought....." (113)

Most journalists for the intellectual revolution also shared
the same attitude toward objective reporting. Lu Xun, for example, advocated the spirit of "beating the drowning dogs", because "if good people do not beat drowning dogs, the dogs would eventually return to bite good people." (114)

Chen Duxiu's (1879-1942) opposition to objective reporting can be best illustrated by his constant denunciation of opponents' rights of expression. In Xin ching nien, he told opponents of the intellectual revolution:

"We are extremely narrow-minded when it comes to the question of the truth. We speak in harsh tones and put on furious faces, because we would rather be scolded as villains than pretend to be gentlemen who confuse right and wrong." (115)

In 1917, Hu Shi wrote to Chen asking for more tolerance of those who opposed the cause of literary revolution so as to promote meaningful discussion. To Hu's suggestion, Chen replied without compromise:

"I understand that tolerance of oppositions and freedom of discussion are principles for advancing academic research. However, on the question of literary revolution, it is so clear who is right and who is wrong that there is no room for free discussion. We know that our principles are absolutely correct. We will not tolerate any suggestion for improvement." (116)

Chen Duxiu became even more violent in language after he became a Communist. In Xiang dao, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen scolded Kang Youwei who attempted to re-install a monarchy in Republican China by saying that he was "an ugly prostitute who got married but could not stay home"
contentedly." (chou ji cong liang, bu an yu shi). (117) Zhang Shizhao, a former revolutionary journalist who became a conservative, was called a "farting dog" (fang pi gou) and:

"When Zhang used revolutionaries’ money to publish journals, he was passing gas like dogs (fang gou pi). When he used Warlord Duan Qirui’s money to publish journals, he was a dog who passed gas (gou fang pi). Now he uses Warlord Zhang Zongchang’s money to publish journals, he becomes a dog who knows nothing but to pass gas (fang pi gou)........ The money was won by the warlord in gambling. Usually it was given to prostitutes (who accompanied him in gambling). Now the money was given to Zhang Shizhao to publish his journal. Therefore, Zhang Shizhao’s journal is even lower than prostitutes......." (118)

The emotional style was inconsistent with Chen’s well-known role in the movement for "democracy and science" in modern China (119). However, I have to argue that, although Chen advocated science, he never put his full trust in rationality. For example, in 1920, after he declared "democracy and science" as two goals of the intellectual revolution, he attacked Chinese culture for its rationality and praised Western civilization for its fiery emotional force derived from the Christian tradition:

"Christianity is a religion of love.... We must cultivate Jesus Christ’s fiery and deep love for the mankind in the blood of the Chinese people so that we can be saved from the cruel, dark and dirty trap....Chinese culture is dominated by moral principles. Western culture is dominated by emotions for beauty in Greek culture and emotions for trust and love in the Christian tradition. Hence, although both Chinese and Western cultures are originated from spiritual impulses, moral principles in Chinese tradition are rational and intellectual, while emotions in Western tradition are natural and supra-rational....Moral actions are motivated by knowledge of what ought to be, while emotional actions are motivated by innate feelings of willingness. Morality is also originated in natural feelings, but.... if knowledge is dissociated from emotions, it is a fragment, not the whole. It is learned, not
In this article, Chen used a Western concept of love, the love of Jesus Christ, to attack Chinese civilization, but his eulogy of emotions and distrust of rationality was clearly in accord with Neo-Confucianism.

Likewise, Chen attacked Confucian ethics but endorsed its theory of willpower to conquer reality. He once explained that tolerance was not a virtue because it inhibited the exercise of willpower to conquer reality. In order to illustrate the point, he even used an example which echoed Liang Qichao's technique of frightening in journalism:

"Take a business deal as an example. If the seller asks for ten dollars, the buyers offers three, the deal will be made at five. However, if the seller asks for five at the very beginning, the final deal will be only two and fifty. The inertia of social revolution works exactly like this. We must advocate one hundred percent reform, because since social inertia will offer only thirty percent, the final result will be fifty percent. If we advocate only fifty percent at the beginning, we will end up with only twenty-five percent. Compromise is the way to describe the objective reality. It is not the way of advocacy." (121)

An examination of Chen's education explained why his style was basically in accord with the Confucian tradition. From his biography, we know that his life-time concern for moral integrity was developed as early as he was six, but he did not anything about the West until he was 17. (122) Hence, although he was an anti-traditionalist, his moral concern was
nevertheless fundamentally a product of Chinese culture.
ii. objective reporting and its rationalization

Li Haoran, the editor-in-chief of Xin wen bao from 1914 to 1947, was a typical objective reporter. He was constantly troubled by the possible inaccuracy of the news in the paper. (123) News might be delayed by the Bureau of Telecommunications, revised or fabricated by politicians, or banned by the government. Sometimes he had to leave a blank space in the news to give the message that part of the news was censored.

Li Haoran’s avoidance of politics could be illustrated by his editorials in Xin wen bao. They were not only short but also extremely dull. He often repeated what had already been said in the news. When Interpretations were offered, they were cast in great uncertainty. Advice was completely absent. For example, On July 4, 1928, Li wrote on Japanese occupation in Shandong as follows:

"The Japanese army in Shandong have become more aggressive recently. Magistrates were expelled. People’s households were ransacked. Japanese are getting impossible.... It is hard for me to understand their actions. The purpose of Japan was to invade China, but would such disturbances make them stay in Shandong?....It is probably because the hardliners had to withdraw under pressure, but they were not willing to. Therefore, they created confusion in the area, so that they could stay. Even so, I still could not understand why they did not care about Japan’s reputation....." (124)

In Li’s theory about objective reporting, the modern term for "objectivity", "ke guang", was hardly mentioned. Instead, shi
a popular term for objectivity and pragmatism in utilitarian Confucianism, was mentioned in ten of the nineteen articles on culture and education in a sample survey of his editorials in *Xin wen bao*. (125) One of Li’s arguments for *shi* went as follows:

"Over-ambitions and vanity are the most important sources for the weakness of our nation-state. We have been sick with them ever since the Song dynasty....Discussions on the government and national defence within the government were abundant, but, the reality was exactly the opposite. People suffered from malnutrition. The armament was below sufficiency.... The more the discussion, the less the actual effect....If we want to revive our nation, we must commit ourselves to the practical. If, after self-examination, we think we can not do it ourselves, we would rather not to talk about it. We especially should not propagate for things because they sound fascinating to the ear....." (126)

"The only way to save us from the national disaster is to devote ourselves to practical actions... Those who are responsible for national planning have to get rid of their habits of empty talks and vanity. Before whatever they say, they have to first consider whether they can put it into practice. If they can not, they should stop talking about it... Those who have military power should also first consider practical actions before they say anything. All the people in our country should pay special attention to practical actions. In such a time, political withdrawals will not save our country, neither will empty slogans. Only if we commit ourselves to do things, will we be able to stand up as a nation." (127)

What is more interesting about Li’s theory about objectivity is that, in contrast to the Western assumption that objective reporting promotes the articulations of self-interest, Li believed objectivity was a consequence of "altruism". In 1935, in an article about the the death of Dr. W. Williams, the dean of the Misourri School of Journalism, Li explained how subjective advocacy resulted from the lack of altruism:
"Dr. Williams visited China three times and kept good relations with Chinese journalists..... I would like to express my deep sorrow for the death of this sincere man..... Among his works, the most influential one is the ten commandments for the journalistic profession. Roughly, he made two main points..... The first was that journalists should believe that newspapers are a public trustee. Newspapers have a long history in the world. However, it has never been clear what a newspaper should be. Generally speaking, most people believe that newspapers should be used for propaganda.... Very few people worry about the problem of the need for a public trustee. In international politics, national boundaries are especially clear. Even newspapers which claim to serve the world interest contest with one another in publicizing others' wrongdoings and exaggerating one's own merits.... 

"The second point was to be accurate and fair.... Many journalists share the concept that they should report what is true in their understanding. However, since they are blinded by their own national interest, it is impossible for them to be fair.... If we examine the current international conflicts, we can understand that most journalists in the world do not report what they know about political reality..... Thus, Dr. Williams' ten commandments are not for journalists only. They are also where the future of the world lies....." (128) 

The argument seems very odd to people who are used to thinking objectivity as something value-free. It is, nevertheless, very reasonable in Confucian moral theory where altruism was treated as the fundamental force in cosmic order and in human nature.

Li's education explained why his objective style was so closely related to pragmatic Confucianism. His father once studied with Liu Guyu, a follower of Yen Yuan's pragmatic Confucianism, earned the highest degree in the civil service examination and was selected to the Imperial Academy. (129) Li himself also studied with Liu and earned the second degree. He then went to Japan to study at age twenty, but he was influenced very little by Western culture. (130) Li's case clearly proved that objective reporting in modern Chinese journalism was formed
within the Confucian tradition itself.

Chen Leng, the editor-in-chief of Shen bao from 1912 to 1930, was also an important objective reporter. Chen was responsible for Shen bao's proofreading system in which every editor was asked to proofread the pages he edited, while every page was proofread at least three times by pairs of proofreaders. He was also known to temporarily suspend Shen bao if he was not allowed to print the news accurately. (131)

Chen's editorials were always very short and vague. For example, in January 1927, Chen wrote 27 editorials for Shen bao. None of them mentioned either names or places. Except two articles on finance and military, the rest were all on general and abstract political principles, such as "On farsightedness", "On misfortune", "On anger over minor things". He was particularly fond of dealing with pairs of opposites, such as "Being content and knowing where to stop", "Expanding and solidifying", and "Principles and methods", and thus, made his editorials more like riddles than political commentaries. The riddle-like nature could be illustrated by the following example:

"On leaving or staying:

"If people can cooperate with one another, they stay. If not, they leave. If they like to cooperate, they make people stay. If not, they make them leave. Therefore, staying means not going, and going means not staying. You can not have both at the same time. However, our Chinese do not think so. When they can not cooperate, they do not like to leave. When they want to leave, they stay. When they want people not to stay, they do not make them leave. When they want them to leave,
Like Li Haoran, Chen did not use the more term "objectivity". This is understandable because, like Li, Chen went to Japan to study after he was twenty and stayed there for only two years. However, unlike Li, Chen repudiated Confucian theory of "practical actions" and claimed himself a follower of Taoist theory of "non-actions". The Taoist flavor made his commentaries much more intriguing than Li's. For example, unlike Li's repetitious and dull commentaries, Chen argued for political withdrawal with Taoist cyclical theory of historical development:

"Crimes and evils in the world will become more solidified if people try to fight them. If people let crimes and evils go their own courses, the farther they go, the worse they will become. When crimes and evils reach the worst extremes, they must of their own accord die out. Then we shall be able to return to the original state of goodness." (134)

The Taoist concept "wer er bu you" (to act, but not to possess) also helped him to form a functionally specific professional attitude, that is, one should work hard in whatever one was doing, but one should never exploit the power derived from one's position for personal benefits:

"Power is a public instrument. When a man has a position, he exercises the power of the position. He does not possess the power. If he mistakenly believes that he has the power for himself, he will not have the power for long."

"Power belongs to the position, not to the man who holds the position. For example, a butcher has a knife because he is a butcher. He is supposed to use the knife to kill cows, sheep and pigs, not to kill people whom he does not like. Power is
like a butcher's knife." (135)

A remaining question is that how a genuine follower of Taoist theory of non-actions could be as attentive to the accuracy of news as Chen. I did not find any evidence that Chen was influenced by pragmatic Confucianism or Confucian textual criticism, but since both schools were very popular in the Late Qing, it is very possible that Chen was also well-trained in one of the schools.
iii. Objective advocacy and its rationalization

Hu Shi (1891-1962) was not a full-time journalist and never published any news-oriented journal. However, as a philosophy professor trained under John Dewey at the Columbia University, Hu persistently argued for rationality and realism in journalism, and hence, became the best theoretician of objective advocacy in his age. A typical Deweyan argument for objective advocacy went as follows:

"Civilization is not created in a vague and general fashion. It is created bit by bit and drop by drop. Progress is not achieved in an evening, in a vague and general fashion. It is achieved bit by bit and drop by drop. Nowadays people are fond of talking about liberation and reconstruction, but they must realize that liberation does not mean liberation at the level of vague generalities, and reconstruction does not mean reconstruction at the level of vague generalities. Liberation means liberation from this or that institution, from this or that belief, for this or that individual. Reconstruction means the reconstruction of this or that institution, of this or that idea, of this or that individual. The work which must serve as the first step in the reconstruction of civilization is the study of this or that problem. The progress of such a reconstruction of civilization means simply the solution of this or that problem." (136)

In his own political commentaries, Hu was indeed more rational and realistic than most his colleagues. For example, on the issue of how to revive China, unlike most Chinese intellectuals who attacked imperialism or capitalism, Hu said that concrete problems in need of immediate solutions in China were poverty, disease, ignorance, corruption and social disorder. (137) On the issue of political freedom, unlike most oppositions leaders who demanded "immediate release of all political prisoners," Hu demanded a law in which arrests, inquiries and sentences of political prisoners
would be legalized. (138)

Hu also showed considerable restraint in his criticism of individual politicians. For example, in August 1932 when Wang Jingwei, the premier of the Nationalist Government, suddenly resigned to protest a "blackmail" of 5 million dollars from a general in the Northeast, Hu criticized Wang's resignation with considerable tolerance and sympathy:

"We have always had great respect for Mr. Wang's courage to sacrifice himself in taking the position of premiership..... However, we were deeply disappointed this time. First of all, when our state is in great danger, the premier should never resign because of his dissatisfaction with his subordinate at the frontier. Thus, although we are sympathetic to his anger, we cannot forgive his methods. Secondly, the government should order military generals to resist invasions and fire those who fail to obey the order. If the premier resigned to push the general to resign, do we still have a government system? Thirdly, Mr. Wang...accused the general of "attempting to accumulate personal wealth in the name of national defence." We think the accusation extremely inappropriate. If the government believes that there are some irregularities in military spending, it should ask an appropriate agency to investigate them. Before the investigation, the premier should not say that the request for financial support from a general was for personal use....." (139)

Most obviously, Hu drew his inspiration for objective advocacy from American pragmatism. However, since Hu was already 19 when he went to the United States (140), it would be impossible for him to embrace American pragmatism if he was not prepared intellectually for it before he went to the United States. Jerome Grieder believes that Hu Shi's early classical education focused more on Neo-Confucian moral philosophy than on Confucian objective textual research. (141) This interpretation is nevertheless a misrepresentation of the orientation of Hu's classical education.
It is true that, under the influence of his father, Hu was taught very early about moral cultivation. However, there is also ample evidence supporting the claim that both Hu and his father had great interest in textual research. For example, in the examination for the Boxer scholarship program which later supported his American education, Hu won a full mark on Chinese language for his textual study on the origins of two Chinese concepts for rulers (guei and ju). (142) The earlier cognitive training in Confucian textual research undoubtedly shaped his fundamental intellectual orientation and paved the way for his conversion to American pragmatism.

If Hu Shi was the best theoretician of objective advocacy in modern Chinese journalism, Zhang Jiluan (1886-1941) of Da gong pao was the most successful practitioner. What is most interesting about Zhang's style is that, unlike Hu who created many enemies because of his candid criticism, Zhang had no enemy at all. (143) His readers included Nationalists, Communists, as well as intellectuals and students of all kinds of political persuasions.

Some believed that Zhang's popularity came from his mastery of the techniques of indirect criticism developed by the school of diplomacy during the Warring State (403-201 B.C.). (144) Zhang nevertheless once said that his journalistic career was a continuation of Confucian tradition of moral criticism. (145) Then, what is exactly the nature and the origins of Zhang's objective style?
First of all, Zhang’s theory of objective advocacy was nothing new. Like Li Haoran, Zhang loved to use the concept of "shi" (being practical). This is understandable, because like Li, Zhang also studied with Liu Guyu before he went to Japan when he was twenty. Zhang’s theory of objective advocacy was also very similar to Hu Shi’s. In his first editorial in Da gong bao, for example, Zhang listed four editing principles:

"The new Da gong bao upholds four editing principles. The first is non-partisanhip (bu dang). The paper will express people’s opinions. It will not support biased partisan opinions. The second principle is not for sale (bu mai). It will not accept financial support from political power, so that its opinion will not be altered by monetary concerns. The third is unselfishness (bu si), We worked for newspapers to express our loyalty to our country, not to gain personal fame or wealth... The fourth is that we will not follow anyone blindly (bu mang). We will not follow a popular cause blindly, nor will we believe in anything blindly. We will not be motivated by emotions blindly to engage in activities which we do not have sufficient knowledge, nor will we compete blindly with others for radical and blind criticism. A newspaper is an instrument for public opinions, it should never treated the opinions of its staff as the public opinion....."

(146)

Except the third principle, selflessness, the rest three, non-partisanhip, not for sale, and independence, were all similar to Hu’s theory of objective advocacy.

What made Zhang different from Hu was that he not only tolerated oppositions, but often appeared very supportive to his opponents. For example, on the issue of freedom of expression, Zhang began to attack the Nationalist party’s censorship with a statement endorsing censorship:

"The central committee of the Nationalist Party proposed a news
policy which would allow free flows of information under the premise that no one should propagate ideas contradicting the doctrines of the Three People’s Principles. We would like to express our consent to and respect for this proposal. However, we have to know that how the principle is put into practice depends upon the interpretation of concrete problems. For example, what is a military secret? ....... If censors do not share the center’s concern for freedom of expression, ....... If they attempt to find faults with newspapers, ....... If they abuse their power, ....... If they do not have sufficient knowledge about national security, ....... they are bound to make mistakes...." (147)

On the problem of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhang also appeared very supportive to the Nationalist Party’s extermination campaigns. However, when he continued to argue that extermination campaigns would not eradicate Communists and that the best policy to exterminate Communists was to legalize the Communist Party, even Communists found it hard to disagree with him:

"The central government launched a large-scaled extermination campaign against Communists... However, from our point of view, extermination campaigns must be aimed at eradicating the socio-economic conditions which created the Chinese Communist Party. When the conditions no long exist, Communists will not be able to exist either. If we only attempt to exterminate Communist with force and do nothing to change the conditions, to every one Communist we exterminate, the socio-economic conditions will create many more...... We have to realize that Communists are different from bandits which can be pacified with force or rewards. They are directed by intellectuals, supported by an international organization, and collaborated with by workers and peasants. They also have political organization spread over several provinces. Since they have already had a political aim and a political organization, we have to combat them with political means...." (148)

On the surface, Zhang’s style was indeed identical to Diplomatists’ indirect criticism in which "waving the red banners to oppose the red banners" was the norm. However, ideologically, Zhang had nothing in common with Diplomatists.
Then, was the style Confucian? Zhang himself seemed to believe so because he once interpreted his own style as nothing more than a form of indirect criticism (wei jian) derived from the Confucian concept of "using obscure statements to expound the moral principles in the time of disorder" (wei yen da i). (149) However, although indirect criticism was sanctioned in Confucianism, it was much more commonly used in the family setting than in national politics. The question then becomes why Zhang, a professed Confucianist, could apply the technique in national politics so well?

An analysis of Zhang's biography discloses that he was able to do so because he managed to displace Confucian familism with nationalism due to personal misfortune. Both of his parents and three brothers died early. Two of his three nephews did not survive. He married early but his wife did not bear any child. Hence, throughout his life, Zhang was constantly troubled by his inability to continue the Zhang's ancestral line. Journalism then became a way to compensate his inadequacy in fulfilling his familial obligations:

"On the one hand, I value family greatly, because I (always regret) that I was not able to requit the infinite love of my parents who died too early. As an orphan, I suffer from loneliness and anxiety about fulfilling my responsibility for the family. Yet, on the other hand, I think it is wrong to take care of one's family during such a national crisis.... If we can not keep China intact, where are we going to find a safe place to keep our families? I support Chinese familism, but I also suggest that we expand familism. We should expand our affection to our parents, siblings and offspnings. We should not only repay our parents' love, but also the affection for all our ancestors." (150)
Interest articulation in modern Chinese journalism

First of all, except objective reporters, most Chinese journalists did believe that one of the most important functions of journalism was to make political demands. For example, Liang Qichao’s petition for a constitution, Chen Duxiu’s attack of Chinese political tradition, and Hu Shi’s demands for human rights, were all forms of interest articulations. Even objective reporters, while avoiding direct political participation, reported others’ political demands, and performed a certain function of interest articulation.

However, interest articulation in modern Chinese journalism were expected to be different from the liberal pluralistic interest articulation because of several subtle but important cultural differences. First of all, in Confucian moral theory, altruism was treated as the most fundamental virtue in social life. Hence, in contrast to the Western assumption that the pursuit of self-interest and particular interest in politics is legitimate and desirable, Chinese would repudiate the pursuit of self-interest and particular interest.

Secondly, although Chinese repudiated self-interest and particular interest because of Confucian moral theory, the very theory would encourage "altruistic" political demands. In Confucianism, every human being is believed to be endowed with a heavenly good nature, so when Confucian elite thought they had grasped the heavenly
principle residing in their nature, they would be particularly confident in making political demands. The altruistic political demands would differ from liberal pluralistic demands in at least two ways. First of all, in altruistic political demands, there would be a strong tendency toward monopolization and intolerance. Secondly, in altruistic political demands, "political rights", that is, demands upon others for the self, would be confused with "political obligations", that is, demands upon the self for others.

The hypotheses were well supported by the seven elite journalists' theories about interest articulation. Among the seven elite journalists, none of them accepted the pursuit of and the competition for self-interest and particular interest. Four of them did not even allow competition. Three of them accepted altruistic competition to some extent, but competition for self-interest and particular interest were never accepted.

As mentioned above, Dai Jitao did not know much about Confucian moral philosophy until 1922, a decade after he became a prominent journalist. However, Dai too did not hesitate to single out altruism as the most important virtue of revolutionaries. For example, in Dai's arguments for freedom, freedom meant the freedom of the nation, not the freedom of the individual:

"Many revolutionaries sacrificed their lives in search of freedom. What they fought for was freedom, but they lost freedom permanently when they lost their own lives. Is there contradiction there? No, our comrades, because, in our minds, freedom means freedom of the nation and the people. In order to fight for freedom for our people, we must first give up our own freedom. If we fight for freedom for ourselves, we will not be able to fight for freedom for the whole country. If the whole
country is not free, we will never be really free." (152)

Dai did not hesitate to use altruism to reject competition either. In 1919, in a reply to a Chinese Communist who asked whether revolution should be monopoly, Dai said that revolution had to be a struggle for monopolization, so long the purpose of monopolization was altruistic:

"'Revolution should not be a monopoly of a few people'. The statement contains a fundamental truth. The cause of political disorder in China is 'monopolization'. The psychology of monopolization is selfishness (bao ban) Whoever is selfish has to be a counter-revolutionary......However, selfish monopolization should not be confused with the struggle for monopolization of real revolutionaries. Since revolutions always occur in social disorder, revolutionaries have to fight for their legitimacy in the society.... They have to concentrate all their hearts and minds on revolution.... Everything else becomes destructible in their eyes. Therefore, although the purpose of revolution is peace, the methods are often cruel. Revolutionaries might be as cruel as dictators.... However, there is a crucial difference between a revolutionary and a dictator. While a dictator is selfish, a revolutionary is altruistic." (151)

Like Dai, Chen Duxiu rejected competition in his reply to Hu Shi about why revolutionaries should not tolerate oppositions. His rejection of self-interest and particular interest was less clear than Dai for he did explicitly advocate individual interests and class interests. In his "patriotism and self-consciousness" in 1915, for example, he argued that the purpose of a nation was to protect individuals' rights and to enrich individuals' happiness. If not, the nation did not deserve to be loved. (153)

However, this does not meant that Chen advocated individualism without reservation. In an article on the meaning of life in 1918, Chen tried to balance individualism and collectivism by saying that the society should respect individuals and individuals should sacrifice for the society. (154) In 1920, shortly before
Chen was converted to Marxism-Leninism, the collectivistic tendency became even clearer than before. In an article in the memory of revolutionaries in the Hunan province, Chen said:

"The life of an individual lasts no more than a hundred years. Hence the issue of life is not how long an individual lives, but whether he has a real life. What do I mean by real life? It means the immortal life an individual leaves to the society....Olive Shreiner once said in her fiction 'Have you ever seen how locusts cross rivers? The first one got down to the water and was washed away. The second came and went, so did the third and the fourth. Finally, the dead bodies accumulated and form a bridge fo all the rest to cross over.' Revolutionaries are like locusts. Those who pass do not have real lives, for they will eventually die and leave nothing. Those how die for the bridge have real lives, for the bridge will remain immortal..." (155)

What is the most interesting about Chen's collectivism as a Marxist-Leninst was that, despite his adoption of Marx's theory of class struggle, his concern for national survival often superseded his concern for the interest of the working class. To him, class struggle was more a means to achieve the end of national liberation than an end itself. For example, in June 1924, in an article on the Nationalist Party and the labor movement, Chen argued for the labor movement because of the revolutionary potentiality of the working class:

"I can not say the bourgeoisie is not revolutionary (in China's struggle against imperialism and warlordism), but I know for sure that its zeal for revolution is always intermittent. The higher the class is, such as the bourgeoisie, the more compromising it is. The lower the class is, such as the working class, the more revolutionary it is.....The Nationalist Party advocates cooperation among different classes, but it also has to know which class can give it the greatest revolutionary potentiality.... We should never sacrifice the working class for the interest of the bourgeoisie, because, without the participation of the working class which is the most revolutionary, we will never be able to achieve the goal of national liberation." (156)
As mentioned above, Li Haoran believed the lack of altruism was the origin of international conflicts. In the early 1930s, Li was also known to support a conservative movement, the New Life Movement, to revive Chinese traditional virtues. One of the virtues was "righteousness", which, according to Li, meant "to help others" and "not to seek self-advancement". (157)

Chen Leng believed in Taoist theory of "non-actions", but he was also known to advocate Confucian virtue of altruism. He once attacked Republican politicians' "self-centeredness" as follows:

"Once they have power, they like to deprive all others of power. Once they have wealth, they like to deprive all others of wealth. Once they have a doctrine, they want to make others' doctrines illegitimate. When they are engaged in debates, they want to make others completely in the wrong. Whey they are in competition, they will be happy only after their opponents are totally destroyed...." (158)

Ch'en then argued that such "self-centeredness" could only be cured by denials of self-interest:

"If everyone puts the public before the private, everything can be done. If everyone puts the private before the public, things will be difficult. If everyone puts the public at the service of the private, nothing can be done. What is 'the public'? It is to give priority to the interest of the country and the people." (159)

Chen continued to formulate a theory about political conflicts:

"If everyone puts the public before the private, there would be no conflicts. Conflicts are the biggest barrier for the development of the public interest.....If everyone is for the public interest, but conflicts still arise because of different opinions, one should dissociate oneself. If it is impossible to dissociate, one should retreat. In the world, there are lots of worthwhile things to do, why must we destroy one another because of temporary disagreement?"
Liang Qichao, the founding father of modern Chinese journalism as well as modern Chinese political thought, accepted altruistic competition, but competition for self-interest and particular interest was never allowed. In 1902, Liang wrote an essay on rights and freedom. (160) It was intended to be an attack against Confucianism, particularly its concept of altruism, ren, but it ended up as a defence of it. I shall first introduce his arguments against altruism:

"While Westerners are good at the discussion of rights, Chinese are good at the discussion of ren.... Ren means that I love others and that others love me.... It also means that, in waiting for others to love them, people would willingly discard their autonomy (dai ren yu ren, er fang qi zi you).... Therefore, the more people who love others there are, the more people who wait for others to love them.... Indeed the concept of ren impoverished our national character...."

"Selfishness and self-interest are considered evils in Chinese classics. However, is it true that they are evils? All morality and laws are enacted for self-interest.... If there is no concept of self-interest, there will not be any concept of rights. In competitions, whoever knows how to achieve his own self-interest, he must win."

However, in the same essay, Liang interpreted the concept of rights as "a moral obligation one owed to oneself and the society." It is clearly a confusion of "rights", that is, demands upon others, and "obligations", demands upon oneself.

Hence, it is not at all strange that, in the latter half of the essay, Liang stepped back from his attack against altruism in arguing that self-interest was in fact a form of altruism:

"If people think that I discard altruism to advocate self-interest, they are completely wrong. Self-interest and
Altruism are two sides of the same coin. According to a Japanese philosopher, there are two kinds of selfishness. One is the original selfishness, the other is disguised selfishness, that is, altruism. A person cannot live alone in the world, therefore we have social groups. Anyone who knows how to serve his own interest the best will serve others' interest first so that his own interest will also be served. Whoever loves others will eventually serve his own interest well. Selfishness and altruism are two names of the one origin."

Elsewhere, Liang expounded more on altruism:

"There are two kinds of altruism. The first is emotional. The second is rational. People rejoice or suffer when their loved ones rejoice or suffer, so they love them as they love themselves... This is what I call emotional altruism. Rational altruism is different. Slaves love their master to avoid punishment. Traders rejoice over other traders' success for it will benefit their own trade.... The principle is that if I do not love others, my own interest will not be fulfilled." (161)

From the context, it is clear what Liang meant by "rational altruism" is "rational self-interest" in ordinary usage. The twist of terms reflected Liang's reluctance to accept "self-interest" as a political value. More interesting is Liang's discussion of emotional altruism. Liang believed that, through education, emotional altruism could be expanded from family to countrymen, to all human beings, and even to all living things in the world. He then cited Kang Youwei's famous statement, "patriotism and cosmopolitan love are derived from the mind by not being able to see the sufferings of others" (jiu guo jiu tian xia jie zong qi bu ren ren zhi xin), which could only be drawn from Confucian theory of ren.

What is also interesting in Liang's discussion of "rights" was that he believed that the concept of rights also meant "a moral
responsibility to sacrifice one's physical existence to protect one's spiritual existence." This interpretation is also clearly an anti-utilitarian Neo-Confucian twist of the English concept of rights. In English, rights meant both spiritual and physical, and it is certainly not a moral obligation that one must sacrifice the latter for the former.

It then becomes natural that, in Liang's theory of interest articulation, competitions among different opinions were allowed, but competitions for the purpose of self-interest were not. For example, in 1913, as the head of the Progressive Party, Liang wrote several treatises on the functions of parties in democracy in which he admitted the importance of political competitions among political parties but denied both the pursuit of self-interest of political parties as interest groups and the pursuit of self-interest of parties members as individuals:

"to the complexity and contradictions involved in various local and group interests, it would be unrealistic to ask a political party to represent the interests of all the people in the country.... However, as the essence of a political party is unselfishness,... the party has to formulate its opinions... on the basis of their understanding of national interest. If people compete for individual interests, class interests or local interests within a party, that party is not a real party.....

"Therefore, a person should join a party completely out of a sense of obligation to national politics.....The "rights" of a party member do not exist. To the party, a member should behave like a son to his parents. "Filial piety" is his obligation. He should never ask for compensation for his filial deeds. If he asks for compensation, it is not filial piety....." (162)
Like Chen Duxiu, Hu shi's collectivistic tendency was obscured by his advocacy of individualism. For example, shortly after he returned to China from his study in the United States, he used "individualism" to attack Chinese traditionalism. Under his direction, Xin qing nian put out a special "Ibsen number" in which he advocated unconditional egoism:

"What I most desire for you is a true and pure egoism. It will cause you to feel that the only things that are important in the world are those that concern youself, and that the rest are not worth counting.... At times I feel that the whole world is like a sinking ship at the sea, and that the most important thing is to save yourself." (163)

Hu was also the most outspoken journalist for freedom of expression. In 1922, he drafted a political proposal demanding the Beijing government "to tolerate the freedom of the individual and to love and protect the development of individuality." (164)

Under the Nationalist regime from 1928 to 1937, Hu was again the leader in the protest against thought control. (165) He was also one of the few steadfast supporters of democracy in the thirties when most Chinese intellectuals were overwhelmed by the success of Italian Fascist Movement. (166)

However, Hu Shi's liberalism was also tainted with Confucian moral theory, and turned out to be quite different from liberalism in the West. To be sure, as early as 1906, Hu declared that he no longer believed in Mencius' theory of human altruistic nature. (167). However, this does not mean that he valued altruism any less than Confucian philosophers did. Like Liang Qichao, Hu asserted the value of self-interest for its altruistic results. In
1919, in defending pure and true egoism, Hu said, "Egoism is in fact the most valuable kind of altruism." (168) Also like Liang Qichao, Hu confused rights with obligations. In 1932, in an article on human rights, he quoted Confucian concept of moral obligation, yi, to the concept of "rights", "If it is not in accord with the moral principle of yi, I will not give anyone anything nor will I receive anything from anyone." (fei qi yi ye, i ge bu yu ren, i ge bu qu yu ren) (169) He seemed not at all bothered by the fundamental incompatibility between the denial of self-interest in Confucian tradition and the assertion of self-interest in Western liberalism.

Hu failed to recognize the incompatibility, because, in his understanding, liberalism in the twentieth century had undergone a drastic change in which free competition of self-interests was giving way to cooperation. The inspiration apparently came from John Dewey's essay "Individualism, old and new" in which Dewey preached that cooperation, a positive individualism, should replace the old negative concept of individualism, competition. (170) However, Hu's interpretation of his master's new individualism was clearly more Confucian than Deweyan:

"Individualism has two meanings. The first is egoism. It is false individualism. The nature of egoism is selfishness. It only cares about one's own interest, and does not care about others' interest. The second is true individualism. It aims at developing one's own individuality through independent thinking. It takes full responsibility for the results of one's own thinking and beliefs. It fears neither authority nor the sacrifice of one's own life. It recognized the truth, but not personal interests." (171)
In the text, Hu made at least two points which were more Confucian than Deweyan. The first is that Hu believed personal interest is an antithesis of individualism. The second is that Hu believed individualism meant solely independent thinking. The former reflected a classic Confucian assumption. The latter reflected the anti-utilitarian bias in Neo-Confucianism.

Hence, Hu's theory of political parties was very similar to that of Liang Qichao. Like Liang, Hu admitted the merits of political parties in democracy but insisted that political parties should work for the common interest of the whole society, not special interest of a few:

"We recognize political parties as a necessary devise in the practice of democratic politics, but we will never tolerate membership in parties which promote the interest of a few or of one class, rather than the happiness of the whole society." (172)

Hu later even retreated from his support of pluralism and invented a theory of "suprapartisan politics" in which political parties, the institution for interest articulation, was totally rejected:

"Most people believe that democracy has to be partisan politics. Fortunately, the superstition has been eased somewhat in the recent twenty years. In my opinion, partisan politics will not dominate Chinese constitutional politics in the future, because, when national consciousness expands, partisan consciousness will definitely decline. National consciousness, such as the idea that the state is above all, will create a national and suprapartisan politics." (173)

Hence, despite his advocacy of tolerance and rationality and his faith in democracy, Hu was not able to conceive politics as a
process of competition and reconciliation of self-interests, not
to mention to provide a workable format to implement it.

Following Liang Qichao, Zhang Jiluan also recognized that
pluralism is inevitable in democracy. In 1922, Zhang preached
political pluralism in modern China:

"According to Liang Qichao, there are three regional characters in
China (san da liu yu zhi min xing). The Cantonese are radical....
People in the Yangtze River Region are progressive.....People in
the Yellow River Region are conservative.... These three
characters are all good and necessary for nation-building. If
they all admit one another's merits and try to compromise, or if
they compete with one another in the right way, our nation will be
unified very soon. However, the problem right now is that each
one of the three wants to unify the nation with its own specific
ideology. Each one of them believes that only itself is
absolutely correct and tries to eliminate the existence of
others....." (174)

What makes Zhang's pluralism different from Liang is, unlike Liang
who denied the pursuit of self-interest, Zhang recognized that, in
reality, most people did pursue their self-interest in politics.
For example, on New Year's Day of 1930, Zhang commented on
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's New Year's address on
"righteousness and thrift" as follows:

"Mr. Chiang must have been motivated by a great feeling about
moral inadequacy in our country to write such a touching
essay.....However, we must say a few words about the methods to
promote righteousness and thrift..... Most people among the
general populace have only average intelligence..... Their
morality is dictated by their self-interest. If they can have
peace and glory with righteousness and thrift, they will become
righteous and thrifty. If they can get only humiliation and
poverty with righteousness and thrift, they will not become
righteous and thrifty....." (175)
However, since Zhang was also heavily influenced by Confucian moral philosophy, he was not ready to forego altruism. His solution to the discrepancy between the moral imperative of altruism and the reality of selfishness in politics was to differentiate politicians and the masses. In an article on Chinese politicians, Zhang indicated that the search of self-interest in politics was an inevitable evil for the general populace, but not for politicians:

"I believe that the only method to solve the problem of political corruption is to revive the traditional Chinese spirit..... Chinese used to treat politics as the business of scholars who believed that politics was a great moral obligation and that the most important political virtue was to be thrifty... The social disorder at our times,... is directly caused by political leaders who reward the greedy.... Thus, the best way to save our nation is to reform the morale in the political world.....Once our political leaders regain the traditional spirit....of moral obligation and political conscience, it will not be very difficult to restore political order...." (176)

The underlying principle can be easily traced to Confucius’ statement that self-denial was the virtue of the elite, not that of the masses. This is, however, not an empirical statement, because, empirically, although some politicians are altruistic, many of them are motivated by self-interest or unconscious need for power. (177) It demonstrates that, despite Zhang’s recognition of the value of self-interest in reality, he was not able to avoid the Confucian tendency of moralization in evaluating the role of self-interest in politicians’ behavior.
Objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation in contemporary China -- a historical perspective

China is well-known for its theory and practice of persuasive communications, and particularly, its massive exploitation of mass media for moral mobilization during its radical periods, such as the Great Leap Forward in the late fifties and the Great Cultural Revolution in the late sixties. (178) However, it is not true that objective reporting was ignored. Even Mao Zedong, the architect of subjective moral mobilization, paid considerable attention to practical problems in reality, as exemplified in his articles like "On practice" and "Report of an investigation into the peasant movement in Hunan" (179)

Objective reporting in journalism was also explicitly advocated by pragmatic leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. (180) Liu's advocacy of objective reporting later became one of his crimes in propagating the "capitalist road" in China. According to Mao Zedong and his followers who upheld the orthodox theory of moral persuasion, Liu ignored that truth had a class character and that the Communist press should never give space to "enemies and hostile ideas."

Besides advocating objective reporting, Liu was also accused of promoting selfish personal interest, such as using material incentives to encourage productivity. However, this accusation
in fact twisted Liu's attitude toward the problem of self-interest. On the one hand, Liu did appear more attentive to material well-being of the people. For example, in contrast to Maoist dramatic denial of personal interest, Liu believed that "So long as the interests of the Party are not violated, a Party member can have his private and family life, and develop his individual inclinations." Yet, on the other hand, Liu also clearly stated that individuals should always subordinate personal interests to that of the collective. (181) Thus, on the issue of personal interest, Liu was more in accord with pragmatic Confucianism than with capitalism.

Liu died in 1971 in humiliation, but, since the downfall of Maoists in 1978, his pragmatic ideas have become the guiding force for the pragmatic policies of "Four Modernizations" in the current regime. Thus, it is quite natural that Liu's ideas about objective reporting and the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation were brought back. For example, in March 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the current pragmatic line, launched a democratization movement to allow more freedom of expression. The masses responded with tremendous enthusiasm. Big posters and underground publications flourished. The Democracy Wall for big posters in Peking quickly became a worldly known public forum for political criticism. However, when some of the critics began to praise capitalism and to attack socialism, Deng decided that the movement had gone too far. He charged that in attacking socialism these people actually put their personal interest above the national
interest. (182) In April 1979, the movement came to an end when many writers were arrested and big posters and underground publications were banned. Many then came to the conclusion the whole democratization movement was staged by Deng to consolidate his own power. However, it is also clear that Deng manipulated the value of objectivity within the limit of altruism, a practice quite common in the pragmatic approach in Chinese political culture.

The leaders of the democratization movement fought for freedom of expression, and thus was accused of being "individualistic." However, it seems that most of them considered themselves "altruistic" rather than "individualistic." For example, after Liu Qing, the publisher of an underground journal in Beijing was sent to the labor camp in the Northwest on charges of counter-revolution, he smuggled a big-poster back to Beijing to accuse the public security system of abuses. In this almost suicidal attempt, Liu comforted himself with his own selflessness in a way not very different from a Confucian Martyr:

"The public security bureau has total control over me. It can do whatever it wants to me, but I will fight until I die....because, if a people tolerate injustice without any protest, it is determined to perish. Chinese people are not like that. Even under the most severe totalitarian control, it always has many sons and daughters who will sacrifice themselves for the right of political criticism." (183)

Neither the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation was accepted in Taiwan where elections for local officials had
been held regularly in the past thirty five years. For example, in an opinion poll conducted in Taipei in October 1983, 56.4% of the citizens believed that representatives should refuse to promote special interests of their constituencies so that they could supervise the government with fair-mindedness. 18.43% believed that they should maintain a balance between their responsibility for special interest groups and the responsibility for fair supervision of the government. Only 7.92% believed that representatives should actively promote special interest groups. (184)

The paper demonstrates, during the first three and half decades of twentieth century, objective reporting was well established as a professional model in modern Chinese journalism. However, unlike American journalism during the age of the penny press, objective reporting did not promote the liberal pluralistic norm of interest articulation because the norm contradicted the most deep-seated value in Chinese cultural tradition, altruism. The pattern persists in contemporary Chinese culture and will certainly remain as the most fundamental issue in the transformation of Chinese political culture.

2. Ibid. pp. 57-60


4. See, for example, Hsiao Kung-chuan, "Liang Song di gong li si xiang" (The Utilitarian Thought in the Northern and Southern Song Dynasties) and "Yuan you dang ren ji li xue jia zhi zheng lun" (The Political Theories of the Yuan You Faction and the Orthodox Neo-Confucians) Zhongguo zheng zhi si xiang shi (A History of Chinese Political Thought) Taipei, 1971 pp. 445-519

5. See, for example, Liang Qichao's study on Yen Yuan's (1635-1704) theory of practical actions (xi), "Yen Li xue pai yu xian dai jiao yu si chao" (Yen Yuan, Li Kung, and the Modern Educational Thought) Yin pin shi wen ji, Taipei, 1978, 14, pp. 3-22

6. See, for example, Yu Ying-shih, "Ch'ing Confucian Intellectualism" The Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies 1975, pp. 105-146


10. For studies on the political thoughts of Liang Qichao, Zhen Duxiu and Hu Shi in English, see Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, Cambridge, 1971; Philip Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism, Seattle, 1972; Benjamin Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West" Journal of the History of Ideas 7:1 (January 1951); Jerome Grieder, Hu Shih and Chinese

11. Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics, a Developmental Approach Boston, 1966


17. Richard Hall, "Professionalization and Bureaucratization" American Sociological Review 30 (February 1968) pp. 93-104


27. Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, *Government Control of the Press in Modern China, 1900-1949* Cambridge, 1974, pp. 7-8

28. Robert Marsh, *The Mandarin*, New York, 1961, p. 14; according to Marsh, in the nineteenth century, about 2% of Chinese total population belonged to the gentry class. Among the 2%, about 2% were actually appointed, 12% were not appointed, while 86% were local elite, not eligible for office.

29. According to Andrew Nathan, the total circulation of Chinese press was 300,000 in 1908; see his "Jin dai Zhongguo yu lun zhi xing qi" (The rise of public opinion in modern China) *Zhongguo xian dai shi zhuoan yi yan jiu bao gao*, 10, Taipei, 1980; the total circulation of daily newspapers in 1936 was about 3 million, see Lin Yutang, *The History of the Press and Public Opinion in China*, Chicago, 1937, p. 48


31. ibid., pp. 18-19

32. ibid., pp. 23-31

33. ibid., p. 29


35. Mai Siyuan, "Qi shi nian lai Hong Kong zhi bao ye" (Hong Kong press in the past seventy years) in *Hua zi ri bao qi shi i nian ji nian kan Hong Kong*, 1935


37. Hu Daojing, "*Shen bao liu shi liu nian shi*, (A history of *Shen bao* in the past 66 years), *Xin wen shi shang di xin shi dai* (A new era in the history of journalism), Shanghai, 1946, p. 103

38. Hu Daojing, "*Xin wen bao si shi nian shi*, (A history of *Xin wen bao* in the past 40 years), in *Bao xue za zhi*, 2 (September 16, 1948)

39. Ming Du, "San shi nian hui i hua cang sang" (On
vicissitudes in the past thirty years) in Bao xue (January, 1962)


42. Hu Daojing, "Xin wen bao si shi nian shi", in Bao xue za ji, 2 (September, 1948)

43. Hu Daojing, "Shen baa liu shi liu nian shi", Xin wen shi shang di xin shi dai Shanghai, 1946, p. 103

44. Hu Daojing, "Xin wen bao si shi nian shi", in Bao xue za ji, 2 (September, 1948)


46. Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo bao xue shi, Shanghai, 1926

47. Hu Daojing, "Shen baa liu shi liu nian shi", Xin wen shi shang di xin shi dai Shanghai, 1946, p. 93

48. Ming Du, "San shi nian hui i hua cang sang" in Bao xue (January, 1962)

49. Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo bao xue shi, Shanghai, 1926, pp. 327-28

50. Gu Mei, Xian dai Zhongguo ji qi jiao yu (Modern China and its education), Shanghai, 1934, pp. 371-72. The relatively high salary of journalists working for large commercial newspapers were, however, exceptional. As most of other newspapers were struggling for existence, their journalists were paid very little. After the 1911 Revolution, about 500 newspapers were established in the country, newerly four times as many as ten years before. However, most had circulations only around 2,500. Many were quickly shut down. (Lai Guanglin, Qi shi nien Zhongguo bao ye shi, Taipei, 1981, p. 18) Under the suppression of the new president Yuan Shikai, the number of newspapers was reduced to 139 in 1913. According to the Nationalist Government, China had 628 newspapers in 1927, and 910 newspapers in 1935. Only one third of them had on full-sized sheet or more each issue and only 31 had circulations above 5,000 (ibid, pp. 95-97). Judging from the small number of successful newspapers, it is reasonable to conclude that, a great number of the commercial newspapers could not afford handsome salaries for their employees. Besides, there were many irregularities in the journalistic profession. According to several reporters in Beijing, at least 40 to 50 newspapers in Beijing in the twenties were actually "ghosts newspapers" without real existence. (Wang
Xinming, Xin wen quan nei si shi nian , Taipei, 1957) They were "published" only to blackmail bureaucrats in the government. "Ghost journalists" had an organization in which they took turns putting out a newspaper containing patches taken from large newspapers. Others then changed the title to make it into their own. "Ghost journalists" were probably supported very well by politicians, but they were hardly journalists.

52. Ibid., p. 72
53. Ibid., p. 69
54. Zhang Xueyuan "Xin wen ji zhe di Liang Qichao" (Liang Qichao as a journalist), in Xin wen xue ji kan , 2:2, (February, 1940)
56. Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo jin dai bao kan shi , Shaanxi, 1981, pp. 78
57. Ibid., pp. 183-88
59. Ibid., pp. 271-77
60. Ge Gongzhen, Zhongguo bao xue shi , Shanghai, 1926, pp. 204-05
61. Huang Liangji, Dong fang za zhi zhi kan xing ji qi ying xiang. (The publication and influence of Dong fang za zhi ) Taipei, 1969; for the circulation of the magazine, see Shanghai xin wen shi ye shi liao ji yao Dalian, 1924, Taipei, reprint, 1977, appendix p. 33
62. Zou Taofen, Taofen wen ji (Selected essays of Zou Taofen), Beijing, 1981, pp. 1-17
64. Hu Daojing "Shanghai di ri bao" (Daily newspapers in Shanghai), Shanghai xin wen shi ye shi ji yao (Collected essays on newspapers in Shanghai), Dalian, 1924, Taipei, reprint, 1977, p. 280
65. Yen Shenyu "Ben bao di chuang kan" (The founding of Zhong yang ri bao ) Zhong yang ri bao , March 12, 1946
66. The episode was disclosed in Hu shi's personal correspondences recently discovered in China, see Lien he bao (United daily), Taipei, September-October, 1982

67. Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, Government Control of the Press in Modern China Cambridge, 1974, p. 71

68. Huang Yuanyong, Yuan sheng i zhu (Selected essays of Huang Yuanyong) Taipei, 1962, p. 7

69. For a biography of Cheng Ping, see Cheng Cangpo, "Zhongguo zi you shi shang di yi wei li di ji zhe" (An independent journalist in the history of freedom in China) in Cang po wen xuan Taipei, 1964, pp. 269-75; "Shi jie ri bao chu chuang jie duan" (The creation of Shi jie ri bao) in Xin wen wen jiu zi liao Beijing, 1980; For a biography of Shao Piaoping, see Xie Xinliang "Zhui diao Shao Piaoping xian sheng" (In memory of Mr. Shao Piaoping) Qing hua zhou kan 25, pp. 10-12 (1925) and his own Shih ji ying yong xin wen xue (Journalism in practice) Beijing, 1923

70. Li Ao, "Bo zhong zhe Hu Shi" (Hu Shi, the seed-planter) in Hu Shi ying ji jie Taipei, 1964


72. Zhang Jiluan, "Da gong bao yi wan hao fa kan ci" (On the publication of the number one hundred thousand Da gong bao) Da gong bao, May 5, 1931

73. Lai Guanglin, Qi shi nian Zhongguo bao ye shi, Taipei, 1981, p. 115

74. Zhang Jiluan "Ben bao fu kan shi nien ji nien ci" "On the tenth anniversary of the new Da gong bao" in Jiluan wen cu (Selected essays of Zhang Jiluan), Shanghai, 1947, p. 202

75. Lai Guanglin, Qi shi nian Zhongguo bao ye shi Taipei, 1981 p. 116
76. Chen Bulei "Yi ge xin wen jie jiu ren zhi zi shen jing yen tan" (On my personal experiences in the journalistic world) in Cao Juren, ed., Xian dai Zhongguo bao gao wen xue xuan. Hong Kong, 1963

77. Fang Hanqi Zhongguo jin dai bao kan shi Shaanxi, 1981, p. 83

78. Liang Qichao "Lun bu bien fa zhi hai" (On damages caused by avoiding political reforms) Yin bin shi wen ji Taipei, 1978, 1, p. 3

79. Liang Qichao "Jing kao wo tong ye zhu jun" (To my comrade journalists) ibid., 4, p. 36

80. Liang Qichao "Bao guo hui yen shuo ci" (Address to the Society of national Preservation), ibid., 2, p. 27


82. See Lu-tao Sophia Wang, "Self-contradictory Liang Qichao -- A Psychological Interpretation", manuscript, January 1983. Cyclothymia is a mild emotional disorder seen in the biological relatives of manic-depressive patients. Patients do not differ from normal people except that they often had short periods of drastic mood and behavior swings between elation and depression, such as hyperactivity and inactivity, over-confidence and feelings of self-inadequacy, over-optimism and pessimism, unusually creative thinking and inability of clear thinking, uninhibited people-seeking and social withdrawal, etc., see Diagnostic and Statistical manual of Mental Disorder 1980, pp. 218-219; Some attempted to explore its psychodynamic and cultural causes but the findings were not conclusive. As most patients were found biologically related to patients of manic-depressive disorder, the cyclothymic disorder is generally attributed to biological rather than cutlural causes. I would like to thank Dr. Paul Yin at the Brockton V. A. Medical Center for the identification of the disorder.

83. Confucius, Analects, 7:29

84. Max Weber, The Religion of China New York, 1964, p. 245 Weber is correct in pointing out that, compared to Puritanism, "the lack of asceticism" in Confucianism is related to its theory of human nature. However, as will be be discussed in the following, far from being denied, the role of asceticism was in fact very ambiguous in Confucianism.

85. For example, Confucius taught that wealth and honor should not be enjoyed if they are attained in violation fo moral principle (Analects, 4:5) Mencius also contrasted "human life" and "moral righteousness" as fish and bear paws and advised that a great man should give up the former for the latter. (The Book of Mencius 3B:9)
86. Confucius, *Analects* 4:16

87. Yen Yuan (1635-1704), a famous utilitarian thinker in the Qing dynasty, advocated studying through practical experiences, see Liang Qichao "Yen Li si xiang yu xian dai jiao yu si chao" (Yen Yuan, Li Kung and the modern educational thought) in *Yin pin shi wen ji* Taipei, 1978, 14, pp. 1-27; and Hu Shi Dai Dongyuan zhe xue Taipei, 1967, pp. 4-8


90. ibid., p. 105

91. Liang Qichao *Qing dai xue shu gai lun* (The intellectual trends in the Qing dynasty) Taipei, 1963

92. Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate* Berkeley, 1958, pp. 5-8


96. Liang Qichao, "Nanhai Kang xian sheng zhuan" (A biography of Mr. Kang Youwei from Nanhai) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Taipei, 3, pp. 57-89

97. Liang Qichao, "Wan mu cao tang xiao xue ji" (On my education at the Wan-mu Academy) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Taipei, 2, pp. 33-35

98. Liang Qichao, *Qing dai xue shu gai lun* (The intellectual trends in the Qing dynasty) 1926, pp. 56-57

99. ibid.

100. Liang Qichao "Wei xin" (On Idealism) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Shanghai, 1902, 7, pp. 76

101. Liang Qichao "Yen shi po li chun" (Inspiration) ibid., 9, pp. 42-44

102. Liang Qichao "Bao guo hui yen shuo ci" (Address to the Society of National Preservation) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Taipei, 2, p. 27

103. Liang Qichao "Ru ho cai neng wan cheng guo qing di yi yi"
(How can we achieve the true meaning of the National Independence Day) Yin bin shi wen ji Taipei, 15, p. 17

104. Liang Qichao "Ren sheng guan yu ke xue" (Philosophy of life and science) Yin bin shi wen ji Taipei, 14, pp. 21-26


106. Wei Shaozheng "Ye Chucang xian sheng di yong rong" i wen zhi 3, (1965), p. 16


108. ibid.

109. Dai Jitao "Yu zhi du shu ji" (On my education) in Dai Jitao xian sheng wen cun Taipei, 1959, pp. 541-49

110. ibid.

111. Dai Jitao "Ji shao shi shi" (On my childhood) in ibid., p. 598

112. Dai Jitao "San min zhu yi di zhe xue ji chu" (The philosophical foundation for the Three People’s Principles) Dai Jitao xian sheng wen cun Taipei, 1959, p. 401

113. ibid., pp. 325-340

114. Lun Xun "Lun fei er po lai yin gai huan xing" (On the necessity of postponing "fair play") Lun Xun chuan ji (Complete works of Lu Xun) Beijing, 1956, 1, p. 247

115. Lai Guanglin "Xin ching nian" in his Jin dai Zhongguo bao ren yu bao ye (Journalists and journalism in modern China) Taipei, 1977


117. Chen Duxiu, "Wu Peifu yu Kang Youwei" (Wu Peifu and Kang Youwei) Xiang dao 25 (May 16, 1923)

118. Chen Duxiu, "Fang guo pi di Jia yin" (Jia yin is like a farting dog) ibid., 185 (January 27, 1927)


120. Chen Duxiu "Ji du jiao yu Zhongguo ren" (Christianity and Chinese) Xin ching nian 7:3 (February 1920)

121. Chen Duxiu "Tiao he lun yu jiu dao te" (Compromise and
traditional virtues) in ibid., 7:1 (December 1919)

122. Chen Duxiu Shi an zi zhuan Taipei, 1967

123. Li Haoran, "Shi nian bian ji jing yen tan" (On my ten year’s experiences as a newspaper editor) Xin wen guan san shi nian ji nian ji Shanghai, 1923, p. 14

124. Haoran "Ri-ben zhi zhen yi ho zai" (What is Japan’s real intention?) Xin wen bao, January 27, 1932

125. An sample survey of Li’s editorials in Xin wen bao from 1928 to 1938. Sample size, 222.

126. Haoran, "Min zu fu xing zhi yao jian" (Basics to revive our nation) Xin wen bao April 1, 1934

127. Haoran "Zhu yi shi xing" (Pay attention to practical actions" Xin wen bao march 5, 1932

128. Haoran, "Diao wei-lian bo shi" (In memory of Dr. Williams) Xin wen bao August 5, 1935

129. Information given by Cheng Cangpo in an interview with this author in June 1982, Taipei.

130. Li Haoran "Zhang Jiluan tong xue wu shi shou xu" (On the fiftieth birthdy of my classmate Zhang Jiluan) Guo wen zhou bao 14:2 p. 70; Li rarely discussed Western political theories or practices in his editorials, but he did mention Yen Fu’s translations of Western political theories occasionallly. For an example, see his discussion of Yen Fu’s translation of Herber Spencer’s The Principle of Sociology. Xin wen bao August 5, 1935

131. Zhao Junhao, "Chen Jinghan xian sheng yu Shanghai Shen bao" (Mr. Chen Jinghan and Shen bao in Shanghai) Bao Xue lun ji Taipei, 1965, p. 51

132. Chen Leng "Qu liu" (on leaving and staying) Shih bao December 8, 1909

133. Bao Tianxiao, Zhuan ying lou hui yi lu (Memoirs in th Zhuan ying Tower) Hong Kong, 1971

134. Chen Leng "Zi gu bu xia" (On even having trouble in talking care of oneself) Shen bao January 6, 1924

135. Chen Leng "Lu xing zhi wo" (About my traevlling experiences) in Lu xing za zhi 100, 1936, p. 96

136. Hu Shih "Xin si chao di yi yi" (The meaning of the new thought) Xin Qing nian December 1919, translation by Jerome Grieder in Hu Shih and Chinese Liberalism Cambridge, 1969, p. 126

137. Hu Shi "Wo men zou na yi tiao lu" (Which way shall way go?) Xin Yue December 10, 1929
138. Hu Shi "Min chuan di bao zhang" (How to protect human rights) Du li ping lun February 19, 1933

139. Hu Shi "Wang Jingwei yu Zhang Xueliang" (Wang Jingwei and Zhang Xueliang) Du li ping lun August 14, 1932

140. For Hu Shi's biographies, see Li Ao, Hu Shi ping zhuang (A critical biography of Hu Shi), Taipei, 1964 and Jerome Grieder, Hu Shih and Chinese Liberalism Cambridge, 1969

141. ibid. p. 5


143. Hu Shi, for example, was accused of being a man with a Chinese body but an American brain by Chinese Communists and was the object of mass criticism in China in 1957, see Jerome Grieder Hu Shih and Chinese Liberalism Cambridge, 1968 p. 307


145. Zhang Juluan "Dui yu yin lun zi you zhi bu ren shi" (On a minimal understanding of freedom of expression) Da Gong bao April 26, 1930

146. Zhang Juluan " Da gong bao fa xing i wan bao ji nian ci" (On the publication of the number ten thousandth Da gong bao) Da gong bao May 25, 1931


148. Zhang Juluan "Jiao fei yao wu" (An essential point about how to exterminate Communists) Da gong bao June 19, 1932

149. Zhang Juluan "Eu zhu kong zhong" (An appeal to the public) Da gong bao April 25, 1930

150. Zhang Juluan "Guei xiang ji" (Homecoming) Guo wen zhou bao 12:1 January 1, 1934


152. Dai Jitao "Bai xun" (One hundred lessons), 191, Dai Jitao xian sheng wen cun 2, Taipei, 1962, pp. 276-277


154. Chen Duxiu, "Ren sheng zhen yi" (The true meaning of life)
155. Chen Duxiu, "Huan ying Hunan ren di jing shen" (We welcome the Hunanese spirit) *Xin qing nian* 20, (January 5, 1920)

156. Chen Duxiu, "Guomingdang yu lao dong yung dong" (The Nationalist Party and the Labor Movement) *Xiang dao zhou bao* 71, (June 25, 1924)

157. Haoran, "Xin sheng huo yun dong zhong lun li yi lian chi" (On rituals, righteousness, frugality and shame in the New Life Movement) *Xin wen bao*, March 27, 1933

158. Chen Leng "Can ren yu ren ai" (Cruelty and benevolence) *Shen bao* January 15, 1928

159. Chen Leng, "Gong si san shuo" (Three theories about the public and the private) *Shen bao* January 15, 1927

160. Liang Qichao, "Lun chuan li si xiang" (On the concept of rights) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Shanghai, 1902 edition, 10, pp. 29-36

161. Liang Qichao, "Le li zhu yi tai do Bianxin zhi xue shuo" (On the thought of Bentham, the master of utilitarianism) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Taipei, 1978 edition, 5, p. 38

162. Liang Qichao, "Jing gao zheng dang yu dang yuan" (To political parties and party members) *Yin bin shi wen ji* Taipei, 1978 edition, 11, pp. 1-13

163. Hu Shi, "I-bu-sheng zhu yi" (Ibsenism) *Xing qing nian* (June 1918)

164. Hu Shi, "Wo meng di zheng zhi zhu zhang" (Our political proposal) *Nu li zhou bao* (May 14, 1922)

165. Hu Shi, "Ming chuan di bao zhang" *Du li ping lun* (February 19, 1933)

166. Hu Shi, "Zhongguo wu du cai di bi yao yu ke neng" (It is neither necessary nor possible to promote dictatorship in China) *Du li ping lun* (December 16, 1934)


169. Hu Shi, "Min chuan di bao zhang" *Du li ping lun* (February 19, 1933)

171. Hu Shi "Fei ge ren zhu yi di xin sheng huo" (A non-individualsitic new life) date January 26, 1920, in Hu Shi wen cun 4, Taipei, 1953

172. Hu Shi "Zheng zhi tong yi di tu jin" (The path to political unification) Du li ping lun (January 21, 1934)

173. Hu Shi "Cong yi dang dao wu dang di zheng zhi" (From one-party to nonpartisan politics) Du li ping lun (October 6, 1935)


175. Zhang Jiluan "Lun ti chang qi jie lian chi" (How to advocate righteousness and thrift) Da gong bao January 7, 1930 see also Jiluan wen cun pp. 3-5

176. Zhang Jiluan "Zhongguo zheng zhi fu bai zhi ben yuan" (The origins of political corruption in China) Da gong bao April 20, 1923

177. see for example, Robert Dahl Modern Political Analysis New Haven, 1976 pp. 113-116

179. Mao Zedong, "On practice" and "Report of an investigation into the peasant movement in Hunan" in Stuart R. Schram, ed., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung New York, 1977, pp. 190-194, pp. 250-59. Mao's famous quote on pragmatism "Experiments are the only criteria to test the validity of the truth" (Shi yen shi jian yen zhen li di wei yi biao zhun) is now used extensively to justify the current pragmatic program of "Four Modernizations", but many argued that the quote is in fact a variation of Hu Shi's pragmatic slogan "Experiments are touchstones of the truth" (shi yen shi zhen li di shi jin shi) For Hu's influence on Mao, see Rober A. Scalapino "The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary - Mao Zedong in 1919-1921" The Journal of Asian Studies, 42:1 (November 1982) pp. 29-62; and Yu Ying-shih "Zhongguo jin dai si xiang shi shang di Hu Shi" (Hu Shi in modern Chinese intellectual history) Lian he bao May 4-14, 1983

180. Lowell Dittmer Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Politics of Mass Criticism Berkeley, 1974, pp. 269-70

181. ibid., p. 216-218

182. "I qie cong guo jia han ren min di gen ben li yi chu fa" (Everything should be considered from the standpoint of the fundamental national interest), editorial, Ren min ri bao April 2, 1979


184. Zhong yang ri bao (Central Daily) October 17, 1983. The poll was conducted by 41 municipal council members in Taipei. The result was drawn from 46,221 questionnaires (return ratio 15.41%).