LONG-RANGE ALTERNATIVES IN ITALIAN POLITICS

The present precarious balance in the Italian Parliament renders the establishment of a stable and positive governmental combination extremely problematical over the short run. In the Chamber, the Christian Democrats have lost their absolute majority and now hold 262 of the 590 Chamber seats. The three minor Center parties -- the Social Democrats (19 seats), the Republicans (5 seats), and the Liberals (14 seats) -- command a total of 38 seats. On the Left, the Communists have 143 seats and their Left-wing Socialist allies have 75. The extreme Right, on the other hand, comprises 69 seats: 40 for the Monarchists and 29 for the Neo-Fascists of the MSI. The remaining 3 seats belong to the Südtiroler Volkspartei, a German Catholic party of Bolzano and Trento provinces. A somewhat more viable situation exists in the Senate, where the Christian Democrats have 116 out of 237 seats, and the minor Center parties have 7 seats: 4 for the Social Democrats and 3 for the Liberals. Here the Communists and Left-wing Socialists have 86 seats (54 Communists, 28 Socialists, and 4 bloc candidates), the extreme Right has 25 (16 Monarchists and 9 Neo-Fascists), and minor groupings have 3 (1 National Democratic Alliance and 2 Südtiroler Volkspartei).
On the surface, the above situation might appear to permit the formation of several different types of governmental combinations based on slim but workable majorities. Actually, however, the heterogeneous complexion of the Christian Democratic Parliamentary Group makes the adoption of any clear political line very difficult indeed. A return to the four-party coalition, with the Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats supporting a Demo-Christian-dominated Cabinet, would probably be impossible unless the Demo-Christians adopted a more Leftist and less pronouncedly clerical approach than has been the case in the past. In fact, Giuseppe Saragat, leader of the Social Democrats, has advocated an "opening to the Left" -- an invitation to Nenni's Left-wing Socialists to enter the Cabinet or, in any event, support the government.¹ Such a departure from the spirit and letter of De Gasperi's Centrist approach would almost certainly be rejected by the conservative wing of Christian Democracy, which is still a force to be reckoned with despite recent electoral setbacks in its Southern strongholds.² On the other hand, the 20-odd Christian Democratic trade union deputies and the 70-80 deputies of "Iniziativa Democratica" (led by former Minister of the Interior Amintore Fanfani, Paolo Emilio Taviani and Mariano Rumor) could not be expected to underwrite a government based on a Christian Democratic-Monarchist entente. It was Pella's open wooing of the Monarchists, in fact, which first alienated
the minor Center parties and then forced the Fanfani group into open intra-party opposition, leading to the overthrow of the Pella Government.

There is, then, no assurance that a stable government can be formed without new elections and, for that matter, no sure indication that another election would necessarily produce a more satisfactory alignment in Parliament. But rather than analyze the possibilities of the next few months -- a moderately useful task but one which would involve the large margin of error and the limited validity for which such efforts at short-run prediction must always allow-- it might be more desirable to trace out the long-range alternatives which could conceivably emerge from Italy's current political stalemate. American appraisals of Italian politics often suffer from a short-term manipulative bias, a tacit assumption that, if only the next election can be won and a "strong government" formed, all will be well. This results in the concoction, by American policy-makers, of a never-ending succession of transparent expedients designed to win the next election or openly fortify the existing government against a Parliamentary crisis. The ill-starred Trieste declarations of 1948 and 1953; the pre-electoral mixtures of thinly-veiled threat, exhortation, and cajolery; the continuous flow of official and unofficial advice -- much of it based on gross over-simplification of Italian problems, as for instance the Dayton
bombshell\(^3\) of 1950, our efforts to induce the "laic" democratic trade unions to fuse with the Catholic CISL\(^4\) and recent suggestions that offshore procurement contracts be granted only to firms utilizing American-type loyalty screening procedures:\(^5\) these are all manifestations of our Italian policy, which might be characterized as a series of spasmodic responses to violent electrical stimuli.

Yet if American foreign policy is to be successful in its aim of helping to ensure a peaceful and reasonably stable Western world, progressing both politically and economically toward higher forms of development, such policy must consider long-term trends and possibilities as well as the fleeting events of the day. It must also consider the eventual implications of some of the hasty experiments we are so quick to advocate. In this paper, I propose to examine briefly a set of possible future outlets, both democratic and non-democratic, for Italy's current crisis.

**Long-run Alternatives**

I. A Return to Fascism

This possibility can probably be ruled out. The Neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) has a fairly limited appeal and polled only 5.9% of the vote in 1953, losing 100,000 votes from the record of 1.6 million attained in the administrative elections of 1951-2. Despite its gains in Northern and North-Central Italy, it is still strongest in the South and Islands, far from the centers
of political and economic power. Its leadership is rather on the mediocre side (De Marsanich and Almirante were minor figures even under Fascism); and the memory of the Fascist era and of the German-sponsored Social Republic of 1943–5 is still too fresh in Italian minds. The MSI, like its Fascist predecessor, could rise to power only through a campaign of systematic violence against other political groupings. But this time the essential ingredient which made the March on Rome possible -- police and Army protection for the Fascist punitive squads\(^6\) -- is lacking and is not likely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Nor is financial support from Northern industrialists as generous as after World War I. The pseudo-Socialist program and wild-eyed demeanor of the MSI has thoroughly frightened many Northern capitalists, who tend to favor more orthodox Rightist movements like the Monarchists.\(^7\) Barring a world-wide depression or some similar catastrophic development, the MSI has virtually no chance of seizing absolute power unless a Right-Center regime takes the unlikely step of relying on Fascist strong-arm support, repeating the disastrous experience of 1919–22.

II. A Communist Italy

This eventuality, though improbable, cannot be entirely excluded: the Communist Party could rise to power in the future as head of a Popular Front coalition including the Nenni Socialists, the minor
Center parties driven leftward by Right-wing excesses, and possibly even disgruntled elements from the ranks of Christian Democracy itself.

An essential precondition for the formation of a Popular Front would be a sustained effort on the part of a Christian Democratic or Liberal Premier to appease the extreme Right. Had Pella received the support of his party in his policy of rapprochement with the Monarchists and Neo-Fascists, had his appointment of a Right-wing Christian Democrat acceptable to the Monarchists to the key post of Minister of Agriculture been approved in party councils, the minor Center parties (which are even now thoroughly disillusioned with Christian Democracy) and the Demo-Christian trade-union elements led by Pastore and Morelli might eventually have been amenable to the Popular Front appeal as a defense against the threat of resurgent Fascism.

Communism has by no means shot its bolt in Italy. Its progress on June 7 marked the continuation of a steady advance begun in 1945. Having virtually consolidated its position among the sharecroppers and farmhands of North-Central Italy and among the workers in the sheltered large-scale industries of the Milan-Turin-Genoa industrial triangle, it has, with the help of its Left-wing Socialist ally, begun to gain at the expense of the Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats in the Catholic strongholds of North Lombardy and the Veneto. The inability of the Italian economic system to absorb its new levies as they enter the labor force may be the reason behind the considerable rise in Communist votes in North Lombard and Venetian industrial areas where Christian Democratic hegemony was previously all but unchallenged. And the awakening South, where the Communist Party has made its most spectacular gains since 1946, is still a partly untapped reservoir.

To be sure, the Communist Party faces some well-nigh insuperable obstacles -- the hostility of most of the urban middle class and land-owning peasantry, the fact that part of the working-class militates in Catholic and Republican-Socialist trade unions, occasional displays of rebelliousness or passive resistance by some sections of its rank and file with some resultant losses of votes, and its dependence on a tenuous alliance with its junior partner and would-rival, Nenni's PSI (over 1/3 of the extreme Leftist vote in 1953 was polled by the PSI). But the continued existence of chronic unemployment and under-employment, the threat of further lay-offs, the widespread public belief that Italian political life is corrupt and that tax evasion by the rich is rampant, the hunger for land and bread in the South and Islands, and the bitter resentment that many secular Centrists feel in regard to clerical domination of Italy and Christian Democratic failure to implement certain Constitutional
norms\textsuperscript{10} -- all these factors work in favor of Italian Communism. Besides, the Communist Party has an excellent well-financed organization,\textsuperscript{11} a serious, concrete, outwardly constructive approach to Italian problems, and a messianic zeal matched only by some elements of Christian Democracy and Catholic Action. But the latter are hampered by an attitude of cloying paternalism which antagonizes large sections of the populace, while the Communist Party, through its intimate cell structure and its constant agitation and discussion of specific goals and targets gives people the illusory sense of actually participating in important policy decisions. The disciplined docility of the Communist electorate (in reality the Socialist electorate of 1919 rendered ripe for Communism by the blackjacks and castor oil of the Fascist action squads), the Communist domination of the trade unions, the bankruptcy of the minor Center parties, and above all the absence of a strong ably-led democratic Socialist party give the PCI a quasi-monopoly of the Leftist opposition to Christian Democracy. The Italian Communist Party will probably be unable to overcome the obstacles cited above, but it will remain an ever-present threat to Italian democracy, especially if it is able to retain the PSI as its ally.

III. A "Salazar" Solution

This is a perhaps overly picturesque title for the ultimate non-democratic outcome of a Right-Center coalition government:
a gradual, more or less violent evolution toward a traditional and rather flexible authoritarian regime of the Portuguese or Latin American type, with or without one-man rule. Such a government would be largely Christian Democratic, with the participation or support of the Monarchists and Right-wing Liberals and with the support or benevolent neutrality of the Neo-Fascists. At the helm would be a conservative Liberal or Christian Democrat of great personal prestige and integrity -- a man like Pella. In fact, there was some apprehension that such a government might be in the making under Pella, who seemed to feel a peculiar need to consult Monarchist and Neo-Fascist leaders on every possible occasion and to speak at the commemoration of Salandra (an interventionist Liberal leader of World War I, who symbolizes the Rightist strand of Italian Liberalism). The inflation of the Trieste question into an overriding issue, transcending all domestic problems and giving rise to riots and jingoist demonstrations, so strengthened Pella's position as to encourage him to seek an understanding with the Right. However, Pella's own party rebelled against him when the Monarchists unveiled one of their conditions -- the appointment of a Minister of Agriculture hostile to the land reform program, Salvatore Aldisio.

Americans, who are sometimes sadly susceptible to the appeal of "the strong man above politics", may perhaps labor under some
delusions as to the character such a regime would perforce assume. A Right-Center government would have to soft-pedal the land reform program (anathema to the Monarchists and to many Right-wing Demo-
Christians), shut an eye to tax law violations, and give strident nationalism a free rein. Dependent as it would be on the most blindly egotistical business and agrarian classes in Western Europe, it would have to sponsor a high-tariff, restrictive policy in regard to foreign trade, while supporting high prices, anti-strike legislation, and reduced social benefits at home. Moreover, it would have to appropriate funds for isolated pork-barrel projects dear to the hearts of Southern deputies, rather than for integrated programs for Southern development. There would be an increasing tendency to use the police and the State apparatus (the provincial Prefects, etc.) to discourage adverse criticism and "manage" elections in the best tradition of Southern politics. Finally, since the Monarchist Party includes many former Fascist hierarchs (Cantalupo, Acerbo, Delcroix), an alliance with it would be regarded as tantamount to a vindication of Fascism in its less extreme aspects -- in other words, a repudiation of the Italian Resistance.

Such a development would probably drive the minor democratic parties into forming a common front with the Nenni Socialists, and through them, with the Communists. It might also lead to the
secession from the DC of many Catholic trade-union elements and be some of Fanfani's followers. It would/be impossible, then, within the framework of the present Parliamentary line-up, to create a Right-Center coalition of the sort Pella envisaged, barring an unconditional capitulation by the DC Left leading to the formation of a Popular Front by the Leftist and Centrist opposition. Only a decisive advance by the extreme Right in new elections, coupled with a higher ratio of preference votes for conservative Demo-Christian deputies (on June 7, the trade-union and "Iniziative Democratica" factions forged ahead while many Catholic conservatives went down to defeat); could render a Right-Center regime feasible: possibly this result might be facilitated if the Church and Gedda's Catholic Action were to throw their weight decisively into the scales on behalf of conservative candidates. But this would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, splitting Christian Democracy and dividing the country into two hostile blocs. Thus, a Right-Center government would either have to resign or attempt to hold its own through reliance on Fascist votes in the Parliament and through the use of accentuated coercive measures in the country at large. If the latter course were adopted and the government were able to prevail over the Communist-led opposition, Italy would evolve toward a modified Salazar-type regime, bolstered by Northern industrial and agrarian capitalism, the Southern subproletariat and landed classes,
and the Church. In a modern country like Italy, with its strong
trade-union tradition and relatively well-educated electorate, such
a regime would be a grotesque anachronism which could not fail to
produce eventually a violent and perhaps decisive Leftist reaction.
At any rate, it would be useless to think in terms of economic
and social development under such a system, let alone democratic
development. It is necessary to stress this point rather strongly,
for the American press treatment of the reasons behind Pella's
resignation showed a certain lack of perception as to the ultimate
issues at stake.
IV. Return to the four-party coalition.

After the June 7 elections, and after the arrogance shown by
De Gasperi and especially by Gonella in their attitude toward the
minor Center parties throughout the period of the electoral campaign
and the post-election Cabinet crisis, it would appear that the
days of De Gasperi's Centrist policy are over. The minor parties
feel, and with some justification, that they have sacrificed them-
selves for seven long years in order to maintain a one-sided
partnership which their principal ally has violated almost at will.
In exchange for a few Cabinet posts, they have lost their separate
identities in the eyes of the voters and have suffered a gradual
but inexorable erosion of their electoral base. Moreover, they
have seen the Christian Democrats steadily increase their
predominance over all sectors of Italian economic life;\textsuperscript{14} take a rather casual attitude toward the implementation of Constitutional safeguards\textsuperscript{15} and threaten to augment their already impressive influence in the schools, the press and radio, and the field of social assistance.\textsuperscript{16}

While the tactical opportunism of the Center parties -- and particularly of the Social Democrats -- has permitted the abandonment of seemingly firm positions in the past\textsuperscript{17} it seems quite probable, as a result of the electoral shock treatment of June 7, that only a more Leftist orientation on the part of Christian Democracy, and only a far greater readiness to meet the minor Center parties halfway, would permit a reconstitution of the four-party alliance. Such an alliance would be based on a very slim majority, unless the minor parties were able to increase their voting strength substantially in the future. It might include minor Center party members in the Cabinet or simply involve minor Center party support for an all Demo-Christian Cabinet.

Any such alternative, which would probably entail the selection of a Left-wing Christian Democrat like Giovanni Gronchi\textsuperscript{18} or Amintore Fanfani as Premier (though even the return of De Gasperi -- a Left-oriented De Gasperi, to be sure -- is conceivable), would face three serious difficulties. The Demo-Christian Left, though
strongly in favor of social reform and possessing many young
advocates of daringly constructive solutions to national problems,
remains rather obtuse and insensitive to the civil-liberty exigencies
of the minor Center parties. Fanfani, heir to Dossetti's "Catholic
integralism", has as Minister of the Interior given no indication
of seeking to repeal the unconstitutional provisions of the penal
code or of showing due tolerance for the rights of Protestant
minority groups. He and other leaders of "Iniziativa Democratica"
are suspected by such laic organs as Il Mondo of thinking along
lines of theocratic paternalism.19 It must be remembered that it
was the Dossetti group (from which "Iniziativa Democratica" stems)
which in 1950 and 1951 proposed jettisoning the minor Center parties
from the Cabinet and forming an all Demo-Christian government.20
So it is quite possible that the aggressive social pioneering and
Catholic zeal of Fanfani and La Pira21 may prove even more obnoxious
to the minor Center parties than the patronage-ridden orthodox
Centrism of De Gasperi and Gonella.

Besides, the minor Center parties suffer from a deep-rooted
inferiority complex due to their chronic inability to attract a
substantial segment of the electorate. This inability is attributed
by many of their leaders to the long period of collaboration with
Christian Democracy, which allegedly laid the minor parties open to
the accusation of being De Gasperi's satellites. Actually, it was
not the fact of collaboration itself, but rather the servile and virtually unconditional character which that collaboration assumed the Center parties' constant internecine bickering and personalistic maneuvering, and their failure to formulate concrete and intelligent policy proposals rather than abstruse ideological platforms, which caused the mass of the Italian electorate to ignore the Third Force. Be that as it may, however, the Third Force parties may well feel that any future four-party coalition, even under Gronchi's less rigidly Catholic leadership, would bear the stigma of the past. Thus, quite apart from Fanfani's potential authoritarian tendencies, the minor Center parties' growing desire to assert their separate identities and their increasingly restive attitude toward Christian Democracy constitute additional hindrance. Either Saragat's "opening to the Left" proposal -- that the Nenni Socialists be invited to join the government coalition -- or La Malfa's proposal for a "democratic alternative" (a Centrist cartel of the three laic parties, opposing both Christian Democracy and Communism) would involve conditions which many Christian Democrats would be unwilling to countenance. And needless to add, a surrender by the minor Center parties today would simply postpone the inevitable showdown with Christian Democracy while enabling the Communists and Nenni Socialists to make further inroads on the Centrist electorate.
The third obstacle to a government led by the Left-wing Christian Democrats would be the attitude of the Demo-Christian and Liberal Right wings, which bitterly oppose the land reform and other social measures and yearn for a Right-Center government. More than a hundred deputies of the present DC Group in the Chamber of Deputies come from Rome and the South; and many of these men are dependent on local conservative clienteles opposed to social and political progress. Christian Democracy in the South is often not far removed from the extreme Right (many parish priests are Monarchist sympathizers) and has frequently appeared to collaborate with the Monarchists and Neo-Fascists in Southern municipal and regional administrations. Similarly, many Liberals are advocates of a coalition with the Monarchist Party. It is an unfortunate fact that, thanks to the virtual non-existence of the minor Center parties in most of the South and the low quality of Christian Democratic leadership there, the more advanced and articulate sections of the Southern electorate vote for the parties of the extreme Left, while the Christian Democrats rely largely on the votes of the more tradition-steeped rural areas such as Campania and the Southern Puglie—votes which generally express a conservative mandate. It is quite possible, then, that any future elections would still produce enough Right-wing Christian Democratic and Liberal
deputies to render a four-party coalition unfeasible except at
the price of abandoning or indefinitely suspending the present
demands of the minor Center parties for a more progressive and
libertarian policy. But as we have previously pointed out, any
such abject retreat by the Third Force would have an ultimately
aggravating effect on an already inflamed situation.

V. A Socialist Alternative.

Our discussion thus far permits us to arrive at a basic
conclusion: Italy can no longer be governed democratically over
an extended period of time unless some other alternative to the
present impasse can be found. A democratic coalition composed of
a gigantic Christian Democratic Party -- internally divided on
socio-economic issues and half-hearted in its allegiance to certain
liberties deemed fundamental by its allies -- and three minor
satellites, is a coalition built on sand. A situation of this
nature must sooner or later degenerate in the direction of one or
another extreme. For it has been clearly demonstrated over the
last six years that large sections of Italian political Catholicism
entertain aims and methods which cannot be entirely reconciled with
political democracy as it is understood in the West.

This poses the central issue of an effective counterbalance
to Christian Democracy in the Centrist coalition. Only the revival
of a strong democratic Socialist party and an expansion of the Liberal movement can provide the necessary impetus to make the Third Force a respected protagonist on the Italian scene. The second of these two requirements is of a rather secondary character, since the Liberals can only hope to expand at the expense of the Christian Democrats and the extreme Right, and such accretions might merely cause the PLI to revert to its ultra-conservative position of 1948. The PLI is already severely split between the able, progressive-minded Left (typified by the Il Mondo group) and the reactionary Right. While further expansion of the PLI might mark the beginning of the decline of the Monarchist Party and a trend toward a more wholesome variety of conservatism in the Rightist camp, it would not of itself provide an answer to the crucial problem of Italian politics.

That problem may be summed up as the capture by the Communist Party and the PSI of the loyalties and hopes of the bulk of the industrial working class and rural proletariat. Over nine and a half million Italian voters cast their ballots for the two mass parties of the extreme Left in the elections of June 7. As long as 35-40% of the Italian electorate is virtually outside the political game, so long must the forces of secular democracy stand weak and isolated against a mass Catholic party and the ever-threatening
presence of the extreme Right, operating through two Rightist parties and through Rightist fellow-travellers in the DC and PLI.

It was on the basis of this insight that Saragat -- after the Social Democrats had lost about 1/3 of their strength in the June 7 elections -- proposed inviting Nenni to enter the government. Such an invitation, Saragat declared, would call Nenni's bluff and test the validity of his pre-election references to a "Socialist alternative" and his purported willingness to accept the Atlantic in return Pact/for a more independent Italian foreign policy within NATO. A refusal on Nenni's part to bear his share of government responsibility would, according to Saragat, reveal the spuriousness of his protestations of autonomy and might lead to wholesale desertions by disgruntled Socialists who would be finally convinced of Nenni's subservience to the Communist line. 26

Now, in discussing an overture to Nenni -- assuming it were approved by the Christian Democrats and other Center parties -- we must bear in mind the Maximalist character of the PSI. In the Maximalist tradition of Italian Socialism, any participation in a bourgeois government, even for the purpose of executing widespread reform measures, is treason to the revolution. So is any rupture of working-class unity; that is, in this case, any break with the Communists. Those who defy this creed are promptly branded as traitors to the working class. And indeed those who have left
the PSI since 1947 have, almost willy-nilly, followed devious paths not always based on a consistent set of principles. Instructive in this regard is the experience of a man like Giuseppe Romita: Socialist Minister of the Interior in 1946, seceded to the Social Democrats in 1949, seceded from the PSI to help form the splinter PSU in 1950, brought the PSU back into Saragat's camp in 1951, and is today a factional leader in the PSDI. Romita, and other notable secessionists like Ivan Matteo Lombardo, Simonini, and Saragat himself, have found that secession from the PSI brought almost automatic loss of working-class support. And unfortunately, the incoherent and opportunistic line followed by the Social Democrats since 1947 has made it ever easier for the Communists and their allies in the PSI to discredit would-be critics of the Unity of Action Pact between the two extreme Leftist parties.

Moreover, the pro-Communist element in the PSI, under the high-handed leadership of Rodolfo Morandi, Oreste Lizzadri, and Giusto Tolloy, has come to control the party machinery and Socialist trade-union movement to such an extent as to render Nenni's status as party leader seriously suspect. Nenni's oratorical magic may fascinate the Socialist crowds at party rallies, his editorials may regularly decorate the first page of the party newspaper _Avanti_, but who is to say that a decision by Nenni to break with the
Communists would not leave him isolated? The PSI as a party has been under the almost absolute domination of the Left wing since 1949, with discussion and criticism all but stifled since the Bologna Congress of 1951. Centrist and autonomist leaders like Alberto Jacometti, Riccardo Lombardi, Bruno Foa, Giovanni Sampietro, and Giancarlo Matteotti have either been cowed into acquiescence or, in Matteotti’s case, expelled. It is also to be noted that Nenni himself no longer speaks in such conciliatory tones in regard to Italian acceptance of the Atlantic Pact and that the recent meeting of the PSI Central Committee reiterated the policy of unity of action with the Communists in the strongest possible terms.

To be sure, Togliatti might -- in pursuit of the Cominform’s current flexible policy -- agree to Nenni’s entry into, or support of, the government, even if the Communist Party were not included in such an invitation. But an arrangement of this sort, with Communist participation, or Communist approval of Socialist participation, in the government, would most likely represent a mere tactical and temporary shift in Communist policy -- designed to establish a useful beachhead for exploitation at some future date -- and would not constitute a long-term solution. Nenni would be collaborating, but only on Communist sufferance as it were.
The problem of reviving democratic Socialism in Italy would still remain.

The PSDI, on the other hand, is certainly ill-equipped to provide the nucleus for a rejuvenated democratic Socialist party. The maneuverings and factional clashes of the last seven years have thoroughly demoralized Italian Social Democracy and its leaders, who have largely ignored concrete social problems and the formulation of specific reforms, and have preferred to concentrate instead on ideological hair-splitting and sterile abstract discussions over whether or not to remain in the Cabinet. Saragat's leadership has been especially damaging in this connection, giving party councils and party policies a distressingly vague and metaphysical intonation. Only a few Social Democratic leaders like Roberto Tremelloni have seen the need for sane empirical objectives based on quantitative knowledge and sound analysis of factual data: but these men have been ignored and lack the forcefulness necessary to put their views into effect. In general, the PSDI is an urban middle-class party, with a few isolated and prosperous working-class islands in the Northern cities and in a few Emilian agricultural cooperatives (e.g. Molinella), with a party organization which is scanty and inefficient and which in any event comes into play only before elections, and with programs and leaders that enjoy no real support among the workers Saragat now wants to win over. Seven years of
bidding primarily for middle-class support have taken their toll. Moreover, other Socialist splinter groups -- the Cucchi-Magnani Independent Socialist Union and the Parri-Calamandrei Popular Unity group -- are quite reluctant to come under Saragat's domination.

As we can see, either the conversion of the PSI to a democratic Socialist policy or the renovation of the PSSI, with a view to enlisting the rank and file of the PSI and of various Socialist splinter groups, would encounter severe difficulties. Another attack on the problem of Socialist unification -- the creation of an entirely new democratic Socialist party -- would be faced, as was the PSU of 1950-51, with the implacable hostility of vested interests in the existing parties. Yet each of these three paths calls for further exploration.

For there is copious raw material for a democratic Socialist movement of the Western European variety. Not only is there a very large part of the PSI electorate -- democratically inclined but held to the Communist alliance by the sentimental myth of working-class solidarity and by fear of going the way of Saragat's secessionists -- but even many Communists in the lower echelons show occasional yearnings for independence. And while the PSSI as a whole has hindered rather than helped the Socialist cause,
some of its less notable leaders -- like Tremelloni, the trade unionist Carmagnola, the old-line reformist Mondolfo, the present PSDI leader in the Chamber Vigorelli -- show occasional sparks of the spirit needed to rekindle the Socialist flame of the early Twentieth Century.

The above possibilities will be further discussed in our coming paper on Italian and French Socialism. Suffice it here to trace out briefly the objective requirements for the rebirth of Italian democratic Socialism. What is needed, first of all, is an active organization operating continuously at the grass roots, maintaining close contact with the working classes and the landless peasantry, studying their needs, agitating on their behalf when necessary -- in short, an organization which can compete with the Communist and Catholic machines on their own ground and with many of their own methods. (In the last elections, incidentally, it was frequently noted by news analysts that the PSDI was the least energetic of the Italian political groupings and the most prone to rely on outworn techniques and slogans. 36)

Such an improved organization requires more funds than have been hitherto available if it is to contend with the Communist apparatus and its formidable corps of paid officials. Here we must beware of the simplistic solution. Current rumors of American
pressure on the Italian Government to cut the Communist Party off from many of its economic wellsprings provide one illustration of the rule-of-thumb approach we warned against earlier in this paper. It is not by turning the PCI into a martyr party that the problem of Communist financial predominance can be successfully combated. Nor are such gifts as the subsidies by Luigi Antonini's Italo-American Labor Council to Right-wing factions of Social Democracy a desirable answer: the role played by these subsidies in corrupting Saragat's party is a byword in Social Democratic circles. There is no easy way out, then. The funds must be raised largely in Italy, partly through the adoption of up-to-date fund-raising techniques (note the PCI's block parties and neighborhood feasts, campaigns for the sale of Unità, and other successful business and entertainment ventures) partly through a more close-knit relationship between the party and its electorate: an enthusiastic, perpetually-mobilized electorate is far more generous in contributions to the party coffers.

Another requirement is further penetration into the trade unions. This is an extremely complex question, particularly since democratic Socialists have thus far adopted no single course. Some remain in the largest labor confederation -- the Communist-dominated CGIL -- and try to work from within. Others, like
Martoni of Molinella, militate in the Catholic-dominated CISL. Still others have formed the numerically-weakest UIL, made up of laic democratic elements. Whichever of these courses may prove to be the wisest, one point must be emphasized: Saragat's policy of basing Italian Social Democracy on an idealistic appeal to the middle class has shown itself to be unsound. A Socialist Party in Italy must rely on organized labor, and hence the struggle in the trade union field is of paramount importance.

Apart from the above tactical considerations, there is an underlying normative requirement: democratic Socialism must know what it wants, must have a constructive program based on careful, quantitative fact-finding, must in short attempt to emulate the qualities which have made Northern European Socialism what it is today. Both Saragat, with his philosophical virtuosity, and Nenni, with his Maximalist sloganeering and destructive demagoguery, have led Italian Socialism along false paths, although Nenni -- a capable orator, who has recaptured the emotional fervor if not the solid content of pre-World War I Socialism -- has retained an impressive popular following. It is the lack of a concrete, well-documented set of policies which has put the PSDI and PSI at such a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Communists and Christian Democrats. For the two latter parties -- the only two modern political moments in Italian life today -- are ready with a proposed
solution to every national and local problem, thus giving the Italian voters an impression of competence and dedication. This is especially true of the Communists. The transformation of Italian democratic Socialism into a mass party will therefore entail a far more systematic approach to Italian social, economic, and constitutional problems than Socialist leaders have displayed since World War II.

Finally, the prospects of a powerful democratic Socialist movement to serve as cornerstone of a democratic coalition depend to a large extent on the actions of foreign powers. Sudden stop-gap loans, short-run offshore purchase contracts, and sensational pronunciamentos by foreign envoys or political leaders can work no permanent amelioration in the Italian political situation. Nor is clandestine pressure on the Italian Government to embark on a perilous "showdown" with the extremes to be recommended. The need is a twofold one: rigorous non-intervention in Italian domestic affairs, on the one hand; and on the other, long-range policies aimed at creating a climate of peace, security, and prosperity in the Western world -- a climate within which the Italian economy can expand, reorganize with a minimum of friction and hardship, and absorb or export the bulk of its unemployed. Only in such an atmosphere, in which fear of war and fear of unemployment have been substantially reduced, can democratic Socialism thrive. Crisis
and insecurity breed Communism or Right-wing extremism. And those who look longingly at the latter alternative should remember that Italy’s twenty-odd years under Fascist rule succeeded in transforming the Communist fringe movement of 1921 into the largest Communist electorate in the free world today.
FOOTNOTES


2) The Right wing of the Christian Democrats comprised, in 1952, the fifty deputies and twenty-four Senators who signed their names to a volume entitled *Studi di parlamentari democristiani: problemi dell'ora e azione di governo*. The names of all the members of this faction (popularly known as the Vespa) are not yet available. It is known, however, that some of its chief exponents (Osuna in Piedmont, Cosenego and Reggio d'Acì in Latium, Vocino in Puglia) were defeated on June 7, while others (Carmine De Martino in Campania, Mastino del Rio in Latium) survived. In addition to the Vespa, certain powerful DC leaders like Togni and Guglielmone are identified with the Right.


5) See *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 1951: pp. 1,4. According to these reports, offshore procurement contracts would be denied to Communist-dominated factories.


7) It was noted by several Italian independent Centrist papers that the Monarchist campaign in North Italy was more abundantly financed than was the MSI campaign effort. See *La Nazione Italiana* (Florence), May 13, 1953: article on Piedmont on p. 7. See also *Il Messaggero* (Rome), May 28, 1953: article on Piedmont on pp. 1-2, and June 1, 1953: article on Lombardy on p.1.

8) The Communists gained about 72,000 votes over their 1951 totals in the Veneto, almost 20,000 votes in Venezia Giulia, almost 30,000 votes in 5 North Lombard provinces, and about 32,000 votes in Milan Province. PSI gains in the same areas totalled about 300,000 votes. Further gains since the June 7 elections have been made at Legnano (North Lombardy) and in other Northern towns. See *Il Popolo* (Rome), June 10, 1953; *Il Messaggero* (Rome), June 10, 1953; *La Gazzetta del Popolo* (Turin), June 10, 1953; *Corriere della Sera* (Sondrio), June 13, 1953; and *New York Times*, Jan. 13, 1954: p.4. See also Edmund Stevens, "Behind the Italian Crisis," *New Leader* (New York), Jan. 18, 1954: pp. 8-9.

9) In recent years, Communist-led political strikes and demonstrations have attracted less of a following. In the election campaign, Communist rallies were often not as well attended as in 1948. The PCI, however, quickly adapted itself to the mood of its electorate, and concentrated on quiet house-to-house proselytising. As the election results bear out, passive resistance did not take the form of anti-Communist votes. See *Giornale dell'Emilia* (Bologna), May 15, 1953: article on Emilia on p.1.


13) Il Mondo (Milan) alleged (April 11, 1953: p. 2) that De Gasperi's decision to dissolve the Senate was taken without adequate consultation with the minor Center parties. Other grievances that repeatedly crop up are (1) Gonella's intransigence during the negotiations between the four Center parties in regard to the majority-premium electoral law; (2) DC Party Secretary Gonella's tendency to blame the minor Center parties for the failure of the Center coalition to achieve a majority; (3) De Gasperi's inclusion, in his post-election Cabinet, of men like Togni and Betticoi, who he knew would be obnoxious to the minor Center parties; (4) the unsportsmanlike way in which De Gasperi accepted his defeat at the hands of Parliament.


15) Despite the existence of relevant Constitutional provisions, the Penal Code and the Public Security Law of 1931 still permit infringements of freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and association. No habeas corpus exists in Italy, and movement from one town to another is restricted. See Einaudi and Goguel, Battaglia, Barile, Jemolo, op. cit. in note 10, supra.

16) Recent developments include the purchase of the Independent Liberal daily, La Gazzetta del Popolo (Turin), by a financial group headed by Senator Guglielmonde of the DC, and the subsequent dismissal of its editor, Massimo Caputo. On the Demo-Christian policy toward the schools, see Giovanni Ferretti, "Il Bilancio del Ministero Gonella," Il Ponte (Florence), Nov. 1951: pp. 1127-1165, and Andrea Rapisarda, "L'Insegnante Sensa Concorso," Il Mondo (Milan), April 12, 1953: p.5. The Catholic assistance agencies have received frequent subsidies from the government, such as the awarding of the summer colonies of the defunct GIL (a Fascist youth organization of the Mussolini era)
16 (cont.)

17) For instance, after the municipal and provincial elections of 1952, the Social Democratic Party abandoned its often-reiterated insistence on proportional representation, and agreed to support the majority-prefumum electoral scheme.

18) Giovanni Gronchi, President of the Chamber of Deputies and a prominent Demo-Christian figure of Left-of-Center tendencies.


22) See op. cit., in note 1, supra.

23) See Ugo La Malfa, "Una Domanda a Tre Partiti," article by former Republican Cabinet Minister in Il Mondo (Milan), Nov. 24, 1953: p. 1.

24) Thus, the DC ran on an affiliated list with the Monarchists in Matera, and with the Qualunquists in Cagliari, Naples, and Campobasso. Bollettino Mensile di Statistica (Rome), Nov. 1952: pp. 34-35. The statistics for the 1952 elections in the minor centers of the South (given in the Bollettino of January, February, and March, 1953) are not nearly as detailed as the data for the 1951 elections in the North, given in earlier issues of the Bollettino. Specifically, the exact nature of the DC-led coalition in each Southern town (usually described as "DC and others") is not given. According to Francesco Compagna, "Clientele Immortali," Il Mondo (Milan), Oct. 6, 1951: p. 1, the Christian Democrats collaborated with the extreme Right, or relied on Rightist support, in the Sicilian regional government, in several provincial governments of Campania and Fuglie, and in many town governments. Some Southern DC deputies actually seceded to join the parties of the extreme Right. All this created understandable confusion in the minds of the Southern voters.

25) The Right wing of the Liberal Party dominated the PLI until 1951 and actually forced the PLI into a coalition with the Uomo Qualunque movement in the 1948 elections. The Liberal Unification at Turin in 1951 brought the estranged Left back into the party, but the pro-Monarchist Right remains dangerous despite the present predominance of a Left-Center ruling coalition under Villabruna.
26) See op. cit. in note 1, supra.


28) Rodolfo Morandi is Vice-Secretary of the PSI, President of the PSI Group in the Senate, and the party's top organizer.

29) Oreste Lizzadri heads the Socialist current in the CIL.

30) Giusto Tolloy is PSI regional boss in Emilia.

31) See Zariski, op. cit. in note 27, supra; chs. 9-10. See also article on PSI in *Il Ponte* (Florence), May 1953: special issue devoted to Italian political parties.


33) *La Malfa*, op. cit. in note 23, supra.

34) Roberto Tremelloni headed the recent Parliamentary Inquiry on Unemployment. Romita's group of recent secessionists from the PSI.

35) The PSU was formed in Dec. 1949 by secessionists from Saragat's PSLI, and a number of ex-Action Party members led by Ignazio Silone. After a year, Romita led a successful rebellion at the Congress of Turin in January 1951, aimed at forcing the PSU into a reunification with the PSLI. This reunification took place in May 1951, and the united party was known first as the PS-SILS and later as the PSDI.


37) Such recommended action by the Italian Government would include ousting Communist Party offices and trade unions from Government-owned buildings, denying Communist newspapers access to Government newsprint supplies, etc. See op. cit. in note 5, supra.

38) This information, while not actually documented, is based on conversations with several reliable informants in the Social Democratic Party. Partial confirmation may be derived from Saragat's blast at alleged "Sicilian-American agents:" i.e. the Simonini-Vacirca Right wing which was still publishing a daily in 1951 (*La Giustizia*) while the PSDI (then the PS-SILS) possessed only a weekly newspaper: *La Voce Socialista*. See *Il Mondo* (Milan), June 23, 1951: p. 2. The Right wing of the PSDI has been consistently better-financed.

A plea for an empirical approach to policy formulation is made by Roberto Tremelloni, "L'analisi:betismo civico. nemico numero uno." *Critica Sociale* (Milan), Nov. 16, 1950: pp. 316-317. Guido Calogero, "Il Compiasso di Clio", *Il Mondo* (Milan), Feb. 18, 1953: pp. 1-2, pens a scathing indictment of Italian Social Democracy and the wary historicism of its leaders. "What Italian Socialist......is capable of answering, on the spot, the following question: 'how much would you have to pay in taxes, assuming your earnings as a given figure x, if the fiscal law prevailing today in England under Churchill's conservative majority were applied to you?' He doesn't know because he has never thought about it, and perhaps also because, in a psychological sense, he prefers not to think about it, prefers not to think of a Socialist system where social legislation actually exists and is therefore actually paid for....."

"In Italy, what are the various currents of Social Democracy, at least for the immense majority of voters, but the currents of Tom, Dick, and Harry? Are you with Tom? Are you with Dick? Have you left [the party] with Harry? Have you re-entered with Dick? Have you formed a new movement with Tom?......almost always, it is only a question of day-to-day controversies which will have become completely outdated when all the contenders present themselves to the voters to tell them what they intend to do in the next legislature. And this will be a difficult thing for them to say because they don't [really] know."