ABSTRACT

A new model concerning the concepts of host nation security force development, or security sector reform (SSR), is proposed. This model is rooted in scholarly literature and seeks to fill current gaps in United States Army doctrine. The model is mobilized as a dependent variable, changing with different conditions of insurgency and ethnicity. This is a novel approach because it considers distinction between military and police forces as the central concept. Additionally, current security sector reform policies and procedures are not well theorized nor codified in doctrine. Empirical studies were carried out in order to validate hypotheses generated by this new proposed model.
Acknowledgements

This thesis represents the culmination not only of many months of thought and writing, but also many years of reflection concerning the my own personal combat experience during two deployments under Operation Iraqi Freedom. I think that I’ve taken the experiences of a young Army officer and framed them as the theories of a graduate student. And for that, there are many people to thank.

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INTRODUCTION

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade have cost the United States over $2 billion in currency\(^1\) and over 6650 servicemembers’ lives since September 11, 2001.\(^2\) A significant part of the war effort has been to rebuild, or create, the security sector for both countries. Host nation security force development refers to reforming police and military functions within a country under occupation, and this line of effort consumed considerable resources on the part of the United States to ensure adequate progress in this area.

Why is this important? As with any complex question, there is more than one answer. First, as the United States withdraws its military forces from Afghanistan (and has already withdrawn from Iraq), it must ensure a viable security sector in order to provide basic safety for the population. This is part of the definition of success for these massive military operations. Second, the US must ensure that the states it helped rebuild are secure from external threats. Third, security from both external and internal threats will create the space and time required for economic development as well as the development of democratic institutions, increasing prosperity in the long term.

How successful has the US been in this endeavor? That is a problematic question for two reasons. On one hand, how does the policymaker define success? Is it securing the population, securing the country’s borders, or a mix of both? On the other, how long

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must these newly rebuilt and retooled military and police forces be viable for their reform to be deemed successful?

My motivation for writing this paper is twofold. First, my own personal experience as an advisor to Iraqi Army forces in Tikrit in 2008 and 2009 suggest that the United States could have done a better job training, mentoring, advising, and assisting Iraq’s armed forces and local police. Second, for those US military and State Department personnel “on the ground,” there is a little in the way of a roadmap to success. I wish to offer some additional perspective in order to provide policymakers and military leaders with some ideas on how to rethink this mission in case the US is faced with a similar problem set in the future. It seems to me that the definition of success as queried above should be of the highest standard. The United States should aim to build professional, cohesive, and skilled military and police forces capable of securing both the population and the borders well enough for liberal democracy to take firm root. However, the question of how to perform such tasks, while asked by military commanders, civilian law enforcement professional (LEP) advisors, and State Department officials, is not answered by any existing doctrine. I wish to supplement US doctrine by looking at the concurrent development of host nation military and police forces considering conditions on the ground. My central research question is: How do insurgency and ethnicity affect the nature and speed of transition from military to police forces?
PLAN OF ACTION

I seek to answer this research question using a systematic, logical process of examination and analysis. The central problem when considering host nation security sector reform (SSR) is that there is no single correct method or answer. There are certainly ideas, lessons learned, and best practices available to policymakers and military professionals through study of past operations, but these resources do not provide a holistic analysis of the factors that affect SSR and their effects. This study aims to fill some of this research gap.

The main idea that propels this research project is that of discrimination and separation between the mission sets of the military and the police. While local police forces do not have the capacity to conduct missions against external, state-level threats, the military has the capacity to conduct internal security missions, especially those vital to a counterinsurgency campaign such as checkpoint operations, searches, patrolling and raids. The intervener (with consultation from the host nation government) has a choice to make: whether and how much to employ the host nation military against internal threats. I argue that internal security must be transitioned to local police in order to allow the military to orient itself toward external threats and to allow the local police to become proficient in internal security missions. Thus, the deliberate assignment of distinct mission sets to a host nation military and police force should allow each to professionalize and become more effective in the long term.

This idea highlights the first choice, or tradeoff, that the intervener must consider: how to gain security quickly while seeking to develop legitimate and professional forces
for the future. There would seem to be methods at two ends of a spectrum here. On one hand, the intervener could arm whatever group claims to represent the interests of the people and has access to the population. For example, the idea that the United States should have used Afghanistan’s Taliban to police the country in the early 2000s has been proposed, because the Taliban were able to, in the eyes of the local populace, administer justice when the central government could not. However, this was not consistent with US strategy at the time. Additionally, adopting this ad hoc style of administering security would not be transferrable to other campaigns and would not allow US and other Coalition military partners to train and plan for future conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, US Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, provides a desired endstate for professional and legitimate host nation military and local police forces. However, the field manual is not adequate when trying to provide military and other personnel with a plan of action or roadmap to success.

This study will fill some of these gaps left by FM 3-24, as I will bring some order and provide some guidance in terms of the question of “how” to develop military and police forces in parallel under conditions of varying insurgent threat and ethnicity. This report is not an analysis of only developing local police forces, and does not seek to answer the question of whether to use a top-down or bottom-up approach in developing police legitimacy. Instead, it is a revision or supplement to existing US doctrine in terms of how to develop the security sector by focusing on the idea of distinction between the military and police.

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3 Department of the Army Civilian; Peacekeeping and Stability Scholar and Advisor. Personal Interview. 28 March 2013.
I will answer my research question through five distinct sections in this thesis. First, I will engage in a literature review of all applicable scholarly work I have been exposed to through graduate course work. This literature review encompasses the disciplines of civil war, civil-military relations, state-building and counterinsurgency, and will highlight key principles that will eventually inform my SSR model. To supplement the literature review, I will also scrutinize SSR components of FM 3-24, and identify weaknesses in current US doctrine. These weaknesses will further inform my proposed model. Taking lessons learned from the literature review and based on personal combat experience, the third section of the paper will propose a model of host nation security force development that highlights distinction between military and police under the dual lenses of insurgent threat and ethnicity. This model will highlight the tradeoffs that the reformer must make in terms of short-term legitimacy and security versus long-term professionalization of security forces. Fourth, I will evaluate methods that could potentially test my model. Lastly, I will provide empirical evidence from interviews with subject matter experts that will assess the feasibility and practicality of my SSR model.

In the end, I will have proposed a new “roadmap” of security sector reform that considers the factors of insurgency and ethnicity that is well-theorized based on existing scholarly literature, and that is tested using empirical data.
LITERATURE REVIEW

I start this study by evaluating existing literature that speaks to the problem of host nation security force development. In an effort to gain knowledge from all applicable subfields of political science, I will review literature in a wide realm of disciplines related to the problem at hand: civil war literature, civil-military relations literature, state-building literature, and counterinsurgency literature. I will also examine existing US doctrine. These assessments will inform my model based on important principles.

From existing civil war literature, we see that civil war takes place when the state does not or cannot maintain a monopoly over coercive violence and challengers to sovereignty appear. Thus, my model should seek to establish the state as the sole maintainer of coercive violence, both at the national and the local level. Civil-military relations literature tells us that once the state has a monopoly over violence, it should maintain control over the military that wields that violence in either an objective or subjective fashion. Since US and Western militaries submit to objective control, any model of SSR should aim to establish objective, civilian control over a military as well as accountability of local police forces to a third party. State-building literature informs us that, although difficult to perform, occupation and reform of the security sector must be performed in a coherent fashion, with an eye toward both internal and external threat. Additionally, we see that a state cannot rely on patronage with irregular forces to provide for its own security; it must develop distinct military and police forces. The recent wave of counterinsurgency literature informs my model with two main conclusions. First, the
counterinsurgent must be able to adequately identify and apply selective violence toward
the insurgent threat. Second, indigenous security forces may be marginally more
effective than occupying forces, and increasing numbers should have a positive effect on
the security situation. Thus, my SSR model should account for the fact that host nation
forces should be built in order to solve the identification problem and maintain the
professionalism required to apply selective coercive violence to an identified insurgent
threat.

CIVIL WAR LITERATURE

The relevant literature on civil war is usually grouped according to the place on
the war timeline upon which it theorizes. That is, civil war literature has the overarching
themes of onset, duration, and termination. Recently, much work has been done in an
effort to both disaggregate the levels of analysis from the state and the group to the local
elite and the individual and to examine civil war dynamics. This civil war dynamics
literature is applicable to my question because of the role of an external occupier as well
as the subtleties of an insurgency. I will also focus on the concepts that come from the
literature on duration and termination, since my research question takes hold during
conflict and speaks to how to end it quickly and decisively.

In terms of the effect of an external occupier, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce
find that third-party intervention into civil conflict on behalf of one side results in quicker
military victory, but intervention on the part of both sides can prolong the time until a negotiated settlement.⁵

The existing literature about the commitment problem in civil war feeds directly into my research question because security forces can alter expected payoffs in the commitment arena. Barbara Walter finds that information asymmetries, as given by war duration and military victory, can explain civil war recurrence. That is, during shorter wars, less information is exchanged between contestants, which hinders calculation of risk of future conflict. Also, decisive military victory sees more information exchanged, leading to the opposite effect.⁶ David Cunningham finds that an increased number of “veto players” heightens the commitment problem, which in turn leads to increased civil war duration.⁷ Strong host nation military and local police forces can impact the veto player issue. Duration can also be affected by how a war is fought. Kalyvas and Balcells find evidence that irregular wars, or insurgencies, last longer than conventional wars or symmetric non-convention wars and are also usually won by the incumbent.⁸

Toft finds that implementing either negotiated settlements in traditional terms (all carrots and no sticks) or simply allowing wars to continue until military victory is achieved does not lessen the probability of lasting peace. She contends that a balance of

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carrots and sticks is necessary, as is a way to re-engineer the police and military forces present under the umbrella of security sector reform.\textsuperscript{9}

In terms of within conflicts themselves, Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro argue that the synergistic effect of the surge of US troops in 2007 combined with the “Anbar awakening” led to the decrease in overall violence in Iraq by the end of 2007.\textsuperscript{10} This speaks directly to the concepts that I have mentioned before, as the argument is twofold. First, a measure of state strength or intervener strength on the part of the US was important in decreasing the violence. This was most likely a necessary but insufficient condition. Second, the ability for the Anbar tribes to at once solve the identification problem and the recruitment problem was the real catalyst in decreasing violence emanating from the Sunni portions of western Iraq. Thus, both state strength and a force that can identify insurgents might decrease violence during an insurgency.

Civil conflict aftermath presents its own set of problems. Even after conflict is over, or, in the case of US intervention, Stedmen theorizes that after the intervener has departed and helped set up institutions, spoilers may emerge with varying sets of grievances and strategies.\textsuperscript{11} While Stedman does not theorize about insurgency itself, perhaps the insurgent threat can be seen as an extremely powerful, well-organized spoiler. Stable, powerful institutions such as professional security forces may lessen the influence of spoilers through coercion or simply by changing the nature of expected payoffs. Doyle and Sambanis theorize that increased local capacity helps to create the

"political space" required for successful, long-lasting peacebuilding strategy. Fortna finds that externally-resourced peacekeeping missions contribute to lasting peace. Applying her findings to developing internal security forces, it could be hypothesized that properly organized forces could also contribute to durable peace.

As difficult as dealing with an insurgency may be, Humphreys and Weinstein find that there are significant challenges to reintegration once conflict is over. They find that participation in abusive groups prevents future reintegration. Additionally, young men and ideologically-driven zealots are likely to remain aligned with their factions. They also find that internationally funded programs do not help facilitate reintegration. The finding that young men are more likely to remain aligned with their fighting group is particularly troubling, as states attempt to recruit young men for their security forces. This highlights the need for professional forces that are not consumed by the ethnic or ideological differences that once permeated the war.

Overall, my model should mobilize the notion that the state holds a monopoly over coercive violence, and that both military and police forces must be built and reformed in such a way that this is the case.

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The central issue in the civil-military relations field is posed as Feaver's problematique: "The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity."\textsuperscript{15} The men who have been given weapons and training by the state may ultimately threaten the sovereign power of the state itself. Thus, much of the civil-military relations literature revolves around maintaining civilian control over the military, and the ability to guard against military takeovers or coups. Alongside this discussion is the matter of maintaining a professional military.

No discussion of civil-military relations theory would be complete without the mention of Samuel Huntington's work, \textit{The Soldier and the State}. In this transcendent piece, Huntington describes the concepts of objective and subjective civilian control of the military under the umbrella of institutional theory as an answer to the civil-military problematique. To summarize very briefly, according to Huntington, the military has separate values from the civilian sector, and maintains the professional virtues of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. If the military's officer corps is highly professionalized and maintains decision-making authority within its own sphere, then civilian leadership can exercise objective control over the military. In the case of objective control, the professional military leadership willfully submits to a legitimate civilian authority. The opposite of objective control, then, would be subjective control, in which the civilian authority more directly asserts control over the military. This control

scheme could take the form of parallel structures that oversee military activities, political officers that serve within military units, or secret police units that protect the ruler but also spy on the military. Again, Huntington’s view of the military is one led by a professional corps of officers that maintains itself separate from that of the rest of civil society.16

Morris Janowitz proposes a contrasting vision of civil-military relations in his work, *The Professional Soldier*. In this book, Janowitz argues that civilian control of the military is best attained under the umbrella of convergence theory; that is, civilianizing the military or militarizing society. Janowitz argues that even though the military is a separate entity from the civilian sector, the gap between those skills that make military personnel successful and those that are applicable in the civil sector is narrowing. He cites the increasing role of technology in both society and the military, and the military officer’s role as a manager and an administrator as examples of this convergence. His central argument is that as the values, skills, and abilities of military versus civilians become more congruent, civilian leadership can exercise control over the military because the military would identify with the civil society more readily.17 Similarly, since civilian and military skill sets resemble each other, convergence could mean a highly professional force as well. This directly contrasts with Huntington’s view of a separate, specialized military force.

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While the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian models of civilian control and professionalism are the two cornerstones of civil-military relations theory, they are more descriptive than prescriptive in nature. That is, they are extremely useful for characterizing an existing nation’s civil-military relations. However, they come up short in describing how a nation might build effective civil-military relations in a developing nation’s civil-military structure, as is the case with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s and beyond. This is because Feaver’s civil-military problematique is incomplete in describing the issues faced by an intervening power in trying to rebuild a host-nation military force.

The analysis of the central problem of maintaining civilian control over a professional military is important, but is insufficient. Two other issues facing an occupier are: first, creating the professional military; and second, creating a military that not only will refrain from using its power to threaten the state, but one that will not threaten the civilian population either. There are two main reasons why these additional problems are important. First, Huntington and Janowitz assume the prior existence of at least a competent, organized military force. This may not be a valid assumption when performing nation-building. Second, military intervention and nation-building are temporary endeavors, and hinge on the presence of security. A host nation military force that threatens civilians is a threat to internal security, and prolongs the occupation.

Thus, when performing nation-building, Feaver’s civil-military problematique must be transformed into a larger nation-building problematique, the tenets of which can be summarized as follows: The occupier must empower an effective host nation military force which may or may not exist, a priori, in a coherent capacity. The intervener must
create a military force that remains under civilian control yet is strong enough to defend the host state. And lastly, the occupier must create a military force that will not use its power against its own civilian population. This last condition may be satisfied by the parallel creation of an effective police force, which interacts with the civilian population in place of a military force.

Alexandre Lambert highlights challenges to security sector reform (SSR) as part of the larger issue of democratic civil-military relations. He cites the notion that democratic control of armed forces is an important component of how the state is seen by others in terms of good governance. “This links questions related to governance with questions related to security. Even though the international community may not yet offer a ‘model’ of good governance of the security sector, it is generally agreed that conventional and regular military forces are just one element as far as the exercise of state power is concerned.”

He indicates that often, paramilitary or irregular forces that share the same mission set as conventional forces, albeit with an internal security focus, will round out the security sector. Thus, the civil-military relations problem isn’t one of strictly civilian control over the conventional armed forces, it is one of democratic control over the entire security sector.

In conclusion, my model will take civil-military relations literature into account by attempting to maintain objective, third party civilian control over both military and police forces.

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Within the state-building set of existing literature, we look to a couple of sources. David Edelstein examines military occupations since 1815 and finds only a 24% success rate (out of 26 occupations, 7 were successful) as opposed to a 54% failure rate. It is important to note that he defines military occupation as “temporary control of a territory by a state (or a group of allied states) that makes no claim to permanent sovereignty over that territory.”\(^{19}\) He defines success during occupation as a mix of whether or not the occupier achieves its goals and at what cost. Thus, it is feasible that an occupier achieves its goals but at a cost greater than expected. Edelstein would code this level of success as “mixed,” which describes 19% of his cases. In his analysis, he finds that the most critical independent variable that leads to occupier success is the nature of the threat to the occupied territory with very specific mechanisms. An external threat leads to greater cooperation between the occupier and the territory, allowing the intervener to achieve goals at a lower cost. An internal threat leads to greater resistance on the part of the occupied territory, leading to greater cost and difficulty in achieving occupation objectives.

Eric Carlton examines the role of ideology in social control within occupied territories, and considers a range of social control measures available to an occupier. Within the narrow context of counterinsurgency and the future role of the US within foreign nations, it seems as though only a small range of these measures are actually available. For example, strategies such as assimilation, arbitrary repression, and

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 extermination are not on the table. It seems as though the US would be more apt to pursue a strategy akin to reconstitutionalization than the others Carlton mentions. He does acknowledge the central role that security forces and selective coercive violence play in bringing about social control.²⁰

Looking at Charles Tilly’s take on the process of state-building, we must examine the interaction between the roles/forces of state-making (eliminating internal enemies within the state), war-making (eliminating external enemies), protection (elimination of the enemies of state clients) and extraction (the ability of the state to resource itself to perform the other three tasks).²¹ In sum, Tilly sees importance in building both internal security forces, comprised of police and other security agencies, and external security forces, comprised of the state’s military.

Achilles Batalas examines the case of mid-nineteenth century Greece, where state elites were unable to demilitarize regional elites. Batalas finds this to be a case of “inverse racketeering”, in which the state becomes a client and not the supplier of protection against internal and external threats. Bandits and irregulars provided the state protection against other groups of irregulars, but when employed by the state against external threats, they were not as successful.²² Following this logic, it could be argued that a modern state cannot rely on a patronage relationship with irregular forces in order to secure itself against internal and external enemies; it must develop its own legitimate monopoly over coercive violence.

Laura Kalmanowiecki looks at the relationship between police and military forces in Argentina from 1880 until 1945. She cites two models of police-building. The top-down model, seen in France, is one in which the police forces comes out of the central government, and is more akin to a military in terms of responsibility and funding. The police are deployed as agents of the central government. The bottom-up approach, seen in the United States, is one in which police forces are municipal, not central, agents. They are responsible to their local communities, and their success depends on their proximity to both the local government and the population. In Argentina, “policing was a top-down, authoritarian construction. Unlike policemen in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Argentine policemen perceived themselves to be at the service of neither the people nor the constitution. Simply put, the Argentine police were an instrument of central government against local challenges to state power.”  

In the Argentine case, the nationalization of police power led to its abuse at the expense of locals, often in collaboration with military and other armed forces. Kalmanowiecki’s argument is that the police and military in Argentina overlapped at all levels of government, and that “we need to revisit the assumed distinction between protecting the state against internal or external threats respectively. Indeed, functional distinctions between the police and the military become blurred in countries where … less-intense war-making generates weaker states and the armed forces use their capacities in ways that largely affect the configuration of states and politics.” Overall, her argument is one of necessary division

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24 Ibid., 210.
between the roles and mission sets of military and police forces, as well as civilian control of both at the applicable levels of government.

Again, any proposed SSR model should account for the lessons from state-building literature by seeking to establish military and police forces with distinct mission sets, oriented toward external and internal threats, respectively.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY LITERATURE**

As a specialized subset of conventional civil conflict literature, there has been a recent push for studies of insurgency and counterinsurgency, no doubt motivated by our recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As already cited above, insurgencies tend to last longer than other types of conflict (Kalyvas and Barcells 2010). Fearon finds that “sons of the soil” dynamics, in which a peripheral ethnic minority comes in conflict with a migrant, state-supported ethnic majority population, drives long-lasting civil conflict.²⁵ Often, an insurgent/incumbent setup of a small, peripheral group juxtaposed to a strong core government mimics this “sons of soil” dynamic, which supports Kalyvas’ findings.

Lyall and Wilson find that increasing mechanization leads to decreased success in counterinsurgency operations for two reasons. First, mechanized forces are less able to interact with the population because they have less infantry soldiers by proportion, contributing to the identification problem and hindering the collection of proper intelligence. Second, this information problem inhibits the ability for mechanized forces

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to apply selective violence against insurgents. They argue that this may fuel, rather than
deter, insurgency.\(^{26}\) These findings should be of note when thinking about equipping and
organizing host nation military forces to perform counterinsurgency (COIN) tasks.

Jeff Friedman also looks at the COIN problem from the perspective of the
incumbent, and concludes that increased manpower does not appear to be a decisive
determinant of incumbent success. That is, there is no threshold value above which
incumbent success becomes much more likely. This is important, given FM 3-24’s
assertion that a 1:50 ratio (1 troop for every 50 inhabitants) is ideal in conducting COIN.
Friedman breaks the manpower debate into two camps: manpower skepticism and
manpower optimism. Skeptics usually adhere to one of three arguments: that increased
troop numbers eventually decrease effectiveness due to exacerbation of tensions within
the society (the “strong variant”); that the effectiveness of increased troops levels off (the
“moderate variant”); and the “foreign variant”, which argues that host-nation forces will
continue to be effective at increased levels, while foreign forces will not. The optimism
side also has 3 variants: increasing, decreasing, or linear marginal returns. Friedman’s
central goal is to characterize the relationship and slope of this curve. Additionally,
Friedman says that host-nation forces may only be marginally more successful than
foreign forces. This is important, because it speaks to FM 3-24’s priority on the
development of host- nation security forces and it buffers Biddle’s claim that fragmented
host-nation forces might not be effective in COIN. Overall, Friedman’s conclusion is that
the shape of the curve is linear in the positive direction, although the slope is relatively

\(^{26}\) Lyall, J., and I. Wilson. “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in
flat. That is, COIN outcome is positively correlated with troop concentration, although the linear returns are small.\textsuperscript{27}

Jason Lyall, however, finds significant evidence that indigenous forces are more effective in a counterinsurgency realm. Utilizing data from the Russian-Chechen conflict, he finds that operations conducted by Chechen forces were more effective when compared to those conducted by all-Russian forces. Lyall attributes this success to two mechanisms: the co-ethnic factor in lessening the problem of identifying insurgents, and prior experience or association with co-ethnic insurgents.\textsuperscript{28}

In terms of the political economy school of thought, scholars have tried to examine the effect of economic development and aid in a counterinsurgency conflict. The mechanism here is well-understood: if goods and services are being exchanged in a stable economic context, personnel are less susceptible to recruitment by insurgents for economic reasons and are less likely to turn toward the insurgency to provide those goods and services. This seems extremely applicable to the “hearts and minds” approach advocated in FM 3-24. Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov find that an Afghan-led development program significantly boosted villagers’ perceptions of economic well-being, but that these development programs had no effect on the security situation around the villages that were treated.\textsuperscript{29}

Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, however, do find some support for the opportunity cost hypothesis. They find that CERP (Commander’s Emergency Relief Program)

\textsuperscript{27} Friedman, J.A. “Boots on the Ground: The Significance of Manpower in Counterinsurgency.” (2010)
spending in Iraq was associated with lower levels of violence, although the effect was more significant after the 2007 surge and was more significant for smaller projects.\textsuperscript{30}

In conclusion, my SSR model should seek to develop effective host nation forces capable of identifying insurgents and applying selective violence. The effect of this type of counterinsurgency strategy seems to be more effective than, or able to enhance, economic components of COIN.

CURRENT US DOCTRINE

Current US doctrine for host-nation security force development is outlined in Chapter 6 of FM 3-24. This chapter provides guidelines for organizing US forces to train and mentor foreign forces as well as topics that are relevant to this discussion of building civil-military relations within a host country. The central theme of force development within a foreign country originates with the host nation's vision for its armed forces in terms of the factors of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities, or DOTMLPF. These components encompass all aspects of force development, although they are "tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize." This statement underscores the difficulty associated with such tasks.

The Counterinsurgency FM goes on to outline the desired endstate for host nation military forces. These desired traits are: flexible, proficient, self-sustained, well led, professional, and integrated into society. The last two characteristics are especially interesting, as these attributes directly translate to both Huntingtonian and Janowitzian interpretations of civil-military relations. In terms of professionalism and the Huntington model, the FM says that, "Security forces that are loyal to the central government and serving national interests, recognizing their role as the people’s servants and not their masters" is desired. Reflecting the convergence model, the FM says that foreign forces should, "represent the host nation's major ethnic groups and are not seen as instruments

32 FM 3-24, page 6-7.
of just one faction." Thus, it is evident that US doctrine for host-nation military building is a hybrid of Huntington’s institutional model and Janowitz’s convergence model. There are likely two reasons for this. First, building a professional military as an institution takes a long time, and the institution’s willingness to support a legitimate civil authority, as in the Huntington model of objective control, would likely be achieved on a longer time scale than the intervener can stomach. However, this condition would satisfy the first part of the nation-building problematique: that the military that does not threaten the state government. The third part of the nation-building problematique, that of creating a military which does not threaten the people, is taken care of through the “integrated into society” component. The reasoning here is that if military units are ethnically heterogeneous and representative of the national population, then within each unit there would exist a balance of power between different ethnic groups, and therefore military units would not be able to act against a specific group within the population.

FM 3-24 goes on to describe how to achieve the goal of an ethnically balanced military. The manual first describes how to ensure heterogeneity through recruiting practices. In summary, the host nation should develop its own military recruiting practices that are aligned with its own national policies, but it should also work to achieve representation from all minority factions. The recruiting of minorities builds military capacity through a very specific mechanism. “Moderate groups and factions within hostile or potentially hostile ethnic groups should be encouraged to join the HN (host nation) security forces. Most HN governments will likely resist recruiting disaffected ethnic groups . . . however, even moderate success . . . provides enormous payoffs. It

33 FM 3-24, page 6-7.
builds the security forces’ legitimacy and often quiets legitimate fears of such groups regarding their relationship to the HN government.” 34 Thus, not only does this type of recruiting practice give minority ethnic groups buy-in to the existing government, it increases the alignment of the military with minority groups and with the society as a whole. The logic is that this would consequently achieve a measure of civilian control according to the Janowitzian model. If the military sees both itself and the government as reflecting the population, it is less apt to act against both the population and the government.

In terms of training a professional military force, the field manual describes officer training as a separate subject than training the military as a whole, reflecting the Huntington model of professionalism. “The leader training methodology must reinforce the different levels of authority within the HN security force. The roles and responsibilities of each commissioned officer and NCO rank must firmly be established so recruits understand what is expected of them. Their subordinate relationship to civilian authorities must also be reinforced to ensure civilian control.” 35 Officers can be selected and trained in a number of ways, including military academies and officer candidate schools. However, the development and implementation of these methods take time, which is scarce when there is most likely an ongoing insurgency to deal with. Thus, the likelihood of being able to train highly professional officers during an insurgency is low. The field manual fully acknowledges this issue. “Citizens under

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34 FM 3-24, Page 6-9 to 6-10.
35 FM 3-24, page 6-14.
attack would rather have an adequate officer and unit now than a better leader and organization years later.\textsuperscript{36}

Taking into account the difficulties associated with professionalizing a host nation military force, it seems as though a simplified, ideal model for building a military as defined in FM 3-24 has a few steps: first, in conjunction with the host nation, develop a vision/doctrine for the military force; second, recruit from all ethnic groups in order to ensure heterogeneity across the force; third, train enlisted recruits in the basics of military tasks (shoot, move, communicate); fourth, train officers in additional tasks (such as intelligence collection, treatment of detainees, etc.), but high-level professional training in the form of academies can be done later. As stated before, this model is a hybrid of the Huntington and Janowitz ideas, but is skewed markedly in the Janowitzian convergence direction. This makes intuitive sense; it is quicker and easier to recruit a heterogeneous force than it is to stand up professional training curricula to support a modern, qualified officer corps. In the ideal case, the professional quality of the officer corps would grow over time, perhaps after the intervener has completed its mission in country. This professionalism would increasingly contribute to civilian control over the military.

The remaining point of discussion with regard to host nation security force development is that of the role or orientation of the military. Counterinsurgency is a complex endeavor, where challenges in identifying and isolating the enemy are compounded by security and governance problems. The intervening military, and in turn, the host nation military, will most likely be used to combat the insurgency as they have

\textsuperscript{36} FM 3-24, page 6-15.
coercive means to deal with insurgents. However, this does not fall in line with US doctrine, which orients the national military toward external threats only.

The field manual supports this notion, and dictates that the primary force to be used in COIN operations should be the local police force. As a local institution, neighborhood police will have a deeper understanding of the immediate area and can gather better intelligence than national military units that may operate in different areas of the country. This underscores the basic notion of civil-military relations that dominates the American way of thinking: the national military should be oriented toward external threats, not internal ones. Again, this condition is hard to meet in a counterinsurgency situation, where the occupier as well as the host nation may feel the need to utilize all assets at their disposal to secure the population and combat the insurgency.

Stephen Biddle highlights a fundamental error in the manual’s application in Iraq: he argues that the manual is written with a generally uncommitted populace in mind. The object of COIN operations would be to win the “hearts and minds” of this population through the administration of public goods (including security). This, in turn, erodes support for the insurgency, solves the identification problem, and the counterinsurgent can both apply violence to the insurgent and help strengthen the state. However, the situation in Iraq did not seem to fit this ideological mold, because the population was generally not uncommitted. The population, divided along sectarian lines (Sunni Arab / Shia Arab / Kurd), quickly turns toward co-ethnics and are not susceptible to the “hearts and minds” approach. Biddle extends the ethnic fragmentation argument to the host

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37 FM 3-24, page 6-19.
government, which is a fair argument in the case of Iraq. In doing so, he highlights the major error of omission within the manual: the absence of coercive bargaining with the host, and the major error of commission: the development of a viable host-nation security force. His logic is that, as a fragmented and possibly illegitimate government, the US should consider using coercive tools in order to persuade that government to act properly. Additionally, host nation security forces that are fragmented could exacerbate the insurgency, not help to quell it. As he concludes, Biddle notes that the policies outlined in the COIN manual are most likely only partially reliable for the decreased violence in Iraq over the latter half of the 2000s. It seem as though the growth of CLC (concerned local citizens) groups and the alienation of the Sunni bloc by Al Qaeda seemed to do more “heavy lifting” in the counterinsurgency fight than did the “hearts and minds” approach, the development of Iraqi Security Forces, or the “surge” of 2007.38

Kalyvas joins Biddle’s criticism of the manual along the lines of the “old” vs. “new” (or “grievance” vs “greed”) argument. Kalyvas says that the manual assumes a grievance model situation, which ignores much of the recent political science research that points to greed or fragmentation as a driver of violence. Kalyvas’s main critique is that the manual treats the front lines as a place where insurgent and incumbent interact with the population on a daily basis. However, he notes that in traditional societies, much of the interaction is mediated by and filtered through local elites. He does qualify this criticism by noting that the COIN manual is inherently geared toward helping to rebuild a collapsed state, therefore it’s understandable why it spends a great deal of time talking about “hearts and minds” and providing public goods rather than characterizing the

insurgency as being rooted in grievance or greed. Also, an “on the ground” manual
should be geared toward a constructivist viewpoint; if the problems are structural in
nature, then a guide from which commanders operate would not only be useless, but may
be counterproductive.
The literature that speaks to military and police establishment, operationalization, and control is extensive and cuts across many disciplines. But, what does this tell us about the issue at hand? To summarize, civil conflict is a complex problem, and counterinsurgency, as a subset of civil conflict, is even more difficult to combat due to problems with identifying insurgents and applying selective violence against them. Furthermore, combating insurgency is both a military problem and a governance problem. We see that indigenous forces may be more effective at counterinsurgency operations, which is important since it provides space and time for democratic institutions to grow, and establishes security so that the occupier can eventually withdraw. Thus, counterinsurgency has state-building and war-making components.

We also see throughout the literature the need for civilian control of the armed forces. Recently, civil-military relations literature has highlighted the need for democratic control of the entire security sector, including paramilitary/irregular forces and police. The cases of mid-nineteenth century Greece and early-twentieth century Argentina illustrate the idea that proper power relationships between the state, the military, the police and the population are necessary for state-building. Therefore, an occupier seeking to establish or re-establish democratic power within a state must successfully train, equip, and advise police and military forces to perform distinct mission sets that fall within each area of desired expertise. During counterinsurgency, however, this is difficult. Colin Jackson notes, “The surface similarity of counterinsurgency to conventional war produces an illusion of familiarity. This illusion in turn leads militaries
to apply conventional military strategies. Faced with small groups of armed opponents, militaries will seek to re-establish order by destroying these groups in battle.\textsuperscript{39} However, while pure military engagement might be effective at the lowest levels in terms of killing or capturing insurgents, it is often less effective at higher levels. Jackson goes on to argue that "optimistic interpretation of performance . . . from these military operations reinforces attachment to the conventional military response to insurgency . . . [however, ] conventional strategies produce stalemate at the campaign level."\textsuperscript{40} Thus, employing the national military in COIN operations is not an optimal strategy.

Therefore, my model is driven by the central idea that police and military forces must be developed both in parallel and distinct from each other during COIN operations. They must be developed as functional counterparts because when the intervener departs, the state must have the ability to combat both internal and external threats and maintain a monopoly over coercive violence. The host nation police and military functions must achieve some baseline level of competency at the time of occupier withdrawal to facilitate that withdrawal and to guard against both state collapse and attack from external threats. Additionally, the police and military must be developed in a distinct and complementary fashion. This idea is novel as part of a "roadmap" to success. Instead of both the police and military engaging the internal threat due to its "surface similarity", they must be given distinct mission sets that fall in line with their intended functions in a democracy.


\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 43.
The development of host nation security forces is part of a larger concept of legitimization, which is the term I use to describe the building of legitimacy and capacity of a state after conflict. The overall concept is described in Figure 1.

![State-Building Legitimation Concept](image)

Figure 1. State-Building Legitimation Concept.

We see three main lines of effort in terms of state-building reforms: the security sector, state institutions, and the economy. Both the security sector and the economy bolster state institutions, while state institutions govern and provide the operating space for the security sector and economy to grow and continue to support the overall development of the state. In this paper, I am concerned with security sector reform because as the figure notes, a well-behaved security sector consisting of both military and police forces provides legitimacy and security for institutions to develop. The term well-behaved refers to a security institution that is subordinate to civilian control and thus accountable to an external third party, acts as an official representative of the government, and is allowed to utilize violence with the permission of the state. This definition holds with Weber's definition that the state holds a monopoly over legitimate
and coercive violence. This definition also accounts for the central concept from civil-military relations theory in that the military must be subordinate to a civilian authority. Likewise, police forces must be accountable to an external or governmental third-party.

Security sector reform is an important issue in this context for three reasons. First, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the many challenges associated with building capable, credible security forces within a host nation. As the United States and other coalition partners incorporate lessons learned from these conflicts into future training and planning, security sector reform and the development of host nation security forces should be of great importance. Second, FM 3-24 only provides an endstate for security force development, not a “how-to.” Thus, security sector reform is likely to be disjointed at different levels of responsibility, as commanders with varying operating pictures interpret the guidelines in FM 3-24 differently. The third reason that this discussion is important is because the SSR strategy should be different given different conditions on the ground. A strong or weak insurgency, ethnic differences, the breakdown of power at the national level amongst different groups, as well as other factors like history of violence should affect the overall strategy in different areas. Thus, a more in-depth look at how these variables affect SSR planning at national and local levels is necessary.

In this paper, I seek to hypothesize about both the nature and the speed at which military forces and police forces might develop under the title of security sector reform. This paper will generate hypotheses that, although not completely testable, offer themselves to scrutiny from experts in the field as well as consideration by US and allied military leadership. I present a model (the dependent variable) that changes via input
from the two distinct independent variables of insurgency and ethnicity. I hypothesize that the presence of an insurgency (COIN YES or COIN NO) alters the nature of the transfer of local security and policing from military to police forces. Additionally, I hypothesize that the potential speed at which the transfer of mission sets takes place is dependent on the ethnicity in the local area, as well as the power relationship at the state level. Therefore, the speed and nature of the security and policing responsibility can be modeled in terms of the presence of an insurgency and the ethnic breakdown of the local neighborhood, when considered against the backdrop of ethnic groups’ power relationships at the state level. The model and variables are depicted in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Model and Variables.](image)

The overall motivation for this paper from my own personal experiences in Iraq comes from the idea that the utilization of both national military and local police forces during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations hinders the ability of each to develop and remain effective in the long term. My hypotheses theorize about the nature and speed of transition from military to police forces during counterinsurgency versus during non-COIN SSR operations and with regard to different ethnic breakdowns (in a notional state with ethnic groups A and B).
H1. The host nation military will not satisfactorily develop its external defense capability until there exists a legitimate external threat.

As a corollary to Hypothesis 1, the host nation military will engage the more imminent threat. The presence of an insurgency diverts the military’s attention away from external defense and toward counterinsurgency.

H2. If the host nation military does not transfer some of its counterinsurgency and policing missions to local police authorities during a conflict, the overall professional development of the military will be hindered.

In the case of Hypothesis 2, we accept that assuming the external defense mission is a large part of a host nation’s definition of a professional force.

H3. If an insurgency exists in a heterogeneous (mixed) area, the transfer of mission sets from military to police will be slow. If one ethnic group holds dominance at the national level, the transfer of mission sets in a locally mixed area will be even slower.

H4. If an insurgency is ongoing and if Group A is dominant at the national level, the transfer of mission sets from military to police will be slow in a local area dominated by Group B.
These hypotheses lead to the proposition of a new model for host nation security force development. This new model takes into account the relevant factors from the literature, including the development, in parallel, of both military and police forces whose end state aligns with doctrinal prescription. Additionally, this model goes a step beyond FM 3-24 and depicts the mechanics of host nation security force development and not simply a simply describing the end goal. This model can be seen as the dependent variable, as described above.

The model has four components or mission sets that evolve through time, or phases of the occupation operation. I attempt to model the mission sets of the military, police, and "hybrid" forces, as well as the nature of the threat. It is important to note that the phases of the operation are not distinct and may not be recognized while operations are ongoing. However, it is worthwhile for the occupier to try to characterize the nature of the mission based, and so I offer some suggestions for general guidelines on when these phase lines are passed. It is also important to recognize that democratization during these types of operations is extremely complex; there are many other agencies, bureaus, and functions of the host nation government that must be stood up, resourced, mentored, and held accountable. The executive, legislative, and judicial components must be developed in parallel with the state security apparatus in order to both strengthen the state overall as well as support and provide legitimacy to the security services. The development of those civil agencies is beyond the scope of the paper, but I assume that those institutions develop alongside the security apparatus, both in ability and legitimacy.
The Impact of Insurgency

The SSR process with regard to a COIN environment vs. a non-COIN environment is depicted in the figures below.

Figure 3. SSR Process in a Non-COIN Environment.

Figure 4. SSR Process in a COIN Environment.
Phase I – COIN YES

Phase I of the operation is the initial occupation of the host nation. The host nation’s legacy security services have been destroyed or have surrendered, and the occupying military initially handles administration of state business. In this phase, the host nation military is significantly weakened; it may or may not exist in a coherent form. Most likely, there is a skeleton of an officer corps in place, as the troops have surrendered or deserted. For the purposes of my model, the local police have disbanded and do not exist. This is a reasonable assumption based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since the occupying military handles law and order operations and has taken martial control of cities and towns, the local police likely does not exist in a coherent fashion. The hybrid force may or may not exist; there may be paramilitary forces that were part of the host nation armed forces or an intelligence service that is still intact. The key event in this phase of the operation is the co-opting of the host nation military and their alignment with the occupying forces. Most likely, a provisional state government has been established and the host nation military is established as its security agent. This may happen well into the campaign, but it is necessary to establish this relationship as both the symbol of the emerging strength of the state as well as to give the state some coercive power.

It is also likely that the occupier establishes a working relationship with the host nation military in a training, advising, and perhaps equipping role. In conjunction with the occupying military, the host nation military handles all security roles for the state, and will respond to murders, theft, and other petty crimes. The military also conducts domestically-oriented military operations such as checkpoints, as well as threats of
terrorism. With the occupier the guarantor of external security to the state, there is no external threat, so the host nation military can engage internal threats with no threat to its long-term performance or ability to professionalize.

Phase I – COIN NO

Phase I of the operation in a non-counterinsurgency environment mimics that of the occupation phase of the counterinsurgency case, for the simple fact that the insurgency has not yet taken root. There remains no external threat due to the presence of the occupying military, and the internal insurgent threat is nonexistent. The role of both the occupying military and the components of the host nation military remain the same as in the counterinsurgency case.

Phase II – COIN YES

In Phase II of the operation, we see variation in the nature of the transfer of mission sets from the military to the police due to the presence of the COIN variable. The nature of the conflict changes significantly. We see the transition from an occupation to a counterinsurgency operation. At the beginning of this phase, both the occupying and the host nation security forces engage the internal threat. It is at this phase where my model provides explanatory power and detail where FM 3-24 falls short. “Armed forces are not intrinsically suited to police work. Soldiers are trained to apply lethal force in war... their efforts are ultimately intended to buy time for the
development of host nation police capabilities.” In this context, the host nation military is well-established in terms of infrastructure, training relationships, and administrative functions. Logistics and intelligence likely lag behind in terms of pace of development; the occupying forces can help with these functions. The host nation military conducts checkpoint operations and counterterror operations.

The host nation police forces are stood up and established in this phase. By now, the occupier has deployed specialized troops and advisors with the special skill sets to advise and train police forces. Most likely, these troops will be the military police forces that already exist in military formations. In this phase, it is critical that the host nation police develop to the point where it can handle simple crimes, such as theft. These types of crimes include the following functions, among others: gathering evidence, questioning and arresting suspects properly, patrolling, responding to calls and complaints, and assisting with domestic disputes. The nature of the threat in this phase is internal; the main opponent to the continued development of the state is the insurgency. The military continues to secure the population through its higher-level operations (checkpoints and counterterror), while the police must emerge as the primary guarantor of security within the local community. This critical step is the missing piece of FM 3-24, and answers the question of when and where should the local police take over security operations.

If the development of the police lags, and it is not yet able to handle simple crimes, the intervener has a choice; by evaluating individual military and police units, the occupier can either wait until all police units are capable or it can transfer authority to local police selectively, perhaps on a province by province basis. This strategy may pay

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dividends, as the intervener can potentially assume risk in certain areas divert resources and attention to those areas whose police lag behind in development. The key point here is that by evaluating conditions on the ground, the model allows for flexibility on the part of ground commanders as the situation changes.

*Phase II – COIN NO*

We see variation in the model if there is no insurgent threat. In this phase of the operation, there exists a legitimate external threat, which the military will orient itself toward. In this more permissive environment, local police forces are less likely to be intimidated by insurgents and other thugs that seek to undermine local security. Additionally, because there is no internal threat, the occupying power is able to deploy civilian advisory agencies in order to accelerate the development of local police forces. Thus, we see variation in this phase in two areas. First, the host nation police forces can concentrate on all internal policing mission sets (theft, checkpoint operations, and murders). Second, civilian agencies, not military police, are able to advise and accelerate the development of the police.

*Phase III – COIN YES*

In the third and final phase of the occupation, the nature of the operation changes yet again. In this phase, the occupier is preparing to withdraw its forces and allow the newly-formed stable democracy to govern and to provide security solely with its own security forces. The nature of the threat changes in this phase. With the countersurgency campaign complete, the insurgency rendered ineffective, and the
occupier's military withdrawing, the threat becomes external once again. The host nation must transition and align its security forces to meet these threats. In essence, defeating the internal threat provides the military and police space and time to transition.

In this phase, the military relinquishes all of its internal security roles and renews its focus on external defense. This is a characteristic of all civilian-controlled democratic militaries and thus, is a key goal of US-led occupation. The police assumes the role of the guarantor of internal security. As such, it continues to respond to thefts and other crimes. It also assumes control over checkpoint operations and other internal security-based operations. Additionally, the police takes over prosecution of murders and other high crimes, which likely require the use of more advanced forensics, evidence-gathering techniques, and utilization of applicable due process of law. The counterterror component of the state's security is turned over to the state's hybrid forces. These paramilitary and national intelligence services can play a vital role in securing the population against these high-level threats.

At the conclusion of the third phase (or, more specifically, when the occupier withdraws its forces), the state security apparatus is arranged just as FM32-4 prescribes it. The national military is oriented toward the external threat, local and national police forces fight crime and provide internal security, and the hybrid force is geared toward transnational crime, terrorism, and other high-level crimes and national security threats that may be either foreign or domestic in nature.
Phase III -- COIN NO

In a non-COIN scenario, we again see the lack of variation in the mission sets of military and police forces when compared to the counterinsurgency case. This arises for two reasons. First, the presence of the external threat drives the orientation of the host nation military. Second, the desired endstate remains the same: a military that is focused on national defense and local police forces that can police neighborhoods and provide local security. This is in concert with FM 3-24, and seems to make sense. The goal, no matter what the threat scenario, should remain the same. It is simply the mechanics of how to achieve that goal which will change due to the presence of the COIN variable.

There are a couple of notes to consider when contemplating this model. First, there is the assumption that a democratic military will not be professional if it is oriented toward internal threats. Professional, democratic militaries are oriented toward external threats. Indeed, this condition is prescribed in FM 3-24. However, where FM 3-24 only provides a desired endstate, this model provides a roadmap of how to transition power from the military to the police in an effective and efficient manner. The second note is that the phases of the operation as I have described them are fluid; there are not “hard” conditions that, when met, dictate the need to transition from one to another. Conditions “on the ground” will always dictate policies. However, it is important to note that there are three necessary conditions for this model to succeed as put forth here.

The first condition is the alignment of the host nation military with the occupying military, which allows for the establishment of a training and advising relationship. The second condition is the transfer of basic internal security missions to the local police. This transition is critical, as it builds the police as a legitimate representative of the state,
and allows the state to exercise coercive violence through means other than the national military. A democratic intervener would consider the use of a national military to repress its own people as unacceptable. The third necessary condition is the eventual defeat of the insurgency. While this condition seems obvious, it is extremely important. The defeat of the insurgency allows the host nation’s military forces to re-align to face potential external threats. It also allows the police to increase their capacity for fighting crime, conducting checkpoint operations, and other basic internal security missions. The lack of an internal threat allows the military to professionalize by orienting toward international threats and the police room to professionalize by focusing on crime fighting. This also gives support to the notion that if an insurgency is ongoing, it prohibits the state’s democratic strength from progressing to the desired endstate. The security situation, often cited as the determinant for other state-building action on the ground, is indeed a significant driving factor in the ability for the military and police to align to their desired roles.

The last note is that the ability for the occupier (and ultimately the host nation) to determine and assign mission sets to its security services drives their ability to progress and professionalize. Thus, even though insurgency looks similar to conventional war on the surface, one of the main ideas of this model is that the police forces must take over local security as the country weakens and defeats the insurgent threat. Otherwise, the military will continue to engage the insurgency, which may have good tactical results, might lead to stalemate or defeat at the campaign level. Again, this model is novel because it provides a roadmap to success, not simply a desired endstate. If implemented
correctly, it should answer the research question in such a manner that will result in both
the military and police reaching higher levels of competency and professionalism.

*The Impact of Ethnicity*

The impact of ethnicity on the nature and speed of transition from military to
police can also be theorized based on simple principles. First, police forces should reflect
the makeup of the local community in order to gain legitimacy among the local
population. Second, the transition from military to police forces will be slowest where
local resistance, especially insurgency, exists. This second point seems trivial, but it is
worth noting. As we have seen during the examination of the COIN variable, the nature
of the transition is affected by insurgency. Therefore, commanders must take both
factors into account when designing operational plans, because both the pace and nature
of transition can vary across and within designated areas of responsibility. A strict
timeline applied across the entire battle space may not be feasible. A summary of the
speed at which transition occurs within the framework of my proposed model is
presented in Figure 5.
### State Power Dynamic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Power Dynamic</th>
<th>A majority B minority</th>
<th>A and B balanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A dominant</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B dominant</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Slow</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = B</td>
<td>Pol = B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = B</td>
<td>Pol = B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and B mixed</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Slowest</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
<td>Pol = Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
<td>Mil → Pol Fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pol = A</td>
<td>Pol = Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COIN Environment</th>
<th>COIN Yes</th>
<th>COIN No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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**Figure 5. Ethnicity Considerations on SSR Speed.**

We see variation in three places in the model: 1) the makeup of the police forces in the mixed case varies with state breakdown; 2) the speed at which transition occurs in the B dominant area varies with state breakdown; and 3) the speed at which transition occurs in the B dominant versus the mixed area when Group A holds power at the national level.

First, we see variation in the makeup of police forces in the mixed area as the state power breakdown varies. Ideally, we should see police forces of mixed ethnicity that are representative of that area. This would enable the local police forces to build legitimacy in the bottom-up sense, and meets the goals set forth in FM 3-24. When Groups A and B are balanced in terms of power, this vision is easier to implement, as
policy from the federal to the local levels will likely reflect this ideal. However, when one group is dominant, we are likely to see official policies that reinforce that group’s power, as well as unofficial selection of police chiefs and other powerful positions that maintain that group’s dominance over local police forces. While not possible in an area dominated by a minority group, these policies will likely be seen in mixed areas. There are two implications of this variation.

The first is that during counterinsurgency, if a particular group in a mixed area dominates local police forces, we expect the transition from military to police to be slowest, for two reasons. One, that police force would not hold legitimacy with the local population, as those members of Group B would resist Group A’s dominance of the security sector. The second reason why this transition would be slowest is that we would expect the insurgency to be strongest in this case. Assuming insurgents come from Group B, they are likely to attack local police forces as well as other targets in order to gain a share of local power. The second major implication of this variation is that in the case of Group A domination at the national level, in a mixed area and during an insurgency, we expect ethnic cleansing to occur. This cleansing may be supported by local police forces that are dominated by Group A or may consist of voluntary migration by members of Group B.

The second variation in the model is in the speed of transition in an area dominated by Group B with variation in state breakdown. If Groups A and B are balanced at the national level, we expect to see quick transition in Group B’s area, regardless of an ongoing insurgency. Members of Group B dominate the local police forces in this area, and so they are likely to gain legitimacy quickly at the local level.
Where Groups A and B are balanced, members of Group B are likely to consolidate power in their own area. This area may be considered a semi-autonomous region under a federal government.

However, if Group A is dominant, Group B is likely to use their neighborhoods as bases for the insurgency. There is a rough parallel here between this argument and the role of Al Anbar province during the Iraq insurgency. Anbar, dominated by the minority Sunni sect, served as the base of the Sunni insurgency with regard to attacks on Coalition Forces in Al Anbar itself as well as attacks against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad and other areas. In this instance, the transfer of security from military to police forces is likely to be slow. The Group A dominated government will seek to eradicate the insurgent base from these areas, and mistrust of local police leaders will slow the empowerment of those personnel.

Lastly, where Group A has power at the national level, we expect to see transition to occur at its slowest rate in a mixed area during an insurgency. There are two reasons for this. First, Group A dominates the local police forces. In a mixed area, this hinders the building of legitimacy of the local level, as members of Group B are likely to see the police as puppets of a federal government controlled by the rival sect. Local police leaders from Group A are likely to be corrupt in order to curry favor with national level leaders as well as members of their own group in the local area. The second reason the transition will be slower in this case is that insurgents in Group B have multiple target sets in order to advance their political goals. Insurgents can attack both the police forces, which are dominated by Group A, as well as the local population. Thus, securing a mixed area, especially one in which the police is controlled by one sect, is particularly
difficult to accomplish. Since securing the area will likely take more time, the ultimate transfer of policing authority to local forces will be delayed.
METHODS

The data required to test this hypothesis must focus on the interaction between police and military forces, which will both evaluate the veracity of my hypothesis as well as shed some light on my proposed development model. A number of methods might be used for this endeavor, however only one is legitimately feasible for this study.

Natural Experiment

A natural experiment would seem to be the best method for testing this hypothesis. In a setting during an ongoing conflict, one could control for complicating factors and get at the root of police and military interaction. This experiment would have to take place within a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Two districts or provinces could be chosen with similar dynamics, similar numbers of police and military forces, and similar ethnicities. My proposed model would then be implemented in one area, while the other district would proceed under the model of development underway in the rest of the combat theater. One could examine the development of both types of forces at multiple levels and compare it with the development within “control district.” Of course, there are a number of reasons why this method is simply not feasible. First, it is highly doubtful that a political science experiment would be allowed to proceed in a combat theater, especially one in which American and host nation citizens’ lives are in jeopardy. Second, the very idea of separating small military and police units and applying treatment within a larger bureaucracy that has its own rules and regulations is likely unacceptable to the host nation government. Lastly, the conflicts under which this experiment would
need to proceed are ending. The United States has withdrawn its combat presence in Iraq, and plans to do the same in Afghanistan by 2014. This leaves no time for an experiment of this nature to proceed.

*Focused Case Study Method*

A case study method might seem to be the most feasible way in which to attack this research question. While it may be unable to operationalize my proposed model, the method would allow me to extract mechanistic details in terms of the interaction of military and police development from documented history. In order to examine the nature of this interaction, I propose to examine the dual cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. As the motivating cases for this paper, it is useful to examine how my hypotheses fit within those conflicts.

There are many interesting issues to examine here, in terms of the United States effort to establish a lasting democracy during counterinsurgency-driven conflicts. My own experience in the Iraq theater speaks to the importance of proper levels and types of support in terms of host nation security force development. While examining my model against the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan may be looking at the “last war,” it would certainly be useful to policymakers and military professionals as they consider reconciliation and state-building strategies during the next conflict. Additionally, these case studies are ripe for surveys and interviews with personnel who served in both conflicts, which will yield original data central to examining my hypothesis.
Quantitative Methods

A large-N, quantitative study of occupation, counterinsurgency, and host-nation security sector reform would be informative, yet remains problematic and not all that feasible. First, the number of cases that fit the situation I am trying to theorize about is simply too small to extract large-N type data from. Edelstein's data set of occupations includes only 26 cases since 1815, which might be enough cases to extract data such as success rate, but not enough variation exists within these 26 cases in terms of host-nation security sector reform. Second, coding within each case would be extremely problematic. Looking at the variables of police and military mission sets, it would be difficult to extract this type of data at the state level across all of these occupations. Additionally, the temporal dimension of how mission sets change over time would affect results. A simple snapshot of police and military dynamics, coding these dynamics, and then extracting data would simply not offer enough explanatory power in a such a small number of cases.

A much more viable quantitative method would need to take place at a lower level of analysis. For example, if it were possible to track the nature of police and military mission sets within cases where data exists, it would be useful if it could be correlated with a measure of effectiveness of those forces. This would speak to the impact of mission sets and orientation on development. I plan on looking for variation in the mission sets and seeing if this drives variation in competence of both the military and police utilizing quantitative data available from both theaters. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, unclassified SIGACT data is simply not robust enough to draw correlation. It is problematic to examine which types of security forces responded to different types of
incidents, see if this changes over time, and correlate that to operational readiness assessment (ORA) ratings. There are a couple of potential issues with using this quantitative data. First, SIGACT data only includes events that coalition forces report, which could leave out many events that host nation forces respond to on their own. It remains uncertain from the data which forces were partnered with local security forces; many activities of host nation security forces would not be captured by coalition SIGACT data. The second issue with using this data is that ORA ratings are subjective on the part of the coalition advisors and partner units. Thus, the true effect of military and police mission sets could be heavily biased based on the role and emphasis that different units have taken in terms of partnership.
EMPIRICAL DATA

Overall, I conducted five interviews with Security Sector Reform policy experts and military personnel that have worked with Iraqi and/or Afghani security forces in an advisory and mentorship role. While not all of my hypotheses can be rigorously tested through a qualitative method such as this, the expert of professionals in the field is certainly useful. The content of these interviews was nothing short of extraordinary, and helped elucidate some of the benefits and also some shortcomings of my proposed model and hypotheses. There also exists a set of new literature in the field regarding the US experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While not primary source material, it is useful to examine recent documents published by SSR practitioners within the context of my model. I present my findings below.

My interviews show great support for Hypothesis 1. Indeed, Colin Jackson’s scholarly work shows that a military engaged in counterinsurgency will most likely adopt conventional strategies in order to defeat the threat. My hypothesis takes this idea a step further, and proposes the idea that while the military is engaging the insurgent threat, it is neglecting its primary role as the guarantor of security from external threats. “In the Iraq case, with the United States military present, they [the Iraqi Army] never entertained that an external threat was possible, as there was too much internal strife.” An officer that advised an Iraqi Army Brigade S3 (Operations Officer) agrees: “The question about external threats has to do with the imminence of the external threat. In Iraq, it’s not as if

42 Army Lieutenant Colonel; Team Chief, Border Transition Team in Iraq 2008-2009; Advisory and Assistance Brigade in Mosul 2010-2011. Personal Interview. 2 April 2013.
there was another country massing forces at the border." While it is impossible to manufacture an external threat, it would be useful to US policymakers and military leaders to ensure that the host nation military understands the potential for such a threat to exist. Otherwise, the military is likely to continue to engage the insurgent threat, hindering both its professionalization as well as the local police’s ability to provide local security. “That line gets blurry: in COIN, what is a criminal act versus what is a military act? It’s difficult to tell the difference between local criminals taking advantage of chaos versus an Al Qaeda cell that is trying to achieve a political goal. The military should want to engage the Al Qaeda threat, and the police should want to engage the day-to-day policing of criminals.” Indeed, the latest version of British COIN doctrine states that, “where armed forces have to act to support the civil authority they should transfer such security responsibilities to the civil police as soon as conditions allow.”

The one issue where the experts seem to differ is at what point, given conditions on the ground, that transition might begin. According to my model, the transition from military to police during COIN begins in earnest during Phase II, when local security has not yet been completely achieved. The issue of whether local security is a prerequisite for the empowerment of local police forces is a debated one.

One school of thought, and one held by most associated with the current counterinsurgency doctrine of “clear, hold, build” is that local security must be established before authority is transferred. “You can’t do policing where you don’t have

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44 Ibid.
security. One of our mistakes in Afghanistan is that we tried to push police forces into areas that did not have local security. It really is dependent on the security situation on the ground. It may be some kind of constabulary force doing policing until local forces are able to take over.”

An alternate idea is that you must begin to transition to local police forces while security operations are ongoing. “Do you need complete security? Absolutely not. You cannot achieve it. The hardest military task to perform is ‘clear’. It is probably an illusion that something is ‘cleared.’

A senior Army officer that served as an advisor to Afghanistan’s National Civil Order of Police, an Afghani two-star general, cautions, “We have to be careful about the militarization of local police forces. Additionally, we have to be careful if the police are tied to a corrupt government. In that case, the police reform effort may not even be worth it. If you push reform too hard, it could pose a problem.”

LTG Dubik, the Commander of the former Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), provides the following perspective: “Military or paramilitary police forces can impose security; local police enforce it once it exists. The difference is subtle, but important. Local police are not trained, armed, equipped, or organized to defeat insurgent attacks. Secure conditions must exist before police can do their job. Once military or paramilitary forces impose security and keep in in place long enough to

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46 Department of the Army Civilian; Peacekeeping and Stability Scholar and Advisor. Personal Interview. 28 March 2013.
47 Army Lieutenant Colonel; Team Chief, Border Transition Team in Iraq 2008-2009; Advisory and Assistance Brigade in Mosul 2010-2011; Personal Interview. 2 April 2013.
sufficiently eliminate the conditions of police intimidation, the process of transforming the local police can begin."\(^{49}\)

A common theme amongst senior military officers interviewed was that of the necessity of a common, standardized training program in order to develop host nation military and police forces. Officers indicated similar problems in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. One officer described a situation in which an Operations Officer of an Iraqi Army Brigade of 1,500 personnel could not send 15 Soldiers to the standard basic training course because their operational tempo was so high.\(^{50}\) The situation was similar with regards to Afghan police forces. “Twenty-six weeks of training is what we recommended for a basic police course, trying to look at the problem long-term. We had to avoid just putting boots on the ground. The police training was watered down to approximately 8 week, or about 1/3 of what is recommended to build a long-term solution as a police force.”\(^{51}\)

Another officer agreed with the notion that the professionalization process is deliberate and long-term. “As we try to define the conditions necessary for transition [from military to police], we have to make sure we have a professional ethic and well-defined roles and responsibilities. In Iraq, we saw that people didn’t agree with those roles; it was a fight for power. We must define those roles and professional standards, and then lay appropriate personalities against those. They must be trained and certified to

\(^{50}\) Army Lieutenant Colonel; Advisor to Iraqi Brigade Operations Officer in Baghdad 2005-2006. Personal Interview. 12 Apr 2013.
\(^{51}\) Army Colonel; Advisor to National Civil Order of Police in Afghanistan 2011-2012. Personal Interview. 28 March 2013.
perform those roles." Another officer touched on the role of training and certification with regard to the Afghan police forces. "In Afghanistan, we had Pashtuns and Tajiks... but the police had to be fair, regardless of ethnicity. This speaks to training, professionalization, and literacy. If the police were fair, the people were happy. This requires in-depth training and education, and this takes time. People in Afghanistan told me they thought this process would take thirty years."

James K. Wither, a former British Army officer, argues that it could take between five and 10 years to create viable local police capabilities in a host nation. "Decades of experience of stability operations reinforce the importance of well-trained, well-led indigenous police forces and indicate the relatively small numbers of highly trained police officers prove more effective than larger numbers of semi-trained police rushed into service."

A robust training and certification program that provides a method for professionalization may be able to transcend dominant societal fractures like ethnicity. For example, "in Rwanda, they took the rebel forces and warring factions and created one police force with Hutus and Tutsis who were involved in the genocide. And they’re making some headway. Granted, it has been a 20-year process, but it’s an interesting example."

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52 Army Lieutenant Colonel; Team Chief, Border Transition Team in Iraq 2008-2009; Advisory and Assistance Brigade in Mosul 2010-2011. Personal Interview. 2 Apr 2013.
54 Wither 44.
55 Ibid., 46.
56 Department of the Army Civilian; Peacekeeping and Stability Scholar and Advisor. Personal Interview. 28 March 2013.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the issue of host nation security force development will continue to be central to US strategy as we move on from the long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the next occupation, we will undoubtedly rely on existing doctrine as prescribed in FM 3-24, as these principles are included in military units’ Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) and are practiced at the nation’s training centers. However, further examination of US doctrine reveals a significant gap in terms of desired endstate and pathways to success. Examining the literature across the subfields of political science that speak to host nation security force development, we see the following trends. First, host nation military and police forces must be developed in parallel, in a complementary fashion, and with the correct mission sets at the correct times within a conflict. Second, civilian control and accountability to an external third party for the entire security sector is key. Lastly, the desired endstate as outlined in FM 3-24 must be reached if there is to be a reasonable expectation of both internal and external security within the state.

My proposed model takes these factors into account, and offers a new potential roadmap for policymakers and military leaders to consider when designing and implementing a security sector reform plan. I seek to fill the gaps in FM 3-24 in terms of actual steps to be taken on the ground in order to attain desired goals, taking into account ethnicity and insurgency. Although not testable with available quantitative data, varying levels of support were achieved through qualitative study. Whether or not my proposals will work on the ground during the next conflict, it is essential that planners give the security sector reform issue proper attention and provide commanders on the ground with
time to implement sound policies and achieve realistic goals. “In Iraq in 2008 and 2009, we were talking about transferring control province by province. In 2010 and 2011, we were talking about TRISP (Transfer of Internal Security to Police), and we would transfer responsibility for external defense to the Iraqi Army. The truth was: the conditions were already determined for our departure; it was time-dependent. So, TRISP was never a realistic goal.”

It is my goal in this paper to provide some additional perspective so that TRISP-like programs can be a realistic goal in the future. There are obviously some tradeoffs involved in the SSR process. For example, in the early 2000s, the United States could have empowered local Taliban personnel and units to police individual towns and districts. This may have gained security and provided a seemingly legitimate authority to the local population, but the Taliban is not a legitimate representative of the state the United States is seeking to build. Therefore, the US opted to trade immediate security and the ability to wage justice at the local level for the potential of building cohesive forces that would maintain the monopoly on coercive violence on behalf of the state.

Another potential tradeoff might be in the area of ethnic representation and legitimacy; if one group dominates national politics, the intervener has a choice between developing local forces that are representative of the local population or those that represent the dominant group. My model is built on the assumption that local representation would contribute to legitimacy at that level. However, security forces that are built around the dominant group may be easier to control. This is a tradeoff that the occupier must think about in conjunction with the state it is trying to reform.

In conclusion, there is no magic formula for security sector reform. It is a complex process that can become derailed due to any number of circumstances, including insurgency and ethnic tension. While there is no single correct answer in terms of "how to" perform such tasks, it is useful to think about how to go about this business in advance. My proposed model, which is rooted in scholarly literature, seeks to go beyond current US doctrine by thinking more methodically about distinction between military and police forces and the roles of insurgency and ethnicity. I hope that it offers military professionals and policymakers some insights into designing effective SSR programs in the future.