

14.581 MIT PhD International Trade
— Lecture 19: Trade and Labor Markets (Theory) —

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Today's Plan

- **Overview: Use of 'assignment models' to study Trade and Labor Markets.**
- Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity).
- Comparative advantage based assignment models.
- Cross-sectional predictions from these models.
- Comparative static predictions from these models.

Assignment Models in the Trade Literature

- Small but rapidly growing literature using assignment models in an international context:
 - Trade: Grossman Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), Yeaple (2005), Ohnsorge Trefler (2007), Costinot (2009), Costinot Vogel (2010).
 - Offshoring: Kremer Maskin (2003), Antras Garicano Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Nocke Yeaple (2008).
- **What do these models have in common?**
 - Factor allocation can be summarized by an assignment function.
 - Large number of factors and/or goods.
- **What is the main difference between these models?**
 - Two sides of each match are in finite supply (as in Becker 1973).
 - One side of each match is in infinite supply (as in Roy 1951).

This Lecture

- We restrict attention to Roy-like assignments models, e.g. Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007 JPE), Costinot (2009 Ecta), and Costinot and Vogel (2010 JPE).
- For reasons which will become clear later, we refer to these as Comparative Advantage Based Assignment Models (CABAM).
- **Objectives:**
 - Describe how these models relate to “standard” neoclassical models.
 - Introduce simple tools from the mathematics of complementarity.
 - Use these tools to derive cross-sectional and comparative static predictions.
- Focus here is largely on methodology. Papers provide fascinating applications and (qualitative) discussions of relation to data.

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Log-supermodularity

Definition

- **Definition 1** A function $g: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is log-supermodular if for all $x, x' \in X$, $g(\max(x, x')) \cdot g(\min(x, x')) \geq g(x) \cdot g(x')$.

- **Bivariate example:**

- If $g: X_1 \times X_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is log-spm, then $x'_1 \geq x''_1$ and $x'_2 \geq x''_2$ imply

$$g(x'_1, x'_2) \cdot g(x''_1, x''_2) \geq g(x'_1, x''_2) \cdot g(x''_1, x'_2).$$

- If g is strictly positive, this can be rearranged as

$$g(x'_1, x'_2) / g(x''_1, x'_2) \geq g(x'_1, x''_2) / g(x''_1, x''_2).$$

Log-supermodularity

Results

- **Lemma 1.** $g, h : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ *log-spm* $\Rightarrow gh$ *log-spm*.
- **Lemma 2.** $g : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ *log-spm* $\Rightarrow G(x_{-i}) = \int_{X_i} g(x) dx_i$ *log-spm*.
- **Lemma 3.** $g : T \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ *log-spm* \Rightarrow
 $x^*(t) \equiv \arg \max_{x \in X} g(t, x)$ *increasing in t*

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Basic Environment

- Consider a world economy with:
 - Multiple countries with characteristics $\gamma \in \Gamma$.
 - Multiple goods or sectors with characteristics $\sigma \in \Sigma$.
 - Multiple factors of production with characteristics $\omega \in \Omega$.
- Factors are immobile across countries, perfectly mobile across sectors.
- Goods are freely traded at world price $p(\sigma) > 0$.

- Within each sector, factors of production are perfect substitutes:

$$Q(\sigma, \gamma) = \int_{\Omega} A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) d\omega,$$

- $A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) \geq 0$ is productivity of ω -factor in σ -sector and γ -country.
- **A1** $A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma)$ is *log-supermodular*.
- A1 implies, in particular, that:
 - High- γ countries have a comparative advantage in high- σ sectors.
 - High- ω factors have a comparative advantage in high- σ sectors,

Factor Endowments

- $V(\omega, \gamma) \geq 0$ is inelastic supply of ω -factor in γ -country.
- **A2** $V(\omega, \gamma)$ is *log-supermodular*.
- A2 implies that:
High- γ countries are relatively more abundant in high- ω factors.
- Preferences will be described later on when we do comparative statics.

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4.1 Competitive Equilibrium

- We take the price schedule $p(\sigma)$ as given [small open economy].
- In a competitive equilibrium, L and w must be such that:

- Firms maximize profit:

$$\begin{aligned} p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) - w(\omega, \gamma) &\leq 0, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega \\ p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) - w(\omega, \gamma) &= 0, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega \text{ s.t. } L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Factor markets clear:

$$V(\omega, \gamma) = \int_{\sigma \in \Sigma} L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) d\sigma, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega$$

4.2 Patterns of Specialization

Predictions

- Let $\Sigma(\omega, \gamma) \equiv \{\sigma \in \Sigma \mid L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) > 0\}$ be the set of sectors in which factor ω is employed in country γ .
- **Theorem** *In a CABAM, $\Sigma(\cdot, \cdot)$ is increasing.*
- **Proof:**
 - Profit maximization $\Rightarrow \Sigma(\omega, \gamma) = \arg \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma} p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma)$.
 - A1 $\Rightarrow p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma)$ log-spm by Lemma 1.
 - $p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma)$ log-spm $\Rightarrow \Sigma(\cdot, \cdot)$ increasing by Lemma 3.
- **Corollary** *High- ω factors specialize in high- σ sectors.*
- **Corollary** *High- γ countries specialize in high- σ sectors.*

4.2 Patterns of Specialization

Relation to the Ricardian literature

- Ricardian model \equiv Special case of CABAM w/
 $A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) \equiv A(\sigma, \gamma)$.
- Previous corollary can help explain:
 - **Multi-country-multi-sector Ricardian model:** Jones (1961)
 - According to Jones (1961), efficient assignment of countries to goods solves $\max \sum \ln A(\sigma, \gamma)$.
 - According to Corollary, $A(\sigma, \gamma)$ log-spm implies PAM of countries to goods; Becker (1973), Kremer (1993), Legros and Newman (1996).
 - **Institutions and Trade:** Acemoglu Antras Helpman (2007), Costinot (2006), Cuñat Melitz (2006), Levchenko (2007), Matsuyama (2005), Nunn (2007), and Vogel (2007).
 - Papers vary in terms of source of "institutional dependence" σ and "institutional quality" γ
 - ...but same fundamental objective: providing micro-theoretical foundations for the log-supermodularity of $A(\sigma, \gamma)$.

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

- Previous results are about the set of goods that each country produces.
- **Question:** *Can we say something about how much each country produces? Or how much it employs in each particular sector?*
- **Answer:** *Without further assumptions, the answer is 'no'.*

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

Additional assumptions

- **A3.** *The profit-maximizing allocation L is unique.*
- **A4.** *Factor productivity satisfies $A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) \equiv A(\omega, \sigma)$.*
- **Comments:**
 - A3 requires $p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma, \gamma)$ to be maximized in a *single* sector.
 - A3 is an implicit restriction on the demand-side of the world-economy.
 - ... but it becomes milder and milder as the number of factors or countries increases.
 - ... generically true if continuum of factors.
 - A4 implies no Ricardian sources of CA across countries.
 - Pure Ricardian case can be studied in a similar fashion.
 - Having multiple sources of CA is more complex (Costinot 2009).

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

Output predictions

- **Theorem** *If A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM, then $Q(\sigma, \gamma)$ is log-spm.*
- **Proof:**
 - Let $\Omega(\sigma) \equiv \{\omega \in \Omega \mid p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma) > \max_{\sigma' \neq \sigma} p(\sigma') A(\omega, \sigma')\}$. A3 and A4 imply $Q(\sigma, \gamma) = \int \mathbf{1}_{\Omega(\sigma)}(\omega) \cdot A(\omega, \sigma) V(\omega, \gamma) d\omega$.
 - A1 $\Rightarrow \tilde{A}(\omega, \sigma) \equiv \mathbf{1}_{\Omega(\sigma)}(\omega) \cdot A(\omega, \sigma)$ log-spm.
 - A2 and $\tilde{A}(\omega, \sigma)$ log-spm + Lemma 1 $\Rightarrow \tilde{A}(\omega, \sigma) V(\omega, \gamma)$ log-spm.
 - $\tilde{A}(\omega, \sigma) V(\omega, \gamma)$ log-spm + Lemma 2 $\Rightarrow Q(\sigma, \gamma)$ log-spm.
- **Intuition:**
 - A1 \Rightarrow high ω -factors are assigned to high σ -sectors.
 - A2 \Rightarrow high ω -factors are more likely in high γ -countries.

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

Output predictions (Cont.)

- **Corollary.** *Suppose that A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM. If two countries produce J goods, with $\gamma_1 \geq \gamma_2$ and $\sigma_1 \geq \dots \geq \sigma_J$, then the high- γ country tends to specialize in the high- σ sectors:*

$$\frac{Q(\sigma_1, \gamma_1)}{Q(\sigma_1, \gamma_2)} \geq \dots \geq \frac{Q(\sigma_J, \gamma_1)}{Q(\sigma_J, \gamma_2)}$$

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

Employment and revenue predictions

- Let $L(\sigma, \gamma) \equiv \int_{\Omega(\sigma)} V(\omega, \gamma) d\omega$ be aggregate employment.
- Let $R(\sigma, \gamma) \equiv \int_{\Omega(\sigma)} r(\omega, \sigma) V(\omega, \gamma) d\omega$ be aggregate revenues.
- **Corollary.** *Suppose that A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM. If two countries produce J goods, with $\gamma_1 \geq \gamma_2$ and $\sigma_1 \geq \dots \geq \sigma_J$, then aggregate employment and aggregate revenues follow the same pattern as aggregate output:*

$$\frac{L(\sigma_1, \gamma_1)}{L(\sigma_1, \gamma_2)} \geq \dots \geq \frac{L(\sigma_J, \gamma_1)}{L(\sigma_J, \gamma_2)} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{R(\sigma_1, \gamma_1)}{R(\sigma_1, \gamma_2)} \geq \dots \geq \frac{R(\sigma_J, \gamma_1)}{R(\sigma_J, \gamma_2)}$$

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment

Relation to the previous literature

● Worker Heterogeneity and Trade

- Generalization of Ruffin (1988):
 - Continuum of factors, Hicks-neutral technological differences.
 - Results hold for an arbitrarily large number of goods and factors.
- Generalization of Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007):
 - No functional form assumption (log-normal distribution of human capital, exponential factor productivity).

● Firm Heterogeneity and Trade

- Closely related to Melitz (2003), Helpman Melitz Yeaple (2004) and Antras Helpman (2004).
 - “Factors” \equiv “Firms” with productivity ω .
 - “Countries” \equiv “Industries” with characteristic γ .
 - “Sectors” \equiv “Organizations” with characteristic σ .
 - $Q(\sigma, \gamma) \equiv$ Sales by firms with “ σ -organization” in “ γ -industry”.
- In previous papers, $f(\omega, \gamma)$ log-spm is crucial, Pareto is not.

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5.1 Closing The Model

Additional assumptions

- Assumptions A1-4 are maintained.
- In order to do comparative statics, we also need to specify the demand side of the model:

$$U = \left\{ \int_{\sigma \in \Sigma} [C(\sigma, \gamma)]^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} d\sigma \right\}^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

- For expositional purposes, we will also assume that:
 - $A(\omega, \sigma)$ is *strictly* log-supermodular.
 - Continuum of factors and sectors: $\Sigma \equiv [\underline{\sigma}, \bar{\sigma}]$ and $\Omega \equiv [\underline{\omega}, \bar{\omega}]$.

5.1 Closing the Model

Autarky equilibrium

Autarky equilibrium is a set of functions (Q, C, L, p, w) such that:

- Firms maximize profit:

$$p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma) - w(\omega, \gamma) \leq 0, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega$$

$$p(\sigma) A(\omega, \sigma) - w(\omega, \gamma) = 0, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega \text{ s.t. } L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) > 0$$

- Factor markets clear:

$$V(\omega, \gamma) = \int_{\sigma \in \Sigma} L(\omega, \sigma, \gamma) d\sigma, \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega$$

- Consumers maximize their utility and good markets clear:

$$C(\sigma, \gamma) = I(\gamma) \times p(\sigma)^{-\varepsilon} = Q(\sigma, \gamma)$$

5.1 Closing the Model

Properties of autarky equilibrium

- **Lemma** *In autarky equilibrium, there exists an increasing bijection $M : \Omega \rightarrow \Sigma$ such that $L(\omega, \sigma) > 0$ if and only if $M(\omega) = \sigma$.*
- **Lemma** *In autarky equilibrium, M and w satisfy*

$$\frac{dM(\omega, \gamma)}{d\omega} = \frac{A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma)] V(\omega, \gamma)}{I(\gamma) \times \{p[M(\omega), \gamma]\}^{-\varepsilon}} \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma)}{d\omega} = \frac{\partial \ln A[\omega, M(\omega)]}{\partial \omega} \quad (2)$$

with $M(\underline{\omega}, \gamma) = \underline{\sigma}$, $M(\bar{\omega}, \gamma) = \bar{\sigma}$, and
 $p[M(\omega, \gamma), \gamma] = w(\omega, \gamma) / A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma)]$.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply

- **Question:** *What happens if we change country characteristics from γ to $\gamma' \leq \gamma$?*
- If ω is worker “skill”, this can be thought of as a change in terms of “skill abundance”:

$$\frac{V(\omega, \gamma)}{V(\omega', \gamma)} \geq \frac{V'(\omega, \gamma')}{V'(\omega', \gamma')}, \text{ for all } \omega > \omega'$$

- If $V(\omega, \gamma)$ was a normal distribution, this would correspond to a change in the mean.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply

Consequence for factor allocation

- **Lemma** $M(\omega, \gamma') \geq M(\omega, \gamma)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$.
- **Intuition:**
 - If there are relatively more low- ω factors, more sectors should use them.
 - From a sector standpoint, this requires *factor downgrading*.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply

Consequence for factor allocation

- **Proof:** By contradiction: if there is ω s.t. $M(\omega, \gamma') < M(\omega, \gamma)$, then there exist:
 - $M(\omega_1, \gamma') = M(\omega_1, \gamma) = \sigma_1$, $M(\omega_2, \gamma') = M(\omega_2, \gamma) = \sigma_2$, and $\frac{M_\omega(\omega_1, \gamma')}{M_\omega(\omega_2, \gamma')} \leq \frac{M_\omega(\omega_1, \gamma)}{M_\omega(\omega_2, \gamma)}$.
 - Equation (1) $\implies \frac{V(\omega_2, \gamma')}{V(\omega_1, \gamma')} \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma')}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma')} \geq \frac{V(\omega_2, \gamma)}{V(\omega_1, \gamma)} \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma)}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma)}$.
 - V log-spm $\implies \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma')}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma')} \geq \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma)}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma)}$.
 - Equation (2) + zero profits $\implies \frac{d \ln p(\sigma, \gamma)}{d\sigma} = -\frac{\partial \ln A[M^{-1}(\sigma, \gamma), \sigma]}{\partial \sigma}$.
 - $M^{-1}(\sigma, \gamma) < M^{-1}(\sigma, \gamma')$ for $\sigma \in (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ + A log-spm $\implies \frac{p(\sigma_1, \gamma)}{p(\sigma_2, \gamma)} < \frac{p(\sigma_1, \gamma')}{p(\sigma_2, \gamma')}$.
 - $\frac{p(\sigma_1, \gamma)}{p(\sigma_2, \gamma)} < \frac{p(\sigma_1, \gamma')}{p(\sigma_2, \gamma')} + \text{CES} \implies \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma')}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma')} > \frac{C(\sigma_1, \gamma)}{C(\sigma_2, \gamma)}$. A contradiction.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply

Consequence for factor prices

- A decrease from γ to γ' implies *pervasive rise in inequality*:

$$\frac{w(\omega, \gamma')}{w(\omega', \gamma')} \geq \frac{w(\omega, \gamma)}{w(\omega', \gamma)}, \text{ for all } \omega > \omega'$$

- The mechanism is simple:

- Profit-maximization implies

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma)}{d\omega} &= \frac{\partial \ln A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma)]}{\partial \omega} \\ \frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma')}{d\omega} &= \frac{\partial \ln A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma')]}{\partial \omega} \end{aligned}$$

- Since A is log-supermodular, task upgrading implies

$$\frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma')}{d\omega} \geq \frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma)}{d\omega}$$

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply

Comments

- Costinot and Vogel (2010) also consider changes in diversity.
 - This corresponds to the case where there exists $\hat{\omega}$ such that $V(\omega, \gamma)$ is log-supermodular for $\omega > \hat{\omega}$, but log-submodular for $\omega < \hat{\omega}$.
- CV (2010) also consider changes in factor demand (Computerization?):

$$U = \left\{ \int_{\sigma \in \Sigma} B(\sigma, \gamma) [C(\sigma, \gamma)]^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} d\sigma \right\}^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

5.3 North-South Trade

Free trade equilibrium

- Two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), with $\gamma_H \geq \gamma_F$.
- A competitive equilibrium in the world economy under free trade is s.t.

$$\frac{dM(\omega, \gamma_T)}{d\omega} = \frac{A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma_T)] V(\omega, \gamma_T)}{I_T \times \{p[M(\omega, \gamma_T), \gamma_T]\}^{-\varepsilon}},$$

$$\frac{d \ln w(\omega, \gamma_T)}{d\omega} = \frac{\partial \ln A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma_T)]}{\partial \omega},$$

where:

$$M(\underline{\omega}, \gamma_T) = \underline{\sigma} \text{ and } M(\bar{\omega}, \gamma_T) = \bar{\sigma}$$

$$p[M(\omega, \gamma_T), \gamma_T] = w(\omega, \gamma_T) A[\omega, M(\omega, \gamma_T)]$$

$$V(\omega, \gamma_T) \equiv V(\omega, \gamma_H) + V(\omega, \gamma_F)$$

5.3 North South Trade

Free trade equilibrium

- **Key observation:**

$$\frac{V(\omega, \gamma_H)}{V(\omega', \gamma_H)} \geq \frac{V(\omega, \gamma_F)}{V(\omega', \gamma_F)}, \text{ for all } \omega > \omega' \Rightarrow \frac{V(\omega, \gamma_H)}{V(\omega', \gamma_H)} \geq \frac{V(\omega, \gamma_T)}{V(\omega', \gamma_T)} \geq \frac{V(\omega, \gamma_F)}{V(\omega', \gamma_F)}$$

- Continuum-by-continuum extensions of two-by-two HO results:

- *Changes in skill-intensities:*

$$M(\omega, \gamma_H) \leq M(\omega, \gamma_T) \leq M(\omega, \gamma_F), \text{ for all } \omega$$

- *Strong Stolper-Samuelson effect:*

$$\frac{w(\omega, \gamma_H)}{w(\omega', \gamma_H)} \leq \frac{w(\omega, \gamma_T)}{w(\omega', \gamma_T)} \leq \frac{w(\omega, \gamma_F)}{w(\omega', \gamma_F)}, \text{ for all } \omega > \omega'$$

5.3 North South Trade

Other Predictions

- North-South trade driven by factor demand differences:
 - Same logic gets to the exact opposite results.
 - Correlation between factor demand and factor supply considerations matters.
- One can also extend analysis to study “North-North” trade:
 - It predicts wage polarization in the more diverse country and wage convergence in the other.

Future Work?

- Dynamic issues:
 - Sector-specific human capital accumulation.
 - Endogenous technology adoption.
- Empirics:
 - Revisiting the consequences of trade liberalization.

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