SOVIET-AMERICAN REGIONAL COMPETITION, 1976

I. "EUROCOMMUNISM": THE THIRD GREAT COMMUNIST SCHISM?

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A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of Eurocommunism. Moscow denies that Eurocommunism exists. Washington fears that it is not a genuine heresy. Both have been vainly attempting to contain it. Does Eurocommunism exist? If so, what is it? What are its causes, present and future content, and prospects? And what are its implications for Soviet and American policies?

First, a provisional definition. In its narrower, West European sense Eurocommunism is a European reformist version of radical Marxism which emphasizes, in contrast to Leninism, the peaceful, parliamentary transition to socialism led by a broad coalition of leftist forces and thereafter allegiance to civil liberties, a multiparty system, and potential rotation

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1This preliminary survey and analysis is primarily based upon discussions in Western Europe in June and early July 1976 and in Romania and Yugoslavia in September and October 1976. I am grateful to The Reader's Digest, of which I am a roving editor and to its editor-in-chief Edward T. Thompson for sponsoring my trip and to the Earhart and Carthage Foundations for research support. The discussions which I had were so extensive and often so confidential that I will not list their participants here. The subject itself is so new that only one published study of it has yet appeared: Neil McInnes, Euro-Communism, The Washington Papers, no. 37 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1976.) See also Pierre Hassner, "Les stratégies de l'URSS et des partis communistes en Europe Occidentale et Méridionale" (MS., mimeo., July 1975.) For background, see McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (Oxford, 1975) and Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., Communism in France and Italy (Princeton, 1975). I have drawn particularly upon the work of, and discussions with, Kevin Devlin of Radio Free Europe, Munich, and Wolfgang Berner of the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Cologne. I also profited from comments when I read an earlier draft of this paper at the first meeting of the Eurocommunism Study Group of the Harvard Center for European Studies on October 26, 1976. See Devlin, "The Challenge of 'Eurocommunism,'" unpublished manuscript of speech at NATO Defense College in Rome, September 1976. For a critical view of Eurocommunism, see Walter Laqueur, "'Eurocommunism' and its Friends," Commentary, August 1976.
of parties in office. However, Eurocommunism remains Marxist, advocates large-scale nationalization of industry, supports the main lines of Soviet foreign policy, and retains democratic centralism (i.e. elitism and banning of factions) within the parties themselves. The center of the reformist tendency is in the Italian and Spanish communist parties, with the French party partially adhering to it. In its broader, pan-European sense Eurocommunism is national communism: it insists on the independence of all communist parties, especially from Soviet domination. The center of this broader aspect is in the Yugoslav and Italian parties, with the Romanians, Spanish, and French allied with them.

The Historical Background

Most of the communist parties of the fully industrialized world are beginning to turn away from Leninism back toward the mainstream of the Marxist tradition, and even toward its later revisionist version. Karl Marx was in one sense the first Eurocommunist and Lenin an elitist deviator from Marx. Marx was a central European who wrote about the problems of advanced capitalist societies. He knew little and cared less about the problems of such underdeveloped societies as Imperial Russia with its tradition of Byzantine, patrimonial autocracy, its lack of Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, or a large working class, and, given Tsarist police oppression, its populist (narodnik) conspiracies and violence.

The nineteenth century homeland of Marxism, Germany, shared with the main areas of today's Eurocommunism, Italy, Spain, and France, some character-

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2 I owe this insight, as so many others, to my friend Richard Löwenthal.
3 Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1974).
istics different from the democratic lands of northern Europe: fewer democratic traditions, late modernization, lack of a democratic social revolution, the psychological alienation caused by very rapid industrialization and urbanization, and nationalism. Prosperity and absence of revolution later moved German Social Democracy toward reformism and nationalism.

Post-1945 West European prosperity also psychologically alienated much of the working class and many intellectuals, drained off revolutionary fervor, and again produced reformist Marxism and nationalism. Thus the post-1918 split between communists and social democrats and the subsequent Soviet domination and bolshevization of the Western European communist parties, prolonged by West European communists' hatred of Nazism and consequent attraction to the Soviet Union, may have been an atypical interlude. The post-1945 period also saw the shift in the center of gravity of West European communism from Germany to Italy and France, because of the lack of a mass base for communism in West Germany, the intensified anticommunism of the West German Social Democrats, and the rigidity and subjection to Moscow of communism in East Germany.

During the height of the Cold War, the West European communist parties appeared to be rigidly pro-Soviet. The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav break did not seem at the time to make them less so. Yet even then, particularly in Italy, Eurocommunism was beginning to develop under the surface. If one were to look for the watershed in its development, one would probably choose the near-unanimous West European communist condemnation of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, it developed differently in each
country and therefore can only be understood by studying each communist party in turn.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union in Western Europe declined as East-West detente intensified, while the image of the United States was deeply tarnished by the Vietnam War and Watergate. In the early 1970s, the rise of Eurocommunism in Italy, France, and Spain was greatly aided by the world-wide recession and the quadrupling of the price of petroleum. These caused economic crises in these countries, overshadowed the memories of post-1945 affluence, and accentuated the psychological alienation which rapid economic development had brought in its train.

The PCI

Far more than any other European communist party, the Italian communist party (Partito comunista italiano—PCI) always held carefully limited

heterodox views, due initially to the influence of Antonio Gramsci, a major figure in the development of Western Marxism, who stressed revolution by the working class's cultural superiority (egemonia--hegemony) and by consensus within a "historic bloc"--a broad revolutionary alliance. In both phenomena, he believed, revolutionary intellectuals would play a major role. Palmiro Togliatti, its postwar leader, continued to hold these views even when they were temporarily submerged by Stalinism, the Cominform, and the Cold War. He realized that the influence of the Catholic Church and of the United States in postwar Italy precluded a successful communist revolution and therefore made parliamentary struggle, preferably in alliance with socialists and Christian Democrats, the only realistic alternative. Finally, he believed that PCI successes at the local level, gained by efficiency and moderation, would gradually bring success at the national level as well.

Gradually, carefully, with Machiavellian skill, the PCI moved toward autonomy from Moscow and domestic reformism. The landmarks in its development were Togliatti's brief support of "polycentrism" in 1956, his increasingly close relations with Tito, Togliatti's deathbed "Yalta testament" in 1964, the PCI's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and its slow but steady increase in local and regional power.

The PCI is transforming the Italian political scene by its gradual movement from opposition toward participation in government. The post-1945

Christian Democratic Italian ruling party (Democrazia cristiana--DC) is factionalized, in part corrupt, and perhaps cannot be reformed. The Italian economic crisis is so serious that, as in Great Britain, it cannot be solved without the cooperation of the trade unions. Since the principal Italian union, the CGIL, is effectively controlled by the PCI, this means PCI support of and de facto participation at least in Italian domestic economic policy.

The PCI has recently been steadily gaining local and regional power and influence. It rules all the major Italian cities. It has made great inroads amongst the Italian intelligentsia, notably the intellectuals and the "collaborationist bourgeoisie," aided by the Italian tradition of trasformismo--going over to the winning side in time. Indeed, one is struck in Italy by the parallels to the period before Mussolini, with the DC playing the role of Giolitti and his successors and the PCI that of the Fascists--"making the trains run on time."

The PCI leadership is now committed to a "democratic transitional stage." It defines this as a "historical compromise" (compromesso storico): a prolonged period of electoral collaboration as well as competition among and rule by all "working class parties," communist, socialist, and catholic, in which the PCI would hopefully be the leading party but only if it won the electoral competition. These "working class parties" must have a vast majority in order to avoid a counterrevolutionary coup and foreign intervention such as occurred, according to the PCI, in Chile. (Allende's overthrow was a major factor in intensifying PCI reformism.)

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the PCI's historical compromise means a DC-PCI coalition with the DC initially in the majority, rather than a left coalition with the socialists, which the PCI would dominate. The goal of this long transitional period remains "socialism," but when and how it will be achieved, and what it will be, is presumably deliberately, left vague. Thus the PCI is neither social democratic, because its goal remains socialization, nor Leninist, because it no longer demands an elite vanguard role. These reformist views by now probably accurately represent those of the majority of the PCI leadership but probably not of the membership, which is considerably to the left (i.e. more Leninist). The leadership is apparently trying to reeducate its membership to this more reformist position.

The PCI's relations with the Soviet Union have seriously worsened, notably as a result of Soviet criticism of its reformism and its advocacy of autonomy for all communist parties and regional cooperation among them. Its close relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) are the core of the autonomal aspects of Eurocommunism. Those with the Spanish Communist Party are particularly close and the core of the reformist aspects of Eurocommunism. Those with the Romanian Communist Party are also good.

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In late 1975 the French Communist Party moved closer to these views. The PCI's leader Enrico Berlinguer gave public endorsement, during the recent Italian parliamentary election campaign, to Italian membership in NATO as a favorable context for socialism in Italy. It probably reflected not only electoral considerations but also the concern of all Italian parties lest Moscow reacquire control over post-Tito Yugoslavia. Such a development would deprive the PCI of its major ally in its struggle against Soviet domination and thus effectively break the power of Eurocommunism and endanger the present PCI leadership.

The PCE

A similar and overtly more frankly expressed evolution has gone on in the Spanish communist party (Partido comunista español—PCE). The bitter struggles during the Spanish Civil War between the communists on the one hand and the socialists and anarchists on the other, the failure of post-

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8 Corriere della Sera, June 15, 1976. The carefully worded passage on NATO was omitted in the L'Unità version of the interview (so as not to alarm the base?) but Berlinguer repeated his statement on Italian television.

1945 PCE guerrillas, and the subsequent almost total dependence of the PCE on Moscow, because of its clandestinity and Stalin's tyranny, made the Spanish socialists and anarchists after 1945 refuse to collaborate with it. Later, the approaching end of the Franco era, the prospects for its legalization thereafter, and the greater opportunities for its clandestine operations in late Francoist Spain moved the PCE toward nationalism and reformism. Finally, because its strength was only about half that of the main socialist party, the PSOE, the PCE was subject to pressure on its right, which also pushed it toward reformism.

The PCE therefore endorsed peaceful decompression from the Francoist dictatorship to a multiparty parliamentary democracy, within which the transition to socialism would be long and through an electoral majority. These policies led to a clash with Moscow, made the more severe by Soviet overestimation of its power over a small, clandestine, Soviet-financed party and by Spanish pride and long-endured humiliation. In the mid-1960s the PCE, led by Santiago Carrillo, who was supported by its grande dame Dolores Ibarurri ("La Pasionaria" of Civil War fame), began to push for independence from the Soviets, a tendency also favored by its illusionary hopes for the 1968 Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face." Even before that the PCE had established good relations with the PCI and the Romanians. (One should remember that in 1944 the Romanian dictator Marshall Antonescu had tried to establish an axis with Mussolini, Franco, and Pétain to bring about a compromise peace.) The PCE had also criticized the Soviet repression of Sinyavskii and Daniel. In all of this, it also reflected the general Spanish desire to "return to Europe."
Moscow thereupon partially and unsuccessfully supported a pro-Soviet splinter group, led by the Civil War general Enrique Lister, against the PCE leadership—a "splitsist" move comparable to Soviet efforts to split the Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand communist parties and to Soviet covert efforts to subvert the Yugoslav communist leadership. The PCE retaliated by moving close to other autonomist communist parties, the Cuban, Japanese, North Vietnamese, and North Korean, as well as to the Italian, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties. Uniquely among Eurocommunist parties, the PCE also tried, with significant if only partial success, to reestablish relations with the Chinese. Finally, and for the Soviets most menacingly, Carrillo and his associates uniquely developed an ideological framework not only for the independence of each communist party from "all others" (i.e. the Soviets) but also for a "regional" (i.e. Eurocommunist) strategy: an alliance of European communist parties which would work within the European Economic Community, reject Soviet sacrifice of revolution in Western Europe for detente with the United States and West European capitalist governments, and aim toward a group of European socialist states independent of the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Moscow initially violently attacked these "incorrect and absurd" theses, which allegedly "reeked with nationalism."

In late 1974, however, within the context of much stronger Eurocommunist resistance to Soviet pressure, Moscow accepted an uneasy coexistence with the PCE, largely on the latter's terms.

The PCF

In Italy and Spain nationalism has historically been centered in the right. The left has been internationalist and therefore little able to profit
from playing the nationalist card. In France, ever since the Jacobin nationalism of the French Revolution, the situation has been the reverse: the modern French nationalist tradition has been more left than right and the French right was discredited by the collaboration of much of it with the Nazis. Yet until 1973 the servile subordination of the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français--PCF)\(^\text{10}\) to the Soviets plus De Gaulle's French nationalism long made it impossible for the PCF to play the French nationalist card. But the departure of De Gaulle, the growing structural problems of French economics and society, and the skill of the socialist leader François Mitterand produced the amazing revival of the French left and above all of the socialist party (Parti socialiste--PS). The PS is now much more powerful than the PCF. It threatens the PCF from the left (by its support of workers self-administration of factories--autogestion) as well as from the social democratic right. It is the dominant force in the primarily PS-PCF Union de la gauche, which may well win a majority in the 1978 parliamentary elections and which nearly won, with Mitterand as its candidate, the last presidential election. The PCF has therefore been pushed, like the PCE, toward reformism by its fear of rising

socialist power, and also toward nationalism by its desire, like the PCI and the PCE, to play the nationalist card, and by its ability, unlike the other two, to play it effectively. Finally, in recent years the PCF membership and cadres have been extensively rejuvenated, which also furthered its move away from a totally pro-Soviet position.

The PCP

The Portuguese Communist Party (Partido comunista português—PCP) is not Eurocommunist; it opposes that strongly. But its recent activities became a major subject of controversy with the Eurocommunists. The Soviet attitude toward the PCP illuminated Moscow's attitude toward Eurocommunism as well. Finally, its 1975 defeat favored the Eurocommunist view of the impracticality of a revolutionary strategy in Western Europe. The PCP became steeled, Stalinist, and rigid in its devotion to revolution during its long years of clandestinity and police persecution under Salazar. Its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, in Portuguese jails from many years and then in Soviet-financed emigration in Prague, was totally hostile to reformism, determined to achieve power by revolution, and had crushed the brief reformist tendencies in the PCP in the 1950s. (Conversely, the other pre-

Salazar parties were broken by police repression.)

Uniquely in western Europe, the 1974 military coup which overthrew Salazar, the result of the unsuccessful, open-ended colonial African war, was carried out by officers many of whom had been infected by leftist ideologies, including especially those of their African guerrilla opponents. The political right and the Catholic Church were discredited by their collaboration with Salazar and the center-left parties had been broken by police repression. The PCP could thus hope to ally with the radical officers to grasp power.

Why did the PCI's strategy fail? Most of the army finally placed its unity over revolution. The PCP's base was only among the workers in Lisbon and the landless agricultural laborers of the southern latifundia, while the north was Catholic and conservative. Finally, the west European social democratic parties, notably the SPD, had aided in the establishment and financing of Mario Soares' Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), the only non-regional Portuguese party.

After the 1974 coup in Lisbon, the MFA (the coup officers) rapidly moved to the left and parts of it allied with the reemerged PCP. The coup had also let loose several extreme radical groups to the left of the PCP, notable for their organizational discipline and their factional feuding. The Soviets, perhaps initially reluctant to support fully the PCP's all-out drive for power, and as always trying for a "controlled disintegration of Western Europe and keeping all their options open, were dragged along with it. By summer 1975 Moscow probably, albeit erroneously, thought that the
PCP could win, and endorsed its revolutionary strategy. Conversely, the PCP's anti-parliamentarism and pro-Sovietism pushed the PCI and the PCE to condemn it publicly. The PCF supported it, but the PS did not. The SPD and the Swedish Social Democrats effectively supported the PSP, while Dr. Kissinger incorrectly thought that the PCP had won, or would win, in which case Western Europe would get a salutory lesson.

Sheer political incompetence was certainly one of the main causes for the failure of the radical officers, the PCP, and the radical leftist parties to seize power in Lisbon in 1975. There were other, deeper ones as well. Only the socialists (the PSP), led by Mario Soares, had a nationwide base and were therefore the strongest party. Above all, as the anti-communist demonstrations in the north in 1975 showed, Portugal was still too much an underdeveloped, conservative Catholic country for the PCP to come to power by legal means.

The Essential East European Component

The history of the Yugoslav and Romanian nationalist deviation from

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Moscow need not be summarized here. Romania is historically anti-Russian and parts of Yugoslavia are as well. Stalin broke with Tito because Tito, the proud leader of a successful guerrilla struggle, would not accept total subordination to Moscow. Romania, more vulnerable to Soviet pressure, has wriggled out from under total Soviet domination by great skill in maneuver, maintenance of domestic Leninist orthodoxy, use of the Sino-Soviet split, and U.S. support. Moscow persistently tried (after 1953) to get Tito to return to the fold and later to limit or reverse the Romanian deviation.

Romanian relations with Moscow remain characterized by tactical maneuvers on Ceausescu's part, retreating when Soviet pressure becomes too great but fundamentally maintaining the Romanian nationalist deviation, and attempting to consolidate it further by rapprochement with Yugoslavia,

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15 For an ideological justification, see Alexandru Tanase, "The Permanence of the Nation and the Real Significance of Internationalism," Lumea, April 1, 1976 (FBIS/EE/April 15, 1976/H8-14.) See also "On the Relations Among the Socialist Countries, Among the Communist and Workers' Parties," Scînteia, April 24, 1976 (FBIS/EE/April 26, 1976/H1-6), quoting not only Zagladin but also LCY, PCF, PCI and JCP sources.
good relations with the West and with Peking, and more recently by ties with the non-aligned world.

Tito remains a communist, if a heterodox one. His global ambitions, not satisfied by his major role in the nonaligned movement and by his good relations with the West, require that he also be reaccepted in the communist world—but only on his terms: reaffirmation of the complete autonomy of every communist party and Soviet toleration of his own heterodox policy positions. Tito has long had close links with the PCI, which has always opposed Soviet pressure on Belgrade. The Romanians have retained good relations with the Chinese. (The PCI and the PCE have for the last decade also resisted Soviet efforts to obtain a collective excommunication of Peking out of fear that Soviet pressure would thereafter be intensified against them.) After the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Chinese stopped their attacks on the Yugoslavs and correct state (albeit not party) relations were reestablished between Belgrade and Peking. The remarkably warm PCF declaration on the occasion of Mao Tse-tung's death demonstrated the same tendency.

The two other significant western European communist parties, the Greek and Finnish, are split. Although one might have expected that the collapse of the Greek colonels would have given a major opportunity to the Greek communists, their split, their past identification with the Yugoslav-sponsored Greek civil war and Belgrade's proposed detachment of part of northern Greece ("Aegean Macedonia"), the competition of the radical left led by Andreas Papandreou, and the magisterial, charismatic personality of Konstantin Karamanlis have made them politically nearly impotent. The
other west European communist parties are of no political significance. Most of them, including the British, Belgian, and Scandinavian have supported the PCI-PCE reformist line. The West German party (Deutsche kommunistische Partei—DKP) is small, politically impotent, and a creature of East Berlin and Moscow.

Eurocommunism Today

1. Italy. The June 1976 Italian parliamentary elections were another step in the long, slow march of the PCI through the Italian political institutions toward eventual participation in the government. Neither the DC nor the PCI ever contemplated that they would result in the PCI's entry into the government. (That was a non-Italian illusion.) The DC and the PCI both won, the former at the cost of its small rightwing allies and the latter of the socialists (Partito socialista italiano—PSI). The PCI's victory was more important because the weakened PSI then refused to renew the center-left coalition lest it lose even more of its left to the PCI and of its right to the DC. Italy thus became arithmetically ungovernable against the opposition of the PCI. The first of the three probable stages of PCI entry into the government, "programmatic accord" (accordo programmatico) thereupon partially occurred: a much larger role for the PCI in parliamentary committees. (The second, PCI support of and participation in the majority

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but not in the government--maggioranza, and the third, participation in a DC-dominated government--participazione, lie in the future.)

The importance of this should not be exaggerated. For five years or more no major law has passed the Italian parliament without the informal agreement of the PCI. The change is that this has now become more formalized, institutionalized, and public. The drift toward PCI participazione continues.

2. Spain. Political decompression, as de Tocqueville remarked about pre-1789 France, is the most difficult of all political arts. It is therefore remarkable that as of this writing (late October 1976) the post-Franco decompression in Spain is going more smoothly than most analysts would probably have predicted. King Juan Carlos and his advisers seem to be moving with but not overwhelmed by the winds of change. The oppositional political parties, including the PCE, bark more than they bite. The army, although skeptical, is so far quiet. The Church favors decompression. The economic situation is serious but compared to Italy and Great Britain it is probably controllable. The memory of the Spanish Civil War and more recently of the near-anarchy in Portugal favor peaceful change, as does the Spanish consensus for integration into Western Europe. Finally, the strong impulses toward regionalism, notably in Catalonia and the Basque region, produce a Castilian consensus, especially in the army, against radical or rapid change.

The main PCE bases in Spain are the unofficial but important comisiones obreras and its own clandestine apparatus. Even so, the PSOE
remains more powerful in the working class. The nascent Christian Democratic party is aided by the pro-reformist position of the Church hierarchy. Although the PCE may well be legalized within a year or so, the army has so far prevented this, as was most recently shown by denials of entry visas to Carrillo and Ibarruri. This move was more symbolic than decisive, however; the rest of the PCE leadership is free to return to Spain, has done so, and is active there. At its recent central committee plenum in Rome the party emerged from clandestinity, revealed all of its leadership, and formally declared its desire to integrate itself into a democratic, parliamentary Spanish political system. That many if not most of its cadres, like those of the PCI, would prefer a more leftist course is probably true but not the main point: the political situation in Spain continues to work against a revolutionary and for a reformist PCE strategy, as do developments within the international communist world.

3. France. The great turn in PCF policy, although foreshadowed before, came in the autumn of 1975; the party--for tactical reasons--moved toward autonomy from the Soviets and reformism at home. The move began in mid-November with a joint PCF-PCI declaration in which the PCF

substantially endorsed the PCI positions. Almost simultaneously, at one of the East Berlin preparatory meetings for the European communist conference, the PCF shifted its support from Moscow to the Yugoslavs and Italians. In December the PCF publicly criticized Soviet labor camps. In January it officially abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat. In February 1976 neither Suslov nor Ponomarev, exceptionally, attended the PCF 22nd Congress, where Marchais reaffirmed the new PCF positions. Later that month Marchais did not attend the CPSU 25th Congress. (Neither did Carrillo; Berlinguer did but had to threaten to walk out to resist Soviet proposals for deletions from his speech.) In April the PCF abandoned its opposition to France's nuclear deterrent and Marchais paid a cordial visit to the Japanese Communist Party, which had previously broken with the Soviets.

However, the PCF maintained democratic centralism and a leftist extremist foreign policy—violently anti-American and pro-national liberation movement. Moreover, its new nationalism—as Marchais put it, "aux couleurs de la France"—led it to attack, in the East Berlin negotiations and elsewhere, Soviet coexistence with Giscard and Bonn and to continue to attack NATO and the EEC.

There have been four other new developments. First, although the PCF's move toward autonomy from the Soviet Union, in my view probably strategic, and its emphasis on domestic democracy, in my view primarily tactical, continue apace, they have not yet resulted in gains vis-à-vis the PS, which remains the stronger party in the Union de la gauche. Second,
polls indicate that the left coalition has a good chance of winning the next parliamentary elections. Presumably in part for this reason President Giscard d'Estaing recently replaced his Gaullist prime minister Chirac by the nonparty Raymond Barre—a move intended to move his government more toward the center and thus make it better able to compete with the leftist coalition. Third, there have been some signs of reappraisals of the past by the PCF intellectuals. Fourth, the PCF continues to modify its opposition to NATO and the EEC. France's current problems, however, remain primarily economic, as the recent weakness of the franc indicated, and they are if anything getting worse, not better. The tension between the PCF and the PS is still strong under the surface and emerges from time to time into public view. It is likely to continue as long as the PS is superior in numbers and claims ideological primacy and the PCF refuses to abandon its claim to a vanguard role among the working-class parties.

4. Portugal is now in the midst of a democratic Thermidor. As in Brazil and Chile, the Portuguese military, led by the new President, Gen. Eanes, eventually chose discipline and moderation rather than euphoric utopian undisciplined revolution and crushed the attempted November 1975 coup by the leftist radical officer Otelo de Carvalho. The present monocole Soares socialist government has grave economic problems.

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But the Portuguese economy is small enough, and the incentives for Washington and Bonn to aid it, after the defeat of the PCP, are so great, that it can probably be managed. The PPD (now renamed the Portuguese Social Democratic Party) and the more conservative CDS, the parties to Soares' right, in fact support the Soares government, which is solely socialist primarily to placate the PSP leftwing which has, however, been largely excluded from ministerial positions. Soares continues to talk like François Mitterand but acts more like Helmut Schmidt.

The Soviet PCP model of revolutionary takeover thus failed ignominiously in Portugal. It did, however, have for the Soviets one important result: in the brief period of radical predominance the PCP and the radical officers turned over power in Luanda to the MPLA and in Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) to Frelimo, thus greatly aiding Soviet influence in both. But in Portugal and in West Europe in general the PCP's failure hurt Moscow and strengthened Eurocommunism.

One should not, however, expect a rapid or decisive change in the PCP. Its leadership, steeled by clandestinity, Soviet support, and emigration, is in its late 60s. The transition of the PCP toward Eurocommunism, although eventually likely, will be slow. In any case, the PCP has sunk into at least temporary political insignificance on the Portuguese and international scene, where its main importance is as a negative example to the Eurocommunist parties and the western European left in general.
Eurocommunism Outside Europe

As the PCF leader Marchais recently remarked, Eurocommunism is a misnomer because it does not include the Japanese Communist Party (JCP.) (Or, one might add, the Australian as well.) Recent developments in the JCP have been strikingly similar to those in the Eurocommunist parties. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been abandoned; civil liberties and multiparty pluralism under socialism affirmed; and the vanguard role abandoned. Internationally, the JCP has long since rejected any privileged role for the Soviet Union, demanded that Moscow return the four southern Kurile islands to Japan, kept equidistant and equally hostile between Moscow and Peking, and successfully warded off efforts by both to split it.

The developments in the Australian communist party (ACP) have been similar but its anti-Soviet position even more extreme, and Moscow has now officially recognized a pro-Soviet group rather than the ACP. (The pro-Maoist group there, as elsewhere, is now insignificant.)

Eurocommunism thus is a phenomenon characteristic of the development of communist parties in all advanced industrial societies. It centers in

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20 I have relied here on conversations in Australia in August 1976.
Western Europe, and its main characteristics have developed there first, but the impulses elsewhere are the same. Indeed, the 1968 Prague Spring may also be seen as a brief, doomed experiment in Eurocommunism.

The 1976 European Communist Conference

Eurocommunism was partially institutionalized by the June 1976 East Berlin European communist conference. Initiated by the Soviets as an attempt to check it and to mobilize against the Chinese, it turned out on balance to be a Soviet defeat and an affirmation of autonomy and revisionism by several major European communist parties.

Why did the Soviets want the conference? The two previous ones, world-wide in 1960 and European in 1969, had also documented the gradual decline of Soviet dominance in the international communist world. At the 1969 conference some parties refused to sign the declaration and others, including the Italian and Romanian, signed either parts only or made reservation. But Moscow, and particularly the Soviet party bureaucracy concerned with inter-party relations, apparently still think it important for Soviet domestic and foreign legitimacy that such conferences take place and that a document be produced which at least endorses, as the 1976 one did, the major lines of Soviet foreign policy.

For communists as for all other politicians, the organizational issue is always primary. As Lenin put it, kto kogo— who does what to whom? Organizationally, the preparations for the 1976 conference differed from the previous ones in two key aspects: the participation,
for the first time since 1957, of Yugoslavia, and the rule of consensus (i.e. unanimity), agreed on at the first working group meeting in Warsaw in October 1974. The Soviets wanted the Yugoslavs to participate to show Tito's return to "the movement" and thereby to get Yugoslav support for their policies. The Yugoslavs wanted to participate in order to increase their own influence in "the movement," to decrease Soviet pressure on them, and thereby, as in their non-aligned policy, to increase their own independence and freedom of maneuver. The PCI wanted the Yugoslavs to participate in order to strengthen the autonomist current in the movement.

In retrospect, it seems clear, in my view, that the basic results of the 1976 conference were foreshadowed at the first preparatory meeting, in Warsaw in October 1974. The most important challenge to the Soviets there was by Grlickov, the Yugoslav representative, on policy and organizational issues. As to the former, he declared that dissimilar roads to socialism and divergencies in the international communist movement are objectively inevitable; that non-alignment is objectively necessary and both anti-imperialist and "anti-hegemonistic" (i.e. against Soviet hegemony); that sovereignty, equality, non-interference and regard for national interests represent the "social and political content of proletarian internationalism" (thereby redefining the term in a sense contrary to the Soviet use of it); and that therefore there can be no recognition of a center, institutionalization of international consultations, or binding documents issuing from the conference. He
then listed the Yugoslav requirements for the meeting. It must be public. It must not represent a continuation of any previous conferences (i.e. at which the LCY had been absent and/or condemned.) It must not discuss the convocation of an international conference (which Moscow wanted.) There must be no result of non-participation by any party (i.e. no collective mobilization against the Chinese.) Finally, and organizationally most importantly, all decisions must be taken by consensus (i.e. unanimously.)

The Romanian representative, Stefan Andrei, echoed the Yugoslav insistence on national and party independence. So, less sharply, did the PCI's Pajetta, who specifically endorsed consensus and, although denying any intention of a West European communist center, did say that "the European West needs ... to lay down in new terms its relations with the United States and the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries, and the developing world." Reportedly, Ponomarev, the Soviet representative,

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21 Text: Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade), October 1974, pp. 44-54.
22 Scinteia, October 22, 1976.
unexpectedly accepted the Yugoslav conditions—in retrospect, a Soviet blunder which Moscow never succeeded in reversing. The Soviets probably thought that by pressure they could backtrack later, and the subsequent eighteen months saw them try to do so more than once, accompanied by veiled but clear polemics against the Eurocommunist positions.

24 This was made clear, as to consensus, by Skrinjar in Komunist (Belgrade), November 4, 1974 (FBIS/EE/November 4, 1974), 18-9 and by Grlitkiov at the December 20, 1974 Budapest preparatory meeting, in Socialist Thought and Practice, December 1974, at p. 11.

The organizational struggle publicly centered on the issues of the Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism, the general line of the movement, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Soviet support of these expressed Moscow's claim to hegemony or at least to the position of primus inter pares in the movement and its insistence on the general validity of the Leninist model of elitist authoritarianism. The autonomists' rejection of the first two symbolized their claim to independence and equality and the reformists' rejection of the third highlighted their move away from Leninism.

The Italians, Spanish, and British also supported a domestic reformist line, rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat for a parliamentary transition to a pluralist socialist society. The French party, drawing on the Jacobin nationalist tradition, opposed Soviet détente policy insofar as it led Moscow to favor Giscard over the PCF, pursue rapprochement with Bonn, and modify its opposition to the EEC.

In late 1975, as we have seen, the French, for tactical reasons, took over the revisionist position of the PCI on domestic politics and vis-à-vis the Soviets in the European conference context. \(^{26}\) (By that time, also, the Portuguese party had lost its bid for power in Lisbon, and the PCF's support of it, and the PCI's and PCE's opposition to it,

\(^{26}\) See the joint PCF-PCI declaration in L'Unità and L'Humanité, November 18, 1976 and Le Monde, November 19, 1975.
were no longer an issue.) The final acceptance by Moscow of the substance of the Eurocommunist positions took place during the visit of Soviet party secretary Katushev to Belgrade at the end of May 1976.

The European communist conference, held on June 29 and 30 in East Berlin, marked a new stage in the opening up of the communist movement to public gaze. At the insistence of the PCI and other parties, all the proceedings were seen, via closed-circuit television, by foreign correspondents. Neues Deutschland, the organ of its East German hosts, had to print the full text of all the speeches. The declaration gave no special status to the Soviets. It endorsed dialogue with other "progressive" forces (i.e. social democrats and Catholics) and (an important bow to the Yugoslavs) non-alignment. Some of the speakers, notably Berlinguer and Carrillo, specifically repudiated any Soviet claim to hegemony, set forth their reformist views in great detail, and insisted that the declaration had no binding force. Berlinguer and Marchais specifically rejected the idea of holding another such conference. The final declaration was not signed and was not binding.

The Soviet defeat at the conference was made clear by the absence of all the three key Soviet formulations in the conference's declaration and by its strong affirmation of the independence of each party.

On the credit side of the ledger from the Soviet viewpoint, the conference did meet, and it unanimously adopted a document which endorsed the main lines of Soviet foreign policy. (As to the support of national

27 See top of p. 28, supra.
liberation struggles, the Eurocommunists were the more positive because this would shield them from Soviet charges of revisionism.) Thus the myth of unanimity, so important for Soviet legitimacy, was in part preserved. As to the organizational and ideological differences which the conference highlighted, the Soviet press censored the references to them in the autonomists' speeches and reaffirmed proletarian internationalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, after the conference, as though they had been endorsed in the declaration. However, the autonomists and revisionists also reaffirmed their viewpoints. The sharp polemics in September 1976 between the Italian and Czechoslovak parties over the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia showed that Moscow was still stubbornly fighting a rear-guard action against its opponents. The Yugoslavs publicly rejected these Soviet maneuvers.28 However, the PCI and the PCF passed over in silence the Soviet distortions of the East Berlin declaration and paid less attention than before to Soviet dissident activity, but in October 1976 the PCF publicly attacked Soviet repression of dissidence in a meeting in Paris attended by émigré dissidents and in which repression in Chile and Iran was also attacked—a new stage in PCF anti-Soviet prises de position.29 In sum, the East Berlin conference institutionalized "unity in diversity," to use Togliatti's formula, in European communism.

The European Socialists

An important but neglected aspect of Eurocommunism is its relations with Western European socialist and social democratic parties. The PCI

and PCE call for close, popular-front type cooperation with socialist parties with or without the communist party being the predominant partner. The PCF has entered into an electoral alliance with Mitterand's socialist party (Parti socialiste--PS)\(^30\) in which the latter is clearly the more powerful. The Scandinavian social democratic parties have often accepted parliamentary support from the minuscule communist parties of that region. Conversely, the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands--SPD) and the British Labour Party, far more powerful than the weak West German and British communist parties, have consistently maintained an anticommunist stance, rejected any cooperation with communists, and actively supported their opponents elsewhere, notably in Portugal.

One may best view West European socialism from the north-south vantage point--i.e. the SPD and the Labour Party vis-à-vis the French PS, the Spanish PSOE, and the Italian PSI. The former are social democrats and reject cooperation with communists. The latter are socialists, favor cooperation with communists, and reject social democracy in favor of large-scale nationalization of industry plus, in the case of the PS, emphasis on workers' self-administration (autogestion.)

Although all these parties are members of the Socialist International, they divide within it on the above issues. The two main other recent areas of controversy have been with respect to cooperation with communists and to the Portuguese situation. The SPD has been trying to influence

\(^{30}\) Jean-Francois Bizot, \textit{Au parti des socialistes} (Paris: Grasset, 1975.)
other socialist parties not to join popular fronts, while Mitterand's
PS has a leading role in the "southern" socialist group (including also
the PSI), which favors them. The SPD helped found and supported the Portuguese
socialist party. The SPD and the PS are competing for the leading Spanish
socialist party, the PSOE.

Why does the PCI, the one major West European communist party which
is clearly superior to its PSI socialist ally, follow the same popular-front
policy as the PCF and the PCE, which are weaker than the PS and the PSOE?
Because, in my view, the PCI wants to participate in a governing coalition
which will have a very broad majority, and therefore its majority partner
must be the Christian Democrats. The lessons of Chile, the long Italian
tradition of foreign influence, and the fear of a rightwing coup all play
their parts. In short, the PCF and the PCE are for a reformist popular-
front strategy to compete successfully with stronger socialist parties,
while the PCI is for it to compete successfully with a stronger Christian
Democratic party.

Eurocommunism and the European Economic Community

The Soviet Union and the West European communist parties long saw the
European Economic Community (EEC) as a major, growing threat to their policies.
It symbolized capitalist affluence, American influence, and bourgeois,
anti-communist political rule. But nothing succeeds like success, and
gradually European communists realized that if one can't lick them, one must
join them.

The first was the PCI. Indeed, one of the major early results of
its reformist policies, in the early 1960s, was the PCI's participation
in EEC activities and its advocacy that the Soviets and other European communist parties do so as well. The PCI has for some years been represented in the Strasbourg European and EEC parliaments and more recently the PCF has joined it there. The Soviets have grudgingly established some minimal contacts with the EEC. (The Chinese recently sent an ambassador to the EEC in Brussels.) The PCE supports Spanish entry into the EEC. Conversely, the PCF opposed French participation in the EEC, while the PS only abstained. The PCF rejects the EEC as a capitalist, American- and West German-dominated organization.

The Prospects

If one were to judge by the history of the communist movement, one would have to predict that the present situation is very unstable, that Moscow would not feel indefinitely able to tolerate the current autonomism and reformism in European communism, if only because it would infect Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, and that it would therefore sooner or later excommunicate the deviant parties. (The autonomist and reformist parties themselves have no reason to break with Moscow, for that would deprive them of any influence on the Soviets and make Moscow try to factionalize their parties.)

But the past need not determine the future. After all, Moscow adjusted, slowly, grudgingly, partially, to the new realities before and during the conferences in 1969 and 1976. Excommunication of its European opponents, after its break with the Chinese, would glaringly document the rapid decline of its influence in the communist world and push its Eurocommunist
opponents further along on the road toward social democracy. It may well be, therefore, that for at least some time to come Moscow will tolerate the present situation. This now seems to be Brezhnev's policy, carried forward despite signs by Suslov and Ponomarev of their lack of enthusiasm for it. Moscow will probably be unable to regain any significant amount of the influence which it has lost over European communism, at least as long as Yugoslavia maintains its independence from Soviet control. But Yugoslavia, after Tito's passing, will be a constant source of temptation for the Soviets to fish in the troubled waters of its nationalities tensions. The future of Yugoslavia is thus the major single source of instability in European communism as in European politics in general. Were it again to fall under Soviet control—an unlikely but possible prospect—Eurocommunism would be deprived of its strongest component, Italy and the PCI would be directly menaced by the Soviets, and détente in Europe, another precondition for Eurocommunism, would be gravely threatened if not indeed ended.

Domestically, the PCI says that it will cooperate with the DC to solve Italy's economic crisis. Yet the PCI-controlled trade union leaders, like the British TUC, are anything but enthusiastic about such a policy, and Luigi Longo, Berlinguer's predecessor, recently echoed their opposition. The PCF continues to oppose strongly any such deflationary strategy. In short, anything like a genuine compromesso storico threatens a split in West European communist parties, such as occurred during and after

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World War I in Western social democratic parties. Finally, one Euro-communist party may well in the future be unenthusiastic about another one coming to power lest that it worsen its own prospects vis-a-vis Western opposition.

Is Eurocommunism, then, genuine, or merely tactical? Would it be abandoned if and when these parties came to power, just as it was in Eastern Europe after 1945? No firm answer, of course, can be given. In my view its reformist views have been genuinely accepted by most of the PCI and PCE leaders. (They have so far been only tactically accepted by the PCF leadership.) They are spreading among the base. Exactly because these parties will not soon enter governments or even less take power, parliamentary reformism will probably intensify in them, since it is their only road to power. Eurocommunism is a process as well as a reality. The process seems to be working in the direction of reformism. More one cannot say.

Will it also lead to a third communism schism? That issue is also still undecided. The Eurocommunist parties are unlikely to split with the Soviets. Whether the Soviets will split with them is less clear, but at the moment Moscow appears to be grudgingly adjusting to Eurocommunism rather than moving toward its excommunication.

U.S. Policy

The current discussion about U.S. policy toward Eurocommunism has been characterized more by heat than by light. Let us first be clear about the issues involved. Neil McInnes has put the problem for the West well:
... the appearance of communists in Latin governments... would constitute a novel situation but one still within the field of diplomacy and political negotiation... challenge to a loose, unorganized status quo. ...

In sum, since we are talking of a region in which the Soviet Union could not, physically, back a putsch, in which local communists could not manage one, and in which NATO would not tolerate one (and all the parties concerned know it), then the prospect of communists in the government is, from the strictly strategic view, an inconvenience but not a disaster. 32

The key policy question is not what to do about the entry of the PCI into the Italian government in the immediate future, for the PCI neither wants nor expects to enter it. It is unlikely that it will get more votes than the DC in the near future and it is committed to a coalition with the DC rather than with other leftist parties. On the contrary, the PCI wants to move toward entry so slowly that the West will at no time decisively act against it. Nor is the issue about the entry of the PCE into the government in Madrid: that also is most unlikely in the near future. If the Union de la gauche wins the 1978 parliamentary elections in France, the PCF may well enter the government, but as a minority partner of the PS, and with Giscard still president. Thus in no West European country is a communist party likely to dominate a governmental coalition in the near future. Nor is any communist party likely to enter the government in the next year or two. U.S. policy is therefore not confronted with an immediate problem.

If is, however, confronted with a serious long-term one. Politics in France, Spain, and Italy are moving toward the left. If the French

32 Euro-Communism, pp. 69, 73.
elections were held tomorrow, the PS-PCF coalition would probably win. The PCI vote continues to rise, and although the compromesso storico will come slowly, it will probably come. The left's position in Spain is improving.

What, then, are the long-range issues for U.S. policy? Is it in the U.S. interest that west European communist parties come closer to power, by entry into governments or otherwise? Is Eurocommunism a greater danger to the U.S. or to the USSR? If it is contrary to U.S. interests, what if anything can and should the U.S. do about it, and how?

It is useful to divide one's answers into political, economic, and military categories. As to the first, in my view in the near future the entry of any west European communist party into government would be viewed in Europe and elsewhere as a loss for the U.S. and a gain for the USSR—and this perception would be the key political reality. Moreover, despite the long-range problems with which Eurocommunism confronts it, Moscow would probably favor such entry because of the short-range difficulties which it would cause the United States.

As to the second, the entry of the communist party into the government would probably intensify the already existing economic crises in Italy\(^3\) and France. Thus the United States (like West Germany) would be confronted with the issue of the extent to which, if at all, it would help financially to alleviate these crises, or, conversely, whether, by making clear in advance that it would not, it could exercise effective pressure to prevent communist entry into the government. Conversely, one

can argue, as the PCI\textsuperscript{34} and some non-communist observers do, that the U.S. should be for the entry of the PCI into the government because only thereby, with trade union cooperation, can the Italian economic crisis be solved or alleviated. So far, however, it does not appear that the PCI has been willing, or perhaps not even able, to accept such decisive cooperation with the Italian government, and one wonders whether it could or would if it entered the government.

As to the third, the military element, this basically applies only to Italy. A PS-PCF government in France would make French cooperation with NATO even less than it is now, but the difference would hardly be crucial. PCE participation in a Spanish government is so unlikely in the near future, and the run-down of U.S. base facilities in Spain so likely that this is also not a major policy issue. There are, however, very extensive U.S. military bases in Italy, vital for U.S. and NATO strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Their future is the major current U.S. policy problem vis-a-vis Eurocommunism. While Berlinguer publicly endorsed NATO during the June 1976 Italian election campaign, and while he most likely shares with almost all Italians the fear that Moscow might again get hold of Yugoslavia, the PCI's membership, more anti-NATO than the leadership, may well continue to pressure the leadership to lower U.S. military presence.

Unless and until the PCI's base becomes reformist, more so

\textsuperscript{34}See Sergio Segre (head of the PCI international department), "The 'Communist Question' in Italy," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, July 1976.
than it now is, and until the PCI abandons its continued democratic centralism (i.e. authoritarian inner-party structure) and its support of Soviet and opposition to U.S. foreign policies, it is in my view not in the U.S. interest that it join the Italian government.

It will remain contrary to U.S. interests unless and until the losses to the U.S. of PCI entry become counterbalanced by the cost to the Soviets of stronger PCI opposition to Soviet policies. This may occur, but it has not yet. Until U.S. gains from this possibility intersect with and become greater than U.S. losses from PCI entry, U.S. opposition to entry should continue.

In the meantime, the U.S. should keep in mind that the PCI's move toward reformism has been in part influenced by western opposition to its entry into the government, that the PCI has not yet made clear exactly how it envisages a future Italy, that it has not yet (and indeed continues to endorse Soviet foreign policy), and that therefore continued U.S. and West European opposition to its participation in the government will continue the pressure on it to make its position clear on these issues. The same is true for other West European communist parties. 35

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35 This point is well made in the excellent analysis by Wolfgang Wagner, "Kommunisten im westlichen Bündnis? Atlantische Allianz und Europäische Gemeinschaft vor einem neuen Problem," Europa Archiv, May 25, 1976. For a view advocating less opposition to PCI participation, see Peter Lange, "What Is to be Done--About Italian Communism?", Foreign Policy, Winter 1975-1976.
What, then, should the U.S. do? It should not, as too many U.S. officials often have, declare that PCI participation in the Italian government is "unacceptable" to the U.S. This unnecessarily and counter-productively antagonizes all Italian nationalists. Second, U.S. officials should indicate, when asked, that they view PCI entry as contrary to U.S. interests, but that this is a matter for Italians, and that they will be guided by general West European views on this matter, notably by those of the other EEC members. (In practice, this would mean primarily the German Federal Republic.) Third, there is no reason why the U.S. should be expected to commit itself to massive financial aid to Italy with the PCI in the government; as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has put it, no nation is required to give aid without strings. Fourth, it is most unlikely that the U.S. Congress would authorize any such massive aid in the near future. Fifth, any such aid decision, however, should also be multilateral. Sixth, since the PCI eventually probably will enter the government, the U.S. should not unnecessarily antagonize it. It should, for example, end the refusal of U.S. entry visas to PCI members, as part of a general abandonment of this practice within the context of the Helsinki Declaration.

As to France and Spain, there is little that the U.S. can or need do. The U.S. has every right, in answer to questions, to make clear its preference that their communist parties not enter government, but it should equally make clear, as with Italy, that this is a choice for their peoples and that the U.S. is not trying to prescribe what
they should do. The French and Spanish peoples are far more nationalistic than the Italian and any open U.S. pressure would be counter-productive.

As to the problem that Eurocommunism presents to the Soviets, the most important U.S. policy to follow, in this as in many other respects, is to make credibly clear to the Soviets that any Soviet attempt to reacquire dominant influence in Yugoslavia would mean the end of detente in Europe and the negotiation of a military relationship between Washington and Peking to counterbalance it. Otherwise, the U.S. can well afford to wait for tensions between Moscow and Eurocommunism to deepen, as they probably will.