THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT
A Design Study on
Arms Control and Limited War
in the Developing Areas

SUMMARY REPORT

ACDA/WEC-98 I

Prepared for
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Prepared by
Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss
with
Col. Laurence J. Legere, U.S.A. (Ret.)
Richard E. Barringer John H. Hoagland
R. Lucas Fischer Janet Fraser
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SUMMARY REPORT

THE AGE OF LOCAL CONFLICT

The world since the end of World War II has lived in the shadow of a cataclysmic nuclear war. The driving ambitions of first the Soviet Union and then Communist China, and the determined opposition of the West, gave such a war every apparent reason for happening. But a general thermonuclear exchange could be regarded only by a madman as a rational means of achieving political ends. This transforming fact has forced into prominence a number of other elements of prime concern to the present study.

One implication of that change is that local quarrels and disorders, although taking place far from the capitals of the great powers, have become aspects of a worldwide competition, posing potential threats of major intensification to wider areas and more destructive weapons.

Another implication involves the reverse of the first. Some local conflicts have been more free to take place to the extent that a fear of intensification has inhibited superpower intervention. And a third implication is that, as the result of the other factors, the most powerful nations on earth have found themselves concerned with small-scale conflicts to a degree that is unique in political history.

Conflicts of the local variety have thus emerged into unanticipated prominence. They have contributed significantly to the general problem of the developing nations in the regions outside Europe, over 90 per cent of them having taken place in the great southern, underdeveloped half of the world. Some of them represent the more traditional.

*We have chosen to use the words "intensification" and "moderation" rather than the more common "escalation" and "de-escalation." These latter are so ambiguously defined in common usage that any but the most egregious steps are subject to quarrel as to whether they qualify or not. "Intensification" and "moderation," while equally imprecise, do not currently carry the same semantic freight.
type of warfare between states. Most have taken place within the frontiers of a single state. All recent wars have been "limited"; even the largest in scale have been confined to restricted, if shifting, objectives.

Nothing seems surer than the prediction that, whatever else may happen, the decade of the 1970s, because it will be one of revolution, modernization, and change, will be one of local conflict. The Soviet Union and China will function, in unpredictable competition or combination, as exploiters of the inevitable tensions engendered by change; and the United States will regard each episode of conflict as a potential threat or opportunity. It can readily be demonstrated that even significant arms-control and disarmament measures would not basically affect this prospect.

In sum, the ingredients will exist in the future, as they do now, for local conflicts to flourish, to draw in the great powers, and to intensify. But the conditions may also exist for a purposeful strategy of conflict control that would aim to moderate such conflicts and make them less threatening to regional and world peace.

By "control" we mean the prevention, moderation, or termination of organized violence at the international and international level. By "local" we mean the small interstate wars, the bitter civil wars, the proxy conflicts behind which the superpowers hide, and the insurgencies and guerrilla warfare in the backwaters of the developing world—in short, the wars that are fought in this era, rather than the big one most planned for and feared, but mercifully not fought.

Our focus is on the continents and regions outside of Europe—Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. What we mean by "conflict" is a dispute that is being or is likely to be dealt with by predominantly military means.

Our analysis concerns itself with conflicts up to and including wars of any size outside Europe not directly involving both Soviet and U.S. forces in open hostilities. On the downward side of the scale it descends to include low-level insurgency. The range of conflicts in the regions in question could go as high as a possible Asian nuclear war, and as low as guerrilla warfare in one province of a Latin American country. Both internal and interstate conflicts are of concern to us, in an age of increasing international intervention in internal struggles. These and all between we include under the label of "local conflict."

The operational purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, it aims to organize an unstructured set of questions in such a way as to serve as a basis for further research. Second, it seeks to produce tentative findings about the applicability of arms control and other
policy measures to the turbulent world outside the central superpower confrontation.

Our focus here is on measures bearing directly on the waging of conflict—measures that tend to produce or influence inhibitions, constraints, or limits with regard to conflicts—or conversely tend to expand conflicts. We are seriously concerned with measures primarily affecting military capabilities, but such measures will not be limited to those previously called "arms control." They will be limited only by being operationally relevant to reducing the risk, limiting the intensity, or facilitating the cessation of local conflicts.

The research question underlying this Design Study is: If one wants to bring a given conflict under control, in the sense of minimizing violence, what would be probably have to do? Whether one wants to carry out such a policy is a different question. We recognize that there may well be local conflicts that the United States is legitimately more interested in winning than in controlling. We grant that on occasion the United States may choose even to foment a local conflict rather than to pay the human or strategic price of not doing so. We recognize that other values are frequently preferred in war—one side winning, justice being served, Communism defeated, oppressors slain, colonial rulers ousted, etc. There will of course be times when the latter ends are, by any but doctrinaire pacifist standards, more to be valued than the exclusive end of minimizing violence. Our analysis aims at generating a set of prescriptions for those times when minimizing violence is—or should be—the determinant of policy.

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

At a very early stage in our thinking, we postulated that there might be within conflicts factors that at crucial pressure points could be subjected to conflict-controlling measures. From the concept of pressure points developed the further notion that within conflicts there were phases that differed from each other in ways that were relevant to the problem of conflict control. The examination of such pressure points and phases required some way in which the dynamic structure of the conflict process itself could be exposed for analysis.

From these relatively uncomplicated notions developed a model of the structure of conflict and its control. The model is both the organizing theme of a large part of our research, and the product of it. In the course of seeking to apply the model to historic conflicts,
the characteristics of the separate phases, and of the transitions between phases, become more clearly differentiated. And as the content of the phases emerged, the nature of the control objectives that were relevant to each of them was seen with greater precision.

We start with a dynamic image of conflict as a process that moves along in time and space. It is divided into identifiable stages or phases. In each phase, factors are at work that generate pressures. Some tend toward increased violence, and some tend away from violence. Within each phase the factors interact to push the conflict across a series of thresholds toward or away from violence. The transition across thresholds is a function of the combined interaction of the factors during the previous phase. Their relative strength during the phase determines whether or not the conflict worsens.

Our picture of the process envisages conflict arising out of a substantive dispute, whether over territory, borders, legitimacy, ideology, power, race, or whatever. This quarrel (dispute) is not necessarily perceived in military terms by either party. If one or more parties introduces a military option, a threshold has been crossed to a new phase in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least plausible; a conflict has been generated. The introduction of a military option does not mean that hostilities have actually occurred, just that they are likely or possible. The conflict is still in a pre-hostilities stage.

If hostilities break out, a new phase is entered. Intensification may take place during this phase. If hostilities are terminated another threshold is crossed to a phase in which the conflict continues without fighting necessarily being resumed, but with at least one party continuing to view the dispute in potentially military terms. It ceases to be a conflict when it is no longer perceived chiefly in military terms, real or potential. It then may enter a phase in which the military option is discarded but the issues remain unsettled, in which case it can be said that the conflict, but not the dispute, is ended.

If the dispute is settled, a final threshold is hopefully crossed. If not, and conflict remains it can flare up again in hostilities. Even if only the dispute remains a military build-up raises the situation can revert to the earlier pre-hostilities conflict situation. Stated this way, conflict is a part of the larger context of dispute between parties over an issue or issues; and actual fighting is a part of the context of conflict. Stated more formally, with names and numbers given the various phases, the preceding paragraphs may be summarized as follows:
Phase I  Dispute, pre-hostilities, pre-military
Phase II  Pre-hostilities, but some in military terms
Phase III  Hostilities
Phase IV  Termination of hostilities, but military option remaining
Phase V  Post-conflict, but dispute remaining

Needless to say, all these phases do not necessarily occur in all conflicts, nor in any invariable order. As a model, this representation will rarely be followed to perfection in real life.

One of our basic assumptions was that it is possible to identify, isolate, and classify the salient factors, singly or in combination, that, in their existence or absence, coincided with the extent to which a conflict was controlled or not, in terms of the transition from one phase to another. We made no advance assumptions either about what those factors or patterns were, or whether and under what circumstances they would promote or inhibit control.

The figure on the following page brings together our definitions of phases and transitions, the notion of conflict-promoting and conflict-inhibiting factors, and the resultant control objectives applying in each phase.

We should stress here that the coexistence of a factor with a given degree of controllability or uncontrollability does not necessarily support the conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship. For one thing, our sample is much too small to justify such an assertion. We do however assert what might be called an "existence-affect" relationship: Where a given factor or group of factors has existed in the past, a given effect has occurred. The most we would be prepared to assert beyond this—and that only about some of the most persistent patterns—is the probability that the existence of the same combination in the future might be associated with the same or similar effect.
## Structure of Local Conflict Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Conflict</th>
<th>Threshold of Transition Between Phases</th>
<th>Description of Phase or Transition</th>
<th>Crucial Factors Bearing on Transition Toward Conflict Control (Away from Violence)</th>
<th>Crucial Factors Bearing on Transition Away from Conflict Control (Toward Violence)</th>
<th>Conflict-Control Policy Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| P-I               | Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party | • Tending to keep dispute non-military  
• Tending toward settlement | • Tending to introduce military option  
• Tending away from settlement | • Keeping dispute non-military  
• Settling the dispute |
| ←- T I-II         | Introduction of military option by one or both parties | (Factors operating during Phase I have combined to push the dispute across the threshold to Phase II, making it a conflict) | | |
| P-II              | Conflict, perceived in military terms by one or both parties | • Inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities  
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Tending toward settlement | • Promoting the outbreak of hostilities  
• Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Tending away from settlement | • Preventing the outbreak of hostilities  
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Settling the dispute |
| ←- T II-III       | Outbreak of hostilities | (Factors operating during Phase II have combined to push conflict across the threshold of Phase III, generating hostilities) | | |
| P-III             | Hostilities | • Moderating hostilities  
• Terminating hostilities  
• Tending toward settlement | • Intensifying hostilities  
• Continuing hostilities  
• Tending away from settlement | • Moderating hostilities  
• Terminating hostilities  
• Settling the dispute |
| ←- T III-IV       | Termination of hostilities | (Factors operating during Phase III have combined to push conflict across the threshold to Phase IV, terminating actual fighting) | | |
| P-IV              | Post-hostilities but conflict still perceived in potentially military terms by at least one party | • Inhibiting the resumption of hostilities  
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Tending toward settlement | • Promoting the resumption of hostilities  
• Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Tending away from settlement | • Preventing the resumption of hostilities  
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities  
• Settling the dispute |
| ←- T IV-V         | End of conflict | (Factors operating during previous phases have combined to remove the military option of both adversaries, but the underlying dispute remains) | | |
| P-V               | Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party | • Tending to keep dispute non-military  
• Tending toward settlement | • Tending to introduce military option  
• Tending away from settlement | • Keeping dispute non-military  
• Settling the dispute |
| ←- S              | Settlement of dispute | (Factors operating during previous phases—or factors unrelated to conflict itself—have combined to bring underlying dispute to settlement) | | |
RESEARCH METHODS

For this Design Study, the model had two tests to meet: Could it be used as a device to structure real conflict data without distorting reality? Would the data so structured reveal the factors at work within each phase that were tending toward or away from conflict-control objectives?

Limitations of time and the priorities appropriate to a design effort dictated that only a small sample of cases be selected for any detailed study. Several practical as well as theoretical reasons led to the decision to confine the selection to the post-1945 period. Data of the sort required were more likely to be available. And we believe that, in general, the motive forces that characterize this period are likely to be prime movers for many years to come.

The post-World War II period may of course be unique in its conjunction of ideological cleavage, rapid technological change, and decolonization (this point is cogently argued by our consultant Alastair Buchan). With some notable exceptions that are high on any list of potential conflict areas, the decolonization process has been completed. But the sensitivities of newly found independence, and the assertive nationalism to which the decolonization process gave rise, are bound to color the perceptions of present and future leaders of the new states. The pace of rapid technological change may slacken, but the impact of that change as it is transferred to the developing world has surely not yet run its course. And while the character of the ideological split may be changing with the rapid decentralization of both Cold War camps, the perceptions of the earlier era, right or wrong, will doubtless linger among both political leaders and their publics. The post-1945 period, then, is a source not only of many examples of the phenomenon of local conflict but also of local conflicts with a character that seems likely to project into the next decades.

Drawing on our own admittedly imperfect memories of the past two decades, and after perusing the lists compiled by others, we settled on a list of 52 postwar cases of local conflict that fit our definition and geographic scope. (The identity of these 52 may be found in Typology A on the following page.)
# TYPOLOGY A

## GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostilities</th>
<th>Conventional Interstate</th>
<th>Unconventional Interstate</th>
<th>Internal with Significant External Involvement</th>
<th>Primarily Internal</th>
<th>Colonial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| No Outbreak Of Hostilities |△ Morocco - Spanish Morocco 1957-58  
oud Honduras-Nicaragua 1957  
○ Kuwait-Iraq 1961 | △ Morocco - Spanish Morocco 1957-58  
○ Honduras-Nicaragua 1957  
○ Kuwait-Iraq 1961 | △ Costa Rica 1947  
○ Lebanon 1958 US | △ French Cameroun 1955-60  
△ Madagascar 1947  
○ Muscat-Oman 1956-58  
△ West Irian 1962-63 | # Goa 1961-62 |
| Hostilities Terminated Quickly Without Intensification | ○ Soviet-Iran 1941-47 SU  
○ Bay of Pigs 1960-61 US  
○ Guatemala 1954 US  
△ Motions-1954  
○ Goan-1954 | ○ Dominican Republic 1963 US  
○ Cyprus 1963-65 | # Angola 1961-62  
○ Indonesia 1945-49  
△ French Morocco 1952-56  
△ Kenya 1952-58 | # Goa 1961-62 |
| Hostilities Terminated Quickly After Intensification | ○ Kashmir 1965 -Ch  
○ Suez 1956 | ○ Kashmir 1965 -Ch  
△ Israel-Palestine 1955-59  
△ Jordan-Yemen 1954-59  
△ India-China 1954-62 Ch | ○ Yemen 1962-63  
○ Laos 1959-60 US-SU-Ch  
△ Tibet 1955-59 Ch  
△ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54  
△ Malaya 1948-60  
△ Burma Civil War 1948-54  
△ Venezuela 1960-63 | ○ Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63  
○ Dominican Republic 1961-62 US  
△ Cuba 1958-59  
△ Philippines 1948-54  
△ Colombia 1960-61 | # Angola 1961-62  
○ Indonesia 1945-49  
△ French Morocco 1952-56  
△ Kenya 1952-58 | # Goa 1961-62 |
| Hostilities Continued Without Intensification | ○ Qemoy-Matsu 1954-58 US  
○ Palestine 1945-48  
○ Aden-Yemen 1954-59  
○ India-China 1954-62 Ch | ○ Qemoy-Matsu 1954-58 US  
○ Palestine 1945-48  
○ Aden-Yemen 1954-59  
○ India-China 1954-62 Ch | ○ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65  
△ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64  
△ Vietnam 1959-60 US-Ch | ○ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65  
△ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64  
△ Vietnam 1959-60 US-Ch  
△ Indian 1945-48 | △ French Morocco 1952-56  
△ Indonesia 1945-49  
△ Algeria 1954-62  
○ Cyprus 1952-59 | # Goa 1961-62 |

Legend: ○ Middle East  
△ Africa  
□ Latin America  
◊ Asia  
US: Direct  
SU: Indirect  
Ch: Direct  
Ch: Indirect

NOTE: Conflicts underlined have been subjects of ACLIM Study.
Typologies Approach

Our first approach to an analysis of the controllability of these cases was to attempt to array all 52 conflicts graphically in terms of a fixed number of variables and our knowledge of the course that each conflict had taken. This "typologies" exercise rested on the supposition that, by adding together what we knew had occurred in each conflict and what we knew the gross characteristics of each conflict to have been, we might discover some interesting patterns and clusters of conflicts. Also, such patterns might suggest the types of conflicts that in the past—and perhaps in the future—proved—or would prove—most or least controllable.

Historic-Analytic Approach

Our chief research effort involved the analysis of a small number of post-World War II cases in terms of the model of conflict described on page 6. For this purpose, the following cases were selected:

- The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949
- The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
- The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1965
- The Kashmir Conflict, 1947-1949
- The Kashmir Conflict, 1965
- The India-China Border Conflict, 1954-1962
- The Bay of Pigs, 1960-1961
- The Venezuelan Insurgency, 1959-1963
- The Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict, 1960-1964
- The Algerian-Moroccan Conflict, 1962-1963
- The Angola Conflict, 1950-1961
- The Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1947
- The Suez-Sinai Conflicts, 1956
- The Greek Insurgency, 1944-1949
- The Conflict on Cyprus, 1952-1959
- The Conflict on Cyprus, 1959-1964

What we have called an "historic-analytic" approach sought to extract from historic data about these cases insights that could contribute to a conflict-control strategy.* The first task was to identify:

*We also experimented with a computer-based analysis of historic data, using a form of configuration analysis. (A description of this technique and its findings will be presented in a later report by Richard E. Barringer and Robert K. Ramers.)
the phases and transitions in each conflict in accordance with our model. The second task was to identify a comprehensive list of factors that, in the analyst's opinion, tended either to support or to make more difficult the achievement of the control objectives stated in the model. As identified on a case-by-case and phase-by-phase basis, the factors took the form, not of abstractions about conflict, but of economic, political, military, or social events, facts, or perceptions. Every factor was recorded that was found to have existed or occurred during any phase and that was deemed to have exerted a pressure, however minor, on the future course of the conflict.

The next task was to identify policy activities and policy measures designed to offset those factors deemed to be conflict-producing and to reinforce those deemed to be conflict-controlling. The goal, in short, was a conflict-controlling policy response for every factor identified. It should be emphasized that we were not seeking to develop new information about these cases, nor to write exhaustive histories of them. The final step in the historic-analytic approach was to ask what lessons for conflict control could be derived from the analysis of each case.

Hardware Approach

We also collected weapons data for a number of conflicts, overlapping to a large extent the conflicts that had been selected for the narrative case studies. The cases for which weapons analyses were performed were:

The Sinai Conflict, 1956; and the Israeli-Egyptian Arms Race, 1955-1966
The Ethiopian-Somalian Conflict, 1950-1966
The Kashmir Conflict, 1965; and the Indian-Pakistani Military Build-up, 1955-1965
The Bay of Pigs, 1961
The Greek Insurgency, 1946-1949
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1965
The Conflict on Cyprus, 1955-1959
The Conflict on Cyprus, 1963-1965
The Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1966
The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949
The Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1946
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

What follows in condensed form are the findings provisionally reached.

Hardware Findings

Weapons used in local conflicts have usually been introduced from outside sources under the aegis of national governments. During the next decade, most local conflicts will continue to be fought primarily with imported weapons, augmented to varying degrees by indigenous manufacture; this applies even to the few relatively high-GNP developing countries that have established or can establish their own arms production programs. The total volume of arms transfers is growing and will continue to grow, as additional suppliers enter the weapons market and as re-transfers arise from the re-equipping of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

All types of weaponry can be used in local conflict, but the most relevant categories are small arms, crew-served weapons including artillery, armored vehicles, and combat aircraft. Missiles did not feature prominently in the conflicts we examined and are unlikely to do so in the coming decade, except in such areas as the Middle East or the Indian subcontinent, where great-power forces are directly engaged.

Small arms—very important in local conflicts—have extraordinary longevity. They are usually acquired as part of a comprehensive government-to-government military assistance agreement, though some are obtained by direct purchase from manufacturers or traders. Lightweight crew-served weapons are quite common on both sides of interstate and internal conflicts, but artillery is normally used only by regular forces. Tanks, too, are most in demand by regular forces, for use in both interstate and internal conflicts; irregular forces generally find them unsuited to their purposes. Aircraft are considered prestigious, given their high visibility. The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France still account for 98 percent of all jet combat aircraft shipped to the developing world, although re-transfer from the inventories of the original receivers is beginning to emerge as an important mode of diffusion.

Other major hardware findings can be summarized as follows:

(I) Irregular forces get their weapons by import, smuggling, stealing, or capturing, or by "inheriting" them at the termination of great-power conflicts.
(2) Interstate conflicts are often characterized by a long pre-conflict, pre-hostilities build-up, ranging from five to fifteen years. It usually involves the whole weapons spectrum. Most states acquire the same range of weapons types; their inventories vary only in size and numbers.

(3) The greatest quantities of all kinds of arms are introduced into local conflicts when a major power becomes directly involved.

(4) The fact of weapons procurement in a tense situation may change the perceptions of potential adversaries, and can thus stimulate military action.

(5) A more intense arms build-up often follows a cease-fire instituted at the urging of the supplying countries (unless of course the dispute gets settled).

(6) Restrictions placed by arms suppliers on end-use have so far proved largely ineffectual.

(7) Control of the spare parts and ammunition flow for weapons can impair military effectiveness (but may stimulate efforts to achieve self-sufficiency).

Typologies Experiment Findings

Clearly, only very tentative value attaches to conclusions based on our limited experimentation with typologies. Nevertheless, it generated several interesting insights.

Typology A, our rather crude beginning, plotted relative controllability (which we scaled in the form of an index of level of hostilities) against the gross nature of 52 postwar conflicts. It led to the elementary conclusion that internal conflicts are much more likely than interstate conflicts to resist prevention, moderation, and termination. In other words, internal conflicts tend to be harder to control than interstate conflicts.

Typology B plotted relative controllability against the factor of great-power partiality for each of the 52 cases. Examination of the distribution of the conflicts within the matrices of this typology suggested that considerable great-power partiality has usually
been a feature of those conflicts that have proved hard to control. The more intense that partiality has been, the more the conflicts have resisted prevention, moderation, or termination of hostilities.

In Typology C, relative controllability was plotted against geopolitical setting (nature of the terrain and weather, attitudes of nations contiguous to the conflict area, and the degree of political stability in the region). The results appeared to warrant the assertion that geopolitical setting does relate significantly to the relative controllability of conflicts, in that controllability correlates negatively with difficult terrain and weather conditions, with neighboring states that incite or support one side or the other, and with political instability in the region.

In Typology D, three factors were jointly plotted and then measured against the relative controllability of the 52 conflicts. The factors were the gross nature of the conflict, great-power partiality, and the commitment of the adversaries to the outcome. With respect to this new factor, Typology D suggested that high commitments of will and resources by conflict adversaries tend to go with continued hostilities, thus producing conflicts hard to control.

Findings from Historic Cases

Our principal substantive findings took the form of conflict-controlling measures that were derived analytically from identification in each phase of each case studied, of what we believed to be the crucial factors bearing on transition toward or away from violence. The measures were formulated on the basis of whether they might have either reinforced factors that tended toward conflict control or offset factors that tended away from it. In some cases the measures were actually taken. In the vast majority of instances they were not.

We do not assert that, if a given measure had been taken at a certain time in a particular case, things would have turned out differently. They might well have, but we shall never know. The point is rather to see how suggestive it is for a general strategy of conflict control to draw up a catalog of policy measures that detailed analysis shows to have been directly relevant to the conflict-influencing factors associated with various phases in the dynamic life of some recent local conflicts.

In fine-grain study of recent local conflicts, the distinction between interstate and internal tends to become blurred, especially in those apparently internal cases that witnessed direct or indirect involvement of third parties.
The number of theoretically available conflict-control measures was highest in the pre-conflict phase, with the number and variety of such measures progressively declining as the conflict developed and progressed through its violent phase. Ironically, however, the incidence of conflict-controlling policy activity actually pursued was almost in inverse proportion to the chances of influencing events. For it was only as the options dwindled that policy activity increased, coming too late to act as a preventive, and trailing off when fighting stopped.

With respect to the relationship between internal and interstate cases, the ratio of measures actually carried out to the total measures presumably available was not impressively different. However, the number of measures both analytically derived and in fact applied to pure "subversive-insurgency" internal cases was far less than the corresponding number for interstate cases, a disparity probably due at least in part to the innate difficulties of dealing with internal insurgency-type situations.

The breakdown of available conflict-controlling measures into functional types disclosed that by far the preponderance (about one-third) of instances where potentially conflict-controlling measures appeared relevant lay in the area of international organization activity--U.N. and/or regional. Then (at about one-fifth of the total) some political measures to be taken by parties external to the conflict, notably great powers but also including allies and neighbors. Military-strategic and internal-political cases next (at about 15 per cent each), followed by arms-hardware, economic-technological, and communications-information.

In comparison, the breakdown into functional types of measures actually taken showed that, while international organization measures remained relatively high (about one-fourth of the total), military-strategic and external-political measures were equally or virtually as high, with both of the latter peaking after the outbreak of hostilities.

Finally, the distribution of the incidence of types of measures available across the chronological conflict phases is interesting. In general, all functional types of measures seemed most available in the early Phases I and II (although military-strategic understandably remained high in the Phase III hostilities period). What had not been so evident before our analysis was the relatively large incidence of international organization measures that appeared appropriate in the preventive Phase I stage. Almost twice as many were implied there as in the Phase II pre-hostilities period, and considerably more than the number that appeared available and relevant after fighting broke out (which is of course where most actual policy activity was and is focused).
TOWARD A STRATEGY OF CONFLICT CONTROL

As Americans look out toward the near and middle-term future, few things seem more certain than the continuation of local conflict in the developing regions outside of Europe. Regional instability in turn is the soil in which superpower competition takes root. For most of the developing regions we have studied, the preconditions for conflict thus already exist in abundance. As Leon Trotsky is reported to have said to anyone wanting to lead a quiet and peaceful life, "You should not have been born in the 20th century."

We have suggested, from our preliminary analysis, a broad range of potentially conflict-controlling measures. But up to this point, we have been neutral as to whether the United States ought or ought not to have sponsored some or all of these measures. As said at the outset of this study, some conflict-control measures might, if they had been taken, have disadvantaged the United States in the pursuit of its particular objectives as seen at the time. Other measures would, if taken, have clearly supported the nation's general interest in stability and peace. Still others might have appeared to be disadvantageous, but actually might have had the effect of sparing the United States from committing what looks in retrospect like a blunder.

For these reasons it is far from easy to recommend a posture for the United States toward local conflict that will be either always consistent or always successful. The first may be undesirable, and the latter impossible. U.S. foreign policy takes its cues not only from what it wants of the world, but also from the complex nature of the international scene and of the forces and pressures that play across it. This in turn gives rise to conflicting interpretations of events, and to the setting of frequently incompatible goals and priorities. It is this tendency that both causes and results from the deep dilemmas to be found in virtually all sectors of policy and strategy.

One paramount dilemma inheres in the orientation of the international system, as presently organized, to the classic model of nation-states, sovereign equality, and the legally impregnable barrier to intervention unless and until uniformed soldiers of one state cross the national boundaries of another. For this type of interstate conflict, the international system is geared to provide a framework for intervention in the name of both law and order. Per contra, particularly until the racial conflicts of southern Africa were rechristened "international" in the 1980s by a growing U.N. majority, the system militated against intervention in civil wars, themselves now rechristened "insurgencies." That the latter type of conflict appears
to be more "uncontrollable" than the former probably reflects the weaknesses of the international system as much as it does the uniquely intractable quality of wars of brother against brother (particularly if one brother is a dedicated Marxist-Leninist).

So far, international organizations have proven generally unable to cope with the new format of conflict within borders—subversion, terror, insurgency, and the whole catalog of conflict types that until now have baffled the international community. This may be the single most unsolvable problem in the field of conflict control.

Our analysis has reinforced our intuition that, for these conflicts, internal reforms are as important as any single element in a conflict-control strategy, and that their absence creates a role for indigenous Communists who, in the still excellent phrase of Walt Rostow, are the "scavengers of the process of modernization."

The cause-effect relationship here has perhaps been clearest where the issue has been primarily colonial. It does not take a Sophocles to describe in advance the nature of the tragedy that could ensue in the southern part of Africa unless the white man's ways are mended, in terms of both colonial and racial policies.

But even here, ambiguities exist for a conflict-control strategy. For in the short term there may be considerably more conflict control if colonial control is firmly retained. This is superficially similar to the security problem in non-colonial internal conflict, where the logic of our analysis has suggested in case after case the prescription of strong, cohesive, and effective local government. In many local interstate conflicts, the same nostrum applies.

At its extreme, this policy is conflict-controlling even if repugnantly repressive. This paradox is underscored by the possibility that a liberalizing, reformist policy may temporarily even increase instability and possibly violence.

The shortcomings of a policy of repression or tyranny are obvious, even conceding its theoretical value as a short-term violence-minimizer. For one thing, it may not always be true that measures directed against dissident groups will minimize the chance of violence. Repressive policies, unless accompanied by total social controls as in Communist countries, lead often to new and more widespread political revolution (cf. 1776, 1789, 1848, not to mention such contemporary instances as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Ghana). It may often be the case that longer-term conflict control in the form of political democracy, and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and dissent, will outweigh short-term conflict-control considerations—
unless the fear of intensification is great enough to overcome all, as in Hungary in 1956 and Cuba in 1962. Certainly, with regard to colonial rule in this era, the argument in favor of short-term suppression collapses in the middle range of time.

In general, suppression has reflected a consistently unsuccessful policy from 1815 and the Holy Alliance through the recent Indonesian, Indochinese, and Algerian experiences. Our tentative conclusion here is that prevention must come early, preferably in the pre-conflict phase (Phase I), if dynamic instabilities are not to be set in motion that later suppression—or reform—will not abate.

The prevention of internal conflict engages massive attention in the United States, but perhaps one of the most compelling needs is the one that encounters the greatest diplomatic sensitivity (vile Camelot)—the need to observe a rebellion before it starts, or at least as close to its inception as possible. Thomas C. Schelling, one of our consultants, makes the telling point that the predictions such early warning ought to engender might even be an effective substitute for control. To have foreseen the contours of the Vietnam situation might have altered profoundly the kinds of policies and commitments undertaken in its early stages.

Arms-control measures, of which we have perceived a modest number and range that might be applied in various phases of local conflict, are also subject to ambiguities and paradoxes. It is normally supposed that a great power intervenes with arms and supplies in a local area dispute because it is already part of, committed to one side or one outcome or another. But Senator Fulbright has support from an influential organ of opinion in wondering if it is not rather the other way around: "... once a great power has become involved through the supply of arms, it develops an interest in the receiving country."

A conflict-control policy will by definition seek to make military conflict less violent, destructive, or unmanageable—a function considered by some as reflecting the highest use of arms control. This calls for limiting the availability of arms, ammunition, spare parts, and supplies, whether through formal disarmament agreements; the discouragement of competitive arming by substituting external agencies of security, national or multilateral; enforcing controls by arms suppliers; or embargoing arms in the course of a given conflict. The ideal here would be either to eliminate arms or in any event not to use them (perhaps employing instead the so-called Brazilian method.

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whereby one side merely displays its dispositions and deployments, whereupon the adversary surrenders, the regime resigns, or whatever).

But this straight-line approach runs afoul of two perplexing questions. The first arises from the measures suggested by many of our cases (and much favored by, *inter alia*, the present authors). These measures would serve to reduce regional armaments to the level needed for internal security purposes only, with assistance toward that end. If successful, this would automatically ensure that whatever hostilities did break out would be conducted at a low level.

But there may be two serious negative effects. A strong capability for internal policing may, by suppressing legitimate dissent help to keep in power a tyrannical regime. And our analysis, not to mention common experience, indicates that, like colonial suppression, this policy tends to generate wider and more bitter later violence.

The second reservation has been suggested by John Hoagland and Geoffrey Kemp. The former points out that the U.S. reprisal in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 set a pattern for "legal" military jet pinpoint attacks subsequently emulated by Syria and Israel (and, in the same week, by Turkey vis-à-vis Cyprus). Hoagland's point is that while seeming to loosen existing barriers and thereby encouraging violence, conflict-control objectives were in fact served because "peace" and "war" were made less brittle concepts, and a single action was no longer necessarily a *casus belli*. Kemp's point is that in many actual local conflicts, so-called status weapons, being sophisticated and complex, are not very useful for combat compared with the small arms and other internal defense weapons we have suggested focusing on.

The second dilemma and paradox concerning local arms supplies is equally perplexing. It concerns the balance to be established between local adversaries in interstate disputes. If the local situation is in military imbalance, one side may be tempted to strike; if it does so, it is then likely, *ceteris paribus*, that it will quickly overcome the victim, and violence will be ended. In the alternative scenario favored by, for example, U.S. Middle Eastern policy, arms are supplied to redress such local imbalances. Rationally, the sides are thus mutually deterred from starting anything. But if hostilities nevertheless ensue, they might well intensify, and speedy termination may be much harder to achieve. On a global scale this is of course the central dilemma of superpower mutual deterrence policy. In the regions the same questions would be magnified manifold in the event that nuclear weapons were to proliferate.

In this Design Study our approach was deliberately a fragmentary and particularistic one. Our chief aim was to burrow into the
fine structure both of theory of conflict and of conflicts themselves. But inevitably, our tentative findings, impressions, and conclusions on the subject ought to be placed in a broader context. Is the simple suppression of violence a legitimate governing principle to inform the U.S. role in international life? Does it not need to be related to some other overarching principle or goal?

For instance, it may be argued that the United States, as the chief beneficiary of the established world political, economic, and social order, has a kind of natural mission to use its power and resources, i.e., to intervene, wherever conflict emerges, for the express purpose of shoring up that particular segment of the status quo. This would always put the United States on the side of legitimate government, always against revolution—scarcely a viable, not to say intelligent, policy. The same ideological principle would choose for the United States the side in an interstate conflict that was most likely to favor stability.

In some cases this "hard-line" advice (which has curiously Marxist overtones) is not necessarily wrong. Take-over attempts by organized Communist-led minorities offend so many principles, both of international stability and of political morality, that sometimes one must defend even an unsavory regime, on the Churchillian principle that "when wolves are about the shepherd must guard his flock even if he does not himself care for mutton."

It is not surprising that the Soviet Union interprets U.S. policy toward local conflict precisely in accordance with Marxist expectations, reinforced by a number of instances when the United States has behaved accordingly. According to one of the ablest American Sovietologists, on the basis of 100 conversations in the Soviet Union and East Europe in the fall of 1966:

Our improvisations are seen as fitting into a pattern of deliberate militancy reflecting a determination to intervene with force in any local situation where political trends are adverse to our interests.²

Whatever may be the ideological name in which great-power intervention takes place—"victory," freedom for the inhabitants, prevention of a larger war, or whatever—the key to such intervention is the existence of great-power partiality as between the sides. This is in many ways the heart of superpower foreign policy toward the regions in question. But one of the most intriguing facts is the

rather low batting average of the superpowers in directly intervening in local conflicts in order to score a clear-cut win.

In many ways the Bay of Pigs was a mirror-image of the situation in Iran in 1945-1946. In the background was a wider conflict of which the case in point was merely one sector or front. In both cases one of the superpowers was a close neighbor. In both cases the neighboring superpower fomented internal conflict through subversive guerrilla forces inside, in addition to training and introducing additional indigenous subversives from without. In both cases, justification for intervention was found in historic precedents and frameworks (sphere-of-influence treaties in Iran, the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba). In both instances, current international law, including the U.N. Charter, expressly forbade the policies the superpowers pursued. And in both instances the superpowers were unsuccessful in their aim of overthrowing the neighboring regime.

One principal reason for their mutual failure was the local unpopularity such external intervention generates. But another was surely the deterrent power of the other superpower against any temptation of the intervener to go too far. Strong and purposeful deterrence emerged in our analysis as a vital component of superpower policy in a strategy of conflict control.

But intervention has two faces. Intervention to "win," or to have "our" side win, is one thing. Intervention for another purpose—such as the minimizing of violence—is quite another. Intervention, as Harlan Cleveland has put it, "in the name of non-intervention," was the strategy followed in the 1960 Congo collapse. The United Nations intervened so that national unilateral intervention, particularly by the superpowers, would not take place. Both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in Laos in 1962 to defuse and neutralize it, and in the India-Pakistan fighting in 1965 to terminate it.

The changing international scene is bound to affect the policy calculations the United States will be making on this issue in the period ahead. The nature and intensity of U.S. interests in local conflicts has been defined so far largely by the extent of the involvement of those conflicts in the Cold War. If both the Communist and the Western worlds continue to grow more pluralistic, and if new political issues, new centers of military power and political activity, and new patterns of conflict and alignment arise to complicate or even subordinate the Cold War issues, U.S. interests may remain as extensive as ever. But U.S. policies and strategies of intervention and conflict control will have to become much more selective and diversified than they have been. Moreover, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the United States may also be less likely automatically...
to interpret local insurrections as part of a coordinated global challenge.

It may finally be ventured that, however the Vietnam war may end, its aftermath will find the United States less rather than more inclined to intervene unilaterally in local internal conflicts to secure a political or military victory.

The strategic options open to the United States are not necessarily mutually antagonistic or exclusive on all counts. A selective strategy of conflict control would not necessarily compete or clash at all points with other currently favored U.S. strategies. There is in fact real convergence with the counterinsurgency approach reported to be current in U.S. Defense Department circles.* The prescriptions in that approach for "victory in any counterinsurgency" are remarkably similar to measures we surfaced here in the name of conflict prevention: better communications and information; a well-trained police force to provide local security; and isolation of the guerrillas from external support.

Both strategies, to succeed, need an early approach to a local problem. But a conflict-control strategy will be interested in prevention and suppression even if Communist take-over is not involved. And in other obvious ways it will act in the name of minimizing violence instead of supporting ideology. Yet if either is to succeed, the truth, recognized by other studies of counterinsurgency, is that something deeper, earlier, and more basic is required for insurgencies truly to be prevented from happening. Analysis confirms that there is still validity in policy toward the developing countries for William

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* Straws in the wind, apart from the known views of some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, come from the other end of the political spectrum in the Senate. Under the leadership of Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senate in early 1967 rejected the Administration's proposal for construction of seven fast-deployment logistics ships—so-called F.D.L.s—intended to enable the U.S. Army to intervene more rapidly in foreign crises. Senator Russell was quoted as saying that "if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something." Senator Mike Mansfield said the program "would . . . in effect make us a world policeman and make us subject to actions for which we might not assent in Congress." New York Times, March 30, 1967.

James' prescription:

what we now need to discover in the social realm is
the moral equivalent of war: something heroic that
will speak to men as universally as war does. . .

As good as any other statement of the practical base that
underlies a U.S. effort to master a strategy of conflict control was
that made by President Johnson at Freedom House on February 23, 1966:

If we are not to fight forever in faraway places--
in Europe, or the far Pacific, or the jungles of
Africa, or the suburbs of Santo Domingo, then we
must learn to get at the roots of violence.**

The present study has sought to investigate the problem of
local conflict in this spirit--and so doing rejects the uncharacter-
stically cynical advice offered by Winston Churchill in his famous
Fulton, Missouri, speech when he announced: "It has been the dominant
lesson of history that mankind is unteachable."#

But here too, as we seek to articulate a basic tone for U.S.
policy to consider, we face perhaps the most serious dilemmas of all
that inher in a strategy that gives emphasis to conflict-control
considerations.

One fundamental dilemma lies in the possible competition be-
tween the goal of minimizing violence and the achievement of other goal
in the years ahead. It is all very well to say, with Salvador de Madr-
riaga, that "the gun that does not shoot is more eloquent than the gun
that has to shoot and above all the gun that has shot," or in purely
tactical terms, and assuming the continuation of struggle, with Sun
Tzu in his classic precept that "the supreme art in war is to subdue
the enemy without fighting."

But non-violence is not the only value to be cherished, and
the issue for the U.S. Government must never be posed in terms of
suppressing violence at the expense of freedom. This dilemma can only
be flagged here, not solved. At root it is moral and ethical in nature
and, at a minimum, carries with it limits to the pursuit of any
strategy that is overweighed in favor of one value or the other.

*The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, Longmans,
Green, 1923), p. 367.


#Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1966. 22
The second dilemma is that in conflict control—as in all of life—one must sometimes choose a lesser evil to avoid a greater one. Lesser violence may be acceptable and even desirable in order to avert greater violence—the ultimate justification for the Vietnam war.

Related to this is the argument that certain kinds of local conflict may have the beneficial result of minimizing a wider war by building backfires, or counter-irritants. A possible example of manipulation of one conflict in order to "control" a larger one is the current Yemen conflict that ties down a significant proportion of limited Egyptian resources and keeps them from potentially greater mischief-making elsewhere. The dangers are of course obvious in such a gamble, particularly when one considers, not the trough in the Yemen fighting, but the initial intense phase and future intensifications possibly to come in conjunction with the fate of the South Arabia Federation and Aden on the final departure of the British. In this context, perhaps we need not be overly fastidious about the possibility of undermining political leadership or opposition, as a tactic directly relevant to controlling local conflicts that are the product of unstable or over-ambitious personalities.

A third dilemma, mentioned in connection with arms policy, is that conflict control may be achieved either by moderating hostilities—which moderation may allow them to drag on—or by intensifying them with a view to a rapid end to the fighting. This trade-off represents one of the central dilemmas of Vietnam in early 1967, and has no easy answer. The crucial variables are probably the perceived chance of intensification vs. the pressures of public opinion—both able to act in either direction.

Still other dilemmas are embedded in this cluster of issues, and they too have no easy solutions, either on political or moral grounds. For example, the tendency to work desperately for early cease-fires in outbreaks of interstate hostilities, regardless of the asserted justice of the claims made by the parties, can hardly be said to represent long-range conflict-control policy. As we have pointed out, it represents only half of the policy of "cease-fire and peaceful change" enunciated by Adlai E. Stevenson. And yet who would advocate delay when a local brush fire threatens to intensify to a worldwide conflagration? If, according to a rational theory of conflict control, hostilities should be suppressed only in accompaniment with relief to legitimate interests at stake, we can only reiterate our sense of urgency that attaches to development of better, workable peaceful change procedures.

We come back inescapably to the arguments concerning an activist U.S. policy of subverting certain tyrannical or anti-American regimes and thus of fomenting rather than controlling conflict. One of the rules of diplomacy is never to say "never," and it may well be that an
the future the United States will on occasion perceive an overriding interest in fomenting rather than suppressing certain kinds of conflict situations where the alternative, on the basis of some kind of net calculation, is clearly worse.

Conflict-control strategy even contains arguments for U.S.-sponsored intensification of a given conflict under certain circumstances. If the United States could be certain that it would not run an intolerably high risk of bringing China or the Soviet Union more directly into the Vietnam war, it can be speculated that less resistance would be offered to pressures to intensify toward more severe punishment of North Vietnam; an analogous situation existed in Korea in the early 1950s. The same fear of "escalation" has inhibited any temptation to let Israel prove (or disprove) to the Arabs that their ambition to drive it into the sea is unrealistic, or to let Pakistan demonstrate to India the necessity of self-determination for Kashmir. It remains an open question whether the interests of world peace would be advanced, considering the intensification potential in each case.

In the light of this, what can we conclude about the United States and conflict control?

Historically, there have been two ways for this country to play its role. One flourished in the 1920s and 1930s, and took the form of a pretense that the United States had no role to play. Generally, it followed Mark Twain's precept that "to do good is noble. To tell others to do good is also noble and a lot less trouble." Leaving aside any analogies to Vietnam, it remains everlastingly true that Hitler and the rulers of Imperial Japan were thus encouraged to believe that no significant obstacles lay in their path of conquest.

The other way, shaped by the shock of emergence from isolation, was for this country to project its power to deter aggression, oppose injustice, support friends, and police disorder. But this active mode of national behavior has within it two further options. One is for the United States to project its power with partiality, taking sides in local disputes and conflicts in the developing areas, on the assumption that U.S. interests are vitally involved in all substantive outcomes. The other employs the projection of U.S. power as a form of influence aimed above all at the goal of preventing, moderating, and terminating local conflict.

Both of these are forms of intervention. But the latter strategy (conflict control) calls for a strategy of selective or partial intervention as well. It emphasizes political rather than military intervention. It emphasizes prevention of conflict in the developing countries, requiring purposeful policies in the political, economic, and social
realms in order to lay the foundations of social and economic health, physical security, and political consensus. It also calls for caring less about certain pieces of global real estate, for mobilizing technology to create surrogates for bases and footholds so that they matter less, both strategically and economically. If one were to compare with our analyzed conflict cases some other instances in which there was no great-power partiality and therefore "nothing happened" (the civil strife in Belgium, or the Romanian-Hungarian dispute over Transylvania), one might on conflict-minimizing grounds envisage a purposeful policy of abstention or even collaboration with our partial adversaries. It has been suggested that, whatever its deeper sentiments may be, the United States would serve its own interests by sometimes even feigning impartiality. In sum, the prescription is for a strategy of withdrawal as much as for one of participation, depending on the affect a given act by an external power is likely to have on the probable course of the conflict.

In the end we would assert that there is, on balance, a generalized U.S. interest in the minimization of international conflict, and the maximization of international procedures for peaceful change and pacific settlement. We would assert a corollary to this in the form of minimum U.S. involvement consistent with its genuinely vital interests and international responsibilities.

In the final analysis, policy will still operate in the gray area, unable for sound reasons to occupy either black or white. Freedom and justice remain the highest values of political ethics. But they sometimes become confused with power and prestige. In our judgment, both world peace and deepest American values will be served by a strategy of conflict control that vigorously seeks to support freedom and justice in ways that purposefully minimize violence.