ARMS CONTROL AND LOCAL CONFLICT

VOL. I

SUMMARY

by

Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss
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PREFACE

This volume constitutes a summary of some of the chief points contained in two principal volumes of this study. Those volumes report on the follow-on research undertaken by the undersigned, along with various colleagues and associates, as part of an overall five-year effort to focus systematic research on the developing regions of the world, with special attention to the problems of security, arms, arms control, and U.S. policies concerning these issues.*

Our later studies** generated several acute dilemmas, above all the still unresolved tension between an older policy that called for action to secure outcomes favorable to the U.S. in multiple local conflicts around the world, even at the cost of unilateral military intervention; and the growing disposition of the American people and their government to minimize costly and sometimes counter-productive unilateral American military intervention based chiefly on ideological grounds.

A related issue of concern, especially in terms of arms control policy, involved the flow of arms from the developed to the developing countries which are the central figures in the small wars being fought in this epoch.

Volume II of the present study reports on four professional-level political exercises--CONEX I, II, III and IV--which were simulations of hypothetical crisis and pre-crisis problems designed to supplement


our on-going research on the problem of what we christened "local conflict," with particular reference to the issues that might face the United States in the early 1970s, and the range of alternative strategies and policies open to it at a time when both the world and the role of this country are undergoing change.*

Volume III reports on the study of arms transfers to 52 selected developing countries with analysis of trends and implications. **

Other supporting papers are available reflecting work performed on the project.***


The first part of this summary refers to Vol. II, and the second part to Vol. III. Our many acknowledgments are found in the prefaces to those separate volumes.

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ANTICIPATING CONFLICT-CONTROL POLICIES:
THE "CONEX" GAMES AS A PLANNING TOOL

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

In probing into the issue of U.S. local conflict policy for the 1970s, it seemed to us that it might be possible to gain some insights by subjecting tentative conclusions of this and previous research to hypothetical situations in which, through simulation, pressures for and against U.S. unilateral intervention, and reactions to various arms inputs into conflict situations, were experimentally generated. The professional-level policy-oriented political-military gaming device, or PME,* which I had a hand in developing but which we had not employed for several years, appeared uniquely suitable as a way to examine some of the notions that emerged in the Design Study about possible future situations of incipient local conflict. The situations would of course be wholly hypothetical. Also very much in our mind was the secondary purpose of seeing if we could improve the technique, methodology, and theory of the PME.

On September 11 and 12, 1968, CONEX I was held at M.I.T.'s Endicott House in Dedham, Mass., followed by CONEX II on December 6 and 7, 1968, and CONEX III on March 28 and 29, 1969. In CONEX IV, held on September 17-19, 1969, we used as an experimental variable condition the CASCON system we were also currently developing.** Because of the technical requirements of that exercise, involving computers not only for CASCON but for game communications as well, it was held in M.I.T.'s Center for Advanced Engineering Studies in Cambridge, Mass.

The format of CONEX I, III, and IV was a relatively free but nonetheless structured role-playing game in which three teams of 6 to 8 American scholars and experts in regional affairs, U.S. foreign policy,

*The proper name of the game should be "Political-Economic-Psychological-Communications-Intelligence-Military Exercise" (or PEPCIME). For short I suggest Political Exercise, or POLEX or even PE, though here for convenience the familiar abbreviation "PME" will be employed.

military strategy, and public opinion were organized to simulate typical groups of contemporary policy-makers. Their inter-active decisions moved the game forward in ways we hoped would expose our policy hypotheses to systematic scrutiny. For purposes of experimental comparisons, two teams were constituted as similarly as possible. The third playing team in those three games portrayed the leadership of the "country" involved in the local conflict.

A "control" team steered the game in order best to bring out answers to our research questions. Control reserved the right to override or block any team move which was unrealistic or preempted the experiment, while refraining from interfering with the interaction between the teams. However, in order to intensify the level of crisis, Control, on the basis of the research design planned in advance, arbitrarily advanced the situation in time between move periods. The Control Team was under the direction of the Game Director and Deputy Director, and included experts who simulated, on a quasi role-playing basis, other critical international actors in the problem, e.g., "Soviet Union," "China," "South Africa," "Pakistan," etc., plus U.S. domestic press and public opinion, and the United Nations. In addition to these quasi-playing "cells," the Control Team represented "Nature" and all governments except the United States and the LDC in question, as well as factions and opinion within all countries.

CONEX II was organized somewhat differently, since its emphasis was on arms transfer problems and thus on interaction between parties to a local conflict rather than primarily on the dynamics of U.S. decision-making. In this kind of game, the principal teams must be those representing the parties to a local conflict.

The choice of illustrative topical problem areas to use as locales for the games was determined by our research purposes. For the first of our research questions, i.e., the focus on U.S. decision-making regarding local conflict and its control, we chose for the three games problem areas representing high, medium, and low assumed a priori national interest. The general areas chosen were the Caribbean Area (CONEX I), Southern Africa (III) and South Asia (IV). For the second research question that focused on arms inputs and reactions, i.e., CONEX II, the area could be of either low or high presumed U.S. interest, and still be interesting for our research purposes. For this we chose as illustrative a hypothetical renewed conflict in North Africa.

The materials on which the games were based were four Scenario-Problems, usually running anywhere from 10-20 pages, in which an imaginary "history" was written carrying the local situation from the present time to the date specified for the game. The latter was generally set at one or two years in the future--far enough off to make plausible an
intensification of the present situation, but not so far as to presuppose basic changes in other elements, e.g., known personalities, superpower relations, world conditions, etc.

Every effort was made to develop scenarios that were authentic and plausible, particularly given the expertise of the players. An accompanying paper entitled "The World Scene" portrayed plausible developments in the United States and elsewhere, varying these where a particular game was focused. Generally the external situation was held as constant as possible for the dates we specified (1971 or 1972) so that the U.S. teams could focus on the local situation.

Additionally, background papers were prepared defining the military forces of all major powers and regional countries as of the 1971 or 1972 dates, as well as a more detailed military assessment of the forces of the countries directly involved. The players also found in their notebooks background papers on U.N. membership and procedures, maps of the region, and in the case of CONEX IV economic data.

After an initial briefing session, the teams convened for an initial move period of two to three hours, at the end of which they were required to produce a document embodying their assessment of the problem, team objectives, alternative strategies, the preferred strategy, detailed policy moves of a political, diplomatic, economic, military, etc. character, anticipation of contingencies, and actions the team would take in response to those contingencies.

After the initial team planning session each team was apprised by Control of developments arising from the decisions of the other team as well as relevant actions of other "governments." The teams then met to discuss these developments, evaluate their impact on the situation, and revise their strategy as necessary. Team decisions and other moves were made in writing on standard message forms (in CONEX IV via computer). All the games in this series ran for two full days including one evening (plus in CONEX IV a briefing on the CASCON system the previous afternoon).

A significant element in the larger report is a description of a number of methodological innovations we introduced into the PME design. All of them were aimed at facilitating the use of PMEs as an experimentally-controlled research technique while retaining their unique benefits. We wished, in other words, to make political gaming more of a social science research tool without losing either the serendipitously-revealed policy insight, or the interest of expert and senior professional personnel in the nature of the exercise.

These somewhat conflicting objectives--increased experimental control, and retention of the interesting policy aspects of "free play"--
have, we feel, been reconciled to a large degree by three interrelated categories of innovations, which create a "hybrid PME." The categories were: experimental controls, organization, communications, and data gathering and analysis (see Volume II, Chapter IV for details).

To achieve our research purposes, it was necessary to structure the exercise to enable relevant hypotheses to be related to the behavior of individual teams at specific times in the game. It is rewarding to report that we have data on some hypotheses for all four games or at least three (which in the case of the "U.S." teams would mean five to seven "runs"). A total of 26 separate policy and behavior hypotheses are reported on in Volume II, Chapter III).

It is axiomatic that PMEs may not be able to "test" policy hypotheses in a way that has provable validity for policy-making. What game performance does is support or disconfirm on the basis of game evidence only hypotheses addressed to real-life policy and behavior. The question of how valid game results are in predicting official behavior is of course widely disputed. Our results are spoken of not as hypothesis-testing, but in terms of examining them in the light of game evidence.

The exercises were designed to permit evaluation of most of the hypothetical propositions by more than one method. In addition to analysis of team documents which reflect group decisions, all discussions were monitored via closed-circuit television in an effort to identify the most influential factors involved in the decisions. Tape-recordings of group discussions were analyzed to resolve or clarify ostensible contradictions between real-time observation of discussions and analysis of documents. Further evidence was adduced from participant comments during the plenary critique and their responses to a post-exercise questionnaire. To be sure, none of these techniques provides irrefutable evidence about the complex propositions that were examined. But given that these hypotheses were derived from an extensive historical review of local conflict, the conclusions about them derived from this series may be fairly considered to support (or disconfirm) the evidence of other independent research.

The bulk of this section is devoted to extracts from the section of Volume II embodying impressions and observations directly stimulated by CONEX games, concerning U.S. foreign policy and strategy, arms transfers and controls, multilateral options, and the U.S. decision-making process. The author takes full responsibility for these statements, although he has drawn liberally on the suggestions of his associates and of the participants in the games. I wish to emphasize that these games provide no particular evidence of actions being taken by the U.S. Government or any other government. What can be suggested by political
exercises are more general issues, probabilities, and clues as to style and posture of decision-making concerning classes of problems the future may bring. At best, they may uncover remediable flaws in assumptions and preconceptions, weaknesses in crisis or pre-crisis strategy, and structural difficulties of policy-making. These comments, then, are not so much about the CONEX games, or about the precise areas gamed, as they are about policy in general in the light of the games. They also represent our own notion of hypotheses about present or future U.S. policy that may be said to have been generated or at least stimulated by the CONEX games.

THE POST-VIETNAM NON-INTERVENTION SYNDROME

1. All four CONEX games supplied unequivocal confirmatory evidence of the strength and pervasiveness of the "Post-Vietnam Syndrome." Seven similarly constituted teams of qualified, experienced American experts and personalities in political life reacted to a variety of hypothetical situations in virtually identical ways. In these simulated situations (which the participants described as very realistic) there was a powerful indisposition to see the United States become directly involved at the present time with its own military forces in local conflicts. On the same evidence one can surmise that only a clear and present danger will override these fears of getting involved in another such situation, at least in the immediate future.

The CONEX participants did not articulate a new or coherent world view that related development, revolution, Communism, violence, and U.S. interests in ways markedly different from the past two decades. But their behavior under simulated strain supports a more general intuition that, at least for a time, the United States will define its interest pragmatically and rather narrowly, area by area, in specific political, economic, or defense terms, rather than in sweeping strategic-global or ideological terms.

2. By itself, a strategy of non-intervention does not add up to a creative or dynamic policy, either in games or in real life:

a) A nation's most "important" international decisions traditionally involve military action. Once that is ruled out, a quantum jump downward in priorities typically takes place. Policy-makers make an automatic distinction between the application of military power on the one hand, and political, economic, psychological policies on the other (activities characterized by some CONEX participants as "fiddling"). The result is a distortion of the diplomatic process.
b) Having rejected unilateral military intervention, the tendency of Americans may be to retreat into hand-wringing rather than search for imaginative alternatives. All of our current games underscore the chronic difficulty the United States may experience, once it decides not to use its own military forces, in deciding on any purposeful action whatever. But if the United States is not willing to use its military power directly to intervene in many local conflict situations that may upset a local or regional balance, this country may nevertheless still have to act; United States interests may still be involved, or a larger peace may be threatened, or longer-term stability may require that the roots of the conflict be dealt with through peaceful change procedures.

CONTROLLING CONFLICT

3. In order to influence events in ways that are consonant with broadly defined U.S. interests, a decision not to intervene militarily needs to be accompanied by non-military measures that are likely to deal effectively with conflict-generating pressures. This desideratum is not likely to be met if the United States continues to address seemingly low-intensity problems purely in traditional terms. The central difficulty is that, even while objectives and priorities may seem clear, orchestrated, integrated, and sufficient U.S. conflict-control measures do not necessarily follow. Even the urgent "band-aid" function is a hit or miss affair and generally comes late, when conflict-prevention options have shrunk, rather than early when timely action might be taken across a far broader front if the will to do so exists. The longer-term strategic problem grows in part at least out of the U.S. decision-making style (see below).

4. My associates and I have been using "control" in the sense of preventing, containing, and terminating violent clashes that may threaten a larger peace. But it is evident that such a policy is futile if genuine popular aspirations are suppressed in the name of anti-violence, and that some turbulence in the short run may be the only assurance of a longer-term stability in today's world. Thus to "control" a conflict, far from suppressing it, may imply allowing certain things to take place that previously the United States might have considered unacceptable as a threat to U.S. interests or an open invitation to Communists to meddle or take over.

5. The United States, in denying or trying to avoid the military option, typically tries to affect those factors over which
it presently has influence, rather than seeking to create alternative avenues of influence over events.

a) "U.S." teams are reluctant to treat seriously with very "radical" regimes. Some Americans seem to assume that bona fide diplomatic or economic agreements with leftist regimes in the third world are either too risky, or politically unacceptable at home. Those Americans may still believe that a foreordained alliance must exist between the United States and the rightist side in such quarrels. Perhaps one of the healthiest exercises for U.S. policy regarding local conflicts in the 70s would be a fresh appraisal of the whole notion of "sides," with a conscious attempt to break away from stereotyped, automatic side-taking that objective analysis may show to be non-rational in terms of U.S. national interests, U.S. history, or the imperatives of conflict-control. The guiding principle should be to apply U.S. influence, pressure, and resources wherever U.S. conflict-control interests warrant.

b) A U.S. retreat from a posture of support for governments in power as long as they are anti-Communist might well require opening and maintaining good communications channels with all parties to a potential conflict, including political forces far to the left, and Soviet "clients," instead of concentrating exclusively on the government in power while other forces build up.

c) The most extreme option for a long-term conflict-control policy is to compete with left-wing extremists in calling for the overthrow of self-destructive undemocratic governments. Short of this, a possible strategy where a moderate center does not exist would be to come down firmly on the side of a liberal constitutional order, and to set up and finance a non-Communist movement to bring it about. In an age of competing Titoism, Fidelism, Maoism, etc. the United States might consider influencing or even working with non-Communist extremists, rather than automatically acting as their enemy. Other suggestions include "buying off the Junta," or, when action fails, working up an alternative multilateral frame such as an ad hoc coalition to rule. What all these possibilities have in common is an attempt to break out of a mold in which U.S. policy may have become stereotyped without commensurate political gains, and with increasingly dubious advantages for U.S. economic interests.

6. The traditional policy of postponing the formulation of a coherent conflict-avoidance policy until forced to do so by the emergence of a crisis can leave us with no real options other than unilateral military intervention on the one hand or impotent withdrawal on the other. This apparent procrastination may be attributable to saturation of the decision-making process with high priority problems,
or to a natural desire to gather more information in the face of the grave consequences of precipitate action. In any event it does serve to reduce the number of conflict-preventing options available to the United States in the early stages of a dispute.

7. The games dramatized a persistent tendency inherent in some local conflict situations for the United States to be drawn in. Policies should be designed to avoid a situation in which (as in Vietnam and, for that matter, World War II) U.S. forces do eventually fight, under unfavorable conditions, and worst of all against this government's better judgment and soberer intentions. Some U.S. "emergency" actions such as military assistance and evacuation of U.S. nationals carry risks of unwitting and unwanted direct U.S. involvement.

8. Almost by definition U.S. interests are simply not identical with those of its local friends. Three of the CONEX games illustrate how a relatively weak LDC that is revisionist in terms of territory may be likely to seize the initiative in a pre-crisis situation and find ways to commit the larger powers against their better judgment.

"AFTER NEO-ISOLATIONISM, WHAT?"

9. Having vigorously espoused a purposeful strategy of conflict-control for the United States, it is clear on the basis of massive historic evidence that there are occasions when in the absence of an effective collective security system the need exists for a great power to counterbalance an aggressive or expansionist power. This is bound to remain true even if those occasions are fewer and less clearcut than U.S. policy has until recently supposed:

a) It remains true that world peace depends in the end on either a better international mechanism for collective action, or on the capacity of great powers to act as the prime counterforce when the balance of power is in fact seriously threatened. The toughest recent problem for the United States has been the discovery that its responses to presumed upsets of the balance might have been inappropriate and even damaging to the international fabric. The toughest future problem may well be for it to have the courage and will to act when it is not only appropriate but indispensable to do so. In a world system that still depends on multiple balances of power for stability, it must remain a contingent possibility for the United States to weigh in with
its incomparable power on the rare occasion when a vital balance—and thus world peace—is likely to be fatally upset.

b) Complete disavowal in advance of unilateral military intervention in a local conflict reduces the influence that can be exerted on disputants and other interested parties. Although the United States may wish to avoid overt involvement in a conflict, it may be desirable on occasion to leave that option open as a deterrent. The possibility of American intervention, however implausible, could be a decisive bargaining tool for conflict control. Absolute abstention by the United States not only creates a great power vacuum but also relieves a potential aggressor of even a contingent threat of American retaliation, thereby reducing the cost of hostilities.

GREAT POWER RELATIONS

10. A crude symmetry may be developing between American and Soviet desires, at least in some areas, to restrain Third World states from generating international violence (though not internal violence). However imperfect, this is the central possibility on which to construct a peacekeeping and conflict-minimizing strategy for the 1970s:

a) There is, in both games and reality, a decreasing disposition to view incipient local conflicts automatically as U.S.-Soviet competitions in which one must be the winner and the other the loser (although note below the special effect of Soviet arms inputs). The world, in short, is decreasingly an arena in which the U.S. reputation, and world peace itself, necessarily depend on the day-to-day boxscore of relative influence across-the-board.

b) The games reinforce reality, at least for this analyst, in suggesting that U.S. policy is correct in seeking to maximize incentives to Moscow to pursue a tranquilizing policy, however superficial common interests may seem at a given time. Indeed I can think of no higher goal of policy than to make it easier for Moscow—and Peking as well—to follow a conflict-limiting course of action in ambiguous and therefore potentially explosive areas of the world such as the Middle East, South East Asia, Latin America, and ultimately southern Africa. The longer-term goal should be to make the parallel interest in conflict-minimizing more durable and eventually "strategic-level."
11. But there also remains a clearly competitive aspect to the superpower relationship. In all the games, local crisis-management arrangements between Washington and Moscow seemed to work fairly satisfactorily. But also implicit in at least two of them was the threat of a Soviet-U.S. confrontation if things got sufficiently out of hand—or if Soviet activities seemed to Washington sufficiently threatening.

a) The United States does not seem to be able or willing to exploit Sino-Soviet competition in the developing world. But in certain circumstances it could be more cost-effective to influence the outcome of a conflict by advancing reforms in the true interest of the inhabitants of the region while helping preserve them from foreign domination, than to support a weak regime in a counter-insurgency campaign.

THE MULTILATERAL OPTION

12. The "multilateral option" remains possibly the most important for pre-crisis management and conflict control, but at the same time one of the most elusive and discouraging. The need seems widely understood for a readily-available, mobile U.N. peacekeeping force to cauterize the elements of various international infections. But such a capability now has to be invented afresh every time. The games served as further illustrations (if they were needed) of how such a capability would serve U.S. interests—and how underdeveloped it is today:

a) One central difficulty is ideological. The United States tends to search for multilateral frameworks for action it thinks necessary, yet the organizations are increasingly resistant to the superpower lead. I believe that the reason is neither tactical nor parliamentary, but a reflection of the notion that has been permitted to grow that the great powers cynically use all diplomatic agencies to advance their ideological predispositions. Those critical of the United States assert that we use the U.N. and OAS to support the status quo against change, even legitimate change.

The charge is of course a distortion. But in order to take full advantage of multilateral diplomatic and other international machinery, we must persuade other members of international political organizations that the United States is sincere in its desire to minimize conflict while accepting and even encouraging needful internal and external changes in the status quo. In this connection
one principle of international peacekeeping that seems increasingly persuasive is that of using multilateral machinery to insulate i.e., "neutralize" a conflict area from external interference while processes of change work themselves out internally. A more relaxed U.S. stance toward the latter process is far more feasible—and potentially constructive—if in the meantime significant external interference is coped with—as it never could be in Vietnam. Harrassed officials argue with some justice that the OAS (or U.N. or whatever) is weak, refractory, unsympathetic, inefficient, etc. But it may also be that the process is a circular one. The U.S. needs to persuade others that its resort to multilateral agencies is neither a cover for planned unilateral military intervention, nor aimed at shoring up repressive and unpopular military dictatorships.

b) There is no doubt of the very low priority the multilateral capability in fact enjoys in the higher levels of great power policy, apart from official rhetoric (and frantic efforts to get international peacekeepers onto the scene in specific crises in the recent past). This may seem a harsh indictment, particularly to the special parts of the U.S. Government where positive efforts have been persistent. But in terms of larger U.S. strategic perceptions one must conclude that, over and above Soviet rigidity, the United States has never really assigned a significant priority to genuine improvements in multilateral peacekeeping capacity, and still shows no signs of doing so, despite commendable efforts to make progress in marginal ways.

The reason for this may lie in the highly selective nature of U.S. interests in such a capability. The United States has a demonstrable interest in multilateral peacekeeping for Africa and the Middle East, an interest that may at times verge on the desperate. But the United States has also traditionally rejected this approach for much of Southeast Asia, as well as for Latin America and the Caribbean. Until this inner tension, growing out of partial and selective acceptance of an international potential, is resolved it seems unlikely that the United States can or will put sufficient influence and resources behind U.N. peacekeeping to make it possible to contemplate a serious improvement in that capability.

c) As long as the rule persists of unlimited power to the "host government" to refuse admission and to eject U.N. observers at will, this vital capacity can remain at the mercy of one side to a quarrel who in a real-life situation could be the least responsible and the most "guilty" of the parties. (Change seems possible now on this.)

d) Another international "structural" difficulty is that the U.N. has yet to find an answer to the question of how the international community can and should relate to internal conflicts in which there is an international interest. It has recently seemed
that virtually the whole array of "third-party" mechanisms the world has developed are useless when it comes to the most intractible conflicts of all—those not involving a clearcut invasion of one country by another. This calls for a major effort to apply international law to the new situation in ways that will command the respect of the majority of nations while adapting to dynamic change. The "peaceful change" field is in urgent need of serious rethinking.

13. The prospects for regional organizations as either peacekeepers or peacemakers continue to look dim. An alternative not to be ruled out, under conditions of regional disunity and U.N. incapacity, would be ad hoc peacekeeping organizations that might not be paralyzed by the parliamentary obstacles of the United Nations, nor disqualified by the parochial interests of for instance the OAU.

THE ROLE OF ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL

14. Local "arms races" may go through several stages, each of which throws the U.S. policy dilemma into sharp relief:
   (1) With conflict at modest levels, the United States tends to see arms aid as part of its general influence policy; competition tends to create a local balance, which may be temporarily stabilizing.
   (2) The "arms race" intensifies, with the United States sometimes—though not always—dragged along reluctantly, and a step behind the Soviets. (3) A crisis develops and weapons may become quantitatively or qualitatively different; the United States suddenly focuses on arms as the primary local problem. (4) The United States is then either fully dragged in, or disengages, in the process losing such control as it had over the situation. From the American standpoint, the result can be to be forced into a posture of political commitment to a regime, or strategic commitment to an area that the United States may not have intended. It is this dynamic process that relates arms transfer policies to the "involvement" and "commitment" problems.

15. Moscow typically arms clients who have revolutionary proclivities (e.g., UAR, Algeria, earlier Indonesia) while hoping that no destabilizing interstate violence will ensue, with the West following with arms, usually in lesser quantities, for the "status quo" state that feels threatened as a result.
   a) Sometimes this works to prevent conflicts from worsening. But the effect of Soviet arms aid, whatever Moscow's motive, is to equip "revolutionary" states to fight wars. At the same time,
Western suppliers have, perhaps inadvertently, equipped "status quo" states in the Third World to achieve their own political ends—precisely the kind of locally destabilizing violence-making that U.S. policy, in the large, abhors.

b) Also the United States often supports a "status quo" state whose objective is direct retaliation against the source of insurgent support. While the United States can, of course, seek to moderate its client's actions, the large number of other sources of weapons gives the client the alternative of seeking a less constraining supplier. Thus any "balance" the United States tries to strike is only temporary, and may have minimal influence on immediate events.

c) In general terms, it can be said that the Soviets use arms aid as a carrot to induce favorable policy decisions, while the U.S. uses it as a stick to punish for bad policies. If a "status quo" state (particularly one that, like South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, or "Morocco" in CONEX II is really committed to altering the status quo) is given weapons that permit punishment of the "revolutionary" state, the latter will seek further to improve its capability, thus setting off an arms spiral. If the "status quo" state cannot retaliate against the sponsor of subversion, it may well be overthrown by the agents of the impervious sponsor.

16. Further evidence was generated concerning the prime role that control of spare parts can play in moderating the level of conflict and even terminating it, in short-run terms.

Also, pre-crisis arms transfers are more likely to provide leverage to suppliers than in-crisis transactions. But U.S. policy typically applies controls on arms for conflict-regulating purposes later rather than earlier in a crisis. By then, except for controls over spare parts and POL, U.S. policy may not be very influential (the exception would be MAPs that are conflict-limiting).

17. CONEX reinforced our impression that for the early 1970s the United States is likely to prefer stopping open-ended competition for influence through arms, even at the price of loss of influence in various places, to involvement that could develop out of arms-supplying. In this event unilateral U.S. arms controls can have two positive effects: damping down war inclinations or in any event keeping fighting relatively brief, and minimizing the risk of more direct U.S. involvement by curtailing the arms-commitment interaction.

18. Our impression based on the CONEX series is that arms supply is not a very useful instrument of short-run conflict control, and that it at present does not seem to affect underlying national
motives of recipients, particularly if they are "revisionist" states. Under the circumstances, even given the scope of U.S. security commit-
ments around the world, it would seem that a highly selective arms
transfer policy approach, region by region, and state by state, is
called for:

a) Only on the basis of such ad hoc judgment can detailed
policies be rationally developed that take account of the chain of
arms transfer/influence/commitment/involvement. The prime reason why
a non-generalized policy can be thus advanced is our knowledge that the
Soviet Union and China, like the Western colonial powers before them,
are unlikely to win a lasting commanding position by becoming the sole
arms supplier to a society or culture that places prime value on cul-
tural identity, nationalism, and political, economic and cultural
independence--as are so many LDCs.

b) Once U.S. interests are redefined region by region
and state by state, several general principles apply. A policy of
matching a "revolutionary" state's "esoteric" weaponry should be
avoided. Where the United States decides that its interests are
served by assisting a government whose stability is threatened, its
arms transfers should be directed essentially to the end of internal
security, limited of course by willingness to pay the price of a
stronger commitment to that country with respect to any external
threat it may face. At the same time the United States can avoid being
put in a position wherein it must compete for influence or control
in the non-radical LDC but is excluded from competing in the
radical LDC.

19. The price of pushing for multilateral arms transfer
agreements might in fact be the least costly for the United States
of the 1970s. Perhaps the best of both worlds can be found by relying
on alternatives such as a friendly France to keep the West's hand in
the game; regulating the superpower input of arms into conflict regions
by bilateral agreement; or, best of all but most difficult, negotiating
multilateral recipient, or supplier-recipient arms-limitation agree-
ments region by region, a process in which the role of regional organ-
izations could become crucial.

20. There are good reasons for mobilizing resources for some
systematic planning and predicting about probable local conflict situa-
tions and U.S. reactions thereto if the NPT is violated; if a nuclear
threat is made; if a threatened party seeks to invoke the Security
Council guarantee; if our current assumptions turn out to be fallacious,
etc. Reluctance to do contingency planning on such sensitive
matters should be overcome by the realization that nothing would be
worse for the United States--or for non-proliferation--than either to believe that the guarantee is firm and have it turn out that we only meant it to apply vs. China--or to discount the guarantee and then find that the Soviet Union--or we--were deadly serious when faced with a problem of enforcement.

U.S. PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING

21. The conclusion is inescapable that U.S. decision-making machinery may be inadequate to deal with the problems it faces in the contemporary world. A majority of CONEX participants seem to share a kind of visceral awareness that the U.S. decision-making process labors under some inherent difficulties. These difficulties include strong preconceptions, the inability to handle information flows efficiently, the tendency to procrastinate in face of uncertainty, and the extraordinary difficulty of even establishing criteria for decision-making. A notorious and persistent problem has been the inability to anticipate consequences adequately. Above all, the question is whether the process is able to handle with foresight and imagination--or even with adequate data--the extraordinary changes in the environment, both domestic and foreign, since the time both attitudes and machinery were initially shaped, or even revised.

a) Some structural weaknesses may fairly be indicted. One is the dominant role traditionally given in top-level decision-making, at least in the post-war years, to the diplomatic and military elements of the U.S. Government. It is almost as if one believed that, by virtue of being at crisis pitch, a complex problem somehow concerned only these two categories of policy.

b) Few risks are run early in the planning process even though a far greater menu of options is available early for potential conflict control than later when governments typically act. This relates to the problem of timing and "early warning." In studying the phenomenon of simulated pre-crisis decision-making I am struck by the persistent difficulty even in a game of attracting the serious attention of people with worldwide perspectives to a conflict situation before it becomes acute. In such a game this is not, as it is in real life, a constraint of time; in the time available the "decision-makers" have this problem alone to focus upon. But what one observes is an inclination not to face up to implications until they become clamant.

c) Moreover, planning groups can surface problems, but are hard-pressed to perform in-depth evaluation on short notice, or to create innovative strategies for complex situations. The process of
situation appraisal clearly needs some "mechanization" in order that high-level generalists can quickly call up the facts, experience, and wisdom that are relevant. The process of decision-making also needs more "mechanization" so that all of the influential factors can be incorporated into the judgment, and the activities of all of the participating agencies properly synchronized, all of course as aids to the indispensable human imagination. The CONEX series powerfully reinforced our belief that a perfected CASCON system might be made very useful as an aid to the memory and the imagination of decision-makers in the face of local conflict situations.

d) Perhaps the prejudices against contingency planning in the political-military realm would be overcome if it was not viewed as an attempt to predict the details of future events (which of course is impossible), but as a mind-stretching attack on assumptions that tend to emerge from the consensus process in staffing out U.S. foreign policy. (Some participants in all the games in this series recommended political gaming as perhaps the best form of alternative-exploring and assumption-testing in the planning process.)

e) Not only has contingency planning sometimes been ruled out in U.S. policy planning. Worse still, many of the tools by which American business, industry, technology, and education have been seeking to revitalize the United States in the last third of the 20th century are still seen by some foreign policy operators as either an inappropriate and unwanted "theoretical" challenge to artful intuition (or they have not heard about them at all). The weakness is magnified by a congenital indisposition to concentrate resources early, to act on early warning, or to act preventively before it is forced by the fear of violence. All in all, short of significant reforms both in attitudes and in priorities, the outlook is discouraging for this nation's ability to play in the years ahead the creative role required by the very fact of U.S. unwillingness to intervene unilaterally in local conflicts.

22. We experimented to see what NSC-type crisis management (and pre-crises management as well) might look like if one deliberately built into the top policy crisis-handling structure additional inputs from sources representing U.S. urban programs, domestic opinion, and economic costs. The results were difficult to measure; but the relevancy of such inputs on a par with the diplomatic and military seems convincing for the period ahead.

23. It would seem more important than ever that this country have particularly good diplomatic agents, political analysts, and intelligence capabilities in the kinds of situations in which decisions are made now with low information. The U.S. national interest
surely calls for a more dispassionate and non-moralistic policy of ensuring high-quality U.S. diplomatic presences particularly where there is suspicion but where the stakes for this nation could suddenly become very high (e.g. the African "liberation" movements and China).

24. Even great powers may act stupidly if they have no reliable and informed independent judgments available to them about the local scene. However, it must be said that some other games in recent times have shown how ill-conceived a national policy decision can be if it is dominated by the myopic "localitis" of Washington area experts or diplomats on the ground. If the U.S. policy goal is to become more selective about the international commitment of American power and prestige, the expert perspectives of the specialist must be taken cum grano salis.

25. The consensus process has been criticized by more than one American President as something to be guarded against, even to the point of naming one of his advisers to act as Devil's Advocate. Only if this goes deep enough will it produce not only different assessments and predictions, but different assumptions as well. In order to surface all available options it is particularly important to have someone—preferably someone who can reflect the views of the younger generation—who will make the argument for some of the extremes that are normally discarded in the consensus process. Innovation and originality will be virtually excluded if policy consensus patterns continue to involve people who are invariably comfortable with one another's assumptions.
ARMS TRANSFERS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Amelia C. Leiss

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is a summary of a long and complex analysis, based on a sample of 52 countries, of the transfer of conventional arms to less developed countries since 1945.* That analysis, in turn, draws upon detailed studies of: qualitative and quantitative trends over the past 25 years of arms transfers;** future military technology of the supplier countries that will impinge upon transfers in years to come;# the types of force structures that are relevant to the physical, military, economic, and social environments of less developed countries;## and the military advice and training that have been offered these countries, along with the hardware.*#

Inevitably in the process of condensing and pruning that is required to compress these many pages into a few, the necessary qualifications, exceptions, and cautions get left behind. And the evidence that underlies assertions of fact and the analysis that led to statements of conclusions are too voluminous to carry forward.

We urge, therefore, that the reader of this short summary turn to our more complete and leisured argument before dismissing these sparsely-stated findings, conclusions and recommendations as too bald, too unsupported, or too unsubtle.

*See Leiss, Kemp, et al., op. cit.
**See Leiss, op. cit.
#See Hoagland, op. cit.
##See Kemp, Classification of Weapons Systems, op. cit.
**See Refson, op. cit., and Kemp, Some Implications of U.S. Military Training, op. cit.
The immediate genesis of the study summarized here lay in our study of conflict in the less developed world and of the policy initiatives open to the United States to help avert such conflict and, if that proved impossible, to lessen the threat it might create to broader world peace.* An ambiguous picture emerged from that study of the relationship between the level and types of arms available in the conflict area and the manner in which the conflict developed. The wars that have taken place in the less developed world have all been fought with arms acquired from outside suppliers. But beyond that simple proposition—and the corollary that the wars would have been fought differently had those arms not been available—the picture of the relationship of arms to conflict in the third world remained unclear.

But it was more than a desire to clarify a set of relationships only obscurely understood that led us to believe that the question of the availability of arms to less developed countries warrants more intense analysis at this time. In the United States, large and articulate segments of both the general public and the government have called into question the relationships between the United States and the countries of the less developed world that evolved during the darkest days of the Cold War. These critics challenge the existence and legitimacy of any strong U.S. "interest" in the outcome of most third-world conflicts. They assert a U.S. responsibility for the uses to which the recipients of U.S. military assistance put their arms. They contend that the succession of military coups that have taken over from faltering elected governments are a direct consequence of the aid and support those military forces have received from the United States and others. They are concerned that the provision of military materiel to an embattled government of a less developed country is a first step toward inevitable direct U.S. involvement in other people's quarrels. They are concerned that emphasis on military security detracts resources from higher priority goals in the United States and in the less developed countries.**

We clearly could not hope to address this entire spectrum of problems. But the facts that these issues are currently subjects

* See Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit.

** The strength of these concerns is reflected in the research summarized in the previous section of this volume on U.S. policy toward conflict in the developing world in the short-term future.
of debate and that debate shows every sign of continuing and intensifying, lend urgency, in our view, to an effort to examine dispassionately what the transfer of weapons to less developed countries has entailed during the past two decades, what the prospects for the future are, what the security problems are of countries in the less developed world and how arms available from U.S. and other sources have affected these problems, and how changes in U.S. relationships with the third world, including changes in policy on arms transfers, will affect third-world security and U.S. interests, as we conceive them to be.

In addition to the context of conflict-control, several basic premises have informed this research from its inception. It is important to note them here because they affect the kinds of questions we have addressed and the limits within which we have considered policy alternatives.

One fundamental assumption we have made is that, rightly or wrongly, rationally or irrationally, sovereign states have a felt need for military forces. For the purpose of our research, the implication of this is clear: The goal of control of the flow of arms to the less developed countries cannot realistically be to reduce that flow to zero. The point is not, of course, that the United States cannot decide to cut back greatly on the arms it makes available to some or all of the less developed countries, and that this will not have a profound impact, in the short run at least, on the types and quantities of arms these countries can acquire. The point to be stressed is that such U.S. unilateral action will affect but not eliminate the international transfer of arms as long as the demand for arms by the less developed countries persists—and we see no grounds for assuming that it will vanish.

In the study referred to earlier of what we called "local conflicts," we spelled out what we believe to be the U.S. interest in helping to avert wars within and between less developed countries, ending quickly such wars as nonetheless take place, and minimizing the risks that these local contests will embroil the United States and other nuclear powers in potentially disastrous clashes.

Within this context of conflict control, we assert that the proper goals for the control of arms transfers must be, first, internal stability of the less developed countries; second, stability in their relationships with each other; third, achievement of these goals in a manner that least impedes the political, economic, and social development of the recipient state.

We do not here, any more than in our previous study, equate "control" with mindless adherence to the internal and international
status quo, however unjust, oppressive, or unpalatable. What we are saying is that U.S. conflict control interests are as disserved by the inability of governments to provide internal and international security to their peoples as by the misuse by those governments of military force to suppress legitimate dissent and grievance. Exclusive attention to the military capabilities of less developed countries without concurrent attention to their economic, social, and political development would be folly. But failure to recognize the genuine security problems that some of the less developed countries face would be equally counterproductive.

GENERAL FINDINGS

A Quantitative Plateau

In many of the types of weapons systems analyzed in this study--military aircraft of all types, armor, missiles, helicopters, and naval systems--the period since 1965 appears to represent a quantitative plateau. For the first time since the mid-1950s, when the United States was constructing a ring of less-developed-country allies and bases around the Soviet and Chinese perimeters, and major Soviet arms aid programs to countries in the sample began, there are signs of a quantitative leveling-off of transfers to the countries in our sample, albeit at a high level of both quantity and cost.

This is not, of course, true for each of the sample countries nor for all weapons systems. But few current examples can be found of the sudden spurts of growth that characterized the 1950s. Whether this is a natural development as inventories reach practical limits, whether this is a lull before a new rapid growth, remains to be seen. We see no reason to anticipate that anything like the rapid build-ups of the late 1950s will occur in the near future, primarily because there are no new suppliers waiting in the wings that are capable of making, in the short run, the kind of quantitative impact that the Soviet Union made a decade ago, and because the United States, another key element in that earlier growth, appears to be reassessing the alliance-containment policy that stimulated its large transfers.

There are clearly areas in which one would expect to see increasing inventories, arising for example from a U.S. withdrawal of forces from Vietnam after the ending of hostilities there and from the British withdrawal from East of Suez. And conflicts such as that in Nigeria will almost inevitably raise arms levels in that part of the world. But what currently seem lacking are the impulses toward very
large and very rapid increases in inventory levels that characterized the late 1950s.

If strong upward pressures do not appear likely in the short-term future, are there signs of any downward turn in the overall quantitative levels of the inventories of the sample countries? We see no such trend. To be sure, one can find examples of inventories that have declined in individual countries. But the most frequent and persistent patterns have been to maintain inventory levels constant or to increase them gradually.

The pressures to maintain inventory levels, at a minimum, appear to be very strong. Latin America is a case in point. In the past several and immediately forthcoming years, most of the Latin American states in our sample possess or will possess combat aircraft inventories that, by our calculations of attrition, have or will reach levels below those normally held during the 1954-1965 decade. The strong pressures from the states in the region to acquire new aircraft are well known. Such strong pressures in the most stable—in terms of inventory growth—region in our sample are multiplied manyfold in the other regions of the less developed world where the regional trends have been upward.

Another less readily quantifiable pressure can be generated by changes in general policy toward the less developed countries that are not, in the first instance, directed to arms transfers. For example, there are indications that U.S. policy toward direct involvement in less developed countries is undergoing reassessment. As one consequence of Vietnam and the debate about the priorities, ends, and means of U.S. policy toward the Third World to which it has given rise, the likelihood of direct commitment of U.S. forces in many parts of the less developed world will probably be significantly less in the future than it has been in the past. There are also indications that economies in the U.S. defense budget will be achieved primarily in U.S. General Purpose Forces, thus reducing not just the likelihood but to some degree the capacity for redressing local imbalances with direct U.S. force—at least it will be widely so perceived.

In less developed countries that rely explicitly or implicitly on the contingency, as a last resort, of direct U.S. military assistance, such shifts in U.S. policy are likely to reinforce pressures to maintain or even increase inventories. This is particularly true for those countries that feel under a direct and imminent security threat.

Steady Modernization

A second trend that appears certain to be operative in the near-term future is continued pressure toward modernization. We use
this term here in two senses. First, the steady transition has been
toward newer military technology--jet for prop combat aircraft, turbo
prop for prop transport aircraft, increasing numbers of helicopters,
anti-aircraft missiles for conventional anti-aircraft, super-sonic
for sub-sonic aircraft.

This form of modernization, in the long run, seems built
into the transfer system. The less developed countries acquire their
arms from the surpluses and production runs of the developed countries.
The trend toward modernization of the type noted above, therefore,
reflects a tendency over which the less developed recipients
of arms and their suppliers have little control. Unless production
runs of older technology are kept open--to continue production or to
produce spare parts--the process seems bound to continue. And either
of these alternatives is extremely costly. It is costly in itself
to tie up production facilities in this manner. It is equally costly
to forego realizing some return on the investment that surplus
inventories represent by selling them in a ready market.

A second way in which we use the word "modernization" repre-
sents, in a sense, the pace at which supplier technological advance
has been transferred. We measured this by what we called the
"modernity index"--the length of time between the date on which a
system entered production and the date of its transfer. Here we found
that, for the sample as a whole, the trend was downward--that is, the
pace at which supplier technology was being transferred was slower in
the post-1960 period than it had been in the 1945-49 period.

Some features of the past record, however, and some character-
istics of the present and short-term future supply picture, complicate
the projection of these two trends. We found, for example, that
some suppliers, particularly those of West Europe, have persistently
transferred more modern technology sooner than have the major donors--
the United States and the Soviet Union. We found, at the same time,
that the extreme costliness and technical complexity of the newest
military technology seems likely to make present and anticipated sur-
pluses more attractive, over a longer period, to the less developed
countries. This combination of factors seems likely to have the follow-
ing effects: to speed up the pace of modernization in those less
developed countries that have the resources and/or the determination
to acquire more modern technology; to hasten the already discernible
trend toward more modern (i.e., newer) but lower performance systems
(e.g., armed jet trainers); and to make present and anticipatable
surpluses attractive to the less well-endowed and more politically
dependent less developed countries--representing for them a qualitative
improvement in inventories but at a relatively slow pace.
Increasing Numbers of Donors

Increasingly, on the supplier side of the equation, the situation is changing toward what we have called a "free market," in which there are a relatively large number of potential suppliers. If potential sources of retransfer of used but serviceable equipment are added, the number of possible suppliers becomes large indeed.

This trend has been strong throughout the post-1945 period. And our study of present and future production plans strongly suggests that it will continue and even accelerate in all but a few systems.

Increasing Supplies

Complementary to the growing number of potential suppliers is the likelihood that, in the near-term future, the number of systems available for transfer will increase. A number of factors help to explain this: impending introduction of new technology into the inventories of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; surpluses created directly or indirectly by the end of the Vietnam War; potential cuts in U.S. General Purpose forces which will generate additional surpluses.

No Global Prescriptions

The transfer of conventional arms to less developed countries has been and promises to continue to be an exceedingly complex process. There are very few generalizations applicable to all transfers and relevant to U.S. policy that can be made about the past, nor any prospects that simple formulae can be applied to make the problem more tractable in the future. Aside from the obvious, but not insignificant, facts that the arms suppliers are among the economically and technically most highly developed countries, and that the prospects for early or extensive indigenous arms development and production among the less developed countries are small, there are few global rules that one can suggest to guide U.S. transfer policy that will be equally applicable to all less developed countries at all times.

Ideally, for the guidance of policy-makers on arms transfers, it would be best if weapons related very directly to particular missions and threats. If that were the case, U.S. objectives, e.g., in supporting a defensive military posture, would be readily served. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For example, for ground forces, which in most less developed countries are the principal military arm, our examination of the relationship between weapons and military capabilities has shown that, among the chief variables that affect this relationship, the physical terrain and the military environment (i.e., the nature of the equipment available to opposing forces) are the critical ones, whereas the mission the forces are seeking to perform is less determining. The physical terrain is clearly one over which no supplier has control. It is a given (although its effects can be moderated by roads, landing strips, etc.). The military environment is rarely one over which a single supplier exercises much influence.
Thus the missions a force can most effectively perform, while probably the most meaningful standard from the point of view of the objectives of control, do not serve as adequate guidelines to a control policy. Yet most proposed and existing control objectives are cast in these terms—for example, policy goals are stated in terms of building forces suitable for defense but incapable of attack, or supplying arms for internal security that cannot be used for external aggression.

We find, furthermore, that the types of weapons most likely to be in demand in the less developed countries in the near-term future include many that are also most likely to be in great supply from a large number of potential suppliers. Weapons in demand over the next decade, if rational military planning is undertaken in the sample countries, would include the following, among others:

- Tracked APCs and wheel-based armored cars
- Light and medium transport helicopters
- Trucks
- Howitzers
- Mortars
- Anti-tank guns and missiles
- Small arms
- Mines
- Rocket launchers
- Light jet trainers
- Mach 1.75-99 jet combat aircraft, especially strike and multi-purpose systems
- Piston-engined strike aircraft
- Twin-engined combat support aircraft, with a STOL capability
- Destroyers
- Minesweepers
- Minelayers, fleet and coastal
- Gunboats
- Missile firing and ordinary patrol boats
- Armed air cushion vehicles

The transfer of arms is not itself a policy goal, arms transfers are among the instruments states use in the pursuit of their broader goals. This further complicates the problem of devising general rules to govern U.S. arms transfers. Neither the United States nor any other supplier of arms has a single set of objectives that are applicable to all the less developed states, nor even to all the states to which the particular donor makes arms available. In fact, the interests of any given supplier in any given less developed country at any given time are likely to be a complex mix of possibly competing goals. And these in turn are as likely to be in competition with goals being sought in other parts of the less developed world as to reinforce them.
The policy dilemma of an arms supplier is made more intense by the fact that each less developed country that receives its arms has interests that may compete and even conflict with those of the donor. And any military force, particularly in the less developed countries in which the military has traditionally played a major political and social role, can turn its weapons and training against its own government and citizenry. There are thus no riskless policies that one can advocate to the United States Government that will ensure that the arms it gives or sells will not be used in ways of which it disapproves.

We would argue that it is perfectly legitimate for a donor to re-examine his transfer policies vis-à-vis a recipient that has seriously disserved the donor's interests. What does not seem warranted is that the donor should be surprised that such contingencies had arisen. Arms should be transferred only in the full knowledge that such transgressions against the donor's interests can and will occur if the recipient feels strongly that they are in his interest. Nor have arms embargoes proved to be effective measures, in any but the shortest run, to bring about change in recipient behavior—at least not so long as important suppliers remain outside the embargo system—vide France and Italy in South Africa or China in Pakistan.

THE VALUE OF ATTENTION AND INFORMATION

Despite the fact that we find no general guidelines for global approaches to the problems of arms in the less developed countries, we are persuaded that there are nonetheless important policy measures that can and should be taken at this general level. These fall under the general headings of attention and information.

Since the failure of the League of Nations' effort to devise a general treaty on arms transfers, it has only been in very recent years that the process of the transfer of arms to less developed countries has again been a focus of critical attention outside the narrow confines of governmental decision making bodies operationally involved in the process. We find the existence of this broader discussion highly salutary, even though we disagree with some of the current assumptions.

The question of the transfer of arms warrants continued and constant attention, within and outside governments, in the supplier and the recipient countries, and at the level of individual states and internationally. The fact that we see no ready outlines
for agreements that will eliminate all the dangers and ambiguities does not in any sense invalidate the legitimacy and urgency of this concern.

We would, therefore, urge the U.S. Government in its own general policy statements and in global multilateral forums to continue to stress the importance of restraint and moderation.

We also recommend that the U.S. Government support public efforts and welcome private efforts to continue the study of and discussion of the international transfer of arms. In this connection, we would urge support of the continuing public and private efforts to publish statistical and other information on the movement of arms, including proposals made in the United Nations General Assembly to revive the League of Nations publications in this field. We recognize the sensitivities of many less developed countries to what appears to them to be an inequality in publicity if only international arms shipments are included; we urge, therefore, that serious consideration be given to ways to reduce this inequality, by, for example, including data on arms production in such publications.

We also urge that the U.S. Government fully exploit its own data on this issue. The information available to the U.S. Government about the arms acquired by less developed countries is vastly superior to that available to the academic researcher. It should be the policy of the U.S. Government to centralize the data it has in this field, including the arms transferred by the U.S. Government, and to exploit these data in order to establish the behavior patterns of recipients, singly and in conjunction with other states with which they are or may be in competition or conflict. This means being concerned not just with current inventories but also with how these developed.

THE RELEVANCE OF PATTERNS

Our data show that there are among both donors of arms and recipients of arms strong patterns of behavior. In other words, individual recipients, groups of recipients, individual donors, and combinations of donors have, in the period since 1945 behaved in identifiable ways concerning the numbers, types, mixes, modernity, and rate of their acquisitions and transfers. Patterns of past and present inventory and training acquisitions, for example, would enable the decision-maker to tell what the potential recipient's and its neighbors' style of procurement for different weapons has been—to replace aging systems in order to maintain a constant force level, to acquire systems rapidly enough to cause the inventory to grow, to maintain a fixed ratio between its inventory and a neighbor's.
These patterns are highly relevant to the question of control. They can provide the framework around which control arrangements can be built and control objectives defined.

A first requirement, of course, is continually to supplement and update these patterns. To this end, we regard the development of a methodology for analyzing systematically the vast array of variables that need to be taken into account in reaching transfer decisions--or in analyzing the impact of the transfers of other donors--as a product of our work that is of potentially substantial value. The post-1945 patterns we have discerned are not, of course, immutable and fixed. Indeed we call attention to the dangers created by the rapid influx of large quantities of arms into a previously stabilized area--what we have called a "surge" of transfers. To have continued validity as a basis for decision-making, therefore, a formal systematic method for considering the whole spectrum of transfers along the lines delineated in this study should be developed. It would enable a more complete picture to evolve of the overall pattern of force levels in less developed countries. Such analysis can not eliminate uncertainty. But it can help to identify the major trade-offs implicit in the policy maker's decision. We strongly recommend that the data, which we urge above be centralized, be exploited to these ends.

Several policy implications flow from the existence of patterns. First, the arms transfer situation in the late 1960s is different from that in the late 1950s. For this reason, it can be profoundly misleading to apply the assumptions of the 1950s to the situation of the 1960s. In the 1950s, for example, the appearance of Soviet arms generally presaged a massive buildup of inventories; in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has made frequent transfers (particularly in Africa) of small token numbers of weapons systems that may have political significance but are not so destabilizing as very large, sudden transfers would be.

The second policy implication is that care needs to be exercised, in evaluating a given transfer, to distinguish between one that is designed to keep an inventory at a steady level by replacing systems that have worn and aged beyond their useful lives, and a transfer designed to increase the size of usable inventories. To characterize all transfers under the same rubric--for example, as arms races--is to obscure the real issues.

A third implication is that global or regional quantitative ceilings on transfers that fall below the levels needed to replace inventory losses due to aging and other normal attrition will automatically entail the reduction of inventory levels in some countries. This is the situation most likely to meet fierce resistance from the recipients.
Policy recommendations flowing from this are:

The minimal goal of U.S. arms transfer policies should be to avoid perturbations in the current supply pattern that could send it into another sharp upward spiral.

In those cases in which the suppliers conclude that reductions from current levels of supply seem warranted, but in which there is a strong demand from the less developed countries, the assured cooperation of all suppliers will be required to enforce this policy on resentful recipients.

Should a reduction of quantitative levels be deemed desirable by the suppliers, the pressure from recipients with declining inventories can be alleviated somewhat by encouraging the substitution of other systems—e.g., armed trainers for combat aircraft, light tanks for medium and heavy tanks, patrol vessels for warships.

We would argue that, in situations in which reduction of current inventories seems impossible to achieve or even undesirable, the next preferred objective from the perspective of arms control is to maintain inventories at constant long-run levels—what we have identified as a replacement pattern. If this is accepted as a legitimate objective of control, care must be taken not to castigate states seeking this modest goal by failing to distinguish their behavior from that of states eager to expand their inventories.

Patterns Among Rivals

We find substantial evidence in comparing the acquisition patterns of rival states among our sample to support our hypotheses that not only can the existence (or absence) of what are commonly called "arms races" be detected but that the qualitative character of the "arms race" can be established. Thus what we would argue are the most dangerous races—those that show that each party is consciously designing its force to improve its capabilities vis-à-vis its rivals—can be distinguished from what we would argue are the least dangerous arms races—those in which two states seek to maintain a fixed quantitative and qualitative ratio between their inventories.

The first type of race is the most destabilizing and the most difficult to control. The second, which rarely produces rapidly growing inventories, can be seen as a highly stable situation, the maintenance of which is, indeed, in the interests of the arms controller.
Failure to distinguish the type of rivalry from the existence of rivalry can result in supply policies that weaken existing stability rather than capitalize upon it.

Regional Patterns

We find strong clusterings of patterns among the countries in our sample in terms of the region of the world in which they exist. We thus find substantial stability and relatively low inventories in Latin America, slow growth and low inventories in Africa South of the Sahara, and instability and large inventories in Asia and the Middle East-North Africa. There are, of course, exceptions in every case, but the largest number of countries in each region falls into the patterns described.

In Latin America, compared with other regions, air and naval inventories have been likely to be no more than average in size and stable or declining, with emphasis on ordnance delivery (combat aircraft and trainers) or transport in air force inventories and ordnance delivery (warships and submarines) in naval inventories. Armor inventories have been likely to be small, and stable in size, with APC the most favored armor type in those few cases in which there has been any preference discernible.

The Middle East-North African region has been likely to see great disparity among states in the area in aircraft inventories, with numbers either above or below average. Whether large or small, aircraft inventories have been likely to be growing and to emphasize combat aircraft. Armor inventories in this region have been likely to be large and unlikely to be stabilized in size. In any event, tanks have predominated. Naval inventories have been likely to be small, but growing, with patrol vessels generally predominating.

States in our sample from Africa South of the Sahara have been likely to have small inventories in all categories of weapons covered in this study. Both air and armor inventories have been likely to be stable or growing. Naval inventories in the region have been most likely to be growing. In aircraft, transport aircraft predominate, and in naval vessels, patrol types have been preferred. In the few armor inventories in which preferences are assessable, tanks have been likely to be favored.

Asia, as a region, has been more likely than the other areas to have large or average air and naval inventories and average armor inventories. Air and armor inventories have been likely to be growing while, with some exceptions, naval forces have been most likely to be stable or declining. Combat aircraft and trainers have been favored over other aircraft, and tanks over other armor. Naval inventories have emphasized either patrol or amphibious vessels.
In terms of modernity and production status, the combat aircraft inventories of the Middle Eastern-North African and Asian countries of the sample have been more likely to be above the sample average, whereas Latin American and Sub-Saharan African states have been likely to be below the sample average.

The relative stability of the inventories in Latin America suggests that most of the states in the region accept the ratios among their inventories that have developed over time. This is not to say that there is not rivalry in arms acquisitions. It is rather that agreements on arms acquisitions among the states in the region may be somewhat easier to reach than if the situation were unstable. It also suggests that unilateral supplier policies that accept the desirability of fixed ratios among the forces in the region are more likely to be acceptable to the recipients and less likely to drive recipients to search for alternate suppliers.

Except for Asian naval forces, all other inventories of all other systems are growing. Africa South of the Sahara, with its uniformly small but growing inventories, has not achieved the stability of Latin America. But our findings do support the possibility that arms transfer policies that permit modest and balanced growth may be suitable for the region—on the initiative of the states that comprise it or as guidance for suppliers.

The Middle East-North Africa and Asia emerge in our analysis as the two regions in which, even without the well-known political rivalries in the area, the bases for region-wide agreements seem to be absent. There is great disparity in the size of existing inventories; and most inventories are growing. In the absence of any indication that the states in the region are satisfied with the existing ratios among their inventories, it is hard to imagine that agreement on arms acquisitions is possible among them. Nor do the data we have assembled on inventory size, growth patterns and regional preferences offer any obvious guidance to agreements among suppliers or individual supplier policies. For these areas, the problems of control are more complex and guidance must be sought from other evidence.

These patterns have implications for helping to define the logical units for which controls might be formulated. (They are also relevant to the question of where the initiatives for controls might be found, which we shall take up later.)

A regional approach to arms control has already been extensively studied.* It underlies much of current U.S. arms transfer

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*See Regional Arms Control Arrangements, op. cit.
and arms control policy—for example, U.S. encouragement of regional initiatives in the arms control field, Congressionally-imposed ceilings on arms and training aid to Latin America and Africa, efforts to find the bases for bilateral or multilateral agreements on arms shipments to the volatile Middle East.

The research summarized here strongly supports the validity of this approach. This is not, of course, to say that ready rules that elude definition on a global scale are significantly more likely to be found on a region by region basis. It does suggest, however, that the similarities of behavior of arms recipients that we see from one region to another—particularly where, as in Africa and Latin America, we would argue that the patterns are consistent with arms control objectives—are part of a regionally acceptable set of power relationships that even-handed and consistent treatment can help to continue and reinforce.

Even the negative evidence—from an arms control perspective—of the patterns in Asia and the Middle East is not insignificant. First, it establishes that the instability in arms levels is a regional phenomenon, not one confined to one or two particularly troublesome conflicts.* It suggests, furthermore, that states in these regions that are not yet caught up in this unstable process may feel under very strong pressure to maintain a qualitative if not quantitative pace with their neighbors. It also suggests, of course, that the problems of controlling arms transfers will be much more difficult.

Donor Patterns

There are also patterns among donors of arms. Two warrant particular attention in terms of controlling arms transfers. The first is the frequency of what we have called the "surge" of transfers by the Soviet Union. Our analysis of patterns of arms acquisitions and patterns of conflict suggests that this is a particularly destabilizing pattern. Clearly, slowing the pace of transfers is a matter that should warrant a high priority of attention in any bilateral U.S.-Soviet approach to the problem. (The feasibility of such an approach is discussed below.)

*It may also be that the existence of conflicts in a region pushes upward the arms acquisitions of all states in the region, including those not directly engaged in the on-going conflict.
Large, growing inventories of combat aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and patrol vessels have been more likely to be Soviet-supplied than supplied by any other single donor and these systems have been more likely than not to be emphasized in the recipients' forces. Moderate to small stable or declining inventories of combat aircraft have been more likely to be U.S.-supplied or British-supplied than to be supplied by any other single donor. In the British case, combat aircraft have been likely to be emphasized among various aircraft types; in the U.S. case, there is a slightly better than even chance that they have not been emphasized. Trainer aircraft inventories supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union present the opposite case from combat aircraft. U.S.-supplied inventories have been likely to be small and stable or declining.

While some U.S.-supplied tank inventories have been large, the inventories have been more likely to be average size or below and growing. They have been less likely to be emphasized among various types of armor than if they were supplied by another donor.

Warship inventories supplied by the United States have tended to be small and stable but emphasized in the recipients' navies. The U.S.S.R., Britain, combinations of Western suppliers, and combinations of Eastern and Western suppliers have been more likely to be donors of average-sized warship inventories that show growth patterns. But the navies of which these inventories are a part have been likely to emphasize patrol or amphibious vessels over warships. Patrol vessel inventories have been likely to be growing regardless of donor. Soviet, Soviet-Chinese, or combinations of Eastern and Western donors have been likely to be the suppliers of larger than average inventories of patrol vessels, whereas the United States, Britain, France, or combinations of Western suppliers have been likely to be the donors of small inventories. Only U.S.-supplied inventories and those supplied by combinations of Western donors have been likely not to emphasize patrol vessels over other types of vessels. In the Soviet case, 83 percent of the patrol vessel inventories made up in whole or primary (over 60 percent) of Soviet supplied systems have been the predominant type of naval system available.

The modernity of military technology transferred has also varied by donor. The ratio of inventories above the sample average to those below it varies from donor to donor as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2:0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other small suppliers</td>
<td>1:0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Western</td>
<td>3:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.8:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Eastern-Western</td>
<td>0.7:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>0.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Eastern</td>
<td>0:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Thus we found the West European arms suppliers to have been, on the whole, more willing to transfer more modern military technology than other donors have been. In large part, this is a consequence of the well-documented pressure on these manufacturers to extend their production runs and reduce their unit costs by selling their arms. To the extent this modernization of less developed country inventories is felt to be undesirable from an arms control perspective, some of this pressure can be alleviated by less intensive U.S. sales efforts in other markets in the developed world—Western Europe itself, for example—in other words, by leaving West European producers an alternative market.

CONFLICT AND ARMS RACES

As noted earlier, we examined inventory patterns of rival states to see what evidence emerged about the existence of "arms races" and different types of "arms races." We were also concerned about the relationship between rivalry in arms acquisitions and conflict.

Looking at the arms acquisitions of several pairs and groups of less developed countries that had gone to war with each other or that had experienced internal insurgencies showed that, in each specific instance, the comparative arms acquisitions helped to explain the course of a specific conflict. What did not emerge, however, was any evidence that there are universally valid generalizations one can make about the arms-conflict syndrome.

One pattern that appears to have been particularly destabilizing is what we have called a "surge" pattern—a rapid, large increase in inventory levels. Many instances of such sudden growth, by one or both parties, can be found in the conflict situations we examined. And very few instances exist in our data of this upsurge of growth that did not take place within, or stimulate, a conflict. The evidence thus seems very strong that this rapid influx of weapons is particularly destabilizing—even when our analysis would suggest that the actual military utility of the new systems is low.

The arms-control and conflict-control implications seem clear—such sudden shifts in the quantities of arms should be avoided. More gradual inventory growth runs much less risk of fueling local conflicts. The fact that we also found the "surge" pattern to be much more frequent in Soviet transfers than in those of other donors makes this a particularly appropriate goal of U.S. discussions with the Soviet Union on joint approaches to arms transfer problems. This question is discussed more fully below.
THE INITIATIVES FOR CONTROL

Our failure to find globally valid patterns of arms transfers or definitions of control objectives casts strong doubts on the feasibility of agreements that could be reached by all suppliers concerning all less developed countries or even by all less developed countries on their own initiative. The question remains, however, whether there are less than total groupings of suppliers or less than total groupings of recipients who might be able to coordinate their policies, tacitly or formally. The question also arises of what degree of control exists at the level of the individual donor and the individual recipient.

Possible Regional Initiatives

We have noted above that there are strong regional patterns and that these, in turn, suggest that the regions constitute logical units around which to construct arms control policies. Does this mean, however, that the regions themselves can be looked to as the initiators of agreements to control their arms acquisitions?

It seems self-evident that the highly unstable inventories of the Middle East-North Africa and in Asia bespeak a competition for local power that is highly unlikely to make regionally negotiated agreements possible. The prospects in Latin America and in Africa South of the Sahara are, on the face of it, somewhat more promising.

In these two instances, the United States should continue to encourage the local states to consider their needs and problems jointly. But arms come close to being the universally accepted symbols of sovereignty. They are thus highly volatile subjects to discuss. Indeed, compelling the states in these areas to acknowledge the nature of the stability that exists may well help to undermine it. The problem is not dissimilar in the strategic nuclear field where claims of "superiority" may make a set of relationships palatable to domestic audiences, while at the same time something more akin to "parity" may make international agreement easier to accomplish. Leaving open options to label the same situation both ways may be extremely important in successful control negotiations.

While we thus see greater prospect for regional initiatives in Latin America and in Africa South of the Sahara, we feel such arrangements will be difficult to achieve and, at best, a prospect many years in the future.

The Special U.S. and Soviet Roles

The United States and Soviet Union occupy special places as donors of military hardware to less developed countries. Not
only are they, overall, the largest suppliers, but also they supply all or most of the inventories of more individual states than do any other donors.

The United States and Soviet Union, individually or in tacit or explicit cooperation, could profoundly affect the quantities of arms now being provided to the sample of less developed countries.

This suggests that, as a matter of high urgency, the United States should seek to reach understandings with the Soviet Union aimed at preserving the present relative quantitative stability and ensuring that such increases as do occur take place at as modest a pace as possible. And, if possible, fostering at least stability or even a reduction in the inventories of their clients.

In the absence of any evidence from our research that clear guidelines on the qualitative characteristics of weapons systems that should be proscribed—aside from the already widely accepted proscription of nuclear weapons—the possibility of finding uniform definitions and rules for an explicit, formal suppliers' agreement seems to us remote. In the absence of such clear guidelines, and in view of the high political cost that would have to be paid for any overt effort to impose restrictions on certain geographic areas or certain classes of less developed countries, we feel that U.S.-Soviet cooperation in jointly regulating their transfers can be best handled by informal and tacit discussions rather than by explicit formal agreements.

The two major donors should recognize that it is in their mutual interest to avoid the uncontrolled spiralling of competitive arming of less developed country clients, for the following reasons: 1) The tempo of such rapid quantitative increases generates pressures on the two suppliers to keep pace with each other; 2) This maximizes the pressure that individual clients can bring to bear on their sponsors; 3) It dilutes the capacity of the donor to tailor his aid to meet those of his client's needs that coincide with his own interests; 4) It maximizes the identification of the donor with the client's cause; and thus 5) It increases the risk of his unwilling involvement and cost of declining to do so.

In any tacit cooperation, and in any subject of this complexity, firm rules cannot be drawn. For this reason, a high degree of uncertainty and flexibility will be imperative. Equally imperative will be to avoid over-rapid reactions to ambiguous evidence.

Unilateral Approaches

For all the reasons cited above, we feel that the major burden, in the short-term future, of controlling the transfer of arms will continue to rest with the individual supplier and with the
individual recipient. It is important to recognize that restrained behavior by both are needed—particularly given the short-term future nature of arms transfers that we have drawn above.

For this reason we would place a very high priority on improving the defense planning skills of the less developed countries. It is, of course, a matter of general policy whether a particular donor wishes to respond to a recipient's felt needs.

But until the less developed countries on the whole want the types of forces and weapons that are within their resources and relevant to their needs, the temptation of the suppliers, in competition for influence or for markets, will be to accommodate toward the recipients' demands. A major driving force in the present arms transfer system could be harnessed to the pursuit of conflict control objectives by an intense effort at what in this case is "consumer education."

Where Political Motives are Paramount

There are also guidelines that can help the supplier unilaterally to tailor his actions to serve arms control and conflict control objectives.

The Soviet Union and the United States differ from other donors in ways other than their great size. Whereas the sales of most other suppliers are primarily commercial in motivation, there is a high element of political motivation in the transfers of the two major donors. The transfer of arms represents one aspect of their competitive search for influence with the governments and the military leadership of the less developed countries.

As long as that competition persists, the transfer of arms for political motivations will persist. For this reason, all measures that will tend to abate super-power search for influence will help to mitigate their motivation for transferring arms.

Where the motivation for a transfer is primarily political, the United States should, as a general rule, concentrate its arms transfers primarily on those systems that have least military utility in the setting to which they are being sent and are least burdensome to the economy. These systems may well include the sophisticated and prestige arms that so many critics feel should not be made available to the less developed countries. These "sophisticated" weapons are the systems that should be regarded as appropriate for transfer if: (a) the motivation of the donor is primarily political; (b) the donor wishes to contribute only marginally to the recipient's military capability; (c) the recipient's skill to operate the new equipment is marginal and is not augmented by substantial military training; (d) the donor in question is the sole or primary supplier of arms and can thus strongly influence the over-all inventory level and force structure; and
(e) the opportunity costs of operating sophisticated equipment reduce the likelihood of other, more useful, systems being acquired.

Where Military Motives are Paramount

Some recipients, in terms of the quantity or types of weapons they receive, are treated differently, or behave differently, from the sample as a whole. Most of these are states that confront a high likelihood of hostilities or are or have recently been engaged in fighting an internal or external enemy. For simplicity's sake, these could be labeled recipients whose forces are structured primarily with a view to their military utility. If the United States makes arms available to a recipient of this type, the United States must be deemed to have a military as well as a political motivation. In other words, the United States has, or acquires, an interest in the outcome of such military clashes as may occur. This U.S. interest is not necessarily identical with that of the recipient. (As a simplified example, the recipient's interests may be to "win" while the U.S. interests may merely be that its client not "lose." As a more complex example, the recipient's interests may be to deter potential enemy A in order to be free to move against potential enemy B, while the U.S. may share the first goal and be profoundly opposed to the second.)

There are no ready guidelines for the United States in these circumstances. Our analysis examined weapons characteristics in terms of their military utility in different technical, strategic, and geographical environments. That analysis revealed that types of military forces and weapons systems that are likely to maximize those capabilities the United States wishes to see the recipients develop are frequently those that are highly desired, from the perspective of military utility, for those capabilities the recipient might want to pursue that are not in the U.S. interest. Thus we find no ready lists of weapons, on the basis of military performance, that permit one to separate "offensive" from "defensive," "sophisticated" from "unsophisticated," or "suited for internal security" from "suited for external aggression."

However, on a case-by-case basis, the United States can design its military assistance in such a way as to maximize the efficiency of the recipient's forces to perform those missions deemed to be in the U.S. interest and minimize the efficiency of the recipient's force to perform those missions deemed not to be in the U.S. interest. It should be emphasized that what we stress above is the efficiency with which a mission can be performed, not whether it can be undertaken. In this regard, control over spare parts, ammunition, etc., can be important in limiting the sustained capability of an assisted force.

Any specific decision taken in line with the above recommendation will involve a wide range of considerations that go beyond the
scope of this report. But a few generalized examples may make the point clearer. If the United States wishes to provide the recipient with an air strike capability against an internal insurgency, the United States, unlike many smaller donors, has a wide range of options among the systems it can provide in terms of their cost, range, payload, speed, vulnerability, ease of maintenance, etc. If the United States wants to minimize the efficiency of the possible use of these same systems to launch a pre-emptive air strike against a neighboring state, it should, depending on geography, elect to transfer those systems that have low range, payload, and speed and are not in series production in other countries.

To take another illustration, the United States may wish to see a recipient acquire the military capability to produce heavy, concentrated defensive firepower to protect a fixed target, such as a city or an airfield. By making available missiles or artillery that usually require fixed base installations, the United States can decrease the ease with which the recipient can deploy this firepower against another target.

These examples are admittedly gross simplifications. Choices rarely will be so clear cut. But we feel not only that these calculations can be made and can help delineate the options available to the United States, but that in most of the cases we have examined of U.S. military assistance to recipients faced with discernible military contingencies that the U.S. wished to help to meet, such calculations appear to have governed the U.S. decisions on transfers of both arms and training.

In successfully implementing this policy, the bargaining power and influence of any supplier will be enhanced by complete recipient reliance on it for systems, spares, ammunition and fuel, replacement, and training. The bargaining power of the recipient will be enhanced by sufficient foreign exchange to permit purchase of the desired systems and support and by self-sufficiency in training. Also entering into these calculations will be political factors—how important is it to the supplier to retain some measure of influence over the ability of the recipient's forces to conduct operations; how important does the supplier regard it to be to its interests that the recipient accomplish mission A; how damaging will it be to its interests if the recipient also opts to embark on B; etc. Similarly the recipient will have to calculate the long run costs of defying the donor.

For all these reasons, our recommendation that the arms transferred be selected to maximize the capabilities the United States wants to see the recipient acquire in such a manner as to minimize the
capabilities that it feels are not in the U.S. interests will not be one that is always easy to implement. Nonetheless, if it is accepted as the ideal goal, the full range of options are more likely to be assessed and the costs of departing from the principle will be more readily calculable.

The Role of Training

In the discussion above, several mentions have been made of the role of training in the transfer of arms to less developed countries. Our research supports the following findings about the U.S. training program. It seems without question that the training of foreign military forces influences the weapons chosen by the force trained. The most direct link between training and acquisition appears to be in those areas of weaponry that are relevant to the military missions the United States feels are priority goals for the recipient--i.e., defense against external aggression (for example, South Korea); internal security and counter-insurgency (for example, Latin America).

While there is no evidence of a direct link between training and the acquisition of arms that the United States would prefer the recipients of its training assistance not to acquire, there is substantial presumptive evidence that some aspects of the training program as presently structured tend to maximize the risk that the effort will produce such unwelcome results. Thus U.S. military advisors are frequently set open-ended and technical military goals, with only the most general political guidelines as to what the overall objectives and limitations of the MAP are. Military professionalism is made the key test of the advisors' success. Given alternatives of training in the local country or in the United States, emphasis is placed on the latter, although the risks of inadvertently stimulating unwanted demand for arms is greatest when training takes place in U.S. professional schools.

These considerations lead us to the following conclusions and recommendations:

Military training is an important and necessary part of a sound arms transfer program. By manipulating the training input, the United States has a powerful instrument to influence the types of capabilities the recipient acquires, in the short run.

Where the purpose of an arms transfer is primarily political, and particularly if the recipient lacks high technical skills, the withholding of training can help minimize the likelihood that the weapons will be employed effectively. Where the U.S. purpose is to enhance the capability of the recipient to perform certain missions while minimizing his capability to perform others, selective training can help to achieve this objective.
The most detailed directives should be available to advisors on all levels on the political and arms control objectives of the United States in the country in question, and in particular on the political and arms control goals of the military assistance program. The particular military capabilities the United States wishes to see enhanced and the capabilities it does not wish to see the recipient country develop should be clear to the advisor in the field.

The career structure within which the military advisor operates should be such that his performance is judged by his effectiveness at carrying out the political-military role he is asked to perform. In cases in which the U.S. interest in rendering military assistance is largely political, or is military in only a restricted degree, the professional standards by which an officer's performance are judged must differ from those that would apply to him in other service roles.

Anticipating the Future

We have already called attention to one way in which the future requirements and reactions of recipients of arms transfers can be anticipated—by assiduous study of their past behavior and their past reactions to the receipts of their neighbors. There is another important handle on the future that arises from our findings concerning the relationship between the inventories of the donors and the arms transferred to the less developed countries at some later date. Given the long lead time of weapons development, it is possible to anticipate in great detail what systems, in what quantities, and from what donors will be available for transfer at approximately what date. This is not to say that one can predict who will get what, and when. But the area of uncertainty can be greatly reduced.

Our detailed examination of future world-wide combat aircraft production produced several findings concerning the future:

(1) The number of potential suppliers is growing.

(2) Both the increasing complexity and cost of the most advanced aircraft likely to be in production in the future made it appear unlikely that any but a few of the less developed countries could either afford to acquire them or be capable of operating them without substantial outside assistance.

(3) In view of the high cost of the most advanced systems, the large anticipated surpluses that will become available as this more advanced technology phases into the developed countries' inventories are likely to be in even greater demand in the less developed countries.
(4) Given this fact, the motivations of the developed countries to cover part of the cost of their own re-equipment by selling their older equipment is likely to be greatly strengthened. And the older equipment will command a high price for a long period.

(5) The United States is in a position to affect the disposition of much of the anticipated surplus because of the terms under which it was made available to its present owners. However, for reasons just noted, it will be politically and economically costly to prevent this surplus from being transferred to the less developed countries.

The finding that the military requirements of the supplier's own forces provides a major key to understanding their transfer policies and the weapons they transfer has three further implications for policy.

First, there are developments currently taking place within supplier inventories that indicate potential changes in future arms supplies that may be disturbing influences in the inventories of less developed countries. As a general principle, it is far easier to avoid an anticipatable problem than to undo its effects once it has arisen. For example, the naval inventories of the recipient countries in our sample are at present growing. But most of their growth is concentrated in small patrol vessels rather than large warships. Latin America is the only region in which there has been obvious rivalry in warships, and their inventories are aging rapidly, with few new acquisitions to offset attrition. However, the growing U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry will, in time, spill over into regions of the less developed world with a much higher level of inter-state conflict than has Latin America. Thus a dangerous and extremely costly new medium of conflict in the developing world could be spun off the central U.S.-Soviet arms rivalry, unless the danger is recognized before competitive transfers begin.

Second, a major source of the weapons transferred to the less developed countries has been the surpluses from great power wars. Weapons developed before 1945 continue to provide a meaningful fraction of the weapons being transferred to the less developed countries, particularly as current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines have concentrated attention on the utility of modified low-speed-high payload World War II aircraft. The end of the war in Vietnam will, as have all other wars, create a surplus of U.S. weapons; we
see no reason to assume that these surpluses, like those of earlier
great power wars, will not find their way into the inventories of the
less developed countries or release older U.S. equipment for transfer,
unless active and unprecedented efforts are made to prevent it.*

It is unlikely that the United States will forego an opportu-
tunity to realize some political and financial return on the huge
investment these surpluses represent. It is even more unlikely that
the cost of rendering these systems inoperable will be readily borne.
However, the United States should ensure that the strictest possible
control is exercised over the disposition of these stocks so that they
do not directly or indirectly produce sudden and large changes in
local inventories.

The third conclusion that flows from our findings on the
significance of donor inventories is a more subtle one, but no less
important for that reason. In some parts of the less developed world--
the Arab-Israel conflict is the best current example--the intense
arms rivalry of the countries of the area is fed by, and in turn gen-
erates, the intense political rivalry between the United States and
the Soviet Union in the region. It is only a slight exaggeration
to say that the Arab-Israel arms race is the other side of the coin
of the East-West influence race. If one didn't exist, the other
would undoubtedly continue but in different form. The existence
of the two simultaneously has created a treadmill which neither the
local powers nor the great powers appear able to get off or to
decelerate.

In circumstances such as these, in which Arab pressures to
react to Israeli acquisitions generate in their turn tremendous pres-
sure on the Soviet Union to respond with added arms (and the same can
be said of Israel and the United States), the United States and the
Soviet Union each needs to, and in fact appears to, examine with great
care the options that are open to the other in responding to appeals
from their clients. What can be asked, however, is whether the
techniques for reviewing U.S. supply policies to Israel and Jordan
can be improved to minimize the risks of Soviet over-reaction.

Unfortunately, it also follows from our research that the
asymmetric inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union make
it far from self-evident what numbers and types of weapons the United
States should supply or withhold. This is also a clear case in which
the United States has other interests besides de-escalating the

* A high proportion of these may in fact go to the South
Vietnamese and other forces in the region. This does not vitiate our
point. These, after all, are transfers.
conventional arms race. Assuming that both the United States and Soviet Union would place an even higher arms control value on keeping nuclear weapons out of Middle Eastern inventories and on avoiding their own direct engagement in local quarrels in that turbulent region, it is not at all obvious that focusing solely on attempts to keep Arab (particularly Egyptian) and Israeli conventional inventories down will necessarily serve these objectives.

ARMS TRANSFERS AND CONFLICT CONTROL

The larger framework of this research is the role of arms transfers in the pursuit of a conflict control policy—that is, a policy aimed at avoiding the outbreak of hostilities, keeping small or brief such hostilities as nonetheless occur and avoiding broadening the scope of conflict in the less developed world to minimize the risk of its generating conflict among the nuclear powers.

Our detailed analysis has failed to find fixed rules that would enable one to say definitively that arms "cause" conflict, or certain arms "cause" conflict, or that there is no relationship. But perhaps this is itself a major lesson to learn. One frequently hears it argued that U.S. military assistance is responsible for a given war in the less developed world because the war was fought on both sides with U.S.-supplied weapons. There may be cases in which this is true. But we find no evidence to support it as a general rule.

To develop an arms transfer policy that is consistent with the goals of conflict control requires a subtler, more flexible approach to the issues. Obviously detailed decisions will always have to be taken in the light of the unique conditions that surround each request for arms. Granting that, we would propose the following principles to govern U.S. transfers of arms to less developed states:

(1) The transfer of arms occurs only when the interests of both the donor and the recipient are served by it. The assumption implicit in much current discussion that it is only U.S. interest—and a misperceived interest at that— that dictates the transfer obscures the fundamental complexity of the issue and diverts attention away from opportunities for control.

(2) For those less developed states in which there is a primarily military purpose to be served by the
transfer of arms--for example, the Forward Defense area, partners in mutual security undertakings, or areas regarded as of high strategic importance--the transfer of arms should be designed as part of an overall policy to avoid the development of military contingencies in which direct involvement of U.S. forces is required to honor U.S. commitments. It is almost inevitable that the recipient has a range of other interests that do not coincide with those of the United States. For this reason, arms transferred should to the greatest extent possible be selected to minimize the efficiency with which the recipient can pursue these objectives while not destroying his capacity to pursue the objectives that coincide with U.S. interests. Our research has demonstrated that this is not an easy prescription to follow. Nonetheless it does suggest that blanket prohibitions of poorly defined categories--e.g., "sophisticated" weapons--can disserve this objective.

(3) In those cases in which the U.S. interest in transferring arms is primarily political, arms with a high prestige factor and least military utility are to be preferred, provided that the overall economic burden of these transfers does not unequivocally detract from economic development, which may also be a strong U.S. interest. These arms are likely to be both expensive and sophisticated.

(4) In those cases where the United States does not wish to maximize certain military capabilities of the recipient, and where the effect of the transfer will produce reactions in a neighboring country, departures from the normal "style" of acquisition of the recipient should be avoided if possible. This style--rate of replacement, rate of growth, mix of systems in inventory, etc.--can be established by an examination of the recipient's past acquisitions.

(5) Similarly the "style" of reactions of neighboring states can be established. To the extent possible, transfers should be designed to disturb fixed ratios among inventory levels as little as possible.
(6) In all cases, sudden and large influxes of major weapons into a less developed country's inventories are more likely to alarm local rivals and stimulate an arms race that will be difficult to stop or slow down than are more gradual inventory growths.

(7) Ultimately the rationalization of the arms transfer process must rest on the ability of the less developed countries to plan responsibly for their defense requirements within the limits of the technical and monetary resources that they have to expend on defense. Increasing local skills in long-term planning should be the priority goal of the U.S. military assistance and training program. Too frequently, defense planning data have been kept from the local military on the plausible grounds that their appetites for equipment will be whetted and that what is projected for planning purposes will be misconstrued as promised. These are serious problems. But if the cost of avoiding them is to limit the opportunities that local defense planners have to learn the hard lessons of long-range planning and long-term cost projections, the costs of avoiding them are much too high.

In conclusion, we find that a program of arms transfers and military training and assistance can be consistent with a U.S. policy of conflict control. If the policy of the United States toward conflict in the Third World is clear and consistent, arms transfers can serve that policy. To the extent that there remain competing U.S. impulses toward the outcome of conflict within and among the less developed countries, arms transfers will continue to serve U.S. interests in some instances and disserve them in others. Finally, the rhetoric, mythology, and easy jargon that substitutes for a hard-headed thinking about the defense problems of the less developed world must give way to dispassionate analysis that takes these problems seriously and recognizes the limits of the capacity of any outside force to influence their course.