On July 18, 1967 the Labour government of Harold Wilson and Denis Healey issued a Defense White Paper making official what everyone already knew: the British government planned to withdraw its forces from Singapore and Malaysia over the next few years to the point where, by the early 1970's, there would no longer be a British military presence in South East Asia.

This announcement coincided with three other events of note. First was the inevitable emergence of the question of possible increase in the Australian and New Zealand contributions to the allied military effort in South Vietnam. Second was a set of seemingly sequential policy decisions by the United States government on dairy imports which, combined with declining wool prices, created what can only be described as a traumatic atmosphere for New Zealand-U.S. relations. Third was the release of figures showing a slow but steady trend towards change in the traditional "White Australia" policy.

For several years the few students of international politics who bothered at all to consider the comfortable, white, friendly nations of the Southwest Pacific had predicted that a time of change was

*The author is grateful to the M.I.T. Center for International Studies, and to the Ford Foundation, for their assistance in making possible a visit to Australia and New Zealand in the summer of 1967.
approaching. Like all problems of middle-range planning, the emphasis has been on prophecy. But the problem suddenly looks nearer at hand, and the evidence of change as close as the nearest lands: dynamic Japan; resurrected Indonesia; war-torn Vietnam—the long shadow of China. All these, plus the finality of the British strategic withdrawal, meant that prophecy would not be enough. New and inescapable choices were taking shape with which both Australia and New Zealand would have to cope, like it or not. With the problems would come opportunities for both to play constructive roles in the new futures that must unfold for East Asia and the long arc of nation-islands extending from the Japan Sea down toward the Antarctic. The only real uncertainty was that of how long it would require both countries to take the measure of their problems—and their opportunities.

Australian political and strategic decisions would not take place in a vacuum. It would be profoundly important whether Australia’s role in a future Pacific-Asian complex was likely to be as part of Asia, or as part of the white, Western, and possibly off-shore American presence. United States interests were inextricably caught up in all aspects of Pacific strategy and politics. For Australia the issue was whether its relationship with its giant distant protector would be based on sound and durable foundations. To a lesser extent the same was true for New Zealand.

On the basis of current evidence, some overall impressions can be stated. The countries concerned—including the United States—have not perceptibly begun to face up to the need for new designs regarding their future. On the central matter of Australian "identity", it was still largely a function of Australian domestic politics whether these "White Asians" were going to regard themselves as part of Asia or part of America. Finally, the extra-
ordinary sense of dependency in the relationship with Washington, while perhaps gratifying to Americans in the short run, in the longer run contain some distinctly unhealthy elements.

II

Australia is a classic example of a developed but under-industrialized country which is now on the verge of a new take-off, further confounding Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist predictions. With 11 million people and a land-mass three-quarters the size of the continental United States, sheer size and terrain might have kept Australia permanently agricultural, like New Zealand, had it not been for an extraordinary succession of recent discoveries of native hard minerals on her shelf lands. As one recent writer pointed out, "Traditionally a heavy net importer of both raw materials and energy sources, Australia has found oil and gas in her offshore waters. Thus could a largely agrarian economy be transformed into one of vital industrial growth with implications extending far beyond her borders. Also, lower energy costs could speed the day... when arid Australia becomes lush and verdant."* Australia as a trading nation exports 15.2% of her gross national product in the form of goods and services, and imports 17.6%. Ninety-nine per cent of Australia's exports are seaborne; 80% of what she buys abroad cannot now be produced in Australia. More to the point, she is not just geographically tied to Asia: 75% of her exports and 70% of her imports are either with South East

*E.W. Seabook Hull "The Political Ocean", in Foreign Affairs, April, 1967 p.496
Asian countries, or go through the vulnerable Southeast Asian Seas, including almost all of her oil supplies (of which 71% in 1965 came from the Middle East and 25% from the Indonesian Archipelago.)

All this adds up to a country enormous in size, robust in spirit, insular in tradition, British in culture, American by necessity, and now increasingly caught up in the nexus of an Asia that Australia traditionally avoided to some extent scorned, and certainly discriminated against.

The writer recalls being struck, in meeting with a group of touring "Asian Student Leaders" a few years ago, by the inclusion of an Australian and a New Zealander among the group. This metamorphosis roughly coincided with the transfer within the U.S. Department of State of diplomatic responsibilities for U.S.-Australian and U.S.-New Zealand relations from the Bureau of European Affairs, where they had traditionally been handled, to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

As significant as any other single development in Australia's move toward Asia are the inroads being made on the policy of White Australia. Essentially begun when the present Prime Minister, Harold Holt, was Minister of Labour and Immigration, the successive incremental increase in admissions to citizenship ten years ago would have been unthinkable. In the twelve months ending in April, 1967, the number of Asians who became naturalized Australians was more than twice that in the previous year. New provisions came into force in April, 1966, reducing from 15 years to 5 the waiting period for resident Asians who wished to become naturalized. At the same time, provisions governing the migration of Asians to Australia were also relaxed. There are no such things as public quotas, the decisions being made by administrative
interpretation. But the latter are becoming liberal to the extent that in the last year 944 were naturalized out of 951 applicants (which included 810 Chinese, 74 Indonesians, 32 Japanese, and 19 Burmese), compared with the previous year in which 399 Asian residents were naturalized out of 570 applicants.

If these numbers still seem minute, it remains true that the war with Japan produced some long memories in Australia, as in New Zealand. For years to come they will lie in the background of relations with Japan, however crucial those relations are likely to be from an economic standpoint. But relations with China reflect one of those charming compromises increasingly to be found among America's allies, of pleasing the Americans while remaining faithful to the spirit of British commercial pragmatism. Australian sells wheat to Peking while according diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

For U.S. foreign policy in the late 1960's the overriding fact about Australia is that she and New Zealand are among the few allies who fight alongside us in Vietnam. Australia's contribution is modest, but not insubstantial for a country her size—the Australian task force of approximately 5 to 6 thousand men consist of two infantry battalions with artillery and other auxiliary services, a hundred military advisors, an air transport unit, a special sky commando squadron, and a flight of eight helicopters. Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the Australian contribution is that the bulk of its task force consists of draftees, an evident mark of increased political sophistication when it is recalled that conscription was totally rejected in World War I, and in World War II draftees were asked only to defend the homeland, interpreted to mean the island chains above Australia.
But in a country led by a Prime Minister whose slogan is "all the way with LBJ" and who is in many ways more hawkish, both publicly and privately, than President Johnson, there is nevertheless a curious apathy toward the Vietnam war. Like any good social scientist, I started with a poll of my own consisting of the inevitable taxi driver in Sydney. He told me that 99% of his fellow countrymen supported the war in Vietnam. When I registered surprise he explained that Aussies like a good fight. Apart from the obvious question of whether Vietnam is really a good fight, it was also uncertain how this correlated with the public opinion polls. Much like their American counterparts, Australian figures indicate that 65% are generally in favor of the Government's Vietnam policy and 25% against. Students in both Australia and New Zealand can of course be found who are critical of the American posture in Vietnam. But except when President Johnson made his visit in 1966 they are relatively apathetic, perhaps because university students Down Under still tend to come out of the upper and middle classes. On related sociological grounds it is perhaps not surprising that it is the faculty rather than the students who are to be found in protest meetings.

Attitudes toward Vietnam could change as the Americans become more visible, now that Sydney is being used as a R&R port for U.S. troops. One can also hear predictions about the possible effect on support for American policy of domestic troubles for Harold Holt in his Liberal-Country Party coalition. But the Australian Labour Party federal conference in August of 1967 surprisingly voted against unqualified withdrawal of Australian forces from Vietnam, and instead adopted a policy instructing a future Labour Government to demand conditions
for continued Australian participation depending on a negotiated settlement. If the United States and Australia's other Vietnam allies refuse to meet the conditions—which include stopping the bombing of North Vietnam and recognizing the NLF—all Australian servicemen would then be pulled out. The balance, as in Britain, is a fine one.

III

On the surface, Australia is clearly a loyal and energetic ally of the United States. If there were any doubt on that score, it might be remembered that none of our NATO allies have contributed any form of presence to a fight which this country defines in terms of its vital national interests. In part this is due to differences in geographical position. Drawing the appropriate lesson from the strategic realities of the Pacific War in 1941, Australia shifted her de facto strategic dependence from London to Washington; all else has flowed from that. Australia and the United States are increasingly close economic collaborators, with scores of American companies actively engaged in helping to open up new areas of Australia to industrial development. No Embassy windows are broken or graffiti chalked condemning the strangling effect of U.S. capital. There is even tolerance of American business delegations arriving to lecture their Australian brethren publicly on what it takes to be a good entrepreneur in a free private enterprise society, surely a mark of real intimacy, if not bad manners, and incontestibly unique. For all their personal attractiveness and warmth, there are other well known components in the Australian makeup that would not gladly accept such patronizing from any other nation in the world.
The Australian Army, Navy, Air Force, and Civil Aviation are vigorously being oriented to American ways. Over a ten year period, a deliberate program of integration and standardization of equipment and procedures with the United States is being followed. In the military satellite field Australia collaborates closely with Washington. She has ordered F-111's for her air arm, and three guided-missile destroyers have been built in the United States, armed with U.S. weapons, and their crews trained in U.S. Navy techniques; one of these is already in Vietnam. So much for the long tradition of following the British Naval style and methods. In sum, while Australia still obviously has some sentimental ties to London, it has already discounted the British entry into the European Economic Community, looks more and more to Washington for its future security and well-being, and is deeply engaged in profound processes of alteration of its military posture, its economic life, and its view of the future awaiting it.

Australia is not a sycophantic nation and never could be. Australians are individually proud, independent, and still, despite the inroads of Hollywood television shows, culturally and linguistically distinctive. In 1955 the then Prime Minister Menzies made it clear that the ANZUS treaty with the United States did not bind Australia to support this country actively in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, then actively under the Chinese Communist gun. A decade or more later Australia enjoys an ambivalent relationship with Peking and is, for example, a good deal more accommodating publicly to Cambodia's version of neutrality than Washington has on occasion been.
But what stands out above all else in appraising the Canberra-Washington relationship is the stark feeling of dependency and even psychic impotence that it engenders in so many Australians, including those in responsible positions. The traditional subservient relationship with London has in large measure simply been substituted for by one with this country. Like the New Zealanders, Australians are perpetually anxious to know how the United States regards them. At a time in history when regional peace and security may depend largely on new ideas, new doctrines and new initiatives, Australia seems afraid to do any of the necessary innovating herself. Like America's European allies over the decade or more when NATO was showing signs of disrepair, Australia seems mesmerized by American wishes, always waiting for the latter to speak first, and in general believing itself to be totally constrained by the very size and power of its great ally. The future of the NATO alliance was not well served by such deference, and it is in retrospect doubtful that U.S. displeasure with inventive planning by others would have driven us to isolationism. What such deference did do was permit resentments to fester.

This stage has not been reached in U.S.-Australian relations, and need never be. But the relationship is peculiarly vulnerable to its inherent inequality, exacerbated by the fitful nature of U.S. strategy in an essentially second-order policy sector. As for Australia, what it brings in psychological terms to the relationship is an extraordinary combination of independent, tough, rough and ready pioneer—and subservient, silent ally. The self-image was well stated by a recent Australian writer:

Institutionalized in the suburbs is the belief in the Australian as a warrior, and the belief in Australia itself as some great power's best ally, somebody's brave and resourceful younger brother.*

*Donald Horne, "Australia Looks Around", Foreign Affairs, April 1966, p. 447
Is Australia in Vietnam just to please us? Is there more than geography in the explanation of why Australia responded when Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, even Canada did not? It may not be true, as one hears in some Australian quarters, that the Australian units in Vietnam are primarily for show, with South Vietnamese rarely allowed within the Australian compound and the latter keep spruced up chiefly for the benefit of visiting Americans. Undoubtedly the story is exaggerated. But among Australians of various political persuasions it is not uncommon to hear the Prime Minister severely criticized for "toady ing" to the United States, and for being "stunned by Lyndon Johnson's flattery."

The impending withdrawal of British power from the region will pose important tests for the strength of Australian feelings with regard both to her own independence of action, and with regard to the long-term need for American protection. But even when it does contingency planning, thoughtful Australians fear that their government will inadvertently be found suggesting to Washington what the latter wants to hear. In fact little or no contingency planning seems to be in process, perhaps because within those portions of the government where one could most expect a serious professional response to the British action there is as yet no national capability for this sort of planning. Even the would-be planners themselves explain candidly that they really do not wish to have to think about the unpleasant choices that may lie ahead.
Preferences aside, Australia lies in a quadrant of the globe that places it uncommonly close to at least one enormous Asian power—Indonesia. Australia thus does not have the option, which in theory the United States has, of not being a direct participant in the affairs of South Asia. It is not always remembered that Australia is the largest remaining white colonial power in that corner of the world, in the sense of holding the largest remaining colony consisting of East New Guinea and Papua—which in addition gives Australia a common border with Indonesia.

It is in this special regional context that the British strategic retreat from Malaysia and Singapore inevitably creates a whole new set of choices for both Australia and New Zealand. Some of them take the form of genuine options. In one form or another, the central strategic question for the next decade in the Pacific region is surely whether U.S. power is to be implanted on the Asian mainland, or whether Asian nations will sort themselves out in a form of concentric rings of neutralization and common action, with the United States playing the role of off-shore guarantor its power deployed outside the rings and circles of indigenous Asian regionalism. It may oversimplify the issue, but it puts it with the necessary political sharpness to ask whether Australia is to be an Asian power or part of an American peripheral defence apparatus for Asia. It is tempting to answer an oversimplified question with an oversimplified response, to the effect that Conservative Australia would likely favor being
part of the off-shore American role, while Socialist Australia would like to identify with the Malays, Melanesians, and Micronesians who inhabit Australia's northern and northwesterly environs. It was logical that the important Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Australian Labour Party in the summer of 1967 rated Indonesia first among the Asian nations with which, in its view, Australia should make new defence alliances in consequence of the British withdrawal.

But to place this fundamental option purely on the basis of domestic politics would not only oversimplify matters. It turns out that many Australians never even heard of the "Confrontation" which many Americans assumed to be the centerpiece of Australia's strategic problems for the last half-decade. This represents in turn a problem Australia and New Zealand both have in common—the virtual detachment of great segments of public opinion in a highly democratic society from the realities of international politics and national strategy. Even among those who are acutely aware of those realities there are responsible men, not only in the opposition Labour Party but within the present government, who believe that Australia must come to see herself as an Asian power. Although admittedly of the wrong color, Australia in this view does not want to take any steps that might appear to abandon its neighbors. For in the end Australia is far more likely to be found among the Asians than in the position of an external guarantor. Even right now a substantial understanding with Indonesia, if not an actual alliance, is felt by some Australians to be absolutely vital to Australian security. Many believe that Australia's proudest modern achievement
was to have had the good sense under the Labour Government of Chifley and Evatt to take the right side in the Indonesian War of Independence in the late 1940's, and to maintain good contacts even during the recent unpleasantness over Sukarno's claims to West Irian, and the actual Confrontation itself.

Today Australia (and New Zealand) for the first time find themselves the only white members of all-Asian regional organizations such as ASPAC. In this and other ways one can discern profound changes in Australian traditions. Even before Pearl Harbor the metropolitan relationship was a one-way street in that, if the United Kingdom were attacked, Australia would help, but the United Kingdom could not have helped Australia. Given new fears that the same thing may become true of the American relationship that dates from Pearl Harbor Day, if some thoughtful Australians have their way they may take what one newspaper recently described as a necessarily unsentimental view:

We have to study our own interest, regardless of past links; reshape our defence policies at far heavier costs; develop the alliance with America to replace the vanishing British shield, but not count for certain on any external aid. *

Perhaps Australia can indeed have its cake and eat it too—remaining an American ally, developing industrially, keeping its defence budget down, and being accepted by Asians as a blood-brother. Australian historians have recently brought to light archives which show that as early as 1909, when Australia was not supposed to have any foreign policy at all or interests outside of the Empire, secret staff papers were prepared in Australian military circles defining a strategic Australian role in the Pacific, while safely shielded by British power.

*Sun Herald, July 23, 1967
But this in turn ought to be viewed against the fact that in the fiscal year 1965-66 Australia's defence expenditures were only 3.7% of gross national product compared with 6.8% in Britain and 8% in the United States. Obviously a new order of magnitude of not only planning and conception but of execution would be involved in an Australian response to the new strategic situation which implied an independent military policy.

In the end, two things may interfere with the growing appreciation that Australia's long-term future may well be as part of the three-fifths of mankind who live in Asia, rather than as part of the white Western Europe that played the roles of dominance, tutelage, and ultimately assistance to Asians as objects of policy. One potential problem lies in New Guinea. If unrest continues to grow in the Western area, due in part to progress under Australian governance in East New Guinea, pressures may mount for Australia to unify the island and make it one nation. Already there is a flow of refugees over the border primarily for economic reasons, a flow Australia is quietly discouraging. Some Australians feel that at this stage their best interests are served by scrupulous non-interference. But suggestions are increasingly heard that Australia face this issue with Indonesia now, particularly given the latter's new and more promising political complexion.

The second complication in making Australia more "Asian" could arise from further emergence of Communist China as a dynamic and potentially expanding force in the Pacific littoral. High government officials speak privately of the possibility that Australia might some day have to develop its own nuclear weapons under a scenario in which China poses a positive
military threat and the United States finds itself deterred. The line
of reasoning is strikingly reminiscent of the Gaullist argument in Europe,
which has never been fully believed either by Americans or by Europeans,
but has been sufficiently unsettling to jar the alliance from its moorings—and
create a national French nuclear force.

V

There are some similarities between Australian and New Zealand
foreign policy; but they are by no means identical. Unlike Australia,
New Zealand is totally dependent upon her exports of wool, meat, and dairy
products. A rather casual American tariff action in July, 1967 was characterized
in the New Zealand Press as "a bombshell" and received "in sheer disbelief."
The "savage cuts" by the United States in imports of cheese did, in fact,
cut ninefold the amount imported during the previous year. There was
little consolation that New Zealand was still the biggest single supplier
in what was left of American dairy imports. New Zealand has little or
no chance of doing of what Australia is doing to become industrialized, eco-
nomically diversified, and strategically more in a position to play a
major role.

With substantial real estate—among the most beautiful in the world—but only a fifth of the population of Australia, New Zealand is to Australia
as Australia is to the United States. (New Zealanders' sensitivity about the
way Australians take them for granted actually bears an uncanny resemblance
to the feeling our Canadian neighbors have about Americans.) New Zealand
relations with Australia are based fundamentally on protection from and
services by the larger cousin to the West. Both countries are tied together
politically by the ANZUS, ANSAM, and SEATO treaties, plus the recent free
trade agreement. Increasing standardization and common procurement are taking place in the defence establishments. In Vietnam, a New Zealand artillery battery fights alongside Australian infantry in a supporting role. New Zealand rides piggy-back, so to speak, on the Australian diplomatic and intelligence services, and the New Zealand High Commissioner in Canberra is the principal funnel of overseas information to the New Zealand government.

But even though Australian-New Zealand relations remain the key to New Zealand's sense of its own future, great difficulty still exists in communication across what many Americans think of as either a fence or, at most, a narrow channel, but which is in fact 1300 miles of one of the roughest seas in the world. Closer communication between the two governments is highly logical. Political and military unity strikes many as an eventual step on the path of rational policy. But as of today unity is nowhere near the stage right reason might recommend, and those who try to simplify the problem by proposing "union now" with Australia have not started with a basic reappraisal of the interests of the two countries. In actual fact, close liaison exists only among the professionals in External Affairs and the military staffs, and unity is at best a distant dream.

New Zealand has one unique position in the Pacific, with a tradition of involvement in island affairs that still tends to dominate much of New Zealand's external perspective. But when it comes to its wider regional, not to say global role, the central fact of New Zealand's foreign is that its involvement has been instinctual and not particularly necessary. Even its substantial and gallant participation in two World Wars was characterized by the general belief that the New Zealand role was completely
optional: if New Zealand did not take part, it would really not have mattered and nothing would have happened—a feeling which New Zealand writer Alan Robinson has called that of "tokenism". If the New Zealand Communist Party has achieved international notoriety for being one of the few to opt for all-out Maoism, the numbers involved are minuscule (and its influence in the country non-existent).

Australia, New Zealanders generally concede, is running fifteen years ahead of New Zealand both in awareness of the Southwest Pacific's place in the world, and in the prospect of action and planning based on this perception. This judgment might not be shared in Australia, and New Zealand itself does not seem fully aware or involved in the implications of a race. The gap with Australia is qualitative and quantitative both, and the depth of the problem is shown by the fact that the defence budget this very year has been reduced. As in Australia, there are in New Zealand well-informed and thoughtful people—government officials, journalists, a growing handful of intellectuals—who worry about such problems. Unanimously they feel strongly held back from what they conceive to be rational strategic planning and action by the relative apathy of public opinion. The man in the street in New Zealand is a potent constraint on foreign policy. If some Australians never heard of Confrontation, New Zealand as a nation was scarcely aware of it. In a very real sense, New Zealand simply cannot see Asia very well through Australia, which blocks the view: New Zealand is 3,000 miles further from Indonesia and any other area of Asia than continental Australia.
VI

The role of the elephant in elephant-rabbit stew is always in large measure pre-ordained. The United States is essentially as unconcerned with the problems of Australia and New Zealand as those two countries are preoccupied with their sense of virtually total dependency on this country. It is probably true that the United States would be doing that which it is doing and will do in the Pacific region, if there were no Australia or New Zealand. As a perceptive Australian historian said recently:

There are no identifiable U.S. defence or strategic commitments... which Americans would not wish to maintain even if the Australian alliance did not exist. America's commitment in Australia furthers but does not cause a U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean.*

It is, at the least, a convenience for the United States that Australia houses and partly mans some of its satellite and space-tracking stations, for example, those at Tiddindilla, Carnavon, and Woomera. In addition, there is a station near Canberra which is designed to track the Apollo mission, and a joint Australian-American research facility at Alice Springs which, it is hinted, may have some relationship to the manned orbital laboratory mission of the U.S. Department of Defence. It is also unofficially rumored that a Joint British-American-Australian research project at Woomera investigates re-entry and ABM problems. Finally, a U-2 base is believed by many Australians to exist in Central

Australia. It has long been known that a U.S. Naval Communications Station exists at the Northwest for allied ships at sea in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

But if the United States has found the Australian and New Zealand relationships useful for practical base requirements, as well as for purposes of displaying alliance unity in Vietnam, there is little evidence that anything resembling a keen sense of common interests exists in American policy-making circles adequate to the significance of the alliance. There is no other way to account for the economic disaster of our own making we have inflicted on our loyal New Zealand ally. Nor is there any other way to account for Washington's persistent tendency to use both Canberra and Wellington as diplomatic dumping-ground—a tendency unanimously described in private by senior officials, intellectuals, and common citizens alike in both countries as a chronic offense to both their intelligence and their patience. It is perhaps natural that successive American administrations have viewed both countries as sufficiently safe to be unimportant and uninteresting from the standpoint of American official representation. But out of 200 million Americans it should be possible for the President of the United States and the Secretary of State to select high-grade, intelligent, thoughtful, perceptive, and well-informed men or women to represent this country in what are virtually the only two independent and self-sustaining fighting allies of the United States today in the world.

In the 1860s Secretary of State Seward predicted that "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond will become the chief
theatre of events in the world's great hereafter."* From the turn of the century the United States, even during its recurrent periods of isolationism with regard to Europe, has viewed itself with reasonable consistency as a Pacific power. The years ahead are likely to underscore this view rather than diminish it. Both in terms relative to American participation in Europe and in absolute terms, there remain to be conceived new strategic and political conceptions that look beyond the war in Vietnam. A posture for the United States is needed that will maximize the chances for stability and progress in Asia in the decade or two ahead, without enmeshing this country in every detail of the inevitable collisions between the forces of modernization and change, and chronic Chinese cultural and ideological imperialism.

Any American grand design for the Pacific-Asian region must ask what the optimal posture for this country can be under such circumstances. There is a growing conviction in the United States that when the Vietnam war can be honorably settled the proper place for American military power is off-shore and not on the mainland. It will be highly relevant to ask whether the role of off-shore guarantor is to be played alone, or with our white allies, or as part of regional or global security and peacekeeping arrangements.

If the United States stumbles into its role through a series of inadvertences—as it has in Vietnam—rather as part of a calculated re-definition of the national interest and an elaboration of strategies and policies appropriate to that interest, we may err in assuming that Australia and New Zealand—or anyone else—will automatically be found in support of such an adventitious and compulsive American

policy. In more positive terms, the United States may benefit greatly by offering greater encouragement to its allies to contribute imaginatively—and candidly—to the grand design.