SOVIET POLITICALindoctrination:

MASS MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA IN THE POST-STALIN PERIOD

by

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Inspired by Alex Inkeles' classic study, I began in the early nineteen sixties to study Soviet mass communication and propaganda. This interest has grown throughout my years of graduate study, and along with it has developed a desire to contribute to the building of bridges between the study of Soviet politics and the analysis of political behavior in general. Although conditions for linking these two fields of enquiry are far from ideal even today, the situation has improved significantly over the last decade. The study of political motivations and actions has come into its own as a legitimate area of scholarly concentration, and the Soviet political environment has improved enough to make available more useful and interesting materials.

The present study is one result of a project on Communist communication systems carried on at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1963 to 1969 under the direction of Ithiel de Sola Pool. As a principle investigator of Soviet mass communications I contributed several monographs on domestic media during the post-Stalin period. My doctoral dissertation was an attempt to bring together and analyze some of the material gathered and to relate it to newly available information on Soviet audience reactions. The present book is an outgrowth of that effort.

Any student of political behavior must still be frustrated by attempting to work on Soviet politics, and it will be some time, if ever, before Western scholars will have direct access to the Soviet population for research purposes. Political restrictions have not prevented the production of a number of insightful works, however, and in some cases have led investigators to unearth new and interesting materials not commonly utilized in the study of more open political systems.*

In the present book, I have made use of some conventional sources, such as the Soviet press and individual Soviet publications on mass communications, as well as some more unusual materials, among which are Soviet anthropological village studies, sociological investigations, and fictional literature. The staff of the above-mentioned project completed over one hundred interviews with former Soviet citizens who left the USSR after 1958; these have been used as case studies to supplement and check other information. My own visits to the Soviet Union, totalling seven months in 1961 and 1964-5, provided me with many opportunities for participant observation and informal interviews on the subject at hand. These have helped to guide me in the necessarily cautious use of the Soviet-produced data.

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PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, other organs of our press and Soviet radio and television are a powerful means of rearing the people and propagandizing the party's ideas, a medium for attracting the broadest masses of working people to participate in the managing of the affairs of our society.... Now that we have entered the epoch of the construction of communism, the importance of all forms of ideological work and its role in the life of society have especially increased.

(L. I. Brezhnev, opening speech at the ceremony celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of IZVESTIYA, printed in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, March 14, 1967, p. 1.)
INTRODUCTION

In Soviet society the process of political socialization is the subject of much greater attention and concern than in almost any other modern industrial nation. This preoccupation, which has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the Party as the sole source and the citizen as a passive recipient of political visions and norms, has remained strong and in some ways even strengthened during the post-Stalin period. One of the most notable features of everyday life in the USSR is the almost inescapable barrage of political messages directed at the ordinary citizen; this we have come to call political "indoctrination," meaning an extensive effort on the part of the regime to imbue adult Soviet citizens with the current official political world-view. In this book we shall examine post-Stalin developments in two main areas of Soviet adult political indoctrination, the mass media and the agitation-propaganda apparatus.

There is little or no distinction made in the Soviet political system between the function of political communication and that of persuasion; indeed, Lenin eschewed such an idea as "bourgeois objectivism." To study the public media of communication in the Soviet Union, then, is to learn something about the over-all process of political socialization. These politically dominated channels are the primary modern means of
teaching the Soviet population the official world view as interpreted by the Party elite at any given time; in other words, they may be considered today the major agents of adult political socialization in the Soviet system. We shall concentrate on developments in organization and the availability of the various mass media and the agitation-propaganda apparatus, and the use of and reactions to them by the Soviet population. In so doing, we seek some insight into little-known attitudes of Soviet citizens toward politically relevant objects and issues. Specifically, the book has the following as its main tasks: (1) to place the mass media and agitation-propaganda apparatus in the general context of Soviet efforts at political socialization, (2) to discuss the development of and relations among the mass media and the public personal communication network during the post-Stalin period, (3) to analyze the availability of these agents to the population and some reactions of that audience to them, and (4) to use this information in making generalizations about the role of mass communications and the propaganda apparatus in the process of Soviet adult political indoctrination during the post-Stalin years.

In order to place our subject matter in perspective we shall look at the context in which Soviet efforts at adult political indoctrination take place. Our concerns will be: the nature of the political system and its effect on the content of political socialization; some important agents of childhood political socialization; and the special position and
potentialities of the mass communications media and agitation-
propaganda apparatus in the overall effort to inculcate citizens with
the proper world view and behavior appropriate to the man "worthy
of living under Communism."
CHAPTER ONE: THE CONTEXT

The Nature of the Political System

Dawson and Prewitt have pointed out some of the basic assumptions made by political socialization theorists: among them are that citizens in different nations come to feel and believe differently about their political leaders and structures, and that the various attitudes citizens have toward political life affect the way in which the State operates. An examination of the Soviet case underscores the necessity of making an additional important assumption: that the way in which the polity is conceived by its founders and leaders affects the character of the citizenship role and therefore the nature, goals, and content of political socialization. There is a good deal of difference in the amount and type of citizen involvement expected in a consensus democracy and that required in a totalitarian dictatorship; there is an attendant difference in how carefully orchestrated are the efforts of these two types of political systems to inculcate the norms of correct citizen behavior in the population.

To understand the Soviet effort, we should be clear about what we mean by two important terms. Political socialization may be viewed from two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, it is the process by which any given political community inculcates in its members
a particular view of power (its real and ideal distribution and use), to-
gether with certain acceptable norms of behavior for political life and
the motivations appropriate to the citizen's role in the political com-
munity. For the citizen, political socialization consists of his growing
exposure to and awareness of politically relevant objects and issues, as
well as some sense of how he relates to them in his role as a member
of the community. This dual focus on the society as "teacher" and the
citizen as "learner" implies not a unidirectional flow of influence, but
a building up of mutual expectations by the two participants in the proc-
ess. Political "indoctrination" is an extreme form of the teaching role,
one which is common to all regimes seeking to totally politicize the life
of their subjects.

For the society, the major significance of political socialization
lies in how well it teaches people to respond to government in certain
expected ways. Since the political system relies upon certain habituated
responses by citizens, this usually amounts to the passing on of the atti-
tudes and habits of one generation to their successor generations. It is
a conservatizing function. In a revolutionary regime, the initial thrust
of political socialization is the opposite of what we have just been describ-
ing: the regime seeks to make its citizens "unlearn" old attitudes and
behaviors toward government, and then to teach young citizens ones
radically different from those of their elders. As the revolutionary
regime consolidates its power, its efforts at political socialization are
directed more and more toward preserving the status quo, but with a built-in contradiction: the dynamism of revolution is to be preserved along with a protection of the new regime from the political upheaval usually associated with such dynamism. This, of course, is one of the paradoxes of Soviet political socialization.

For individual citizens, political socialization is a part of one's increasing familiarity with his cultural environment, of which politics is one component. It helps him to define his identity and role vis-a-vis other members of the society. This has been called the formation of the "political self," after Mead's concept of the "social self." Part of this is providing the person with a more or less structured outlook which enables him to identify with his own political community ("I am a Soviet man"), to sort people and events into political categories ("capitalist exploiters," "struggles for national liberation"), and to judge them by political criteria ("Fascist beasts"). To the extent that it is effective, political socialization also provides the foundation for recruitment to and training in political roles more specialized than that of citizen. Unless an individual understands and to some degree accepts the political system under which he lives he is not likely to work effectively within it or to even aspire to do so.

This leads us to consider what is the position of the individual in relation to Soviet society. Whereas the Anglo-American democratic tradition conceives of political man as a rational decision-maker with
certain inalienable civil rights, such a notion is not central to Com-
munist thought on the subject. Rather, the emphasis in Marxism-
Leninism is on the individual in his capacity as member of a collective,
one who derives important benefits from that membership and who owes
certain centrally defined obligations to it. The possibility of legitimate
conflict between the state and its citizens is raised, but not resolved,
in the following quotation from an article in the main theoretical journal,

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY:

The unity of individual and state interests under socialism
neither implies that they are indistinguishable nor precludes
the existence of certain contradictions between the state's
interests and the direct interests of the individual citizen.
But these contradictions do not affect the foundations of the
socialist system, because the entire social system of social-
ism, the whole activity of the socialist state, is directed
toward serving man's welfare, and, consequently, such con-
tradictions are successfully surmounted by the consolidation
and development of socialist relationships and by the growth
of communist consciousness among the workers.

In other words, conflicts between the state and the citizen are in practice
resolved by changes in the citizen, who accommodates himself to the
political order, and not the other way around. This places the burden
of reconciling differences between the two on the citizen's perception
of the historical situation; his perception is either totally correct or
totally incorrect, depending on whether it matches that of the elite.

If the individual's behavior and attitudes are to be changed to fit
the state's conception of what they should be, the state must have some
program for inducing the proper attitudes and behaviors among its citi-
zens. The Soviet system has been remarkably innovative in institution-
alizing such means. One can conceive of the Soviet program as a three-pronged effort: (1) political indoctrination or persuasion, (2) positive coercion, (3) negative coercion. Individuals are bombarded throughout their life cycle with a steady stream of messages meant to convince them of the legitimacy and moral rectitude of the regime's policies and to mobilize the population for the fulfillment of those policies. This is the Soviet regime's conception of its role in political socialization. However, the extent to which a regime has ambitions for citizen conformity determines not only the nature of political socialization itself, but the extent to which that program is backed up by complementary coercive mechanisms for enforcing the norms of behavior, and the seriousness of punishments for their violation.

Even if an individual resists internalizing the Soviet Communist world view presented to him, he is coerced to behave in ways which "prove" that he has accepted it. He is forced to "go through the motions" of enthusiasm and loyalty, and to continually express confidence in the regime. This is accomplished by intensive pressures on people to participate in mass demonstrations, to attend political meetings and rallies, or to vote en bloc with neighbors and colleagues. The assumption, which is by no means a naive one, is that the individual playing the role of good citizen will eventually come to be one.4

Should persuasion and role-playing fail, or produce a boomerang effect, the regime is well supplied with adequate means for intimidating
the unconvinced and rebellious into submission to, if not active support for, the political order. Such intimidation does not merely fulfill the function of eliminating or re-socializing by force all those who openly violate norms. It also plays a more subtle and perhaps more important role for the political system. This effect has been called by Alex Inkeles the "institutionalization of anxiety":

I am suggesting that the terror is as important for handling those whom the regime regards as relatively solid citizens as it is for dealing with those whom the totalitarian wishes to eliminate or put out of circulation for varying periods. In other words, terror is a means for institutionalizing and channeling anxiety.

The regime seeks to create in every man the nagging fear that he may have done something wrong, that he may have left something undone, that he may have said some impermissible thing.

...it is a powerful force in making every man doubly watchful of his step. ...It will wake him in the middle of the night to go back to his office to do his sums over again, to redraw his blueprint and then draw it again, to edit and then edit again the article he is writing, to check and then recheck and then check his machine again. Anxiety demands relief and compulsive reiteration of action is one of the most common human patterns for the handling of anxiety. It is this compulsive conformity which the totalitarian regime wants.5

One of the major features of Soviet political indoctrination, then, is that it is reinforced by a coercive system which attempts to force people to behave in prescribed ways, and to intimidate them into not behaving in proscribed ways. Such coercion may in fact contribute to an acceptance of the persuasive effort as normal, and to the substance of these efforts, the role of the ideal citizen, as acceptable. In short,
when people find themselves in a situation they cannot escape, they usually make some adjustment to the requirements of circumstance.

There are several other outstanding features of Soviet political "persuasion" which bear mentioning, for they are essential to an understanding of the role of mass media in the over-all process.

1) High visibility of political content. The most casual visitor to the Soviet Union notices slogans, politicized art, and ubiquitous political symbols such as portraits of Lenin and current leaders, the hammer and sickle, and so forth. Those who speak Russian are even more impressed by the subtlety of the political message in Soviet society.

2) Broad scope of penetration of political content. No subject in the school curriculum, no radio or television station, no newspaper, no library, club, factory, or other place where people gather in extra-family groups is free from this very obvious political content. Such ubiquity makes it difficult for Soviet individuals to escape the political messages being sent out by the regime.

3. High intensity and internal consistency of political indoctrination. The first two features contribute to a high intensity which is brought about by constant repetition and reinforcement of the same messages by all of the public media. There is some, but very little, variation in the messages going out over public and Party sources of information, so that extra-official information and alternative interpretations must travel almost exclusively among individuals in face-to-face situations.
There are written bulletins for elite groups, but the general population does not have access to them directly. This means that incongruence of political content occurs mainly only between the public message and the private word-of-mouth message, the agents for which are family and friends. Occasionally two journals will differ over an issue or the radio will let slip an important fact which is later suppressed, but these are exceptions.

Soviet Conceptions About Human Nature

Raymond Bauer has pointed to the necessity for understanding fundamental Soviet conceptions about human character, stressing that such notions about man in society provide a foundation for a theory of the prediction and control of human behavior, as well as a model for training its future members. Several scholars have explored the Soviet view of human nature, so that it is possible to identify a set of characteristics thought to be basic to all men. Bauer has commented on the Soviet conception of man's nature as essentially "plastic." This emphasis, he notes, is related to two central points of Marxist doctrine, the dialectical principle of the continual change of everything that exists, and the historical materialist principle of the social nature of man. This leads naturally to a second assumption about man, that his behavior is socially determined. Yurii Bronfenbrenner has cited some manifestations of this view in Soviet child training, especially
certain forms of collective socialization stressing control by peers:

competition organized among social units rather than individuals, and

collective censure or punishment of deviant behavior. Certainly the

traditional Bolshevik mistrust of "class enemies" is partially a state-

ment of faith in the extent of social influence; bourgeois and aristocratic

attitudes acquired from parents and environment are considered all but

impossible for an individual to shed.

Margaret Mead has pointed to a third important and related ele-

ment in the Bolshevik conception of human nature. This premise is

essentially a dialectical view of personality, holding that each individual,

while capable of being changed and molded by his environment, carries

with him at all times a whole series of "disallowed" attitudes. This

means that no one, not even the most loyal Party member, can ever

relax his vigilance against undesirable tendencies in himself and others.

Instead of a conception of human character in which, through a

long period of maturation, the individual becomes permanently

attached to the Good as his society sees it and so becomes

permanently incorruptible and reliable, the conception is that

every individual maintains the capacity for complete betrayal

of all those values to which he has hitherto shown devoted

allegiance.

Both Nathan Leites and Geoffrey Gorer have commented on this feature

as well. Thus, even after the successful teaching of political ideals,

there must be a never-ending effort on the part of society to help indi-

viduals remain attached to the good and to prevent moral and political

corrosion by treacherous destructive elements always lurking within

the individual's personality.
These three premises, (1) the plasticity of man's nature, (2) the social determination of his behavior, (3) the internal struggle between good and evil within man, together serve as justifications for a sustained, aggressive, and pervasive system of political socialization aimed at adult Soviet citizens. In a sense, they can be considered the raw material out of which the ideal member of Soviet society is to be fashioned.

The Content of Soviet Political Socialization

The process of becoming a political person clearly involves more than the acceptance of a formal ideology; it includes as well the acquisition of a perceptual framework which helps the individual recognize what is "political," and which determines in part his emotional orientation towards political objects and issues. There is, then, a distinction to be made between that which is easily recognizable as directly related to politics, for example the taking on of political party loyalties, and that which has more indirect effects, such as a perception of authority based on observations of parental behavior.

Our concern in this book will be limited to the transmission of rather specific political content via the public channels of communication which we are studying and the reactions of people to those channels. Generally speaking, this means the Soviet Communist world-view, which includes information, attitudes, and judgments about:
1) How political power in the world is and should be structured.

2) Notions of progress and the nature and direction of historical change.

3) The role of the Soviet Union in world affairs.

4) The role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at home and abroad.

5) The place of the citizen in Soviet political life, and his ideal qualities.

Most of the ideological conceptions falling into these categories are well-known and need no recapitulation here. They are presented to Soviet citizens in a remarkably coherent fashion by all state agencies of political socialization, including the public channels of communications.

The fifth of these categories tells us much about what everyday political life is supposed to be like for the individual Soviet citizen. The extent to which the regime succeeds in instilling such qualities in the Soviet population determines how much conformity can be taken for granted and how much coercion must be employed to supplement efforts at persuasion. A number of authors have dealt either implicitly or explicitly with the qualities of the ideal citizen, so that we can draw a rough portrait of him.

1) He is a lover of labor, a willing and enthusiastic contributor to the material growth of the economy. 12

2) His life is totally politicized, 13 meaning:

   a) He is continually expected to subordinate his own will to that of the party leadership at any given time.

   b) All personal emotions, needs, values, comforts, and interests are to be subordinated to political goals.
c) He accepts all Party pronouncements and orders with credulousness and enthusiasm. 14

3) He is always an activist, participating in civic activities, demonstrations, agitation sessions, and so on; in this way he translates his strong sense of social duty into reality. 15

4) He is politically literate, and uses his firm grasp of ideology to guide his actions and attitudes toward specific people or events. 16

5) He is unspontaneous and self-disciplined. 17 (This is of course rooted in the dialectical view of human personality which breeds a suspicion of one's own emotions.)

6) He is vigilant against not only his own "inner enemies," the emotions, but also against others as enemies. 18 Friends, family members, or colleagues may be wittingly or unwittingly agents of larger, more diffuse enemies, such as imperialism, or the "capitalist conspiracy," or Fascism.

7) He has a sense of solidarity with workers in all countries, and particularly with those in other socialist countries. 19

8) He is patriotic. 20 (Patriotism is sometimes linked ominously with vigilance against internal and external enemies, and failure to detect them may result in charges of treason.)

9) He is collectivist, anti-individualist, and anti-egoist. 21

10) He manifests a host of virtues which are not political in themselves, but which may be politically derived: honesty, sobriety, modesty, courage, etc., as well as a total lack of snobbishness, arrogance, or desire to exploit one's fellow man. The virtues listed in the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism (1961) are: "humanism and mutual respect between people; honesty and truthfulness; moral purity and modesty in public and private life; mutual respect in the family and concern for the upbringing of children; and intolerance toward injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism, and money-grubbing."

11) Although many of these virtues have been claimed as Christian, modern Soviet man is expected to be a convinced atheist, having no need for religion of any kind.
This is the ideal image of the future Soviet citizen which is transmitted to the population via all of the socialization agents. To be at once politically literate, totally committed to Communism and the Party, activist, labor-loving, collectivist, patriotic, vigilant, internationalist, disciplined, as well as modest, honest, unselfish and so forth is perhaps not realistically expected of all Soviet citizens, but it is the model toward which they are all expected to strive. Almost as interesting as the virtues listed are those not mentioned. It is no accident that Soviet citizens are not encouraged to be "open-minded," "fair," "independent," "self-reliant," or to exhibit a spirit of compromise, all traits which would put them in good standing in a democratic society. Also missing from our portrait of Soviet-man-to-be is a discussion of the rules of the game of politics [other than following the will of the Party and listening modestly to criticism of one's acts and attitudes]. This is no accident, either, for the rules of Soviet politics are not designed for mediation and problem-solving by an association of equal citizens; therefore, there is no elaborate or sophisticated public education program of this sort.

Although only the most dedicated Party member can really expect to live up to the impressive list of characterological requirements we have summarized, there is a sort of "all-or-nothing" aspect to their presentation. An individual is defined as being either totally "for" or totally "against" the regime and the Party. It is inconceivable, for
example, that one could be considered a good Russian if he rejected the dictatorship of the Party, or even one of its concrete policies. This means that one must constantly prove one's activism, devotion, and commitment or become suspect of some deviation or conspiracy. Note the linkage in the moral code; the first item is "devotion to the goal of communism, love for the socialist motherland, and toward the countries of socialism," all in one.

Some Agents of Childhood Political Socialization: Family, School, Youth Organizations, and Mass Media

Mass adult political indoctrination is preceded and surrounded by the influence of other important agents of political socialization. Learning about and becoming part of the political culture in which one lives is a life-long process, and one in which certain types of content are more important at one stage than another. Likewise, certain agents of socialization are more significant at one stage in the life cycle than at another. In childhood, the most important sources of influence are the family, the school and the peer group. In the Soviet context, the family is viewed as complementary to the more formal agents of society, such as the school and youth groups, and the latter two are much more closely intertwined than in Western democracies. Though peer groups in any society tend to become increasingly important as an individual takes his place among equals, in the Soviet Union this process is accelerated by official promotion of the influence of the collective and public
agencies (such as Party youth organizations) over personal and private ones (the family and informal friendship groups).

The Family

The importance of the family's influence on the formation of political socialization, although some of them attribute more significance to it than do others. Undoubtedly the family plays an important part in the formation of a child's basic personality patterns. Parental influence is both intense, resulting largely from the unequal power relationship in which the child is almost wholly dependent for sustenance and affection; and broad, resulting in the transmission of all sorts of attitudes related both directly and indirectly to politics. Enjoying a near monopoly of the child's attention and affection during his earliest years, the family, comprising a small power structure, presents the child with his first behavioral models and experiences in interpersonal relationships. On this basis he forms expectations which he may later generalize to political objects.

Soviet thought on the role of the family in child rearing has from the beginning focused on the parental role in the formation of the child's political and social attitudes. Parents are considered temporary custodians of the young citizen, and their degree of legitimate authority over the child is directly dependent on how well they perform their role in the eyes of the Party. A recent article in PRAVDA emphasized this "mission":

"mission":
It is the parents' sacred duty to instill in their children from an early age such precious qualities as conscious love of the socialist homeland, devotion to the cause of Communism, honesty, diligence and the desire to serve the people loyally and to defend the gains of the Revolution. This calls for constant and concerned penetration into the spiritual world of children and patient and comprehensive upbringing work.\textsuperscript{23}

Although the understandable fear of revolutionaries has been that the family is an agent of tradition, tending to pass on the ideas and attitudes of older generations reared in previous social orders, research on Soviet post-revolutionary families has indicated that this is not necessarily so. Alex Inkeles found that, far from recapitulating in its own parental behavior the socialization patterns and goals of its parents, the "revolutionary generation" (i.e., those who were young adults at the time of the revolution) turned away from old ideas, stressing values and goals more appropriate to the new social order where politics was much more salient.\textsuperscript{24} Likewise, Kent Geiger found that "...in a majority of cases anti-Soviet parents were unwilling or unable by their own efforts to raise anti-Soviet children."\textsuperscript{25} Parents either declined to discuss politics in front of children, or the impressive line-up of opposing forces from the outside society was too overwhelming for the child to resist.

It seems reasonable to assume that as Soviet power grows older, resistance by the family to the political system lessens. One must conclude, then, that the Soviet family tends to support and reinforce the political socialization carried on by the agents of the society; it is relatively ineffectual in opposing or resisting such influence.
Interestingly enough, during the post-Stalin period Soviet authorities have become more and more openly concerned about political change, and especially about the role of parents teaching children the appropriate motivations and attitudes for life in the Communist society to come. They have been concerned with social attitudes, because of the chronic presence of juvenile delinquency in the socialist society, and with political attitudes because of rapid political change accompanied by discontinuous patterns of political socialization. The PRAVDA article mentioned above goes on to complain of parental negligence in these areas:

Few fathers and only some mothers talk with their children on civic themes, apparently believing that our Soviet reality itself molds one's Communist world view. Some parents even forget to ask their sons or daughters what assignments he or she is fulfilling in the Young Pioneer detachments of the Young Communist League group and rarely take an interest in children's public activities in school. But after all, this is extremely important—detailed conversations about the small citizens' doings, joint excursions to historical sites, family discussions on new books and motion pictures, and many other things that go into moral upbringing.\(^{26}\)

The statement is interesting in that it seemingly contradicts a rather basic Marxian tenet that the social environment forms man's character; an alternative inference would be that Soviet socialist society is not as perfect as it is represented in official literature, and thus its social influence has negative results in character formation.

The School and Youth Groups

Discussions of childhood political socialization usually separate the influence of the school from that of peer groups. This is due to the fact
that most of the studies on these agents have been done in the Western democratic context, where most peer groups are informal, voluntary, and varied in purpose. Two characteristic features of totalitarian societies combine to make the Soviet case quite different: a tremendous concern with teaching youth the political values and behavior appropriate to a particular highly organized and programmatic political system, and aspirations toward a government monopoly of all social and political associations. Almost all peer groups in the Soviet Union are highly organized, non-voluntary, and political in purpose. Controlling all recreational facilities, they are closely linked to the school environment; thus, together with the school, they almost completely monopolize the child's free time and access to recreational and social life outside the family environment. Since education is compulsory, all young Soviet citizens pass through this system, which presents children with a common political outlook and training in correct, standardized citizen behavior.

What sort of attitudes and behaviors related to politics are learned in school? Western studies have shown that by the time a child comes to school he has already begun to develop a positive emotional attachment to his country and to a political party. In school these commitments are intensified and given a cognitive dimension through the acquisition of knowledge about the political world. The child begins to learn his role in political life, and to form more concrete perceptions
of political institutions and relationships. His conceptions gradually shift from concrete to abstract notions, so that there is a gradual absorption of some ideological viewpoint; this progresses to its maximum level by the last years in high school. The school also plays a great part in inculcating the norms of citizen behavior; in this respect the rules and rituals of classroom life are extremely important. Research on American school children has shown that younger pupils tend to idealize political authority, seeing it as overwhelmingly benevolent, and that by the eighth grade children are still much less cynical about the political system than their teachers. These findings from American studies show that, even in a system where relatively little emphasis is placed on overt political education, the school is an important agent of political socialization, especially in developing feelings of loyalty, ideological orientation, and compliance with the rules of citizen behavior. It seems fair to assume that the Soviet school system, which places an extreme emphasis on political education, is at least equally successful at this age level.

What aspects of the Soviet educational environment contribute to its effectiveness as an agent of political socialization? The Soviet school curriculum has many courses that teach a one-sided political outlook. Children are required to pass political courses each year, such as "Fundamentals of Political Knowledge," or "Political Economics," stressing only the Marxist-Leninist view of reality. Philosophy and
history, too, are essentially courses in political theory and history, selecting whatever concepts and facts illustrate the current Party line. Mathematics and science courses, as well as literature and artistic subjects, also stress political rather than scientific or aesthetic principles. Classroom ritual is another source of political influence; children are taught slogans, salutes, songs, and stories which glorify the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They are constantly confronted with Young Pioneer and Komsomol models of behavior to emulate. The teacher is a third important source of political influence: as a representative of society's authority, she is both an adult model of behavior, and the perpetrator of a learning culture in which political correctness is an integral part of scholarly success. The Soviet classroom culture emphasizes discipline, respect for authority, and the mastering of prescribed patterns. Alternative views of politics are ridiculed or ignored, and Marxism-Leninism is presented as the basis of all knowledge -- social, political, aesthetic, and scientific.

In contrast to the finding of Hess and Torney\textsuperscript{34} that peer group membership or activity seems to have no effect on the acceptance by the child of the basic elements of citizenship in a democratic state, the Soviet child's participation in a society of his peers is much more likely to bear political fruit. His free time is completely monopolized by school and the youth organizations, whose activities are closely coordinated to reinforce political training in a group atmosphere. Membership
in the Young Octobrist and Young Pioneer organizations is practically universal for the eligible age group, and all recreational facilities are controlled by the youth organizations, so that there is little opportunity to escape their influence. The structure of the Young Pioneers follows the school organization: a brigade consists of all children in all classes of a single school grade, a detachment is composed of all children in one class, and detachments with ten or more members are broken into links, the membership of which is supposedly determined by the children themselves.  

When the child leaves for the first time the hierarchical power structure of his family and enters into association with a collective of his peers, he must learn the proper behavior and attitudes. These are taught him by the teacher and youth group leader with the aid of the older children. The emphasis is on collective activity: games and toys are shared, cooperative projects are carried out, and competition is organized among groups rather than individuals. The child learns immediately that what he does affects the success of his group, and that he is responsible for the attitudes and behaviors of other children. He learns not only the correct forms of behavior, but also the positive and negative sanctions used by the group to influence its members: public criticism, awards for meritorious deeds, and so on.

The activities of youth groups are explicitly and totally political. They feature visits to historical sites, mobilizations for holidays
demonstrations and public campaigns, and group sports and hobbies which have a para-military significance. Youth camps run by the Pioneer and Komsomol organization place heavy emphasis on learning such skills as amateur radio operation, glider flying, motorcycle driving, hiking, and camping. Physical fitness and "military preparedness" are fostered. These camps are aided by the DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy) organization. In recent years there has been a campaign to intensify this sort of training for young people; a 1967 PRAVDA editorial stated:

DOSAAF committees...must more fully satisfy the growing demands of young people. It is necessary to expand the construction of sports installations and facilities and to set up new clubs, sports, and technical schools and military patriotic camps. 36

Komsomol organizations claim about a fifty percent membership of the eligible age group, but the proportion is higher for students in universities and higher educational institutions. Again, the youth groups control most of the recreational facilities, and young people are always subject to public criticism by the local Komsomol groups. Komsomols themselves are often organized into specialized groups for political indoctrination: MOLODY EZH AZERBAIDZHANA (Youth of Azerbaidzhan) on August 17, 1966 mentioned the setting up of clubs called such names as "Rodina" (Motherland), for the purpose of studying the history and culture and revolutionary traditions of the Party and nation, and "Olymp" for revealing the "deeper socio-political role of physical culture." 37
The major significance of all these activities is not only to teach young people specific attitudes and behaviors, but to get them used to active political involvement from an early age. Children thus become used to taking orders, following the group, and do not develop habits of privatized leisure. As the child grows older, the function of political socialization is deliberately and gradually transferred from the parents to the school:

On no account is it admissible to belittle the importance of family upbringing, particularly in early childhood, but the adolescent requires the attention of very highly trained teachers. In this connection we think it would be more correct to shift the center of gravity of the adolescent's upbringing to the school. We have in mind the need for comprehensive development of extra-curricular work with the pupils of the middle and upper grades, the gradual transformation of the school, after classes, into a Young Pioneer--Y.C.L. (Komsomol) club, and the broadening of the sphere of schoolchildren's socially useful labor activity. 38

Mass Media

Another important influence on children, especially in the Soviet Union, is the mass media, mainly the broadcast media. We have little consistent or conclusive data on how radio and television exposure is related to the formation of political attitudes by American children, and even less basis on which to speculate in the Soviet case. For several reasons, we can assume that Soviet children spend a good deal less time being exposed to the broadcast media than either American children or Soviet adults. Their time is not only very nearly monopolized by organized activities outside the home, but media exposure patterns are quite
different in the Soviet Union. Television is, of course, much less accessible than in the United States, so that only in large cities and European areas does the child have ready access to a television set at all.

When television is available, however, viewing conditions are not always favorable. The Soviet parent cannot simply use the television set as an electronic babysitter; because of crowded living conditions, the wishes of other adults must be considered, and usually all must join the child in his television viewing, an activity for which most adults have limited patience. Television programs for children in the Soviet Union are carefully planned to convey the same political messages which are transmitted to children in the school and youth groups, so they have mainly a reinforcing effect. In fact, Pioneer personnel are often called upon to assist in preparing children's programs. The following quotation gives an idea of the orientation of Soviet children's programs:

We try to transmit to our listeners the high moral principles of builders of communism through living human characters, to show them the traits of citizens and patriots in the course of their development, the fight and conflict with the opposing contradictory old world... our task is to use stories about the older generation and to transmit their revolutionary traditions to children, to develop in children a readiness for heroism and to change it into action which can find expression in various, sometimes unimportant events of our life. This aim is served by the broadcasts entitled "A World to Young Lenin Followers," "Courage and Valor," "Glory," "This is the Work Action of Young Pioneers," etc.

By the time a Soviet individual reaches adulthood, he has had long, intensive exposure to several important agents of political socialization.
Most of these agents (such as the school, youth organizations, and the mass media) place such a heavy emphasis on political training that they may be more accurately described as instruments of political indoctrination. What have these agents achieved?

By the age of five or six, the Soviet child can probably identify the Soviet Union as his country, and himself as a Soviet citizen. This attachment, which is indiscriminately positive, is fostered and intensified by the school and the society of peers created within the context of the Young Octobrist, Young Pioneer, and Komsomol organizations. At school age children can also identify political symbols and objects, such as the hammer and sickle and cosmonauts, and political authorities are perceived as overwhelmingly benevolent. The Soviet child is taught to identify the Soviet Union with the Communist Party, and every effort is made to encourage this joint identification. Even in adult political indoctrination the inseparability of Communism and the Soviet government is a fundamental tenet, thus automatically defining anyone who questions the acceptability of communism as a traitor. Like American children, but in a much more extreme form, Soviet children have been presented with a simplistic, sugar-coated version of political life, and they have little with which to compare that vision. The post-Stalin period has, of course, presented an exception to this: the rapid and radical changes in textbooks and official versions have provided all Soviet citizens, especially those in the course of active political indoctrination, with several
different idealized visions of truth, thus contributing to confusion in ideological orientation. The Soviet child has been thoroughly trained in the correct forms of citizen behavior, and taught to rely on his peers for judgment of his attitudes and actions. He has been used to an active involvement in politically relevant activities, but at the same time taught to suspect individual initiative in making decisions and interpreting political events. He has learned the rudiments of the Marxist-Leninist outlook as interpreted by the Party elite, and has learned the basic rules of politics as they apply to him at that stage in life.

The Soviet Emphasis on Adult Political Socialization

Having looked at what has probably been accomplished by the time a Soviet citizen reaches adulthood, we might ask the question, "What tasks are left for the political socialization program?" Phrased another way, we are asking what are the limitations and potentialities of adult socialization.

From Western studies we know that changes in national or group loyalties are not likely to occur after an individual reaches maturity. Similarly, conceptions about the rules of politics (for example, how political leaders are chosen) do not ordinarily change after maturity, nor do broad ideological goals. Several studies have indicated that even refugees from Communist systems continue to accept many of the basic political values taught them, so that to this extent political socialization
in childhood lays foundations that are difficult to shake.

The changes that do occur in adulthood usually stem from changes in the individual's life style (he assumes new roles, moves to a new location) or from changes in the society (wars, political upheavals). In the Soviet case, an example of the former is that direct experience with arrest, either of self or family member, was found to greatly increase the likelihood of hostility toward the regime. On a societal level, there is little doubt that de-Stalinization and the subsequent partial return to Stalinist tactics has caused some changes in the political attitudes and behaviors of Soviet citizens.

Because of the "all-or-nothing" character of the citizen role in the Soviet political system, such changes in adult political attitudes and behavior are risky and undesirable. Added to the conception that men are always on the brink of defection, there is the linking of attitudes toward specific policies with a total outlook (for example, you don't: support the invasion of Czechoslovakia, therefore you are an enemy), and of loyalty to nation with loyalty to regime. Moreover, a government brought into power by revolution constantly looks for plots to uncover, enemies to pursue. The efforts made to insure citizen conformity are directed toward preventing radical changes in adult attitudes and behaviors, then, rather than producing sophisticated citizens. When political change does come, people are ill prepared to deal with it, and this has been one of the notable dangers of the de-Stalinization process.
The general propensity to work toward continuity and conformity is underpinned by other, more specific motivations. One might think of them as responses to challenges, some of which are common to many political systems, and some of which are engendered or intensified by the nature of the Soviet system itself. These problems lead to a particularly heavy emphasis on adult political socialization as a corrective and supplement to political socialization efforts directed at children and young people. Of those problems which are common to many political communities, one is the necessity for completing or correcting earlier unsuccessful socialization. Dennis Wrong has referred to man as "social but not entirely socialized," meaning that there are forces within man's nature which resist influence from the society. Although the Soviet model is somewhat simplistic in this regard, assuming that man is moldable by the forces of society, Western studies have indicated that socialization is not a one-way system of influence in which the individual receives information and attitudes, but a dynamic process in which societal factors and personal "screens" interfere to mitigate the effect of society's efforts. Non-political motives often intervene to foil ideological designs. For example, although the exploitation of labor and profit motives have been eschewed throughout most of Soviet history, people have continued to engage in profitable but illegal capitalist-style economic activities in the face of severe punishment. The Soviet press from time to time openly admits that there is substantial interference of this sort:
One still encounters backward views among some of our young people, especially a consumer attitude toward life. In addition to correcting "mistakes" of unsuccessful childhood socialization, Soviet political teaching is concerned with forming attitudes untouched by early exposure. Talcott Parsons has commented "...socialization, like learning, goes on throughout life. The case of the development of the child is only the most dramatic because he has so far to go." Heinz Eulau found in his study of American state legislators that a sizable proportion of them reported first paying attention to politics either after college (or its equivalent period) or at the time of entry into politics. One legislator mentioned not being especially interested until after his election. An individual's values are basically formed by the time he reaches adulthood, but there are certain types of attitudes and behaviors, among them those toward specific or new events and those appropriate to new roles, that are capable of alteration. For example, new and very salient political events occur constantly, and it is important from the regime's point of view to have some well-oiled machinery on hand for presenting the "correct" version to the population.

A common problem in modern nations is the task of teaching a common political perception of the world to a large and diverse population. The integration of various national and ethnic groups into Soviet political life is one aspect of this problem. Schools, the Party education network, the mass media and cultural organizations have been the main
agencies entrusted with this task, which has consisted in part of "Russianizing" local Party elites and school curricula. A less discussed, but in some ways more basic, aspect of the problem of political integration is the urban-rural gap. As in all countries, the Soviet rural population is less exposed to many of the attributes of modernity than are urban people, and they cling to traditional life styles. Again, this would not be such a problem if conformity and active mobilization for certain political goals were not required. Among the advanced industrial nations the Soviet Union manifests a particularly marked urban-rural gap in life styles. This is the result of many legacies. Centuries of isolation from town life in pre-revolutionary times and the traditional peasant mistrust of officials has made the rural population particularly resistant to change. Bolshevik ambivalence toward peasants as a class has contributed to this rural isolation through the adoption of many policies unfavorable to country people: rapid industrialization with heavy requisitioning of agricultural products, the excessive brutality of collectivization, and the continued denial of internal passports to collective farmers have all combined to reinforce resistance. The Soviet ideological emphasis on the proletariat with disproportionately high capital investment in urban amenities along with implicit and sometimes explicit slurs on peasant loyalty have also contributed to the "gap between the city and the country," as it is called in the Soviet press. In addition to a tradition of social and economic distance, the city and the country have also
been unequally exposed to efforts at political socialization. This is partly a matter of capital investment: vast distances between rural settlements mean that roads and vehicles, to say nothing of radio, television, and periodicals, require more capital outlay per person than in densely populated areas. It is understandable that limited resources have been concentrated where they would reach the greatest number of people. We should also remember that these are not only agents of political socialization, but indices of modernity, so that it is not surprising that they are concentrated in cities, the showcases of communist development. In short, many factors have combined to perpetuate an inequality between the urban and the rural population as far as participation in modern life and an identity with the political system are concerned. In spite of recent drives to penetrate the countryside with mass media, there are still many reports of "survivals" of traditional life, those foils of communist political socialization such as patriarchal families and religious convictions. Such habits operate to mount a formidable resistance to the political modernization of the "other Russia."

There are other problems of political socialization in the Soviet case which are either engendered completely by the nature of the political system, or intensified by it. The assumption that man is constantly struggling to keep himself attached to the "good" as opposed to the evil influences in his own personality, and that society must help him in this,
leads to the attempt to create an environment in which the forces of good as defined politically, are constantly reinforced. Adult political socialization carries a good share of this "reinforcement" function.

Related to this is the official declared state of ideological warfare with all non-Communist systems, which in fact serves as a major justification for domestic propaganda and agitation. Even during the periods of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy, there was declared to be "no coexistence in the ideological sphere," and Khruschchev himself stated that it is precisely in such a period that the ideological struggle intensifies. This stance presents the political system as defensive, carrying on a ceaseless battle against the subversive influence of Western culture, bearer of ideological decay and disease. In a recent lead article the editors of SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA (Soviet Russia) wrote:

"Tourism, economic relations, cultural exchange and advertising are all put to use by imperialist propaganda to prettify capitalism and defame socialism, to arouse discontent in the socialist countries, capture people's minds there and undermine their faith in the ideology of socialism... A direct conclusion should be drawn from this: Political work among the masses and counterpropaganda must be conducted daily, actively, and aggressively.... The Party makes special demands on Communists working on the ideological front--journalists, writers, and people in the arts. They are in the vanguard of the struggle against the troubadours of imperialism. The Party has entrusted to them the most powerful weapons--the press, radio, television, the theater and cinema. Naturally the Party demands that they make excellent use of this weaponry against ideological saboteurs and that they actively assist the Party in rearing builders of a Communist society." 48

It is this defensive position which leads the Soviets to speak of "militant pencils" and to entitle an article about Estonian television, which has
some competition from Finnish television, "Like Heavy Guns Into Battle"! The agents of socialization discussed in this book are considered by the Soviets as "weapons" to be used aggressively in the defense of Communist world order.

The Soviet demand for a high degree of conformity in citizen behavior constitutes a major challenge to the program of political socialization and leads logically to a concern with adult indoctrination. Here the insistence on "activism" is important. Although people may be successfully socialized to the political order, it is necessary to continually reinforce earlier learning in order to keep them from slipping into apathy. Constant involvement in and exposure to political activity not only demonstrates to the world how "democratic" the system is, but it keeps people primed for rapid mobilization in the event of crisis. Activism becomes a sort of substitute for revolutionary fervor in a non-revolutionary epoch. It becomes increasingly difficult to instill traditions of self sacrifice and dedication to the social order as life becomes more and more comfortable, and "enemies" seem more remote. Young people who have only a second or third-hand knowledge of the revolution understandably find romantic rhetoric about it a little difficult to relate to their daily lives. That the revolutionary dedication is still considered important is shown in the following article:

However, it does not follow from this that the young generation in the Land of the Soviets only enjoys the good things in life and is not responsible for anything. Of course, the exploits and sacrifices of the older generations have relieved
young people of the necessity to risk their lives every day in open battle with the class enemy. But they have also imposed on young people the obligation of acquiring, in conditions of peaceful construction, the character traits that usually are formed in stubborn and harsh class struggle.  

A problem which may arise in any political system, but which is particularly important in the Soviet case, is that of discontinuity of political socialization. Charles Merriam, in his classic study of citizenship training, has written: "The state must make its case not once and for all but continuously for each new generation and each new period." Such attention to changing events, and the molding of popular opinion about them, has been particularly important in the post-Stalin period. The experiences of an older generation reared in Stalin's time have not been appropriate guides for young people growing up in the fifties and sixties, and it may be that their experience will not be appropriate for their children. This form of generational discontinuity is common, especially in modern or modernizing societies, but is more serious in Soviet society than in most because of expectations of well orchestrated civic responses to current policies. Where political mistakes have milder consequences, such confusion is not so serious. 

The discontinuity among generations is only a part of the picture, however; there is also an inconsistency in the presentation of historical events from period to period. As the "true" perception of such important political phenomena as the purges, and the role of Comrade Stalin in the Second World War have changed rapidly and radically, the shock
to popular political attitudes has been almost cataclysmic. The bitter fruits of such disruptive changes have been openly admitted from time to time as in the following article from PRAVDA, May 17, 1969:

As is known, the unhealthy longing for the "deheroization" of the revolutionary past and the truly heroic present, the downgrading of Soviet man and his labor and struggle and the reappraisal, without serious justification, of entire periods of history and the role of outstanding individuals therein, no matter what the motivating intentions, objectively lead to a disruption of the spiritual, class, and political continuity between the generations and prepares the soil for alien influences. 52

The Soviet political system has been actively concerned with a high level of citizen conformity at least since the late twenties, and this heritage has not been abandoned during the years since Stalin died. In fact, with the decrease in the use of negative coercion, efforts at indoctrination have rather increased as a result of this ambition. Part of this trend has been an increased desire to keep the population "informed" of current developments, and with the development of the mass communications system, this has also become increasingly possible. In practice, of course, this has meant selectively informing people with an official line on new issues and events. The declared state of ideological warfare, the very obvious discontinuities caused by political chance, and the drive to bring rural areas more into national political life have all intensified during this period. We shall observe, then, that the Soviet effort at political socialization of adults, if anything, became more intensive and more sophisticated as the regime approached its fiftieth anniversary.
The Mass Media and Propaganda Apparatus as Instruments of Persuasion

Since Stalin's death in 1953 there have been important fluctuations in the Soviet domestic political atmosphere, alternating periods of relatively free public expression and often heavy-handed official repression. Particularly during the Khrushchev era, much of official policy was oriented toward controlling and channelling, rather than flatly disallowing, the spontaneous expression of public sentiment. Khrushchev's successors seem less and less inclined to show even this much tolerance for diversity. The changes have caused reverberations in the mass media and propaganda apparatus, in some ways the most sensitive indicators of political mood.

Although the post-Stalin period has brought more color and diversity to these public channels of information, their basic function remains essentially that conceived by Lenin; they are the Party's instruments of overt, explicit political socialization. Far from declining in importance or being converted into mere mouthpieces of various pressure groups within the Soviet polity, the mass media and propaganda apparatus have been expanded and revitalized during the past two decades with the explicit purpose of rendering them more effective in their role of helping to mold the members of the future Soviet society. In the sixties, studies of the population, and of the media audience in particular, have been carried out for a related purpose—that of evaluating the impact of these channels in order to improve their performance. We will review
the principle changes and then look at some of the first available data on audience use of, and reactions to, the media. On this basis we shall attempt to evaluate the significance and success of these channels in the political socialization of the adult Soviet population during this period.

Some characteristics of the mass media make them ideal instruments for persuasion, and others tend to inhibit their effectiveness. Probably their most obvious feature is that they have the capacity, given a well-developed technical apparatus, for reaching huge numbers of people dispersed over a large area. The Soviet population answers just such a description, and reaching that population with a political message has been one of the major themes in Soviet development. The broadcast media also have the capacity of speed; they can transmit a message from Moscow to Vladivostok in seconds. Providing there is a central control apparatus for the production of media output, they can reproduce political messages uniformly and repeatedy. Since control and the repetition of simplified messages are two characteristic features of Communist propaganda technique, the mass media have been ideal instruments from this point of view. Mass media also occupy vast amounts of the population's leisure time in passive exposure to approved information and entertainment; this makes it unavailable for pursuits officially considered politically dubious. The "narcotizing effect" of the media has long been noted in Western studies; it seems to be of particular
use to the Soviet regime in helping to neutralize potential disruption. People who sit in front of their television sets in the passive pursuit of relaxation tend to spend less time planning and acting on their own. Media also select from among a vast amount of information and interpret events for their audiences; when content is as well-coordinated and pre-digested as it is in the Soviet case, the audience members become less capable of functioning as critical beings. This tends to enhance conformism and inhibit political pressures from the population.

More positively, the mass media in the Soviet Union provide clear, concrete models of behavior for citizens, and these examples are more perfect and consistent than anyone in a single individual's immediate environment. The range of ideal types appearing in the mass media help prepare citizens for new roles useful to the state. Public communication via the mass media can do much to enforce the political norms and values of the society, by making them known to a wider range of people, by publicizing infractions of rules and the penalties for violating them. Mass media also provide factual information about the political world, conferring status on certain people and events, and ignoring others; the complete disappearance of Khrushchev from the Soviet media is a graphic example of how important political figures can be made into "unpersons." Gradually the Soviet citizen forms a picture of the political world in which his attention is easily focused on American aggression in Vietnam or "neo-Fascism" in West Germany, but in which it
takes considerable effort to be concerned about the persecution of Soviet minority nationalities or the invasion of a Communist ally's country.

One of the greatest advantages of the mass media as propaganda devices is the fact that they can provide political socialization in a "package" with entertainment. If the entertainment is amusing enough, the audience is captive, and favorably disposed to a political message which can be slipped in almost unnoticed. Such a "sweetening" effect can also soften the anxiety produced by disturbing news.

Ubiquitous and repetitive as they are in the Soviet Union, the mass media provide a supportive context for the other agents of political socialization. They ensure that most adults and many children will be reached by the regime's message. They reinforce earlier learning and confirm messages heard from propagandists, agitators, and often family and friends.

The major shortcoming of the mass media as instruments of persuasion stems from the communicator-audience relationship. The audiences of the media are by their very nature heterogeneous and disconnected, and their exact composition at any given time is unknown. This is an especially marked feature of the Soviet mass communications scene, since it is only in the past decade that any serious attempt has been made at audience research. Such a lack of feedback means that the communicator cannot differentiate content and delivery format according to the actual people who are attending, but must address himself
to an abstraction, usually an approximated "average" audience member who may bear little resemblance to any living person. Messages which take into account audience characteristics and attitudes are obviously more effective than those which do not, so this lacuna of information is a decided handicap for the regime in selling its vision of political reality. The time and space situation which accounts for the audience anonymity also has another complication: the communicator cannot observe his audience's reactions so as to tailor his presentation to the immediate relationship. A hostile audience is likely to remain unblanched, and an apathetic one uninspired. Such disadvantages are as frustrating for the individual audience members as they are dysfunctional for the regime, for content disseminated by the media are as likely as not to be unrelated to a citizen's personal experience, hence unsatisfying of his needs and desires. The longterm reaction may be boredom and/or frustration.

The Soviet propaganda and agitation network supplements the mass media by providing personal, face-to-face contact. The importance of personal influence and the role of the social setting have long been recognized and utilized by the Bolsheviks in their attempts to politicize the population. Whereas the audience of the media is composed of passive, isolated individuals and small groups who are attentive or semi-attentive to the products of a technical apparatus, that of the propaganda meeting or agitation session consists of a group of individuals in a defined social setting. They are present for a definite purpose, political instruction.
They are expected to listen to the speaker and to believe what he says. The Soviet propagandist and his audience jointly participate in a kind of political ritual which includes certain patterns of speech and the acknowledgement of unifying symbols. As a representative of the political system, the propagandist or agitator carries a measure of authority and the audience has a good idea of how it is supposed to respond to it. Even in less obviously structured meetings listeners tend to make stereotyped responses to stereotyped stimuli, and this sort of role-playing works for the speaker. Also to the speaker's advantage is the fact that he can observe his listeners, sensing hostility, suspicion, or approval, and this may inspire or inhibit his subsequent delivery. In turn the audience may ask questions or express doubts or anxieties by entering into a dialogue with or questioning the speaker. Although the formal political context of a propaganda meeting often inhibits the expression of genuine doubts, the possibility of making some reply may provide some emotional outlet for critics, and thus help to neutralize adverse reaction.

Audience members have an effect on one another as well. Floyd H. Allport has called the reinforcement effect of the behavior of others in the same audience "social facilitation." People who are subject to the same stimuli tend to imitate one another in responding to those stimuli; it becomes difficult for any single individual to act in a way that is markedly different from the way most others present are behaving. One can see how the device of "planting" enthusiastic people in the audience
helps the speaker make use of this phenomenon to create an atmosphere favorable to his message.

The lecturer or agitator, unlike his counterpart who communicates via the mass media, has a good idea of who his audience is and what their attitudes and concerns are. If he is not a member of the local Party organization himself (more common with propagandists than agitators, who tend to work among their co-workers or neighbors) he can obtain such information from it. Dealing with the concrete problems of everyday life is, indeed, one of the main tasks of the Bolshevik agitator. Lenin's early realization of the importance of using concrete examples from local conditions has contributed greatly to the Bolshevik agitator's ability to make his message meaningful to his audience.57

Finally the agitation-propaganda apparatus often deals with subjects which have mainly local significance or which are considered too sensitive for dissemination over the mass media. While the mass media never mention local food shortages, for example, agitators are often asked to explain to groups of workers why it is necessary to ration certain supplies. The ouster of Khrushchev was an event for which little explanation was offered in the press or on radio and television, yet meetings were held all over the Soviet Union to discuss the reasons for the change in leadership and the implications for future policy. Such meetings help to stem or channel rumors which inevitably circulate in crisis situations. Not all explanations given are satisfactory to the audience, of course,
but people are often made to feel that they are being given some explanation and information, and this can help to avert panic reactions.

Obviously the Soviet agitation and propaganda network provides a useful supplement to the mass media. It reinforces the media by repeating certain messages in a face-to-face context, and complements it by dealing with local issues and sensitive topics. In form, it helps to counterbalance the disadvantages of the impersonal media. What the lecturer or agitator lacks in his capacity to reach large numbers of people, he gains in influence by the immediacy of personal contact. Since he can observe and question his audience, he also serves as an important conductor of public mood and reaction to higher echelons of the Party.

Having pointed to some of the relevant characteristics of the mass media and public personal information network as agents of political persuasion, we shall now turn to an examination of their recent history and development, and discuss some of the findings of early Soviet studies on the audience. This will help us to assess what new directions the public channels of information have taken in the last two decades, and how their importance vis-a-vis other agents of adult political socialization has changed, and to evaluate their success as reflected in audience reactions.
Footnotes, Chapter One


2 Ibid., Chapter Two.


7 Ibid., p. 81.


10 Ibid.

11 Geoffrey Gorer, in THE PEOPLE OF GREAT RUSSIA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY (W. W. Norton Co., 1962/1949, New York), considers "sudden switches and alternations from one type of behavior in complete contrast to the first" (p. 151) a persistent feature of great Russian national character; Nathan Leites, in A STUDY OF BOLSHIEVISM (Rand Corp., Free Press, Glencoe, 1953), discusses (pp. 237) the Bolshevik fear and mistrust of "swings in mood and activity."


20 Hollander, op. cit., p. 356;


22 Compare, for example, Herbert Hyman's statement: "Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family." (p. 69, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION Free Press, 1959) and that of Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney: "The data of this study raise several questions about the efficacy of the family as contrasted with other socializing agents...." (p. 95, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN, Aldine, Chicago, 1967).


27 Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 106.

28 Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 178.


31 Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 110.

32 Greenstein, op. cit., p. 31, 35-6.

33 Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 112.

34 Ibid., p. 219.


41 Inkeles and Bauer, op. cit., p. 256.


43 For example, see Henry Kamm, "Farmers Cheat Moscow Shoppers," THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 18, 1969.


47 Maksim Gorkiy, in his essay "On the Russian Peasantry" (O Russkom Krestyanstvye), Berlin, 1922 (Translated by V. Boss, History Department, Harvard University), says: "Those who try to contribute something to the villages, to add something of their own—these are met with hostility, and are eventually shouldered or pushed out of the community. More often than not, the innovator after colliding with the insuperable conservativism of the village, departs of his own accord.


50 Kosolapov, op. cit., p. 27.


52 Kosolapov, loc. cit.

53 For a discussion of Bolshevik media use, see Inkeles, Alex, PUBLIC OPINION IN SOVIET RUSSIA, op. cit.


56 Allport, Floyd H., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1924, pp. 261-2, 292.

57 For a good discussion of the role of the Bolshevik agitator, see Inkeles, PUBLIC OPINION, op. cit. Ch 5.
CHAPTER TWO: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

The Structure and Function of the Press

The importance of periodical publications, especially newspapers, in Communist party and Soviet history is difficult to overestimate. Early Soviet newspapers were continuations of the pre-revolutionary underground press, and it is on this tradition that Lenin based his often-quoted slogan "The newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator—it is also a collective organizer." Lenin's experience with ISKRA (The Spark) led him to place great emphasis on the newspaper as a focus of political activity as well as a vehicle for conveying the Party line not only to the masses but to members of the Party as well. Thus, the importance of control over personnel and censorship of content was well-established from the very beginning.

Newspapers and magazines have certain characteristics which affect their role as agents of political socialization. They provide a printed record of policy statements and a chronicle of events which may be studied, reread and referred to for some time after issue. One drawback of printed media is, of course, that in order to be exposed directly to their message an individual must be literate. Literacy was by no means to be taken for granted during the early days of Soviet power. This fact contributed to the establishment of two well-known

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Bolshevik policies. The collective reading of newspapers by a local agitator (who might be the only literate person for miles around) was instituted to extend the first Bolshevik medium of mass communication to those who could not read or were unable to obtain one of the scarce copies. Meanwhile the regime embarked on an aggressive campaign to eradicate illiteracy; of those between 9 and 49 years of age in 1926, 56.6% were literate, but by 1959 this percentage had climbed to 98.5%.

The Soviet newspaper reaches most of the urban population on the day of publication (most cities have dailies), but in rural areas poor transportation facilities often cause delays in delivery. This means that a relatively concise record of published Party policy and news interpretation can be obtained by most Soviet people within a fairly short period of time. Usually the news has already been transmitted by the broadcast media, of course, but people like to reread articles and feature items at greater leisure; where censorship and control are so important, people search for often important hidden nuances and subtle changes which are easily missed on broadcast transmissions. Soviet magazines provide a more permanent, but still less timely, source of political interpretation and information, encased in more description, fiction, and feature articles of various kinds.

PRAVDA (Truth), the official Party daily established in 1912, has remained by far the most authoritative and influential organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the pinnacle of the Soviet newspaper
hierarchy, it has traditionally served as a model for Soviet as well as for other Communist newspapers in Asia and East Europe. In the post-war years, technological progress gradually led to the development of an extensive radio and then a television network, but Soviet mass communications continued to be dominated by the newspaper and PRAVDA remained the most authoritative news source. It was not until 1960 that the high accessibility of radio contributed to a policy change, and news agencies were instructed to report news directly to the broadcast media, bypassing PRAVDA. Yet the role of the Soviet newspaper has not been seriously challenged, except as most rapid conveyor of news bulletins; it remains the time-honored exemplar of information channels and continues to serve as political organizer, educator, and legitimizer of the regime. As such it plays an integral part in the Soviet political system.

The Soviet press has expanded rather rapidly during the post-Stalin period, with the main emphasis on getting more copies to the population rather than the creation of new papers. In 1953 there were about 25 copies of newspapers per 100 people (including children, illiterates, etc.); this has steadily increased, and by 1965 there were almost 45 copies of Soviet newspapers per 100 people. This means that in the Soviet Union today, most people who want to can read the newspaper. Of national newspapers there were only 7 copies per 100 people in 1953, and this had grown to almost 20 copies per 100 people by 1965. The absolute number of newspapers shows a different pattern of growth: there
were 7,754 Soviet newspapers in 1953, and this had increased to only 8,524 in 1967. Although there had been over eleven thousand newspapers in 1961, many of them were district newspapers which were discontinued in 1962. After 1964, when district newspapers were revived, the number of Soviet newspapers began to rise again. The output of Soviet magazines has increased tremendously during the post-Stalin years. In 1950 the combined annual circulation of all Soviet magazines was 114.4 million and by 1966 it had reached over a billion and a half. The greatest increases were in the fields of art, physical culture and sports, health and medicine, transport, natural science and mathematics, popular science and culture, literature, and political-economic subjects.

Like all Party and governmental structures in the Soviet Union, the newspaper network is organized along hierarchical lines, as illustrated in Chart One (below). This structure has remained essentially the same throughout the post-Stalin years, with two changes. The first has already been mentioned; it occurred in connection with the Party's reorganization by Khrushchev along two parallel lines (agricultural and industrial) in 1962. This involved the formation of bodies called Production Administrations; the number of district or raion newspapers at this time was sharply reduced, and those left at this level were converted into official organs of the Production Administrations. This organization was, of course, abandoned in 1964 with Khrushchev's ouster, and district newspapers were again revived. The second major change was the gradual
appearance of individual collective farm newspapers between 1956 and 1959.

All-Union or national newspapers and magazines are expected to serve as prototypes in content, form, and political reliability for all lower newspapers. For example, most trade union newspapers throughout the USSR are modelled on TRUD (Labor) adopting its line on any issue and referring to it for content or emphasis. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the national organ of the Young Communist League, is a model for all lower-level newspapers of this designation, and so on. Regardless of their institutional affiliation, Soviet newspapers are considered organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and this is the reason for such heavy reliance on PRAVDA as a model. Even IZVESTIYA, the official government newspaper, was described as follows on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary:

Izvestiya is the Party's faithful assistant in the strengthening of Party ties with the masses in the development of socialist democracy.6

Of course, all organizations in the Soviet Union are modelled on and controlled by the Party, so that this subordination of newspapers and magazines is but one expression of a more general phenomenon.
Chart One: Organization of the Soviet Newspaper Network

National or Central Newspapers  
(All-Union)

Republic Newspapers  
(15 Union Republics)

Krai, Oblast, and Okrug Newspapers¹  
Autonomous Republic and Autonomous Oblast Newspapers²

City Newspapers

Raion or District Newspapers

Lower Press or House Organs³  
(of Factories, Institutes, etc.)  
Newspapers of Individual Collective Farms

Wall Newspapers⁴

¹ Roughly equivalent to provinces and counties, respectively.

² About equal to a krai or oblast, but having a separate identity as the home of a minority nationality.

³ Printed in editions of one copy per 3 to 4 workers, and distributed among members of the enterprise, educational institute, etc.

⁴ Not newspapers in the Western sense, but rather bulletin boards in the form of an open newspaper with articles and features.
NEWS AGENCIES

The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS is the abbreviation for the Russian name) assumed complete control of all newsgathering and dissemination in 1935, taking over from ROSTA, the Russian Telegraph Agency. It held this monopoly until February 1961 when a new Soviet news agency, Agentsvo Pechati Novosti (Novosti News Agency) or APN was created. Officially, NOVOSTI is a "public" news agency, while TASS is the government agency. In reality, the difference is one of function. TASS is a state news agency as the term is understood in the West, while NOVOSTI is more a public relations agency for the Soviet Union.

Attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR, TASS remains the official Soviet vehicle for gathering and distributing news throughout the Soviet Union and the world at large. It maintains personnel in at least 94 different countries and cooperates with about forty other news agencies, many of them Communist agencies modelled on the Soviet organization. TASS produces about two and a half million words of copy daily, amounting to more than six thousand typewritten pages.

The General Director of TASS is responsible for the entire operation of the agency; he is aided by three deputies and a collegium created in 1962. Consisting of twelve members, this collegium gives advice on administrative and policy matters. The central apparatus of TASS consists of three main editorial boards (Foreign Information, Union
Information for Abroad) and several lesser editorial boards and service departments. 9

The Main Editorial Board for Union Information disseminates information received from Moscow and from its correspondents located all over the Soviet Union. The Leningrad Department, for example, receives information from Moscow, and transmits it by wire to Vologda, Archangelsk, Pskov, Novgorod, Petrozavodsk, Murmansk, and Kronstadt. Editors of Leningrad newspapers receive news directly from the Leningrad office. For Leningrad oblast newspapers and radio and television stations, morning and evening editions of a TASS herald (of about 20 pages each) of Leningrad and Leningrad oblast news are prepared; city and raion newspapers receive three special editions per week, consisting of about 8 to 10 pages apiece. The Leningrad office of TASS daily transmits information to Moscow about Leningrad and the oblast region. There are about 11 correspondents in the Leningrad office, and about 64 (one or two per oblast) in other regions of the Russian republic. Republic news agencies employ from 120 to 135 persons, among which are included krai and oblast correspondents. In addition to the staff correspondents of TASS and other Union Republic news agencies run by TASS, there are also "non-staff authors" for individual newspapers. 10

Information received by TASS is transmitted directly to the central press in Moscow, and to the Main Editorial Boards of Union and Foreign
Broadcasting of Soviet Radio. The Main Editorial Board of Union
Broadcasts prepares from the information received the following survey
heralds: for military newspapers, for Komsomol newspapers, for
Pioneer newspapers, for oblast and republic newspapers, and special
editions for evening newspapers. Informational materials are also
prepared for separate republics and oblasts, geographical zones (Far
East, Central Asia, Polar), various fields of industry (metallurgy,
chemistry, textiles) and agriculture (cotton-growing, animal husbandry,
crop cultivation). All of these materials are distributed by TASS
through subscription. Within the USSR, there are about 5,000 sub-
scribers to these materials; most of them are newspapers, journals,
radio and television stations. There are four different types of TASS
bulletins, signified by various colors for different levels of secrecy,
which come to the subscribers each day. The first is called the "violet"
TASS; material in this type may be printed in whole or in part depending
on the discretion of the responsible secretary and the amount of space
available, providing no wording is changed. The "white" TASS is
confidential and for reference only; this is sent to a more select group,
such as editors-in-chief, their deputies, some managing editors and
political columnists. The "red" TASS is even more confidential, and
contains so-called "dangerous" news; this is mostly factual information
without comment, and it may contradict information in the "violet" TASS
bulletin. It is delivered by armed guard, who signs for it, and is then
responsible for its secrecy. It is eventually returned to TASS, and not kept around the newspaper for very long. The final and fourth category of TASS bulletin is sent only to high Party officials like secretaries, Politburo members, first secretaries of provincial party committees, and to editors-in-chief of a handful of national newspapers; this is called the Special Bulletin; it probably contains some anti-Soviet material as well as highly secret factual information.

The highest governing body of the NOVOSTI is its Founders' Council, composed of five members each from its four sponsoring organizations: the USSR Union of Journalists, the USSR Writers' Union, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (Znaniye). The purpose of NOVOSTI is to counteract what the Soviet Union feels is hostile bourgeois propaganda about life in the USSR; one of its main purposes is to provide foreign publications and government agencies with favorable material about Soviet society. The task of providing selective information for Soviet people about life abroad is not concentrated in NOVOSTI, since such selectivity has always been a main feature of both TASS and the major Soviet central newspapers. NOVOSTI's official purpose is "to disseminate abroad correct information about the Soviet Union and to acquaint the Soviet people with the life of peoples of foreign countries in order to in every way influence the development and strengthen mutual understanding, confidence, and friendship between people."
In 1963 NOVOSTI published abroad 26 Soviet magazines, five newspapers, and 53 bulletins with a circulation of 1.5 million copies. It also produces books and films for distribution abroad, and surveys for the foreign press in Moscow and for the Soviet press. In 1965 it put out about 500 pages of text per day in 15 languages. NOVOSTI's domestic function is to supply the Soviet mass media with materials (commentaries, reports, photographs, etc.) on life in foreign countries. It also prepares on request materials on Soviet life for Soviet as well as foreign newspapers. It puts together "Heralds for Soviet Readers," surveys which supplement the TASS surveys mentioned earlier. Among them are: "Across the Soviet Union" (six times a week), "International Information" (six times a week), "Science and Technology" (once a week), "Culture and Art" (once a week), and "Sports" (twice a week). These surveys are reported to be received by some 515 Soviet newspapers, magazines, and committees on radio and television.

**Soviet Journalists**

In the mid-fifties the first steps were taken toward the formation of a Soviet Union of Journalists. An organizational bureau was set up in the Spring of 1956, and by the middle of 1957 it had drawn up regulations and membership procedures, and worked out other organizational problems. Before November 1959, twenty-three thousand journalists had been accepted as members of the new union. In that
month the first All-Union Congress of Soviet Journalists took place in Moscow, attended by more than 700 delegates. The main work of the congress was to accept and approve the regulations and membership procedures drawn up by the orgbureau and to elect members of the administration. The Second All-Russian Congress was held in October, 1966; by this time membership had grown to forty-three thousand, making this the largest professional union in the country. The Soviet journalists' union is one of the constituent members of the Communist-dominated International Organization of Journalists (known as Mozh, for the initials of its name in Russian).

Probably the basic role of the Soviet journalist has not changed drastically since the beginning of the profession; certainly the official conception of that role has not. Early Soviet journalists, of course, worked mainly on newspapers, and were a readily identifiable and fairly closely controlled group. With the development and expansion of the broadcasting media, however, and the rapid expansion of the newspaper network, the term "journalist" has come to be applied to a large range of people working in all aspects of the mass media. This proliferation of professional journalists was undoubtedly one impetus toward the institution of the journalists union.

The work of the Soviet journalist is often sensitive and directly subject to rapid and broad fluctuations in the political atmosphere. He must present events in such a way as to ensure that the content of his
article illustrates the ideological prescriptions of the moment. To be sensitive to subtle changes in the Party line is one of the most important qualities of the Soviet journalist. A PRAVDA editorial summarizes the traits the ideal journalist should possess:

A journalist is an active fighter for the cause of the Party. It is not enough for him to have good intentions. He must also have clear views, a knowledge of life, and the ability to present his thoughts convincingly and brilliantly from Leninist positions. The journalist and the public activist writing in the press must constantly perfect his knowledge and skill in order to see life in all its diversity, to know how to single out at the right moment what is practically important and to focus attention on the unsolved tasks of the day.

Soviet journalists learn to identify the "tasks of the day" by attending regional, city, and editorial conferences, by reading directives and TASS bulletins, and by keeping up with the editorials in PRAVDA. Beyond this, a major general reference is the journal of the profession. In 1967 the more traditional journal SOVIETSKAYA PECHAT (Soviet Press) was replaced by the much more colorful and interesting ZHURNALIST. The lead article in each issue describes current emphases of Party policy, setting guidelines for the writing of articles on the particular subjects under discussion. Though this is often written in language which is vague and seemingly unspecific, it is fully understandable to a Soviet-trained journalist, and is an important source of professional guidance.
In the early fifties another development began to take place which, along with the Union of Journalists, has contributed to the professionalization of Soviet journalism. This was the establishing of schools and faculties of journalism. By 1965 more than twenty universities throughout the country were preparing students for various careers in the gathering and dissemination of news. About a thousand graduates of regular, evening, and correspondence schools enter the profession each year, of which about 500 have followed a regular course of study. The Faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University is the largest and most famous journalism school in the country; there about 800 day students, who study five years for a diploma; 600 evening and 1100 correspondence students who earn their diplomas usually in six years or more, and more than thirty graduate students. By far the greatest percentage enter newspaper work: of the 1965 graduating class of 150 day students, 100 went to work immediately as reporters or editors of newspapers or magazines, 15 went into radio, 15 into television, and 20 into book publishing. The increasing professionalization of journalism and the greater variety of jobs available for trained journalists has attracted more and more capable young people.

The training of journalists, it must be noted, is very much a Party supervised affair, and many of the schools of journalism are in fact attached to Party schools. There is a Section for Journalists at the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, and the Higher Party School in Moscow has an extensive correspondence course program
for aspiring journalists.

Higher professional training is becoming more and more the normal background for working journalists, but it has not replaced apprenticeship training as a source of recruitment. Ideological demands, such as the "Party's ties with the masses," demand that the Soviet press be staffed by political workers and volunteer reporters as well; often these people become professional journalists after a period of on-the-job training.

"Volunteer" Correspondents

One of the basic tenets of the Soviet press has always been that every newspaper should at all times maintain active and continuous ties with the masses of the population. Throughout most of its history, this has meant extensive work with letters to the editor and the RABSELKOR (worker-peasant correspondent) movement. In 1960, about the time of a great resurgence in ideological treatment of the future Communist society and its nature, there was a good deal of discussion about public control and participation in the running of the society. One of the preliminary forms of this public control, it was felt, should be public participation in the operation of the press. The Central Committee of the Communist Party CPSU adopted a resolution on June 28, 1960, called "On the Further Development of Public Principles in the Soviet Press and Radio." The thrust of the resolution was the recommendation
that newspapers should "broaden their public participation" by means of
the creation of (a) non-staff departments, and (b) RABSELKOR (worker-
peasant correspondents) and authors' councils attached to departments
and editorial staffs of newspapers, magazines, and radio.

The stated purpose of these changes is to keep the newspaper from
becoming too professional in its journalistic outlook and too far removed
from the needs and demands of ordinary workers. RABSELKORS have
been a consistent and rather unique feature of the Soviet newspaper
network since their creation in the staff of PRAVDA in 1918.14 These
volunteer, but Party-approved, amateur journalists contribute articles
and write letters to the newspapers to which they are assigned. There
is usually a core organization, called the newspaper RABSELKOR
"aktiv" which guides the activity of its members under the direction of
the newspaper's Party committee. In connection with their contribu-
tions to the newspaper, Worker and Peasant Correspondents also conduct
"raids" or surprise inspection visits to factories and institutions; the
results of these spot checks often form the subject matter for an article
or letter to the newspaper. The RABSELKOR can also be viewed as
an attempt to "coopt" people to the Party's tasks, inviting them to play
the role of volunteer journalist (under Party supervision) and thus
become part of the political system. As long as they identify with
the regime in performing their correspondent duties, they are strengh-
tening their support, both active and spiritual, for the status quo. When
they cease to identify with it, their RABSELKOR status is terminated. Such public "access" to the press has been a major feature of Soviet "democracy," supposedly distinguishing it from bourgeois society in which only a few wealthy people are said to control access to the public forum. What is glossed over, however, is the fact that those who happen to disagree with the regime are not allowed access to public channels of communication because they do not fit any of the officially prescribed roles in which one can express opinions on political matters.

In contributing to the newspaper the worker or peasant correspondent is expected to seek out shortcomings in his locality and report on them to the newspaper, urging correction. Such publication of errors is a sort of modern public shaming, and is a powerful mechanism of political socialization. Criticizing one's neighbors is not an easy task, especially because of the non-official status of the correspondent. Sometimes the situation becomes very uncomfortable for the volunteer, as in the following incident from Gorkiy:

On an assignment from GORKOVSKAYA PRAVDA worker-correspondent Isakin wrote the article "Convictions and Deeds" for the newspaper. In it he criticized A. Dubova, a worker at the Engine of the Revolution Plant who, owning her own house, sold it to her tenants and then contrived to get a communal apartment for herself. Despite the plenitude of factual evidence, Dubova called the article slanderous and declared that its author had defamed her. Comrade Safonenko, the assistant head of the department of the Gorkiy City Party Committee, to which she appealed for "aid" did not trouble himself to check the
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facts, but straightaway fell upon Comrade Isakin. The worker-corrrespondent was accused of "constantly looking for only the bad in people" and of striving to "blacken everything, to ridicule," etc.

"I can fix it so they won't print your articles any more!" Comrade Safonenko threatened in conclusion....

The case of Comrade Isakin is not the only one in Gorkiy. We received a complaint from worker-corrrespondent Nikolai Droshkhin of Sormovo, to whom the city Party committee also gave a tongue-lashing for a critical report he had published in GORKOVSKIY RABOCHIY. The editors of GORKOVSKIY RABOCHIY have not helped their worker-correspondents in any way.

Worker-correspondents raise important questions in their articles. It is incumbent upon Party committees and newspaper editors to react sensitively to each signal from worker-correspondents. Unfortunately, this is not always done in Gorkiy.

Content of the Press

It is in the content of the periodical press that changes in the political climate have been reflected most clearly. In newspapers, this has occurred principally within the framework already in existence: well-established newspapers, like IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, have become more interesting and varied. In magazines, the change has been reflected in the proliferation of better-designed journals more in keeping with the tastes of readers than the old standbys; along with the time-sanctioned ZDOROV'YE (Health), RABOTNITSA (Woman Worker), and TSEMENT (Cement) have appeared surveys
of the foreign press and contemporary non-Soviet literature and journals introducing newly available products.

Before going on to discuss in detail the changes in the content of Soviet periodicals, it is instructive to review the basic goals of the Soviet press which serve as guidelines for the selection of materials for publication. Most of these points can be regarded as Bolshevik reactions to the "bourgeois" press; they are supposed to express certain norms of Communist Party life. A handbook for Soviet journalists lists these "Basic Principles of the Soviet Press,"16 and devotes an entire chapter to their clarification:

(1) \textit{Partiinost}: Party-mindedness or unconditional Party loyalty.
(2) \textit{Ideinost}: High ideological content.
(3) \textit{Otechestvennost}: Patriotism.
(4) \textit{Pravdivost}: Truthfulness (to Leninist theory).
(5) \textit{Narodnost}: Having a popular character.
(6) \textit{Massovost}: Accessibility to the masses.
(7) \textit{Kritika i Samo-Kritika}: Criticism and self-criticism.

There are, of course, certain fluctuations in the emphasis given each of these qualities, depending on the prevailing currents of political mood, but they are all cited at one time or another as justification for some decision on content. The "principles" are vague and leave much room for interpretation. A good part of the Soviet journalist's training is devoted to teaching him how to apply them in various situations. How well he uses these guidelines is one measure of his success.

In analyzing content, we should begin with the question "What is news?" in the Soviet context. Basically, anything which can be
used to illustrate current Party policy or economic progress is considered worthy of publication, and almost anything else is considered unimportant or unworthy. For example, a friendly but routine meeting between Soviet leaders and Hungarian Party officials is likely to make the front page of PRAVDA, but the defection of a major Soviet writer to the West might be relegated to the back page, or not reported at all.

It is interesting to consider what is not considered news in Soviet journalism. Among the topics not traditionally treated in the Soviet press are some which figure prominently in Western newspapers: (1) crime, accidents, and natural disasters, (2) miscellaneous feature items (such as do-it-yourself instructions), (3) human interest stories, (4) travel and tourism, (5) society news, (6) advertising, (7) the results of public opinion polls. A notable feature of post-Stalin changes in Soviet newspaper content is that some of these items have begun to appear in the press.

For most of its history, the Soviet press has ignored news dealing with crimes or accidents and disasters. Crime was avoided because its very existence was denied. In recent years, however, in connection with a general loosening up of censorship and a resurgence of sociological research, problems of crime and delinquency have begun to be discussed at great length in the press. The thrust of the articles is
remedial. As for news of accidents and natural disasters, several scattered terse announcements have appeared in recent years. The Samarkand flood of 1963 went almost unreported in the Soviet press, but the Tashkent earthquake of 1966 was fairly well covered. Usually no descriptive information is given, but merely the news that an accident or disaster occurred and was "being investigated by the proper authorities." Such announcements represent an official recognition of the fact that people are learning of such events through listening to foreign radio and talking with foreign visitors. The proliferation of rumors that has always surrounded any accident or disaster which has been hushed up or ignored by the press is disturbing to the authorities because of the potential for sparking panic behavior. Soviet citizens have developed remarkable facilities for becoming informed in the face of a near void of official news releases. The following admission was made at the Second Congress of Soviet Journalists in 1966:

There are also accidental happenings in life but the silence of the newspapers has turned into a snowball held together by rumors. Here is an example. On the night of February 17 (1966) at Sheremet'ev International Airport in Moscow a TU-114 airplane bound for the Congo (Brazzaville) suffered an accident in take-off. Foreign correspondents in Moscow... registered the details of the catastrophe, citing the most contradictory and inflated figures on the numbers of deaths: "about fifty," "forty-eight persons out of seventy," "from forty to seventy" and so on.

Obviously if our information agencies and radio had communicated news of the airplane's accident
immediately then it would have been difficult for the foreign journalists to disseminate unverified rumors, to exaggerate the scope of the catastrophe. It is also obvious that it would have been better if Muscovites had learned about this accident from Moscow radio and not from "Voice of America" or "BBC."17

Some miscellaneous items, such as household hints, have also been featured in recent years. For example, Vechernaya Moskva (Evening Moscow) in November, 1965, printed photographs and charts on how to set one's hair at home for holiday celebrations because beauty shops are so crowded at the time of the November anniversary.18 Kommuna (Commune) in Voronezh province had a column called "Our Everyday Life" which has such headings as "Beauty Secrets," "How to Care for Synthetics," and "Care of Kitchen Dishes."19 Surveys show that this kind of information for daily life is extremely popular among Soviet readers.

Human interest stories in the Soviet press are generally limited to articles about people who can be considered models for behavior: for example, articles about exemplary workers and heroic Komsomol members are quite common. Society news, the recounting of who did what and where, is almost entirely absent from the press. The lives of public officials are not displayed to the masses, partly because there is a contradiction between the Marxist theory of a classless society and the luxurious life style of Communist Party leaders. This sort of material is not likely to appear in the Soviet press even during "liberal"
periods. Travel articles are now seen from time to time, but they are mainly limited to suggestions for suburban day trips, and descriptions of domestic Soviet tourist sites. There is obviously no point in stimulating an appetite among the population for foreign travel when only a handful of people is allowed to go abroad each year.

Until recently advertising was considered one of the characteristics of the evil and exploitative bourgeois society. Soviet products were supposed to sell themselves. This reflected not only an ideological posture but an economic reality: consumer goods were in short supply. As early as 1958, however, television made an attempt to sell Khrushchev's famous cornflakes to the population. Since then several official agencies have been organized to deal with advertising of products, and on March 6, 1968, VECHERNAYA MOSKVA began a weekly advertising supplement. Advertising will undoubtedly never be a prominent feature in the Soviet newspaper. As an aid to the consumer it is almost useless, since goods in short supply are sold out long before a newspaper notice is seen by most people; word-of-mouth is still the most efficient and reliable source of advance information about interesting and unusual products on the market.

Since the early sixties public opinion polls have been featured rather prominently in the Soviet press. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was the pioneer in this field, establishing its own Public Opinion
Institute in 1960. Working with the Central Statistical Office in Moscow, the newspaper has since then conducted various opinion polls among the readers of the newspaper. The first polls asked such questions as: "Can a War Be Averted?" "How has your standard of living changed in recent years?" "What do you think of your generation?"; later polls dealt with the design of radio and television sets, and the preferences of theatergoers in dramatic presentations. Most of the questionnaires have been printed in the newspaper itself, with a deadline for sending in completed forms. The polls became so popular as an outlet for public sentiment that the institute grew to become one of the most important sources of information on Soviet public opinion. Other newspapers followed suit, and even the orthodox military newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star) polled its readers on army life. Eventually Soviet papers began to solicit their readers' opinions about the newspapers themselves, and by the late 1960's even PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA were asking readers for suggestions on how to improve their content. Based as they are on voluntary responses from readers of particular newspapers, none of the polls draw a representative sampling of public opinion and the summary reports published are so vaguely worded that it is difficult to tell exactly what results were obtained. Nevertheless, the newspaper polls do represent an important departure from the Stalinist press, and one that is reflective of the political mood of the last decade and a half. They are also an important source of information for
the regime, and an outlet for the frustrations of the population.

In order to measure some of the changes in press content during the post-Stalin years, we have done a content analysis of PRAVDA. We chose a random sample of 12 issues in each of four years: 1956, 1959, 1962, 1965. Categories of content and the amount of space (in column inches) devoted to each category are shown in Table One which follows. Several trends are apparent. There is a steady decline in international news, with a particularly sharp decrease in items about China and Albania. A more gradual decrease is noticeable in news about non-Communist countries. Latin America received little attention as a whole, but figures in the treatment of "other Communist parties."

It is common for the Soviet press to restrict its reporting on developing countries to activities of the local Communist party, proletarian dissatisfaction, and so on; discontent and a predisposition to revolution are emphasized, thus illustrating the Marxist prediction of the proliferation of "struggles for national liberation." There is a steady increase in domestic news, but much of this is still economic news. There is a noticeable increase in military news, related to the crystallization of the war in Vietnam, and the approaching twentieth anniversary of the Second World War, known in the Soviet Union as the Great Fatherland War. There is more news about science and education, reflecting an increase in publicity for the Soviet space program. There is also an
### Table One: News Coverage in PRAVDA (column inches)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content Classification</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Communist:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and Allies</td>
<td>1569.5</td>
<td>1793.5</td>
<td>1628.5</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europe, Cuba</td>
<td>570.5</td>
<td>509.5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Communist Parties</td>
<td>227.5</td>
<td>227.5</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>309.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Non-Communist:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>667.4</td>
<td>634.5</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and NATO</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>559.5</td>
<td>476.5</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>516.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>228.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>977.5</td>
<td>408.5</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>259.5</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. United Nations, Disarmament</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Political:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Article with Commentary</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>540.5</td>
<td>1757.5</td>
<td>1849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1008.5</td>
<td>737.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcements</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcements</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>256.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Economic:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short article</td>
<td>2419.5</td>
<td>3431.5</td>
<td>2608</td>
<td>2116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Articles with Commentary</td>
<td>405.5</td>
<td>237.5</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>1638</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>1428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Public Welfare, Housing</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Arts, Literature, Culture</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Science, Education</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Sports</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>132.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Military</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1140.5</td>
<td>654.5</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Crime</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>1093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Feature:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>133.5</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information (theater, radio)</td>
<td>133.5</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Information (theater, radio)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Crime</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Crime</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Crime</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Crime</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Crime</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
increase in the publication of theater and film production schedules, and lists of radio and television programs, indicating the rapid development of the broadcast media during these years.

Ironically, the many changes in the Soviet press during the post-Stalin period have not really altered what is essentially a dull, unexciting experience for the Soviet newspaper reader. There have been some important innovations in form and content, some of which we have already discussed. The increasing professionalization and sophistication of the Soviet journalist has been partially responsible for this. For example, under the tutelage of Alexei Adzhubei, a graduate of Moscow University's journalism faculty, IZVESTIYA became an evening paper, and at the same time other innovations made it more interesting and attractive to readers. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was transformed from a four-page paper appearing three times a week, to a more substantial sixteen page weekly. But these changes represent attempts at improvement within the very narrow confines of political control and function. Basically, the Soviet press reflects the essentially conservative outlook of the Party leadership, and this seems to have an inevitable, stultifying effect on the quality of presentation. One of the places where this constrictive posture is reflected most clearly is the style of newswriting, which directly reflects the tone of political discourse within the Party. The following quotation from a 1960 article could have been written in 1969:
Newspaper language is especially corrupted and distorted by its formal, bureaucratic style.

Let us recall how frequently we see stereotyped locutions in newspaper articles and notices! Words that express great thoughts and deep feelings are, as a result of their immoderately frequent and mechanical repetition, fossilized into stock phrases that desecrate and disfigure our speech.

The following excerpt from an IZVESTIYA article of July 10, 1969 illustrates how little the tone of the Soviet press has really altered:

But no inventions of our ideological enemies can alter the unshakable truth that Marxism-Leninism is a rigorous science, a single, integral science of the objective laws of social development, socialist revolution, dictatorship of the working classes and of the objective laws of the construction and development of the socialist society. History and the modern period are the best and most radical verification and overwhelming proof of the reality and truth of Marxism-Leninism and of the objectivity of the laws of social development it has disclosed. This is attested by the undeniable and unmatched world transformations of the twentieth century.

Letters to the Newspaper

One of the most important departments of any Soviet newspaper is the "Letters from Workers" section. Politically, this division provides the basis for the claim that the Soviet mass media are accessible to the masses (except, of course, to "enemies of the people and the Soviet state") as a public forum. Indeed, as an institution the letter to the newspaper may give the Soviet citizen a sense of participation in the running of his society, and allow him some outlet for his frustrations; it also provides the regime with another crude measure of public sentiment.
A major problem in analyzing Soviet letters published in newspapers is determining how representative they are. Since most content is selected to illustrate Party policy, we can assume that there is a good deal of selectivity in the printing of letters as well. Apparently, there is a great deal of difference among newspapers as to the ratio of letters printed in comparison to the number received. GUDOK received 69,452 letters in 1966, for example, and printed 9,376, while SOVIET-SKAYA ROSSIYA received 140,000 and printed only 2,542.\textsuperscript{25} The following figures indicate that the evening Leningrad daily received three-fourths the mail of the oblast newspaper during a three-year period and published four times more:\textsuperscript{26}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LENINGRADSAYA PRAVDA (oblast) - Received</th>
<th>LENINGRADSAYA PRAVDA (oblast) - Printed</th>
<th>VECHERNYI LENINGRAD (evening) - Received</th>
<th>VECHERNYI LENINGRAD (evening) - Printed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>49,006</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>25,105</td>
<td>7,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>43,227</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>30,568</td>
<td>9,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>49,127</td>
<td>3,709</td>
<td>36,290</td>
<td>12,986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since we have no access to Soviet newspaper letter files, we have done an analysis of letters actually printed in IZVESTIYA and ZARYA VOSTOKA (Dawn of the East), a local newspaper. We sampled ten issues at random from each of the four years 1956, 1969, 1962, and 1965 of both newspapers. Of the 80 issues examined, 37 contained letters. The total number of letters read was 87, of which 67 were single-authored and 20 were signed by a group of persons. The professions represented (when indicated) were:
Party and government workers: 5 people
Scientists and engineers: 14
Technical personnel: 10
Workers: 9
Professors: 5
Teachers: 4
Economic workers: 2
Students: 2
Tourist employees: 2
Housewives: 2

The areas of comments, with the tone of the letter, are summarized in Table Two on the following page.

Whether or not the letters are printed, they are supposed to be answered, and handed over to the authority about whom the complaint was lodged. A report on the action taken is supposed to be transmitted to the writer of the letter. The newspaper MAGADANSKAYA PRAVDA, noticing that its mail had declined during the first half of 1966, decided to administer a questionnaire to those who wrote critical letters to the paper. The survey showed that only about half of the authors were satisfied with the help given them as a result of their letters. It also showed that a more active publication of letters stimulated flow of mail into the newspaper; the more their letters appeared in print, the more people were encouraged to believe that letter-writing was worthwhile. The author of the article reporting the survey noted that there is no uniform way of handling letters coming in to oblast newspapers, and each newspaper has its own system. She pointed out the need for more sociological research on the publication of letters.
Recent discussion in the Central Committee of the Party indicated that it is beginning to take the answering of readers' complaints more seriously. The Central Committee adopted a resolution printed in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on September 17, 1967 (pp. 1-2), entitled "On Improving the Work of Investigating Letters from Working People and Arranging Personal Interviews for Them." The resolution stated that "an inattentive attitude toward requests and complaints gives rise to the dissatisfaction of the letter-writers and compels them to turn to central Party and state bodies on questions which can and should be solved locally."

Magazine Format and Content

Soviet magazines have changed a good deal during the post-Stalin period, perhaps even more in some ways than newspapers. We have already mentioned that there was a tremendous growth in the circulation of magazines, but much of this comes from the creation of new, interesting journals which seem to reflect readers' tastes more than those of the Stalin era. Among these new publications are INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA (Foreign Literature), started in 1955, which carries novels and stories in translation; NOVIYE TOVARY (New Products), started in 1957, which describes new Soviet and Western consumer goods; ZA RUBEZHOM (Abroad), started in 1960), which prints articles from the foreign press in translation; and SLUZHBA BYTA (Service in Everyday Life), which discusses consumer services. Although the circulation of these magazines
has increased at an astonishing rate in the years since they were started, the magazines printed in the greatest number of copies per edition are still the old stand-bys from the early days of Soviet power: RABOTNITSA (Woman Worker, 10 million copies), ZDOROV'YE (Health, 8 million copies), KREST'YANKA (Peasant Girl, 5.2 million copies), and KROKODIL (Crocodile, 4.6 million copies). Part of this is due to long-established readership and subscription habits, and part to political priorities. Soviet publications as a rule are printed not according to consumer demand but in response to official policy.

Graphic presentation in Soviet magazines has improved a good deal; better paper is available, brighter colors and modern designs are being used, and more photographs are evident. Magazine layout still suffers, however, from a generally poor level of graphic design, and is below the esthetic standards of most Western publications. Paper shortages still plague the publishing industry, though subscriptions to magazines and newspapers have been theoretically unrestricted for several years.

Soviet popular magazines, unlike many of their Western "bourgeois" counterparts, are not escapist publications. Many of them are published for specific occupational groups, and their aim is rather to increase the reader's concern with his everyday activities rather than to divert his attention from them. This means that Soviet magazines will probably never come to closely resemble Western magazines in content and style. They, too, are bound by political demands which inhibit any extensive proliferation of stimulating and varied materials.
Methods of Party Control

The control of the content of the Soviet press is a rather complex and sometimes confusing process. Ultimately it is the highest Party organ (the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) which has the last word on any issue. Officially, however, it is the State Committee on the Press of the Council of Ministers, USSR (formed in 1963), which is the governing body for all publishing matters. The latter is a state body and, as such, is constantly subject to Party direction. The main newspaper censorship agency is the Main Administration for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press. This is formally attached to the State Committee on the Press and the Council of Ministers, but actually works directly under the guidance of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department Press Sector. Another name for the censorship apparatus is GLAVLIT (Main Administration for Literary Affairs and Publishing), but this is presently not mentioned in official sources.

At the national level, the basic means of guidance is the policy resolution taken at a plenary session of the Central Committee. Another is a decree by the Supreme Soviet (the highest state body) or the Council of Ministers; such decrees have their origins in Party Central Committee discussion also, but they have a more formal and public character than the resolution. Either the Party resolution or the government decree may be covert or publicly announced, and may deal with any one of the following areas:
1) Directions as to the general emphasis of information in the newspaper and propaganda (in all forms) for a certain time period.

2) Directions as to the treatment of a specific news item.

3) Directives governing the organizational structure of the publishing and newsgathering apparatus, usually in the form of a government decree.

4) The setting aside of thematic days (e.g., "a tribute to Soviet space").

5) Changes and appointments in personnel of the press (the Party has power to appoint the staffs of newspapers at any level.

Meetings are held periodically to inform newspaper personnel of these general policy lines, treatment of specific news items, and to review political "mistakes." On the national level such meetings are held in Moscow on every second Tuesday in the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. They are attended by the editors-in-chief of national newspapers and magazines, and the high-ranking personnel of radio and television stations; sometimes local Moscow media personnel are invited for the sake of convenience. The policy directives presented at these meetings are sent to oblast and district Party committees, so that their propaganda people can hold similar meetings for local media personnel. Political mistakes made by the Soviet media during the period since the last meeting are discussed, and usually the punishment for the culpable personnel is announced at this time. This part of the
meeting is not automatically transmitted to the lower levels. Thirdly, the meetings are presented with a "forecast" of campaigns or events to come. For example, the campaign against "hooliganism" began in this manner; after the subject had been discussed in the press, the Supreme Soviet passed anti-hooligan laws, because of the "demands of public opinion." This clearly illustrates the direction of the flow of influence in the Soviet public forum.

Censorship on the individual newspaper is performed by two people, the first of whom is called a "responsible secretary." Though formally he ranks below the editor-in-chief and his deputy, he actually has considerable power, since he decides what is and what is not to be published. After reviewing the prepared copy of the newspaper, the responsible secretary sends it to the censor. If he approves it, he sends it to the editor-in-chief, with his stamp containing a code and the words "allowed to be printed" (razreshayetsyakpechati) together with the date and his signature. If he does not approve the prepared copy, he calls the managing editor, who must replace the unacceptable lines (usually there is no questioning of the censor's decision) from an already prepared stock of extra copy. Then the stamp of approval is given. After the newspaper goes to the editor-in-chief, and then to the printer's shop, the first printed copy is again sent to the censor; if he approves, he stamps it "allowed to be released" (razreshayetsyakvypuskuvsvyet).

In addition to the formal censorship apparatus, the Soviet newspaper editor of journalist is subject to a number of semi-official or informal
influences. His professional activities are always subject to review by the Union of Journalists. Under its statutes, he may even be removed from his position for breach of the professional code, which is vague enough to permit almost any kind of Party-sponsored rebuke. Editors are also subject to influence by the local Party control commission, or Party secretary.

Soviet Reading Habits

It has become almost a truism that Soviets are avid consumers of printed matter. Travelogues by Western visitors to the USSR abound in tales of workers reading on streetcars and subway trains. Soviet authorities never tire of telling how many tons of newsprint and how many copies of books they produce each year. Since the ideal citizen is supposed to be cultured and well-informed, a high consumption of printed matter is almost a political virtue. The time budget studies we looked at show that Soviet people do indeed read a great deal. The Soviet part of the Multinational Comparative Time Budget Research Project which was carried out in Pskov (a provincial city in European Russia) found that 66 percent of all respondents spent some time reading; this is the highest percentage of all countries participating in this study. Of these, a higher proportion of men than women reported that they spend time reading. More unmarried women, who usually do not have the responsibility of a household, read than do married women. On the other hand, fewer unmarried
men read than do married men. The time actually devoted to reading decreases with marriage for both men and women (see below).

Kotov found that in a Brigade of Communist labor 100 percent of the group of 100 people read newspapers and 80 percent of them read books and magazines. This figure is higher than the average noted by the Pekov study, and the reason is probably that these workers are expected to be models of behavior not only in their production output, but in their everyday lives as well. Because reading is such a positive cultural and political value in the Soviet Union, they are expected to manifest good reading habits. The opposite extreme in reading habits was reported by the authors of a study in the rural Leninsk Settlement of Tula Oblast: out of 136 people interviewed, 39 did not read newspapers, 88 did not read magazines, and 54 did not read books.

As to rank order of reading matter, a Komsomolskaya Pravda study reported that newspapers are most read (by 91.9 percent of men and 93.3 percent of women interviewed, books next (by 79.3 percent of men and 75.1 percent of women), and magazines least (by 69.3 percent of men and 73.3 percent of women). All of these percentages are fairly high, and it is interesting that in this study women are reported to read newspapers and magazines, though not books, more than men.

Frequency of Reading

The same study reports that 85.2 percent of male respondents read the newspaper every day, while only 79.1 percent of women read daily.
Another 22 percent of men and 13.4 percent of women reported reading "at least several times a week." Magazines were read by 57 percent of women and 55.6 percent of men questioned.38 "several times a week or more often." A study by Grushin (1967) 39 reports the following frequencies (reported in percent of the total sample):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Several Times Daily</th>
<th>Several Times a Week</th>
<th>Several Times a Month</th>
<th>Less Than Once a Month</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here again, men reported reading more than women; 92.5 percent of them read a newspaper at least several times a month and 86.8 percent daily, while only 86.5 percent of women read several times a month and 77.2 percent daily. The same is roughly true for magazines. People with a secondary education or higher reported reading newspapers at least several times a week more than did those with a below-secondary education. Workers said they read newspapers several times per week in slightly lower proportion than did members of the technical intelligentsia, non-technical intelligentsia, and white-collar employees. Housewives read least of all; only 78.7 percent of them reported looking at a paper at least several times a week. The same trends are clear for reading magazines "at least several times a month." Here again the technical intelligentsia reads most and housewives read least.40
Young people in general read more than their elders, with the 25-29 year-olds reading most (newspapers "at least several times a week" and magazines "at least several times a month"). Reading then tapers off, until age 60, when it begins to rise again. This is understandable, since young people are still actively learning, and have fewer responsibilities to interfere with leisure reading; at retirement age, the responsibility of family and job are usually past, and more time is devoted to leisure activities. The Grushin study found that many people (21.9 percent of them ranging from the 15.6 percent of over 60 year-olds to the 31.4 percent of technical intelligentsia) said they "would like to spend more time reading." This activity took second place out of 13 leisure activities that people "would like to engage in more often."

Amount of Time Spent Reading

Two of the available studies (Fedorov and the Pskov study) report that the average person spends about 48 minutes per day reading. A third study, carried out in seven Soviet cities (Petrosyan) reported an average of only 28 minutes per day. The Fedorov study reported that men spent about twice as much time per day (60 minutes) as women (30 minutes); the Pskov study also indicates a larger expenditure of time on reading by men than women (66 minutes per day as compared to 42 minutes per day). These proportions vary somewhat when we consider the type of reading material, though two other studies contradict each other on this
point. Goncharenko reports that men spend more than three times as much time reading newspapers as women (23 minutes as compared to 7 minutes). The Beliaev study results give the reverse impression, namely that women spend slightly more time reading socio-political literature (27 minutes as compared with 23 minutes for men). It is difficult to say why the results of this study contradict those of the others.

Marriage reduces the time spent reading, but at a different rate for men and women. The Pskov study results indicate that men reported they read 72 minutes if unmarried and 66 minutes if married. Women said they read 54 minutes if they were unmarried and 36 minutes if they were married. Goncharenko also found that marriage reduces reading time for both sexes on the whole (average minutes per day):  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional literature</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers and magazines</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the reduction here in time spent reading is due wholly to a decrease in time of exposure to fictional literature. This is almost compensated for by an increase for both sexes in the amount of time spent reading newspapers and magazines.

Both Beliaev and Goncharenko report that people spend more time on newspapers and magazines as they grow older, but less time on
The two studies which have data on the effects of education indicate the predictable: more educated people spend more time reading both newspapers and literature. Petrosyam reports that people with a higher education spend more than twice as much time reading (35 minutes a day) as to those with only an elementary education (15 minutes). Goncharenko reports an even greater increase, which is steady as the level of education goes up: those with a higher education read three times as much as those with only an elementary education.

Four studies provide us with information about the effects of the type of occupation on reading habits. All of them indicate the expected, based on the findings from education: those people in jobs which require more training or education spend more time reading on the whole than do those with jobs requiring less training. Both Beliaev and Goncharenko compare ordinary workers with engineering and technical personnel.

Beliaev found that workers read socio-political literature less (16 minutes
compared to 23 minutes) than did engineering-technical employees. Goncharenko found that workers read newspapers less than engineering-technical people. Fomin compared scientific workers with teachers in higher educational institutions, and found that scientific workers read newspapers less (37 minutes per day as compared to 45 minutes per day for teachers) than teachers.

Especially interesting in the Soviet case is the effect of Party affiliation on the amount of time spent reading. Beliaev and Goncharenko again provide us with data on this. Both indicate that Party members read (newspapers and socio-political literature) most of all (28 minutes per day and 29 minutes per day), Komsomol members read least of all (7 minutes and 9 minutes), and non-Party people spend an amount of time somewhere in between (16 and 11 minutes per day). Strumilin has some data on the effect of income. He reports a steady rise in the amount of time reading according to income per family member:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income in Rubles Per Month</th>
<th>Reading Time in Minutes Per Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 plus</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, income is related to occupational level, education, and age (see above) so it is not surprising that the amount of time spent reading increases with level of income.
Reading habits also vary according to the day of the week. Until recently this meant a division of two categories, "day off" and "weekday," because Soviet workers usually had only one day, and at most a day and a half, off per week. Since the institution of the five-day week, however, the two-day weekend has begun to be a significant unit. Unfortunately, there are still no results available from time budgets carried out since the transition to the five-day week, so we shall have to be content with the two former categories for the time being. The two time budget studies which use these categories indicate that everyone reads more on his day off than he does on weekdays. Shein's study of young workers under the age of 26 indicates that men spent 45 minutes a day reading on weekdays, but 51 minutes on their day off; women spent 50 minutes on weekdays and 56 minutes on their day off. Petrosyan's results from three cities are similar to those of Shein, except that the differences between time spent on weekdays and days off were somewhat greater:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minutes Spent Reading</th>
<th>Weekday</th>
<th>Day Off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Novokuznetsk: men</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk: men</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yerevan: both sexes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are also interested in the effects of residence on the amount of time spent reading. A study of farmers' leisure time mentioned earlier
found that in summer, men spend an average of 25 minutes a day reading, whereas women spend a little more than 10 minutes. In winter, men spend about 54 minutes and women 13 minutes. This time expenditure for men is about the same as it is in cities. As might be expected on the basis of our earlier findings on leisure, the amount spent reading by rural women is from one-half to one-third that spent by city women. On the whole, then, both urban and rural women have less free time than do men, and spend less time reading; but the difference is greater in rural than in urban areas.

The Availability of Periodicals

The Soviet reader obtains his journals through the network of the Main Administration for the Distribution of the Press, USSR, better known as SOYUZPECHAT. This agency, subdivided into a Central Subscription Agency and a Central Retail Agency, operates under the Ministry of Communications, USSR. Subscriptions are taken all year round, and since 1962, there has been no limit on the number of subscriptions taken. About 80 percent of all newspapers and magazines sold in the Soviet Union are sold by subscription. This retail-to-subscription ratio varies somewhat from republic to republic, however; in 1963, for example, there was one retail copy for every four subscription copies in the Tadzhik SSR, but nine retail copies to every 11 subscription copies in the Latvian SSR. While it might be expected that there are fewer retail copies sold in rural
than in urban areas, this seems to be not the case. In 1956, the proportion of rural retail sales in total retail sales was exactly the same as the proportion of the rural population to the total USSR population. We have no more recent information which would indicate that this relationship no longer exists.

Subscriptions to newspapers and magazines are taken at all offices of communications, newspaper junctions (distribution points), and by volunteer distributors of the press who earn a percentage of the price of the journals for which they sell subscriptions. These volunteers take subscriptions on farms, in factories, in housing units, and in any other place designated as a subscription point. In 1965 there were about 300,000 of these places throughout the USSR. In the 1963 periodical subscription campaign in Sakhalin oblast, a sparsely settled area, there was a ratio of about one volunteer distributor per 200 inhabitants, both in the towns and in the countryside. In Belgorodskiy oblast, a more densely populated area in the European part of the country, there was one distributor per each 500 of the rural population, and one per 180 of the urban population; in this area, of course, the rural population travels back and forth between city and country much more often, and can take advantage of the urban distributors.

Subscription copies are mailed out through the Newspaper-Magazines Dispatching Organ of the Post Office. The largest such office in Moscow sends out by regular mail over 8.5 million copies of periodicals a day to
9,000 newspaper junctions. Here the newspapers and magazines are sorted and sent to subscription postal departments, where workers pick up bundles to distribute to subscribers. Retail sales take place in communications departments and kiosks, of which there were about 22,000 in the SOYUZPECHAT network in 1967. Large cities now have automatic newspaper vending machines as well as kiosks, and some conductors on public transportation are allowed to sell periodicals during working hours.

In such a large and centralized operation there are bound to be problems. Many of these stem from the nature of the operation itself; Sazhin, chief of SOYUZPECHAT, commented in 1965:

Yes, there are shortcomings, and we won't try to excuse ourselves...but imagine for a minute that the whole country eats rolls baked in Moscow. Hard to imagine? And now recall that we must daily distribute from the capital a thousand newspapers to Nakhodka, Kushka, Tartu, and Tselinograd, and also try to make sure that they don't get stale on the way.

The problems of press distribution take many forms and have many sources. Often the periodicals are late getting to press, and the edition misses the plane which will take it to a far corner of the country.

For the central newspapers printing is done in peripheral cities from newspaper matrices. Over ten cities, including Leningrad, Kiev, and Minsk, receive facsimile transmissions from which the central newspapers are printed locally. This system is now in the process of expansion, and will greatly facilitate newspaper deliveries. An example of the scale of improvement is the case of Khabarovsk: previously it took eight hours to fly the matrices, but facsimile transmission takes only a few
minutes. At present the system is used mainly for PRAVDA, but is soon to be extended to SELSKAYA ZHIZN (Rural Life) and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as well. Meanwhile other newspapers will continue to be delayed by uncertain weather, high priority freight shipments and so on.

The example of newspaper distribution is one good example of the purely physical difficulties of Soviet communications; the size of the country will continue to create great problems unless technical facilities are improved. Most of the efforts to improve newspaper distribution, however, are still concentrated on the Moscow-periphery stage. Still to be tackled are the problems of local delivery in the peripheral areas. Often a shortage of vehicles and bad road conditions delay newspapers and mail for days and even weeks.

A problem which seems to be a chronic ill of the Soviet newspaper network is that of the supply and demand ratio. Periodicals are produced according to the number of subscription copies ordered and the estimated number of retail copies to be sold. The Soviet newspaper publishing industry by the middle fifties had passed the UNESCO minimum of 10 copies of daily newspapers per 100 inhabitants. In 1957, there were 11.4 copies of daily newspapers per 100 Soviet inhabitants (see Table Two, appendix), and by 1964 this had risen to 19.0 copies per 100. This fact, combined with the lifting of restrictions on newspaper subscriptions, makes it clear that there is no real shortage of newspapers for the population. Quite the contrary, in fact. Often huge quantities of periodicals are shipped to
areas where they are not needed or wanted; these lie unsold in the local kiosks for weeks. Then again, people are often forced by local Party pressure to subscribe to newspapers and magazines that they do not want. The prevailing philosophy seems to be "Get the periodical into the home at any cost." An example of such "violations of the principle of voluntariness," as this phenomenon is euphemistically called in the Soviet press, was reported in 1960 by the Belorussian newspaper CHYRVONAYA ZMENA. Noticing that many people at the Minsk brick factory did not subscribe to periodicals, the local Komsomol organization became alarmed. It decided to launch a campaign; all young workers who did not subscribe were listed and each was subjected to a series of "personal talks" by Komsomol activists. As a result, subscriptions increased by 500 copies.

Studies of the Newspaper Audience

A recent survey in Leningrad conducted jointly by the city administration of SOYUZPECHAT and the Leningrad State University gives some interesting information about periodical buying habits in an urban area. The survey was conducted in two parts: first, about 400 questionnaires were distributed to kiosk workers, asking for critical suggestions, information on the conditions of their work (proximity to subway station, etc.), and a diary to be kept from October 17-23 on sales, left-over copies, and deficits; second, 9,000 questionnaires on buying habits were distributed to readers, of which over 1,000 were returned. Kiosk operators
working in hotels reported selling not more than 200 copies per day, but those near factories sold 500 to 600 copies per day. Near Moscow Station, a centrally located terminal, seven kiosks sold a total of 12 to 14 thousand copies of newspapers per day. Another kiosk near the Victory Park subway station sold from 5 to 6 thousand copies per day. Kiosk workers complained that newspapers were often delivered to them late; this hurt their sales because people bought newspapers most often on their way to work and if newspapers reach the kiosks after the work day begins then all of these sales are lost.

Buying patterns change on days off, especially on Sundays when everyone is off from work. Kiosks near routes to work and transfer points (such as subway stations) were much less busy, and those located in central areas of the city fell off 40 to 50 percent in total sales. Out of 1123 people answering the readers' questionnaire, all reported buying papers on weekdays, but on Sundays 168 of them did not buy the paper at all; these people bought 79 less copies of IZVESTIYA, 134 copies less of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, and 66 copies less of SMENA. Of those answering, 378 bought NEDELYA, the weekly supplement to IZVESTIYA, on Sunday, and 74 bought ZA RUBEZHOM, a journal of translations from the foreign press. This would suggest that people want more depth and breadth to their Sunday reading, probably because they spend more time reading on this day than on weekdays.

In Leningrad there are 597 stationary kiosks, 31 self-service kiosks, 56 non-staff distributors, 73 streetcar conductors selling newspapers, and
230 automatic vending machines for newspapers. The readers' survey showed that people wanted more automatic vending machines and more conductors selling newspapers. The most popular newspapers sold at all of these locations together were (1966 figures): LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 75,2 thousand a day; IZVESTIYA, 50 thousand copies a day; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 36 thousand copies a day; SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 31 thousand copies a day; and SMENA (Leningrad youth newspaper), 29 thousand copies per day.

A recent article in ZHURNALIST \textsuperscript{71} indicates that retail sales of Soviet periodicals, particularly of magazines, is not very efficient. In March 1967, for example, about 5,900 copies of the magazine DRUZHBNA RAO (Friendship of Peoples) remained unsold; this was about 36 percent of the retail copies for that month! Other journals suffered a similar fate, which apparently is not unusual:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>No. of Retail Copies Unsold In March 1967</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Retail Copies for That Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovyety Deputatov Trudyashchikhnya</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Soviets of Workers' Deputies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voprosy Ekonomiki</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Problems of Economics)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Mirye Knig</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In the World of Books)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovyetskaya Muzika</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Soviet Music)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, these are not the top-selling Soviet magazines, and we do not know how serious the situation is among the more popular journals. It is also important to point out that retail sales are a small proportion of total magazine sales.
Soviet Studies on Newspaper Readers

The ideological significance of the Soviet press introduces difficulties in judging its total circulation. Subscription to Soviet newspapers has been less a matter of the reader's wishes than an act of public compliance with Party policy. It is only recently that Soviet editors have been willing or able to consider the tastes and demands of their readers as a means of increasing circulation. Previous to the resurgence of sociological investigation from 1959 onward, the only methods of audience "feedback" were those institutionalized in the early days of Soviet power. These methods are still very much in use, but fortunately they have been supplemented by more modern methods of media research. One typically Soviet method of audience contact has been the Letters from Workers Department which we discussed earlier. Another crude method is the "readers conference": journalists visit factories, farms and housing units, gather all the residents and ask them to express their feelings on a particular newspaper or magazine. Since most of these newspaper people are also Party members, and the opinions expressed are a matter of public record, people often respond more in terms of political expectations than of their own feelings. These meetings are also not very frequent or systematic, and there have been many opinions voiced that complaints are never taken into account anyway.

In the past two or three years some Soviet newspapers and journals have begun to include tear-out blanks on which the reader can indicate which features of the publication he liked most and which he disliked.
This is not a particularly objective way to study audience reaction, but it does indicate an interest in readers' thoughts about the periodical, and it provides an opportunity for an anonymous gripe session.

Several studies on newspaper readership have been done by Party organs and academic institutions. One such study was done in February 1966 in the city of Kamyslova in Sverdlovsk oblast by the Press, Radio and Television Sector of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee of the CPSU, and the Council on Propaganda and Distribution of the Press of that Party Committee. Out of 2500 questionnaires, 1,733 were returned. Readers were asked 11 questions. The data obtained showed that women between the ages of 17 and 45 subscribed more than men, with the exception of those of childbearing age (between 26-35 on the average). Across all social and age groups, local papers were clearly most popular. In percentages of those responding, the following breakdown of readership was manifested:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Za Kommunizm (local)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uralskiy Rabochiy (oblast paper)</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>12.</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomolskaya Pravda</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovietskaya Rossiya (republic paper)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na Smenu! (oblast paper)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trud (Labor)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An investigation of the readers' Party affiliation showed that the most active readers of leading newspapers are: those who are both working
and studying, those who are studying in the system of Party education, and activists and social workers (such as agitators, propagandists, lecturers, members of Party bureaus, and so on). As institutionalized opinion leaders, these people must be better informed than the average person, especially in regard to current policies and the official version of political events.

In answer to the question, "Why did you begin to subscribe to this particular newspaper?" the following answers were returned:

1. Advice or suggestion of comrades 5.5%
2. Suggestion of public press distributor 9.9
3. Summons of Party or Komsomol activists 8.1
4. Accidentally read interesting articles 10.9
5. After joining Party or Komsomol 8.6
6. After contact with advertising about the paper 3.0
7. Tradition or habit 11.7
8. "Inner needs" 35.0
9. Other reasons 4.2
10. Hard to say 3.1

The largest number of people indicated that their choice of newspaper was dictated by "inner needs"; it is impossible to say whether this was chosen as a "safe" category, whether people have been told this as a desirable reason so long that they automatically gave it as an answer, or to what extent that particular newspaper actually did satisfy some personal demand. This category was chosen most often by older people, by people with higher education, and by Party people. Advertising of newspapers seems to have had very little effect on readership. This may indicate that people do not fail to subscribe merely because they are unaware of subscription possibilities but for some other reason. Three categories which
may be called "potentially coercive" account together for a rather large (26.6 percent) proportion; these are "Suggestion of public press distributor," "Summons of Party activist" and "After joining Party or Komsomol." Another study was carried out in Leningrad in April 1967. Though the researchers of this case were mainly interested in television viewing habits, they also asked questions about their other sources of information, including newspapers. Respondents totalled 1,916 persons; not all were television set owners. In answer to the question, "How many newspapers do you usually read?" the following distribution of answers was obtained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of persons</th>
<th>Approximate % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't read or didn't answer</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read one newspaper</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read two newspapers</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read three newspapers</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read four newspapers</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read five newspapers</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read six newspapers</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study reported that 86 percent of all those who owned and watched television also read several newspapers. This would seem to support the finding of Paul Lazarsfeld and associates that among the audience of the mass media, there is a considerable degree of "media clustering;" in other words, those who expose themselves to one medium of mass communication are more likely than others to expose themselves to another medium.
In answer to the question, "What newspaper do you usually read?"

the following percentages were returned:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Proportion of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leningradskaya Pravda</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecherniy Leningrad</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedelya</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smena</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsolskaya Pravda</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literaturnaya Gazeta</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovetskaya Rossiya</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't read</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the Sverdlovsk study, local newspapers were most popular, with
IZVESTIYA and its weekly supplement NEDELYA next. PRAVDA,
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA are much
more widely read here than among the Sverdlovsk study's respondents.

In March 1966 IZVESTIYA conducted a poll among its readers. This study, which included some 26,000 respondents (mainly subscribers),
uncovered some interesting facts about the types of people who read the
major government daily (IZVESTIYA is the official organ of the Supreme
Soviet). The age structure of IZVESTIYA'S audience is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Proportion of Izvestiya's Readers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 years</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 years</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-55 years</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner age</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unfortunately, neither of the two reports on the IZVESTIYA study gives complete figures. The above age breakdown of readers totals only 86.6 percent, and we are left uninformed as to what age group the remaining 13.4 percent of readers belong. Another report on the study stated that 25 percent of IZVESTIYA’S readers are under the age of 30; this would suggest that about 6 percent (25%-[15.6% plus 3.4%]) are under 20. The other reports indicate that 55 percent of readers are between the ages of 30 and 55; this agrees with the above percentages which total 54.6 percent for this age group. The second report, however, is also incomplete, since it accounts for only 80 percent of readers in mentioning age groups. What does seem clear from these reports is that over half of IZVESTIYA’S readers are between the ages of 30 and 55; presumably these are settled people with families and some responsibility.

What about the educational level of IZVESTIYA’S readers? Again, the figures reported are incomplete. Only 93.2 percent of readers are accounted for; they fall into the following categories:

- Incomplete and higher education 44.0%
- Special and secondary education 19.0%
- 10-11 grades 9.4%
- 7-9 grades 12.0%
- 4-6 grades 6.0%
- Below primary 2.8%

Readers of the major government daily are obviously fairly well educated, 63 percent of them having a secondary education or above. A report on the study hastens to add, however, that trend data show that high educational level is
neither a new nor a permanent characteristic of IZVESTIYA readers; it has been thought that especially in recent years people with a high level of education have been attracted to IZVESTIYA. It turns out that this is not at all true; a noticeable rise in the educational level of subscribers was observed already 10-13 years ago. At that time people with a 4-11 grade education and correspondence school students stood out from the other categories of IZVESTIYA readers in the rate of their subscriptions. At present this tendency is observed: among new subscribers the proportion of readers with a higher education dropped from 56 percent to 35 percent, and the proportion of readers with a 4-9th grade education tripled. Women are reported to be active readers of IZVESTIYA, especially up to the age of 30. At this point, their readership drops for a while, and then rises again later, though it never again reaches the previous level. We are not told what that level was, neither are we told how it compares to male readership and how that changes with age.

According to the reports on the study, anywhere from 33 to 55 percent of IZVESTIYA'S readers are new, having started their subscriptions within the last five years. From 20 to 24 percent have subscribed more than ten years, and 6 percent have subscribed for more than 18 years.

The data on occupation are especially interesting. Fifteen percent of IZVESTIYA'S readers are engineering and technical workers, and only ten percent are ordinary workers; this means that at most 25 percent of IZVESTIYA'S readers are in industry and transport whereas this occupational group makes up 36 percent of the population. Only five percent of IZVESTIYA'S readers are employed in agriculture, whereas 31 percent of the population is employed in this field. This suggests that IZVESTIYA'S
readers are mainly urban rather than rural people. On the whole the manual occupations mentioned, namely industry, transport and agriculture, account for only 30 percent of IZVESTIYA'S readers. We do not know in what areas the other 70 percent of readers are employed, but they may well be in more skilled, white-collar jobs. This again would suggest a high proportion of urban rather than rural readers.

A very general profile of the most typical IZVESTIYA reader would, according to the above data, look something like this: he or she is likely to be well into the adult years of family responsibility (30-55 years), fairly well-educated, probably in a skilled or semi-professional occupation, and living in an urban environment.

What topics interest IZVESTIYA'S readers most? The poll asked people to name the topics on which they read items most regularly. Unfortunately, here again the information reported is somewhat confusing, and even contradictory in a few cases. The first report, published in NEDELYA (the weekly supplement to IZVESTIYA), stated that the following topics are read most regularly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Percent of Readers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict situations</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilletons</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work of the Soviets</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents and crime</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and daily life</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another report, which came out later and is somewhat more detailed than the first, gives the following figures on "regular readership":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On moral themes</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprising stories</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International surveys</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family circle</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feuilletons</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events in countries of Asia,</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, Latin America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man, collective, and society.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings with interesting people</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events in socialist countries</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World of the intelligent man</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juridical problems</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature and art</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead article</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda articles</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work of the Soviets</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several points of contradiction here. The first report says 39 percent of readers read materials on the work of Soviets and the second says only 17 percent do so. Both of these percentages seem somewhat low, since this topic is supposed to be the main raison d'etre of the newspaper! Almost as many people (33 percent) read about accidents and crime, which constitutes a miniscule proportion of content in IZVESTIYA, as it does in all Soviet newspapers. The first report says that only 5 percent of readers regularly read on family and daily living, while the second says that 66 percent of readers read the main feature in that category, Family Circle; indeed, this is reported as one of the most
popular parts of the paper. Thirdly, the first report says that only 3 percent of readers regularly turn to stories on economics, while the second says that 23 percent of readers do so. Clearly this is not a popular topic for Soviet newspaper readers, and this is all the more amazing since it constitutes a large proportion of the total space in Soviet newspapers. Other studies have indicated that Soviet readers find economics dull, and international topics and moral themes just as interesting, as do IZVESTIYA'S readers. The ComCom interviews with 115 former Soviet residents showed that economics was not a popular subject, and that neither were Party resolutions. On the other hand, there was a tremendous interest in practical information, family themes, and international news. Studies by Vasilenko and Kurganov, both reported in ZHURNALIST last year, reported similar findings.  

A notable feature of the IZVESTIYA study's content categories is that there is no mention of news about Western Europe and the United States. Presumably these are included under "International Surveys," and if so, news about these countries is very popular. Why the reports of the studies did not single out these areas as they did the developing and socialist countries is an interesting question. Finally, what is meant by "propaganda articles" is not at all clear; most Soviet newspaper articles are propagandistic in nature, but deal with specific topics on domestic or international affairs.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the IZVESTIYA study is the response to the question "Was there any instance in which you disagreed
with the newspaper on a published fact?" Twenty-five percent answered that they were "in full agreement" with the newspaper. Twelve percent said that there were times when they disagreed, and all the rest of the respondents (63 percent) refused to answer the question! If indeed Party and government workers were involved in carrying out the study the reluctance of the respondents to answer such a sensitive question by them is not surprising. The more negative comments came mainly from two groups--those who had only a primary education and those who had a higher education. People who read most regularly were also the most critical of the newspaper. 80

Readers were asked for suggestions to improve the newspaper's coverage. Fifty-four percent thought that the paper should improve its coverage of moral-political themes, and 34 percent thought it should improve on problems of intra-collective relationships; 27.8 percent thought that questions of science and economics should be improved, and 21 percent wanted better treatment of village life. Only 30 percent of readers were happy with reporting on how workers live, another 30 percent were happy with reporting on the intelligentsia, 22 percent on women, and 21 percent on the lives of collective farmers. 81

Finally, the study asked how many of IZVESTIYA's readers read other newspapers, and how many they read. The results were:

- 14 percent read only IZVESTIYA
- 22 percent read one other paper;
- 26 percent read two other papers;
- 19 percent read three other papers;
- 8 percent read four or more other papers.
Again, this accounts for only 89 percent of readers.

The IZVESTIYA study is important because it is the first published attempt by a major Soviet information-propaganda organ to learn about its audience. It demonstrates a desire to base contemporary propaganda efforts on concrete information rather than vague conceptions about audience needs and characteristics. No doubt the professional training of young Soviet journalists has played a large part in producing this trend, as has the continued development of sociological investigation in other areas.

Another extensive Soviet newspaper readership study comes from Estonia. The newspaper EDAZI, in the city of Tartu, carried out such a project from 1956 to 1966. In answer to the question "How much attention in your opinion does the newspaper EDAZI devote to the following themes?" the researchers found that there sometimes was little correspondence between readers' wishes and the newspaper's emphasis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>Enough</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement for communist labor</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions of health and illness</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family life and love</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions of wages and material incentives</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities of government</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of children and adolescents</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions of embezzlement of state property and mismanagement</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions of foreign policy</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents and other occurrences</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clearly readers are tired of hearing about "Communist Labor" and governmental activities, and want more advice for daily living--articles on family life, love, education, and health. It is interesting that half of the readers are interested in hearing more about wage incentives and about cases of embezzlement of state property! "Accidents and other occurrences" is a great focus of curiosity; now that they are finally given a chance to express their preferences, readers are beginning to express their sense of deprivation in regard to such information.

Perhaps the most interesting Soviet newspaper readership study is that completed by the official trade union newspaper, TRUD (Labor) in 1968. In surveying its three million subscribers, it found that only 37 percent of them are workers, 18 percent are engineers and the remaining 45 percent are: workers in higher educational institutions, scientific research workers, students, pupils, and pensioners. TRUD's readers are slightly younger than IZVESTIYA's, the average age being 39 years, and the most typical between 31 and 40 years. They are less educated than the readers of IZVESTIYA: only about a fourth of them have a higher education, and two-thirds have some sort of secondary education. About half of them live in cities with a population of over half a million.

The TRUD study gives us the first Soviet-produced data on pass-on readership, and enables us to estimate more accurately the actual audience of the newspaper. About 90 percent of its readers have families, with the average size being 3 to 4 people. More than half of the family
members also read the newspaper (.9 times three million, or 2.7 million times one-half of the 2.5 family members besides the subscriber), adding another 3.4 million readers to the original three million subscribers. A good half of the subscription copies were reported to be read by neighbors and acquaintances as well; if we take a conservative estimate that only one other person outside the family reads the newspaper, this adds another 1.5 million readers. For three million subscription copies, then, the actual readership is almost 8 million (7.9 million) people!

For ten percent of TRUD's subscribers, it is the only newspaper they read. On the average, readers subscribe to more than three newspapers, most popular among which are PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Two-thirds of TRUD's readers also subscribe to local newspapers. The average reader also subscribes to three magazines as well; among these, the most popular are RABOTNITSA ZDOROV'YE, and other scientific-popular journals.

According to the survey, there are three main types of motivation among subscribers to TRUD: those who do so for "emotional" reasons, such as "I am used to it"; those who do so for professional reasons, including trade union employees and activists, and upper echelon administrative personnel in plants and construction projects; and "passive" subscribers, those who follow the advice of friends or "just like the name." The second group is the least numerous, and is more educated and active
than the other groups. Its members read lead articles and items on trade union activities, and tend to be more critical of content than other readers.

Eighty-five percent of TRUD subscribers read the paper at home after work. Six percent read it during the lunch break at work, including the younger and more intellectual members of the audience. The average time spent on an issue is forty minutes. This means that about half the paper is read, since it takes about one hour and forty-five minutes to cover the whole paper thoroughly. Younger readers give about 26 minutes a day to the paper, and older people about 35 minutes. If a reader has between fifteen and thirty minutes at his disposal, he'll read first the international information, critical materials, and feuilletons. Only those who have an hour or more read lead articles and trade union materials. Fifty percent of readers like articles on morality, daily life, and legal problems; this is interesting, since we have already noted that these topics are fairly rare in the Soviet press. Between thirty and fifty percent regularly read articles on international topics, science, technology, literature, art and trade union themes. In third place are articles on production themes, propagandistic materials, and lead articles; less than thirty percent of subscribers read them. The authors conclude their discussion of topics read with the following comment:

The sociologists noted a curious regularity of reader interests. Interest in an article is greater the closer it is to everyday, personal problems of the person. This means that in the absence of interest in some themes, the newspaper, not the reader, is primarily at fault.84
The authors of the TRUD study made another daring innovation in comparing reader preferences with the actual content of the newspaper. They took the file of TRUD for January through April of 1967, and counted the number of lines which TRUD devotes to each of several thematic divisions. Almost the same distribution of content appeared each month and usually TRUD prints the same forms of articles in the same proportions each month. The authors compared the first ten themes chosen by readers and those which appeared in the greatest volume in the newspaper:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume:</th>
<th>Popular with readers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. official TASS communiques</td>
<td>1. feuilletons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sports</td>
<td>2. everyday life, morals, pedagogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. entertaining information</td>
<td>3. legal questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. problems of industry</td>
<td>4. sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Foreign TASS information</td>
<td>5. critical materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. stories of progressive collectives</td>
<td>6. events in capitalist countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. literature and art</td>
<td>7. science and technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. lead articles</td>
<td>8. medical themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. propaganda materials</td>
<td>9. work of trade union organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. work of trade union organs</td>
<td>10. stories of leaders of industry and socialist competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that different names were chosen for content categories by readers and by the authors makes it difficult to compare the two columns; it also indicates a gap between the readers' conception of the newspaper's content and that content as seen by the newspaper staff. There are only three categories that clearly appear in both lists, though they occupy different positions on the two scales: sports is #2 in volume, and #4 in readers' preference; "stories of progressive collectives," the newspapers' #6, coincides with readers' preference #10, "stories of leaders of industry
and socialist competition; and the work of trade union organs, supposedly the main topic of the newspaper, occupies tenth place in volume and ninth place in readers' preferences! Items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 in the readers' preferences column are not among the first ten items on the "greatest volume" list, although there are some items which do relate to those topics. For example, "official TASS communiques or "foreign TASS information" may concern "events in capitalist countries" from time to time; and "entertaining information" may include feuilletons, and articles about everyday life. The authors of the study conclude: "of course, a newspaper cannot blindly follow the average reader, increasing its volume of feuilletons and sports chronicles. But the editorial board should know about the existing disproportions in order to draw its own conclusions."  

The effects of residence on newspaper and magazine readership are also interesting. Most of the studies discussed above have to do with urban patterns of buying and reading. Readership of periodical publications is fairly high in rural areas, and in fact the newspaper may well be the medium which has most penetrated the Soviet countryside. The Kopanka study reports that in 1963, 503 families out of 1592 subscribed to magazines, and 1459 subscribed to newspapers; this is 10 times more than in 1950. The inhabitants get 25 different newspapers; of the total of 1631 copies of newspapers, 305 copies were of central papers, and the rest were republic or local papers. 86 The study on Kalinin oblast reports that in Bezhetskiy Raion 95 percent of all households get newspapers or magazines. Most
popular are raion and oblast newspapers, and among central publications, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KROKODIL, AND OGONYOK. In the village of Lebedevka, "there is no home that does not subscribe to a newspaper." The post office there reported that in 1963 people in the village subscribed to 306 newspapers and 138 journals, making 47 periodicals for each 100 persons. Most popular here are SELSKAYA ZHIZN, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and the oblast and raion newspapers; also popular are such magazines as KRESTYANKA (Peasant Girl), ZDOROVYE (Health), and OGONYOK. Two of the village studies give a list of periodicals and the number of people who subscribe to them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>By Individuals</th>
<th>By Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestiya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovietskaya Rossiya</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomolskaya Pravda</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trud (Labor)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneerskaya Pravda</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchitelskaya Gazeta</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priokskaya Pravda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryazanskaya Komsomolets</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leniniskiy Put</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gudok (Whistle)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovietskaya Torgovlya (Soviet Trade)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovietskiy Sport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovietskaya Kultura</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literatura i Zhizn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrativnaya Gazeta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meditsinskiy Rabotnik (Medical Worker)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>332</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is difficult to compare these two tables systematically since they represent situations in two different villages in two different years. However, some general conclusions can be drawn. It is clear, for example, that rural people are most interested in their local newspapers, and if they read any central newspapers, they are very likely to include PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA among them. Though both of the villages are agricultural and both are located in the Russian Republic, Korablino seems to prefer SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the Russian Republic newspaper, and Viryatino SELSKAYA KHOZIASTVO (Agriculture) as a "most popular" central newspaper. Professional people subscribe to such papers as UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA and MEDITSINSKIY RABOTNIK as one way of keeping up with their profession while they are in the country. In Viryatino, it is primarily the library or school which subscribes to these publications, and in Korablino it is individuals who do so most. In Viryatino,
OGONYOK and KRESTYANKA are on the subscription list, which also includes 18 copies of BLOKNOT AGITATORA (Agitator's Notebook) and some methodological journals for teachers. The Viryatino study says that when a farmer does not subscribe to a newspaper or magazine, he reads it "without fail" in the farm administration office, library, or borrows it from a friend.

Most farms also produce their own wall newspaper, which is put up once a week or month by the local Party or Komsomol organization. Village schools or large farm brigades may also have their own wall newspapers. How many people read these "bulletin boards" in the form of newspapers is, of course, almost impossible to assess.

The Moscow University Sociological Faculty used some materials from the Ukrainian village of Terpeniye (Melitopol raion, Zaporozhe province) to study reading habits in the community. It turned out that there was no real difference between workers and collective farmers in the readership of newspapers. The sharp contrast came between skilled and unskilled workers among both farmers and workers. The number of families subscribing to newspapers was substantially higher in the skilled groups than in the unskilled groups. Almost all of the former subscribed to one or more newspapers, but only four-fifths of the families of unskilled laborers subscribed to newspapers. From our earlier investigation of reading habits (based mainly on urban people), we found that workers read less frequently than do other occupational groups, such as intelligentsia.
and white-collar employees. People in jobs requiring more skill spend more time reading than do those in jobs requiring less training and education. Also, educated people spend more time reading than do uneducated or less educated people. Thus, the findings for rural people are similar to those for urban people with regard to the effects of occupational level on reading habits.

There are, of course, strong generational differences in the amount of time spent reading, and these differences are especially strong among the rural population. Older people often are illiterate. In Vryatino, for example, in 1953 21 percent of people were illiterate, and most of these were old people, especially women. In Kopanka, 63.5 percent of those over 65 were illiterate at the time of the study.

Summary

Many changes have occurred in the Soviet press during the post-Stalin years to make it more effective as an instrument of political socialization. More copies of newspapers are available, so that almost anyone who wants to can read a Soviet newspaper. The content of newspapers and magazines is much more varied and interesting than in Stalin's time, though the style of writing is still formalistic and dull, preserving many tired political cliches. There have been several major changes in an
effort to make public persuasion by print more professional and efficient.
The forming of a journalists' union and the institution of higher education
courses in journalism are but two examples. A second news agency has
been created, essentially for the purpose of bolstering the Soviet Union's
image at home and abroad, and to increase ties with other countries.
Finally, there is less reliance on such dubious methods of audience feedback as readers' conferences and letters to the newspaper, and more emphasis on studying the audience by means of scientific sociological investigation. The latter effort is one of the most important, for it tells the regime with some reliability where it has been successful and where it has failed, and most important of all, what sort of efforts should be made in the future.

Reading in the Soviet Union is considered a highly desirable activity, both by the regime and the population. The regime's interest stems mainly from a desire to expose the population to a maximum of political material, while members of the population, in seeking enrichment and diversion from reading, are following a long Russian cultural tradition. Soviet people do indeed read a great deal, more than people in most of the other countries in a ten-nation time budget study, and to this extent the Soviet regime has successfully made use of a Russian intellectual tradition. Newspapers are read most, followed by books and magazines.

What kinds of people are most easily reached by the printed media? Three related factors are known to have a positive effect on exposure:
education, occupation (level of skill), and income. An increase in the level of any of the three increases the likelihood that an individual will read more. Essentially, then, those who have fared well under the regime tend to expose themselves more to its messages. Young people tend to read more than older people in general, and to spend less time on newspapers and magazines. Middle-aged people spend more time on periodicals but one study indicated that there is a levelling-off point somewhere just after middle age, after which people go back to literature. Generational differences are more marked in rural areas, where many older people are still wholly or partially illiterate. Young people have better reading habits and more motivation to read than do older peasants.

Party members tend to read socio-political literature and periodicals more than either members of the Young Communist League (ages 18-35) or non-Party people. The patterns mentioned here suggest that people who are older and more politically involved tend to read more for utilitarian reasons than for enjoyment.

Men in general read more than women, and the difference is especially marked after marriage; married women read less than unmarried ones, indicating that the burdens of housework are a great obstacle for exposure to printed matter. This male/female reading difference is even more pronounced in rural areas, where women work even more (they tend private plots, and have less supporting services for normal housework) than in cities. Rural people also read less than urban people in the
summer months, when agricultural work is at its busiest. People who work in the fields read less than those who work in the village centers near the club or library. Other than the seasonal difference, and the particularly poor reading time for rural women, rural people tend to read about as much as urban people. They seem to have adequate access to periodicals through subscriptions and the local library, and they make good use of this access.

One of the most interesting reading patterns from the standpoint of political socialization is that of exposure to various types of content. Ideally, one would assume that the regime would prefer people to read articles on economic progress and political matters, and certainly the amount of space devoted to these topics in Soviet newspapers would indicate just that. The audience surveys, however, leave us with the impression that the most popular rubrics are news of accidents and crime (to which newspapers devote very little space even now), family circle topics, and international news. Political resolutions and economic news is considered boring and uninteresting by most readers. This indicates that people reach a saturation point in exposure to politics or perhaps because it is limited.
Footnotes, Chapter Two: Newspapers and Magazines

1 From "S chevo nachat'?" (With What Shall We Begin?), in SOCHINENIYE, Vol. 5, Moscow.


3 A resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, entitled "On Improving Soviet Radio Broadcasting and on Further Developing Television" PARTIINAYA ZHIZN (No. 4, Feb. 10, 1960, pp. 26-34), stated: "The Central radio stations in Moscow must first of all assure timely broadcasts of important information, effective commentary on domestic and foreign events, and the organization of various artistic programs...Because radio should give the population the important news before the newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to transmit news immediately to central and local radio stations."

4 For more detailed information on the circulation and changes in the press, see: Hollander, Gayle D., SOVIET NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES, Monograph, 1967, Center for International Studies, M.I.T..

5 For a more detailed breakdown, see Hollander, Gayle D., op.cit.


10 Ibid.

11 Information communicated orally by a former high-ranking Soviet journalist.

12 For a translation of the Statutes of The Union of Journalist, revised to October, 1966, see the appendix of Hollander, Gayle D., op. cit.

14 For a summary of the history of the RABSELKOR movement, see Hollander, Gayle D., op. cit., pp. 63-69.


16 Bogdanov and Vyazemskiy, op. cit., Chapter Two.


22 Many of the polls have been translated in the CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS.


26 Igoshin, Sergei, "Myest 'srednovo pokazatelya'" ("Vengeance of the 'Average Index'") ZHURNALIST, No. 8, 1967, pp. 34-6.

See discussion by Alex Inkeles, PUBLIC OPINION, op. cit., Chapter 13.

Information in this section communicated orally by a former high-ranking Soviet journalist.

MULTINATIONAL COMPARATIVE SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1966, December issue of the AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, and Appendix to that issue (hereafter referred to as PSKOV). The second highest percentage of readership was in the United States, with 57.9 percent (56.7 percent for Jackson) and the lowest was in the national sample for the Federal Republic of Germany, with 37.8 percent. Reading in the USSR is basically a primary activity. As a secondary activity (reading while eating, etc.) it occupies no more than 10 percent of an hour, or 6 minutes a day.

80.2 percent of men, and 55.7 percent of women.

61.4 percent of this group as compared to 53.5 percent of married employed women.

77.6 percent compared to 81.1 percent reported regular reading.

Kotov, L., "Byudzhet Vremini" ("Time Budget"), MOLODOI KOMMUNIST, No. 7, 1960, p. 34. (This is essentially a group of exemplary workers.)


Baikova, V.G., et al., SVOBODNOYE VREMYA i VSESTORONNEYE RAZVITIYE LICHNOSTI (Free Time and the All-Round Development of the Personality), Moscow, 1965, p. 133.

The overall literacy level is very high in the Soviet Union. Old women have the lowest literacy rate, followed by old men; among young people there is practically no difference between the sexes.

Baikova, et al., op. cit.

Grushin, B., SVOBODNOYE VREMYA--ACTUALNIYE PROBLEMY (Free Time--Pressing Problems), Moscow, 1967, Table 9, p. 76.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81. [Below secondary education, 82.8%; secondary education, 94.6%; higher education, 94.7%. Workers, 90.4%; technical intelligentsia, 94.4%; non-technical intelligentsia, 93.0%; and white collar, 92.2%.]
Possibly the difference is related to the geographical area in which the study was carried out. Leningrad, the site of the Beliaev project, is an intellectual center, while the other studies were done in fairly provincial areas. Perhaps in a more stimulating environment, where household amenities are greater, women follow literary pursuits more actively than men. While this is a possible explanation, the data are certainly not conclusive and clearly Beliaev's results are atypical.
54 Beliaev, op. cit., Table 2, p. 49; Goncharenko, op. cit., Table 4, p. 35; Pskov, IV. 11; and Fomin, V. G., "Voprosu Izucheniya Byudzheta Vremeni Nauchnykh Rabotnikov," Table 5, p. 203 in Predenskiy, op. cit.

55 Beliaev, op. cit., Table 8, p. 52; Goncharenko, op. cit., Table 7, p. 38. This is partly an effect of age, though there is an overlap between eligible age groups for Party and Komsomol members (the twenties). The difference between Party members and non-Party people cannot be explained by age, of course.


57 Shein, Yu. C., "Opyt Izucheniya Vnerabochevo Vremeni Trudyashchikseya v Promyshlennosti g. Stalinska" ("Experience in the Study of Non-working Time of Workers") in Prudenskiy, op. cit., Table 4, p. 163. It is interesting to note that this study, like the Beliaev one, indicates that women read slightly more than men; these two studies are exceptional in this respect.

58 Petrosyan, op. cit., Table II, p. 96.


60 See RASPROSTRANENIYA PECATI, No. 3, 1964.

61 This was 47 percent. Stepanov, B. P., RASPROSTRANENIYE, EKSPEDIROVANIYE, i DOSTAVKA GAZET i ZHURNALOV v SSSR), lectures given in the Faculty of Journalism, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1955, pp. 23, 28, 32.

62 An office which handles mail, inter-city telephone communications, and telegraph transmission.


Figures for some other countries in the early sixties are (from UNESCO, WORLD COMMUNICATIONS, Paris, 1964):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Copies per 100 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the November, 12, 1960, issue.


Firsov, Boris, "Srednevo Sritelya' Nyet" ("There is No 'Average Viewer'"), ZHURNALIST, December 1967, pp. 42-45.


There were three types of information collection in the survey:

1) Interview at the place of work. About 100 categories of professions were established, and for each category a minimum of 150 questionnaires were completed.

2) Interview at place of residence. Lists of subscribers were obtained at local post offices; from these, each tenth family was chosen. These first two categories of enquiry yielded about 8 thousand respondents.
3) In addition, about 150,000 mail questionnaires were sent out. For this, a post office was chosen in each of the following types of places: large, average, and small cities, and a village. The entire list of subscribers in each post office (one from each type of settlement) was sent questionnaires. In Lipetsk oblast, there was a special study; all subscribers in this oblast were sent questionnaires.

In all, 211 places in the country were represented. Out of a total of 177,000 questionnaires, 26,000 were returned. (This is a response rate of about 14.5%). Note that only the first type of questioning could include retail purchasers.

The data were analyzed at the Computer Center of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences USSR. People taking part in the project included (according to Soviet categories, which are not otherwise clarified): 269 staff and volunteer correspondents; 5.7 "activists"; workers of Party and and Soviet apparatus, and workers of communications. The fact that Party and government people were involved, possibly in the actual interviewing, is not in keeping with Western practices to minimize the interviewer bias. However, it seems to be normal practice in Soviet investigations of this type.

For further information on the methodology of the study, see Davydchenko, V., and V. Shlyapentokh, "Izvestiya' izuchayut chitatelya" ("Izvestiya' Studies Its Reader"), ZHURNALIST, No. 2, 1968, pp. 23-25.

76 In NEDELYA, the weekly supplement to IZVESTIYA, No. 11, 1967, p. 4.


78 NEDELYA, op. cit.


80 Davydchenko, loc. cit.

81 NEDELYA, loc. cit.


84 Ibid., p. 47.

85 Ibid., p. 48.


89 Selivanov, V.I., et al., KORABLINO--SYELO RUSSKOE (Korablino -- A Russian Village), Sovietskaya Rossiya Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 147.


91 Figures for Viryatino are from about 1955 and those for Korablino from 1958.

92 An examination of the studies failed to produce any information which would satisfactorily explain this difference.

93 Kushner, op. cit., p. 272, Table 22.

94 Ibid., p. 271.


96 Kushner, op. cit., p. 255.

97 Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 97.
Prior to 1963 about half of the Soviet book publishing houses were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. The rest, about half of which were in Moscow, worked under various specialized ministries and organizations.\(^1\) In March, 1963, an article in the Party journal PARTI-NAYA ZHIZN (Party Life) outlined an extensive reform of the publishing apparatus.\(^2\) Its purpose was to increase control over the type of books published and to promote efficiency in production and distribution. A vast number of publishing houses had apparently made for a good deal of confusion. Books rejected by one publisher were accepted by another; this sort of chaos obviously undermined political control, and was considered impermissible in a centrally controlled operation. For example, IZVESTIYA complained on July 15, 1963, that certain "hacks" were taking advantage of the general confusion by carrying their works from one place to another: "Rejected by one publishing house, their manuscripts migrate elsewhere."\(^3\)

In November 1963, the Central Committee published a resolution on the formation of the new State Committee for the Press of the Council of Ministers, USSR, and the consolidation of all publishing houses into a unified network.\(^4\) Seventy-seven percent of these houses were made
subordinate to the committee, whereas only 43 percent of publishing firms had been previously subordinate to the Ministry of Culture. The new structure did away with a good deal of overlapping in specialization of content, and made each house directly subordinate to the committee. Centralized control was thus reimposed on a chaotic apparatus. By 1967, 52.1 percent of all titles and 76.9 percent of all copies of books and pamphlets were published by firms under the direct control of the State Committee on the Press.

Growth of Publishing and Changes in Content.

The total number of books and pamphlets published in the Soviet Union grew between 1953 and 1967, with the greatest increase taking place during the late fifties. The number of titles increased from 41,027 in 1953 to 74,081 in 1967; the total of copies published grew from 961.5 million to 1243.6 million. This is not a terribly significant growth rate compared with the natural population increase during this period, and the expansion rates of the newer mass media.

While there has been some general improvement in the fare offered the Soviet reader during the last 15 or so years, the change in content has not been as dramatic as in the case of periodic literature. The following subjects showed the greatest growth in the number of copies published: political, social, and economic; natural science and mathematics; physical culture and sports; linguistics; literary criticism; fiction; and art. Sub-
jects which decreased in availability were: technology, industry, and transport; communications and communal affairs; agriculture; health and medicine; and press, bibliography, and handbooks. Popular science and culture remained about the same. The number of books translated from foreign languages increased to 1,831 titles in 1967, with a total of over 53 million copies. The number of translations from English has increased more than any other single language, from 485 titles in 1956 to 757 in 1967; again, however, the greatest growth spurt took place in the late fifties.

Problems

Although the consolidation and reform of the book publishing industry in 1963 was a major step toward correcting some of the industry's problems, there are still chronic ills that seem to crop up in the frequent newspaper discussions of Soviet book publishing. One difficulty which the Soviet publishing industry (both periodical and book sectors) has always had is a shortage of paper. Though subscriptions to periodical publications are no longer limited by this shortage, it is still a difficult issue for book publishers. Problems with paper shortage stem partly from antiquated equipment both in the production of paper and its distribution. Firms continue to put out low grade and wrapping paper at the expense of printing paper because losses are less, and the paper is much more highly priced. It is easier to fulfill the economic plan by not producing newsprint.
In addition, much damage occurs in loading and unloading newsprint, and in storage because of poor construction of warehouses. 11

Some of the problems of the Soviet publishing industry result from the nature of the economic system itself; centralized planning seems to fail in coordinating the various processes involved with the output of books. For example, an article in PRAVDA reported that in addition to the fact that 75 to 80 percent of machinery is obsolete, enterprises do not receive conveyor lines and other machines for the manufacture of books and magazines; all of this holds up the mechanization of printing. So far the USSR Ministry of Machine-Building for Light Industry has failed to come through with the necessary equipment. 12

A third problem which continues to be bothersome for the Soviet book publishing industry is the lack of coordination of supply with demand. Another PRAVDA article of 1966 gave the following example. The Nauka (Science) Publishing House planned then to put out a book REFORM IN DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES OF RUSSIA, in a printing of 3,000 copies, although only 158 copies had been ordered. The article concludes that: "The book trade network works poorly and the book trade organizations made an inadequate study of the demand for literature.... How many insipid, dull, and poorly written books are published in this country to this day!" 13 Although classics of Russian and Soviet literature are extremely popular among readers it is these editions which are struck from publishers' plans when paper shortages occur; their absence from the shelves is
presumably less likely to cause trouble for the publisher than that of more political subjects. 14

Bookselling

From 1953, the Administration of the Book Trade was under the Ministry of Culture. This was transformed in 1958 to the All-Union Unified Book Trade (called Soyuzkniga). At that time all local book sellers were subordinated to the Ministries of Culture of the Union Republics and to the administrations of culture of local Soviets. In 1957, a demarcation was made between the urban and rural book trade, with urban bookselling to remain under the Ministry of Culture, and the rural to be placed under the system of rural consumers' cooperatives. 15

Several resolutions have been adopted throughout the post-Stalin years in an attempts to improve the selling and "propagandizing" of books. On April 1, 1959, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution called "On the Condition and Measures for the Improvement in the Book Trade"; this was followed by a similar resolution in the Party Central Committee with administrative decisions on how to correct those mistakes. Apparently this resolution was not as successful as had been hoped, for in July 1964, the Council of Ministers adopted another resolution "On Measures for the Improvement of Publishing Activity and Annihilation of Shortcomings in the Book Trade." 17 Book sales in cities and towns were placed under
the following jurisdictions: Book dealers (under the State Committee for the Press); Soyuzpechat; Voyenkniga (under the Ministry of Defense); and Akademkniga (under the Academy of Sciences Publishing House, "Nauka.") Rural bookselling is still under the jurisdiction of the Enterprises of Consumers' Cooperatives. Special types of books are sold in music, radio supply, photography, and sports good shops. As of January 1967, there were over 13,000 bookstores and 32,000 kiosks in the Soviet Union. 18

Political Control

Political control of the book publishing apparatus, like that for periodicals, has the goal not only of keeping sensitive and secret information vital to the security of the Soviet Union out of the public realm, but also that of preventing deviant information and views from creeping into the picture of the world presented by all the mass media. Formally, the State Committee on the Press is responsible for what appears in print, but censorship is carried out in a number of ways and much of the actual power rests in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, assisted by a body called GLAVLIT. GLAVLIT, formed in 1922, formally works directly under the Council of Ministers, USSR, and is a state body. Like all official government organizations, however, it is actually subordinate to the higher bodies of the Party, in this case the Propaganda
Department. We have already discussed the basic operation of censorship for the periodical press, and that for book publishing is similar.

Censorship in the Soviet Union takes place both before and after publication. A representative of the censorship apparatus reads each manuscript before it is approved for publication. Materials dealing with subjects on the "perechen" or proscribed list are automatically refused; others may be published with modifications. Once a manuscript has been approved by GLAVLIT for publication, it receives a censorship number, usually one or two letters followed by five digits. The GLAVLIT number of the handbook RAZVITIYE SVYAZI v SSSR (The Development of Communications, USSR, 1967) for example, is T-08464. This number, until 1940, read "GLAVLIT Representative Number....." followed by the same form. The letter prefix denotes the geographical location of the publication of the book. Once published, copies are examined again, not only by representatives of GLAVLIT, but also by certain other bodies, such as the Secret Police and the Propaganda Department. The most blatant, and perhaps the most awkward, form of censorship is that practiced on a manuscript after it has already been printed, and, in some cases after it has been distributed. For example, Gorokhoff cites the case of Volume 50 of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, which appeared in 1957. In the first copies to reach the United States, the leaf containing pages 425-6 was cut out and a new one pasted in. On page 425 a blank line appeared in the middle of a sentence about Stalin. It is not unusual for subscribers to Soviet
serial book publications to receive copies of new pages, with instructions to cut out the original leaves and insert the new ones. Soviet libraries and bookstores often receive lists of authors or books which are to be removed from the shelves. Control from the top is a major feature of the Soviet book publishing industry, and one which is clearly evident in the often clumsy censorship procedures.

The type of control we have discussed here is fairly direct. An entire volume could be written about another, more indirect form of control over Soviet authors and other intellectuals. Various sanctions, such as privileges to shop in specialized stores, cash bonuses, and the possibility of travelling abroad, as well as constant harassment, are used against Soviet writers in order to force them to report on the political sentiments of their fellow literary figures. Anatoly Kuznetsov, a prominent writer who recently left the Soviet Union, has given a vivid description of pressures used on him to collaborate with the secret police in giving information about the political sentiments of his friends. He himself was allowed to travel abroad only after giving the Committee on State Security (Secret Police) a concocted statement about the alleged subversive activities of other certain authors, among whom were Evgeniy Evtushenko, an internationally known Soviet poet, and Vasilii Aksyonov, a well-known young novelist. Such activity is common in Soviet society, and particularly in intellectual circles, where "informers" who pretend to be friends constantly survey the activities and opinions of their acquaintances.
and report on them to the secret police. Such an informer network has the function of inhibiting the expression of dissent or criticism, and of keeping tabs on the mood of influential people. It is an excellent example of what Alex Inkeles described as the "institutionalization of anxiety," which we referred to in Chapter One. It is a basic and pervasive form of political control in Soviet society, and affects the production of literary work which ultimately reaches the public.

Obtaining and Reading Books

There is no doubt that Soviet people are fond of reading books. Exposure to literature is a strong Russian cultural tradition, which has been fostered by the Soviet regime for obvious purposes. Baikova reports that books are the second most popular reading matter, preceded by periodicals. Grushin found the following frequency of readership of books (reported in percentage of the total sample):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Read Daily</th>
<th>Several times a week</th>
<th>Several times a month</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>Total people reading regularly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baikova found that in her sample, men and women read books in almost equal proportions; 55.5 percent of men and 54.8 percent of women read books daily. In the Grushin study, slightly more men than women reported reading regularly: 79.7 percent as compared with 71.2 percent.
Goncharenko reports that men in his sample spent two-thirds more time reading Belles Lettres (34 minutes per day on the average as compared to 21 minutes) than did women. Beliaev, on the other hand, found that women spend more than three times the amount men do on Belles Lettres; 36 minutes per day on the average compared to 10 minutes. In sum, the data on sex are not conclusive; various other specific factors, such as marriage, education, and geographic locations seem to be stronger factors in influencing reading habits.

Goncharenko found that marriage definitely reduces the amount of time spent on fictional literature: for men, the change was from 50 to 29 minutes per day on the average, and for women, from 28 to 19 minutes.

An increase in age seems to have a negative effect on the time spent reading, at least up to middle age. Grushin found that the age group which read most in his sample was the youngest, those between sixteen and twenty-four years old. Probably the direct institutional contact with books through education is a strong factor here, and one which wears off as people grow older and assume other responsibilities. Both Beliaev and Goncharenko report that people tend to spend less time on literature as they grow older: though after age forty, according to Goncharenko, there is a slight increase.

Education has a predictable effect on reading of books: Grushin, Petrosyan and Goncharenko all report an increase with the acquisition of formal education. Occupational level, which is related to education, has
a similar effect, but one which is not quite as marked. Those in more highly skilled or professional occupations tend to read books more. Goncharenko found that Engineering-technical personnel in this sample read literature more than did ordinary workers. Fomin found in his study of people working in higher educational institutes that scientific research workers read slightly more (an average of 32 minutes a day) than did teachers (26 minutes a day); the difference, however, is not great. Beliaev's findings contradict this trend, but not seriously: in his sample, workers read Belles Lettres slightly more (33 minutes per day on the average) than did engineers (29 minutes a day). Arutunyan, working with a sample of occupational groups in the countryside, found that there was no significant difference between rural unskilled workers and farmers in either the amount of books read or in the type of content (socio-political or fiction) they preferred. There was a sharp contrast, however, when skill levels within the two groups were studied, suggesting again that education is the crucial variable. The number of families owning books was substantially higher in the skilled category for both types of content: almost all of them, but only one-third of unskilled workers, owned books.

Many Soviet readers use the public or "mass libraries" most of which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. The number of libraries has actually decreased since the early fifties, from 136,700 in 1952 to 123,400 in 1967. However, the number of books and magazines
in all Soviet libraries has increased considerably, from 364.1 million copies in 1952 to 1,154.3 million copies in 1967. In 1952, almost 82 percent of libraries were in rural areas, but by 1967 this proportion had dropped to seventy percent. This decrease is about the same as the change in the proportion of the rural population: in 1952, 58 percent of the Soviet population was rural, and in 1967, 45 percent was rural.

The proportion of libraries under the Ministry of Culture's jurisdiction has also changed, but very slightly, from 67.5 percent in 1952, to 66.6 percent in 1967. Perhaps the most important index to learn about over-all reading habits of library users is the number of books and journals checked out to each reader. This has not changed as much as the increase in books and magazines available; it has remained relatively steady since the late fifties, with 18.8 items per reader in 1958 and 19.0 in 1965. These trends hold fairly steady for all levels of libraries, with the exception of urban libraries and independent rural libraries. While there are more urban readers than in 1958, and there are more books available per reader, the average number of books checked out to each reader dropped from 23.0 in 1958 to 21.5 in 1965. On the other hand, the average number of books checked out to rural readers grew slightly during this period.

The Sociological Laboratory of Sverdlovsk University in mid-1960 studied 664 workers of industrial enterprises in the city of Sverdlovsk and found that 62 percent of them used the libraries regularly, while 41
judge how this affected reader's choices of books. Women on the whole read more of certain types of books: classics of Russian literature, contemporary Soviet literature, foreign literature, socio-political journals; they read much more literary criticism and many more literary journals than did men. Men, on the other hand, read more adventure, military memoirs, historical novels, science fiction, social science, technical literature, art, history and travel; they read more than twice the number of technical journals that women read. Both sexes together read more fiction than any other type of book, 6,928 out of 8,923 books.

Party members and Komsomol members were found to read more than did non-Party people. While they constituted 9.5 percent of readers, Party members read 10.4 percent of the books, an average of 11.7 books per Party member for the six-month period. Komsomol members, who accounted for 11.4 percent of readers, read 29.8 percent of books (a greater share than Party members), an average of 27.7 books per person for six months. Non-Party people (79.1 percent) read 59.8 percent of books, or an average of 8.02 books per person in six months. Together making up 20.9 percent of all readers, Party and Komsomol members read much more than their share of certain types of books in particular: they read 52 percent of all social science books, 54 percent of literary criticism, 47 percent of technology, 46 percent of art, 47 percent of history, 31 percent of travel, 37 percent of contemporary Soviet fiction, and 48 percent of classical literature.
Most rural readers seem to obtain their books through the local library. Though in recent years more books have become available in stores, the stock in libraries has also increased considerably. The Viryatino study noted that "the purchase of a book is a relatively rare occurrence" in that village (located in European Russia). Most villages have a library, or a reading room in the local club, and if there is a House of Culture it generally has its own library. The Viryatino library opened only in 1953, with a stock of 2,500 books; this seems fairly late, considering that the Soviet regime has been in power for fifty years, and that Viryatino is a pre-revolutionary village, not a new settlement. Vladimir Kantorovich, in his novel *In a Young City* mentions that in the small town of Sasov near Ryazan, there is a library in the railroad workers' club and one in the local House of Culture. In Kalinin Oblast, a library is reported to serve about ten or twelve villages, not all of which are on the same farm. There are also some small libraries on individual farms. For each rural library in that region there are mobile units which visit the villages in winter, and the field brigades during the busy summer season. Where rural libraries do not make efforts of this sort, people find it difficult to reach the library in winter because of poor roads and lack of transportation, and in summer because of lack of time. For example, the Kopanka authors report that those whose daily routines bring them into the village center read books three times more than those who work in the fields.
How many people use the rural libraries? In Kalinin oblast, every third inhabitant is reported to be a library user. Between 88 and 98 percent of families have some contact with the library. In Korablino, out of a thousand residents, 400 are regular library users. In Kopanka, there are 500 regular library users, but in 1964 over 2,000 people, or 46.4 percent of people in the village took out books from the library. The most frequent users of the library are young people. In Kalinin, people under 30 are most active, followed by those between 30 and 40 years of age. Old people and women use the library least. The average reader in Kalinin oblast reads from six to nine books each year, but certain groups, such as Komsomols, brigade leaders, and intellectuals, read anywhere from 20 to 30 books each year. In Kopanka, 75 percent of people are reported to take out three to 10 books a year regularly. Four people on the library’s records read from 20 to 30 books a year. In Viryatino, too, the biggest library users are young people, those from 16 to 35 years of age, and especially those who have from five to six years of education. Of 31 people in the Komsomol organization of the village, 25 are regular library users. Again, we find that Komsomol people, like those in the city, are among the most active consumers of books, while old people and women are least active. In this respect, the country differs little from the city in its reading habits.

People were asked in the questionnaire section of the Guryanov study (220 questionnaires administered to some of the above 840 card owners).
"How did you first learn about a book?" The answers are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saw on display</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice of librarian</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalogue or bibliographical source</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a study list</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice of comrades, relatives</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read about in newspaper, magazine, or on poster</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By radio, film, television announcement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiar author</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most people seem to learn about new books either from friends and relatives, or from the librarian. Advertising on radio, in newspapers, or in catalogues is not a significant source of book information for these readers, although displays seem to help in informing people about new books.

It is interesting to compare the authors which emerge as most popular in several book readership studies. Besides the Kogan and Guryanov studies mentioned above, we also have some data from the ComCom interviews on leisure time use. The authors which were mentioned most, were, in order of popularity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kogan</th>
<th>Guryanov</th>
<th>ComCom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sholokhov</td>
<td>Pushkin</td>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushkin</td>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
<td>Pushkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
<td>Chekhov</td>
<td>Dostoevskiy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreiser</td>
<td>Lermontov</td>
<td>Sholokhov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lermontov</td>
<td>Nekrasov</td>
<td>Chekhov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorkiy</td>
<td>Turgenev</td>
<td>Gorkiy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
percent of them had their own personal libraries. Another study done by the Faculty of Dialectical and Historical Materialism of the Urals State University together with the Sverdlovsk oblast youth newspaper NA SMENU! questioned workers in five industrial enterprises of the city. Out of 358 people questioned, 200 had their own libraries, and 256 used the public and factory libraries. Obviously, library ownership and public library use are not mutually exclusive activities, and those who are regular readers probably use books from both sources. Guryanov did a study of factory workers in which he questioned 220 people out of 840 whose library cards had been studied. Among those he questioned, 143 people owned from 10 to 50 of their own books; another 42 owned from 50 to 200 books, and 18 owned from 200 to 1,000 books! Twenty-six people indicated that they used the library near where they lived, and 86 people said they used the technical library of their plant.

In its analysis of readers' library cards, the Guryanov group took every eighth card for the period from May 1, 1963, to October 30, 1963. The total number of books read by 840 people was 8,923 during the six month period; this means that each person read an average of 10.6 books in six months, or 1.76 books per month during that period. Women read about the same as men, 10.6 books for six months or 1.76 per month, as compared with 10.5 books per six months or 1.75 per month.

We do not know much about the types of reading matter available to readers or in what quantity various topics were available, and so we cannot
judge how this affected reader's choices of books. Women on the whole read more of certain types of books: classics of Russian literature, contemporary Soviet literature, foreign literature, socio-political journals; they read much more literary criticism and many more literary journals than did men. Men, on the other hand, read more adventure, military memoirs, historical novels, science fiction, social science, technical literature, art, history and travel; they read more than twice the number of technical journals that women read. Both sexes together read more fiction than any other type of book, 6,928 out of 8,923 books.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice of librarian</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalogue or bibliographical source</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a study list</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice of comrades, relatives</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read about in newspaper, magazine, or on poster</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By radio, film, television announcement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiar author</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most people seem to learn about new books either from friends and relatives, or from the librarian. Advertising on radio, in newspapers, or in catalogues is not a significant source of book information for these readers, although displays seem to help in informing people about new books.

It is interesting to compare the authors which emerge as most popular in several book readership studies. Besides the Kogan and Guryanov studies mentioned above, we also have some data from the ComCom interviews on leisure time use. The authors which were mentioned most, were, in order of popularity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kogan 61</th>
<th>Guryanov 62</th>
<th>ComCom 63</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sholokhov</td>
<td>Pushkin</td>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushkin</td>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
<td>Pushkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolstoi</td>
<td>Chekhov</td>
<td>Dostoevski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreiser</td>
<td>Lermontov</td>
<td>Sholokhov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lermontov</td>
<td>Nekrasov</td>
<td>Chekhov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorkiy</td>
<td>Turgenev</td>
<td>Gorkiy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of these writers are classical authors of Russian literature. Clearly most agree that Pushkin and Tolstoi are the favorites, while two studies each found Sholokhov, Chekhov, Gorkiy, Lermontov favorite authors.

It is interesting to note that while the Guryanov study reported that more books by contemporary Soviet authors were read (3, 525) than books by classical authors (301), the classics still emerge as more popular. Undoubtedly this reflects the fact that contemporary Soviet authors are more available to the reader, though they may not be as satisfying to him as the old favorites. This is an indication of the shortcomings of planned literary production. In an earlier chapter we noted that when editions are cut short to save printing paper, it is usually classics of Russian literature which are removed from publishers' lists; this is because there are fewer political repercussions from such cuts. From the polls of readers' preferences it is clear that such practices ignore the Soviet reader's wishes.

What do country people like to read? This question is difficult to answer, since we do not know precisely the selection of books available in the libraries. We cannot say what they would like to read ideally, but only what books out of those available to them they like best. The village studies and some literary accounts indicate that books available in country libraries stick fairly close to the old, tried-and-true classics of Soviet fiction, and that there is a great shortage of current literature, even in Soviet fiction. For example, in Kalinin oblast, the most popular books are
reported to be Polevoi's *STORY OF A REAL MAN*, Ostrovskiy's *HOW THE STEEL WAS TEMPERED*, Fadeyev's *YOUNG GUARD*, Sholokhov's *VIRGIN SOIL UPTURNED*, and Nikolayeva's *HARVEST*. 64 Two other village studies mention the Fadeyev and the Polevoi books as favorites. 65 Vladimir Kantorovich, in the above-mentioned novel *IN A YOUNG CITY*, mentions the provincial nature of a village library's selections:

One can therefore stamp "provincialism" on the literary life of Sasov, if one understands by this word the selection of literature for reading.

It is annoying that the libraries don't inform readers about new books appearing in journals, and that readers' conferences are most often devoted to works that have long since attained a considerable reputation and have even been included in school texts. In Sasov, for example, they set for discussion "How the Steel Was Tempered." 66

The Kopanka study reports that books about agriculture are enormously in demand, and that readers checked these books out most often. The works of contemporary Soviet writers (by this they do not mean only current but all Soviet fiction, apparently) account for about 40 percent of books checked out; natural science literature accounts for about 20 percent of books, and the good old stand-by works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin account for about 35 percent of books checked out. People in Kopanka are reported to be fond of books about the Civil War, World War II, and "adventure-heroic literature." They also like Zola, Stendahl, Jack London, Dreiser, Verne, and Hugo. 67 Classics were mentioned as being popular among intellectuals in Viryatino. 68
In 1955 there was held a conference in the village of Olginskaya in Rostov province, to enable rural people to comment on certain specific recent books about rural life. Some 600 people attended the conference, mostly from three collective farms: one "advanced," one "backward," and a group from a local Machine-Tractor Station. Women reported that they wanted more books dealing with personal problems of rural life. Most farmers said they felt that the existing novels reflected farm life only to a small degree. References to ordinary people were rare; books dealt with "heroes" and model types. Antonov, a young Moldavian writer, reported that a collective farmer said to him: "A lot of commissioners come to our farm, three or four a day; they want to know everything, but there is never one who wants to know how a collective farmer lives, what he eats, what he sleeps on, whether the roof leaks on him." As we have noted, more literature dealing with rural life did appear in the late fifties and early sixties. Farmers also complained of the dull "readers' conference": "In a collective farm such a book is read to groups, which then discuss it; the discussion is very flat and then a report is written that this readers' conference was very lively and interesting."

Summary

The Soviet book publishing apparatus has experienced some growing pains during the post-Stalin period, without manifesting any significant development in terms of either volume of output or diversification of content.
While some expansion took place in the early post-Stalin years, the next decade ushered in a period of reorganization and internal change. Attempts to overcome some rather obvious inefficiencies in production and political control resulted in a more tightly organized structure. Some major problems remain: primarily, difficulties in getting other industries, like paper and printing equipment producers, to coordinate their output with publishing plans; and discrepancies between supply and demand. It is difficult to separate economic from political factors in both cases, but it is clear that it is the nature of the centralized system, with its rather inflexible and sometimes unpopular system of priorities, which is responsible for both sets of problems. The available output of printing equipment may be relegated to the more highly politicized newspapers because of ideological exigencies. Likewise, thousands of volumes of Lenin are printed when readers cry out for fictional classics. Such shortcomings will not be overcome in the near future unless the present conservative leadership is either replaced or has a major change of heart.

Soviet people are clearly avid book lovers. Their rate of leadership rises with education, occupational skill, and with Party affiliation (especially for young people). It decreases with marriage and age. Soviet libraries are well-used, and book stores and kiosks are busy. One would suppose, on the basis of the findings on readership preferences, that there are many books in Soviet libraries and bookstores, among them the ubiquitous and numerous ideological tracts that go unused and unbought,
while a major proportion of readers seeks the less available and more popular stock of fiction. Books are obtainable in about equal proportions to users of both rural and urban libraries, but this does not seem to be true of books for sale. Urban people have greater access to a wider range of books for purchase than do their rural relatives, and they may also have faster access to a greater variety of library books as well. This is a common phenomenon in most countries, of course, and one that is not peculiar to the Soviet situation; it may be more pronounced there than in most industrialized societies, however, because of unusually poor rural transportation, the absence of commercial advertising of books, and of firms dealing in mail order purchasing.

Soviet people seem to learn about new books most frequently by word of mouth either from their local librarian, or from friends and relatives. Again, this is a cumulative phenomenon, and one which is much less active and people have a narrower range of personal contacts. The Russian classics are the most popular form of content, though in the country people seem to like the classics of Soviet fiction. This may be a function of the later introduction of literacy in the countryside: the first books many rural people read were those published and distributed under the Soviet regime. Urban people have a longer history of exposure to literature, and may conform to previously established family patterns of familiarity with the classical authors. They may also be more educated, or tend to have the sort of education which brings them into contact with literary classics, than
rural people. Rural people complain that there are not enough books about their own life; they want fiction which speaks to them through their own experiences.

In short, the oldest mass medium, the printed book, has developed less than any other mode of communication during the post-Stalin period. This is not merely a matter of organizational difficulties, for periodical publishing and the broadcast media have had their problems as well. It is due to a combination of political and economic factors. The shortage of classical fiction is a matter of low political and economic priority: the Soviet government will use scarce facilities to produce ideological works and theoretical writings rather than expanding the output of prerevolutionary classics, regardless of reader preferences. The problem with current Soviet fiction is another matter; it is a result of a dilemma which seems inherent in the totalitarian society, that of retaining strict political control while trying to produce high quality artistic literature. The post-Stalin "thaw" period seemed to auger well for the Soviet writer and reader, as did some interludes during Khrushchev's tenure of power. The last few years, however, with their persecution and harassment of prominent intellectuals, have caused many to abandon their hopes for a flowering of modern Soviet literary production, or at least for its publication. Those authors who are published--although in brutally distorted versions of their original manuscripts--are available only in very small editions, obtainable only by the most avid urban readers. Others practice
"samizdat" or self-publication by circulating typed manuscripts of their works; these are read by an even smaller circle. The average Soviet reader is left with a narrow range of fairly uninteresting, hard-to-obtain literature.
Footnotes, Chapter Three: Books


3 Cited by Maurice Freidberg in "What Price Censorship?" PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Sept-Oct, 1968, pp. 18-23. Kuznetsov, a prominent Soviet writer who recently emigrated, indicates that this sort of activity was still common in regard to literary journals at least until the late sixties. He tells of having his manuscript of the novel IN YOUR OWN HOME rejected by YUNOST, and then later published, albeit with unauthorized cuts and changes, by NOVIY MIR. Anatoliy Kuznetsov, "My Diary in the Other World," THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 17, 1969, p. 26.

4 Bogolyubov, op. cit.


7 There are several points to keep in mind when reading Soviet publishing statistics. Soviet figures include what we would call pamphlets (UNESCO'S definition of a pamphlet is "a non-periodical publication of less than 49 pages") as books; this increases the over-all volume of titles and also the total number of copies. Also, the same book, published in several different languages, may be counted more than once.

8 Figures for 1953 are from Gorokhoff, op. cit., p. 200; for 1967, from PECHAT SSSR v 1967, p. V.

9 Subject headings are official Soviet categories.


Smirnov, I., "Book Standards," PRAVDA, June 14, 1967, p. 3; CDSP, XIX No. 24, p. 27.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 154.

Ibid.

For a fuller discussion, see Gorokhoff, PUBLISHING, op. cit., p. 74.

Ibid., p. 82.


Kuznetsov disowned this statement publicly as soon as he had successfully obtained permission to stay in England.

Baikova, op. cit., p. 133.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 9, p. 76.

Baikova, p. 133.

Grushin, Table 11, p. 81.

Goncharenko, op. cit., Table 5, p. 36.

Beliaev, op. cit., Table 5, p. 50.

Goncharenko, Table 5, p. 36.

Grushin, Table 11, p. 81.

Beliaev, Table 7, p. 51.

Goncharenko, Table 5, p. 36.
Grushin, Table 11, p. 81; Petrosyan, Table 21, p. 115; Goncharenko, Table 6, p. 37.

Goncharenko, Table 4, p. 35.

Fomin, op. cit., Table 5, p. 203.

Beliaev, Table 2, p. 49.


Ibid.

Calculated from above sources: 113 thousand out of 137 thousand libraries in 1952 were rural, and 86 thousand out of 123 thousand were rural in 1967.


Calculated from sources in footnote #38. In 1953, 93 thousand out of 137 thousand were under the Ministry of Culture, and in 1967, 82 thousand out of 123 thousand were under the Ministry of Culture.

NARODNOYE KHOZIASTVO V 1965 GODU, Moscow, 1966, p. 724. These figures are for "independent libraries" under the Ministry of Culture.


Ibid., p. 191.


Summarized from Tables 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 in Guryanov, op. cit.

Ibid., p. 171.

Kushner, op. cit., 221.
50 Ibid., p. 272-3.

51 Kantorovich, V., V MOLODOM GORODYE, Moscow, 1960, p. 62-3.

52 Anokhina and Shmeleva, op. cit., p. 324.

53 Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 100.

54 Anokhina and Shmeleva, loc. cit.

55 Selivanov, op. cit., p. 148.


57 Anokhina and Shmeleva, loc. cit.

58 Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 100.


60 Apparently the question refers to their general experience in finding out about books in that period. The Russian question is literally "Kak i ot kovo chitalel' uznal o knigye?" (How and from whom did the reader learn about a book?) Guryanov, op. cit., p. 174.

61 Kogan, op. cit., p. 193.

62 Guryanov, op. cit., p. 176.

63 From ComCom interviews with over 100 former Soviet citizens leaving the USSR no later than 1958; most left in the early sixties. The interviews were conducted by the staff of the project in the United States and Europe between 1963 and 1967.

64 Anokhina and Shmeleva, op. cit., p. 324. The Ostrovskiy and Sholokhov books were published in the thirties and the rest in the middle to late forties. The most recent of these books is twenty years old.

65 Yermuratskiy, p. 101; Selivanov, p. 148.


67 Yermuratskiy, p. 100.

68 Kushner, p. 245.

CHAPTER FOUR: RADIO AND TELEVISION

Like the printed media, radio and television possess special qualities which make them useful agents of political persuasion. They are fast in transmitting messages across vast distances. They can cover areas with poor transportation, reaching isolated settlements which are cut off from mail and newspapers for days and even weeks at a time during winter and early spring. Radio and television have the special advantage of being able to reach illiterate people. They also reach busy people, who may not take time for reading, but can listen to radio or watch television while doing something else. Studies on the American audience indicate that such "secondary" activities show a good deal more attention to the mass media than would have been apparent otherwise. Since radio is by far the more widespread of the two, one can say that the fastest, most efficient way of reaching the greatest number of Soviet citizens is by radio broadcast. Also important is the fact that the broadcast media are "modern." They make transitional people feel part of a national modern culture. A television set or transistor radio is still a great status symbol in the Soviet Union, and this has a positive effect on both exposure and reactions to what is seen and heard. Television offers the advantage of a visual stimulus right in the owner's home; unlike movie attendance, television viewing requires no great decision in order to make the audience member an "eye witness" to events.
One peculiarity of the broadcast media is that their messages are swiftly delivered and leave no record. Repetition of important messages helps to counteract this quality. It can also operate to the regime's advantage, however; sometimes important messages or "slips" are simply deleted in later transmissions because it is easy to deny or ignore that they ever were made. One disadvantage from the regime's viewpoint (but a decided benefit for the audience) is that radio, and in border areas television as well, allows access to non-Soviet sources of information and entertainment; those who own short wave sets (or medium wave sets if they live in border areas) can listen to foreign stations. Many of these broadcasts are "jammed" by the Soviet government, but people still listen, and not all of the technical interference is effective.

The Structure of the Radio Network

The organization of Soviet domestic radiobroadcasting has remained basically as described by Alex Inkeles in his book PUBLIC OPINION IN SOVIET RUSSIA: A STUDY IN MASS PERSUASION. Transmitters operate at three levels, the highest of which is Central Broadcasting in Moscow. Transmission from Moscow Central is by long or medium wave to Moscow and nearby networks, by short wave to isolated networks and individual sets, and by wire to urban and suburban Moscow and to networks in close proximity to Central Broadcasting's main transmitter. Local
broadcasting at the republic and regional levels is organized into zonal networks, all of which are part of the national apparatus. Programs are received from Central in Moscow either by wave or by wire, and sometimes by both. The lowest level of radiobroadcasting is the radio diffusion exchange, a simple wired network. It receives broadcasts, usually by wave, from the Central or local network, and transmits programs by wire to the speakers in homes or other buildings. The diffusion exchange may originate programs of its own, adding local features to the day's broadcast schedule. These programs which originate at the radio-diffusion exchange never actually go "on the air," of course, but move over wired transmission networks within limited localities. Public address systems may be connected to the wired networks.

Wired radiobroadcasting has been a prominent feature of Communist information networks, though it has been used in non-Communist countries as well. This is partly related to problems of development, since the Soviet regime has had as one of its goals the extensive penetration of the population by an extensive information and propaganda broadcasting system and yet was faced with a lack of modern facilities for the purpose. Along with an intensive industrialization campaign there has been a drive for electrification and radio installation in all cities and rural areas. Wired broadcasting has been important because radios can be installed in areas where electricity has not yet reached; thus, electric lights may be absent from the peasant cottage, but through wired radio-
broadcasting the regime's message can reach him just the same. In the early years of the Soviet regime wired broadcasting was the main form of radio transmission. While wired sets continued to predominate in rural areas, however, the number of wave sets began to catch up and in 1963 for the first time the total number of wave sets (over 35 million) exceeded that of wired sets (a little less than 34 million). The rapid increase in wave sets, of course, took place mainly in urban areas where lack of electricity is no longer a problem. Wave radios have continued to dominate the receiving network until the present.

During 1967-68 a policy was adopted which was intended to reverse the trend toward wave radio listening. ZHURNALIST (No. 5, 1967) carried an announcement of a Central Committee resolution "On the Acceleration of the Development of Wired Broadcasting." In the resolution it was noted that there were "serious shortcomings and mistakes" in the development of wired broadcasting. An editorial in VYESTNIK SVYAZI (Herald of Communications) made clear what some of these shortcomings were. In 1966 the Ministry of Communications of the Uzbek and Kazakh Republics did not fulfill their "radiofication" plans, and the same thing happened in the oblast administrations of Orenburg, Pskov, and Bryansk. There was much trouble with maintenance of technical facilities, and technicians repairing rural electrical networks damaged lines on which radiobroadcasts were transmitted. For this reason over 200 wired radios in Tropetskiy Raion, Kalinin oblast, didn't operate for
months and over 900 speakers were out of order in Tomsk oblast.

Another problem was the misuse of capital investments intended for rural radio network expansion. Due to this factor only 34 population settlements out of an intended 75 in Irkutsk had radio outlets installed in 1966, leaving 290 settlements in the area without radio. In Kemerovsk oblast out of 120,000 rubles intended for radiofication, only 63,000 were used, leaving 95 settlements with no radio. A third problem with radio installation is a shortage of speakers. Wired radio loudspeakers, which consist largely of a transformer and an amplifier, are plugged into an outlet of the radio network; they cost approximately 5 to 12 rubles. But in many places the production of radio loudspeakers simply was not coordinated with radio installation. IZVESTIYA reported on April 14, 1967 that while radio installation was increasing, the number of radio loudspeakers on sale in some places had actually decreased. In Severodonnetsk, for example, in 1965 there were 2,000-2,500 loudspeakers on sale, and in 1966 only 600; 800 more were needed just to complete radio installation of a micro-raion. The same situation was reported from Zaporozhe oblast: Officials decided to "radiofy" their area in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the revolution, but after installing over a thousand outlets they found there were no speakers to plug in.

The resolution reported in ZHURNALIST outlined "concrete measures" for eliminating these shortcomings and for increasing wired broadcasting, especially in rural localities. It transferred servicing operations
to the Ministry of Communications USSR, and placed emphasis on the development of multi-program broadcasting (wired broadcasting with a choice of three programs, begun in 1962) in capitals of union republics and in large industrial centers. It seems, then, that wired multi-program broadcasting is intended to compete with wave broadcasting. The first channel will carry the all-union program, the second the radio program Mayak (a program of light music and frequent news broadcasts begun in 1964) and the third program will handle mainly local broadcasts. This system will also allow the broadcasting of programs simultaneously in Russian and in local nationality languages. The advantages of wired broadcasting cited were: high quality of sound (though this applies only to Class I receivers which are rare), absence of interference, operation independent from household electricity network, and the preservation of electrical energy. To this list might be added that wired radio cannot receive foreign broadcasts. It is this aspect of controlled access to the radio listener that makes wired radio such a popular Communist medium.

It is early to speculate on how successful the intensification of the wired broadcasting effort has been so far. There is evidence to suggest that production and distribution problems have been especially severe in regard to multi-program loudspeakers; and this may hinder progress toward complete installation for some time until the Ministry of Trade coordinates its plans with those of the radio industry. By early 1967 between 80 and 90 cities had multi-program wired broadcasting and about three million speakers for receiving the broadcasts had been installed.
Television Broadcasting

Though radio has developed tremendously during the post-Stalin years (from 21 million receiving sets in 1953 to 80.6 million sets in 1967), the growth of television has been one of the most startling facts of this period. Starting with three television centers in 1952, the television broadcasting network has grown to over 243 powerful stations (program centers and powerful relay stations) and over 750 smaller relay centers in 1969. One hundred and fifty-three cities are within the program range of Moscow Central Television. The receiving network has grown from 225,000 sets in 1953 to over 27 million in 1969; 37 million are expected by 1970. In addition to its regular system of transmission, Soviet television broadcasts by means of an artificial satellite, "Molniya-One" (News Flash-One"). The system, called "Orbita" allows Moscow central broadcasts to be received and rebroadcast by about 25 ground stations located all across the country.

Color television experimental broadcasts began in the Soviet Union in 1959-60, with the first regular channel opening on October 1, 1967 in Moscow. There are reportedly over 20,000 color TV sets in operation. The Soviets have adopted the French Secam system of color broadcasting and many of the East European countries have adopted this system as well. Soviet educational television opened its first regular channel in 1964 in Leningrad, and Moscow now also has an educational channel. Of course, all Soviet television is potentially "educational" in the sense that it includes
Soviet television is linked to an Eastern European network of television broadcasting through a system called INTERVIDENIYE (Intervision). Intervision was created in January 1960 at an extraordinary meeting of the Administrative Council of OIRT (The International Radio and Television Organization) in Budapest. The system originally included Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and later added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Rumania, the Ukraine, and the USSR as a whole. Finland, Yugoslavia, and sometimes Denmark, have sat in as observers and have participated in exchanges. Intervision's Council meets four times a year to arrange exchanges. From 1960 to 1965 over 3,700 programs were exchanged; the broadcasts fell into the following content categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cultural</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topical</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sports</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entertainment</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for children</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1964 Olympics were transmitted to the Soviet Union from Tokyo through Eurovision (the West European television hook-up system) and Intervision. President Kennedy's funeral was also transmitted on Moscow television from the United States via Eurovision and Intervision.
Administration

From 1953 until 1957, broadcasting in the Soviet Union was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture; at that time, a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers announced the formation of the State Committee on Radio and Television of the Council of Ministers. This committee has corresponding bodies which act as its representative on the lower administrative levels (union republics, autonomous republics, oblasts and krais). These are generally called either editorial boards of radio and television, or committees of radio and television. Under these editorial boards or committees, there are usually "departments of lower broadcasting."

The State Committee for Radio and Television of the USSR Council of Ministers is headed by a chairman. He is aided by a deputy chairman, who is simultaneously the chief of the Main Administration for Radiobroadcasting, or "Central Broadcasting." The Committee includes: the Main Editorial Board for Radiobroadcasting; the Main Editorial Board for Television; the Technical Administration, with its various subdivisions; the departments; a creative apparatus which prepares materials for programs; and a body which handles the technological problems of sound recording. Broadcasting plants, including studios, television centers, amplifiers, and lines for broadcasting, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communications.
Since radio and television programs on all levels depend a great deal on the central administration, its program planning is closely coordinated with theirs. Editorial boards and committees on radio and television make up their thematic plans for a month in advance, in order to ensure the compatibility of themes chosen with currents in programming policy. From the main points included in the long-range plans, the editorial board makes up more detailed weekly plans, indicating the length of broadcasts, authors, and so on. These plans are then passed on to the editorial board of programs of the State Committee, where they are coordinated.

Local committees carry out their own daily broadcast schedule, taking into account the program of Central Broadcasting. They choose the time when their programs will least conflict with the important programs from Central. If Central begins to broadcast some important event or announcement, the local committee may have to interrupt its program, or record the announcement to be broadcast later. In rural regions and separate factories, local broadcasts are also organized to be broadcast over the diffusion exchange, usually for about thirty minutes at a time, three times a week. The inspector of local broadcasting controls the broadcasts over the diffusion exchange.
Unlike radio, television relies a great deal on local materials for broadcasts, which are supplemented by the Moscow central program. In the department of local broadcasting in Moscow, there is a group which collects film materials from Central Television; the materials are then sent to the local networks to be broadcast. This situation particularly applies to events such as Party Congresses, when films taken at the Congress are issued in special "film journals" to be broadcast over local television stations throughout the Soviet Union.

We have already mentioned the fact that jamming of most foreign stations almost ceased from June 1963 to August 1968, introducing some competition for Soviet radio. The response was to step up the volume of Soviet domestic broadcasting and to try and introduce enough variety and verve into the usually dull radio propaganda to lure Soviet listeners back to the fold. In August 1964 Soviet radio introduced a new Second Program called Mayak (Beacon). Mayak in format is a clear nod to foreign broadcasting, since it combines light music with half-hourly news and commentary around the clock. Clearly the late-night broadcasting effort (Soviet stations usually cease broadcasting activities around midnight) is an attempt to compete with foreign stations, who concentrate on the hours between ten and one because of better broadcasting conditions at this time. According to this author's observations, Mayak has been very popular, though it by no means has replaced foreign stations as a source for fast, complete news coverage and the latest in popular music. It certainly has
improved the fare of those who listen mainly to domestic stations, and is a notable feature in the "modernization" of Soviet radio.

We have already indicated that local radio programming is heavily influenced by the output of Moscow Central. The following figures illustrate the extent of this influence: of 800 broadcasts received from Moscow in Khabarovsk (Siberia) during 1965, 644 were used on the air; of 1,275 broadcasts received in Kazan (European section), 1,265 were used. Program One of Moscow Central is an All-Union program providing much of the broadcast schedule; Mayak (Program Two) is also now an All-Union Program and can be included by local stations all over the country. Because of time differences in a country as vast as the Soviet Union, Program One is received directly mainly in European parts of the country, in the Urals, and in Central Asia. Program 4-B is intended for Western Siberia, and Program 4-A for Eastern Siberia and the Far East; these last two programs are timed to coincide with Siberian broadcast schedules which, because of time zone changes, are not the same as for the European area.

Perhaps because there has been so much emphasis on expanding the technical facilities of Soviet television, the development of programming has been slow. In early 1967, the three programs of Moscow television produced about fifteen hours of programming per day. With the completion of the Ostankino television center in October, 1967, more facilities were available for introducing new channels and expanding pro-
gram hours on existing ones. The heavily didactic orientation of Soviet television seems to be a major obstacle to producing more interesting and varied programs, although some efforts have been made to popularize "social education." For example, the Ministry for the preservation of Public Order has teamed up with television stations to produce programs on crime. The staff of the USSR Prosecutor's Office travels to various parts of the country and locates interesting cases; telecasts with commentary are sometimes made from the courtroom. The Perm Oblast Executive Committee on Radio and Television has a similar show; it produces a monthly television journal called "02," in which viewers are sometimes shown photographs of criminals and asked to help in apprehending them. The discussions are basically intended to combat crime rather than entertain the audience.

Television news reporting, though it could easily be as up-to-date as radio news broadcasts, seems to lag behind. The following incident was reported in ZHURNALIST, for example:

In the morning we read in the paper the sad news. The Polish film director Zbigniew Cybulski had died. In the evening of the same day, Central Television showed "Girl from the Bank," where Cybulski played the leading role. Of course this coincidence was purely accidental. The showing of the picture had been announced in advance.... But no one said anything this evening. Television communicated the news of Cybulski's death only after ten days,...

Because discussion on the subject of television program content has been more noticeable in the press, we may assume that some efforts are being
made to improve it. Now that the transmitting and receiving network of Soviet television is well developed, we can expect that more attention will be paid to making programs more effective and interesting, within the confines of the basic purpose of Soviet mass media.

News broadcasts on Soviet radio and television are an interesting and important illustration of the way content is tailored to serve the function of political socialization. The guiding principles for Soviet news mentioned in Chapter Two are meant to apply equally to radio and television reporting. These rather abstract emphases are translated into reality by a continual stream of specific directives and the purposeful training of journalists in interpreting current Party policy. The result is a fairly efficient and well-orchestrated vision of political events.

The most important quality of the Soviet newscast is "purposefulness:"

A durable political impression should be made, one item standing out and remaining in the listener's memory to stimulate action. The principle underlying this characteristic is 'A newscast is not a mirror, but a magnifying glass.'

Aside from this explicit distinguishing characteristic, there are two important implicit ones. Although news should be as up-to-date as possible most of the time, it should not convey spontaneity, and recounting of happenings should never supercede the reporting of historically more basic events. This explains why significant political developments may go unreported for days in the Soviet news media, while hours of prime time are spent recounting the minutest details of routine Party congresses. News is a part of an over-all plan, and always relates to a particular
policy which is currently being emphasized. Secondly, "human interest" also has a distinctly didactic orientation. The activities of individuals are rarely reported unless they have some symbolic significance; persons are models of some specific political or social virtue. The following complaint is meant to direct radio reporters in achieving this:

It is the greatest misfortune that many radio correspondents see in the plant, the factory, only machines, and do not notice people who create these machines, the creators of the news; they do not make even short note of showing the man himself, his rich spiritual world, his high moral outlook.Stories about exemplary workers, sometimes called "shockworkers" or "Stakhanovites," (after an early model of this type) abound in Soviet news.

The forms of Soviet newscasts are fairly standardized, and this repetitiveness contributes to the pervasive dullness of the Soviet media. Common rubrics are: "Survey of the Press," "Weekly Interviews," "News Commentary," and "International Survey," besides the straight Newscast which selectively reports and comments on important news items. Television news broadcasts often feature round table discussions, montages from historical and documentary films, and Tass photographs. Television news reporting is, of course, new in the post-Stalin period, at least as far as most of the population is concerned. This has probably made news somewhat more interesting for the audience, and there can be little doubt that the introduction of a visual component has been helpful to the regime in presenting its version of reality.
Since no verbatim monitoring reports are available for Soviet radio and television stations, and no Soviet study of news content has been made public, we are unable to quantify our observations on the relative proportions of different types of news broadcast over Soviet radio and television. Nevertheless, Soviet news schedules and general monitoring reports make it possible for us to make some general statements. Heavy emphasis is placed on domestic news coverage, primarily of political and economic events. Discussion of local news is necessary, of course, to supplement the other media and the network of oral interpersonal communication. By interpreting or selectively emphasizing already known events, the regime seeks to confer status on certain people and happenings, seeking support for its policies and correcting impressions it considers politically undesirable. Foreign news likewise is reported selectively and in a manner designed to illustrate Soviet policies. Events and speeches which show imperialist tendencies and warmongering traits of Western capitalist nations are featured with appropriate commentary, while guerilla activities and revolutionary fervor in Latin America and Africa are played up to the exclusion of most other events. Part of this is a result of sources used. In surveys of the foreign press, prominence is given to reports from Communist newspapers, while articles from major Western newspapers are much more scarce. TASS and NOVOSTI provide most of the foreign news on all Soviet media. While there have been some temporary breakthroughs in Soviet news broadcasts, such as the radio
program "On the Short Wave," which summarized news from Western stations, the present trend seems to be toward a tightening up of sources and a reintroduction of control over what the Soviet listener hears.

The Audience of the Broadcast Media

Accessibility of Radio and Television

Most Soviet people today can listen to radio, with the exception of some extremely isolated areas similar to the "deaf corners" of tsarist Russia. We have noted that in many rural areas electrification and radio installation have not proceeded as rapidly as the Soviets had claimed or some in the West had supposed. Nonetheless, access to radio is a very high priority goal of the regime, and we can assume that in the very near future anyone who wants to will be able to expose himself to both newspapers and radio. Television, which was introduced much later, still has a limited audience, though one which is growing rapidly. A Soviet source estimated that in mid-1967 there were between 60 and 70 million viewers. With a total of about twenty million television sets at that time in operation, this is not an unreasonable claim. Even if all viewers were watching at once it would mean that an average of three to four people was watching each Soviet television set. We know that many sets are located in public places (clubs or lounges), and have a much larger audience than this. This means that at least thirty percent of the Soviet population
had access to television at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution. This number has been increasing steadily; with over 27 million sets reported to be in operation in 1969, the Soviet television audience may be well over 95 million people in 1970.

While some people listen to radio or watch television in the local club, factory Red Corner, or some other semi-public or public place, many Soviet citizens own their own sets. A wired radio outlet, which is sometimes purchased by the farm or living unit but very often by the listener himself, may cost anywhere from five to fifteen rubles, depending on the type and quality. A large table model radio with short-wave, medium-wave, and long-wave capabilities might cost several hundred rubles. A good quality portable transistor with short-wave bands, such as the "Spidola" or "Transistor-Ten" models, costs around 70 to 100 rubles. A television set costs three or four hundred rubles. License fees for the use of radio and television sets were discontinued in the early sixties and these fees are now included in the price of the set.

What does the cost of mass broadcast media mean in terms of the average Soviet salary? The minimum pay for workers and employees was recently raised from 45 rubles to 60 rubles per month. The average wage in 1965 was 103 rubles per month and was probably something like 110 rubles per month in 1967. Of this, the worker pays 8.4 percent in income tax, about 3 to 5 percent for rent, perhaps 40 to 50 percent for food, and the rest (about 50 rubles) is left for other necessities. Clothing
is expensive, as are some household goods, but once these are acquired there is little else to spend money on. One of the first luxury items a Soviet is likely to buy is a radio or a television set. It can be seen that a wired radio outlet is very accessible, financially speaking, while a table model or transistor radio would take some saving to acquire. A television set is a fairly sizable investment for the average worker, but one that many Soviets seem quite willing to make.

So far our discussion has been mainly about the urban audience, but that is only a little more than half of the picture. It appears that radio is almost as accessible to the rural population today as newspapers, if not more so. In the village of Kopanka, in 1964, there were 1517 wave radio sets and 811 wired radio sets were installed in 1963. With 1592 households in the village, this means that there are many homes which have both a wired and a wave radio set. Television was introduced in rural areas in the early sixties, and most of the village studies we read mentioned that there were some television sets by then. There were 214 television sets in Kopanka in 1964, or one per 7.4 households. In Korablino, all homes have wired radio sets, and there were "some" wave radio sets in the late fifties when the study on that village was done. There were 50 television sets, and since most of the studies reported great increases in television early in the sixties, we can assume that there are many more there now. In Lebedevka, there is reported to be a radio in every home, and many television sets, which the residents call
"domashniy teatr" (home theatre). In Viryatino, almost every house had a radio set of one type or the other in 1958, but no television sets were mentioned. In the Shovgen community near Maikop, radio is very accessible to the inhabitants. There were 1,200 wired radio outlets in the early sixties, and 200 wave sets (the village has 744 households), meaning that many houses have more than one.

Many of the village studies mention that there is a local radio diffusion exchange, where programs can be originated, and sometimes programs emanate from there each day. In the Kuban, for instance, in the Staro-Myshastovskaya House of Culture there is a weekly radio show telling about amateur artistic activities in the area. Even if individual households do not have radio outlets, once the villages have been equipped with radio it is difficult for inhabitants to escape some exposure to radio. This is because of the practice of installing radio outlets in public places; these radio outlets are on constantly during the broadcast day, and it is impossible to avoid the noise. Abramov describes them in his story "Around and About":

It was an August darkness and the street was empty. Only high above, on the posts, radio loudspeakers raged like machine guns through the village.

The ubiquity of broadcasting, without individual choice as to whether one wants to listen, seems to be a characteristic of modern totalitarian communications environments. Life with an outdoor radio loudspeaker for a week or so can make very clear the value of freedom "from communication."
Viewing and Listening Habits

Our information on viewing and listening habits comes both from time budget studies and from two or three audience research projects done recently in the Soviet Union. Kotov indicates that of the 100 members of the Brigade for Communist Labor that he studied, 80 percent listen to radio and watch television for an average of an hour a day. Petrosyan gives a much lower figure of 12 minutes per day for the average viewing and listening times combined. The Pskov study reports that people spend about six minutes a day listening to radio as a primary activity (average for all respondents) and 36 minutes as a secondary activity, that is, when they are also doing other things; together, this means that people expose themselves to radio a total of 42 minutes a day. People who watch television do so for 42 minutes a day, as a primary activity only. An Estonian study reports that people spend two or three hours on weekdays before the television set. These figures include a wide range, 12 minutes to several hours for both activities. Such broad differences in exposure time can be explained partly by the times and locations of the various studies. Kotov's project was done in Siberia during the late fifties; at that time television was not widely available there and strong patterns of television exposure could hardly have been well established. Petrosyan's data, gathered in the sixties, is from several cities, among which are some in Siberia and the Caucasus; this would tend to bring exposure time down for this study, since television, though more
available than to Kotov's sample, was still limited there. The Pskov study, carried out in the mid-sixties in a provincial European Russian town, reflects the increased accessibility to television in this area, though exposure here still is lower than in Leningrad and Estonia. The latter studies (see bibliography) were done later and indicate that viewing and listening in urban European Soviet areas is much higher than in other places. Leningrad, Moscow, and the Baltic capitals probably have the highest broadcast media exposure in the Soviet Union. This is partly because of older habits of exposure to printed media and partly due to the longer period of accessibility to the broadcast media in these areas. The differences in viewing and listening time may also be due to different bases (average time for all who watched or listened vs. average time over all respondents in sample), but this is impossible to check since Soviet time budget studies rarely make known what bases they are using.

The effects of sex on viewing and listening are fairly predictable. Women spend more time on the whole listening to radio than do men; this is an activity they can engage in while performing household tasks. They spend less time on television than men, and the combined time for both broadcasting media is lower for women than for men. The effect of marriage is different in degree, depending on the sex. Men, according to the Pskov study, spend less time on radio after marriage (an average of 36 minutes per day as compared to 42 minutes for bachelors) but much more time on television viewing (an average of an hour a day, as compared
Women spend less time on television if they are employed. They spend more time on television after marriage, regardless of whether they are employed.

Beliaev reports that people spend more time on the two broadcast media combined as they grow older. Those 18-30 years old spend an average of 41.5 minutes per day, those 31-40 spend 45 minutes, and those over 40 spend 58 minutes. Grushin reports a u-shaped curve by age for both radio and television exposure (in percentages of those asked):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Listen to Radio at Least Several Times a Week</th>
<th>Watch Television at Least Several Times a Week</th>
<th>Watch Television at Least Several Times a Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education seems to have a negative effect on exposure to radio, but a positive effect on exposure to television. Petrosyan reports that people with an elementary education spent 33 minutes a day on the average on both broadcasting media, while those with a higher education spent 24 minutes. Grushin's results showed that radio listening in his sample is about the same for those with a secondary education and those with less than a secondary education (79.9% and 79.5% reported listening "at least several times a week") but that fewer people with a higher education listened as frequently as the other two groups (74.5%). His data for television show just the opposite pattern: more people with a higher education
exposed themselves regularly to television (31.8% of those with below secondary, 39.3% of those with secondary, and 46.6% of those with higher education watched "at least several times a week.") The pattern for television exposure is clearly related to the accessibility of the medium in the Soviet Union. More educated people tend to have better jobs with higher salaries, and thus have greater access to sets. From studying the correlation between television saturation and the effects of education on exposure among the nations participating in the Multi-national Time Budget Project (from whence comes the Pskov data), Robinson and Converse have concluded the following:

...the main trends in the data seem to imply that as diffusion of television sets approaches saturation in a national context the correlation between education and television usage may tend to move from positive to negative.

On the basis of this finding, we can expect that as television becomes more accessible to the Soviet population, the effect of education will gradually level off, then reverse itself so that groups with less education are among the most highly exposed.

Exposure trends according to occupational type are not so clear-cut as are trends for some other demographic features. Beliaev found that ordinary workers spent an average of 44.9 minutes a day on radio and television combined, while engineering and technical workers spent 50.4 minutes. The Pskov study reports that as the level of skill of the occupation rises, the radio listening increases: unskilled people report listening
to radio 30 minutes a day while white collar employees and professionals said they listened 42 minutes. Grushin reports that workers listened least (75.8 percent of them) and pensioners listened most (97.3 percent of them). The Pskov study found that television watching goes up with skill level of occupation for men: unskilled workers watched 30 minutes per day while white collar and professionals listened 54 minutes. For women television watching remains about constant with skill level, ranging from 30 to 36 minutes a day. Grushin found that white collar employees watched television least and members of the technical intelligentsia watched most.

The only information on the correlation of Party affiliation on exposure to the broadcast media comes from the Beliaev study in Leningrad. This study reported that Party members, devoted an average of 56 minutes a day to these media, while non-Party people were second with 51 minutes per day, and Komsomol members trailed with 30 minutes a day. Our other data on age suggest that here the Komsomols are either atypical of their contemporaries, or the study is unreliable in this regard. Most people in the age group 15 to 30, according to the Grushin study, listen to radio more than other age groups and have just about as high rate of exposure to television.

People seem to devote more time to radio and television on their day off than they do on weekdays. Petrosyan reported that in three cities, Novokuznetsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Yerevan, men spent anywhere from an
average of 41 minutes to 46 minutes on weekdays with the broadcast media, but on their days off the time rose from 52 minutes to 66 minutes. For women the range was 15 to 20 minutes on weekdays and 24 to 42 minutes of their day off. Shein's study of young workers showed that men spent about 42 minutes on their day off as compared to 15 minutes on weekdays, whereas women spent 8 minutes compared to no time at all on weekdays.

An interesting aspect of radio and television viewing and listening habits is the times of day during which the media have their largest and smallest audiences. One study done in 1964 showed that peak listening times for radio were 6 to 9 a.m. and from five in the afternoon to 12 midnight. Morning programs were listened to primarily by workers from the second shift, white collar workers, engineers, and technical workers. Daily programs from 9 a.m. to 12 noon were listened to mainly by housewives and pensioners. Television viewing hours were somewhat different. Broadcasting usually lasts for a few hours around noon and during the evening from five to 12 midnight or so. Of those who watched, only 4.5 percent of people reported watching at noon; 60.7 percent listened from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m., and 58 percent listened from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. Sixty-nine percent reported listening to news broadcasts, which are usually around 6 p.m.

Country people spend a little less time on radio and television than do city people. They are only slightly less exposed to radio, but much
less exposed to television, than urban dwellers. In summer, men in the Duchal study sample spent an average of 28 minutes a day on radio and television combined, and women spent 11 minutes. In winter, men spent about 55 minutes, whereas women spent only 13. This means that in winter men approach the average urban exposure time for broadcast media, but that rural people in general, especially women, are less exposed than their urban counterparts.

A recent article in ZHURNALIST gives an interesting account of some rural reactions to television programming. In March of 1969, a correspondent from the magazine went to three oblasts (Yaroslavl, Kalininsk, and Vladimirsk) to study the reactions of country people to the rural program "Sel'skiy Chas'" (The Rural Hour). The program started in January, 1969, and is broadcast from one to two on Sunday afternoons. On the Gorshikha collective farm in Yaroslavl Raion (Yaroslavl Oblast), the journalist gathered a few people to watch the show. It is significant that the correspondent had to arrange for people to watch the program; most of those gathered indicated that they ordinarily don't watch it. During the program the viewers (including the Secretary of the Party bureau, an agronomist, an animal husbandry worker, the deputy chairman of the farm, the bookkeeper, and one of the farmers) became bored and restless and started to make remarks. The farmer complained about the poor use of visual materials: "One should talk on radio; on television you have to show." The Party secretary remarked bluntly "There is nothing useful
in this broadcast for the rural village." All complained that the timing of the program was impossibly inconvenient; Sunday may be a day of leisure for city people, but rural people are occupied with their daily jobs. One person remarked: "In the summer we need a television on the tractor in order to watch television in the daytime." The farmers asked for broadcasts after working hours in the evening, with fewer facts and statistics, and more relevant information and entertainment. The author concluded that there was nothing of local interest in the program, that rural broadcasts are poorly advertised, and that they are often produced by people who know nothing about country life.

Foreign Radio Listening

A particularly interesting aspect of Soviet communications behavior is foreign radio listening. Because Soviet domestic stations are so boring and tendentious, particularly in their news reporting and selection of music, people have turned to foreign stations for information and entertainment. In general, there are three types of foreign stations available to Soviet listeners: European domestic stations on short or medium wave (such as Vienna, Paris, or Prague); short wave programs aimed at an international audience (such as the BBC or Voice of America in English); and those short wave stations or programs aimed primarily at the Soviet audience (Radio Liberty, the Voice of America in Russian or Ukrainian, and the BBC Russian service). The first group is most accessible to those
who live in border areas, because such stations are not jammed, or jamming is not effective over such short distances. In order to comprehend news reports on such stations, the listener must have a command of the language; many educated Estonians, for example, can understand Finnish, and some Ukrainians can understand German or Austrian broadcasts. For the international programs the listener must have some command of English; Voice of America has some broadcasts in "special English" (slow, simple speech) to help those whose comprehension is low.

The third group requires no comprehension of a foreign language; usually Russian or Ukrainian nationals in exile work as announcers on these stations. Partly because of this, such programs are considered particularly insidious and harmful by the regime. Most of the efforts aimed at countering the influence of foreign radio are directed at these stations.

Soviet efforts at undermining the influence of foreign radio among the population have taken several forms. The most obvious is the jamming of foreign stations. This continued from Stalin's death until 1963, when jamming of most Western (though not of Chinese) stations was lifted: after this, jamming of these stations was selective and inconsistent, appearing only at times of extreme crisis. People openly admitted listening to foreign stations, and cited them as sources for information. Although the official attitude was still one of censure, even highly placed Party people admitted listening to foreign news reports and music. In 1964, the new Soviet station "Mayak" (Beacon) was begun, as a rather
obvious attempt to compete with foreign radio. It broadcast a round-the-clock program of news, commentary, and popular music. Some of the transmissions were on the same wavelengths as Western stations, so that in effect "Mayak" was a more palatable form of jamming. All went fairly well for the foreign radio listener until the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. At that time Soviet leaders again admitted that foreign radio represented a threat to popular support by re-imposing jamming of all Western broadcasts. Since that time jamming has increased until now it is said to be equal to or above the pre-1963 level for many stations. 62

Another means of combatting the influence of foreign radio is the official propaganda campaign. This was fairly common prior to 1963, and was resumed in 1968 just prior to the resumption of jamming, indicating that it is part of an over-all anti-Western policy, not simply a tactical move specific to the Czechoslovak situation. The 1968 campaign included a newspaper article in PRAVDA on July 31 several weeks prior to the invasion. The article urged Party members to counter "heresay" (rumor) on foreign life. The article mentioned agitators who use foreign radio as a source of information:

In this collective the working day began with an account by Engineer B. of the "latest news" he had heard the previous evening over foreign radio broadcasts. It is noteworthy that even before the Party committee intervened, his own colleagues explained to him that he had become a sort of extended communications line for a foreign radio station, which with his help was disseminating false reports about events taking place in the world. 63
One device used in such campaigns is to link individual stations with espionage networks, thereby attempting to discredit them in the eyes of Soviet listeners. Traditionally the BBC has been considered one of the less hostile of the foreign stations broadcasting specifically for the Soviet audience, and it is particularly inauspicious that in two recent articles, Izvestiya linked the BBC with the Secret Intelligence Service. The following excerpts indicate the tone of the article:

To put it bluntly, in its 46 years on the banks of the Thames, it has accumulated considerable experience in ideological sabotage, which has always been primarily aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

***

The BBC, the mouthpiece of rabid anti-communism in the British Isles, has been taking a very active part in several extremely ugly S.I.S. operations. This is confirmed by a number of documents in our possession.

***

London's radio spies cooperate with the S.I.S. in other fields as well. For instance, British intelligence has long been interested in the extensive mail the BBC receives from its listeners, primarily, of course, from the European socialist countries and the Soviet Union. In connection with all this another document has come to light; it states that "an agreement exists with BBC to turn over to the S.I.S. all letters sent to the BBC from listeners in the socialist countries." The addresses of the letter-writers are also to be handed over.

The obvious intent of these articles is to sow the seeds of disbelief in the minds of the BBC's listeners, and to prevent them from writing letters to the station. For Soviet listeners, the implications of such a campaign are clear: don't listen to foreign radio openly, and above all, don't cite it publicly as a source of information. We cannot know precisely what effect this campaign is having. On the basis of past experience,
we must assume that a good many Soviet citizens will continue to listen to foreign radio as they did in previous years, even though it may be physically more difficult. We can also assume that a large number of people have gotten into the habit of turning to foreign radio for information and entertainment, and that this habit will not be so easily changed. But official attempts to inhibit public references to foreign radio will undoubtedly contribute to a gradual attrition among those who are less motivated to seek non-Soviet sources of information.

One problem with assessing the size of the Soviet foreign radio audience is determining how many potential listeners there are on the basis of a knowledge of how many sets are capable of receiving the broadcasts. Most Soviet wave radios can receive some short wave transmissions, since domestic stations use short wave for long distance broadcasting. However, the short wave bands are often quite narrow, and cannot always receive those wave lengths best suited for foreign broadcasting. Many Soviets know how to build and adapt their own radios, however, and a good number of them have converted their sets to receive foreign broadcasts. Radio amateurism is a popular hobby, and since it has military uses, is taught and encouraged in Pioneer and Komsomol organizations. The shortage of repair facilities for radios and television sets has caused many people to resort to do-it-yourself electronics, so that the proportion of people who can repair and adapt radio sets is impressive. Licensed radio amateurs, who can obtain spare parts and old lend-lease radio sets
through the DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy) organization, are great listeners to foreign stations; they also obtain news from their Western ham radio contacts and pass it on to friends. Restrictions on the power of Soviet ham radio stations are intended to curtail extensive contact with Western hams, as are restrictions on the exchange of QSL (contact acknowledgement) cards. It is clear, however, that radio amateurism is an important though limited source of foreign news. A lead article in RADIO, the journal of Soviet radio amateurism, commented on the "misuse" of foreign radio for purposes of obtaining information:

We must pay greater attention to the strengthening of discipline in the ether. We cannot be reconciled to the fact that individual amateurs are operating on imperfect transmitters and on powers above those authorized, use frequencies not allotted to amateur communications, and carry on conversations not relating to amateur radio operation, etc.67

Why do people listen to foreign radio? We have already mentioned the two main attractions: non-Soviet sources of information, and more modern music than is ever heard on Soviet stations. The ComCom interviews have provided some interesting data on the relative credibility of Soviet and foreign radio news broadcasts. For three types of events ("events in non-Communist countries," "USSR economic news," and "political news") people said that Soviet stations offered the most news, but that foreign stations were more reliable: 68
Events in non-Communist countries:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet Stations</th>
<th>Foreign Stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>most news</td>
<td>33 people</td>
<td>17 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most reliable</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USSR economic news:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet Stations</th>
<th>Foreign Stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>most news</td>
<td>31 people</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most reliable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political news:  

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet Stations</th>
<th>Foreign Stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>most news</td>
<td>42 people</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most reliable</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most people in the ComCom interviews, as well as those in informal conversations with this author, mentioned listening to foreign stations in the evenings. Several foreign radio stations have suppertime news broadcasts (from about 5:15 to 6:30 p.m.), though short wave reception is generally better late at night and most programming on foreign stations aimed at the Soviet audience is scheduled to coincide with prime reception time.

Young people often plan parties around foreign radio broadcasts, using Western jazz as entertainment. The extreme popularity of portable tape recorders (rather than record players) is explained by the fact that young people can build their own musical library by recording Western broadcasts such as Willis Conover's Voice of America jazz program. 69

A story by Yuriy Kazakov describes one person's feeling about listening to such broadcasts:

I went to the corner where the radio was and turned it on. I was looking for music but all I could find was static and muttered announcements. I knew there must be some, and I found it. A velvety male voice said something in English, and then there was a pause, and I realized they were going to play music.

I jumped when I heard the melody because I recognized it. Whenever I'm feeling especially good, or especially bad, I remember this particular jazz melody. It's not my kind of music, but there's an idea hidden in it. 70
It is difficult to say exactly which foreign station is listened to most. The ComCom respondents mentioned listening to almost every existing foreign station, but several were mentioned much more frequently than others. Among 108 respondents, the following stations were chosen as "most often heard":

- Voice of America: 35 people
- BBC: 26
- Radio Liberty: 7
- Other Western stations: 8
- Other Socialist stations: 8

People listen to different stations for various reasons. Many people mentioned to this author that they listened to VOA "in order to learn more about life in America"; the United States gets a lot of adverse publicity in the Soviet media, and this seems to whet the appetite of people to find out more precisely what is happening there. They also liked the jazz broadcasts on Voice of America. Other people mentioned listening to BBC because they liked less commentary and interpretation. Listening also varies according to time periods, according to what sort of crises are taking place in the world, and who is most likely to have the most information on a particular situation.

Soviet Studies on the Urban Television Audience

Boris Firsov and his colleagues have published the first major study on the Soviet television audience. His data was collected exclusively in Leningrad, where television set density is higher than in most
localities in the Soviet Union. The sample consisted of 1,916 people selected by city district according to economic sector, type of occupation, sex, and some other demographic features. Of these people, 87.4 percent had a wired radio outlet in their homes, and 69.5 percent had a wave radio set. Most people (64.5 percent) listened to the radio every day, and a sizable proportion (30 percent) listened from time to time.

Of the people interviewed, 85.9 percent owned a television set; and of these set owners, about 57.4 percent had owned their set for more than five years. Most of the other sets were bought during the last few years, with only 11 percent obtained during the last two years. Of those who did not own television sets (N = 270), 25.2 percent reported that they hardly ever missed a program they wanted to see; 9.8 percent reported watching "rather often" and 59.8 percent said they watch occasionally. Most people in Leningrad can probably see television if they so desire. Of those who did not own their own sets, 42.1 percent said they would like to own one, and another 30 percent said they would "probably" like to own one. Of those who wanted one, almost 60 percent said that they didn't have one for financial reasons, and another 26 percent said that a television would "disturb difficult living conditions." Most Soviet city dwellers still share apartments with several other families.

When asked to estimate how many hours they watched television on the days when they did watch, people gave the following responses:
From these data it is clear that most Leningrad television viewers watch on weekdays anywhere from one to three hours a day (74.9 percent of respondents fall into this viewing time range). On Saturdays and Sundays viewing time goes up considerably, with more people spending more time on television on Sunday, the second day of the weekend. Most people have Sunday off, and television program hours on Sunday are longer; alternative sources of entertainment are also not as available on this day. These findings agree with our earlier hypothesis that in European Russia viewing time now reaches an hour to several hours a day. This means that Soviet viewing time is becoming more like the American television exposure pattern as sets become available to more people. 72

On the basis of the above viewing times, Firsov made a typology of "viewer types," ranging from what he called "the very enthusiastic" to the "very moderate." We have summarized these types in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type name</th>
<th>Very Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Very Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range of hours per week</td>
<td>15-27</td>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>less than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>they watch television</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respondents in type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age in type</td>
<td>38.2 years</td>
<td>37.7 years</td>
<td>36.1 years</td>
<td>34.5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type male</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Occupational type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type name</th>
<th>Very Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Very Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type workers</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type white collar workers</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type specialist with secondary education</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of type specialist with higher education</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below 9th grade</th>
<th>Specialized or secondary</th>
<th>Higher or incomplete higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent with below 9th grade</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with specialized or secondary education</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with higher or incomplete higher education</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since it is interesting to know how many of the total respondents fall into each viewer type according to certain characteristics, we have made up another table for two characteristics, sex and education: (percentage of people in type)

### For total sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Enthusiastic</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Very Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 9th grade education</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized or secondary education</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher or incomplete higher education</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data give us the following profile of Soviet urban television viewers: those who watch television most are more likely than not to be less educated, to be ordinary workers (as opposed to specialists) by profession, to be older, and less likely to be females than groups who watch television less. How does this information compare with that from the time budget studies? We have noted in looking at our time budget data that women tend to watch television less than men—all of the projects agreed on this finding. As for age, the Firsov study shows that people in their early thirties are more likely to be in moderate viewing groups and those in their late thirties in higher viewing groups (see average age of types). This also agrees with our findings from time budget studies as to the correlation of age with viewing; Beliaev found that older people watch more, and Grushin found that viewing went down in the thirties and rose in the forties (since he used ten-year units it is likely that at the end of the thirties people approach the "forty-and-above" patterns). In the Firsov study, more educated people are clearly more likely to be in moderate viewing groups, and less educated people are in higher viewing groups. Probably Grushin's findings of an opposite trend are related to a scarcity of sets (see above data on education).

Asked where they usually obtained their information about broadcast schedules on television, over 71 percent said from reading the daily newspaper RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMMES. Thirty percent more learned of programs from other newspapers, 17.8 percent from radio
reports, 11.3 percent from television announcements, and 13.6 percent by word-of-mouth.

One of the most interesting parts of the Firsov study is the section on attitudes and viewer satisfaction. When asked "What is Television to You Personally?" over 70 percent of respondents said, "a means of entertainment, rest, and relaxation." This answer is quite interesting, since television is not (and never has been) officially conceived of as primarily a means of entertainment, but a means for education. The Firsov finding echoes that of an American study which found:

Television, among the home sources of mass communications, has its greatest comparative advantage in the field of entertainment....It is television, and by a large margin, that is turned to for relaxation and diversion.74

When asked "What do you think about entertainment programs?" over 41 percent said there were too few such programs, and another 48 percent said they thought the quality of entertainment programs should be improved. Clearly this is the most important type of television program to the Lenin-grad viewer, and he is not satisfied with the fare offered. Sixty percent of respondents replied that to them television is a "source of the most varied information about events in the country and abroad," and another 45 percent said it was "a means of broadening knowledge and cultural horizons."

Though information was important to them, 17 percent said that the most lacking aspect of informational programs is "frankness," and another
11.6 percent said most lacking was "effectiveness in the interpretation of events." Apparently, news is very important to Soviet viewers, but of them (29 percent in this study said so openly) are not convinced that they are being given the correct information on or interpretation of events.

The greatest satisfaction with television programs was manifested towards television plays, feature and television films, reporting of sports, concerts, and variety shows. News and current events and socio-political programs, were the least-liked programs as they now stand. People with lower levels of education preferred television plays, educational programs, feature and television films, and disliked socio-political programs and news broadcasts. Those with higher levels of education like serious music and opera, and disliked socio-political programs and Soviet history. This group was, in fact, the most critical in their attitude toward television programming, finding fewer programs which satisfied their tastes. Younger people liked entertainment programs, such as films, concert and variety shows, and theatrical and literary programs. They disliked programs on Soviet history, or those with a socio-political orientation. Older people preferred educational programs, serious music and opera, and films. They alone seemed to like socio-political programs, though they, too, disliked programs on Soviet history.

The Estonian Television Studio's methodological section also carried out a research project on its television audience in the past year. The study is of particular interest because it deals with a television audience
in a "border" area, where viewers have a choice of listening to Moscow Central (some of the republic's sets can receive it), Estonian television, and Finnish television. This is one of the few places in the Soviet Union where viewers can see foreign television, and the extent to which this possibility represents a threat to Soviet propaganda via television is clear in the title of the article reporting the study: "Like Heavy Guns into Battle."

Two-thirds of the population of the republic were estimated to be television viewers; this is probably a much higher proportion than in non-European areas of the Soviet Union. The authors tried to model their sample on what was known about viewers' demographic characteristics. The final sample consisted of 1160 completed questionnaires, the results of which were analyzed at the University in Tallin.

The majority of viewers could receive the First or Tallin Program. Several cities, such as Kokhtla-Yarva, Tartu and a few others have good reception of Central Television from Moscow. The Northern areas and Tallin can receive Finnish broadcasts, which educated Estonians apparently can understand quite well. Tallin viewers turned out to be most critical of program selection, more so than those who could only receive one station. People were asked whether they watched Estonian television, a) if reception of Estonian television is good, b) if reception of Central Television is good, and c) if reception of Finnish television is good. Seventy-one percent of respondents watched Estonian television if it was good and if Central was also good; Central television did not seem to be a serious
contender for attention of Estonian viewers. A lower percentage (66 percent) said they watched Estonian television if reception of Finnish television is good, from which we can conclude that Finnish television does provide some competition for the Estonian station. People reported that they wanted more broadcasting in Estonian, as opposed to Russian. When people turn to the Finnish channel, they are seeking mainly information and entertainment. More men, and more members of the Estonian intelligentsia are viewers of Finnish television than any other group.

To the question "Which programs do you most look forward to?" 88.7 percent answered that they looked forward to those programs that helped them to rest after work. This concurs with the desire of the Lenin-grad audience to use television primarily as a means of entertainment. Less than one percent said that they watched programs about "labor processes." The two most popular entertainment categories were feature films and popular concerts. The interest of agricultural workers in programs about agriculture is lower than in any other kind of serious content.

People were asked "How do you watch television?" and told to check the following responses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of Those Responding:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I sit down to watch television when I have finished the day's work and watch while I have free time or until I fall asleep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I try to finish my work before the beginning of an interesting program and then I watch several programs one after another</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. I watch those broadcasts which I absolutely want to see, and frankly speaking, do not turn off the television set at once but wait to see what's on next  

4. I watch television only during those hours when a broadcast is on that I have really decided to watch.  

5. Other  

Though in each home where there was a television set there was also a radio, 91 percent said they would rather watch a play on television than hear one on radio. The visual aspect of television apparently makes it a far more attractive means of amusement. 

One of the most significant findings of this study is the fact that people turn much less to Moscow Central Television for news and information (only 20 percent of people watch Moscow Central news and children's programs combined, though we don't know what proportion of those listen to news), than to Finnish television. Apparently they, like the Leningrad television viewers, are dissatisfied with Soviet television news reporting and when given a choice will choose an outside station. Another interesting finding is the fact that educated people in Estonia watch television just as often as anyone else, though they are more selective in their viewing habits. This is no doubt a result of the availability of the Helsinki station, to which they turn for news.
The Impact of Television on the Use of Other Media

Television is the newest among the mass media and its introduction in most countries has led to some modification of overall communications behavior. In summarizing the effects of television, one author concludes:

A good deal of evidence... converges to suggest that the growth of television, while in some measure acting to replace radio listening as an obvious functional equivalent, is also serving to increase in an absolute sense the amounts of time being devoted to mass media attention.\(^7\)

We have very little information on the impact of television on the Soviet audience, because we have little data on Soviet media usage as a whole.

So far there has been one major published Soviet study dealing with the impact of television on reading and film attendance. The Sociological Research Sector on Spiritual Culture of the Urals Branch of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, together with the Sverdlovsk Committee on Radio and Television and the oblast office of film ticket sales worked jointly on the project.\(^7\) About five thousand people in Sverdlovsk, all of whom were television viewers, were questioned. The results of this survey were compared to a similar study comparing 7,000 people in three large industrial towns of the Central Urals. A little more than half of those questioned (56.1 percent) said they read almost as much after they got their television sets as before; 27.5 percent said they read less; and 16.4 percent said they read more.

Those with a low level of education were most affected by the acquisition of a television set in regard to their reading habits: only 44.8 percent
of them said that they read as much as before, compared to 70.4 percent of those with a higher education. Age was also a significant factor in the change of reading habits: older people were most negatively affected. About 37 percent of them read less after the acquisition of a set, while those between 14 and 18 years of age began to read more. The lower reading levels for less educated and older people are undoubtedly related to poorer reading habits and less motivation than among more educated, younger people. In terms of occupation, only pupils began to read more; housewives, pensioners, non-specialized white collar workers, and workers read less after getting a television set. By and large, people who were most selective in their leisure time expenditures before the acquisition of a set remained so afterwards.

The effect of television on movie attendance was to make existing habits more extreme: those who went to the movies fairly often before obtaining a television set went even more after, and those who went rarely went even less after buying their set. Young people (age 14-18 years) and old people (over 55) were most affected in their film attendance habits; both attended more after getting a set, though the effects were stronger on young than old people. People with a primary education were little affected by the acquisition of the television set; the number of active moviegoers among them increased by only 0.6 percent. Among those with a secondary education, this number increased by 33 percent and among those with a higher education it increased by 22.6 percent. When asked
whether an increase in free time hadn't been the factor rather than the acquisition of a television set, most respondents made it clear that, in their minds at least, their increased film attendance was a direct result of getting the television set.

In the three-city study (Nizhniy Tagil, Serov, Kamensk-Uralsk) between 20 and 35 percent of those questioned cited television as among the factors responsible for lower movie attendance. Those in the older age group were most affected, though this was not true for the youngest age group as in the Sverdlovsk study. Here again also the acquisition of a television set had the effect of exaggerating already established patterns: television had a positive influence on film attendance among those who went more than once a week, and a negative influence on those who went less.

Owning a television set seemed to increase the selectivity of film-attendance. Those who would ordinarily go to the movies just to "kill time" now do it by watching television. Television owners who look at broadcasts selectively by consulting a printed program go to movies an average of 31.1 times a year; those who look at "any old program" go 20.1 times a year, and those who don't have television go 28.4 times a year. (All of these groups have an atypically high annual rate of movie attendance compared with the national average.) Thus, those who are most selective in their television watching actually go to the movies more than those who don't have television at all. Television had the greatest negative effect on movie attendance in the city where it had been introduced most recently;
this effect was therefore attributed to the novelty of television, and was expected to level off after a while.

Summary

The growth of radio and television during the years since Stalin died can best be described as a communications explosion. Radio reaches almost every inhabited place in the country today, with a few exceptions; the television network is rapidly spreading out, aided by a satellite relay system, and linked to East European television via the Intervision system. The receiving network expanded from 11.8 radio sets per 100 people in 1953 to 33.2 sets per 100 in 1967; this means that almost everyone can listen. Having started later, the television network is much less developed, growing from .1 set per 100 people in 1953 to 8.2 in 1966; these sets are located mainly in urban areas, but rural areas, too, are now included in the receiver network, especially those in the European part of the country.

Foreign radio during the post-Stalin period became more accessible, especially during the years 1961-1968, when jamming was ceased. More and more, people listened openly in these years, and came to depend on foreign stations for variety and information. The popularity of foreign radio, especially in urban areas, prompted a spirit of competition in Soviet radio, which came forth with more interesting and varied programming, including the music and round-the-clock broadcasts of MAYAK (Beacon). This
trend was reversed in August 1968, when jamming of foreign stations was reimposed.

Perhaps most important of all the developments in radio and television has been a tremendous rise in status in comparison with other media. The State Committee on Radio and Television is equal to the State Committee on the Press, and radio and television journalists have more and more influence along with their counterparts in the periodical press. The recognition that news should be transmitted to the population faster, making it necessary to by-pass PRAVDA, was both a recognition of, and a contribution to, this new status.

The audience data for radio and television is not so conclusive as that for the printed media, perhaps because of the relative youth of the media, especially television. Indications are that viewing patterns are becoming more like those of Western industrial nations, and this should continue as the population becomes more saturated by television. Young people expose themselves extensively to both radio and television; this decreases during the twenties and thirties, and then rises steadily after middle age. Education is correlated negatively with exposure to radio, but positively with television; this is related to the scarcity of the visual medium, and is expected to reverse once television has become more widespread in the USSR. Urban people have more access to radio and television than rural people, but radio may play a more important role for rural people than for urban during certain periods of the year because of physical isolation. It is also
the most important medium for housewives and pensioners, especially
those who live in the country. Everyone watches television more on his
day off, especially on Sunday, the second day of the weekend. Program-
ming is longer on this day, and household duties are carried out the day
before. Peak listening times for radio on weekdays are before work
(6-9 a.m.), noon, and early evening; for television, noon and evening
are prime times. Political affiliation seems to have a positive effect on
exposure to radio and television.

Most Soviet people have radios, and almost everyone would like to
have a television set. This means that collective listening, one of the
characteristic features of Communist media exposure, is dying away, es-
specially in cities. Earlier, group sessions were used to both extend the
media, and to influence reactions to the programs by means of follow-up
discussion. With increased private access and exposure to radio and tele-
vision, this second function is on the wane. Soviet people were given
television originally as a means of education (primarily political education),
but they accepted it as a source of entertainment and diversion. The dis-
crepancy between its intended function by the regime and its reception by
the audience made it almost inevitable that there would be some frustration
on the part of the viewers. This turns out to be the case. People like the
entertainment shows, but complain that they should be better and that there
should be more of them; they are dissatisfied with news and socio-political
programs as they now exist. They would like to see more frankness and
better interpretation of news. The data on television viewing in Estonia indicates that, given the chance, people will turn to foreign television stations for news and information. To this extent, television has failed as a medium of political socialization. The fact that audience research on the media has begun, however, means that more effective use of the media is being sought, and that the audience's tastes and wishes will have to be taken into account if the media are to improve their persuasive powers.
Footnotes, Chapter Four: Radio and Television


2 Chapter 16.

3 In Russian, radio-tranzlatsionniy uzel, or simply radio-uzel.


5 No. 6, 1967, p. 1.

6 "Myortviye Tochki" (Dead Outlets), IZVESTIYA, April 14, 1967, p. 3.

7 "Vam, Radio slushateli!" (For You, Radio Listeners!), SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA, February 15, 1967, p. 4.


9 Ibid.


13 Budantsev, Yu., and Vladimir Derevitskiy, "V Etot Dyen' i Chas -- Teleekran i Sobytiye" (At this Day and Hour -- The Television Screen and Events), ZHURNALIST, No. 3, 1967, pp. 46-7.


16 News schedules are printed in Soviet newspapers, and monitoring reports are done from time to time by Radio Liberty. For an analysis of some of this data, see F. Gayle Durham (this author), NEWS BROADCASTING ON SOVIET RADIO AND TELEVISION, Center for International Studies, 1965.


18 Sergeichuk, loc. cit.


21 Ibid.

22 Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 97.

23 Ibid., p. 91.

24 Selivanov, op. cit., p. 147.

25 Arsenov, op. cit., p. 95.

26 Kushner, op. cit., p. 277.


Kotov, op. cit., p. 34.

Petrosyan, op. cit., p. 163, Table 29.

Pskov, op. cit., IV. 9. The use of television as a primary activity was common for East European countries in the study (Yugoslavs might reach 12 minutes of exposure per day as a secondary activity, but this is exceptional), while people from Western European countries exposed themselves more as a secondary activity: U.S.A. --as much as 48 minutes per day for women; Belgium --12 minutes; France -- 42 minutes for women.

Karemyaye, Ruth, "Kogda Nakalyayutsky Kinesilkopy" ("When the Tube Lights UP"), ZHURNALIST, No. 4, 1967, p. 35.

Beliaev reported that women spend 33.5 minutes a day on both, and men 55.3 minutes (Table 5, p. 50). Petrosyan reported that men spend 41-46 minutes a week day on the two media, while women spend 15-20 minutes (Table 11, p. 96). The Pskov study reported that men spend 42 minutes a day on the radio while women spend 48 minutes, but that men spend 48 minutes on television while women spend only 42 (IV, 9.). Shein's study of young workers showed that while men spend 15 minutes a day on radio, women spend almost no time at all as a primary activity; they may listen as a secondary activity, however (Table 4, p. 163).

48 minutes compared to 54 minutes (Pskov, IV, 9).

42 minutes compared to 24 minutes for employed and 60 minutes compared to 48 minutes if unemployed (Pskov, IV, 9).

Beliaev, op. cit., Table 7, p. 51.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

Ibid., Table 12, p. 89.

Table 21, p. 115.

Table 11, p. 81.
218


44 Belaev, op. cit., Table 2, p. 49.

45 Pskov, op. cit., IV, 9.

46 Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

47 Pskov, op. cit., IV, 9.

48 Table 11, p. 81.

49 Belaev, op. cit., Table 8, p. 52.

50 Petrosyan, op. cit., Table 11, p. 96.

51 Shein, op. cit., Table 4, p. 163.

52 Aleskovskiy, M., "Shto Vklyuchit: Priyomnik ili Televizor?" ("What Should Be Turned On, the Radio or the Television?") SOVIETSKAYA PECHAT, No. 1, 1964, pp. 32-3. Based on interviews with 3,000 people.

53 From 5-7 p.m., 32.5% listened; from 7-9 p.m., 42.7% listened; and from 9-12 p.m., 34.3% listened. In the morning from 6-9 a.m., 34.4% listened. Ibid.

54 Duchal, op. cit., p. 223.

55 Shpikalov, Aleksandr, "Voskreseniye v Sel'skom Domye" (Sunday in a Rural Home), ZHURNALIST, No. 7, 1969, pp. 31-4.

56 Ibid., p. 31.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 32.

59 Ibid., p. 34.

60 For example, this author noted at the time of Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 that some jamming of Western stations took place.

61 See above, this Chapter, in section on Content.


65 Ibid., p. 10.

66 For more information on radio amateur activity, see F. Gayle Durham (this author), AMATEUR RADIO OPERATION IN THE SOVIET UNION, monograph, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., June, 1965.


69 Young people buy Western records from visitors to the USSR and from returning Soviet tourists. They also receive them as gifts from foreign tourists. Prices for these records vary from 5 to 10 times their retail value in the West. They are re-recorded many times and sold or given to friends. Broadcasts from Western stations are also treated in this manner, so that the audience of a broadcast is not limited to its initial listeners.

70 Kazakov, Yuriy, "Autumn in the Oak Woods," in GOING TO TOWN AND OTHER STORIES, Boston, 1964, p. 35.

71 Firsov, op. cit., p. 43. Leningrad is more saturated by television than other cities (except Moscow), but even so this sample probably contains a higher proportion of set owners than the city as a universe.

72 The Multi-National Time Budget Survey data show that Americans watch about 140 minutes per day (John P. Robinson, "Television and Leisure Time: Yesterday, Today, and (Maybe) Tomorrow," Survey Research Center Mimeo, September, 1967, p. 5). Neilson's most recent figure for the American audience (quoted, loc. cit.) is 190 minutes per day for each individual adult. Other studies vary from 2 to 3 hours per day on the average per viewer (see, loc. cit.: VIDEOTOWN 1948-1958, New York, 1959, gives a figure of three hours per day per set owner on the average; Mutual
Broadcasting in 1954 gave a figure of just over two hours; and Sindlinger in 1958 gives a figure of an average of two hours per set owner.

73 Data for occupation was neither clear nor complete, and could not be restructured in this manner.


75 Karemyaye, Ruth, "Kak Tyazholiye Pushki v Boiu" ("Like Heavy Guns into Battle"), SOVIETSKOYE RADIO I TELEVIDENIYE, No. 7, 1967, pp. 30-33.

76 Robinson, op. cit., p. 17.

CHAPTER FIVE: FILM

Soviet leaders, repeating Lenin, have frequently referred to film as "the most powerful means of educating the masses." In the early days of Soviet power the cinema was one of the three major instruments of political education, along with the newspaper and personal oral agitation. It did not require a literate audience, and had the added advantage of visual presentation. Perhaps most important, the moving picture was a relatively new phenomenon, and as such, acted as messenger of the modern world; this was a distinct asset to a regime which sought to present itself as an agent of progress. Like the newspaper, the Soviet film has had to yield its prominent place, sharing the political socialization function with newer, faster media. It has become more and more specialized as a means of entertainment, though, along with other artistic forms in the Soviet Union, the film is subordinated to politics. Its protagonists, like those in literature, are meant to serve as models and anti-models for Soviet citizens. Ironically, this formula-oriented regimentation has undermined its effectiveness both as an art form and as an agent of political socialization.

Since the decision to expose oneself to cinema involves more than the mere flicking of a switch or turning of a page, the film must have greater initial appeal than the television program or newspaper article.
It is the focus of an evening's activity, requiring a change in the daily routine. Once the audience has gathered, however, the film has a monopoly on its attention, safe from the interruption of visitors and telephone calls. The message is therefore sure to be heard.

Expansion of Production Facilities

The last years of Stalin's regime were characterized by stagnation and low productivity in most of the arts. In 1952 only a few feature films were produced. These years of regimentation had been frustrating, and there were increasing demands for new scenarios and motion pictures. After Stalin's death discussion of the problems of the film industry were much more open and many changes were proposed. The new Ministry of Culture almost immediately released a production plan for 25 feature films and called a conference of young writers to discuss the problems of the motion picture industry. Part of the problem was that only trusted writers had been commissioned to write scripts, and a campaign was launched to draw new talented writers into scenario writing. There was a concerted drive to produce more feature films: by 1954, there were 38 full-length films; by 1957, the number had jumped to 90, and the number has continued to grow: by 1963 the number was 133 and in 1967, 175.2

There are presently over 40 film studios in the USSR. In March, 1963, the State Cinematography Committee of the Council of Ministers, USSR, was formed so that the Soviet film network was given administrative status similar to that of the press and broadcast media.
The increase in output was paralleled by a growing concern over the content of these new films which were to reach the public in much greater numbers. This period saw a revitalization of the "new Soviet man" concept. Interpretations of "socialist realism," the formula for Soviet artistic production, began to broaden. In 1957 it was decided to open a comedy workshop at Mosfilm Studio in order to bring together and stimulate people to work on this long-neglected and politically troublesome genre.

The political problems which have beset other art forms in this period have been troublesome in the production of feature films as well. Artists now knew that they could begin to produce less orthodox works, but they did not know how far they could go in certain directions. Many were to get into ideological trouble because of this uncertainty; but ultimately the zig-zag course of liberalization had a positive effect in stimulating the production of less orthodox and more interesting fare. There was increasing emphasis on contemporary significance and variety in films. Whereas the typical Soviet film hero of Stalin's day was more or less the prototypical "positive hero," in films of the late fifties and early sixties he began to be a complex human being, influenced by circumstances and doubts beyond mere ideological considerations. He was thus more credible and appealing to the film's viewers.

Changes in the Accessibility of Films

Concurrent with the drive to increase production and improve content there was developed a drive to extend the film projection network. The
number of projectors grew from 52,300 in 1953 (40,500 of them in rural areas) to 153,000 in 1967 (130,000 of them in rural areas). Since the average seating capacity of film houses in the USSR is about 140 places, this means that there are about 21.4 million cinema seats, the majority of which are in rural areas. The number of moviegoers increased over two and a half times during this period, with a total of 4.5 billion single film attendances in 1967. This is an average of 210 visits per seat.

Individuals have been slowly increasing their rates of attendance as films become more available and attractive. The average annual number of cinema visits per person was:

6 in 1950
16.2 in 1958
17.7 in 1961
19.0 in 1965
19.0 in 1967

The greatest increase took place in the early post-Stalin years; since then, attendance has increased more gradually, with little change in the past few years. At present the Soviet Union has one of the world's highest rates of film attendance.

Factors Influencing Film Attendance

Rural film attendance has increased steadily and quite markedly from 1950 to 1967. Rural people saw an average of three films in the former year, and 17 in the latter. Movie attendance in cities increased for the first few years after Stalin died, but later began to level off.
Average annual visits to movies per inhabitant:

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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decrease in urban film attendance may be the effect of the introduction of television, but as the novelty effect wears off, film attendance seems to gradually rise again. Although rural people have a better chance of getting in to see a movie once it is being shown than do urban people (because of a higher ratio of seats per population) they tend to see fewer films. This is because films are not shown continuously in the country. Rural areas are usually served by mobile projectors which travel from village to village, and during bad weather the projector may not reach an isolated village for months.

The average number of visits to movies per person varies from republic to republic. The Russian Republic has the highest rate of film attendance, with 21 visits annually per person, and the Georgian and Armenian Republics vie for lowest place with 11 visits per person. If we separate urban average annual attendance from rural, a slightly different picture emerges. Lithuania and Latvia, each with an average annual per person attendance rate of 23, are highest; the Armenian Republic is lowest with a rate of 13 visits per year. In rural attendance the Russian Republic is highest with 20 annual attendances per inhabitant, and Georgia is lowest, with only 5 attendances per inhabitant annually.
Kotov reports that of 100 members of the Brigade of Communist Labor he studied, 60 percent regularly saw films, and that the time each person spent on this averaged out to half an hour per day. Baikova reports that 83.7 percent of the men interviewed in her study saw films "regularly" and 83.9 percent of the women did so. Grushin reports percentage figures from his sample of 74.4 for men, and 72.3 for women. Thus, the differences between males and females in film attendance did not seem to be as great as the differences in time expenditures on other mass media such as newspapers, radio and television. Perhaps this is because film attendance involves going out of the house, and is regarded as a social event; couples attend films together whereas joint participation is not so common for reading, listening to radio and watching television. Beliaev also reports fairly close time expenditures on film-going for men and women; men spent an average of 18.9 minutes per day and women an average of 16.7 minutes. This means that women went to the movies about once a week on the average, and men slightly more frequently.

On overall frequency of film attendance, Grushin reports that 0.2 percent of his sample said they went daily, 44.6 percent said they went to the movies several times a week, and 28.5 percent said they went several times a month; this indicates that the sample is atypical, since it shows a much higher rate of annual film attendance than reported in the official figures above.
Age seems to have a predictable influence: young adults are the most avid film-goers. Grushin reports the following percentages for regular film-going among his sample in various age groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-24 years</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59 years</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The peak comes in the late twenties, with a sharp decline in the thirties, and after sixty, a slight increase. Beliaev reports that young people between the ages of 18 and 30 spend an average of 20.2 minutes per day, those between 31 to 40 spend 20.4, and those over 41 drop to an average of 13.0 minutes per day spent on film attendance. This pattern is different from most other countries, where peak attendance comes earlier, before the arrival of children.

From the evidence on the effects of occupation we can draw no clear cut conclusions. Grushin reports that 80.2 percent of the technical intelligentsia and 81.3 percent of other intellectuals reported going to movies regularly while only 75 percent of ordinary workers did. Thus it would seem that people in occupations requiring more training and education had a higher rate of film attendance. Beliaev, on the other hand, says that in his sample workers spent more time on the average going to movies than did engineering and technical personnel (20.8 minutes as compared to 13.2 minutes per day). Grushin reports that people with a secondary education (79.2 percent) are more likely to go to films than either those with an
elementary education (66.4 percent) or those with a higher education (72.4 percent). The data suggest that perhaps there is a "critical optimum" of training and skill, at which level film attendance is highest, but we cannot draw any clear hypothesis from the evidence available.

Party members were reported by Beliaev to spend less time on movies than either Komsomols or non-Party people. Party people averaged only 14.8 minutes per day (a little less than one film a week) while Komsomol members reported 18.4 minutes on the average per day (about one film a week) and non-Party people spent 21.6 minutes on the average per day (more than one film a week).

As we have indicated, rural film attendance is problematic for the majority of people. In most rural settlements films can be seen from time to time, though few villages have permanent facilities. In winter and early spring, many villages, even in European Russia, are inaccessible for the mobile projection unit, and even for mail delivery. The villages studied by Soviet ethnographers seem to be exceptional in this regard. Kopanka, for example, has a film projection hall in the House of Culture as well as another in the village club. In the House of Culture films are reportedly shown five times a week. In Korablino, films are shown only in the club, and this seems to be true for most of the villages in Kalinin oblast. Each stationary film unit there serves an area within a radius of three to five kilometers. As of 1963, there were 1,400 units serving 13,000 population settlements, or one projection unit per nine villages.
Bezhetskiy raion in 1960 there were only six stationary film projectors and 22 mobile ones, serving 64 population points; this is a somewhat better ratio than the average for the entire oblast. In Ves'yegonskiy raion there were 13 stationary and 10 mobile units together serving 46 population centers; again, this is much better than the average ratio. This means that there is a rather uneven pattern of availability of movies to the rural population: some villages are well above average in exposure, and others well below.

In their average film annual attendance rates, the rural villages studied are also atypically high. In the Shovgen community near Maikop, the villagers reportedly have an average annual film attendance per inhabitant of 30 in 1960; the all-union average was 17 for that year, and rural attendance was 16 per person. In Kopanka, a survey was taken on film attendance on the basis of nationality:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
<th>Once a Week</th>
<th>Twice a Week</th>
<th>Thrice a Week</th>
<th>Once a Month</th>
<th>More Rarely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This indicates that films must be changed fairly often; if there are six showings a week, and 195 families attend three times a week, the program is either sufficiently varied, or these people are exceedingly tolerant of repetitious entertainment!
Exposure patterns for age are in keeping with our earlier findings. The Kalinin oblast study indicates that there young people are the most avid film-goers. Most of them don't miss a single picture, and people know what is coming far in advance; word spreads quickly if films are good. Old people rarely go to the movies. In Korablino, the five most popular films in one year in the early sixties were seen by an average of 178 people each, though we have no idea of how typical these audience sizes are for films shown there.

Film lectures are used quite frequently in the country as a means of trying to educate rural people in new agricultural techniques and propagate the achievements of the Soviet countryside. There are indications that Soviet collective farmers are tired and disgusted with this fare, especially the image of rural life portrayed on the screen. They seem to feel it has little to do with them personally. The writer Yefim Dorosh, who specializes in writing on rural life, has expressed his feelings on Soviet documentaries about the countryside:

Almost every time I see a documentary film about the countryside I feel uncomfortable and annoyed by turns. I am ashamed to listen to ordinary people who, owing to the circumstances of their everyday life, are accustomed to behaving naturally and simply, utter in wooden and stilted voices words they do not commonly use in their everyday life; moreover, although they are speaking to one another, they seem to be addressing themselves to me, sitting in the theater. I am annoyed by the artificial tone in which the narrator talks about the land and the grain, the irrelevance and stupidity of his agrotechnical maxims and the tactlessness, to say no more, of his grandiloquent reflections on the history of the collective farm countryside.
Another reason for my reaction, I think, is the inordinate zeal with which some makers of documentary films shoot tractors, combines, and electric milling machines, with the result that these are machines and pieces of equipment, although they have long since come into common use in the countryside and surprise no one, look like advertising displays.

A former collective farm leader has expressed a similar impatience and disgust with the "culture for the peasants" approach of some films:

You must bear in mind that all these broadcasts, films and plays devised especially for the countryside, with their eternal bucolic jingles and folk dancing, are now being received by the farmers with ironical grins. They have no respect for second-rate culture. It is too bad that some people still do not understand that. We are interested in cybernetics and in space and in ballet. I am not idealizing anything. You have to be blind not to see how the country people have developed.

At present the gap between urban and rural life styles is a very charged subject for most people, whether they are emphasizing or minimizing it. The press discussion of Yashin's story "Vologda Wedding," in which he describes the backwardness of village life is a good case. In the discussion Yashin was bitterly criticized:

No, Yashin is wrong in describing our village life! Such villages as Sushino, where "there is no electricity, no radio, no library, no club, and where the mobile cinema has not been seen for the last two years" are now rare. But this author makes a single case look typical. 

Yashin's fellow villagers came to his defense in a letter to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA:

Yashin's notes mentioned that in the village of Skochkovo there had been no movie for more than a year. That is so. And in Yashin's home village, Bludnovo, where he grew up, in 1962 only two movies were shown in the year. The first movie was shown in April--and the last in December. Here we are still living in the 2nd month of 1963 already but they still don't show movies to the collective farmers, we are still unable to see movies...
Audience Studies

We do not know how many people see the average film, but the Soviet press has published figures on the number of people who saw a few of the most popular films in recent years. These are all Soviet films, products of the middle sixties, which reflect a much more interesting style and content than films made in the fifties and early 1960's. They include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Part 1</th>
<th>Part 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Living and the Dead</td>
<td>seen by 41.5 million</td>
<td>seen by 40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe Me, People</td>
<td>seen by 40.3</td>
<td>seen by 39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Criminal</td>
<td>seen by 39.5</td>
<td>seen by 34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Blood</td>
<td>seen by 34.9</td>
<td>seen by 33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairman</td>
<td>seen by 33.0</td>
<td>seen by 32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1</td>
<td>seen by 32.3</td>
<td>seen by 32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2</td>
<td>seen by 32.1</td>
<td>seen by 31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comrade of the Cheka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress Actress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(These figures probably include only those who saw the films in theaters and not those who also saw them on television.) The magazine SOVIET-SKIY EKRAN (Soviet Screen) began in 1965-6 to conduct an annual audience survey to learn what readers of the journal thought of Soviet and foreign films, how many of them saw these films, and something about the audience. The first questionnaire form appeared in issue number 24, 1965. The results of the questionnaire survey and the magazine's discussion of these results provided some of the most revealing information yet published about Soviet film-goers and their reactions to what they see. Ten thousand people filled out and returned the questionnaires. The films named best were, in order of choice:
1. **The Chairman**, chosen best by 53 percent of the respondents (Mosfilm Studio)
2. **Divorce Italian Style** (French-Italian)
3. **Father of a Soldier** (Georgian Film Studio)
4. **There Once Was an Old Man and an Old Woman** (Mosfilm)
5. **Believe Me, People** (Gorkey Film Studio for Children and Youth)
6. **The Garnet Bracelet** (Mosfilm)
7. **I Am Twenty Years Old** (Gorkiy Film Studio for Children and Youth)
8. **Judgement at Nuremberg** (USA)
9. **Ashes and Diamonds** (Poland)
10. **Operation "X" and Other Adventures of Shurik** (Mosfilm)

The film which took first place among Soviet films for the year 1965 is a two-part study of a collective farm chairman and his village from the late forties until after Stalin's death in 1953. It is a frank and outspoken film, touching on attitudes and conditions in the Soviet countryside which have been openly discussed only during the last few years. The film is especially significant because its frankness about Soviet agriculture and the collective farm system is said to have displeased Khrushchev, and it was suppressed for some time. When it was finally released during the first months following his ouster, people came from miles to see it. At this point the film had not been distributed outside the larger cities, and people were apparently concerned that it might be withdrawn in the uncertain atmosphere of the succession period. The magazine RT commented on the choice of this film as most popular; its conclusions are:

More than half the filmgoers (53%) named "The Chairman" as the best—a rare instance of unanimity in our contest.

Let us recall that of all the films of 1965 "The Chairman" evoked the greatest controversy in our press. Some thought that for the first time the grim truth was being told about the countryside after the war; others thought that the film had laid
it on too thick, and still others that it offered too easy a solution to the conflict it portrayed. Some liked Part I and thought the ending false, others wanted the whole film to be consistent with the spirit of the ending.

That "The Chairman" won first place clearly shows that it is truth that the viewer values in a film above all else, and not far-fetched pathos. The viewer yearns for truth. 35

This article also commented on the fact that many good films are listed alongside very bad films as "most popular." The United Arab Republic picture "The Dark Glasses" for example, was listed among the worst by most of the 10,000 movie-goers who responded, while about 300 of them thought it was the best! "Wild Strawberries" which the magazine calls one of the "masterpieces of the world cinema," was mentioned as best fewer times than "Dark Glasses." The magazine concludes:

The results of the contest disclosed two attitudes towards films, the active, creative attitude and the passive, spongelike one. Sometimes these two trends stand out against each other clearly, but more often than not they are curiously intertwined.

Judging by the answers to the questionnaire, the passive attitude toward film perception seems to be the most widespread today; and this is not surprising. It has long been known that the subject matter of art creates the public capable of responding to it. A flood of dull pictures has swept over the viewer, corrupting his taste and undermining his faith in the seriousness of anything the screen can convey.... The spectator has been bred on a mass of ersatz and comes to regard truly serious works uncritically, passively. 36

These remarks seem to indicate a growing awareness that the dull, monotonous quality of Soviet artistic production has had a stultifying, rather than politically inspiring, effect on its audience. It is a tacit admission that the Soviet artistic formula of socialist realism needs to be revised if the contemporary Soviet audience is to be stimulated by artistic production.
Gradually a demand for more sophisticated treatment of subjects is developing, and this taste is whetted by exposure to foreign films. SOVIETSKII EKRAN continued its "contest" or readers' survey the following year, publishing a questionnaire in issue number 24, 1966. By March 1, 1967, 52,000 completed questionnaires (five times the number of the previous year) had been returned, indicating a tremendous desire on the part of the Soviet moviegoer to express his views. Thirty-six thousand women and 16,000 men chose the top three films: 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Saw It</th>
<th>Thought It Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) No One Wanted to Die (Lithuanian Film Studio)</td>
<td>75% of all</td>
<td>35% men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) War and Peace (Mosfilm)</td>
<td>78% men</td>
<td>34% men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91% women</td>
<td>23.6% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Ordinary Fascism</td>
<td>80% men</td>
<td>17.7% men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70% women</td>
<td>17.7% women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that two of these films (1 and 3) have to do with contemporary military-patriotic themes, and another, a classic, has to do with similar themes from Russian history. Russian film producers make a large number of such films each year, and they are extremely popular. These films keep alive the wartime memories of Soviet citizens, serving to recruit support for Soviet foreign policy by continually reiterating the themes of patriotism and peace. Such themes are also prominent in other Soviet artistic works, such as novels, short stories, and poems.

According to the Sverdlovsk study on the effects of television on movie attendance (see Chapter Four) people see more films in movie
theaters than they do on television. This is interesting, since in the Soviet Union there is a lag of only a few months before new films are shown on television. It indicates that Soviet people are eager to see each new film, and are far from saturated with them. Eighty-five percent of the people in the Sverdlovsk sample said they watched films on the movie screen rather than on television. The screen-to-television ratio changes as people grow older: while those under 35 goe to movies most often, those who have reached 60 see more movies on television. People reported that they prefer to see longer, two-part films, such as "The Chairman" and "State Criminal" at home, because they take up such large blocks of time. One would suppose that this preference extends to a more recent Soviet film, "War and Peace" which takes four evenings to see!

Summary

Soviet films in the years since Stalin died have become more numerous and more interesting, at times even controversial. The models of behavior presented in them have gradually become more complex, almost credible as human beings. This cannot but have had a positive effect on the cinema's efficacy as an instrument of political socialization, since some identification is necessary for any transfer of values and behavioral norms.

The Soviet film has become much more accessible to the population, especially in the countryside. Although rural attendance rates have increased
at a faster rate than urban, however, the average annual attendance figure for country people is still below that of their urban counterparts. This is due to the difference in life style of the two segments of the population: long distances and poor transportation, especially during certain seasons of the year, make attendance very difficult for rural people. While television seems to have had the effect of slightly decreasing the rate of urban attendance in recent years, this is now levelling off. Television has not yet made a similar impact in rural areas.

Sex differences in film attendance are not so great in the Soviet Union as for exposure to other media. Young people are the greatest movie fans, especially those in their late twenties; after this, attendance declines until approximately retirement age. Party people spend less time on the cinema than Young Communist League members, but non-Party people spend the most time of all. This would indicate that the more political members of the Soviet population tend to be somewhat more utilitarian in their motivations to exposure to mass media than the rest of the population.

The Soviet population is eager to see new films. Word of a new film's quality and entertainment value spreads quickly, and few wait until the film is shown on television before they see it. Movie-going is one of the cheapest, most accessible forms of public recreation and people are not saturated with it by any means. Audience research on the film audience is still in a fairly primitive state: we know less about motivations
to exposure and reactions to films than we do about audience behavior for radio, television, or newspaper.
Footnotes: Chapter Five

1 LENIN, STALIN, i PARTIYO O KINO (Lenin, Stalin, and the Party on the Cinema), Moscow, 1938, pp. 7-8.

2 STRANA SOVIETOV ZA 50 LYET, op. cit., p. 288.


5 The United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1966 (Paris, 1968), Table 7.2, gives the following figures for average annual film attendance per inhabitant in 1965 for various countries: Ghana, 2 visits to movies per year per inhabitant; Liberia, 1.4 visits; United Arab Republic, 2 visits; United States, 12 visits; Burma, 9 visits; Israel, 20 visits; Japan, 4 visits; Albania, 4 visits; Bulgaria, 15 visits; Czechoslovakia, 9 visits; Federal Republic of Germany, 5 visits; German Democratic Republic, 7 visits; Hungary, 10 visits; France, 5 visits; Portugal, 3 visits; Yugoslavia, 6 visits; USSR, 19 visits; Rumania, 10 visits; Switzerland, 8 visits; United Kingdom, 6 visits; New Zealand, 10 visits.


7 NARODNOYE KHOZIASTVO V 1965 GODU, op. cit., p. 731.

8 Kotov, op. cit., p. 34.

9 Baikova, op. cit., p. 136.

10 Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

11 Beliaev, op. cit., Table 5, p. 50.

12 Grushin, op. cit., Table 9, p. 76.
Since official figures always try to show a maximum of exposure, we conclude that it is the nature of the Grushin sample which is responsible for the excessively high rate of attendance.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

Beliaev, op. cit., Table 7, p. 51.

The Soviet deviation from the general pattern may be explained in one of two ways. The average childbearing age may be somewhat later in the USSR than in other countries because of housing shortages delaying marriages, etc. I could not find comparative statistics on average childbearing ages, so I am unable to substantiate this impression. More probably the housing shortage has another effect which can also account for the phenomenon of late peak movie attendance. This is the fact that several generations are forced to live together; this means that grandparents are readily available for baby-sitting and allows young parents more freedom to go out to movies than they would have otherwise.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

Beliaev, op. cit., Table 2, p. 49.

Grushin, op. cit., Table 11, p. 81.

Beliaev, op. cit., Table 8, p. 52.

Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 89.

Selivanov, op. cit., p. 96.

Anokhina and Shmeleva, op. cit., p. 320.

Autlev, et al., op. cit., p. 166.

Yermuratskiy, op. cit., p. 100.

Anokhina and Shmeleva, op. cit., p. 320.

Selivanov, op. cit., p. 150.


"This is How We Live, This is Our Stand--Interview with a Collective Farm Leader," KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Feb. 2, 1966, pp. 1-2; CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, p. 11, 1966.


32 Poluboyarinov, op. cit., p. 23.

33 See SOVIETSKIY EKRAN, No. 10 (226), May 1966, p. 1.

34 This author, standing in line in a Moscow theater for tickets, overheard many many people who, being turned away, made comments like "But I came all the way from village X to see this film. You must have a ticket for me, comrade!"


36 Ibid., p. 9.

CHAPTER SIX: AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA

The classic Bolshevik system of mass propaganda and agitation served in the early years of the regime primarily to extend the then scarce media, ensuring that the revolutionary message reached every worker and peasant. Later on it continued to provide a two-way communication link, albeit not always an efficient one, between the "masses" and the Party: propagandists and agitators disseminated the official message, carrying back the public's reactions to the leadership. One of the main paradoxes of Soviet political control has been clearly evident in this apparatus, and the post-Stalin period has been no exception: how to convince the population using lifeless slogans and scarce information. This problem was articulated as recently as May, 1969:

Unfortunately, comrades can still be found among us who... agitate by means of ready-made formulas, universally known premises, and bare slogans.¹

The post-Stalin period has brought many fluctuations in the conduct of agitation and propaganda. The official system of face-to-face communications has had to respond not only to the vicissitudes of political moods and events, but to the challenges offered by the growth of faster, more impersonal ways of reaching the population.
Organizational Changes

Until the end of 1962 all mass personal political indoctrination was under the direction of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, usually referred to as AGITPROP. At this time, Ilyichev, Khrushchev's ideological deputy, created the Ideological Department of the Central Committee. Under this leadership the system of Party education was greatly enlarged, drawing in many non-Party students; this had its effect on the mass propaganda and agitation system, whose teachers come from this source. In the Spring of 1965, after Khrushchev's political demise, the Ideological Department became once again the AGITPROP Department, with T.K. Kuprikov as Chairman. By May, 1966, AGITPROP was renamed the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. It became clear that the system of Party education and mass political indoctrination were undergoing some fundamental changes. The intent of the new leadership was to strengthen the ideological orthodoxy of Party cadres and increase the effectiveness of mass propaganda and agitation. By cutting down on the number of students in the Party education system and limiting it largely to Party people the new leadership hoped to attain better control over ideas disseminated through mass political work. Moreover, in addition to the traditional types of ideological worker, a third was introduced. "Political informers" were created to assist agitators and propagandists in reaching today's more sophisticated and educated Soviet population.
Mass Lecture Propaganda

Lecturers for the mass forms of propaganda generally are trained in the system of Party education. They are organized into lecture groups within Party organizations and work in connection with the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (Znaniye). Lectures by propagandists are given in Houses of Culture, clubs, in housing administrations in urban apartment houses, in brigade meetings on collective farms, in factory shops, public parks and just about everywhere an audience can be gathered for a meeting. Often propaganda lectures form part of a "cultural evening" in a club or House of Culture and are followed by a concert and dance.

The Znaniye Society

Znaniye was formed in 1947, and later took over the direction of lecture propaganda from the Ministry of Culture. The society's membership has grown from 36,700 in 1949 to 1,980,752 members in 1967. Memberships are both individual (including over one thousand members of the Academy of Sciences in 1963) and collective (including over 36 scientific societies in 1963, the Writers' Union, the Composers' Union, and the Filmworkers' Union. Any member of these constituent groups may be called upon to give lectures. The Society is reported to have given about two million such lectures in 1956, 10 million in 1960 and over 16 million in 1967.
Giving public lectures is considered one way an intellectual can fulfill his social obligations. Topics may range from "Hypnosis and Miraculous Health Healing," to a lecture on the current international situation, or a talk by a circus animal trainer. Admission is often free, but sometimes a small fee is charged. During lectures, the audience may write questions down; these are passed to the lecture stand where a number of them are selected for discussion by the society after the talk. Soliciting questions is one method of finding out what is on the audience's mind and the pieces of paper are often saved even if they are not answered.

People's Universities of Culture

One important form of mass lecture propaganda is the People's University of Culture. Started under Khrushchev in 1957, this system of popular indoctrination is one example of his avowed ambition to "strengthen the Party's ties with the masses." Some of the Universities of Culture were organized by the ministries of culture (including 28 percent of the universities and 23 percent of the students in 1961-2), others by the Znaniye Society (27 percent of the universities and 25 percent of the students in 1961-2), still others by the Central Council of Trade Unions (27 percent of the universities and 37 percent of the students in 1961-2) and the rest by various other departments and organizations (18 percent of the universities and 15 percent of the students in 1961-2). In the year 1961-2 a statistical study of Universities of Culture showed that out of a total of 6,357 univer-
sities with 1.5 million students, most of the universities were urban (3,587 city and borough with 858,000 students and 522 with 410,000 students attached to enterprises). Only 420 universities were attached to collective farms, accounting for only 57,000 students. By 1969 there were reported to be over 17,000 such schools with more than 3 million students studying in them. 8

Although the "universities" concentrate on various special topics, such as health, literature, or agriculture, their main purpose is clearly political indoctrination. They were described in one article as:

...promoting an increase in the Communist consciousness of the people, the ideological-esthetic upbringing of Soviet people, and propaganda of the newest achievements of science, technology, and advance experience. 9

Lecturers in the universities work on a voluntary basis: "They give their knowledge to the working people unselfishly, as is the duty of a Soviet man who considers it his foremost obligation to serve the interests of the people." 10 In 1969, there were reported to be over 200,000 such volunteer teachers. 11

Although Universities of Culture in the early years were free, they were later obliged to fulfill a financial plan and began asking registrants to pay in advance for lectures. As a result of this condition, the attendance in many areas dropped, and many universities ceased to exist. 12 The overall number of universities has increased, however, to 9.6 thousand in 1964 with 1.9 million students and 15.8 thousand in 1965 with 2.6 million students. 13
By 1969, there were over 17 thousand Universities of Culture, with 3 million students and 200,000 volunteer instructors.  

Several attempts have been made to beef up the sometimes shaky universities. For example, on March 11, 1964, a resolution on Universities of Culture was adopted jointly by the Presidium of the Administration of ZNANIYE, the Collegium of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) organization. This statement made certain criticisms of the work of universities of culture, recommending better methods of study, the establishment of a pedagogical collective in each university, and improvements of the ideological tone of instruction. It also asked the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to take a more active part in the program. Apparently this effort was not successful, since almost four years later, on October 8, 1968, another resolution appeared, this time from the Central Committee of the Party. It created a Central Council of People's Universities to coordinate activities, and adopted more specific measures for improving the work of the "universities."

Though official discussions of the Universities of Culture often give glowing reports of progress, newspaper articles sometimes reveal that there has been little improvement. One such article appeared in IZVESTIYA in 1966. The author of the article was told that a certain University of Culture had been awarded the Znaniye Society's first-class diploma and
an All-Union prize, and he was being sent to the village of Novospasskoye to write a scenario for a film about the university. When he arrived at the village, the situation appeared a good deal different than it had been described to him in Moscow. The local University of Culture had no regular student body, no faculties, and had stopped giving lectures because the local House of Culture had ceased to operate:

"I'm not going to abet this deception!" declared Nikolai Yevstigneyev... who was awarded a certificate of merit as one of the best lecturers in the Soviet Union. "I won't accept the certificate."

"Why not?"

"Because I've never delivered a single lecture at the university."17

If the Znaniye Society bestows such awards on inoperative universities of culture, one wonders what the less worthy ones must be like!

A new form of mass propaganda, the School of Communist Labor, appeared in Leningrad a few years ago. This type of organization offers lectures on current political and economic problems, on current production techniques, and excursions to factories using the latest methods. As a rule, the schools are supposed to deal with practical tasks facing each group at a particular time. However, the curriculum of a School of Communist Labor in Voronezh indicates that the subject matter is not confined to practical questions. The program consists of five sections: first one on general political questions and policy decisions of the Party and government; second, Communist upbringing; third, applied economics; fourth, advanced technology; and fifth, mass cultural activities. Classes are held
twice a month in classrooms or at the place of work. In some schools, such as that at the Gorkiy automobile works, the program lasts for two years. There are now 3,350 of these schools in the city of Leningrad, with 80,000 workers enrolled. Gorkiy province has 1,426 such schools and Voronezh has 900 of them. The schools are under the regulation of the trade union network. 18

Agitation

In contrast to mass lecture propaganda, agitation is concerned with reaching people through concrete examples which illustrate specific phenomena relating to party policy. Plekhanov made the distinction as follows: "A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few people; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people."19 The crucial distinction here between the two types of ideological work is supposedly not in the number of people making up the audience. In fact, the agitator often speaks to very small groups and lectures frequently have huge audiences. Alex Inkeles has pointed to three types of agitation classified by audience: personal oral agitation, in which the agitator speaks to many people through means of mass communications.20 More important than the size of the audience is the type of idea being presented. In practice propaganda tends to be more theoretical, directed toward a deep understanding of a series of inter-related ideas; agitation is directed more toward the correct interpretation of several individual
ideas, with the intent of producing fairly specific behaviors and attitudes. Lenin described its intended effects:

The consciousness of the masses of workers cannot be genuine class consciousness unless the workers learn to observe from concrete, and above all, from topical, political events and facts, every other social class and above all the manifestations of the intellectual, ethical, and political life of these classes... a working man... must understand what interests certain institutions and certain laws reflect and how they are reflected. The working man cannot obtain this "clear picture" from books. He can obtain it only from living examples and from exposures, following hot after their occurrence, of what goes on around him at a given moment, of what is being discussed.  

Agitators

The number of agitators in the Soviet Union is always difficult to ascertain, partly because of seasonal fluctuations. Some agitators work in rural areas only during the sowing and harvesting of crops; others work only at election time. Inkeles estimated that in 1946 there were approximately three million agitators during the election campaign, and that this number probably dropped to two million during interim periods; this is a ratio of one agitator to one hundred people. The ratio was higher in more densely populated areas, such as the city of Moscow, which he estimated to have a ratio of one agitator to thirty people in 1946. Our most recent estimate of the total number of Soviet agitators comes from 1961; it was reported that before the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 there were held about 500,000 meetings, at which 4.6 million people spoke. This number of agitators gives a ratio of one agitator per 47
persons in the population during a period of intense agitational activity.
Again, the number of agitators varies from place to place: in February
1965 for example, there were reported to be 11,000 agitators in the city
of Izhevsk, giving a ratio of one agitator per 26 people; in Rybinsk there
were 8,000, or one agitator per 23 people.24

Agitators may be Party members, or non-Party volunteers who are
considered reliable. They may be appointed by the primary party organ-
ization, but sometimes volunteer for such work as one way of demonstrat-
ing political reliability and dedication. The primary Party organization
is ultimately responsible for the work of agitators and most primary party
organizations have what is called an "agit-collective" or core group of
agitators. The bureau of the Party organization must make up a work
plan for all Party work, including the activities of the agit-collective. A
plan is made up for a month at a time, and includes themes and dates of
lectures, seminars, and who is to give them.25 The task of leadership
usually falls to the local party secretary because "he, better than anyone,
knows the concrete problems of the enterprise, collective farm, direc-
tives of the city party committee and can guarantee that agitation will not
be led in a distracted way but with a close link to life."26 The secretary
holds final responsibility for the work of the agit-collective and usually
keeps close tabs on its members.

Agitation is carried on almost anywhere, and very often takes place
in the field during a rest break or during the lunch hour at a factory shop.
There are also permanent places for agitation, called "agit-points" where literature, film projectors, tape recorders, and other aids are kept, and where scheduled sessions are held. These are often in clubs and Houses of Culture.

Occasions for Agitation

There are several notable uses of agitation. The first is agitation for the fulfillment of economic quotas and plans. This type of agitation is most often encountered in the factory or on the farm, usually during a campaign to "get the harvest out" or to "fulfill the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule." It is basically a way of trying to get workers to produce more efficiently; the basic technique is to provide some ideological incentive by showing them the relation of their work to the greater economic development of the society as a whole. The new economic system, which employs wage and price incentives, seems to be among other things an admission that economic agitation alone did not inspire Soviet workers on to sufficiently productive work.

The second category of agitation is that connected with elections.

The USSR constitution (Article 125) and the Law on Elections (Article 70):
radio and television—in our country all this is in the hands of our state, in the hands of our people, which also provides real opportunities for free agitation for candidates.27

The key phrase in this statement is "all candidates registered with the District Election Commissions," for only Party-approved candidates are allowed to be registered, and there is only one candidate for office. The voter either casts his ballot for the candidate, in which case the voter must go into a booth and make changes. Under such a system, of course, the election officials know whether a person votes against a Party candidate. In light of the risks involved in voting against the Party's candidates, the vote is usually overwhelmingly in support of them. In practice, then, agitation or campaigning for candidates is intended to get people to the polls and see that their ballots are cast.

If we ascribe any validity at all to these statistics, we have to conclude that the Party is successful in getting out the vote. In the March 1967 elections for deputies to the Supreme Soviet, for example, a total of 145,736,412 persons voted in favor of the candidates; this was 99.81 percent of those voting. The number of people voting represents 28 99.96 percent of all eligible voters. In many places, the election is conducted in a holiday spirit, with time off from work and entertainment at the polls after closing time.

The third main area of agitational work, one that is assisted by the propaganda system and youth organizations as well, is the
promotion of atheism. This sometimes involves mass media and group agitation, but most atheistic agitation is conducted on a person-to-person basis. For example, when a young person is observed to be falling under the influence of religion through a parent or grandparent, he is often isolated in a dormitory; here he is visited frequently by an agitator who uses his knowledge of the person to steer him away from religion. Such atheistic propaganda is an important part of the overall system, since religion provides serious competition to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

Rural Agitation

Agitational work is one of the most important activities of rural Party organizations. In Korablino, the secretary of the Party bureau closely follows agitational work, writing down each day who led what discussions on which topics, what questions were asked, and how the agitators responded. In each brigade there is an agitator, and for the entire village there is an effort to choose agitators from among the more literate people. Agitational sessions are held in the pastures and fields during lunch or rest breaks. In Viryatino, agitational work is especially well-organized: the village is divided up into "tens," or sectors consisting of ten households, and each agitator in the village is responsible for one sector (making about 45 agitators in the village). Here, too, agitational work is conducted in the fields, for it is
otherwise almost impossible to get people together during the busy agricultural season. In Kalinin oblast, many communities hold "agitator's days" on which the entire adult population is invited to the Red Corner or club for discussions, but we do not know how well-attended they are.

In places where there are no clubs or Red Corners, Agitator's Houses have been opened. This move was made in conjunction with the amalgamation of some farms in the early sixties. In Kalinin oblast in the first half of 1963 there were 2280 Houses of Agitators. Agitator's brigades were formed, usually consisting of some eight or ten people. These are people who can because of the nature of their work (librarian, bookkeeper, etc.) leave their jobs during the day and go to the fields during the summer. There were 474 such brigades in the oblast in 1962. In some places groups called "agitational-cultural" brigades have been formed. Consisting of lecturers, movie projectionists, actors and artists, these groups combine amateur talent shows and agitational work.

Agitational work in the countryside is particularly important during religious holiday seasons and at election time. In Kopanka, from the beginning of 1961 to mid-1962 there were about 700 anti-religion talks given, most of them scheduled on or around religious holidays. Sometimes it is difficult for the local Party Committee to recruit agitators for such seasonal campaigns. An American visiting a collective farm in 1963
described the following search by the local Party secretary for someone to lead the pre-election agitation campaign:

He was looking for a person with a certain amount of authority, but all those who were suitable were declining the responsibility on the grounds that they were too busy with their production work. One of the stops on this quest was a state farm agricultural school, located, for some strange reason, on the grounds of the collective farm. The Director of the school, it seemed, was one of the secretary's chief consultants on such matters. The Director himself had declined the honor, on the usual grounds, but he suggested a certain retired collective farmer, whom several others had also mentioned. The question was thereupon settled. The candidate had not yet been consulted, but the secretary was sure that he would accept. He has always come through for them in a tight spot before.  

Political Informers

Since the reorganization of the Agitprop Department into the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, it was expected that some important changes would be forthcoming. In mid-1967 the institution of "political informers" (polit-informatory) was announced and soon after there began to be discussions in the press on the progress of local Party organizations in appointing people and organizing training sessions for them. This innovation seems to be an attempt to cope with the constantly rising educational level of the Soviet population and its greater sophistication in regard to news. A recent article echoed the concern of the Party for ideological purity:

Present conditions make necessary the wide and regular informing of propagandists. They must be given all-round preparation in order to be able to answer disturbing political
questions from the Party position, organically to relate the study of theory to the practical activities of Party organizations and to come forward as political educators and organizers. 34

Agitators and propagandists are often superficially informed and uninterested in the issues that disturb their audiences: frequently agitation sessions consist of reading the newspaper aloud or giving short, unconvincing talks during lunch breaks. 35 Propagandists often give talks on topics that are too general or removed from the lives of their audience to make any significant impact. The purpose of political informers seems to be to make both propagandists and agitators more aware of current events and to force them to make these happenings meaningful to their audiences by introducing better trained, more sophisticated ideological workers as competition. A 1967 article in AGITATOR summarized the idea behind political informers as an institution:

They are not to mechanically replace agit-collectives but to lead in mass political work. Agit-collectives' work changes when the institution of political informers comes in. In practice agitators are to carry on individual work among believers, act as examples before young people, and carry on rural agitation. Polit-informers specialize in one of four fields. Here they differ from Znaniye lecturers who talk generally on scientific and political subjects. As a rule political informers have higher education, theoretical preparation and great experience with mass work. They are on a level with the propagandist. 36
Fewer people are selected to be political informers, but they indeed seem to be of higher educational level than the general population. For example, in Tyumen Oblast there are 5,500 political informers (about one per 235 people, a much lower ratio than for agitators), of whom 1,500 are engineers and technicians, 700 are agricultural specialists, 630 are Party, trade union and government workers, 37 and 500 are teachers. In Sverdlovsk Province in 1969, there were 14,000 political informers, a ratio of roughly one to 350 members of the population. More than half of them were reported to have a higher education, the remainder having a secondary or incomplete higher education.

Apparently political informer groups had been set up in most areas of the country by early 1968. Another article in AGITATOR discussing their organization suggested that there should be four main types of political informers: 1) those specializing in the political life of the country, who would make sure that party and government decisions and resolutions and information on the work of government agencies is transmitted accurately and speedily to the population and that their significance is made clear; 2) those who specialize in economic affairs, who would know the factory or enterprises well, know the current status of the new economic reforms and draw workers into competitions; 3) those specializing in cultural life, who would inform people about the achievements of Soviet science and teach people
to judge cultural matters from a political viewpoint; and 4) those who would specialize in the international situation, some of whom would concentrate on the socialist countries, and others of whom would divide other areas of the world among themselves. 39 Special schools and courses for political informers are just getting started, but probably many of them are studying or have studied in the system of Party education as well.

Two years after the institution of the political information network it was abundantly clear that Party organizations were still having difficulty defining the roles of the various ideological workers in their daily work. Some Party committees simply renamed Agitation Collectives "Political Information Collectives," with no distinction between duties of the two. Others completely separated the two groups, with no flow of experience or information occurring between them:

Some Party organizations today observe a peculiar kind of "separation of roles." The agitation collectives are assigned only to agitation work and the political information workers are assigned only to information work. It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that such a "separation" will only clip the wings both of the agitators and of the political information workers, that it will constrict their field of action, blunt the political sharpness and militant spirit of agitation and hence diminish its efficacy. Agitation unsupported by information and conversely, information divorced from agitation, are equally ineffective... 40

Though the new system of political information may be a response
to the times, there are already indications that it has fallen prey to one of the seemingly inherent ills of the Soviet system of ideological work—an inability to respond quickly because of a fear of incorrect interpretation which could lead to serious political error. While pleading for polit-informers to react quickly to current events in informing the population, one author notes that the response of the political informer often is painfully slow:

The event has taken place, it is being discussed and sometimes interpreted the wrong way, but the polit-informers are silent; they are waiting for "instructions." The leaders of the party and public organizations are not always responsible for the weak activity of some of the polit-informers, for their lack of operativeness. Sometimes the informer is silent and does not speak because he does not know what to say, he does not have material for a thorough speech. But the local, as well as central newspapers and journals give such materials sometimes with great delay; its amount and quality do not always correspond to the increased demands....

Apparently part of the polit-informer’s problem is that information on events, and particularly on the latest Party line concerning them, is so slow. People learn about happenings by means of foreign radio and word-of-mouth before the official "opinion leaders" can find out the Party's interpretation of the situation. This must be a very awkward position for the political informer, who is rendered much less effectual in providing "guidance" for understanding world events. It is easy enough for the Party to control domestic information, but unless some faster means of communicating the latest Party line on foreign affairs
is developed, the position of the polit-informers will continue to be undermined in this way. The very fact that there have been available alternative sources of information for Soviet citizens must have caused some erosion of the hitherto relatively consistent view of the outside world, and a delayed official interpretation only makes the Party's version less potent.

Facilities of the Agitprop Apparatus

All three types of ideological workers are assisted by methodological centers. These are usually called Houses or Cabinets of Political Enlightenment. They may consist of a room for the ideological workers of a shop in a factory or brigade on a farm, or they may be city-wide or interregional and occupy an entire building with different rooms for various subjects; some Houses of Political Enlightenment have separate "cabinets" (or little rooms) on the History of the Party, Philosophy, Economy, and Foreign Policy. The main function of these cabinets is to supply propagandists, agitators, and political informers with materials and audio-visual aids for talks and discussions. A minimum library contains the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, materials such as KOMMUNIST, PARTIINAYA ZHIZN, POLITICHESKAYA, and AGITATOR. Some of these libraries hold what are called "Readers' Conferences," to discuss books of interest. Exhibits on certain topics are also held, particularly when a campaign on a certain problem is underway.
Cabinets or Houses of Political Enlightenment also hold seminars and give courses and individual lectures on methodology. There is often a methodological council of a House of Political Enlightenment consisting of from seven to 20 persons, who meet regularly to exchange experiences. Houses and Cabinets of Political Enlightenment are sometimes supported by the local Party organization, and sometimes by volunteer contributions by propagandists and party members.

One of the most important features of the Soviet propaganda apparatus is the club network, which combines social activity and diversion with mass political exposure. Clubs and Houses of Culture have been a distinguishing feature of the Soviet propaganda scene since the revolution. The first clubs were converted peasant huts or churches where people, under pressure of the local Party activists, were gathered together for propaganda, agitation, literacy training, collective radio listening, and so on. At present the club or House of Culture ideally consists of an entire building with rooms for all sorts of social and educational activities. It is the social center for neighborhoods and small communities because it is often the sole place where people can gather together.

The overall expansion of club facilities during the post-Stalin years has not been impressive; in some years the number declined. From 1953 to 1959 there was an increase in the total number of clubs from 123,000 to 126,000. During this period the number of rural clubs
fluctuated, increasing from 112,600 in 1953 to 115,600 in 1956, decreasing in 1956-7 to 114,400, and increasing again to 116,000 in 1959. During the years 1959 to 1963, there was a decrease in the total number of clubs, including rural clubs. This was due largely to the amalgamation of small collective farms into larger units; as the number of farms decreased so did the number of rural clubs. From 1963 to 1966 the total number of clubs increased to 129,000 but it began to drop again in 1967 to 126,000. Of the more than 127,000 clubs in the Soviet Union in 1965, over 61 percent of them were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. Of these, about 85 percent were rural clubs and Houses of Culture. Generally speaking, the club is primarily a rural phenomenon even today. This is due to the great discrepancy between the city and country in access to cultural facilities. Rural people depend on the club for almost all their entertainment and social life. There are many problems with club facilities in rural areas, ranging from difficulties in obtaining building materials to attracting competent supervisory personnel. One article stated that as of 1964, 70 to 80 percent or rural clubs were not even heated.

Besides poor facilities and a shortage of personnel, there are other complaints about the clubs. People resent the oppressive propaganda slogans and over-organization of the club activities. Yefim Dorosh, in his novel Country Diary, comments on this "visual agitation" and the indifference of people to it:
Sunday evening we were at the movies. The local clubhouse is a large, shed-like building, rather clean, one must say, but very uncomfortable. On the walls are two or three posters on agricultural topics and several slogans on red banners. The slogans are long and wordy; it is not so much that they are incomprehensible but rather that they have become familiar, not to be taken to heart, as if they were not directed to the people who sit in the hall.43

In clubs and Red Corners there are usually also blackboards or bulletin boards listing the leading workers of the week. This is sometimes augmented by the farm "wall newspaper." Activities of the clubs are over-organized for two reasons: The shortage of facilities means that in order to use clubs efficiently, some order must be introduced. More important than this, however, is the Soviet view that too much unorganized leisure breeds deviance. The reactions of people to this heavy politicization of their free time is well expressed in the following quotation:

...people are fed up to the eyebrows with it, as they say, with monotonous, boring, gray "activities." "We are too activated," N. Demina, head of the mass sector of the Gorkiy Palace of Culture in Sverdlovsk, stated when asked why there are no relaxation rooms in the clubs where someone can simply sit and rest without paying admission.44

A recent article discussed at length the type of response this situation has produced in Soviet individuals:
More and more has been written lately about the problem of the individual and his leisure time. Everyone wants to be culturally developed, to read, to listen, to see things and go places. But the individual needs time for himself, too. He has been imbibing an incredible amount of information; this information has to be digested, pondered and discussed. The individual has no time for this. He is driven to the point of collapse and hustled along mainly by activities in which he finds himself in a passive role, as a spectator, listener or member....

The individual gradually evolves a counter-response and withdraws to his books, tape recorders, and close friends. He does not want to be a "mass spectator" or "mass member," sitting in a hall and getting "what is being given." 45

Attendance at Public Political Meetings

There is little doubt that attendance at agitation sessions and propaganda meetings is one of the most reluctantly executed expenditures of "leisure" time in the Soviet Union. The fact that there are such obvious official devices for getting people to meetings is a tacit admission of this. Most agitation sessions are conducted at places of work, during the lunch break or before or after the shift begins, because workers cannot avoid meetings at these times. Propaganda meetings at clubs and Palaces of Culture are held in conjunction with some form of entertainment, and attendance at the concert or dance is usually contingent on prior attendance at the lecture or demonstration. This author attended a typical evening of the October Palace of Culture in Kiev: tickets admitted the bearer for a political lecture and dance presentation, followed by a social gathering; doors were locked after
the audience was seated for the lecture, and no one was admitted for the
subsequent parts of the evening program. Such "package deals" are
common, especially in rural areas, where the difficulties of drawing
an audience are compounded by poor transportation and lack of leisure
time.

The best-attended meetings are those held in connection with
some political crisis; not only is the Party effort to get people to
attend more vigorous at such times, but people are actively seeking
information about the event (even if only about how they are supposed
to react). Such meetings were held after the U-2 incident, the Cuban
missile crisis, and the death of John Kennedy; this author was per-
sonally told about meetings on the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961,
the release of the film "Who are You, Dr. Zorge?" (the first post-
Stalin Soviet spy film) in 1964, and the ouster of Khrushchev. Often
information which is too sensitive to print or broadcast is disseminated
in this manner.

How often are people exposed to agitation and propaganda
meetings? We have already mentioned some figures approximating the
audience for various forms of mass propaganda. Over 800 million people
were estimated to have heard the ZNANIYE society's lectures in 1967.
Another 3 million people were studying in the Universities of Culture
in 1969. We have estimated that there were about 4.6 million agitators
in the USSR in the early sixties, and there are probably more now; if we
conjecture that there are about five million agitators today (and this is probably a low guess), and that these speakers address relatively small groups, say 15 people per session on the average, then we estimate a one-time audience for these agitators of 75 million. Since each agitator gives more than one talk per year, the audience for agitation is very large indeed. There are about 236 million people in the Soviet Union today (and many of them are children) so we can conclude that on the average a Soviet adult is exposed to some form of mass propaganda or agitation at least several times a year, and in many cases more often. There are of course people who are rarely exposed, or never attend meetings. From time to time there are complaints about such passive people in the press:

Some comrades, principally the activists, come frequently to lectures at the factory club, propagandists' discussions and theoretical conferences. But alongside them is another group of workers, for one reason or another less mature ideologically, who for years never go to a lecture or a conference. And to what extent is education work going on in their place of residence? We still have housewives, women between 25 and 40 who have never once been to a Red Corner of the Housing Administration, not to a single lecture, although lectures are given....

Clearly the rates of attendance at meetings must vary a good deal. The COMCOM interviews with some 70 former Soviet citizens who left the Soviet Union (mostly in the early sixties) give us an idea of how broad that range is: 14 people attended one to three times a month; two attended 5 to 10 times a month; one attended practically daily; 22 rarely attended;
and 31 generally attended no meetings at all.

The frequency of attendance at meetings depends on many things, and though there is almost no data on the influence of various demographic variables on attendance at meetings, we would hypothesize that level of occupation, sex, and residence are three of the most important. For example, we know that managerial personnel are required to attend more meetings than unskilled workers, because their occupation demands that they be well-informed and the Party has an interest in keeping them so. Sex is important because of the great discrepancies in free time between men and women; while women may attend meetings held at their place of employment, they are less likely to spend their scarce free evening that way. Residence is important, too, because people in large cities are more accessible to more active Party organizations than residents of provincial cities. One citizen of Volgograd made the following statement to a visiting Western scholar: "In the last three years, we were called only twice to attend political gatherings." The scholar notes that in Moscow, by contrast, meetings of the inhabitants of an apartment block are far more frequent. In the country it is even easier to avoid political meetings than in the city; great distances between villages, and even among houses in the same village, make it easier to plead bad roads and lack of time.

Up until the last two or three years people attended fewer meetings than they did years at the time of Stalin's death. The extension of
The mass media has meant that people no longer have to rely on the agitator to read them the day's news: "In our eyes such forms of political education as mass newspaper reading in the lunch break have disappeared into the past. The people themselves have now developed the desire to read the newspapers daily." Having greater access to the mass media, the audience is also much more well-informed than it was in the early fifties. This means that a simple reiteration of facts or the Party line is not enough to hold the audience's attention; they have more penetrating questions about current events. The institution of the political informers who specialize in one of several areas is an attempt to meet the challenge of a more sophisticated public.

According to a well-known Western journalist who recently returned from a two-year residence in Moscow, all sorts of political meetings have been held with much greater frequency since the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee. This Plenum marked the "intensification of the ideological struggle," justified by liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia which were portrayed in the Soviet Union as "counterrevolutionary activities" and schemes of imperialists.

The dynamics of personal political persuasion is one of the areas of Soviet political socialization about which we know least. There is little information about the exact size of the audience, or how many people are reached each year via the face-to-face political network. But there is even less known about how effective that network is in terms of
persuasive power. We know something about the activity of the official opinion leaders, the agitators, propagandists, and political informers; but we know very little about the operation of informal opinion leadership. This is unlikely to be the subject of a Soviet study of information flow, since it is assumed that the Party member, being the prime source for political information and acting as the representative of the regime, is the most important opinion leader in Soviet society. However, there may be individuals with sources of influence not part of the regime's official scheme of prestige-conferral. If they exist, we will probably not learn about them from Soviet sources, and it is unlikely that in the near future non-Soviets will be allowed to do studies which may uncover such pockets of alternative influence.

A significant factor in the official personal political communications network is that at meetings the reactions of people and the remarks they make are all a matter of public record. These reactions are thus influenced by the political acuity of such individuals and their perception of their own position in the socio-political situation. The degree to which an audience member is forced to participate in a presentation has been found to have an influence on his outlook. The Soviet citizen in public meetings must pretend to be the "new man," the builder of Communism, the "ideal shock-worker," or some other acceptable model the qualities of which are well known to all, and such conformity is bound to influence his attitudes. A final aspect of the communications situation
about which we need to know more is the effect of the range within which individuals can express dissent. The extent to which a Soviet citizen who disagrees with an official communication can act out his feelings in public is quite limited. This may be an important factor in limiting the development of resistance or in determining its nature. Though all of these aspects of the social situation need basic research, it is not likely that they will be studied in the near future, or that if studied by Soviet scholars the results will be published.

Functions and Effectiveness of the System

The system of public political indoctrination performs many functions for the system, among them the institutionalization of direct contact between the Party and the masses. It provides some outlet for Soviet citizens who can focus their emotions on the ideological worker and ideally get direct and immediate answers to their questions. This personal contact is intended to provide them with a sense of participation in the society. In addition it gives the Party a crude measure of popular sentiment, for each agitator and propagandist is supposed to make note of the questions asked of him. In earlier days the system of agitation fulfilled the function of extending the scarce mass media, making sure that each person knew the current Party policy and had some knowledge, although highly selective, of what was going on in the world. With the widespread development of mass media which we have documented, face-to-face indoctrination
It is no secret that in our time, when every apartment has a radio, a television set and newspapers, many workers have lost interest in agitator-speakers. On the other hand, some enterprising agitators have taken advantage of the development of the mass media. On the collective farms of the Lipetsk region, agitators have begun to carry portable transistor radios to the fields. People gather to listen to the radio at newstime, and the broadcast is followed by a short agitation session. The agitators comment that the use of the radio relieves them of the need to inform the farmers on all subjects and allows them to concentrate their own efforts on local problems not covered in the broadcasts. Some farms have purchased a radio for every brigade.

Mass political indoctrination, especially agitation, is a traditional and uniquely Bolshevik invention. It is remarkable that the importance of the personal element in forming opinions was recognized so early by Party leaders. The role of personal influence in opinion change has been extensively studied and documented in the West in the post World War II period, and Alex Inkeles has pointed to the relevance of some of these findings for the Soviet system of agitation. We know that opinions are more stable if they are shared by a group, that work-groups, families, and the like are interpersonal communication networks through which influence flows in patterned ways, and that the leader of a group is a
strategic element in the formation of group opinions. The Bolshevik practice of choosing for agitation work a person who is known and respected in the group and who is aware of its everyday concerns and activities, works for the optimization of opinion formation and attitude change in the desired direction.

Since Inkeles' book was first written other studies have revealed other aspects of personal influence which are pertinent to the study of agitation, particularly in its present mode of competition and cooperation with mass media. Most notable among these studies is the Katz and Lazarsfeld study, _Personal Influence_. In looking at changes in voting intentions in the 1940 American presidential elections, the authors found that among those who changed their vote, most were influenced by other persons; that among these people there were "opinion leaders" who exercised a disproportionate amount of influence on their peers; and that these opinion leaders tended to be distributed throughout all occupational and social groups. In seeking to learn what influenced the opinion leaders themselves, the authors came up with the concept of the "two-step flow":

that ideas often seem to flow from radio and print to opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population. 55

Opinion leaders were found by the authors to be much higher consumers of the mass media than others.
Likewise, Soviet agitators are constantly encouraged to expose themselves to newspapers and journals, radio and television in order to be informed of events and the Party's view of them so that they can transmit this information package to others and act as a source to which people will turn for guidance. This, of course, is a planned and organized system of personal opinion leadership designed to supplement the mass media. Since the process is initiated from the top by the Party hierarchy, we certainly cannot assume that it works exactly the same way that personal leadership does in a more or less spontaneous situation such as that described by Katz and Lazarsfeld. What is interesting, however, is that the model on which the system of agitation is based seems to be almost exactly that described by Katz and Lazarsfeld in their "two-step flow" hypothesis. Lenin, the initiator of agitation in Russia, may thus be credited with an understanding of the operation of personal influence which was well ahead of his time.

Even if the answer is speculative, one must ask the question, "How effective is Soviet propaganda and agitation?" Some people are exposed a good deal, and some not at all. This may mean that those who "need" convincing from the regime's point of view are precisely those who never attend meetings, like housewives, old people, and those in rural areas.

Two areas of agitation show definite positive results, but it is not at all clear that agitation is responsible for the success. The Soviet
Union, at a great cost to its population, has made tremendous strides in economic development. Much of agitation is directed toward motivating workers to fulfill and over-fulfill their plans. On the other hand, it is clear from the recent institution of economic incentives, which stress profits and returns, that at least in the regime's view agitation alone was not successful enough in providing motivation. Perhaps the stage has come in Soviet economic and social development when talk of sacrifice, revolutionary enthusiasm, and other "crisis" propaganda does not do the trick. Agitation for voting around election time seems on the surface to have been successful; almost the entire electorate votes, and the overwhelming majority (with an infinitesimal percentage abstaining or dissenting) votes for the official slate of candidates. However, this suspiciously high civic enthusiasm may be due to any one of several other factors, among which may be complete falsification of the electoral statistics, or the coercive methods, such as occupational and residential block voting, used to get people to the polls and observe them while they cast their ballots.

David Powell has made an interesting attempt to assess the effectiveness of atheistic propaganda in the Soviet Union. He points out that in 1936 fifty-seven percent of the Soviet population was estimated to be religious; in the late 60's 58 million, or 25 percent of the population (including infants and children) were estimated to be "believers," and of these, 38.7 million were in the rural population (constituting 36 percent
of the rural population). This is a remarkably high number of religious people in a country which has been pursuing a massive program of atheistic propaganda and religious persecution for fifty years (with the exception of the fairly neutral period in World War II).

Powell discusses several reasons for this apparent failure of atheistic propaganda, and his conclusions have implications for other forms of propaganda and agitation as well. People tend to expose themselves selectively; religious people go to church, but do not attend lectures on atheism. Party workers have been repeatedly criticized for not making more of an effort to reach such people. When reached, people often appear to comply with the propagandist, but later revert to religion, if necessary joining the religious underground. Most religious people live in outlying rural areas where one seldom sees propagandists. Such people tend to live in a social environment which reinforces their beliefs: basically, they don't want to change their ideas. Finally, atheistic propaganda and agitation is too simplistic, placing too much emphasis on Soviet history, and not enough on concrete examples from everyday life. The failure to take account of various psychological factors may be a result of the simplistic model of personality formation which stresses the extreme malleability of man's nature.

Finally, Party propaganda has not been very successful in getting the Soviet population involved in "do-it-yourself" propaganda, amateur talent participation in clubs. People also continue to complain
of repetitious sloganeering and the excessive organization of their leisure time, expressing boredom and frustration. If audience research continues to develop and is extended to studies of the system of public personal political indoctrination, the overly simplistic model of personality formation we discussed in Chapter One may have to be modified, and a more sophisticated approach taken. The creation of "political informers" seems to be a crude step in that direction.
Chapter Six: Footnotes


2. In 1964-5 of 25 million students in the system of Party education, almost 80 percent were non-Party people. (Mickiewicz, Ellen P., Soviet Political Schools, New Haven, 1967, p. 10). Khrushchev's successors reversed the trend, and in the 1965-6 academic year there were only 12 million students, of whom 75 percent were members or candidates of the Party. In 1969 there are about fifteen million students.


10. Ibid.

11. Tretyakov, loc. cit.

13 KOMMUNIST, January 1966, No. 1, p. 123.

14 Tretyakov, loc. cit.


16 Tretyakov, loc. cit.


21 Lenin, op. cit., p. 68.

22 Inkeles, op. cit., p. 68.


24 PARTIINAYA ZHIZN, No. 4, 1965, p. 79.

25 SPRAVOCHNIK SEKRETARYA PERVICHNOI PARTIINOI ORGANIZAT-SII (Handbook for the Primary Party Organization Secretary), GOSPOLIT-ZDAT, Moscow, 1960, p. 496.

26 Ibid., p. 503.


29 Selivanov, op. cit., p. 94.
30 Kushner, op. cit., pp. 239 and 270.

31 Anokhina and Shmeleva, op. cit., p. 296.

32 Ibid., p. 336.


37 AGITATOR, No. 16, 1967, p. 43.

38 Kuryanov, op. cit., p. 17.


40 Kuryanov, PRAVDA, op. cit., p. 17.


43 Dorosh, Yefim, DEREVENSKIY DNEVNIK, op. cit., pp. 42-3.

44 Dimentman, loc. cit.


47 Cited by Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Opportunities for Change: Communications with the USSR," paper delivered at a workshop on Communications with the People of the USSR, Radio Liberty Committee, New York University, November 20, 1965.


53 "Transistor--Sputnik Agitatora" ("The Transistor--The Fellow Traveler of the Agitator"), PARTIINAYA ZHIZN, October 1965, No. 19, p. 80.

54 See Chapter Eight of Inkeles, Public Opinion..., op. cit.


CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SOVIET AUDIENCE -- SOME GENERALIZATIONS

The mass media in the Soviet Union have undergone a tremendous expansion since the death of Stalin; the rapid development of radio, television, newspaper and film can accurately be termed a "communications explosion." Clearly, the Soviet regime has begun to approach its goal of reaching the entire population with its political messages. At the time of Stalin’s death collective radio listening and newspaper reading were the only exposure many people had to outside information. Today most Soviet citizens have private and informal access to at least one of the mass media.

The last decade and a half has also witnessed the development of new relationships among the media, with the broadcast media assuming more and more significance because of their speed and directness. The suspension of jamming of foreign broadcasts from 1963 to 1968, together with increased tourism and exchange of publications afforded readily accessible alternative sources of information. This was a major development, for it meant that a more or less closed communications system became an open one, subject to outside influence. The domestic media responded by becoming more interesting and professional in order to keep or recapture their audiences. Of course, political restrictions impose severe limitations on the extent to which Soviet media can compete with foreign sources, but there seems little doubt that the availability of foreign
radio and journals has contributed to the improvement of the fare offered on Soviet radio and in domestic publications.

The resumption of jamming during the August, 1968, invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent increase in the level of that interference is, of course, a major policy reversal. Increased restrictions on foreign newsmen in the Soviet Union, the harsh treatment of dissidents, and the intensification of mass personal political indoctrination all point to a general tightening up which may not be relaxed for some time. On the basis of this evidence, we should anticipate at least a partial return to the monotonous ideological conformity of earlier periods, although tempered by the post-Stalin respite which has opened broader horizons and nurtured rising expectations among the members of the population. The overall reversal is an open admission that the leadership is not yet confident enough of the effectiveness of the Soviet system of political indoctrination and that it is willing to go only so far in competing with outside sources of information.

One of the most important results of the Soviet communications explosion is just beginning to become clear: this is the increased privatization of mass media exposure. During the early post-Stalin years collective radio listening and collective television watching were the rule. People gathered in a club to listen to a play or lecture on radio and then were led in a discussion of the program by the local Party agitator. Today many people, especially those living in cities, have access to private sets and
can choose their own programs, watching them in the company of friends and relatives. This means that they can choose not to listen to certain programs, and that if they do listen their reactions can be expressed openly or left to jell at a later time. People can turn off sets and avoid reading newspapers if they find them boring, especially if they have foreign sources to compare them with. Obviously, the development of a mere technical apparatus will not be enough to get the regime's message across if this continues to be a predominant pattern.

As far as sheer volume is concerned, Soviet people seem saturated with newspapers. They complain that the papers arrive late, but they do not ask for more. They are still pressured into subscribing to journals which they find dull and useless except for wrapping paper. Radio and television, on the other hand, are increasingly used as sources for all kinds of information and entertainment. Moreover, they are symbols of modernity, and people want more of them. Muscovites as well as Vladivostokians carry around transistor radios as if they were wearing the latest Paris fashions, and those who have no television sets crave them. Those who do own sets seem basically satisfied, though they find the medium a bit under par in certain areas. Even though officially Soviet television was conceived of as an instrument of education, the audience has regarded it primarily as a source of entertainment. This has led in turn to a dissatisfaction with content, especially in entertainment type programs. Soviet people also wish there were more movies, and think there should
be more variety in the repertoire available. Even so, they have one of the world's highest rates of film attendance.

An upsurge in sociological investigation combined with a growing professionalization of journalism has created new opportunities for the Soviet audience to make its tastes known, if not felt. A multitude of leisure time studies and a growing number of audience research projects have begun to open up vital channels of feedback. No longer does the regime rely on readers' conferences, worker correspondents and letters from workers to learn how the audience is reacting. The interesting thing is that, unconsulted for decades about its preferences, the Soviet audience is at no loss for words to articulate its frustrations and desires. It cries out for entertainment, for variety in news and other fare, and it complains about overorganized leisure when fifteen years ago it would have thought such an amount of leisure time a fantasy. This opportunity to express its grievances may have the effect of sharpening them in the audience's minds; it may also impart a certain legitimacy to these complaints. For this reason, we may expect that if jamming continues and the media become more conservative, such probes of the audience will cease.

Soviet studies of audience behavior have certain shortcomings from our point of view. The problems stem mainly from the influence of ideology, which determines the form of the studies, the categories used, and the specific questions asked of respondents. Often these categories make
basic assumptions which should be the subject of scholarly work on communications behavior. For example, the data from Soviet research reports rarely include any information which would allow an evaluation of the audience's attitude to the source, in other words to the regime itself. Instead the assumption is made that all people support the system, at least tacitly. If this is not so, then Soviet sociologists are not willing to take the responsibility of pointing it out. From the literature of mass media we know that the audience's image of the source does indeed affect credibility; it has an impact on how the audience will treat the communications sent out. Information is also lacking on other aspects of the communications situation which have been found to be influential, for example group orientation of the audience members. In the Soviet Union group membership is usually assumed to be highly important. Much of early social training is in fact directed toward the goal of making individuals sensitive to group sanctions. For certain people, however, this training may be less effective than assumed and the group membership less salient than some other factor. Again, this is a politically sensitive issue, and one which Soviet social scientists have avoided.

The Effects of Sex and Marriage

The average Soviet man is likely to have more time for exposure to communications than his wife or sister. He has anywhere from three and a half to five hours free time a day. Of this he spends about an hour a day...
reading, about twice as much as does his wife. Half of this time is spent on newspapers and magazines, and half on books. After marriage the Soviet man spends more time on periodicals but less time on literature. In literature he prefers fiction, adventure, military history, science fiction, technical subjects, art, history and travel. He watches television more than his fellow citizens, especially after marriage. His radio listening is less than that of the Soviet woman and this again is accentuated by marriage, when radio-listening time goes down. The average Soviet man is about as likely as his wife to attend movies, but much more likely to participate in amateur talent groups.

Soviet women have little free time. Because most of them have jobs and then work a "second shift" in housework each day, they have only about an hour and a half to three and a half hours per day to themselves. The Soviet woman devotes about 30 to 40 minutes to reading each day; she reads more after marriage, especially newspapers and magazines. In books she prefers literary subjects, fiction and criticism, and likes classics, contemporary Soviet fiction, foreign fiction, and socio-political affairs. She listens to the radio more than the typical male, because it is easy to combine with household duties. She devotes less time to television than the Soviet man, but likes going out to the movies as much as her husband. She is less likely to attend political meetings, especially if she lives in a rural area.
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The Effect of Age

Young people in Soviet society are fairly high media consumers. Age has different effects depending on the media involved, but generally there is a low period of activity in the late twenties or thirties, the time when responsibilities of family and career are beginning to weigh most heavily. After this, there is a slight rise in communications use, and older people after retirement age tend to expose themselves somewhat more than those who are middle-aged. This is a refinement of the Harvard project results, which showed that there was a slight tendency for older people to be less exposed to mass communications.² We found that reading tapers off until middle age, and then it begins to rise slightly between 40 and 60; it is difficult to tell exactly when this period occurs, because of the age categories used by the various Soviet studies. Beliaev reports that people spend more time on radio and television together as they grow older. Grushin, on the other hand, found the pattern to be the same as for reading: there is a low point in radio exposure in the 31-40 age group and in television in the 26-29 age group, and then a rise in middle age to older people. In the Firsov study, older people were more likely to be in the television viewing types with heavy exposure. Grushin reports that movie attendance declines after age 30, but rises slightly later; Beliaev reports a steady decrease with age. The Sverdlovsk study reported that many people over 55 went to the movies frequently (55.7 percent) and that these frequent movie-goers increased in number after
the introduction of television (72.7 percent of this age group).

The age pattern of communications behavior described here is clearly related to the life cycle of the individual. In late adolescence and young adulthood, he consciously exposes himself to many types of communication and cultural activities; this is the way by which an individual learns about the world and his place in it. After the termination of formal education this exposure continues up to the time the young adult begins to "settle down," i.e., marry and raise a family. This process almost always involves a reduction in time spent outside the home. The individual spends more time with his family, particularly with children, and this reduces both exposure to outside cultural productions and participation in collective and civic activities. It increases exposure to television. As the children grow up and begin to spend more time outside the home (thus beginning the cycle for themselves) the middle-aged parents continue to spend time at home, but increase the time spent on passive forms of leisure activity, such as reading, radio, television.

The Effects of Political Involvement

The Harvard project found that Party members are the most likely to be exposed to movies; the hypothesis of the authors was that these people identify most with the message and actors. In contrast, our findings indicate that Party people are now the most exposed to reading matter
and broadcasting media compared to Komsomol members and non-Party people, but that they are least likely to be exposed to movies. Komsomol members are found to read literature most, while non-Party people are likely to attend movies most. This pattern suggests that Party people are the highest consumers of media carrying official news and political interpretation. However, they are not the highest consumers of "aesthetic official" media, such as film. Party and Komsomol members are, of course, much more likely to attend political meetings than non-Party people, other demographic variables held constant.

The Effects of Occupation

Workers are officially considered the most progressive group in socialist society. Therefore, they should theoretically be exemplary in their communications behavior. We find that this is not always the case. All studies report that workers read less than higher skill groups, with the possible exception of fictional literature. They read more as education and income go up. The time spent on broadcast media varies; radio listening increases with skill level, meaning that unskilled workers listen least. Workers seem to have a fairly high exposure to television in comparison with other groups; they are most likely to constitute the majority of viewers in high exposure groups as reported by Firsov, and they watch television less than the technical intelligentsia, but more than other occupational groups. Information on film attendance is contradictory
and inconclusive. The communications behavior of workers is "exemplary" only with regard to television watching and the reading of literature.

The most isolated group in the population seems to be housewives. They read newspapers and magazines least, and books next to least. Their radio exposure is the second highest of all occupational groups, however, and this is probably due to the reason we mentioned, the fact that radio listening can be combined with housework. Housewives have a medium exposure to television and are very low on theater and film attendance. They probably attend meetings less than any other group. Because most Soviet women work, however, housewives constitute a fairly small segment of the population.

The Effects of Residence

One of the most important variables affecting communications behavior in the Soviet Union is residence. An urbanite is much more exposed to television, has more access to a greater variety of movies, and is slightly more exposed to newspapers, magazines, and perhaps radio, than his rural cousin. The rhythm of agricultural work and the difficulties of rural life combine to produce a great discrepancy in the cultural life of city and village. Rural people can expose themselves more easily to films and books in the summer because transportation is easiest at this time of year; but this is their busiest season, and they have little
time for entertainment. In winter, when leisure time is at its maximum in the countryside, the farmer is isolated. The rural housewife is by far the most deprived demographic type in the Soviet population: her heavy burden of household chores, work on the private plot, and lack of amenities make her dependent on the radio for news and entertainment more than any other person in her family.

The Weekly Cycle

Soviet people increase their exposure to virtually all mass media on their day off in comparison with weekdays. This is important to know, since workers have recently had their schedules changed, giving them two continuous free days a week instead of one. This means that their working day is a little longer during the week, so that their exposure to mass media on weekdays may decrease. It means that they will have even more time for relaxing and exposing themselves to media on the weekend. The effect of this change on media habits will be interesting to watch. The activities to which people do not devote more time on the day off are political study, amateur talent group participation, and the fulfillment of civic obligations, because these are related to the occupational setting. What will happen to these activities, which are usually confined to weekdays, when the time available on weekdays is less? Either the time spent on these activities will decrease, or people will have to shift such participation to their days off. The latter course will no doubt be preferable in
the eyes of the regime, but people may resent these encroachments on
their leisure time even more. Because many political meetings are held
at the place of work, it will be difficult to generate attendance on the
weekend.

Attitudes Toward Content of Media

From the audience surveys some attitudes of Soviet people about
the mass media and the fare offered have become clear. In the newspaper
people like to read Party resolutions and economic news least; yet these
two items are precisely the areas of content which dominate the Soviet
press. Topics which are least treated by the press, such as crime, acci-
dents, and practical information are most popular with readers. Moral
questions and international news are also more popular than the space
devoted to them would indicate; these include moral questions and inter-
national news.

Soviet people seem to rely on the radio and newspapers for news, and are critical of television news broadcasts, especially of dullness and
lack of candor in reporting foreign news. We don’t know whether they
would make the same comments about radio news and newspaper informa-
tion, but they seem at least to prefer these media to television as an in-
formation source. Television is considered by the Soviet audience to be
an entertainment medium; this is interesting because the regime has
never advertised it as such, but on the contrary has tried to make it the
most didactic of all media. Only in the face of criticism has the state made an attempt to improve programming in the direction of increasing the variety and entertainment value. Though movies and plays are popular on television, people usually will not wait the month or two before a new film is shown on television but will go to see it in a movie theater. This suggests that there is still a serious lack of variety in film repertoire, and that people are eager to see each new film as soon as possible. Conversation in the Soviet Union is characterized by a great amount of attention to a small range of films and plays, in contrast to the steady bombardment of variety characteristic of Western entertainment and aesthetic media. Very little time goes by in the Soviet Union before a new film or play is seen by most people interested in it.

Reliance on Private Communication

There is a secondary aspect of Soviet mass media usage which bears mentioning. The heavily politicized and controlled nature of the public channels of communication make it necessary to rely on private sources for political and other kinds of news. This introduces a pattern of communications behavior which is atypical of modern industrial nations with well-developed systems for the transfer of information. We know from the Harvard project that word-of-mouth was one of the most important sources of information in the Soviet Union during the 1940's; intellectuals used it mainly to supplement media and peasants used it as a substitute
Today there are still certain kinds of information for which people rely on private conversation. This includes news about available goods, descriptive details on accidents and natural disasters, human interest stories, and, most important from the standpoint of political socialization, news about political events and intrigues.

The most information a Soviet citizen is likely to get from the mass media about leadership changes and power struggles is an *ex post facto* announcement that "so-and-so has been relieved of his duties and transferred to important work elsewhere." Such an announcement must be read with care; this one in particular usually means that the person has been fired and either sent to jail or exiled to become director of some obscure factory, or perhaps "kicked upstairs." All details about political happenings must be filled in by word-of-mouth. The source for this oral network is often foreign radio. Sometimes the Party circulates an explanation through its membership ranks, with the expectation that the information will be disseminated via the word-of-mouth system. Such was the case with the ouster of Khrushchev. A letter was circulated among Party organizations listing the reasons for Khrushchev's ouster, and this information was passed on to the general population. The accuracy of such a transmission is probably very high. This particular letter, for example, was described to the author by at least three different Soviet citizens who were apparently unacquainted with each other, and there was very little variation among the accounts. In the ComCom interviews more
people cited conversation as "most reliable source" for political news than they did any of the Soviet mass media, in spite of the fact that they received less news this way than from media. Meetings are often held during crisis situations to present the official explanation to key individuals in a community; these people are then expected to disseminate the information orally. The seemingly deliberate use of the word-of-mouth network by the regime to disseminate its official version of a story would indicate that the regime considers word-of-mouth to be a highly credible source among the members of the population. Indeed, we know from rumor studies that while in a laboratory situation messages passed along orally are often distorted, in real life this is not so; people for whom the message is cloudy or has low salience will not pass it on. The lack of alternative sources in the Soviet Union for some types of information, plus the long experience with word-of-mouth as a source, has made people very adept at using this unofficial channel of communication quite efficiently. People in the Harvard project, particularly the intellectuals, reported a high degree of trust in word-of-mouth. I would conjecture that this is still the case today. The recent writers' trials in the Soviet Union, beginning with the arrest of Sinyavskiy and Danil in the Fall of 1965 and continuing until the present, are a good example of the sort of event on which word-of-mouth is almost the only information source. Although the Soviet mass media made only terse announcements and a few denunciatory statements on these cases, many Soviet people seem to be well acquainted with
the cases, and were disturbed enough about them to protest by appearing at the trials, writing letters to newspapers, and conducting meetings in support of the writers. A collective farm chairman in Latvia who had been cited in 1964 by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA for his work, wrote to Suslov complaining about the trials and the harm they are doing to the society and the Party; his statement gives some indication of the extent to which official silence on such matters stimulates the passage of information by word-of-mouth:

I live in the provinces where, for every electrified home there are ten unelectrified, where in winter the buses can't get through, and the mail is late by whole weeks. If information has reached us on the broadest scale you can well imagine what you have done, what kinds of seeds you have sown throughout the country.  

Oral messages are also used to supplement other kinds of topics, from foreign news to local events. A story by Valentin Ovechkin recounts the following scene:

"Tell us, Pyotr Illarionovich, if it isn't secret," asked Vasiliy, "what was Borsov sacked for?"

"You've read it in the paper," replied Martynov, putting on his coat.

"Yes, but the paper only said 'for suppression of criticism.'"

"For suppression of criticism," nodded Martynov.

"We've heard that some Communist at a Party meeting spoke up against him and Borsov is supposed to have phoned the militia the next day, 'Haven't you got anything on this fellow? No matter how remote? If not, get something moving.'"

"Something like that did happen."
Conclusions

Clearly the Soviet audience member is in some ways similar to his Western counterpart, and in some ways very different. He reads a good deal, likes to go to movies, finds television a great source of entertainment, and tends to stay home more with passive amusements after marriage. In these aspects and others he is not terribly unusual. There are, however, peculiar features of his environment which tend to produce in him behavior not considered usual in modern, industrialized nations with highly developed communications facilities. These features stem from the nature of the Soviet political system.

A major factor in Soviet communications is the heavy politicization and censorship in all forms of mass media. This makes it necessary for the audience to develop a facility for "reading between the lines," and for seeking extra-official sources of information. He is forced to attend political meetings and display exemplary behavior at them. He uses word-of-mouth communications for some types of news almost as much as a member of a traditional society—to learn what's where and who's who. It also means that his attention is focused upon a relatively narrow range of topics, and these topics are discussed repeatedly and thoroughly. While the Soviet communications environment is coercive and constrictive, there are clearly signs that the audience member has not been forced into the official mold. Though television is supposed to teach him, he looks at it as a means of entertainment, and finds it dull and disappointing; he
doesn't hesitate to make this clear when asked. Although exhorted and encouraged *ad nauseum* to join in amateur talent groups, he resists; he might be forced to attend such things, but is unwilling to involve himself actively. He complains of the overorganization of his free time, and pleads for time and space for reflection and informal social life. Furthermore, Soviet workers, who are supposed to be the progressive models on which the future communist society is to be based, are not the paragons of cultural and political involvement the regime would like, at least not as evidenced by their use of the mass media; they, like workers in the West, prefer light entertainment and television after a hard day's work. Finally, it is abundantly clear that human beings have a need for information, and they seek out clandestine and extra-official sources when they feel they are being denied it. All of these signs are hopeful. They do not necessarily mean that the system is in trouble or that the regime will inevitably open up channels of communication more and more; in fact, the present trend is in the opposite direction. However, they do indicate that there is a limit to the malleability of man as a social being, and that he is inclined to be flexible under pressure.

In short, there are some ways in which Soviet mass media and propaganda apparatus have been very successful agents of political socialization, but there are indications that this success is limited. They do expose most people to the important political messages, and people do like to watch television, read the newspaper, and listen to radio. Further-
more, there are indications that Soviets basically do not question the legitimacy of the regime and most of its political messages. However, people are dissatisfied with the dull, uninteresting form in which political information is presented to them, and they resent the lack of candor and simplistic interpretations in news broadcasts. Although the media are viewed officially as instruments of political education, the audience does not accept this function; they see the media as sources of diversion and enlightenment, and are dissatisfied with the fare offered. They are much more interested in non-political information, such as practical tips and human interest, than the space devoted to these topics in the media would indicate; in turn, political and economic information is nowhere close to being as important to the audience as the regime would like. When given a chance, the Soviet audience will turn to foreign media for entertainment and information.
Chapter Seven: Footnotes


3 Rossi and Bauer, *op. cit.*


5 In an analysis of responses from 62-65 ComCom interviews, Rosemarie Rogers also found newspapers and radio were considered the most important news sources: "Either medium was frequently cited as the medium that covered the news most completely, while in our respondents' perceptions the radio is practically without a rival with regard to speed of news coverage" (p. 131). Mrs. Rogers' respondents also mentioned that the radio brought more sensitive news sometimes. Rogers, R., *The Soviet Audience: How It Uses the Media*, Doctoral dissertation, M.I.T., June 1967.

6 Rogers also found that television was rarely mentioned in connection with either completeness or speed of news coverage (p. 137) and that respondents who had access to television cited it as the "most entertaining" medium (p. 141). Ibid.

7 Inkeles and Bauer, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII.

8 Among 71 of the ComCom respondents (tabulated by Maureen Shea):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Most News</th>
<th>Most Reliable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet newspaper</td>
<td>47 people</td>
<td>10 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mentioned it</td>
<td>mentioned it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet radio</td>
<td>42 people</td>
<td>7 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign radio</td>
<td>8 people</td>
<td>31 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation</td>
<td>11 people</td>
<td>12 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only foreign radio is considered more reliable for political news, though the Soviet media provide a greater volume of news. Among these respondents more turned to foreign radio and word-of-mouth information than to Soviet media for more news in a crisis situation.

10 THE SOVIET CITIZEN, op. cit., Chapter VII.


CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

Several important questions remain to be answered in concluding our discussion of post-Stalin developments in the mass media and propaganda apparatus. How has the relationship between these two public systems of communication changed during this period? What can be said about their relationship to other agents of adult political socialization? Has the over-all system of political indoctrination been strengthened by the mass media? What are the dysfunctional aspects, if any, of post-Stalin developments in these areas? And, finally, what can we say about the nature of the Soviet political system and its recent development on the basis of this study?

Clearly the relationship between the mass media and the agitation-propaganda apparatus has undergone important changes during the years since Stalin died. From the early days of Soviet power through the post-World War Two period, agitation and propaganda served two main purposes for the regime: they extended the coverage of the sparse media network, carrying the regime's political messages to more people than would have been possible by electronic or mechanical means alone; and they supplemented the impersonal media with face-to-face personal contacts between political activists and the rest of the population. The necessity for the first function has practically disappeared in most areas of the Soviet Union, and the resulting decline in personal contacts has under-
mined the system of official influence. People no longer feel such a need to look to the agitator or propagandist for information; they can hear it on the radio or read it in the newspaper. Most of the time what they can't learn from the mass media they can find out only via the informal word-of-mouth network, not from the Party official. Moreover, the Soviet audience, as it becomes more informed and more sophisticated, has less need to rely on official representatives for interpretation of the news; they have learned how to "read between the lines" and understand the meaning of current Party policy for themselves. Only in times of crisis, when sensitive information is not transmitted by official public media, are people highly motivated to attend political meetings. This means that the propagandist or agitator has less and less frequent opportunity to intervene with official personal opinion leadership. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, however, the Party has shown active concern about the decline of personal agitation and propaganda. For the present, at least, there seems to be a policy of restricting access to external sources of interpretation and information (e.g., jamming of foreign radio, discouraging contacts with foreigners, etc.) and intensifying contacts between political activists (propagandists, political informers, and agitators) and the population.

Clearly the mass media are the main agents of adult political socialization in the Soviet Union today. They focus the audience's attention on certain people and events, and the prestige thus conferred is little chal-
lenged by other agents. However, the still somewhat narrow use of the media forces people to rely on an informal rumor network to an extent which is unusual in modern industrial nations. This increases the credibility of word-of-mouth information, and strengthens the capacity of extra-official sources as competitive agents of political socialization. People turn to their family and friends for details, for speculation and interpretation, although the regime continues to claim itself as the sole possessor of the truth. A somewhat simplistic model of human personality causes the regime to overlook the fact that people are never satisfied with dull, half-truths, and that the more sophisticated the audience becomes, the more dissatisfied it will be with distortions and omissions.

The Soviet audience's exposure to Western media, which are not conceived of primarily as agents of political socialization, has focused its attention on new issues and increased its critical ability. This in turn has placed the Soviet media on the defensive, causing a conflict between their official role as agents of political indoctrination and that imposed by the audience as general sources of information and entertainment. For a while it seemed as if competition would ultimately force the Soviet media out of their narrowly defined official role, but the cutback on access to foreign media in 1968 has indicated that the Soviet leadership will go only so far in accommodating itself to audience demands.

The post-Stalin period has been characterized by a lessening of obvious uses of coercion. If we think of political socialization and coercion
as reciprocal mechanisms for producing the desired citizen behavior, then we can conclude that for most of the post-Stalin period "coercive persuasion" has had the upper hand. Again, however, our conclusions here should be cautious, for the mechanisms of coercion are still kept well-oiled, and seem to be more and more frequently used against certain groups in the population (most notably dissident intellectuals). Since Western access to Soviet information is also decreasing at present, it is difficult to know how far the use of coercion has been revived. What is certain is that it has been by no means discredited as a political weapon within the Soviet leadership.

Has the over-all effectiveness of the Soviet program of political indoctrination been strengthened by the developments we have discussed in this study? The answer must be yes, but with major qualification. The sheer growth of the media has accomplished a primary goal: to reach every Soviet citizen. No other agent has the capacity to do this so efficiently and so completely. Moreover, the very fact of the existence and tremendous development of the mass media identifies the Soviet Union as a modern nation, and this contributes to the regime's legitimacy. In addition, it is clear that the regime has shown increasing sophistication in the use of the mass media and propaganda. The media in form and content are more attractive than they have ever been. They speak to more specific groups in the population through popular programs and publications. Soviet media personnel are at long last beginning to study their audience. They
have accepted the fact that modern Western psychology and sociology have something to offer them in increasing the effectiveness of political socialization via the public channels. And finally, the regime has realized that a more informed and sophisticated audience calls for better prepared and more specialized propagandists; the creation of "political informers" is an attempt to provide them.

The three main features of Soviet political socialization mentioned in Chapter One seem to have been enhanced by the development of the mass media. Certainly political messages are more visible, their scope of penetration has broadened, and the media have the potential for increasing consistency among the various official agents of political socialization. Softening the effects of these three features is the fact that foreign information sources and the rumor network are strengthened by the continued narrow, dull focus of the Soviet official media.

We must, then, be somewhat reserved in our generally positive assessment of the changed role of the Soviet media. There has been a certain irony in their expansion, for example. The regime has come more and more to rely on them as agents of political socialization. As accessibility to the media has increased, exposure has become more and more privatized. The artificially supportive context of earlier days, collective listening and the agitator who guided discussions after programs or newspaper readings, has gradually begun to disappear. As people have less and less contact with officials who try to guide their exposure
patterns and reactions, they become somewhat freer in their choices regarding the media. Liberated from official scrutiny, people can now more easily choose not to expose themselves to media, and they can react to political messages in private or in the company of trusted friends. Such interpersonal support is an important condition for resisting and supplementing official interpretations. A second possible dysfunctional effect of the mass media comes from their capacity to penetrate the population so rapidly with news. When fewer people were informed of events, sudden changes in the Party line were not as noticeable. Today, when everyone hears that General de Gaulle's regime is one of "personal power" and tomorrow that he is a great ally of the Soviet Union, a certain amount of confusion or cynicism must be produced. Such discontinuities cannot help but undermine the over-all effect of Soviet political socialization.

Last, but certainly not least from the regime's point of view, the more attractive package in which political socialization is put out (the more varied and interesting form and content of the media) may have its own distracting effect. Since the Soviet population is so starved for information and variety, the sugar-coating on the pill of political indoctrination may in fact be stealing the audience's attention. This could be creating a revolution of rising expectations, leading to greater frustration if long hoped-for improvements are not forthcoming.

An important question about the future effectiveness of Soviet mass political indoctrination is raised by the results of some of the audience
research projects. They show that the Soviet population, far from being a passive receiver of political influence, has certain needs and demands of which the regime has either been unaware, or which it has refused to take into account. It does not accept the media as teachers but as sources of information and diversion. It is saturated with material on politics and economics, and wants more human interest, practical information, and entertainment. Most disturbing to the regime, it seeks these from foreign media when given the opportunity. In short, the Soviet view of personality formation and development has serious shortcomings, and must be revised if political socialization via public communication channels is to be more effective. If Soviet communicators continue to disregard obvious factors in audience psychology, they will at best go on reaping the same criticisms and frustrations that face them now.

Finally, what conclusions can we draw about the evolving nature of the Soviet political system on the basis of our analysis of mass media and propaganda? The greater reliance on persuasion as opposed to coercion, and the more open and varied style of public communication after Stalin's death have suggested to many people that the Soviet Union is moving toward a democratic, pluralistic type of political community. Richard Lowenthal has listed the following in his discussion of the characteristics of totalitarian single party states:

...the monopolistic control of all channels of public communications, from the press and other mass media to all forms of education, of literature and art, with the aim not merely of
preventing the expression of hostile or undesirable opinions by a kind of censorship, but of controlling the formation of opinion at the source by the planned selection of all the elements of information.²

This is an adequate description of the Soviet communications environment at the time of Stalin's death. In this sense, then, we can call Stalin's regime at that time "totalitarian." In another aspect, too, the Soviet regime at that time was fully totalitarian: it strove for total politicization of the individual citizen's life. A large share of this effort was born by the mass media and propaganda apparatus. The word "totalitarian," of course, has the word "total" as its root and this has an absolute sound. But even in Stalin's day, the characteristics of totalitarianism were never completely achieved, but only aspired to by the regime. There were people then who by-passed the official system of communication, who listened to foreign radio, and who held and expressed politically unacceptable opinions. There were also many who managed to avoid the regime's vigorous efforts to politicize daily life, for there simply were not enough facilities to reach every Soviet individual.

From 1953 to the present, the situation has changed considerably. Because of increased tourism and scholarly exchanges, as well as a five-year hiatus in the jamming of foreign broadcasts, there are some alternative sources of information for many Soviet citizens. They need not rely wholly on official media. However, there is no sign that the still characteristic total monopoly over all domestic media will change; quite the
opposite appears to be the current trend. And far from relaxing its efforts at political socialization, the regime has increased them, claiming as justification that the Soviet system is now entering a period of intensified ideological struggle. In no real sense, then, can we conclude from our analysis that the Soviet system is aspiring or evolving toward anything like a modern pluralistic industrial nation. The political realities and resultant communications policies, as well as the citizen behavior they produce, are too atypical. The question one must ask in assessing the changes of the last decade and a half is "Do they alter the basic character of the political system?" In this author's view, the events of the last few years, in particular the increased use of coercion, the cutback on foreign sources of information for the Soviet population, and the decreased access to information on Soviet life by foreign journalists, indicate that it is too soon to start pounding the nails into the coffin of Soviet totalitarianism. The Soviet system can best be described as an "enlightened" totalitarianism, which yields some concessions and relies on persuasion where feasible, but which, when it perceives itself as seriously challenged, will ultimately rely on force. Although a freer exchange of ideas and an increased flexibility in the role of public channels of information may eventually lead to an erosion of the totalitarian mode of government, the present Soviet leaders have amply demonstrated that they have no inclination to let matters progress that far. There will in all probability be no return to full-blown Stalinism, but there is a definite move toward more orthodox
forms of political socialization and a more cautious use of public channels of communication in carrying out that program. On the basis of recent developments against the background of the last fifteen or sixteen years, we can only conclude that the Soviet system at present is merely a more sophisticated totalitarian society than had generally been supposed.
Chapter Eight  Footnotes

1 Implying that there is little alternative to the acceptance of the "persuader's" ideas.

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