MODERNIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND NATION BUILDING

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There are few questions relating to contemporary public affairs more puzzling, and more fundamentally disturbing, than that of whether Western political forms and ideals are appropriate or even relevant for the new states. The most ardent believer in Western liberal democracy is likely to hesitate and even qualify his faith when considering the extent to which representative institutions and the democratic ethos are exportable to the underdeveloped portions of the world. And on the other side, statesmen and intellectuals in the transitional societies demonstrate in countless ways their unsureness of how complete their commitment to democratic practices should be, given the problem of their societies.

These questions and doubts were rarely openly expressed a decade and a half ago when Southeast Asia was serving as the first proving grounds for the transferral of power from colonial to national hands. Since then the spirit of optimism which accompanies the birth of new nations is to be found in modified form mainly in Africa; in Southeast Asia the passing of time has raised the level of uncertainty and
perplexity, if not pessimism. The record clearly shows that
the ending of the colonial epoch set into motion great ex-
pectations but little performance. In the meantime, latent
doubts and anxieties have gradually come to the fore, and
now the regions seem to be in the profound grip of uncertainty.

Both outside observers and those who would be the spokes-
men of these underdeveloped countries seem to have disturbingly
little confidence as to what should be the content of political
development. There is little sense as to what should be
taken as realistic standards of national performance for
transitional peoples. If the early expectations were ex-
aggerated, what now would constitute more appropriate aspira-
tions? Since the leaders in the region are unable to define
the bounds of realistic achievement standards and of appro-
priate political norms, public life in some of the countries
seems to be surrounded in a cloud of excessive hypocrisy,
alibies, and pretensions. Yet it is impossible to tell where
the line between rationalizations and legitimate justifications
should run as long as there is universal uncertainty as to
the nature of the nation-building process.

At what pace should a society be able to develop competence
in the management of modern institutions of government? Is
there in the political realm a discernible dynamic process of
national development which might serve to guide expectations about the development of particular countries? What sequence of trends can be expected in transitional societies? What interpretations should be placed on such tendencies as the emergence of authoritarian practices and of military rule? The rate at which significant questions can pile up begging for answers suggests the degree to which we lack crucial knowledge about the processes of political development.

Some Theoretical Considerations

Intellectually the new states of the underdeveloped areas present a major challenge to Western theorists. There is no question that contemporary political science was not adequately prepared to deal with the problems of political development and nation building. The tremendous advances of recent years in American political science have generally followed upon the trend of pushing behind the legal structures and the formal institutions of government and of taking hard looks at the realities of political life. The picture of American politics which has emerged from the vigorous studies of the clash of parties and interest groups and of the dynamics of voting behavior have been only of marginal value in providing useful conceptualization about the nature of political development. Indeed, in a very fundamental sense the model
which has emerged out of this tradition of empirical study of the American political process has been misleading when applied to most of the new states. For the American scene it is appropriate to conceive of government structures as representing the institutionalization of fundamental cultural and historical patterns of behavior, and to assume further that the dynamics of the political process consists of pressures and forces emerging from the broad social and economic bases of the country, contending with each other, and striving to shape policy and influence the course of government. Thus in a sense the "in-puts" of the system come from the society at large while the "out-puts" are in the form of governmental policies. Changes in policy outputs alter the condition of social life, and produce equilibrium adjustments until new pressures emerge calling for new policies.

In very crude terms this has been the model which has proved so useful in understanding the American political process. It is, however, unfortunately of little relevance for many of the new countries. For in these systems the source of dynamic change often resides largely within the formal structures of government, which do not represent the institutionalization of indigenous cultural patterns but rather foreign importations. Thus although much of recent
work on the American political process is of value in sensitizing scholars to the importance of informal and general social patterns of behavior, the basic model for analysis has not been too helpful in advancing our understanding of the processes of political development and nation building.

Unfortunately, if we turn to the field of comparative politics we still do not find much help in the problem of a theory of political development. Until very recently the emphasis in comparative government was on analyzing the existing structures and practices of the major European governments, with possibly some attention to one or more of the leading Asian nations. The traditional strength of comparative politics did not, however, lie in either explicit comparative analysis nor in explaining patterns of development and change. In recent years there has been a significant revitalization of the field as a result of the compelling need to incorporate into the study of comparative politics the experiences of the newly-independent countries. This series of lectures is a part of this upsurge of interest in the place of the non-Western world in the study of man's experiences with political systems.

Theoretical concern with the new countries has taken many forms depending upon the interests and intellectual styles of
the analysts. Nearly every approach, however, has either implicitly or explicitly had to deal with the problem of categorizing and classifying types of political systems. The need to establish even the most elementary typologies stemmed from the fact that there were, first, such manifest differences between the European political systems of transitional comparative politics and the new systems of the underdeveloped regions, and, second, far too many new systems to be treated on an individual basis. As long as study centered on a handful of systems of the same cultural areas it was possible, and indeed advantageous, to concentrate on the qualities of the particular systems and to avoid generalized categories.

Once attention was extended to the new states, it immediately became apparent that discussion could be facilitated by distinguishing between at a minimum the Western and the non-Western types of systems. Closer analysis soon revealed that it was important to distinguish among various types of non-Western systems, for that category clearly includes countries at quite different stages of development. At the same time the increase in the total universe of political systems being studied made us more appreciative of significant differences among the European or Western systems, and
thus there has been a greater need to differentiate among the separate systems with this category.

The sum effect has been an increasing interest in arriving at typologies of all political systems, but a decline in satisfaction with the simple dichotomous scheme. The basic trend seems to be in the direction of an ever-heightening appreciation of the unique and particularistic qualities of each transitional system, a trend which has been encouraged by the very strong sense of cultural relativism basic to the outlook of the contemporary generation of American social scientists. The fundamental problem at the moment which seems to be holding up the advancement of theory is our uncertainty over what should be the appropriate general principles for differentiating and classifying political systems. The difficulty is not that we lack rigorously defined criteria for building our typologies, but we seem to be completely unsure of what will prove to be the most rewarding bases for classification.

In the main it can be said that we are still at the stage of trying to classify systems as they exist at the moment. The purpose of such efforts, of course, is to relate similar types of political systems so that only increased understanding of the operations of one system will readily lead to insights about the probable nature of similar ones.
We are unfortunately not yet in the position to establish developmental typologies through which we would be able to hypothesize about how societies are likely to move from one category to another. This is the problem of the difference between static and dynamic analysis which is so crucial in dealing with questions of political development.

Recently there has been increasingly widespread dissatisfaction over the stress in the social sciences of static rather than dynamic modes of analysis. There are some very profound methodological reasons why dynamic theories have tended to remain at an extremely elementary state which need not concern us here. It is possibly more significant that certain intellectual uncertainties and ambivalences which spring from the realm of mood and sentiment seem to have been important handicaps to the development of dynamic theories about how political systems are likely to change. There has been, above all, in this field of classifying transitional political systems a peculiarly intense struggle in the universal conflict between the particular and the general, between unique experience and law-like behavior patterns. This is because this universal problem easily spills over into the conflict between the spirit of cultural relativism and the instinct for believing in progress and evolution.
Cultural relativism rests upon the imperative that all cultures must be respected for their uniqueness and their integrity. A recognition of the importance of the distinctive characteristics of each culture makes it difficult to classify systems according to limited categories, and particularly in terms of patterns of changes and degrees of development. In a very fundamental sense modern social science has been endeavoring over the past few decades to escape from any intellectual association with the Victorian views about progress and social evolution. Yet suddenly now we find that the conditions of the new countries compels us to return again to that old question and to ask ourselves anew whether there are any general laws of social change and political development. We find now that we never really resolved the issues; we only pushed them out of mind.

To appreciate the problem of social evolution vs cultural relativism it is necessary first to examine very briefly some of the basic assumptions commonly employed in the social sciences in conceptualizing social change.

Social Roles and Social Change

One of the great difficulties in attempting to explain social change and, more specifically, how changes in one sphere of life are likely to affect the other spheres of the
society is that we are quickly confronted with questions that have been largely ignored by the social sciences because they do not fall readily within the conventional scope of any of the established disciplines. For example, we do not have adequate knowledge to define with any confidence the relationship between changes in the pattern of economic behavior and changes in political behavior. Given our current state of knowledge, it is impossible to assign any meaningful priorities of importance to developments in one sphere of life against those in the other spheres. Even less are we sure whether particular modes of behavior are likely to be communicated from one sphere to another. Is the impact of certain more secular and more rational forms of organized activities, whether they be political, economic, or social, likely to produce congruent developments in all the dimensions of the society it affects? Or is it more likely that the introduction of new practices in one field may release counter-forces in other aspects of the society? What are the necessary conditions to encourage the one rather than the other?

Possibly one of the reasons why social scientists have not directly concerned themselves with such questions is that they have felt that they already possessed an adequate concept
which needed only to be refined and made slightly more precise in order to handle such inter-disciplinary questions. This concept, which underlies the approach of all the social sciences to the fundamental nature of human societies, derives from the view that any society is, in the technical sense, a system and that thus all the elements within it are interrelated in such a manner that any change in the character of one will result in changes in all the others, and the pattern of these changes can be analyzed both logically and causally. ¹

Armed with this concept of society, it was possible for one to picture any outside influence striking at some particular aspect of a society and bringing about a change which would in turn set in motion a chain reaction that would bring changes throughout the system. Moreover, that image was not limited by the analog of the pebble dropped in a pond because social scientists have not let themselves be inhibited by any such principle as the conservation of energy. Instead, the general practice has been to accept the idea that the consequent series of changes can far exceed the "energy" of the initial impact.

¹ That is, the pattern of change can be analyzed either in terms of a theoretical model, constructed on the basis of a series of definitions and governed by a prescribed system of logic; or in terms of empirically tracing through the precise chain of reactions in a particular setting.
In short, we have the concept that there is a "multiplier effect" at work in the process of social change which is similar to the "multiplier effect" that follows injection of capital into an economic system, it being generally assumed that in the case of general social change the multiplier can be of a much greater magnitude than in the case of an economy. But, although within the social sciences this concept of society as a system is widely held, it has not been refined to the point of providing a basis for systematic analysis. That is to say, it does not make possible genuine explanations or predictions but merely provides clues as to past developments and a feeling of expectation about future ones.

There is a more detailed concept of the social system which rests upon the idea that all social action can be in terms of actors performing according to socially defined roles. Thus the relationships within the system are role relationships which are governed by the expectations of the participants; and, in turn, performance according to the prescribed roles within any society is maintained by the society's methods of sanctioning and rewarding behavior.

This concept suggests that there is almost no possibility for change in any closed system. It views change as largely
coming from outside the system and therefore, gives great weight to the impact that comes from exposure to any foreign society. But it also recognized that change is brought about by the activities of social deviants, a form of change which embraces Toynbee's idea of "withdrawal and return" since in such cases an actor has in some fashion ceased performing his previous roles and then adopted some new roles which for a time constitutes deviant behavior. (Intellectuals tend to have a bias in favor of the innovating character of deviant behavior for many reasons, not the least of which is a feeling of antipathy toward the idea of conformity, and a readiness to place great stock in social importance.)

Although this latter concept provides the two most common explanations of change within a social system, quite obviously changes can occur which cannot be so readily explained. This raises the question as to whether the concept of social systems based on roles can explain developmental growth within a closed system.

In large part the difficulty seems to be that in analysis the practice has been to describe roles in such idealized terms as to make them seem far more rigid than is the actual case in any society. It is often overlooked that even in a closed
society there is always a significant degree of tolerance in determining what constitutes acceptable performance of any social role. This is the case if for no other reason than that it must be possible for all personality types which the society judges to be "normal" to perform in an acceptable fashion. It is true that certain personality types may be strongly attracted to particular roles and thus color the society's views about the character of those roles. However, there always remains a distinction, since the definition of acceptable role behavior stems primarily from considerations of the function of the role for the society as a whole and not of its functions for the personality of the individual.

In overlooking the existence of this tolerance in the performance of any given role one also overlooks the corollary that tolerance opens the way for constant changes in the character of all roles--and, therefore, in the society as a whole. It seems to us important, then, to note the factors which govern change in the character of roles within a closed society.

First of all, the rewards and punishment employed to control role performance cannot have the same effect over time. If the rewards and punishments are kept constant with
respect to a particular role they will tend to lose their efficacy. If, on the other hand, changes are made in the rewards and punishments in order to maintain consistency in the way a particular role is performed then there must be changes in the significance of the rewards and punishments used in controlling other roles. In a sense a society has a constant problem in allocating the rewards and punishments at its disposal in such a fashion as to maintain desired role performance and preventing unacceptable behavior. Consistency in the character of roles is thus impossible.

Secondly, change can follow from the fact that it is possible to distinguish between excellence and mediocrity in the performing of any social role. The factor of skill is particularly significant with respect to those roles associated with social power, since in all societies power tends to be agglutinative. Those who gain power in the form of wealth, for example, tend also to be able to realize other forms of power such as enlightenment, respectability, the command of information, and personal association with those possessing other forms of power.

This relationship of social roles to power tends to lead to a broadening of the definition of the particular role. The
result is an expansion of the particular role to the point that it comes to cover several more specialized forms of activities which may in time come to be recognized as separate and distinct roles. This phenomenon can be illustrated by what often occurs with respect to the role of those who are responsible for relations with the divine in traditional societies. Frequently this role is so sharply defined that members of the priesthood are prohibited from performing any other generally accepted roles. The priests may be denied the role of husband or any role that carries with it control over secular matters or a close relationship with material things. However, the development of skill and prestige within the priesthood may so expand the functions of this limited role as to lead to the creation of a variety of more specialized roles. For example, expertness in the study of sacred texts may result in elements within the priesthood developing skills in interpreting the Laws of the Divine which may be recognized as relevant in handling temporal matters, and thus, gradually they may come to adopt a role comparable to that of secular lawyer. Or, for example, the rising prestige of the priesthood may result in the accumulation of church property which may in turn lead elements in the priesthood to act in such a manner as to create for the society a new role, that of
managing and maintaining records about property that is not privately owned.

The proliferation of roles by such internal developments and the creation of new ones through exposure to outside systems may result in either greater stability or a serious disruption of the social system. The possibility of one or the other developments is, indeed, the fundamental question that confronts us in analyzing the political process in non-Western societies. Will innovation result in a more efficient social system so that social goals can be more effectively sought, or will the social order be so damaged as to hamper purposeful action?

When we move from these concepts of social change to the political problems of non-Western societies it becomes apparent that the objective of achieving a purposeful development depends upon the creation of a new system of roles. This in turn depends upon, first, the currently influential elements in those societies having some appreciation of what the appropriate new roles should be, and, second, the effective use of rewards and punishments in institutionalizing these new roles. Change will continue in those societies, but in a random fashion, if there is not a concerted effort to channel
the direction of change toward the establishment of the desired system of new roles.

Some Problems of Politically Directed Change in Non-Western Societies

For our purposes we may visualize the situation in non-Western societies as one in which new elites, operating in terms of new roles, are striving to alter the total social system in predetermined directions. The leaders of most of these countries have committed themselves to the establishment of Westernized forms of government and to the encouragement of more modern practices throughout their societies.

Before turning to the specific character of the political process within which these elites must act, it is possible to distinguish two critical problems that are directly related to the nature of the social system. The first of these problems involves the question of how the leadership may divide its efforts in seeking to encourage desired changes in social roles. The second concerns the availability of resources for inducing people to adopt new roles in non-Western societies.

In a general sense, the leadership in those societies is faced with the problem of dividing its effort between developing more skill in performing elite roles and so creating
a viable system of intra-elite relations and striving to effect mass behavior so as to establish a total social system based on new patterns of role relationships. Some of the peculiar characteristics of the political process in non-Western societies encourage the national leadership to devote almost all its energies to intr-elite activities. Considerable attention to such activities is, indeed, necessary if an effective leadership is to emerge. However, the task of creating a new system of elite relations can be easily confused with that of reconstituting the total social system, especially since it can be personally rewarding and extremely exciting for the participants. On the other hand, if the elite directs its energies entirely toward influencing the behavior of the masses, it may soon dissipate its strength and lose its position of leadership. Much of the criticism of elite behavior in non-Western societies overlooks the fact that, unless there is a viable system of intra-elite role relationships that can provide a genuine basis of unity, the attempt to bring about a new system of relationships on the part of the masses is likely to create divisions within the elite and thus destroy the very basis of national unity.

There is a problem here too complicated to be solved merely by the appropriate allocation of resources to the two
areas of elite action. A fundamental difficulty is that in any system the forces of disorganization will prove to be superior to those supporting the organization of the system unless new energies are introduced on the side of order. This is to say that within a social system there is a phenomenon comparable to that of entropy within any physical system. We were alluding to this problem when we suggested that if the rewards and punishments used to maintain role performance are kept constant they will lose their effectiveness over time. Any system will thus "run down" if constant effort is not made to maintain it. This means that in the non-Western societies the elite is working against the odds since they not only have to oppose the inertia of the traditional system and the random developments that stem from the indirect pattern of social change but must also constantly devote energies to maintaining their own intra-elite system.

The second major problem is the serious shortage of resources available to the elites who are seeking to control the pattern of social change. As we have indicated the "energy" for changing or maintaining role behavior in a social system consists of rewards and punishments. The fact that most non-Western societies are poor countries places certain material limits on the rewards that can be given to those who accept
new roles. Generally the leaders of those countries tend to rely upon three forms of rewards: (1) exhortations and praise, (2) salaries within a bureaucratic structure, and (3) admission to the society of the elite.

Exhortations and praise are of limited value as rewards except in encouraging people to accept new roles, since they can influence only those who already see some advantage in accepting the new roles. Likewise, salaries are more effective in maintaining a system than in encouraging the adoption of new roles. And, of course, the virtues of a bureaucratic arrangement are not those related to the encouragement of innovation.

Admission to the ranks of the elite appears to be the most effective method of rewards in most non-Western societies. However, it is also a method that has its limitations in creating a new social system. If admission to the ranks of the elite is made too easy, the system of intra-elite relations can be disrupted and the position of the elite will be undermined. Even more important is the fact that it is not a method well designed to encourage the adoption of new roles of a non-elite character. Indeed, it is all too common in non-Western societies for people trained to perform general roles in the society to find that greater rewards lie in
seeking admission to the ranks of the elite and ignoring their specialized training. Thus, for example, the man trained to be, say, a modern engineer may feel that he can obtain greater rewards by becoming a member of the elite performing an administrative role than by applying his newly-learned skills in the general society.

There is another important reason why the method of encouraging new roles by rewards is seriously limited in most non-Western societies. The presence of social sanctions to maintain the existing roles within any society means that the rewards for innovating new roles must appear to some people to be substantially greater than the risks involved in defying convention. In most societies those who create new roles for themselves face at least the charges of "immoral" and "corrupt" behavior if not more severe sanctions. The difficulty in most non-Western societies is that in addition to the restraints which still exist in terms of the traditional society, the modernized elite has accepted standards common to current Western society in which innovation has been institutionalized and massive rewards are no longer essential, and hence viewed as socially undesirable. Thus the elites in most non-Western societies are explicitly opposed to anyone in
their societies receiving rewards comparable to those available to the individuals who risked innovating the necessary roles in creating industrial development in the West. Rather, they generally take their ethics from a relatively stable Western system in which the rewards of "social service" are meaningful.

Thus most non-Western societies are doubly conservative with respect to rewards for inducing new role performance. In addition to the restraint of the traditional system there is an elite that is seeking change and has adopted a conservative attitude with respect to rewards even when it is committed to programs that are radical not only in terms of their own societies but even in terms of the West. The result is a very slim margin within which rewards can operate to effect changes in role behavior. This suggests that the fundamental question in some non-Western countries is not whether they can achieve rapid industrialization within a democratic framework but rather whether they can do it within such a framework and at the same time limit themselves in stimulating motivation for innovating roles to mere salaries and nationalistic exhortations.

In contrast to the limitations on rewards, there is wide
flexibility in the range of punishment in most non-Western societies since, in general, there is no inherent limitation in the availability of sanctions except the efficiency of administrative controls. This situation, reinforced by the authoritarian qualities common to most traditional societies, encourages even elites seeking to establish liberal-democratic systems to employ repressive measures. Thus, inescapably, in most non-Western societies the scales are weighted in favor of punishment rather than reward. Here again, the democratic leaders of non-Western countries are working against heavy odds.

Evolution and Relatively Isolated Cultures

It is appropriate to return again to the conflict between cultural relativism and social evolution. We have already gone beyond the point of the degree to which isolated systems can be expected to generate change and we are entering into the problems of change as a consequence of contacts between cultures and the diffusion of cultural traits. We must now make a telling observation which is basic to understanding our difficulties in theorizing about political development in the new states: the fundamental outlook of comparative politics has been that of treating the development of each political system as separate and largely autonomous entities,
and the objective of evolutionary theories has been to arrive at laws which would explain the stages of growth of relatively autonomous political organisms, and yet the burden of empirical evidence is entirely on the side of relating significant social change to cultural diffusion which is always independent of the time factor. This is to say that attempts to theorize about the progressive stages of development of relatively isolated systems represent a gross misapplication of effort.

It would be useful at this point to quote at some length the anthropologist Robert H. Lovie at the conclusion of his classic study of social organization, *Primitive Society*:

The belief in social progress was a natural accompaniment of the belief in historical laws, especially when tinged with the evolutionary optimism of the 'seventies of the nineteenth century. If inherent necessity urges all societies along a fixed path, metaphysicians may still dispute whether the underlying force be divine or diabolic, but there can at least be no doubt as to which community is retarded and which accelerated in its movement toward the appointed goal. But no such necessity or design appears from the study of culture history. Cultures develop mainly through the borrowings due to chance contact. Our own civilization is even more largely than the rest a complex of borrowed traits. The singular order of events by which it has come into being provides no schedule for the itinerary of alien cultures. Hence the specious plea that a given people must pass through such or such a stage in our history before attaining this or that destination can no longer be sustained.

Lowie reminds us also of the profound words of the jurist Maitland in *Domesday Book and Beyond* which he quotes:

Even had our anthropologists at their command material that would justify them in prescribing that every independent portion of mankind must, if it is to move at all, move through one fated series of stages which may be designated as Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, and so forth, we still should have to face the fact that the rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas and have thus been enabled, for anything that we can tell, to leap from Stage A to Stage X without passing through any intermediate stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet or at the Nicene Creed, by traversing a long series of 'stages'; they leapt to the one and to the other.  

There is considerable danger that in the light of the pressing policy problems of development in the new states people will come to think increasingly of all human societies as organic entities with very definite patterns of growth. This is especially likely to be the case as we tend more and more to apply shorthand terminology to different ranges of policy problems and thus to speak of country A as being at such and such a stage of development and country B at another stage. We shall be shortly noting why such ways of classification may be appropriate for considering policy matters. At this point we must make very clear the conviction that we have no solid intellectual grounds to justify the notion that all societies

must or are likely to pass through discernible and historically progressive stages of evolution.

As long as we are concerned with the pattern of change in individual societies it is almost impossible to speak of stages of development while avoiding the pitfall of teleological reasoning. To assume that the histories of the new states will parallel the experiences of the industrial countries is not to replace static analysis with a dynamic approach; it is to indulge in a glorified form of ethnocentrism.

It is true that many respected philosophers of history and students of civilization have postulated that societies have life cycles which follow discernible laws. Basic to the thinking of such different men as Marx, Toynbee, and Spengler, has been a common effort to elucidate the sequences of growth, development and decline of human societies. And certainly the founders of modern sociology were intensely interested in the problem of social evolution. Max Weber, in seeking to explain the industrial revolution in Europe, formulated the evolutionary patterns of changes in forms of authority in which the traditional system gave way to the charismatic, and then if development continued, there would emerge the rational-legal form of authority.¹

Auguste Comte also formulated a three stage progression of social evolution: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positivist periods. And of course there are many others who have sought to find some historical order in the experiences of societies and civilizations. For our purposes it is not necessary to evaluate all of these efforts; it is sufficient to recognize that these authors have been dealing with units of human history which are far larger both in terms of cultural areas and historical time than the relatively modest units which are represented by the new states of the underdeveloped areas. Whatever the merits of any particular theory about the rise and fall of civilization, they are not likely to be manifest when applied to the situation in the various new states.

The Nation State System and the Diffusion of a World Culture

Our contention has been that change is an open-ended process, so long as societies are conceived of as isolated systems with only intermittent and random contacts with other systems. We are also suggesting that most attempts to theorize about the processes of social and political change have been largely in terms of such autonomous systems. Even among some authors who have acknowledged the crucial role of outside influence

In generating change there is still the tendency to try to mute the role of diffusion and to search for laws internal to the social system to explain the course of social and political development.

In turning our backs upon the possibility of discovering any set laws which might govern recognizable stages of development, we are not necessarily driven to the conclusion that there is no order or pattern behind the direction of change in the underdeveloped areas. The theoretical nature of our problem changes fundamentally when we recognize that the present-day question of political development in the new states is directly connected to an historical epoch, and therefore our search should not be for universal laws about the ultimate direction of social development but rather for a clearer understanding of how the contemporary forces at work in the world are likely to effect the particular experiences of the currently underdeveloped countries. Instead of the historic pattern of random and haphazard contacts among cultures, of nomads meeting agriculturalists, seafarers meeting and trading with land-based peoples, and of adventurers, wanderers, pilgrims and soldiers, and of each rubbing off a bit of its culture on the other; we now live at a time in which there is massive diffusion of culture which is almost entirely moving in one direction.
When the European world first pressed outward and learned of the worlds of Africa and Asia there was some basis of mutuality in the contacts. It would have been hard at the time of these first contacts to have predicted how the interchange of cultural contacts would have affected each side. But at an ever-accelerating rate the direction and the volume of cross-cultural influences has become nearly a uniform pattern of the Western industrial world imposing its practices, standards, techniques, and values upon the non-Western world.

This massive, essentially one-way flow of cultural diffusion is most clearly manifest in the political realm. The development of the nation-state is only in part an autonomous, domestic process, for all states are shaped in very fundamental ways by the fact that they are units of a nation-state system and they are constantly called upon to interact with that system. Indeed, the nation-state has little meaning in isolation, and all the concepts basic to the operations and organization of the modern nation-state are derived from the standards common to the international community. It would take us well beyond the scope of our present analysis to elaborate in detail the essential nature of the nation-state system and the ways in which this system compels all societies that would be sovereign entities to adopt certain
forms of public institutions. It is enough to note that starting from the problems of defense and foreign policy and carrying over into the fields of membership in the United Nations and the control of international trade and commerce and on into the realm of the domestic management of affairs there are a host of very explicit pressures which press governments in certain very definite directions.

There is of course always considerable latitude as to the particular institutional forms of government—whether for example a state will have a presidential or a cabinet form of executive authority—and also there can be considerable variations as to the organization of the polity and the spirit of the political culture—whether there are few or many political parties and whether there is an open or closed political process. We shall shortly be returning to these possibilities for variations. At the moment, however, we must stress that there are certain minimum qualifications of statehood in the international community which do place demands upon the development of all nation-states. We must also recognize that these pressures go beyond just those related to the functional needs of the nation-state system as a whole and reflect what we might call the cultural climate of that system. That is to say that there is also what we may call a "world" or a "cosmopolitan" culture which is closely related to the nation-state system.
Just as the nation-state system reflects in numerous ways its historical origins in the European cultural area, so too does this world culture encompass much of Western civilization. However both the system and the culture have in the last three hundred years increasingly spread outward to engulf the entire world, and thus it is appropriate to speak of both as world rather than Western or European systems and cultures.

We cannot dwell here on the content of the world culture; it is sufficient to observe that it does have a degree of inner coherence and it is generally recognized as being the essence of modern life. It is based upon a secular rather than a sacred view of human relations, a rational outlook, an acceptance of the entire substance and spirit of the scientific approach, a vigorous application of an expanding technology, an industrialized organization of production, and generally humanistic and popularistic set of values for political life.

Once we recognize the demands and the attractions of both the nation-state system and the world culture we can begin to appreciate the basic stresses which must underlie the nation-building process in the new states. We can now see why there is no escaping from our initial questions as to the relevance of what we first called Western institutions to the underdeveloped countries.
Up to a point all societies must adjust to the historical facts of our era and they must adopt their economies, societies, and polities to the world system and the world culture. Thus we can see that the underdeveloped countries can only up to a very narrow degree reject, first, their own historical experiences in being introduced into the world community, and second, their continuing need to preserve their identity and sovereignty in the world community of states.

All of this is to say that there is a minimum level of what were once Western but are now world standards which the new states must accept. And there is also a general direction that national development must follow.

The Process of Acculturation to the Modern World

There remains, however, the great variety of ways in which separate societies may be acculturated to the world systems and the world culture. The problems of nation-building are thus directly related to the dynamics of this acculturation process, and not to any form of natural evolution or organic change in autonomous systems.

Those features of the acculturation process which are peculiar to each non-Western society are generally related to the characteristics of their particular traditional cultures and the
conditions under which they were exposed to the West.

There are, of course, significant differences in the character of traditional societies. In some the traditional order represented great civilizations with elaborate patterns of social relations; in others it consisted of relatively primitive peasant communities with no written traditions. Each type of traditional society, therefore, has its distinctive basis for response to the Western impact. To go further than this general observation and determine which aspects of traditional life have persisted in a given non-Western society and to explain why they have maintained a dynamic quality is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however, make certain observations with respect to the Western impact which has come to the traditional societies in a variety of ways.

First, there were differences in the auspices under which Western influences were introduced. In some instances it was traceable primarily to the activities of private Western individuals and organizations; in others the agent was Western rule in the form of colonialism; in still others the Western impact was mediated through an indigenous elite.

Secondly, there are the differences in the spheres of life which were most immediately affected by Western influences. Colonialism operated directly at the level of government. Other
forms of Western influence primarily affected commerce, education, or religion.

Thirdly, there have been great differences in the intensity and the direction of the Western impact. Some traditional societies have been exposed to the West over long periods of time but the intensity of the exposure has been relatively low. In others the Western challenge has been an intense one over only a brief span.¹

Fourthly, there are differences in the degree of violence which accompanied the most intensive Western impacts. In Southeast Asia the more gradual and less violent process of change was suddenly and abruptly altered by the Second World War and the period of Japanese occupation. Elsewhere non-Western societies have been spared the more violent impacts of the modern world.

At the heart of the acculturation process in all transitional societies lies an inherent conflict between the need for order and the need for continuing change. The diffusion of the world culture is fundamentally disruptive of all traditional forms of social organization. At the same time, however, the process of diffusion demands that societies maintain the necessary degree of order so as to prevent the disruption of the international system.

¹. This discussion follows the line of analysis of the character of non-Western societies and their exposure to the West in: George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, December, 1955, pp. 1022-1041.
and of those domestic systems essential for supporting aspects of the world culture. We could cite countless illustrations of how these two requirements of order and change create destructive internal tensions. Modernization, for example, may force a disruption of the traditional family system while at the same time requiring the establishment of modern educational systems; yet the very weakening of the family system may so affect the socialization process as to make it difficult if not impossible for the youth of the society to perform effectively in the educational system.

Similarly, modernization may require a weakening of village forms of social organization and the establishment of more industrialized organizations, yet the very process of concentrating populations in new urban centers may produce so many psychological insecurities that the result is not a reliable labor force but explosive mobs of people.

**Political Instability and the Process of Social Change**

The state of equilibrium between order and change is thus critical in determining the political condition in any transitional society at any particular moment.

In this context we would note first that the essence of political stability is that it is a requirement for the realization
of directed and purposeful change, since it connotes a public policy which effectively reflects and satisfies the changing scheme of values within a society. In direct contrast, political instability connoted a public policy either too rigid and inflexible to accommodate the changing balance of values in the society or too vacillating and unsure to be able to advance any objectives. Thus, political stability can be associated with change that is rationally directed toward satisfying the social needs of the maximum possible proportion of the population, while instability is associated with change that fails to gratify the social demands of the people and leaves an increasing proportion frustrated.

Secondly, we would note that the dynamic factor in creating tension has generally been the uneven and discontinuous process of social change in the direction of greater urbanization, for it seems that in transitional societies the rate of urban growth has far outstripped the rate of industrial and economic development which is the functional basis of the modern city. People have chosen the life of the city even when they cannot find there the functions usually associated with a modern city, a development which demonstrates that individuals can become acculturated to a modern way of life far more readily than societies can be re-organized.
The connection between the general principle of the relationship between political stability and social change and the fact of uneven and discontinuous social change in the transitional societies is demonstrated clearly by the case of the highly trained Asian who finds that he cannot apply his new knowledge and skills in his underdeveloped society. It is similarly demonstrated by the less educated person who has turned to the city in search of a more exciting and richer life and cannot find activities to which he can hitch his ambitions. It is plain that when institutional development lags behind the pace of individual acculturation the grounds are created for serious frustrations.

This connection between principle and observable conditions in transitional societies points out that one common cause of their political instability is the widespread personal and individual instability which inevitably results from frustration.

But we must look deeper than that--and into the more fundamental matter of the operation of the society of which the frustrated individual is a member. It is the over-all workings of the society which condition his responses and which are responsible for the discontinuity of change.

When we look beyond the individual we see that most
transitional societies lack two of the essential prerequisites for a stable system of representative government. The first of these is a social mechanism whereby it becomes possible to determine and clarify continuously the pattern of values and interests within the society and relate these to the pattern of power through an aggregating and bargaining process. The second is the availability of appropriate instruments for carrying out public policy once the society has expressed its relative values and interests— that is, an efficient bureaucracy which is not just one of the dominant political groupings in the society. The lack of these in transitional societies constitutes a basic weakness.

Under these conditions it is, of course, possible for the society to avoid excessive tensions if those who have political aspirations can be recruited into the elite society and accept its outlook. Indeed, some such form of political tutelage is essential if a traditional society is to adopt a more modern form of political life. The danger, however, always exists that the current elite will strive to maintain its administrative and political monopoly and not permit the development of the autonomous roles of the administrator and the politician. When this occurs there is a rise in authori-
tarianism which is reinforced by the fact that the elite is becoming even more isolated from the masses.

The failure of most transitional societies to develop those who can skillfully articulate the values of the population creates other dangers. Even when advancing programs that conform to the broad aspirations of the population, no government can harness the energies of the people unless there is genuine communication between the decision-makers and the population. Where there is no articulation of the values of the population, the administrators can at best stimulate only a synthetic enthusiasm in the nature of the response common to public relations efforts. If the public is to be identified with the programs of the administrators the people must have a sense of participation in the making of the decisions which most directly affect them. Although the elite can assume the initiative and dominate the communication system, some mechanisms for determining and expressing mass attitudes are essential if the energies of the society are to be effectively mobilized.

The lack of those who can perform the full role of the politician is also a major reason why the gap between aspiration and reality becomes a source of general frustration in many
transitional societies. An important but often overlooked function of open and competitive political articulation is that of creating in the minds of the public a better appreciation of the distinction between the plausible and the possible.

In societies experiencing rapid cultural change people are often just beginning to learn that they can change their condition of life through political effort. However, in their enthusiastic responses to the power of idealism they are likely to be slow in developing a new and appropriate sense of realism. Also, since people engrossed in the problems of acculturation tend to stress the forms or styles of behavior and become in a sense fad-oriented, their behavior is guided by their images of an ultimately desired way of life and not by the realities of the existing situation. Once such people feel that it is no longer appropriate to be restrained by the essentially cautious and shrewd outlook on life common to traditional and peasant societies, they are likely to find it difficult to determine what should be the new and realistic standards for guiding their behavior.

In transitional societies large politically significant elements of the population feel that they can expect a new relationship to exist between effort and reward but are still
unsure as to what this relationship actually is. Their political behavior tends toward the extremes of either believing in pie-in-the-sky promises or distrusting completely the words of the politician. It is here that the role of the articulating and competing politicians become important, since it is through exposure to their messages that a public can develop a sense of political realism without losing an appreciation for the appropriate function of idealism. In time the public can learn that in listening to political discourse it is necessary to discriminate between the exaggerated language that constitutes the wrappings of political promises and the actual policy implications that are partially hidden within the messages. It is this function of open and even exaggerated political debate in creating a more sophisticated public which can ignore the wild promises of political extremists that led the philosopher T.V. Smith to say "They also serve who only articulate." Once a public feels rightly or wrongly that it knows as much as its politicians, if not more, one of the necessary conditions for totalitarian movements is removed.

To summarize and to return to our attempt to identify the central cause of political instability in transitional
societies, we would point to the lack of an effective relationship between the ruling elites and their peoples. We see that in some instances political instability is directly connected with the fact that sudden and sharp changes in intra-elite relations are possible because the key members of the elite do not have any firm commitments to the interests of particular segments of the public; and since the members of the elite are not securely anchored to the interests and points of view of a constituency, they are free to act according to their personal interpretations of what is advantageous in the limited sphere of intra-elite relations. Consequently their behavior often tends to be essentially opportunistic. We see that in other instances the elite may remain united but project to the public only its own views of what is socially and politically desirable. Even though they may believe themselves to be sympathetic to the aspirations of the people they may be in fact isolated in their own world. It is clear that when for any reason there is a gap between elite and public there is both opportunity and temptation for any set of would-be leaders, with or without valid qualifications, to attempt to fill it—a situation almost inevitably fatal to hopes for political stability.
Democracy and the Fusion of the Universal and the Parochial

We may return now to our original questions about the applicability of Western institutions, and particularly of democratic practices, for the process of nation building in the new states. It should be apparent from our analysis that we are dealing with a problem that is on the one hand deeply grounded in the context of our particular period of history, but which on the other hand is of such tremendous significance for the development of world history that it does seem to constitute a universal problem that is above all particularistic considerations of time and place.

The fundamental problem of nation building at this stage of history in most of the new states is that of finding a satisfactory reconciliation between the universalistic dimensions of the world culture and the parochial expressions of the local culture. A modern nation state represents not only the political applications of all the technologies, the attitudes and knowledge basic to what we have called the world culture, but also a unique expression of the local and special interests of a distinctive community of people. The test of nation building in the
new states is the search for a new sense of collective identity for an entire people—a sense of identity which will be built around a command of all the potentialities inherent in the universal and cosmopolitan culture of the modern world, and a full expression of self-respect for all that is distinctive in one's own heritage.

During the first stages when the world culture is being introduced into a transitional society, the process can be greatly facilitated by the application of authoritative means. Indeed, it is possible to establish much of the infrastructure of a modern state through such imposed methods. This of course is a function which colonialism performed in many of the new states. The very limitations of colonialism however point to the limitations of authoritarian methods in the building of modern states.

At a second stage the need is for bringing together the universal and the parochial. It is at this stage that there must be a more intimate relationship between the government and the masses. This is the delicate stage when the particularistic sentiments and the real interests of the people must be brought into the political process without disrupting the requirements of the state apparatus. The
merging of the cosmopolitan and the parochial can appear to be done through populist movements and enunciation of nationalist ideologies, but in the main these turn out to be synthetic attempts. For only very rarely in human history has it been possible for a creative individual to give expression to the sense of identity of an entire people. Under conditions of rapid social change this is particularly difficult.

The attempts of African leaders to give expression to the "soul of Africa," to find the "African personality," and to identify themselves with the "spirit of Pan-Africanism" reflects this urgent need to bring together the universal and the parochial. Yet often these attempts seem to fail in giving a genuine sense of identity to the emerging polity because what is claimed to be the parochial does not in fact represent specific and concrete interests within the society.

It is at this point that the basic functions of representative government become critical in the nation building process. If these new societies are going to achieve a new level of integration they must find methods for giving representation to both cosmopolitan and parochial
forces. Out of the interplay of representative politics it is possible for a society to realize a fundamental fusion of elements of the world culture and the indigenous traditions. This process of blending lies at the heart of the modernization process; and it is this fact which justifies our faith that there is a close association between democratization and modernization.