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POLITICAL MODERNISATION

SOME COMPARATIVE NOTES

by

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Throughout the world we witness today the continuous spread of modern forms of political organization and process.

This process is, in a way, much more ubiquitous and general than that of economic growth and development to which so much attention has been paid and it does also serve a basic prerequisite or condition of economic development. Moreover, in many of the so-called new countries the goal of economic development is more of a political goal than a fact of economic life, and much of the fate of economic development is nowadays in the hands of the politicians.

The political forms and processes which develop in these New States may sometimes seem to be entirely new, different
from those which were connected with the establishment of
modern political frameworks in Europe, the United States,
the Dominions or Latin America. And yet the very fact that
we designate them as modern shows that there may exist affin-
ity and similarity in the very forms and in some of the elements
of the political process.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of these
affinities as well as of the major differences between the
various types of modern political regimes.

1. Some of these considerations have been presented by
the author in a fuller way in "Bureaucracy and Political Devel-
opment", in J. La Polambara (ed.)-- Bureaucracy and Political
Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press (forth-
coming) and will be also dealt with in greater detail in a
forthcoming publication by the author.
Historically, political modernization can be equated with those types of political systems which have developed in Western Europe from the 17th century and have then spread to other European countries, to the American and in the 19th and 20th centuries to Asian and African continents.

Typologically, political modernization is characterized by the development, within a political system, of a series of features. Some - but not all - of these features have existed also in pre-modern political systems, often serving as precursors to modernization and as important conditions of initial modernization.
The most general traits of political modernization are, on the one hand, continuous development of a high extent of differentiation, unification and centralization of the political system, and on the other hand, continuous development of a high extent of "free-floating" (i.e. non-committed to anyascriptive groups) political power and resources.

These general traits are manifest in several more concrete characteristics.

The first such characteristic of political modernization is the development of a highly differentiated political structure in terms of specific political roles and institutions,
of the centralization of the polity and of development of
specific political goals and orientations.

Second, political modernization is characterized by
growing extension of the scope of the central, legal, admin-
istrative and political activities and their permeation into
all spheres and regions of the society.

Third, it is characterized by the continuous spread of
potential political power to wider groups in the society -
ultimately to all adult citizens.

Further, it is characterized by the weakening of tradit-
ional elites and of traditional legitimation of the rulers and
by the establishment of some sort of ideological and usually also institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled who are the holders of the potential political power.

All these characteristics are, of course, connected with the continuous growth of great fluidity of political support, with the lack of ascriptive commitment of political allegiance to any given ruler or group. This necessitates that the rulers, in order to maintain themselves effectively in power and receive support for the specific goals which they propagate and for the policies they want to implement, have to search continuously the political support of the ruled, or at least of
large or vocal parts thereof; and have to mobilize continuously full political support.

The culmination of this process, as it has gradually developed in the outright modern systems, is the participation of the ruled in the selection of the rulers, in the setting up of the major political goals, and to a smaller extent, also in the formulation of policies. The formal expression of this is the system of elections, as it has evolved, in different ways, in most modern political systems.

Unlike the rulers of traditional regimes the rulers of the totalitarian regimes cannot take the political passivity
and/or traditional identification of their subjects for granted

and are even afraid of such passivity - just because such pass-

ivity may become in these systems a potential focus for the
crystallization of the potential political power of the citizens.

The difference between modern democratic or semi-democratic and
totalitarian political systems lies not in the fact of the
spread of such power - which is common to all of them - but in
the ways in which the rulers react to this power.

The preceding analysis does not imply that no charismatic

and traditional (feudal) relations obtain between rulers and
ruled in a modern political system.
But traditional legitimation cannot be predominant in any modern political system where the rule or ideology of "accountancy" of the rulers to the ruled be the predominant ones. These may be either charismatic, or legal rational or "social" in the sense of devotion to secular social values (a category which may be akin to Weber's "Wertrational" but which he did not use in his classification of types of legitimation).

III

The political process in modern, as in all other types of political systems, is characterized by the continuous interaction

2. For a fuller exposition of the differences between premodern and modern political systems, see S.N. Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963, esp. ch. XIII.
between the political institutions, the rulers on the one hand, and other spheres and groups of the society on the other hand.

The major social groups put before the rulers various types of demands for policy decisions. At the same time, these groups make various types of resources available to the rulers' political institutions. These resources are made available through the activities of various political elites which compete for them and organize them within the frameworks of the major political institutions.

As in all other political systems so in the modern ones, the rulers have to deal both with "objective" problems such as
international relations and alliances, budget taxes, mobilization of economic resources, on the one hand, and with mobilization of political support on the other hand. But the connection between these two is in modern political systems much more close than in other types of political systems, because the growing participation of wider strata of population in the political process makes these groups much more sensitive and interested in - although not necessarily always better able to understand - these "objective" problems.

Similarly, the articulation of political demands and activities in modern political systems is much more closely
related to the provision of resources to the political elite than in other types of political systems. Some effective political organization of the ruled is here almost a basic prerequisite of the continuous provision of resources to the polity. Because of this the availability - at different levels - of elites which are able to mobilize resources and political support and at the same time to articulate political demands is of crucial importance for the working of these systems.

At different stages of the development of modernization there developed different patterns of articulation and aggregation of political demands and of mobilization of political
support; but some general institutional devices, which have
developed in most modern political systems, can be discerned.

Among the specific types of organizations through which
political demands are articulated are interest groups, social
movements, "public opinion" and political parties. The first
three may to some extent be seen as components of the last
i.e. of parties which are the most articulate forms of modern
political organization, and which perform also crucial functions
of aggregation of political demands; but this is true only in

part as the various interest groups, social movements and various forms of public opinion have all autonomous existence and orientations of their own.

The interest group or the pressure group is usually oriented to gaining concrete, specific interests - be they economic, religious, cultural or political - and is interested in the wider broader political machinery of the party or of the State, only or mainly, in so far as it can directly promote this interest (or at least assure its optimal promotion in a given situation). There are, of course, many diverse types of such interest groups - economic, professional, religious, ethnic or
tribal - and their specific interests may vary greatly from situation to situation.

The second type of organization through which political orientations and demands are articulated and aggregated in modern political systems are social movements. A social movement usually aims at the development of some new total society or polity. It attempts to infuse certain values or goals into a given institutional structure or to transform such structure according to these aims and values. These aims are usually inclusive and diffuse. A social movement usually has a strong "future" orientation and tends to depict the future as greatly
different from the present and to fight for the realization of this change. It very often contains some apocalyptic, semi-
Messianic elements, and it tends usually to make demands of total obedience or loyalty on its members and to make extreme distinctions between friends and foes.

The third element through which political demands are articulated in modern political systems is what can be called "general, diffuse, intelligent interest in public issues."

By this is meant people or groups who have a rather more flexible attitude to both specific interests and to "total" ideas and claims, who are not firmly attached to any given interest
group, movement or organization, and who are interested mainly in the "sober" evaluation of a political programme in values and concrete possibilities.

Each of these forms of articulation of interests has existed in various forms also in pre-modern systems, but with a difference. One such difference was that with the partial exception of petitions or entreaties by interest groups or cliques, the representation of the political activities and orientations of such groups was not usually firmly legitimised within the central political institutions, while social or social-religious movements were largely a-political or "non-
legitimate" from the point of view of the existing political institutions.

The second such difference was that these groups were mostly concerned with petitioning the rules for various concrete benefits and not with the determination of major political goals or the selection of rulers.

The third was rooted in the fact that it is only in the modern political system that these different interest groups and movements tend to become integrated, even if only to some extent, into the framework of common continuous political activity and organization, such as political parties, or other
organizations which perform similar functions of continuous mobilization of support and interpretation of different political demands. Such integration is attained by the parties (or other party-line organizations), through the development of specific party organs, leadership and programmes, and through the aggregation within the party of various concrete interests under some more general rules or aims which may be of some appeal to a wider public, and through the translation, as it were, of the inclusive, diffuse aims of the social movements into more realistic terms of concrete political goals, issues
and dilemmas.

Different parties may evince, of course, different degrees of predominance of each of these elements. But whatever such relative predominance, the integration of each of these elements into the parties is never complete, and interest groups, social movements and different organs of public opinion, tend to develop autonomous orientations, in many situations tend often to "burst" the frameworks imposed on them by the parties.

They tend to maintain their autonomous orientations through the presentation of their own demands directly to the central pol-

4. See *The Political Systems of Empires*, op. cit.
itical institutions - be they the executive, legislature or bureaucracy - without the mediation of any given party, through attempts to mobilize support and resources for themselves directly, and not through a party, as well as through attempts to aggregate within their own frameworks different political demands.

This tendency is, of course, facilitated by the parallel tendency of the major central political institutions to perform themselves directly the major functions of political aggregation.

IV

These various characteristics of modern political systems tended, of course, to develop gradually in various modern regimes. These characteristics developed in the wider frame-
work of social, economic and cultural modernization. The combined impact of these conditions and of the basic characteristics of modern political systems gave rise to continuous generation of new types of political demands and organizations, which the central political institutions have had to absorb.

At different stages of the development of modern political systems, there have developed different problems which became important and different types of organizational frameworks through which such problems were dealt with. Thus at certain stages of modernization, the problem of suffrage and of the definition of the new political community, of attainment of its independence, assumed most central importance. In other
spheres or at other stages, there were mainly problems of religious toleration or of so-called secularization of culture that were most prominent. While still in other stages or in other phases of modernization the economic and social problems as well as problems of organization were most pertinent. The development of each of these problems was usually connected with the entrance of different new groups and strata into the political arena.

The nature of their major problems as well as of the various groups which become involved in them at any given stage has greatly influenced, as we shall see, the ways in which political demands and concentration became articulated and
organized, the degrees to which they could be subsumed under broader policy-orientations.

But perhaps the most important aspect of this question to bear in mind is that within any modern political system new problems and forms of political organization tend to develop continuously and new groups are continuously drawn into the central political orbit.

V

Hence, the central problem of political modernization is the ability of any system to adapt itself to these changing demands, to absorb them in terms of policy-making and to assure its own continuity in the face of continuous new demands.
and new forms of political organization.

Modern political systems are then faced not only, as any other political system, with the problem of how to maintain in general some balance between political demands and policies, but also with the problem of how to maintain such a balance through the absorption of demands and patterns of political organization which are, potentially at least, continuously changing.

In other words, political modernization creates in its wake problems of sustained political growth as its central problem. The ability to deal with continuous changes in political demands is the crucial test of such sustained polit-
ical growth of political development and is the crucial focus of modern political systems or of political modernisation.

It is true that such a modern system may retard further political modernisation - but this does not mean that it is necessarily a non-modern system. There is a basic difference between, let us say, pre-1950's Nepal and Franco's Spain or even Salazar's Portugal. This difference lies in the fact that the last try to suppress or manipulate political demands which are to some extent rooted in the basic social characteristics of the system but to which it does deny free political expression - i.e. expression in terms of articulate demands made on the central political authorities for formulation of
policies and for participation in the ultimate decision making.

In a "traditional" system, on the other hand, the problem does not exist in this sense because various groups and strata do not evince, on the whole, such orientations.

VI

Although the propensity to generate changes and also to some extent to absorb them is built into the institutional structure of modern political systems, the capacity to deal with such changes effectively varies greatly between different modern regimes.

The history of modern political systems is, of course, full of cases of unsuccessful adaptation, or of lack of
adaptation of existing political structures to new types of political demands and organization. In such cases the capacity for continuous political growth and for continuous sustenance of such growth may be blocked or impaired.

Such impairment of political growth or development may become manifest either in the non-ability of the various groups to formulate their demands in an articulated way, in the non-provision of resources by various groups to the political elites and institutions or by the development of too intensive demands which the existing institutions cannot absorb.

The "external" manifestations of such blocking are usually some type of political "eruptions", i.e. of more or less
violent outbreaks of political activities and development of symbols which are oriented against the existing system and its symbols.

The more "primitive" types of such eruptions - various mob activities and outbursts - develop when there are no elites available which are able to organize and articulate the potential political demands of different groups.

The more articulated types of such eruptions are usually very closely related to, or manifest in the development of some types of organized political activity which are, however, not in accord with the frameworks and premises of the existing parties and political institutions, and whose leaders do
not find a way to integrate their demands within the frame-
work of these parties and institutions or in the lack of
integration of interest groups into any wider common frame-
work, or the non-institutionalism of social movements within
the framework of parties and policy making.

Insofar as such eruptions are not merely transitory
their structural outcomes may cause the disintegration of a
given political system or the successful suppression, by the
rulers, of the new political demands and organization to a
level (sometimes the former level, sometimes a somewhat new
level) with which they and the political institutions are
capable of dealing.
In principle any modern political system can deal with the problem of absorbing change in several different ways:

One such way is to attempt to minimise the development of any changes which would generate new political demands and patterns of development.

The second is to control and manipulate such changes and their political expressions within relatively strict limits imposed by the rulers.

The third is to absorb (obviously within certain - but relatively feasible and changing - limits) such new demands and organizations.

Obviously, in any concrete regime there always exists some
mixture of these different attitudes to political change, but
the nature of this mixture varies between different regimes
and different regimes vary as to the relative predominance of
each of them.

VIII

Within "constitutional" and democratic systems (many
of which have developed from more "traditional" centralized
oligarchic regimes), the capacity to absorb changing political
demands and organizations usually is not a fully conscious pol-
itical goal but it has been rather attained - insofar as it

5. See: C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and
Democracy, Boston 1950
H. Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern
Government, New York 1949
S. Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties,
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press 1956.
S.M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960
S.H. Beer & A.B. Ulam (eds.) Patterns of
Government, The Major Political Systems
is attained - through the pliability, flexibility of the
political institutions and through the sensitivity of the major
political and social elites to the continuously changing demands
and forms of political organization. Although obviously the
rulers and those who compete for the ruling positions initiate
political reforms and changes and articulate the major policies,
yet the initial crucial impetus to such changes usually comes
in these regimes from within the fold of various social, pro-
fessional or cultural groups, from different interest groups,
social movements, from the more diffuse general public opinion,
and from the political elites which appeal to such groups,
compete for their support and attempt to integrate them in the
framework of political parties.

The varied impetuses become articulated as political demands through the active participation and articulation of the various competing elites into various, often innovating, policies and into new institutional frameworks.

In this way, political innovations tend in these regimes to be initiated and articulated by political leadership (be it the leadership of a party or of a more independent group) and by different parties which absorb the impulses for change from within social groups and strata, and which mobilize wider support for various goals and policies.
The major areas of political decision making and of institutionalization of political changes and innovations are usually centered, at least formally, in the legislature, in the executive acting with the legislature and also, in the bureaucracy. It is in these more central organs in which the major policies are, if not decided on, at least fully and publicly articulated, presented and discussed.

The importance both of mass parties and bureaucracies as arenas of decision making has been growing continuously with growing differentiation of the social structure and with continuous modernization; with the growth of complex social and
and economic problems on the one hand and with growing political mobilisation of the wider masses on the other hand; and many crucial political decisions and functions have become concentrated within them in all modern regimes, constitutional or totalitarian.

But in the constitutional regimes neither the parties nor the bureaucracy have become the only areas of political discussion, innovation, and decision making, and executive and legislative organs continued to maintain some of their - at least symbolic - positions of control, as the main frameworks of independent public opinion and leadership, and as the main areas in which political innovation became institutionalized.
The innovating ability of the democratic elites and the possibility of institutionalizing various innovations were to no small degree dependent on the ability of the parties and their leadership to integrate various diverging interest groups, and to institutionalize the more intensive demands and orientations of social movements and hence also on the continuous existence and political ability of some independent leadership and public opinion.

The various eruptions to which these regimes were prone tended mostly to develop insofar as the parties were not able to assure, within their frameworks, such aggregation of interest groups and social movements.
The nature and organizational contents of the eruptions which tend to develop in the constitutional regimes differ greatly according to the level of differentiation of the social structure and of the extension of political participation of the broader social groups within it.

Thus in the early stages of modernization, when these regimes were ruled by relatively small oligarchies and when political participation and suffrage were limited, most of the eruptions took on the form of relatively unorganized, highly activistic, movements and outlines oriented either at the attainment of immediate needs or to the obtaining of political rights and inclusion in the body politic.
With growing extension of social differentiation and political participation, there tended to develop more organized eruptions which became mostly organized in various social movements or violent interest groups.

This tendency within these regimes to the development of more organized eruptions is rooted in the fact that by their very nature such regimes encourage certain levels of articulation and aggregation of political demands and of mobilization and organisation of political support. The eruptions that tend to develop within these regimes derive their strength more

from the lack of absorption of such demands by the existing political institution than from the non-availability of any type of leadership to organize and articulate such demands, although in some instances - especially, but not only, in the initial stages of modernization - cases of lack of any adequate leadership, of erosion of the active political leadership, may also develop.

The eruptions which developed in these regimes may have been absorbed by them - as was the case in England, the United States, Scandinavia, Holland, Switzerland to some extent, in Belgium and Uruguay - while others may give rise to disruptions of the system and its change into other types of
systems as was the case in Italy, Germany, and to some extent in France before the Fourth Republic, and in many Latin American countries.

IX

The patterns of absorption of political change within totalitarian regimes are, of course, different from those of the constitutional (multi-party) ones. In the totalitarian regimes, political, social and economic change are consciously and deliberately fostered and directed by the political elite which, at the same time, attempts to minimise the autonomous

political expression of various social groups and their political reaction to the changes initiated by the elite. The expression of political demands of these various groups is carefully moulded by the rulers within organisations over which they attempt to maintain almost complete control and any attempts to break through this control is looked upon by them as a very grave political aberration.

The various social changes here are formulated as political goals of the regime and their political contents and expression are set and controlled by the political elite.

Thus these regimes are characterised both by direction, manipulation and control of change by the ruling elite and by
the minimization of the actual political expressions of the reactions of various groups to such changes.

The major media of political modernization, innovation and decision making are here the party and the party leadership and to some extent the bureaucracy, while the legislature performs purely ritual functions and the executive (as distinct from the party leadership), although important in several aspects, plays mainly only a secondary, routine, role. Although the relations between the party and the bureaucracy are, in these regimes, often delicate and precarious, yet it is through the juxtaposition of these two that the major impetus to change, as well as the control and manipulation of its expressions are
organized and institutionalized. The party leadership and the
party tend usually to serve as the major centers of innovation
and of active manipulation and mobilization of political support,
while the bureaucracy tends more to deal with the "routine"
administration of the new conditions generated by the changes
initiated by the political leadership and the party.

The continuity of such fostered change and the regime's
ability to control it are closely connected with the close
interweaving of various interest groups and of (very often non-
existent or suppressed) social movements in the monolithic party
framework. The almost total integration of interest groups
and of the nuclei of social movements or public opinion in the
party or their control by the bureaucracy is of crucial importance for the ability of the elite to manipulate and control the political expression of change. Any attempt on behalf of such groups to more autonomous public debate or presentation of their demands is usually envisaged as a very serious potential threat to the regime, as potential breeding ground for eruption and hence gives rise to many repressive measures.

The continuity of these regimes is greatly dependent on the maintenance of a balance between the repressive measures aimed at the minimisation of such autonomous political expression and the flexibility and ability of the ruling elite to aggregate changing demands and orientations into the framework of the
party and the bureaucracy, without at the same time allowing
them more autonomous forms of expression.

The eruptions that tend to develop in these regimes are
much less organized than those that develop in the constitution-
al regimes. They take here the form of mob activities and
outbreaks, of "subversive" clique activities of different
interest groups or of some outbursts of "free" public opinion
or of underground nuclei or remnants of social movements.

These regimes may also be threatened by the potentially "secess-
ional" or usurpational tendencies of their apparatus - be they
the army, the secret police, some parts of the bureaucracy or
even regional sectors of the party. But by their very nature
these regimes do not engender the development of the more
organized and articulated forms of eruption and political act-
ivities. As until now we did not have any examples of internal
systematic changes of totalitarian regimes except under the
impact of defeat in war, it is impossible to designate either
the exact range of the absorptive capacity or the types of re-
gimes which may succeed them.

X

Seemingly similar, but in many crucial aspects, different

attitudes to change can be found in those regimes like Turkey or Mexico in which new, modern or modernizing regimes were established through a revolutionary group or congeries of groups which evolved into a full fledged party with relatively strong monolithic tendencies, and which attempted to direct social and political changes into certain well-defined channels. But their goals of social, economic, or political change were usually less far-reaching and disruptive of previous conditions than those of the totalitarian regimes, while politically the internal structure of the parties was also to some extent (especially in Mexico) less monolithic than in totalitarian regimes.

The party and to some extent the executive served here as
the main foci of political decision making and of political innovation. Parties were the main foci of political and often social innovation, of the formulation of various policies which aimed at cliques and of mobilization of support for new policies.

At the same time, however, these parties did not aim or succeed in effecting a close and monolithic integration of various groups, movements and independent public opinion and in the total negation of their autonomous political expression. Usually they allowed - whether willingly or unwillingly - some such expression. Hence there developed within them some recourse to the legislative and to the executive as media of political discourse, innovation and decision making, and to the bureau-
cracy as an important, and to some extent, autonomous instrument of implementation and execution of such policies.

In later stages of development these characteristics enabled an increase in the importance of bureaucracy and even of the legislature as media of political decision making and innovation.

A different constellation of attitudes to change and structural arrangements can be seen among semi-autocratic or autocratic (civil or military) dictatorships which have developed in different countries and especially in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period, in some Middle Eastern
countries, and to some extent in Latin America. In many ways they were akin to the more traditional autocracies, although here there was also official emphasis on some change — on what might be called technical modernization, especially modernization in military and technical fields. But the whole outlook and orientation of the ruling elite was here usually very conservative, with a much stronger emphasis on the maintenance of the prevailing social structure, even if connected with some changes in the composition of the bureaucracy and

some subelite groups.

Hence here we find that executives and "conservative" bureaucracies were much more predominant in the political process and in political decision making than parties and the parties that did develop were used (with different degrees of success) by the executive and bureaucracy and the military mainly as instruments of mobilization of some limited political support from among different social groups, as additional arenas of political patronage and of control of such groups and but rarely as agents of social-political change and innovation.

Hence it were the executive and conservative bureaucracy that usually constitute in these regimes the main arenas of
decision making and political innovation.

The capacity of these regimes to absorb political changes has been usually small. Much of the efforts of the rulers were directed towards keeping a relatively low level of political demands and articulation, and to the maintenance of the relative preponderance of interest groups (as against social movements, free public opinion and parties) as the main organs of political articulation, and to the aggregation within the bureaucracy of many of the demands of the various interest groups.

The eruptions that tend to develop in these regimes may take on a great variety of forms ranging from mob outbreaks up
to the more organized forms of social movements, parties and public opinion.

Insofar as these eruptions were not absorbed with the pre-existing system or suppressed by the elite, they gave rise to changes of the regimes.

Some such changes may have given rise to a type of regime not greatly different from the preceding one, while others may have given rise to other types of regimes - mainly to some variants of the one party regime or in very exceptional cases, to constitutional ones.

III

At the end of the scale of modern regimes from the point
of view of attitudes to change we find the semi-autocratic
regimes such as the more traditional regimes of the 19th
century or, in the 20th century, the Franco and Salazar
(10) regimes. These regimes attempt to minimize the development
of social and political changes - even to the extent of the
impediment of the full development of the major character-
istics of modern political system, i.e. in terms of extension
of suffrage, spread of political power, etc.

They are characterized by the predominance of the execut-

ch. 8 and 27; E.J. Hughes, *Report from Spain*, New York, 1947;
ive and the bureaucracy and by the small importance of both legislative bodies and parties as arenas of political process, innovation and decision making. In these regimes the bureaucracy and executive tend to deal directly with various interest groups and tend to look askance on attempts to integrate such interest groups into any wider, active party political frameworks; they attempt to suppress any social movements and more independent expressions of public opinion, and employ towards them various repressive measures, so as to minimize the possibilities of their developing into active and highly articulated political elements and organizations.

These measures of control are often effected not through
the mobilization of support by a monopolistic party, but
mainly through attempts not to raise the level of political
demands and to minimize the possibility of the development of
free expression and articulation of such demands. However,
they can but rarely entirely succeed in these endeavors.

Because of their need for some free resources and political
support, they usually have to countenance some sort of polit-
cial organizations and some - even if limited - forms of
public opinion. Hence, the eruptions which tend to develop
may take the form not only of mob outbreaks, but also of more
organized and articulated forms of political activity and of
expression of public opinion.
The concrete forms of such eruptions depend here greatly on the level of differentiation of the social structure as well as on the extent to which the existing political institutions allow some political organization and expression.

The absorptive capacity of these regimes has, on the whole, been a rather limited one — although many of them have successfully maintained themselves for long periods of time.

Under the impact of the more violent eruptions they have become often transformed into other types of regimes — whether constitutional, totalitarian or some other types which will be shortly discussed.
The various New States, especially the post-colonial ones, hold a rather special position from the point of view of their attitudes towards change and the ability to absorb it.

Truly enough within the New States there tend to develop a great variety of regimes - comprising according to Shils' classification, the traditional oligarchy, various types of modernizing oligarchies (civil or military), totalitarian regimes and tutelary democracies - and resembling in many ways some of the types of regimes described above.

But whatever the differences between them, most of the New States - especially those which have developed from former colonial states - tend to evince, especially in the initial stages of their development, some common characteristics or problems with relation to change.

Among most of them (with the partial exception of those ruled by traditional oligarchies) the emphasis on change, progress, and economic development is one of the main tenets of their political and ideological orientations. But at the same time, their institutional capacity to absorb changes may be disproportionately small to their aspirations for change, although it necessarily greatly differs among the different
New States according to varied conditions - some of which will be discussed later.

This strong emphasis on change is usually connected in most of these states with the relatively great importance - especially in initial phases - of parties as centers of political innovation, and as the main organs, together with the executive, of political decision making, through which attempts are made to institutionalize the manifold changes to which they aspire.

But the ability of these regimes to implement these various changes is often limited and very often they are barely able to maintain their own continuity and stability. This rel-
atively small extent of institutional ability to absorb change develops insofar as basic political symbols and administrative and political frameworks are weak, and various autonomous interest groups are weak and underdeveloped.

This discrepancy between the strong emphasis on change and the relative weakness of the institutional frameworks which have to absorb them can be seen in the nature of the eruptions which tend to develop in these regimes.

These eruptions are characterized by a combination of what may be called very primitive outbreaks and outbursts.

on the one hand, with the much more organized and articulated eruptions in the form of organized social and political movements,
on the other hand. The exact nature, scope and persistence of these eruptions, as well as the regime's ability to absorb them, varies greatly between these various New States and naturally may greatly influence their stability and continuity.

Here of central importance is the fact that the rulers of these countries are faced - more than rulers of other types of regimes hitherto discussed - with the simultaneous development of several different problems, the solution of which may greatly influence the extent of institutionalization of stable modern political systems. The rulers of these regimes are
faced first, with the problem of creation and spread of a general identification with the new polity, with the maintenance of general, continuous interest in different complex political issues and problems and with mobilisation of support for its own programme; second, with maintaining themselves in power and third, with finding adequate ways and means of solving various outstanding social, economic and political problems which are or appear of foremost importance to them.

Insofar as the development of these various aspects of political orientations reinforce one another, the prospects for the development of a realistic and critical attitude towards political issues and of the possibility of getting political
support in terms of realistic programmes are relatively great.

But insofar as these different political orientations contra-

dict one another - and such a possibility can be seen as to

some extent inherent in some of the basic conditions of these

states - various unrealistic and "destructive" attitudes

towards political life may easily develop and the different

types of eruptions which were analyzed above can easily develop.

This special constellation of conditions in the New States,

the lack or weakness of long-standing political frameworks, the

relatively high level of political demands, the possible

cleavages within the elites in their pursuit of popular

support may easily create conditions under which the elites
may be unable to assure the initial institutionalisation of political frameworks capable of absorption of change and may give way to regimes with a lower level of such ability.

The crucial stage for all these regimes comes when various new political forces - i.e., forces not fully represented by the original nationalist elite - be they regional, trade-union, new rural leaders - emerge, often through the policies of development of the nationalist elites, and create, through their demands, potential splits within the elite and strains on the working of the central institutions. In some cases,

have precipitated a downfall of the initial regime; in others, like India, Ceylon, Nigeria, Guinea and Tunisia, they are still attempting to absorb these new groups and demands within the initial frameworks.

XIV

The preceding analysis, preliminary as it has been, has indicated some of the major problems in the comparative analysis of political modernisation. First it has shown that the process of political modernisation can take on, within the framework of the basic common characteristics

outlined above, a great variety of institutional and structural forms. Second, this analysis has also shown that various modern or modernising political regimes do not only differ in various structural-institutional arrangements, but evince also great differences in their attitudes to change and in their ability to absorb continuous change within their institutional frameworks. We have then to see whether it is possible to explain, first, this variety of structural forms of political modernisation, and second, whether there exist any relations between some aspects of this structural variety on the one hand and the attitudes to change and the constitutional ability to absorb change on the other hand.
From this point of view, it might be useful to analyse the process of modernisation and of the establishment of modern political frameworks as a social process, and especially as a continuous process of interaction between what has been called "modernising" elites and wider groups and strata of the population.

Perhaps the most important concept here is that of the modernising elite - a concept which recognises the fact that it is some more active group or groups which provides at least the initial push to modernisation in different institutional spheres.

This approach does basically assume — although the full implications of this assumption have not been made explicit — that the process of modernisation is, like many other types of creation of new institutional structures, borne or developed by "charismatic" groups or personalities — even if the nature of its characteristics differ greatly from those of older, "classical" religious types of charisms, and that what may be called the institutionalisation of modernisation is not unlike the various processes of routinisation of charisms which were analysed by Weber.

In order to be able to understand the process of modernisation, the institutionalisation of modern frameworks, it is
important to analyse the relations between the innovating

groups and the broader institutional setting, and especially
	heir relations to the pre-existing institutional structure

and the social orientations of those elites which held the

power positions within it, on the one hand, and to the broader

groups and strata of the society - those groups and strata

which have to provide the basic resources, be they manpower,

labour resources, social or political support for implementation

of more differentiated, modern goals - on the other hand.

Accordingly it might be worth while to attempt to explain

the structural differences attendant on processes of modernis-
ation in different societies by the differences in the orientations and goals of the major modernising elites on the one hand and in the modernising tendencies and orientations of the broader social strata on the other. In other words, we may attempt to see to what extent various modernising elites and social groups may evince different attitudes to change and propensities to develop or have recourse to different organisational structures.

Thus it seems that ruling traditional autocratic or oligarchic elites which are interested to minimise change or to limit it mostly to technical spheres tend to use mostly the executive branch of the government and a relatively conserv-
ative bureaucracy and to limit, insofar as possible, the
development of free organs public opinion and leadership, or
legislative organs or of widespread parties.

Insofar as they are interested in promoting controlled
change but at the same time to minimise the political parti-
cipation and mobilisation of wider groups they will attempt to
develop and use continuously expanding and modernised bureau-
cracies but to limit the development of parties and autonomous
(17)
legislative bodies.

17. The early Japanese experience is very instructive from
this point of view. Se H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a
Modern State, New York, Institute of Public Relations, 1940,
and R.N. Bellah, "Values and Social Change in Modern Japan" in
Asian Cultural Studies, No. 3, Studies on Modernisation of
Japan, Intern. It may be compared with the German Imperial
experience under Bismarck.
Non-autocratic elites - whether oligarchic or recruited from wider groups and strata and having a more flexible attitude to change, i.e., being committed to the implementation of various differentiated goals, such as economic advancement, cultural activities, extension of the suffrage etc.

have usually tended to have recourse to a greater variety of structural forms, to various organs of public opinion, to legislative groups and "cliques". With growing differentiation of the social structure they tend to expand their activities to bureaucracies and parties alike without however abandoning the other organs.

Revolutionary elites stemming usually from social movements
and aiming at institutionalising total change tend to develop,

above all, mass parties and to use also to some extent

bureaucracies.

XVI

A tentative parallel analysis may be attempted with regard
to the nature of articulation of political demands among
different types of groups and strata.

The most important conditions influencing the nature of
such articulation seem to be "closure" or traditionality of
these groups on the one hand and their placement within the
social structure, the extent of their internal cohesion and of
their interrelations with other strata on the other hand.
The more traditional and "closed" such groups are the less they are usually articulated politically and whatever political activities they undertake are in usually the form of intermittent interest or petitioning groups with direct relations to the executive or bureaucracy.

Insofar as social groups become internally more modernised and flexible they tend to develop more articulate, specialised, interests and organisations and also to evince certain propensities to participate in wider political frameworks and to develop some orientations to the central political institutions.

Insofar as their internal cohesion is small and they are
alienated from other strata and elites, then their ability to participate in wider frameworks tends to be relatively small and is usually limited only to intermittent participation in extremist social movements.

Insofar as their internal cohesion and attachment to other groups is relatively high, they might show a greater ability or propensity to participation and integration in such wider frameworks.

Both social movements and more diffuse public leadership tend to develop especially among various secondary elite groups and intellectuals who are caught in processes of change and differentiation and to some extent dislocated through
these processes. The extent of their propensity to become integrated into some existing or emerging wider frameworks or parties is also greatly dependent on the extent to which the groups from which they are recruited are cohesive and not alienated from one another.

The preceding analysis does also indicate some of the conditions of stability and continuity of modern or modernizing political systems.

It clearly indicates that such stability or continuity does not depend on any one structural form and is not confined to any such form. It depends rather on the extent of compatibility between the types of structural organisations used
and developed by the elites and the levels and types of political articulation of the broader groups and strata of the society.

The stability or continuity of different modern political regimes can be maintained on different levels of institutional ability to absorb change, ranging from the most minimal extent of such ability up to most flexible and differentiated modern systems, and on each such level it is connected with a different constellation of structural forms within the central political institutions, of ways of aggregation of political interests and orientations and of articulation of political activities and demands.
On the other hand, the tendencies to instability, to out-
break of eruptions and transformations of modern regimes is
usually manifest in the lack of compatibility between the
types of structural organisations used by the rulers and the
levels of political articulation of broader groups and strata.
Such lack of compatibility may also develop on different levels
of institutional ability to absorb change and take on different
structural forms.

The focus of such compatibility is the articulation and
formulation of political demands on the one hand and the ability
of the elites and political frameworks to absorb such demands in
terms of policies on the other. It is within this context
that aggregation of diverse political interests and orientations in political parties or other organisations and the ability of different elites to subsume such various interests in terms of effective policies becomes crucially important.

XVII

But whatever these structural forms that tend to develop in modern regimes their stability is greatly influenced both by some "structural" aspects of the central political institutions and by broader social conditions - especially by some aspects of the interrelation between the modernising elites on the one hand and the broader groups of the society on the other hand.
The most important structural aspect of central institutions which influences the stability of modern or modernising regimes is the development of some ability of institutionalising the various impetus to political change which tend always to develop with continuing modernisation.

The preceding analysis indicates, first, that while impetus to political change and innovation can be located in all the different types of political organisations and institutions, there are some forms of political organizations which seem to be especially prone to become the force of such innovations and of the institutionalization of political change. One such arena of political innovation is the political party, especially
a party which develops from a social movement and within which different interest groups are integrated through the activities of a central political leadership and elites. The leaders of such parties are committed to some goals of change and they have to attempt to mobilize broad support and to integrate different interest groups and broader public opinion so as to assure the maximization of such support.

A second important locus of impending impetus to change and political innovations may come from what has been called independent leadership and public opinion, ranging from relatively organized political leadership and social, political, professional, and cultural elites to different types of more
While such leadership may be found in any and every form of political organization, it tends to direct some at least of its activities and innovating impulses to parties and to representative-legislative frameworks.

However, the possibility of the institutionalization of changes and of the absorption of such changes and innovations is greatly dependent on the degree to which the innovating groups and organizations become closely related to the executive and bureaucracy and are able to develop such frameworks and work within them.

It is the bureaucracy and the executive that provide some
of the indispensable frameworks for the provision of administrative services to the various groups and strata in the population, for the regulation of political processes and for the maintenance of continuity of political frameworks.

Moreover, as the executive usually serves also as the symbol of political community, it plays therefore a very important part in the assurance of the continuity of the political system.

Hence, the possibility of some continuous institutionalization of political innovation of absorption of changing political demands and organisations, which constitutes, as we have seen, the crucial test of political modernization, is greatly dependent on the extent to which these frameworks are continuously
functioning and some continuous and viable modus vivendi between them and the more "innovating" organisations and agencies can be established.

The establishment of such modus vivendi greatly depends on the one hand on the aggregation of different types of interest groups, social movements in the wider framework of different parties or other groups which perform such functions. On the other hand, the establishment of such modus vivendi between the different political institutions greatly facilitates the ability of the political elites to effect some integration of interests and social movements within the framework of political parties or party-line organisations.
The nature of such aggregation and subsumption of varied interests and demands under some general policy principles varies greatly between different types of regimes and at different stages of their development, but some such integration of diverse political interests and activities and organization within the frameworks of "party-political" activities constitutes a basic prerequisite of the stability or continuity of any modern political system.

Each of these regimes has developed, as we have seen, some mechanism through which it attempted to deal with change according to its own basic attitudes and to maintain, in this way, its own continuity. The exact nature of these mechanisms
varied, as we have indicated, between the different regimes as did also their relative success in absorbing changes according to their premises and in maintaining their own continuity.

Contrariwise, the lack of ability of elites - and of institutional frameworks - to integrate and aggregate the political demands of various groups would often spell the possibility of outbreaks of eruptions and of ultimate breakdown of a regime.

But the stability and continuity of modern or modernising political systems is also greatly influenced by broader social conditions and especially by some of the interrelations between
the modernising elites and the broader strata of the population.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go in detail into this problem, which anyhow would necessitate much new research, but some preliminary indications might be not out of place.

The continuity and stability of modern regimes is greatly dependent first, on the general level of development of "internal" modernisation of the different strata which take part in the process of modernisation and of their internal cohesion.

Second, it is dependent on the extent of compatibility or affinity between the modernising elites and the major social strata.

The extent of such compatibility and affinity between the
modernisation elites and the major groups and strata as well as the structure, propensity of modernisation, and cohesion of the major strata, greatly influence the patterns of organisation of political activities and demands as well as the concomitant eruptions that tend to develop throughout the process of modernisation.

Insofar as there exists some such affinity, even if it is a rather passive one, between the modernising elite and the major groups and strata, then the process of political modernisation tends to develop relatively smoothly with but little eruptions.

Under such conditions the ability of the major elites to aggregate various interest groups into some wider types of
political organisation and to institutionalise the different types of political demands and political organisation is relatively high.

The stronger and more cohesive internally are the major strata, and the more they are able to participate in the process of modernisation in various institutional spheres, the greater is, on the one hand, the extent of resources which they are able to put at the disposal of various modern institutions and organisations, on the other also their ability to articulate realistic political demands and to influence the formulation of major political goals and policies by the elites.

Insofar as the elites are more set on modernisation then
the broader groups and strata but there still exists some affinity between them, then the range of change which the regime is capable of absorbing will usually be smaller but it may still be able to develop relatively smoothly.

The smaller such affinity and the more set are the elites on a definite course of modernisation the more would they have to take recourse to coercive measures.

Insofar as both the elites and the broader groups evince only a limited interest in modernisation the stability of the regimes can be maintained on a relatively low level of absorption of change.

Insofar as there exists or develops an extreme lack of
affinity between the modernising elites and the modernising tendencies of broader groups and strata and the institutional settings are not able to foster some such affinity and the elites would not be able to aggregate the political demands of the broader groups.

In such cases, the various groups and strata tend, on the one hand, to develop discrete interest groups which cannot be easily integrated into any order while the other tend also to develop various extreme social movements which do not evince a strong tendency to institutionalisation of their demands within the existing political framework.

Under these latter conditions attempts may be made by some
such extreme elites to "smash" the existing interest group

and/or to integrate the newly emerging strata into a monolithic

framework.

In general, such conditions may easily give rise to a great

variety of eruptions - either eruptions which become, as it

were, thresholds for new types of regimes or which may easily

create a condition of continuous semi-institutionalized instab-

ility and stagnation.

The preceding analysis has necessarily been preliminary and
tentative but it might perhaps indicate some possibilities of

comparative research in the field of modernisation.