Breakdowns of Modernization

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I

The optimism which guided much of the concern with and many of the studies of underdeveloped areas or New Nations and which assumed that these countries were advancing—even if slowly and intermittently—towards full-fledged modernization and continuous growth has lately given way to a much more cautious and even pessimistic view. This pessimism has been mainly due to the fact that in many New Nations where initially modern frameworks were established in different institutional fields, especially in the political one, the progress towards modernization was not only slow but these constitutional regimes faltered, giving way, in their place, to various autocratic and authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Sudan are perhaps the most important recent examples of this trend.

1. On Indonesia see:
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of the social processes in these countries which led to these changes, to what may be called breakdowns in their political modernization.

II

The significant characteristic of the development of these countries is not that in these cases the "take-off" from a traditional setting to modernity did not fully materialize. Other cases—Ethiopia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, where premodern, "traditional" regimes or societies are still predominant are better instances of slow or unsuccessful take-off to modernity. The reforms or attempts at modernization which are being attempted in such countries are interwoven within the framework


On B Res:

of relatively traditional societies and political systems and often aim
more at reviving these systems rather than at creating conditions for
full-fledged modernization.

But in almost all of the countries discussed here (Indonesia, Burma,
etc.) attempts were made to establish modern political and social frame-
works and institutions, and many aspects or characteristics of such insti-
tutions—be they constitutions, modern bureaucratic administrations,

1. (cont'd.) Wallinsky, L., Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960,

Badley, John H., "Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two Political
Traditions," Asian Survey, III, no. 2 (February 1963), pp. 89-96

On Pakistan:

Sayeed, K.B., Pakistan: The Formative Phase, (Karachi: Pakistan
Publishing House, 1960)

Newman, K.J., "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes," Pacific
Affairs, XXXII, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 10-42.

Sayeed, K.B., "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan,"

Wheeler, R., "Pakistan, New Constitution, Old Issues," Asian Survey,


Callard, K., Pakistan: a Political Study (New York: McMillen, 1957).
political parties, or modern economic enterprises were initially
established. Similarly, many important indices of modernization-
be they weakening of various traditional frameworks, urbanization,
literacy exposure to mass media, some modernization of the occupa-
tional structure, the development of some modern forms of political
organization like interest groups and parties—could be found, to
some extent at least, continuously existing in these societies. 2

Although large parts of these societies are still traditional in the
sense of being confined to relatively close, autarchic units yet they
have been becoming rapidly "de-traditionalized" in many important as-
pacts. Growing parts of these societies are continuously drawn into
wider, more differentiated institutional frameworks. And yet, 'in these

2. On the plural concepts of modernization as used or implied in the
present analysis see:
E. 5enscheidt, S.N., "Bureaucracy and Political Development" in
La Polambra, J. (ed). Bureaucracy and Political Development,
Princeton, Princeton Lin. Press (forthcoming)
M. Eisenstadt, S.N., Modernization, Diversity and Growth, (forthcoming)
See also: Lerner, D., The Passing of Traditional Society ("The Free Press:195").
societies all these developments did not give rise to the development, especially in the political field, of a viable modern institutional system capable of absorbing continuously changing diversified problems (and demands). Many such institutional frameworks which were established in the initial period of modernization became disorganized and unable to function, giving place to the less differentiated, usually more autocratic or authoritarian regimes. In some of these cases, like Pakistan and perhaps Sudan, these "reversals" in the political field did not undermine the possibilities of some economic growth and may have even facilitated it. In others, like Indonesia, and seemingly also Burma, the breakdown of the constitutional regimes was paralleled by economic stagnation.

III

but although most of these societies have by now "reverted," as it were, to a level of social and especially political institutions which
can be—as we shall see—seen as less flexible or differentiated
than that at which they presumably started in their initial stages of
modernization, yet in almost none of them did there take place a com-
plete reversal to truly traditional types of central social institutions.

This is manifest in several interconnected ways. Although in many
cases the new autocratic or authoritarian elites behave as if in the
"traditional" (whether colonial—as in Pakistan, or "pre-colonial"
regal—like in Burma) manner, or attempt to utilize traditional symbols
and attitudes—they were not able or perhaps even willing to revert
entirely to a traditional, premodern political structure. Not only
are "external"—but still important symbols of modernity—such as
universal suffrage (even if suspended) some modern legal frameworks—
were, officially at least, maintained. What is even more important is
that these new rulers of elites portrayed their own legitimation in
secularized, modern, terms and symbols—in terms or symbols of
social movements or of legal rationality and efficiency rather than in terms of purely traditional values.

This is true even in those cases, as that of Pakistan, where the emphasis on some aspects of the Islamic tradition has been relatively strong or where, as in Indonesia, the search for new symbols or ideology was strongly couched in traditional terms.

Whatever accountability the new rulers of these societies evinced towards their subjects was not usually couched in terms of the older "religious" mandate of the ruler but mainly in terms of more modern values or charisms in which, in principle at least, the citizens participated or shared with the rulers. Whatever the limitations on political activities these regimes may have attempted to establish, they did not abandon the idea of the citizen as distinct from the older (traditional and colonial) idea of a subject.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) See, for instance:
Similarly, however anti-Western or anti-Capitalist the ideologies of these regimes were and however much they attempted to close off their countries from outside influence—they did not entirely negate modernity. Rather, they attempted to discover or rediscover some synthesis between what they thought might be the "basic," undiluted by accidents of history or by materialistic orientations, values and elements of both their own tradition and that of modernity.

Truly enough such attempts or formulations may have been pure utopian expressions of pious intentions without the ability or will to pay any institutional price demanded for their implementations.

But however actually stagnant or inefficient many of the institutional frameworks of these societies may have been before or become after the


On Pakistan see:
See the discussion between L.A. Shervani and D.P. Singhal in
changes in their regimes they have but rarely set themselves actively against the expansion of all of the social aspects or processes of modernization such as education, economic development and industrialization.

Although some of the polices of the new elites may result in the return of some parts at least of the more traditional social structure (i.e., in some greater emphasis on the integration of rural communities) others are very often consciously aiming at the continuous expansion of varied aspects of modernization. Even in the rural communities some emphasis on their modernization—whether in the form of Pakistan's basic democracies or of community development in general can usually be found.

Thus we do not have here cases of non-development of modernization, or a lack of "take-off" to modernization, but rather of breakdown of some...
(especially political) modern institutions—-even if in the cases mentioned
above this breakdown took place in relatively early phases of modernization.

From this point of view these developments are not entirely dissimilar
from others in the history of development of modern societies—which
have been perhaps recently forgotten although some of them did form, in
their time, foci of both public interest and sociological analysis.

The case of the initial modernization of China, so often used as a
negative example in comparison with the more successful initial modernization
of Japan comes here immediately to mind. Similarly, the long history of
several Latin American countries may come into the picture. Although in
many of the Latin American countries there developed over a very long time only

4. For one of the most pertinent statements of the problem, see:
Levy, Marion J., Jr., Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China
and Japan in Kuran, S., Moore, W., and Spencer, J., (eds.),
Economic Growth in Brazil, India, Japan, (Durham, N.C., Duke University

A recent survey is G.N. Beckman's The Modernization of China and Japan,
(New York: Harber & Row, 1963)
the very minimal structural or socio-demographic features of modernization,
in other cases, as in Chile and especially in pre-Peru Argentina—an
evident progress to modernization was halted or reversed.5

Lastly, the example of the rise of militarism in Japan and especially
of Fascism and Nazism in Europe in the twenties and thirties should also
be mentioned here as perhaps the most important case of break-down of

4. (cont’d.) See also: Li Chien-Shung, The Political History of China,
1840-1928, ed. and trans. by Sau-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls, (Princeton, N.J.:

5. On Argentina in the twenties and thirties see:
IV and V.

Also: Goletti, A., La Realidad Argentina en el Siglo XX, La Politica y
Los Partidos, (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ., 1961), esp. chps. IV, V, VI

A general survey can be found also in Argentina 1930-60, ed. SUR,
Buenos Aires 1961, esp. p II

See also: Bagà, Sergio, La Estructuración Economica en la Etapa Formative
de la Argentina Moderna, Desarrollo Economico, Buenos Aires, Vol. 1, No 2,
Jul-Sept. 1961, pp. 113-129
of modernization, at much more advanced levels of development.6

In all these cases we witness the breakdown of relatively differentiated and modern frameworks, the establishment of a less differentiated framework or the development of a long series of vicious circles of under-development, of blockages and eruptions leading often to institutionalized stagnation and instability. Thus all these developments took place within the frameworks of processes of modernization, as parts of these processes.

They can be seen as its pathologies, breakdowns or as in the case of Nazism attempts at what may be called demodernization—but not as cases of simple lack or of truly modernization.

6. SEE on Japan:

On Germany see Neumann, S., Germany- Changing Patterns and Lasting Problems, op. cit., pp. 354-394
What may be called the "external" story of all these cases is, on

the face of it, relatively simple and straightforward—and in very broad

outlines similar in most of these cases despite the great differences in
detail and setting.

One basic characteristic of this story is the development of con-
tinuous internal warfare and conflict between different groups wit in
the society, the development of extreme antagonism and cleave-
gages without
the possibility of finding any continuous and viable modus vivendi between
them. Unresolved conflicts over various issues—be they economic, regional,
cultural or ideological, or simple conflicts of narrow economic interests,
developed continuously among the most active or vocal groups in these
societies. These conflicts, the details of which have, of course, greatly
varied from case to case were also usually closely connected with continuous
economic crises and very often with growing uncontrollable inflation.
which were in their turn very often fed by these very continuous conflicts and by the lack of consensus and any clear policy of how to deal with them.

These processes, continuous strong conflicts and cleavages over a very great variety of issues, economic deterioration and the lack of any strong acceptable leadership which could enforce legitimate authority and regulate these conflicts and problems, together with the growing corruption and inefficiency of the bureaucracy (which went beyond the scope of 'traditional' corruption) have been often singled out for the explanation of the downfall of these regimes and as well of the establishment of the new, less differentiated, autocratic or authoritarian types of regimes. 7

While there can be no doubt that these explanations do at least

partially account for these developments in a way they do not go far enough. It is, of course, true that such conflicts did develop in these countries and that the existing political leadership was unable to deal with them. But why was it so? It is not the very existence of such conflicts or of bad economic conditions that is of crucial importance. Conflicts or economic problems of what may seem as initially alarming magnitudes did probably exist, and have been resolved, even if only partially, in other modern or modernizing countries. What is therefore of crucial importance is rather the fact that in the countries under consideration here these conflicts were not resolved or regulated and that because of this they spiralled into a continuous series of vicious circles which undermined the very stability and continuity of the emerging modern frameworks.

VI

In order to be able to explain why, in the countries studied here,
these conflicts were not solved, we might attempt first to analyze the

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nature of some of the major developments in several institutional spheres

in these societies.

This analysis will not go, at this stage, beyond an analytical
description of these developments and will not explore their causes.

But it will help, we hope, in articulating the problems to be explained.

Let us start with developments in the political sphere. The most
general trend that developed in the political sphere in these societies

was a marked discrepancy between the demands of different groups—parties,

cliques, bureaucracy, army, regional groups—and the responses and ability

of the central rulers to deal with these demands.

The levels of these demands were both higher or much lower (i.e., more

or less articulated) than the level of aggregation and policy-making within

the central institutions.8 In most of these cases the demands of the most

The terms "articulation," "aggregation," etc., are used here mostly as
social groups oscillated continuously between politically relatively
highly articulated types of demands as manifest in the formation of
varied interest groups, of social movements with a high level of political
intensity on the one hand and the more primitive, less articulated types
of demands manifest in direct pressures on the bureaucracy in petitioning
the local potentates (or bureaucracy) and central rulers and infrequent
mob outbreaks on the other hand.

The power position of the various groups making these varied demands
has greatly increased as a result of the processes of modernization and
they could no longer be suppressed and neglected, but at the same time
ways of integrating them in some orderly way were found.

There developed but few middle range institutional frameworks within
which these varied types of political demands could become regulated and

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3. (con.) in Almond, G. & Coleman, J. eds., The Politics of the Developing
Studies presented in this book contain excellent background material and
analysis for the problems discussed here.
translated into concrete policy demands and policies.

The leadership of the parties or of the varied movements was 

not able to aggregate these varied interests and political orienta-

tions in some relatively ordered way or to develop adequate policies 
able to deal with the different demands of the major groups and with 

major problems to which these demands were related.

The formal institutions appropriate for such aggregation and 
policy formulation did exist in these societies in the form of central 
executive, administrative and legislative organs on the one hand and 
of various parties on the other hand. But in their actual working 

these institutions were not able to perform effectively these functions.
On the other hand there did exist within these political systems some organs—such as organs of bureaucratic administration, of local government or traditional communal units which were able to deal with less articulated types of demands, and later on, after the overthrow of these regimes, became very often again (i.e., as they often were in the colonial or even pre-colonial times) very important foci of political processes and aggregation. But during the preceding period even their functioning was not very efficient because they were subordinate to the more differentiated but ineffective agencies, and were caught up, as it were, within the various uncertainties which developed within these agencies. Hence these organs—and especially the bureaucracy—became very often both inefficient and corrupted.9

Thus the most important characteristic of the political situation in

9. Bralbanti, R., "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," Public Administration,
these countries has been not the mere existence of numerous conflicts or
of different levels of articulation of demands or even the lack of full
coordination between these different levels—a situation which can be
easily found in relatively stable traditional regimes. In the societies
studied here, because of the push to modernization these different levels
of political demands and activities were not, as in many postmodern regimes,
kept in relatively segregated, even if interlocked, compartments but were
brought into relatively common frameworks of political process and decision-
making. At the same time within this framework there did not develop
adequate mechanisms and principles of aggregating them or of regulating
the conflicts attendant on their development. In other words, the new
values that many people wanted to realize in these societies demanded a
relatively high level of coordination of individuals' behavior and no

structure of power and organization linking these individuals and the
new, more articulated demands and activities has been created—and even
the older structure might have broken down.

VIII

A similar picture emerges if we examine the nature and scope of what
may be called eruptions and movements of protest that have developed in
these societies.

In terms of the contents of the symbols that have been developed or
taken over by these movements they were not necessarily different from the
whole range of such symbols that has developed during different periods
of stages of modernization in European, Asian and African countries.11

They ranged from nationalistic, anti-colonial, traditionalistic,

11. See, for a good collection of some of their ideologies:
ethnic, symbols, through symbols of social protest or economic deprivation up to various symbols of cultural renovation coined in anti-Western terms or in terms of religious and communal revivals.

They were probably—but not always and not necessarily—more extreme in the intensity of their protest than those that can be found in other, more sedate movements. But beyond this some other more crucial characteristics of these movements and symbols stand out.12 One was the relative closeness, separateness, and segregation of these different movements; second was their sectarian nature on the one hand and their intermittency and alternation between brief periods of highly intensive eruptions and long periods of stagnation and inactivity on the other hand.

Third, within many such sectarian and mutually hostile movements there often developed—on the same level of extremist articulation—a coalescence

of different, seemingly conflicting values or social orientations--such as
those of traditionalism and economic development or of traditionalism and
democracy. These different orientations were not usually organized or
coordinated in some way which would make them meaningful not only in terms
of the momentary situation but also in terms of some continuous activity, policy
formulation and implementation.

This was an important indicator of the lack of predisposition on the part of these various movements to become incorporated or transposed
into wider frameworks, parties, or informal organs of public opinion, and
of lack of adaption to such wider regulative frameworks. This lack of
predisposition on the part of the movements was often matched by the lack of
ability on the part of the ruling institutions to absorb these various symbols
and orientations into their own frameworks.

As a result of these characteristic, the movements of protest and of
of opposition in these countries oscillated between apathy, lack or with- drawal of the interest of wider groups and strata from the central institu-
tions on the one hand and very intensive outburst which made extreme de-
mands on these institutions, demands for total, immediate change of the regime or of the place of any given groups within this regime, on the other hand.

IX

A similar picture emerges if we analyze the characteristic of process or structure of communication within these societies.

One such characteristic has been the existence of different patterns of communication among different strata—the more traditional, closed patterns of communication within the confines of the villages and the more differen-
tiated, sophisticated systems of the central elites or urban groups. Second, the communicative structure in these societies was often characterized by the lack of what has been called "communicative mediators" or brokers between these dif-
different levels of communicative activities.\textsuperscript{13}

Thirdly, it was characterized by a continuous oscillation of wide groups and strata between communicative apathy towards the central institutions of the society on the one hand and predilection to mob excitement and

\textsuperscript{13} See:


On the structure of traditional communications see:


and:


The most comprehensive recent work is:

Pye, L.W. (ed.), \textit{Communication and Political Development}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), and especially the chapters by:

Shils, E., "Nemegone and Cadres in the Political Development of New States," pp. 64-78;

Hyman, H., \textit{Mass Media and Political Socialization, The Role of Patterns of Communication}, pp. 1-19;

Lerner, D., "Towards a Communication Theory of Modernization," pp. 327-351
activity and succumbance to agitation on the other hand. Fourthly, there
tended to develop in these societies vicious circles of over-sensitivity
to various mass-media and the lack of ability to absorb these stimuli in some
continuous and coherent way.

Thus, here, as in the political sphere, the most important character-
istic is not the mere existence of different levels or types of communication,
not even the relative weakness of some of the intermediary links between these
different levels—situation which was characteristic of many of the traditional
societies. Rather the crucial characteristic of the structure of communication
in these countries was the bringing together of these different types of
communicative behavior into a relatively common framework, their exposure to
similar or common stimuli without the development among them of some stable
patterns of receptivity to these stimuli.

The same situation can be, of course, found in the economic sphere.
proper. The major ills or economic problems of these societies were
due not only to low levels of development of their economies, to lack of
available skills of their depletion because of external events but above
all to the discrepancies between the push to modernization and the insti-
tutional ability to sustained growth, between the continuous disruption of the
traditional frameworks and the lack of possibility of finding adequate
outlets in the new modernize frameworks.

We see thus in all these institutional spheres a very similar situation—
a situation of bringing together of different groups of growing interdependence
and mutual awareness of these different groups but at the same time also the
lack of development of adequate new common norms which would be to some
extent at least be binding on these groups and which could help to reg-
ulate their new inter-relationships.
This inadequate development of new interactive mechanisms has been manifest in several aspects of institutional development and in the sphere of crystallization of symbols in these societies.

One of the most important indications of this situation in institutional sphere could be found in the development, in all institutional spheres but perhaps especially in the political one—of a sharp dissociation between what has been called solidarity-makers on the one hand and the instrumentally task-oriented leaders and administrators on the other hand. 14

This distinction is not necessarily identical with that between politicians and administrators and it may well cut across them although, obviously,


the politicians may be more prone to become "solidarity makers" while the government official may be more prone to an instrumentally oriented order. Rather it applies to two basic aspects or facets which are inherent in any political (and social) system although they may greatly vary in their exact structural location in different political structures.

The development of such a disassociation was fully described by Feith for Indonesia but can also be found in many of the other countries studied here.15

Truly enough, in some of the New States one of these types—especially the relatively modern, efficient, administrator—might have been almost entirely lacking, but in most of the cases there did develop different cadres of relatively skilled people who were able to organize various administrative agencies, develop new economic enterprises and some mechanisms or organs of organizational activity and to attempt to establish some policies based on these rules. Many such groups or cadres came from the colonial admin'
strategies others developed in response the problems of economic development
or programs of educational expansion.

But in most of the cases studied here the rules, injunctions and
policies developed by these cadres, leaders, or organizations were not leg-
itized or upheld by new esoteric symbols and by these leaders or groups who
upheld and developed these new symbols.

The new symbols which were developed or upheld in these countries
did not seem valid or relevant to the more mundane problems with which
the various rules developed by the "instrumental" cadres were concerned.
While some discrepancy between such different orientations is probably
inherent in any political system its extent was, in the cases discussed
here, much more acute and extreme. This discrepancy could be found in all the
countries studied here. Thus, for instance, in Indonesia we find that the
sets of symbols and value orientations continuously developed by Sukarno and
by the major parties were not only incapable of addressing themselves to the manifold problems of modernization but negated, as if were, their existence and significance although at the same time these problems were besetting the body politic. In Burma the mixture of symbols of Buddhism and Socialism developed by U Nu, especially after the first military take-over did not deal with any but the most marginal of concrete problems besetting Burmese political life.16

In Pakistan the constitutional debates about the nature of the state in general and the Islamic state in particular did not greatly help the solution of the many acute administrative, economic and political problems besetting this State in the first stages of its development.17

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17. See Blinder, op. cit., Saeed, Pakistan, op. cit.
orientations which did not undergo an internal modernizing transformation gave rise to a mixture of "traditionalist" orientations and symbols more extremist anti-modern or anti-Western symbols—neither of which could provide adequate guidance to many of the new problems attendant on the development of modernization. 18

The situation in some of the Latin American countries—especially in Argentina in the thirties—while differing in details from that in the New States discussed above did yet exhibit several similar characteristics.

There the older oligarchic elites were able only to a limited extent to deal with the new economic and political problems attendant on a continuous moderniza-

18. See, for instance:
A limited ability of theirs and the continuously growing politicalizations of the broader state of the society gave rise to a continuous oscillation between repressive dictators and demagogues. Each of these tried to use different types of solidarity symbols. But what they usually had in common was the dissociation of these symbols from the various concrete economic, administrative and political problems which were developing with continuous immigration, colonization, and economic development.19

For Argentina within the setup of Latin America see:
Germani, G., Politica X Sociedad en Una Bocca de Transicion (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1969), esp. part IV.


For some important comparative data see:

Similarly, in Japan in the late twenties and early thirties the various conservative elites—be they the remnants of the older Meiji oligarchy or some of the conservative circles and new military groups tried to uphold, in face of growing problems attendant on industrialization, some of the older general symbols of patriotism, and imperial loyalty, which were not adequate to deal with these new problems attendant on continuous industrialization and modernization.20

The rift between the different elites about the attitudes to modernity and industrialization in pre-Fascist Italy and pre-Nazi Germany is too well known to need any further elaboration or illustration here.

XII

These developments were closely paralleled by some aspects of the

20. See Scallapino, op. cit.; Beckman, op. cit., Chaps. 27, 28, & 29.
organization and functioning of political institutions proper, which can
be best seen in some of the New States discussed here. In many, although
not all, of these, we find very high degrees of continuous lack of coordination
between the major political agencies. Whatever the initial separation
between the branches of government, many difficulties developed in es-
tablishing some continuous, visible proper division of labour between them.

The two extremes of an administration engaging in political contests (or
being used by the parties in power to this end) or the executive and leg-
islative interfering in the working of the administration are situations to
be found frequently, and quite often together in many of these countries.

In addition to such continuous overlapping between the executive and the administration there did also develop—in varying degrees—a similar overlapping between the party bureaucracies and organizations and the governmental administration. The latter is very often employed as a channel of advancement for party functionaries and satellites and as an agency which distributes various goods, facilities and services, according to party criteria and demands. The party (or parties) often are not satisfied with exerting their influence in the higher governmental spheres but insist also in direct interference in the work of the bureaucracy and
in the distribution of the goods which are at its disposal.

This tendency to overlapping and lack of differentiation between the major political institutions has to some degree been due to their different origins, to the potential rivalry of their personnel, and to the attempts of each to control as many aspects of the political process as possible.

But whatever the origins of this situation the relatively high degree of lack of coordination has been evident in most of them. While some such overlapping between different governmental agencies appears as a natural development in many other New Nations the extent to which it was difficult or impossible to establish any continuous modus vivendi or coordination between them seems to have been especially acute in the countries studied here. 21

A similar situation can be discerned in the processes of development of the new central symbols of partial groups or sectors of the society. The various separate particularistic "primordial" symbols of local, ethnic caste or class groups were not incorporated into the new center of the society and their reformulation on a new level of common identification did not take place. Hence these symbols tended to become points of structural separateness and impediments for the development of a new civil order.

It was not the mere persistence of these symbols that was of crucial importance but rather the fact that they did not become incorporated into the more central symbolic framework which had to be oriented towards the more differentiated and varieded problems that developed in these societies as a result of the continuous process of modernization and the growing interaction between the different groups within them. Or in other words, no new ideology or value and symbol system which could provide
some minimal acceptable meaning and framework of answers to the varied problems stemming from the new social situation did develop at the center.22

If we attempt to summarize the description of the situations in the countries analyzed above, two aspects seem to stand out. First, in all the cases analyzed here, there tended to develop, in almost all the institutional spheres, a situation of growing interaction between different groups and strata, of their being drawn together into new common frameworks, of growing differentiation and at the same time lack of adequate mechanism to deal with the problems attendant on such internal differentiation and on the growing


interaction between the various groups. This coming together of different
groups into common social frameworks may have been intermittent and
unequally distributed between different groups and strata of the population.
But from all these points of view it is extremely doubtful whether it differed
greatly from developments in other modernizing or modern societies at
similar levels of modernization which were more successful in establishing
relatively stable institutional frameworks.

The crucial problem of these societies has been not a relatively small
extent of modernization but rather the lack of development of new institu-
tional settings, regulative mechanism and normative injunctions upheld
within strategic areas of the social structure and capable of dealing with
the various problems, which arose in all these spheres.

This situation could be described in Durkheim’s terms as the non-
development and non-institutionalization of the precontractual elements
of contracts in the society.
The number of "contract," i.e., of different spheres of interaction—be they in the field of labor relations, industrial relations, or administrative practice—in which new contractual and administrative arrangements developed was very great. But there did not develop adequate frameworks for the application of normative injunctions to specific situations, and the many contractual arrangements were not upheld by commonly shared values and orientations.

It was the combination of these characteristics that has given rise, in many of these cases, to what one investigator has described as the original Hobbesian state of war, i.e., to a state of "internal war of all against all without the existence of any common rules which the participants could find as binding. 23

Again, in Durkheim's terms, in all these cases there took place a

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23. See K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan, op. cit., esp. chs. XIV-XVI.
failure of establishment and institutionalization of new levels of 

solidarity, of transition from mechanic to organic solidarity, or from 

a level of low organic solidarity to a higher one, even though the older 

frameworks of solidarity were undermined by the growing differentiation and 

interaction between the different groups.

The preceding discussion attempted to provide an analytic description 

of the developments in these societies. It does not, by itself, explain 

the reasons for the lack of development of the adequate integrative mechanisms in these societies. We shall attempt now to analyze some of these reasons:

The lack of development of adequate mechanisms of social integration 

was not due to the lack of attempts by the rulers and the aspirants to elite 

positions to develop such mechanisms and policies or to the lack of demands 

by various groups in the society, for the development of some far-reaching 

social and economic policies.
Manifold policies which aimed at the establishment of some regulative
principles in the body politic and at the implementation of various
collective goals were developed and implemented by the political elites--
very often in response to various demands on behalf of wider groups in the
society. But these policies and the demands to which they responded did not contribute to the establishment of relatively stable coordination in the
society.

The most important common denominator of these policies has been the
continuous oscillation between attempts of the ruling elites at controlling
all the major power positions and groups in the society and monopolizing
the positions of effective control on the one hand and a continuous, almost
indiscriminate, giving in to the demands of various groups on the other hand.

The development of policies of the rulers was very closely related to
some of their basic socio-political orientations and especially to what may
be called their monolithic aspirations, i.e., to attempt to direct and control all social developments and all avenues of social and occupational mobility within them, and to monopolize all positions of power and of allocation of prestige. 24

But unlike, as we shall see, in the case of Soviet Russia, Mexico, or Kemalist Turkey, where similar status orientations developed among the ruling elites, those in Indonesia, Burma, and Kuomintang China, etc., were very closely connected with the development of a sort of "ascriptive" freezing of status aspirations and symbols—with an emphasis on a very restricted range of such symbols. In most of these cases rarely have new status and occupational orientations and symbols been developed by the elite. It was mostly the symbols developed from the preceding—be it colonial or traditional systems—and only some were among them—that were upheld and even emphasized by them with greater strength.

Thus, for instance, the strong emphasis given in Pakistan and Indonesia to bureaucratic and "literary" positions was to a very great extent a continuation of the traditions which existed in the colonial or even precolonial times. Similarly, in Kuomintang China there developed and was upheld by the elite a marked continuity from the point of view of the social and mobility aspirations, with the preceding Confucian symbols with its emphasis on classical (non-professional) learning.

Hence the monopoly of status and power that these elites tended to develop was rather "static" and "scriptive" and incapable of creating broader, new, more differentiated social organization and new capable coordinating frameworks.

In order, however, to be able to understand the reasons for the development of these policies and oscillations it is not enough to refer them to

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the socio-political orientations of the elites. They have to be put into
the wider context of the social and political orientation of the broader
social strata and of the interaction between them and the elites.

As we have seen above, all these societies were characterised by
continuously growing interrelations between different groups and strata,
by growing mobility, urbanization and some development of modern economic
frameworks, i.e., by the general process of "social mobilization." 26

But the structure of these processes of social mobilization took on
here some special characteristics. The most important of these characteristics
was that the wider social groups and strata evinced a very high degree of
social and cultural "closeness" and self-centeredness, however great their

dependence on other groups might have become. This applied—naturally
in different degrees—to various local and regional groups, to rural and
urban groups in different echelons of the social and occupational hierarchy,
to small peasant communities, to semi-skilled and urban workers, to
professionals in their relations to each other and to the central institutions
of the society. 27

The most basic aspect of this closeness was the predominance of a purely
"adaptive" attitude to the wider social setting with but little a tive
solidary orientation to it or "identification with it. This adaptive orien-
tation could be manifest in two different, seemingly opposing and often
coalescing ways. One such way, most frequently found among various
"traditional", lower and sometimes also middle rural and urban groups is char-

27. Wolf, E.R., "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesamerica and
Central Java," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, XTV, (Spring 1975),
p. 1-18
characterized by a relatively passive attitude to the wider social settings.

This closeness and passivity is manifest in the rigidity of their conception of society in general and of their own place within it in particular. This rigidity was not entirely identical with the general traditional lack of empathy with others. It was rather characterized by very rigid, "ritual" status images which did not allow for any great flexibility of orientations to the wider society. It was often manifested in very minimal development of any aspirations beyond the traditional shapes of occupations or of aspirations to new, different types of community political or social participation, leadership or organization.

These characteristics were closely related to some features of the internal structure of these groups—to a strong tendency to minimize internal differentiation with relatively severe sanctions against those who may have tended to break up such homogeneity, to a great weakness of...
ible self-regulatory mechanisms within these groups and to a very minimal
ability to enter into or deal with more complex internal or external relations.29

XVI

These characteristics had many repercussions on the structure and
activities of these groups when they were pushed into new, modernized
and differentiated urban, industrial and semi-industrialized settings.

They resulted in the perpetuation of previous "traditional" types of re-

lationships——i.e., of paternalistic arrangements in industrial settings and
relations, in dealing with officials, politicians or leaders of the church,
in the lack of readiness to undertake responsibility or initiative in the new set-
tings, and in general in great passivity and in small range of interests.29

the papers by: Lopes, J.R.B., "Aspects of Adjustment of Rural Emigrants
to Urban-Industrial Conditions in Sao Paulo, Brazil," pp. 238-49;
Carmel, G., "Inquiry Into the Social Effects of Urbanization on a Working
On a similar situation in Southern Italy see: Barsini, Luigi, "Italy,
Similarly, insofar as new occupational and aspirations did develop within these groups, they were focused on relatively restricted pre-existing types or ranges of occupational and status conceptions and images. The great propensity to academic, professional, bureaucratic, white collar occupations as against more technical, business, professional which is so widely spread in many of these countries, on all levels of the occupational scale is perhaps the clearest manifestation or indication of these trends.

The second major way in which this adaptive attitude to the wider social setting could be manifest was that of what may be called exaggerated, unlimited "openness" and "flexibility" and in attempts to obtain with this new setting many various benefits, emoluments and positions without any consideration of actual possibilities or of other groups in the societies. These cases are best

Almeida, F., Migracoes Sociais no Brasil, op. cit., Chaps. X & XI.
exemplified by some of the more active urbanized groups in Argentina and other Latin American countries. The members of these groups tend to develop very wide flexible and occupational status orientations and aspirations. But these orientations are not too closely related to the existing reality and hence they also develop sharp pressures on the existent social structure.

There were only relatively few groups within these societies which evinced somewhat greater and more realistic internal and external flexibility. Most important among them were some economic business communities or new professional groups, some relatively rare non-agricultural rural leadership, and some reformatory religious groups. But these were, in most of the societies studied here, weak and above all relatively segregated both from the central institutions of the societies and from wider groups.

31. I am indebted to Prof. G. Germani for this information as well as for pointing out the general significance of this type of group attitude. See also: Germani, G., Politics y Sociedad, cit., esp. Ch. VII.
Thus extremely important parallels in the orientations and activities of the new elites and of large parts of the broader groups and strata within these societies can be found. Both were characterized by maintaining and developing within the new modern institutional frameworks, of relatively rigid and restricted social, cultural and political orientations. In both cases these orientations and aspirations were largely conceived either in terms of some of the status and symbols derived mostly from the preceding social structure and focused in a relatively rigid way on even only some possibilities within these structures, or in terms of "flexible" but unattainable goods.

These parallel developments in the orientations of the elites and of the broader groups and strata go a far way to explain several very important structural characteristics of various groups and of political activities, or-
orientations, and policies that developed within these societies.

Structurally, perhaps the most important factor was that in all these cases, even though new types of specialized and differentiated social organizations, trade unions, professional organizations, etc., were created both among the elite and among the broader groups of society which were drawn into new frameworks, this did not result in the creation of a viable new differentiated institutional structure.

These groups were unable to function effectively because they had to work under what may be called "false" premises, i.e., some of the prerequisites for their effective functioning did not develop. They very often exhibited characteristics of what has been called by a student of French "retardation" or "traditionalism," "delinquent communities," i.e., communities not oriented to the attainment of their manifest goals (be they economic growth, community development, or the like) but to the main-
tenance of the vested status and interest positions of their members within the existing settings.32

These orientations were not, in principle, unlike the type of "narrow familial" orientation which constituted the moral basis of a backward society as described by Banfield for South Italy, although they operated here on all levels of the social structure.

Moreover, even if these tended to develop, within some institutional spheres---be it in education, in the field of economic enterprise or in the profession, either through diffusion, or through the development of specifically active groups, some more stable, differentiated groups and organizations, their ability to develop and maintain their organization and activities within the wider setting was very restricted. Very often they succumbed to


the pressures of the environment becoming disorganized or "delinquent." 34

As a result there tended to be repeated vicious circles of breakdown, eruptions and crises and lack of ability to regulate them in even a seemingly effective way.

These structural characteristics may also to some extent explain the nature of political activities and orientations that developed among the elite within the societies, among both the elite and the broader groups of the society.

The most important fact to be remembered here is that in most of the countries analyzed here there developed a very high degree of politicization of wide strata of the population.

The relatively highly politicized, in most of these countries, tended to focus its demand on the attainment of such positions and various benefits.


(material, status, perhaps, or power) to be derived largely set within
the framework of the pending social order. Hence there tended to develop
in these cases a vicious circle of pressures on existing resources, pressures
which were strongly linked to the rigidity of aspirations of these groups and
were often reinforced by the policies and activities of the rulers which ul-
timately necessarily tended to deplete these resources.

The political self perception and self-legislation of the political
leaders was also to no small extent focused on the attainment, through the
new political frameworks, of many of these benefits—to the espoused as
such, to the major (articulate) strata—and especially to those strata which
were, as it were, deprived from sharing in these benefits in the former
period.

The various policies developed by them were to no small extent guided
by such considerations. Most of these policies did develop in response
to growing demands on the part of the relatively highly politicized masses.
But in dealing with these demands the new rulers not only succumbed to pressures from different groups but very often themselves created and legitimized such pressures. Thus a very general result of these policies was to reduce available resources and to squander them. Such squandering of resources took place often because of "symbolic" or ideological reasons and because of the search of the rulers for support and their attempts to attest, in this way, to their legitimation. It usually minimized the range of maneuvering ability available to the rulers. At the same time, because of lack of any clear principles or regulation of priorities, they tended to exacerbate the level of conflict between various groups as the aspiration of them all rose while the total output of the economy remained static or even decreased.

XIX

The most important common denominator of these policies has been the continuous oscillation between attempts of the ruling elites at controlling
all the major power positions and groups in the society and monopolizing
the positions of effective control on the one hand and a continuous giving
in to the demands of various groups on the other hand. Examples of such os-
cillating policies could be found in many important fields.

Thus, first, in almost all these countries, but perhaps especially in
Indonesia, on the one hand, and in many Latin American countries on the other,
there took place a continuous expansion and swelling of the bureaucracies by
new aspirants, the continuous giving in, by the rulers, to the growing de-
mands of the holders of these positions for tenure of office and for increased
(even if not fully adequate to catch up with the growing inflation) wages
and emoluments.35

A similar oscillation can be found in the field of agrarian reform.

In many of these countries very far-reaching official programs of redis-

35 See Feith, op. cit., esp. chs. VII, VIII, & IX
and Ianni, O., "Eleman de Burocratizarea no Brazil," Boletim, Centro Latino
Americano De Pesquisas Em Ciencias Sociais, Rio de Janeiro, IV, no.3
(Ag. 1950), pp. 9-27
tribution of land were attempted. These programs often resulted in these countries in disorganization of the agricultural traditional rural setting on the one hand and in the resistance of various vested interests which attempted to utilize the situation for their own self-aggrandizement. Such vested interests which tended to obstruct attempts at the modernization of agriculture could be upheld by both older landlords and by the new peasant proprietors.

Both often succeeded in evading and subverting the policies of the government aimed at increase of technical output, modernization of agriculture, etc. 36

In many cases the agencies of rural improvement—credit agencies, community development centers which were established by the government, were


taken up and swallowed, as it were, by these vested interests, against
the goals and policies of the government without the government being
able to control them effectively.37

In the field of education the rulers oscillated between attempts to
repress autonomous activities of the students and to direct them in their
educational activities on the one hand and giving in to their demands on
the other. As a result, one of the most important developments in the
field was the very quick swelling up of numbers of students in various
educational institutions—especially in "humanistic," "academic" high
schools and in the more traditional (humanistic, legal) faculties of the
universities. Similarly, the rulers tended to give in to the demands of
students and in educational and pedagogical fields and a consequent lowering
of standards. Very often and side by side with this there took place many,

37. See Feder, E., "Feminism and Agricultural Development: The Role of
Controlled Credit in Chile's Agriculture," Land Economics, XXXVY, no. 1
(Feb. 1960), pp. 92-100
albeit not too successful, attempts by the rulers to control the students—

to direct them to the non-academic (technical, professional) subjects and

to maintain some discipline among them.38

In the sphere of economic policy proper the examples of regimentation

and confiscation which lowered the efficiency of the economic sectors on

the one hand and of wide redistributive measures to various parts of the

population on the other hand are too numerous and well known to need any

detailed illustration.39


Moreira, J. Roberto, Educacao e Desenvolvimento No Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 190.

Fischer, J., "Universities and the Political Process in S.E. Asia," Pacific Affairs, XXVII, no. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 3-16.


For a general analysis see:

39. See, for instance,

In general, the various more restrictive policies in all these fields could be found in the more "traditional" countries like Pakistan or Sudan, while the policies of "giving in" to exaggerated demands of the labour groups could be found especially in the more modern countries like Indonesia or Burma, although both tendencies could be found, in some measure, in all these countries.

Needless to say, many such policies—especially the more repressive and regimentating ones can be found also in many other "new" and older nations—and for each concrete policy undertaken in Indonesia, Burma or Pakistan there could also be found an equivalent in a more stable regime. But the most important characteristic of these policies as they developed in the countries analyzed here


has been not any specific detail but rather the continuous oscillation be-

tween the repressive orientation on the one hand and the giving in to

the various demands for many groups on the other hand the lack of devel-

opment of any stable or continuous criteria of priorities. Hence there tended

to develop in these cases continuous pressures on existing resources,

pressures which were strongly linked to the rigidity of aspirations of these

groups, which were often reinforced by the policies and activities of the rulers

and which tended to deplete the existing resources.

In order to be able to a precise full: the nature of the developments

in the societies discussed above, we might perhaps compare them briefly with

those in countries like Mexico, Kemalist Turkey or Meiji Japan—not to say

anything about the special type of developments in Soviet Russia—where new

modernizing regimes were able to deal with, to some extent, at least, in the

initial stages of modernization, some of the problems and contradictions
discussed above. There the elites were able not only to impose their policies on the wider social groups and strata but also to draw these groups into the more differentiated institutional framework and the same time to regulate, at least to some extent, their interaction within the framework.


These elites developed simultaneous orientations to collective ideological transformation and to concrete tasks and problems in different "practical" fields. They perceived their legitimation in terms of such wider changes and not only in terms of providing various immediate benefits to different social groups—although they hoped and expected that ultimately the new political system will also bring marked improvements in the standard of living of the broader groups and strata of the population, as well as in the strengthening of the economy and political structure of the country.

This could be seen in some of the policies developed by these elites to deal with problems of modernization.

Hence, for instance, the restructuring of the process of communication was effected in these countries by gradual linking of different levels of communication and their gradual incorporation into a relatively unified system of communication. An important aspect of this process of gradual incorporation
was that for a certain period of time the different levels or types of communicative patterns were kept relatively segregated but that special interlinking mechanisms which maintained some relation to the central communicative system by the elites were gradually, but continuously, expanded. *Turkey's experience here is very instructive.*

"It is the essence of the Atatürk Revolution that it exploited the communicative bifurcation existing in Turkish society rather than lamenting it or immediately attacking it, as a number of other nationalist movements have done. Atatürk concentrated on the extension and consolidation of the modernist beachhead within the ruling elite won by the graduates of the great secular schools and those with European training. This effort involved the final expulsion of religion from the temple of politics and the attempt to complete the "Westernization of the intellectual elite of the society before plunging ahead to more grandiose ventures with the entire Turkish population. It also involved the reformers in a drive to make the uncongenial cities and larger towns of Anatolia habitable for the new class of Westernized Turkish intellectuals who were to serve and represent the new state. It was by no
means an immediate attempt to remold the society by starting with the peasant masses. Such an attempt was not in keeping with the history of the Turkish revolutionary movement or the psychologies of its leaders. Moreover, the task was simply too immense for such an approach. As in most emergent nations, a smaller handle was necessary—a lever more easily grasped.

Put another way, what we are saying is that the communications bifurcation in Turkish society between educated elite and uneducated masses actually provided Mustafa Kemal with a convenient halfway house in the reshaping of his country. He could to a large extent afford to for at about the submerged peasant masses and concentrate his limited resources on solidifying his hold on the dominant intellectual group, to which he could increasingly appeal through such improvements in communications techniques as had been made. Then, once this crucial initial battle was won, once the bulk of the ruling elite had been modernized, he could move on to the greater task of changing the masses. The lack of communications between elite and mass was a vital factor which he used to simplify his task and equate it with his resources.

The same picture could be seen on the whole in the field of development.

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of educational policies. Thus, for instance, in Turkey there took place

a widespread extension of primary education on the local level, side by side

with the extension of special new secularized and diversified elite schools,

and with only a gradual extension of mobility between these levels.7

Similar developments both in the field of communication and education

took place in Japan and in Mexico. The initial attempts of the Meiji leaders

were to break down some of the "feudal closeness" of the rural groups and en-
courage them to transfer their traditional loyalties to the new polity,

without necessarily destroying their traditional settings. This was to

a large extent effected by the extension and unification of the system of

primary education. At the same time many new schools and universities into

which the more active and mobile elements could be at least partially ab-

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In Mexico the spread of education to the various social groups was also implemented in a similar way.

Third, and perhaps most important from the point of view of our discussion, has been the structuring of the processes of social mobility in these societies. In all these countries there did continuously develop processes of mobility which necessarily broke down the self-sufficiency of some at least of the traditional units and brought them into the framework of the new, more modernized institutions. In this way, this mobility was geared to realistic expanding opportunities—or at least the discrepancy between the mobility aspirations and the realities was not as great as in the other cases discussed above. The processes of mobility


were here greatly connected with the development of at least some new, more
differentiated status and occupational orientations and aspirations which
had some realistic prospects of success in the developing society.

Similarly, the processes did often result here in a growing internal
differentiation within the local—rural or urban units—giving rise to
some important changes in the structure of leadership and community par-
ticipation, and to growing connections between these groups and the central
institution.

In all these cases the new rulers were, of course, also interested
in maintaining in their hands monopoly of power and allocation of status.

But they attempted to develop and maintain such monopoly together with a
growing variation of the symbols and frameworks of status. They also did,
of course, stress the importance of the political status but usually
attempted to connect it with emphasis on new occupational, technical and
and professional activities. They attempted also to minimize as far as possible various tendencies to ascriptive monopolization of upper positions by various elite and bureaucratic groups.

The case of Soviet Russia is probably most instructive from this point of view. In Soviet Russia there developed on the one hand among many parts of the emerging elites—bureaucrats, technicians, politicians—strong tendencies to "freeze" their positions in an ascriptive way through monopolization for themselves and their families of many social, economic, and educational prerogatives. But these tendencies were countered by the attempt of the top political leaders to break up these ascriptive bases and to maintain through predominance of the party to some extent in continuous differentiation of status and power criteria.45 Similar tendencies and policies can be found in Kemalist Turkey, Mexico or Meiji Japan.

If, however, these elites were relatively more flexible in their status orientations they were also more cohesive and firm in the implementation of their policies and they did not give it continuously and indiscriminately to the demands of different groups and strata within their societies.

In extreme cases, like in Russia, they used coercion against these groups but in others they attempted to direct and manipulate these demands. Some of these demands—like those for Agrarian Reform in Mexico have become important symbols of the new regimes—but interestingly enough the actual policies related to these symbols did not always fully implement all the potential demands which could—and very often even did—develop in connection with their symbols. Thus, for instance, reforms that were implemented in Mexico in the field of agrarian reforms, were important from the point of view of the restructuring of internal arrangements of the rural communities.

creating new social and economic groups within them and opening up new
channels of mobility to the center. But these reforms were not on the whole
allowed to block continuously, through giving in to both old and new
vested interests, the expansion of the economy.6

The various policies undertaken in these countries in these fields, such
as education or labor relations had on the whole similar effects.

Truly enough the success of these elites in these different countries
varied greatly, depending on the initial affinity between them and the
wider groups of the society and on the score of the initial openness
and flexibility of these wider groups.

In none of these cases do we find a situation similar to that in

We turn countries, where the initial stages of modernization, the secondary

6. On Mexican land reform see H. Cline, op.cit., Ch. XXII; J.O. Maddox,
Mexican Land Reform, American Universities Field Staff, JCM-5-57 (N.Y.: 1957);
elites which were the major bearers of modern orientations, were most active in the economic and cultural spheres, and where the wider social groups and strata were to a very great extent open to those modernizing influences and tendencies in both economic and ideological spheres. Hence in all the cases discussed here the elites faced the problem of "opening up," encouraging and at the same time controlling whatever modernizing forces or orientations existed within the broader strata. Insofar as the affinity between the modernizing orientations of the elites and of the broader strata was small, as was the case in Soviet Russia, the elites embarked on a course of using very coercive measures. But, although some elements of coercion were used in almost all these countries, yet in most of them, the elites were either less monolithic and totalistic in their orientations than the Soviet elite or there existed a greater (even if reactive) affinity between them and the

the wider strata. Hence they were able to use less coercive measures and face less intensive tensions.48

Truly enough the success of these elites in one phase of modernization did not necessarily assume, as the cases of Turkey or Japan testify to, continuous uninterrupted growth and mobility. But the success in one phase may have created some important facilitating factors for further developments.

XXIII

The problem why in Turkey, Japan, Mexico or Russia there emerged in the initial stages of modernization elites with orientations to change and ability to implement relatively effective policies while they did not develop in these initial phases in Indonesia, Pakistan or Burma, or why elites with similar differences tended to develop also in later stages of modernization, is an extremely difficult one and constitutes one of the most baffling problems in comparative sociological analysis. There are but few available

48 See S.N. Eisenstadt, Initial Patterns, op. cit.
indications to deal with this problem. Very tentatively it may perhaps
be suggested that it has to some extent to do with the placement of these
elites in the preceding social structure, with the extent of their internal
cohesiveness and internal transformation of their own value orientation.9

In all the New States discussed here the new modernizing elite were
greatly alienated from the preceding (colonial and/or traditional) socio-
political systems and tended to emphasize the development of new values
and ideologies as a very important part of their modernizing orientation.

But in most of the countries analyzed here the new elites were mostly
composed of intellectuals and in many cases they constituted the only ini-
tially available modern elite. They had but very few

internal social and ideological contacts

or identifications (even if an ambivalent one) with either the bearers of
pre-existing traditions or with the wider groups of the society. The
modernizing orientations of these elites were focused mostly on the
political, much less on the economic sphere, and surprisingly enough also
very often less on the cultural sphere, in the sense of redefinition and
reformation of their own basic internal value-orientation. Consequently
they were not able to establish a strong internal cohesiveness and strong
ideological and value-identifications and connections with other, potentially
modernized groups and strata.

Similarly the various political elites or leaders, whether the more
oligarchic or more demagogic ones, in many of the Latin American countries,
were also mostly most dissociated even if in a different way, from the various
broader groups that were continuously coming into the society or impinging
on its central institutions. The process of selection and formation of
these elites was a relatively rigid and restricted one, bringing in re-
Relative weaker elements and intensifying their alienation from the broader group as well as their internal insecurity and lack of cohesion.50

Similar—and even more intensive rifts between different elites developed, as is well known, in various European countries in the twenties and thirties.

On the other hand, the elites in Turkey, Japan and Mexico, or some of the more cohesive elites in countries of later stages of modernization, however great the differences between them, had yet some contrary characteristics in common. They were not usually composed only of intellectual groups entirely alienated from the pre-existing elites and some of the broader groups of the society but were to some extent placed in secondary elite positions in the preceding structure, and had somewhat closer relations with many active, broader groups.

In the ideological and value spheres they aimed at the development

of a new, more flexible set of symbols and collective identity which, while not negating the traditions would also provide some new meaning for the new processes of change. Hence they tended on the one hand to be more cohesive, while at the same time to effect some internal value transformation within the broader groups and strata.

But these are necessarily only very brief preliminary and inadequate remarks with regard to this problem, which should constitute a focus of continuing comparative research dealing both with initial and later stages of modernization.

XXIV

The development of processes of social mobilization without adequate integration, of rifts between the "instrumental" and "solidarity making" leaders, and within the symbolic and ideological realms of a society did develop in all the countries in which some breakdowns of modernization and especially of political modernization took place. They developed in
different phases or areas of modernization—in the various new States

enumerated above, in Kuomintang China, in some Latin Countries best exemplified

by pre-Pecon Argentina, in Japan in the late twenties, in pre-Nazi Germany.

But, needless to say, the concrete details—and outcomes—of these processes

varied greatly between these various types of countries.

One common outcome of these processes is implicit in most of the

preceding analysis—namely, the "reversal" of these regimes to what may be
called a lower, less flexible level of political and social differentiation, as seen in the scope of problems with which they are capable to deal. But

on the other hand, as has already been pointed out above, most of these

less differentiated regimes have to some extent retained some of the symbols,
goals and institutional arrangements of modernity, even if they attempted to

develop new ideologies and symbols.

This combination has necessarily created a potential contradiction

which could develop, in principle into several different directions. One
such possible outcome was the institutionalization of a relatively modern system, a somewhat lower level of differentiation, albeit with some possibilities of limited institutional absorption of change, and conducive to some economic growth. The other possibility is that of development of stagnant regimes with but very little capacity for absorption of change and which may either become relatively stable or develop a system of vicious circles of eruptions, blockages and violence. The analysis of the conditions which may lead to any of these directions is beyond the province of this paper.

They depend mostly on the cohesion and value orientation of the elites, on the extent to which the new elites were capable of overcoming the difficulties and pitfalls of the preceding periods and of developing policies which would not be beset by continuous oscillations and contradictions.

But it might perhaps be worth while to sum up, by the way of some comparative notes about the different types of breakdown of modernization
which took place in the different situations analyzed in this paper.

XXV

In most of the new states the major points of rift were between the traditional and the more modern settings and within the modern settings themselves. The various traditional sectors in Burma, Pakistan, or Indonesia—and before that of most Imperial China—have been continuously drawn into more differentiated and modern sectors. Even those groups which remained within the older, traditional settings became very often disorganized, and large parts of their population were withdrawn from effective participation within them. Yet many of their older frameworks, symbols and traditions of solidarity tended to persist and exert some pull and influence both in the more traditional and the more modern settings.

Within the more modern new centers the processes of disorganization, of conflict continued, and many new rifts developed, but even there many groups were still to a relatively great extent oriented to some of the symbols of traditional solidarity. Hence the various elites could to some
extent draw on the reservoirs of this traditional solidarity and their anti-
modern tendencies and orientations were to no small extent tempered by the
ttempts to find some modus vivendi between modernity and traditionalism.

The situation in Argentina was already different. Throughout the last
decimal of the 19th century and the first two of the 20th century there
developed, through continuous immigration and colonization different new
"relatively modern" groups—such as new planters, workers, etc. These
groups tended, on the whole, to be socially and culturally rather separate.

However, because of the continuous economic expansion in a colonisatory
setup they were able to continue to maintain their separate existence
and mutual closeness together with continuous development, change, and
modernization. Only gradually they became interwoven into a closer
framework of mutual interdependence. At the same time, the major olc-
develop new symbols, institutions, and policies capable of dealing with these new problems and basically maintained the framework developed in the mid-19th century, thus also impeding the full integration of these groups into new more modern frameworks.

It was only when on the one hand the interrelation between these groups became closer and the continued economic expansion became halted, that the shaky co-existence was broken down—giving rise to long periods of conflicts and tension in the thirties, giving then rise to the Peronist regime and continuing later some of the same institutional instabilities.

Thus, in a way, the Argentine case shows the limits of the continuity and stability of a society in which precontractual elements were weak or underdeveloped from the very beginning, and which did not have any strong pre-existing traditional base of solidarity. Hence the new symbols and orientations developed by the various groups and by the various political leaders were much less anchored in common traditional backgrounds. Al-
though many of these leaders attempted to develop some symbols of demodernization, they were yet limited by the various separate traditions of the different groups, by the lack of common symbols of identification against which it was possible to rebel and by the basically positive attitudes to modernization of most of these groups. Hence the regimes that tended to develop here were more based on various populistic symbols and various attempts to raise the populations' participation in the central political life and its share in the economic benefits of this life, rather than on outright demodernization.

The situation in Japan in the twenties and thirties, after the breakdown of the original Meiji oligarchic modernization was already couched in many terms of outright demodernization. But its potential drift to such demodernization was tempered by the persistence of the imperial symbolism, and of many traditional elements within the society and by the relative internal weaknesses of the military cliques.
The trend towards complete demodernization has attained its peak in the development of Nazi Germany and to a somewhat smaller extent in Fascist Italy. Here it was mostly groups which attained a relatively high level of modernization that were drawn into even more new, yet unstable differentiated conditions. Their conflicts were set almost entirely in terms of highly differentiated interests and within frameworks of modern institutions, whatever traditional symbols were used there were mostly of a purely negativist, demodernizing nature, without really being any longer rooted in any traditional solidarity or identification.