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Cultural Construction of Jakarta:
Design, Planning, and Development in Jabotabek, 1980-1997

by

Robert Cowherd

B.Arch., The Cooper Union, 1988

Submitted to the Department of Architecture
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture: History and Theory of Architecture


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June 2002

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Abstract

Jakarta's physical restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s was largely the result of choices made by a small circle of business and political elite surrounding President Suharto (1966-1998) in emulation of North American urban form. The insights of urban regime theory are useful in moderating any lingering economic determinism common in political economy and globalization approaches but fail to account for the successes of Suharto's growth coalition. With media controls setting the terms of reference for public discourse, Suharto's "New Order" regime deployed a rhetoric of "development," functioning as the overarching paradigm to coordinate individual and collective values, priorities, and assumptions while reinforcing both fears of violent repression and aspirations for the trappings of modernization. Examination of specific historical processes reveals that, unlike their dominance in the West, economic forces operated within, and subordinate to, long-standing culturally-defined structures of power, as but one of a long history of syncretically adapted forms imported from foreign sources.

With culture defining the goals and means of the controlling elite, the restructuring of architecture, urban design, and planning of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area became, not just a reflection of the dominant culture, but one of the most significant instruments for achieving the desired social order. The imagery employed in the design and marketing of Jabotabek suburban real estate development played off interwoven projections of life imagined to exist in the developed West (based largely on American television and film), while the internal spaces of California-style houses reveal a hybrid formation reflecting persistent social relationships and everyday practices. Planning's normative function to remediate and avoid infrastructure shortages and a growing environmental crisis was acquiesced in the pursuit of the New Order elite's rent-seeking projects, ultimately responsible for the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 that ended Suharto's rule. The inescapable spatial divide driven between the enclaves of high amenity (entertainment kitchens, gated communities, private automobiles) and the left-over spaces beyond the walls of privilege (servants quarters, the *kampung*, the street) left a shrinking public realm increasingly abandoned to the multiple crises of failing infrastructures, poor housing, and environmental degradation.

Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson

Title: Professor of History and Architecture, Head of the Department of Architecture

Dedicated to the next generation of urbanists in Indonesia.

*In loving memory of
Edwin Russell Cowherd (1921-2000)
and
Helen Lammers Cowherd (1929-2001)*

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Acknowledgments

It all began with a photograph of a narrow street leading to a massive gate and the teasing glimpse of the world inside the Dalem Joyokusuman in Kampung Gajahan, Solo. Since then I have spent half of the last decade living in Indonesia, not feeling quite at home but somehow strangely lost when living back in the US.

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Notes on Terminology

As a work in English about Indonesia, it is inevitably one that deals with extensive linguistic and cultural translation. The quality of its analysis is dependent to a certain extent on overcoming the fact that local languages used in Indonesia (mainly Indonesian but including Javanese and Sundanese) rarely exist in an isomorphic, one-to-one relationship with the nearest English equivalents. Where suitable English equivalents exist I use only the English term. Where the original Indonesian term might not be immediately discernable from the English to readers familiar with Indonesia, the *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian) term will be used as well. Where the closest English equivalent is either not helpful as in *becak* (far more than just a “pedi-cab”) or misleading as in *kampung* (often mistakenly translated as “slums”), the Indonesian term will be clarified and used exclusively. A listing of these Indonesian terms can be found in a glossary at the end of the work. The primary resource for translating from Indonesian to English has been: John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily, *Kamus Indonesia Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary*, eds. John U. Wolff, James T. Collins, and Hassan Shadily (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1997).

I use the North American convention of first floor being the same as the ground floor, which matches the Indonesian language usage of *lantai satu* and *lantai dua*, etc. but differs from European designations of levels.

I favor Metric System units of measure because the source data is invariably recorded in metric units and maintaining them as such provides less opportunity for error, and in anticipation that the majority of the potential audience for this work lies outside of North America.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

GLOBAL ECONOMY OR LOCAL SYNCRETIC CULTURE?

“We shape our buildings, thereafter they shape us.”

—Winston Churchill¹

“When ideology succeeds in constructing the objective conditions of daily life it need no longer depend on overt violence or its threat.”

—Pierre Bourdieu²

Jakarta's transformation during the last two decades of the twentieth century was largely the result of choices made by a small circle of business and political elite surrounding President Suharto (1966-1998) under the strong influence of North American models of economic liberalization, suburban real estate development, and urban form. These choices were structured by the opportunities presented them as leaders of Indonesia's economic boom under conditions of the new international division of labor and guided by the shared values, assumptions and visions of Suharto's "New Order." Posited against its opposite (the "former chaos") under President Sukarno (1949-1966), the mission of the New Order government was "development" (pembangunan). The banner of "development" was flown up the flagpole wherever and whenever the New Order oligarchy wished to send the message that it would brook no opposition. The New Order development agenda became Indonesia's own version of the twentieth century's promise of more or less universal prosperity through "modernization."³ Shrugged off elsewhere as the temporary sacrifices of a "transitional phase," the deepening structural inequities brought by "development" in Indonesia were already familiar to Indonesians after centuries of feudal and colonial rule, and socially managed by Suharto's New Order appeals to the greater good of the nation.

The culture of New Order "development" became the organizing paradigm and rhetorical means, if not the driving force, behind the physical restructuring of Jakarta and its surrounding region. The land reform policies established by Sukarno were reversed under Suharto to facilitate the

¹ *Time* (12 September, 1960).

² Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 (1972)).

³ Perhaps the most coherent formulation of the concepts that came to be associated with Modernization theory was offered by W.W. Rostow in his *Stages of Economic Growth* in which he formulated the sequence of stages leading to "economic takeoff" and eventually to a sustained high level of production, consumption and general prosperity. Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

process of land assembly and large-scale development. Indonesia's vast planning and permitting bureaucracy was mobilized to meet the requirements for international recognition as a modern nation only to relinquish its role in establishing normative standards. Instead, it granted legitimacy to flagrant contraventions of planning regulations and policies by both the private and public sectors. Environmentally sensitive coastlines, protected agricultural lands, and water catchment areas vital to the maintenance of Jakarta's water supply were all routinely sacrificed to the demands of "development." The New Order regime bestowed upon large developers the ability to accumulate a vast privately held suburban land bank twice the size of Jakarta itself for the purposes of land speculation. The great wealth produced for the small group surrounding Suharto was rationalized as a necessary part of upgrading Jakarta's image from being "the city of a thousand *kampung*"⁴ to "Jakarta, the Metropolitan City." By extending privileges to a small group of developers and investors, Jakarta was transformed during the last two decades of the twentieth century taking on new layers of urban form in emulation of North American cities. A new line of high-rise office, hotel and condominium towers remade the skyline as new toll roads led to gated luxury suburban golf course communities that exploded across the administrative boundaries of Jakarta into the surrounding counties of West Java.

The city built by a culture of "development" then in turn conditioned the daily lives of its inhabitants to the needs of Suharto's New Order power structure. Jakartans were increasingly compelled by their interactions with and within the built environment to define themselves in reference to the growing divide between the haves and the have-nots. The divide itself has been an institution of Indonesian life since long before there was an Indonesia, however, a new set of spatially defined distinctions has made the operation of social division a more present reality in the daily lives of Jakartans. Class distinctions once limited to matters of dress, language, and behavior are now more often spatially demarcated by walls, tinted glass, barbed wire, gates, and guard posts separating an air-conditioned, well-serviced realm of the elite from the rest of the world. Beyond simply reflecting naturally evolving social realities, the built environment has been wielded so as to contribute to the formation of a society spatially divided in new, more definitive ways.

Framing Narrative

I entered into this study as a practicing architect with a three month grant to do research on traditional Javanese architecture and urban form in the former capital of feudal Indonesia, Solo,

⁴ Officially defined as "rural village or urban quarter," *kampung* is often misinterpreted as meaning "slum." In cities, it is typically a high-density predominantly residential quarter, although it often includes food stalls, small stores, light industry, and sometimes more substantial manufacturing uses. Despite its generally low level of infrastructures and services, it is often a place of great socio-economic diversity.

Java (a.k.a. Surakarta; population 600,000), in search of human-scale urban form alternatives to the spaces produced in American cities since World War II. From my earlier research on Italian cities, I redirected my attentions to Indonesia when I became aware of the utterly undocumented richness of Javanese urban space traditions still to be found in the royal court centers. In 1991, I arrived at the concentrically organized courtyards of the palace complex at the heart of Solo, where I discovered a uniquely powerful set of relationships between urban form and the social, political, economic, artistic, linguistic, and behavioral operations of the city reaching back to the deepest roots of Java's rich cultural history. I rented a "students room" (*kos*) in a doctor's house in Solo's Arab *kampung* near the palace, where I spent the next four years exploring the relationships between history, culture and the built environment through work as a conservation architect at the royal palace *Karaton Surakarta* (ca. 1745)—a double-walled city within the city at the heart of Solo.

Like a handful of other foreigners in Solo studying traditional music, dance, language, batik, and shadow puppet theater, I tried not to be bothered by the fact that my passion for Javanese culture was unmatched by almost any of Solo's Javanese residents. The notable exception were those who had moved away to Jakarta. From the perspective of those trapped in Jakarta by their own competence and a local dearth of opportunity, Solo retained the innocent charms associated with Javanese traditional culture and the city's two palaces that still sponsored the religio-cultural ritual performances demanded by *Kejawen* (the syncretic Islamic-Hindu-Javanese religion). Poverty and neglect had left the cultural practices of the two palaces, the general ambiance of the city, and the delightful openness of its people largely intact. It was the support of successful Solonese in Jakarta that made my work restoring the palace possible. It was the source of significant confusion to the king, the royal family, and the Solonese in general that an American architect might be interested in spending time and attention on something "old" rather than the exciting new modern developments in the larger cities of Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung.

Even as I struggled to forge the insights of the history of Javanese urbanism into my own thinking about cities of the North America—the deep connections between urban form, culture and community in the *kampung* (urban village) and the *kraton* (palace)—I found it to be under attack through the aggressive pursuit of an idealized modern city. It was with great anguish that I witnessed the demolition of several wonderful Dutch-influenced shophouses along Solo's main street to make way for new tinted-glass bank buildings. Each year the dominance of pedestrians, bicycles, wheeled vendors, and bicycle taxis was challenged a bit more by growing numbers of private automobiles that squeezed their way through the narrow streets of the compact city. The luxury suburb of *Solo Baru* (New Solo), reachable across several kilometers of still open farmland, had brought automobile dependency to a haven of non-motorized mobility. The

perceived “backwardness” of Solo inspired a disdain for its traditional ways and a longing to be more like Jakarta (itself longing to be more like Houston) even as the “modernity” of Jakarta spawned a postmodern nostalgia for the life of Solo. It was a fascinating juxtaposition of pre-modern, modern, and postmodern urban form, life practices, and attitudes. It was with the painful awareness of the processes by which Indonesian cities were being aggressively transformed in uncritical emulation of postwar American urban development that I first traveled to Jakarta in 1992 to convert my “social-cultural visit” visa to a long-term research permit.

In 1992, Jakarta was reaching the apogee of 30 years of sustained economic expansion during which time its population roughly doubled to reach 8.7 million people. Urbanization had long ago extended beyond the borders of the 65,000-hectare (250 square-mile) Jakarta Special Capital Province (*Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta* or *DKI Jakarta*) to start transforming the agricultural lands of the three counties of West Java province surrounding Jakarta into industrial parks and suburban housing estates. Taken together with Jakarta, the Jakarta Metropolitan Area population in 1992 was about 18.5 million people growing at a rate of almost three percent per year, mostly due to immigration. As both the commercial and political capital, more than twice the size of Indonesia’s second largest city of Surabaya in East Java, Jakarta is one of Southeast Asia’s “primate” cities dominating the nation’s political and economic life.⁵ Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous nation (after China, India, and the US) occupying a vast archipelago of 17,000 islands strung out between Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. It is an unlikely agglomeration of several hundred distinct ethnicities, languages, and cultures brought together around 1900 under Dutch colonial rule and kept together under the flag of Indonesia since independence in 1949. The island of Java is seven percent of Indonesia’s land area, roughly the size of California, but home to about 60 percent of its population making it one of the most densely populated regions on earth. The island of Java is named after its most populous group occupying Central and East Java while the Sundanese occupy “Sunda” which is in West Java. Thus the geographic area of the Javanese is not contiguous with the island of Java, so while Jakarta is on the island of Java it is not a “Javanese city” per se.

The rapid growth of Jakarta’s population is part of the global urbanization boom of the twentieth century. Western precedents during the first industrial revolution fail to offer many useful insights into this new wave of urbanization given the significant differences in scale, speed, and availability of resources to cope with the phenomenon. During the industrial revolution a handful of English

⁵ A primate city is one that dominates the economic and political life of a nation by its size and function. Geographers have defined the primate city as a nation’s largest city that is more than the combined populations of the second and third largest cities. Paris, London, Mexico City and Bangkok are all primate cities. Mark Jefferson, “The Law of the Primate City,” *Geographical Review* 29 (1939), 226-32.

towns startled the world by growing at a rate of up to ten percent per annum. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is not uncommon for cities of the developing world to approach this rate of growth but this time they are starting out not as small towns but as already swollen cities of several million people. The infrastructures of the industrial cities of the late nineteenth century were built not only from the proceeds of rapid industrialization but also from the wealth extracted from colonial empires. Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, Europe had never before been home to the largest city in the world, and no nation anywhere had ever seen more than half of its population living in cities. This changed with the peaking of the British Empire and the urbanization of England. With a substantial part of the world serving as its imperial hinterland, over half of the population of England was able to live in cities.

This process of urbanization has since transcended national boundaries and is occurring on a global scale. The urbanization of the human race during the twentieth century represents what has been called "the most massive geographic shift of human population since the beginning of recorded history."⁶ In 1900, 14 percent of the world's population lived in cities. By 1950 the urban share had more than doubled to 30 percent and by 2000 it was estimated that over half of the world's population lives in urban areas.⁷ Urbanization is expected to continue unabated through 2020 when urbanized share of the world's population will reach 57 percent. It is important to recognize that these increasing percentages do not capture the significant difference in base population they refer to. The staggering proportions of this shift are captured only in looking at the population numbers involved. In 1900, the 14 percent global urban population represented 233 million people living in cities. By the year 2000, this population had risen to 2.8 billion. Between 2000 and 2025 the numerical increase in urban population will be around 1.5 billion people.⁸ In the next one hundred years the urban population is expected to quadruple.⁹ Moreover, virtually all of this increase will be located in developing countries where already many of the largest cities in the world do not have the resources, opportunities, or time frame that the cities of the European and North American industrial revolution were able to exploit during their period of urban expansion.

⁶ David A. Smith, *Third World Cities in Global Perspective: The Political Economy of Uneven Urbanization* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 3.

⁷ Dinesh Mehta, "Urbanization of Poverty," *Habitat Debate* (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) 6, no. 4 (2000) <<http://www.unchs.org/unchs/english/hdv6n4/home4.htm>>.

⁸ Mehta, "Urbanization of Poverty,"; see also: Habitat and Willem van Vliet, eds., *Cities in a Globalizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements, 2001* (Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), 2001).

⁹ John Friedmann, "The Coming Age of Cities," lecture given at MIT Department of Urban Studies special series: *A World of Cities: Six Lectures on 21st-Century Urbanization* (25 October 1999).

By 2015, Jakarta is expected to become the world's fifth most populous urban regions behind Tokyo, Mumbai, Lagos, and Shanghai.¹⁰

Another key aspect of this urban population growth is found in the changing ways in which this growth will come about. There are three ways in which people become part of an urbanized area:

1. Natural population growth of the already urbanized population;
2. Rural to urban migration; and
3. Expansion of urban areas to encompass formerly rural areas.

Historically, from the Laws of Enclosure in nineteenth century England to the developing world's circular migrations of the 1980s, by far the greatest contributions to urbanization have come from rural-to-urban migration. With natural population increase holding steady or even declining in many places, a growing share of urban growth is now the result of the structural transformation of formerly rural villages and agricultural lands located on the outskirts of existing urban areas. Now, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, fewer people are coming to the city while in more and more places, the city is coming to the people through expanding urbanization processes.

With improved communication and transportation systems and the integration of economic markets across national boundaries, there is an accompanying convergence in the form of metropolitan areas seen in their dispersion and spread across the landscape and into areas that were formerly perceived to be remote from the city center. Despite the vast range of differences in culture, history, socio-economic distribution, technological development, political structures, etc. from place to place, geographers point out increasingly common attributes of urban regional form. This form is characterized by shifting land uses from extractive industries to manufacturing and from manufacturing to service industries as an enlarging road network supports the relocation of luxury housing, industry, shopping and recreation to the expanding urban edge. The key to the converging form of the world's cities towards the sprawl model is said to be the rising living standards of an emergent middle class intent on leaving the environmental degradation of the city for the better amenities of the new suburbs. The franchising, local partnerships, and direct operation of multi-national firms in emerging economies of the developing world constitute the expansion of markets able to reach ever widening populations of new consumers. The expanded operations of these firms are only too happy to cater to the whims expressed through the greater discretionary spending of this so-called new middle class. Two of the more conspicuous forms that

¹⁰ "Capital's Population Drops by 1.1 Million, Governor Reveals," *Jakarta Post* 18, no. 145 (20 September 2000), 3.

this spending takes are the new suburban housing and the private automobile that have been working together to transform the urban peripheries of the developing world.

Existing metropolitan regions have extended their geographic boundaries through improvements in transportation and communication systems, particularly the expansion of road networks and increases in levels of motorization. The relative economic advantages have attracted ever-greater populations to shift their economic activities from the rural economy of their immediate surroundings to engage in the urban economy wherever transportation systems permit. Geographer Terry McGee coined the term “desakotasasi”—from the Indonesian terms *desa* (village), *kota* (city), and the affix *-sasi* connoting the operation of a process—to characterize the changing nature of vast regions and corridors around Southeast Asian cities. The regions of the “desakota” retain a rural appearance despite population densities surpassing those of many American cities. At the same time, the introduction of improved roads and mini-van public transportation networks have increasingly allowed agrarian households to diversify their economic activities adding light manufacturing and food processing for sale in newly accessible urban markets.¹¹ The retention of a rural spatial form masks the fundamental shift to participation in a regional urban economy.

At the same time, financially successful city dwellers, pushed by deteriorating environmental conditions in the city as well as pulled by the appeal of more space and other amenities, have moved to the expanding periphery of the urban area. The histories of sprawl development of cities and nations have been documented in a large body of literature of the past forty years dominated by studies of the phenomena in the United States where it has arguably had the first and most dramatic transformative impact on the landscape.¹² Contemporary reexaminations of history have been informed by concern over suburbanization finding it to be a factor in Renaissance Italy, Rome, and even evidence of sprawl in the archeological ruins of Mayan settlements.¹³ Common among the questions being asked in research on cities are: To what extent has the expansion of urban areas, so strongly associated with the United States, become a more general phenomenon found in urban

¹¹ T.G. McGee, “The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis,” and Michael Douglass, “Planning for Environmental Sustainability in the Extended Jakarta Metropolitan Region,” chapters 1 and 12 in *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, eds. Norton Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel and T.G. McGee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 3-26.

¹² The literature of American sprawl is itself rapidly expanding. Of particular interest are: Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy, *Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming Automobile Dependence* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999); Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter Calthorpe, *The Next American Metropolis: Ecology, Community and the American Dream* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993); James Howard Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

¹³ John Noble Wilford, “In Maya Ruins, Scholars See Evidence of Urban Sprawl,” *New York Times*, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/19/science/19MAYA.html>> (19 December 2000).

areas throughout the world? With the penetration of foreign media, foreign investment and the global market economy into ever more far-reaching corners of the world, are we heading towards a time when there is a single normative model for all cities of the world?

In his 1998 essay, Melvin Webber refers to this single model of global urbanization as “spread-city”—eschewing the more common pejorative label of “urban sprawl”—as the form that most closely matches the modernization of society. He portrays the compelling nature of the spread-city as arising from the common path of modernization resulting in rising levels of income and wealth, and the shift in patterns of consumption. In Webber’s portrayal, the preferred means of transportation and communication, and the new lifestyle choices, all follow increasingly similar patterns in cities around the world at this time in history despite often dramatic geographic differences.¹⁴ Bangkok and Jakarta are mentioned as two of the clearest examples of this model proliferating despite significant cultural, political and historic differences.

Writing about the same time, Australian economic historian Howard Dick and geographer Peter Rimmer represent the colonial period of urban development as the first era of “globalization” in which imported garden city models contributed to the increasing convergence of urban development in both Southeast Asia and Europe. This period of convergence was interrupted for a time by the Japanese and then independence, which ushered in a period of neo-colonial dependence. The emergence of urban development trends during this period were theorized by geographers as paradigms of the third world city and the Southeast Asian city distinctly different from those of the West. Since the 1970s, this divergent path has been reversed as seen in the mode of economic development, architecture, and urban form in Indonesia’s major cities. This recent realignment of urban development paradigms in both the developed and developing worlds is represented as the final and conclusive convergence leading Dick and Rimmer to argue that “...globalisation has made the paradigm of the Third World City obsolete in south-east Asia.”¹⁵

The seemingly universal trend towards spatial dispersion is seen by Webber as the result of two general categories of forces:

1. as the result of “powerful, world-wide technological and institutional imperatives that most societies have so far been unable or unwilling to restrain”; and
2. as compelled by “highly valued outcomes” in line with consumer preferences found in wealthy Metropolitan areas.

¹⁴ Melvin Webber, “The Joys of Spread-City,” *Urban Design International* 3, no. 4 (December 1998), 201-206.

¹⁵ Howard W. Dick and Peter J. Rimmer, “Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography of South-east Asia,” *Urban Studies* 35, no. 12 (1998), 2304.

These two general terms of the equation correspond to what economists refer to as the push of supply and the pull of demand. Of the two, Webber chooses to emphasize demand-side pulls on the “spread-city” as the “natural” result of lifestyle preferences catered to by private developers who are rewarded or punished by consumers expressing themselves through property markets. The difficulty in making a clean separation between supply and demand factors stems from the operation of two key mechanisms:

1. the operation of cultural reproduction: messages conveyed by the media, including advertising, have a strong influence on the formation of demand; and
2. the control of “decision space”: consumer choices are limited and guided by the structures of the economy and built environment in ways that alter the trends of consumer demand.

Webber does not elaborate further on the form and operation of the “powerful, world-wide technological and institutional imperatives” rendering them instead as a “natural” part of the human context.

In the wake of the abstractions offered by Dick and Rimmer, Webber, and the growing group of authors on the multiple phenomena grouped together under the heading “globalization,” the challenge for research into the form and meaning of cities is to bring a specificity to the seemingly ubiquitous forces of the economy—the “powerful imperatives” invoked by Webber. The generalizations of the global city demand a process of qualification and a reining-in best offered by research on the operation of the forces in question within the bounded contexts of specific places. In particular, it is through the examination of historic processes in all of its complexity that offers a more complete understanding of the forces operating to forge the built form of cities. In this context, Jakarta offers what must be considered an extreme example of rapid transformation through an opening up of its society and economy to global forces. The challenge in reading the built form of Jakarta, is to do so not only with the eyes of an American architect in which the I.M. Pei tower in Jakarta means the same thing as the I.M. Pei tower in Seattle from which it is derived, but also with the eyes of someone familiar with Indonesian language, customs, culture, history and society. Paraphrasing Kostof, the challenge is to read form not in the abstract but as the receptacle for meaning deriving from a specific history and culture.¹⁶ Seen through the lens of history and culture, the I.M. Pei tower in Jakarta takes on a new world of meanings as a function of its reception into the context of Jakarta.

¹⁶ Spiro Kostof, *A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9.




FIGURE 1.1 The procession of Postmodern bank towers along Jakarta's main north-south ceremonial axis.
 Photograph: Robert Cowherd

Arriving in Jakarta, my initial reading of the city's steel and glass towers, wide elevated freeways, and its fountain and sculpture festooned boulevards all indicated a significant material and logistical investment in the built environment of the city. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, a dramatic increase in the foreign direct investment was imprinted on Jakarta's spatial form as post-modern towers, new toll roads choked with new traffic leading to glittering shopping malls, golf courses and gated communities sprawling into the surrounding counties. In expanding city-regions such as the one growing around Jakarta clearly in the advanced stages of an ongoing "modernization" process, it is generally taken for granted that the form of the city and its infrastructures are a product of some careful consideration of future needs and available resources—that the built environment has been conceived and executed on the basis of rational processes of planning. But lapping at the bulwarks of the high-rise compounds lies a choppy sea of red clay tile roofs of the one-story self-built *kampung* houses filling the vast inner blocks of the city. Only rarely can a rivulet be traced between the high walls of two adjacent high-rise parcels to provide a connection between the ramshackle world of the *kampung*, through the facade of corporate landscapes to spill its inhabitants into the wide boulevards of monumental Jakarta. The relative poverty and environmental degradation of the majority of Jakarta's population is not yet

completely hidden behind wall of the steel and glass towers. The *kampung* of Jakarta exhibit several similarities to what Engels observed in Manchester, England as recorded in his *Condition of the Working Class in England*. The relative scarcity and thus distant spacing of wide streets in Jakarta leaves vast blocks of the city with only alleys of various widths called *gang* as the means of access. An outer crust of commercial shops naturally developed along every roadway forming a kind of hard “crust” of commercial activity enclosing the soft residential belly of every block interior. In effect this hard crust served, like the retail shops of nineteenth century Manchester, as “a concealment of everything which might affront the eye and the nerves of the bourgeoisie...”¹⁷ To the extent that signs remain of the uneven development of Jakarta, one assumes that population pressures in combination with resource constraints have so far conspired to thwart the fulfillment of planning visions and overwhelmed the strategies to manage the city into a better future. The recent history of Jakarta’s planning efforts confirms that indeed, a great deal of effort has been focused on providing the criteria, vision, rationale, and even suggested the means for directing Jakarta’s development in certain specific ways towards these ends.

It is thus interesting to find in the case of the rapid and dramatic transformation of Jakarta’s built environment a striking example of how significant planning efforts were not simply overwhelmed by demographic forces and economic constraints but systematically undermined or redirected at the hands of a national power elite. In fact, at a time when unprecedented resources became available for the mobilization of planned investment in the long-term health and viability of Jakarta and its region, the nation’s leadership chose instead to indulge in a dramatic expansion of their rent-seeking behaviors popularly condemned during the protests of 1997 and 1998, as corruption, collusion, and nepotism.¹⁸ As pointed out by Suharto’s defense attorneys during his 2000 trial for corruption, such practices were not yet illegal in Indonesia. The grand scale of many of the Suharto regime’s dealings made attempts to hide them futile and they were instead dressed up as development projects for the greater glory and advancement of the nation, in the manner of the emperor’s new clothes. When disclosed, hints of the staggering benefits accruing to the small circle surrounding President Suharto from such ventures were represented as the fruits of an almost divine favor—rewards to which they were entitled as the contemporary equivalent of Javanese feudal royalty from which Suharto and his wife proudly traced their divine mandate. As perhaps the most visible aspect of this process, Suharto and his inner circle effectively mobilized

¹⁷ Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (London: Granada Publishing, 1969 (1844)), 47.

¹⁸ Andrew MacIntyre, “Funny Money: Fiscal Policy, Rent-seeking and Economic Performance in Indonesia,” chapter 6 in *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

the transformation of the Jakarta city region over more than two decades of sustained growth often in direct contravention of planning and regulatory guidelines.

Framing Questions and Thesis

Framed by these issues and my own personal and professional experience, the following set of questions emerged:

- What are the forces behind the transformation of cities in general and Jakarta in particular?
- What is the basis of attraction to North American models of architecture, planning and development?
- What new meanings emerge from the translation of planning practices and urban form between cultures?
- How are these models received, reinterpreted, and responded to in their new settings?
- What are the prospects for a distinctively local (syncretic yet modern) architecture and urbanism?

The pursuit of these questions through field research in Jakarta and its surrounding counties and towns took on the aspect of gathering items to place in two lists. Since cities and regions have only rarely sprung from the vision of single individuals or groups at a given moment in history, the first was a list of the points of decision-making that each contributed in some way incrementally to the form and operation of Jakarta. The second list was that of “forces” exercising some degree of influence over the decisions made. Economists might divide the first list into two columns of supply-side decisions and demand-side decisions each registering their “vote” in market transactions weighted according to the value of the transaction. The items on my list included decisions related to planning, development proposals, household relocation and transportation mode only incompletely understood as transactions in the marketplace and not clearly divisible into categories of demand and supply. Instead, the individual and collective choices that aggregate to constitute the city are more usefully seen as existing along a supply-demand continuum. With decisions of the national economic development planning at one extreme and individual or household choices regarding housing and transportation at the other.

The more daunting challenge was posed by the task of listing the forces operating to influence the choices made at each level that contribute to the form and operation of the city region. This list of “forces” organizes itself into a diagram along a scale from the global to the local as follows:




FIGURE 1.2 Diagram of forces contributing to the formation and operation of the city region.

The form of the city according to this schematic model functions as both cause and effect. The space of the city at any given moment in history establishes for its inhabitants both a norm—the way things normally exist—and, for those interested in maintaining the status quo, a normative model—the way things *should* be. Once established, the formal and social aspects of urban space demonstrates a strong tendency to reproduce itself, spawning more of the same or only slightly varying from the established norms. The arrangement of and access to infrastructures and urban amenities has a significant impact on the economic, social opportunities of its inhabitants, and exerts a formidable influence on the distribution of life chances.¹⁹ In this regard, the diagram is congruent with the Chicago School's "human ecology" analyses of the deterministic role of technological and economic infrastructures limited as it is to examining the relationship between the spatial field of the city and the urban structure of local social communities.

On the other side of the urban spatial component that anchors this diagram lies the role of the state. It is generally presumed that the state performs a beneficent, or at worst benign, role in the ordering of urban space. But the normative role of the state, especially in rapidly expanding city regions, is prone to manipulation by powerful interests. Here political economy approaches are useful in examining the relationship between the state and centers of power in society (military, political, private capital, royalty, etc.). These approaches offer a particularly compelling explanatory power applied to the case of Jakarta given the central role of corruption in the coordination of state and private sector operations. These approaches, alternately labeled "urban political economy" and "new urban sociology," offer insights into the effects of the self-interested

¹⁹ Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition* (London: Routledge, 2001).

orchestration of planning and regulatory mechanisms to capture advantageous opportunities and mobilize state resources for private gain. The focus of political economy models on the operation of informal cooperative arrangements between the business community elite and political leaders working together in loosely configured "growth coalitions" go a long way in accounting for the history of Jakarta's transformation during the economic booms of the 1980s and 1990s. Much recent scholarship has focused on the relationship between the state and powerful interests as explored through the literatures of urban regime theories.²⁰

Powerful private sector and political elite seek out, develop, and respond to opportunities presented them by the combination of conditions in their home region (labor, capital, infrastructure, land resource availability) and in the national, regional and increasingly international marketplace (availability of investment capital, import-export opportunities, etc.). Under the conditions commonly associated with the "new international division of labor" (cheap energy and new technological innovations that permit taking advantage of lower labor costs in far flung locations), the urban power elite are more likely to be presented with a wider variety of opportunities that significantly impact the built landscape of the city region.

Both globalization and world systems theorists would generally ascribe a causative sequence to these relationships: the global economy compels the urban power elite to direct planning and development in specific ways so as to increase the global competitiveness of the city region in attracting foreign direct investment and economically productive activities through the provision of infrastructure and restructuring of land uses. A similar model was in fact presented by Smith to frame his quantitative analysis of the persistent dependency of "third world" cities.²¹ Using the political economy approach of world systems theory, his model features a strong causal directionality of forces moving from the global dynamics of "world systems" expansion and contraction.²² The resulting urban structure in turn largely determines the spatial and social distribution of urban amenities and the quality of life possible for groups in different parts of the region. While the study that follows generally corroborates the operation of this sequential chain of cause and effect relationships, it finds that the unilateral nature of each of these links is anything but assured. Instead, a more specific historical examination reveals significant counter-forces

²⁰ John Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Clarence N. Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989); Mickey Lauria, ed., *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997).

²¹ David A. Smith, *Third World Cities in Global Perspective: The Political Economy of Uneven Urbanization* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 24.

²² Smith, *Third World Cities*, 23-25.

operating in the opposite direction along this chain of relationships. At each link in this chain there are feedback mechanisms that temper the dominant trend. Each relationship represented in this diagram is found to function in accordance with cultural norms and values that mediate transactions, either facilitating or obstructing dominance.

The usefulness of this schematic diagram lies in its capacity to position different theories, methodologies, and even disciplines in relation to each other transcending presumptions of mutual exclusivity. However, like its constituent parts, this diagram remains an abstraction. Both the extent of its usefulness and its capacity to deceive remain to be tested in application to bodies of evidence provided by the actual histories of specific cases. The role of specific histories in identifying the limitations of theory lies at the heart of both scholarship and the worldly task of collective decision making. Once identified, the shortcomings of theory and the valuable resources of historical evidence provide the fertile soil for a further cycle of theorization and testing. Taken in the abstract, outside its application in a specific historical context, the chain of cause and effect relationships such as the one described above tend to take on deterministic overtones. Both Marxian based political economy approaches and neo-classical assumptions of efficiency optimization share a privileging of the invisible or incremental operation of economic forces as an almost organic fact of life.²³ In the former, corporate capitalists stand unchallenged and invincible in subsuming all else to the task of capital accumulation unfettered by the social or environmental consequences. In the latter, lone individuals making choices based on pure self-interest yielding the greatest aggregate good distributed neutrally and benignly for maximum overall "efficiency."²⁴ In either case, by ascribing an inevitability to market forces and the "flows of capital" analyses are predisposed to a certain outcome by the very nature of their terms of reference. Against these, a number of recent studies instead open to the possibilities for the space of the city as a significant factor in negotiations between competing flows capable of limiting and even challenging the dominance of economic forces. These include the forces of cultural identity, language, land rights, environmental justice, alternative distribution of life chances, etc. competing with business interests on the dynamic field of contest that is the space of the city.²⁵ The significant pressures brought to bear by these interests suggest a portrayal of the city as a stage upon which the story unfolds along a plot line significantly different from the one pre-determined by an overconfident economic prologue. A major challenge of such analyses lies in the need to question the terms of

²³ Logan, *Urban Fortunes*, 4-15.

²⁴ Logan, *Urban Fortunes*, 1, 5-6, 11.

²⁵ An excellent gathering of such analyses is offered by Anthony D. King, ed., *Re-Presenting the City: Ethnicity, Capital and Culture in the 21st-Century Metropolis* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

reference, the rhetorical framework, and the language itself employed by previous representations of history—to look not only at the forces behind the form of the city but to make explicit the forces behind their description as well.

The specific historic case of Jakarta's transformation during the boom years of the late Suharto period (1980 to 1997) offers a dramatic example that simultaneously corroborates the operation of power and money as modeled by the political economy approaches, *and* reveals the significant limitations of these models. While the general outline of this history identifies the basic operation of corporate business and political interests as the primary determinants of where, how, and for whose benefit the human landscape of the expanding Jakarta urban agglomeration was transformed, these forces alone fail significantly to account for the full extent and depth of change. In particular, President Suharto's "New Order" regime successfully evolved from an oppressive military rule to one based on the promise of national "development." Sailing under the banner of "development," the ship of state assumed dimensions of a virtually unassailable juggernaut sweeping all other concerns aside and leaving new extremes of unevenly distributed benefits and costs in its wake. The concept of "development" was sufficiently abstracted to permit even the most self-serving projects to proceed unobstructed by the normative structures of pretensions to representative democracy, planning bureaucracies, or the Indonesian legal system. The gap left between what can be accounted for by urban regime models and what remained beyond their direct influence suggests the operation of "cultural" forces. Far from being economically determined, changes in the form and operation of the city under the influence of economic forces are found to be possible only when sanctioned by a prevailing rhetoric of values, priorities, assumptions and aspirations of decision makers and those in possession of the means to hamper their will. Beyond the reach of economically or politically compelling forces, these cultural forces move from merely facilitating economically driven changes to taking on a decidedly active role of their own—as demonstrated by cases where communities willingly relinquish their rights for the greater good of national "development." Culture, thus takes on a significance not granted it in previous political economy models as a necessary, though insufficient, factor in accounting for the form and operation of the city. Far from being the inexorable product of incremental decisions based on shifting economic exigencies, the city instead is the spatial field through which a variety of forces compete to register a cultural imprint. Thus one of the central points of this dissertation is that economic forces operate within, and subordinate to, the processes of cultural construction in the formation and operation of city regions.

This study suggests that the transformation of Jakarta during the economic booms of the 1980s and 1990s was to an extraordinary extent commanded from a concentration of power in the close circle of President Suharto's family and business partners. From an initial power-base of violent

military control established through the bloodshed of 1965 and 1966, General Suharto engineered a cultural transformation over the next several decades into a far more dispersed and deeply embedded, and thus effective, national consensus—a “manufactured consent”²⁶—structured as his New Order development agenda. The incremental successes of Suharto’s national development programs, particularly in the areas of education, health, food security, and rural infrastructure, helped to win the hearts and minds of Indonesians even as the New Order regime was emboldened to new extremes of corruption. The ever-greater penetration of Suharto’s culture of “development” progressed hand in glove with the progressive extension of command and control over business and government dealings. Every five years, national elections were engineered into a ritualized reconfirmation of Suharto. Similarly, outward appearances of competitive entrepreneurship and governmental oversight thinly cloaked a vast network of patron-client relations through which licenses, contracts, monopolies, positions, permits, and special exemptions were systematically bought and sold. Through his cultural project, Suharto’s status was elevated from being merely the President of the nation to *Bapak Pembangunan* (Father of Development) projecting a self-styled aura of traditional Javanese kingship and claiming rights of royal privilege for his family and close business partners.²⁷ At the same time Suharto’s ubiquitous pyramid of patronage relations ultimately engulfed any business dealings of note and subsumed even the functioning of national and regional governance to his interests.

With power concentrated in a handful of developers closely allied with or related to Suharto, a planning and regulatory framework was established in the early 1970s creating Jakarta’s suburban property market. The real estate oligarchy led by Chinese-Indonesian architect-developer Ciputra, gained control over a vast privately held land bank (reaching twice the size of the Jakarta Special Capital Province itself). The transformation of Jakarta in the last two decades of Suharto’s rule was largely commanded through the decisions made by this small group regarding the regulation, control, and selective development of these lands. The fundamental fallacy of the implicit or explicit economic determinism common to approaches ranging from world systems research, political economy models, and neo-Marxian analysis to neo-classical theories, proponents of economic liberalization, and globalization literature in general, is demonstrated by examining specific contexts and their actual histories. While economic forces may exert significant influence

²⁶ This term was coined in 1921 in a notably positive reference to the increasing necessity and sophistication of propaganda to reproduce the personal values, beliefs, and behavioral norms useful in the maintenance of a particular social order. Walter Lippmann *Public Opinion* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932 (1921)); cited in Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufactured Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

²⁷ Ariel Heryanto, “The Development of ‘Development’,” *Indonesia* 46 (1988), 1-24.

on the decisions made by actors within urban regimes such as Suharto's New Order business and political elite, they do so only as mediated by the value and priority granted them in competition with other considerations. The influence of the global economy, and economics in general, manifests in the form of perceived opportunities and threats evaluated within the core group of decision-makers according to their values, ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and visions of the future. The proper focus of attention then is, not the macro-structural forces of global economy or world systems, but instead how these forces compete with other considerations within the assumed range of alternative choices, the perceived costs and benefits of each, and the culturally constructed criteria and considerations employed in their evaluation—what Friedmann and Wulff called the “decision space” applied here to the dynamics of an identifiable oligarchic elite.²⁸ Thus the key methodological concept to clarify in this introductory chapter is that of culture.

Methodologies

I have attempted to avoid the coining, or even the passing along, of neologisms wherever more commonly used turns of phrase are available—and have happily found that they are almost always available. Therefore it is under duress that I use the phrase “cultural construction” (even making it the dominant feature of my title) recognizing the absence of alternatives sufficiently encompassing to perform the necessary task at hand. What is meant by “cultural construction” is best revealed by the processes examined in the history of Jakarta that follows. Nonetheless, here I offer a more generalized definition. The first step is to delineate the boundaries of phenomena and forces that are encompassed by the use of the term “culture” in this study. The definition offered by the *Oxford English Dictionary* most closely associated with the term as intended here is:

A particular form or type of intellectual development. Also, the civilization, customs, artistic achievements, etc., of a people, esp. at a certain stage of its development or history.²⁹

Unfortunately, most of the phenomena thrown into the bin of “culture” by this study would have to be included under the “et cetera” portion of this definition. Culture is a term and a concept that lies at the core of several areas of disciplinary knowledge each with a separate literature establishing its definition as deemed most useful to the goals and applications of that discipline. There is no single

²⁸ John Friedmann and Robert Wulff, *The Urban Transition: Comparative Studies of Newly Industrializing Societies* (Los Angeles: School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975), 90.

²⁹ *Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition (Oxford: Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).

meaning, even the “common sense” usage, which can be employed in each of its applications.³⁰ Thus its precise meaning develops out of each specific field of disciplinary knowledge and the history of its usage within a particular theoretical context. Wherever it is used there is an obligation to establish the discursive context of its use.

At the same time, each usage relates in some sense back to its origins in the agricultural sense of cultivation as in: the deliberate manipulation of growth towards a desired end. The term first left its agricultural context in application to human society coinciding with the rise of agrarian capitalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this context the cultivation of the highest qualities of human society could lead to the development of “culture” as the basis for political power in competition with the divine right of natural succession or rulers. This basis of power held by a “cultured” elite was in turn challenged in the nineteenth century by the rise of entrepreneurial and imperial successes as well as by Marx who criticized “culture” as the exclusive realm of the wealthy from which the poor were excluded. Matthew Arnold restored the term culture by removing its material base and defining it instead as a kind of spiritual perfection achieved through ever-greater senses of discrimination and appreciation.³¹ A related definition of “culture” developed in association with the traditions of cultural criticism centered on intrinsic or eternal values and issues of aesthetics. “Culture” stood in opposition to the mass society and its encroachments via materialism and its technologies. This sense of the word culture is *not* the one intended here and would better be expressed by the sense connoted in the term “high culture” as in an embattled bastion against popular culture in which the ideologies of the elite were represented as universal interests and thus effectively dispossessing the majority.

The use of the term culture intended here coincides more closely with its use in cultural anthropology and sociology referring to the values, practices, and meanings encoded in the “complex of attitudes, beliefs, norms of behavior, etc.” including those of “subordinate classes in a given historical period.”³² Similarly, Berlin defines culture as:

³⁰ Tim O’Sullivan et al., *Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1994), 68-69.

³¹ O’Sullivan, *Key Concepts*, 70.

³² Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), xiv.

...the interconnection of diverse activities on the part of members of a given community ...the links that exist between legal systems, religions, arts, sciences, customs and, above all, languages, as well as myths and legends and ritual forms of behaviour, and bind them into identifiable ways of life with differing ideals and values...³³

The emphasis here is on culture as a connective tissue, as a milieu common to a wide variety of human activities. As used in the following chapters, culture encompasses not just the arts, literature, languages, and behaviors, but also political ideologies; collective assumptions regarding class, traditional societies, and the natural deterministic power of markets; shared visions, imagery, and aspirations for the future; and attitudes towards the environment, religion, the West, etc. In each of these areas, culture manifests a set of meanings, values, and priorities that can most directly be understood as the key factors conjoining each of the identifiable components of culture as employed in anthropology.

Against the naturalistic assumptions of elitism inherent in cultural criticism, a further evolution of meaning came with the rise of cultural studies with roots in the late 1950s efforts to dismantle the hegemony of elite, high English culture. Cultural studies emerged using methodologies that examine the processes of social production of sense and consciousness specifically in relation to economics and politics. Through feminist, Marxist, and multi-culturalist critiques as well as other efforts falling within the discipline of cultural studies, culture is defined as: "The sphere of meaning, which unifies the spheres of production (economics) and social relations (politics)."³⁴ Again there is an emphasis on the associative capacities of shared values and ideals bringing together diverse areas of human endeavor. But the role of culture as developed within cultural studies emphasizes also its active role, beyond that of a passive category. In this context, culture is credited with:

...the social production and reproduction of sense, meaning and consciousness... [as] a determining and not just determined part of social activity, and therefore culture is a significant sphere for the reproduction of social power inequalities.³⁵

It is to this active role of culture and the necessity of referring to the processes by which it operates that we apply the term "cultural construction."

³³ Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of History: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991 (1951)), 54.

³⁴ O'Sullivan, *Key Concepts*, 68.

³⁵ O'Sullivan, *Key Concepts*, 68, 71.

But the explanatory power of this broadly conceived use of the term culture presents a double-edged sword: its usefulness comes with a commitment to engage in the crossing of disciplinary boundaries. Such a commitment has proven to be one of the key demands of effective examinations of the city. Architectural historian John Summerson identified in the study of the city the opportunity to examine a conveniently delineated social history using the concrete methodologies appropriate to the study of the social, psychological, and economic forces behind the formation of actual artifacts. He urged urban historians to go beyond buildings to examine:

...the history of the fabrics of cities.... the tangible substance, the stuff of the city... the whole physical mass of marble, bricks, steel and concrete, tarmac and rubble, metal conduits and rails — the whole artifact.³⁶

The qualities and characteristics of urban space derive from the successes and failures of a variety of social agents or actors forming, changing, dissolving, and reforming in a dynamic, often competitive, relation to one another. Certain individuals, groups, ideologies, technologies, economic arrangements, etc. emerge, evolve, and disappear at different times to take on special roles and exert particular influence in the ebb and flow of historic processes. These forces share little in common other than their interaction within the space of cities. To varying degrees they each involve the space of the city as both a “cause”—certain phenomena manifest in the ways they do because of the facilitating conditions of specific aspects of urban form and operation—and an effect—in that they leave their imprint on the face of the city.

Given the nature of the complex intersection of forces within the space of the city, the investigation of the forces behind Jakarta’s dramatic transformation has necessitated the crossing of several disciplinary boundaries. These boundaries were crossed with a certain degree of reluctance given the constraints of time, ability, and background required to fathom and use often unfamiliar and difficult concepts. However, the diversity of perspectives and explanatory theories were demanded by the diversity of the phenomena on the ground in Jakarta itself. Along with these demands, boundary crossings were often enough rewarded with a key insight that, if missed, would have yielded a far less significant and useful study. Were it not for the grounding of this study in a detailed examination of recent history, such encroachments onto foreign soil would have no doubt been a far more perilous undertaking. Each of my disciplinary excursions was undertaken as an assignment to answer a specific question, follow up a clue, or similarly focused so as to keep me more or less on track. At each turn in the investigation, the pitfalls of theoretical abstraction were countered by the specificity of the material requiring a transparent act of translation and

³⁶ John Summerson, “Urban Forms,” in *The Historian and the City*, eds. O. Handlin and J. Burchard (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), 165-69; cited in Zeynep Celik and Diane Favro, “Methods of Urban History,” *Journal of Architectural Education*, no. 3 (Spring 1988), 5.

application to the everyday experience of Jakarta. This is not to say that holes in the evidence were entirely avoided but the hope is that these holes are sufficiently explicit so as to indicate the kinds of studies still necessary for a more complete understanding. This is also not to say that overarching generalizations have been shunned entirely. Instead the goal has been to avoid both the dangers of disconnected abstraction and the misplaced idealism of too great a circumspection—to strike a balance between useful generalizations and the specific knowledge that informs them.

Commenting on the necessity of adopting multiple disciplinary perspectives in the study of the city, Wolfgang Braunfels wrote:

Cities can no more be understood by means of aesthetic norms alone than by means of standards borrowed from sociology and political science.... We can never pursue more than a few. Research finds it necessary to do art... an injustice by paying attention only to those parts of the whole phenomenon that respond to the specific questions of the research in some particular case.³⁷

The two core disciplines of this study are architecture and planning. These dominate in the four central chapters of this dissertation. Chapter Three examines the cultural production of architectural artifacts in real estate development. Chapter Four takes a more anthropological approach using the house plans of recent real estate developments to read the meaning and use of space in the every day lives of a selected segment of society. Chapter Five is written in the tradition of planning history. While being grounded in the central questions of planning and its counterpart, development, Chapter Six is where the greatest dissolution of disciplinary boundaries occurs oscillating between political science, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, and political economy. These core chapters are further framed by a chapter on a history of Jakarta from the perspective of urban political economy (Chapter Two) and one that is guided by an urban sociological perspective (Chapter Seven). In 1989, beginning the research that was to eventually culminate in this dissertation, I was faced with the challenge that my burning questions concerning Javanese urbanism might require of me a certain immersion in an anthropological literature. I never imagined that I might have the need, desire, or capacity to delve into the concepts of economics, political science, real estate, or sociology, which at the time seemed very far from my core interest in architecture and urban space. But the drive to investigate can be a cruel task master and with my nose to the ground, I came up against these areas one by one drawn by the explanatory power they offered the evolving set of questions sampled above. The compelling need to draw on a number of perspectives beyond architecture and planning is indicative of both the nature of the city and the

³⁷ Wolfgang Braunfels, "Introduction," *Urban Design in Western Architecture: Regime and Architecture, 900-1900*, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988 (1976)), 9-10.

importance of expanding the agenda for architecture and planning criticism if this criticism is to justify claims of relevance to society.

This research was undertaken in the conviction that there is a significant role to be played by an American looking at social and political forces operating in the transformation of Indonesian cities. The decidedly personal nature of the framing narrative that constitutes the opening section of the dissertation represents an attempt to establish the position of the author—to place the reader in the position from which to more effectively “question author-ity.” In recognizing that this research (some would say *all* research) is inherently political—in the sense that it deals with the way that Indonesians organize a social life together and the relationships of power that this involves—I also recognize the reader’s obligation to read through any claims of technical, self-evident, scientific, or universal truth. To acknowledge my position in undertaking this research is to also render this dissertation “readable” in the sense that the arguments that I make here would be largely unintelligible outside the purposes and conditions from which they arise.³⁸ The objects of research and the methods applied here have each been selected as demanded by the chosen topic in light of the practical objectives reflected in the opening section of this chapter. As a study that focuses on the processes of “cultural construction,” it is only fitting that this examination itself be undertaken with an explicit exposition of the values held by its author. As implied by its dedication, my hope is that the material presented here might be effectively deployed by the next generation of Indonesian urbanists in bringing a more critical awareness to the use of North American models and to the operations that transform and maintain social-power structures of Indonesian cities.

History of Southeast Asian Urbanism: Formation and Operation of Towns

This study of Jakarta’s transformation at the end of the twentieth century rests at the intersection of two distinct contexts: The context of the transformation of cities around the world; and the history of Southeast Asian urbanism. Given the relative popularity and availability of literature on the former and the obscurity and lack of literature on the latter, I have devoted most of the rest of this chapter to a brief review of what I consider the salient features of the city in Southeast Asia and its literature. Instead of a similarly terse review of the global city, I refer to specific works on the global city as required in the chapters that follow. The fundamental conflict between the “one world urban paradigm” as represented by Dick, Rimmer, and Webber, and a local historical specificity represented in the brief treatment of the topic that follows necessitates reference to these two contextual frameworks and their confluence in the recent transformations of Jakarta.

³⁸ Eagleton writes of cultural studies as the reinvention of what has historically been called “rhetoric” in its almost entirely obscured sense as the “art of speaking or writing effectively.” Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 206.

In the preface to the classic work on Javanese culture by Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, George McT. Kahin points out that any attempt to fathom the social and political articulation of contemporary Indonesian society sooner or later confronts the necessity of seeking an understanding of the pre-Western culture of Java. Contemporary Indonesia remains encoded with much of what was established long ago in pre-western Java.

[Pre-western Javanese culture has] conditioned the way in which all outside ideas, Western and non-Western, have been received, and they help to account for the particular patterns of synthesis which are woven into the Javanese milieu. Most striking is the way in which persisting elements of old Javanese culture affect contemporary values. An ability to accommodate to and tolerate conflicting norms and ideas, the capacity to entertain in coexistence ideas and values that would seem incompatible in many Western settings, an unusual capacity for sympathetic toleration in social behavior—these are all attributes of contemporary Javanese society deriving from old Javanese culture.³⁹

The remarkable tolerance of the Javanese, though, is rooted in an exceptional self-confidence that if social norms allowed to be expressed, would certainly manifest as arrogance. Children are distinguished from adults with the phrase “*durung Jowo*” (not yet Javanese) in a way that suggests that to be adult or even civilized one must have attained a mastery of high Javanese language.⁴⁰ Through exceptional effort, non-Javanese can aspire to approximate this level of sophistication but are generally held outside (below) the strict hierarchies of Javanese society. The solidity of this foundation is the basis for much of what constitutes Javanese culture. Anderson points to this foundation to account for the capacity of the Javanese to accept foreign influences, and whole cultural elements, adopting and then adapting them freely to produce hybrid artifacts and practices. Moreover, this process of cultural hybridization was a self-conscious operation reflected in the contemporary use of the verb “*dijawakan*” (Javanize).

To the extent that pre-Western Javanese culture remains the starting point for understanding the social and political organization of contemporary Indonesia, it is even more significant for those attempting to understand the form and operation of Indonesian cities and towns on the island of Java. While the residuum of pre-Western Javanese urbanism can be found most clearly in the royal

³⁹ George McT. Kahin, “Preface” to Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996 (1965)), 5.

⁴⁰ High Javanese employs a vocabulary distinct from and foreign to the vocabulary of normal daily conversation. Mastery of this separate vocabulary is considered a sign of refinement and associated with the elite. In towns outside of the central court centers, it would not be uncommon to find that almost no one has a command of high-Javanese. Anderson, *Mythology*, 16.

court centers of inland Central Java, they can also be found to some degree in every settlement throughout the island including in the post-independence developments of Jakarta.

In his examination of the Southeast Asian urbanism, Richard O'Connor goes even further than Kahin in admonishing scholars of the Southeast Asian city to pay attention to the historic roots of these societies. He asserts that neither colonialism nor the rise of capitalism and modern rationality has been sufficient to create the schism between a traditional past and modern present that the industrial revolution and the world wars cemented in the West. In O'Connor's analysis, the role of symbol and ritual remain dominant over the additional role of economics and rational planning. While the form of the city and the lifestyles of a small segment of the population may lend the appearance of such a transformation:

...the history and symbolic meanings of the city are as vital today as they were when early cities mirrored the cosmos and Indic rituals ordered the realm. There has been no break, no time when the past was erased and the present became simply 'rational' instead of symbolic.... Somewhere between the cosmological past and the modern present scholars lost the Southeast Asian city and put Chicago in its place. Sometimes this miraculous change is written as history—colonialism, it seems, wiped away tradition and unleashed capitalism. Other times it is written into a theory—the market, some say, rules the city and its social life. Often the change comes by making the city measurable—births, deaths, costs, and crimes are taken to say what can reliably be said about the city. Always the Southeast Asian city is changed from indigenous to Western, not willfully but implicitly in the way it is studied and explained.⁴¹

The lens of established Western theory operates to color what is seen in the Southeast Asian city. Theory operates by selecting some elements as significant and by which the rest is understood. To the extent that actions are based on the interpretation of what is seen, the lens of theory then predetermines certain actions. Where the assumptions of Western perspectives fall short of accounting for the course of events, the explanatory powers of indigenous perspectives are most evident. An understanding of the historic context of the Southeast Asian city is necessary to account for much of the recent history to the extent that many of the actors involved in the transformation of Jakarta at the end of the twentieth century operated according to a view of the city in which the symbolic retains its power to intervene in the order of things. To the extent that the Western perspective conflicts with the terms by which most Southeast Asian urbanites actually operate within their cities, it has and will continue to be a source of problems.

⁴¹ Richard A. O'Connor, *A Theory of Indigenous Southeast Asian Urbanism*, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 38 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), vi, 1.

It is useful to consider the history of urban development on Java in three phases: First, the Indic period from the first centuries CE up to the arrival of Middle Eastern and European influences in the twelve to fifteenth centuries—often mislabeled the “indigenous” period despite its main feature being the strong influences from India and China. Second, the period of “pin-prick” colonialism in which first Iberian and then Dutch and British commercial interests formed trading partnerships and competed over monopoly control especially over the lucrative spice trade—although these influences were concurrent with a perhaps more significant Islamization of Java. Third, the period of colonial urban development from 1800, when the Dutch East India Company turned over their contracts to the colonial administration of the Dutch East Indies, and ending with the Japanese occupation in 1942.⁴² The most interesting aspect of this history is the role played by the remarkable capacity of the Javanese to adopt and adapt foreign influences while remaining anchored in an essential Javanese-ness—a capacity for hybrid cultural formation that remains true to the core meanings at the root of Javanese culture if not always the outward appearance. Through each of these periods of urban development, the Javanese city and its society underwent sometimes radical transformations without experiencing the kind of breach in continuity felt with the rise of modernity in the West.

⁴² David A. Smith and Roger J. Nemeth, “Urban Development in Southeast Asia,” *Urbanisation in the Developing World*, ed. David Drakakis-Smith (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 121-140.



FIGURE 1.3 Even today, the hundreds of diverse cultures comprising Indonesia from Stone Age to Information Age can make for some striking juxtapositions in the national capital. Photograph: *Jakarta Post*

The first towns started to form in the first centuries of the Common Era when sea trade routes brought the inhabitants of Java into contact with traders from China and India. The acceptance of Hindu religious concepts eventually led to social differentiations that formed in conjunction with agricultural surpluses made possible by the volcanic ash-fed fertility of the inland valleys. This early specialization gave rise to towns and eventually to the accoutrement of high culture—architecture, art, literature, etc.—to match a ruling class. But royalty was slow to appear as it had to overcome the egalitarian norms and mores of the pre-Hindu customary laws.⁴³ A line of god-kings consolidated power by appealing to the pre-Hindu ancestor worship establishing themselves as reincarnations of Hindu gods.⁴⁴ The influence of Hindu culture on Java (and settlements

⁴³ Peter J. M. Nas, "The Early Indonesian Town: Rise and Decline of the City-State and Its Capital," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 20-21.

⁴⁴ Nas, "Early Indonesian Town," 21.

throughout Southeast Asia) was so strong that early historians of this period characterized Java as a colony of India.⁴⁵

The first cities on Java arose as royal court centers and constructed as a microcosmic model of the Hindu-Javanese conception of the universe.⁴⁶ The central mountain of the Hindu-Javanese cosmos on whose upper slopes the gods dwelled was manifested as the central pavilion of the *kraton* (palace complex). The seven concentric rings of alternating oceans and continents were emulated by the series of seven walled courtyards organized along the north-south axis of the *kraton*. The endless ocean that lies beyond the seventh continent is embodied in the two great sand covered plains found at either end of the north-south ceremonial axis of the palace complex. Reinforcing the connection of these town squares to the north and the south of Javanese palaces to the cosmic ocean they are called *alun-alun* (waves). The south *alun-alun* symbolizes death and a return to nothingness and thus is intended to be maintained as an empty space. In contrast, the north *alun-alun* evolved to serve as the focal point of every Javanese town with local administrative offices substituting for the *kraton* on its southern edge, a mosque to the west (towards Mecca) and a market to the east. The *alun-alun* (town square) and its role in organizing the cities and towns of Java remains the most visible physical manifestation of an indigenous urbanism reaching back beyond European, Middle Eastern and Chinese influences while taking on aspects of each of these. In the 1950s and 1960s, Sukarno reorganized colonial Dutch Batavia's military parade and fair ground into the nation's *alun-alun*.

Every point in the palace complex was charged with multiple layers of symbolism through naming strategies, plantings, colors, architectural motifs, and function to reinforce its correspondence both with the related element of the cosmic model and with a portion of the royal realm under the control of the king. These connections to the cosmos and the realm were reinforced through the performance of ritual offerings, renewals, meditations, and events in order to maintain or reestablish a harmonious alignment of heaven and earth. The central pavilion of the palace was similarly conceived as the cosmic navel connecting heaven and earth by an umbilical cord through which all good fortune was believed to flow from the gods to the human world. This established

⁴⁵ George Coedes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, eds. Walter F. Vella and Susan Brown Cowing (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968).


⁴⁶ The history of Javanese urbanism presented here is inseparable from the history of the royal palace at the core of the court centers. See: Robert Cowherd, "Conservation and Development: the Case of Surakarta Palace Heritage Site in Solo," in *Tourism and Heritage Management*, ed. Wiendu Nuryanti (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1997) 443-462; Paul Wheatley, *Nagara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Traditions* (University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper Nos. 207-208, 1983), 430; Timothy Earl Behrend, "Kraton and Cosmos in Traditional Java" (unpublished masters thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1982); and Robert Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper no. 18, 1956).

simultaneously the worldly hierarchy of humankind and space as a concentrically organized stratification of power with the king at the center in his holy pavilion, home also to the most sacred *pusaka* (sacred heirlooms vested with mystical powers). Surrounding the king and his *pusaka* were his wives and children each occupying residences organized around courtyards nearest to the center of the palace. From here, the more distant relatives and nobles were housed in widening concentric circles of lessening status. Outside the walls of the inner palace were arranged dense neighborhood quarters, many of them walled. Each quarter was identified by the functional role played by its residents in the daily operation of palace life. Many of these place designations survive to the present attached to quarters named for each of the regiments in the palace guard, another for the kitchen staff, and several for the different groups of performing artists. The residents of the court city were considered similarly the more *halus* (refined, sophisticated in language, dress, and behavior) in comparison with the inhabitants of the north coast of Java at the periphery of the realm. By nature of their remote spatial location from the "navel" at the center of the palace complex through which heavenly fortune flowed, these people were considered *kasar* (coarse, unrefined, the opposite of *halus*) unable to speak or understand high Javanese. This regional configuration was further complicated by the replication of local power centers corresponding with a local nobility each with an *alun-alun* and *kraton* at a smaller scale subordinate to the king and his *kraton*.

In the immediate vicinity of the royal court center, the houses of princes, ministers, high officials, and other nobility were configured in direct emulation of the king's palace on a smaller scale. The main roads of the traditional Javanese city formed the boundaries of walled districts entered through a small number of distinctive gateways. Each of these noble's houses occupied the center of an urban precinct encrusted on all sides with the high density residential fabric and surrounded by an enclosing wall (figure 1.3). The several dozen households of the precinct lived under the protection of, and in service to, the noble occupying the center of the quarter. The highly structured relationship between noble and community was called *magersari*, from the Javanese word *pagar* for fence or wall.⁴⁷ This relationship went far beyond what can be described as that between a landlord and his tenants. The payment and receipt of rents was easily its least significant aspect. The dominant nature of *magersari* was social while also constituting the dominant structure for local economic activity, the provision for local safety and security, and local governance. The noble would typically organize the remunerative production of a guild as the economic basis for this local community and the offering of a specialized commodity or service to the larger

⁴⁷ Ikaputra, "A Study on the Contemporary Utilization of the Javanese Urban Heritage and its Effect on Historicity," (Ph.D. diss., Japan, 1998).

community of the royal court and its city. He would also charge a nominal rent most often taking the form of goods or services rendered to the royal household within the framework of a religious ceremony performed to reinforce traditional socio-cultural norms. The inhabitants of the noble's compound would render services in times of war and, in turn, seek the protection and prestige deriving from association with the noble household. It also fulfilled the functions of a social security safety net in times of personal hardship.



25. *Dalem Ngadlwinatan* (1987)

FIGURE 1.4 A typical *magersari kampung* in contemporary Yogyakarta constitutes a symbiotic social/spatial formation. Source: Ikaputra

Although operating within a highly dualistic society—exhibiting great extremes of relative wealth and poverty, power and serfdom—the *magersari* urban formation must be seen, by today's standards, as a highly integrated society. Socio-economic distinctions in the *magersari* society were made on the basis of personal face-to-face interactions characteristic of the finely-grained spatial patterns of the city supportive of somewhat symbiotic economic and social relationships between a local elite and the *wong cilik* (Jav.: little people). The *magersari kampung* offered a safe haven from the anonymous operation of large-scale categorizations according to class. Even beyond the

walls of the local community, every household and individual of the city came to occupy an identifiable position in the larger economic and social community as structured by, and operating according to, the spatial form of the city. This inherently spatial structure was the means by which the position of every subject was established within the larger hierarchy of Javanese society.⁴⁸ In this way, the physical form of the city was not simply a *reflection* of the social ordering of the city but constituted an integral part of its religious, social, economic, and symbolic operation.

Islam became a formidable force on Java gradually between the twelfth century, when Islam first came to Java, and the sixteenth century, when the last Hindu-Buddhist empire of Majapahit was eclipsed by the Muslim kingdom of Demak. The mystical nature of Hindu-Buddhist-Javanism predisposed the Javanese to a mystical strain of Sufi Islam that dominated the first wave of Islamization. Subsequent waves of Islamic reformation, even up to the present, have aimed at purifying the faith. This has proven a difficult task given the apparent ease with which figures as central to institutionalized Islam as the king can preside over the ceremonies dedicated to Mohamad one day and the mythical deity Queen of the South Seas the next. Javanese Muslims typically express a genuine confusion over questions implying an inherent conflict in the juxtapositions of such practices. Such conflicts are dispelled with reference to "the many paths up the mountain."

The Javanese classical Islamic architecture is one of the quintessential demonstrations of the syncretic hybridization of the Javanese culture. The grand Mosque of Demak, the earliest and most revered of Indonesian mosques, was an adaptation of the most sacred pavilion of Hindu-Javanese architecture characterized by a square plan, open pavilion, with an odd number of nesting pyramidal roofs coming together in a perfect pinnacle. The Demak Mosque is a broadened three-tiered version of this architecture and remained the dominant prototype for mosque architecture in Indonesia until Middle Eastern influence intervened in the 1970s and later to awkwardly append an onion dome, often chrome-plated, to this roof.

Concurrent with the Islamization of Java, the first contact with Europeans came in 1509 with the Portuguese traders arriving in the Indonesian archipelago in search of the precious spices of Maluku (the Moluccas, also known as the "spice islands"). The Dutch were isolated from the suppliers of their profitable Northern Europe spice trade when Spain and Portugal allied in preventing Holland's bid for independence. This inspired the Dutch to mount their own expedition in search of the treasured source of spices in 1596. By 1611, the Dutch had established a permanent post at the small north coast port of Sunda Kalapa and renamed it Batavia (later to become Jakarta) in 1620 with the defeat of their English competition for control of the spice trade.

⁴⁸ On the operation of social classifications in traditional Javanese society see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976); and Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

From this administrative, military, and transshipment center, the Dutch established a monopoly on the spice trade and soon expanded their activities to agricultural production of the fertile interior. In a 1749 treaty, the Dutch Company was granted sovereignty over most of Java. However it proved impractical to assume direct control. True to the Javanese genius for syncretic hybridization, the Dutch proceeded as before, ruling indirectly through Javanese kings and the local *bupati* (regents). Administrators of the Dutch Company were integrated into the hierarchies of Javanese royalty taking on the titles, rank, and status of foreign-born nobles attached to the court. Far from the usual arrangements of colonial rule, they instead enjoyed a status similar to that of foreign trading partners from China, India, and the Middle East in the time before European contact. Despite only minimal investments in infrastructure and other development projects that would have indicated a deeper involvement in the colony, for most of the next two centuries the costs of military campaigns to maintain themselves and their Javanese allies in control kept the Dutch East Indies Company from holding on to the profits made from their colonial adventures.⁴⁹ At the end of the eighteenth century, they declared bankruptcy and all holdings and contracts of the Dutch East Indies Company passed to the Dutch Government.

By 1830, the Dutch had established the “cultivation system” (*Cultuurstelsel*) by which a land rent was demanded of all Javanese farmers in the form of export crops at prices set by the colonial administration. Colonial policy reinforced the urban primacy of Batavia by favoring it as a centralized point of control. Distance, topography, and Java’s fertility dictated that Batavia’s administrative port be replicated at two other ports on Java’s north coast, Semarang and Surabaya. These served as the administrative centers and collection points for the cultivation system’s spoils from the productive valleys of Central and East Java respectively. The three coastal ports of Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya constituted the hubs of radial road and rail systems funneling in from the hinterlands. This radial pattern offered a graphic depiction of the single-minded purpose of colonial infrastructure and urban formation: that of resource extraction from the countryside directly to the port for transshipment to Europe.⁵⁰ The increasing demands for more export production of sugar, coffee, and indigo displaced rice crops while widespread corruption and abuses of power kept the system barely viable. The result was starvation in the midst of plenty. Former colonial official, Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820-1887) writing under the pseudonym Multatuli published the novel *Max Havelaar* in 1859 that has been called “the book that killed

⁴⁹ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Circa 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 114.

⁵⁰ Smith and Nemeth, “Urban Development,” 121-40; T.G. McGee, *The Southeast Asian City: A Social Geography of the Primate Cities of Southeast Asia* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1967), 55-61.

colonialism.”⁵¹ Its description of the hardships inflicted on native populations sent a jolt through Dutch society and mobilized a liberal movement that shamed the Dutch Government into phasing out the cultivation system in stages between 1862 to 1919.⁵²

Holland lagged behind Britain not only in its progress towards industrialization but also in its willingness to permit rising standards in its colonies. It has been argued that the restrictions on indigenous development and international trade fostered a higher degree of dependency and led to a severe underdevelopment of Dutch colonies.⁵³ The Ethical Policy was born of a convergence of interests between the moral outrage inspired by *Max Havelaar* and the expansion of business opportunities with the opening up to private enterprises for the first time in 1870. Back in Holland, industrial interests identified Java as a potential market and promoted a raising of living standards to that end. While the basic exploitation and subjugation continued largely unhampered by the Ethical Policy, the shift in culture was fundamental and a new generation of infrastructure development, education, and health care reform was suddenly possible.⁵⁴

Among the most progressive reformers of the Ethical Policy era of Dutch colonialism, was a group of idealist planner-architects personified by Thomas Karsten and Maclaine Pont. Working in planning and architecture in an age when the two were still considered aspects of a single endeavor, Karsten and Pont were both ethnic Dutch born on Java in 1884, married to Javanese women, and committed to living out their days on Java. They professed a greater attachment to the Dutch Indies than to Holland and even expressed views on Indonesian independence as both necessary and inevitable.⁵⁵ Karsten and Pont were vocal critics of colonialism but continued to work within the colonial administrative system as “objective technical professionals” engaged in a struggle for the higher cause of social modernity.⁵⁶ At the turn of the century, the concept of an *Indische* (Indies) culture and society arose that would be neither Dutch nor native but a hybrid of the two. The discourses of emerging Modernism in Europe filtered deeply into the debates over the

⁵¹ Pramoedya Ananta Toer, “The Book That Killed Colonialism,” *New York Times Magazine*, (18 April 1999), 112-14.

⁵² Riklefs, *History*, 117-19.

⁵³ William Kirk, “South East Asia in the Colonial Period: Cores and Peripheries in Development Processes,” chapter 2 in *South East Asian Development: Geographical Perspectives*, ed. Dennis Dwyer (Essex, U.K.: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1990), 38.

⁵⁴ Riklefs, *History*, 143.

⁵⁵ C. Nico van der Heiden, “Town Planning in the Dutch Indies,” *Planning Perspectives*, no. 1 (January 1990), 63-84.

⁵⁶ Abidin Kusno, “Beyond the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Planning and Political Cultures in Indonesia,” (Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Binghamton, 1997).

nature of the *Indische* style, in particular over the question of whether or not the building traditions of Java were worthy of being venerated as "Javanese architecture." Where colonial policy called for a modernization process by which native institutions and forms would be updated or replaced to meet the standards of tropical Holland, the idealist architect planners called instead for a dominance of the indigenous. The values asserted in the writings and made operative in the city planning and architectural designs of the generation of Indies-born Dutch idealist architect-planners were the expression of a vision for an ethnically integrated society and a hybrid *Indische* culture operating against the grain of Dutch colonialism. They recognized the genius of native traditions and trusted in the syncretic capacity of local cultures to transform influences from Holland and elsewhere into a new society expressed in the built form of an *Indische* architecture and urbanism. Their scholarship and architecture was expressive of this creative hybridity.⁵⁷ Fortunately, they left behind many examples of their efforts to engage in a cultural re-construction of colonial societies through architecture and urban form. In the *Indische* town, the physical and social form of the *kampung* continued to play a central and even heightened role.⁵⁸

The urban extensions designed for Semarang, Batavia, Malang, Yogyakarta, Magelang, and Bandung demonstrated the various attempts to bring together aspects of the Garden City and the *kampung*. Up until the passage in 1903 of the Decentralization Law, the cities in the Dutch Indies had two distinct governments. The areas of improved infrastructure including the road network and the markets were governed by colonial town administrators with official statutes and laws.⁵⁹ Floating as independent islands within this larger colonial framework, every town had a Chinatown and dozens of separate *kampung* each with its own district chief operating outside the governance and infrastructure of the Dutch administration. Ethnic segregation was strictly enforced. Karsten in particular led the drive to break free of the strict segregation of the city by establishing new neighborhoods in which Dutch, Chinese, and indigenous residents all lived. Commentators on this history typically characterize the new urban design of these garden city extensions as replacing the ethnically segregated *kampung* with ethnically integrated but socio-

⁵⁷ Henri Maclaine Pont, "Javaansche Architectuur" (Javanese Architecture) published in three parts in *Djawa* 3 (1923), 112-27, 159-70 and *Djawa* 4 (1924), 44-73; Helen Ibbitson Jessup, "The Architecture of Henri Maclaine Pont: Colonial Style and Native Tradition in Indonesia," *Lotus International* 26 (1980), 108-13. Helen Ibbitson Jessup, "Dutch Architectural Visions of the Indonesian Tradition," *Muqarnas* 3 (1985), 138-61; and Kusno, "Beyond the Postcolonial."

⁵⁸ Thomas Karsten, "Indiese Stedebouw" (Indies Town Building) *Local Belangen* (May 1920); Erica Bogaers and Peter de Ruijter, "Ir. Thomas Karsten and Indonesian Town Planning, 1915-1940," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986)

⁵⁹ Sandi Siregar, "Inner City Revitalisation and the Role of Local Government: Urban Space as a Product of History," Paper presented at the Seminar: *Save Our Cities: Integrated Approaches to Inner City Revitalization and Urban Heritage in Indonesia* (17 February 2000).

economically segregated neighborhoods.⁶⁰ While the areas of the relatively rich and poor are clearly identifiable in Karsten's plans—Dutch villas along the curvilinear streets and higher density housing located within the block interiors—the rich and the poor actually live in close proximity sharing infrastructure, access, and the space of the street. Though separated by high walls, the rich and the poor in both Karsten's new vision of an *Indische* garden city and traditional *kampung* existed in conditions of social and economic symbiosis.⁶¹ This socio-economic mixing at a relatively fine-grained scale would hardly qualify as socio-economic segregation in comparison with the colonial segregation of the day or the gated communities of today.

The central role played by the *kampung* and its social structures was acknowledged not only by the Dutch but also by the Japanese who brought Dutch colonialism to an end with their invasion and occupation in 1942. Within weeks of establishing control over the cities of Java, the local *rukun tetangga* neighborhood councils that managed the affairs of every *kampung* were formalized into a compulsory form of local governance. Consisting of 10 to 20 heads of households, each *rukun tetangga* block association took on the role of disseminating Japanese propaganda, controlling the behaviors of the Javanese on a local level, and recruiting young men into a native army to fight for the Japanese cause. The *rukun tetangga* structure formalized by the Japanese closely replicated the *tonari gumi* system of neighborhood governance and control in Japan that had begun similarly as a traditional custom, formalized in 1938 and mandated in 1940.⁶²

The post-independence history of the *kampung* is characterized as much by its ubiquitous nature as it is by a love-hate relationship with both the Indonesian government and society. Often the object of shame and derision, it is also home to a vast majority of Indonesians. One of the most common Indonesian put-downs is to refer to someone or something as "*kampung*" meaning low-class, cheap, or *déclassé*. At the same time, for even those who do not reside in a *kampung*, the word still refers to "home" as seen in the annual Lebaran holiday pilgrimage in which all Muslims "*pulang kampung*" meaning to travel to their familial homes. The Indonesian government has won international kudos for its Kampung Improvement Program ongoing since the 1960s but,

⁶⁰ Suryadi Santoso, "Quarter Typological Approach in Modernization of Urban Structure," paper presented at seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000).

⁶¹ Michael Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW: Culture, Vision, and the Extended Metropolitan Region of Jakarta," *Environment and Planning A*, no. 9 (September 1996), 1621.

⁶² Nicole Niessen, "Indonesian Municipalities Under Japanese Rules," *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), footnote 26, 126. The *tonari gumi* system was dismantled in Japan by occupation forces but is considered the direct predecessor of the *choneikei* system that remains a strong force in Japanese neighborhood politics to the present. Andre Sorensen, "Kanson Minpi and the Extreme Narrowness of the Public Realm: The 20th Century Evolution of Japanese Planning Culture," MIT Roundtable on Planning Cultures (12 March 2002).

at the same time, has seen fit to bulldoze some of the same neighborhoods it so carefully improved, to make way for new development. The Suharto government even found it within their capacities to approve planning measures that would extend *kampung* development at the urbanizing edges of Jakarta's urban sprawl simultaneous with statements indicating the long term project of replacing all *kampung* with more appropriately "modern" development.⁶³

Regardless of the schizophrenic attitude towards the *kampung* in Indonesia, it remains the dominant feature of Indonesian cities housing 70 to 80 percent of the Indonesian urban population.⁶⁴ Houses in the *kampung* are constructed through informal processes of incremental owner- or small contractor-built units over long periods of time, without commercial credit or public approvals. Despite housing a majority of Jabotabek residents, these areas occupy a disproportionately small part of the urbanized land area, typically from 5 to 15 percent.⁶⁵ Historically, different *kampung* took on identities and names according to ethnic-functional distinctions. Most often ethnicity and occupation were isomorphic pairs as in Chinese-shop keepers, Arab-textile merchants, or Madurese-soldiers. Neighborhoods were designated alternately by ethnicity or by occupation. *Kampung* named for residents of foreign origins were particularly frequent in the port cities: Kampung Petjinan (Chinese), Kampung Pakojan (Indian), Kampung Kebalen (Balinese). *Kampung* names could also reflect a dominance of occupation as in Kampung Penjaringan (fishermen), Kampung Kepandean (blacksmith), Kampung Kawiragoenan (craftsmen); or religious caste as in Kampung Kauman (strict observers of Islam), or Kampung Kesantrian (Muslim students).⁶⁶

Against the tendency for ethnic and occupational homogeneity within each *kampung* and given the reluctance of residents to move away from their social communities, there grew a certain degree of socio-economic diversity within the *kampung*. Also, the high density of these neighborhoods and the importance of informal sector economic activity, the *kampung* tended to harbor a rich diversity of land uses often housing "industrial," "retail" and "residential" uses within a single 80-square meter (900-square foot) parcel. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the *kampung* is the

⁶³ See the discussion of Guided Land Development and the Metropolitan image of Jakarta in chapter six.

⁶⁴ Abeyasekere offers the range of 60 to 80 percent. Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 222. Struyk et al. put informal housing at 67 percent of all housing. Raymond J. Struyk et al., *The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities* (Jakarta and Washington, D.C.: Hasfarm Dian Konsultan and The Urban Institute Press, 1990), 55.

⁶⁵ In Surabaya, Indonesia's second most populous city, 63 percent of the population lives in *kampung* that occupy only 7 percent of the urbanized area according to a report from the UN's Habitat program.

⁶⁶ Suryadi Santoso, "Quarter Typological Approach in Modernization of Urban Structure," paper presented at the seminar: *Planning of New Towns and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), 3-5.

rich and finely variegated distinctions of private and public space. The *gang* (alleys) of *kampung* vary in width from one to two meters (three to seven feet) and rarely are they wide enough for cars. Entrances to the *kampung* offer opportunities for local communities to express themselves in the form of gates. Often at night, the gates would be closed and guarded as local young men patrolled the narrow streets within as night watchmen.⁶⁷ There is a feeling throughout that the space of the *gang* “belong” to local communities. Visitors are always conscious of being watched. Missing from the hierarchy of public-private spaces of the *kampung* are the both extremes of the completely public—so as to render visitors anonymous—and the completely private—so as to remove inhabitants entirely from view. Santoso credits this complexity of semi-public/semi-private spaces as the source of the *kampung*’s urbanity, its capacity to support leisurely social interaction, and foster what Heidegger called “*lebensraum*.”⁶⁸ Even after the decline of the nobility and the end of the official feudal social and economic relationships of the *kampung* under a *kraton*-cosmos model, social hierarchies formed to fulfill a similar role of patron-client relations. It was not until as recently as 1989 that steps were taken to divert the official chain of authority from the *rukun tetangga* and the *rukun kampung* from the traditional Sultans in the two Javanese court centers of Solo and Yogyakarta, instead to the central bureaucracy in Jakarta.⁶⁹ Even with the weakening of official institutionalizations of the traditional patron-client relationship, the wealthier residents fulfilled unwritten social obligations to help out their neighbors in funding the ritual renewals of communal bonds at holidays, births, deaths, and weddings.⁷⁰ The social glue of the *kampung* is made most explicit in the concept of *gotong royong* (Javanese: mutual self-help) by which residents call upon the community for assistance in time of need. Strong social pressures are applied to compel a willingness to assist, particularly those perceived as being in the best position to do so.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Joshua Barker, “Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung,” *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines and Colonial Vietnam* (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1999), 95-127.

⁶⁸ Santoso, “Quarter Typological Approach,” 11-12.

⁶⁹ P.J. Suwarno, *Dari Azazyookai dan Tonarigumi ke Rukun Kampung dan Rukun Tetangga di Yogyakarta, 1942-1989: Sebuah Tinjauan Historis* (From Azazyookai and Tonarigumi to Rukun Kampung and Rukun Tetangga in Yogyakarta, 1942-1989: An Historic Overview) (Yogyakarta: Universitas Sanata Dharma, 1995).

⁷⁰ On the social conditions of the *kampung* see: Patrick Guinness, “*Rukun Kampung: Social Relation in Urban Yogyakarta*,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Australia National University, 1981), John Sullivan, “*Kampung and State: The Role of Government in the Development of Urban Community in Yogyakarta*,” *Indonesia*, no. 41 (April 1986), 63-88; and Lea Jellinek, *The Wheel of Fortune: The History of a Poor Community in Jakarta* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).

⁷¹ The contribution of *gotong royong* to the quality of life in Indonesian cities is discussed in Inge Komardjaja and Harald Leisch, “No Set Standard on Urban Quality of Life,” *Jakarta Post* (19 March 2000).

The history of Javanese urbanism, even that of pre-colonial and colonial urban formations, remains a significant frame of reference for the ongoing discussions of the city on Java insofar as the legacy of these earlier periods remain present in the dominance of the physical and social forms of the *kampung*. The two attributes of community and hierarchy remain legible in different ways throughout the history of urban form on the island of Java. This pattern of urban formation can still be read in the urban fabric of many cities while elsewhere this basic relationship has been reinterpreted and reconfigured while still retaining attributes of the original. Each wave of cultural influence on society and urban form from Hinduism to Islam to European colonialism was incorporated into the form and operation of the indigenous city. Rather than displacing or erasing elements of the past, many of the same forces at work throughout history came to operate through slightly different means. Aspects imported from the West such as the heightened role of the market economy and formal education came to be additional aspects of the primary operation of an already complex hierarchy of power. Feudalism, colonialism, and postcolonial capitalism each came to operate within this fundamental topography of power relationships. To make too much of the disjunction between these different periods in Javanese history risks misinterpreting the larger historic progression characterized more by what has remained constant than the more superficial aspects of what appears to have changed.

It is useful in this context to refer to the advice of Shrieke on the dangers of indulging the tendency of Western scholarship to over-periodize, over-specialize, and project an historic dynamism in the study of Southeast Asian histories.

In such studies one is too much under the influence of the dynamism of the familiar modern Western world, whereas the static society going to make up the subject of the present historical study cherished no other ideal than to remain as it was, shunning all change. This is not to deny that in the course of time changes did take place as a result of influences from outside. Such changes, however, were not sought after as representing 'progress'; rather they were condemned as deviations from the tradition, the primary factors which determined the structure of Javanese society remaining unchanged.⁷²

The trope of rise-florescence-decline that has been usefully deployed in so many studies of history in the West tends to distort the true nature of things when applied to a society devoted, almost above all else, in smoothing over the potential disruptions in historic continuity. Even in what would seem to be the most irrefutable breach with the past, Dutch colonialism, the Javanese construction of this history found continuity of royal lineage through the Princess of Pajajaran who

⁷² B. Schrieke, *Ruler and Realm in Early Java* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1957), 99.

had been centuries earlier traded to the Dutch Company for guns. Full royal authority was considered to have passed to the Dutch by marriage to the Princess of Pajajaran and it was her pale-skinned descendants that wielded such power over the realm.⁷³

The forces behind the formation of cities on the island of Java have exhibited a persistence beyond the experience and history of Western scholarship and thus easily overlooked when viewed from a Western perspective. One of the significant goals in presenting this context is to offer an alternative frame of reference for viewing and interpreting cities on the island of Java. My claim is that much of the recent scholarship proclaiming the convergence of urban cultures stems from a failure to look past formal appearances to consider the larger operation of historic forces and the divergence of meanings attributed to even identical forms. I have been compelled by research into Javanese urbanism to constantly test my own preconceived notions of the city, rejecting much of what I originally brought to this study as too colored by the Western experience of architecture and urbanism. This critical examination of a history and culture foreign to my own experience carries as one of its primary demands the obligation to guard against reproducing a history similarly distorted by my own position. By presenting this brief section on the historic context of urban formation on the island of Java, it is hoped that the reader will also be forewarned about the existence of a distinct frame of reference that only partially overlaps with the one offered by Western scholarship and experience.

The challenge posed by O'Connor to Western scholars of Southeast Asian cities and societies (echoing Anderson, McGee, and others) is to trace the operation of economic forces in the region granting them their due without at the same time projecting a Western-biased economic determinism.⁷⁴ He argues that the two related elements of strong local community ties and the hierarchical structure of status and power can be seen as the two most significant features of Southeast Asian urbanism through history up to and including the present. These two elements of hierarchy and community were historically and remain even in the modern Southeast Asian city more important than the less complex benefits of status and power accruing as a direct result of wealth.⁷⁵ With the rise of markets and education, economic and educational status were added to the traditional structure as further distinguishing values but without fundamentally displacing previously established traditional hierarchies. The "modern" urban hierarchies of Indonesian cities

⁷³ Schrieke, *Ruler and Realm*, 12.

⁷⁴ Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); McGee, *Southeast Asian City*; and T.G. McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1971); Friedmann and Wulff, *Urban Transition*.

⁷⁵ O'Connor, *Theory of Indigenous Urbanism*.

operate as a continuation of the former order which operates not in spite of, but through modernity.⁷⁶ This is not to deny the power of markets in Indonesian urbanism but it does deny economics the role as the dominant force structuring society and the city—as seen, for example, in its status as primary determinant of form, life, and symbolism in the West. The power of markets operates in Southeast Asia instead within and through the pre-existing channels of communities organized in specific hierarchies of power.

Much of the scholarship on urban development in Southeast Asia grows directly from studies of modern urban development in the West that has been “contextualized” by appending it with an appropriate dose of historical and geographic background. But understanding urban Southeast Asia is not simply a matter of transferring to it the processes of modern urban development experienced in the West. The development process itself, and the messy history of non-indigenous actors in it, can be understood to a great extent as the on-going story of suppression of indigenous terms of reference. In understanding how the Southeast Asian city lives, grows, and develops one must employ its own historically developed relationships of power. It is more accurately understood as the processes of power at work through familial, ethnic, and culturally defined networks that intersect with and alter economic relationships. The economic perspective tends to constitute and dominate the terms of reference that are imposed whenever attempts are made to gauge the Southeast Asian urban experience with an insufficiently qualified Western worldview. When failing to look beyond economic relationships and motivations themselves to the operation of these traditional networks of power, the Western perspective, employed all the more enthusiastically by well-educated Southeast Asians, colors the interpretation of conditions and events with often dire consequences. Instead, the particular successes and failures of Southeast Asian economic development might be understood best in terms of a continuing development within an economy of indigenous power.

One of the key insights offered by even this brief overview of Southeast Asian history is that most of the elements of what is popularly understood as the recent conditions of “globalization” were already present in the Southeast Asian archipelago as early as the first centuries CE. The general nature of the literature on globalization renders it only vaguely useful in understanding the more complex and long-term nature of cross-cultural influences impinging on Southeast Asia in general and the societies of its archipelago in particular. The study of cross-cultural influences in Indonesia is made exceptional in several regards. First, Indonesia remains a nation constituted by literally hundreds of cultures, most of which are distinguished by their own languages. Thus cross-cultural influences are understood as the rule rather than the exception in the way

⁷⁶ O'Connor, *Theory of Indigenous Urbanism*, 11.

Indonesians construct identities. Such identity construction operates against much smaller geographic scales than even European national identities. In many parts of Indonesia, entirely different languages and cultures occupy adjacent valleys. Thus, cultural distinctions are more strongly localized in nature. Second, Indonesia's dominant cultures were each heavily influenced by Indian, Chinese, Arab, Portuguese, and Dutch cultures. After the first waves of Chinese and especially Indian cultural dominance, subsequent waves of further "globalization" came from the Middle East giving the region its Islamic traditions, and then from Europe in the form of international colonialism. And third, the influence of modern Western culture has grown since independence in parallel with perhaps even more significant inroads made by a Middle Eastern variants of Islam and associated lifestyles.

Thus, "globalization" as a force in social, cultural, and urban development is anything but a new phenomenon on the island of Java and Western culture faces serious competition from Middle Eastern culture. The assumptions of largely insular "authentic" traditional cultures suddenly uprooted and displaced by American and Western European culture that have become clichés of the recent globalization literature are confronted in the context of Indonesia by a very different set of conditions. While the immediate appearance of cultural imperialism may not be entirely false, beyond the over-simplifications of recent literature of "globalization" lies the realities of more complex and subtle phenomena of cultural syncretism, the roots of which reach far beyond the scope of most globalization theory. The location of the Indonesian archipelago exposed it to foreign cultures that have each registered their imprints, often still identifiable in the language, arts, architecture and urban form of the region. In contrast to the characterizations of cultural globalization, these imprints have seldom been wholesale adoptions but instead have undergone an elaborate process of transformation in which some parts have been rejected while useful and attractive elements have been retained and further transformed in combination and integration with previously existing elements. The highly evolved culture of the Javanese is one of the more striking products of this process of hybridization.⁷⁷ In the chapters that follow, it will be important to bear in mind the complexity and local specificity of cross-cultural influences. With sufficiently specific description, these influences often take on the quality of translation rather than a coarser over-simplified displacement or usurpation of what was there before. The skyscrapers, major roadways, and the accompanying "big road architecture" of malls, suburbs and edge cities which command the greatest attention in what follows are recent additions to a landscape that remains

⁷⁷ John Pemberton, *On the Subject of "Java"* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

fundamentally intact. The *alun-alun* (town square), the traditional markets, and the mosque all remain in place as the primary sources of meaning and orientation of the city.⁷⁸

It is worth noting briefly at this point how the insights of postcolonial criticism do and do not bear on the history of Indonesia's capital in the first half-century of independence. Several factors unique to the Indonesian condition and its three and a half centuries of Dutch colonial rule impinge to circumscribe many of the methodologies applied to other postcolonial contexts. First, up to the last four decades of Dutch colonial rule, the nature of Dutch colonialism was dominated by mercantile considerations. Second, a Protestant spirit of tolerance and a national aversion to proselytizing perhaps contributed to avoidance of the "civilizing mission" that charged British and French colonialism.⁷⁹ And third, the multiplicity of cultures brought together by the Dutch and retained together by the Republic of Indonesia did not provide a single coherent native society but a cacophonous collection of languages and cultures wholly resistant to consolidation as a coherent "other." For whatever reasons, the result was that the Dutch ethnographers and idealist colonial reformers who struggled to achieve a hybrid modernity retain almost a century later, a position of romantic reverence among those struggling to construct a contemporary Indonesian identity. Their contribution is seen as a scholarship and a cultural production true to both the spirit of the age and the cultural histories of the archipelago. Just as the task of holding together the disparate cultures and societies passed seamlessly from Dutch to Indonesian administrations, so too the colonial project of identity construction seems to have been passed more or less intact to the modern Indonesian state. Much of the Dutch colonial administrative role was directly inherited as the Indonesian administrative role. Foulcher goes so far as to assert that postcolonial criticism doesn't fit Indonesia because the displacement of the indigenous by colonialism has yet to be acknowledged.⁸⁰ Kusno accounts for this as stemming from the aggressive campaign by the Suharto regime to dress up Indonesian modernity in the garb of local traditions.⁸¹ The displacement of indigenous culture first by Dutch colonialism and then by modernization programs of the independent nation has only partially been acknowledged. For most of the colonial era, policies progressively segregated indigenous peoples within ever-shrinking territories. However,

⁷⁸ Peter Nas and Reynt Sluis, "In Search of Meaning: Urban Orientation Principles in Indonesia," paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

⁷⁹ Edward Saïd, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

⁸⁰ Keith Foulcher, "In Search of the Postcolonial in Indonesian literature," *Sojourn* 10, no. 2 (1995) cited in Abidin Kusno, "Beyond the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Planning and Political Cultures in Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Binghamton, 1997), 149.

⁸¹ Kusno, "Beyond the Postcolonial," 1-13.

within these, they were largely left to fend for themselves. The colonial displacement of local cultures left little trace of a “civilizing mission” to critique using the standard tools of postcolonial criticism. The problem of applying postcolonial criticism to the case of Indonesia is that the political cultures of Indonesia have yet to face the moment of the inauthenticity of its postcolonial culture.⁸²

Relation to Other Work

There are several other bodies of work, large and small, that bear directly on the analyses pursued in this dissertation. This list could easily be extended to include several dozen authors but due to limitations of the medium, I discuss the four most relevant to the primary direction chosen for the present study. Michael Leaf’s 1991 Ph.D. dissertation “Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: From the ‘Big Village’ to the ‘Modern City’”⁸³ and several subsequent journal articles elaborating on this research⁸⁴ were the foundational work for this dissertation. Leaf’s thorough treatment of land regulation and its role in the New Order’s larger mission of improving the image of Jakarta allowed the present work to venture further afield into the role of design and culture in the remaining years of the New Order. While Leaf’s focus is on a treatment of regulatory mechanisms, he touches on the themes of housing, the *kampung*, culture, and politics that became central to the present work.

Abidin Kusno’s 1997 Ph.D. dissertation “Beyond the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Planning and Political Cultures in Indonesia,”⁸⁵ and several journal articles⁸⁶ anticipating its recent publication⁸⁷ broke the ground for applying the methods of postcolonial criticism to an indigenous postcolonial regime. In these works, Kusno demonstrates the debt owed by Suharto’s New Order to the strategies of both cultural and political domination exercised by Dutch colonialism. Of particular interest is the discussion of the search for an authentic “Indonesian Architecture” in light of the history of the Dutch efforts to do the same and the problematic relationship of the idealist

⁸² Kusno, “Beyond the Postcolonial,” 11.

⁸³ Michael Leon Leaf, “Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: From the ‘Big Village’ to the ‘Modern City’,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991).

⁸⁴ In particular: “The Suburbanisation of Jakarta: A Concurrence of Economics and Ideology,” *Third World Planning Review*, no. 1 (April 1995), 341-57; and “Building the Road for the BMW: Culture, Vision, and the Extended Metropolitan Region of Jakarta,” *Environment and Planning A*, no. 9 (September 1996), 1617-1635.

⁸⁵ “Beyond the Postcolonial.”

⁸⁶ “Beyond the Postcolonial,” 549-75.

⁸⁷ *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Dutch architect-planners in carrying out their efforts to challenge colonial power structures and culture while participating in it. Kusno also deals with the issues of the image of Jakarta under Sukarno and the role played by the *kampung* each of which serve to complement the discussion of image creation through architecture.

Other works on a smaller scale, although not necessarily of less significance, are found first in the prodigious output over the last decade of work on the planning and development of the Jakarta region by Tommy Firman⁸⁸ of the Bandung Institute of Technology and one article co-authored by Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni.⁸⁹ His ongoing analysis of the shifting nature of Jakarta's planning and development formed a foundation for the analyses of chapters five and six. Finally, one work worth mentioning here in hopeful anticipation that it may someday be published and given the recognition it deserves, is a paper by Achmad D. Tardiyana⁹⁰ applying Logan and Molotch's theory of "growth coalition"⁹¹ to the operation of the New Order in Jakarta. His arguments have been extended in this dissertation but at the same time fails to cover many of the points included in the original exposition, in particular an analysis incorporating David Harvey's three circuits of capital flows.⁹²

Overview of Chapters

Salient features of urban development in and around cities throughout the world have led to the assertion that a single urban model has been established by some combination of global consumer consensus on what is desirable and under the influence of vaguely articulated "powerful forces" popularly associated with the notion of "globalization." This dissertation offers an analysis of how selected aspects of broadly acting forces of global economy manifested and developed under the political, social, and cultural forces found in Jakarta in the 1980s and 1990s. The distinctive

⁸⁸ "The Spatial Pattern of Urban Population Growth in Java, 1980-1990," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 28, no. 2 (August 1992), 95-109; "Land Conversion and Urban Development in the Northern Region of West Java," *Urban Studies* 34, no. 7 (1997), 1027-46; "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 229-43; "From 'Global City' to 'City of Crisis': Jakarta Metropolitan Region Under Economic Turmoil," *Habitat International* 23, no. 4 (1999), 447-66

⁸⁹ "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 79-94.

⁹⁰ "The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order," paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

⁹¹ John Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

⁹² David Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

indigenous urbanism of Java evolved under the influences of India, China, Europe, and Japan through a process of syncretic-hybridization, always with its compact form of the *kampung* and other elements of indigenous urban form intact. The forces of global economy are thus acting locally in Jakarta in the context of a society that has stood at the global crossroads for two millennia. This is the proper historic context against which to understand the recent transformations of Jakarta.

Chapter Two examines the Jakarta city region as a product of speculative investment and the exigencies of the two-pronged program of economic liberalization and power consolidation under Suharto. The symbolism of the Suharto era was established through economic liberalization along lines established by the cities of the United States. The form of Jakarta became the means used to demonstrate the accomplishments of Suharto's development agenda through skyscrapers, freeways, and luxury suburbs. The birth and boom of the suburban property market transformed the region physically and economically not least through the consolidation of a vast private sector-held land bank. The major developers of the property oligopoly were a major component of the "urban regime" guiding the form and operation of the city region.

Chapter Three describes the caricature of the developed West provided by the architecture and urban design of the luxury new towns. The Southern California real estate industry provided a ready-made and easily replicable model for the rapid development of a suburban housing market in the 1970s and 1980s. The imagery employed in the marketing and design of this new real estate development constitutes an elaborate construction of interwoven and mutually supportive projections of life imagined to exist in a developed West.

The reproduction of a certain interpretation of Western lifestyles described in Chapter Three is tempered in Chapter Four by a more nuanced examination of the form and use of the developer-built houses. The architecture of these houses have been reconfigured from their original inspirations in the West to accommodate certain persistent practices of everyday life in Indonesia that can be read in the arrangement of internal spaces of the house. The *real estate* style houses of Indonesia stand as an example of hybridization between the architecture of an imagined West and the persistence of everyday life practices.

Moving to the scale of regional planning, Chapter Five employs an analysis of four major problems facing the city region as the point of reference against which to judge the responses of three generations of internationally constituted planning teams as documented in a series of Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans from 1973 to 1993. The 1981 Plan in particular was the most convincing vision for addressing regional problems. By the time of the 1993 review of this plan, the planning team felt compelled to alter the plan to conform to the directions set by the

ensuing decade of Suharto-led private sector intervention in regional development reflecting a commitment to deregulation and acquiescence of planning to market forces.

The rapid and dramatic transformation of Jakarta's built environment during the late Suharto period is then examined as having occurred in direct contravention of the planning and regulatory guidelines that had been established to guide building and development in and around Jakarta. A history of the implementation of these planning tools in the context of the structure of the political and corporate power elite reveals the operation of a pervasive set of messages and rationales propagated through the media and reinforced through social and political relationships that together constituted an effective displacement of the official planning goals by those satisfying altogether different agenda. Chapter Six develops the proposition that it is useful to examine such a complex of actors who together engage in the propagation and reproduction of an identifiable, if not entirely coherent, set of meanings and values, as a "culture" incorporating, refuting, and overlaying meanings and values of Javanese, "Indonesian" and imported cultures.

In Chapter Seven the insights of urban sociology are used to examine the ways in which new urban formations of Jakarta compel Jakartans to "position" themselves spatially and socially in ways that were never part of the former Jakarta. A new spatial demarcation of residential neighborhoods, the space of the street, workplaces, and shops has fostered a dramatic increase in the tensions born of segregation. The interplay of the economic and the cultural is examined through site planning, urban design, and larger regional structural patterns operating to maintain and extend spatially constituted social dualisms. The further consequences of Jakarta's transformation under Suharto are examined in Indonesia's economic collapse in 1997 and 1998 largely driven by the excesses of property market speculation facilitated by the New Order.

In Chapter Eight the findings of the preceding analyses are summarized and form the basis of a discussion of the prospects for future developments and further research. Recent events since the onset of the financial crisis in 1997, are examined for indications of the prospects for the complementary movements of regional autonomy, political reform, and the rise of grassroots organizations in establishing a more broadly based "civil society" capable of displacing the remains of Suharto's New Order culture that continues to haunt Indonesia.

CHAPTER 2

SUHARTO'S JABOTABEK: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING

The history of the government's liberalization policies, the loosening of bank lending practices, the flexibility with which regulations were interpreted, and the dynamics of the property sector oligopoly were indelibly etched into the urban landscape of Jakarta in the form of new toll roads; whole communities displaced by office towers, shopping malls, and golf courses; and the sudden conversion of the vast agricultural landscape surrounding Jakarta into a sea of suburban housing estates. The communities that were spared direct displacement found themselves walled off from an increasing proportion of the world. By 1996, a quarter century after the birth of Indonesia's suburban real estate market, over half a million luxury houses had been built on approximately 10 percent of Jakarta's urbanized land area.¹ Only half of these homes were occupied and housed only around seven percent of region's wealthiest families—about 1.0 to 1.5 million people.² The rest were maintained empty as speculative investments. In the meantime, no less than one fifth of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area was held off the market as areas for future suburban housing development.³ This was enough land to satisfy the regional private sector housing demand for somewhere between 100 and 200 years. The withholding of so much land off of the property market had a significant inflationary impact on land rents throughout the region with the most devastating impacts experienced by the already relatively land-poor majority living in the high-density urban *kampung* residential neighborhoods. Additionally, this vast private sector land bank was the basis for widespread bank fraud that enriched and consolidated the position of Suharto's close circle of family and friends, even as it drove the Indonesian economy to the point of collapse in 1997.

The sheer physical dimensions of the impacts left by the rise of suburban property development and its complementary redevelopment of the urban core during the late Suharto period would seem to indicate a general transformation of society with some widely distributed benefits or at least the emergence of a popular "middle class." Unfortunately, such a correspondence is elusive at best.

¹ National Land Agency data cited in Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), Table 5.4, 146, 250.

² 1995 market research data on occupancy in 29 selected Tangerang housing projects purchased prior to 1993 shows a 52% occupancy rate. Gibb Asia and PT Lenggogeni, "Market Research for Kota Tigaraksa," (PT Panca Wiratama Sakti, October 1995) 7-9.

³ "Tanah Terlantar, Salah Siapa?" (Idle Land, Whose Fault?), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 39 (April 1997), 22-25.

Even the smallest of the formal sector provided houses (21 square meters; 225 square feet) was affordable by only the richest 30 percent of Jakartan households. A vast majority of the houses built by the newly deregulated private sector were targeted at the wealthiest five to ten percent of the urban population. Reported sightings of the much-anticipated "emerging middle class" proved to be exaggerated. At Indonesia's economic height in the early 1990s, estimates of this "middle class" reached eight to ten percent of Jakarta's population and included the very rich among their numbers.⁴ Unlike the new bourgeoisie that formed elsewhere throughout history, this group owed their recent rise to a state-run system of patronage effectively disqualifying them as candidates for toppling outmoded bastions of feudalism.⁵ The financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 that finally did topple the king, if not the feudal system, took the so-called middle class down first leaving nothing much in its place but empty cafe's, luke-warm air conditioning, and decaying shopping malls. Those reaping the greatest benefits from the economic boom and its physical transformation of Jakarta were the small handful of the largest developers and their local and national partners in government. In the meantime, the vast majority of Jakartans were increasingly the victims of massive displacement and rapidly rising costs from artificially created scarcities of land for housing and agriculture.

This chapter examines the larger history of politics, economics, and their role in the physical transformation of Jakarta through the operation of the suburban property market. Suharto ushered in an era of political stability and economic growth. The first period of growth was from cashing in the vast wealth of mineral and forest resources removed from Indonesia's outer islands. With instability in world oil prices, Suharto led Indonesia through a period of dramatic economic diversification and liberalization seizing the opportunities presented by the new international division of labor and the rise in foreign direct investment. The primary objective of the Suharto New Order regime was to capitalize on the conditions favoring speculative investment presented by the combination of international economic forces and local opportunities for resource (land, labor, credit, etc.) exploitation. Although this undertaking often satisfied a deeply felt need to upgrade the image of Jakarta, the transformation of the city region is most accurately understood as a secondary outcome of rent-seeking behaviors and speculative investment. In particular, state and financial institutions established guidelines and practices (often through codified regulatory deviations or

⁴ Richard Robison, "The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia," chapter 4 in *New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-class Revolution*, ed. Richard Robison and David S.B. Goodman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 84.

⁵ Richard Robison and David S.B. Goodman, "The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Stauts and Political Consciousness," chapter 1 in *New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-class Revolution*, ed. Richard Robison and David S.B. Goodman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 13.

negotiated extralegal arrangements) by which the capital and political elite of the country benefited from large-scale transfers of land rights, subsidized credit, fraudulent loan arrangements, exemptions from planning controls, and immunity from legal repercussions. The large and small decisions in this game were made on this decidedly uneven playing field according to score keeping (investment returns) almost entirely divorced from the real costs and benefits accruing to the vast majority of the population.

To account for these phenomena it is necessary to consider the large and small decisions that were made that contributed to these outcome. The function of the history presented in this chapter is to establish the specific framework within which these large and small decisions were made. Within each "frame" presented, a set of actors made choices between a narrow range of alternatives according to a set of criteria under specific historical conditions. In examining each case, it is useful to consider these alternatives, criteria, and conditions as the components of a "decision space" that can be a useful tool of analysis in understanding collective adaptive behaviors.⁶ The collective adaptive behaviors of interest to us here are those of the developers at whose hands the landscape was transformed, and consumers whose own collective decisions reinforced and sustained them.

Suharto's New Order: Stability and Growth

When Sukarno took command of the former Dutch East Indies making Jakarta the capital of the new Republic of Indonesia, the city was in the midst of a population explosion. The 1948 population of 823,000 more than doubled in only four years to 1.8 million in 1952 and again reaching 3.8 million by 1965.⁷ The inflation rate during the last year of Sukarno's rule ran at 1500 percent.⁸ National budget deficits during the early 1960s came to equal receipts and by 1965 the state budget deficit reached three times the state revenues.⁹ The final years of Sukarno's presidency brought Jakarta to the edge of chaos and bankruptcy and left for his successor a mandate for political stability and economic growth.

⁶ John Friedmann and Robert Wulff, *The Urban Transition: Comparative Studies of Newly Industrializing Societies* (Los Angeles: School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975), 90-92.

⁷ The population was probably significantly higher as temporary residents and circular migrants are excluded. *Djakarta Dalam Angka Tahun 1969* (Djakarta: Kantor Sensus dan Statistik, 1969) 7 cited in Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 171.

⁸ Achmad D. Tardiyana, "The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order," paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden, (7 December 2000).

⁹ Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX quoted in Hal Hill, "The Economy," chapter 2 in *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 55.

Suharto delivered political stability through an uncompromising authoritarianism backed by an iron-fisted military rule. This rule was inaugurated by the blood bath unleashed ostensibly to rid the nation of members of the Communist Party that had been one of the most powerful political forces under Sukarno's encouragement. Between October 1965 and the end of 1966 some 500,000 to one million dead were left in mass graves and ravines throughout Java and Bali. All political parties were dissolved and replaced by two tightly constrained opposition "political" parties contrasted by the more business-like, less "emotional," "functional group" (*Golkar*) of the military and the government bureaucracy. Tightly controlled one-month campaigns and carefully engineered elections were ritually enacted every five years to reconfirm Suharto's presidency. The state became the employer to a majority of the Indonesian formal workforce which faced significant pressures from their employer to support the government party. Even without winning the popular election, Suharto guaranteed the presidency by controlling a large number of appointments to the extra parliamentary body that directly elected the president.¹⁰ In return Suharto oversaw the vast system of patronage operating both within and outside of official fiscal channels. To the population at large, he promised to deliver an appropriately Indonesianized version of twentieth century "modernization," the multiple benefits of which were so clearly demonstrated by representations of life in the developed nations of the world at the time. What Suharto promised through the "New Order" he constructed on the rubble left by the excesses and decadence of Sukarno's "old chaos." Suharto's message was emblazoned upon the minds of every Indonesian within sight of a newspaper, sound of a radio, or reachable by the outside world in the word "development."

From the mid-1960s and the transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto, the economic growth of Indonesia was based on the exploitation of raw mineral resources particularly the large oil and natural gas reserves of the outer islands (the islands other than Java and Bali). This resource mining was under the direction of Pertamina (*Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara*, State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Enterprise, est. 1968) which was also the key institution at the top of a vast pyramid of power and corruption. The rise in world oil prices in 1973 was a bonanza for Pertamina and by 1975 it had become one of the world's largest corporations with involvement in almost every substantial state-controlled development project in the nation. The subsequent recession suddenly burst Pertamina's bubble leaving a trail of massive corruption and one of the largest bankruptcies in world history to the tune of US\$10 billion.¹¹ Oil and other natural resource revenues continued to fuel strong growth in the Indonesian economy up to 1981.

¹⁰ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Circa 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). 276-77.

¹¹ Ricklefs, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 276-78.

These revenues were increasingly deployed in a way that fostered a rapid diversification of the Indonesian economy into manufacturing fed by a global shift in conditions popularly understood as being a part of the “new international division of labor.” These conditions fostered the unprecedented sustained growth of several nations dubbed the “dragons” or “economic miracles of Asia.” Conditions for international economic interaction during the 1970s shifted to favor nations like Indonesia who moved swiftly to take advantage of them. These were:

1. Widespread adoption of flexible currency exchange rates;
2. The oil boom creating export capital;
3. Relatively high labor costs in developed countries;
4. Availability of technologies permitting dispersion of manufacturing overseas;
5. Stronger institutions for transnational commerce;
6. The rise in international flows of capital and finance; and
7. A slowdown in growth in developed countries and fast growth in developing countries.¹²

In particular, Indonesia moved decisively into textile production and the manufacture of finished clothing and shoes. Jakarta with its superior infrastructure was the focus of most of the ensuing growth. It was also the location uniquely favored by virtue of the importance of face-to-face meetings with government officials—the prerequisite to any sizable commercial transaction and establishing both legal and extra-legal relationships. As a result of New Order policies designed to expand this part of the economy, Indonesia’s textile production soared from 0.2 percent of the economy in 1970 to 23 percent by 1994. Malaysia interestingly enough aimed higher in the economic food chain skipping over such low-skill activities as textile production and becoming instead a major assembler of electronic goods and machinery (44 percent by 1994) while Indonesia’s output in this sector remained relatively low at 5 percent.¹³

These conditions rekindled prior tendencies of urban primacy in Indonesia understood as a mutually reinforcing combination of demographic concentration and functional centralization that results in a single urban agglomeration dominating all other cities and regions in a nation none of

¹² Warwick Armstrong and T.G. McGee, *Theatres of Accumulation: Studies in Asian and Latin American Urbanization* (London: Methuen, 1985), 3.

¹³ Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, “Asia’s Reemergence,” *Foreign Affairs*, no. 6 (November/December 1997), 44-59., 55.

which even approach the size and significance of the primate city.¹⁴ Urban primacy in colonial Southeast Asia reflected a centralized administration and the economic function of siphoning raw materials from a vast hinterland along radial routes converging on the port for transshipment to the metropole.¹⁵ The renewed urban primacy of Jakarta combined aspects of the administrative and economic convergence that characterized colonial primate cities with the additional symbolic dominance that was a feature of pre-colonial primacy of the royal court cities.¹⁶ The meaning, configuration and function of the Javanese court center as the "navel" of the world through which all good fortune flowed from the gods was replicated in the modern re-conception of Jakarta under Sukarno.¹⁷ The dominant position of Jakarta was reinforced by receiving more than half of the (official) national budget expenditures every year throughout the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁸ Other reasons for focusing foreign and domestic investment on Jakarta include the sharp concentration of entrepreneurs and skilled labor, access to the largest markets of Indonesia, and access to decision makers. Despite the favorable resource allocation, the "rural push" of harsh conditions for peasant farmers remained a far more significant factor in rural-urban migration than the "urban pull" deriving from favorable conditions in Jakarta. The dominant role of demographic pressures, forcing populations into the cities, as opposed to the more favorable conditions of nineteenth century European urbanization, based on economic development and industrialization, led McGee to identify the Southeast Asian phenomenon as "pseudo-urbanization" lacking the fundamental economic base of urbanization as understood through its history in the West.¹⁹ The "urban bias" in

¹⁴ David A. Smith and Roger J. Nemeth, "Urban Development in Southeast Asia," *Urbanisation in the Developing World*, ed. David Drakakis-Smith (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 121-22; Mattei Dogan and John D. Kasarda, "Comparing Giant Cities," introduction to *The Metropolis Era: Volume 2, Mega-Cities*, ed. Mattei Dogan and John D. Kasarda (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1988), 11.

¹⁵ T.G. McGee, *The Southeast Asian City: A Social Geography of the Primate Cities of Southeast Asia* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1967), 55-61; Frank J. Costa et al., "Trends and Prospects," chapter 1 in *Urbanization in Asia: Spatial Dimensions and Policy Issues*, ed. Frank J. Costa et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 3-4.

¹⁶ Paul Wheatley, *Nagara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Traditions* (University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper Nos. 207-208, 1983), 430; Richard A. O'Connor, *A Theory of Indigenous Southeast Asian Urbanism*, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 38 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), 11.

¹⁷ Robert Cowherd, "Conservation and Development: the Case of Surakarta Palace Heritage Site in Solo," *Tourism and Heritage Management*, ed. Wiendu Nuryanti (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1997), 443-462.

¹⁸ Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept on Metropolitan Planning of the Jakarta Region," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 107-109.

¹⁹ T.G. McGee, *The Southeast Asian City: A Social Geography of the Primate Cities of Southeast Asia* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1967), 15-17.

Indonesia was further institutionalized in the control of rice prices that continuously immiserated the rural farmers while favoring the urban populations with depressed food costs. Jakarta's population jump in only a few decades from less than half a million to over five million by the mid-1970s flooded the city with recent arrivals most of whom struggled to carve out a niche in Jakarta's vast informal sector economy. The fierce competition amongst the swollen ranks of the informal economy came to constitute 70 percent of the workforce driving incomes to near subsistence levels.²⁰

The DKI Jakarta boundaries were established shortly after independence by the Djakarta Raja plan of 1952 to accommodate the anticipated spread of Jakarta's urbanized area to the south, east, and west away from the port. These boundaries encompass 66,000 hectares (250 square miles). The spread of *kampung* residential neighborhoods and the development of formal sector employee housing quickly filled in the remaining agricultural and undeveloped open spaces within the official boundaries of the Jakarta Special Capital Province (DKI Jakarta). By the time of the Jakarta Master Plan 1965-1985, the spread of urbanization into the surrounding counties in the Province of West Java was already anticipated.²¹ Access to and development of these lands were made a key component of planning reports at least as early as 1973.²² It became necessary to speak of what elsewhere might be called the Jakarta Metropolitan Area encompassing DKI Jakarta and the surrounding three *kabupaten* (counties) of Tangerang to the west, Bogor to the south, and Bekasi to the east. In keeping with the Indonesian language affinity for abbreviations that form new words, the key syllables from each of the four geographic areas were conjoined to create the new geographic designation "Jabotabek": JA-karta, BO-gor, TA-ngerang, and BEK-asi. The terms Jabotabek and Jakarta Metropolitan Area are used interchangeably. The distinction between the Jakarta Special Capital Province and the three surrounding *kabupaten* is made using a similar abbreviation strategy by identifying the two distinct components of Jabotabek as being Jakarta and "Botabek" (*kabupaten* and *kotamadya* BO-gor, TA-ngerang and BEK-asi).²³

²⁰ Giebels, "JABOTABEK," 109-11

²¹ Susan Abeyasekera, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 219-20.

²² Giebels, "JABOTABEK," 109-110.

²³ Since 1997, several administrative reconfigurations have increased the number of administrative entities at the *kabupaten/kotamadyo* (county/municipality), the so-called *tingkat II* (level 2) layer of the Indonesian administrative hierarchy, in Botabek. Kabupaten Tangerang was split into Kabupaten Tangerang and Kotamadyo Tangerang distinguishing the Municipality of Tangerang from the larger Tangerang County that surrounds it. Similarly, the Municipality of Depok has been split off from Bogor County. Thus Jabotabek has gone from comprising five *tingkat II* administrations to seven and is now called Jabodetabek to acknowledge the presence of DE-pok.

The Special Capital District (DKI) Jakarta administrative boundaries account for less than 10 percent of the Jabotabek land area totaling 690,000 hectares (2,700 square miles). The populations of Jakarta's surrounding counties were linked to Jakarta by three rail lines running west to Tangerang, south to Bogor, and east to Bekasi. In the 1970s, the "Colt Revolution" named for the small vans that were deployed in overlapping networks to cover all of Java, enabled cheap and relatively convenient access to Jakarta from not just the towns of Tangerang, Bogor, and Bekasi but also the vast hinterlands between. Daily commuting from Bogor was further facilitated by Sukarno's Jagorawi (JA-karta-Bo-GOR Jal-A-n WI-layah or the Jakarta-Bogor Regional Road) highway. In the 1980s, the east west toll roads were constructed connecting the capital to Tangerang and Bekasi as well. Both the formal sector housing development and more dispersed housing choices reflected a strong relationship between road and rail infrastructure, and housing location. The redistribution of population growth between Jakarta and Botabek reflects these changes in transportation access and the subsequent shifts in housing provision. A disaggregation of population data indicates that the towns of Tangerang, Bogor, and Bekasi were the site of by far the greatest population growth with much slower growth in Jakarta and even slower growth in the *kabupaten* (counties) outside of these central towns.²⁴ The areas around these more peripheral towns 20 to 40 kilometers from the center of Jakarta experienced an employment growth of 425 percent between 1980 and 1990. This compared with 52 percent employment growth in DKI Jakarta and 36 percent in the counties (*kabupaten*) of Botabek outside of the 40-kilometer radius ring.²⁵

Table 2.1: Population in millions

<i>area</i>	1961	1971	1980	1990	2000
Jakarta	2.9	4.6	6.5	8.3	10.1
Botabek	3.0	3.8	5.4	8.9	12.6
Jabotabek	5.9	8.3	11.9	17.1	23.7

Sources: Winarso (1999)²⁶

²⁴ The tracking of population and other statistics according to large administrative divisions and not more carefully demarcated demographic and geographic boundaries more closely related to the phenomena being observed makes drawing conclusions about Jabotabek difficult.

²⁵ Gavin W. Jones and Si Gde Made Mamas, "The Changing Employment Structure of the Extended Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 32, no. 1 (April 1996), 51-70.

²⁶ "Study on the Emerging International Urban System of Megacities in East Asia: The Case of Jabotabek Region," (Jakarta: Bappenas and Nippon Life Insurance Research Institute, 1995), 279; cited in Haryo Winarso, "Private Residential Developers and the Spatial Structure of Jabotabek," chapter 15 in *Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume 1: Making the Cities*, ed. Graham P. Chapman, Ashok K. Dutt and Robert W. Bradnock (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999), 277-79.

The focus on economic development that was at least ostensibly aimed at national economies became under these new conditions unabashedly focused on specific city regions. About 43 percent of Indonesia's approved domestic and foreign investments from 1967 to 1997 were concentrated in Jabotabek. Of this, about one third was in Jakarta and two thirds in the surrounding province of West Java mostly in the regencies of Botabek. Excluding investments in oil and gas, about half of Indonesia's investments were concentrated in Jabotabek.²⁷ This reinforced urban primacy of the dominant cities as smaller cities could not command the resources of the nation nor muster their own in any way that might compete with cities like Manila, Bangkok or Jakarta.²⁸

²⁷ Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 233-234.

²⁸ Michael Douglass, "Globalisation, Intercity Competition and Civil Society in Pacific Asia: Toward Livable cities in the 21st Century," paper presented to international workshop: *Southeast Asian Urban Futures*, Singapore (21 July 2000).




Figure 2.1 The extent of the *kampung* in Jakarta in 1973.
 Source: Giebels

Prior to the 1970s, large-scale housing development was limited to the largest public institutions and private businesses that built homes to satisfy the expectation of employer-supplied housing for formal sector employees. Employing a majority of the formal sector workforce, the Indonesian government was the largest housing developer. The Perumnas National Housing Corporation (*Perusahaan Perumahan Nasional*) established in 1974 continues to use a quota system by which a majority of the units built are reserved for government employees. The virtual absence of large-scale speculative housing development was in part due to the safeguards introduced in the 1960 Basic Agraria Law against accumulation of land for speculative purposes in response to the long experience with Dutch land laws and market controls that were one of the primary means of economic and social domination during the last century of colonial rule.²⁹ The Basic Agraria Law

²⁹ For more on the Basic Agrarian Law protection of traditional land rights see chapter six.

restricted fee simple ownership of land to individuals. Corporations could only acquire 20 to 30 year "Right of Use" leases. As intended, the Basic Agraria Law placed effective constraints on the large-scale commodification of land. Not that there was an absence of property market activity in the rural hinterlands of Jakarta, but the value of land was tied more directly to its use value rather than the more volatile fluctuations of a property market dominated by prices set according to exchange value. By limiting the capacity of firms to own and consolidate land in larger holdings, the commodification of land for speculative gain in a volatile property market was curtailed. In addition, local customs encouraged the rental or sale of land for often token amounts of money as a means of solidifying social relationships amongst extended family members or within village communities, often in continuation of traditional *magersari* relationships. These practices are popularly associated with the "social function of land." The Basic Agraria Law was the cornerstone of Sukarno's effort during the early years of independence to restore land rights and practices that had been severely curtailed during the long colonial rule of the Dutch. The closest thing to a land reform law Indonesia has ever attempted, the 1960 Basic Agraria Law reserved the right of the state to expropriate lands in private ownership for the purposes of protecting and promoting these traditional land practices.³⁰

The state-led housing development policies that were carried over from the Sukarno period fell short of providing the necessary housing for the growing population by several orders of magnitude. Along with the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development planning process of the 1970s (see Chapter Five), President Suharto's New Order Regime established a housing policy with two primary objectives: to reduce the population densities of Jakarta by providing substantial quantities of housing beyond the city center; and to transform Jakarta's image from "the city of a thousand *kampung*" to a modern, ordered "Metropolitan City." Suharto's foreign-trained advisors led Indonesia to become an early adopter of what has since come to be known as "market enabling strategies." These were policies designed to mobilize the private sector to take on formerly government functions guided by a regulatory framework of incentives and restrictions to achieve the broader goals of society. The profit motive along with government programs to facilitate land consolidation and housing finance were the incentives used to harness a dynamic private sector to build housing far in excess of, and higher in quality than, what the state could possibly provide by its own efforts and limited resources. By some gross measures, this program appears to have been successful. By 1995, the largest 10 private sector housing development projects covered a land

³⁰ Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), 90.

area of 27,000 hectares (67,000 acres) while the government sponsored National Housing Corporation had a target of 6,000 hectares (15,000 acres).³¹

Given the dominance of traditional practices of land exchange and ownership in the rural hinterlands of Jabotabek, the very idea of an Indonesian suburban property market was a far-fetched proposition until a small group of property developers engaged in building condominium and office towers in downtown Jakarta got together with their political allies and created the proper conditions for it to become a reality. The changes most directly responsible for altering the conditions leading to the sudden emergence of the suburban real estate market were two laws passed in 1972. The first created the *Surat Ijin Penunjukan Penggunaan Tanah* (SIPPT) later to become the *Ijin Lokasi* (Location Permit) ostensibly established to ensure that changes in land uses comply with official planning documents. It was promoted as the best means to make Jakarta and its surroundings into a planned modern city region.³² As amended over the years from the Ministry of Home Affairs Decree No. 5 of 1974 up to the State Minister of Agraria/Head of National Land Agency Decree No. 2 1993 it was to serve as an early intervention to ensure that development conformed to social and economic policy, spatial planning, and included significant provisions for low-cost housing.³³ Addressing fears that the issuing of a Location Permit in an area would lead to rampant price escalation, the government granted exclusive purchasing rights to the holder of the location permit. Location Permits were granted for one year with the provision that developers could apply for a single one-year extension if the developer had purchased at least half of the land held under permit. A second law created the *Hak Guna Bangunan Induk* or Building Use Right Master Certificate form of land rights under which corporations could hold aggregated land under a single 30-year right of use Master Certificate. The Master Certificate was then used to facilitate the subdivision of the aggregated holdings sold with 30-year right of use convertible to *hak milik* fee simple ownership.³⁴ Two years later the *Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri* Interior Ministry Regulation No. 5 required these subdivided lots to have new buildings on them to discourage speculation. Together, these regulatory instruments effectively replaced the restrictions of the 1960 Basic Agraria Law with significant incentives for the large-scale consolidation and development of land. The explosion of development activity that ensued is described later in this chapter.

³¹ Dalhar Susanto, "Kota Baru di Jabotabek: Optimalisasi Bisnis" (New Towns in Jabotabek: Business Optimization), paper presented at the seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), 1-2.

³² Michael Leon Leaf, "Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the 'Big Village' to the 'Modern City'," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991), 80-81.

³³ Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour," 115.

³⁴ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 79-80.

The subsequent economic liberalization policies introduced by the Suharto government in the 1970s and 1980s contributed further to dramatic changes in the spatial form of Jakarta. The shape of the new Jakarta was molded to conform to the purposes of the Suharto-led growth coalition in ways that, with sufficient understanding of the conditions under which it was forged, can be read from the urban form it left in its wake. Not only was the arrangement of land uses shifted in the urban core but also entirely new land uses were introduced both in the Central Business District and on a newly urbanizing periphery. While not the most visually striking of these transformations, the most significant change in terms of land area, environmental impact, and economics was the explosion of suburban housing development first on the remaining agricultural and underdeveloped lands within the DKI Jakarta boundaries and then the vast hinterlands of the surrounding counties and municipalities of Botabek.

Deregulation and the New Order Growth Coalition

In 1981, declining oil prices and the rising value of the Yen created a foreign currency crisis for Indonesia which had increasing difficulties servicing its extensive loans from the Japanese.³⁵ Suharto's team of economic advisors³⁶ counseled a diversification of economic activities to take advantage of the emergent new international division of labor. Foregoing both the approaches of a state-led "big push" (as in China's "Great Leap Forward"), and of a protectionist modernization strategy of import substitution, New Order economic policy focused instead on developing the conditions necessary to attract the "flying geese" of foreign direct investment—landing only on the ponds where good food (low labor, natural resource, and transport costs) and safety (political stability) are to be found.³⁷ With labor costs amongst the lowest in the world and an incomparable natural resource base, the additional ingredients of the Indonesian "flying geese" strategy were continued political stability, infrastructure development and reduction of the bureaucratic frictions of doing business.

³⁵ Hal Hill, "The Economy," chapter 2 in *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-economic Transformation*, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 54-122; Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy Since 1966* (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³⁶ Dominated by recent graduates of the University of California at Berkeley this group was known as the Berkeley Mafia.

³⁷ The "Flying Geese" model was first articulated by Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s. It holds that a flock of geese (foreign investors) will land wherever there is good food and safety. Adam Smith predicted over two centuries ago that something like what is described by the "flying geese" model would result in the eventual evening out of the playing field between European and Asian economies. See Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "Asia's Reemergence," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 6 (November/December 1997), 44-59.

In scripting and directing the playing out of events from the late 1970s through the 1990s, Suharto and his advisors led Indonesia through a series of incremental reforms designed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new international division of labor, the increasingly mobile nature of investment, and their own dominance of the formal and informal arrangements of state and financial institutions that set the terms for investment. The New Order regime's perception of these opportunities—one of the key elements defining their "decision space" during the 1980s and 1990s—led them to aggressively pursue the path of economic liberalization as preached by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Suharto's authority derived from both his position at the top of the Indonesian government's formal structure, and his position at the apex of the unofficial pyramid of patronage that extended during his rule to every significant commercial endeavor in the nation. Suharto was thus in an unparalleled position from which to influence the shape of investment in Indonesia. The terms of reference through which the opportunities presented by the global economy to be captured or missed were perceived by Suharto and his cadre came to have an enormous influence on decisions that would have otherwise been made on the basis of more basic needs of a local nature. It was through the New Order regime and its varied mechanisms of control and influence that the forces behind foreign capital investment came to impact on the physical, economic, and social constitution—what Firman calls "the internal structures"—of Jakarta during the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s.³⁸

Among the first of the many new growth opportunities presented by changes in the world economy that the New Order moved to take advantage of, was the establishment of "Special Economic Zones" or "Export Platforms." This was perhaps the most vivid example of a direct application of the flying geese model. These are designated enclaves within the boundaries of a specific nation governed by a special set of regulations so as to favorably compete with the economic conditions found in a rival region or another nation's "special economic zone." By concentrating infrastructure investments in a spatially confined site and bringing in whatever labor the host nation is able to provide, a combination of efficient infrastructure, minimal regulatory intervention, low transport costs, and low labor costs are intended to attract foreign direct investment. Indonesia's flagship special economic zone was established on the island of Batam, a half-hour boat ride from Singapore. It served as a pilot program of infrastructure development and policy deregulations, some of which were subsequently unleashed elsewhere in Indonesia. Special tax exemptions, legal protections, trade policies, high security, and intensive infrastructure investment were designed to create the ideal conditions for attracting foreign investment that would

³⁸ Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 229-30.

have been difficult or impossible to achieve elsewhere as effectively and quickly given political and logistical barriers.³⁹ Such areas have been characterized as “transnational space” as they exist beyond the legal, regulatory, and cultural constraints found in the rest of the nation. Instead they match economic conditions that businesses would find in their home countries or other such special enclaves. These spaces simultaneously exist within a national boundary but outside and between economies and cultures.⁴⁰ Ultimately, the economic growth agenda demands that the conditions of the “special economic zone” be extended to encompass, first, a selected set of urban master control points—cities joined to the network of global cities— and then, the regions surrounding them.

Ultimately, the New Order economic growth agenda demanded that the conditions of the special economic zone become the norm rather than the exception. The goal of attracting foreign investment demanded special trade policies, tax holidays, and other financial incentives, stable political conditions (whether through military repression or social means), functional enforcement of contracts through courts or extra-legal means throughout the nation. As these spaces grew and expanded, global processes came to be felt directly in more and more places often bringing radical change to social structures, economic systems, and political power distributions. In the case of New Order Indonesia the expansion of transnational space served to extend the reach of political, social, and economic control more effectively than previously possible. The series of deregulation policy packages (*kebijaksanaan deregulasi*) implemented from 1982 to 1997, were among the primary means by which the boundaries of this transnational space were extended to make all of Indonesia a “free trade zone” (although only the port cities of Jakarta and Surabaya had the complementary infrastructure and labor markets required to attract substantial levels of foreign investment).⁴¹ The policies reduced the administrative friction of making foreign investments in Indonesia. Up to this point, the bureaucratic procedures established by the Dutch had persisted and even flourished after independence without the benefits of Dutch effectiveness and efficiency. With the new deregulation, simplified licensing, banking procedures, and investment permission provided easier access while financial incentives were added. These included the reduction or waiving of fees, tax exemptions and deferments, the easing of regulatory procedures. The steady flow of regulatory changes established customer service oriented “one stop...” regulatory procedures to would-be foreign investors. Joint venture exports were permitted first in 1987,

³⁹ Radelet, “Asia’s Reemergence,” 52-53.

⁴⁰ Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 1994).

⁴¹ Firman notes that along with attracting foreign investment, the policies also sought to encourage domestic savings and replace the long practice of state-controlled resource allocation with more efficient market-based economic controls. Tommy Firman, “From Global City’ to ‘City of Crisis’: Jakarta Metropolitan Region Under Economic Turmoil,” *Habitat International* 23, no. 4 (1999), 251-252.

foreign-operated industrial estates in 1989, and wholly foreign-owned ventures in 1993.⁴² The effect was to further concentrate development in Jabotabek with industrial development shifting to Botabek, finance and services agglomerating in downtown Jakarta, and housing reshuffled into new positions in a greatly expanded spatial field of Jabotabek. This expansion also necessitated a quantum leap in infrastructure expenditures along with spending for providing new amenities and a higher standard of services. Golf courses, hospitals, schools, the airport, and seaport were among the most visible of these new developments.

Studies of the impacts of these reforms indicate a significant release of pent up market forces leading to dramatic growth. The Jakarta Stock Exchange grew from just 13 companies with a market capitalization of Rp99 billion in 1982 to 238 companies with a market capitalization of Rp152 trillion by 1995.⁴³ Despite some efforts to spread this growth to other regions of the nation, Jabotabek benefited disproportionately from increased investments largely due to its relative advantages in terms of basic infrastructures, manpower, and access to the political elite. The result of the reforms was an even greater concentration of economic activity and urban agglomeration in Jabotabek. The value of goods passing into and out of Jakarta's seaport of Tanjung Priok is indicative of the role Jakarta played as a producer and consumer in the international trade between Indonesia and the rest of the world. As a producer of exported goods, Jakarta accounted for about 28 percent of Indonesia's exports from 1990 to 1996 while over the same period it consumed between 50 and 60 percent of goods imported into Indonesia.⁴⁴ The role of Jakarta in the hierarchy of global cities is indicated by its trading partners, primarily Japan, and the US, followed by South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Extending the global city literature of Sassen and others, Firman places Jakarta in the third tier of the global city hierarchy below Tokyo (first tier) and Hong Kong, Singapore, and Seoul (second tier). It shares its third tier orbit around Tokyo with Taipei, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁵ The flow of people, goods, and mail in and out of Jakarta confirmed the integration of Jakarta into the system of global cities dominated by connections between Jakarta and other Asian cities.⁴⁶ Foreign direct investment in Jakarta was dominated by Japan, Hong

⁴² M. Pangestu, "Foreign Firm and Structural Change in the Indonesian Manufacturing Sector," in *Direct Foreign Investment in Asia's Developing Economies and Structural Change in the Asia Pacific Region*, ed. E.D. Ramsteter (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 36-37; cited in Tommy Firman and Ida Ayu Indra Dharmapatni, "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 89.

⁴³ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 234.

⁴⁴ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 235, and Table 7, 236

⁴⁵ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 232.

⁴⁶ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 235

Kong, Singapore, South Korea and was a direct reflection of the new international division of labor as these nations shifted their labor-intensive activities to lower wage labor markets. In the mid-1990s, Japan was the source of about one third of foreign direct investment in Jakarta followed by Hong Kong (13 percent) and Singapore (12 percent).⁴⁷ The international expansion of retail, food and beverages is seen in the rise in number of franchises in Indonesia from 27 in 1991 to 139 in 1995. This sector was dominated by American foreign investment accounting for some 60 percent of these franchised businesses.⁴⁸

The property sector investment grew throughout this period in the highly visible form of high-rise condominium towers, office buildings, shopping malls, and large-scale housing estates. By May 1997, two months prior to the initial drop in the value of the Indonesian *rupiah* (the national currency, Rp), bank loans to the property sector had reached Rp37.1 trillion (US\$16.1 billion) accounting for almost 20 percent of all bank loans in Indonesia.⁴⁹ Between 1978 and 1997 the commercial space in Jakarta grew from 100,000 square meters (1.0 million square feet) to 2.7 million square meters (29.1 million square feet) with an occupancy rate of 90 percent. Commercial retail space was first built in the 1992 to 1995 boom and reached almost 1.8 million square meters (19.4 million square feet) in 1997, 40 percent of which was built after 1995.⁵⁰

Several of the key ingredients for attracting foreign investment were directly connected with the built environment. Building permit applications, environmental impact analysis procedures, and other development controls were simplified and barriers were lowered as a means of fostering greater private sector development. Examination of these measures will be taken up in the second part of this chapter. The most directly relevant component of the built environment effecting the attractiveness of a place for foreign direct investment was that of infrastructure. As in the colonial period one of the primary economic imperatives was to get raw commodities from their point of extraction to points of production or processing, and then on to markets. The costs of moving goods need to be kept low by using the least expensive means of transport available: shipping, rail, and high capacity road systems. These require huge investments of capital. David Harvey has categorized such investments as a shift of resources from the first circuit of capital—the appropriation of surplus value from labor via production—to the second circuit of capital—the flow of capital into fixed assets either directly or indirectly supportive of capital accumulation in the

⁴⁷ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 233

⁴⁸ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 233-34

⁴⁹ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 235.

⁵⁰ *Far Eastern Economic Review* (22 May 1997), 57; cited in Tommy Firman, "From 'Global City' to 'City of Crisis': Jakarta Metropolitan Region Under Economic Turmoil," *Habitat International* 23, no. 4 (1999), 453.

first circuit.⁵¹ A third circuit of capital identified by Harvey is in the development of labor power, as in research and education. Included in Harvey's second category are not only the fixed assets of production, as in machinery, factories, and equipment, but also the fixed assets of the city: transportation and other infrastructures, the sidewalks, parks, and all of the elements of what we call the built environment. In Harvey's categorization, capital is transferred from the first circuit (production) into the second (the built environment) and third (education and research) circuits when such investments are seen as being supportive of the activities of the first circuit. A strict interpretation of this view, coming out of the political economy approach to the city, holds that investments in the built environment (the second circuit of capital) are made primarily to the extent that they measurably benefit the operation of capital accumulation through production in the first circuit of capital. In this view, the nature, quality, shape, and direction of investments in the built environment are largely determined by the perception of benefits accruing by nature of such investments to particular entities engaged in production activities in the first circuit of capital. Stated another way: cities are built to serve the purposes of capital accumulation from production, and their form reflects these purposes.

While acknowledging that understanding this relationship is a prerequisite necessary to account for the forces operating on the formation or transformation of cities, the case of Jakarta illuminates the complexity of motivations behind people's actions beyond pursuit of profit itself. In later chapters, while largely accepting the usefulness of the political economy approach to the relationship between the built environment and the operations of a capitalist economy, efforts will be made to temper this view by restating this relationship without discounting the variable of people's individual and collective perceptions of this relationship. With the acknowledgment that people's perceptions are the product of culture, the hard-edged material determinism of the political economy formulation is complicated by the more difficult issues of culture and perception.

In Jabotabek during the 1980s and 1990s, investments in the built environment were both the result of greater foreign investment and widely accepted as the means for attracting further foreign investment. This is the time during which the efforts of Sukarno and DKI Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin to replace the "city of a thousand *kampung*" with the "Metropolitan City" bore fruit. The city of Western-style high-rise buildings, wide boulevards with the "slums" kept out of site was a city familiar and attractive for foreigners. With the cost of labor kept low and the complementary government policies in place, foreigners were comfortable coming to Jakarta to invest, work, and

⁵¹ David Harvey, *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society* (New York: Methuen, 1985), 91-122. See also: T.G. McGee, "Circuits and Networks of Capital: Internationalisation of the World Economy and National Urbanisation," chapter 2 in *Urbanisation in the Developing World*, ed. David Drakakis-Smith (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 27-36.

even live. This was part of the desired outcome from the start. National policy had been adjusted so as to foster desired outcomes in the built environment based on understanding of both the operation of the regional circuits of capital as well as the effect of world economic trends on them .

In investigating the question: to what extent did the forces of the global economy influence the land uses and urban structure of Jabotabek? Firman identified the components of Jakarta's restructuring as it joined the expanding network of "global cities":




FIGURE 2.2 Citraland shopping Mall/Hotel, one of Jakarta's many "superblock" projects.
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

1. Industry, finance, trade and property sectors were largely "integrated into the global capitalist system";
2. The rapid increase in space production seen in the new towns, office and condominium towers, industrial estates, shopping centers, etc.;
3. Land use shifts on the periphery from agriculture to housing and industry and in the center from housing to shopping centers, hotels, condominiums, offices and other non-residential uses;
4. The tremendous increase in commuters and trip length from the periphery to the center;

5. The rise in importance granted to infrastructure development in renewed recognition of the link between economic and infrastructure development; and
6. The shift from a single core to a multiple core pattern even as the center remains dominant.

Similarly, Nas has characterized these formal transformations of Jakarta as “condominium urbanization”—the product of a new cooperative arrangement between private and public sectors ushering in “a new phase of symbolic construction.”⁵² Nas acknowledges the larger phenomena being symbolized and the political and economic forces underlying them but singles out the condominium towers sitting on massive shopping mall podiums as the most distinctive physical element looming in the haze over the new toll roads and thus the best candidate for a new symbolism for the city region.

Others mistake this new formal expression of Jakarta as a signal that a single urban paradigm has taken hold of the world's cities under expanding reach of the global economy.⁵³ But, as will be examined in Chapter Seven, the physical extent of these changes misrepresents the fact that they reflect the economic advancement of a tiny minority at the top of Indonesian society. Firman acknowledges the persistence of the old city under the shiny veneer of the new symbols of Jakarta as one of his primary characterizations of the city's restructuring. He notes the unexpected capacity for these major changes to coexist with the preexisting urban problems of lack of infrastructure, housing, formal employment, and clean air.⁵⁴

It is important to see this restructuring not simply as a function of internationalization of economic activity but also as a function of the local growth coalition's consolidation of power, influence, and wealth.⁵⁵ The global city perspective would have us understand the restructuring of the Jakarta region not only as the secondary impact of foreign direct investment but also as the means of attracting more of that investment. But these exogenous forces are only significant on the ground in Jakarta to the extent that they are understood and form the basis of decisions made by local actors. It is the specific perception of these factors and the opportunities presented by them

⁵² Peter J.M. Nas, “Jakarta, City Full of Symbols: An Essay in Symbolic Ecology,” chapter 2 in *Urban Symbolism*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 21.

⁵³ Howard W. Dick and Peter J. Rimmer, “Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography of South-east Asia,” *Urban Studies* 35, no. 12 (1998), 2303-21; Melvin Webber, “The Joys of Spread-City,” *Urban Design International* 3, no. 4 (December 1998), 201-206. See discussion of these in chapter one.

⁵⁴ Firman, “Restructuring of Jakarta,” 231, 240-42.

⁵⁵ The term “growth coalition” was introduced by the seminal work: John Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

for the advancement of a local agenda of growth and extension of power that they become the basis of decisions for new development. These decisions are disproportionately placed in the hands of a small coalition between the top figures of the Suharto government and the largest corporate families of Indonesia. Tardiyana has identified the Suharto oligarchy as a classic growth coalition comparable with the American and British national regimes of the 1980s which negotiated the shift from welfare state to “right wing” economies.⁵⁶ The paradigm shifts engineered by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher resulted in changes to local planning and tax codes to the advantage of private sector interests. Adopting Harvey’s three circuits of capital analysis, Tardiyana shows how the Suharto-led coalition’s unchallenged command over both the public and the private sector left them in a unique position from which to control the flow of capital from the first circuit (production) to the second circuit (including the built environment of city regions). The primary means of this control were provided by state and financial institutions. The operations of planning and regulatory mechanisms along with the practices of the banking and finance industry provided the necessary tools for effectively managing the transformation of the built environment. These tools were utilized not only to provide the transportation and communications infrastructures in support of economic growth but also provided infrastructures in spatially selective ways so as to lavish the highest standards of services on some while continuing to neglect even the most basic needs of others.⁵⁷

The efforts to privatize many government operations were pursued through “market enabling strategies” enacted through the New Order’s many deregulation packages of the 1980s and 1990s which matched incentives with requirements. It is instructive to note the effectiveness with which the incentive portions of these policies accelerated national economic growth and transformed the shape and operation of the Jakarta region while, at the same time, land use controls, environmental protections, and requirements to provide public infrastructures and services proved to be largely ineffective. The extension of planning mechanisms to guide the accelerating growth unleashed by privatization, deregulation, and de-bureaucratization of investment procedures, had almost no impact.⁵⁸ Instead, these often-enormous bureaucratic undertakings appear in hindsight as little more than empty rhetorical gestures rarely having even the slightest bearing on new

⁵⁶ Achmad D. Tardiyana, “The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order,” paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

⁵⁷ This spatial segregation of infrastructure is taken up in greater detail in chapter seven.

⁵⁸ See chapters five and six.

development.⁵⁹ The unchallenged dominance of the New Order growth coalition led to the proliferation of illegal development to the point of becoming pervasive. Illegal development came to be openly pursued with the tacit approval of regulatory agencies, praise of top government officials, and support from presidential decrees. The Jakarta case demonstrates a strong "political will" mobilized in the pursuit of narrow interests at great costs to the wider collective and long term interests of the region's population. The remainder of this chapter presents the short history of planning and development during the late Suharto period, particularly that of the new suburban housing developments on the urbanizing fringe of Jakarta.

The Cendana-Cukong alliance and the Suburban Real Estate Industry

Together the regulations establishing the Location Permit and the Master Certificate used in the subdivision of land, effectively replaced the protection of traditional land exchange practices against speculative development previously provided by the 1945 constitution and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law by facilitating the consolidation of multiple plots under a single corporate ownership. If implemented as originally enacted, the Location Permit laws would have limited the size of lands held under Location Permits to that which the developer could afford to purchase within two years. The costs of owning land were assumed significant enough to further compel the timely development of lands purchased and their timely release to the market as developed housing units. In practice, the rule barring land subdivision without new construction was routinely circumvented by selling empty subdivided lots on the basis of a letter guaranteeing that the seller will transfer the legal subdivided land rights upon completion of new construction.⁶⁰ Later amendments to the Location Permit regulations allowed a second one-year extension of the permit to a maximum of three years. Larger land development projects such as Bumi Serpong Damai were granted an exception to the Location Permit time limits in recognition of their scale and the difficulty and expense of purchasing such vast areas of land. After the exception granted to Bumi Serpong Damai, it became standard practice to allow indefinite extensions of all large Location Permits. The temporary powers of preemptive development rights granted to the holders of Location Permits took on entirely new dimensions as soon as it was no longer just temporary. Without an enforced time limit, developers were free to lay claim to exclusive development rights over vast areas of land with no obligation to develop the land within a certain time frame. Location Permits became the

⁵⁹ Tommy Firman, Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni, "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 88-90.

⁶⁰ Jo Santoso, conversation with the author on tour of Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangerang (15 September 2000).

avored means for land speculation allowing companies to hold most of the rights usually reserved for titled owners without having to actually purchase the land.

The sudden replacement of the ban on rural land consolidation with laws that streamlined the process of land aggregation, development, and resale was the starting gun for the race to develop the lands around Jakarta as new suburban housing. Small-scale developers would spend much of the next two decades slowly trying to grow incrementally up in scale to tackle the larger development projects made possible by the new legal conditions. In sharp contrast to the smaller developers, the handful of Indonesia's largest commercial developers who had been instrumental in conceiving these policy changes, were poised and ready to spring across the starting line when these laws were enacted. The "twin peaks" of the New Order topography of power were embodied in Suharto's closest friends and immediate family members (a group referred to as *cendana* after the street in the elite Jakarta neighborhood where Suharto and several of his children and friends maintain homes), and the vast wealth concentrated in a handful of Chinese family-based business empires (called *cukong* meaning capitalist engaged in illegal practices). At the core of the *cukong* group was Sudono Salim (a.k.a. Liem Sioe Liong) Indonesia's wealthiest man and foremost industrialist. Salim personifies the rise of the ethnic Chinese in corporate Indonesia via an alliance with Suharto through a relationship that started in the 1950s with contracts to supply the Diponegoro Division of the Army, under the command of a then young General Suharto. This was the starting point of what has since become an historic alliance of capital and political power in Indonesia.⁶¹ General Suharto was in fact reprimanded repeatedly for his corrupt activities and finally was moved away from his network in Semarang, Central Java to Makassar, Sulawesi, at least in part to derail his racketeering activities. But his cronies followed him wherever he went eventually bringing them to the *Kostrad* Reserve Corps close to the center of power in Jakarta. Here they established the first of several "foundations" through which to channel the flow of corruption money beyond the controls of the military. As Adam Schwarz documents in *A Nation in Waiting*, a book that was banned in New Order Indonesia, an implicit accommodation was reached under Suharto between the *cendana* (Suharto and family) and the *cukong* (their Chinese-Indonesian business partners).⁶²

⁶¹ Sori Ersa Siregar and Kencana Tirta Widya, *Liem Sioe Liong dari Futching ke Mancanegara* (Liem Sioe Liong from Futching to Overseas) (Jakarta: Pustaka Merdeka, 1988); cited in Leaf, "Land Regulation," 239-40.

⁶² Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press) 1994.



FIGURE 2.3 Billboard celebrating New Order "development," and the "Father of Development" Photograph: Robert Cowherd

In return for substantial shares in the Chinese corporate holdings, a powerful *bumiputra* (native) political elite with backing from the military, safeguarded their now common interests of protecting and favoring the economically powerful ethnic Chinese conglomerates. Although Chinese-Indonesians make up only three to four percent of the population, most of the largest private domestic corporations (not including foreign- or state-owned firms), were controlled by a handful of Chinese business families often in some form of partnership with members of the Suharto family and the armed forces.⁶³ Having invested in real estate development in downtown Jakarta,

⁶³One of the most often referred to truism about race and the Indonesian economy is that "The Chinese constitute only 3.5 percent of the population but control 70 percent of Indonesia's economy." The rarely cited source of this oversimplified and thus misleading assertion is a 1995 study by the Australian government. The actual statement of this report is far more specific and thus less misleading: "Sino-Indonesians control approximately 73 percent of listed firms by market capitalization... after listed firms controlled by governments or foreigners are discounted.... At the end of 1993, Sino-Indonesians (who constitute just 3.5 percent of all Indonesians) controlled 68 percent of the top 300 conglomerates and nine of the top ten private-sector groups." Michael Backman, *Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia* (Canberra, East Asia Analytical Unit, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995) cited in George J. Aditjondro "The Myth of Chinese Domination," *Jakarta Post* (14 August 1998), 4. Some of the places where this oversimplified statistic has appeared without citation include: *South China Morning Post* (1 September 2000); Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Dominique Fischer, "Indonesia's Real Estate Disturbance: An Ineluctable Outcome," chapter 11 in *Asia's Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate*, eds. Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 219-41;

Salim recognized the even greater potential for huge profits from the creation of a suburban property market. In a 1984 interview, Anthony Salim, Sudono's son, explained how the Salim Group moved into new industries through joint ventures by carefully selecting the industry insiders with the greatest expertise and experience:

In the field of banking, for example, we are in partnership with Mochtar Riady [the developer of Lippo Karawaci new town discussed later], in the field of real estate, we have chosen Ciputra.⁶⁴

Ciputra was a young architect when Salim picked him to head the government-owned corporation PT. Pembangunan Jaya to develop a vast area of the north Jakarta waterfront as the Ancol amusement park and recreation area. In 1971, while still directing the government-owned development firm, Ciputra formed a new private company PT Metropolitan Development to build office buildings downtown. Not surprisingly, by the time the two laws opening up the areas around Jakarta for suburban housing development were passed, Ciputra, with financial backing from Sudono Salim, were poised and ready to kick off the land rush with the first and largest of the big Location Permit applications. With the passage of the new property laws, Ciputra and Salim formed PT Metropolitan Kencana and bought the first 450 hectares (1,100 acres) of rubber plantations that was to become eventually a 720-hectare (1,800-acre) luxury housing development called Pondok Indah. Ciputra's closest competitor was Endang Widjaya (a.k.a. A Cai) who assembled 500 hectares (1,200 acres) of land in Pluit, West Jakarta where he built luxury houses on 500- to 1000-square meter (5,000- to 11,000-square foot) lots.⁶⁵ Not to be outdone, Ciputra made his lots larger and his homes even more opulent.

Ciputra was also an early innovator in extreme security measures. The core development of Pondok Indah was not only a gated community, but rivers were rerouted to almost encircle it as a moat surrounding an island fortress. On the other side of the rivers lies an 18-hole golf course in replication of the open "fire fields" surrounding walled cities of medieval Europe. These were as important as the walls themselves as they forced the besieging armies out into the open. Outside the fire fields of the golf course, the rest of the new housing area was arranged along winding lanes emulating the Dutch Garden City housing extensions added to Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Malang, and Yogyakarta in the 1920s and 1930s. Ciputra also improved on Widjaya's example by

and Schwarz, 99. The author is indebted to Prof. Eric Heikkila, University of Southern California for his input on the position and role of the Chinese Indonesians in the economy of New Order Indonesia.

⁶⁴ *Tempo*, (31 March 1984) cited in Leaf, "Land Regulation," 244.

⁶⁵ Panangian Simanungkalit, "Prospek Proyek Mega Properti Abad 21" (Prospects for Property Sector Mega-projects in the 21st Century), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 2 (March 1994), 38.

offering commercial and recreational facilities to complement his luxury housing, although the actual construction of the shopping mall and recreational facilities illustrated in the early brochures lagged the housing construction by 15 years. Other large-scale land consolidations by members of Suharto's inner circle followed close on the heels of Ciputra and Widjaya in 1973 when the Chinese-Indonesian developer Anton Haliman (PT Agung Podomoro) assembled 320 hectares (800 acres) and Suharto's brother, Probosutejo, assembled 124 hectares (300 acres) of land for similar luxury housing developments.⁶⁶ Despite attempts to mobilize *bumiputra* (native Indonesian) entrepreneurs, indigenous developers were to play only a minor role in the property market dominated throughout its three decade history by the large, ethnic Chinese family-owned development groups closely connected with the center of power. Even among the largest developers, Ciputra's early and rapid emergence as the dominant figure of suburban housing development was unmatched by any other figure. His prominence could not have occurred without substantial financial backing from the outset by Suharto's close friend and business partner Sudono Salim. As the key figure responsible for consolidating most of the Suharto family's own substantial financial empire, Salim's partnership and support at key moments was a crucial factor that propelled Ciputra's career to undertake ever greater and more ambitious suburban property developments. Ciputra's Pondok Indah development was the first of many such ventures. Despite attempts to replicate the Pondok Indah model, it was to prove the most dramatically successful development of the decade and set the formula for suburban housing ventures well into the next.

In 1972 Ciputra founded the industry trade association Real Estate Indonesia (REI) on the recommendation of the National Housing Coordination Board (*Badan Koordinasi Perumahan Nasional*, BKPN). The primary goal was to promote housing production by the private sector towards meeting the severely under-served housing demand in Jakarta and, eventually, elsewhere in Indonesia.⁶⁷ Ciputra served as the association's first president, presiding over 25 charter members. Unlike its usage in English, the term "*ril estate*," "*rel estate*," or more commonly "*real estate*" has been adopted into the Indonesian language to mean "private sector developed single-family (landed) housing" and tends to not include commercial, office, condominium or any other form of property. Real Estate Indonesia, accordingly, was devoted primarily to matters associated with large-scale suburban housing development with branches in every other major city in Indonesia. Claims that Real Estate Indonesia was Ciputra's means of limiting participation in the industry would seem to be not entirely without foundation. In 1975, membership in Ciputra's

⁶⁶ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 243-44.

⁶⁷ Leaf, "Land Regulation," footnote 2, 225

association became a prerequisite for applying for a Location Permit.⁶⁸ Along with his dominance of the suburban housing trade association, Ciputra was also among the primary financiers of the industry's monthly publication *InfoPapan* (Information Board) poised as the primary media for tracking property market trends including advance news of new regulatory measures in the works. The newsletter grew and evolved through the 1980s to become *Bisnis Properti*. By 1994, it was an enormously popular, full-color monthly journal commonly available on newsstands throughout Jakarta. It included extensive regular coverage of design trends in the housing industry profiling the lifestyles of the rich and famous in their homes. It came to include an English language synopsis of several articles implying an international readership. It also portrayed itself as the industry watchdog covering the more flamboyant adventures in corruption. However, its profiling of new projects and their developers, who were also major financial contributors to the journal, blurred the line between journalism and self-promotion with several issues assembled as a series of extensive project brochures in a single convenient binding. The most prominently covered developments were those under the umbrella of Ciputra—himself the frequent focus of articles, interviews and even two special bonus inserts in 1996.

Ciputra's next major suburban development project after Pondok Indah was the Bintaro Jaya housing project launched in 1981. His special relationship with the government of DKI Jakarta as head of the government owned PT Pembangunan Jaya again played an important role in both assembling the land, which eventually grew to encompass 1,780 hectares (4,400 acres), and in arranging for a major toll road to be planned to pass through this development all the way to the heart of the old city center of Jakarta. Its vast size, location further out of Jakarta, and the expected delay in building the toll road compelled Bintaro Jaya to cater to a slightly less elite market segment than Pondok Indah. At about the same time, several projects were underway closer to, and more integrated with, the existing residential fabric of Jakarta. Notable among these were Kebun Jeruk in West Jakarta and the 500-hectare (1,200-acre) Kelapa Gading which incorporated a major new regional bus terminal and market. As sites closer in to the city filled up with development, the cries of the land developers added substantially to the pressures for extending the long-planned toll roads beyond the boundaries of Jakarta into the surrounding counties. During the 1980s, major toll road projects extending to the east and west out of Jakarta did more than anything else to open up these counties to a new phase of property development.

⁶⁸ In 1978, six permits on lands ranging from 1.3 to 200 hectares were among the only permits ever to be revoked by the government for failing to meet the permit requirements. The reasons for revocation were never discussed openly but all six were non-REI members. "Dicabut, Penunjukan Tanah untuk 6 Real Estate" (6 Real Estate Projects Canceled Citing Land Irregularities) in *Kompas* (21 July 1978); cited in Leaf, "Land Regulation," 244-45.

Despite the dominant role they played throughout the Indonesian economy, until the mid-1980s only a select handful of Indonesia's major corporate investors took the plunge into the area of suburban housing development. The steady rise in land values enjoyed by early luxury housing developments like Pondok Indah created a desire on the part of many conglomerates to get into the business but they still faced the problem of not having the expertise required to take on large-scale property development. Following Sudono Salim's lead, the answer was to turn to Ciputra. One day in the early 1980s, Eka Tjipta Widjaja, the head of Indonesia's third largest conglomerate, the Sinar Mas Group, invited Ciputra on a trip to look at some land he was putting together. Ciputra in turn invited Sudono Salim's son Anthony who had gotten his start in real estate managing land acquisition for Pondok Indah. The story of that fateful day as told by Ciputra goes like this: taking a rest overlooking Widjaja's site the earth fell into darkness at midday in the shadow of a solar eclipse. Ciputra fell into a deep sleep during which he was visited by a dream that set before him the vision of a shining new city totally independent of Jakarta. When he awoke he accepted Widjaja's offer to enter into a partnership, along with Anthony's Salim Group, to direct the development of what was to become Indonesia's largest new town. By the end of 1984, opportunities to join the partnership had been extended and accepted by a total of 10 corporations. The agreement was that they would supply the finance and Ciputra would supply his vision.⁶⁹ The announcement of the Bumi Serpong Damai consortium in 1984 signaled an unprecedented confidence in the long-term strength of the still-emerging suburban housing market. In fact, these 10 corporations were all controlled by the three men who were present on the site of the future city on the day of the eclipse.⁷⁰ However, the consortium's board of directors lists Sudwikatmono, Suharto's cousin, as the Chief Executive Advisor, above the names of even Sudono Salim, Ciputra, and Eka Tjipta Widjaja in recognition of the special role he played in the project.

In the process of assembling the Bumi Serpong Damai consortium, the boundaries of the project grew to incorporate adjacent lands held under Location Permit by the Salim Group and eventually pushing up hard against the boundaries of Ciputra's Bintaro Jaya to the east. The new town plan was coordinated with the German assistance program establishing the major industrial *Puspipetek* Center for Science and Technology Development to the south of the site. Bumi Serpong Damai was planned to cover 6,000 hectares (23 square miles), more than three times the area of any

⁶⁹ "Kiat Menjadi Konglomerat Properti, Part 1" (The Secret of Becoming a Property Conglomerate), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 34, Bonus Section (November 1996), 2-3.

⁷⁰ The four parent companies were: Widjaja's Sinar Mas Group, Ciputra and Salim's Metropolitan Kencana formed to develop Pondok Indah, and Ciputra's Jaya and Metropolitan Groups. Jo Santoso, the original chief planner for Bumi Serpong Damai, interview with the author on tour of Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangerang (15 September 2000); confirmed by Wicaksono Sarosa, interview with the author, Plaza Senayan, Jakarta (22 November 2000).

development project that had been previously conceived. There had been plenty of other developments making the claim of being *kota mandiri* or “self-sufficient cities” but all had proven to be little more than bedroom communities with some commercial services added during the final stages of development. Bumi Serpong Damai by contrast was to boast a Central Business District to rival Jakarta’s, complete with a big city image garnered from the construction of skyscrapers. Located a mere 20 kilometers (12 miles) from Jakarta’s Central Business District, it was to become Jakarta’s first glittering “edge city” in the North American tradition. At completion by 2005, Bumi Serpong Damai was to be home to a population of 600,000. The subsequent addition of higher-density apartment housing in the core was projected to bring the total population to over a million inhabitants.⁷¹

The new town was so large that the developers of Bumi Serpong Damai were initially inclined to take seriously the task of being able to accommodate more than simply the wealthiest five to ten percent of Jakartans. The developers initially felt that a settlement on this scale would need to include a large number of homes affordable to young professionals as well. There was also a strong commitment by the first chief planner of Bumi Serpong Damai, Suryadi Santoso, to meeting both the spirit and letter of the recently updated “mixed settlement” regulations. Under these regulations, in order to qualify for government subsidized home ownership loans, new developments were required build at least six “Very Small Houses” at 21 square meters (230 square feet) or less, and three “Small Houses” at 22 to 36 square meters (390 square feet) for every “luxury” house (over 36 square meters) it built.⁷² To meet these requirements at Bumi Serpong Damai the smaller units were built first while land values were still relatively low. As the development grew in size and more and more facilities were added, the land values would increase and the larger units would be built only at that time. In addition, the original plan called for mixing the different classes of units together within each 80- to 100-hectare (200- to 250-acre) “sector” of the project.⁷³ This is a part of the mixed settlements regulations that was almost entirely ignored in projects before and since the earliest development at Bumi Serpong Damai.

⁷¹ Haryo Winarso, “Private Residential Developers and the Spatial Structure of Jabotabek,” chapter 15 in *Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume 1: Making the Cities* ed. Graham P. Chapman et al. (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999), 282.

⁷² See chapter six for a more thorough discussion of the 1:3:6 mixed settlement regulations.

⁷³ Suryadi Santoso, conversation with the author, Universitas Indonusa, Jakarta (12 September 2000).

In 1989, the homes in the first completed sector of Bumi Serpong Damai became the fastest selling product on the suburban housing market—a distinction it maintained for most of the next decade. The year 1989 must be acknowledged as a milestone in the history of Indonesian suburban property development for several other reasons as well. It began in October 1988 when Suharto's program of economic liberalization extended to Indonesia's banking industry. Up until 1988, there were only five public banks in all of Indonesia.⁷⁴ The sudden deregulation of the banking industry led to the establishment of hundreds of new banks opening virtually overnight. By 1992, there were 214 state-owned banks, 618 national private banks, and 101 foreign banks operating in Jabotabek.⁷⁵ This set off its own urban real estate boom as the first tinted glass banks replaced turn-of-the-century rows of concrete shophouses on the main streets of every town on the Island of Java. It also meant that corporations were free to open their own banks. The sudden surge in new bank formation resulted in competition to make new loans at ever decreasing interest rates in order to establish the loan portfolios of the fledgling banks. Loans for land development were a popular choice for these new loans. The strong financial performance of the suburban housing market and the easy credit terms conglomerates enjoyed through access to their own banks brought a second wave of investment coming from Indonesia's largest existing financial interests as every one of Indonesia's major corporate conglomerates found a place at the table where the suburban property game was being played out. Even before the end of this process in 1989, already two-thirds of the top 30 property development firms had come into real estate as a diversification of activities in other areas of business and investment.⁷⁶

Government policies and unofficial practices made Location Permits easier than ever before to obtain and extend. With nothing more than a Location Permit in hand developers could qualify for large bank loans supposedly for the purchase and development of lands. The lax implementation of Location Permit regulations allowed developers to control the option to buy land indefinitely rendering the actual purchase of title an unnecessary step. Neither the agencies overseeing the

⁷⁴ Dominique Fischer, "Indonesia's Real Estate Disturbance: An Ineluctable Outcome," chapter 11 in *Asia's Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate*, eds. Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 231.

⁷⁵ Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 234.

⁷⁶ R. Gilbert and M. Larkin, "Constraints Upon the Supply of BTN-Financed Housing by Private Developers in Indonesia," Working Paper prepared for the Indonesian Housing Ministry and the World (Jakarta: The Urban Institute and Hasfarm, 1989); cited in Bruce W. Ferguson and Michael L. Hoffman, "Land Markets and the Effect of Regulation on Formal-sector Development in Urban Indonesia," *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1993), 64, footnote 13.

Location Permits nor the banks administering the loans monitored the use of either permits or loans. For many of these newcomers, property investment was a money-making proposition independent of whether or not they actually built houses or even purchased any land. The year 1989 saw an unprecedented tripling in volume of total bank credit. Only a small proportion of these loans actually ended up being used in the housing industry with much of it finding its way into other investments, often overseas, or simply disappearing into the pockets of individuals—and into house purchases in the new suburbs.

The Location Permit was used to amass immense privately held land banks by the largest private developers in one of the largest land speculation schemes the world has ever seen. Between 1983 to 1988 over 48,000 hectares (120,000 acres) of Botabek land was held under Location Permits mostly for housing development. This accounted for about eight percent of all the land in Botabek, or enough land to satisfy Jabotabek's formal sector housing demand for the following 40 to 60 years.⁷⁷ By 1988, only 10 percent of this land had been developed, leaving most of the rest vacant and idle. By the end of 1996, the area of land registered under Location Permits for housing construction in Botabek had surpassed 121,000 hectares—more than one fifth of all land in Botabek and almost twice the size of the Special Capital Province of Jakarta itself.⁷⁸ Of this area, only 38 percent had been purchased and a mere 14 percent had actually begun development despite a government requirement that projects be completed within a period of three years from the issuance of a development permit.⁷⁹ The remaining 105,000 hectares awaiting development would have been sufficient to satisfy the expected formal sector housing demand for the next 100 to 150 years.

The secondary impacts of this scheme were enormous. While lands under Location Permit await the decades it will take for demand to make a dent in this land bank, the land has been effectively removed from the property market—an artificially induced land scarcity putting significant upward pressures on land prices and rental rates throughout the region effecting inner city *kampung* as much as settled areas adjacent to the idle lands on the periphery.⁸⁰ Not only did it create an artificial

⁷⁷ Ferguson and Hoffman report that 48,000 hectares (120,000 acres) are enough to house 4 million people which was more than the projected population increase for the Botabek area for the following decade. See: "Land Markets," 59-60. It would appear to be more relevant to consider the likely range of demand for formal sector housing: 48,000 hectares at 150 people/hectare divided by 4.4 people per household divided by 25,000 to 40,000 formal sector housing units per year yields the 40 to 60 year period given here.

⁷⁸ "Tanah Terlantar, Salah Siapa?" (Idle Land, Who's to Blame?), *Properti Indonesia* no. 39 (April 1997), 23.

⁷⁹ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 206-207.

⁸⁰ Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), 251.

scarcity but it also caused a large amount of formerly productive agricultural land to be removed from production. Between 1980 and 1994, Botabek's land under wet rice production fell 13 percent and plantation lands were reduced by 36 percent.⁸¹ This despite a national law forbidding the conversion of technically irrigated lands for wet rice production to other uses. The impacts of both the artificial scarcity of land and the reduction in land areas for food production were price inflation. Because of the role of the property sector in providing the highest performing domestic investments for both Indonesia's largest corporations and wealthiest individuals, increasing prices only spurred on further investment and increasing scarcity.

The artificial scarcity created in land supply was complemented by an artificial demand created through the mismanagement of the state-subsidized home ownership loans. The government's *Kredit Pemilik Rumah* (KPR) Homeowners Credit Subsidy program established in the 1970s had two goals: to bring homeownership within the reach of a larger proportion of the population in the 20th to 80th income percentiles, and to stimulate the construction economy. The evidence of industry production and loan performance indicates that it did indeed stimulate the private sector housing construction industry. However, it failed to meet its housing provision goal by a wide margin. Throughout the 1980s, it operated to disproportionately subsidize the wealthiest households encouraging this group to simply buy bigger luxury houses. Between 1976 and 1990, the median monthly income of the households benefiting from the subsidy to buy private sector housing (83 percent of the program's funds) exceeded the 80th percentile income group cut-off point of the program.⁸² The primary beneficiaries of the subsidies have been the wealthiest purchasers of new housing and the real estate industry itself. The government's subsidized loan programs made investment in both property development and finished houses irresistible. The housing credit program was abused by some to subsidize the purchase of a dozen or more houses, not to occupy or even to rent, but as an investment motivated by the strong performance of real estate in comparison with other investment opportunities.

The rise in demand brought a rise in house prices and land values in mature housing estates. The steady increase in land values at Pondok Indah took a sudden jump upwards. In some of the more mature developments, the annual increase in land value approached 100 percent far surpassing any other competing investment possibility.

⁸¹ Haryo Winarso, "Private Residential Developers and the Spatial Structure of Jabotabek," chapter 15 in *Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume 1: Making the Cities*, ed. Graham P. Chapman et al. (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999), 288.

⁸² Leaf, "Suburbanisation of Jakarta," 76.

Prices for Developed Land in Three Housing Projects 1978-1993




FIGURE 2.4 Prices for Developed Land in Three Housing Projects, 1978 - 1993.
Source: *Properti Indonesia* (March 1994)

The widespread purchase of new suburban housing as an investment is evidenced by the fact that rising prices, normally resulting in decreased sales, instead brought an unprecedented surge in sales. New house sales for 1989 broke all records reaching 166,600 units.⁸³

Within the context of this financial feeding frenzy passed off as a housing boom, the initial town building ambitions of the developers at Bumi Serpong Damai were displaced by the immediate financial opportunities presented by market conditions. Santoso's approach of following the legal requirements of the "Mixed Settlements" regulations is looked back on as a radical and naive experiment. Already in 1990, the consortium sought the involvement of the American real estate economist Ken Angelo who brought with him a doctrine that was subsequently embraced at Bumi Serpong Damai and most large developments since. The basis of Angelo's approach was that buyers would justify buying lands that were more expensive than surrounding parcels only if the land values were also increasing at a faster rate. The goal was that every year the price of your parcels would rise faster than inflation, wages, and the prices of your neighbor's lands. The fact that the size of your target market under this approach also shrinks every year was offset by the fact that the households in that shrinking target market were in effect not limited by the quaint notion that it was only practical to own one home at a time. It was a rare condition for housing

⁸³ Simanungkalit, "Prospek Proyek," 38-39.

markets in which the number of households in a target market could be shrinking while their demand for houses actually increased. Angelo's approach came squarely into conflict with many of the goals of town building championed by Santoso and he left the chief planner's position in 1992.⁸⁴ Sales performance data up to 1995 on Bumi Serpong Damai and five other major new town projects in Tangerang that each began marketing houses for sale in 1989 finds an occupancy rate of only 44 percent. In Bumi Serpong Damai, which by the early 1990s had changed its marketing approach in line with Angelo's doctrine to become the most up-market of these projects, the occupancy rate was a mere 19 percent.⁸⁵

Up until this suburban property boom, formal sector housing developers including the Perumnas National Housing Corporation development programs were capable of producing housing affordable down to the 50th percentile of the urban population income distribution. This changed dramatically with the new round of land speculation peaking in 1989. Between 1985 and 1988, land prices rose an average of 36 percent per annum. Formal sector land parcels rose an average of 21 percent per year making them for the first time competitive with time deposits (17-20 percent). During the same period the per capita gross income remained constant in real terms at about \$560 according to the World Bank.⁸⁶ Angelo's analysis proved a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the 1990s progressed, the urban income group served by private sector housing development in the expanding suburbs shrank from the top 30 percent to the top 7 percent by the eve of the financial crisis in 1997.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Suryadi Santoso, conversation with the author, Universitas Indonusa, Jakarta (12 September 2000).

⁸⁵ Gibb Asia and PT Lenggogeni, "Market Research for Kota Tigaraksa," (PT Panca Wiratama Sakti, October 1995), 7-9.

⁸⁶ Bruce W. Ferguson and Michael L. Hoffman, "Land Markets and the Effect of Regulation on Formal-sector Development in Urban Indonesia," *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1993), 51-53.

⁸⁷ Gibb, "Market Research," 5-7; Leaf, "Land Regulation," 249-51.



FIGURE 2.5 The first phase of 6,000-hectare Bumi Serpong Damai the largest housing development in Indonesia. Source: Planning map from PT. Bumi Serpong Damai, planning office.

The Salim Group and the Sinar Mas Group were largely motivated to be involved in Bumi Serpong Damai as a fast and effective way to develop their own expertise by working with Ciputra's companies, eventually allowing them to undertake their own new town projects. Unlike other new towns that followed, these conglomerates did not relocate their corporate offices to Bumi Serpong Damai. Instead they held back this level of commitment in anticipation of relocating to their own individual new town projects once these were launched. Such corporate relocations, as

they learned from Ciputra, provided a crucial employment base to stimulate housing demand that could make all the difference in the prospects for financial success.⁸⁸ Even those not involved in Ciputra's consortium followed his example at Bumi Serpong Damai with great interest. Already in 1990, the first non-property-based conglomerate to follow the Bumi Serpong Damai model launched the 700-hectare (1,700-acre) Modernland in Tangerang. Within the next few years a dozen other so-called "new town" projects of about 500 hectares (1,200 acres) or more in area were announced. These new town projects were undertaken despite a sharp downturn in the market in the early 1990s.

By 1990 there were 10 new towns over 500 hectares in Botabek⁸⁹ This number rose to 15 by 1995 and 24 by 1997.⁹⁰ At least part of the pressure pushing new town projects to be larger in size was the incentive to capture the increase in land values resulting from development. If the first phase of a project was planned to cover 150 hectares (370 acres), whoever controlled the 300 hectares (750 acres) surrounding this core stood to reap the benefits of this initial investment in the form of an increase in land values. But even the largest of early new towns, Bumi Serpong Damai, in developing the first several hundred of its 6,000 hectares (15,000 acres) set off a land rush in Tangerang that resulted in some 27,000 hectares (67,000 acres or 20 percent of the *kabupaten*) being allocated under Location Permits by the mid 1990s.⁹¹ The discussion of these development projects is, in fact, made problematic by the practice of distinguishing between housing estates and so-called "new towns" based simply on the size of their associated Location Permits, which are more likely a product of speculative interests than intentions to provide the variety and juxtaposition of land uses characteristic of anything resembling a "town." Bumi Serpong Damai and Lippo Karawaci stand out as being developments that took seriously the prospect of developing commercial business centers. But even here it was more in the fashion of private corporate business parks in American "edge cities" than the British projects of the twentieth century most commonly associated with the term "new town."⁹²

⁸⁸ Jo Santoso, Conversation with the author, Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangerang (15 September 2000).

⁸⁹ Winarso, "Private Residential Developers," 282.

⁹⁰ "Boom Kota Baru di Pinggir Jakarta" (New Town Boom at Jakarta's Edge), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 17 (June 1995), 27-29; "Tanah Terlantar," 22-25;

⁹¹ Michael Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW: Culture, Vision, and the Extended Metropolitan Region of Jakarta," *Environment and Planning A*, no. 9 (September 1996), 1627.

⁹² Winarso, "Private Residential Developers," 282.

Housing Developments over 500 hectares




FIGURE 2.6 Housing Developments over 500 hectares (1,200 acres). Source: *Properti Indonesia* (June 1995 & April 1997)

The attractiveness of investing in suburban housing inspired by low interest rates of the KPR Homeownership Subsidy program and the rapid rise in property values was soon eroded by rising inflation, itself brought on in large part by the property market boom. Ten percent annual inflation drove commercial interest rates to 26 percent and the government subsidized mortgage rates to 23 percent. As inflation and mortgage interest rates threatened to catch up to the rise in property values, suburban housing as an investment became less attractive and the real estate bubble burst. From its peak in 1989, house sales plunged to 74,000 in 1990 and about 50,000 units by 1992. During this slump, no fewer than half of the developers went out of business.⁹³ But those dropping out of the game tended to be the smaller operators with fewer connections and weaker access to credit. Some of the advantages enjoyed by the largest developers were the connections needed to get exemptions from (or changes to) zoning, special treatment when applying for Location Permits or their extension far beyond legal limits, and in several cases, the wholesale abrogation of national planning laws including by presidential decree.⁹⁴ The largest investors who had the resources to stay in the property development business over the long-term were able to take over the Location Permits of the smaller players as they were weeded out. It was in part due to the top-heavy nature of the suburban housing industry that the early 1990s saw an unprecedented volume of large new town start-ups despite the sharp downturn in sales.

The number of large real estate development projects also reflected the make up of Indonesia's real estate industry. The ups and downs of the property market served to progressively remove smaller firms from the game or greatly restrict their activities to relatively small projects of 50 hectares (120 acres) or less. The profile of Indonesia's suburban property industry came to be characterized by a very small number of very large developers. These larger companies dominated over the large number of small firms working with only a small percentage of the total property area in the industry.⁹⁵ This was particularly the case in its largest suburban property market in and around Jakarta.⁹⁶ Describing the degree to which control over vast areas of Jabotabek land was concentrated in the hands of only a few firms during the 1990s is complicated by several factors:

1. Developers typically establish a separate corporate entity for each development project undertaken.

⁹³ Siminangkali, "Prospek Proyek," 39; Winarso, "Private Residential Developers," 289.

⁹⁴ Ferguson and Hoffman, "Land Markets," 64

⁹⁵ Struyk, "Market for Shelter," 74.

⁹⁶ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 229-32; Panangian Simanungkalit, "Prospek Proyek Mega Properti Abad 21" (Prospects for Property Sector Mega-projects in the 21st Century), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 2 (March 1994), 39.

2. Often these project-specific development corporations are established as partnerships of two or more existing development corporations or companies entering the property business from other sectors of the economy particularly banking and government.
3. The share of interest and roles played by each partner is obscured as a product of the business culture of Indonesia that often involves illicit arrangements.

To a large extent the nature of information on the make-up of the property development industry is a matter of anecdote and informal communications. Comprehensive and authoritative information on the interconnections between different companies is difficult to come by.⁹⁷

Table 2.2: Land Holdings of Largest Developers

Rank	Developer	Land Holdings (hectares)	% of total housing Location Permits
1	Metropolitan (Ciputra, Salim, Lippo)	9,595	15%
2	Bumi Serpong Damai (Ciputra, Salim, Sinar Mas)	6,000	10%
3	Pembangunan Jaya (Ciputra)	5,930	10%
4	Lippo (James Riady)	4,133	7%
5	Sumarecon	4,020	6%
6	Ciputra (Ciputra)	3,955	6%
7	Tigaraksa	3,000	5%
8	Putra Alvita Pratama	2,000	3%
9	Modern	1,570	3%
10	Kalbeland	1,040	2%
	Total	41,243	67%

Sources: *Indonesia Property Report* (3rd Quarter 1995); *Properti Indonesia* (April 1995)

⁹⁷ A notable exception is the organization chart attempting to represent the relationships between Ciputra and the more than 60 companies in which he has a controlling interest published as the first of 13 profiles of the new "property kings" under the feature heading: "Exposing the Business Map of the Property Kings." This was the first issue published under the new name "Properti Indonesia" and marked the launching of a more aggressive direction (though short-lived) with greater accountability to its readers than the magazines out of which it grew "Bisnis Properti Indonesia" and "Infopapan." "Sang Pelopor: Hadir Dengan Gagasan-gagasan Besar" (Sang Pelopor Development Group Shows up with Big Ideas), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 1 (February 1994), 8-11.

At the same time, the political and capital elite enjoyed such a high level of impunity under the protective authoritarian New Order regime so as to foster a certain frank openness among many of the controlling factions. Ciputra stands out in any discussion of real estate development in Indonesia. Not only was he the dominant figure in the formation of the property sector, but also the holder of the most land under Location Permits. He opted early on in his career to occupy a high-profile position in Indonesian society even establishing his name as self-proclaimed "trademark" associated with each of his many development projects. Often he has used an abbreviation of his own name, "Citra," in the names of his most prominent projects: Citra Indah, Citra Raya, Citra Gran, Perumahan Citra. Ciputra's campaign of notoriety stands in distinct contrast with the general Javanese predilection for self-deprecation particularly in matters of business.⁹⁸ In one of his several biographical profiles in the popular press, he was likened to Harry Chandler, the owner of the Los Angeles Times from the 1917 to 1944 famous for his influence on government and industry in the transformation of Los Angeles in part through his amassing of over 600,000 hectares (1.5 million acres) of real estate.⁹⁹ Chandler is most popularly known as the inspiration for the villainous property developer portrayed in the 1976 film "Chinatown."¹⁰⁰ It is indicative of the general immunity from criticism enjoyed by the political and popular elite under Suharto that this comparison was clearly intended as a celebration of the man's greatness and not an indictment leveled at his abuse of power.

⁹⁸ The ubiquitous naming strategies of Javanese-run businesses tend towards abstract spiritual aspirations as if a name can attract the favor of divine interventions. As in PT. Mutiara Jaya Lestari (Eternally Prosperous Pearl) or PT. Pratama Sejati (Supreme Peace).

⁹⁹ "Bila Harry Chandlers [sic] punya visi untuk mengembangkan kawasan selatan Los Angeles, Ciputra punya visi untuk mengembangkan kawasan barat-selatan Jakarta." roughly translated: "If Harry Chandlers was the visionary of South Los Angeles, Ciputra is the visionary of South and West Jakarta." from "Kiat Menjadi Konglomerat Properti, Part 1" (The Secret of Becoming a Property Conglomerate), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 34, Bonus section (November 1996), 4.

¹⁰⁰ Dennis McDougal, *Privileged Son: Otis Chandler and the Rise and Fall of the L.A. Times Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 2001).

Winarso attempted to map the variety of interwoven interests dominating the suburban property development industry all leading eventually to Suharto and his close circle of family and friends (Figure).¹⁰¹ Leaf's quantitative description of the real estate industry's concentration of control is dramatic, even without uncovering the associations masked by multiple firm names for what is in fact an interlinked network of dealings all tied to a single family-run business empire. Looking at the 325 Location Permits granted to 189 firms between 1972 and 1989 in Jakarta, Leaf found that one quarter of the land was controlled by the top four developers while one half was controlled by only 16 developers.¹⁰² At the same time, 89 of the 189 firms held permits on lands of 10 hectares (25 acres) or less, together accounting for only 6 percent of the total area held under Location Permits.¹⁰³ Moving beyond Jakarta, most of Botabek's housing development was concentrated in Kabupaten Tangerang accounting for 81 percent of Botabek's Location Permit land area. Here the concentration of land under the control of only a few developers was even more pronounced. Of the 150 firms holding Location Permits, 11 controlled half, and 24 controlled three-quarters of the land.¹⁰⁴ By the mid-1990s, the concentration of land holdings in the hands of only a few developers became even more pronounced. Larger corporations benefited from the greatest access to capital and government officials responsible for granting and extending Location Permits as well as infrastructure planning. Winarso compiled profiles of seven large developers operating in the county and city of Tangerang through 86 projects undertaken by 60 companies over half of which were controlled by a small handful of parent companies.¹⁰⁵ A listing of the largest ten developers published in the 1995 Indonesian Property Report, indicated that the top ten developers controlled more than two thirds of the total 62,000 hectares under Location Permits for Housing in Jabotabek (Table 2.2).¹⁰⁶

The list ranked "Salim Group" as the largest developer based on its investment in the vast Kapuk Indah Teluk Naga project. What was not represented in this list was that this project was a joint development with involvement of both Ciputra and the Lippo Group. A similar list published in April of the same year is more specific in naming "Metropolitan" as the developer of Kapuk

¹⁰¹ Winarso, "Residential Land Developers," Figure 6.7, 181.

¹⁰² Leaf, "Suburbanisation of Jakarta," 347

¹⁰³ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 230.

¹⁰⁴ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 229.

¹⁰⁵ Winarso, "Residential Land Developers," 164-80.

¹⁰⁶ Jess C. Lukas, Chief Operating Officer PT Lippo Village, "Township Development: A Situational Analysis," *Indonesia Property Report* 1, no. 2 (3rd Quarter 1995), 20.

Indah Teluk Naga and the largest land holder in Jabotabek.¹⁰⁷ Metropolitan Kencana is the name of the partnership between Sudono Salim and Ciputra formed to develop the Pondok Indah housing estate in South Jakarta. This partnership expanded to become the Metropolitan Group, one of the five flagship conglomerates controlled by Ciputra called "*Si Pengembang*" (the one who develops).¹⁰⁸ These include Bumi Serpong Damai, Jaya Group, Pembangunan Jaya, Ciputra Group, and Pondok Indah Group—the largest four of which are represented individually in the top ten list. The combined land holdings of the five *Si Pengembang* conglomerates under Ciputra's control, presents a very different portrait.¹⁰⁹ This portrayal in keeping with Ciputra's self-promotions in the popular press, indicates that he held 44 percent of the 62,000 hectares of Location Permit land for housing by 1995. It was estimated that as much as 5 percent of Jakarta had at one time been under the control of one of Ciputra's companies.¹¹⁰ The accumulation of land under Location Permit was institutionalized as the standing policy for Ciputra's Jaya Group. From its earliest projects, Ciputra directed that for every square meter of land sold the company must buy two square meters.¹¹¹

The proliferation of distinct corporate entities, frequent changes of company names, and the lack of authoritative data collection on the real estate industry in Indonesia have rendered the data on land holdings difficult to collect and assess. Not surprisingly, other listings of the most land-rich development companies appear to use different names for the same companies. Yet, the general portrait of the industry tells a similar story of the progressive and dramatic concentration of land holdings in the hands of the largest developers (Figure 2.7).¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ "Mengugat Oligopoli" (Shake Up the Oligopoly), *Properti Indonesia* no. 15 (April 1995), 21-22.

¹⁰⁸ Ciputra's original designation for this collection of five development conglomerates was "*Sang Pelopor*" (the Pioneer) but he was compelled to change this over the objections of other developers who arguably preceded him in the large scale development of residential property in Indonesia.

¹⁰⁹ "Kiat Menjadi Konglomerat Properti, Part 1" (The Secret of Becoming a Property Conglomerate), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 34, Bonus section (November 1996), 1-8.

¹¹⁰ Leaf, "Suburbanisation of Jakarta," 346.

¹¹¹ "Kiat Menjadi Konglomerat," 7.

¹¹² "Menguak Peta Bisnis Para Raja Properti" (Exposing the Business Map of the Property Kings), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 1 (February 1994), 6-7. "Tanah Terlantar, Salah Siapa?" (Idle Land, Whose Fault?), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 39 (April 1997), 22-25.

Known Land Holdings of Largest 20 Developers 1994 & 1997




FIGURE 2.7 Known land holdings of top 20 developers, 1994 and 1997. Sources: *Properti Indonesia* (February 1994 & April 1997)

With the downturn in the property market in the early 1990s, the largest firms abandoned the market for government subsidized housing for the lowest income formal sector home buyers

altogether to take up increased production of ultra-luxury housing as well as commercial and industrial developments.

The Imprint of Power on the Face of the City

It would seem that no degree of excess manifest in the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a very few, the operation of corruption, or the devastation of natural systems could catch the attention of the ruling elite. In Singapore, the effort to attract the foreign direct investment considered essential to the very survival of the island nation in the absence of natural resources or low-cost labor resources to exploit, motivated the moral equivalent of war to wipe out corruption. In Indonesia, no such campaign was ever contemplated even on the rhetorical level despite estimates that corruption served to measurably discourage investors equivalent to an additional tax of 20 percent or more.¹¹³ The efforts to attract foreign direct investment used to justify the wholesale reconfiguration of the regulatory landscape was never considered sufficient cause to decrease or even alter the degree or nature of the open corruption engaged in by Suharto's family members and close business partners. A similar disincentive to foreign investment is found in the devastating impacts of environmental degradation inflicted on the region by growth-related activities. Some have estimated the annual costs inflicted by remediable levels of pollution to be in the billions of dollars.¹¹⁴ Although less immediate in its impact on attracting investment, this is one more point where the long-term goal of attracting growth-inducing foreign direct investment comes into direct conflict with capturing the benefits offered by investment and growth in the short-term. Corruption and environmental pollution provide two areas where evidence reveals the true nature of, and motivation behind, the New Order's development agenda. Here the rhetoric of economic growth in the pursuit of a "national development" rings hollow. Taken together with closer examinations of the growth and development during the 1980s and 1990s reviewed in this chapter, the evidence suggests instead that the specific course of economic deregulation was more directly shaped by the need to offer greater opportunities for the expansion and consolidation of power to those already in a position to guide the direction of economic policy and its selective implementation. Nowhere perhaps is the operation of Jakarta's *Cendana-cukong* alliance of political and corporate power more evident than in the transformation and management of the built environment during the late Suharto period. Some have interpreted this transformation as the

¹¹³ Shang-Jin Wei, "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?" (NBER Working Paper No. 6030, 1997); cited in Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "Asia's Reemergence," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 6 (November/December 1997), 56.

¹¹⁴ Radelet, "Asia's Reemergence," 56.

product of “economic globalization” in which the emerging imperative for cities and regions to compete with ever further flung other cities and regions for a greater share of the available foreign investment capital and increasingly footloose economic activities. Other’s emphasize a convergence of economic, social, and cultural needs around the world leading to, in affect, an emerging global consensus on the American “spread-city” model as the inevitable and desirable fate of cities. Without denying the complementary operation of these two related forces, what is suggested by the history examined in this chapter is that the specific implementation of the New Order development agenda provided the means by which the political and corporate elite further consolidated and extended their grasp of power and rent-seeking capacity. This process was facilitated by both legal and extra legal means by which even the well-intentioned regulations aimed at preventing and mitigating some of Jakarta’s most serious environmental and social problems were undermined or redirected in their implementation in ways that made them either ineffectual or such that they had the opposite effect than what was originally intended.



FIGURE 2.8 Rendering of Bumi Serpong Damai: American edge-city form in Indonesia.
Source: Bumi Serpong Damai brochure

This overview is offered to portray the larger dimensions of the phenomena related to the transformation of Jakarta and its surrounding region during the 1980s and 1990s. The legacy of Sukarno’s experiment in confrontation and chaos set the stage for what in many ways was its

opposite in the iron-fisted stability of Suharto's patriarchal New Order. The small circle of Suharto family members and their business partners operated as a classic "growth coalition" as outlined by urban regime theories mobilizing state and financial institutions as the means for extending their rent-seeking activities and consolidation of economic and political control. Through each stage of the New Order economic expansion—natural resource exploitation, export-oriented production, and economic liberalization to attract foreign direct investment winning Jakarta a place in the global economy—the New Order regime seized growth opportunities extending their command over the economy even as they portrayed this expansion as fulfillment of the national "development agenda." The secondary impact of economic expansion, also providing one of the means of attracting foreign direct investment, was the transformation of Jakarta and its surrounding counties (Jabotabek). The physical restructuring of the city region was characterized by the rapid increase of space production as informal *kampung* neighborhoods in the urban core were displaced by high-rise office, hotel and condominium towers rendered in the internationally recognized vocabulary of steel and glass; agricultural villages of the periphery were displaced by industrial estates and new luxury suburban housing surrounding golf courses; and a renewed significance of infrastructure as long distance commuting surged and new enterprises competed for the few well-serviced locations. Despite the broad extent of these dramatic changes, they came to exist as a burdensome overlay on the persistent city where a vast majority of residents competed for shrinking niches in the informal economy, struggled to cope with rising housing costs from so much dislocation, and suffered disproportionately from worsening environmental degradation.

The creation of the suburban real estate market in the 1970s and its consolidation in the hands of a distinct oligopoly under the leadership of Ciputra provides a vivid example of the operation of the New Order growth coalition. The selective implementation of Location Permit regulations, bank deregulation, the accumulation of vast privately held land banks, the encouragement of housing as speculative investment, and the informal arrangements among members of Suharto's inner circle all represent the mobilization of state and financial institutions to favor the private interests of a handful of the political and private sector elite. In the process, the landscape of the Jakarta metropolitan area was transformed. While the New Order command of Jakarta's property sector typified the complementary operation of the Suharto-led growth coalition in other sectors of the Indonesian economy, no other field of operation left as lasting a legacy as the traces indelibly etched in the built environment of the region. But examining these traces alone leaves open multiple opportunities for misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the true nature of the operation and meaning of the new city of Jakarta for its residents. It is only through a deeper understanding of the history of Jakarta under Suharto that the larger social, cultural, economic meanings become available.

Building on the background presented in this chapter the following chapters delve more deeply into how the highest aspirations and persistence of daily practices were manifest in the architecture of the new real estate styles built in the suburban housing estates; how these dreams and exigencies informed the collective vision for the region as manifest in the evolution of planning visions for the region; how these dreams were packaged for cultural proliferation in the New Order development agenda as manifest in the selective implementation of planning mechanisms; and finally how the new form of Jakarta operated to divide the space of the city into distinct zones demarcated to varying degrees by tinted glass, air conditioning, surveillance cameras, walls, barbed wire and military guards.

CHAPTER 3

DESIGNING AND MARKETING AN IMAGINED WEST

Cross-cultural Translation or How My Big Mac became Nasi Mas Donel

In the base of Sukarno's Sarinah Department Store building on Jakarta's "100 percent corner" (the property location commanding the highest rental price per square foot in a city), is Indonesia's first and most successful McDonalds. One evening in 1993, I was crammed in a *taksi* with Nugroho, a second generation Jakartan, and members of his extended family passing this famous American restaurant when Nugroho's six year old son called out with insistent repetition "*Mas Donel! Mas Donel!*"¹ This was apparently the boy's reaction every time he passed by the eight meter (25 foot) tall inflatable Ronald McDonald sitting cross-legged on the second story roof. The boy's mother perhaps saw my presence as an opportunity to finally satisfy her son's and, as it turned out, her own curiosity without the crippling expense. Her instructions to the driver delivered in Javanese apparently commanded more authority than my own in Indonesian as the driver made a U-turn next to Monas National Monument and dropped us at the feet of the giant *Mas Donel*. The boy's glee turned to fright when confronted by another Ronald McDonald guarding the entrance, this time only slightly larger than life size and rendered in brightly tinted resin. The sentinel of the West that had so drawn him from a distance was terrifying at a closer perspective and now stood between him and the promised rewards of the magical realm that lay beyond. Unable to either retreat or advance, the deadlock between fear and desire was finally broken when Nugroho covered the boy's eyes, picked him up and rushed past the menacing plastic grin. Once inside, a crisply uniformed McDonalds Indonesia employee explained that there was no rice on the menu. For Indonesians, to eat a meal is to eat rice—breakfast, lunch and dinner. Anything else is just a "snack." For many in Indonesia, a meal at McDonalds would technically satisfy the criteria for a kind of fasting. Not easily dissuaded having come so far up the slopes of this Mt. Olympus of consumer aspirations, we repaired to the dining area/indoor playground carrying trays piled high with Quarter Pounders, shakes, and fries costing enough to feed the average Indonesian household for a month. Braced at last for an authentic taste of America, the last flickers of their initial excitement faded to confusion as they bit into the burgers. Apparently the anticipated transformative taste sensation promised by the visual stimulation of its advertising failed

¹ *Mas* is Javanese which literally means "older brother" but is more commonly heard as one of several terms of respectful address used almost without exception before people's names.

to meet expectations. Through even their Javanese restraint, their antipathy towards the half-nibbled burgers was visible. Back at the home we temporarily shared, Nugroho's wife skillfully adapted the burgers and fries to her family's tastes by chopping them up and serving them on top of the usual plates of rice made palatable finally with the addition of a sauce of spiced coconut milk. In place of the usual meal of *nasi goreng* (fried rice) or *nasi opor* (rice with stewed chicken) she had created *nasi Mas Donel* (Rice à la Donald).



FIGURE 3.1 The first and most successful McDonalds in Indonesia. This day, Ronald's position is occupied by a giant inflatable Big Mac. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

To understand the forces behind the transformation of Jakarta in the 1980s and 1990s, it is insufficient merely to note the physical presence of Western cultural elements, even if this alone already helps to clarify a great deal about the nature of these forces. It is also necessary to understand the processes by which a cultural artifact came to exist where, when, and how it did: By what combination of pushing from outside and pulling from within Indonesia did it come into being? In what ways has the new context changed as a result of its introduction? In what ways has the artifact changed to accommodate the new context? And what does it mean in the new context that differs from its original context? The fact of a McDonalds restaurant located in the center of Jakarta (later joined by the Hard Rock Cafe next door) is notable in and of itself, for example, but

should be considered only the starting point for understanding the complex cultural interactions that are implied by such a juxtaposition and the multifaceted meanings and influences that ensue from it. What you see is not necessarily what you get. The meanings associated with the architectural and urban forms in North America are not necessarily the same as the meanings affixed to these same or similar forms when they are transplanted to other geographic conditions. McDonalds in Jakarta is still not high cuisine, but it is enough of a status symbol that bags emblazoned with the golden arches are carefully preserved and proudly reused to display the status of its bearer.² As explored in chapter one, architectural and urban forms serve as receptacles of meaning not only based on the conditions of their generation (after Spiro Kostof) or the subsequent layerings that constitute the processes of historic associations (after Nelson Goodman) but also based on their transference from one set of specific geographic, cultural or historical conditions to another and its reception in that new context.³ In the new context of Jakarta, the generic cheap fast food of McDonalds is transformed into an abhorrently expensive and much coveted experience of American culture. The seemingly irresistible appeal of the great burger is ineluctably fused with that of MTV, Hollywood movies, and other icons of the American way of life and is only slightly tempered by the fact that it is unpalatable to most Indonesians. If anything the indigestibility of the burger only adds to the mystique of its allure. The reception of McDonalds transforms its meaning in ways that renders it almost unrecognizable in relation to its counterpart on American soil even if it remains largely identical in form. The particular conditions of its reception in Indonesia have led not only to a shift in meanings but also to an alteration of its experience. In the market context of Indonesia, McDonalds introduced a rice dish to its menu. It is a compressed stick of fried rice with egg and a small but detectable piece of chicken. Notably, this is the least expensive item ever to be listed on the McDonalds menu in Indonesia. While not nearly as satisfying as Mrs. Nugroho's *nasi Mas Donel*, it is nonetheless a useful example of how the reception of McDonalds within a specific local culture has led not to simple adoption of the original artifact but also its adaptation according to the needs and cultural conditions of the new setting.

With this example and the questions of reception, cultural translation, and transformation in mind, this chapter turns to the examination of the architecture and planning of suburban real estate

² Gerke has coined the term "lifestyling" to describe the strategies of virtual consumption by which groups jointly purchase and collectively own items of high status to display membership in the consumer class that they could not afford as individuals. Solvay Gerke, "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class," chapter 6 in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (New York: Routledge, 2000), 136-37.

³ Spiro Kostof, *A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10; Nelson Goodman, "How Buildings Mean," in *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences*, eds. Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), 31-48.

development at the edges and beyond the boundaries of the Jakarta Special Capital Province (DKI Jakarta). Like McDonalds, American style housing subdivisions were virtually unknown until their sudden appearance seemingly overnight in the mid 1970s. Like McDonalds, a significant component of the perceived value of the new suburban housing derived from its associations with American culture. Both McDonalds, Inc. and a whole class of American architecture and planning firms boosted profits by expanding their activities overseas—an expansion in both cases seized upon by Indonesians as a chance to boost national self-esteem. Both products of American culture contributed to making Jakarta look and feel more like Houston. But both were also forced to go through changes and reinterpretations to adapt to the new context even as they contributed to its transformation. And both McDonalds and the American-style subdivision took on meanings in their new settings entirely unpredicted by how they were experienced on US soil. However, the experience of eating out does not cut as close to the cultural bone as does the experience of inhabiting a home, especially when one of the central attractions of the restaurant is its promise of transporting you to another culture. In contrast, the architecture of the house touches Indonesians, quite literally, where they live. The addition to the menu of a rice dish is a fairly minor adaptation. The changes found in the American-style homes in Jabotabek's suburban housing developments are far more complex and interwoven into the fabric of the architecture bearing directly on, as will be examined in the following chapter, less the way they live than the way that people perceive their lives. It is to this complex simultaneous accommodation of elements and requirements with their origins on either shore of the Pacific Ocean that I apply the term hybrid.

The spread of American models of housing development and planning in Indonesia was the result of both American export and popular demand within Indonesia for all things American. The act of transferring the American subdivision to the context of Indonesia resulted in various degrees of selective and unintended distortions, reinterpretations, and alterations reflecting the specific needs, realities, and aspirations of people in the new context. The following two chapters examine the larger real estate developments or "new towns" of Jabotabek in two apparently contradictory ways. First, the outward appearance of the suburban housing type was designed and marketed in emulation of the Southern California real estate industry's forms and methods to fulfill Indonesian aspirations of both a wealthy consumer class and the national political elite to display the status symbols of Western-style suburban housing. And second, as an adaptation of a foreign cultural import conforming more closely with local norms (like *nasi Mas Donel*), the architectural spaces of the suburban Jabotabek housing type offer an example of hybrid architecture caught between an imagined world of the West and the continuity of the daily practices of modern consumer class Indonesians.

Those designing and marketing these new homes, neighborhoods and towns indulged in often breathtaking flights of fantasy in producing imaginative replications of Western cultural iconography. What was constructed as an authentic replication of the Western housing subdivision is best understood in light of its reinterpretation within the Indonesian context as a product of marketing imagination cooked up from the ingredients of partial understanding of the original in the oven of local cultural exigencies. In contrast, the interior plans demonstrate a grounding in the architectural layouts of previous Indonesian housing precedents that diverge from the American precedents so carefully evoked on the exterior. The contrast between the architecture of the exterior, demonstrating a break with local precedents, and the interior spaces, with recognizable elements of earlier Indonesian housing models, are examined as evidence of a schism between outward appearances that appeal to consumer aspirations and inner meanings that match more closely the requirements of everyday life. The suburban housing types produced in emulation of the Southern California subdivision represent a hybrid formation demonstrating attributes of both American and Indonesian precedents. More specifically, while the architectural envelope performs the function of exhibiting imaginative recombinations of architectural features of not just America, but also from places around the world, the interior spaces are more closely related to persistent daily practices of the preferred Indonesian lifestyle. The phenomena of the Jabotabek new towns demonstrate both the power and appeal of the images being broadcast from Southern California and their malleability through the complex processes of hybrid cultural construction. These analyses are pursued as one of the means useful for a fuller understanding of the significant complexities cloaked in the appearance of a global convergence of consumer demand for architecture and urban form.

Cultural Construction of an Imagined West

In *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre offers a categorization of three realms of experience that characterize the human relationship to space:

1. The physical and material experience of space in daily practices or "spatial practice";
2. The perceptual, linguistic and representative experience of space encoded in the signs, symbols and knowledge that permits the physical and material experience to be understood and talked about—what Lefebvre calls "representations of space"; and
3. The imagination of possible experiences of space or new meanings for spatial practices—utopian visions, invented landscapes, imagined pasts, etc.—that may or

may not take physical form (architectural plans, paintings, literature, dreams, etc.), Lefebvre's "representational spaces."⁴

By distinguishing between these three realms of spatial experience, Lefebvre's categories are useful in examining how the form of our built environment contributes to how we conceive of our world and further sets the limits within which we imagine the past, present, and future possibilities. More significantly for the present study, these categories are useful in understanding how imagined realities of other times and other places both inform our perceptual experiences of space and influence the form of the material world that is then constructed. Another important characteristic of human spatial experience as categorized by Lefebvre, is the apparent autonomy of each realm of practice, perception, and imagination—the way in which three distinct phenomena manifest in overlapping and contradictory ways unproblematically within a single urban-architectural-social space.

The focus of this chapter is on the role of the imagination in human spatial experience as framed by Lefebvre, and how that experience impacted the way that images and models of the city were transferred and interpreted in Indonesia during the 1980s and 1990s. The dominant model during this period was that of urban North America as demonstrated by the introduction of postmodern high-rise office and condominium towers, toll roads, golf courses, shopping malls, luxury suburbs and a rapidly expanding automobile dependency. The proliferation of American urban form is part of a larger phenomena of the rising popularity of Western culture. One of the most powerful forces to shape post-independence Indonesia, and increasingly so towards the end of the century, was the allure of North American and West European ("Western") culture. Since the early days of Indonesian television when content was carefully limited to domestic productions, the progressive commercialization of television brought with it an opening up to content produced elsewhere. By the late 1980s, the waters were being tested to gauge the public response to greater programming content originating in the West, particularly the United States. With 90 percent of Indonesians proclaiming Islam as their religion there was the expected outcry protesting the decadence of Western values as American productions were aired. Despite these objections, the popularity of American television and film proved to be too powerful to hold back and gradually this component of programming content grew as a proportion of the total air time. This trend was accelerated as the number of broadcast channels and companies expanded beyond the original single state-run broadcast company.

⁴ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991 (1974)). See also the significant interpretation of Lefebvre's concepts in the work of David Harvey: *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry on the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 218-19; and *Social Justice and the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988 (1973)), 307-13.

The most effectively marketed media included not only television, but also film and popular music. The powerful imagery and appeal of American popular culture propagated mainly, although not exclusively, through these channels, created a demand by association for other forms of American cultural production including fast food, fashion, electronic equipment, hairstyles, the use of the English language, and also architecture and urban form. The reception of each of these components of American culture was influenced by association with the others such that together, they represented multiple facets of a larger cultural complex. Cultural filters located both in North American transmission and Southeast Asian reception performed a curious role in selecting, editing, and omitting different aspects of American culture deemed appropriate for proliferation. Somehow, Madonna, Sylvester Stalone, and Harley Davidson were disproportionately represented in Indonesia while Bob Dylan, Woody Allen, and skate boarding never registered in the public consciousness. The transference of culture is dependent jointly on the conditions of its sending and those of its reception. Cultural production in the form of action movies, advertising, or rock n'roll was intended to make a deep impression and often to shock. The reception of these images was informed alternately by utopian and dystopian projections of the magical yet profane, sophisticated yet decadent, abundant yet depraved, West. Partially informed caricatures of Western culture formed a mutually reinforcing set of images that came largely to stand-in for Western culture. Stopping far short of arguing that there is an "Occidentalism" conveniently symmetrical to S aid's "Orientalism," it is important to recognize that cultural misunderstanding is not a crime unique to colonizers and imperialists nor should it "prevent us from reading each other, face to face or from a great distance, trying to get it right."⁵ With still a long ways to go before "getting it right" the rapid circulation of what were taken within Indonesia to be authentic attributes of Western culture fed into the development of an increasingly autonomous hyper-reality of an "imagined West."

The transfer of visions and models of the North American city was a component of the imagined lifestyles of the West. Just as the American suburb evolved in the nineteenth century under the powerful influences of illustrated books coming from England, an even more powerful medium was provided by the technologies of the moving image.⁶ The ability to move the viewer through space over time makes cinematography uniquely suited to making powerful representations of urban space and thus guide our impressions of the city. Pizarro has argued that the suburban

⁵ David Mason, "Reflections on Postcolonial Studies," *The Hudson Review* (Summer 2000), <<http://www.litline.org/hudson/>>.

⁶ English traditions of the romantic landscape were interpreted for the newly popular American country residences via Catherine Beecher's *Treatise in Domestic Economy* (1841) and Andrew Jackson Downing's *The Architecture of Country Houses* (1850) cited in Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 45-72.

development around several Latin American cities emerged, not only out of similar conditions, but also in direct emulation of North America indicated by the formal language of its architecture and urban design.⁷ According to Gilbert:

Differences are apparent but, apart from the writing of the signs, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the streets of Caracas from those of Los Angeles. ...Latin America's affluent suburbs featured ...California style housing during the 1950s and 1960s. Today, most elite residential areas feel much like North American suburbs. Indeed, the whole suburban life-style is imitative of the United States, based on the car and its associated retail structures such as the supermarket and shopping and entertainment malls.⁸

The attractive imagery of the American suburb was complemented by the demonization of the city in American film. In America, this depiction is partially mollified by a widespread direct familiarity with the city with which these portrayals might be challenged. Not so in far off places where the American city remains vile, often matching local urban realities, and drives the need to create its benign counterpart in the suburbs. Pizarro's arguments are easily extended to the impact of film, television, video, and music videos in Southeast Asian urban formation: American cultural production helped to foster the growth of the American-style suburb by offering an imagery of an environment that contrasted with both local degraded conditions of urban centers and poverty-stricken rural villages.⁹ The distortions introduced in the process of transferring American housing forms to the Indonesian context reflect the needs of the receiving context. The suburban model was seen as the ideal means of escaping from both rural and urban conditions.

But the connection between the imagery purveyed by the American film and television and the emerging suburbanites of the developing world was not a direct one. This relationship was further mediated by the suburban real estate developers who undertook the task of interpreting what was seen on the silver or phosphorescent screens into the concrete block and plaster three-dimensional reality. As examined in the previous chapter, the large developers that dominated the suburban Jabotabek property market made their money not from selling houses but from selling land. The cost of construction was one of the factors that developers quickly reduced to a minimized fixed cost, leaving permitting fees and the amount of time waiting for them as the two remaining key variables in determining their bottom line. Given the operational style of the New Order

⁷ Rafael Pizarro, "Exporting the Dream: Suburbia in Latin America and the Role of American Cinema," *Southern California and the World*, eds. Eric Heikkila and Rafael Pizarro (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, in press).

⁸ Alan Gilbert, *The Latin American City* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1994), 30; cited in Pizarro, "Exporting the Dream."

⁹ Pizarro, "Exporting the Dream."

bureaucracy, these two variables were inversely proportional—the more money paid to officials the shorter the delay waiting for permits. Generally, the more land they sold the more money the developers made. This was an additional incentive to favor larger houses on larger lots over many small parcels that simply drove up the share taken up by construction and transaction costs. The relatively insignificant role played by house design and construction in the developers' bottom line was reflected in the relatively low quality of house construction and the remarkable degree of standardization of house design across the suburban real estate market.

The similarity of house models from one development to another appears to have emerged from the fact that each developer was trying to satisfy a similar set of needs, but even more so from the role played by associations like Real Estate Indonesia and international trade associations such as International Real Estate Federation (FIABCI) in promoting certain standards and images across the industry nationally and internationally. In Indonesia as elsewhere, the decision to build American-style suburban developments was naturally accompanied by the decision to build American-style houses. Even in America, the design of suburbs needed to project an image that distanced them from both the problems of the urban core and rural poverty. American suburban design fulfilled these same requirements all the more effectively outside of the United States. Even more powerfully, the American-style suburb evoked associations with all that had already been established in the minds of upper-class consumers as the "imagined West." If Jakarta's real estate developers were looking for a means of conjuring an idealized West to offer the consumer class, they need look no further than the ready-made imagery of America and the developed West already firmly lodged in the consciousness of Indonesians via the television, film, advertising, music, and other industries of cultural production based in Southern California. As the birthplace also of the style of suburban real estate development that became pervasive outside of cities throughout the United States, Southern California offered the convenience of a one-stop source of cultural production. The imagery of film, television, and real estate development became neatly complementary as if to say: You've seen it at the movies. You've shopped for it in the mall. Now you can live it in your very own little piece of "Beverly Hills 90210."

Southern California Models Come to Indonesia: A Progression of Examples

In his examination of Orange County, Edward Soja¹⁰ invokes the concept of *simulacra* first defined by Jean Baudrillard as a cultural artifact that lays claims to being an authentic reproduction

¹⁰ Edward W. Soja, "Inside Exopolis: Everyday Life in the Postmodern World," chapter 8 in *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996) 237-79. An earlier version of this chapter is also found in Michael Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).

of an original that may or may not have ever existed as such.¹¹ Home to a plethora of amusement parks including Disneyland, Soja portrays Orange County as the birthplace and capital of theme park-inspired residential communities which require residents to maintain the architectural style of the neighborhoods supporting a collective invocation of cultural fantasy. The neighborhoods of Orange County's Mission Viejo community are given the names: "Spanish Colonial," "Greek Island," "Cervantes' Spain," "Capri Villa," and "Uniquely American."¹² Emulating these marketing strategies, the first real estate developments in Jakarta were satisfied to simply employ naming schemes that refer to foreign sources. Names of European and North American cities and regions were used in the naming of house models and gated neighborhoods as a means of tapping into the imaginary projections by Indonesians of the "good life" in the developed West.

In part to their apparent success in capturing the imagination and attracting the consumer class to these developments, naming strategies quickly escalated in the 1980s and early 1990s to the creation of elaborate costumes of historic architectural elements and roof forms within which to clothe standardized house plans as a more direct evocation of an "imagined West" congruent with the images from Western film, television and advertising. The houses produced for the Indonesian new towns were marketed as "Mediterranean" or "American" houses. Much to the disdain of the generation of architects attempting to forge an identifiable "Indonesian Architecture," developers employed the imagery of the developed West while deliberately eschewing Indonesian traditional architectures. Whole neighborhoods were thematically defined as "Barcelona," "London," "Venice," or "Beverly Hills" with a matching kit of thinly conceived architectural elements and materials applied to the standardized units within. These naming strategies prevailed despite an earlier presidential decree prohibiting the use of anything but Indonesian terms and place names in advertising. It wasn't until the early 1990s when Suharto decided to threaten enforcement of this decree, that property developers took the steps to "Indonesianize" their product names. Thus Lippo Village and Lippo City became Lippo Karawaci and Lippo Cikarang. However these changes effected only those names that were likely to appear on billboards and many of the neighborhood and house model names retained their direct references to Western precedents.

Encouraged by the market response to their emulation of the products of the Southern California real estate industry, the larger developers of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area came increasingly to employ planners and architects based in Southern California. Together, they offered the wealthiest Jakartans houses and communities implied to be authentic foreign imports from the most sophisticated societies of the developed West. Many of these houses were designed by architectural

¹¹ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, trans. Paul Foss et al. (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983) 146-47.

¹² Soja, *Thirdspace*, 269.

firms in Southern California by architects who never left Orange County in developing the designs. The developers intended these houses to be attractive as authentic products of America or even Southern California. They offered to potential buyers the opportunity to join a transnational elite within their own country.

Examining the marketing materials of eight of the largest and best known “new towns” of Indonesia, references to American and European styles and the naming of house models dominates in every example. Indonesian naming conventions are employed in only one of the developments examined and this in a peripheral location outside of the main development. One of the earliest and deepest involvement of an American architectural firm was the 2,000 hectare (5,000 acre) new town Kota Legenda (Legend City) which features a range of house sizes and plans each available in either “Mediterranean” or “American Colonial” style. The “83/144” house,¹³ for example, is available in either the model named “Malta” (the “Mediterranean” variant) or the “Dallas” (the “American Colonial” variant). The two styles are applied to houses that are identical in plan. The only differences between the “Malta” and the “Dallas” are seen in the use of hip versus gable roofs, stucco versus brick, and a difference in door, window, and ornamental details. The application of these stylistic elements, and indeed the concept itself, shares much in common with the design of themed amusement parks. Stylistic themes do not simply apply to individual lots, but are applied to whole gated neighborhood and in some cases entire developments.

Yet just as the house plans of both the “Malta” and the “Dallas” are identical, so too the layouts of entire subdivisions display the same uniformity of parcel and street layout that characterizes such developments in Southern California. The layout of “Mediterranean”-style developments is anything but Mediterranean. Instead it is immediately recognizable as “Southern California Real Estate Developer” style by its layout. Indeed, it is the apotheosis of real estate subdivision having a connection to Europe only in as much as the same American model has been imported there as well.

These elements offer an appearance of variety of consumer choice that is taken as a prerequisite for successful commodification. Underlying the ornamental symbolism of the facades, there is an oppressive uniformity of house plans, site planning, parcel division, street layout, and subdivision planning exhibited across the Jabotabek real estate industry. This careful balance of the tamed exotic and the safely familiar reflect the formulations of symbols and codes developed in the real estate design and marketing practices of Southern California—“imagineering” to use the term of the Walt Disney Company. The reference to European places and styles were not directly inspired by

¹³ House layouts are identified according to a two number sequence corresponding to the areas of the house and the parcel in square meters. A house measuring 83 square meters (900 square feet) in area on a parcel of 144 square meters (1,600 square feet) is identified by the sequence 83/144.

anything in Europe but were the product of employing the symbols and codes developed in the real estate design and marketing practices of Southern California aimed at evoking an image of Europe. The studied affectation of European styles reflected in Southern California real estate design was here once again removed from its source. The “Mediterranean” styles of Indonesian new towns were derived from sources in Southern California which are no closer to the Mediterranean sea than Jakarta is. Even the architects and planners of the Southern California real estate industry who were directly involved in the design and planning of developments in Jabotabek based their designs more on what they have seen and experienced in Orange County than on their trips to Italy.



FIGURE 3.2. The gate to “*Taman Mediterranean*” (Mediterranean Garden) in Bumi Serpong Damai.
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

Apparently the artifice of a direct European pedigree has been taken at face value even under the examination of graduate students (and presumably their professors as well). Several examples of Masters level thesis work pass along the presumption of European origins for the “Mediterranean” architecture of real estate developments without a mention of an American intermediary style. One Masters student made the origins of the Indonesian “Mediterranean” style the direct focus of her research. In it, she makes comparisons between Indonesian examples and their supposed precedents in Italy, Spain, and France without so much as a mention of a possible mediating role

of the United States despite one of her four examples being named “Pemukiman [settlement] Pasadena.”¹⁴

The significant number of architectural, engineering, and planning firms located in Southern California employed by Indonesian developers makes the Indonesian real estate industry in many ways, an extension of the Southern California real estate industry. The 770-hectare (1,900-acre) Alam Sutera housing estate was planned by SWA Group of Laguna Beach, Orange County. The 3,000-hectare (7,000-acre) Citra Raya new town developed by Ciputra was based on a master plan and architectural designs of RNM Architects of Newport Beach, Orange County. The 30,000 hectare (74,000 acre) Bukit Jonggol Asri series of new towns employed the same planners as the 35,000 hectare (84,000 acre) Irvine Ranch which constitutes over one fifth of Orange County. There is also a significant overlap between the two professional communities in terms of finance and affiliations including membership by many in both Real Estate Indonesia and the US based National Association of Home Builders. During much of the 1980s, Ciputra even served as the president of and the International Real Estate Federation (FIABCI).

As the Southern California style of suburban development proliferated elsewhere in the US, Canada, and Australia, so too the design firms from some of these areas took on clients from Jabotabek. Ciputra’s favored firm for much of the 1980s was Baltimore’s Design Development Group (DDG). DDG hit a gold mine with its extensive connections in Indonesia offering an “American” touch to the design and planning of large-scale commercial projects. Among the many hotels, condominium complexes, resorts, shopping malls, and real estate developments realized in Indonesia were some of the most prestigious projects in the nation including Pondok Indah Mall, Bandung Mall, Kota Casablanca, Bintaro Jaya, Pantai Kapuk Indah, Kapuk Naga, and Kota Legenda. By the 1990s, most significant developments were obliged to boast of international designers not only from North America but also from Australia, Japan, and Singapore, in order to remain competitive. In several cases, even when their design was rejected as inappropriate, the fees already paid were felt sufficient to justify crediting the foreign firm with the design that was eventually used.¹⁵ One Indonesian architect formerly employed by DDG wrote that his former firm

¹⁴ Meylinna, “Penerapan Gaya Arsitektur Mediterranean pada Pemukiman Baru di Bandung” (Application of Mediterranean Style Architecture in New Settlements in Bandung), (diploma thesis, Catholic University of Parahyangan, Bandung, 1998).

¹⁵ One significant case of this was when, in the wake of Lippo Karawaci’s demonstration of superior design standards Ciputra’s team developing Bumi Serpong Damai commissioned Doxiadis Associates of Greece to move their “structure plan” into a “masterplan” and John Portman Associates of Atlanta, Georgia to create urban design guidelines for the central business district. In the end both of these designs were fundamentally rejected as being impractical and the plans submitted by the local firm PT Encona were the dominant basis for what was subsequently built. Despite this, Doxiadis and Portman retained top billing in marketing literature. Doxiadis Associates, John Portman & Associates, and PT Encona Engineering, “Bumi Serpong Damai New City: Revised Master Plan and

“made the most of Indonesian developers’ mental weakness for all things Western arising from the cultural conflicts of globalization.”¹⁶

A particularly direct example of the influence of the Southern California real estate industry on its Jabotabek protégé is provided by the Riady family’s three major new town developments, particularly Lippo Karawaci. One of Indonesia’s largest banking giants, Lippo Bank, was one of



Figure 3.3 A “Mediterranean” style house in Lippo Karawaci. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

the prominent Chinese-Indonesian family-run businesses with close ties to Suharto. Riding the wave of the New Order’s mid-1980s deregulation, conglomerates aggressively moved into the suburban property sector to replicate the profitable undertakings most flamboyantly exemplified by

Central Business District Planning,” unpublished Draft Final Report (1 December 1995); Gunawan Tjahjono, “New Town: Urban Future for Expanded Metropolis in Indonesia?” *Journal of Southeast Asian Architecture*, no. 1 (November 1997), 15; personal communication with Gunawan Tjahjono (12 September 2000) and Danisworo (6 October 2000) of PT Encona.

¹⁶ The actual quote is: “*Selain selalu menjaga performa profesionalisme kerja, mereka juga memanfaatkan betul kelemahan mental pelaku properti di Indonesia yang cenderung western minded sebagai efek dari gegar budaya globalisme.*” M. Ridwan Kamil, “Arus Kapitalisme Global dan Masa Depan Arsitektur Indonesia” (Currents in Global Capitalism and the Future of Indonesian Architecture), *Desain! Arsitektur*, no. 3 (June 2000), 7.

Ciputra's projects.¹⁷ A partnership between the Central Javanese textile giant, Batik Keris, and Lippo Bank for the Jakarta Baru Kosmopolitan (Cosmopolitan New Jakarta) new town project in Tangerang brought the Riady family into the real estate development business. James Riady¹⁸ recently back from graduate studies in Los Angeles attempted to push his partners to adopt a stronger Southern California influence than demonstrated by the Central Javanese project of Solo Baru (New Solo), being promoted by the Batik Keris team. The clash in visions was resolved when Riady split off the partnership in 1992 taking 2,000 hectares (5,000 acres) with him. He sold off much of this retaining the choicest 500 hectares (1,200 acres) that became the core of Lippo Karawaci, located at kilometer 21 (13 miles from the western edge of Jakarta) of the new 35,000 vehicles per day Jakarta-Merak toll road in Tangerang.¹⁹

Various teams of foreign consultants competed for the privilege of designing what promised to be Indonesia's premier new town development. Out of the field of mainly Australian, British, and American consultants, Walter Raleigh Stewart of Desmond Muirhead's Newport Beach-based golf course design team produced the master plan and Malaysian-born Scotsman, Gordon Benton, became the in-house urban designer. Despite the caliber of this hired talent, it was arguably Riady's own experience with and interpretation of Southern California's built environment that provided the main vision of what Lippo Karawaci was to become. When there was trouble with the first phase of the development, Riady put 14 of his top people on a private jet and flew them off to tour several newly-built houses in Orange County that he had personally selected on the pretense of house hunting. Somehow getting into the houses without the broker along, the group produced tape measures and proceeded to document every aspect of the houses for later replication back in Indonesia. This was Riady's sixth visit to some of these houses.²⁰ After early experiments in more familiarly Indonesian real estate speculator styles, the third phase of housing development was to

¹⁷ Panangian Simanungkalit, "Prospek Proyek Mega Properti Abad 21" (Prospects for Mega-Property Projects in the 21st Century), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 2 (March 1994), 38-39.

¹⁸ James Riady is best known in the US as the conduit (along with John Huang) for millions of dollars worth of illegal campaign contributions to the American Democratic Party leading up to the 1996 Clinton-Gore reelection. In the meantime, former Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker and Hillary Clinton's Law partner Joseph Giroir, both convicted on charges related to the Whitewater Scandal, have shown up as consultants and investors (owning 1.5 percent share each worth about US\$40 million) in the Riadys' AcrossAsia K@belvision fiber-optic network company. "The Riady Connection: The World's Cronies Assemble AcrossAsia," *Asian Wall Street Journal* 24, no. 228 (20 July 2000), 10.

¹⁹ Gordon Benton, Interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).

²⁰ Gordon Benton, Interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).

be “Mediterranean” with a vengeance—“Orange County with deeper overhangs” designed by Bessend and Leggoni of Newport Beach.²¹

Style Debates and Reinforcing Social Dualisms

To the extent that objections to the dominance of foreign imagery in the real estate developments of Indonesia were raised at all, it came from a vocal segment of Indonesian architects and *budayawan* (people concerned with issues of culture): Why not refer to the cultural roots of Indonesia’s rich cultural heritage? Sometimes appealing to a sense of national pride the styles of these developments were portrayed as “arrogant” foreign intrusions by foreign architects. Responding to such accusations Gordon Benton, who had become Town Manager of Lippo Karawaci, appealed to the necessity of deferring to market forces:

Today, clients want to be international, because of their extensive travels to Europe and the US. They are also highly influenced by television. They aren’t too keen on ethnic architecture. ...They want Mediterranean style, Los Angeles style and Beverly Hills style. Our marketing people have been successful in identifying the market and we are very sure of what they want.²²

When later asked about this market research, Benton identified Lippo Karawaci’s target group as being the top four to seven percent Double-Income-No-Kids (DINKs) professionals who already own a car.²³ He predicted the eventual replacement of local styles with an “international style, heavily influenced by the US” citing poor sales of the few houses that offer references to indigenous styles.²⁴ Seconding this position, Ciputra, was quoted in the same article as saying that 99 percent of real estate was sold to locals uninterested in Indonesian styles, suggesting instead that local culture be preserved in interior decoration as seen in the lobbies of several of the biggest hotels in Jakarta.

Edi Sedyawati, Indonesia’s former Director General of Culture, warned of the influential Western industries of cultural production “from the book to recorded music to the film industry” that “may transform, or even alter, a person’s taste, preferences and thinking.”²⁵ She went on to

²¹ Gordon Benton, comments provided during guided tour of Lippo Karawaci for the seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (30 March 2000).

²² “RI Enters Post-mo in Architecture,” *Jakarta Post* (19 March 1995) 1.

²³ Gordon Benton, Interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).

²⁴ “RI Enters Post-mo,” 1.

²⁵ Edi Sedyawati, “Can Traditional Cultures Survive in Globalized World,” *Jakarta Post* 18, no. 148 (23 September 2000), 4.

express concern over the apparent displacement of local cultures by a universalizing force of the West:

The overwhelming influence in “targeting other countries” may also result in the alienation of the peoples of those “other countries” against their own traditional cultures. Through the products of Western cultural industries (often parallel with modern educational systems based on Western models) the minds of those “target” peoples have become more or less “Westernized,” even to such a level that they consider the Western model as the only proper and legitimate one in the world. We can no more speak then of a freedom of choice, since the choice has been dictated by aggressive promotion and advertising. ...Their own traditional cultural expressions, such as in literature, visual and performing arts, not to say architecture, become rarely exposed.²⁶

In using these terms she points out a strong supply-side bias to the marketing and sale of cultural products in Indonesia from soft drinks to urban form. She also emphasizes that the celebration of




FIGURE 3.4 A simulacra of the Erechtheon decorates the central pond of Wisata Legenda.
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

²⁶ Sedyawati, “Can Traditional Cultures Survive.”

all things from the West carries with it the significant secondary impact of displacing the indigenous as an inferior cultural production—making the celebration simultaneously a form of self-degradation. In a roughly equivalent replaying of the Hindu cultural influx of the first centuries CE, the gravitation of the elite castes to a foreign culture manifests as a new consolidation of social stratification.



FIGURE 3.5 An adaptive juxtaposition of the Roman Forum and the Athenian Acropolis serves as the marketing office for Wisata Legenda. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

There is a long history of social dualism, from the rise of the first cities under the influence of Indic hierarchical models that developed into the feudalism of Java, to the three centuries of Dutch colonialism. This persistent social dualism was reinterpreted in the terms of nationalism in the Sukarno years and later in terms of economic development by Suharto. Though associated with different social constructs and distinct historical circumstances, each subsequent version of social dualism took on certain characteristics of the earlier construct. These hierarchies pursued at national and international scales served to reinforce the deeply rooted status consciousness of most Indonesians and particularly the new consumer class of Jakarta.



FIGURE 3.6 The Sphinx adorns the grand entrance to Wisata Legenda (Legendary Tour City).
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

In the context of this long history and its internalization, the world of Indonesian real estate played upon the imagined realities of a more sophisticated, developed West which came to serve as a convenient reference point for perceptions of its opposite. Since the late 1970s, the Indonesian real estate industry aggressively marketed a decidedly cosmopolitan way of life to guide the formation, attainment, and reformation of consumer class aspirations that is the business of consumption. This vision was constructed in part by reinforcing images of the bleak physical realities of Jakarta as its opposite: garbage-strewn streets, the stench of waterways, traffic-clogged arteries, and a negative portrayal of life in the *kampung*. Home to the majority of Indonesian urbanites while occupying a relatively small percentage of the land, the *kampung* plays a crucial role in the social and cultural life of Indonesian cities. Despite the socio-economic diversity and close-knit nature of communities in most *kampung* in Jakarta, its general lack of formally provided infrastructure and the presence of the poor has made the word "*kampung*" into a derogatory term and source of shame. Against this image of environmental degradation, traffic congestion, and the aura of the *kampung*, the real estate marketers set out to construct its opposite from images of an idealized modern, developed West.



FIGURE 3.7 Houses in Wisata Legenda's "Marco Polo" neighborhood. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

The debate between the "*budayawan*" and the "globalizers" has unfolded as an uncanny revisiting of the famous style debates of the 1920s where the viability of a new hybrid "Indische" culture, most prominently exhibited in the plans and designs of a committed group of idealist architects and planners. What is missing this time is a roughly equivalent vision provided in the 1920s by East Indies-born Maclaine Pont and Thomas Karsten. So far, the significant architectural and planning output addressing the issue of local identity has been conspicuously restrained by a thin Post Modern approach.²⁷ The architects and other *budayawan* who have been vocally opposed to the blatant rejection of Indonesian sources should perhaps be grateful to not have their own heritage subjected to the bastardization of pastiche that seems to be the only means available to the designers of the real estate development to convey meaning. In Lippo Karawaci, some of the Very Small Houses have been given Indonesian themes such as a Balinese neighborhood supposedly referring to the tourist town of Ubud. That the application of local style is limited to the smallest

²⁷ A more thorough examination of these issues and their continuity from the 1920s to the present is offered by Abidin Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000).

and least expensive of the houses offered by the private sector housing industry is not a coincidence. It is in keeping with the association of local styles with relative poverty.

Kota Wisata



FIGURE 3.8 Kota Wisata's rendering of Rodeo Drive shopping for a neighborhood convenience shopping center. The lower sign forbids itinerant sellers from setting up shop here. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

The California Office of Tourism advertises Orange County as “a seven hundred and eighty-six square mile theme park” where “the theme is ‘you can have anything you want.’”²⁸ Soja writes that it is no longer necessary to make a special trip to experience the pleasures of the artificial theme park, for the land of make-believe has come to envelope the world that more and more people live in. Even as he was warning of the replication of Orange County on the peripheries of cities across America, the creators of Kota Wisata (Tour City) less than an hour's commute south of Jakarta, were busy constructing a 1,000-hectare (2,500-acre) “new town” completely integrated with the features and facilities of a theme park evoking the cultural capitals of the imagined West. In the employment of thematization, Indonesian developers exhibit greater zeal than their predecessors in the US do. The theme, and the fact that it is a theme, is in and of itself, one of the primary

²⁸ From an advertisement for *The Californias*, California Office of Tourism. Quoted in Soja, *Thirdspace*, 237.




FIGURE 3.9 A miniature "il Duomo" guards the entrance to "Florence." Photograph: Robert Cowherd

attractive features offered by private sector housing. Tour City set out to make it possible to experience a tour around the world without ever leaving the security of your own gated real estate development. However, given the California-style layout of the development, you *will* be wanting to drive. The town center was planned as an "International Village" quoting fragments of London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Rome in a multi-cultural version of Disney's Main Street. When completed, crossing over "Jurassic Lake" via replicas of the Sydney Harbor Bridge and London's Tower Bridge (here called "London Bridge") you will reach "Fantasy Island" where a water park and amusement park rides will be mixed with invocations of "River Walk New Orleans" and "Caribbean [sic] Plaza," all in the heart of the town center.

The explicit theme park strategy was extended to the residential neighborhoods as well with each gated community assigned a different identity invoking the most visited places of an imagined West: Florence, Paris, Marseilles, Monaco, Madrid, Amsterdam, Den Haag, *Amerika*, California, and Kyoto.²⁹ The monuments of each of these places were replicated in miniature in each of the

²⁹ Tellingly, the Japanese appear to enjoy a status in the eyes of Indonesians more closely associated with the developed West than Asia as demonstrated whenever a Japanese foreigner is referred to as a "londo" (literally a person of Dutch descent, from the word *Belanda* meaning The Netherlands) usually reserved for Caucasians. This reinforces

neighborhood *simulacra*: Mt. Rushmore in *Amerika*, a windmill in Amsterdam, an Ise Shrine in Kyoto, a *L'arche de Triomphe* in Paris complete with a statue of Napoleon, and references to



FIGURE 3.10 A house in the “Kyoto” neighborhood. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

Roman Fountains (in the neighborhood with the Florence theme). Outside of the world of theme parks, rarely has the translation from imagination to built environment been executed so directly. In his examination of Orange County *simulacra*, Umberto Eco identifies Disneyland and its brethren as the basis for creating new realities with the premise that the fake is more enjoyable than the real.³⁰ The creators of Tour City have made this premise their foundational credo posing the question: Wouldn't we all rather live inside a theme park?

the point that the operative distinction to be considered worthy of simulation of an imagined West is not ethnic or geographic, but membership in the developed first world.

³⁰ Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyperreality*, trans. W. Weaver (San Diego: Harcourt, 1986) 43-46; cited in Soja, *Thirdspace*, 251.



FIGURE 3.11 The gate house to Wisata Legenda's "Kyoto" neighborhood. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

The attraction of the packaging and explicit commodification of housing in Indonesia exceeds even the tolerance of American consumers. The literature of the professional association Real Estate Indonesia (REI), refers to the choices offered to home buyers as if they were choosing from a selection of soft drinks in the supermarket:

The buyer can even have a lifestyle of his choice—living at a development which emphasizes a resort lifestyle, artistic nuances, nearby industrial or commercial workplaces, hilltop retreats, or bustling new cities. In each case developers provide infrastructure and facilities in keeping with the philosophy, or theme of the project.³¹

By carrying the operation of thematizing housing to this level, Indonesian private sector housing distinguishes itself from the original model in Southern California. The developers of Tourism City (Kota Wisata) go so far as to call their marketing concept "dream city" (*kota mimpi*). By appealing to the dreams and fantasies of the wealthiest Indonesians during the post-1997 economic crisis, the developers of Tourism City were able to employ the power of Lefebvre's third category of the

³¹ Antony Zeidra Abidin, "New Urban Centers and Indonesia's Future," *Indonesia Property Report* 1, no. 2 (3rd Quarter 1995) 3.




Figure 3.12 Photo-montage is the preferred means of conceiving the architecture of the new towns. The images are assembled independent of references to any actual original. Source: Kota Legenda marketing brochure.

“imagination.” They succeeded by flooding the media with advertising that appealed to the consumer class imagining of life in the developed West “offering a global lifestyle.”³²

³² The actual quote is: “Konsep ‘kota mimpi’ yang menawarkan gaya hidup global, seperti selaras dengan psikologis orang-orang yang kaya mendadak akibat krisis.” In “Piawai Menjual Mimpi” (Experts in Selling Dreams), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 1078 (Juli 2000), 14-15.

CHAPTER 4

HYBRIDIZATION BETWEEN AN IMAGINED WEST AND THE PERSISTENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE

When Cross-cultural Translations Assert Their Autonomy

Despite claims of authentic origins in the West—even as the products of Southern Californian architecture and planning firms—the houses produced for the Indonesian suburban real estate market bear the traces of more local origins. I will here make the argument that certain elements of these houses derive from more or less long-standing local practices and developed out of “indigenous,” colonial, or more recent influences on housing form, even as these were themselves the products of earlier import and adaptation of foreign sources. Despite their explicitly derivative nature and the appeals of their marketing imagery, these houses can most accurately be seen as examples of a “hybrid” culture.

The choice of the term “hybrid” is in keeping with the use of this term in anthropological writing on the histories of the cultures of Southeast Asia. The related term “third culture” has come into favor since first being used by Anthony King¹ in referring to a “colonial third culture.” In King’s usage, “third culture” is understood as a cultural production resulting from the juxtaposition of a European colonial “first culture” and an indigenous non-European “second culture.” The subsequent recombination of recognizable elements from these two sources yields a “third culture” in some way distinct from either predecessors. Peter Nas has looked at the appropriateness of using the term “third culture”—and several other terms associated with recent writings on “globalization” in reference to the architectural traditions of Indonesia—and found them useful only if properly qualified.² In particular, he points out that “globalization” and “third culture” formation preceded colonialism. By the time of the first European contact, the cultures of the Indonesian archipelago had already developed for more than a millennium of interaction with other cultures of Asia and South Asia. After Nas, the term “hybrid” is preferred in this study over the more narrowly construed term “third culture” for two reasons. First, “third culture” implies a linearity of process in which a cultural operation acts on two distinct and identifiable entities to produce a third.

¹ Anthony D. King, *Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976). See also: Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990), 291-322.

² Peter J.M. Nas, “The House in Indonesia: Between Globalization and Localization,” in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 154, no. 2 (1998) 335-360.

Such a linearity may be appropriate in some limited cases but its use would hinder the consideration of more complex cultural transformations involving three or more cultural sources, or elements that are perhaps less clearly identified. Soja's notion of a "third space" is similarly problematic in this regard.³ The second reason relates to the latent traces of the "colonial" in the concept of "third culture" formation. This chapter demonstrates that the trace of colonial power relations that remains operative in the supposedly new construct of postcolonial nationalism is best considered but one of several forces at work in the reproduction of culture during the Suharto era in Indonesia.



FIGURE 4.1 The new streetscape of "Federal Style" Indonesia. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

With the image of a transnational lifestyle firmly established by the symbols embedded in the larger environment of the real estate development and explicitly imprinted on the facade of their homes, the *orang real estate* (literally: real estate people) live lives largely independent of this image. The form their architecture takes behind the themetized facade reflects a way of life much closer to the lives of the wealthiest of their counterparts in the *kampung* than is suggested by the imagery of the "new town." With the imaginations of "new town" dwellers captured, it is not

³ Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996).

necessary for either the actual experience of living in their new environment or its form to directly match its Western model. Perception suffices where reality falls short. Day-to-day practices are slow to change, and with them, architectural elements at the more intimate scale of the interior space of the house tend to remain closely related to older forms.

Working simultaneously, but in apparent contradiction to the operation of the spatial imagination, is the persistence and social cohesion of habitual preferences and daily practices of life that coexist alongside (and possibly quite independent of) the symbolic system of the spatial imagination. De Certeau assigns to the practice of everyday life the power to “re-colonize” our own lives, displacing the interventions imposed by the larger power structures of state, church, corporation, etc.⁴ In the case of the luxury suburban architecture, the practice of everyday life partially displaces the imposed spaces common to American real estate development without displacing the imagery of the facade. The practices of day-to-day existence as theorized by De Certeau correspond with Lefebvre’s first category of “spatial practices.”⁵ The conflict between the imagined life and the life of everyday practices registers in only the most subtle ways to influence the perception of the living environment (Lefebvre’s second category) which in the new developments is dominated by the reference to the other worlds being conjured in the spatial imagination. The aspirations of the consumer class require that life in the new suburbs be perceived as cosmopolitan—what elsewhere has been labeled “transnational space”⁶—regardless of what little resemblance Jabotabek *real estate* life may actually bear to life in Madrid, Kyoto or Beverly Hills. What follows is an examination of the ways in which the symbolic codes invoking an imagined West extend into the interior space of the house and are forged into hybrid forms, where they run up against the resistance offered by “spatial practices” of Indonesian everyday life. The resulting formation of a hybrid architecture of domestic space is characterized by forms, associated uses, and meanings that do not directly correspond to either Western or Indonesian precedents.

In the Indonesian context, the study of cross-cultural translations, such as the one resulting in *nasi Mas Donel*, can well benefit from an established history of precedents, dating from the enthusiastic embrace by the first millennium Javanese of all things Hindu, up through creative adaptations of Chinese, Islamic, Portuguese, and Dutch cultural elements. The Southeast Asian archipelago, due to its geographic location along the trade routes between two oceans, has

⁴ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

⁵ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991 (1974)), 38-39.

⁶ Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

remained since the early centuries of the Common Era the crossroads of a rich international cultural influence and exchange, impinging on as heterogeneous a collection of indigenous cultures as can be found anywhere in the world. The remarkable capacity for the Javanese, for example, to adapt and adopt foreign elements that then became core elements of Javanese culture, presents but one of the more striking set of precedents for contemporary studies of cultural translations. As argued in Chapter One, the study of cross-cultural influences in Indonesia demands a more nuanced approach than the ones offered by much of the recent globalization literature. In place of the ill-defined neologisms of globalization and "glocalization," we instead benefit from the ability to employ more precisely understood notions of syncretic cultural formations established by a substantial body of anthropological literature on the religion, language, mythology, and arts of the dominant cultures of Indonesia.⁷

Elsewhere, the assumption of exclusive proprietary rights to cultural artifacts originating in North America has only recently been challenged. The concrete and glass white mansions built on the edges of Mandalay are considered neo-Thai built with Burmese and Chinese money probably from illegal drug, gems, and timber trade.⁸ The rainforest clear-cuts for golf courses and the violent movies of Bombay and Hong Kong are all arguably Asian, not American, phenomena. It used to be easy to point to America as the source of all that is evil: divorce; gangs; rock n' roll displacing the former popularity of the Javanese *gamelan* (traditional orchestra of gongs, xylophones, drums, etc.); AIDS (Thailand has made this their own); and satellite dishes in the remotest villages of Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). As a greater proportion of the global population gains exposure to the imagery transmitted from the developed West, what was Western has become the basic elements of what has become a set of universalized aspirations. It is more difficult to see these elements as monsters that the West has unleashed on the rest of the world as they have been claimed as the cultural property of other societies. Koolhaas presents our position as being somewhat akin to: "...dead parents deploring the mess our children have made of their inheritance."⁹ The greater the degree of adaptation, the more legitimate claims of local ownership become.

⁷ Paul Wheatley, *Nagara and Commandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Traditions* (University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper Nos. 207-208, 1983); Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976); Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996 (1965)); Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

⁸ Barbara Crossette, "The Unreal Thing: Un-American Ugly Americans," *New York Times* (11 May 1997), 1, 5.

⁹ Rem Koolhaas, "Singapore Songlines: Thirty Years of Tabula Rasa," *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-Large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture*, ed. Jennifer Sigler (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 1013.

Hybrid Precedents: The White House Style

A body of literature from sociology and anthropology supports Lefebvre in finding a dialectic relationship between social and cultural norms and practices on the one hand, and the physical forms of the built environment on the other.¹⁰ This relationship of mutual encoding is associated with a high degree of resistance to rapid change, as persistent spatial forms work against attempts to change the social order, and vice versa. The uniformity of house, site, and neighborhood planning noted in the previous chapter, along with the need to offer a range of house and lot sizes in order to satisfy buyers of different means, has yielded a collection of house designs that exhibit an almost systematic progression from small and simple to large and more complex. Starting from the most basic house plans, the progressive elaboration and addition of elements provides evidence of the designer/marketers' priorities and thus offers a portrait of the relative values of the lifestyle envisioned for the new consumer class of Indonesia. These attributes lend the *real estate* housing of Jabotabek to an analytic method usually reserved for long-established vernacular traditions. A comparison of several features of the Indonesian private sector house with their closest American equivalents (as indicated by their architectural attributes or their labeling conventions) are used here to trace the origins of form back to foreign and indigenous sources.

The interior space of the house is both the space most richly endowed with meanings most closely tied to day-to-day functioning of human life, and the space in which memories are most deeply encoded. It does not lend itself as easily to dramatic transformation as does exterior form. The patterns of human life are not as variable or subject to change as is physically possible in the material forms of the built environment. Referring back to the three categories of Lefebvre, it is in the realm of human perception that we find a greater capacity for change. In the interior space of the home we find the strongest connection between spatial and daily practices. This is not to imply that within the space of the interior, mundane uses take on a dominance over the perceptual or symbolic functions. As an "instrument of convenience," Barthes reminds us, the primary role of use is to "shelter meaning."¹¹

Most of the features of the private-sector housing of the New Order period most closely tied to the daily life of its residents—the spaces of the interior of the house—were already highly evolved by the time they were injected into the new clothing of the imagined West. These interior spaces

¹⁰ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1963); Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 (1972)); and Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

¹¹ Roland Barthes, "The Eiffel Tower," *A Barthes Reader*, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982 (1971)), 239-40.

demonstrate a link to the earlier architectures of the Dutch colonial period, itself a product of cultural hybridization heavily influenced by the housing of urban and rural *kampung* traditions.¹² The most significant link between these earlier forms and the “new towns” of the New Order period is found in the form of the so-called “White House” style that proliferated in the extensions of the largest cities on Java in the 1970s and 1980s. It is important to mention briefly this phenomenon as the most immediate precedent to what soon followed, which Indonesians call simply *real estate*, translated to English as the “Real Estate style” house. Many, if not most, of the Real Estate style interior plan elements are already present in a highly developed form in the proliferation of the White House style.¹³

The White House style manifested in a distinctive housing type built in large districts constructed as urban extensions zoned exclusively for housing. These extensions were built originally in Jakarta and Bandung, while the most extensive district of these houses can now be found in Surabaya. These houses continue to be built within a narrow range of elaboration throughout the larger towns of Java, and examples can be found in small clusters or individual lots in long-established *kampung* neighborhoods as well. This particular architectural formulation has its origins in the communities of Chinese-Indonesian industrialists. It appears to be part a local variant of a regional phenomenon sharing many characteristics with serially produced large white mansions that have appeared throughout Southeast Asia and China.

During the 1970s, a handful of architecture students recently graduated from Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, designed houses for wealthy Chinese-Indonesians in Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya, primarily of the Hok Chia clans from Fuchien, China that have long been dominant in the Indonesian textile industry. About 90 percent of the residents of White House style homes are still of Chinese origins.¹⁴ The first variants were called “capsule” and then “*lisplank*” (trim board) houses whose facades masked a *ruko* (shophouse) interior that served the dual function of factory or shop, and home. This soon evolved into the White House style also called *Rumah Orang Kaya Baru* (OKB; or *nouveau riche* house) or *Gedung Gajah Putih* (White Elephant Building).¹⁵ In emulating the official residence of President Suharto in the center of Jakarta, the

¹² The primary typology that indicates this linkage is the Dutch influenced “*loji*” (Dutch-style tropical bungalow).

¹³ The author is obliged to Johannes Widodo, Dean of the Architecture Faculty of Parahyangan University, for entertaining and correcting early speculations on the topic of the “White House” style.

¹⁴ Johannes Widodo, personal communication with the author, Bandung (28 June 2000).

¹⁵ Zaenudin Kartadiwiria, “*Gejala-gejala Transisional: Faktor Penentu Dalam Menuju Arsitektur Indonesia*” (Symptoms of Transition: Determining Factors Towards an Indonesian Architecture), chapter 13 in *Menuju Arsitektur Indonesia* (Towards an Indonesian Architecture), ed. Eko Budihardjo (Bandung: Penerbit Alumni, 1983), 125-31.

White House style repeats the genealogical origins of the traditional Javanese house (*Joglo*) that evolved as an emulation of the central pavilions of the Javanese royal palace compound.¹⁶ One of the defining concepts of this style was to build on a grand scale and to use materials that are as expensive as possible: marble, stainless steel, tinted glass, etc. (figure 4.2). It was a smash success and was quickly repeated throughout the island of Java. The White House style earned its name not just from its association with the Indonesian President's White House but also for its large white concrete facades. In the center of the facade is a *porte cochere*. It is festooned



FIGURE 4.2 An early variant of the "White House" style found in Pluit, North Jakarta.
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

throughout with neoclassical columns and cornices, balconies with stainless steel railings, and stained glass windows. The symmetry is broken by a bowed glass wall set to one side revealing a grand curved staircase within. This element is balanced on the other side by a garage. The White House style is characterized by a grand scale with ceilings of four meters (13 feet) or more on two floors. Favoring large houses over landscaping, the buildings tend to fill the entire lot except for a setback from the front lot line to accommodate the display of a car or two. Given the history of

¹⁶ Hamzuri, *Rumah Tradisionil Jawa*, (The Traditional Javanese House), (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, n.d.).

violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the White House style evolved as an urban fortress, with barbed wire on top of high concrete walls on three sides of the lot, steel fences along the front complemented by a guard post, and increasingly, surveillance cameras.¹⁷

The house is commonly built all the way to the rear wall of the lot. Only between a portion of the family room and the rear wall is there a break in the roof permitting a small space for a "garden." These are reminiscent of the central light wells of the Southeast Asian shophouse. This garden is typically the only landscaped space in the White House style and performs a symbolic function in keeping with the rules of Feng Shui to ensure the success and prosperity of the household. This garden is rendered in "grotto kitsch" style: on the rear wall of the lot is a concrete "grotto" with the appearance of a rock cliff featuring planters of small shrubs, vines, ferns, flowers, and a waterfall cascading into a pool stocked with carp. The pool is surrounded by patches of grass, moss, and gravel in which a felled tree and several tree stumps sit. The logs and stumps are rendered in concrete down to a great level of detail, revealing the texture of the bark or the exposed smooth core of heartwood where it has been partially removed. Floors around this garden are covered in large white ceramic tiles or, better yet, white marble.

With no windows possible due to zero lot lines to the left or right and only a portion of the rear facade available for windows (that portion corresponding with the small garden), the opportunities for fenestration are extremely limited by modern standards of ventilation and natural light developed in the nineteenth century, particularly in the tropics. The priority is for maximum living space over light and ventilation considerations, even if the built space provided is not well utilized. Bedrooms will often have windows opening onto interior spaces, particularly the double height spaces offering a view into the room below.

Interestingly, the White House style is understood in the context of Indonesian towns as an "international" style emulating its own imagined version of Western architectural culture. But to Western eyes, only the highly altered reference to classical elements of columns, cornices, and broken pediments (and perhaps a certain Baroque over-exuberance), hint at any such connection. This is an earlier version of the imagined West. It demonstrates the power the spatial imagination can have over physical reality. The Chinese-Indonesians, who were the primary clients for architects conjuring up the narrow range of variations on the White House Style, had several reasons to reject local and Chinese historical cultural referents in favor of more international associations. Since the arrival of the first traders from the southern provinces of the mainland in the

¹⁷ Periodic outbreaks of mob violence targeting Chinese-Indonesians has a centuries-old history in the region. This pattern was repeated most recently during the monetary crisis riots which toppled Suharto. These peaked in May of 1998 when the shops and neighborhoods favored by Chinese-Indonesians were targeted for burning, looting and rape in Jakarta, Solo, Medan and several other Indonesian cities.

first millennium, the long-standing enmity between the Javanese and the Chinese severely limited the options for assimilating into a local indigenous identity. Many later generation Chinese-Indonesians, having long ago lost touch with their roots in China along with the ability to speak Mandarin, Cantonese, or Fuchien, no longer felt quite Chinese. For much of the colonial period, the language and identity of the colonial masters provided an anchor for an influential group of Dutch-speaking Chinese. The so-called “Yellow Dutch” of Surabaya were perhaps the best-established hybrid cultural community of the colonial period.



FIGURE 4.3 Whole neighborhoods of the “White House” style can be found in towns throughout Java.
Photograph: Robert Cowherd

In contradiction to the theories of political economy that prove useful elsewhere, the wealthy minority of Chinese merchants and industrialists have been prevented from wielding significant political power. In 1967, a series of regulations banned any printed matter using Chinese characters, required the adoption of Javanese names, and demanded that all ethnic Chinese either apply for Indonesian citizenship or leave the country.¹⁸ Unable to express their own cultural

¹⁸ For a fuller examination of the so-called “China Problem” in Indonesia see: *Symposium Proceedings: The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life* in a special issue of the journal *Indonesia* (1991); and Ariel Heryanto, “Ethnic Identities and Erasure: Chinese Indonesians in Public Culture,” chapter 4 in *Southeast Asian*

identities, the Chinese were left to appeal to a relatively neutral, third party to negotiate the cultural minefield presented to them. Both the White House style and the Real Estate style are a manifestation of what is perceived as the safe haven of an imagined West conjured as a means of transcending the local conflicts of race and class. While Chinese-Indonesians have a particularly compelling set of reasons for invoking the imagery of the West, members of the indigenous ethnic groups of the archipelago share similar motivations for transcending both the categorizations of traditional cultures and any associations with the *kampung*. This motivation—shared among wealthy Chinese and indigenous Indonesians alike—made first the White House style and later the Real Estate style popular among both of these groups. In many ways the evolution from the White House to Real Estate styles was a matter of updating references to origins in the West—from a loose reference to the Baroque to a more literal emulation of Mediterranean styles via Southern California.



FIGURE 4.4 A gated enclave “White House” style in Bandung. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

Analysis of the Real Estate Style Interiors

This evolution is reflected in the interior plans of the Real Estate style houses that include many of the features found in the White House style before it. One of these is the *ruang tamu* (literally: guest room), labeled “living room” in the houses produced by the Indonesian real estate industry of even the smallest size. As shown in marketing plans, this room is furnished with a sofa, easy chairs, end tables, lamps, and rugs, similar to the manner of a living room found in North American homes. But the location, adjacencies, and use of the Indonesian “living room” do not directly correspond to those of North American living rooms. Marketing plans that are labeled in Indonesian employ the term “*ruang tamu*” (literally: guest room)—a room and function with a long history in local domestic architecture. Unlike the Anglo-American usage of the term “guest room,” the *ruang tamu* is the semi-public space found in the front of houses throughout Indonesia.¹⁹ They are typically screened off from the rest of the house, protecting the more intimate realm of the family living space from the probing gaze of visitors. This screening permits polite, albeit tentative, admittance to the home for the duration of a conversation and the requisite niceties exchanged over tea.²⁰ Those who would be accepted into this space, but no further into the more sensitive spaces of the home, might be people soliciting money for the building of a mosque, sales people, the head of the neighborhood or block association collecting monthly dues, people who are introducing themselves for the first time, or researchers asking uncomfortably probing questions.

In smaller or more rural houses, this function is served by a covered porch at the entrance to the house. In fact, many of the *ruang tamu* are formed when this front porch is enclosed in an extension of the house facade. The enduring function of this space after enclosure is seen in the fact that this extension does not usually then lead to a new porch being added to the new facade. The Indonesian real estate industry has produced houses that feature a space that fits the location, orientation, adjacency, and thus many of the functions of the *ruang tamu*, while breaking with tradition by integrating it visually with the dining space and the rest of the house in the manner of an American living room. The foyer that mediates between the front door and the living room in typical Anglo-American houses is not included here. In the enlarged and elaborated version of the *ruang tamu* of the Real Estate style, its form, function, and meanings begin to overlap with the North American “living room” accounting for associations made between the two forms, and somewhat justifying their common label. But with its cramped size, its function as a circulation

¹⁹ In North America a “guest room” is a bedroom used by guests who stay overnight.

²⁰ For an interesting look at the rituals surrounding the *ruang tamu* and its form, see: Saya Shiraishi, “Silakan Masuk, Silakan Duduk” (Please Come In, Please Sit Down), *Indonesia* 41 (1986), 89-131. The author thanks Ben Zimmer for pointing out this reference.

space, and the omission of the foyer, the relationship is not one-to-one. The differences are significant enough to identify this Indonesian living room/*ruang tamu* as a hybrid element, demonstrating characteristics of both traditions while not entirely satisfying either. Questions for further research might concern whether or not this hybrid space fosters a new set of social practices: In what percentage of the homes do the occupants visually separate the dining room and the living room (where this separation is not already a part of the architecture) with a screen or partition? Does this separation replicate the meaning and function of the *ruang tamu*? Is the absence of a foyer between the front door and the living room best understood as an adaptation due to differences in climate? Is the living room/*ruang tamu* used in the way a living room in Southern California would be used?




FIGURE 4.5 The “living room” just inside the front door in this 285-square-meter (3,000-square-foot) house, is closely related to its immediate precedent, the “*ruang tamu*.” Source: Citrayaya brochure

A second common feature of the developer housing is the double height space over a portion of the “family room.” Although this feature may occasionally be left out in many Very Small House designs, some developments include this feature on even these one story houses. Ostensibly, the

purpose might be to lend a sense of vertical grandeur to the most important spaces of the house. More often than not, the vertical extension is narrower than the ground floor room below it and creates an awkward breaking of the ceiling plane. For those ending up sitting in the wrong chair, the space, rather than being grand, creates the effect of sitting at the bottom of an elevator shaft. These double height spaces also trace their origins to the White House style and further to the Chinese shop house that typically features a light well over the interior garden element reaching up to the roof.

In private sector housing, the favored floor and wall finishes are white and reflective. Walls are finished smooth and flat with a cementacious plaster and painted a bright white. The standard flooring material, advertised prominently in the marketing materials and found in the model houses, is a heavily glazed large square (40 cm by 40 cm; 14 in by 14 in) ceramic tile. The furnishings of model units continue the white and shiny theme offering the greatest possible contrast to its opposite in the *kampung*. At the same time, there is an aesthetic that runs counter to the white and shiny in both interior design and the design of entire houses that favors the use of materials kept closer to their state in nature. Particularly popular with indigenous Javanese and Sundanese (from West Java), this style, as of yet unnamed, features thin wooden stick elements, a plethora of brackets, louvered shutters, open gable ends with exposed trusses and glass, and a complexity of overlapping roofs. Even as anything associated with the *kampung* tends to meet with immediate dismissal, the glass and steel modernity of Jakarta, as well as the increase in stress that comes with epic traffic jams, choking air pollution, and other features of urban lifestyles, has partially set the proper conditions for the rise of a “back-to-nature” aesthetic. A certain degree of backlash against urban life has helped to foster a nostalgia among the cosmopolitan classes of Jakarta for some of the elements of the *kampung*. Some of the materials of this style are bamboo, rattan, thatch, hemp, dark stained woods, exposed brackets, trusses, and louvered doors and windows. These are elements that have been salvaged from the scrap heap of the *kampung*, re-educated, and repackaged with a higher pedigree as a fully post-modern “traditional” style. This style has proven more successful in the smaller cities and towns of the island of Java only showing up in the Jakarta region in the interior decoration of homes. The notable exception to this is in the much-celebrated redecoration of some of the most luxurious hotel lobbies in Jakarta. The early 1990s renovation of the Hilton Hotel in the heart of Jakarta is perhaps the most famous example of the post-modern revitalization of traditional style.

In larger models, this double height space of the family room coincides on the second floor with the half-height wall or railing of a “lounge” on the second floor. This space is furnished like an open plan family room with couch, coffee table, television, and incorporating circulation space to the several bedrooms of the second floor. It also often features a duplication of the “pantry”

(examined below), including a sink and refrigerator for late night drinks and snacks. The preferred location of the master bedroom is on the ground floor, leaving the upstairs as a children's realm. The space labeled "lounge" overlooking the family room then serves as part of this children's realm that would be under the oversight of a nanny. While this configuration may not be without precedent elsewhere in the world (it is said to be derived from Le Corbusier's "*La Maisonette*"),²¹ here its prevalence across the industry establishes it as part of the real estate developer's housing formula. It is also one which corresponds with the inclusion of one or more live-in domestic servants or *pembantu* (domestic servant; literally: helper or assistant) in the wealthiest one quarter of Indonesian households.




FIGURE 4.6 The *Pembantu* sleeps on the second floor with her own stair case (upper left corner) unconnected to the space of the family. 175 square meters (1,900 square feet). Source: Wisata Legenda brochure

It is interesting to note that almost all housing produced by the formal sector includes separate quarters for domestic servants or *pembantu*. Even in the 21 square meter (226 square foot) "Very Small House" (*Rumah Sangat Sederhana, RSS*) category, these quarters are planned for as part of the optional later extension of the house into the back yard space. The presence of the *pembantu* is

²¹ Johannes Widodo, personal communication with the author, Bandung (28 June 2000).

imprinted on the physical form of the house plans in several ways, none of which correspond with Californian models, even in the very few American models where quarters for domestic servants are provided. The most obvious difference is in the size of living quarters allotted to *pembantu*.




FIGURE 4.7 The *pembantu* bedroom is so small that it requires a special bed in order to fit. 95 square meters (1,000 square feet) Source: Kota Legenda brochure

Marketing plans show these within a range of sizes from 5.9 square meters (64 square feet) down to 2.2 square meters (24 square feet)—barely room enough to stand at the foot of a twin-sized bed.²² In larger model houses *pembantu* quarters are located up a spiral staircase on the

²² The smallest *pembantu* quarters found so far is in the relatively large 95-square-meter (1,023-square-foot) house “Nice/Berkeley” model at Kota Legenda. This bedroom measures 1.0 meter by 2.2 meters (3.3 feet by 7.2 feet).

second floor, off of the garage or the rear yard. This space is inaccessible from the rest of the second floor and the spiral staircase duplicates the main tairway of the house.




FIGURE 4.8 This house is only 38 square meters (400 square feet) but still has room for a *pembantu* in back with a separate bathroom. Not the kitchen" incorporated into the back porch. Source: Citraraya brochure

Although living quarters for domestic servants have long been a feature of upper class indigenous housing, the extension of the *pembantu* realm into a more distinct spatial segregation of the house both horizontally and vertically—as well as the duplication of elements such as stairs—is a recent development with the White House and Real Estate styles.




FIGURE 4.9 First floor: The “dapur” kitchen is between the family “pantry” and the garage. Source: Lippo Karawaci brochure

Although some opening to the exterior is preferred in every room of the house, it is not a requirement of any enforced building code. There are as of yet no supplementary mechanical ventilation systems used to compensate for lack of windows or other natural ventilation in these rooms buried in the interior of the building mass. This cutting off of the interior spaces from the outside is in part a means of keeping interior spaces cool and reducing the cooling loads on air-




FIGURE 4.10 Second floor: note the double-height space over the "living room/*ruang tamu*." 145 square meters (1,560 square feet). Source: Lippo Karawaci brochure

conditioners. Air conditioning in these houses tends to be neither from window units nor from central air handling systems. Instead they operate through individual fan coil units mounted on the wall of each major space or bedroom, with coolant pipes connecting them to individual or centralized compressors on the roof or in the back yard. Due to the noise and heat given off by

these compressors, they are most often located above the quarters of the pembantu or in the clothes drying spaces incorporated into the pembantu quarters, either on the ground level or on a flat roof space off of the second floor. Even where windows are provided directly to the outside spaces of the house, these are kept closed and covered with curtains much of the time. The site planning practices of the private sector house reflect in part, economic conditions of land scarcity and the resulting high relative costs of land. It is in part due to climatic conditions and the ubiquity of air conditioning in this class of housing. It is also in part a reflection of cultural attitudes towards landscaping, aesthetic traditions of the grotto kitsch, and the practices of Feng Shui. Another way of saying this is that these houses are marketed to households that are looking for the most house for their money, with open space on the site and access to light, air, and landscaped spaces having a lower priority. The percentage of the total parcel area that is covered by building tends to be very high—much higher than on similar real estate developments in Southern California.




FIGURE 4.11 Although only 138 square meters (1,480 square feet), having two separate kitchens is a high priority. Source: Lippo Karawaci

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, real estate developments were increasingly located in the *kabupaten* (counties) outside of DKI Jakarta. There was also a shift in the market with a greater representation of non-Chinese-Indonesians, mostly from upper echelon bureaucratic circles. The lower land costs of the real estate developments on the periphery, the increasing means of the wealthiest new home buyers in Jakarta, and an increasing exposure of members of the Real Estate Indonesia to the designs and practices of the Southern California real estate industry, all contributed to the opening up of the site for lower lot coverage percentages and a higher proportion of the site being devoted to landscaping. The biggest shift in the siting of houses moving from the White House style to the more remote locations of the Real Estate style developments, was the pairing of houses in matching right and left symmetrically reflected floor plans. In pairing reflected

floor plans, the designers created a pattern that permits one side of each house to take advantage of the more open portion of the adjacent site. This benefits both houses by increasing the perception of openness. On the opposite side of the parcel, the entire lot line is filled with building, extending from the *pembantu* quarters in the rear to the garage in the front (mirrored on the other side of the lot line with the same elements). The same pairing of the gardens is repeated in the rear at a smaller scale, and this time enclosed with walls at least two meters (6.5 feet) tall. The rear of the house is the furthest from the entrance and the most private of the spaces of the house requiring visual and physical enclosure, while the lot line in front of the house is typically enclosed with only a low wall or plantings.

The bedroom and bathroom of the *pembantu* are frequently left unventilated except for what air circulation might be provided passively through open doors. *Pembantu* quarters are often found opening out onto the carport and even enclosed garages. This adjacency shows a lack of concern for separating living spaces from the emissions of automobiles elsewhere forbidden by building codes. This is however not unique to real estate developments or to the treatment of *pembantu*. The main communal living spaces of many first floor houses throughout both urban and rural Indonesia doubles as the storage space for the family motorbike. This is more often than not an accommodation made necessary by the need to secure this valuable family asset added after the original construction of the house. It is made possible by the addition of a ramp over whatever stairs there may be to the raised level of the ground floor. Nor is this lack of concern extended only to the *pembantu*. In some designs the kitchen is open to the enclosed garage.

The kitchen of the Real Estate style house is a space where the divergent needs of persistent daily practices and the invocation of an imagined West apparently cannot be accommodated as it might be in a single, hybrid kitchen. Instead, to use Lefebvre's terms, the needs of the aspiring "spatial imagination" and the mundane daily "spatial practices" each require their *own* kitchen. To foreign eyes, the *dapur* (traditional kitchens) of the owner-built housing prevalent in the *kampung*, are course affairs: small, dimly lit spaces with concrete floors. Dishes are washed in a bucket on the floor and dried on free-standing racks. A one- or two-burner, kerosene or propane stove is also on the floor where most cooking is done in squatting position. In "improved" kitchens the addition of a concrete countertop raises some of these tasks up to counter height, while much of the food preparation, such as cutting, pressing of coconut flesh, and the grinding of spices, still occurs at the floor level. Despite appearances, these kitchens are highly functional, and still produce a vast majority of what is cooked and eaten in Indonesia. Many Indonesians, given the choice, still prefer cooking mostly at floor level in these more traditional kitchens.

In the smallest of the Real Estate style housing, the Indonesian *dapur* is replaced by a simple and small raised countertop with a sink built into it. These small kitchens are typically located in

one of several positions, including under a porch roof open to the rear courtyard or towards the front of the house incorporated into the carport. The most common kitchen location in the smaller models of *real estate* housing is integrated into a single unified space serving the multiple functions of kitchen, *ruang tamu*, dining room, and family room—sometimes slightly set off to one side in an alcove. Moving up in house size, the kitchen takes on a form that more closely corresponds to the form of American precedents, albeit on a more modest scale. If there are any appliances or cabinets at all, they are smaller in size. Countertops are the main feature, often wrapping around a corner of the room. In more up-scale models, the usual kerosene stove set on top of the counter might be set in on a lowered shelf so that its top is flush with the countertop. The sink location is often directly below a window, as in the typical American kitchen.

But apparently it is far easier to change the form of the kitchens in formal sector housing sold to the rising consumer class than it is to change the way they or their servants cook. Moving up in the size of house models, it is at about the 170-square-meter to 220-square-meter (1,800-square-foot to 2,300-square-foot) range that a second kitchen appears on the plans. This second kitchen is the *pembantu's* kitchen located in a way that isolates it from the main living spaces of the house. The two kitchens resulting from this Solomonian solution are distinguished as the *pembantu's* “wet” or “dirty” kitchen, and the family’s “dry,” or “clean” kitchen—or, as labeled on marketing plans, “pantry.” This counter-distinction replicates the pairing of the traditional *pasar* (bazaar) or “wet” market and the modern *swalayan* (self-service supermarket) or “dry goods” store. The Indonesian word *dapur* is the term used to label the traditional kitchen of most Indonesian households, associated more with the pre-real estate origins of the *kampung*. In contrast, the term “pantry” was chosen to label the family’s “dry” or “clean” kitchen, perhaps as a shortened version of “butler’s pantry,” as in the optional, additional space between the dining room and the main kitchen that is included as a feature in only the largest and most well-appointed houses in the West. The connotations of the “butler’s pantry” would seem to be more congruent with the other naming strategies of the Indonesian real estate industry than associating the “dry” or “clean” kitchen with the more mundane sense of the term “pantry” as in, a cabinet or small room to store food. Almost all of the cooking is done by the *pembantu* in the “wet” kitchen, while the sophisticated appliances of the “pantry” remain off limits unless supervised by a member of the family. With the burden of utility removed, the kitchen included in the main living space of the house is freed up to more emphatically exercise its function of conveying status.




FIGURE 4.12 The two kitchens of this model are identical in size and layout. At 243 square meters (2,600 square feet). Source: Wisata Legenda brochure

The American kitchen underwent a similar transformation during the 1980s and 1990s, becoming more seamlessly joined with the dining and family rooms of the house. It even led to one of the only claims at a new programmatic space in American home architecture during these years, the "great room," combining the functions of family room, dining room, and kitchen in a single, more or less unified space. This new program grew out of changing social practices. The shifting status of women within the family meant that it was no longer acceptable for one member of the household to be shuttered away from the rest of the dinner party preparing the meal. Instead, the kitchen was brought out into the space of entertaining company, and meal preparation took on a social role of its own. Peninsulas with raised countertops separating the dining area from the kitchen were lined with stools for guests to sit munching on *hors d'oeuvres* while conversing with those preparing the meal on the other side. With husband and wife more equitably sharing tasks of

meal preparation, and the performance of this ritual under the gaze of guests, a new market opened up for expensive trophy kitchen appliances, cabinets, countertops, and fixtures combining the




FIGURE 4.13 Western kitchen fashions in Indonesian journals.
Source: Properti Indonesia (April 1998)

functions of both high performance and the display of status. American kitchen fashions were propagated through glossy home improvement and architectural fashion magazines, first in the West, and then in Indonesia, creating a strong demand among the elite for the import of all manner of finish materials and appliances from Europe, Australia, and North America.²³ Indonesian real estate developers, ever eager to appeal to the status consciousness of potential home buyers, were early adopters of the trophy kitchen trend. The real estate developers felt understandably compelled

²³ "Tempat Memasak Yang Juga Bisa Bergaya" (Kitchens That Can Also Be Stylish), in *Properti Indonesia*, no. 1082 (November 2000), 35-39.

to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the new availability of imported kitchen appliances, countertops, and cabinets, to display wealth and status. The strongest correspondence between American and Indonesian kitchens appeared in the real estate developed homes in the range from 200 to 350 square meter (2,100 to 3,800 square feet). In plan, materials, fixtures, appliances, and adjacency to dining and living spaces, these kitchens come the closest to matching the practices of American kitchen design.



FIGURE 4.14 The entertainment kitchen is matched by a working kitchen behind the wall to the right. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

At the top end of the Indonesian housing scale the fundamental differences between the American kitchen and the Indonesian "pantry" become more pronounced. The formal dining halls of the largest new Indonesian mansions are matched up with large "pantries" that take on a more formal decorative quality, matching the materials and motifs of the dining hall itself. Here glassware and liquor are displayed through the glass doors of under-lit cabinets. Much of the utilitarian air of even the most opulent of American kitchens is displaced by functions of display of crockery and glassware (figure:).



FIGURE 4.15 The more opulent variant of the “pantry” becomes more like a butler’s pantry but is open to the dining room. Source: Properti Indonesia

Social Dualism in a Hybrid Architecture

What formal similarities exist between the American “great room” kitchens and the Indonesian Real Estate style “pantry” mask a set of fundamental differences in the actual social configuration of the American and Indonesian households. Where the increasing integration of the American kitchen with the rest of the house was a product of greater gender equity and the incorporation of cooking rituals into those of entertaining, the correspondent programmatic and formal integration in the Indonesian home was brought about by adding the “entertainment kitchen” to the plan while maintaining or even deepening the isolation and segregation of the actual working kitchen, which evolved very little from earlier home plans. If anything, these became even smaller, darker and more isolated as they became the sole domain of the *pembantu*. The family members were newly freed from the need to enter the space of the *pembantu* in order to use the kitchen. The splitting of the kitchen results in the “dirty kitchen” reverting back to few if any appliances, a propane or kerosene stove, a lack of light and ventilation, concrete floor and counters, and in several cases, back to the bare concrete room without countertops at all—as the location of most food preparation tasks returned to the floor.

In contrast, the “pantry” is equipped with a full-height refrigerator, a stainless steel or enameled steel sink, and perhaps even a full oven/stove unit with ovens above and below. This is the recreational kitchen where snacks and drinks may be retrieved by family members and used when entertaining guests. It is also the kitchen-as-status-symbol where the American-style kitchen is displayed, even if infrequently used for actual cooking. The “pantry” is a set piece behind which the real kitchen is concealed. It is not a new idea, as it closely parallels a similar separation of the *pembantu* quarters from the space of the family. In both cases, spaces and functions exist in parallel worlds divided by a wall and distinguished by stark contrast in their standards of space, light, finishes, and amenities. The dual kitchen constitutes the extension of the Indonesian social divide into a new programmatic area of the house.

A shift in cultural perceptions of the Indonesian consumer class is encoded in several features of the houses built in the new suburban real estate developments, even as the actual function and usage of the spaces demonstrate a strong connection with the past and remain surprisingly similar to life in the *kampung*. The *ruang tamu* has been reconceived as a “living room” and in some cases, even reconfigured physically to be more integrated with the rest of the house. However, it still functions in much the same manner as when it was more isolated. The *ruang tamu*/living room is a hybrid space showing a distinct formal evolution away from the *ruang tamu* of its indigenous precedent as it aspires to become more like the American-model living room—even as it maintains a strong association with its traditional function in Indonesian social life. The double-height space over the living room, dining room, or family room is a direct import from the West that has similarly taken on a new life at the hands of Indonesian real estate developers, never experienced in its original context. It has evolved in its new setting to become a standard feature of the house coupled with the upstairs “lounge.” Together, the double-height space and the “lounge” have evolved to serve as a kind of playroom for the younger members of the household—unlike any typological precedents in either West or Indonesia.

The presence in the household of the *pembantu* is one of the significant conditions driving the hybridization of Indonesian domestic architecture. The demand for extending spatial separations of the house both horizontally and vertically is one of the more striking features of the Indonesian hybrid adaptation of the American real estate typology. The presence of the *pembantu* and the social inertia of Indonesian cooking practices precludes anything but a subtle change in the kitchen, while the aspirations for the display of a more “modern” lifestyle would seem to demand that it be replaced entirely. The doubling of the kitchen accommodates both the persistence of everyday practices and consumer class aspirations. The splintering off of the Indonesian kitchen, as part of the growing divide between the *pembantu* realm and that of the family, is a domestic-scale manifestation of the larger phenomenon of the emerging new spaces of social dualism. The greater

segregation of domestic space, demonstrated in the hybrid architecture of the Real Estate style, resonates with the requisite counter-distinction that is increasingly operative at every scale of the social dualism of Indonesian society. This larger spatial division is examined further in Chapter Seven: the operation of new spatial divisions between the suburban gated-communities and the *kampung*; between the public realm and the private automobile; and between the air-conditioned enclaves of high amenity and the left-over spaces beyond the walls of privilege that are increasingly abandoned to the multiple crises of failing infrastructures, poor housing, and environmental degradation. It is to these crises and the task of the planning professions to address them, that we turn in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE PLANNING RESPONSE: NORMATIVE MODEL VS. DEREGULATION

The Jakarta Experience

As the brake lights appear over the crest in the toll road ahead, traffic grinds to a stop even though the roadside markers indicate that we are still six kilometers away from the toll booth, the immediate cause of the stopped traffic. The familiar yearning for a wider road or an alternative parallel route immediately returns along with the mantra: "build more roads." With the traffic jam comes a wave of young men shuffling between the disorderly lanes of traffic offering tabloid newspapers, bottles of water, snacks, and the latest fashion in cheap trinkets to hit the streets. Drivers lock their doors and do their best to avoid hitting the sellers when changing lanes during the brief moments of traffic flow. Crowds lean against the guardrail at an unauthorized highway bus stop peering back through the traffic for a glimpse of their bus making its way towards them. They are hoping that there might be some room to squeeze on the next one just appearing over the glaring roofs of the cars. On the bus, well-dressed office workers struggle not to sweat as they squint their eyes against the glare reflected from the sea of cars that surrounds them. Unable to see through the tinted glass of the cars, they imagine the comforts of lush air conditioned surround-sound interiors and dream of the day when they will at last get access to enough credit to cross the air conditioned divide. At the moment, it matters little that they would be just as stuck. The important distinction is that they imagine being the masters of their own destiny. Inside the car, the lone drivers struggle to remain calm as they curse the bus that fills their windshield views with the black smoke billowing out of the aging engines fouled with kerosene-charged diesel fuel. They somehow imagine that when the buses are finally removed from the road, there will be less pollution and traffic will flow more freely. Inching into the city, the elevated toll road offers a panoramic view of the *kampung* below with the gleaming post modern high-rise skyline on the horizon. The occasional breaks in red clay tile roofs offer fleeting glimpses of narrow alleys, smoldering garbage piles, and stagnant drainage canals.

The conditions found in Jakarta have a way of inspiring a normative response in visitors and residents alike: The Indonesian government should work with international sources of technical and financial aid to analyze the situation, develop proper planning solutions, and undertake a prioritized implementation of regulatory and development programs that address the most serious of the problems found in the region. After all, many of the problems encountered in and around

Jakarta bear some resemblance to those found in other contexts around the world and throughout history. The question naturally arises: Can the resolution of similar problems elsewhere serve as a guide to overcoming some of the region's more serious challenges?




FIGURE 5.1 Grand boulevard Jalan Thamrin is the main north-south axes of Jakarta. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

In its broadest conception, the normative response to Jabotabek's problems suggests that what is needed is a careful and complete analysis of the situation projected into the future and a comprehensive planning approach to address the needs of the region. What is surprising, and more than a little bit disappointing, is that Jakarta, in fact, has a recent history of doing just that. A look back at the planning history of post-independence Indonesia reveals a serious and well-supported effort to comprehensively analyze and address the most serious problems facing the Jakarta region.

Several generations of planning documents comprising the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan and its Review were generated over the last three decades of the 20th century with the repeated assistance of the Dutch Government, the United Nations, the World Bank, and several generations of planning teams composed of Indonesian and international planners. The internationally funded and informed planning responses of the Jabotabek Plans called for careful location of new infrastructure to direct the private sector and informal builders to develop mixed-income, mixed-use communities clustered around rail stations leaving environmentally sensitive areas as open space without depending on the unlikely prospects of effective land use controls.

In this chapter, descriptions of the four most significant problems faced in planning for the future of the Jakarta region are used as the reference points against which to evaluate the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans. The first of three sections is a compilation of information on conditions underlying the water supply, flooding, mobility and housing issues that prevailed during the period of unprecedented growth from the 1970s to the 1990s. These are the problems identified and analyzed in each planning exercise in the Jakarta metropolitan area as the most serious challenges to the long-term welfare of the region. The second and third sections examine the responses offered by three generations of planning teams associated with the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan process. The second section covers planning efforts up through the problem analysis and theoretical modeling of the final 1993 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review. The work of the planning teams up to this point is found to be basically sound, judging them against the region's needs as described in the first section. In the final section of the chapter, a fundamental shift in approach is found between the analytic first half of the 1993 Review and its prescriptive second half. The recommendations of the 1993 Review's Strategic Land Use Plan and Strategic Implementation are found to represent a decisive break from the Jabotabek planning vision that had evolved over the previous two decades. The plan is found to contradict even its own analyses and rationales in several significant ways.

Jakarta's Perennial Problems

For every effort to plan for Jakarta's future from 1956 to 1999 there was a preceding attempt to identify and describe the key problems faced by the administrators of the city and its region. The prospects for economic development were in each case seen as a means for mobilizing the infrastructure, housing, economic, and administrative development necessary to resolve what came with time to be understood as the perennial woes of the region. During the heady years of unprecedented economic growth fostered by the New Order Government, the faith that economic growth was the key to solving the problems of the region drove administrators to turn a blind eye to the longer-term implications of unbridled physical growth. The Suharto regime was driven by

the imperatives placed on it by economic competition with increasingly powerful forces from outside its national borders. At the top of its agenda was the need to make whatever changes in its policies and the conditions of its cities and infrastructures necessary to compete with other nations in the region, and ever further afield, to attract foreign investment. The physical changes made both to attract, and resulting from, increased investment contributed to a dramatic restructuring of the land uses, settlement patterns, infrastructure development, and appearance of the Jakarta region. These changes were also linked with a wide range of social factors such as commuting patterns, buying habits, lifestyle choices, patterns of social interaction, etc. many of which were examined in Chapters Three and Four. Concurrent with the progressive extension of economic liberalization measures, a significant series of planning initiatives were pursued to resolve Jakarta's problems and provide the infrastructure most essential to further economic growth. Planning documents attempted to identify and characterize the problems of the Jakarta region in order to then prescribe measures for their remediation. Among the problems identified in every generation of land use planning have been:

1. Loss of prime agricultural lands to housing, industrial and infrastructure uses;
2. The displacement of agricultural activities to the less expensive southern slopes has led to greater soil erosion;¹
3. Loss of undeveloped open space required for the recharge of ground water supplies;
4. Greater water supply demands resulting from more intensive land use;
5. Local drainage and systemic flooding problems due to greater surface runoff that comes with development;
6. Surface water decrease in both quality and quantity with increasing demands as a water supply source and as a place for disposing sewerage;
7. Ongoing failure to collect and dispose of the increasing levels of solid waste generated by higher consumption levels of growing populations and industrial manufacturing activities;
8. Increasing levels of traffic congestion with population growth, economic expansion, increasing ownership rates of both motorbikes and private automobiles, and

¹ In some watersheds including that of the Ciliwung River at whose mouth the first settlement occurred, the soil erosion rate increased from the natural state of 14 tons per hectare per year to 193 tons per hectare per year. Tommy Firman and Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni, "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 86.

- increasing number and average length of motorized trips far beyond increases in road capacity;
9. Deteriorating air quality due to the air pollution from increasing motorization and industry;
 10. Decreasing quantity and quality of the housing stock for the majority of residents accompanied by rising housing costs far out-pacing per capita income gains along with greater scarcity of land as housing needs compete with manufacturing, retail, and service sector expansion for land.

What is clear from this list is that each subsequent generation of planning had to contend not only with the failures of the preceding effort but also with its “successes”—remediating one problem only to exacerbate or introduce others. These instances demonstrate the complexity and interconnected nature of what might otherwise be seen too simply as individual, clearly identifiable problems.

For the purposes of the present study, a selection of the four most significant problem areas facing the Jabotabek region through the 1980s and 1990s are here presented in greater depth to serve as indicators of the role played by planning in the development of the region during the late New Order period. The four problem areas identified here are: water supply (and related problems of water pollution, groundwater salinization, and soil subsidence), flooding, mobility, and housing.

As late as 1990, only an estimated 3.5 million out of 17 million Jabotabek residents were served by treated piped water (2.6 million of 8.3 million in DKI Jakarta).² The municipal water supply treatment has never been sufficient to yield potable water, and all water is further boiled within each household before it is used for cooking or drinking. The deep groundwater lying below Jakarta has been extracted, or “mined,” far in excess of its replenishment rate, with the proliferation of illegal wells for both industrial and residential developments.³ The lowering of the water table has necessitated ever deeper and more expensive wells to be drilled, or alternatively, greater reliance on heavily polluted shallow groundwater and surface water resources. Illegal shallow groundwater wells are the norm for supplying domestic water. Sewage is handled on-site and disposed of via dry wells and pit latrines that leach directly into shallow groundwater systems. Within a single household parcel, the well is located in the rear off to one side, while the dry well

² *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review: The Strategic Land Use Plan* (Jakarta: Ministry of Public Works, September 1993), 11.

³ *Jabotabek Review*, 10

for disposing of household sewage is located in the opposite corner. Given the small size of the average household parcel and the lack of coordination between neighbors, it is common that by locating the water source as far away as possible from their own point of sewage disposal, a household has located their well as close as possible to their neighbors' point of sewage disposal. With densities reaching over 300 persons per hectare (120 persons per acre), the practice of on-site sewage disposal and water supply has proven dangerous. Municipal sewage systems are almost unheard of in Indonesia even in the largest cities.⁴

In Indonesia, solid waste disposal is so inadequate that it impacts the water supply as well. The millennia-old tradition of throwing refuse into rivers and streams (or anywhere that water is expected to flow during the rainy season), is based on conditions prevalent throughout most of human history in which refuse came from nature and was merely diverted temporarily from this natural course back to the sea in order to satisfy some human need. This practice was reinforced and encouraged by religious convictions that held that ravines where water flowed (and the sea itself) were places associated with death, decay, and filth. Despite the introduction of less benign industrially-produced materials, and the changing nature of solid waste flows, these deeply seated cultural practices remain evident in the Javanese landscape.⁵ The disposable, woven palm leaf baskets have been replaced by disposable plastic bags. Banana leaf containers have been replaced by plastic plates and bowls. And the ceramic *kendi* water jugs have been replaced by plastic water bottles. Whereas the worst of the former waste stream would persist in a recognizable form for a season or two, this new waste stream will breakdown only slightly even after thousands of years. Besides polluting surface water flows, it also clogs drainage systems contributing to flooding problems. The commonly practiced alternative is to burn garbage locally within each household, or at the scale of the neighborhood in urban areas. While posing less of a problem for water supply pollution, flooding, and urban space constraints, transforming the garbage into more readily absorbed and widely distributed toxic airborne particles can hardly be deemed a more satisfactory option.

⁴ The notable exceptions are the new town developments of Lippo Karawaci and Bumi Serpong Damai. Besides these, several municipal pilot projects were initiated in the 1980s as part of the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP). A small pilot project of communal sewage collection and treatment is part of a larger 200-hectare (500-acre) proposed service area. Plans exist for expansion of this system to cover 45 percent of the DKI Jakarta population by 2010 at an estimated cost of US\$900 million. Bogor has started working on a sewage system for 3,000 persons as part of the Bogor-Palembang Urban Development Plan and the Setya Budi area of Tangerang has a sewage system for 1,500 residents. *Jabotabek Review*, 16.

⁵ The best glimpse of how these cultural practices once operated in Java is offered, as in many matters, by looking at how these cultural practices still prevail in Bali.

Increased pesticide usage associated with technological advances in farming, and the loss of undeveloped land in water catchment areas associated with pressures of urban sprawl, have also contributed to the deterioration of surface water quality and quantity. As deep ground water sources are depleted, the state-owned Jakarta Water Supply Corporation (PDAM DKI Jakarta) has recognized that it must look to surface water in order to expand its capacity to keep up with greater demand. Given the existing constraints on the water resources in the urbanized areas of Jabotabek, these new sources will come from points ever further from their point of consumption. Besides the costs of constructing such distribution systems, it is estimated that as of the early 1990s, half or more of the water entering the distribution systems was lost by the time it reached its point of consumption.⁶ Such measures also likely to locate the water supply source in a different administrative area than its end users, creating a classic recipe for political conflict.

Deep groundwater depletion has led to two significant secondary impacts: salinization and soil subsidence. The dynamic equilibrium naturally maintained between seawater and freshwater in the deep porous layers of the earth was disturbed by extractions from the freshwater side of the balance. This has resulted in seawater pouring in from above and the salinization of the water table below Jakarta. Groundwater as far inland as the Monas National Monument, some six kilometers (four miles) from the coast, had become contaminated by seawater by the mid-1990s. The other secondary impact of deep groundwater mining is the drying up and shrinking of clay layers, leading to soil subsidence. North Jakarta has experienced soil subsidence rates of up to five centimeters (two inches) per year. In some areas the ground sank over 70 centimeters (28 inches) between 1974 and 1990, causing severe damage to buildings and public infrastructures, and a worsening of flooding conditions.⁷

⁶ *Jabotabek Review*, 12.

⁷ *Jabotabek Review*, 9; Firman and Dharmapatni, "Sustainable Development," 86.



FIGURE 5.2 Solid waste clogs the mouth of a flood canal in North Jakarta. Source: *Jakarta Post* (28 September 2000)

The flooding experienced in Jabotabek is not the kind of systemic seasonal flooding found in the alluvial flood plains of large river systems as in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Instead, it is local in nature and preventable in part through infrastructure improvements, but more significantly, through enforcement of development regulations restricting development in flood plains and along drainage channels, and by requiring adequate drainage systems. With the post-independence population boom, the Dutch-constructed *Banjir* (flood) Canal, built in 1920 to protect the southwestern periphery of the city, came to be located in the heart of the city with settlements built across most of the previously designated flood plains. Despite regulatory protections, there was significant development, including the Jakarta airport built in the 1980s, in the once extensive open space to the northwest of the city, and the wide belt of coastal wetlands that played a significant role in preventing and lowering the severity of flooding in Jakarta. Drainage systems, where they are provided at all, are often sized for minor rainfalls and designed with too small of an area under consideration. These add to the drainage problems of neighboring sites. Land needed for the drainage of planned developments is often not included in the original land acquisition, or even the location permit, causing serious land acquisition problems later when drainage controls are found to be necessary.⁸ Buildings were often built on what had been wet rice fields with floor levels at or

⁸ *Jabotabek Review*, 13.

near the former water level. Not surprisingly, the severity and frequency of flood events in Jakarta steadily increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Undeveloped open space around rivers and streams is necessary to ensure that a certain amount of the rainfall percolates into the soil before it flows into the surface water system as runoff. Upstream changes in land use from undeveloped to agricultural, or from agricultural to residential and other urban uses, altered the porousness of the ground plain, increased surface runoff, and sent higher volumes of water and lost topsoil flowing to downstream flood-prone areas from as far as a hundred kilometers away. Thus, poorly planned or unregulated development in both flood-prone downstream areas as well as the sensitive far upstream reaches of water catchment areas contribute to the increasing extent, severity, and frequency of Jakarta's flooding problems.

Of Jakarta's planning issues highlighted in this analysis, it is issue of mobility that stands out for several reasons:

1. Unlike the mostly abstract fears of potential flooding and failures in the water supply, ever greater urban specialization and spatial separation of land uses have caused the activities of daily life—home, work, shopping, education, recreation—to be increasingly mediated by transportation and forced more and more Jakartans to face increasingly severe traffic congestion on a daily basis;
2. Transportation infrastructure has proven throughout history to be one of the primary ingredients necessary for the promotion of economic growth in trade and commerce, and is increasingly viewed in the emerging context of global competition among cities as a key factor in attracting foreign investment;
3. As the consequences of reaching and exceeding environmental limits come to impact people's daily lives, the fact that transportation is the number one contributor to both air pollution and energy consumption will make it one of the first areas to be affected by both conservation measures taken by government, market adjustments, and the environmental limits of ecosystems themselves;⁹
4. As more and more people shift from non-motorized or public transportation to motorbikes and then to automobiles, competition for road space intensifies leading to

⁹ Muhamad Isnaeni, Harun Al-Rasyid S. Lubis, "Efek Lingkungan Interaksi Transportasi Dan Tata Ruang Kota" (Environmental Effects of the Interaction Between Transport and Urban Land Use), unpublished paper presented at the Civil Engineering Department Bandung Institute of Technology (2000).

ever greater conflicts over the use of the scarce commodity of space in the public realm;¹⁰ and

5. As bad as conditions are at present, trends and assumptions made about the future would indicate that demand for putting private automobiles on the road could continue to increase rapidly to unimaginable levels.

The complexity of mobility issues, the long time-horizons required for infrastructure developments, and the structural isolation of policies affecting the key factors of mobility—most notably, but not exclusively, land use and transportation—make these issues of particular difficulty and importance.




FIGURE 5.3 It is common for road volumes on both the toll road and the parallel “free” road to surpass design capacities. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

On the island of Java, the Dutch oversaw the construction of a communication and transportation infrastructure rivaled only by Japan in all of East Asia.¹¹ The war years and early

¹⁰ Harry T. Dimitriou, “Transport Problems of Third World Cities,” chapter 2 in *Transport Planning for Third World Cities* ed. Harry T. Dimitriou (New York: Routledge, 1990), 50-84.

¹¹ Howard Dick, “Representations of Development in 19th and 20th Century Indonesia: A Transport History Perspective,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 36, no. 1 (April 2000), 185-207.

days of independence saw the deterioration of these infrastructures with very little invested in maintenance or expansion. A return to a relatively high degree of mobility had to wait until the “colt revolution” of the 1970s when interconnected routes of small vans provided fast and cheap transportation to even the most remote locations. The complex multi-model transit and para-transit systems of Java peaked in the 1980s, gradually giving way to a rise in first motorbikes and then private automobiles. The nations that continue to serve as the models for automobile-centered




FIGURE 5.4 The growth in private motor vehicles in Jakarta, 1978-2000. sources: various

lifestyles developed road infrastructures gradually over the course of the twentieth century more or less paralleling a relatively steady rise of automobile usage. In contrast, many economically less developed nations like Indonesia experienced automobile ownership increases far in excess of anything experienced previously in the West, at a time when they were ill prepared to develop road

infrastructures at a comparable rate and often under conditions of far greater resource constraints.¹² As recently as 1987, the official projections for car ownership in DKI Jakarta were 600,000 cars by the year 1995 and 900,000 cars by the year 2005.¹³ In fact, the 900,000 mark was surpassed some nine years ahead of schedule (Figure 5.4). With car ownership increasing at an average of 12 percent per annum in the decade preceding the monetary crisis of 1997, the expansion of Jakarta's road network grew at an average annual rate of only two percent.¹⁴ The lifestyle changes accompanying rising incomes in the 1980s brought increases in both the numbers of motorized trips taken and the average trip length, concurrently with decreasing average speeds, and more time wasted on the road stuck in traffic jams of epic proportions. The private automobile became the fastest rising direct contributor to air pollution.¹⁵ Even with rapid industrialization, transportation replaced industry as the largest source of air pollution during the 1980s.¹⁶ The passenger car population of Jakarta accounts for between 35 and 40 percent of the cars in all of Indonesia, while the population of Jakarta accounts for about five percent of the national population. The population shift from Jakarta to the surrounding counties caused the average daily number of commuters from Botabek into Jakarta to double every four years through the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁷ A substantial portion of this population shift was the flight of the wealthiest Jakartans, also the most car-ownership intensive population, out of the city into the new single-use housing estates of the surrounding counties. One car households in Jakarta became two- or three-car households when they moved out to Botabek. The reallocation of road space that accompanied such an increase of

¹² Dimitriou, "Transport Problems," 80.

¹³ *Jakarta 2005: Peraturan Daerah No. 5 Tahun 1985 Tentang Rencana Umum Tata Ruang (RUTR) Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta 1985-2005* (Jakarta 2005: Provincial Regulation No. 5, 1984 regarding the Jakarta General Spatial Plan 1985-2005) (Jakarta: BAPPEDA, DKI Jakarta, 1987), Table 4.24, 40.

¹⁴ Before the crisis the cities of Java in general were generating traffic growth rates of between 7 and 15 percent per year. Heru Dewanto, "The Future of Toll Road Investment," *Jakarta Post* 18, no. 146 & 147 (21-22 September 2000), 4. *Statistik Kendaraan Bermotor dan Panjang Jalan 1995-1996* (Motor Vehicle and Road Length Statistics), (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1997), 1-13; and *Statistik Perhubungan 1998* (Transportation and Communication Statistics 1998), (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), 9, 87-94. In Indonesia's largest cities (over one million in population) the increase in vehicles ranged from 8 to 12 percent annually during the 1990s while road construction grew by about seven percent per annum on average. From Soebiyijo Soemodihardo, "Urban Transport Development In Indonesia," <http://www.unchs.org/unchs/english/transport/indones.htm>.

¹⁵ Harun al-Rasyid S. Lubis, contribution to the Sustainable Transport Action Network for Asia and the Pacific (the SUSTRAN Network) List Server. <http://www.malaysiakini.com/sustran>

¹⁶ Ade Sjafruddin et al., "Sistem Transportasi Berkelanjutan dan Masalah Dampak Lingkungan Transportasi Perkotaan" (Sustainable Transportation System and Environmental Impacts of Urban Transportation), *Simposium Nasional dan Civil Expo 2000: Peluang dan Tantangan Bidang Teknologi dan Profesi Teknik Sipil Indonesia dalam Menghadapi Era Otonomi Daerah dan Pasar Bebas*, Jurusan Teknik Sipil - ITB Bandung (8-9 September 2000).

¹⁷ Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 237.

automobile usage impacted bus and rail commuters as well. Buses were caught in the ensuing traffic jams shifting more commuters to already overcrowded rail service—or, if they could possibly afford it, into their own cars. As a result the median per trip commute time reached an astonishing two hours by 1995 and continued to rise, approaching two-and-a-half hours by 2000.¹⁸ There are no statistics available for the number of cars in Jabotabek, but the automobile population of Jakarta doubled in nine years between 1979 and 1988, and again in seven years by 1995. As bad as conditions had become by the eve of the 1997 financial crisis, trends would indicate that demand for putting private automobiles on the roads of Jabotabek could continue to double every five to ten years.¹⁹ Widely held assumptions that Indonesia is following a teleological development path more or less resembling that of the United States would have Jakarta's 1997 car ownership rate of about 70 cars per 1,000 population eventually increase more than ten-fold.

The war-time and post-independence waves of migration into Jakarta effectively filled up most of the open spaces that had been left undeveloped by the Dutch. First makeshift shanties, and later, permanent houses, filled in areas previously set aside for parks, green belts, infrastructure projects, and the banks of rivers and canals. As housing pressures continued to increase, the open spaces between buildings in formally defined parcels were filled in as well. Long distances between roadways left vast block interiors that became the sites of the unserved urban *kampung*, accessed only by a labyrinth of alleys too narrow for anything on more than two wheels. The thin crust of luxury villas or commercial establishments along the roads concealed the ramshackle life of the *kampung* from public view replicating certain aspects of nineteenth century Manchester, England as described by Frederick Engels.²⁰ Successive waves of in-migration pushed demand and prices upward, causing market and household gardens to be replaced by more housing, and existing houses to be serially subdivided. Between 1961 and 1971, Jakarta's population grew by 57 percent, compared to the national growth rate of 22 percent.²¹ By the 1970s, conditions deteriorated as space standards and basic urban services failed to keep pace with the growing densities that reached 400 to 700 persons per hectare (150 to 300 persons per acre) in several inner

¹⁸ Sapto Nugroho, "Penglaju dan 'TOD' di Jabotabek" (Commuters and Transit Oriented Development in Jabotabek), *Kompas* (16 August 2000); "Boom Kota Baru di Pinggir Jakarta" (New Town Boom at Jakarta's Edge), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 17 (June 1995), 27.

¹⁹ Car ownership has become the new preferred means of speculative investment and has artificially skewed the car ownership numbers upward without reflecting necessarily an increase in car usage. These tend to be luxury import cars assembled overseas.

²⁰ Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (London: Granada Publishing, 1969 (1844)).

²¹ Darrundono et al., ed., "Thirty Years Kampung Improvement Program, 1969-1999: From KIP-1 to KIP-3," *Miscellany of Kampung Improvement Program* (Jakarta: Jakarta Provincial Government, 2000), 8.

city *kampung*.²² The internationally acclaimed Kampung Improvement Projects starting in the 1970s, maximized funding by mobilizing local labor to retrofit water supply, drainage, and paved footpaths in many urban *kampung* in Jakarta. Unfortunately, many of the *kampung*, even those that had been improved, were cleared away in the 1980s and 1990s to make way for new high-rise office, condominium, or shopping mall development without arrangements for re-housing those who were displaced. New formal sector housing on the expanding edges of the urban road network during this period, was priced well beyond the means of most Jakarta households. By the early 1990s, some 70 percent of the population of Jabotabek could not afford to purchase the home they lived in; construction costs had long been rising faster than median incomes; and even the smallest 10-square-meter (110-square-foot) core housing units built by the Perumnas National Housing Corporation were beyond the means of most workers.²³ Economic growth policies began to fail from so much success, as the conditions supporting the supply of low cost labor that was a key ingredient of Indonesia's economic boom were disrupted and urban residents were displaced from the formerly low-cost residential areas close to employment centers.²⁴

While the four problem areas of water supply, flooding, mobility and housing are neither neatly delineated nor all-inclusive, they have been consistently identified in one way or another at the core of the highest priority issues needing to be addressed in planning for the future development of Jakarta and its region. The extent to which these issues were addressed or ignored will be taken as an indication of the priorities, values, and criteria associated with both the planning positions examined in the remainder of this chapter and the implementation of planning measures examined in the next chapter.

The Normative Response of the Planning Professions

The earliest planning efforts of the newly founded Republic of Indonesia were continuations of large-scale development projects initiated under Dutch colonial rule prior to the Japanese occupation in 1942. Central among these plans is the Kebayoran Baru New Town in South Jakarta. With independence, Sukarno charged an advisory committee to demarcate the boundaries of "greater Jakarta" (*Djakarta Raja*). This became the basis for what was later designated the

²² Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 221.

²³ *Jabotabek Review*, 22-23; Wim Stolte, "From JABOTABEK to PANTURA," in *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 242.

²⁴ *Jabotabek Review*, 22.

Special Capital Province of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta or DKI Jakarta).²⁵ The 1952 Djakarta Raja plan envisioned a concentrically organized city around the Monas National Monument reinforced by a series of ring roads and delimited by a green belt. Many vestiges of the thinking of this original plan remained lodged in the thinking of Indonesian planners and bureaucrats, eventually finding their way into built form, despite concerted efforts made to get away from concentric development models.

A 1956 United Nations mission to Jakarta began as an exercise to train Indonesia's first post-independence generation of planners. Sukarno unexpectedly transformed this training program into a comprehensive masterplanning effort. The planning team's charge was to prepare the capital city for rapid industrialization. The retooling of the capital was to foster the development of Jakarta as the center of a growing modern industrial economy, that would in turn, serve as the means of financing the much needed major infrastructure improvements, ring roads, slum clearance, and new housing. Upon completion in 1960, the masterplan was almost entirely ignored by the Architect/President Sukarno who made the realization of his own personal vision for the city his top priority. The Djakarta 1965-1985 Plan (passed into law in 1967) continued the concentric patterns of industrial development and population growth of earlier plans, but for the first time anticipated the breaching of what had been thought vast area of the Special Capital Province of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta).²⁶

Cooperation between the Indonesian and Dutch Governments in the areas of urban and regional planning was hampered by continuing conflicts between the two nations, first over Dutch citizen rights in the young Republic of Indonesia, and then in the 1960s over control of Dutch New Guinea. This was resolved by US intervention in 1963, clearing the way for a renewed flow of technical and financial planning assistance from the Dutch in 1964. The atmosphere created by Sukarno's open hostility to the West limited the role of these efforts at the time, but in the early 1970s it resulted in the establishment of several of the key institutions promoting the development of housing in Indonesia: the Ministry of Housing, the National Housing Corporation (Perusahaan Rumah Nasional or Perumnas), and the National Mortgage Bank (Bank Tabungan Negara or

²⁵ Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept on Metropolitan Planning of the Jakarta Region," in *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 102.

²⁶ Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, 219-20; Haryo Winarso, "Private Residential Developers and the Spatial Structure of Jabotabek," chapter 15 in *Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume 1: Making the Cities*, ed. Graham P. Chapman et al. (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999), 279.

BTN). It also resulted in a pilot sites and services housing program that produced 4,000 units in Cirebon.²⁷

In 1973, a Dutch-sponsored training exercise was again converted into an actual planning effort that yielded dozens of significant planning documents including the 1980 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan and its Review in 1993. Together, these plans served as the most far-reaching and comprehensive planning exercise ever seen in Indonesia. Although the Jabotabek plans were never formally adopted directly, they were the basis of the Jakarta 1985-2005 plan, served as the prerequisite guidelines for internationally funded infrastructure projects, and established the framework for coordinating planning across the multiple administrative jurisdictions of the region. The influence exerted by the plan on the overall pattern of regional development was found to be significant as a consequence of its role in guiding the location of several major infrastructure projects.²⁸ The 20-year history of the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan and Plan Reviews is of particular significance to the present study for several reasons:

1. The Jabotabek planning efforts were launched at about the same time as the suburban real estate industry was being born and preceded the major development boom periods enough to have potentially played a significant role in guiding the location, nature, and interconnectedness of that development.
2. The geographic scope of the Jabotabek plans broke free of the administrative limitations of the former provincial level West Java and DKI Jakarta plans, to encompass an area more closely matching the pattern of urbanization and the forces that were subsequently unleashed.
3. The Jabotabek plans brought a broad range of national, provincial, and county/municipal governmental agencies into contact with each other along with an international community of planners.
4. The Dutch model that guided the Jabotabek plans was uniquely well-suited to the fine-grained pattern of compact, densely-populated, land constrained, and agriculturally oriented urbanism of Indonesia in ways that British or American planning precedents were notably ill-equipped to address.

²⁷ Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept," 104-105.

²⁸ Part of the 1993 *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review* was the evaluation of new development during the period from 1980 to 1990 as compared to the guidelines layed out in the 1980 *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan*. Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 230.

Two of the most notable phenomena of the Indonesian built environment since independence were, in fact, the birth and boom of the suburban real estate industry on the one hand, and the regional planning of Jabotabek on the other. That these two phenomena should be compressed into the span of almost identical time periods—the heyday of suburban real estate development (from 1972 to 1997) and the Jabotabek plan years (from 1973 to 1993)—makes their comparison all the more illustrative of the forces behind each of them.

The planning team's first, and perhaps most lasting, contribution to the Jakarta Metropolitan Area was the name Jabotabek itself, originally coined to identify the secondary urban centers (not the counties as it was later redefined) of the expanding urbanization: JA-karta in the center, BO-gor to the south, TA-ngerang to the east, and BEK-asi to the west.²⁹ The Indonesian and Dutch members of the planning team identified in the region around Jakarta what Friedmann called "agropolitan development"—agriculture in a metropolitan area.³⁰ A decade later, geographer Terry McGee would develop his concept of Southeast Asian urbanization, *desakotasasi*, through his examination of the same hybrid urbanization. Both Friedmann and McGee were struck by the persistence of agricultural uses and rural urban forms, despite population densities surpassing those of most American cities, accompanied by the widespread participation of these households in the nearby urban economy.³¹

In 1973, the first of the Jabotabek planning studies "Jabotabek: A Planning Approach of the Absorption Capacity for New Settlements within the Jakarta Metropolitan Region" already acknowledged the threats posed by increasing levels of private motorization. The report was critical of the inefficiencies of ribbon development patterns following the course of each improved road radiating out of Jakarta. One of the salient features of the Jabotabek plans from its initial studies through the formal review concluded in 1993, was a frank acknowledgment of the two fundamental realities of development and planning in Indonesia that circumscribed any proposal to influence Jakarta's development. First, that the Indonesian government had proven incapable of effectively controlling either the kind or location of new development towards a previously determined 'public good' even in the 1990s, by which time a significant arsenal of regulatory

²⁹ The town of Depok was granted *kotamadyo* (municipality) status in 2000 putting it on a par with the municipalities and counties of Tangerang, Bekasi and Bogor. To acknowledge its new status, the regional designation of Jabotabek was changed to "Jabodetabek."

³⁰ John Friedmann and Robert Wulff, *The Urban Transition: Comparative Studies of Newly Industrializing Societies* (Los Angeles: School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975).

³¹ T.G. McGee, "The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis," chapter 1 in *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, ed. Norton Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel and T.G. McGee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 3-26.

tools, plans, agencies, and regulations had been deployed to do just that.³² And second, that the location of new transportation infrastructure (particularly big roads) was the most direct influence on where new development occurred.³³ The team's recommendations called for concentrated urbanization focused on existing urban subcenters. By emphasizing the established town centers of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi, and identifying smaller growth centers along existing rail lines, the Jabotabek concept proposed to develop a hierarchical network of distinct growth centers separated from each other by lower density development and open space. One of their primary objectives was to stave off the development of the homogenous linear densities of road-based ribbon development. This rail-based settlement pattern was integrated with, and complemented by, an interwoven network of bus and para-transit service.

With this as the core of the Jabotabek concept, the key question became: What form should the urbanization take around and between Jakarta and these three primary subcenters? As part of the methodology for developing and reviewing the Jabotabek plans from 1973 to 1993, several alternative "paradigms" were considered and evaluated as possible approaches to planning for the future of the region. It is worth examining these to establish the underlying values that informed the masterplans, and to understand what the planners were explicitly working to avoid. Not surprisingly, the Dutch members of the team brought with them a strong vision of the Randstad as the key model for the initial plan. The central paradigm of Dutch planning at the time was captured in the concept of "bundled deconcentration"—the development of high-density subcenters to permit growth outside of the overcrowded center of Jakarta but without low-density sprawl.³⁴ In the 1973 Jabotabek plan, two alternative patterns of bundled deconcentration were compared: A "linear system," with subcenters organized along the rail lines running east, west, and south from Jakarta; and a "concentric system," with subcenters organized along a ring road about 20 kilometers (32 miles) in radius from the center of Jakarta. Sketches of both the initial development pattern and its expected subsequent extension were examined in assessing each "paradigm" (see figures). In both of the models considered, towns already located along existing rail lines were chosen as the centers for the initial phase of new growth. Each of these centers would be expected to grow in population up to several hundred thousand people. In addition, these growth centers would be mixed-use with a balance of jobs and housing in order to reduce their dependence on, and thus trips to and from,

³² The *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review* noted that 'negative controls' had proven ineffective. *Jabotabek Review*, 31.

³³ Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept," 109; *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan, 1980-1990: Executive Summary: Implementation Report I/1* Edisi Bahasa Indonesia (Jakarta: Ministry of Public Works, 1981), 3; *Jabotabek Review*, 31.

³⁴ Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept," 111, 113.

Jakarta. By choosing to develop around existing town center, the new urbanization was expected to embody a stronger sense of place than would be likely to emerge from wholly new towns. The extensions of urbanization in subsequent phases of development would also be concentrated around transportation nodes but permitted to locate away from the railway lines.




FIGURE 5.5 Comparison between a "Linear Model" and a "Concentric Model." Source: Giebels

The criteria employed for judging the relative merits of the two distinct patterns for the proposed "bundled deconcentration" of new concentrated growth centers outside and separate from Jakarta can be derived from the planning document and its description elsewhere.³⁵

³⁵ Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept," 111, 113.

1. What is the most efficient settlement pattern for infrastructure provision?
2. What pattern allows the greatest utilization of rail transportation and reduces the tendency to depend on roadways?
3. What pattern most easily facilitates preservation of open space for water storage, aquifer recharge, flood protection, and agriculture?

These are the three dimensions along which the two competing models appear to have been compared.

The diagram of the concentric system is drawn in such a way as to emphasize the hierarchical relationship of the new growth centers, representing the primary centers such as Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, and Serpong as circles. The diagram of the linear system on the other hand, seems to propose a less hierarchical series of new concentrated settlements. The road network represented in each diagram are close to being identical with the major exception of the new ring road shown in the concentric system diagram. This road serves as a major axis passing through the center of each of the primary new growth centers and is represented as a secondary roadway (presumably not a toll road). However, this arrangement would have replicated the conflict between local and regional traffic experienced in the urban centers throughout Indonesia. The alternative of building this ring road as a limited access toll road would serve to reduce the impact of local trips on regional traffic flows but would disrupt the formation of the urban centers. In contrast, the same major roadways (except for the ring road) shown in the linear system diagram do not pass through the town centers but flank them, avoiding conflicts between local and regional trips. The existing rail line to the south-west through Serpong is left off the linear system diagram, although it is questionable whether an approach so committed to making maximum advantage of existing rail infrastructure would, in implementation, forego such a valuable opportunity.

The Jabotabek planning team selected the linear system paradigm over the concentric system paradigm for three reasons:

1. While taking a stance against ribbon development along roadways, the team felt that the linear model was more sympathetic to the natural tendencies of Indonesian development as demonstrated in the historic progression of Jakarta along the axis of major roads from the old port southward to Monas and further to Kebayoran. Taming the historic tendency towards ribbon development by alternating between densely developed and open space land uses was considered a more realistic challenge than the preservation of entire rings of open space between new towns.

2. The linear model was deemed a more efficient and flexible geometry for infrastructure provision. Perpendicular road-based transportation extensions off the primary spines of rail lines would face fewer spatial constraints. Particularly persuasive was the possibility of further extension beyond the Jabotabek boundaries along a single line of infrastructure not offered by the geometry of a ring.
3. The three arms of the linear model were separated by greater distances between the areas of high-density development than found in the concentric model, thus it was thought that open space preservation would be easier to manage successfully.

A pattern of new town subcenters organized in concentric rings was explicitly also rejected, as this pattern would have required the construction of new towns on agricultural lands away from the existing rail-served town centers of Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor. It would necessitate the construction of greater amounts of infrastructure to serve the new towns in locations that could be expected to accelerate the filling up of suburban roadways with new traffic.³⁶ The linear pattern, by withholding new infrastructure construction, was more likely to constrain further undesirable development even if regulatory constraints were incompletely enforced.

In 1976, the World Bank took over funding of the Jabotabek planning process from the Dutch government. A new team of consultants, again with participation by Dutch planners, was commissioned in 1978 to prepare the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan 1980-1990.³⁷ The second planning team similarly rejected the concentric model and endorsed the linear model, making a crucial adaptation. In greater recognition of the sensitivity of the watershed areas surrounding Bogor and the Serpong-Depok aquifer recharge zone, the southern arm of the linear model reaching towards Bogor was de-emphasized. What urban and industrial development that was to occur to the south from Depok to Bogor would be restricted to the compact secondary growth centers.³⁸ The team's plan, released in 1981, also called for a minimization of further developments in the sensitive coastal zone, covering a vast area from the Java sea to a line roughly 15 kilometers (9 miles) to the south.³⁹ Again, recognizing the Indonesian government's historic regulatory and administrative limitations, the team focused on infrastructure provision as the key spatial determinant of future development. The most significant single element of the 1981 Jabotabek Plan was the east-west development corridor where proposed infrastructure

³⁶ Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept," 113.

³⁷ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 229; *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*.

³⁸ *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*, 3.

³⁹ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 229; *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*, 3-4.

improvements were concentrated. Rail improvements (electrification, double-tracking, service upgrades) were the main focus. This was complemented by programs for upgrading roads, water supply, sanitation, drainage, and other urban infrastructure concentrated along an east-west corridor from Balaraja in the east through Kebayoran in South Jakarta and westward to Cikarang (figure 5.6).⁴⁰ This corridor was to have worked in conjunction with the development of employment centers along its length to achieve a greater jobs-housing balance.⁴¹ Rail improvements, in fact, represented the largest, by far, annual expenditure proposed under the plan, accounting for almost a fifth of the plan budget by fiscal year 1988/1989.⁴² The improved rail service was to have tied in with measures for curtailing the use of private motor vehicles, including limitations on the number of private cars allowed to enter the city. By the end of the 1970s, planners had already predicted the coming boom in private motorization and the resulting road congestion crisis. Aggressive proposals for expanding bus, rail, and para-transit systems; maintaining and extending Jakarta's traditionally compact, high density node-and-spoke transportation-land use pattern; and imposing disincentives to automobile ownership, were all considered higher priorities than the ambitious traffic management and new road construction projects that were also planned. It was hoped that with sufficient improvements to public transportation, a mode split of 30 percent public and 70 percent private trips could be maintained.⁴³ The goal was to satisfy most people's mobility needs through public transportation in order to keep enough trips out of private motorized vehicles, so that the expanded road capacity offered by the toll road network already being built in 1978 would not be overwhelmed before it was completed.

After the railroads, the most ambitious proposal of the 1981 plan was to support the creation of serviced low-cost housing within, or closely bordering, Jakarta for around two million people. This program, called Guided Land Development, grew naturally out of the Kampung Improvement Program of the 1970s as its logical extension. The most serious obstacle faced by the Kampung Improvement Program was the lack of space in the *kampung* needed for retrofitting infrastructures, garbage collection points, communal bathrooms, clinics, etc. In light of this, the Guided Land Development Program aimed at combining the advantages of long-range infrastructure planning with the low-cost and high-volume popular self-help housing production of the informal sector settlements in the urban *kampung*. Under the plan, the government would assemble and layout

⁴⁰ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 229; *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*, 3-4.

⁴¹ *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*, 3, 18.

⁴² *Jabotabek Plan 1980-1990*, 18, 35.

⁴³ SRI International, "Jakarta Transport System Improvement" in 4 volumes, (SRI International, Menlo Park, Calif., December 1978).

mixed parcel sizes on lands identified at the expanding edge of urbanization along the east-west development corridor. Infrastructure and services would be developed incrementally, as mixed income *kampung* communities grew on the sites and became, over time, increasingly able to pay for them.⁴⁴ Government land assembly, preplanning of infrastructure, and mixing of income levels were key components of the strategy aimed at lowering costs and fostering an internal cross-subsidization structure. Roughly one third of the land area identified for development in the 1981 Plan was designated land for Guided Land Development. This included 2,500 hectares (6,000 acres) in West Jakarta and 2,000 hectares (5,000 acres) in East Jakarta to be developed by the year 2000.⁴⁵ Guided Land Development was adopted by several regional planning efforts. It was proposed for 9,250 hectares (23,000 acres) by the 1985 Jabotabek Development Plan Report and on 11 sites, at an average of 40 hectares (100 acres) per site, by the 1985 West Java Urban Development Report.⁴⁶

In the early 1990s the financial and technical assistance supporting the Jabotabek planning process was again mobilized to conduct a review of the 1981 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan assessing its effectiveness, revisiting the issues it originally attempted to address, updating its recommendations in light of ensuing events, and proposing new directions as deemed necessary. As a result, the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review was issued in 1993. With an emphasis on the review function of this plan, there is a tone of 'pragmatic realism' as many of the key elements of the 1981 Plan were down-played or abandoned. In this review, the planning team employed once again the methodology of developing competing spatial development "paradigms" judged by a set of criteria serving to make the goals of the planning team more explicit.⁴⁷ Here the "linear system" model of the 1970s reappears, slightly altered, as the "east/west linear city." In the diagram of this paradigm the densely developed corridors of urban agglomeration to the east and west were emphasized as the band of urbanization reaching southward to Bogor was shown as subordinate. In place of the earlier "concentric system," the 1993 review chose instead to posit a "self-sustaining new towns paradigm" showing a ring of new towns floating in a protected "open area." A third paradigm was introduced to the comparison in the diagram of a "finger city"

⁴⁴ Andrew M. Hamer et al., "Indonesia: The Challenge of Urbanization," World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 787 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986), 89; Michael Leon Leaf, "Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the 'Big Village' to the 'Modern City'," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991), 185-86.

⁴⁵ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 195-96, and footnote 38, 196.

⁴⁶ Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), 261-62.

⁴⁷ *Jabotabek Review*, 31-40.

showing a ribbon of development to the southeast (presumably incorporating the new town Bumi Serpong Damai launched several years earlier) and another to the southwest.




FIGURE 5.6 The east-west development corridor concentrating development away from the wet rice cultivation areas to the north and south and the forested slopes of the southern watershed. Source: 1981 Jakarta Metropolitan Development Plan

Each of the three spatial development models was evaluated on the basis of nine criteria. These were:

1. How well does the paradigm match the analysis of environmental sensitivity?
2. How flexible is it in accommodating unpredicted future developments?
3. How much additional infrastructure is demanded by the model?
4. How great are the risks of further sprawl?
5. How efficiently does it provide for public transportation and utility infrastructure?
6. How efficiently does it provide for agricultural areas?
7. How accessible would open space be for inhabitants?

8. How likely is it to reduce traffic pressure on downtown Jakarta?
9. How enforceable is the model?⁴⁸

The planning team's evaluation of each of the three "paradigms" according to their nine criteria were conclusive. On a scale of one to one hundred, the scores were as follows:

"self-sustaining new towns"	31
"finger city"	44
"linear city"	72 ⁴⁹

It can be argued that each step of this process leaves much to be desired. One could point out that the choice and description of "paradigms" largely pre-ordained the outcome, and that other models were more worthy of being considered. For example, why was not a poly-nucleated urban form modeled for consideration? While the criteria are defensible, one could argue that they are not at all of equal importance and should be weighted according to relative value. The subjective values placed on each model according to the personal judgments of the planning team could also be questioned. However, it is the act of engaging in, and reporting the details of, such an exercise that is perhaps more significant than its conclusions. By being explicit about the models, the criteria for judging them, and the relative values assigned to each, the planning team created a transparent means for collective decision making even at the risk of opening their own choices up to questioning by others. Such a means of decision making could be taken up by future planners, planning teams, or even a broader participatory process.

The perceived relative advantages of the linear model over the alternatives considered were that it would:

1. Promote efficiency of investment in transportation systems,
2. Foster relatively straight-forward development control (no presumption that regulation could resist infilling of areas between new towns or between development 'fingers'),
3. Allow a good match between major residential and employment areas,
4. Be in broad sympathy with the environmental zoning model,
5. Align with the general development prognosis of the external model for West Java, and

⁴⁸ *Jabotabek Review*, 31-32.

⁴⁹ The one element that is unclear is how these scores were derived from the rating of each criterium. The author's distribution of scores from the most positive to the most negative possible values result in scores on a scale of one to one hundred of 27, 39 and 59 respectively.

6. Exhibit flexibility, in that it might be extended to include Karawang/Cikampek and Serang in an integrated linear metropolitan chain.⁵⁰

The main shortcoming associated with the linear model was that it was deemed less favorable towards providing ready access to open spaces. The fact that the linear model was the one most likely to result in the preservation of any open space at all indicates that the team's concern for proximity between residential areas and open space was more important in their evaluation than the existence of open space in the proper places for environmental reasons.⁵¹ It is interesting to note that the new towns model was rejected, scoring poorly in almost every category—especially given that this is the model that was in fact most forcefully guaranteed in Suharto's decision to turn over the direction of Jabotabek's development to private sector initiative. The proliferation of new towns was rejected by the planning team, as it provided few options for future growth and significant incentives to infill between the new towns and towards Jakarta. The successful preservation of any open space was seen as being too dependent upon the self-sufficiency of the new towns and upon government ability to prevent non-agricultural development between the new towns and Jakarta. It would also compel the development of radial transportation routes, exacerbating Jakarta's traffic problems rather than improving them.⁵² The "finger city" model was more favorably received than the new towns option. By acknowledging the improbability that the new towns could ever be truly independent, and accepting ribbon development along transportation routes radiating out from Jakarta, the ambitious notion of successfully defending an open space greenbelt around Jakarta was abandoned. However, this model was similarly rejected as being still too dependent upon regulatory capacity to prevent development between and beyond the "fingers" of ribbon development. It would also place the greatest road traffic demands on Jakarta by reinforcing a radial regional structure.

The Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review used a growth model based on weighted capacities of each of Jabotabek's 1408 *desa* (administrative villages) to accommodate growth based primarily on road accessibility and environmental capacity. The derivation of overall capacity was based on the supply of water available for use within each site, and significantly, not the need to preserve the regional water supply capacity. At the same time, the more detailed environmental analysis of the 1993 review found that the sub-soil conditions of Jabotabek makes horizontal water table recharge relatively insignificant, leaving the region's shallow and deep aquifers largely

⁵⁰ *Jabotabek Review*, 31.

⁵¹ *Jabotabek Review*, 33; Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 236-37.

⁵² *Jabotabek Review*, 32; Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 236.

dependent on vertical recharge. These findings indicate that the region's water table is far more vulnerable to surface pollution than previously believed. The role of the southern water catchment areas in the recharging of deep and even shallow aquifers was found to be less significant than their role as direct sources of surface water. The use of weighted development capacities led to the forecast that the current trend would result in annual growth of about four percent equally to the east, the south, and the west, while the growth rate of Jakarta would fall below two percent up to the year 2010. Continued growth to the south was seen as being directly counter to the goals of the 1981 Jakarta Metropolitan Development Plan and was found to be contributing to aggravated traffic, greater flooding, and worsening pollution problems for Jakarta. Further southward growth would also hasten regional water supply shortages.⁵³ The necessity of shifting development away from the southern Jagorawi highway corridor, first raised in the 1981 plan, was reaffirmed and amplified by the 1993 review. In calling for the reduction in the role of Bogor as a growing urban center, the 1993 planning team pushed the projection of future growth further east beyond Tangerang to Serang and past Bekasi to Cirebon in the west. The Jabotabek Model was thus reconceived on a larger scale as the "Pantura" or North Coast Corridor model (figure 5.6).⁵⁴

The Jabotabek Environmental Zone Analysis, updated in each new generation of planning, set the boundaries for the east-west development corridor. These were established according to the need to protect areas crucial to the maintenance of the region's water supply and the prevention of flooding. The channeling of future development into this corridor would simultaneously generate significant benefits from both the inherent efficiencies, and the ease of future expansion offered by linear infrastructure patterns—in particular, transportation infrastructure. By proposing that this new development be concentrated at higher densities in close proximity to existing and new rail stations, and that investment in rail service improvements take priority over and proceed in advance of road improvements (as emphasized in the 1981 Plan), the Jabotabek plans offered a strong response to the mobility problems facing the region. By allocating as much as one third of the new development areas within this corridor to informal *kampung* development with formal infrastructure provision (Guided Land Development), the Jabotabek Plans offered perhaps the best chance for improving housing of the majority of Jakartans. With a sincere effort to implement these proposals, backed by the government leadership, an expectation of significant success against the

⁵³ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 237-40.

⁵⁴ North coast in Indonesian is *pantai utara* from which the term Pantura derives as in *PANT-ai U-ta-RA*. This term in itself is deceiving as each of the Jabotabek plans preserves a wide swath of coastal area to the east and west of Jakarta. The sensitive coastal wetlands, mangrove swamps and wet-rice agricultural lands located here are instrumental in flood prevention and protection of coastal conditions all along the north coast including Jakarta. Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 228-29.

four problem areas of water supply, flooding, mobility, and housing was justifiable. Taken together, these planning, regulatory, and policy mechanisms represent a formidable program for guiding the formation of the Jakarta region to meet an identifiable set of economic, social and environmental goals.

Planning Loses its Normative Voice

Before examining in greater detail the ways in which these planning and regulatory mechanisms were and were not implemented in the next chapter, it is useful to first examine, in the remaining section of this chapter, the ways in which the planning process itself responded to the political pressures of the late Suharto Period.

As in the earlier planning documents, a comparison of spatial planning paradigms in the abstract begins the 1993 Review and establishes an idealized model as the key reference point for the proposals that follow. In the second chapter of the review, quantitative analyses are used to establish the relative development potentials of each village unit in the region reinforcing the strengths of the east-west development model.⁵⁵ Having established a certain theoretical and analytical legitimacy as its foundation, the following chapters proposing the Jabotabek spatial plan and implementation strategies make reference to these earlier findings but also break with them and the major elements of earlier Jabotabek plans in significant ways—in most instances, without offering justifications or even noting the divergence. The substantive recommendations of the review demonstrate a significant weakening of the normative planning approach in favor of proposals that aligned with the trends and directions set by private sector developers.

The extent of this disconnection is here evaluated by referring to the problem areas established by the Jabotabek plans and described in the first section of this chapter. By relating proposals back to the identified problem areas, the performance of planning in generating reasonable responses can be evaluated based on their merits and deficiencies as proposals, even before examining their performance in implementation. Where a plausible rationale linking the problem analysis to the planning proposal is not explicitly provided or cannot be readily deduced, further questions are asked concerning the political, economic, and social forces at work. This questioning reveals that even the international team of consultants working with Indonesian planners to solve some of the most serious urban problems found anywhere in the world could be swayed from their task by the formidable pressures of the political and private sector elite.

The primary key to addressing the first two of the four problem areas, water supply and flooding, was controlling the location of new development. The sensitive environmental zones of

⁵⁵ *Jabotabek Review*, 41-52

the coast and the southern slopes were both instrumental in decreasing the frequency and severity of flooding, as well as fighting water pollution and aquifer depletion. While the decisive resolution of these problems is probably impossible without strong environmentally-based zoning and building controls, their larger dimensions were more immediately addressed by not allowing new road investment in these two areas. The chronic shortage of road capacity in Jakarta since independence established a condition in which any new road construction leads to a surge of new economic activity along its length. An informal commercial strip was often the first form of development along improved roadways with food stalls, tire repair, and other itinerant activities setting up shop. By some later date these would be transformed, either incrementally or through large-scale redevelopment, into a formal sector commercial strip lined by three to four story shop houses (*ruko*). This pent up demand amplifies the influence of road improvements on the location of new development, even beyond the already significant connection between road networks and development where there is little or no unsatisfied demand for access.

The degree to which improved road access accounts for locational preferences is indicated in part by the effect of improved roads on land values. In the 1990s, the proximity of good road infrastructure to residential land uses in Jakarta was found to add 49 percent to property values on average. The added value rose to 88 percent at distances of 15 kilometers (10 miles) or more from the center of Jakarta.⁵⁶ Office space within 500 meters (three tenths of a mile) of a toll road interchange in Jakarta was priced US\$1.35 more per square meter per month than equivalent rental space more than 2.5 kilometers (one-and-a-half miles) from an interchange.⁵⁷ Indeed, the 1993 review found a strong correlation between the location of major road improvements, especially new toll road projects, and the overall spatial development pattern of the region.⁵⁸ These data corroborate what the original Indonesian-Dutch planning team pointed out (reconfirmed by subsequent international planning teams in their analyses and acknowledged by their proposals): urban form follows freeways. This understanding underpinned the recommendations against adopting any plan that depended on regulatory restrictions against ribbon development along

⁵⁶ David Dowall and Michael Leaf, "The Price of Land for Housing in Jakarta," *Urban Studies* 28, no. 5 (1991), 707-22; cited in Bambang Susantono, "Transportation and Land Use Dynamics in Metropolitan Jakarta," *Berkeley Planning Journal* 12 (1998), 137

⁵⁷ Robert Cervero and Bambang Susantono, "Rent Captialization and Transportation Infrastructure Development in Jakarta, Indonesia," paper presented to the *Workshop on Technological Change and Urban Form*, Jakarta (1997), cited in Susantono, "Transportation and Land Use," 138. See also: Aria Indra Purnama, "Sistem Transportasi dan Pola Penggunaan Lahan: Studi Kasus: Jakarta Metropolitan, Indonesia" (Transportation Systems and Land Use Patterns: Metropolitan Jakarta Case), *Centre for Developing Cities* <http://cities.canberra.edu.au/publications/Policypaper/aria_indo.htm> (2000).

⁵⁸ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 230; *Jabotabek Review*, 41

improved or new roadways, or any plan that would allow further freeway construction outside of the narrow east-west development corridor bounded by the flood prone agricultural and conservation lands of the north coast and the sensitive water catchment areas of the southern slopes.

The development corridor approach to resolving the most serious threats posed by water supply and flooding issues was also deemed the best means of addressing the majority of the regional mobility related problems. Rail transportation was the key to achieving the vision of "bundled deconcentration" espoused by the 1973 Jabotabek plan, and the mode most consonant with the goals of the preferred Linear Model of regional development. However, the rail infrastructure investments proposed by the first Jabotabek planning team in the 1970s was never followed through with by the Indonesian government, despite its salience as the dominant funding priority of the 1981 Plan. In the 1993 Review proposals, major new investments in rail infrastructure were to be deferred until after the road network had been built-out and sufficient population densities had been attained to justify it.⁵⁹ In the meantime, it endorsed the Jakarta Urban Mass Transit Preparation Programme (JUMTPP) recommendation to convert existing heavy rail lines to light rail as a cost reduction measure.⁶⁰ The only mention of rail investments extending beyond Jabotabek to a larger regional extension at the scale addressed by the Pantura model, was made to assert, simply, that it was not feasible.⁶¹ The shift away from the priorities and values established in the earlier chapters of the review to an endorsement of road-based ribbon development occurs in its subsequent proposals without comment. This paradigm shift occurred in two steps. The failure during the 1980s to follow through on the 1981 recommendations for rail investment constituted a shift from rail- to road-based transportation. But even with this shift in which mode was to be receive the highest priority, the road investments, at first, were still to be concentrated within the east-west development corridor. However, given the nature of road networks, their geometries, spatial requirements, sources of finance, and basic economics, the subsequent abandonment of the east-west development corridor followed as the logical outcome of the new priority given to road development.

Indonesia's first major highways were built in Jakarta by Sukarno in the 1960s according to a very personal set of priorities. The inner ring road, with its monumental Semanggi cloverleaf interchange where it intersects with Jakarta's main north-south axis, was a centerpiece of Sukarno's Jakarta. It established the framework within which the next several decades of

⁵⁹ *Jabotabek Review*, 58, 73.

⁶⁰ *Jabotabek Review*, 72-73.

⁶¹ *Jabotabek Review*, 73.

development was to occur. The Jagorawi (JA-karta Bo-GOR J-A-lan WI-layah, or Jakarta-to-Bogor Regional Highway) was built along the route to and from Sukarno's weekend retreat in the cooler climate of Bogor. This remarkable state-funded indulgence of his private self-interest was, perhaps, deemed his prerogative as a Javanese ruler. It was then quite a leap to locate the next two major toll road projects according to the greater collective interests established by the Jabotabek planning processes of the 1970s and 1980s. In the absence of significant rail investments, these two roadways were the most concrete manifestations to the east-west development corridor concept proposed in the Jabotabek plans. These two roadways, one running from Jakarta east to Tangerang, subsequently extended to Merak, and one running west to Cikampek, were the key to the development of what became the largest concentration of new development in all of Indonesia. National statistics counted 33,250 hectares (82,000 acres) of new industrial estates throughout Indonesia from 1989 to 1992 with 62 percent of this area being in the Province of West Java, and most of this in the Botabek districts located in direct relation to one of these two toll roads.⁶² Most of the new private sector housing developments built up until 1997 are accessed in some way by these two freeways. The construction of the east-west toll roads in partial fulfillment of the east-west development corridor has proven to be a notable exception to the prevailing pattern of ignored planning proposals in Indonesia.

The secondary impacts of road construction are multiple, complex, and often significant. The initial primary impacts of greater road capacity and lessening of road congestion along the improved sections can, under certain conditions, be overwhelmed within a matter of months by the secondary impact of traffic volume increases induced by the road improvements themselves.⁶³ This and other secondary impacts—typically unaccounted for in predictions of mobility improvements—include the expansion of catchment areas as new roads bring new trips and new destinations into the road network. For similar reasons, new roads anywhere in a region tend to contribute to greater traffic congestion in its urban centers, particularly in cases of extreme urban primacy as seen in Jakarta (similarly in Bangkok and Manila). The unexpected speed with which new road capacity is overwhelmed is likely to inspire even more road construction, further extending the phenomenon to cover a larger area. The long-term outcome of road-based transportation land use patterns was already well documented by the 1970s in both developed and developing nations. Transportation studies conducted in Indonesia in the 1970s predicted a future

⁶² Tommy Firman and Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatri, "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 89.

⁶³ This phenomenon is identified as "induced traffic." See: Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment, "Trunk Roads and the Generation of Traffic," (London: HMSO, December 1994); and Mark Hansen, "Do New Highways Generate Traffic?" *Access*, no. 7 (Fall 1996), 16-22.

filled with problems if road-based transportation models were pursued in and around Jakarta. These studies and their conclusions formed influential in solidifying the commitment to rail-based transportation investment proposed by the first two generations of Jabotabek plans.⁶⁴

Two factors mitigating the positive impacts of the east-west development corridor were the failure to adopt and implement the Jabotabek plans as the official planning regulation for most of the region, and the still significant impacts of new land uses developed in violation of the planning regulations that *were* put into place. The 1981 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan 1980-2000 was accepted as the basis for the Jakarta 2005 plan that was passed into law in 1987. This plan was the official document used to control both public infrastructure planning and all private development regulated through the issuance of Location Permits.⁶⁵ Perhaps even more significantly, compliance with the 1981 Jabotabek Plan was made a prerequisite for funding by international donor agencies for major infrastructure development. However, the West Java Province, within whose borders lay 90 percent of Jabotabek's land area, chose not to follow the plan. Instead, a West Java Provincial Plan, developed independently from the recommendations of the Jabotabek Plan, was adopted to serve as the governing document for the formulation of the County/Municipal Structure Plans for the then three counties (*kabupaten*) of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, collectively referred to as "Botabek" (BO-gor, TA-ngerang, and BEK-asi).

Anticipating ongoing disagreement and lack of communication between the national government, the Special Capital Province of Jakarta (DKI Jakarta) and West Java province, the Jabotabek Development Cooperation Agency (Badan Kerjasama Pembangunan Jabotabek) was established in 1976 to coordinate efforts of each administrative level. Despite the ambitious mandate that they, "Integrate, synchronize and simplify," development programs of the region, the agency was not granted any powers or tools to implement or coordinate anything. While the option of vesting such a regional body with the authority to set development policy was explored, its role overlapped significantly with the provincial Regional Development Agency (Badan Pengelolaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA). The Jabotabek Development Cooperation Agency took on a role as a lobbyist facilitating communication and informal negotiations across administrative boundaries.⁶⁶ In contrast to the guiding influences of the toll road construction on market forces,

⁶⁴ "Jakarta Transport System Improvement," in 4 volumes (SRI International, Menlo Park, Calif., December 1978).

⁶⁵ *Jakarta 2005: Peraturan Daerah No. 5 Tahun 1985 Tentang Rencana Umum Tata Ruang (RUTR) Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta 1985-2005* (Jakarta 2005: Provincial Regulation No. 5, 1984 regarding the Jakarta General Spatial Plan 1985-2005), (Jakarta: BAPPEDA, DKI Jakarta, 1987).

⁶⁶ Gunawan, Director of *Badan Kerjasama Jabotabek*, interview with the author, Jakarta, Indonesia (21 November 2000). See Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 229-30; and Tommy Firman and Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni,

the influence wielded by direct intervention of the government's regulatory mechanisms proved to be virtually imperceptible. The 1993 review reported that less than half of the Location Permits granted in Botabek were in accordance with official plans.⁶⁷ The failure to institutionalize the recommendations of the Jabotabek plans, along with the near-absence of land use regulation, reflected a more generalized culture of privatization under Suharto. The political, economic and social conditions emerging under Suharto's authoritarian rule placed distinct limitations on the scope of possible planning and development outcomes during the 1980s and 1990s. The planning team formulating the Jabotabek Review was operating with a far greater awareness of these constraints than had been the case during the work of their predecessors. By the early 1990s, the unprecedented history of strong economic growth and Suharto's confident pursuit of ever further-reaching economic liberalization policies, contributed to the apparent decision by the third Jabotabek planning team to take a more 'pragmatic' approach to the 1993 Jabotabek planning process.

Perhaps the most significant schism between the Jabotabek concept and the 1993 plan can be seen in the proposals to locate a series of concentric ring roads every 10 to 15 kilometers (six to ten miles) all the way to Bogor. Despite the serious consideration of this model, and its explicit rejection in the 1970s, the idea remained fixed in the popular imagination and the concentric ring model was reintroduced as the basis of the 1993 regional transportation plan. What makes this reemergence all the more surprising is that the 1993 planning team's own analysis explicitly rejected this idea as it reconfirmed the relative merits of the east-west linear plan. The Jabotabek linear city model was so compromised by acceptance of the private sector driven development trends, as to render it all but meaningless. The original Inner Ring Road, proposed originally in the 1957 UN sponsored plan for Jakarta under Sukarno, proved to be an enormously successful stimulus to private sector property development of lands ripe for investment around the dense core of Jakarta in the 1980s and 1990s. The successful mobilization of the private sector in the development of both the toll road and the lands it accessed, appears to have overwhelmed awareness of the threats posed by concentric ring development as modeled by the Jabotabek planning teams. The Inner Ring Road demonstrated all of the attributes of a New Order success, thus making it a model to be emulated and repeated. The 1993 Review endorsed the construction of

"The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994) 90-91.

⁶⁷ *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review: Technical Review of Land Management* (1993); and the *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review: Fringe Area Developments Sister Study* (1993); cited in Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 232.

the Jakarta Outer Ring Road, approximately 12 kilometers (8 miles) radius from the Monas National Monument, and plans for the Jakarta Outer-Outer Ring Road, 10 kilometers (6 miles) further out.⁶⁸ This third ring road would form the central spine of what its planners called the




FIGURE 5.7 Recent transportation planning projections have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the concentric ring-road model so roundly rejected in earlier planning exercises. Source: 1997 Jabotabek Region and Environs Development Strategy (*Strategi Pengembangan Kawasan Jabotabek dan Sekitarnya*)

Bekasi-Depok-Parung-Tangerang Development Corridor. In the 1993 review's transportation map, the Outer-Outer Ring Road is shown to bisect the area identified elsewhere as the region's most valuable and sensitive water catchment area (figure 5.7).⁶⁹ This, and a second north-south toll road from Serpong to Bogor, were both shown as passing through preserved open space—the very condition considered throughout the earlier Jabotabek plans, and subsequently proven to be, untenable. The Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review presented these infrastructure

⁶⁸ *Jabotabek Review*, 69-77

⁶⁹ "...diantara pengembangan poros timur-barat (Bekasi-Jakarta-Tangerang), utara-selatan (Jakarta-Depok-Bogor) dan timur-selatan-barat (Bekasi-Depok-Parung-Tangerang) akan terdapat kawasan kawasan terbuka." In *Jabotabek 2015: Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kawasan Tertentu Jabotabek 1995-2015: Ringkasan* (Jabotabek Special Area Regional Spatial Plan 1995-2015: Summary), (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Cipta Karya, 1999), 13.

plans as if they were the outcome of their own independent planning processes, rather than acknowledging that they came from various other proposals, including those pushed for by private sector developers. It did so without addressing the almost certain likelihood that continued under-supply of road infrastructure would lead to rapid and intensive land development along any new roadways—a point reasserted in an earlier chapter of the plan.⁷⁰

Just as the inner ring road became the armature for much of the construction during the building booms of the 1980s and 1990s, the outer ring roads and the Serpong-Bogor road, if built, are likely to render meaningless any attempts to preserve open space anywhere nearby, much less lands fronting the roads. In advocating the second ring road, the 1993 review asserted simply that it was needed, "...to raise the efficiency of necessary movements south of Jakarta," without any acknowledgment of impacts on the spatial patterns of further development.⁷¹ The third ring road was advocated, "...to form the basis of a primary east-west grid," violating the defined boundaries of the east-west corridor.⁷²

In the end, this 'planning pragmatism' did not lead to any greater official acceptance for their document than did the relatively harder line taken by the 1981 plan. However, many elements and methods of the 1993 review were directly emulated in the planning document that was subsequently prepared by the Indonesian Directorate General of Public Works, operating without the input of foreign consultants. The Indonesian Parliament enacted the Jabotabek Regional Spatial Plan 1995-2015 in 1992 although the details of the plan itself were not developed and published until 1999.⁷³ All provincial, county, and municipal plans in the Jabotabek region are required to conform with the general zoning, densities, and major infrastructure alignments set forth by this plan. Like the earlier Jabotabek plans, the 1999 Regional Spatial Plan again compares three abstracted spatial development patterns for evaluation (figures). The three models considered in this process were:

1. *Pola Linier*: Linear development between Jakarta and its three subcenters.
2. *Pola Satelit*: Satellite structure with more intensive development of the three subcenters.
3. *Pola Linier-Buffer*: The Linear development broken by protected buffer zones.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ *Jabotabek Review*, 5.

⁷¹ *Jabotabek Review*, 71

⁷² *Jabotabek Review*, 72.

⁷³ *Jabotabek 2015*.

⁷⁴ *Jabotabek 2015*, 9.

The first two of these are recycled from the 1993 Jabotabek Review “paradigms.” The third one was an abstraction of the east-west corridor as described in a later chapter presenting the Jabotabek Strategic Land Use Plan of the 1993 review.⁷⁵

An abrupt disconnect is wrought in drawing conclusions from this comparison when a “ring-radial” model makes a surprise appearance at the last moment. In summing up the comparisons, the report text reads:

Evaluation of the geographic character of the Jabotabek clarifies that the *ring-radial* development scenario is the more effective model to use compared to the other two spatial scenarios.⁷⁶

Its sudden invocation, without any prior mention, would seem to conflate one of the three models described with a *ring-radial* model. The English language term “ring radial” is employed in the original Indonesian text. In the end, it is neither clear nor, apparently, is it considered relevant, which of the three models were ostensibly chosen. It was as if the winner of a beauty pageant had made her first appearance only at the very end of the contest when walking on stage to accept her crown, while the other contestants stood by dumb-struck. With the ring-radial model crowned the guiding spatial concept for the region, the 1999 plan was then free to call for more concentric ring roads—the model that was summarily rejected in 1973 but would not die. In 1997, with only about 10 percent of the second ring road completed, construction was halted due to the financial crisis. Within the next year, 24 toll road contracts were canceled due to corruption linked to deposed President Suharto.⁷⁷ With the issue of driving a third concentric ring road directly through the Serpong-Depok aquifer recharge zone unresolved, the subsequent 1999 plan called for a fourth concentric ring road located at a radius of about 35 kilometers (22 miles) from the center of Jakarta.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Jabotabek Review*, 58, and figure 4.7 “The Principle of Linear Urban Expansion,” 3rd leaf between pages 58 and 59.

⁷⁶ Emphasis added. The original text reads: “*Penilaian pada karakter geografis Kawasan Tertentu Jabotabek menyatakan bahwa skenario pengembangan ring radial lebih tepat dipakai sebagai model dibandingkan dengan dua skenario spasial lainnya.*” Translation by Robert Cowherd. *Jabotabek 2015*, 10.

⁷⁷ “Indonesia Axes Suharto-Linked Road Projects,” *Reuters World Report Wire Service* (14 December 1998).

⁷⁸ *Jabotabek 2015*, in a map labelled “Arahan Sistem Jaringan Jalan 2015” (Road Network System Direction 2015) between pages 15 and 16. This fourth concentric ring road is also featured with greater clarity in: *Strategi Pengembangan Kawasan Jabotabek dan Sekitarnya* (Jabotabek Region and Environs Development Strategy) (Jakarta: PT. Lenggogeni, Ministry of Public Works, February 1997), IV-74, in a map labeled “*Kondisi Pemanfaatan Ruang Tahun 2005 (Pekiraan)*” (Spatial Use Conditions Year 2005 (estimate)). The *Jabotabek 2015* map refers to the *Strategi Pengembangan* document as one of three sources.




FIGURE 5.8 The 1993 Review endorses the “Outer-Outer Ring Road” despite it bisecting the Serpong Depok aquifer recharge zone. Source: 1993 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review

The commitment to protect sensitive coastal environments was also abandoned by the 1993 planning team in its tacit endorsement of three major waterfront reclamation and redevelopment projects. These projects were to have transformed approximately 50 kilometers (30 miles) of northwest Java’s coastline stretching from the Tanjung Priok harbor in the east, to Teluknaga, north of Tangerang, in the west. Once again, the normative voice of the 1993 review’s early chapters warn against steps that are then endorsed in the ‘pragmatic’ later chapters of the same document. In addressing the problem of flooding in the region, the review warns that projects proposing to reclaim land from the Java Sea constitute an invitation for worsening flooding unless extreme measures are taken to prevent it. It also supports the empowerment of local communities as the most likely victims of neglect, and thus, the strongest supporters of good drainage.⁷⁹ In the early 1990s, the Suharto government approved three projects constituting 13,700 hectares (34,000 acres) of development along the north coast of Java in DKI Jakarta and Kabupaten Tangerang. The Jakarta Waterfront City was established by Presidential Decree in 1994 for the redevelopment of 2,500 hectares (6,000 acres) of Jakarta along the existing waterfront and for an additional 2,700

⁷⁹ *Jabotabek Review*, 14.

hectares (6,700 acres) of land to be reclaimed from the sea.⁸⁰ Modeled on waterfront cities in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London, the Jakarta version of the “world-class waterfront city” would be a center for international service industries.⁸¹ The largest of the three projects would have been the Kawasan Wisata Terpadu Pantai Kapuknaga (Kapuknaga Beach Integrated Tourism Area) planned for 8,000 hectares (20,000 acres) of land, half of which was to have been reclaimed from the sea.⁸² The objections voiced by several ministers and the Bupati of Tangerang were overridden by another Presidential decree.⁸³ Both of these projects were put on hold with the onset of the financial crisis in 1997 and Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998.⁸⁴

The smallest of these three projects, the 500-hectare (1,200-acre) Pantai Indah Kapuk (Beautiful Kapuk Beach), was begun in 1993. This recreational enclave of luxury housing and tourism attractions included lakes, canals, a golf course, a theme park, a water park, hotels, and eventually a mixed-use commercial and retail center.⁸⁵ Pantai Indah Kapuk, like the privately financed toll roads, was widely heralded as a great development success story exemplifying the Suharto regime’s mobilization of private capital for the development of the nation. It was also a model for further development projects, especially waterfront development projects such as the Jakarta Waterfront City and Kapuknaga. Even as the 1993 Review was going to print, the developers of Pantai Indah Kapuk were displacing coastal fishing communities, cutting others off from their livelihoods along with access to the sea, and destroying a coastal wetlands area along with a rare coastal mangrove forest.⁸⁶ Predictably, it also exacerbated flooding. The notoriety that this abrogation of land use planning came to enjoy was not due to the rarity of illegal development, but

⁸⁰ The Presidential Decree referred to is Keputusan Presiden No.17/1994 tentang Repelita VI. See: “Jakarta Imbangi Kebangkitan Kota Pantai Di Dunia” (Jakarta Resurrected as a Global Waterfront City), *Suara Pembaruan Online* (2 June 1997).

⁸¹ Ahmad Safrudin, “Reklamasi dan Revitalisasi Pantura Jakarta: Mega Proyek yang Tidak Rasional!” (Reclamation and Revitalization of Jakarta’s North Coast: An Irrational Mega-Project), Press Release from the Indonesian environmental group WALHI (4 September 2000).

⁸² Tommy Firman, “The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A ‘Global City’ in Asia,” *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 238.

⁸³ Agus Rachmat, former head of the Tangerang Regional Development Board, interview with the author, Cisangkui Cafe, Bandung, Indonesia (15 November 2000).

⁸⁴ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

⁸⁵ *A Commitment to Excellence* (Jakarta: Metropolitan Kencana Group, ca. 1996); and Panangian Simanungkalit, “Prospek Proyek Mega Properti Abad 21” (Prospects for Mega-Projects in the 21st Century), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 2 (March 1994), 38-39.

⁸⁶ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

because Pantai Indah Kapuk was built adjacent to the new Jakarta international airport and the new toll road leading to it, guaranteed never to flood. The development of Pantai Indah Kapuk so dramatically changed local drainage conditions that even typical rain storms cause flooding. Since its completion, Jakartans and visitors have had to accept the closure of the airport as an annual event during the worst of the monsoon season storms. The 1993 planning team endorsed development and reclamation projects along the north coast, against its own advice in earlier chapters, justifying it as a means of shifting population growth away from Bogor and other areas of the south.⁸⁷ One might just as easily expect the 1993 review to simultaneously justify its promotion of toll road construction across the southern slopes around Bogor as a means of shifting population growth from the sensitive north coast.

In addition to the three problem areas of water supply, flooding, and mobility, closely intertwined through their simultaneous resolution in the East-West Development Corridor, the problems related to providing affordable housing in the right locations also serve as an instructive point of reference from which to evaluate the 1993 review. The primary strategy for providing affordable housing and guiding low income residential locational choices throughout most of the previous Jabotabek planning process was the approach of Guided Land Development (GLD) described above. At the outset, the 1993 review characterized the 1981 plan in terms of its weaknesses regarding the means of implementation. Guided Land Development in particular was used as an example typical of the plan which made proposals that, "...could never have happened on the scale necessary to influence strategic development trends."⁸⁸ But in its place, the review's housing recommendations were so vague as to render them insignificant. Its two recommendations linked specifically to housing were for:

Institutional change to bring squatters and landless residents into the formal system,⁸⁹
[and]

An extensive programme of low cost housing allied to tenure security and access to new land for individual low income self builder.⁹⁰

These were offered without elaborating further on what kind of actions they might entail. The Review's housing recommendations also did not refer to the history of previous and, then current programs to do exactly what was being suggested. The distinction, for example, between what the

⁸⁷ Stolte, "JABOTABEK to PANTURA," 240.

⁸⁸ *Jabotabek Review*, 3.

⁸⁹ *Jabotabek Review*, 67.

⁹⁰ *Jabotabek Review*, 68.

second recommendation calls for and the rejected program of Guided Land Development is difficult to ascertain. The few concrete references to existing programs appear to be dishearteningly out of touch with their histories of success and failure. Incongruously, the 1993 planning team pointed with hope to increased output from the Perumnas National Housing Corporation despite the proven incapacity of Perumnas to make anything but a very small contribution to housing of middle- to upper-level government employees.⁹¹ It faint-heartedly called on government not to abandon altogether its Kampung Improvement Program.⁹² In the absence of more significant efforts to provide for affordable housing, the 1993 review called for private sector developers (even naming several projects specifically) to provide affordable housing for families displaced by development, and new low wage workers employed within or near the developments.⁹³

In a separate section on "dispersing growth," not directly associated with the challenges of housing provision, Guided Land Development is endorsed as a means, "...to implement the preferred urban form paradigm."⁹⁴ But this endorsement is no sooner given than it is significantly limited. To compete with the private sector for land would require raising funds through greater land expropriation and sale rather than the betterment levies originally proposed for Guided Land Development. The report acknowledged that this would likely prove socially unacceptable, as land was still valued as a community resource and not simply a commodity for sale.⁹⁵ In place of Guided Land Development, private sector developers were again suggested as the proper agents of guiding development to achieve the preferred land use mixes and patterns. But this suggestion was accompanied by the caveat that the constant profit and positive cash flow requirements of private sector development precludes the socially and economically appropriate land use mixes, in favor of large land banks and luxury housing as the rule.⁹⁶ The half-hearted recommendations to continue Kampung Improvement, Perumnas, and Guided Land Development leave the impression that they are being condemned even as they are identified as the best hope of improving prospects for affordable housing. By failing to suggest a path comparable in scope to the 1981 Guided Land Development plan (a plan proposed to account for a third of all new development), the 1993 review

⁹¹ *Jabotabek Review*, 66-67.

⁹² *Jabotabek Review*, 67.

⁹³ Bumi Serpong Damai, Bekasi 2000, Jakarta Baru, Tegaraksa, Balaraja, Ciaru, Lippo City, North Jakarta Waterfront, Pantai Indah Kapuk, Sudirman CBD, Senayuan Square and Kuningan are all mentioned specifically. *Jabotabek Review* (1993), 68.

⁹⁴ *Jabotabek Review*, 64.

⁹⁵ *Jabotabek Review*, 63.

⁹⁶ *Jabotabek Review*, 64.

defaulted to the voluntary efforts by the private sector for any hope of affordable housing provision. Even this recommendation was qualified by the sense that it would be unrealistic to expect too much from this quarter either.




FIGURE 5.9 The medium-range projection of ring-road development. the Outer-Outer Ring Road shown here bisects the Depok-Serpong Aquifer Recharge Zone. Source: Department of Public Works

Behind the awkward bait and switch of the 1993 review, lay a genuine attempt to remain relevant in the context of the late Suharto regime. The incorporation of independent private sector initiatives into planning documents as if they were the products of their independent, normative planning process has a long history in Indonesian planning as elsewhere. By incorporating the toll road projects already underway through private-public partnerships (both official and clandestine) around the Jakarta region, the 1993 review perhaps stood a better chance of not being rejected out of hand. Unfortunately, in taking what the planning team may have felt was a ‘pragmatic’ approach, the 1993 review represents the abandonment of much of the original intention of the Jabotabek planning process, conceived in the 1970s and developed into concrete measures in the 1980s.

The primary goals and strategies expressed in the earlier plans retain a high degree of analytic rigor, and the merits of their recommendations are defensible even up to the present.

Acknowledging the incapacity of the Indonesian government to regulate land uses, the Jabotabek planning process concept of an east-west development corridor, as an overarching strategy for addressing the problems of water supply, flooding, and mobility, remains strongly relevant to the unmet challenges inherited by the Indonesia's planners of the twenty-first century. Similarly, using the government role of infrastructure planning, Guided Land Development remains a powerful opportunity to stimulate a dynamic informal sector to produce mixed-income, mixed-use, incrementally serviced, self-built affordable housing areas.

In abandoning these two concepts in all but name, the 1993 review commended the fate of the region into the unsympathetic hands of private sector developers. The review's series of recommendations for the implementation of its Strategic Land Use Plan helped to institutionalize the shift from the original Jabotabek rail-based east-west development corridor to a spatial plan based on ribbon development along concentric ring-roads infilled by private sector housing developments. It also announced the parallel shift away from controlled expansion of the *kampung* and new formal development around existing infrastructure and towns, to a strategy of green-field "new town" development away from existing towns and infrastructure. The directions advocated by the 1993 review's recommendations closely replicate the very models considered, and strongly rejected, in each cycle of the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development planning process. In sharp contrast with what was called for in the earlier Jabotabek plans, the urban transformations wrought or in progress by the early 1990s, reflected instead the forces of private sector development allied with the interests of the political elite surrounding Suharto. In many ways, these changes conflicted with the development path called for by the several generations of planning analyses, proposals, and regulations ostensibly governing the developments in and around Jakarta. The conflict led to an abrupt shift, both in the approach taken by the 1993 Jabotabek planning team and, as will be examined in the following chapter, in the implementation of planning and regulatory measures that were actually put into place.

CHAPTER 6

PLANNING OR CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION?

Beyond Regime Theory: Cultural Construction

The forces operating to influence the direction of planning frameworks, proposed by the international membership of the Jabotabek regional planning teams examined in the previous chapter, had an even more immediate and fundamental impact on the implementation of the national, provincial, and local policy and regulatory measures. The task of this chapter is to describe the mechanisms designed to implement planning policies and examine the history of their implementation during the late New Order period from 1980 to 1997. The historic record of the implementation of these planning tools reveals that the expected normative functions of planning were strongly stated as rhetorical abstractions but subsequently undermined or reversed in execution. The normative role of planning tools and mechanisms was relinquished when the public purposes behind them were overwhelmed by the quest for private gain by the small circle of power elite surrounding Suharto, his family, and closest business partners—the Cendana-Cukong alliance (see Chapter Two). The fundamental question posed by this study—What were the forces behind the transformation of Jakarta in the late New Order period?—can, to a great extent, be satisfied by going no further than the virtually uncontested control exercised by this small elite group. Jakarta's urban form was integral to the functions of power both as a physical manifestation of its achievements and failures, and as an instrument of its operation and extension. Overall, by various degrees of deviation from the planning and regulatory framework ranging from the subtle nuances of interpretation, to grand projects representing the wholesale flaunting of national law, the Jakarta region was transformed through the years of the late Suharto regime in service to the consolidation of power and the reaping of benefits by the political and capital elite. So fundamental was the deviation from planning recommendations that Jabotabek was increasingly characterized by worsening environmental degradation, resource depletion, infrastructure failures, and housing problems that closely resembled the negative models that were explicitly identified and sought to be avoided in the earlier planning processes.

Much has been written on the exercise of power by a political and business elite on and through urban form in the literature of “growth coalition” or “urban regime” theory. These theories are useful in showing how public agencies and private interests function together through informal

arrangements to guide the development and operation of a city region.¹ However, the depth and range of the “successes” achieved by Suharto’s particular urban regime cannot be accounted for by the overt mobilization of either authoritarian power or its coalition with private sector cronies, in the sense usually delineated in urban regime theories. The history of the New Order’s escapades in domination and corruption acts as an ever-present backdrop for a far more subtle and pervasive project of cultural and social engineering. This project was pursued through the careful management of the images and language circulated through a controlled public discourse. While the analysis of the following examples confirms the general outlines of urban regime theory, it moves decisively beyond this theoretical framework to consider the role of culture in the construction of the city. The three key components of the New Order regime’s control over Indonesian society were: first, the ever-present threat of military force; second, its sophisticated pyramid of corruption and political patronage centered on Suharto (of which the vast bureaucratic structure of Indonesian governance formed but one subordinate component); and third, the complementary surveillance and control of the media, meetings, and the spaces of the city. Just as the form of the city is inadequately accounted for by limiting our analysis to the overt operations of military power—a shortcoming substantially rectified by urban regime theories—so too would an analysis limited to the coordinated actions taken by the state and private sector fall short of accounting for the full extent of changes seen in the Jakarta region during this period.

It is only through the internalization of the state ideology by a broad segment of the general population—by simultaneously transforming the urban culture—that the Jakarta metropolitan region was transformed in the ways it was. Beyond the redevelopment wrought by the intermingled interests of politics, money, and corruption, the operation of a pervasive set of messages and ideas propagated through the media and reinforced through social and political relationships worked, in complementary ways, to effectively displace official planning measures and goals, at the policy level, and the social norms and values governing social relationships, the sustenance of communities, and their physical manifestations on the landscape, at the more local and even individual level. In addition to the more overt abuses of power, this set of notions, with which bureaucrats and developers justified their actions to themselves and others, wrapped both the large and small abuses of power in rationales rendering them somehow palatable and defensible even to those who were ultimately the greatest victims of these abuses.

¹ John Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Clarence N. Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* (Kansas City: University of Kansas Press, 1989); Mickey Lauria, ed., *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997). On growth coalitions in late New Order Jakarta see: Achmad D. Tardiyana, “The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order,” paper presented at the workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

This chapter develops the proposition that it is useful to examine the propagation and reproduction of this identifiable, if not entirely coherent, set of meanings and values, as a “culture.” The use of the term culture here is intended to encompass not only the realm of aesthetics and art covered by the more classical definition of the term, but also the norms and values manifest in social, political, and economic relations.² As such, the usage of culture here encompasses those relations commonly analyzed in studies of political economy but moves beyond considerations of production and power to include the wider set of rationales that serve to explain the conditions of everyday life, the shared frameworks within which perceptions of society are interpreted, and the collective imagination that provides the images with which future possibilities are imagined and constructed. This use of the term “culture” has the advantage of encompassing not only the ideologies and concepts circulating in the realms of economics and politics, but also the images, visions, use of language, and assumptions that will be shown to have played a significant role in facilitating the physical transformation (“construction”) of Jakarta.³ Among the cultural elements that supported the rebuilding of New Order Jakarta were widely shared assumptions of: the inevitability of a certain kind of development; the proper disposition of traditional communities and the poor vis-a-vis an emerging “modern middle class;” the privileges of the political and economic elite as a naturally derived hierarchical order; and the role of government in general, and planning in particular, in relation to the private sector.

These ideas, encapsulated in stark imagery and convenient turns of phrase, emerge within the circles of political and capital power as the internal terms of reference and rationales that justify their actions. They are then injected into the public consciousness through the rhetoric of the development agenda proffered through the state-controlled evening news and quickly picked up by the tightly government- and self-censored newspapers. The extent to which the failure of planning and regulatory mechanisms can be associated with a set of interrelated ideas exchanged through largely fixed structures of power and space, the changes in the form, meaning, and operation of the city can be said to result from processes of cultural construction. In each case, the key factor in reversing the regulatory measure was the proliferation and reproduction of strong ideological messages, underpinned by a set of images, concepts, assumptions, and visions of the future through the means of cultural dissemination. Operating within and through a dominant New Order culture, the Suharto regime influenced the evolution of core values and impacted the tacit

² A further description of the meaning of the word “culture” intended in this work and its foundations can be found in chapter one.

³ This aspect of my usage of the term “culture” and “cultural construction” is consistent with a growing literature of urban sociology and geography. See Hans-Deiter Evers and Rüdiger Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

assumptions of broad segments of the population regarding class relations, individual aspirations, and collective visions of the future as it established the very terms of reference by which the urban region was imagined, constructed, perceived, and inhabited by a majority of its citizens.

To understand the role these notions played in changes made to New Order Jakarta it is necessary to examine the functional understanding revealed by the statements and actions of those intervening in the built environment, as well as those impacted by the changes made. As such the following analyses draw on interviews with developers, design professionals, and residents of Jabotabek to establish how these changes were represented to themselves and others. It also draws on reports in the real estate trade journal *Properti Indonesia* (1994-2001) and the popular press. For the purposes of the present chapter—to demonstrate the role played by a set of values disseminated and consolidated by the New Order regime in extending the effective reach of its work to transform the city region—it is sufficient to refer to how the actors implementing, and being effected by, interventions in the built environment perceive their relationship with larger social communities as mediated by the world constructed around them. Through their statements and actions, agents of urban change propagated and produced their vision of the Jakarta region in keeping with the imagery and values of New Order culture. This common vision held by both the powerful and the relatively powerless, and the collective set of values informing their choices, operated to extend the capacity of the New Order regime to forge change in the urban landscape of Jakarta.

The Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans did not significantly alter the planning mechanisms ostensibly governing the direction and pace of urbanization and infrastructure provision. The first brief section of this chapter describes the planning framework and the permitting processes by which plans were implemented. The second section presents a history of the rise of Suharto's Cendana-Cukong "growth coalition" and the direct abrogation of planning guidelines by presidential decree. This history presents the sweeping gestures with which the largest and boldest development projects were undertaken as the direct action of the New Order regime largely in keeping with the framework of urban regime theories. In the third section, this portrayal is extended to take into consideration the substantial influence of the New Order over what was thought and said through its control over the media, the space of the city, and even the use of the Indonesian language. The fourth and final section draws on three areas of planning implementation to present a more detailed examination of key areas of government intervention into urban development and the role played by specific messages and rationales in redirecting these interventions in service to the larger goals of the New Order government.

Land Use Planning System

A fundamental component of the Jabotabek plans examined in the previous chapter were recommendations for the reconfiguration of the region's administrative structure. Several possible options were explored. Among them were: the formation of a new province of Jabotabek, the enlargement of the Special Capital Province of Jakarta to match the boundaries of Jabotabek, the establishment of Botabek as a province separate from West Java to facilitate coordination with DKI Jakarta, or the establishment of a statutory Jabotabek Cooperative Development Authority.⁴ Instead, the Jabotabek Development Cooperation Agency (Badan Kerjasama Pembangunan Jabotabek) added yet another agency—and one without any formal powers—to the already crowded scene of the two provincial, and nine county/municipal governments.⁵ In the absence of changes to the administrative hierarchy of Jabotabek, the relationships between planning and regulatory functions of the different administrations were governed by the Indonesian government's land use planning system. These government land use plans were established at no less than six levels of administrative hierarchy and map scale (compared, for example, with the two levels of the British planning tradition). The six levels of planning controls were: the National Plan at a scale of 1:1,000,000; the Provincial Plan at a scale of 1:250,000; the County/Municipal (*Kabupaten/Kotamadya*) Plan at a scale of 1:50,000; the General City Plan at a scale of 1:25,000; the Detail District Plan at a scale of 1:5,000; and the Technical Plan at a scale of 1:1,000. The Structure Plan for the Special Capital Province of Jakarta 1985-2005 (*Rencana Umum Tata Ruang DKI Jakarta tahun 2005* or *Jakarta 2005*)⁶ approved in 1984 was based on the 1981 Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan. Given the smaller geographic territory of the provincial level DKI Jakarta, the plan was rendered at the 1:50,000 scale, common to the county/municipal level plans. This plan was intended to control both infrastructure development and the issuing of permits for new construction, as well as to establish the basis for more detailed plans.

⁴ Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept on Metropolitan Planning of the Jakarta Region," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986) 113-115; Wim Stolte, "From JABOTABEK to PANTURA," *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995) 244-45; *Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review: The Strategic Land Use Plan* (Jakarta: Ministry of Public Works, September 1993), 89-91.

⁵ Gunawan, Head of the Jabotabek Cooperative Development Authority, interview with the author, Jakarta, Indonesia (21 November 2000).

⁶ *Jakarta 2005* (Jakarta: BAPPEDA, DKI Jakarta, 1987). This report was the official publication of the *Peraturan Daerah (DKI Jakarta) no. 5 Tahun 1984 Tentang Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Daerah-DKI Jakarta* (Special Capital Province Jakarta Provincial Regulation number 5, 1984, concerning the Jakarta General Spatial Plan).

The instruments established for implementing and enforcing these plans were a series of permits required for each stage of land development. In keeping with national law, county/municipal level administrations established and administered these permits. Exceptions were made for development proposals of exceptional scale or where impacts were expected to reach over administrative boundaries, in which case the provincial or even national level agencies would oversee approvals directly. The Concept Permit or Permit in Principle (*Ijin Prinsip*) was the first level of permitting control and represented government approval for the general intent of the land development. The Location Permit (*Ijin Lokasi*) ensured that the proposed development was in compliance with the County/Municipal Land Use Plan (*RTRW Kabupaten/Kotamadya*) and was required before bank loans could be released or land purchased from existing owners. An approved Environmental Impact Study (*Amdal*) and a Building Permit (*Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan*) were also required prior to breaking ground.

The actual operation of these planning and regulatory structures during the late Suharto period indicates that they served several purposes other than the normative functions one would expect to be their primary role. Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the displacement of the planning agenda in implementation is that *most* of the developments authorized under Location Permits in the five counties and municipalities surrounding Jakarta did not comply with planning guidelines and restrictions. An examination of the history of planning and development of the Jakarta region from about 1980 to 1997 clarifies how these land uses were developed despite being disallowed in official plans. It also suggests the nature of the purposes served in the specific ways that planning and regulatory measures were implemented.

Planning By Decree: Urban Regime Theory

There is scant evidence that anything remotely resembling the role envisioned for administrative agencies and government planning in Jabotabek ever came to pass. In the context of the long history of power relations in the Indonesian archipelago, it is difficult not to see the many obstacles to successfully implementing a rational normative planning system in cultural terms. Urban regime theory may be perceived as a relatively recent and novel appearance in political science and studies of urban management in the West, but it would appear to be something almost taken for granted as the norm throughout most of Southeast Asian history. The ruling styles of the first half century of Indonesian independence under its first two presidents were overtly modeled on the rule of Javanese kings. In many more subtle and substantial ways, the nature of power relations had more to do with the feudal past than modern democratic governance. Suharto in particular, went to great lengths to assure that his rule observed certain key traditions of Javanese dynastic succession so as not to break the continuity necessary for his presidency to simultaneously be accepted by God and

history as the legitimate successor to the New Mataram Dynasty (ca.1500-1942). Suharto's "kingship" was secured through self-styled emulations of the rituals, symbolism, and physical *kraton* (palace) of the traditional rulers of Java.⁷ To the extent that Suharto's kingly qualities were put on display, this may have been in part designed to de-emphasize the fact that the administration of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia had far more in common with their Dutch predecessors—the challenges of holding together the awkward colonial agglomeration of far-flung islands and cultures, and the continuation of Dutch colonial bureaucracies—than any of their Javanese predecessors.

Perhaps the most consequential manifestation of Suharto's royal persona was the vast patriarchal network of power he first constructed around himself as a rising star in the Indonesian military and then consolidated as President. The power of Suharto's Cendana-Cukong alliance overshadowed even the Indonesian Government itself, which was rendered a subsidiary operation of the larger hierarchy of power in which almost no significant public or private sector initiative escaped its all-encompassing web.⁸ In the place of an effective legal system, the function of enforcing the validity of business contracts was performed by a system of personal guarantees. All business contracts of any significance were entered into on the basis of an often elaborate mapping out of one or more of the partners' relationship through the hierarchies of power and protection to a minister, business associate, crony, or family member close to Suharto. In this way, every position of power and source of protection devolved ultimately from the personal guarantee of Suharto himself as it would have under the patriarchal protection of a Javanese king. What is known of the pervasive corruption of the New Order reveals that almost no significant contract, business operation, market control, production facility, etc. escaped the attention of its all-encompassing web. The links in this chain were comprised of direct payments, a share of the proceeds, favorable credit terms, monopoly rights over markets (particularly agricultural and forestry commodities), or some combination of these being distributed at each step along the way. The "bidding" process for major infrastructure projects was limited to the question of which cronies would share what portions of each project. Project-specific partnerships formed in which a member of Suharto's family would team up with a crony from the small circle of ethnic-Chinese businessmen. This high-level, large-scale corruption was reproduced in the manner of a "pyramid scheme" down to the lowest levels of governance to the vast cadre of low level functionaries

⁷ The divine light of god's authority on earth (*wahyu*) was believed by many Javanese to have passed to Suharto through his wife Tien, herself a descendent of the Mataram Dynasty ruler King Amangkurat I. See Ananta Widya Sasana, "Tien Suharto di Antara Tumbal, Jimat, Sakti dan Wahyu" (Tien Soeharto Between Charms, Talismans, Magic Powers and Divine Revelation), *Indonesia Daily News Online* (18 July 1996).

⁸ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 133-61.

struggling to augment inadequate incomes. Meager official wages are supplemented by the regular distribution of envelopes to even low-level government officials containing their unofficial income (from extralegal fees, kickbacks, bribes) supplementing the below-subsistence income of their official wages.




FIGURE 6.1 Winarso attempted to map out some of the dominant interconnections between the most significant projects, developers, and Suharto family connections. Source: Winarso (2000)

While it is an unjust oversimplification to conflate the systemic venal corruption of the Suharto regime with traditional Javanese culture, a common thread can be found in certain features of the Javanese conception of power.⁹ An important distinction is made in Javanese culture between wealth that rightfully attaches itself to spiritually disciplined, and thus powerful, individuals and the crass pursuit of wealth and power for personal gain.¹⁰ Money itself is not the source of power but is one of several manifestations of power that naturally flows to those who are favored by birth, position, or God's benevolence. The special privileges enjoyed by the king and his inner

⁹ Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," chapter 1 in *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990 (1972)), 17-77; and Franz Magnis-Suseno, "Javanese Culture: Scapegoat for All Evils?" *Jakarta Post* (2 November 1992), 1.

¹⁰ Anderson, "Idea of Power," 50-54.

circle were justified or even required as the attributes of power reflecting directly on the welfare of the realm. For many Indonesians living under the New Order regime, Suharto's accumulation of wealth was accepted as an accoutrement of *wahyu* (divine rule). The message reinforced daily through the operation of corruption, was that success or failure was not a function of talent, hard work, or sacrifice but of achieving the proper position from which to tap into this flow of power, in this case coinciding with the flow of corruption money. For the majority of Indonesians, the excesses of power exhibited by Suharto and his inner circle were accepted or at least familiar as the continuation of Javanese tradition. This association between Javanese culture and Suharto-led corruption resulted largely from Suharto's own messages about the religious, social, and cultural traditions that he made reference to in order to undergird his mandate to lead the nation. Reformers endeavoring to curb or even understand the extent of mismanagement and corruption have typically come to the conclusion eventually that far from being a correctable aberration, corruption was the essential means by which the New Order government had come to operate.¹¹ Unofficial structures of patronage had largely supplanted or rendered subsidiary the official fiscal and legal structures of daily governance. The close business associates of Suharto, including the largest real estate developers, seem to have benefited from being held in high esteem or, at least, above the law—a status that owed a great deal of its currency to the echoes of traditional Java under the New Order paradigm of revived Javanese culture.

The development of Jakarta's environs was dominated by the initiatives of private sector property developers. The largest of these developments were undertaken by those closely associated with the small circle of Suharto family and friends. As examined by Tardiyana, the form and manner of the Jakarta region's transformation under Suharto is to a large extent directly attributable to the dynamics of the New Order "growth coalition."¹² The largest developments in the Jakarta region were in fact made possible only through Suharto's direct intervention in the form of presidential decrees. These were used as a means of circumventing all planning controls and the normal operations of property sector competition. The presidential decrees issued by Suharto on behalf of the mega-projects undertaken by his family, friends, and business partners covered, by the time of his resignation, more than 80,000 hectares (200,000 acres) of Jabotabek—accounting for two thirds of the entire area held under Location Permits and an area larger than Jakarta itself.¹³

¹¹ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Circa 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 276-78

¹² Achmad D. Tardiyana, "The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order," paper presented at the workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, Leiden, The Netherlands (7 December 2000).

¹³ Tardiyana, "Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions."

These cases of planning by presidential decree offer the most dramatic examples of how urban regime theory is useful in accounting for the transformation of the Jakarta region during the 1980s and 1990s.

Sudono Salim was instrumental in launching the property development careers of Ciputra and James Riady who, together with Salim, held development rights to land accounting for more than 60 percent of the land under government issued Location Permits in Jabotabek by 1995.¹⁴ Each of these three along with other developers closely associated with Suharto, benefited from the special privileges accruing to them as a result of this association. The Presidential Decree number 73 of 1995 designated a 4,000 hectare area on the north coast of West Java and an adjacent equivalent area of the Java Sea (to be reclaimed) as the Kapuknaga Beach Tourism Development Area. This decree was issued at the request of Salim against the objections of several ministries and the *bupati* (head of the county or regency equivalent in rank to the mayor of a major city) of Tangerang. These objections were based not least on the fact that most of the land area was then technically irrigated rice fields, a land use explicitly protected from development by Indonesian law.¹⁵ Suharto's own Ministry of the Environment had previously warned that development of the sensitive coastline area and the 4,000 hectare land reclamation project threatened to exacerbate flooding problems of the already flood-prone area. These obstacles were addressed not by scaling back the development or by upgrading the proposed drainage system, but by reducing the matter to one of priorities. In the Plan prepared by the Province of West Java, the pros and cons of the Kapuknaga development were enumerated and weighed. On the con side, the tangible consequences of flooding and increased rice imports were acknowledged. On the pro side, these were apparently deemed a reasonable sacrifice to be offset by the narrowly distributed or abstract benefits of building more luxury housing and recreation areas, stimulating the economy of West Java, providing a model for future public-private partnerships, and "making the coastline more orderly."¹⁶ This trade-off exemplifies the values that dominated in some measure, by the planning

¹⁴ This is based on a table reproduced in Jess C. Lukas, Chief Operating Officer PT Lippo Village, "Township Development: A Situational Analysis," *Indonesia Property Report* 1, no. 2 (3rd Quarter 1995), 20-25.; and "Mengugat Oligopoli" (Shake Up the Oligopoly), *Properti Indonesia* no. 15 (April 1995), 21-22.

¹⁵ Ramalis S. Prihandana, former head of West Java Public Works, interview with the author, Bandung (3 April 1998); Agus Rachmat, former head of Kabupaten Tangerang Regional Planning Development Board, interview with the author, Cisangkui Cafe, Bandung, Indonesia (15 November 2000); Dicky Saromi, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000); "Regent Bars Land Sale," *Jakarta Post* (29 September 1993).

¹⁶ The original text reads: "...membangun dan menata lingkungan pantai agar lebih baik." Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Barat, "Perencanaan dan Pengembangan Kawasan Wisata Terpadu Pantai Kapuknaga" (Planning and Development of the Kapuknaga Integrated Tourism Area) (Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Barat, 1995); "Gambaran Umum Kemajuan Persiapan Reklamasi Pantai Kapuknaga Sebagai Realisasi Keputusan Presiden Nomor

and development judgments of the era. The residents of the Kecamatan Teluknaga District not displaced by the Kapuknaga development would become the victims of widespread flooding. The vast area of irrigated rice fields lost to the Kapuknaga development would present a further setback to the national campaign for food self-sufficiency identified as one of the fundamental components of controlling inflation and poverty levels nationwide. Housing and recreation provided by the development would serve only the extremely wealthy. The new economic activity might provide some jobs for local residents who managed to stay in the area, but even in this regard, the up-market employers have demonstrated a distinct preference for even the lowest-level positions to be filled by workers from outside the area. Some developers promised jobs for local residents only to subsequently reject local applicants considering the persistence of local communities a source of crime, an eyesore, and a competitor for control of land.¹⁷ The replicability of the public-private partnership would not be a widely distributed benefit. As for “making the coastline more orderly,” its mention as a rationale for such an undertaking is a disconcerting reminder of the power of the fantasies embraced by politicians and planners.¹⁸

Not to be outdone, in 1997 Suharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was granted the right to develop a series of new towns in a 30,000-hectare (74,000-acre) area—almost half the size of the Special Capital Province of Jakarta. Because this area in the hills to the southeast of Jakarta had been considered a protected water catchment preservation zone, it was necessary that the controversial project be commanded by yet another Presidential Decree.¹⁹ The idea of the Jonggol Hills project was hatched during a trip to Southern California’s 37,000-hectare (90,000-acre) Irvine Ranch, the largest private development in the world.²⁰ The parallels between the two mega-projects were no coincidence as Bambang employed Irvine Ranch’s planning team to prepare the

73 Tahun 1995” (General Progress Report on the Kapuknaga Beach Reclamation in realization of Presidential Decree 73, 1995) (Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Barat, 1997).

¹⁷ Lana Winayanti Aksoro, “The Effects of the Location Permit on Urban Land Markets: A Case Study in the Jabotabek Area, Indonesia,” (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1994), 93; and Gordon Benton, Urban Designer and Town Manager for Lippo Karawaci, Interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).

¹⁸ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

¹⁹ Karen Polglaze, “Indonesia To Take Back Suharto Land,” Associated Press Online Wire Service (27 October 1998); Bondan Winarno, “Jonggol Jangan Jadi Kota Asrama” (Jonggol Shouldn’t Become a Bedroom Community) *Kompas* (25 Januari 1997);

²⁰ Gladwin Hill, “Big But Not Bold: Irvine Today,” *Planning: American Planning Association*, no. 2 (February 1986), 16.

Jonggol Land Use and Transportation Plans.²¹ Neither of these two planning firms was given sufficient fees to justify a trip to Indonesia. The reports were prepared more as technical exercises of abstract adaptation of the Irvine Ranch formula to a different topography. Without the benefit of sufficient data on Indonesian transportation trip mode loadings, assumptions were made that the residents of Jonggol would be similar to Americans in their transportation behaviors.²² The two firms were also not privileged with certain information openly discussed in the Indonesian press regarding the function of the 30,000-hectare area as part of the watershed district critical to both the water supply of Jabotabek and the control of downstream flooding.²³ The scope of planning services required of them was intentionally narrow and did not include a great deal of attention to environmental or social concerns.²⁴

To better ensure demand for so much land being developed relatively far from the heart of Jakarta, Suharto also gave his preliminary support in concept to the transfer of the national capital from Jakarta to Jonggol.²⁵ When challenged by the evidence that other so-called "self-sufficient new towns" had only increased traffic congestion, loss of water supply, and downstream flooding in Jakarta, Bambang inexplicably responded that residents of Jonggol would be required to also work in Jonggol.²⁶ In a temporarily successful effort to silence would-be critics, he invoked his father's "Development Agenda" saying: "Developing this new town should not result in consequences that are in conflict with the aspirations for 'development.'" ²⁷ Far from the nonsensical statement it appears to be when taken out of context, it was in fact, a clear reminder that the Jonggol project enjoyed all of the protection granted to the New Order's top priority

²¹ Roger McErlane, McErlane Associates, Master Planning, Laguna Beach, Calif. and Robert Matson, Transportation Planner, RBF & Associates, interviews by the author (Irvine, Calif., 1 May 1997).

²² Matson, interview.

²³ Ibu Rani, Head of the National Planning Agency, Ministry of Public Works, interview by the author (Jakarta, 2 April 1998).

²⁴ McErlane, interview.

²⁵ "Presiden Soeharto Menyetujui Konsep Kota Mandiri Bukit Jonggol Asri" (President Soeharto Agrees to Concept of Beautiful Jonggol Hills Satellite City), *Suara Pembaruan* (19 November 1996); Jenderal Soemitro, "Memindahkan Ibu Kota Negara" (Moving the National Capital), *Kompas* (25 January 1997).

²⁶ "Gubernur DKI Soal Jonggol: Jangan Jadi Penyakit Bagi Jakarta" (Jakarta Governor on the Jonggol Issue: Don't Become a Disease for Jakarta), *Republika* (14 November 1996); "Pemda Jabar Sudah Bebaskan 70 Persen Lokasi Kota Jonggol" (West Java Government Already Repossessed 70 Percent of Jonggol City Site), *Kompas* (21 December 1996).

²⁷ The quotation marks around 'development' are mine. The original statement reads: "*Proses pembangunan kota baru itu jangan sampai menimbulkan akibat yang bertentangan dengan cita-cita pembangunan.*" Quoted in Firkah Fansuri, "Mampukah Jonggol menjadi Kota Mandiri?" (Does Jonggol Have What it Takes to Become a Satellite City?), *Republika* (26 December 1996).

projects of national development—that those who dare challenge the project would answer to the higher law of Suharto himself.

Bambang's appeal to his father's "development agenda" points out the limitations of direct assertions of power even under the authoritarian rule of Suharto. For all of the weight behind the presidential decrees authorizing the Jonggol new towns and the its establishment as Indonesia's new capital, they were, on their own, insufficient to fulfill Bambang's fantasy of an Indonesian Irvine Ranch. Even within the relatively narrow range of tolerated expression, resistance to the project in the media, and elsewhere threatened to make life difficult for Bambang and the pursuit of his dream. The overt nature of these excesses and the widespread hardships inflicted Suharto's children and golfing partners were the New Order's most vulnerable weakness. Against these offenses, the New Order's "development agenda" was the means by which the hearts and minds of a majority of Indonesians were won over. It was only through the broad consensus forged through a combination of power, threat of violence, and cultural means that the operations of the political and private sector elite were undertaken successfully. Those who succeeded under the New Order did so by effectively associating themselves and their personal agenda with the established national priorities of "development." It was a profoundly successful marriage of consensus and tyranny brought together through the effective promotion of a culture of "development."

Development Culture

Maintaining the power of the New Order (along with its networks of corruption) and holding the unlikely archipelago nation together, was the task of the Indonesian military. In the absence of military threats from beyond Indonesia's borders, the visible presence of military might in Jakarta and elsewhere stood as a daily reminder of the historic moments when the New Order regime found it expedient to strike with startling severity lest its larger message be lost on those not paying close attention already. The history of the Cendana-Cukong alliance proved a capacity to mete out staggering punishments to those who would pose even a symbolic opposition.²⁸ But the Cendana-Cukong alliance was successful only insofar as it did not need to impose its will by force. The living memory of occasional demonstrations of a willingness to employ a swift and wrathful violence acted as an ever-present backdrop for a far more subtle project of cultural and social engineering.

²⁸ The hunt for supposed communist party members in 1965 and 1966 that accompanied Suharto's rise to the presidency saw the killing of several hundred thousand Indonesians. The killing of unarmed protesters at Tanjung Priok in 1984, East Timor in 1991 and several small protracted armed conflicts against independence movements in Aceh, East Timor, and West Irian served to periodically renew a fear of military repression.

Having both secured the nation militarily against revolutionary action, and established a far-reaching network of political and corruption money patronage, Suharto's leadership was then freed up to undertake the task of constructing a leadership around a rhetoric of "development" (*pembangunan*). Complementing the "stick" of military force was the much better publicized "carrot" of Suharto's "development agenda" promising broadly conceived and widely distributed quality of life benefits. The dominant message of Suharto's New Order was that the resources of the nation were being mobilized for the purposes of development for the greater good of the Indonesian people.²⁹ In particular, this message was directed to the populations of the resource rich "outer islands" (meaning any part of Indonesia beyond Java and Bali) that had been promised a share of development benefits since independence. These outer islands were the source of a vast majority of the nation's wealth flowing at a far greater rate into Jakarta than it flowed back out to the outer islands: the vast timber holdings of Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), oil from Sumatra, gold from Irian Jaya (now West Irian), and tourist dollars from Bali.

To his credit, many of Suharto's programs did benefit the poorest farmers and most remote villages. His efforts in the areas of rural electrification, road improvements, and the construction of health clinics in every village contributed to a dramatic improvement in life chances for the average Indonesian. In particular, his program of public education yielded dramatic results. By the 1990s universal primary education was almost a reality with illiteracy virtually eliminated in the younger population.³⁰ Between 1971 and 1990 the proportion of the population with no schooling dropped from 45 to 19 percent. The rate of secondary schooling rose from 8 to 25 percent.³¹ Though still lagging behind men, women experienced the greatest improvements during this time. Even acknowledging much of Suharto's mismanagement, his success in turning around the Indonesian economy stands for many as one of the swiftest and most effective success stories of twentieth century economics.³² Indonesia's average annual growth in Gross National Product per Capita from 1965 to 1996 was 4.7 percent.³³ This performance sustained over three decades earned international praise for Suharto's presidency.

²⁹ For an analysis of the semiotics of the New Order political discourse see Ariel Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development'," *Indonesia* 46 (1988), 1-24.

³⁰ Terence H. Hull and Gavin W. Jones, "Demographic Perspectives," chapter 3 in *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 161.

³¹ Hull, "Demographic Perspectives," Table 3.14, 168.

³² Hill, "The Economy," 54-55.

³³ "Competitiveness Indicators Database," (World Bank) <wbi0018.worldbank.org/psd/compete.nsf>.

Ultimately the aggressive pursuit of economic growth itself undermined a great deal of the social progress made by the New Order. Memories of how bad conditions were in 1966 when Suharto assumed command of the economy became, with time, a less significant point of reference than those offered by the cultural revolution and its concomitant rising expectations. Suharto inherited an economy in shambles (see Chapter Two). In the first years of the Suharto Presidency, Sumitro Hadikusumo and his "Berkeley Mafia" (so named due to the group of Indonesian economic advisors recently graduated from the University of California at Berkeley) set a course of fiscal pragmatism. Suharto's often unpopular return to the orthodoxy of market forces represented a decisive shift from Sukarno's dirigist policies pursued increasingly for rhetorical effect. Suharto's New Order was anchored by a drive for political and economic stability, physical and social infrastructure development, and a reopening to international aid, trade, and investment.

The fuller story Suharto's economic successes is only now being unraveled in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 financial crisis that brought an abrupt end to both the economic progress and the Suharto presidency. The rapid contraction of the economy exposed the fact that exaggerated claims of economic gains during the Suharto era, in part, masked a structural vulnerability of the economy stemming from the rampant corruption and rising levels of inequality.³⁴ Behind the social and cultural rhetoric of New Order "development," lay a more simplistic economic agenda driven by the quest for growth for the benefit of the already privileged elite. The dramatic government deregulation programs of the 1980s and 1990s, were aimed in particular, at driving the raw numbers of investment and growth within the context of diminishing oil revenues and greater competition for attracting investment from both domestic and foreign sources.³⁵ The aggressive pursuit of this "growth agenda" left little room for the subtleties of delivering on promises of broadly distributed benefits promised by Suharto's rhetoric of "development." Even the initiatives emerging from the ostensibly successful public policy campaigns promoting greater development benefits to rural areas and the outer islands, environmental protections, and greater social justice, underwent a metamorphosis on their way to implementation that reflected the prerogatives of another agenda intent on the consolidation and expansion of power held by the political and corporate elite.

³⁴ Anne Booth, "Poverty and Inequality in the Soeharto Era: An Assessment," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 36, no. 1, (April 2000), 73-104.

³⁵ Firman notes that along with attracting foreign investment the policies also sought to encourage domestic savings and replace the long practice of state-controlled resource allocation with more efficient market-based economic controls. Tommy Firman, "From Global City' to 'City of Crisis': Jakarta Metropolitan Region Under Economic Turmoil," *Habitat International* 23, no. 4 (1999), 251-252.

In the absence of an independent judiciary system, victories won for progressive causes in the public policy arena were commonly reversed in the pursuit, or neglect, of their execution in the wake of other priorities. Without the balancing influence of a viable political opposition, meaningful political party competition, or avenues for even the most seemingly harmless expressions of dissent, what under other conditions would form as a political ideology in competition with others in the marketplace of ideas, instead took on the nature of a pervasive culture. This culture, for want of significantly different alternatives, operated as a pervasive magnetic field aligning all compass needles to the magnetic north of the inscrutable, yet all-knowing, paternal figure of Suharto. The priorities that shaped the boundaries of the possibilities of lives that could be lived in New Order Indonesia, and the values they reflected, operated as a culture and were disseminated through cultural means. With control over the economic and political machinery of the nation well in hand, and a firm grip on both the hopes (development) and fears (violent repression) of its citizenry, Suharto laid a claim to controlling the traditional modes of discourse as well. Government approval was required for meetings of more than a few people. The reach of the Indonesian government stretched along a multi-level hierarchy down to the district (*kelurahan*), sub-district (*kecamatan*), neighborhood (*rukun warga*), and block (*rukun tetangga*) levels serving primarily surveillance and control functions. This reach gave credence to the program of control pursued by Suharto where elsewhere such ambitions were dashed for lack of means. Certain behaviors were enforced at the very local level by nightly patrols of young volunteers from the neighborhood.³⁶ Although exercised rarely and selectively, there was little room for doubt that, depending on the content and participation of a meeting, it would be tolerated or interrupted at the discretion of the long arm of Suharto's control. Given the localized nature of Suharto's hierarchy of controls, hopes of holding meetings in secrecy were frequently proven to be dangerous delusions.

The media was dominated by state produced, censored, or more effectively, self-censored newspapers, radio, and television. Because of its reach, television became the medium of choice for the New Order government. From its birth in 1962, the Indonesian television industry was seen as a near perfect instrument of state policy and propaganda. One of the early goals of the Suharto regime was to place a television in every village (even before electricity or telephones in many regions), thus making the single government news channel the most powerful means of

³⁶ Joshua Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung," *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines and Colonial Vietnam* (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1999), 95-127.

bringing his message of development to the nation.³⁷ Even after control of the air waves joined the areas of Indonesian life to be transformed by economic liberalization, the new private broadcasters remained captive to the requirements of broadcasting the government-produced nightly news. The industry was opened up during the 1980s in a carefully limited way to allow a diversification and extension of commercial activities while ensuring the continuation of the state function of television. State propaganda continued to dominate while greater commercialization increased profits. Nor was there a strong motivation to open up the perspectives offered by broadcast news given that the opportunities to operate private commercial broadcast companies were offered exclusively to a handful of the usual suspects already familiar to us as the largest developers of the suburban real estate industry: Bambang Trihatmodjo (Suharto's son and developer of Jonggol), Tutut (Suharto's daughter and controlling shareholder of most toll road ventures), Sudwikatmono (Suharto's cousin and Chief Executive Advisor to Ciputra and Sudono Salim's Metropolitan Kencana Group), Sudono Salim (Suharto's closest business partner and Indonesia's richest man), and Aburizal Bakrie (Suharto friend and developer of Indonesia's largest apartment complexes and resorts).³⁸ In her analysis of the television industry, Hermin Indah Wahyuni uses the term "patrimonial cluster" to identify this group demonstrating a near total control over the television industry.³⁹ This media empire urban regime presents as exquisite a symbiosis of political and economic interests as could be found anywhere.

The nation sat rapt every evening before the words and pictures presenting concrete evidence of how the New Order's mission of development had progressed that day. The stories of kidnapped union organizers and the hardships of whole villages dislocated by dam or golf course building projects garnered relatively little attention. In the remote villages of Bali, the statues of Shiva in the central town pavilions were commonly replaced by televisions around which the men of the village would crowd. The volume turned-up over the sound of the generator, the men sat cross-legged on mats, smoking and gossiping as they participated in the nightly ritual in which the sacred promises of the New Order development agenda were reverentially intoned and renewed. When the news ended, these same televisions delivered the images of the developed West even to the remotest villages of the archipelago. These images provided the raw material from which the New Order

³⁷ Veven Sp Wardhana, *Kapitalisme Televisi dan Strategi Budaya Massa* (Television Capitalism and Strategies of Mass Culture) (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997).

³⁸ Hermin Indah Wahyuni, *Televisi dan Intervensi Negara: Konteks Politik Kebijakan Publik Industri Penyiaran Televisi pada Era Ordre Baru* (Television and National Intervention: The Political Context of Public Policy Governing the Broadcast Television Industry) (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 22-23.

³⁹ Wahyuni, *Televisi dan Intervensi*, 175-76.

culture of development shaped and molded the vision of a developed Indonesia complete with suburban homes, fast cars, gleaming office towers, beautiful people, and general abundance.

Every night the images of Suharto, or his appointed lieutenants, cutting ribbons on new irrigation projects, schools, mosques, etc. were accompanied by cryptic acronyms and carefully crafted turns of phrase injected into the public consciousness as hermetically sealed justifications for actions taken in pursuit of “development.”⁴⁰ These terms could then be heard in the food stalls, *becak* and taxi queues, and in line at the post office from a citizenry eager to flaunt a sophistication qualifying them to participate in the public discourse. It was a daily demonstration of the role of language in guiding the narrative of public life. George Orwell warned of the ways in which language can be enlisted as an instrument of control pointing out that “...if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.”⁴¹ Orwell was particularly wary of vagueness employed in political writing:

As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and... prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen house.⁴²

Orwell pointed out that the role of these “prefabricated phrases” was to freeze certain meanings as the fixed and inflexible abstract codes that stand in for, and thus displace, concrete realities. An important class of such prefabricated phrases is represented by euphemisms that substitute “an agreeable or inoffensive expression for one that may offend or suggest something unpleasant.”⁴³ These phrases injected into the language of collective decision making are capable of displacing the examination of concrete realities, substitute for authentic thinking, and ultimately limit the political discourse in significant ways.

In his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Pierre Bourdieu refers to ways that the built environment, social relations, and language operate in conjunction with each other under dominating social groups to establish “that which goes without saying”—what become accepted as the structural realities and limitations within which people construct their lives. A key part of establishing “that which goes without saying” is protecting “what cannot be said for lack of an available

⁴⁰ For an analysis of the semiotics of the New Order political discourse see Ariel Heryanto, “The Development of ‘Development’,” *Indonesia* 46 (1988), 1-24.

⁴¹ George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” (1946), <www.k-1.com/Orwell/pol.htm>.

⁴² Orwell, “Politics.”

⁴³ *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass: Miriam-Webster, 1985)

discourse.”⁴⁴ It is crucial not just to control what gets said but whether the linguistic means for expressing certain ideas are permitted to develop or not:

It is only when the dominated have the material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition of the real that is imposed on them through logical structures reproducing the social structures (i.e. the state of the power relations) and to lift the (institutionalized or internalized) censorships which it implies, i.e. when social classifications become the object and instrument of class struggle, that the arbitrary principles of the prevailing classification can appear as such and it therefore becomes necessary to undertake the work of conscious systematization and express rationalization...⁴⁵

What the case of New Order development culture demonstrates is the importance not just of controlling what is published, broadcast, and discussed but how establishing the terms of reference for a society operates to stand in for and effectively displace critical thought.

By nature of its structure and grammatical function, Indonesian is a language particularly prone to abstraction—a feature of the language widely exploited by the New Order. For a vast majority of Indonesians, the Indonesian language is an acquired second language learned through writing in school, the mass media, and as the language of official bureaucracy. The renowned journalist and editor of Indonesia’s *Tempo* magazine, Goenawan Mohamad, has eloquently characterized the linguistic schizophrenia of Indonesians in which certain topics, issues, experiences, or fields of knowledge become associated with one language and not another affecting the way those languages are used, and ultimately, how they *can* be used.

Our language has been ripped from the world, stripped of shape, smell, color and form, cleansed of the grit and graffiti, the rumpus and commotion, that make up real life. And it is this language that for reasons of ‘limited time and space’, the press and other forms of mass media feed back to the public in a bland but easily digested stew. Lack of spice in language has become the norm, and the powers that be—the political powers—have adopted it with a relish.⁴⁶

Indonesian language does not employ verb tenses, freeing speakers from the obligation to distinguish between specific events (often marked by the past tense in English) and the general

⁴⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 (1972)), 170.

⁴⁵ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*, 169.

⁴⁶ Goenawan Mohamad, “*Pasemon: On Allusions and Illusions*,” translated by John H. McGlynn, in *Managerie 2* (Jakarta: Lontar Foundation, 1993), 135; as quoted in Jennifer Lindsay, “Introduction,” to Goenawan Mohamad, *Sidelines: Thought Pieces from Tempo Magazine*, trans. Jennifer Lindsay (Jakarta: Lontar, 1994), xiii-xiv.

condition (present tense in English). In Indonesian, direct statements can be made so as to render them indistinguishable from vague generalities.⁴⁷ The corrupt language of the New Order's culture of development, as will be examined in the remainder of the chapter, was a fundamental tool for displacing authentic thought, concealing meanings, squelching criticism, and proliferating its programs.

Even as the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans were being developed and partially adopted, the official plans were being drafted and passed by local legislatures, and regulations on land development and affordable housing were being forged and implemented, Suharto was actively promoting a less interventionist role in business matters for the national and local governance. The ground work laid by the Berkeley Mafia during the early New Order period had, by the 1980s, prepared fertile ground for the seeds dispersed by the international crusade for economic liberalization pressed by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. The message delivered from the bully pulpit of the Suharto presidency on the evening news was that the key to the development of the nation for the benefit of all Indonesians was the mobilization of free market capital. In matters of the built environment, the private sector could provide more and better housing, infrastructure, public amenities, and urban services than the government could possibly match.

Over the course of the 1980s, this message expanded to the point where Suharto actively instituted a new non-interventionist role for government. Suharto issued decrees deregulating several aspects of commercial operations in Indonesia through a series of regulatory packages (actually, de-regulatory packages) called "Pakto" (short for *Paket Oktober*, so-named as they were timed each year to be enacted in October). Along with the concrete measures instituted in his "Pakto" deregulation packages, Suharto delivered the clear message for government agencies to not stand in the way of the dynamic, creative, innovations of the private sector as these were the key to freeing up economic growth and development for the nation. Where private sector initiatives came into apparent conflict with social, economic, or environmental policies and protections, the government agencies concerned were directed by Suharto to engage in "negotiations" to resolve the conflict amicably. Suharto invoked the still strong local practice of "*musyawarah*" which means to settle conflicts through deliberations and negotiation with roots in both imported Islam and indigenous traditions. As seen in the implementation of planning and regulatory measures, the message to government officials became "*Semua bisa dimusyawarahkan*"—Everything is negotiable. In the words of the Head of Land Use Planning for the West Java Province Regional

⁴⁷ Lindsay, "Introduction," xiv.

Development Agency, the message was: "Don't stand in their way. Invite them to go ahead."⁴⁸ Beyond the removal of trade barriers and restrictive licensing procedures on domestic and foreign operations, Suharto sent out the message to government officials by both word, and his own example, that the dynamic initiative of the private sector was to be encouraged, even where and when it appeared to come into conflict with established laws and policies. The message was clear in part due to the decades-long history of Suharto's own deeds, lending a familiarity with this mode of operation. Even more than usual, regulations were to be interpreted liberally, restrictions were to be deemed flexible, and, in the Javanese tradition of *musyawarah*, all conflicts were to be resolved through amicable negotiation. With this step, bold even for the self-anointed Javanese king of Indonesia, the Suharto New Order Regime not only operated its own "urban regime"—the coalition formed with Suharto family members and cronies at the pinnacle of a vast pyramid of patronage and power connections—but it also emboldened other levels of government to extend their own franchise "regimes" in coalition with local private sector elite. Such informal arrangements that challenged or even transgressed established areas of national and local laws were not only to be tolerated, but also celebrated as the free market way.

Thus a dual system was put into place. On the one hand, a set of planning regulations, agencies, and regulatory mechanisms continued to expand and delineate increasingly ambitious programs aimed at rationalizing the processes of urbanization. On the other hand, these regulatory agencies and frameworks were increasingly marginalized or took on roles and functions unrelated or counter to their original intentions. As the New Order power structure matured, it evolved its own distorted sense of "pragmatism" similar to the shift in attitudes seen in the progression through the three cycles of the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan programs (see Chapter Five). A similar dynamic manifested on a personal level with the individual administrators, planners, and developers. These agents of Jakarta's transformation were eager to express to their interviewer a constant personal struggle between their own idealistic programs to do the right thing for the people immediately impacted by their role, and the narrow limitations imposed by the constraints of the larger national "development agenda." The seemingly ubiquitous feature of the New Order administrative personality testifies to the reach and potency of Suharto's message.

In the particular history of the late New Order implementation of planning regulations, it is difficult in each case to discern a clear boundary between the overt impositions of power and the more subtle operation of culture. Even in the most venal abuses of power perpetrated by Suharto's

⁴⁸ The actual statement was "*Jangan dihalangi. Dipersilahkan terus.*" Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Province Regional Development Planning Board, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

offspring and inner circle, there appears in the accompanying rhetoric a justifying rationale that purports somehow to be serving a common good. The big idea laid as the foundation of the New Order ideology was that economic growth was the key to advancing the general welfare of Indonesian society. But the history of this period demonstrates that, in the indiscriminating drive to achieve growth at almost any social cost, developments that exacted greater social, economic, and environmental costs from the majority than could ever be justified by the windfall benefits accruing to a small minority, went forward in the name of growth. The values and priorities promulgated and institutionalized by the New Order's development agenda were not accommodating to such cost-benefit analyses that might serve as reference points for decision making processes. It became a matter of national faith that growth was good. Even though growth was disproportionately better for some than for others, still, it was presumed that all stood to benefit from the projects pursued by the political and power elite. From this idea came the New Order pro-growth ideology propagated throughout society as the values and priorities (culture) of Suharto's development agenda. Disseminated through every pore and crevice of the vast bureaucracy of New Order Indonesia, the growth-at-all-costs values of the Suharto development agenda took on the nature of a national faith. Even personal decisions were guided by this faith. The abstract notion of national development via growth took on exaggerated importance to outweigh even very concrete hardships imposed by it.

To this set of priorities growing out of the New Order pro-growth ideology was grafted the alluring vision of a future Indonesia approaching the material abundance portrayed in film, television, and print media from the West. The imagery of life in the developed West emanating from Australia, Western Europe, and, most vividly, America provided the raw material from which to construct the possibilities for lifestyles of material wealth for Indonesians. With the New Order project of bringing television to the masses, these images provided the ready-made raw material from which the aspirations of some 200 million individuals were constructed under the fatherly guidance of the New Order media.⁴⁹ The gleaming skylines lit up at night animated by the blur of headlights weaving on ribbons of elevated freeways between the glass and steel towers became a national icon. Access to the shopping malls, golf courses, and suburban real estate developments were established as the prize for buying the right government position. The historic familiarity of the Javanese with sharply delineated social stratification received such images of the future as part of a natural evolution of social change.

⁴⁹ Philip Kitley, *Television, Nature, and Culture in Indonesia* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000).

The effectiveness with which Suharto's culture of development was incorporated into individual values of the legions of New Order bureaucrats, members of the business community, neighborhood leaders, and even those most directly victimized by the Suharto growth machine was the key element necessary to account for the vast transformative effects upon the regional landscape as well as the form, meaning, and operation of the city. Without winning over the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people, the New Order growth coalition would have faced more substantial obstacles to their program and left a very different legacy for future generations of Jakartans. Without downplaying General Suharto's role as commander and chief of the armed forces in an often brutal military dictatorship, the reach and longevity of his 32 year consummate control over the unlikely archipelago nation would not have been possible but for the effective engineering of the national culture. It wasn't until the 1980s that the gradual loosening of the military hold on Indonesian society progressed significantly even as it was complemented by a simultaneous advancing consolidation of control by civil and social institutions.⁵⁰ The culturally disseminated and socially enforced prerequisite for citizenship in New Order Indonesia was the acceptance of the core values of Suharto's "development agenda" as one's own. In the examples of regulatory implementation that follow, the overt exercise of power is insufficient to account for the course of events and their reception by Indonesian society. In each case, to varying degrees, the history of the ways that planning measures were and were not implemented demonstrate a widespread sharing of the values propagated by the New Order regime.

Social Jealousy

An examination of how the Mixed Settlement regulations were implemented during the late Suharto period offers a vivid demonstration of how the New Order's priorities altered the impacts of planning and regulatory controls. To a large extent, they redirected the built form of the city and the relationships between social classes. The incentives offered to the private sector to stimulate housing production as part of Suharto's "market enabling strategies" were paired with requirements to ensure that private sector housing production matched the needs of the majority of Jakartans. A series of national government decrees dating from 1974 established quotas for standard house types imposed on developments larger than 200 hectares (500 acres) wishing to qualify for the government program of subsidized loans.⁵¹ For every single luxury house built,

⁵⁰ Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, introduction to *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), xxii-xxxv.

⁵¹ Two of these decrees are: Surat Keputusan Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (SK BKPM) No. 28 tahun 1974 tentang Pedoman Penanaman Modal Bidang Pembangunan Perumahan (Investment Coordination Board Decree No. 28, 1974 regarding Housing Development Investment Guidelines); discussed in Siswono Yudohusodo et al., ed.,

developers were required to build three "Small Houses" at 22 to 36 square meters (237 to 388 square feet) and six "Very Small Houses" at 21 square meters (226 square feet) or less. This ratio of 1:3:6 reflected the overall perception of income stratification at the time. The intention of this Mixed Settlements (*Hunian Berimbang*) program was for the subsidized loans and the smaller nine out of ten houses to be within the financial reach of the 20 to 80 percentile middle income groups.⁵² Significantly, the decree also stated that the different house types must be "mixed" within the same contiguous developments to encourage a greater social integration.⁵³ Given the land costs in most larger developments, direct subsidies would have been required to keep the smaller units below the maximum price ceilings established in the 1980s for each locality. This direct subsidy was to be complemented by an indirect subsidy in the form of greater access by lower income groups to a better class of urban services. A minimum amount of urban services and infrastructure were required of every development over 200 hectares (500 acres) as a percentage of the developed area. For most of the 1990s this was 40 percent.⁵⁴ These so-called "Public" and "Social Facilities" (*Fasilitas Sosial* and *Fasilitas Umum* or more commonly *Fasos* and *Fasum*) included roads, schools, mosques, churches, cemeteries, sport and recreation facilities, governmental offices, public open space, and public markets. By integrating a wider diversity of income groups in a single development, the Mixed Settlement requirements were designed to grant access by lower income households to the higher quality urban services and infrastructures developers needed to build in order to satisfy the needs of potential luxury housing buyers.

Unfortunately, for the vast majority of Jakartans, this decree was undermined in a variety of ways by both developers and administering agencies with the tacit approval of the ministries that set the regulations, the courts, and even the usually critical members of academia. Except for smaller developments intentionally catering to lower income households, the Mixed Settlement requirements were almost never met despite their institutionalization as prerequisites for both Location Permits and the government subsidized credit utilized by most private housing

Rumah Untuk Seluruh Rakyat (Housing for All) (Jakarta: INKOPPOL, Percetakan Bharakerta, 1991), 114; and Surat Keputusan Badan Kebijaksanaan Perumahan Nasional 12 September 1974 (National Housing Policy Board Decree 12 September 1974) discussed in: Michael Leon Leaf, "Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the 'Big Village' to the 'Modern City'" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991), 246, footnote 30.

⁵² Leaf, "Land Regulation," 246-52.

⁵³ The actual term used is *berimbang* which means "balanced" but the English equivalent is often provided in parentheses as "Mixed Community." Ramalis S. Prihandana, Head of the West Java Province Department of Public Works, interview with the author, Bandung (3 April 1998).

⁵⁴ Ramalis, interview.

developments. The ways in which the 1:3:6 housing quotas were circumvented varied from elaborate options for paying a fee in lieu of building the housing to simply ignoring the requirement with impunity.⁵⁵ By 1990, the Mixed Settlement regulation was declared a success amidst claims that the 1:3:6 quota had been exceeded, reaching a ratio of 1:4:14.⁵⁶ However, these figures touted by both the public housing ministry and Real Estate Indonesia almost certainly referred not to the housing governed by the Mixed Settlements regulations but all formal sector provided housing, which included the significant subsidized housing programs of the Perumnas National Housing Corporation. Leaf estimated that up until 1990, the number of Very Small Houses actually built resulted in a ratio that was more in the range of one to one.⁵⁷

The required "Public" and "Social Facilities" (*Fasum* and *Fasos*) were often replaced with more housing (more profit), deferred indefinitely, or openly abandoned altogether. The omission of the required public facilities from large new housing developments was often arranged by tacit agreement between the developers, who were reluctant to pay for construction, and public administrators, who were reluctant to take on responsibility for maintenance and operation.⁵⁸ One group of developers, when faced with pressure from an ad hoc commission pressing for enforcement of the *Fasos* and *Fasum* requirements, "met" the deadline set for them by holding a grand ceremony in which it publicly turned over schools, sports facilities, a mosque, a church, and a market to the city government despite the fact that none of these facilities had yet been built.⁵⁹ Golf courses and country clubs were often offered in fulfillment of public facilities requirements although exclusionary fees and fences hardly qualified these as "public." As in many instances of weak implementation of planning regulations, some of the largest developers employed as "consultants" the very planning officials responsible for regulating their activities.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ The consistent undermining of the 1:3:6 regulation is described by Dalhar Susanto, "Kota Baru di Jabotabek: Optimalisasi Bisnis" (New Towns of Jabotabek: Business Optimization), paper presented at the seminar The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000) 7-8; and Harald Leisch, "Gated Paradise?: Quality of Life in Private New Towns in JABOTABEK," Proceedings of The Second International Conference on Quality of Life in Cities, National University of Singapore, School of Building and Real Estate (8-10 March 2000) 257-64.

⁵⁶ Siswono Yudohusodo and Soearli Salam, eds., *Rumah Untuk Seluruh Rakyat (Housing for All)*, (Jakarta: INKOPPOL, Percetakan Bhakerta, 1991), 432.

⁵⁷ Rather than the required one to six ratio. Leaf, "Land Regulation," 247-49.

⁵⁸ Gunawan Tjahjono, "New Town: Urban Future for Expanded Metropolis in Indonesia?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Architecture*, no. 1 (November 1997) 13-24.

⁵⁹ "N. Jakarta Gets Public Facilities from Realtors," *Jakarta Post* (28 January 1991); cited in Leaf, "Land Regulation," 207-209.

⁶⁰ This assertion is based on confidential communications with the author by reliable observers.

Both the direct subsidies compelled through price ceilings on specific required housing types and the indirect subsidies fostered through spatially mixed low- and high-income housing were widely considered unreasonable and irrelevant to actual development practice by both developers and government officials. The implementation of the Mixed Settlement regulations suffered from administrative irregularities justified in the minds of government officials, developers, and the general public, in part, by Suharto's appeal for "flexibility" in regulating the private sector. Three areas of "flexibility" regarding the required price, size, and location of developments were exhibited in various combinations and to different degrees in every significant private sector housing development in Jabotabek:

1. The technical guidelines that set price maximums at below market levels were often ignored, especially for developers who built their smaller houses within the same development as their luxury housing.⁶¹ Even if the smaller nine houses were to have been built within the same developments as the luxury housing, the pricing of the smallest houses missed its target group by a wide margin, excluding most of the intended beneficiaries of the Mixed Settlement regulations. Even before the 1997 monetary crisis, the smallest units of 21 square meters (226 square feet) or less were affordable by only the top 40 percent income groups.⁶²
2. Discrepancies in definitions of house and lot size restrictions between different governmental levels, and changes in these definitions from the first National Housing Board decree in 1974 to the Joint Ministerial Decree of 1992 contributed to some confusion and much flexibility with which the quotas were applied to a wide range of parcel and building sizes.⁶³ In several luxury housing estates, houses too large to be officially classified as anything but a Luxury House were offered up as fulfilling the

⁶¹ Maximum selling prices are assigned to one and two story Rumah Sederhana (36-70/60-200) and Rumah Inti (12-36/45-165) at 75 to 82.5 percent of local prices per square meter for similar "Klas C" housing. "Public Works Ministerial Decree No. 20/KPTS/1986 tentang Pedoman Teknik Pembangunan Perumahan Sederhana Tidak Bersusun" (Single Family Low-income Housing Technical Development Guidelines) (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum, 1986), 49-51 and "Penjelasan Materi" (Clarification), 44-47.

⁶² Leaf, "Land Regulation," 246-52.

⁶³ Comparing two different imprints of the same regulation uncovered a discrepancy in the parcel size limit of Luxury houses that was only settled by looking at a third version of the same text. Further complexities were introduced in the Addendum to the 1992 decree, Joint Ministerial Decree No. 04/KPTS/BKP4N/1995, which redefined Very Small, Small, and Luxury Houses using a matrix that added three ranges of price per square meter to the definition.

Small House quota because it was small in comparison with other houses in the development.⁶⁴

3. While the Mixed Settlement regulation required the different classes of housing to be provided within a single contiguous development an exception was allowed where density limits in local Structure Plans forbade the higher density Very Small Houses.⁶⁵ Despite such limits existing in only a few areas south of Jakarta, this exception was exploited as a loophole somehow applied to areas all over Jabotabek regardless of density restrictions. The lack of specific prescriptions on what scale the houses were to be mixed, was considered a weakness of the regulation and cause for a loose interpretation of locational requirements.⁶⁶ Citing these two factors, officials allowed the required smaller housing to be built on much cheaper land elsewhere and with less infrastructure investment.

As with the larger lots, smaller lots without any building on them, offered ostensibly in satisfaction of the 1:3:6 housing quota, were sold via agreement letters circumventing the *Hak Guna Bangunan Induk* Subdivision Regulation.⁶⁷

The most systematic undermining of the 1:3:6 Mixed Settlement rules came in the form of a West Java Province Gubernatorial Decree in the late 1980s giving developers in West Java (including the 90 percent of Jabotabek where almost all of Jakarta's exurban development occurred since the 1970s) the option to pay Rp1.4 million (about US\$600 in 1994) in lieu of each Very Small House not built. No payment in lieu of building Small Houses was required. These payments were made to the Governor's "Lovely Houses" Foundation (*Sawung Kaduduh* in the local Sundanese language of West Java). No records were kept of the house building performance of this foundation. However, even outside of Jabotabek in the far reaches of West Java where the Governor claimed to be helping the poorest communities of his province, the 1994-1998 official

⁶⁴ Agus Rachmat, former head of Kabupaten Tangerang Regional Planning Development Board, interview with the author, Cisangkui Cafe, Bandung, Indonesia (15 November 2000).

⁶⁵ Yusuf Yuniarto, Director of New Settlements and Backward Areas (Permukiman Baru dan Kawasan Tertinggal), interview with the author, Jakarta, Indonesia (9 November 2000).

⁶⁶ Ibu Ramalis S. Prihandana, Head of the West Java Province Department of Public Works, interview with the author, Bandung (3 April 1998).

⁶⁷ Details on the circumvention of the Subdivision Regulation comes from Jo Santoso, conversation with the author on tour of Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangerang (15 September 2000). The same practice used for smaller empty lots as a circumvention of the Mixed Settlement Regulations is alluded to as one of the many ways in which the Mixed Settlements regulations were violated listed in Harald Leisch, "Gated Paradise?: Quality of Life in Private New Towns in JABOTABEK," Proceedings of The Second International Conference on Quality of Life in Cities, National University of Singapore, School of Building and Real Estate (8-10 March 2000) 257-64.

price of building a 21 square meter (230 square foot) Very Small House type on a 60 square meter (650 square foot) parcel was set at Rp2.4 million (US\$1000 in 1994).⁶⁸ This proved a very attractive arrangement for developers as it cost many times this to develop the housing within Jabotabek, it saved them the higher development costs per unit of these houses, and preserved the marketing image for their “exclusive” housing estates.⁶⁹ That the provincial decree undermining national level regulations to the enrichment of the Governor’s foundation was not corrected through either the courts or reassertion of national jurisdiction, indicates that other forces and other mechanisms were at work to preserve the governor’s arrangement. It fell to a few isolated county/municipal heads to disallow the Governor’s payoff option and reestablish Mixed Settlement requirements in response to local pressure.⁷⁰

In the media, academic and professional conferences, and face-to-face interviews, these apparent breaches of the law were discussed with surprising openness by high-ranking officials, academics, design professionals, and residents employing a common set of rationales. Three particular “rationales” examined here reveal a high level of general acceptance despite logical flaws that seem to only be apparent outside the context of near universal consensus. That these positions could enjoy a politically significant currency does much to shed light on the operations of culture in the formation of a society and its built form within the context of late New Order Indonesia. The first of these was that the Mixed Settlement regulations were recast in the minds of government officials as a set of governmental “suggestions” (*usulan* or *rekomendasi*). These were to be followed in part, or not at all, at the discretion of the developer or, at most, as agreed to in amicable negotiation with local officials. Lacking the intervention of one of the three ministries who jointly enacted the original decree, or by the courts, the Mixed Settlement regulations remained, in practice, optional, even in the absence of overriding legislation or decree that would have altered their status as legal requirements. The second rationale was that because the smaller housing units were not profitable, or not as profitable as luxury units, that it was beyond the scope of government regulation to require that they be built. The maximization of private sector profits would thus appear to be the supreme law of the land, and sufficient justification for breaking laws that might hurt the bottom line. Suharto’s message to not inhibit the dynamic capacity of free

⁶⁸ Lebak, Garut and Sukabumi were the three remote locations mentioned. Agus Rachmat, interview with the author, Cisangkui Cafe, Bandung, Indonesia (15 November 2000).

⁶⁹ Ramalis S. Prihandana, Head of Urban Development, West Java, interview with the author, Bandung (3 April 1998).

⁷⁰ In 1995, the Bupati of Kabupaten Tangerang Syafullah Abdurachman (1993-1998) returned to requiring the 1:3:6 Mixed Settlement ratio. This is why Lippo Karawaci has built neighborhoods of Rumah Sederhana and Rumah Sangat Sederhana within the walls of their new town.

markets made it reasonable to ignore the cross-subsidy requirements of the Mixed Settlements regulations.

The third and most commonly invoked rationale was encapsulated in the term “social jealousy” (*keceburuan sosial*). Its status as an established catch phrase of the New Order culture of development is attested to by its use in isolation of any further accompanying argumentation or explication. Proclaimed as if it were a well-intentioned humanitarian defense of the poor, the mere mention of the phrase “social jealousy” was declared in a way similar to the term “development” itself as if referring to a pre-ordained consensus so as to end all further debate—so as to say: ‘of course we all agree that it would be unjust to impose on the poor that they endure the nearby presence of the wealthy as a constant reminder of their poverty.’ In such a portrayal of costs and benefits of lower income households, the suffering imposed by such a proximity was assumed to outweigh the benefits of living in affordable housing located in relatively high amenity areas with access to urban services, employment opportunities, and transportation infrastructure.

That the specious arguments of these three “rationales” were granted sufficient legitimacy to warrant such flagrant contraventions of both the spirit and letter of the Mixed Settlement regulations demonstrates the significant role played by the exchange and flow of ideas. These ideas were coupled with a broadly shared set of values operating and reproducing itself through the New Order’s social and political structures, a controlled media’s influence on linguistic trends, and the guided construction of social and material aspirations, taken together in this study as a “culture.” The collective representations that would appear absurd outside of this cultural context were, within it, rendered meaningful and granted currency. This culture operated during the late New Order period to render certain events and conditions (breaking the law) acceptable, and others (being poor) deplorable.

Location Permit

Of the official plans and permits described above, only the *kabupaten/kotamadya* (county/municipal) plan at 1:50,000 scale and the Location Permit were of any significance. But the role these tools took on was starkly different than the regulatory function that was originally intended. The dramatic divergence between the way in which the Location Permit and other planning tools were implemented, and the well-known rhetorical rationales that surrounded them, demonstrates the power of the faith placed in the positive effects of growth for its own sake. While the Location Permit and its associated spatial plan were commandeered by the New Order developers for their own purposes, the other permits remained empty gestures. Even though the implementing legislation for the Concept Permit (*Ijin Prinsip*) was never enacted, the permit was required and fees were collected by the county/municipal Development Planning Agency (*Badan*

Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah or Bappeda). The Environmental Permit (Amdal), was also required but was so narrow in scope—it did not consider issues of transportation—as to be meaningless. Yet, this step in the process supported the County/Municipal Environmental Impact Planning and Control Agency (*Badan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah* or BaPPeDaLDa)—a bureaucracy as vast as its acronym but seemingly devoid of regulatory powers. Building Permits (*Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan* or IMB) were issued by municipal Public Works Office of Spatial Planning (*Pekerjaan Umum Dinas Tata Ruang*), who periodically over the years, launched campaigns to make the Building Permit relevant to home builders and developers but these never covered more than a minority of building projects. These permits have no history of being enforced. They served simply as administrative hoops justifying the existence of vast bureaucracies supported by the official and unofficial fees collected through the permitting process. They are treated as mere formalities with each regulating authority performing the service of granting these permissions as a service to developers. There is not a feeling that these permissions should, or can be, refused to the projects. At various points during the late New Order period, the concept of a “One Stop Shop” (*Pelayanan Satu Atap* or YanTap) was explored to provide a single office where all of a developer’s permitting needs could be satisfied. The YanTap reorganization would not expand the individual or joint powers of the separate regulatory agencies but simply provide more convenient service for the developers.⁷¹

The key tool of land use regulation was the Location Permit (*Ijin Lokasi*) ostensibly giving governments the ability to coordinate the rate and location of new development with infrastructure capacities, and to regulate the operation of the market to serve the broader needs of environmental protection and economic planning. But within the context of the Suharto regime’s larger development program of “marketing enabling strategies,” the intended function of land use regulation slipped into the background as subsequent legislation expanded the role of the Location Permit to satisfy other purposes. By the mid-1980s, these supplementary clauses eased the land assembly process and protected holders of Location Permits from rapid price rises by giving them exclusive rights to purchase and develop the land.⁷² Facilitating private sector development replaced land use regulation as the dominant function of the Location Permit. By easing the processes of land assembly and finance, the New Order government hoped to stimulate the production of housing by the private sector. Indeed this proved to be an effective strategy. From

⁷¹ The YanTap concept began a pilot program of implementation in 1999. Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Province Regional Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

⁷² See chapter two.

1974 when both the private and public sectors began to build large numbers of houses, to 1996, the private sector produced some 360,000 units financed through the government housing credit program as compared with the 86,000 houses provided by Perumnas National Housing Corporation in the same period.⁷³ But these houses continued to be priced out of the reach of the majority of Jakartans. Like many of the New Order successes, the aggregate numbers indicate great success, the benefits of which accrued disproportionately to the already fortunate few at the top of the socioeconomic scale.

While the Location Permit contributed to an increase in the numbers of houses produced, it was almost never utilized for the enforcement of land use and infrastructure planning. The planning function of the Location Permit was hampered by several problems:

1. Land use plans were limited in significance by low fees paid to the private consultants producing them with little incentive to do much more than cursory, and frequently inaccurate, reports on existing land uses, along with a few vague recommendations they knew were unlikely to ever be enforced;⁷⁴
2. Land use plans were often created by the same firms associated with large developers with their own plans for the area, or routinely changed to accommodate private sector development proposals;
3. Land use plans existed only at larger scales incapable of offering more than just a symbolic association between certain areas and a prevalent land use, and insufficiently detailed to actually function as zoning to allow or preclude any given use from a specific parcel;
4. Despite regulations to the contrary, administrators were not directed by their superiors to make or use land use plans to coordinate infrastructure planning with development; and

⁷³ Statistik Pembangunan Perumahan Indonesia 1996 (Housing Construction Statistics 1996) (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1997), 3-4, 30-31.

⁷⁴ A large portion of the fee paid to consultants is eaten up by the costs of printing and distributing the final report. Danisworo, Head of Bandung Institute of Technology Urban Design Center, conversation with the author, Bandung (2 October 2000).

5. Even for administrators and developers inclined to refer to land use plans, the actual plan documents were almost never reliably preserved or stored in any way that would allow their retrieval.⁷⁵

The aggregate impact of these obstacles was to render the Location Permit not only useless for the purposes of land use and infrastructure planning, but also subject to abuses as a tool for guiding large-scale changes in land use. Land use plans were either not referred to or altered in processing applications for a Location Permit. This is demonstrated in the high percentage of Location Permits granted to proposals that clearly contravened the official land use plans. Assessments of land use compliance rates have varied over the years and in different locations, ranging from a high of 51 percent of Location Permits in Tangerang,⁷⁶ to a low of eight percent of Location Permits in Botabek.⁷⁷

The case of the 6,000-hectare (15,000-acre) Bumi Serpong Damai new town project in Tangerang County illustrates many of these abuses. Like many regional plans, the 1:25,000 scale Serpong General City Plan was prepared by a team of private sector firms. The three firms that teamed up to prepare this plan were PT. Arkonim, PT Pembangunan Jaya, and a Japanese Consultant. Both of the Indonesian firms were subsidiaries of Ciputra's Si Pengembang Group of conglomerates several of which, including PT Pembangunan Jaya, were members of the 10 firm consortium developing Bumi Serpong Damai. The Bumi Serpong Damai new town project was launched in 1984 and its 1986 masterplan was produced concurrently with the official Government plan for Serpong. Despite this clear conflict of interest, the Serpong plan was adopted by the National Planning Agency (Bappenas) in 1987, and approved as the 1989 Serpong General City Plan (RUTRK Serpong) through a by-law of the Kabupaten Tangerang.⁷⁸ The influence of Ciputra's private plans on the official government planning documents for the region is seen at the

⁷⁵ Throughout my research, land use plans were found to be missing from local land agency (Badan Pertanahan Negara) offices, the county and provincial Development Agencies (Bappeda) and the Jabotabek Cooperative Development Board (Badan Kerjasama Jabotabek). Aksoro's study found a similar problem on the more local level finding conflicting versions of location permit boundaries held by different entities and officials in one village lacking even a simple map of their own village. Lana Winayanti Aksoro, "The Effects of the Location Permit on Urban Land Markets: A Case Study in the Jabotabek Area, Indonesia," (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1994), 69-93.

⁷⁶ Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan Review: The Strategic Land Use Plan (Jakarta: Ministry of Public Works, September 1993), 31, footnote 1.

⁷⁷ Direktorat Jenderal Agraria, Konsep Saran Perubahan Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Jabotabek (Proposed Changes in the Jabotabek Structure Plan), (1988) quoted in Bruce W. Ferguson and Michael L. Hoffman, "Land Markets and the Effect of Regulation on Formal-sector Development in Urban Indonesia," in *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1993), 61.

⁷⁸ Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), 113, footnote 31.

larger scale as well. The new town developments in Depok and Serpong lie within the boundaries of the Jabopunjur (JA-karta, BO-gor, PUN-cak, and Cian-JUR) water catchment conservation area and violate not only the regional plans, and water supply protection laws, but pose a tangible threat in the form of reduced water supplies and downstream flooding.⁷⁹

The private influence on public planning extended to infrastructure planning as well. Jakarta's first Mass Rapid Transit was proposed in the early 1990s along the central north-south axis of Jakarta from the new shopping center at Blok M in the south, to Kota near the old port in the north. This proposal incorporated a toll road as well configured as a triple-decker roadway with south bound roadway on one level, the northbound on another and the elevated railway on yet another. The toll road would continue on through Ciputra's 1,700-hectare (4,200-acre) Bintaro Jaya development to Bumi Serpong Damai. By the mid-1990s, an interesting feature appeared in the brochures for Ciputra's projects in Tangerang, and later, in regional transportation plans. These plans showed the new toll road forming a giant loop, an alignment pattern almost never seen in major road planning. Instead, major roadways tend to favor regional interconnectivity by extending in a single direction. Ciputra's own maps of this road show with greater clarity the reason for this unlikely alignment. Extending to the south west out of Jakarta, this new toll road would link together Ciputra's biggest housing projects: Pondok Indah, Bintaro Jaya, Bumi Serpong Damai and then, looping northward, Citra Raya, and Puri Jaya before turning again back east towards Jakarta completing a 180 degree loop to connect up with the airport toll road (figure 6.2). The particular geometry of this road brings to mind another side of Ciputra, expressing his well-known propensity for self-promotion. He likes to hand out plaques engraved with the following quotation from Kahlil Gibran:

In life there is something more glorious and higher than fame. This something is the GREAT WORK that brings this fame. I feel there is within myself a hidden force that strives to clothe my nakedness in a beautiful robe that is this GREAT WORK. This makes me feel that I am on this Earth to write my name in the face of life with CAPITAL LETTERS. I carry this feeling with me DAY AND NIGHT...⁸⁰

Given his propensity for both self-inflation and literalness, it is difficult to see this toll road not only as the means for greatly increasing the value of his developments, but on a more personal level, as a way to etch his initial, a giant capital "C," on the surface of the earth.

⁷⁹ Tommy Firman and Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni, "The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region," *Habitat International* 18, no. 3 (1994), 86.

⁸⁰ Emphasis comes from the original. Translation from the Indonesian back into English by the author. "Kiat Menjadi Konglomerat Properti, Part 2," *Properti Indonesia*, no. 35 (December 1996), Bonus section page "a" between pages 108 and 109.




FIGURE 6.2 The toll road planned for Tangerang takes an unorthodox route linking together Ciputra's largest projects. It also would leave his signature "C" to be seen from distant planets. Source: *Properti Indonesia* (November 1996)

Denial, revocation, or enforcement of permits was almost unheard of under Suharto. Instead of regulating land development, they served no discernable purpose beyond providing a source of revenue for, and justifying the existence of, vast government bureaucracies. With the exception of the Building Permit, the actual fees charged ran well above the official fee rates (see table). The most significant of these permit fees was charged for the annual renewal of Location Permits. This procedure prevailed despite there being no official charge and a two year limit to renewals. In practice, the Location Permits were extended every year without limitations, in part motivated by the substantial income that such renewals generated. The spoils were distributed up and down the political hierarchy ensuring a widespread support for the continuation of such arrangements. The financial and loan interest costs compelled by the elaborate permitting process accounted for about one third of the total project cost of development. The largest component was the carrying costs accrued while waiting for approval of Location Permits.⁸¹ While the actual granting of permits was taken to be a foregone conclusion, the primary variable was how long it would take at each step of the permitting process. Again, the way to circumvent the delays was to pay for speedier service with additional payments to "expedite" the processing of permit applications.

⁸¹ Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behavior," 113-14.

Table 6.1: 1996 Permitting Fees for a 100-hectare (250-acre) development (US\$=Rp2300)

<i>Permit</i>	<i>Official Tariff</i>	<i>Actual Cost</i>
Concept Permit	\$22,000	\$170,000-\$480,000
Location Permit	none	\$43,000-\$430,000
Advice Planning	\$22,000	\$22,000-\$87,000
Building Permit	2-3% of construction costs	0.6% of construction costs
Subdivision Master Title	\$43,000-\$130,000	\$130,000-\$870,000
Each Subdivision Title	\$15-33/plot	\$43-65/plot

source: Properti Indonesia (1996)⁸²

Although government officials proved expert at reviewing applications and collecting (and distributing) fees, enforcement of regulations governing the permitting process, and the projects under permit did not seem to enter into the picture. An exceptional case that confirms this general rule is found in the action taken against illegal construction of luxury villas on the picturesque slopes to the south of Jakarta near the resort town of Puncak.⁸³ Puncak is located in a significant watershed feeding several major rivers including the Ciliwung that flows through the heart of Jakarta. The illegal deforestation and development of many of these slopes was finally acknowledged as a significant factor in the seriousness of 1996 flooding in Jakarta. Despite the fact that these projects abrogated virtually every single planning and permitting regulation, not a single regulatory agency deemed it within their powers to intervene. The *Bupati* (county head) finally had to empower a special ad hoc commission to order their alteration or demolition concluding that not a single one of the standing administrative agencies had the capacity or, perhaps more to the point, the political will, to enforce the permits that they routinely issued.⁸⁴ After two years of the commission's work, some of the illegal villas were actually demolished. But in 1998, changes

⁸² There are inconsistencies in the information reported in this article. In particular, the text reports Location Permits and renewals charged at a rate of Rp1,000 per square meter (p. 23) well beyond the range reported in the article's accompanying table of permit fee rates: Rp100-400 per square meter (p. 23). "Tak Mau Repot, Ambil Jalan Pintas" (Avoid Inconvenience, Take the Short-Cut), Properti Indonesia, no. 34 (November 1996), 22-23. This table is reproduced in Haryo Winarso, "Residential Land Developers' Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000), 114.

⁸³ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Province Regional Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

⁸⁴ Arie Djunardi Djoekardi, "The Implementation of Spatial Planning Policies in Indonesia: A Case Study of Puncak, West Java," (masters thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990); "Pemda Bogor Akan Bongkar Ribuan Vila di Puncak," Kompas (7 February 2002).

were made in the composition of the commission and demolitions were halted pending the preparation of a new study.⁸⁵

Social Function of Land

With the widespread cultural consensus establishing “development” as the greatest common good, even the poorest property owners in Indonesia could be convinced that selling their land at below market rates, to even large developers building luxury houses, was a social obligation. The roots of this condition lie in the long history of social dualism regarding land rights in Indonesia. During the late Dutch colonial period up to 1942, statutory laws applied only to Europeans, Chinese, and Indians living in separate areas from native populations. All arrangements within the native *kampung* (taxes, tenancies, etc.) were handled through the local native chiefs (*Lurah*) governing each neighborhood (*Kelurahan*).⁸⁶ The Indonesian Constitution established the legal basis for protecting the “social function of land.”⁸⁷ The social function of land is understood as operating in cases where land rights are transferred for the purposes of inheritance, marriage, strengthening of kinship ties, expansion of local cooperative agricultural practices, etc. without a reciprocal exchange according to its market value. The Agrarian Law was established to defend the “eternal relationship” between traditional communities and land usage from the operation of land markets that threatened to make land too expensive to support agriculture and community use. Under the Dutch, the rise of property markets that established land prices according to its exchange value, visited devastation upon whole communities, bringing an abrupt end to centuries-long practices not unlike the outright military seizure of land. The Indonesian Constitution established, in principle, the authority of the State to intervene where land markets posed a threat to the functioning of local social customs of land exchange. One of the most substantial reforms of the Sukarno presidency was the enactment of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law.⁸⁸ This law sought to bring an end to colonial era social dualism through differential systems of land rights by granting full legal recognition of registered title to those holding land under traditional land rights practices. It also established the legal authority of the State (*Hak Menguasai Negara*) to defend the social

⁸⁵ The Jakarta flood of February 2002 has brought the illegal villas in Puncak and the unfinished work of this commission back to the forefront of discussion on how to prevent future flooding. Ester Fitrinika, “Re: Pemda Bogor Akan Bongkar Ribuan Vila di Puncak” local government to demolish thousands of villas in Puncak), Message posted to Malibi listserv (<builtenvironment@yahoogroups.com>, 12 February 2002).

⁸⁶ Lana Winayanti Aksoro, “The Effects of the Location Permit on Urban Land Markets: A Case Study in the Jabotabek Area, Indonesia,” (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1994), footnote 6, page 25.

⁸⁷ Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Indonesian Constitution of 1945) article 33.

⁸⁸ Undang-undang Pokok Agraria (Basic Agrarian Law) No. 5, 1960, article 6.

function of land through extraordinary powers to expropriate land from private ownership for the purposes of returning land to local communities employing traditional land rights practices.⁸⁹ The law severely limited the size of privately held lands in support of family farms, and protected local communities against land expropriation without fair compensation.⁹⁰ There was little room for ambiguity on the point that the Indonesian Constitution and the granting of extraordinary state powers were all aligned in defense of “the social function of land” against the threats posed by the rise of capitalist land markets. These protections were designed to allow social and use values to dominate the exchange of land rights where traditional practices still prevailed, even as the exchange value of land as a commodity dominated transactions elsewhere.

In practice, the conversion of traditional forms of land holding (*Hak Girik*) as evidenced by tax receipts and letters, to full fee-simple ownership (*Hak Milik*) was a costly undertaking in terms of time and the exaction of both legal and extra-legal fees. Since the local land markets operated unhindered by a lack of formally registered titles, very few conversions in fact took place without changes in ownership.⁹¹ The land reform provisions of the Basic Agrarian Law were frozen when Suharto took full power in 1966. The processes of land reform were halted and reversed as new regulations provided the means to more easily consolidate private ownership of large tracts of land. The means of land transfer overriding the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law were established by two 1976 Interior Ministry Regulations on “Land Acquisition and Land Titling for Public Housing Development,” and “Land Acquisition and Land Titling for Private Sector Housing Development.”⁹² These were further revised in 1987 by the Interior Ministry Regulation on the “Location Permit, Land Acquisition and Land Titling for Companies.”⁹³ Together these acts established the Location Permit and its terms. In exchange for temporary exclusive rights to acquire and develop lands identified under the permit, the government required developers to follow land use planning, preserve irrigated rice fields and other prime farmland, avoid environmental damage, and employ the 1:3:6 housing quotas of the Mixed Settlement regulations.⁹⁴

For the expropriation of lands for public infrastructure projects, provisions for the formation of local “Land Appropriation Committees” were made. Local small land owners unwilling to sell their

⁸⁹ Winarso, “Residential Land Developers’ Behaviour,” 90; and Aksoro, “Effects of Location Permit,” 25-27.

⁹⁰ Lutfi Nasoetion, “Interview: There has been a Deviation in Implementing the Basic Land Law,” *Tempo* 1, English Edition, no. 2 (19-25 September 2000), 44.

⁹¹ Aksoro, “Effects of Location Permit,” 27.

⁹² Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (Interior Minister Decree) no. 15 and no. 16, 1976.

⁹³ Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (Interior Minister Decree) no. 3, 1987

⁹⁴ Aksoro, “Effects of Location Permit,” 27.

land would meet with a committee made up of local government officials (ostensibly considered the advocates for protecting local land owner interests), infrastructure authorities, and their contractors. The committee was charged with reaching a mutually agreed upon arrangement for the use of the land in question with fair compensation to the owner. Land Appropriation Committees were required to offer reluctant sellers the option of resettlement or "land adjustment" in which the land owner would be granted a share in the ownership of the completed project.⁹⁵

Table 6.2: Typical Land Prices reported in *Kabupaten Tangerang* (Rupiah per square meter of land)

<i>seller</i>	<i>buyer</i>	1987	1990	1993
land owner	broker	7,000	16,000	46,000
broker	developer	na	na	74,000
developer	new home owner	160,000	250,000	450,000

Source: Aksoro (1994)⁹⁶

The negotiating position of small land owners was weakened in several ways as a result of influences ranging from social pressures to threats of violence. Despite the stipulations of the Location Permit that make the registered developer the only one legally able to purchase the land under permit, ownership almost always changed hands several times before ending up with the developer. The trade association Real Estate Indonesia reported that about 90 percent of the land member-developers' purchases were acquired through land brokers (*calo*).⁹⁷ Small land holders signed contracts with informal land brokers granting them the right of first refusal to purchase their land for a designated amount in exchange for advances on the sale price, loans, fees or under conditions of coercion or intimidation.⁹⁸ Brokers could then hold these contracts for years or decades as land values rose. When developers proceeded with the purchase of lands they typically did so through their own land brokers at an agreed fixed price. The difference between the prices

⁹⁵ "Land readjustment" or "land adjustment" is a strategy of collective land redevelopment popular with the World Bank in the 1980s resulting in several projects throughout the developing world notably in Thailand. See: Mochtarram Karyoedi, "Inner-City Redevelopment Process for Urban Poor: A Case Study of Housing development Project in Bandung Inner-city," Workshop on Southeast Asian Urban Futures, Singapore (22 July 2000).

⁹⁶ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 46, 54, 74-77

⁹⁷ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 57.

⁹⁸ Ediwarman has documented the many ways in which land compensation laws were undermined by their partial application and misuse drawing on case examples from Medan, Sumatra. Informal brokers employing coercion and intimidation, drove compensation rates far below mandated levels. Cases of conflict were typically settled out of court leaving the practices in general unchanged. *Victimologi: Kaitannya Dengan Pelaksanaan Ganti Rugi Tanah* (Victimology: Regarding the Implementation of Land Compensation), (Bandung: Mandar Maju, 1999)

offered by developers and the fixed prices agreed to long before often left room for a series of transactions between several consolidating land brokers in which vast fortunes were made (see table). Minimum sales prices mandated by local authorities had no impact on these prior arrangements. Even with a rapid increase in acquisition prices a sizable marginal increase in land values left plenty of room for developer profit from land sales alone.

In the exceptional cases where land owners refused to sell their land at the right price to either informal land brokers or the developers themselves, the use of Land Appropriation Committees was extended beyond its intended role in public land acquisitions, to facilitate the process of consolidating lands for private development. In such cases, the principle of "the social function of land" was resurrected and redeployed. Under these circumstances the "social function" being defended was no longer the traditional practices of land exchange in preservation of kinship and local communal customs, but the "social function" of supporting the national development agenda. The rationale applied in these cases was that "development" was a top national priority and that it was the patriotic duty as Indonesian citizens and villages to set aside petty self interests for the sake of the larger society and national economic development. Within the context of Suharto's culture of development, the argument was convincingly made that developers were building luxury housing and golf courses for the common good of the society.⁹⁹ Aksoro's interviews with local administrators participating on Land Appropriation Committees reveal a deep commitment on their part to supporting this new interpretation of the "social function of land" against the interests of their constituencies in the villages. One village head was quoted as saying: "The villagers do not understand the importance of housing development" in reference to the "social function" of land.¹⁰⁰ Neither resettlement nor land readjustment options were utilized except in very rare instances.¹⁰¹ In fact, the most common outcome of involvement by Land Appropriation Committees is the sale of land at below market rates.¹⁰² The currency granted in such cases to the disingenuous rationales offered to small land owners trying to hold onto their homes and

⁹⁹ Bruce W. Ferguson and Michael L. Hoffman, "Land Markets and the Effect of Regulation on Formal-sector Development in Urban Indonesia," *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1993), 51, 62-63.

¹⁰⁰ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 96.

¹⁰¹ Land readjustment results in a complex form of ownership unlikely to meet the approval of large developers. Suryadi Santoso, Chief Urban Designer for first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai, conversation with the author, Universitas Indonusa, Jakarta (12 September 2000).

¹⁰² Local officials and developers together further justify holding out for below market prices given that developers by this point have usually paid a great deal of money for Location Permit extensions and for the services of local officials. Ferguson and Hoffman, "Land Markets," 63.

communities, demonstrates the power wielded by the ability of the Suharto regime to control the terms of public discourse and the collectively held set of core values.

Stripped of its normative role in society, planning policies and frameworks were reduced to three functions:

1. It offered rhetorical facade upon which to hang the development agenda messages of the New Order;
2. It aspired to serve as one of the key signposts indicating the advanced state of Indonesia on the course along the path from "underdeveloped" to "developed nation" status; and
3. The regulatory mechanisms of permitting provided a much needed source of both official and unofficial income feeding the vast network of civil service corruption.

With planning structures and regulatory mechanisms for collecting fees in place, these three functions of planning were satisfied and the normative role that is its ostensible *raison d'être* seems not to have been missed. The direction and pace of development occurred against this framework but in a way that appears to have been largely independent of it. However, upon closer examination it becomes clear that the mechanisms of planning and regulation operated to control who could and could not take part in, and benefit from, the informal arrangements by which the region was transformed.

It cannot be said that planning during the late Suharto era failed for lack of resources, lack of training, or lack of tools, even if each of these may in part have been true. The 1980s and 1990s were a time of unprecedented economic growth as well as a watershed period of international technical and financial assistance for Indonesia. A more accurate portrayal is hinted at by the truism that most of Jakarta's problems were becoming worse during the 1980s and 1990s due to a "lack of political will." More to the point, the lavish foreign and domestic investment in new office and condominium towers on the former sites of residential neighborhoods; luxury villas surrounding golf courses on the former sites of agricultural villages; and the planning of toll roads lined by shopping malls through sensitive watershed areas, ultimately reflect the priorities and values of Suharto's New Order Regime. During the boom years of economic growth under Suharto, the environmental, social, and managerial problems continued to worsen despite strong statements, the mobilization of a vast bureaucracy of urban and regional planning and governance armed with a flotilla of planning and regulatory mechanisms, and a staggering multiplicity of agencies and local governments. The direction offered by the Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plans and regulatory frameworks such as the Location Permit and the Mixed Settlements regulations were reasonable planning responses to these problems. Any bona fide implementation of these measures would have surely resulted in significant progress in the problems of water supply, flooding,

transportation, and housing plaguing the city region. Instead, planning and regulatory measures were reinterpreted, tailored to the needs of powerful interests, and selectively implemented in ways that often significantly exacerbated the very problems they were originally designed to redress. The resulting environmental degradation, resource depletion, infrastructure failures and housing shortages came to closely resemble the negative models that were explicitly identified in earlier planning processes. The “lack of political will” demonstrated in the failures of these collective actions can be understood more specifically as the product of three groups of factors:

1. The cumulative effects of a pervasive combination of petty corruption and general lack of skills on the part of mid- and lower-level administrators—those aspects identified since the 1970s as a structural part of many less developed nations;
2. Special dispensations ranging from the grand corruption of Suharto’s immediate circle of political and business elite to the more universal regulatory accommodation and flexibility extended to private sector business interests—those aspects usefully illuminated by urban regime theories; and
3. The deeply seated traditional values revived with new meaning by the New Order and redeployed as a national culture that valorized “development,” the profit motive, and a sharply demarcated social and economic hierarchy, while relegating whole segments of the society to relative obscurity—those aspects that have been examined here as culture.

While grand corruption and the excesses of capitalism have arguably been the most significant forces in the transformation of Jakarta, these were tolerated and, to a great extent, carried out through cultural means. It is the operation of culture that remains the most complex and least well understood aspect of how Jakarta and other cities have been transformed under the pressures of global economic expansion. Beyond the oversimplifications of “globalization” and supplementing the useful insights of urban regime theories, a deeper understanding of the geographically and historically specific flows and exchanges of ideas and values, gathered in this analysis under the category of “culture,” is necessary to account more fully for the scope and nature of the still recent dramatic transformations of Jakarta and its region.

The historic processes by which the areas of planning and regulation examined in this chapter were undermined or turned around in their implementation illustrate the forces that were effectively competing against the official planning agenda for control over the form and future of the city. In each case, the New Order command over the public discourse was a success: the illogical was made logical, the illegal was made acceptable, or the absurd was made banal. By redirecting specific regulatory measures in their implementation, the overriding set of messages propagated as

a New Order “culture” played a fundamental role in guiding the transformation of the region and left its imprint on the spatial form, operation, and meaning of the Jakarta city region.

CHAPTER 7

THE AIR CONDITIONING DIVIDE: THE NEW SPACES OF SOCIAL DUALISM

Historic Precedents of Indonesian Social Dualism

The term social dualism refers to the tendency of socio-economic characteristics of a society to move from that of a continuum towards a greater polarization. David Harvey, in his classic work *Social Justice and the City*, describes the phenomenon as one with roots in the split between the town and country:

In advanced capitalist nations the local conflict between town and country has been over-come only to be replaced on the one hand by a broader and even deeper antagonism between developed and underdeveloped nations, and on the other by a growing antagonism based on the internal differentiation within metropolitan areas.¹

Harvey's statement reflects the operation of the phenomenon of social dualism at multiple scales. The work of urban sociology in recent decades has been largely structured by attempts to characterize the multiple phenomena related to social dualism in a proliferation of terms: "Dual City,"² "uneven development," "gentrification," etc. Each of these seemingly corresponds with parallel phenomena operating at a larger scale as studied by the disciplines of geography: "World Systems Research," "Dependency Theory," "Globalization," etc. Throughout, there are references from research at one scale to counterparts operating at the other scale.

Commentators on the culture of urban form have characterized social dualism in similarly multiple ways. Christine Boyer refers to the "figured city" of the elite against the "dis-figured city" of the disenfranchised.³ Mike Davis calls Los Angeles a "Fortress City" focusing on the increasing dominance of physical barriers and surveillance to divide the city into separate realms.⁴ What remains outside the walls of the "fortress" and on the other side of the tinted glass of cars on the

¹ David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988 (1973)), 237.

² One of the urban types included in Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996 (1988)); J.H. Mollenkopt and Manuel Castells, *Dual City: Restructuring New York* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).

³ M. Christine Boyer, "The Great Frame-up: Fantastic Appearances in Contemporary Spatial Politics," *Spatial Practices*, eds. H. Liggett and D. Perry (London: Sage, 1995), 81-109.

⁴ Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (New York: Vintage, 1992), 221-64.

highway is what Rem Koolhaas has called "junkspace."⁵ In commenting on the potential dark side of the coming information age, William Mitchell acknowledged Jakarta as the apotheosis of the new social dualism in warning of the dangers of creating "electronic Jakartas," described as:

...well-connected, well-serviced, fortified enclaves of privilege surrounded by miserable hyperghettoes, where investments in information infrastructure and appliances are not made, electronically delivered services do not reach, and few economic opportunities are to be found. The poor could be left with the obsolete and decaying urban remnants and isolated rural settlements that the more privileged no longer need.⁶

Writing in 1995, Mitchell's choice in iconography pays homage to the world already well-established by the culture of the New Order.

But even as these realms of privilege proliferate and expand around the world, the number of people that benefit from them continues to shrink as a proportion of the population. The United Nations recently reported that the world's wealthiest 20 percent earn 86 times more than its poorest 20 percent.⁷ As recently as 1997, they earned 74 times more, and in 1960 a mere 30 times more.⁸ A recent study reported that, of the world's 100 largest economic entities, 51 are corporations and 49 are countries. The world's top 200 corporations account for over a quarter of the economic activity on the globe while employing less than one percent of its workforce. The combined sales of these 200 corporations amount to more than the combined economies of all countries minus the 10 wealthiest. Moreover, the pace of polarization is accelerating as exhibited by the over 360 percent growth in profits enjoyed by these 200 corporations between 1983 and 1999, while the number of people they employ grew by only 14 percent.⁹ The popular press of the left is replete with such statistics that, upon first hearing, stagger the imagination by their sheer magnitude. Once they are digested, these same statistics seem to induce a certain mind-numbing dread.

⁵ Rem Koolhaas, "Junkspace: The Debris of Modernization," *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping: Project on the City 2*, eds. Chuihua Judy Chung et al. (Köln and Cambridge, Mass.: Taschen and Harvard Design School, 2001).

⁶ William J. Mitchell, *City of Bits: Space, Place and the Infobahn* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 170-71.

⁷ *United Nations Human Development Report* cited in: "The Chips are Down: What Lies Ahead for a World Riven by Money?" *New Scientist* 174, no. 2340 (27 April 2002), 30.

⁸ Trevor Inguane quoting UN figures cited in Tony Juniper and Hilary Wainwright, "Worlds Apart," *The Guardian* (31 January 2001).

⁹ Sarah Anderson of the Institute for Policy Studies quoted in "Research Institute Releases Study on Corporate Power on 1st Anniversary of Seattle Protests Study Reinforces Public Distrust of Corporations," <<http://www.ipsdc.org/top200.htm>> (4 December 2000).

So far in this study, the emphasis has been on the processes through which the urban transformation of Jakarta has been carried out. In this chapter, we turn more directly to examine the consequences of the transforming city region and perhaps its most fascinating and significant aspect: the phenomena by which the city region came to not just reflect the dominant New Order culture, but to reinforce, extend, and reproduce it. Indonesia has a long history of explicitly segregated urban spaces, and its cities provide a rich demonstration of ways in which the built environment takes shape in the presence of deeply seated social dualism. In particular, the




FIGURE 7.1 The noble's house at the core of the *magersari* urban social formation. Source: Ikaputra (1998)

magersari relationship and socio-economically integrated *kampung* communities described in Chapter One were characterized by mutually beneficial ties between elite and the general citizenry as structured by the spatial qualities of the traditional urban form (figure). An important distinction is raised by these precedents between social dualisms that operate at the level of personal interaction between neighbors within a local social community and the anonymous operation of social categorizations inherent in conditions of large-scale spatial segregation. One of the significant insights emerging from even the cursory comparison offered here between the pre-colonial urban society and contemporary conditions is that the spatial division of social actors through the form of the city and the nature of its public realm (streetscapes), can play a significant role in fostering one set of social relationships or another. That, accepting that socio-economic

distinction's are not likely to dissolve anytime soon, the spatial nature of social dualism takes on a fundamental significance in its capacity to either exacerbate or mitigate the impacts of socio-economic divisions.




FIGURE 7.2 The shaded area shows the location of the interior realm of the Gempol quarter in the shadow of the proposed capital of the Dutch East Indies. Source: Siregar (1990)

An abiding faith in this capacity of the built environment was one of the core principles of the idealist Dutch architect-planners working at the beginning of the twentieth century to transform the cities of Java to reflect a then emerging Dutch-Javanese hybrid "*Indische*" culture.¹⁰ One of the most fully realized examples urban form based on this principle is a significant component of the 1917 garden city extension of Bandung, Java to accommodate its establishment as the new capital city of the Dutch East Indies. In the construction of this Garden City suburb during the rarefied period of the 1920s and 1930s, the ideas of Thomas Karsten were made manifest in the construction of a model settlement intended to serve as a pattern for replication by private sector

¹⁰ The context of Dutch architectural and planning debates in the late colonial period is well documented in Helen Ibbitson Jessup, "Netherlands Architecture in Indonesia, 1900-1942," (Ph.D. diss., Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London, 1989).

developers.¹¹ In this model, the large villas of the Dutch administrators line the wide undulating tree-lined streets while behind these villas at the center of the urban quarter were built the smaller homes of the indigenous lower-level administrators. The architecture of the interior block reflected various interpretations of traditional architectural styles arranged in a more open setting recalling the indigenous *kampung*. Homes were configured as single-, two- and multiple-family houses without strict separations along parcel boundaries. Significantly, the two most developed examples of this settlement pattern were constructed not in some peripheral part of the city but virtually in the shadow of the grand capital complex. Here the formal position of the elite is reversed from the earlier example in the *magersari kampung*. Another difference from the earlier socio-spatial arrangement was that there were no assumptions made of any direct economic or social




FIGURE 7.3 A figure-ground drawing of the Gempol quarter shows a contrast between inner block and boulevard housing typologies. Source: Siregar (1990)

relationships between the inner core of the native administrators. Instead the designers counted on the several other factors to facilitate the formation of community bonds. Not least of these was the expectation that all residents of Gempol would be employed in the colonial administration, located

¹¹ Sandi Siregar, "Bandung: The Architecture of a City in Development: Urban Analysis of a Regional Capital as a Contribution to the Present Debate on Indonesian Urbanity and Architectural Identity," (Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, The Netherlands, 1990).

literally across the street. Beyond the hierarchically defined social bonds of common employment, the ties of the block and neighborhood associations, a shared public realm, and mutually beneficial economic relationships (food stalls, household services, etc.) were anticipated to become a part of the inherent benefits of such a spatial relationship. Further historical research complementing Siregar's study¹² of the neighborhood's more formal qualities, could valuably contribute to contemporary debates over such issues as *kecemburuan sosial* (social jealousy) and government programs such as the Mixed Settlement Regulations (1:3:6).




FIGURE 7.4 The inner-block realm of the Gempol quarter has an open feel and indigenous roof forms recalling the rural kampung. Source: Siregar (1990)

These two examples of urban social formations would appear, on the face of things, to be unlikely sources of inspiration for a healthier society in that they come from two eras considered to be watershed periods of social injustice: one from the feudal or patriarchal period of the Javanese royal city and the other from the last decades of Dutch colonialism. However, they each share the characteristics of fostering a spatial propinquity between the privileged elite and subordinate classes. They have both been characterized by historians as "segregated" urban arrangements but this "segregation" is at such a small scale so as to qualify as a high degree of social integration by

¹² Siregar, "Bandung."

today's standards. This by itself is not a guarantee of positive social interrelationships (as seen in Yugoslavia in 1990) and under conditions found elsewhere would almost guarantee social tensions and even violence. But, so far, Indonesian society has demonstrated a higher capacity to tolerate and coexist with ethnic and socio-economic differences particularly when these are subsumed within the cohesive structures of local community institutions at the level of block (*rukun tetangga*) and neighborhood (*rukun warga* or *rukun kampung*) associations than when they are concentrated in exclusive neighborhoods.¹³ These two Indonesian precedents offer a relevant set of reference points for evaluating the contemporary condition. They are suggestive of a set of criteria against which to evaluate current and future propositions for cities on Java.

With these local historic precedents in mind, the Jakarta example demonstrates that the space of the city can exist both as a manifestation of social inequities and as an instrument through which they are perpetuated. This chapter examines urban spaces and spatial practices in two areas of investigation: the gated communities developed as "new towns" at the expanding exurban edge of Jakarta, and escalating competition in the urban core over the scarce space of the *kampung* and the street. Finally, this chapter describes the financial crisis (brought on in large part by speculative practices, banking abuses, and corruption in the property sector) that inspired riots and the resignation of President Suharto.

New Towns: Constructing the Great Divide

In the early 1970s, President Suharto's New Order Regime established a housing policy with the intention of achieving two primary goals: the provision of housing for the majority of the growing population of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area; and the transformation of the image of Jakarta from the sea of *kampung* to a modern, ordered cosmopolitan city. The state-led housing development policies that were carried over from the Sukarno period fell short of providing the necessary housing for the growing population by several orders of magnitude. Suharto's foreign advisors led Indonesia to be an early adopter of what has since become known as a Market Enabling Strategy designed to stimulate private sector activity guided by government incentives and restrictions to achieve the goals of society. The profit motive along with government programs to facilitate land consolidation and housing finance were the incentives used to mobilize a dynamic private sector to build housing far in excess of, and higher in quality than, what the state could possibly provide by its own efforts and limited resources. The restrictions, however, were

¹³ Peter J.M. Nas and Reynt Jan Sluis, "Contained Student Protest: The Symbolic Meaning of Urban Space during the 1998 Crisis in Jakarta," *Journal of Social Science* 4, no. 2-3 (2000), 153-63.

consistently weakened by lack of enforcement to the great benefit of developers and the consumer class, while conditions for the targeted beneficiaries worsened significantly (see Chapter Two).

The "mixed settlement" regulations requiring developers to build nine "small" and "very small" houses for every "luxury" house (all within the same neighborhood) were almost universally ignored by both developers and would-be enforcers (see previous chapter). Regulations requiring developers to supply a certain capacity of "Public Facilities" and "Social Facilities" (mosques, churches, sport and recreation facilities, schools, markets, public open space, etc.) were left open to a wide range of interpretation. In emulation of Southern California real estate developments, the so-called "new towns" of Jakarta employ strategies of privatization of both urban space and infrastructures. Most of these real estate developments were built as exclusive gated communities in which a higher standard of public space, urban services, luxury shopping, and luxury housing were all "bundled" together as a single package and marketed to the wealthiest five to ten percent of Indonesians. Golf courses and country clubs are often offered as fulfillment of requirements although exclusionary fees and fences hardly qualify these as "Public." At the 2,800-hectare (7,000-acre) Lippo Karawaci, the 18-hole golf course that occupies the heart of the new town and its private school are both considered the most expensive facilities of their type in Indonesia. They are priced so high as to be beyond the reach of even of Lippo Karawaci's exclusive population. Instead the wealthiest Indonesians send their children to the school from all over the Jabotabek region. The children of Lippo Karawaci cross their paths on their way to the less expensive private schools in Jakarta. The golf club membership is dominated by expatriates who are given membership as a job prerequisite. Despite this, both the golf course and the school were built as fulfillment of the requirements for Public and Social Facilities.

Even though they are priced out of using their own local "public facilities," the upwardly mobile residents of Lippo Karawaci claim to garner great social benefits from the luster cast off by these exclusive facilities. While privately they confide that they consider the golf course a great waste of land, they are happy to benefit from the symbolic associations of status that the country club yields them.¹⁴ The Lippo Karawaci "supermall," at 100,000 square meters (over 1 million square feet) momentarily the largest mall in Indonesia, plays a similar role as both a symbolic and a recreational asset used only for window shopping. As in other new towns around Jakarta, the requisite golf course was the first thing to be built at Lippo Karawaci. It is deemed an essential feature for marketing housing, not because it is a particularly popular sport in Indonesia, but because of its

¹⁴ Harald Leisch, "Structures and Functions of New Towns in Jabotabek," chapter 8 in *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Berlin: LIT Verlag, in press).

symbolic value.¹⁵ The word “golf” is often thrown into neighborhood or new town names (such as “Mediterranean Golf” or “Beverly Golf”) to make sure the connection is not lost. James Riady and his team of developers went a step further in the conception and construction of Lippo Karawaci. Riady was not satisfied with the lack of “image” projected by American “edge cities” which remained the most direct model for his development. In place of low-rise office parks, Riady directed the erection of a world-class skyline visible from the toll road approach from Jakarta and from every salable parcel. To fill these towers, Lippo Group moved their corporate headquarters to the town. Despite substantial discounts, the two 52-story condominium towers




FIGURE 7.5 A view of the exclusive realm of Lippo Karawaci featuring a rare combination of a high-rise skyline and a golf course. Source: Advertisement in *Properti Indonesia*

(marketed as the highest condominium towers in Asia) remained mostly deserted long after their completion. Still, these towers were considered an important feature of the overall marketing strategy for the sale of improved land which was the true money-making proposition of the entire endeavor. Recent research has found that similar social and cultural perceptions of value have a

¹⁵ Dalhar Susanto, “Kota Baru di Jabotabek: Optimalisasi Bisnis” (New Towns in Jabotabek: Business Optimization), paper presented at the seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), 3.

profound impact on property values and settlement patterns of cities and regions increasingly contradictory to the predictions of classical urban economic theory.¹⁶

Lippo Karawaci boasts the distinctions of having a municipal sewer system (one of the only such systems in all of Indonesia!), satellite-fed cable television, its own exit off of the main regional toll road, bicycle lanes on its main residential artery, and the highest standards of landscaping and trash removal of any town in Indonesia. Rather than entrusting the maintenance of this enormous investment to an existing local government, the development company established a private town management company that employs a staff of 1,000 including 300 security guards. Its annual budget of some Rp14 billion (US\$1.5 million in 2000) goes to the 24-hour security force, maintenance crews, and a town manager who enforces, among other things, design restrictions on alterations to house facades and fences.¹⁷

In fact, the primary attraction for most of Lippo Karawaci's upscale citizens is the high level of security it provides. The primacy of concerns over security found its most extreme expression in the built environment with the rise of the "White House style" (see Chapter Three), with its high concrete walls topped with barbed wire on three sides complemented by a high fence, concrete guard post, and surveillance cameras out front. Once whole neighborhoods came to be filled with houses each sporting these defenses, the logic of the gated community was a natural next step. Gated neighborhoods became a standard part of the real estate development formula typically featuring a single point of entry and exit attended 24 hours a day by guards in military uniform. With the proliferation of Southern California-style real estate developments, these gated neighborhoods were further enclosed by a second barricade around entire towns.¹⁸ Often whole new towns were connected to the rest of the world through only a single gateway. As was vividly demonstrated during the riots of 1998, the towns were designed to be sealed off from the rest of the world in times of crisis by massive barricades of steel, concrete, and barbed wire defended, in some cases, by whole companies of the Indonesian military. One of the "Public Facilities" that the developers of Lippo Karawaci were eager to provide was a new military base and helicopter pad for the Indonesian military adjacent to the new town's "central business district" and entrance off of the main highway.

¹⁶ Hoang Huu Phe and P. Wakely, "Status, Quality and the Other Trade-Off: Towards a New Theory of Urban Residential Location," *Urban Studies* 37, no. 1 (2000), 7-36.

¹⁷ Gordon Benton, Lippo Karawaci Town Manager, interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).

¹⁸ Gunawan Tjahjono, "New Town: Urban Future for Expanded Metropolis in Indonesia?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Architecture*, no. 1 (November 1997), 14-15.

Lippo Karawaci's 500-hectare (1,200-acre) commercial district, including a private university, several office and condominium towers, and the Lippo *supermal*, is separated from the main residential district with a modest example of a well-fortified single point of entry. Inside this defensive barrier, each neighborhood is configured in what marketers have dubbed a "Totally Protected Zone" usually encoded simply as "TPZ." Within this second layer of defenses, high walls and fences were not allowed, giving the residential streets of Lippo Karawaci an open feeling rarely experienced in Indonesia outside of life in the rural *kampung*. As originally conceived, each of the themed and separately gated Totally Protected Zones were interconnected by internal streets that continued between neighborhoods.




FIGURE 7.6 The gate to the most elite, and secure area of the Lippo Karawaci development. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

However, the developers were forced to fence off these internal connecting streets in the wake of safety concerns expressed by predominantly Chinese-Indonesian residents. As the identifiable group most likely to be targeted by historical cycles of rioting and least likely to benefit from the social cohesion of the *kampung*, the predominant market for Lippo Karawaci has proven to be among the population of wealthy Chinese financiers, merchants, and industrialists. As further evidence of the limited significance of analyses based on theories of political economy in the Indonesian context, the Chinese-Indonesian minority have been the most consistently persecuted group throughout the history of Indonesia, despite the alliance between Chinese capital and Suharto that formed the armature of the New Order regime. Separate schools, newspapers, enclaves, businesses, transportation systems, etc. were repeatedly set up, banned and re-

established in different form throughout the Sukarno years.¹⁹ In 1967, Chinese written language and other symbols of Chinese identity were all banned as part of a larger deracination campaign seeking to subsume ethnic divisions under a national “Indonesian Culture” and a denial of the “Chinese Problem” altogether.²⁰ But even into the 1990s, the vulnerability felt by the Chinese remained a primary feature of urban life—born out by the riots of May 1998 targeting those of Chinese descent. If the second layer of defenses were somehow breached in a single spot, then each of the internal neighborhoods would be made vulnerable. The amenity value of a pleasant environment for evening or early morning walking or bicycle riding turned out to be less highly valued than the urban designers originally presumed. By creating these internal divisions, the residents of Lippo Karawaci brought their new town into conformity with the other gated communities of the region as a world of dead end *culs de sac*.²¹

The failure by the Indonesian government to implement its mixed-income settlements regulations and routine abuses of its subsidized housing credit program resulted in the loss of the opportunities for socially diverse new settlements that had been the aspiration of some leaders in the 1970s and 1980s. By yielding to the developers’ desire to isolate the wealthiest Indonesians behind the barricades and walls of the new gated communities, several significant potential benefits sought by the government, according to its rhetoric, were forfeited. Mixing income groups within a single neighborhood was not only to serve social goals of fostering the conditions for a more integrated society, but also to offer the least interventionist means of fostering cross-subsidies (shared infrastructures, urban services) and economic stimulation coming from conditions of mixed wage rates. For example, in providing good roads, water, sanitation, electricity, telephone,

¹⁹ Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 188-91.

²⁰ Suharto’s sustained attempts to render less-conspicuous the coincidence of class and race represented by his partnership with the Chinese corporate elite, were complemented by the establishment of professional associations and preferential policies aimed at favoring the stimulation of an indigenous business class albeit one largely dependent on state contracts. See: Richard Robison, “The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia,” chapter 4 in *New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-class Revolution*, eds. Richard Robison and David S.B. Goodman (New York: Routledge, 1996), 93-95. This campaign assumed that the use of the terms “Medium- and Small- Business (loans, incentives, supports, etc.)” was silently understood as meaning “non-Chinese.” It is interesting to compare this with the open rhetoric of the approach taken by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Suharto’s autocratic counterpart in Malaysia where no comparable alliance has been made. Mahathir’s decidedly politically incorrect response to communal race riots of 1969, *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1970), propagated the rationale for Malaysia’s subsequent aggressive national affirmative action program designed to counter ethnic Chinese economic dominance over the ethnic Malay majority. Such a head-on approach in Indonesia is found only in the ban on Chinese cultural expressions designed to satisfy popular resentment of the ethnic Chinese. This left the Chinese-based conglomerates, a minority within the minority, to play a free hand in dominating the corporate economy.

²¹ Gordon Benton, Lippo Karawaci Town Manager, interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (29 March 2000).

etc., to the wealthier residents, the marginal costs of extending these to their lower income neighbors would have been reduced. Similarly, the larger population densities of lower income households could have provided the basis for shorter trips to go shopping, better transit services, and ready access to a wealth of lower cost services in the immediate neighborhood: food stalls, tailors, baby sitters, domestic help, construction, etc. In contrast, highly segregated societies (Apartheid South Africa, expensive Connecticut suburbs of New York City for example) have found it necessary to incur high costs of transporting lower wage workers formidable distances to serve their needs.

Elsewhere, the prospect of constructing new towns on the exurban fringe is taken as an opportunity to improve infrastructures and services provided to the surrounding rural communities. With so much new investment in electricity, drainage, water supply, telephone, and especially, road networks, it would be hard to imagine circumstances in which adjacent existing settlements not immediately displaced by the new development could be kept from deriving at least some benefit from their close proximity. Leaf, McGee, Dick and Rimmer all write somewhat optimistically of such prospects associated with the extension of urban infrastructures that accompanies luxury real estate development.²² But the experience of new town construction in Jabotabek to date tells a different story altogether. There has not yet been sufficient research to draw conclusions about the benefits accruing to existing villages from extensions of electricity, telephone and water supply to the new real estate developments. However, the nature of these systems and prevailing practices in Indonesia remain such that they are not typically given to universal distribution even where such arrangements have been made more convenient by extension of networks. More clearly, rather than improving drainage infrastructure, new developments have been found to result in dramatic increases in the frequency and severity of flooding in neighboring settlements.²³

The most likely benefits to existing residents would be expected in the area of road infrastructure improvements. But even here, the experiences of Jabotabek residents has been mixed

²² Michael Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW: Culture, Vision, and the Extended Metropolitan Region of Jakarta," *Environment and Planning A*, no. 9 (September 1996), 1617-1635; T.G. McGee, "The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis," chapter 1 in *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, eds. Norton Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel and T.G. McGee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 3-26; and Howard W. Dick and Peter J. Rimmer, "Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography of South-east Asia," *Urban Studies* 35, no. 12 (1998), 2303-21.

²³ The most dramatic example is seen in the luxury housing development Pantai Indah Kapuk responsible for blocking the flow of water to the Java Sea resulting in the flooding of a vast area including the supposedly flood-proof new toll road to the Jakarta International airport. See: "Atas Petunjuk... Jadilah PIK" (The Finger Points to... Pantai Indah Kapuk), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 1073 (February 2000), 14-15; and several related stories in this same issue.

at best. New roads were often planned not only for the exclusive benefit of the new developments but also in ways that block off previously established access routes. In fact, new housing developments in the 1980s and 1990s were more likely to sever economic and social links between existing communities than to create new ones. Developers were motivated to remain detached from surrounding communities to reduce any associations that might negatively effect property values, to increase perceptions of security, and often to intentionally reduce land values adjacent to their property in anticipation of buying it for future expansion.²⁴ Much of this phenomena is directly connected with the practice of creating single points of entry and exit in gated new towns. As the protective fortifications cut across long-existing paths and roads that once connected residents with markets, jobs, friends, mosques, etc., economic, social and recreational opportunities were lost, and trip lengths increased to the point where motorized transportation suddenly became a necessity. Far from benefiting existing rural communities, new towns often had the opposite impact, imposing new hardships on local populations.




FIGURE 7.7 A view of the fortress wall surrounding the entire perimeter of Citra Raya. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

²⁴ Dalhar Susanto, "Kota Baru di Jabotabek: Optimalisasi Bisnis," paper presented at the seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), 5.

In addition to the use of concrete walls, developers often alter the topography of development areas with extensive areas of cut and fill earthwork. This can leave substantial barriers at the edges of development areas in the form of changes in grade of several meters. Cases where developers punished recalcitrant owners by enclosing them entirely within a wall leaving only a small opening for them to come and go led to harsh criticism but notably no regulations prohibiting such behaviors. In response to criticism, developers resorted to the no less effective practice of the using cut boundaries to make life unpleasant for uncooperative holdouts.²⁵ For example, when several small landowners refused to sell their lands to developers in Kabupaten Bekasi, the developers re-graded the land surrounding their houses on all sides leaving them stranded some six meters (20 feet) above the surrounding landscape with no means of getting down.²⁶




FIGURE 7.8 The prospects for an interconnected urban form are denied due to the commitment to development in utter isolation. Source: C.V. Indo Buwana Map of Tangerang (1996/1997)

²⁵ Lana Winayanti Aksoro, "The Effects of the Location Permit on Urban Land Markets: A Case Study in the Jabotabek Area, Indonesia," (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1994), 85-89.

²⁶ Djoko Sujarto, Institut Teknologi Bandung planning professor and researcher, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (18 November 2000).

Similarly, the patchwork quilt of large new housing developments, each internally isolated from the other, have contributed to making motorized transport the only option. What would otherwise be a reasonable walk between housing developments is thus transformed into a trip by car or motorbike on regional arterial roads. Even with only partial occupancy of the new housing estates in the mid-1990s, traffic congestion on the public roads connecting them had already become a significant factor in land valuation and assessments of land development potential.²⁷ Efforts in the 1990s to coordinate adjacent private developments failed to develop either formal mechanisms or informal arrangements capable of facilitating the alignment road patterns necessary for interconnection between developments.²⁸




FIGURE 7.9 Adjacent developments develop so as to make internal connection between them unlikely to ever be made. Source: *Properti Indonesia*

²⁷ Yudi Suharso, "Konsumen Perlu Perhatikan Akses Kereta Api" (Consumers Should Pay Attention to Rail Access), *Properti Indonesia* 1049 (August 2000), 28-29.

²⁸ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Province Regional Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

In 1990, a fence was constructed around the lands that would eventually be developed as Lippo Karawaci isolating a long and narrow peninsula of public housing development by enclosing it on three sides. This fence cut off the existing community from two nearby transportation corridors by which most residents reached nearby markets, jobs, schools, relatives, and friends in Jakarta, Tangerang and nearby communities. Subsequent private housing development to the south of Lippo Karawaci further increased the travel distance necessary to reach otherwise nearby destinations. It wasn't until 1998 when, responding to public outcries and pressure from local governments, finally acceded to tolerating a hole rent in a fence allowing residents to walk, bicycle, or ride motorbikes along an enclosed gas pipeline right-of-way corridor to the main access artery of Lippo Karawaci and points beyond.²⁹




FIGURE 7.10 A peninsula of the Sari Bumi housing development is isolated within the west side of Lippo Karawaci. The toll road passes to the north (top of the map) of Lippo Karawaci. Source: Lippo Karawaci Masterplan

²⁹ Agus Rachmat, former head of Kabupaten Tangerang Regional Planning Development Board, interview with the author, Cisangkui Cafe, Bandung, Indonesia (15 November 2000).

More extensive accommodations of existing adjacent communities are found at Ciputra's 1,800-hectare (4,400-acre) Bintaro Jaya new town development. Holes knocked out of the three-meter (10-foot) perimeter concrete wall surrounding the new town have been tolerated in several locations since the early 1990s. Some entrepreneurs from the adjacent *kampung* identifying a strong demand in the single-use-zoned new town, set up a small vegetable market in one of the holes rent in the concrete wall.³⁰ The residents and managers of Bintaro Jaya were thus faced with a difficult dilemma. By moving to Bintaro Jaya, upwardly mobile home buyers were redefining themselves against their former existence in the *kampung*. At the same time they long for the freshness, low prices, and convenience offered by small scale informal markets like the one fashioned out of a hole in Bintaro Jaya's wall.




FIGURE 7.11 Local residents take advantage of the tentative toleration of a breach in Lippo Karawaci's defensive perimeter to walk along a gas right-of-way towards the toll road. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

One of the key questions facing the future of the new real estate developments of Jabotabek is: How will the relationship between adjacent communities (both within and across socio-economic classes) evolve over the years and decades ahead? In most cases, the existing local rural

³⁰ Bre Redana, "Sebuah 'Loket' di Sudut Jalan" (A Street Corner "Shop Counter"), *Kompas* (25 January 1997).

communities either are displaced by subsequent development piggy-backing on the pioneering ventures of the largest developers, or experience such a disruption to their quality of life due to the isolating effects of new development, that populations eventually dwindle. The other cases cited above, where temporary accommodations are made to permit access through the perimeter walls of the new enclaves and perhaps even the formation of economic relations across the divide, must be seen as rare exceptions to the norm. Still, some would suggest that these minor incursions offer some measure of hope that the multiple advantages for both communities may result eventually in more significant relationships developing at a larger scale between the enclaves of luxury and the adjacent rural *kampung* or public housing developments.³¹ However, residents would rightly argue that a defensive wall is only as good as its weakest point. Even the most optimistic scenarios of road network interconnection and removal of the surrounding walls would fail to create the kind of integrated urbanization that would have been the result of effective implementation of the Indonesian government's Mixed Settlement regulations, public facility requirements, and housing subsidy programs.

Urban Expropriations: The Kampung and the Street

The residential gated communities on the periphery of the urbanized area now connect to complementary islands of exclusive corporate office space in the city center by an ever increasing dependence on the private automobile. Even as the development of the new towns, golf courses, condominium and office towers, malls, and toll roads displaced the Jakartans dependent upon housing in the informal *kampung* settlements, the increased car traffic displaced them from the public space of the street. Site planning practices of new commercial and public institutional buildings in Jakarta increasingly eliminated pedestrian access between adjacent sites and even from the street as if to dissuade all but those arriving by car. Worsening environmental conditions have increased the need for private motorization, further deepening the problem. These forces have come together to bring about what is, in effect, a privatization of the street and the displacement or eradication of the public life that once depended on it.

The high-density *kampung* neighborhoods of cities on the island of Java demonstrate a remarkable ability to provide housing for some three quarters of urban populations at a relatively high quality and a fraction of the cost per square meter in a mere 7 to 10 percent of the total urban

³¹ Such hope has been expressed by a researcher on Bintaro Jaya, Lizzy van Leeuwen, at the workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000) in response to the author's presentation. See: Lizzy van Leeuwen, *Airconditioned Lifestyles: Nieuwe Rijken in Jakarta* (New Rich in Jakarta) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1997).

land area.³² Popular housing production in the *kampung* accounts for as much as 80 percent of all housing production. It is efficient and tailored to consumer demand, functioning better than its equivalent in almost any other part of the world.³³ The remaining 20 percent provided by Private developers and the National Housing Corporation (Perumnas) is limited to often heavily subsidized housing for moderate- to high-income groups (see Chapters Three and Four). Recognition of improving conditions in the *kampung* as the key to housing policy first emerged during Dutch colonial rule in the 1918 *Kampung Verbetering*³⁴ and later in the internationally acclaimed Kampung Improvement Program that has operated from the 1960s to the present.

Growing out of the success of Kampung Improvement, the Guided Land Development program aimed at combining the advantages of long-range public planning with the low-cost and high-volume popular self-help housing production found in the *kampung*. Under the plan, the government would assemble and layout mixed parcel sizes on lands identified at the expanding edge of urbanization. Infrastructure would be gradually added and improved as the community grew on the sites and became, over time, increasingly able to pay for them.³⁵ Government land assembly, preplanning of infrastructure and mixing of income levels were key components of the strategy aimed at lowering costs and fostering an internal cross-subsidization structure. But despite the socio-economic diversity and close-knit nature of communities in most *kampung* in Jakarta, its general lack of formally provided infrastructure and the presence of the poor has made the word "*kampung*" into a derogatory term and source of shame. This cultural factor has contributed to a reluctance to maintain (in the Kampung Improvement Program) or extend (Guided Land Development) anything remotely associated with the *kampung*. Through the 1980s and 1990s funding levels for Kampung Improvement were less than one third of money allocated to the housing subsidy programs benefiting a tiny minority of upper income households.³⁶ The Guided Land Development Program has remained a component of Jakarta's official land use plan through

³² Siswono Yudohusodo and Soearli Salam, eds., *Rumah Untuk Seluruh Rakyat* (Housing for All) (Jakarta: INKOPPOL, Percetakan Bharakerta, 1991).

³³ Raymond J. Struyk et al., *The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities* (Jakarta and Washington, D.C.: Hasfarm Dian Konsultan and The Urban Institute Press, 1990), 9.

³⁴ Erica Bogaers and Peter de Ruijter, "Ir. Thomas Karsten and Indonesian Town Planning, 1915-1940," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986).

³⁵ Andrew M. Hamer et al., "Indonesia: The Challenge of Urbanization," World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 787 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986), 89; Michael Leon Leaf, "Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the 'Big Village' to the 'Modern City'," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991), 185-86.

³⁶ The policies reported on in Struyk et al. were continued through the 1990s.

the year 2005 but the original lands earmarked for the program were sold off to private developers during the boom in suburban property of the 1980s. The factor that appears to have operated most consistently against the effective implementation of this program is higher priority given to the goals of creating a modern "Metropolitan City."³⁷

The land reform programs instituted by Sukarno's Basic Agraria Act in 1960, if implemented, would have granted full legal title officially registered to holders of locally recognized traditional land rights. Administrative, legal, and financial obstacles and later, Suharto's replacement of the land reform with pro-development mechanisms, effectively maintained the subordinate position of the holders of traditional land rights. Operating outside of the "official" regulatory structures of the city, informal land rights were strategically tolerated by the New Order government as a means of deflating land acquisition costs for developers. Local *kampung* communities are permitted the temporary use of highly valued urban lands until such time as a developer is interested in investing in the redevelopment of that portion of the city. At this point the informal land rights which are recognized for the purposes of collecting taxes and within the land markets of the *kampung*, cease to be accepted as legitimate. The pseudo-legal status of traditional land rights is associated with a market value substantially lower than adjacent parcels with full registered status. The national project of rationalizing, regularizing and bringing *kampung* lands into the formal land regulatory system establishes the framework within which small scale land brokers called *calo* move in to buy up land options at a fraction of their market value, selling them to larger brokers or directly to developers at a significant profit.³⁸ The result is that the *kampung* serves as an inexpensive, readily accessible land bank for private and governmental development without the expense and inefficiencies of land purchase in advance of development.

Resulting from the combined impacts of over-granting of Location Permits (creating an artificial scarcity of land), and the routine abuse of government housing subsidies for personal speculative investment in multiple luxury suburban houses (artificial demand), land rents, and thus housing prices, for the entire region were pushed to ever more dizzying heights of inflation, even for lands in the urban *kampung* (see Chapter Two). With this over-stimulation of the property sector, the long-term goal of moving *kampung* residents into "proper" formal sector-produced housing on fully regulated parcels in effect degenerated into a race to simply eliminate the *kampung* to make way for skyscrapers, shopping malls, toll roads, golf courses, and the new ring of luxury

³⁷ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 304-305.

³⁸ Legal protections against coercion and intimidation protections are systematically undermined through partial application and misuse of the official processes. Cases of conflict are typically settled out of court leaving the practices in general unchanged. See: Ediwarman, *Victimologi: Kaitannya Dengan Pelaksanaan Ganti Rugi Tanah* (Victimology: The Implementation of Land Compensation) (Bandung: Mandar Maju, 1999).

suburbs. The banking system contributed to the property boom through lax regulations which allowed real estate developers to set up what were in effect private banks. These received massive infusions of overseas financial capital from investors eager to partake of the Southeast Asian Miracle. The loss of *kampung* areas and the inflationary pressures of the property boom have contributed to a significant decline in both the security and quality of housing for a majority of Jakartans.³⁹

The expropriation of housing in the inner city *kampung* is paralleled by a insidious process of displacement of people from the public space of the street. One of the most misunderstood outcomes of suburbanization is how it often increases crowding in the cities from which the population has moved. While there may be fewer residents in the urban core, employment centers and economic activities often lag behind population flights out of the center. The effect is to substitute pedestrians, bicyclists, and transit riders with suburbanites on motorbikes and in cars. Since a driver occupies nine times the road space as she would in a bus, 20 times that of a cyclist, and 75 times that of a pedestrian, it only takes a minor increase in motorized traffic to more than cancel out any increased public space per capita deriving from even relatively large decreases in the local primarily non-motorized population.⁴⁰

The space of the street itself has become the battleground of intense competition between the motorized elite who contribute to the image of the Metropolitan City and the non-motorized majority who make their livings and are served by the *warung* (sidewalk vendors), the *becak* (bicycle taxis), and the *kaki lima* (literally "five feet" referring to the three wheeled roving vendors). Even as more residents of the *kampung* were displaced from the city, this shift in the modal share of different transportation modes effected a *de facto* transfer of the public space of the street into the private spaces enclosed within an increasing population of private cars. Every few years a new campaign is launched to rid the streets of Jakarta from these inappropriate vestiges of a backward past. In 1988, *becak* (three-wheeled bicycle taxis) were banned in Jakarta claiming that it was "inhumane" to use human labor as a means of transport. Despite providing an income, albeit meager, for over 100,000 Jakartans, and providing low cost, environmentally friendly transport for countless others, *becak* did not fit the image of "Jakarta, the Metropolitan City." Given the dominant paradigm of Suharto's development agenda, it was seen as inevitable progress that the *becak* should be forced to yield its street space to a rapidly expanding traffic of private

³⁹ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 290-96.

⁴⁰ Data is compiled from several sources: J.F. Linn, *Cities in Developing Countries*, (Oxford: World Bank Research publication, Oxford University Press, 1983); Harry T. Dimitriou, "Transport and Third World City Development," chapter 1 in *Transport Planning for Third World Cities*, ed. Harry T. Dimitriou (New York: Routledge, 1990), 19; and personal communications on the Sustainable Transportation list serve.

automobiles. Tens of thousands of *becak* were not only confiscated but with a melodramatic flourish, dumped into the Java Sea.⁴¹ Similarly, the public bus system has been allowed to decay in a steady decline of service levels in recent decades characterized by increases in crime, delays due to traffic congestion, broken air conditioning, and black smoke spewing from the aging fleets (figure). Even buses have become targets of the influential pro-car forces and labeled in the public consciousness as a hindrance to the free flow of traffic, increasingly comprised of private automobiles. In the meantime, congestion levels worsen in the face of every effort to build more roads, remove impediments of non-motorized users of urban space, and even a ban Single Occupant Vehicles from the business district during rush hours. Crossing the street has become a task requiring a five to ten minute taxi ride around the labyrinth of one way streets through the urban core. The privatized space defined by the steel and glass air-conditioned boxes of private automobiles would seem to represent the highest value to the Indonesian state and society. It would seem that the heat and exhaust endured on the daily commute for the vast majority of Jakarta's residents crammed in buses or pushing past the hot metal of the stopped traffic only serves to feed the demand for more private automobiles. The protection of this privilege would appear to be consistent with the aspirations of the vast majority of Indonesian society.

⁴¹The battle over the *becak* continues after pedicab drivers temporarily regained their right to ply Jakarta's streets as a poverty relief measure in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis only to have it quickly lost again with Jakarta In August 2000, Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso vowed to defy a court order lifting the 12-year ban on *becak*. "Pedicab Drivers Win Lawsuit Against Jakarta Governor," *Jakarta Post* 18, no. 96 (1 August 2000), 1.



FIGURE 7.12 Not an uncommon sight on the streets of Jakarta. Source: *Jakarta Post*

The fiscal, political, and cultural campaign against public transportation seen in Indonesia, as elsewhere, is part of the thus far successful propagation of developmentalist assumptions. Part of this package of priorities and values is the truism that as the development status of a nation rises so does the level of private automobile ownership. In Japan, a geographic region almost as densely populated as Java, the rise in affluence was accompanied by strict disincentives to automobile ownership. To assuage the voracious demands of a powerful automobile industry, the Japan Overseas Corporation extended generous loans and grants to developing countries for the construction of roads—the kind of development program Japanese leadership knew would have brought economic growth of the most destructive nature if pursued domestically. In Thailand, for example, the Japan Overseas Corporation investment in road construction was US\$135 million from 1963 to 1986 and then surged to US\$283 million from 1987 to 1991.⁴² But this investment was not entirely without its rewards. Some 85 percent of all vehicle imports to Thailand come from Japan. By the mid-1990s with a per capita Gross National Product of only US\$2,000, the number

⁴² Saskia Sassen, "Globalization and Asian Cities," paper presented at the *Harvard Asia Pacific Design Conference* (4 April 1997).

of cars per thousand inhabitants in Thailand surpassed that of Japan where the per capita Gross National Product was more than ten times greater. One of the few features that favored the chosen site of Indonesia's largest new town, 6,000-hectare (15,000-acre) Bumi Serpong Damai, was the existing regional rail line. However, the influence of Salim Group, the primary investor in both the new town and the effort to create an Indonesian automobile industry, led to the marginalization of the rail line and the planning of a major new toll road connecting to downtown Jakarta.⁴³ Never one to be outdone by Ciputra, James Riady built no fewer than seven heliports in Lippo Karawaci (two more are planned) raising the stakes for segregated infrastructure. They anticipate a boom in private helicopter transportation, especially among the "ultra-elite" residents of Lippo Karawaci, as congestion on the Jakarta-Merak toll road that skirts Lippo Karawaci becomes more of an obstacle.⁴⁴

Adding to the crowding of motorization is a shift in site planning practices that send a clear message to users of urban space that car drivers are welcome while pedestrians are not. The tradition of planning parcels with single entry points becomes more problematic as sites increase in size to accommodate the larger building typologies of modern urban development. At Grogol in West Jakarta, a university located adjacent to a shopping mall illustrates this point well. A person in the university wanting to go to the shopping mall next door is compelled to walk back to the single entry gate of the university, along a 10 lane urban expressway, and then into the shopping mall's driveway (the site's only point of entry) adding as much as a kilometer to what would have been a short stroll had connections been planned between the two sites (figure). This condition worsened in the wake of the 1998 riots. The already meager accommodations to pedestrians in the form of entrances that could be used to avoid competing with cars entering and leaving driveways and parking lots were sealed off throughout the city for the indefinite future. Even at the Blok M bus terminal where cars are not allowed to enter, would-be bus riders were forced to squeeze past arriving and departing buses in the narrow driveway since the pedestrian entrances have been barricaded with barbed wire fences. It would seem that since rioters do not arrive in cars, all pedestrians are considered suspect.

⁴³ Suryadi Santoso, head of urban planning for first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai, personal communication with the author at Taman Sari restaurant, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000).

⁴⁴ Gordon Benton, Urban Designer and Town Manager for Lippo Karawaci, Interview with the author, Lippo Karawaci, Tangerang (13 September 2000).




FIGURE 7.13 A world of walled-in enclaves and obstacles for pedestrians. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

It is within the space of the consumer class that the advances of architecture and urban design were concentrated. Complementing the luxury of the new suburban housing estates are Jakarta's downtown "superblocks." Developed during the building booms of the 1990s, these large internally integrated downtown blocks were developed by separate developers conforming to an extensive set of urban design guidelines intended to achieve a complementary mix of uses and high design standards. The Kuningan CBD Superblock in the "Golden Triangle" area of downtown Jakarta, features two five-star hotels, restaurants, spas, garaged parking, and office towers that boast of having the fastest internet connections in Indonesia. The Western innovations of traffic-calming and bicycle lanes have found their way to Indonesia as well, but again, only within the already privatized street space of new towns like Lippo Karawaci have such experiments in urban design been ventured.




FIGURE 7.14 The Sudirman superblock aims at achieving a higher standard of urban space amenities through private development of a vast area of the downtown area. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

The new towns, like shopping malls and the new superblocks, foster a deepening social dualism that provides a higher quality environment and more sophisticated infrastructure for the consumer class without having to provide it for all citizens. This increasing segregation of space and infrastructure is defended through a range of means from the subtleties of surveillance to actual physical barriers dividing the mobile from the place-bound; the cosmopolitan from the tribal; and

the connected from the unconnected.⁴⁵ Prominent among the aspirations of modernity that held great currency in the twentieth century, particularly in the United States, was the ideal of publicly provided “universal infrastructures.” It is thus ironic that the US should have championed the cause of economic liberalization effectively displacing earlier ideals.⁴⁶ In emulating the socio-spatial aspects of American urbanism, Indonesian developers have found a resonance between America’s highly skewed income distribution and discomfort with public space and Indonesian consumer class fears of racial violence and striving for social differentiation.⁴⁷ But the American paradigm, exemplified by the new spaces of Orange County, take on entirely different and largely unpredictable consequences when applied uncritically to the context of Indonesia.

As seen from the perspective of the developed West, it is difficult not to be deceived by the shining fortresses of glass and steel accessed exclusively by a growing fleet of private cars on the crowded new toll roads leading from the guarded gates of the walled off new towns. Clearly, Indonesians were becoming more like us. Or so it would seem. But behind these appearances lie the harder truths that despite the vast areas of land lavished on the project of constructing the shining new Metropolitan City of Jakarta, it was built for a tiny minority of the very rich. Despite all of the traffic congestion on the toll roads, the car ownership rate of Jakarta was only 70 cars per 1000 population—a mere one tenth of the car ownership rate in the US. With such a vast area of the city set aside for luxury housing in the last decades of the twentieth century, it is surprising to find that only about seven percent of the population actually lived there. And even with crowds of people thronging the shopping malls, the only money that most people spend there is for food and games to enhance the mall’s entertainment value. The eye-catching overlay of first world glitz was a heavy burden weighing down upon the pre-existing city of Jakarta with its prevailing conditions of missing urban services, environmental degradation, social dualism, and lack of housing.⁴⁸ In fact, for most of the population, these conditions worsened on every count amidst the largest building boom in the nation’s history.

⁴⁵Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, vol. 1 of *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); J.H. Mollenkopt and Manuel Castells, *Dual City: Restructuring New York* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).

⁴⁶Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition* (London: Routledge, 2001).

⁴⁷ This observation is also mentioned in: Howard W. Dick and Peter J. Rimmer, “Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography of South-east Asia,” *Urban Studies* 35, no. 12 (1998), 2317-18.

⁴⁸ Tommy Firman has also pointed out that the advantages of foreign investment in Jakarta did not come without certain disadvantages. “The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A ‘Global City’ in Asia,” *Cities* 15, no. 4 (1998), 229-43.

It is instructive that the dominant models for contemporary urbanism in Indonesia should so completely turn away from the precedents of Indonesian history itself. In turning to foreign models, it is also interesting that the similarities between the compact cities and scarce agricultural land of both Java and much of Western Europe did not lead to land use planning models closer to the Dutch model as seen in the case of Singapore, especially considering their shared history and extensive technical assistance flowing from Dutch planning experts to the fledgling independent nation in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁹ Instead, Indonesian developers have chosen to provide a world of the "imagined West" (see Chapter Three). The consumer appeal and market success of American models of suburban housing and automobile dependency in Indonesia has more to do with deeply ingrained social norms than the appropriateness of the model for the social, economic, and environmental conditions of the country. Indonesia's wide income disparities, general unease with public space, history of ethnic tensions, and predilection for conspicuous distinctions in social status have contributed to making privatized urban spaces a great commercial success. The distinctions created between the world of the elite and the masses range from the subtleties of aesthetic taste and spatial standards to financial barriers imposed by road tolls, purchase prices, and membership fees to the less subtle barriers posed by surveillance cameras, guard posts, speeding cars, high walls, razor wire, and military force. The boundaries of air conditioned spaces have come to serve as the physical demarcations between two distinct worlds. These boundaries, once limited to individual homes and office buildings, have expanded outward to surround urban superblocks, whole neighborhoods, and even entire towns. American models as portrayed by the industries of cultural production headquartered in Southern California, offer to the private sector of Jakarta clear blueprints for creating *simulacra* of what is imagined to be the good life of the developed West. With the future form of the Indonesian city firmly in the hands of the supply-side offerings of the private sector, the indigenous precedents of compact urban form, the rich architectural traditions of the archipelago or even the later colonial interpretations of the garden city, are unlikely to enter into the picture until environmental sustainability and social justice emerge as more pressing criteria for planning the built environment than the shorter-term imperatives of private sector profits.

The international marketplace of personal aspirations affects not only consumer choices in malls and new real estate markets, but also the personal visions of the political and business elite. The lure of the biggest, brightest, tallest, and most lavish futures have proven compelling, even if

⁴⁹ Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept on Metropolitan Planning of the Jakarta Region," *The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 101-115; Wim Stolte, "From JABOTABEK to PANTURA," *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 228-45.

gained at the cost of increased exclusion and immiseration of the majority. A cultural shift seems to have transferred responsibility for the future to the private sector. It seems to have excused a responsible leadership from asking any longer how better conditions could be extended to the city and society as a whole. The privatization of space itself is one of the primary sources of worsening conditions for the majority. Motorized traffic expands to reduce the possible uses of the public realm and to displace its role as a space of social interaction and collective construction of meaning. Observations of the built environment in Jakarta show that, contrary to popular political ideologies, rising tides lift some boats and flood out the rest; anything that might “trickle down” evaporates somewhere in the lower reaches of the urban elite; and the vast suburban fantasies engulfing rapidly developing cities are inhabited by a small minority of local compradors who were quick to cash in on what amounts to a global pyramid scheme. These lessons, taught daily to local populations by the messages conveyed through their built environments, only serve to further justify in the minds of the privileged minority the necessity of defending and extending their privileged position—a position measured against standards that are updated in daily broadcasts from what is seen as the ultimate position of privilege, America.

Final Implosion of New Order “Underdevelopment”

Throughout the New Order period, the excesses of the power elite and the escalating sacrifices extracted from the *wong cilik* (Javanese: the masses; literally: “small people”) were justified with the rationale that at some point the benefits of greater opportunities and a better life (as seen on TV) would begin to flow more universally. With volatility of world oil prices, it became clear that development should depend on a diversification of the Indonesian economy and in particular, as elsewhere, the ability to attract foreign direct investment. The physical transformation of the Jakarta region during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the success of local entrepreneurs and political elite in mobilizing both domestic and foreign capital for new ventures. This development tended to enhance specific infrastructures for a select few and to create a more positive image for Jakarta—both considered key factors in the effort to attract further investment. Investments were neither coordinated by an overseeing state nor were they based on market research. Much of the development was guided by a fierce competition amongst the biggest developers to produce the biggest, shiniest, tallest, most opulent products and services in order to attract the much coveted extremely rich clientele willing to pay a premium for such attractions, and the prestige that accrues to those who attract them. Such competition inevitably resulted in wasteful duplication, as demonstrated when this month’s grand shopping mall opening cut into the gross sales of the one

that opened last month.⁵⁰ It was this hyper-competition for the very top end of every kind of new service and amenity that filled the landscape of Jakarta's expanding urban agglomeration with the marginally profitable carcasses of formerly luxurious development projects. These projects were




FIGURE 7.15 The current biggest, brightest, most expensive shopping mall in Jakarta. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

built with money that could have profitably been invested to provide for the more modest real needs of a larger segment of the population. They were built on land that was once home to whole

⁵⁰ Cor Dijkgraaf presented this idea as the “cannibalism” of market forces in “The Urban Building Sector in Indonesia Before and After the Crisis of 1997,” paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

communities of people made suddenly destitute by their displacement. Despite the magnitude of these hardships, they were presented and perceived as the sacrifices necessary for the larger goal of "development."

The same hyper-competition between golf courses or shopping malls in Jakarta was evident on a larger scale between competing city regions. Ever larger investments by cities in newer larger, faster, more high tech, airports, container ports, transshipment terminals, etc. led to a kind of infrastructure arms race. The new economic conditions in which cities compete on an international scale to attract foreign direct investment, reward cities that invest in image-making and specialized infrastructures for commercial ventures. The greater competition ratchets up the pressure for building this infrastructure ominously not guaranteeing that the infrastructure will be used. The folly of the competition between cities is demonstrated in other parts of East and Southeast Asia as well. There will soon be six international airports between Tokyo and Osaka connected by a magnetic-levitation high-speed train. These redundant projects were launched even at a time when Osaka was bankrupted when no one came to use their new airport.⁵¹ Hong Kong is paying 90 percent of the development costs for a new Disneyland and getting only 50 percent ownership. They are spending US\$100,000 for every job that is expected to be created from the development.⁵² The number of national regimes favorable to foreign direct investment grew from a mere handful in the early 1950s to about 150 by 1998.⁵³ As competition makes an increasing number of cities interchangeable, the fortunes of those cities becomes increasingly susceptible to the volatile swings in economic fortunes when the "Flying Geese" once again take flight for a more favorable "pond" in someone else's "international free trade zone." Some argue that there is no longer any such thing as "domestic investment" since an investor in Jakarta can invest just as easily in a venture based in Chicago or Rotterdam. Increasingly, all investment competes on an international playing field.

This interplay of the political, economic, and cultural forces in developing cities like Jakarta under the influence of non-local decision-making has led to claims that wherever global economic forces are felt, social dualisms are exacerbated.⁵⁴ Cities are increasingly both the victims and beneficiaries of these new relationships, with the benefits and hardships subject to differential

⁵¹ Michael Douglass, "Reinventing Pacific Asian Cities after the Monetary Crisis," lecture presented to the Institut Teknologi Bandung Department of Architecture (7 November 2000).

⁵² Douglass, "Reinventing Pacific Asian Cities."

⁵³ Michael Douglass, "Globalisation, Intercity Competition and Civil Society in Pacific Asia: Toward Livable cities in the 21st Century," Workshop on *Southeast Asian Urban Futures*, Singapore (21 July 2000).

⁵⁴ Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 1994).

distribution.⁵⁵ Economies that opened themselves to global economic forces during the 1980s came to exhibit burgeoning GNPs even as “quality of life” indicators indicated sharpening inequalities and even decreases in key quality of life indicators, such as the calories consumed in the average daily diet.⁵⁶ But it is wrong to attribute a deterministic quality to these dynamic international relationships (what Webber referred to as “powerful forces”).⁵⁷ The more relevant story to be told occurs at the local level of historical analysis using actual case studies at the locus of power and control of specific city-regions.⁵⁸

The case of Jakarta demonstrates how the dynamic nature of these new international relationships have presented opportunities to the alliance of political and business elite forged by Suharto to extend their advantages of political power and the reaping of economic rewards. New Order Jakarta presents a vivid display of what Hall calls the “advantage of backwardness” enjoyed by the compradors of “semiperipheral states.”⁵⁹ The conditions of this advantage are characterized by a vast surplus of low-cost semi-skilled labor, access to advanced technologies and investment, and local regimes skilled in the techniques of power. In the property sector, the hyper-competition for the opportunities of “development” was used as the justification for ever greater regulatory flexibility and extensions of development incentives. The United States is pointed to as a source of evidence that generosity in the granting of privileges and economic advantages to the corporate elite is a necessary precondition for economic development.⁶⁰ In hindsight, the culture that supported the extension of privilege to the political and business elite as a means of stimulating “development” instead bred an upward spiral of escalating speculation, corruption, and abuse of regulatory and financial systems. These fed a classic “bubble” economy led by the property sector

⁵⁵ Anthony D. King, *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System* (London: Routledge, 1990), viii.

⁵⁶ Bill McKibben, *Hope, Human and Wild: True Stories of Living Lightly on the Earth* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995), 161.

⁵⁷ Melvin Webber, “The Joys of Spread-City,” *Urban Design International* 3, no. 4 (December 1998), 201.

⁵⁸ David A. Smith qualifies his quantitative analysis of the relative status of nations and regions in the world system with the caveat that such analysis provides the necessary but insufficient basis for the study of specific individual cities. At the same time, the specific case analytic studies hold the key to understanding the actual outcomes of forces operating at a global level. *Third World Cities in Global Perspective: The Political Economy of Uneven Urbanization* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 37.

⁵⁹ Thomas D. Hall, “World-Systems and Evolution An Appraisal,” *Journal of World Systems Research* 2, no. 4 (1996), 1-43, <http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html>.

⁶⁰ Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); and “Urban Bias Revisited,” *Journal of Development Studies* 20 (1984), 139-66 cited in David A. Smith, *Third World Cities in Global Perspective: The Political Economy of Uneven Urbanization* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 5-6.

that came crashing down in the second half of 1997 in one of the most spectacular financial collapses of modern times.

Several conditions in the Jabotabek property sector together contributed significantly to the creation of the Indonesian "bubble" economy. One of the key factors was the failure to enforce the time limits placed on Location Permits. The Location Permit granted certain powers that contributed to lower compensation rates for small landowners, large-scale land speculation, and bank fraud. The permit as originally established was for a one-year period, with renewals allowed up to a maximum of two years if a developer had successfully purchased at least 50 percent of the land under permit within the first year. However, it was a normal practice to automatically accept Location Permit renewals indefinitely, a practice that was made official policy in 1997.⁶¹ In fact, developers typically took for granted that they had control over lands under permit for the duration of their 10 to 25 year development plans.⁶² Aksoro reports that Location Permit extensions were easily obtained regardless of whether anything was actually built. She reports that one developer held a location permit for over 12 years without building anything.⁶³ The granting of Location Permits in many ways displaced the need for developers to buy lands from small land owners until they were ready to break ground. Lands were effectively held off the market by the conditions of the Location Permit. The terms of the Location Permit, and the consensus among developers and government officials to not execute its time limit, granted, in effect, monopoly development rights over lands in exchange for a fee, thus greatly postponing the expense and complication of having to purchase land from multiple owners.

The use of Location Permits as a means of land speculation and bank fraud is reflected in the permitting of land far in excess of even the artificially inflated market demand. From 1983 to 1988 over 48,000 hectares (120,000 acres) of Botabek land was under Location Permit (about eight percent of Botabek). On this land over 4 million residents could be housed, far in excess of both the formal sector housing demand projected at the time, and the actual demand, for the next decade.⁶⁴ In fact, the Pelita VI Five Year National Development Plan for 1994 to 1999 estimated the formal sector housing needs for the entire nation to be only 4,000 hectares (10,000 acres) per year. With approximately one third of the nation's urbanized population, Jabotabek's share of this formal sector housing need would be about 1,300 hectares (3,000 acres) per year including lands

⁶¹ Ministerial Decree 462-2183/1997 on Location Permit Extensions (Soni Harsono, Menteri Negara Agraria/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional, 8 August 1997).

⁶² Ferguson, "Land Markets," 58.

⁶³ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 30, 35.

⁶⁴ Ferguson, "Land Markets," 59-60.

used for Perumnas National Housing Corporation developments.⁶⁵ The land area under Location Permit for housing in Jabotabek by 1994 was 51,000 hectares (126,000 acres), reaching 60,000 hectares (148,000 acres) by 1995.⁶⁶ Herman Sudarsono, chair of the Real Estate Indonesia (REI), pointed out that it had taken 14 years for its members to develop and sell 3,000 hectares (7,000 acres) worth of housing—an average rate of development of 214 hectares (530 acres) per year. He predicted that, even with an increase in the demand for private sector suburban housing to 400 hectares (1,000 acres) per year (roughly twice the historic rate) the area under Location Permit would suffice to satisfy Jabotabek's formal sector housing needs for the next 150 years.⁶⁷ Other data suggest that these estimates were low. Winarso's study cites Indonesian National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik) data indicating that from 1973 to 1993, private developers averaged 25,000 house sales per year, transforming a total of almost 16,600 hectares (41,000 acres) of land in Jabotabek.⁶⁸ These data indicate an average development rate of 830 hectares (2,000 acres) per year at a density of 30 units per hectare (12 units per acre). At this rate the 60,000 hectares (148,000 acres) under Location Permits in 1995 would suffice for the next 70 years.

Data on the relative completion rates of lands held off the market under Location Permits support industry observations reported during this period that the larger developers in and around Jakarta were the most likely to be employing Location Permits for the purposes of speculative investment, not housing development.⁶⁹ Analysis of the National Mortgage Bank (Bank Tabungan Negara) program performance for West Java showed that the high demand areas of Botabek had a 28 percent completion rate of housing projects compared with the lower demand areas of the province outside of Botabek which had an average completion rate of 76 percent.⁷⁰ This indicates that higher demand was more likely to trigger speculative practices than actual housing production.

Elsewhere, high carrying costs and limits on bank financing for the purchase of land, operate to curb the practice of land speculation. In Indonesia, prohibitions on lending money for land acquisition with land as the collateral were introduced only in the mid-1990s, but these were never

⁶⁵ "Membatasi Luas Penguasaan Lahan Developer" (Limit the Powers of Land Developers), in *Bisnis Properti Indonesia* (December 1993), 6-8, cited in: Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 73-74.

⁶⁶ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 73-74.

⁶⁷ "Boom Kota Baru di Pinggir Jakarta (New Town Boom at Jakarta's Edge)," in *Properti Indonesia*, no. 17 (June 1995), 28.

⁶⁸ Haryo Winarso, "Private Residential Developers and the Spatial Structure of Jabotabek," chapter 15 in *Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume 1: Making the Cities* ed. Graham P. Chapman et al. (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999), 277.

⁶⁹ Leaf, "Land Regulation," 167-221.

⁷⁰ Ferguson, "Land Markets," 60.

properly enforced.⁷¹ Indonesian property taxes are low relative to other nations at 0.1 percent of land cost per year (compared with one to three percent in the US.). Interest on construction loans is subsidized and between 1985 and 1991, the interest carry on typical residential projects averaging 32 months came to only 9.3 percent of total project costs. Official and unofficial fees for permits, on the other hand, were relatively high at 10 to 30 percent of land costs (typically a third of the sale price).⁷² However, given the broad rights conferred along with the Location Permit—the restrictions placed on land owners to sell only to the holder of the Location Permit, and restrictions on infrastructure provision to areas under Location Permit that do not conform to the proposed development—most of the financial benefits of land ownership accrue to the holder of the Location Permit without incurring the higher costs of actually purchasing, much less developing, the land.⁷³ The Location Permit and the selective enforcement of its various provisions essentially operated as a:

...means to provide sizable land for developers, many of whom actually have little capacity to develop large-scale development projects and have no intention to develop the whole permitted areas.⁷⁴

This observation is born out by the slow rate of development seen in the areas under Location Permit (Table). The exclusive development rights granted by the Location Permit were in fact themselves the basis of a secondary market in which Location Permits were bought and sold amongst developers without involving the actual owners of the land and regardless of legal land titles.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Ferguson, "Land Markets," 67.

⁷² Ferguson, "Land Markets," 68.

⁷³ Ferguson, "Land Markets," 58-59.

⁷⁴ Tommy Firman, "Rural to Urban Land Conversion in Indonesia During Boom and Bust Periods," *Land Use Policy* 17 (2000), 19.

⁷⁵ "Tanah Terlantar, Salah Siapa?" (Idle Land, Whose Fault?), *Properti Indonesia*, no. 39 (April 1997), 23.




FIGURE 7.16 The status of Botabek Location Permits for Housing.
 Source: *Properti Indonesia* (April 1997)

At the end of 1993, the Suharto government released a new series of economic liberalization measures aimed at stimulating foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia. The October Deregulation Package (*Paket Deregulasi no. 2, 23 Oktober 1993* or *Pakto 2/1993*) included deregulation of trade, a dropping of import tariffs, incentives for capital investment, easing of

requirements and time delays of permits, and reduced requirements for environmental impact analysis. Starting in 1994 and 1995, Location Permits for projects between 15 to 200 hectares (40 to 500 acres) in size (formerly approved by the provincial governor), and larger projects (formerly approved by the Interior Minister), were now all approved at the *kabupaten/kotamadya* (county/municipal) offices of the National Land Agency (Kantor Pertanahan Daerah Tingkat II) under the control of the *Bupati* or mayor. The regulation also set the maximum time from application to issue of the permit as 12 working days.⁷⁶ With the reallocation of administrative responsibilities, there was a new land rush as each local administration competed with the others to capture the fee income generated by the issuing of Location Permits. The original functions of the Location Permit as a mechanism for regulating development in coordination with infrastructure development and local planning, was further eroded as local offices had neither access to or expertise in interpreting planning documents. Instead, there was a push to place as much land under Location Permits as possible. One local planning official in Tangerang, for example, is quoted as saying: "We will issue as many Location Permits as the land we have. [We] should provide land to support housing development."⁷⁷

From the pre-Pakto 1993 level of 60,000 hectares (148,000 acres) under Location Permits, the new administrative arrangements quickly resulted in a doubling of this amount. In October 1996, the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Negara, BPN) released figures indicating that the land held under Location Permits for housing in Botabek had reached over 121,000 hectares (300,000 acres).⁷⁸ With this report, the head of the National Land Agency announced a freeze on the issue of new Location Permits. He estimated that this area of land was sufficient for the next 20 years of private sector land development, assuming inexplicably that developers would be suddenly capable of developing and selling 6,000 hectares (15,000 acres) of land per year. Winarso's analysis, in contrast, indicates that this land was then sufficient to satisfy the private sector housing demands for the next 201 years, although this analysis is based on assumptions in conflict with the historic data that he cites earlier.⁷⁹ Based on historic precedents, the time frame would have been probably more on the order of 120 years.⁸⁰ Regardless of which rate of

⁷⁶ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency, interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000). See also: Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 30.

⁷⁷ Aksoro, "Effects of the Location Permit," 74.

⁷⁸ "Tanah Terlantar," 22-25.

⁷⁹ Winarso, "Private Residential," 297.

⁸⁰ Winarso's citation of Badan Pusat Statistik data is here held to be the best guide for future performance. This data indicates that from 1973 to 1993, private developers averaged 25,000 house sales per year transforming a total of

production is favored, what is clear is that this land was placed under Location Permit for the purposes of land speculation.

Along with the government subsidized housing credit programs, the Location Permit facilitated the practice of using luxury single-family homes as a speculative investment. The limit of one housing loan per household was easily circumvented and some families would purchase a dozen or more houses in new housing estates only to leave them empty except for a team of domestic servants to clean and guard them (figure). The artificially increased demand pressure on luxury housing further fed the escalating value of these properties. The rate of price increase made suburban real estate the most attractive investment opportunity for those who could afford it, far outperforming the interest rates available from stocks, bonds, or financial instruments available through banks. Developers consistently denied knowledge of occupation rates in their new developments but preliminary investigations in several developments found that occupation rates of 20 to 50 percent in already sold-out neighborhoods were not uncommon.⁸¹ Thus much of the private sector housing production supported by government programs never contributed to the goal of providing shelter but instead, were maintained empty as instruments of speculative investment. The opportunities for committing bank fraud became a further incentive to obtain Location Permits. It was standard practice for banks to release development and construction loans on the basis of a Location Permit with little or no oversight to ensure that the funds were used for property development. With the explosive growth in new banks after the 1989 deregulation of the banking industry, it was common for every developer to have access to their own bank via their parent conglomerate. This is a situation analyzed by Fischer as “turpi-leverage” comparable to the “symmetrically morally hazardous” relationship between two drug dealers in which the illegal nature of the relationship obviates any attempts to claim damages from a higher authority.⁸²

By May 1997, lending to the real estate sector reached Rp37.1 trillion (US\$16 billion) or about one fifth of the total bank loans in Indonesia.⁸³ Paralleling Indonesia’s adventure in property

almost 16,600 hectares of land in Jabotabek. This indicates an average housing density of 30 units per hectare and a land consumption rate of 830 hectares per year.

⁸¹ Occupation rates tend to rise gradually over time. Several houses along one side of a street in Solo Baru in central Java were each owned by the children of a single wealthy textile factory owner. The oldest child was 14 years old and the houses were intended to be sold when it was time for each child to get married. In the meantime, only a cleaning woman lived in each house and a guard was posted outside.

⁸² Dominique Fischer, “Indonesia’s Real Estate Disturbance: An Ineluctable Outcome,” chapter 11 in *Asia’s Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate*, eds. Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 233-34.

⁸³ Firman, “Restructuring of Jakarta,” 235.

market excesses, Thailand had long been feeding its own economic bubble. Revelations that the real estate empires of Thailand were built on a sinking raft of unsecured loans, the Thai government was compelled on 2 July 1997 to float the Baht on the international currency market leading to an immediate and severe devaluation. With attention drawn to the region's lax financial practices, particularly in real estate sectors, the financial world undertook a closer look at their loans and investments. The Philippine and Malaysian currencies were the next ones to take heavy hits. Recognizing some measure of vulnerability, the Indonesian Government passed legislation on 7 July freezing loans to the property sector for all but low income housing production,⁸⁴ but most observers believed that the Indonesian market was too large and important to follow on the heels of Thailand. By mid-August, the Indonesian rupiah had fallen from Rp2,400/US\$ to Rp2,600/US\$ and rapidly depleting foreign reserves made price supports impossible to maintain. The immediate slide by the rupiah to Rp2,800/US\$ was seen as a shock at the time, but it proved to be only the tip of the iceberg. By January 1998 the rupiah had fallen to a low of Rp17,100/US\$ representing a loss of 86 percent of its value.⁸⁵ Between June 1997 and January 1998, the Jakarta stock market capitalization contracted from US\$118 billion to US\$17 billion. Over the same period, the per capita income dropped from US\$1,200 to US\$300.⁸⁶ The Gross Domestic Product growth rate in Indonesia dropped from 8 percent in 1996 and 5 percent in 1997 to a negative 14 percent in 1998—the greatest decrease of any of the economies most afflicted by the Asian financial crisis (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand).⁸⁷ In each of these countries, real estate was the sector of the economy that took the hardest hit, and none of them were hit as hard as Indonesia's property sector. In 1999, 87 percent of Indonesian real estate firms were unable to repay their debts compared with 53 percent in Malaysia, 47 percent in Thailand, and 44 percent in South Korea.⁸⁸

While the financial crisis in Indonesia grew out of multiple causes including oil prices, severe droughts, devastating forest fires, and El Niño,⁸⁹ revelations since the initial crashes of 1997 and

⁸⁴ Tjahja Gunawan, "Jangan Lagi Memberi Kredit Berlebihan ke Properti" (Never Again Give Excessive Loans to the Property Sector), *Kompas* (15 July 2000), 15.

⁸⁵ Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud, introduction to *Asia's Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate*, eds. Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 3.

⁸⁶ Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta," 230.

⁸⁷ Mera and Renaud, *Asia's Financial Crisis*, 3-4.

⁸⁸ Mera and Renaud, *Asia's Financial Crisis*, 7-8.

⁸⁹ Comments made by Anne Booth on a panel discussion "Asia After the Crisis" at the *EUROSEAS International Conference Looking Forward, Looking Back*, Hamburg (4 September 1998).

1998 indicate that the routine practices of large Indonesian property developers, in particular bank fraud related to real estate development, was a significant contributor to the onset, depth, and duration of the crisis that followed.⁹⁰ More generally, the “footloose” character of foreign direct investment—the attribute that made it possible for the surge in manufacturing and service sector growth in Jabotabek during the 1980s and 1990s—proved to be one of the key factors adding to the extreme nature of the 1997 collapse of the Indonesian economy. Foreign investors fled with the same ease that they arrived, and were quick to pull out of Indonesia at the first signs of trouble, further accelerating its fall.⁹¹

Many have argued that the hollowness of Suharto’s “development” is proven by the sudden return of most Indonesians to the same poverty that they were in when Suharto took over leadership of the nation three decades earlier.⁹² The exaggerated claims of economic gains during the Suharto era were exposed as a shallow façade masking the more fundamental weaknesses and structural vulnerabilities of the Indonesian economy.⁹³ The more heart-wrenching realizations are those that consider some of the monumental “missed opportunities” for investing in development that could have gone towards satisfying the more basic material needs of the wider population of Indonesia.⁹⁴ Instead, the trophy projects like the “Timor” national car served only to enrich Suharto family and friends while driving the nation into ever more unfavorable and burdensome long-term debt.⁹⁵ Instead of benefiting the national economy as a whole, such mega-projects typical of the New Order government served as the means for siphoning off sorely needed national

⁹⁰ Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).

⁹¹ Firman, “Restructuring of Jakarta,” 233.

⁹² Achmad D. Tardiyana, “The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order,” paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (7 December 2000).

⁹³ Anne Booth, “Poverty and Inequality in the Soeharto Era: An Assessment,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 36, no. 1 (April 2000), 73-104.

⁹⁴ Anne Booth, *The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

⁹⁵ The national car project, “Timor,” was financed by Suharto’s close business and golfing partner Soedono Salim and headed by his youngest son and would-be race car driver Tommy. It is estimated that the project cost the nation some US\$500 million. J. Thomas Lindblad, “Indonesian Economic Development in a Time of Globalization,” *Globalization, Localization and Indonesia: Bijdragen to de Taal-, land- en Volkenkunde*, no. 2 (1998); “Asia: Tommy Suharto Named a Suspect by Anti-corruption Commission,” (Australian Associated Press Wire Service, 11 December 1998).

resources and transforming them into vast accumulations of personal wealth. This was part of a larger process characterized by geographers as “underdevelopment.”⁹⁶

But even these perspectives remain muted in the lingering aftermath of the financial and political crises of 1997 and 1998 as the Cendana-Cukong alliance continues mostly undisturbed despite the displacement of Suharto himself. Since Suharto’s resignation in the wake of violent rioting in May 1998, economic recovery efforts by the three self-proclaimed “*reformasi*” (reform) regimes appear focused on picking up where they left off before the crisis without significant changes or even hints of understanding what the root causes of the crisis were. Others read in the history of the New Order boom and bust, signs capable of bringing the discrepancies between sustained economic growth and sustainable development into even sharper relief.⁹⁷ It is tempting to believe that Suharto’s comeuppance is a lesson that “there is a limit to how rotten a system can be before it threatens the symbolic ideal” to which it pretends to aspire.⁹⁸ However, the more likely legacy of the chaotic, though tentative, experiments in greater openness of the post-Suharto years appears to be a nostalgia for the good old stability and appearance of progress portrayed by the New Order. The almost total failure to change the fundamental structures of the New Order or to prosecute the perpetrators of even its most flagrant criminal acts, is widely seen as a vindication of the strength and other merits of the New Order network of patronage.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis and Suharto’s resignation, the elite established by the New Order remain protective of their interests. Even the minor and largely symbolic threat to their hegemony posed by President Wahid’s token pursuit of *reformasi* sparked violent responses. In 2000, attempts to place former President Suharto on trial for embezzlement became a test of wills between Wahid’s Attorney General and an elite defending the very concept of privilege so forcefully established by Suharto’s example in emulation of Javanese royalty. The *wong cilik* (“small people”) were expected to remain hidden away and waiting patiently in what remained of the *kampung*, by the car in the parking garages, in the servants quarters, and back kitchens for the moment when they are called on to serve. The struggle between defenders of the status quo and those who felt the need for change underscored just how far the elite group was willing to go to

⁹⁶ Warwick Armstrong and T.G. McGee, *Theatres of Accumulation: Studies in Asian and Latin American Urbanization* (London: Methuen, 1985); and A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

⁹⁷ Bill Gould and David Smith, “Labour and Society in Urban South-east Asia,” introduction to *Third World Planning Review* 20, no. 2 (May 1998), vi.

⁹⁸ Heather Sutherland, comments made in response to questions regarding her paper “Money in Makassar: Credit and Debt in an Eighteenth Century VOC Settlement,” presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, Leiden (6 December 2000).

defend its privileges. This included a bomb placed in the parking garage of Jakarta's World Financial Center, home of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, and the assassination of Wahid's Attorney General. These events were widely interpreted as an indication that the business and political elite were willing to engage in a "scorched earth policy to protect their vested interests... They are prepared to bring the entire economy down."⁹⁹ Later it was revealed that both acts of terror were ordered by Suharto's son, Tommy, then on the run to escape a short sentence for a fraudulent land swap deal that went bad.

On a more fundamental level, there are few signs of willingness to reevaluate the assumptions behind the New Order development imperative in light of the deepening relative and absolute impoverishment experienced by the majority of the national population. By and large, the deepening social dualisms of Jakarta are taken to be the familiar social distinctions of traditional Javanese society rendered in modern forms—even as these forms take on an increasingly invasive spatial nature. Social distinctions have been brought to life with an unprecedented immediacy in the new forms largely imported (with some adaptation as seen in the double kitchen) from North America. These models of architecture, urban design and planning are emulated in catering to the perceived needs of a new consumer class. The ring of luxury suburban enclaves around Jakarta provide the symbolic capital required to confirm the distinction between the new suburban elite and the masses left behind in the *kampung*. Similarly, the rising popularity of the automobile also exhibits a taste for tinted glass further segregating the privileged from those left to struggle with patronizing a deteriorating public transportation system and occupying what is left of the un-air-conditioned "junkspace" of Jakarta's public realm. The newly concretized distinctions splitting the consumer class from those who can only aspire to join its ranks, manifest as spatial divisions reproduced at every scale of the built environment. It is there in the wall dividing the gated real estate developments and the *kampung*; in the reflective glass curtain walls of the corporate "superblocks" downtown; in the speeding cars capturing ever greater swaths of the public realm; in the wall that divides the Lilliputian spaces of the domestic help from the echoing emptiness of the double-height living room/*ruang tamu*; and in the door that separates the family "pantry" from the darkness of the domestic servants' traditional kitchen.

The split itself is one of the significant causes of worsening conditions for Jakarta's aspiring majority as economic and social opportunities are literally sealed off and rendered inaccessible. The object lesson of Jakarta's new built environment is that it will be the lucky few, able to afford the price of admission, who will view the playing out of this vicious cycle from the comfort and

⁹⁹ Arian Ardie, an international business consultant and adviser to the American Chamber of Commerce quoted in Terry McCarthy, "Wahid Goes to War: The President Takes on Dark, Destabilizing Forces From Indonesia's Troubled Past, Does he Have the Will and the Weapons to Win?" *Time* 156, no. 12 (25 September 2000), 18-23.

security of the consumer class enclaves of privilege. In the absence of signs that these conditions will be changing any time soon, the spatial segregation of the divided society operates to further exacerbate tensions and reinforce the resolve of the wealthy minority to defend and extend the divide at all costs. With the images of the new global elite dominating the words, sounds, and images of the mass media penetrating to ever further corners of globe, the need for people to find some real basis for believing in the prospects for forward motion towards the aspirations they have been led to claim as their own becomes ever more irrepressible. There are dangers associated with feeding dreams that recede ever further out of reach. Locked irredeemably on the wrong side of the divide, hope collapses.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: CIVIL SOCIETY AND JAKARTA'S CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION

Engaging with the City Built by a Command Culture

The dramatic transformations of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region (Jabotabek) during the second half of the Suharto presidency (1980-1997) poses a number of fascinating questions for those interested in issues of globalization seen through urban and architectural form and its role in recent "third world" urbanization. By all outward appearances, Jakarta would seem to present all of the classic symptoms of an urban region rapidly expanding in direct emulation of North American postwar urban development. The transfer of formal models from America to other parts of the world, including Indonesia, has led several observers to go so far as declare a final convergence to a single global urban paradigm exemplified by Los Angeles. Melvin Webber, for example, provides an excellent summary of the problems of American style sprawl (social segregation; low-income groups subsidizing the costs and disproportionately carrying the environmental burdens of the affluent; unworkable geometry of cars and cities; and the apparent incapacity of land markets to protect the common good) and even emphasizes the particular intractability of these problems in developing countries as they attempt to follow in America's footsteps. But then in a bizarre twist that one almost suspects of being tongue-in-cheek for all its exuberance, he declares a "Hallelujah!" that the American style spread-city is becoming the norm world wide.¹

Similarly, Australian economic geographers Dick and Rimmer use the example of Jakarta's new town developments to declare an end to distinctions between Southeast Asian urbanism and that of North America and the rest of the developed world: "Any attempt to explain either the historical or contemporary urbanization of south-east Asia as a unique phenomenon is therefore doomed to absurdity."² At best, this is an ingenuous overstatement apparently based on the observation that elements of North American urban development are being reproduced in and around Jakarta. Tokyo offers another striking counter example. Tokyo has sprawled at least as much as Los Angeles (similarly driven by manufacturing), but it has done so at a much higher density and with opposite social and economic trends. Unlike American cities there is low income inequality, a

¹ Melvin Webber, "The Joys of Spread-City," *Urban Design International* 3, no. 4 (December 1998), 206.

² Howard W. Dick and Peter J. Rimmer, "Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography of South-east Asia," *Urban Studies* 35, no. 12 (1998), 2318-19.

virtual absence of spatial segregation by class, the middle class is not disappearing, and crime rates are negligible.³ Yet Tokyo is identified by Sassen as one of the three great “global cities.”⁴ Rather than concluding that there are not now (nor were there ever) any unique conditions to consider regarding the city in Southeast Asia, a more reasonable position would be a renewed commitment to distinguishing between those aspects that Western and Southeast Asian cities do and do not share. Now that elements of North American urban development since World War II have been reproduced under very different conditions elsewhere, the critique of these patterns can now also expand.

But the fundamental starting point of any examination of these models being applied to other contexts, and particularly to the setting of Jakarta, is that the pre-existing city remains the norm for the vast majority of the population. It is sadly over-optimistic to assume that the residents of the *kampung* displaced by the new development now live in the new condominium towers. For most Jakartans, the harsh realities of the earlier Jakarta were only made worse by the even greater overcrowding imposed by the more opulent housing conditions, better urban amenities, more major roadways, more cars, more malls, a more impressive skyline, etc., enjoyed by the few privileged Jakartans. A “before and after picture” of a rural agricultural village struggling to subsist replaced by a gated luxury golf community does not appear as an “improvement” to the dispossessed farmers. If we are to assume that what is good outside of Melbourne is also good outside of Jakarta, then we assume that the dislocated farmers were given fair compensation for their lands and the opportunity for a new life elsewhere. That this is not the case is an important factor that highlights significant distinctions between the two situations, even if they look very much alike. To neglect this detail is to miss the important differences between a luxury golf community outside of Houston and one outside of Jakarta. Once again we learn that issues of distribution matter.

The fact that the “middle class” of Indonesia, even at the height of the Indonesia’s long economic boom, excluded all but the top 7 to 10 percent income earners of the population tells of a very different story than the one told by the formal transformation of the landscape.⁵ Judging from the vastness of the land areas that were transformed into modern towers, toll roads, malls, golf courses and luxury suburbs, one would presume a similarly significant demographic

³ Kuniko Fujita, contribution to email discussion responding to D.W. Miller, “The New Urban Studies,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (18 August 2000) <<http://chronicle.com/free/v46/i50/50a01501.htm>>

⁴ Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

⁵ Ian Chalmers, “Democracy Constrained: The Emerging Political Culture of the Indonesian Middle Class,” *Asian Studies Review*, no. 17 (1993), 54; cited in Solvay Gerke, “Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class,” chapter 6 in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (New York: Routledge, 2000), 136.

transformation. But the multiple distortions deriving from the extraordinary concentrations of wealth, the rampant manipulation of land use and banking regulations, and the speculative nature of both development investment and consumption (particularly housing) led to a situation in which the enormous mobilization of land and development resources that transformed Jakarta was perpetrated for the benefit of a tiny minority of the population. In the meantime, the vast majority of Jakartans were forced to make do with less. Agricultural workers were displaced from their lands and into the *kampung* where they joined the already over-crowded informal sector selling small commodities of daily consumption for a minuscule mark up, precariously awaiting the next police campaign to rid Jakarta's streets of the illegal and unsightly stalls lining the streets cheek-by-jowl. The loss of *kampung* neighborhoods in the urban core has resulted in additional crowding in those that remain as well as relocation to areas much farther from the social and economic opportunities of the city.

Even the phenomenon of strong "middle-class" formation reaching upwards of 10 percent of the population proved to be built upon extremely unstable conditions. In the two years after the onset of the Indonesian currency crisis in July 1997, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from US\$1,300 to US\$400. Along with it, the so-called middle-class shrunk to about five million or two percent of the 230 million Indonesian population.⁶ The vast shining new city of Jakarta built for a small fraction of the population was now left an empty carcass. Before the economic crisis it was already a symbol of greed, corruption, and waste. The crisis itself was triggered in large part by the bank fraud and corruption that built the new Jakarta. Even the realistic expectation of a slow recovery over the course of five to ten years has proven overly optimistic in light of the still huge burdens imposed by so much excess office, mall, condominium, suburban housing space and the debts (now held by the state) incurred in building it. The social transformation that observers of Indonesia, including many social scientists, are eager to read in the dramatic physical transformation of Jakarta remains a phantom that promises to haunt the nation for generations to come.

Form in the abstract holds the capacity to mask as much as it reveals. Jakarta cloaked in the forms of Houston is still Jakarta to those who live there. Spiro Kostof wrote:

⁶ Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture under President Habibie quoted in the *Straits Times* (19 May, 1999) cited in Gerke, "Global Lifestyles," 136.

We “read” form correctly only to the extent that we are familiar with the precise cultural conditions that generated it. Rather than presume, in other words, as practically everybody in the architectural world wants to presume, that buildings and city-forms are a transparent medium of cultural expression, I am convinced that the relationship only works the other way around. The more we know about cultures, about the structure of society in various periods of history in different parts of the world, the better we are able to read their built environment.⁷

In the spirit of Kostof, this dissertation is an attempt to offer such a reading, yielding conclusions very different from those readings that assume that an office tower in Miami carries the same meanings as one in Jakarta, or that a gated community in Orange County, California tells more or less the same story as one in Kabupaten Tangerang, West Java.

Urban forms that result from emulation or imitation of an original, particularly undertaken in starkly different social, economic, and historical contexts, cannot be expected to carry the same meanings as the original. The glass and steel tower, the luxury suburb, the freeway and automobile dependency, shopping malls, and gated golf communities were each invented or perfected in North America. The apotheosis of each of these forms achieved in American cities since World War II have been celebrated, caricatured, and made into icons of consumer desire, propagated the world over by the industries of cultural production: Hollywood, television, music videos, advertising for every kind of fashion, video game, soft drink, fast food, automobile, and the self-replicating concept of advertising itself. These images broadcast and renewed daily from Southern California and its substations located around the world have come to provide the basic building blocks from fragmentary images to whole intact visions from which much of the world now constructs its aspirations for the future for themselves and their children—an achievement that the great world religions could only dream of. Writing in the mid-1990s, Bill McKibben asserted that: “...one billion people ...see the TV program Baywatch each week ...more than take communion ...or bow to Mecca.”⁸ The point is that the caricature of life in the developed West, the United States in particular—an imagined West—has become an object of veneration, to be striven for and replicated. The imagery of the imagined West does not only impinge on the nature of consumer demand at the point of sale for clothes, fast food, cars or housing, but it also forms the basis of the range of possible worlds imagined by political and entrepreneurial leadership and their cadre of planners and designers. To varying degrees these replications manifest as hybrid formations undergoing a process of creative translation more or less appropriate to their new contexts. Even

⁷ Spiro Kostof, *A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10.

⁸ Bill McKibben, *Hope, Human and Wild: True Stories of Living Lightly on the Earth* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995), 53.

without a transformation of the form itself, original meanings are irrevocably changed by new contexts and the circumstances of transference.

Tapping in to the pent up demand for all things associated with modern Western lifestyles, the themetized Southern California suburban housing subdivision appeared as the ideal device with which to develop and market the products of the suburban property market invented virtually overnight by a small circle of financiers closely connected with President Suharto and his family. All of the positive associations of a sophisticated and liberated consumer lifestyle had been previously implanted by an opening up of the Indonesian media to the West. Each thematic enclave offering a slice of Venice, London, or Santa Barbara were automatically associated with the imagery promulgated by mostly American film and television programs—everything that local traditions of architecture and urban form were not. More than just a way to sell land, making good on the promise of an Indonesian variant of the imagined West appears to be at the heart of what the developer-politician architects of the New Order transformation of Jakarta were trying to achieve. In their own version of “doing well by doing good” they imagined themselves making it possible for Jakarta to shake off its third world image as the “city of a thousand *kampung*” to be reborn as “Jakarta, the Metropolitan City”⁹—only incidentally making themselves unimaginably wealthy in the process. The subtleties distinguishing between the helpful hand of government pulling Indonesian society up from poverty into formal sector housing and an iron-fisted war against the poor, burning down or bulldozing whole communities in the middle of the night, was lost somewhere along the way. So tantalizing was the New Order’s vision of a modern metropolitan Jakarta—the Levi’s Jeans or shiny new BMW of the national leadership set—that it was willing to make extraordinary but necessary sacrifices in the livelihoods and even lives of its least fortunate citizens to achieve it.

The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a very few individuals close to Suharto made the ideas, visions, values, priorities, business strategies, and opportunities shared by this small group of tremendous significance. The centralized control of the media and long-standing traditions of the deification of political leaders both contributed to Suharto’s extraordinary success in dictating the terms of political discussion. He waged a constant media campaign broadcast on the state-controlled evening news that established the New Order development agenda as the fundamental terms of reference within which the thinking of Indonesian society was guided. The personal values, political ideologies, assumptions of race and class, the shared psychological attributes and place in history of Suharto and his oligarchy, all figure prominently in guiding the

⁹ Michael Leon Leaf, “Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the ‘Big Village’ to the ‘Modern City’,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991).

decisions with the greatest transformative impact on Jakarta. In all of this, it must be noted that a large measure of the power wielded by the New Order culture of development lay in the inherent attractiveness of its ideas as well as the actual benefits accruing widely to the population of Indonesia. Suharto oversaw huge strides in education, health, rice self-sufficiency, family planning, and political stability. Rural electrification, road, school, clinic, and mosque building programs reached virtually every hamlet in the vast archipelago nation. However these formidable gains were bittersweet as they played a major role in consolidating a systematic and ubiquitous corruption. For every two schools funded by Suharto's development machine, one was built and the other was forfeited to line the pockets of New Order administrators. Suharto's example, understood as a modern interpretation of the Javanese traditions of a privileged leadership, established the values and practices of the New Order in which corruption was not incompatible with maintaining the highest ideals of public service.

The movement to deregulate business practices and turn state-owned operations over to the private sector in the 1980s opened up whole new arenas of opportunity for corruption. The influences of the "new international division of labor" and the mobility of foreign direct investment (the dynamic duo of economic globalization) were conditioned on the perception of opportunities presented to the coalition between the political and private sector elite under Suharto. Growth coalition and urban regime theories, engaged as they are in the actual history of actors, institutions, and places, go much further into actual historical processes than the relative abstractness of world-system and globalization theories. The explanatory power of world systems research, while being insufficient on its own, lies in its capacity to lay out the forces applying pressure to groups such as the New Order oligarchy, and the alternatives and opportunities presented to them. However the actual extent and nature of the influence exerted by external economic forces is not the foregone conclusion that it is often assumed to be. These forces find expression in local events only as far as they are taken up by the local elites, and then only in ways that are mediated by their choices—choices made within a complex "decision space" between often competing considerations. A fuller understanding of the other elements entering this "decision space" can only be accounted for through a deeper examination of the shared social, political, and economic history of this group. Through identification of, and inquiries into, the several components of this key decision space, the mono-valent determinism of economics carried by so many methodologies opens up to the complexities of human social psychology, political thought, local circumstances, and the wider array of historical processes. The primary factors interacting within the decision spaces of the key agents of Jakarta's transformation demonstrate both a complexity and commonalty that together dispel attempts to ascribe an economic determinism and suggest instead the useful application of the concept of culture.

Despite the vast bureaucracy, permitting processes, regulatory mechanisms, international technical and financial aid, and even some good plans, the institutions and culture of planning were consistently undermined, diverted and redirected in the way they were implemented so as to have either no impact or, in some cases, the opposite impact of the one originally intended. Planning methodologies by their very nature strive to move the key decisions concerning the built environment out of decision spaces of narrow interests and personal gain and into a more democratically configured decision space of long term collective benefit. In the absence of a viable judiciary, such things as morality, ethics, and justice appear to have been imprisoned in the realm of abstraction. Powerful displays of progressive thought were prominently exhibited at academic conferences, for rhetorical impact in public, in the introductions to planning and regulatory documents, and sometimes even in actual legislation as in the case of the Mixed Settlements regulations. It was safe to do so without fear of actually being bound by any of it due to the pragmatic separation of such abstractions from the day to day realities of governance under the New Order. The high idealism of planning methods were often celebrated in speeches and the introductory chapters of planning documents only to be derailed or reversed in moving from the abstract to action planning and concrete implementation. The common feature was the redirection of regulatory measures in such a way that they catered instead to the extension of power, narrowing of competition, or easing the capacity to reap benefits by the largest developers.

The forms adopted for the new Jakarta reflect the choices made by both the political-private sector elite (supply) and the so-called "middle-class" consumers (demand) as conditioned and facilitated by the New Order culture of "development." They also reflect the vastly disproportionate allocation of resources to a small minority of the wealthiest Jakartans. The office and condominium tower complexes downtown and the new luxury suburbs out of town are both similarly fortified, gated, and guarded enclaves. The architecture, site planning, urban design, and regional transportation planning of these complementary pairs, and the toll roads connecting them, all favor access by private automobile. Pedestrians enter through driveways increasingly in competition with automobile traffic and are more likely to be stopped and questioned by the uniformed sentries. Whole "new towns" with populations projected into the tens of thousands are built with a single point of entry and exit. Armed sentries wearing military uniforms stand alongside enormous barricades festooned with razor wire ready to seal off the entrance at a moment's notice. The long history of collective outbreaks of organized violence against well-to-do Chinese Indonesians has much to do with the resonance with which America's gated community model has been received in Jakarta. Similarly, a fear of public space and the striving for social differentiation has informed the apparent Indonesian enthusiastic drive towards an automobile dependent future. The fact that every new road improvement is almost immediately overwhelmed by new levels of traffic congestion

(despite a car ownership rate one tenth that of most American cities) gives an indication of the kind of future this trend faces.¹⁰ In the process, the streets of Jakarta have become a battleground, pitting the city government against bicycle taxis (*becak*), informal sector merchants, three-wheeled motorcycle taxis (*bajaj*, deployed to fill the void left by the missing *becak*), public buses, sidewalks, and pedestrians, all in the name of clearing the way for more private cars as the only suitable vehicles for the message that Jakarta is a modern metropolis.¹¹ The impact of more private automobile traffic, and efforts made to accommodate it, represent the de facto privatization of the formerly public realm of the street.



FIGURE 8.1 The grand gateway to Citraraya "The City of Art." Photograph: Robert Cowherd

The task of this chapter is to consider the implications these findings may have particularly in evaluating the prospects for both further research and the ongoing struggles to establish a civil society in competition with the lingering hegemony of New Order interests. In doing so, I break with the tendency in academic endeavors of cultural criticism to refrain from proposing alternative

¹⁰ Harun al-Rasyid S. Lubis, Professor of Transport Engineering Institut Teknologi Bandung, personal communication (August 2000).

¹¹ Government Regulation number 11, 1988 (*Perda DKI Jakarta No. 11, Tahun 1988 tentang Ketertiban Umum*), places an official ban on a wide variety of behaviors and practices common to most Indonesian cities.

visions for fear of reproducing the trespasses of authority so heart-wrenchingly exposed. Foucault's now famous identification of "discursive constraints" reserved for himself, and an army of postmodern social critics that followed, the privilege of inhabiting a comfortably ironic disengagement with struggles for political change. They also managed to secure for themselves, by some trick of linguistic obfuscation, an aura of radicalism even as they remained safely cloistered away in what Roth labeled the "ironist's cage."¹² Without downplaying the inherent risk involved in such ventures, this study has indulged the conceit that there exists a complementary relationship between critical research and engaged social change. By remaining explicit about the "positioned" nature of the research (see Chapter One) the author looks to the reader to assume a measure of responsibility for judging the usefulness and dependability of its methods, representations and findings. Because I write as a non-Indonesian, the relevance of what follows must be immediately deemed of suspect value. The epistemic gauntlet presented by my other personal modifiers (white, male, American, professional) would seem to condemn any further exposition. But having already rejected a position of "forsaking understanding for the sake of respect"¹³ when I exchanged my tourist visa for a research permit, I hazard the risks inherent in forging ahead, drawn by both the prospects of offering a more hopeful prognosis for the future and the fear of leaving the cultural constructions of the past unchallenged.

Implications, Prospects, and Role of Future Research

The fundamental conclusion of this research is that culture matters. It matters more than economics or the International Monetary Fund, more than corruption or the entrenched networks of patronage, and more even than the imagery transmitted to Indonesia of the splendor of American-style capitalism. Culture matters more because it is the framework within which each of these forces are cast and thereby granted or denied a significance in the consciousness of both the key decision makers of Indonesian power structures and the daily lives of its people. Under conditions of less centralized control and a greater plurality of choices, the framework of culture is the product of a greater diversity of choices favoring demand-side choices over supply-side choices. In Indonesia, even after the New Order, culture takes on aspects based on a relatively narrow distribution of power. The remarkable capacity demonstrated by Suharto to mold the cultural framework of Indonesia to a specific program under the banner of New Order "development"

¹² Michael S. Roth, "Performing History: Modernist contextualism in Carl Schorske's *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*," *American Historical Review* (June 1994), 738.

¹³ Satya P. Mohanty, "Colonial Legacies, Multicultural Futures: Relativism, Objectivity, and the Challenge of Otherness," *Colonialism and the Postcolonial Condition* (n.d.), 111.

offers a dramatic example of the critical role played by culture in guiding the formation of social structures and space. The insights garnered from this study of the role of culture in the transformation of Jakarta in the late Suharto period are suggestive of a potentially significant positive role for culture in shaping a better future for Jakarta and other Indonesian cities. The implications for the potential positive role of culture in the post-Suharto era fall into two general areas expressed in the following questions: First, given the central role played by Suharto in establishing the terms of reference for public discourse in New Order Indonesia, can a new leadership wield a similar influence in charting a more appropriate course? And second, can an opening up of the society yield a more openly constructed framework of culture that is less directive and more reflective of society's values?

To the first question, a preliminary assessment of the three presidencies since Suharto would indicate that, so far, no one has yet to rise to the task of reconfiguring the juggernaut of the New Order development agenda and its empire of patronage. Despite all of the changes that came in the wake of the monetary crisis and the toppling of the official New Order government, the limited progress made by the Indonesian reform movement (*reformasi*) must be seen as a disappointment. The short-lived presidency of Abdurachman Wahid (2000-2001) appeared to be more intent on demonstrating that someone besides Suharto could rule the nation than it was on making substantive change. Indonesia's fifth president is Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-). Although elected through the passionate exultations of the youthful supporters of the Indonesian Democratic Party, she has proven more concerned with asserting control over the elaborate power networks established by the New Order than dismantling it. The lack of progress despite yet another change of regime has inspired several grassroots coalitions to declare that "Reform is no longer a fireworks but has instead been quickly absorbed into the New Order's language, symbolic system and political mechanisms."¹⁴ It remains an open question whether the potential for constructing a reform culture to replace the still prevalent culture and dominating culture of the New Order will be seized.

To the second question, there are several indications that cultural, social, political, and institutional adjustments to a more open society are in progress. The remarkable release of pent up energies liberated by the lifting of New Order media censorship has led to a boom in new daily, weekly, and monthly publications, as well as a retooling of existing media to satisfy the long unmet demands for a freer and more independent journalism. Unfortunately, much of the new

¹⁴ "Reformasi tidak lebih sebuah kembang api yang dengan cepat diadopsi ke dalam sistem simbol dari mekanisme politik bahasa yang dikembangkan orde baru." "2001: Wayang Dengan Layar Api" (2001: Shadow Puppet Play Cast on a Flaming Screen), Statement of the Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota (Urban Poor Consortium), and Serikat Becak (United Bicycle Taxi Drivers), (Jakarta, 1 January 2002).

media coverage is fraught with signs of tabloid sensationalism aimed more at moving paper than fulfilling a new social mandate. The relaxation of controls governing the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs called *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* (LSM) in Indonesian, literally meaning People's Empowerment Organizations) has led to an explosion of such groups, fed in part by a shift in the way international aid organizations target their funding to Indonesia. For most of the New Order period, international aid flowed exclusively to the central government and was distributed through various ministries. During the early 1990s, this system was opened up to allow private sector consultancies to administer aid grants. Government officials wanting to maintain their flow of illegal income from such grants quickly established private consultancies to maintain their former relationship to the aid money. More recently the further shifting of aid money to NGOs has led similarly to a boom in NGOs formed by these same government officials. The task of distinguishing between these and the more legitimate NGOs has become a significant challenge.

Ironically, it appears that the most significant and lasting change after Suharto was initiated by his protégé, Vice President and immediate successor, Bacharuddin Yusuf Habibie (1998-2000). Notably neither a Javanese nor a military officer (previously assumed to be the two prerequisites for the Indonesian presidency), he became the nation's third president in its half century of independence through the nation's first constitutional transition in leadership. Of the three presidents since Suharto, it appears that the German-trained engineer from Sulawesi was so far the most capable of implementing reforms. The changes made by Habibie were motivated by the immediate needs to restore order, cool-down the ongoing demonstrations that toppled his mentor and win favor in anticipation of the 1999 elections. It fell to Habibie, responding to a surge in secessionist movements with the fall of Suharto, to take the next steps in the national transition to greater regional autonomy. With the chaos of East Timor's incipient independence, Habibie was eager to satisfy certain demands from the outer islands that might soften the arguments for making a complete break from Jakarta. In passing the Regional Autonomy Law no. 22, 1999 (*Undang-undang No. 22, tahun 1999 tentang Otonomi Daerah*) and an accompanying Intergovernmental Fiscal Balance Law no. 25, 1999 (*Undang-undang No. 25, tahun 1999*), Habibie skipped over the 26 provincial level governments to grant significant powers to the hundreds of *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* (counties and municipalities). These two laws made it possible to shift control of ports, industries, plantations, mining, forestry, land management, education, health, and tourism to local authorities—powers that previously lay with the central government through the bureaucracy of its ministries. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Balance law was designed to decrease the amount of local tax revenues siphoned off to Jakarta. The combination of greater local authority and retention and control of local tax revenues was seen as one way to slake separatist yearnings of several resource-

rich areas, including Irian Jaya (the Indonesian half of New Guinea island), Aceh (in northern Sumatra), and Riau (the islands between Sumatra and Singapore).

Supporters of *reformasi* (reform) see the new autonomy laws as a means of breaking the *korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme* (corruption, collusion and nepotism), popularly referred to as *KKN*, but ambitious *bupati* (county heads) and mayors had long ago demonstrated that whatever corruption benefits not absorbed at the central and provincial levels were eagerly taken in at the county-municipal level. Moreover, the centralization of corruption and its management within a sort of moral and ethical code of conduct, informed by Suharto's reinterpretation of Javanese royal privilege, would seem to have had a mollifying affect in controlling certain excesses. When left to the discretion, or lack thereof, of far flung local administrators, however the *Bupati* and mayors have demonstrated a capacity and willingness to take on the role of feudal tyrants visiting great hardships upon local residents.

The simultaneous progress made in both political reform and regional autonomy would seem to present opportunities to devolve power to local leadership where new democratic mechanisms would hold them to higher standards of transparency, accountability and professionalism. Unfortunately, the New Order system of patronage is so deeply entrenched that even the acknowledged voices of reform claim that the networks of corruption money cannot be touched until economic recovery progresses to the point where salary increases might hope to compensate for the loss in unofficial incomes.¹⁵ But even the common sense of this approach was ignored when President Abdurachman Wahid doubled and tripled the official salaries of the highest and lowest paid public servants (including teachers who had been making below the official minimum wage) without so much as a mention of the move playing a role in reducing the incentives for corruption. It would seem that even outsider reform advocates have become incapable of imagining a system of Indonesian governance independent of the still dominant New Order network of patronage.

Civil Society Governance

Nonetheless, even in the absence of either significant reform or processes of democratic empowerment initiated in the usual top-down fashion, the tidal movement towards the devolution of power brought on by the dramatic shifts negotiated through the regional autonomy legislation would seem to hold great promise. The power of the idea of *otonomi* itself, and the positive associations that have accrued to it in the public consciousness, constitute a cultural phenomenon with its own momentum that would seem to be propelling Indonesian society into an era that

¹⁵ "No Autonomy Without Reform," *Jakarta Post* (23 June 2000).

promises to witness further power devolution beyond the level of County and Municipal leadership. The new press freedoms and the rise in grassroots efforts represented by increased activity by non-governmental organizations have been complemented recently by a number of innovations in local governance.

The central question implicit in these developments in the light cast by the present research is: How soon and how far will the formation of institutions and a culture of civil society pose significant challenges to the private sector-political elite oligarchy that so far remains remarkably unchanged? The experiences elsewhere in other historic moments indicate that the foundations for such a civil society will likely rest in an emerging middle-class. Despite the application of this conventional label to the newly rich of the Late Suharto period in Indonesia, this Indonesian "middle-class" is more accurately understood as an expansion of the elite consumer class and, more significantly, they owe their status not to an independent activity of commerce but to being inextricably intertwined with New Order government system of formal and informal patronage relationships.¹⁶

Hopes for a rise in civil society must instead lie in the numerous *lembaga swadaya masyarakat* (LSM; literally "peoples empowerment organizations" or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) and a parallel revival of traditional urban neighborhood-based associations. A key area of research is apparent in the changing role of the traditional *rukun tetangga* (neighborhood association of 10 to 40 households each) and *rukun kampung* (district association comprised of several *rukun tetangga*). Centuries before these were codified and made mandatory by Japanese forces of occupation to replicate the *Tonari Gumi* system in Japan, they existed as the primary form of local governance throughout the island of Java.¹⁷ *Rukun tetangga* have always been comprised of the heads of households (usually all male) who made decisions and chose a leader by consensus. The *rukun tetangga* still function as the primary institution of social capital in the *kampung*, offering credit, aid for required birth, death, and wedding rituals, channeling charitable contributions through childhood nutrition programs, maintaining trash collection, drainage, security, utilities, roads, and neighborhood improvements. The Japanese converted what was a traditional grassroots organization into a tool of surveillance and control. During a brief and chaotic experiment in a more pluralistic constitutional democracy from 1945 to 1960 the *rukun tetangga* system was returned to its traditional role as an instrument of democratic self-governance. In the early 1960s Sukarno

¹⁶ Solvay Gerke, "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class," chapter 6 in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (New York: Routledge, 2000), 135.

¹⁷ Nicole Niessen, "Indonesian Municipalities Under Japanese Rules," *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 115-31.

instituted what he called "Guided Democracy." This was carried forward and perfected by Suharto who returned the top-down function of surveillance and control to the *rukun tetangga*.¹⁸ It was only in 1989 that the *rukun kampung* was changed into the *rukun warga* in order to redirect the institutional link replacing the traditional sultans and princes with the New Order Bureaucracy at the top of the *rukun tetangga* hierarchy.

Given this history and the ubiquitous dominance of this institutional structure in every city on the island of Java, the *rukun tetangga-rukun warga* would appear to present a unique opportunity to establish, or, as seen through a sufficiently broad historical perspective, to re-establish, a consensus-based representative democracy. When asked of the potential for retooling these top-down institutional relationships to serve a new set of bottom-up needs (including expansion of participation beyond the heads of households), most informants were clear in their view that the *rukun tetangga-rukun warga* were irredeemably mired in their New Order ways. In contrast, they expressed great interest in similar emerging institutions in North America devoted to local management of the built environment (New Urbanism) and collective social capital building (cohousing). Likewise, where significant local initiatives in local governance or resolution of land use conflicts, the non-governmental organization (NGO) model is the preferred approach even where it closely parallels existing *rukun tetangga*. In general, there appears to be a significant resistance to entertaining the idea that traditional forms offer significant opportunities for overcoming Indonesia's "modern" problems. The stigma associated with the New Order role of the *rukun tetangga* have led many to conclude that it is easier to start over with new institutions than to attempt to reform existing ones.¹⁹ A cultural predisposition to foreign forms is again observable.

At the same time, there have already been spontaneous institutional reforms that have reclaimed some of these formerly top-down mechanisms for the purposes of democratic empowerment. Citing the transition to regional autonomy, the metropolitan government of South Jakarta (*MetroPemKot Jakarta Selatan*) formed a council of representatives from 65 *kelurahan* (sub-districts)²⁰ elected through the *rukun tetangga/rukun warga* hierarchy. The cited purpose of this

¹⁸ Interior Ministry Decree Nol 7, 1983 made the social institution of *rukun kampung* and *rukun tetangga* into an extension of the central government bureaucracy. P.J. Suwarno, *Dari Azazyookai dan Tonarigumi ke Rukun Kampung dan Rukun Tetangga di Yogyakarta, 1942-1989 : Sebuah Tinjauan Historis* (From Azazyookai and Tonarigumi to Rukun Kampung and Rukun Tetangga in Yogyakarta, 1942-1989: An Historic Overview), (Yogyakarta: Universitas Sanata Dharma, 1995).

¹⁹ Wicak Sarosa, "Potensi Peran RT dan RW" (Potential Role for *Rukun Tetangga* and *Rukun Warga*), contribution to Forum Desain Urban listserv (31 August 2000) <fdu.home.dhs.org>.

²⁰ The Special Capital Province of Jakarta is comprised of five *kotamadya* (municipalities) one of which is South Jakarta, which in turn is comprised of several *kecamatan* (districts) and further into 65 *kelurahan* (sub-districts). Each *kelurahan* covers several *kampung* or *rukun warga* (neighborhood associations) and each of these brings together several *rukun tetangga*

council is to act as a power base for democratic demands for greater accountability and transparency both within the representative bodies of the *kelurahan-rukun warga-rukun tetangga* structure as well as the city and provincial governments.²¹ A similar island-wide council of local village heads has been established on Bali as a new form of bottom-up representation based on traditional structures of local governance.²² Local cooperative land use and governance arrangements have emerged in several locations on the outskirts of Jakarta as arrangements made between neighboring *kampung* or several new non-governmental organizations.²³ The question remains: Can grassroots organizing through existing traditional institutions and new non-governmental organizations fill the gap left by the absence of an independent middle-class to provide a foundation for the rise of civil society?

Civil Society Housing

Related questions are: To what extent can an Indonesian civil society compete with the business and political elite coalitions of power in managing the further transformations of the Jakarta region? And what might a city of Jakarta emerging out of conditions of a stronger civil society look like? With Suharto's resignation, both the 8,000 hectare (20,000 acre) Kapuknaga and the 30,000 hectare (74,000 acre) Jonggol new town projects were canceled. In all, Habibie rescinded seven presidential decrees related to land development schemes.²⁴ But it is important to note that the reasons for canceling these projects had everything to do with their association with Suharto's corruption, collusion, and nepotism. They were notably not canceled due to the objections of planners, environmentalists, social justice advocates, or judges. The cultural legacy of Suharto's New Order still runs deep and it can be expected that as soon as the present or future regimes succeed in repairing and resurfacing the New Order power structure, similar mega-projects will be pushed forward with the full weight behind them of whatever president happens to be in power. In the absence of any incentives to acknowledge property development as a significant cause of the

²¹ Sunu, "MetroPekot Jakarta Selatan Bentuk Dewan Kelurahan" (South Jakarta Government Forms Sub-district Council), *Kompas Interactive* (17 January 2001).

²² *International Symposium: Conserving Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Social, Economic and Tourism Development*, Sanur, Bali (10-16 July 2000).

²³ Two such examples are provided by *Hutan Setawan* cooperatively farming a one tenth of a hectare parcel in Ciledug, Tangerang and *Lapak* which has established a cooperative composting operation on an abandoned sand quarry adjacent to the Bumi Serpong Damai new town in Tangerang. Marco Kusumawijaya, "Gambaran Singkat Mengenai Hutan Setawan" (A Brief Portrait of Hutan Setawan), posting on Malibi listserve (10 May 2001) <builtenvironment@yahoo.com>.

²⁴ Achmad D. Tardiyana, "The Rise and Fall of Growth Coalitions: Urban Development of Jakarta Under the New Order," paper presented at the workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, Leiden, The Netherlands (7 December 2000).

financial crisis, developers, government officials, and the professions of planning and architecture are simply biding time for the moment when market signals indicate the moment to pick up where they left off in 1997.²⁵ In the meantime, many developers have returned to supplying housing as shelter rather than housing as speculative investment. For smaller developers and those focusing on small lot-small house developments, the financial crisis has not been as difficult a time as it has proven to be for the larger developers. These small developers with poorer access to credit than the conglomerate-associated development giants found themselves far less vulnerable to the debt crisis.

In the time before the financial crisis, even the smallest houses of 21 square meters (226 square feet) on the smallest lots in the most remote locations were affordable only to the wealthiest 30 percent of the population.²⁶ This housing form also all but requires car ownership, contributing to its marginal significance for the majority of Jakartans, and a contributor to worsening urban problems on its own. Experiments in inner city low rise apartment blocks (*rumah susun* or *rusun*) met with very limited success leading most observers to reject this housing form.²⁷ Many social and economic reasons are given for the need for the poor to stay close to the ground plane including the prevalence in times of economic hardship of houses operating as small stores or food stalls.²⁸ With the failure of low rise apartment schemes some developers have experimented with townhouse forms with some interesting results.²⁹ Rental "cabins" represent a form of formal sector housing development for very low income groups, and is supported by a government program of soft loans since the financial crisis. These are typically 40 square meter (430 square feet) units arranged in rows with kitchen and bathing facilities on a private back porch and organized around a common open space without accommodation for cars.³⁰ These units manage to

²⁵ Bill Gould and David Smith, "Labour and Society in Urban South-east Asia," introduction to *Third World Planning Review* 20, no. 2 (May 1998), vii.

²⁶ Raymond J. Struyk et al., *The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities* (Jakarta and Washington, D.C.: Hasfarm Dian Konsultan and The Urban Institute Press, 1990); Wim Stolte, "From JABOTABEK to PANTURA," *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 228-45.

²⁷ Lea Jellinek, *The Wheel of Fortune: The History of a Poor Community in Jakarta* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).

²⁸ Han Awal, "Arsitektur Untuk Si Miskin di Indonesia (Architecture for the Poor in Indonesia)," chapter 19 in *Menuju Arsitektur Indonesia* (Towards an Indonesian Architecture), ed. Eko Budihardjo (Bandung: Penerbit Alumni, 1983), 177-84.

²⁹ Muhammad Thamrin and Achmad D. Tardiyana, "Townhouse: Eksperimen Menuju Budaya Hunian Majemuk Berkepadatan Tinggi" (Townhouse: Experimentation Towards a Culture of High Density Housing Settlement), paper presented at the open house for the opening of the new building by Andra Matin (8 July 2000).

³⁰ Yudi Suharso, "Rumah Petak: Menguntungkan Sebagai Usaha Sambilan" (Cabin Housing: A Profitable Side Venture), *Properti Indonesia* no. 1080 (September 2000), 18-19.

offer twice the space of the least expensive for-sale housing yet are affordable to a much greater proportion of the Jakarta population. A common logic to new low cost housing schemes for Indonesia is to keep private indoor space to a minimum, given the benign climate and the capacity for strong social connections with neighbors. Food is available from food stalls (*warung*) at less than the price of home cooked meals so kitchen facilities can be kept to a minimum. Some have gone so far as to suggest that a single three meter by three meter room (100 square feet) is all that is required per family, or that the longhouse typologies of some outer island traditions be investigated.³¹

Eventually, any serious analysis of the prospects for improving housing provision in Jakarta returns to the *kampung*. One of the most serious assessments of housing in Indonesia was the study by a joint US.-Indonesian research team published in 1990. It compared the performance of informal sector housing provision of the *kampung* with both formal and informal housing production elsewhere and found it to be efficient, well-tailored to consumer demand, and better performing than its equivalent in almost any other part of the world.³² Its final recommendation was summarized as:

*...government must direct more of its effort toward enhancing the effectiveness of those processes that already provide most of the housing in urban areas. ...The process of incremental and self-help development must be viewed as a process to be facilitated and encouraged, not one to be eliminated or replaced.*³³

The challenge such a recommendation posed and still poses is that the New Order identified the *kampung* itself as the problem. The commitment to its eventual elimination was so fundamental that even its positive attributes were dismissed out of hand. Even in the absence of a viable alternative to the *kampung* its demise was assumed inevitable and a positive component of the New Order Development agenda. Expenditures on the much heralded *Kampung* Improvement Program since 1969 were actually quite minor compared with things like mortgage subsidies to upper-income formal-sector home buyers.³⁴ Investments to improve the *kampung* were not significant compared

³¹ Erwinthon P. Napitupulu, Aristotulus Tungka and Suntana, "Rumah Sederhana dan Rumah Sangat Sederhana" (Small and Very Small Houses), contributions to Malibi listserv (14 September 2000) <builtenvironment@yahoogroups.com>.

³² Raymond J. Struyk et al., *The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities* (Jakarta and Washington, D.C.: Hasfarm Dian Konsultan and The Urban Institute Press, 1990), 9.

³³ Struyk et al.'s emphasis. Struyk, *Market for Shelter*, 10.

³⁴ In 1987 housing subsidies to the middle and upper income households in the form of BTN housing loans were Rp117 billion (US\$67 million) at a time when annual KIP investment was only Rp37.5 billion (US\$21 million). Struyk, *Market for Shelter*, 10.

with the value of the land and were frequently forfeited along with the rest of the *kampung* in cases where improved *kampung* were subsequently cleared without warning for development of high rise office or condominium complexes.³⁵ Given that a majority of Jakarta's workforce is involved in the informal sector with very uneven flows of income, both the steady monthly salary required by mortgage lenders and formal sector housing remains out of their reach. *Kampung* housing instead is often built by owner-residents or private contractors at times when an extra bit of money, credit, building materials, or labor becomes available. Sometimes these come from relatives or the *kampung* itself. The wisdom of not throwing the baby out with the bath water was acknowledged as early as 1925 with the *Kampoeng Verbetering* (the Dutch colonial *Kampung* Improvement Program) providing water supply, drainage, sanitation, paths, and electrification even before the autonomy of the *kampung* under a native *bupati* was ended and *kampung* were annexed into the colonial city governance.³⁶ The key to providing housing for the majority of Jakartans remains solving the problems of infrastructure provision to the existing *kampung* areas.

Of even greater potential still are the prospects of guiding new self-built housing in such a manner that right-of-ways are set aside for future infrastructure construction. This was the core strategy of the Guided Land Development plan partially implemented as part of the multi-national Jabotabek Metropolitan Development Plan efforts of the 1970s and 1980s. Parcel sizes were mixed to encourage a greater socio-economic integration that would also lead to a natural cross-subsidy. Just as the self-built housing of the *kampung* develops incrementally as households can afford it, infrastructure under Guided Land Development was to be provided incrementally as each local neighborhood was able to finance or provide the labor for it.³⁷ When the scheduled purchase of 4500 hectares (11,000 acres) for Guided Land Development was delayed in the 1980s, increasing land prices provided the excuse to abandon the program. The land was instead placed under control of private development Location Permits. Despite the multiple benefits that a housing policy based

³⁵ Andrea Peresthu, "Urban Kampung Empowerment," paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (8 December 2000).

³⁶ Sandi Siregar, "Bandung: The Architecture of a City in Development: Urban Analysis of a Regional Capital as a Contribution to the Present Debate on Indonesian Urbanity and Architectural Identity," (Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1990), 35; Sandi Siregar, "Inner City Revitalisation and the Role of Local Government: Urban Space as a Product of History," paper presented at workshop *Save Our Cities: Integrated Approaches to Inner City Revitalization and Urban Heritage in Indonesia* (17 February 2000).

³⁷ The Guided Land Development Program (GLD) was established in 1980 by the Jakarta Metropolitan Development Plan, Proposed Guided Land Development Programme for Greater Jakarta, Report no. 29, Directorate of Urban and Regional Planning, RI, December 1980. Guided land development and Perumnas housing were expected to contribute 41 percent of the housing expansion with Private development providing only 9 percent and popular sector housing expansion providing 50 percent. Michael Leon Leaf, "Land Regulation and Housing Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: from the 'Big Village' to the 'Modern City'," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1991), 185-86.

on Guided Land Development would have yielded, it was not enough to overcome the larger goal of New Order urban policy: As a long-term commitment to housing the poor it was in opposition to modernization goals central to the New Order development agenda.³⁸

Just as it is difficult for most Indonesians to see the potential for the *rukun tetangga* to play a role in developing stronger institutions of civil society, one would be even more hard pressed to find Indonesians who would be enthusiastic about proposals in anyway associated with the *kampung* as a solution to housing problems. The history exposing the constructed nature of many of these negative associations might offer an alternative to simply accepting this condition as “consumer demand” to be countered only at the risk of economic failure. The salient precedent for this is provided by a group of Dutch idealist architect-planners who in the 1920s designed and built extensions to several cities in the then Dutch Indies according to a vision of a hybrid architecture and urbanism. In Bandung, a three-hour train ride into the mountains from Jakarta, dozens of neighborhoods were built as a government demonstration project to show private sector builders how lower-cost housing settlement forms based on the indigenous *kampung* could be incorporated into the inner block areas and integrated with the villa-lined picturesquely winding boulevards of the tropical Dutch garden city extension of Bandung.³⁹ More recently a far more subtle influence of *kampung* spatial richness informed the design of the first phase of housing construction at the 6,000 hectare (15,000 acre) Bumi Serpong Damai new town in *kabupaten* Tangerang.⁴⁰

Once again, a significant degree of cultural resistance would need to be overcome to successfully propose a “new” *kampung*. Such a proposal would apparently stand a far better chance of acceptance if it were passed off instead as a Western concept—perhaps wrapped up in the label of “New Urbanism.” Ciputra’s close encounter with a New Urbanism interpretation of traditional Indonesian architecture and urban form illustrates the point. In 1993, after developing several new towns planned by the Baltimore-based Design Development Group, Ciputra’s Jayaland asked one of their former architects, then studying at Berkeley, for suggestions on what other American firms should be approached to design two new town projects outside of Surabaya

³⁸ A second goal noted by Leaf was the extension of officially registered land status over the previously unregistered lands of the *kampung*. Leaf, “Land Regulation,” 278-79, 304-305; Andrew M. Hamer et al., *Indonesia: The Challenge of Urbanization*, World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 787 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986); Wim Stolte, “From JABOTABEK to PANTURA,” *Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 228-45; Haryo Winarso, “Residential Land Developers’ Behaviour in Jabotabek, Indonesia,” (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2000).

³⁹ Sandi Siregar, “Bandung: The Architecture of a City in Development: Urban Analysis of a Regional Capital as a Contribution to the Present Debate on Indonesian Urbanity and Architectural Identity,” (Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1990), 102-107.

⁴⁰ Suryadi Santoso, head of urban planning for first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai, conversation with the author on tour of Bumi Serpong Damai, Tangerang (15 September 2000).

and Jakarta. From his list of 11 firms, they short-listed three: Duany Plater-Zyberk, Calthorpe/Solomon, and Kaplan, McLaughlin, Diaz (KMD). Daniel Solomon and Peter Calthorpe, two of the co-founders and leading advocates of the Congress for the New Urbanism, were chosen for masterplanning and KMD for the urban design of the business districts. Instead of proposing American neo-traditional neighborhood designs on the two sites with perhaps a few minor alterations as expected, Solomon launched into a study of traditional Indonesian urban form and architecture even taking the radical step of visiting the proposed sites in Indonesia. Peter Calthorpe altered his "Transit Oriented Development" concept into a "Para-transit Oriented Development" to take advantage of prevalence in Indonesia of bicycles, bicycle taxis, jeepneys, shuttle vans, and fixed route vans.⁴¹ As soon as the directors of Jayaland caught wind of the designers' intent they sent an urgent fax that said in effect: "Don't study Indonesian traditional architecture because it's not marketable."⁴² Apparently the Calthorpe/Solomon masterplans failed to renounce indigenous references sufficiently to be deemed "marketable" and were rejected. The entire project was given to KMD whose flashy renderings of postmodern high-rise towers won the favor of Jayaland's directors.⁴³ The benefits of recognizing and building upon the positive attributes of traditional Indonesian urbanism and architecture pose interesting opportunities for both research and professional practice. The 1920s "Indische" architecture and urban form offer a significant set of precedents for such a study. One of the most interesting aspects of such work would be the issue of the cultural reception of indigenous references discernable within hybrid visions.

Civil Society Urbanism

With the severe drop in per capita GDP to less than one third the 1997 level on top of widespread price increases for basic needs, many families have had to remove their children from the public schools. With an *average* per capita income of only Rp350,000 (US\$35) school costs typically run from Rp100,000 (US\$10) annual registration and Rp15,000 (US\$1.50) per month for elementary school to Rp700,000 (US\$70) annual registration and Rp50,000 (US\$5) per month

⁴¹ Calthorpe/Solomon, Associated Architects and Planners, "Tangerang 'Green City': A Model of Sustainable Development," (Jayaland Board of Directors, 25 November 1994); Calthorpe/Solomon, Associated Architects and Planners, "Tangerang 'Green City'," (Jayaland Board of Directors, 15 December 1994).

⁴² Wicaksono Sarosa, conversation with the author, Bona Pasogit Restaurant, Jakarta (12 September 2000).

⁴³ Calthorpe/Solomon, Associated Architects and Planners and Kaplan McLaughlin Diaz, Architects and Planners, "Puri Jaya, Tangerang, Indonesia," (Jayaland Board of Directors, 28 June 1996); Calthorpe/Solomon, Associated Architects and Planners and Kaplan McLaughlin Diaz, Architects and Planners, "Bumi Jaya, Sidoarjo, Indonesia," (Jayaland Board of Directors, 28 June 1996).

for high school. Books and required school uniforms add substantially to these costs. In the absence of a national social security net, the local social structure of the *kampung* takes on the role of helping out its least fortunate residents depending on the capacity of the community as a whole. It falls to the *rukun tetangga* to match students, who would otherwise be withdrawn from school, with sponsors from the *kampung* who pay their school fees directly to the schools (to avoid misdirection of the funds).⁴⁴ Similarly, a monthly weighing and health evaluation of the *kampung's* children identifies needy recipients of food aid also collected locally. In addition, the usual urban services of road maintenance, drainage, water supply, trash collection, security posts and patrols, and sometimes electricity and telephone service, are all organized and provided through the *kampung* itself with a minimal interface with municipal government. These services are provided through some combination of fair-share payments, payment according to ability, and sweat equity. Under such arrangements, homogeneously poor and homogeneously rich neighborhoods are both at a disadvantage—poor neighborhoods because sweat equity only goes so far and rich neighborhoods because of the need to pay more to hire out services. These neighborhoods also miss out on the benefits of hiring locally for all manner of domestic services which comprise a much larger proportion of the work force in Indonesia than in the developed West.

During the riots in May 1998 that brought a violent end to Suharto's 32 years as president, wealthy Chinese households and factories were targeted by truckloads of young thugs suspected of being members of the Indonesian military in civilian clothes. Hundreds of Chinese Indonesians were the victims of murder, rape, looting, and arson. The difference between those who were struck and those who were not was often dependent on whether the men of the *kampung* were successful in defending the neighborhood and keeping the outsiders from entering. In West Jakarta the Chinese families from Sumatra were more often struck than those from Central Java reflecting differing degrees of social mixing in the neighborhoods. The worst hit areas were those luxury housing areas where in the absence of social solidarity with a large local Muslim male population, the walls, gates, and guards were quickly overwhelmed. One Chinese-Indonesian-owned factory was saved when the men of the *kampung* formed a human wall between it and the arriving trucks of "rioters." A saying newly popularized in the aftermath of the riots was: "Rice bowl security is stronger than concrete wall security."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ R.H. Dadang Hidayat, Head of *Rukun Tetangga 06/Rukun Warga 06* Ciumbuleuit, conversation with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (3 November 2000).

⁴⁵ "Pagar mangkok lebih kuat dari pagar tembok." Kusbiantoro, Head of Urban and Regional Development Research Center (Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Wilayah dan Kota), interview by the author, Bandung, Indonesia (18 November 2001).

Ultimately the social cohesion of the *kampung* is inseparable from the space of the *kampung* itself. The most conventional point of entry in this complex relationship between space and society is represented by observations of how urban form evolves to reflect dominant social relationships. But just as clearly in the case of the Indonesian *kampung* is how the collective responsibility for the maintenance and management of a relatively small spatially demarcated community in the absence of a professional private or municipal management (and the means to pay for such formal services) has contributed to the forging of strong social ties. The necessity of collective decision making responsibilities over a wide variety of shared space making up a relatively large proportion of all local space creates significant disincentives for loners who might prefer to wall themselves off from their neighbors. Even under conditions of dramatic gentrification or ethnic diversity, residents of the *kampung* demonstrate an impressive capacity for mutual respect and solidarity in times of need. The spatial norms of the *kampung* hold that, except for rooms used for sleeping, spaces are more or less “open” or “closed,” not based on physical barriers or locks but on a highly complex vocabulary of forms and practices.⁴⁶ Boundaries are demarcated but only rarely bar passage. Upon passing through an entry gate to a *kampung* (guarded at night and closed only in times of trouble) one goes from being an anonymous passer-by on the street to being unambiguously identified as either of-the-*kampung* or an outsider. As the *gang* (narrow street or alley) twists and turns, widens and narrows, and occasionally opens onto larger spaces, the sheer density of habitation and the rare absence of people, a multiplicity of “eyes on the street” all contribute to what might be the ultimate defensible space. Public and private spaces are only gently distinguished and then according to fine gradients of semi-public/semi-private. Boundaries are crossed or not in keeping with particular combinations of signs conveyed through both physical form and inviting glances and gestures.

Despite New Order fantasies of eliminating them from Jakarta, *kampung* are likely to remain home to a vast majority of Jakartans and continue to be *the* crucial component of the future of Indonesian urbanism for a long time to come. Even as the land area committed to formal housing development grew by leaps and bounds through the 1980s and 1990s, the market share of *kampung* housing actually increased.⁴⁷ However, questions linger over how far the hostile attitude towards the *kampung* will be permitted to further harm the efforts by residents to improve the

⁴⁶ Bernd Multhaup and Suryadi Santoso, “Surabaya: The City is Not a Tree,” *Stadt in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika* (Cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America), ed. Rainer W. Ernst (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1984), 125-51; Suryadi Santoso, “Quarter Typological Approach in Modernization of Urban Structure,” paper presented at seminar *The Planning of New Town and Restructuring Urban Centers*, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), 12-13.

⁴⁷ Santoso, “Quarter Typological Approach,” 2.

quality of their lives and the strength of their communal institutions. In particular: Can the recent shift in energies from the elite to the grassroots be sustained to maintain and build upon the social capital of the *kampung*? Far from being simply a question of political economy, the image of the *kampung* in popular consciousness, while being highly complex, is perhaps most generally indicated by the use of the term *kampungan* (of the *kampung*; déclassé) as the most common pejorative in the Indonesian language. Even as consciousness of the irreplaceable nature of "social capital" is on the rise in the West, the institutions of social capital in Indonesia have been under attack for decades.⁴⁸ The signs of this trend reversing at any time soon are mixed at best. Where the issue of social capital *does* become a question of political economy is when institutions of social capital are placed in situations where they must compete with institutions of the money economy. Conventional strategies of translating the value of social capital into other more accepted values (architectural or environmental preservation) or even to economic value (tourism) have been proven useful as part of larger campaigns to build political coalitions.⁴⁹ But the prevailing cultural biases shared by both sides of the struggle often predispose even the defenders of social capital to accept an economically-based judgment as all but inevitable. Though deeply conditioned, cultural predispositions have been shown to be accessible to negotiation and change, not least through a number of recent efforts in Jakarta.

Several *kampung* redevelopment projects in different cities have been implemented during the 1990s, each combining aspects of architect-generated urban designs and accommodating spontaneous informal initiatives by residents. These projects in Yogyakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and Solo each involved some aspect of "land readjustment" by which the area is redeveloped with greater space allocation for infrastructures, common amenities, and sometimes commercial space for generating income to finance the redevelopment. Then the remaining space is reallocated according to the original percentage ownership.⁵⁰ In each case, with varying degrees of success, the intention was to maintain and strengthen social institutions of the *kampung* while improving the quality of the living environment. A criticism applied to each of these projects is that the role of the

⁴⁸ Social Capital has been identified as the value of the associations formed between individuals and groups that foster trust and become the basis of economic, social, political, etc. opportunities and that bring people together to address common problems. See: Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

⁴⁹ Aha Pasang, "Dialektika Kampung Kota-Metropolis," contribution to Malibi listserv (9 September 2000) <builtenvironment@yahoogroups.com>.

⁵⁰ These projects were at Mojosongo, Solo; Kali Code, Yogyakarta; Bandarharjo, Semarang; and Industri Dalem, Bandung.

architect-planner as the technical expert with final authority over what is done was disruptive of the normal processes of decision-making in the community.⁵¹

Part of the impact brought by the recent surge in non-governmental organization activity can be seen in efforts to intervene in conflicts between existing rural *kampung* communities and the suburban real estate developers who hold Location Permits over their lands. The 6,000 hectare (15,000 acre) Bumi Serpong Damai new town project in Kabupaten Tangerang acquired a Location Permit for the lands occupied by Lengkong Gudang *kampung* offering a below-market value price to its residents. According to the terms of the Location Permit the residents could neither sell their land to anyone else nor qualify for any government funds for infrastructure investment. A similar case at Kampung Prumpung in West Jakarta resulted in the rare step of revoking the developers Location Permit and committing funding to the improvement of the *kampung*. The community formed a cooperative to work with two other NGOs, including the Indonesian Institute of Architects, in implementing the improvements to individual homes and common facilities.⁵² Special attention is being given in this generation of grassroots activity to avoid some of the shortcomings that have plagued the *Kampung Improvement Program* projects. In particular, the improvements, even those to individual households, are being handled as part of a communal trust to discourage individual households from immediately selling their homes in order to cash in on the added value.⁵³ These and similar projects are worthy of further attention and research.⁵⁴

One might expect processes of hybridization similar to those operating upon the architecture of *real estate* style houses (examined in Chapter Four) to be found at work at the scale of urban design and planning of new housing developments and new towns. However, with few exceptions (such as the seen in the first phase of Bumi Serpong Damai) there seems to be very little evidence of such adaptation. Instead the new housing developments appear to undergo a process of adaptation after the fact of their original construction. One of the most common adaptations is that of the opening up of *warung* (food stalls or small shops) along the otherwise single-use residential streets. In direct contravention of the housing development deeds, residents looking for a source of additional income in some (particularly older and less high-profile) housing developments convert a garage or

⁵¹ See especially Kusno's discussion of Bandarharjo, Semarang project: Abidin Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000), 120-35.

⁵² Wicaksono Sarosa, conversation with the author, Bona Pasogit Restaurant, Jakarta (12 September 2000).

⁵³ John Lewis Taylor, "An Evaluation of Selected Impacts of Jakarta's Kampung Improvement Program (Indonesia)," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1983).

⁵⁴ Ph.D. research on land rights of traditional settlements has recently been completed at the University of Melbourne by Ispurwono Soemarno and Lana Winayanti Aksoro.

carport, or even build an illegal addition to house these small shops. Corner lots are particularly attracted to this alternative.




FIGURE 8.2 A small store set up in a converted garage on a street corner in a housing estate against the rules protecting the single-use homogeneity of the development. Photograph: Robert Cowherd

Another notable adaptation of the *real estate* housing estates bringing them closer to life in the *kampung* is the toleration in several locations of breaches in the fortifications around the development. At Bintaro Jaya straddling the boundary between South Jakarta and *kabupaten* Tangerang, one hole through the three-meter (ten-foot) concrete wall around the development was used like a shop window. Here, some residents of the neighboring *kampung* sold fresh vegetables and other goods to the residents and domestic help of the luxury housing.⁵⁵ Holes in the defensive barricades have been tolerated at even the ultra-luxurious Lippo Karawaci new town allowing residents of adjacent *kampung* and housing estates passage through the new town. Research is needed on these kinds of user adaptations to new towns as they age and evolve in ways that are more reflective of the actual needs of residents.

⁵⁵ Bre Redana, "Sebuah 'Loket' di Sudut Jalan" (A Street Corner "Shop Counter"), *Kompas* (Sabtu, 25 Januari 1997).

Similar to the hybridization of the *real estate* house plan, there appears to be a strong demand for somehow incorporating the most positive attributes of traditional Indonesian urbanism into new urban development. The prerequisite operation appears to be the sanitizing of these elements by removing all associations with the *kampung* or, perhaps, repackaged as part of an assembly of urban elements presented as being imported from the developed West. Along these lines, Lippo Karawaci established a temporary *pasar* (traditional open-air market) along one of its major thoroughfares which was built more than twice as wide as it needed to be. Given the Indonesian practice of purchasing, cooking, and consuming food all in the same day, the morning *pasar* was deemed a valuable asset, but controversial, nonetheless, for its associations with the *kampung*. To remedy this, the *pasar* was presented in the manner of an American-style “farmer’s market” with vendors carefully selected from the best suppliers in Jakarta—taking specific pains to exclude purveyors coming from the nearby rural *kampung*. So far, the Western environmental movement culture has caught on in Indonesia only superficially—advertising for “green” or “sustainable” environments refer to developments with golf courses and frequent litter collection. If this culture develops over time into a deeper popular consciousness, then elements of traditional Indonesian urbanism might successfully be marketed in association with the goals of “sustainability.” Under such “green” packaging, new developments might successfully replicate the high-density, mixed-use, mixed-income, traffic-calmed, pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly aspects of the *kampung* with the welcome addition of higher quality infrastructure, landscaping, and urban design.

Approaching the process of hybridization from a slightly different perspective, another pressing question for research and practice is: Where Western urban and architectural models are applied to Indonesian contexts, can a process of more critical adaptation help reduce negative impacts and bring the model’s interpretation into a more positive relationship with what already exists? The historic precedents for such a process of critical adaptation comes not only from the experiences of Singapore, Japan, and elsewhere, but also of the long history of Javanese culture itself in “Javanizing” (*men-Jawa-kan*) influences from India, China, Portugal, The Netherlands, and the Middle East throughout its recorded history.

Restoring a Normative, Collective Decision Making Role for Planning

Much of the potential for positive responses to the research and practice questions posed thus far depends on what roles develop for planning practices in Indonesia. As examined in Chapters Five and Six, planning under the New Order served largely rhetorical—supplying a foundation of high idealism to speeches and planning documents—and symbolic purposes—satisfying international expectations understood as prerequisite for admission to the club of “modern” nations. One of the most fascinating aspects of Indonesian planning is an uncanny capacity to

accommodate stark discrepancies between boldly expressed ideals and the multiple ways in which they are almost immediately undermined, contradicted, contravened, or reversed in implementation. There is a matter-of-fact quality in the ways that contradictory extremes of abstract idealism and its pragmatic abandonment are juxtaposed within single regulatory measures, agencies, individuals, reports, and even within single statements.⁵⁶ Even if living up to its rhetorical claims would be too much to expect from any administration, simply complying with its own planning regulations as enacted would have resulted in a revolutionary shift in the role of planning and the balance of power in Indonesia. Under the New Order, the normative functions of planning were consistently undermined in acquiescence to the pursuit of the political and business elite's self-interested purposes.

It is also worth noting that even within this highly marginalized scope of operation, Indonesian planning culture under the New Order was dominated by a top-down, expert-driven, technocratic approach, more often commanding compliance from citizens than seeking consultation or approval. In 1996 a national government regulation was passed requiring all planning processes to incorporate an extensive program of popular consultation and approval in their development and implementation.⁵⁷ But passage of such a law, particularly in Indonesia, falls far short of achieving a change in the way planning is instituted, approved, and implemented. Commenting on the difficulty in managing a change in planning culture, Erna Witoelar, a prominent grassroots activist raised to Minister of Human Settlements and Regional Development in the Wahid cabinet, said that despite making training in community participation a requirement throughout her department, a transformation of the thinking of the 29,700 bureaucrats (mostly engineers) under her direction was at best a long-term prospect.⁵⁸ In the meantime, planning has continued to be dominated by:

...a culture of flexibility towards the planning rules and guidelines [in] ...service to private sector interests not based on public agreement, not transparent, not consultative, not dynamic, not from the people despite the PP 69/1996 [regulation requiring participatory planning], and incompatible with the long term needs of the people.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Most interviewees questioned about the 1:3:6 mixed settlement requirements of the Location Permit were capable of both expressing pride in the high-mindedness of the quota requirements and dismissing them disdainfully as being hopelessly naive in the same breath.

⁵⁷ *Peraturan Pemerintah No. 69 Tahun 1996 tentang Peranserta Masyarakat dalam Penataan Ruang* (Government Regulation no. 69, 1996 concerning Citizen Participation in Spatial Planning).

⁵⁸ Comments in response to a keynote address at the international symposium: *Conserving Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Social, Economic and Tourism Development*, Sanur, Bali (12 July 2000).

⁵⁹ Dicky Saromi, Head of Land Use Planning, West Java Province Regional Development Planning Agency (Bappeda Jawa Barat), interview with the author, Bandung, Indonesia (9 October 2000).

Questions remain over how quickly and to what effect this planning culture can and will be replaced by one that is compatible with a more open society.

Perhaps a more significant question is: To what extent can planning's normative function be restored to become an effective instrument for collective decision making as a cultural-political force? Fortunately, the swelling of non-governmental organization (NGO) activity has entailed a small boom in the area of participatory planning, empowering local communities to work both with and against government programs.⁶⁰ Hopefully, the example set by NGOs will both familiarize the population, including government officials, with effective participatory processes, and will compel their adoption in order to compete. The progress made towards both greater autonomy and deeper political reform would contribute to the more effective mobilization of local communities towards self-empowerment. The primary obstacle to effective local autonomy remains the limited capabilities of local administrators. In this regard the more dynamic capacities demonstrated by the NGO sector so far promise to play a crucial role.




FIGURE 8.3 Reclaiming the over-built road space. Do we call it a "farmers' market" or a "*pasar*"? Photograph: Robert Cowherd

⁶⁰ Two examples cited by Firman are *Sarasehan Warga Bandung* (Bandung Citizens Forum abbreviated as *Sawarung*) and *Forum Kota Semarang* (Semarang Urban Forum). Tommy Firman, "Recent Urban Development in Indonesia," paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (8 December 2000), 12-13.

It remains unclear what significance can be placed on the fact that for centuries local traditions of governance throughout the archipelago were, and continue to be, based on some form of consensus process. Some have argued that such traditions constitute a dramatic head start in comparison with any Western democratic systems in the universal quest to reach what many consider a far superior means of collective decision making.⁶¹ Others contend that "consensus" as practiced within the context of strictly-guarded differential hierarchies of power limited to male heads of households was more authoritarian than anything we might associate with the term given its contemporary Western usage. Inevitably the separate trajectories of Indonesian and Western planning (apparently moving in opposite directions) intersect in fascinating ways. At some point the conflicts between New Order top-down planning and indigenous forms of local governance can be usefully informed by the shift in the West from rational planning to more engaged public policy models. In particular, one wonders whether or not the continued hegemony of New Order command planning can be effectively challenged through knowledge of the virtual self-implosion (picture the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe) of North American rational planning methods in the 1960s and 1970s,⁶² and further, whether or not the campaigns for local empowerment might not benefit from a familiarity with the subsequent development of public policy models from "incremental planning" to "advocacy planning" to "equity planning" and, perhaps most optimistically, "communicative planning."⁶³

Such differentiations in the range of possible "styles" of consensus remain crucial if participatory planning processes are to lead to an actual empowerment of local communities rather than simply serve as yet another rhetorical ideal masking a continuation of the status quo. Some recognize the need to start not with government programs of empowerment but initiatives arising from the *kampung* itself. Peresthu makes the point: "There is no empowerment that is not self-

⁶¹Robert Cowherd, "Architects Versus the Village: Alternatives to Top-Down Planning," paper presented to the international symposium: *Conserving Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Social, Economic and Tourism Development*, Sanur, Bali (13 July 2000).

⁶²For an overview of the critique of rational planning see: Alan A. Altshuler, *The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

⁶³On "incremental planning" see: Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review* 19 (1959), 79-88. On "advocacy planning" see: Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 21, no. 4 (1965). On "equity planning" see: Norm Krumholz and John Forester, *Making Equity Planning Work: Leadership in the Public Sector* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). I thank Yan Zhang for leading me to these references. On "communicative planning" see: Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); and John Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

empowerment.”⁶⁴ Rather than being satisfied with “participating” in decisions, these efforts focus on planning and design of local community spaces, building upon the methods (“self-decision”) that have always been employed in the *kampung*⁶⁵—the ultimate goal being to strengthen the negotiating position of the *kampung* within the inevitably political processes of urban planning of the larger city and region.

⁶⁴ Andrea Peresthu, “Urban Kampung Empowerment,” paper presented at workshop *The Indonesian Town Revisited*, University of Leiden (8 December 2000).

⁶⁵ Aha Pasang, “Dialektika Kampung Kota-Metropolis” (Urban *Kampung*-Metropolis Dialectics), contribution to Forum Desain Urban listserv (9 September 2000) <www.egroups.com/group/fdu>.

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