Abstract—The continuous advancements of embedded computing and communication technologies are pushing several engineering systems toward increased levels of autonomy. A remarkable example is that of cooperative active safety systems currently being developed by government and industry consortia. While these systems promise a future in which transportation will be safer, more enjoyable, and more efficient, they also pose a great design challenge to the control, communication, and computer science communities. That is, safety must be guaranteed by design despite these systems are multi-agent, partially physical and partially computational, and involve human operators. In this paper, we focus on the problem of safe design in the presence of human operators and employ a formal hybrid control approach. We illustrate our results on an in-scale multi-vehicle roundabout test-bed.

Index Terms—Safety, hybrid control, mode estimation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) for in-vehicle cooperative active safety continue to be examined worldwide by government and industry consortia. The role of these systems in every-day driving tasks will be to warn the driver about incoming collisions, suggest safe actions, and ultimately take control of the vehicle to prevent an otherwise certain collision. Several initiatives are taking place, including the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) [2, 3] and Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Consortium (VIIC) [4, 5] in the U.S., the Car2Car Communications Consortium in Europe [1], the Advanced Safety Vehicle project 3 (ASV3) in Japan. Specifically, reducing collisions at traffic intersections, mergings and roundabouts is a central part of these initiatives [29]. Positioning (Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS)) and wireless communication (Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) 5.9 GHz in United States) technologies are becoming more advanced while their cost is declining to the point that ITS can be employed to improve in-vehicle production safety systems by the automotive industry. In the near future, ITS is expected to become more comprehensive connecting vehicles with each other and with the surrounding road infrastructure through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) wireless communication.

In order for in-vehicle cooperative active safety systems to be a realistic solution to decrease the number of accidents, they should be safe by design while adapting to the presence of human-driven vehicles. Hence, the control algorithms developed for guaranteeing safety must be able to operate in this semi-autonomous real world scenario as long as road-side infrastructure provides the approximate position of non-communicating vehicles. An interesting challenge is that a conventional approach that accounts for the worst case uncertainty due to human driving decisions would not be practical as too conservative solutions would result. Conservative solutions cannot be considered for deployment as they would cause false alarms, leading the users to lose trust in the safety system and to routinely neglect its warnings.

There is a rich literature about the classification through hybrid dynamical models of human behavior in structured tasks (see, for example, [16, 17] and the references therein). These works show that human behavior can be recognized provided certain identifiability assumptions are satisfied. In this paper, we propose an approach in which human driving behavior is modeled as a hybrid automaton, in which the mode is unknown and represents a primitive driving dynamics such as braking and acceleration. On the basis of this hybrid model, the vehicles equipped with the cooperative active safety system estimate in real-time the current driving mode of non-communicating human-driven vehicles and exploit this information to establish least restrictive safe control actions. This type of solution leads to less conservative safety controllers than those that treat human-driven vehicles as enemies to be counter-acted for the worst case scenarios. This approach can be formulated as a safety control problem for hybrid automata with imperfect mode information [38–40]. Specifically, in [38, 39], a mode estimator is constructed, which keeps track of the current mode uncertainty based on continuous state measurements. For each current mode uncertainty, a mode-dependent capture set is constructed, which determines the set of all continuous states that lead to an unsafe configuration for the given mode uncertainty. Then, a hybrid feedback map is computed that for each mode uncertainty keeps the continuous state outside of the current mode-
dependent capture set. These algorithms are provably safe and least restrictive.

**Related Work.** While the safety control problem for hybrid systems has been extensively considered when the state is measured [19, 23, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36], the same control problem when the mode in unknown has been receiving much less attention. A number of works have addressed the control problem for special classes of hybrid systems with imperfect state information [13, 14, 21, 38–40, 42]. There has been a wealth of work on employing hybrid system models and formal methods to generate collision-free trajectories in multi-vehicle and multi-robot systems. The automated highway system (AHS) by the California PATH in the 90s is an early example. The objective of the AHS project was the development of fully autonomous highway systems, mainly based on the concept of platooning, to increase traffic throughput, safety, and fuel efficiency [22]. In the context of platooning, a number of papers have proposed a formal hybrid modeling and control approach based on the computation of the safe set of initial conditions (the complement of the static capture set), on optimal control, and on game theory [9, 20, 25, 26]. A decentralized cooperative policy for conflict resolution in multi-vehicle systems with guaranteed safety has been proposed in [30]. Since conflicts are resolved locally, the complexity of the control policy is independent of the number of vehicles. Other approaches have been focusing on formal methods for collision detection based on stochastic reachability analysis (see [8] and the references therein). Formal reasoning both for design and verification for autonomous vehicles driving in the presence of human drivers has been developed and implemented in the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge by several of the participating teams [12]. Behavior prediction for human drivers has also been widely investigated (see, for example [24, 31]). Yet, formally including these predictions into planning remains mostly an open question [12].

II. SAFETY CONTROL PROBLEM FOR HIDDEN MODE HYBRID SYSTEMS

In this section, we formally introduce the safety control problem for hidden mode hybrid systems and provide the solution as it has been proposed in earlier work [38–40].

**Definition 1.** A Hybrid Automaton with Uncontrolled Mode Transitions $H$ is a tuple $H = (Q, X, U, D, \Sigma, Inv, R, f)$, in which $Q$ is the set of modes; $X$ is the continuous state space; $U$ is the continuous set of control inputs; $D$ is the continuous set of disturbance inputs; $\Sigma$ is the set of disturbance events that trigger transitions among modes; $Inv = \{e\}$ is the discrete set of silent events, which correspond to no transition occurring; $R : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q$ is the mode update map and $f : X \times Q \times U \times D \rightarrow X$ is the vector field, which is allowed to be piecewise continuous with its arguments.

The hybrid trajectories $(q(t), x(t))$ of $H$ are piece-wise continuous signals with transitions due to the occurrence of discrete events (see [27] for details).

**Definition 2.** A Hidden Mode Hybrid System (HMHS) is a hybrid automaton with uncontrolled mode transitions in which the discrete state $q(t)$ is not measured and the initial mode $q_0$ is only known to belong to a set $\tilde{Q} \subseteq Q$.

Let $Bad \subseteq X$ be a bad set of states, the control task is to keep the continuous state $x(t)$ outside $Bad$ for all time using all the available information $(x(t), u(t), q_0)$.

**Application scenario.** Referring to Figure 1, we assume that the infrastructure measures the position and speed of vehicle 2 through road-side sensors such as cameras and magnetic induction loops and that it transmits this information to the on-board controller of vehicle 1. Vehicle 1 has to use this information to avoid a collision. Vehicle 1 longitudinal dynamics along its path are given by the second order system $\ddot{p}_1 = v_1, \quad \dot{v}_1 = a + b - cv_1^2$, in which $p_1$ is the longitudinal displacement of the vehicle along its path and $v_1$ is the longitudinal speed (see Figure 1), $u \in [u_L, u_H]$ is the control input (positive when the vehicle accelerates and negative when the vehicle brakes), $b < 0$ represents the static friction term, and $c > 0$ with the $cv_1^2$ term modeling air drag (see [41] for more details on the model). Vehicle 2 is controlled by a driver. There has been a wealth of work on modeling human driving behavior through hybrid systems, wherein each mode corresponds to a primitive behavior such as braking, acceleration, steering, run-out, lane change maneuver, etc. [7, 34].

We model human driving behavior in the proximity of an intersection through a hybrid system with two modes: braking and acceleration, that is, $p_2 = v_2, \quad \dot{v}_2 = \beta_q + \gamma_q \bar{d}_q$, with $q \in \{A, B\}, \quad \bar{d} \in [-\bar{d}, \bar{d}]$, in which $p_2$ is
the longitudinal displacement of the vehicle along its path and \( v_2 \) is the longitudinal speed (see Figure 1). \( \bar{d} > 0 \), \( q \) is the mode with \( q = B \) corresponding to braking mode and \( q = A \) corresponding to acceleration mode, and \( \gamma_q > 0 \). The value of \( \beta_q \) corresponds to the nominal dynamics of mode \( q \) and thus we have that \( \beta_B < 0 \) and that \( \beta_A > 0 \). The disturbance \( \bar{d} \) models the error with respect to the nominal model. This implies that if \( v_2 \in \beta_q + \gamma_q [-\bar{d}, \bar{d}] \), the current mode can be mode \( q \). This allowed error in each mode captures the fact that there are several ways in which mode \( A \) or mode \( B \) can be realized (for example, having harder braking or softer braking, harder acceleration or softer acceleration). It also captures variability among drivers. Finally, we assume there is no transition between modes, that is, the driver cannot change his/her mind. This is a reasonable assumption when one models the behavior of vehicles that are close enough to the intersection. Models considering transitions from acceleration, to coasting, to braking have been considered in [40]. More complex models involving arbitrary transitions among modes will be considered in future work. Since the vehicles do not go in reverse, there is a lower non-negative speed limit, denoted \( v_{min} \). Note that a strictly positive \( v_{min} \) also guarantees the liveness of the system preventing vehicles to stop. Similarly, we allow an upper speed limit (which could be infinity), denoted \( v_{max} \), to respect speed limitation regulations in the proximity of the intersection.

The intersection system is a hybrid automaton with uncontrolled mode transitions \( H \), in which \( Q = \{A, B\}; X = \mathbb{R}^4 \) and \( x \in X \) is such that \( x = (p_1, v_1, p_2, v_2); U = [u_{t_L}, u_{t_H}] \subset \mathbb{R}; D = [-\bar{d}, \bar{d}] \subset \mathbb{R}; \Sigma = \emptyset \) as there is no transition allowed between the modes; \( R : Q \times \Sigma \to Q \) is the mode update map, which is trivial as \( \Sigma = \emptyset \), and \( f : X \times Q \times U \times D \to X \) is the vector field, which is piecewise continuous and it is given by \( f(x, q, u, d) = (f_1(p_1, v_1, u), f_2(p_2, v_2, q, d)) \) in which

\[
\begin{align*}
f_1(p_1, v_1, u) &= \begin{cases} v_1 & \text{if } (v_1 = v_{min} \text{ and } \alpha_1 < 0) \text{ or } (v_1 = v_{max} \text{ and } \alpha_1 > 0) \\ \alpha_1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},
\end{align*}
\]

with \( \alpha_1 = au + b - cv_1^2 \) and

\[
\begin{align*}
f_2(p_2, v_2, q, d) &= \begin{cases} v_2 & \text{if } (v_2 = v_{min} \text{ and } \alpha_2 < 0) \text{ or } (v_2 = v_{max} \text{ and } \alpha_2 > 0) \\ \alpha_2 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},
\end{align*}
\]

with \( \alpha_2 = \beta_q + \gamma_q d \). Referring to Figure 1, the set of bad states for system \( H \) models collision configurations and it is given by \( Bad := \{(p_1, v_1, p_2, v_2) \in \mathbb{R}^4 \mid (p_1, p_2) \in \{L_1, U_1\} \times \{L_2, U_2\} \} \).

\[\text{III. Problem solution}\]

The control problem can be interpreted as a game between \( u \) and \( d \) in which \( d \) has full information about the environment state (the mode) while \( u \) is uninformed. In the theory of games, such problems with imperfect information have been elegantly solved by first translating them into equivalent problems with full state information and by then leveraging available techniques for solving games of perfect information [37]. In order to formulate an equivalent problem with full state information, an estimator is introduced. For details on conditions for equivalence, the reader is referred to [38–40].

**Definition 3.** An estimator is a hybrid automaton with uncontrollable mode transitions \( \hat{H} = (\hat{Q}, \hat{X}, U, D, Y, \hat{Inv}, \hat{R}, \hat{f}) \), in which \( \hat{Q} \subseteq 2^Q \), \( \hat{Inv} = \{\epsilon\}, \hat{f} : X \times \hat{Q} \times U \times D \to 2^X \) is a set valued map such that \( f(x, \hat{q}, u, d) := \bigcup_{q \in \hat{q}} f(x, q, u, d) \), \( \hat{q}(t) \) is such that \( q(t) \in \hat{q}(t) \) for all \( t \geq 0 \), and \( \hat{x}(t) \in \hat{f}(\hat{x}(t), \hat{q}(t), u(t), d(t)) \) while \( \hat{q}(t) \) is constant.

Here, \( 2^Q \) denotes the set of all subsets of \( Q \). The estimator keeps track of a set of possible modes compatible with the measurements and with the system dynamics (for example, see [11, 15] and the references therein). Here, we show how to construct a suitable estimator for the application example.

**Application scenario.** We have \( \hat{H} = (\hat{Q}, \hat{X}, U, D, Y, \hat{Inv}, \hat{R}, \hat{f}) \), in which \( \hat{Q} = \{\hat{q}_1, \hat{q}_2, \hat{q}_3\} \) with \( \hat{q}_1 = \{A, B\}, \hat{q}_2 = \{A\}, \hat{q}_3 = \{B\} \), and \( \hat{q}(0) = \hat{q}_1 \). We define \( Y = \{y_A, y_B\} \). Starting in \( \hat{q}_1 \), event \( y_A \) occurs as soon as \( B \) is not currently possible given the measurement \( x \) and event \( y_B \) occurs as soon as \( A \) is not currently possible given the measurement \( x \). This results in the map \( \hat{R} \) defined as \( \hat{R}(\hat{q}_1, y_A) := \hat{q}_2 \) and \( \hat{R}(\hat{q}_1, y_B) := \hat{q}_3 \), which leads to the automaton of Figure 2.

![Fig. 2. Hybrid automaton \( \hat{H} \).](image-url)

In order to establish when \( A \) or \( B \) are ruled out given the measurement of \( x \), we consider the estimate \( \hat{y}(t) = 1 \int_{\tau}^{t} v_2(t) \sqrt{d} \, dt, \tau \geq T,^1 \) where \( T > 0 \) is a time window. If the

\[^1\text{Note that in practice, we will not require measurement of acceleration as we will consider discrete time models where derivative is replaced by time anticipation.}\]
mode is \( q \), then necessarily we have that \( |\dot{\beta}(t) - \beta| \leq \gamma d \).
Thus, for \( t > T \), define \( y(t) = y_A \) if \( |\dot{\beta}(t) - \beta| > \gamma b d \), \( y(t) = y_B \) if \( |\dot{\beta}(t) - \beta| \leq \gamma b d \), and \( y(t) = \epsilon \) otherwise.

Basically, the continuous dynamics of \( \hat{H} \) describe the set of dynamics of \( x \) that are compatible with the current discrete state estimate. Let \( \hat{\pi} : \hat{Q} \times X \to U \) be a feedback map. We denote the \( x \)-trajectories of the closed loop system by \( \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}_0, x_0), d, y) \), which are given by the system \( \hat{H} \), in which we have set \( u(t) = \hat{\pi}(\hat{q}(t), \hat{x}(t)) \). The capture set for system \( \hat{H} \) is given by \( \hat{C} \subseteq \{ x_0 \in X | \forall t \in \hat{\pi} \} \), where \( \hat{C}_q := \{ x_0 \in X | \forall t \in \hat{\pi} \} \) and \( d, y \), \( t \geq 0 \) s.t. some \( \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}, x_0), d, y) \in Pre(q, Bad) \) is called mode-dependent capture set. It is the set of all continuous states that are taken to \( Bad \) for all feedback maps when the initial mode estimate is equal to \( q \).

**Problem 1.** Determine the set \( \hat{C} \) and a feedback map \( \hat{\pi} \) that keeps any trajectory starting outside \( \hat{C} \) outside it.

We briefly describe the solution as it appears in [38–40]. For this purpose, for any \( \hat{q} \in \hat{Q} \) and \( F \subseteq X \) define the operator \( Pre(q, F) := \{ x \in X | \forall t \geq 0 \text{ s.t. some } \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}, x), d, e) \in F \} \), in which \( \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}, x), d, e) \) is the continuous trajectory of \( \hat{H} \) when the mode \( \hat{q} \) stays constant. Hence, \( Pre(q, F) \) is the set of all continuous states that are taken to \( F \) for all feedback maps when the mode estimate is kept constant to \( q \). The sets \( \hat{C}_q \) for \( \hat{q} \in \hat{Q} \) can be obtained as the fixed point of the following algorithmic procedure. Let \( \hat{Q} = \{ \hat{q}_1, \ldots, \hat{q}_M \} \), \( S_i \subseteq X \) for \( i \in \{ 1, \ldots, M \} \), and define \( S = (S_1, \ldots, S_M) \). We define the map \( G : (2^X)^M \to (2^X)^M \) as

\[
G(S) := \begin{bmatrix}
Pre(\hat{q}_1, \bigcup_{i \in \hat{q}_1, s \in \hat{\pi}_{\hat{q}_1, s}} S_j \cup Bad) \\
\vdots \\
Pre(\hat{q}_M, \bigcup_{i \in \hat{q}_M, s \in \hat{\pi}_{\hat{q}_M, s}} S_j \cup Bad)
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

**Algorithm 1**

\[
S^0 := (S_1^0, S_2^0, \ldots, S_M^0) := (\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)
\]

while \( S^{k+1} \neq S^k \) do

\[
S^{k+1} = G(S^k)
\]

end while

If Algorithm 1 terminates, the fixed point is equal to the tuple of sets \( (\hat{C}_{\hat{q}_1}, \ldots, \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_M}) \) (see [38] for details). We next show how to calculate the steps of this algorithm for the hybrid automaton of Figure 2.

**Application Scenario.** Referring to Figure 2, we have that system \( \hat{H} \) is such that \( \hat{Q} = \{ \hat{q}_1, \hat{q}_2, \hat{q}_3 \} \) with \( \hat{q}_1 = \{ A, B \}, \hat{q}_2 = \{ A \}, \) and \( \hat{q}_3 = \{ B \} \). As a consequence, Algorithm 1 leads to

\[
G(S) = \begin{bmatrix}
Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \\
Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \\
Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad)
\end{bmatrix},
\]

so that \( S^1 = \{ Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad), Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad), Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \} \) and \( S^2 = \{ Pre(\hat{q}_1, Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \cup Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \cup Bad), Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \cup Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \cup Bad, Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \} \).

The first component of this expression means that when the system is in mode \( \hat{q}_1 \), the trajectory can enter \( Bad \) by flowing in \( \hat{q}_1 \), or by first transitioning to \( \hat{q}_2 \) or \( \hat{q}_3 \) and by then flowing in either of these modes. By the properties of the \( Pre \) operator (refer to [38, 39]), since \( \hat{q}_2, \hat{q}_3 \subseteq \hat{q}_1 \), it can be shown that \( Pre(\hat{q}_1, Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \cup Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \cup Bad) = Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \). Therefore, we have that \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_1} = Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \), \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_2} = Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \) and \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_3} = Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \).

**A. Computational tools**

The sets \( Pre(\hat{q}, Bad) \) can be computed by linear complexity algorithms. This is because for every mode estimate \( \hat{q} \) the continuous dynamics are the parallel composition of two order preserving systems and the bad set is convex [14, 21]. Specifically, for the application example, define the restricted \( Pre \) operators for \( i \in \{ 1, 2, 3 \} \)

\[
Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n := \{ x \in X | \forall d, t \geq 0 \text{ s.t. some } \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}_1, x), u_H, d, e) \in Bad \}
\]

and

\[
Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n := \{ x \in X | \forall d, t \geq 0 \text{ s.t. some } \phi_x^\pi(t, (\hat{q}_2, x), u_H, d, e) \in Bad \}.
\]

Therefore, we have that (refer to [21]) \( Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) = Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n \cup Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n \cup Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad)_n \) for \( i \in \{ 1, 2, 3 \} \).

Each of the sets \( Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n \) and \( Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n \) can be computed by linear complexity discrete time algorithms (Section IV).

For each mode \( \hat{q}_i \) for \( i \in \{ 1, 2, 3 \} \), a safe control map \( \hat{\pi}(\hat{q}_i, x) \) acts in such a way to maintain the state outside the current mode-dependent capture set \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_i} \). This results in a map \( \hat{\pi}(\hat{q}_i, x) \) that makes the vector field point outside set \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_i} \) when \( x \) is on the boundary of \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_i} \). One can show (refer to [21]) that a control map \( \hat{\pi}(\hat{q}_i, x) \) that maintains the state \( x \) outside \( Pre(\hat{q}_i, Bad) \), which is equal to \( \hat{C}_{\hat{q}_i} \) for the application, is given by

\[
\begin{aligned}
\{ u_H \text{ if } x \in Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n \cap \partial Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n; u_L \text{ if } x \in Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n \cap \partial Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n; \{ u_H, u_L \text{ if } x \in \partial Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad)_n \cup \partial Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad)_n; U \text{ otherwise.}
\end{aligned}
\]

Since we have that \( Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \subseteq Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \) for \( i \in \{ 2, 3 \} \), when the mode switches from \( \hat{q}_1 \) to \( \hat{q}_2 \) or from \( \hat{q}_1 \) to \( \hat{q}_3 \) the continuous state \( x \) being outside \( Pre(\hat{q}_1, Bad) \) implies that it is also outside \( Pre(\hat{q}_2, Bad) \) and \( Pre(\hat{q}_3, Bad) \). Therefore, the above feedback map guarantees that the state never enters the capture set.

**IV. Experimental setup**

The two-vehicle conflict scenario of Figure 1 was implemented in an in-scale multi-vehicle lab. The lab is equipped with an over-head camera-based positioning system, a control station, a human-driver interface, the roundabout system and six scaled vehicles.\(^2\)

\(^2\)https://wikis.mit.edu/confluence/display/DeIVecchioLab
A car chassis (length 0.375 m, width 0.185 m and wheelbase 0.257 m) is used as the hardware platform for the scaled vehicle. The vehicles are equipped with an onboard computer (Mini ITX) and a motion controller. The longitudinal dynamics are dynamically similar to that of a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) [41]. One of the scaled vehicles is configured to be an autonomous vehicle that can follow a predefined path and control its throttle/brake input while another acts as a human-driven vehicle that can be driven by a human-driver using a human-driver interface. The human-driver interface comprises a steering wheel and two pedals for throttle and brake commands (see Figure 3). The hardware used is a Logitech MOMO force feedback racing wheel and pedal set. The hardware is connected to the control station via a USB cable and the input command from the hardware is transmitted to the vehicle via the wireless connection.

Figure 3 shows the roundabout system. There are two circular paths that share a common section on a 6 m by 6 m arena. The human-driven vehicle follows the outer path while the autonomous vehicle follows the inner path. Both vehicles travel in an anti-clockwise direction. A collision is possible at the intersection when both vehicles are in the area shaded red, in Figure 3, at the same time. This area corresponds to the set, \([ (p_1, p_2) \mid (p_1, p_2) \in [L_1, U_1] \times [L_2, U_2] ]\). The maximum vehicle speed is 1100 mm/sec and the minimum speed is 350 mm/sec. A software module on all the vehicles maintains the speed between the specified bounds. When the two vehicles are simultaneously present in the shared path (between points \(P_{T_1}\) and \(P_{T_2}\)), another software module prevents rear-end collision by appropriately accelerating or decelerating the autonomous vehicle when the two vehicles are too close. The maintain speed and rear-end collision prevention modules are based on a simple PID control scheme. The positioning system transmits the position information to the vehicles over the wireless network.

**Learning human driving model.** A set of experiments were performed in which 5 human subjects drove a vehicle on the outer path in the roundabout system in 10 acceleration and 10 braking trials each. In these experiments, the subjects were directed to either brake or accelerate at the human-decision point \(D^p\) in Figure 3, while also avoiding a moving target on the inner path. The data collected in these braking and acceleration trials was then analyzed to estimate the parameters \(\beta^p\) and \(\gamma^p\) of Section II. We denote the position measurement at time step \(k\) by \(p(k)\) with \(dT = 0.1\) sec the time lapsed between two consecutive steps. The acceleration/deceleration at time step \(k\) is denoted \(a(k)\) and is calculated as \(a(k) = \frac{p(k) - p(k-1) + p(k-2)}{dT^2}\).

The average acceleration/deceleration is calculated for the trial as \(\bar{a} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=2}^{N} a(k)\). A total of 99 trial runs were obtained. These trials were divided into a training set and a test set. The model of the driver behavior was then obtained by fitting two Gaussian distributions to the training data for braking and acceleration trials and then using the test data to verify the model. More than 1000 randomly chosen training and test sets were considered. The average training and test errors are 56% and 96% respectively. As the final model, we chose one with zero training and test errors, in which 79 trials were used as the training set (40 braking and 39 acceleration trials) and 20 trials were used as the test set (10 braking and 10 acceleration trials). The resulting values of the model parameters in equations (2) are given by \(\beta_B = -282.7\) mm/sec\(^2\) and \(\beta_A = 350.5\) mm/sec\(^2\). The values of \(\gamma_B\) and \(\gamma_A\) are given by \(\gamma_B = 139.6\) mm/sec\(^2\) and \(\gamma_B = 106.6\) mm/sec\(^2\).

We set \(\bar{d} = 3\), corresponding to three standard deviations.

**Trials Experimental Conditions.** A total of 8 human subjects participated in the study. This set of subjects is different from the set used to generate the human driving model. To start the experiment, the subjects were given an introduction about the setup. This was followed by a practice session in which the subject drove the vehicle on the outer path. The autonomous vehicle was run on the inner path at a constant speed of 500 mm/sec. Subjects were free to drive the human-driven vehicle at any speed between the points \(P_{T_1}\) and \(P_{T_2}\). Between point \(P_{T_2}\) and \(D^p\), the maintain speed module keeps the vehicle speed at 600 mm/sec. This ensures that the human-driven vehicle does not cross the decision point with minimum or maximum speed. Thus, we instructed the human subjects to either accelerate or decelerate as soon as they crossed the decision point \(D^p\), in order to force the two vehicles in the bad set at the same time.

**Mode Estimator Implementation.** We use a discrete time form of the estimator proposed in Section III. Since the driver decides to switch the mode to brake or accelerate once the human-driven vehicle crosses \(D^p\), the mode estimator running on the autonomous vehicle uses the continuous state measurements of the human-driven vehicle after it crosses \(D^p\). The instance \(n = 0\) corresponds to the time step when the human-driven vehicle crosses this decision point. We take \(N = 20\) and consider \(n > N\). At
the $n^{th}$ time step after the human-driven vehicle crosses the human-decision point, the estimate is calculated by using the formula: $\hat{\beta}(n) = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha(k)}$. Hence, $n$ time steps after the human-driven vehicle crosses the decision point, $y(n)$ is given by $y(n) = y_A$ if $|\hat{\beta}(n) - \beta_B| > \gamma_B \bar{d}$, $y(n) = y_B$ if $|\hat{\beta}(n) - \beta_B| > \gamma_B \bar{d}$, and $y(n) = \epsilon$ otherwise.

**Control Map Implementation.** We introduce the following discretization of system $H$ given in equations (1)-(2) (employing forward Euler approximation) with step size $dT > 0$, $i \in (1, 2)$, and index $j$: $p_i[j + 1] = p_i[j] + F^i_1(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j])$ and $v_i[j + 1] = \hat{F}^i(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j])$, where $F^i_1 = dT \, v_i[j]$, $\hat{F}^i(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j]) = v_i[j] + dT \, \gamma(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j]), \gamma(v_i, \alpha_i) := \alpha_i$ if $v_i + \alpha_i dT < \nu_{\text{max}}$ and $v_i + \alpha_i dT > \nu_{\text{min}}$, $\gamma(v_i, \alpha_i) := \gamma_{\text{max}} - v_i)/dT$ if $v_i + \alpha_i dT < \nu_{\text{max}}$ and $\gamma(v_i, \alpha_i) := \gamma_{\text{min}}(v_i - \nu_i)/dT$ if $v_i + \alpha_i dT < \nu_{\text{min}}$. We define the notation for a sequence of constant inputs $\alpha_i$ for $i \in (1, 2)$: $\hat{F}^{i,k}(v_i, \alpha_i) := v_i$ and $\hat{F}^{i,k+1}(v_i, \alpha_i) := \hat{F}^{i,k}(\hat{F}^{i,k}(v_i, \alpha_i), \alpha_i)$ with $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The value of $p_i[k]$ starting from initial conditions $(p_i, v_i)$ can be calculated as $p_i[k] = p_i + \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} F^i_1(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j])$. Since $\text{Bad} = \{L_1, U_1\} \times \mathbb{R} \times \{L_2, U_2\} \times \mathbb{R}$, define for $i \in (1, 2)$ the sequences $L^i_1(v_i, \alpha_i) := L_1 - \sum_{j=1}^{k} F^i_1(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j]), U^i_1(v_i, \alpha_i) := U_1 - \sum_{j=1}^{k} F^i_1(v_i[j], \alpha_i[j]), L^i_2(v_i, \alpha_i) := L_2 - \sum_{j=1}^{k} F^i_1 \left( \hat{F}^{i,k}(v_i, \alpha_i), \max(\alpha_i) \right), U^i_2(v_i, \alpha_i) := U_2 - \sum_{j=1}^{k} F^i_1 \left( \hat{F}^{i,k}(v_i, \alpha_i), \min(\alpha_i) \right)$, where $\max(\alpha_i) = \beta_{\alpha} + \gamma_{\alpha} \bar{d}$ and $\min(\alpha_i) = \beta_{\alpha} - \gamma_{\alpha} \bar{d}$ when $\hat{\gamma} = \gamma_{\alpha}$, while $\max(\alpha_i) = \beta_{\alpha} + \gamma_{\alpha} \bar{d}$ and $\min(\alpha_i) = \beta_{\alpha} - \gamma_{\alpha} \bar{d}$ when $\hat{\gamma} = \gamma_{\alpha}$. Then, one can show that $\text{Pre}(\hat{\gamma}, \text{Bad})_{|u} = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid k \geq 0 \text{ s.t. } L^i_1(v_i, \alpha_i) < u_i < U^i_1(v_i, \alpha_i) \}$ and $L^i_2(v_i, \alpha_i) < u_i < U^i_2(v_i, \alpha_i) \}$, hence, given mode estimate $\hat{\gamma}$, $\text{Pre}(\hat{\gamma}, \text{Bad})_{|u}$ and $\text{Pre}(\hat{\gamma}, \text{Bad})_{|u}$ are computed for the given pair of speeds $(v_i, v_2)$ as a union of rectangles in the position plane. Checking whether a point $x = (p_1, v_1, p_2, v_2)$ is in $\text{Pre}(\hat{\gamma}, \text{Bad})_{|u} \cap \text{Pre}(\hat{\gamma}, \text{Bad})_{|u}$ is performed by comparing $(p_1, p_2)$ against the upper and lower bounds $L^i_1, U^i_1, L^i_2$ and $U^i_2$. Moreover, to check whether $p_1 \in [L^i_1, U^i_1]$, it is enough to compute such intervals only while $U^i_1 > p_1$, since the sequences $\{L^i_1[1 \leq 0], U^i_1[1 \leq 0], L^i_2[2 \leq 0], U^i_2[2 \leq 0] \}$ are strictly decreasing [21]. Thus, we only need to make a finite number of computations.

To implement the feedback map $\tilde{\pi}(\hat{\gamma}, x)$ of Section III-A, we need to track when the continuous flow hits the boundary of the relevant set $\text{Pre}(\epsilon)$. In discrete time, we consider the continuous state to be on the boundary of $\text{Pre}(\epsilon)$ when it is outside it while its prediction forward in time is inside it. To make this procedure robust to both communication and actuator delays, we consider 1D forward predictions in time instead of one only.

**V. Experimental results**

The cumulative time for which the trials were conducted is 3479 seconds resulting in a total of 97 instances of collision avoidance in which the autonomous vehicle applied control in order to avoid a collision. In doing so, the autonomous vehicle entered the capture set in 3 such instances and resulted in a collision in 1 such instance resulting in an overall success rate of 96.9%. During the total duration of the experiments, the mode was estimated as $A$ (acceleration) 102 times, as $B$ (braking) 45 times and remained at $\{A, B\}$ (acceleration or braking) 9 times. These results are presented in Table I. All mode estimations are correct. Figure 4 shows a collision avoidance instance when the human-driven vehicle mode was identified as $A$.

**VI. Discussion and conclusions**

In this paper, we have illustrated the application of a formal hybrid control approach to design semi-autonomous multi-vehicle systems that are guaranteed to be safe. Our experimental results illustrate that in a structured task, such as driving, simple human decision models can be effectively learned and employed in a feedback control system that enforces a safety specification. They also highlight how the incorporation of these models in a safety control system makes the control actions required for safety less conservative. In fact, by virtue of the mode estimate, the current (mode dependent) capture set to avoid to guarantee safety is considerably smaller than the capture set to be avoided when the mode estimate is not available. This is essential for the practical applicability of cooperative active safety systems. In our data set, the flow entered the capture set only 3% of the times. These failures are due mainly to communication delays between the vehicles and the workstation. These delays, when significant, cause the calculated capture set to be different from the actual one and hence may cause to enforce control too late. These delays, in future work, should be formally accounted for in the models and in the safety control algorithm.
More complex models of human decisions in the proximity of an intersection and the incorporation of additional details, such as weather conditions and road geometry, offer the potential for reducing the conservatism of safe control actions even further. Future work will also consider the extension to the case in which vehicles are not known to evolve on a fixed route. This case will be handled by keeping track of routes that are compatible with the position and speed of the vehicle and by progressively eliminating those that become incompatible. The models here considered are deterministic because most of the tools currently available to perform safety control have assumed deterministic models, wherein uncertainty is bounded. However, human decision models are more naturally captured by stochastic frameworks, in which uncertainty due to variability in both subjects and realizations of the same decision is probabilistic (see [28] for a review on the topic). As results in stochastic safety verification and design become available [6, 10], it will be important to extend the proposed techniques of this paper to safety control of stochastic hybrid automata, in which the mode estimate is constructed probabilistically.

By virtue of the order preserving dynamics of the vehicles and the fact that the bad set is convex, the complexity of the algorithm that calculates the capture set (Algorithm 1) is linear with the number of continuous variables and inputs (see [14, 21]). Hence, the algorithm can be efficiently implemented in real-time. When there are more than two vehicles, the bad set is not convex and determining an exact solution in general is harder. However, one can perform modular synthesis, in which a two-vehicle collision avoidance routine is employed as a control primitive [18], or exploit the order preserving structure of the system to obtain suitable abstractions for which the problem is computationally simpler. This is subject of current research.

Finally, in any real-life implementation of cooperative active safety systems, the algorithms implemented by the
autonomous vehicle should be capable of interacting with a human driver. That is, they should first warn the driver and suggest actions, and take control of the vehicle only when the driver is incapable of preventing a collision. Hence, future work will consider the incorporation of human response time to warnings in the algorithms and the problem of establishing when it is absolutely necessary to override a human driver for maintaining safety.

REFERENCES