Low-Income Communities in World Heritage Cities: Revitalizing Neighborhoods in Tunis and Quito

by

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Abstract

Since the 1970s, international preservation and funding agencies have promoted revitalization projects in developing countries aiming to, among other things, benefit low-income communities. For the most part, these projects have resulted in visibly improved physical spaces, reflecting upgraded infrastructure along with conservation of the architectural fabric. These outcomes are impressive in light of decades of neglect and decay. The impact on low-income residents, however, remains obscure. In what cases have the poor really benefited from these revitalization projects? Through what specific channels can low-income communities benefit from interventions? How have governments in these countries responded to the external pressure to benefit low-income residents given their often limited institutions and budgets?

This thesis seeks to address these questions. In particular, it aims to understand the conditions under which revitalization projects in historic cities of developing countries can benefit low-income communities. It begins by considering the evolution of international philosophy, following the shift from a central focus on monument preservation to that of urban revitalization, with a notable difference being the incorporation of social objectives in the latter phase. It then turns to exploring how these goals of revitalization have played out in two World Heritage Cities, Tunis and Quito. Findings indicate that low-income residents have indeed benefited from revitalization projects in both cases. Drawing from these experiences, this thesis reveals four common elements in the process through which this favorable outcome was achieved: 1) a significant component of public participation, 2) a semi-public development agency with operational flexibility and innovative financing strategies, 3) international catalysts in the form of World Heritage recognition and collaboration with international organizations and agencies, and 4) image improvement leading to a renewed self-image of the neighborhood. While these four elements by no means offer a template for success, they do indicate institutional structures that may support developing countries' efforts to reach the poor while revitalizing their cities.

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Introduction

If a center is to stay alive, it must change to meet its new function, and this means a shift, but not an abrupt break, in activity, a mix of old and new, and in between, and the retention of a normal resident population.

- Kevin Lynch (1990)

The key to successfully revitalizing low-income neighborhoods in World Heritage Cities is reaching a harmonic balance between the needs of the existing residents and the necessity of infusing new activity into urban centers. Kevin Lynch explains this condition quite clearly and urges us to consider the city as a living entity. He is reflecting on his experience during the mid seventies in Poland, but he could just as easily be talking about Tunis or Quito. These cities have undergone remarkable transformations since then. Projects in both cities have paralleled a global ideological shift from monument preservation to urban revitalization, from inner city gentrification to low-income housing rehabilitation. This shift is far from complete, but there are optimistic signs that projects in the historic centers of developing countries can benefit a mix of socio-economic classes.

The experiences of Tunis and Quito offer a few insights on conditions under which low-income communities can benefit to some extent from revitalization projects in World Heritage Cities.

Given a growing trend by the global preservation community and international funding agencies in promoting revitalization projects that in one way or another benefit low-income communities, I set out to understand if low-income communities are indeed benefitting and, if so, how? Upon reviewing the literature, I found relatively little that addressed the issue. Therefore, I decided to tackle the question by looking at the World Heritage Cities of Tunis and Quito, both of which have been widely regarded as success stories of incorporating low-income communities in the process of revitalizing their historic centers.

The research for this thesis consisted of a literature review and open-ended interviews. The literature review covered the progression of the international preservation ideology and what the projects consisted of, including basic information on their outcomes. As for the interviews, I spoke with practitioners and academics in the field, and World Bank

\[1\] I relied primarily on text and interviews in English because of language constraints and therefore recognize the limitations of not drawing from the vast and rich literature on these issues in French and Spanish. Moreover, I did not interview low-income residents in either Tunis or Quito; doing so would have undoubtedly contributed to this research.
and IDB staff familiar with the projects. In the case of Tunis, I also spoke with directors and technical staff of the local agency, ASM, and from the National Institute of Cultural Patrimony.

World Heritage Designation

The designation of World Heritage listing by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) implies that a place has extraordinary universal cultural or natural value. Over three quarters of the 630 sites listed have been designated because of their cultural significance. This listing began with the 1972 World Heritage Convention in an effort to increase awareness and protection of the world’s finite cultural heritage:

The Convention is posited on the awareness that there are certain parts of the heritage whose value to the world as a whole is so outstanding that their protection, conservation, and transmission to future generations are matters not merely for individual countries in which they occur but also for the international community as a whole (Cleere, 1996:86).

A World Heritage site listed for cultural reasons may be an individual monument or complex such as the Temples of Angkor, the Taj Mahal and the Pyramids at Giza, or it may be an entire historic city center as in the cases of Quito and Tunis (Figure 1). While this thesis will examine both types of sites, it focuses on addressing the challenges accompanying an entire historic center. For the purpose of this discussion, the term World Heritage City will be used to differentiate the latter from the former. As part of a global heritage, projects in these areas are more likely to receive greater financial and technical assistance, accompanied by increased scrutiny that would otherwise not occur in most cases. Nevertheless, the objective in analyzing Tunis and Quito is to gain insight that is relevant not only for World Heritage Cities, but

Figure 1. Better known World Heritage Sites are singular monuments and archeological complexes such as the Temple of Angkor Wat in Cambodia.
Choosing the Cases

Tunis and Quito are very different cities, yet share enough characteristics and parallel experiences in revitalization projects to make a comparison between them valuable. The Médina in Tunis was laid out in the 7th century and is an organic pattern centering on Islamic monuments, while the original settlement of Quito was laid out in the 16th century on a grid, reinforcing the order of Spanish Catholic colonization practices. Tunis was built in a previously unsettled area, and Quito on the ruins of an ancient city. Tunis on the Mediterranean coast and Quito high up in the Andes. Yet, both cities were built during religious conquests, the Arabs in North Africa and the Spaniards in South America. Both historic centers have faced the universal challenge of maintaining a historic center built for and abandoned by the wealthy. And both have shared deterioration of urban infrastructure and building conditions following the end of the Second World War.

In the 1970s, international attention was directed to Tunis and Quito in an effort to arrest their decay. UNESCO recognized both areas and included them on the World Heritage list in 1979. Since then internationally funded projects have been developed in collaboration with local organizations and government agencies. Tunis and Quito were the first projects focused on housing low-income communities in historic centers to be funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), respectively. They are both touted as success stories by these development organizations and, more broadly, in academic journals and in the popular press.

While the accomplishments of Tunis and Quito are being trumpeted, concern during the last three decades of international intervention has arisen over equitable returns upon project completion. Rather than helping low-income communities, urban revitalization programs often displace the very households they aim to benefit (Young and Joussellin, 1999). The challenge is to minimize these effects. However, it must be recognized that displacement, followed closely by gentrification, is not the inevitable result of historic preservation. Neil Smith, who writes extensively on the subject, describes gentrification as the process by which poor and working class neighborhoods in the inner city, having previously experienced urban decay and a middle class exodus, are refurbished via an influx of capital and middle-class homeowners and renters (1996). Steps, such as low-cost home purchase and rent subsidies, can be taken to ensure that low-income communities
remain (Listokin, 1985). Still, it may be financially and politically impossible to consider undertaking revitalization in historic neighborhoods without accepting some, albeit limited, displacement.

This thesis seeks to understand which effective strategies exist to halt the physical and social deterioration of the historic urban centers while also benefiting those who call it home. It is organized as follows: Chapter One explores the nature of international interventions and the charters that govern their philosophical approach. Their evolution from single monuments to a "socially-oriented" approach mirrors the changing nature of preservation projects over time. Chapter Two defines urban revitalization and describes some of the challenges in benefiting low-income communities. Chapters Three and Four present the progression of preservation philosophy as well as its actual realization in the cases of Tunis and Quito. The final chapter draws lessons from these cases and raises questions for further research.
Chapter One. International Ideology

International interventions to protect and revitalize the world’s heritage have both been growing steadily in numbers and changing in focus within the second half of the 20th century. There is a growing international awareness and cooperation facilitated by agencies such as the UNESCO and the ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), initiating conservation projects and celebrating national and local heritage (Dix, 1990; Lowenthal, 1998). While global consciousness and willingness to intervene are growing, so too is a sensitivity to the benefits of neighborhood revitalization instead of monument preservation. Along with this, the idea and practice of addressing the impact of revitalization on the existing communities is gaining momentum in both the planning and implementation of urban projects. Finally, we have witnessed, in the last two decades, the participation of international development banks infusing capital into heritage development projects. Working together, international advocacy organizations and funding agencies have partnered with local constituencies to develop projects in World Heritage Cities, that not only preserve the architectural fabric, but help insure the continuity of a “living city.”

This chapter explores the evolution of charters, declarations and recommendations, as a way of tracing the changes in the ideology of international interventions over time. Early documents focused on the significance of preserving monuments and antiquities,

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2 The idea of a “universal” heritage and the practice of international cooperation originated centuries ago. Jokilehto suggests that “the roots of the modern concept of universal heritage can be seen in Antiquity; the idea of identifying the Seven Wonders of the World anticipated the World Heritage List of UNESCO” (1996:55-6). Modern concepts of protection and conservation of cultural heritage began in 18th century Europe, growing out of cross-cultural exposures during the Grand Tours. Travelers observed the precarious condition of the art and architecture in various countries and proposed that international action could assist in their conservation (Jokilehto, 1996). In the 19th century several treaties were signed to establish the ownership of artistic objects in times of war. The result of heated debates led to the formation of national preservation organizations and establishment of regulatory legislation to protect monuments. For example in Mexico, the first measures to protect ancient sites began with the establishment of the Junta de Antigüedades in 1808, in Turkey, the first laws on historic monuments were passed in 1869, and in Egypt, a Committee for the Conservation of Monuments and Arabic Art began in 1881 (Jokilehto, 1999).

3 By the mid 20th century international agencies had been formed, providing advocacy assistance, technical advice and financial resources to projects across the globe. The UNESCO was one the first such agencies, forming in 1945. Part of its mission was to “maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by assuring the conservation and protections of the world’s inheritance of books, works or art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions.” UNESCO in turn spawned several other organizations; among the more prominent are ICCROM in 1956 and ICOMOS created ten years later.
primarily in Europe. In addition, specific monuments in developing countries that unquestionably held a universal value were also recognized (Figure 2). The idea of including the surrounding architectural and socio-economic context of the monument was first presented in the text of Las Normas de Quito in the late 1960s. But it was not until after the 1972 World Heritage Convention that socially-oriented conservation recommendations were prominently included in charters and declarations. Since then, these objectives have been reinforced through other documents along the way and scarcely thirty years after the subject was first broached in Quito, the international preservation community seems to have embraced the idea wholeheartedly.

Charting a Course

International conferences concerning the conservation of built heritage accompanied the growth of international organizations and in many cases resulted in new ones forming. Often the outcome of such conferences was a new charter outlining appropriate interventions in cultural heritage projects. One of the earliest was the International Congress on Modern Architecture (CIAM) that produced the Athens Charter in 1933. Though relating mainly to modern architecture and urban planning, it also included observations on the protection and rehabilitation of historic centers. The Second International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments met in Venice in 1964 and presented “a declaration on the fundamental principles of conservation and restoration of the architectural heritage, The Venice Charter” (Jokilehto, 1996: 58). These early charters focused on the concept of “monument” or archeological site and were biased toward European antiquities.

It was only with Las Normas de Quito (the Norms of Quito) in 1967, that we began to see an ideological change in direction. This declaration, while maintaining a focus on the monument, began to consider the socio-economic context of the site. It was stressed that “standards for protection and enrichment must be extended to the entire environment of the monument,” and that legislation should designate a “rigorously protected zone” around the site. Additionally, Las Normas de Quito was probably the first such document that
set out to address issues of heritage conservation specifically targeted toward developing countries. However, it is only after the adoption of UNESCO’s 1972 World Heritage Convention that a international preservation philosophy reached a critical threshold.

By the mid 1970s, a series of charters and recommendations were built upon the broad base of the 1972 World Heritage Convention. Each promoted the concepts of both urban conservation and its impact on the existing residents. The Declaration of Amsterdam (1975) carried the social component one step further:

The rehabilitation of old areas should be conceived and carried out in such a way as to ensure that, where possible, this does not necessitate a major change in the social composition of the residents, all sections or society should share in the benefits of restoration financed by public funds.

This appears to be the first allusion to gentrification and displacement in revitalization projects. The authors of the declaration seem well aware of the disruptive nature such activities have had in the past. This declaration was just one of four documents, submitted within a year of each other, reflecting a surge in interest and acknowledgment by a growing international preservation community of the significance in urban conservation, inclusive of its existing residents. The subtext of these proclamations is an increasing dissatisfaction with heritage projects focused solely on architectural monuments and antiquities of the past.

The Burra Charter, adopted by ICOMOS Australia in 1979, pushed the definitions guiding international interventions to new socially conscious levels. Prior to its adoption, preservation efforts were generally focused on the issues of archeological, architectural and historical significance. This charter introduced the concept of “cultural significance,” and hence defined a new terminology with which to justify and legitimate the idea of social value in heritage projects (Johnston, 1992). Following Australia’s lead, in 1982 the Declaration of Tlaxcala emerged out of the third Inter-American Symposium on the Conservation of the Built Heritage devoted to the subject of “The Revitalization of Small Settlements.” The declaration was concerned with “living” settlements and recommended:

That any initiative with a view to the conservation and revitalization of small settlements must be designed as a part of a programme embracing the historical, anthropological, social and economic aspects of the area and the possibilities for its revitalization, failing which it would be fated to be superficial and ineffectual.
Five years later, the ICOMOS Brazil Committee developed a set of recommendations called the *Carta de Petropolis* (1987). It directed interventions to the preservation of social value as the primary motivator and continued to place the concerns of the existing residents as the foremost priority in any revitalization project:

As a socially produced cultural expression the city adds rather than subtracts. Built space, thus, is the physical result of a social productive process. Its replacement is not justified unless its socio-cultural potentialities are proven exhausted. Evaluation standards for replacement convenience should take into account the socio-cultural costs of the new environment.

While ICOMOS Brazil developed its charter as a national committee, it differed little in spirit from the internationally adopted *Washington Charter* drafted by ICOMOS in the same year. This charter is purposefully broad and explicitly states the necessity of drawing up a charter for historic towns and urban areas that would complement *The Venice Charter*. Although the *Washington Charter* is indeed broad, its contribution to the dialogue is the statement that “The participation and involvement of the residents are essential for the success of the conservation programme and should be encouraged. The conservation of historic towns and urban areas concerns their residents first of all.” Since 1987, several other recommendations and charters have been developed and adopted, either localized toward specific countries (*The Labore Charter*, 1989) or based on topics such as the protection of cultural property (*Charter of Courmayeur*, 1992) or tourism (*International Cultural Tourism Charter*, 1999), each one including a social component. It is quite clear that in the last decade the philosophical approach to preservation interventions has fully integrated a recognition of the need for a neighborhood oriented approach, considering not merely the architectural fabric but the socio-economic context of a historic center (Figure 3). What remains to be seen however, is whether or not this enlightened state translates into physical projects on the ground.

*Figure 3. By the mid 1970s, national and international charters had recognized the importance of including existing residents in urban revitalization. In "Islamic Cairo" the Aga Khan Trust for Culture recently began a neighborhood revitalization program.*
Chapter Two. Urban Revitalization Defined

Urban revitalization refers to the process of regenerating not only the physical fabric, but also the socio-economic conditions and accompanying cultural contexts of a neighborhood. It incorporates complete historic and urban networks, including existing street systems, housing patterns, and composite civic structures that have developed over many centuries (Bianca, 1997). Urban revitalization maintains activities of a “living city,” rather than resulting in a petrified streetscape with uniform characteristics. It seeks to encourage the continuity of the community itself and at the same time implement new interventions compatible with the image held by its members. Stefano Bianca cautions that “salvaging the physical shell of past cultures and civilizations, though commendable, may prove meaningless if it is not supported by parallels efforts to encourage a living culture that can creatively relate to the physical heritage” (Bianca, 1997: 30).

Distinguishing urban revitalization from monument preservation is important in order to understand the central idea of this thesis. Monument preservation has been the normative form of international interventions for the last few hundred years. Recall that the international preservation movement developed around the notion that certain landmarks are part of the world’s heritage and should thus be protected. This idea of monument preservation is still a pervasive approach to preserving our past. Who hasn’t heard of the Temples of Angkor, the Taj Mahal, the Pyramids at Giza, or the Forbidden City? Their significance is not questioned nor is the value of protecting them. Arguments for spending enormous resources on them are justified in both cultural and economic terms. For example, international interventions at Angkor have achieved considerable success in preserving the stone temples scattered across the ancient ruined city. The projects

4 The term “urban revitalization” is not used in the charters discussed in Chapter One, but it is commonly used in practice to reflect precisely the notion of preservation accompanied by social benefits that is embodied in the words of these documents.
employ local craftsmen and the increasing numbers of tourists rely on guides and food vendors to support their explorations of the vast complex. Additionally, the nearby city of Siem Reap is experiencing considerable growth in service industries catering to the visitors. Signs advertising guest houses, restaurants and internet cafés are posted throughout the city. Streetscape improvements foretell of an even greater expected boom to arrive when direct flights from Singapore and Bangkok begin in 2000. However, the relationship between Angkor’s protection and Siem Reap’s development may be more of an anomaly than a typical example of monument preservation. In this case the lush vegetation surrounding the temples have been left relatively untouched. Yet, there are many examples of World Heritage monument preservation projects that have been considered in isolation of their traditional context.

It seems that more often than not in monument preservation, the surroundings of the monument are ignored, destroying its traditional context and isolating it as an island. The traditional fabric around the Forbidden City, for instance, is rapidly vanishing, depriving it of its historical context. Ironically, the best view of the Pyramids at Giza is from the second floor of the Pizza Hut that lies close to the paws of the Great Sphinx; until recently, a hotel development scheme threatened to encircle the great monuments (Figure 4). These examples illustrate the perils of developing a World Heritage site without fully taking into account its surroundings. Not only does the monument lose an opportunity for a historical narrative, but its potential to be used

Figure 4. The Pharaonic monuments can clearly be seen through the window logo of a nearby Pizza Hut, demonstrating the importance of including the context in cultural heritage projects.
as a catalyst for reviving the surrounding neighborhoods (if they have survived) is also forgone.

The Forbidden City is perhaps one of the best examples of this lost opportunity. Until the 1950s, most of the city of Beijing’s historical city was intact, including its defensive walls. When Mao Tse Tung came to power, the walls were torn down, the Forbidden City opened, and the dense urban fabric in front of it was destroyed to create the vast Tianamen Square. Since then most of the remaining Hutongs (traditional neighborhoods) have been cleared to make way for the progress of the New China and modern development. Beijing lost an enviable chance to more richly narrate the history of the Forbidden City and pre-communist China, as well as preserving the traditional Hutongs for current residents. Instead, the monument feels like a stage set in a sea of modern development. And the former surrounding residents have been moved into high-rise housing on the redeveloped sites or beyond the former city walls.

In order to address some of the issues emerging from the monument preservation, the international community is beginning to develop urban revitalization projects that address entire neighborhoods, and incorporate monuments into the existing living fabric of the city. While it is relatively straightforward to develop a plan for a single monument, revitalizing an entire neighborhood is clearly much more difficult, especially when one also hopes to benefit low-income communities.

*Including Low-Income Communities*

In this research I set out to understand how low-income communities can benefit from revitalization programs. Thus far I have described the shift in preservation perspectives and defined urban revitalization. Where do low-income communities fit in? Recall that
in the Declaration of Tlaxcala, the Carta de Petropolis and the Washington Charter there was an explicit call for maintaining the existing social fabric of historic cities. In developing countries, this social fabric is usually comprised of low-income communities. Therefore the idea is to promote urban revitalization that accrues benefits to low-income residents as well.

An important channel through which revitalization affects low-income residents in historic cities is displacement. Too frequently, revitalization in low-income neighborhoods results in displacing its existing residents without adequately addressing their social and economic requirements. While in some cases displaced residents are better off because their compensation includes improved housing and access to infrastructure and services in newly developed areas (so much so that they willingly move), other cases are disastrous. Residents are forced out of their dwellings and distanced from their long-established communities and sources of income.

Many are the examples of urban revitalization projects in developing countries, but there have been few that have explicitly targeted low-income communities (Figure 5). In Lamu (Kenya) and Cartegena (Columbia) the main beneficiaries of revitalization were wealthier groups (Pulver and Siravo, 1986; Rojas, 1999). Other cases in Stone Town (Zanzibar) and Sana’a (Yemen) did to some extent consider low-income communities but the architectural fabric seemed to have a disproportionate weight over the social (McQuillan and
Other projects in Fez (Morocco) and Cairo (Egypt) have certainly received considerable attention for decades, but housing programs for the existing residents are just beginning to be developed. However, there are two cases that have had both a long period of international intervention and a focus on low-income communities. I now turn to exploring these two, Tunis and Quito, focusing particularly on how these projects have benefited low-income communities.
Chapter Three. Tunis, Tunisia

Tunis has demonstrated that revitalization projects in historic urban centers can benefit the low-income communities living there. UNESCO listed the historic “Arab City” or Medina on its World Heritage list in 1979, more than a decade after it began collaborating with ASM (Association Sauvegarde de la Médina de Tunis), an organization it helped found. Municipal authorities worked through ASM creatively tapping into a combination of both local and international expertise and funding sources in its quest to develop socially-oriented revitalization projects, balancing a need for low-income housing and a respect for the traditional context of the old city. Proponents of the interventions had to overcome aesthetic biases toward a modernistic design solution and political pressure to exclude lower income residents. ASM navigated the fine line between urban revitalization and gentrification, developing a structure in which higher income units would cross-subsidize the units of affordable housing in the neighborhood. Civic and professional leaders in Tunis were not afraid to take bold steps while also learning from their mistakes, continuously re-evaluating the lessons learned and searching for strategies to improve the project design and implementation. As a result of several decades of hard work and self-scrutinizing, Tunis has a great deal to be proud of in their approach to upgrading the Medina, and a great deal to offer others committed to urban revitalization in low-income neighborhoods.

The city of Tunis was founded in the 7th century and by the 14th the Medina had acquired all of its major physical characteristics (Lawless, 1986). The city grew steadily for the next 500 years, but its development was contained within the walls of the Medina (Figure 6). By the mid 19th

Figure 6. View of the Médina to the West from the Villeneuve, shows a dense fabric of the old city contrasting to the European Quarter's formal character shown in the foreground.
century, railway lines and other “modern” services were installed on flat land outside the old city and a new period of development was born. The beginnings of urbanization outside of the Médina can be traced to railroad activities and vehicular traffic along the road from the city to the docks, and beyond to the Gulf of Tunis (Amodei, 1985). The network of rough tracks in the newly forming European quarter to the east of the Médina was replaced with a grid of streets and sewer lines on the grand Roman pattern (Lawless, 1986).

The establishment of the French Protectorate in 1881 led to the birth of the Villeneuve, outside the old walls of the Médina. Banks, commerce, government offices, industry, transport, and head-offices were all located in the Villeneuve. The new quarters filled up with buildings occupied by a foreign population connected with the colonial government. The proximity of this urbanization adjacent to the old city had a detrimental effect on the Médina, siphoning off major functions from an area where most Tunisians lived. In writing about the formation of the colonial town, Amodei described the emerging condition as one where two models coexisted uncomfortably in the Médina-new city that was not considered a functioning unity (1985). The result of this relationship was the marginalization of the old city and the burgeoning of the Villeneuve.

Through the early twentieth century, the politicians and planners struggled to more clearly integrate the modern city with the Médina that it had already fully engulfed. One of the most ambitious projects was the planning and implementation of a ring road replacing the old walls of the Médina (Figure 7). “European” buildings were built along the new road. As the city continued to expand outward and connections to the suburban settlements enhanced through tramways and rail lines, the value of the historic center was increasingly questioned. However, by this time, an anticipated byproduct of colonization began to surface. Increasing volumes of rural mi-

Figure 7. Notice the traces of the old wall around the city. The vacant land and large building blocks in the Hafsia Quarter (top right of image) contrast sharply the dense fabric of the Médina.
grants began arriving in Tunis as a result of the restructuring of agricultural practices and the introduction of modern machinery (Amodei, 1985). One of the primary receiving areas for this population was the Médina, where housing was inexpensive due to low land values, deteriorating physical conditions of the buildings, and lack of functional significance.

As physical and social conditions in the Médina were rapidly changing, the historic significance of the old city was incorporated into planning documents. In the 1920 municipal plan, concerning the “ancient” city, the general view and vocabulary were that of the colonial period (Amodei, 1985). To the Europeans, the Médina was a romantic and exotic stage set. The plan used phrases like “This old picturesque city which makes our city incomparable to all the oriental cities of the Mediterranean basin, and which attracts tourists and artists.” The plan seems to have recognized the importance of the Médina urging new planning proposals to be made with great prudence and avoiding large-scale interventions in favor of incremental projects. However, though insightful and proactive, this document seems to have carried little weight in determining urban projects in the years to come.

By 1931, a new municipal plan had been developed, de-emphasizing the historic center and proposing bold interventions. The plan did not protect the Médina and, in fact, no longer emphasized a clear separation of it from the rest of the city: “It seems quite unlikely to think of building today the separation between the ancient and the new city, where the ramparts are no more” (Royer, 1932). The plan proposed condemning and demolishing the old Jewish quarter (La Hara, now known as La Hafsia), where there were “plenty” of deteriorated buildings to make room for a new European quarter, crossed by a 35 meter wide thoroughfare cutting north-south across the Médina. By 1943, partial demolition of La Hafsia and the construction of three blocks on a European pattern had begun (Amodei, 1985). Additionally, this area of the Médina sustained damage from bombing raids during Second World War. In 1954, La Hafsia was declared a zone for renewal, discouraging all private maintenance, thus exponentially expediting a process of

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4 The affluent Jewish population began departing La Hara in the early 20th century to live in the new European Quarter to the east of the Médina. The area was officially declared a health hazard in 1928 by local authorities and following Independence in 1956, most of the Tunisian Jews emigrated to Israel or France (Lawless, 1981). The Jewish population in Tunisia today accounts for less than 1 percent of the country’s total population.
deterioration already in an advance stage (Ferretti, 1992).

Independence from France in 1956 initiated considerable changes in the socio-economic conditions of the Médina. The European community represented almost a third of the city’s total population before independence, but within a decade it had declined to below four percent (Lawless, 1986). The vacuum left behind was quickly filled by the Tunisian Arab bourgeoisie who abandoned the Médina in favor of a more comfortable lifestyle in the Villeneuve or suburbs beyond (Figure 8). Richard Lawless describes the fate of the historic center: “the Médina became a ‘haven of archaisms’ to a class that rejected it as a place to live, as a place to conduct business and most importantly perhaps, as a place to learn and worship” (1986). The vacancies in turn left by this exodus were almost immediately filled by refugees from housing settlements demolished by the government in other parts of the city, but the vast majority were rural migrants from across the country. These newcomers rushed in to occupy the emptying houses and palaces, which were subdivided and rented out by absentee landlords (Lawless, 1981).

Preserving the Médina

The image of the Médina suffered considerably in the minds of most Tunisians, but by the 1960s, the municipality, recognizing an untapped tourism potential, began a gradual process of building restoration. As momentum grew, a movement strengthened to create a body that would cope with the long-range problems of the Médina and coordinate
projects within its boundaries (Micaud, 1976). The result was the ASM (Association Sauvegarde de la Médina de Tunis), founded in 1967 under the guidance of UNESCO and the municipality of Tunis. Its charge was to conduct a series of extensive, multidisciplinary studies that would help direct future planning efforts in the old city. Due to this early groundwork, UNESCO committed itself to undertake the Project Tunis-Carthage (PTC) completed in 1973. The project has been criticized for focusing too much on the Médina only as a tourist attraction in conjunction with Carthage and devoting the majority of its energies on plans for the protection, rehabilitation, and archeological exploitation of the area centering on Carthage (Micaud, 1976). Nevertheless UNESCO’s involvement unquestionably placed Tunis in an international spotlight. The organization’s technical experts worked in conjunction with ASM in completing an exhaustive study of the Médina that laid the foundation for planning the project known as Hafsia I.

**Housing for the Poor: Learning from the Past**

The plan ASM prepared outlining the rehabilitation of the Hafsia quarter proposed the reconstruction of the covered *souks* (bazaars), the maintenance of street patterns, and new housing on vacant land, built in the traditional style for low-income families that had been displaced (Lawless, 1978) (Figure 9). The plan was based on a socio-economic survey (begun in 1972) of the projected inhabitants.

![Figure 9. Hafsia I reconnected the zigzagging linear souk, adding 100 new shops to the community as well a school (seen as two larger squares). The dashed line represents the second phase of reconstruction, Hafsia II.](image)

7 The French word *sauvegarde* does not literally translate into safeguarding, though in ASM’s English documents their name is written as the Association for the Safeguarding of the Médina. A more appropriate translation for the *sauvegarde* is “preservation,” as referenced in UNESCO’s French/English/Spanish Index of Descriptors (http://www.ulcc.ac.uk/unesco/french/list18.htm).
including their background and income level, their re-
quirements regarding dwelling size and layout, and a com-
mercial study on the shops needed (AKTC, 1983). Armed
with this information, ASM prepared a project brief out-
lining three primary components: the building of 95
housing units, the reconstruction of Souk el Hout with
nearly 100 shops, and the construction of 22 offices (Fig-
ure 10). Local officials and some architects who recom-
manded high-rise apartment buildings instead of the neo-
traditional development pushed by ASM contested the
urban design of the project. The designs presented in
the brief completed in May 1973 prevailed and by the
end of the year construction began. The project was
completed in April 1978 at an estimated cost of $3.7 mil-
lion.¹

The Aga Khan Trust for Culture described the mixed achievements of Hafsia I in a
technical review five years after its completion. The objective of maintaining a harmoni-
ous relationship with the existing urban morphology was achieved yet the objective of
“providing appropriate housing solutions for the poor from neighboring areas was al-
most a complete failure” (AKTC, 1983). Articles in the popular press reaffirmed this
bittersweet accomplishment even as the project was presented with an Aga Khan Award
for Architecture in 1983. In that same year both Architectural Record and Architectural
Review cited the master jury’s concern that the result of the project was “flawed in both
its detail and execution (the scheme is largely in situ concrete with brick infill) – and
flawed socially because it does not cater for the poorest inhabitants of the Médina.”

The physical development of the area followed quite closely to the ASM’s guidelines, but
its social concerns were essentially ignored. Why did this happen? The most commonly
cited reason is that local politicians insisted on a more prestigious operation eliminating
the poorest inhabitants in the process of raising the housing standards midway through
the project. While it is not entirely clear that the politicians were the only reason for the

¹ I have chosen to describe all costs in US$ instead of Tunisian Dinar (TD) to simplify compari-
sions. Where U.S. dollars were cited I used them and in other cases I converted figures using a
.5TD to 1USD ratio in 1980 and 1 to 1 ratio in 1990. Bearing in mind variances in exchange rates
and the fact that I did not adjust figures for inflation, the costs cited should only be used as
approximations.
betrayal of social goals, the result was strikingly apparent. The terms of sale were a down payment with the balance to be paid off in 20 years with installments of $30 to $60 a month, yet the median income in the Hafsia quarter was around $33 a month (Figure 11). Due to this disparity, only the wealthy members of neighboring communities could afford to buy a house, thereby resulting in a large percentage of new residents belonging to more affluent social sectors (AKTC, 1983).

Hafsia I failed on numerous social goals but still the project proved to be a valuable precedent, perhaps even a transitional catalyst toward a new way of designing revitalization projects. The Award recognized its flaws, but hoped that future projects would build on the lessons learned. The Award citation presented a constructive scenario to these challenges:

Yet such shortcomings were not unexpected in a first attempt by the Tunisian authorities in dealing differently with the problems of urban housing in the Médina. Subsequent phases of the program will build upon the experience gained in the first step in a continuing search for culturally sensitive and economically viable design solutions (AKTC, 1985).

The project was hailed as the first large-scale renovation project of its kind in an Islamic country. The building knitted back together a piece of the old city with a linear Souk, infill buildings and residential complexes respecting the architectural integrity of the existing neighborhood. Hafsia I brought new commercial and residential life into what had been a barren and forsaken quarter of the Médina. Equally important, the project set an urban design standard for subsequent phases of development. Upon this foundation, ASM set about building another case for low-income housing in the area.

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The developer S.N.I.T. (Société Nationale Immobiliare de Tunisie) was a public corporation commissioned by the city.
Even before the completion of Hafsia I, ASM in collaboration with international experts and organizations began developing a “new and improved” version. Hafsia II (or the Third Urban Project) was based on the following five principles:

1) Integrated projects. All architectural, urban, demographic, socio-economic, and employment data should be simultaneously taken into consideration.
2) User participation. Financial and institutional incentives should be given to private owners to undertake rehabilitation.
3) Urban continuity. Renovation areas should not adjoin derelict areas but should be entirely surrounded by rehabilitation zones.
4) Social solidarity. In order to displace as few as possible of the urban poor already living in the neighborhood, the incoming, more affluent inhabitants should pay a higher share of the costs.
5) Replicability. To ensure the spread of the rehabilitation projects to the rest of the Médiina, appropriate funding and agencies should be set up and cost recovery of expenses should be as high as possible.

The Tunisian government jointly developed Hafsia II with the Municipality and the World Bank, and by 1983 the project had been officially adopted.10 In addition to the five general objectives, the functional requirements can be grouped into three main components: an infrastructure upgrading project concerning street networks and utilities, rehabilitation and reuse of decaying structures, and building on vacant land and on sites cleared by demolition (Fadel, 1995).

The project statistics are much more impressive for low-income communities than Hafsia I. There were 11,500 total dwelling units in the Médina at this time with a median size of less than two rooms (Vigier, 1987). Hafsia II rehabilitated about 600 residential units and added another 400 with new construction. Commercial space and offices were built and roads upgraded. New community services including a hammam (public bathhouse), clinic, nursery, post office and additional parking spaces were added. Functionally, the project added considerably to life in the Médina. Architecturally, the project built off of Hafsia I, respecting the traditional courtyard housing style and irregular street patterns of the old city. The project, partially financed by the World Bank, was completed in 1993 with the total cost (not including the price of land) at just over $13.5 million.11 Again, in 1995 ASM and the Municipality were recognized for their revitalization efforts.

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10 The developer for Hafsia II was AARU (Agence de Réhabilitation et Rénovation Urbaine), a new agency created to oversee revitalization projects in the city of Tunis.
11 Estimates for the World Bank loan vary in range from 20 percent to 50 percent of the total project cost in written documents. According to an interview with an ASM director, the World Bank funded 49 percent of project costs, with the rest covered by the Tunisian government.
when Hafsia II won an Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKTC, 1995).

Low-income residents from the adjacent communities benefited considerably with the implementation of Hafsia II. Minimum standards of housing were established and the rent was capped at 18 percent of their income per month for the very poor. For those who opted and qualified to buy, a monthly payment of about 22 percent of the household income was set (Fadel, 1995). The strategy of cross-subsidizing the lower-income residents in social housing with higher income units in private developments allowed the project to financially sustain itself and ensured the availability of affordable housing in the area (Figure 12). According to ASM, the units in the Hafsia quarter are now 95 percent owner occupied (Faika, 2000a). Yet if this is correct, then it implies that only 5 percent of the units are for the very poor. Of the 134 families that were directly affected by new construction and demolition, two-thirds did not qualify to buy a house. The question remains then, what happens to this lower income tier of the existing population? Out of these families, 23 were rehoused in rental units within the Hafsia and the remaining 65 families rehoused in subsidized housing outside the Médina (Fadel, 1995). Still, Hafsia II added nearly 400 units and rehabilitated another 600, certainly a praiseworthy endeavor.

Relocation and Renovation

With the public component of Hafsia II completed, ASM launched and devoted its attention to an innovative project to tackle severe overcrowded conditions throughout the Médina. The old city had been a receptor of rural migrants since the establishment of the French Protectorate in the late 19th century, but after Independence the inward migration from the countryside intensified. This population found shelter wherever they

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To qualify to own a housing unit in the Hafsia a family must have minimum income exceeding $150 a month.
could in subdivided houses of absentee landlords who recently abandoned the Médina in favor of the Villeneuve. These accommodations began to be called *oukalas* in reference to buildings traditionally providing accommodation for men passing through the city.\(^\text{13}\) The consequences of this level of residential density results in health risks of alarming proportions and the degradation of the area's rich inventory of historic buildings (Ferretti, 1992). The UNESCO study in the early 1970s had identified widespread existence of the overcrowding in the Médina, but it was two more decades before ASM was able to fully concentrate on this particular condition.

In December 1990, as part of the “National Programme of Reabsorption of Spontaneous Housing,” a slum clearance program, the national government mandated that the Municipality of Tunis develop a plan for the Médina (Ettehadieh, 1998). In conjunction with this program, ASM initiated the Oukalas Project (1991) in an effort to link heritage and social concerns by upgrading more than 600 oukalas, affecting nearly 3000 families (Faika, 2000b). The project’s two main objectives were rehabilitating the buildings endangered by overcrowding and lack of maintenance and saving architecturally and historically significant buildings. An extensive survey determined which buildings could still be rescued and which were unsalvageable. In the buildings that could be restored the occupants were temporarily relocated during the project. Those that were nearing collapse were evacuated immediately and slated for demolition.

Differing from both Hafsia projects where net housing units were added to the stock in the Médina, the result of the Oukalas Project was an overall decrease in available housing alternatives in the historic city. Thus their fundamental challenge was not how to rehabilitate the deteriorating stock (for this ASM had a proven track record), but to develop a system for equitable housing distribution amongst its low-income residents. The 1218 households living in 256 severely dangerous buildings were evacuated and rehoused by the Municipality in three sites on the western periphery of the city (Faika, 2000b). Eighty percent of these households were not normally eligible for social housing according to the current Tunisian regulations and the average income was one-third below the monthly minimum wage of $145 (Ettehadieh, 1998). The conditions of the resettlement for this very low income group gave them a unique opportunity to own their own home. In the

\(^{13}\) For the purpose of the revitalization project, ASM defined an “oukala” as any structure housing more than four families without parental connections, referring to density rather than the traditional use of this type of building as men’s hostel. In their survey they found in some cases that buildings have housed more than 20 families.
new housing area, the municipality established sale-by-rent agreements lasting 25 years with repayments ranging from $32 to $37 per month. At the same time this population was at once moved to the periphery of the city, far from their social surroundings and current employment opportunities.

The natural reaction to this resettlement project is generally skeptical, but it may be too soon to fully assess the impacts on the displaced population. ASM has reassured potential critics that most residents, originally from rural communities, jumped at the offer of land tenure (Mouhli, 2000). Advocates point out that development of the new settlement districts included play areas for children, upgrading of adjacent school systems, transportation improvements and new social services, providing among other assistance, job placement. Yet, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture cautioned against celebrating too quickly the achievements of the resettlement project costing more than $15 million, and financed through local and national sources. The report cited the potential of creating pockets of poverty, increased commuting times to work, and reduced access to services (Ettehadieh, 1998). In fact, the project was nominated for an Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1998, and though the Jury’s reasons for not accepting it are confidential, there is a possibility that concern regarding issues of displacement had an impact on its decision. Without additional studies and field interviews it would be senseless to try to accurately portray the socio-economic conditions of those displaced to the periphery.

The remaining 400 buildings in the Médina (occupied by some 1600 families) included in the Oukalas Project were in fair enough condition to be able to undergo renovation. In order to facilitate this upgrading, the Municipality borrowed $15 million from the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (FADES). The loan has been used as a revolving fund, with money being lent out to homeowners at below market rates (5 percent) payable over 15 years (Faika, 2000b). The households in these buildings were temporarily relocated. Additional incentives such as tax exemptions and new legislation concerning the management of jointly owned buildings have helped spur private investment in the Médina. The same Aga Khan Trust for Culture report that questions the resettlement component praises the work within the Médina. It attributes the project with raising public awareness about the old city, thus encouraging the upgrading of neighborhoods and attracting increasing numbers of private investors (Ettehadieh, 1998). The entire Oukalas Project was estimated to cost upwards of $70 million, but its leveraging power has been considerably greater, spurring development in the Médina and other parts of the city.
The image of the Médina is changing, low-income residents are living in improved conditions alongside their better off neighbors, pride is returning to an area long neglected by the culture whose heritage it represents. Civic and professional leaders were able to persuade the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development to invest in “upgrading” funds in a historic neighborhood. These were early, if not the first, projects of these two international organizations in World Heritage cities. That Tunis has been able to accomplish considerable gains is in no small part due to strong political leadership. ASM works closely with the municipality. In fact, its President is the Mayor of Tunis. Nevertheless, in Hafsia I the political pressure was too strong to allow for low-income units to be constructed as planned. It is unclear precisely how this was overcome in Hafsia II, but part of the answer may lie in the fact that international funding from the World Bank dictated that a percentage of units be allocated to affordable housing. Tunis has proven the value of such an investment, but not only in economic terms. Jobs have been created and private investment has been leveraged to help increase the number of quality low-income housing units.
Chapter Four. Quito, Ecuador

The historic center of Quito, arguably the largest preserved colonial city in South America, has taken considerable strides in revitalizing its neighborhoods for a mix of residents. UNESCO placed the historic core of Quito on its World Heritage list in 1979. In addition to international support resulting from the listing, Quito has been able to leverage funding for revitalization of its urban heritage in the wake of disaster assistance contributed after the earthquake of 1987. Since then, several organizations and semi-autonomous agencies have been established to develop and manage projects. Collaborating with international non-profit organizations and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a low-income housing program was begun in 1994. The program is nearly halfway toward its goal of providing an additional 1000 affordable housing units in the historic center. The evolution of conservation policy in Quito and the lessons learned through international interventions demonstrate the feasibility of implementing projects that benefit the existing residents of a community.

Quito was founded in 1534 by Spanish conquistador Sebastián de Benalcázar, and laid out on a grid plan (Levin, 1994). The city developed, albeit slowly, for the next three centuries as a sophisticated urban center and held on to its position of prominence until the arrival of the railroad from the port city of Guayaquil in the early 20th century. The railroad opened up trade with the rest of the country and the world beyond, thus instigating a rapid process of urban change (Figure 13). The urban center began to lose its social importance and its traditional inhabitants, the elite left for areas in the northern part of the city, seeking new levels of residential comfort.

Figure 13. The original city grid is still clearly seen in the historic city center, abandoned by the wealthy in the 20th century for new high-rises and residential housing to the north.
(Zaaier, 1991). Poorer residents who had been living on the periphery and rural migrants quickly filled the void left by the more affluent classes. As a result, the physical condition of the buildings began a downward spiral of deterioration. What had been single-family homes of the wealthy were subdivided and rented out room by room by absentee landlords to a low-income population.

Preserving Historic Quito

In describing the emergence of conservation policies in Quito, Bromley and Jones (1995) suggest that these policies can be grouped into three phases: a pre-1966 phase of benign neglect; the period of 1966-1987 characterized by attempts at control; and the post-1987 phase of imaginative intervention. The groupings are instructional for discussing the evolution of a preservation framework in the city. The first phase was marked by the Plan Jones (1942) that included a delimitation of an historic area focusing on the preservation of particular monuments, and was followed by the first protective legislation in 1945. Both plans focused on monumental colonial heritage and neither stemmed the tide of demolition by neglect or controlled modern infill buildings in the historic core. The second phase began with landmark legislation in 1966 that officially recognized the historic center, creating an oversight commission to regulate activities within the delimited area. At this time the potential for tourism was also recognized as benefit to revitalization work. Again, little was discussed of the worsening condition of housing conditions. The construction of transport arteries to the north, the development of industries to the south, and the oil boom of the mid 1970s exacerbated the conditions in the geographically constrained historic center.

The conditions in the historic core were brought to the world’s attention when in 1979 UNESCO listed it as a World Heritage site. Activity generated by the recognition resulted in the creation of a new institution, the Instituto Nacional de Patrimonio Cultural (INPC), followed by new national legislation. The 1979 law of Cultural Heritage spelled out the role of the INPC, giving it a joint responsibility with the commission to oversee work in the historic area (Bromley and Jones, 1995). The first task of the new organization was to carry out an extensive inventory with the buildings included in it.

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Figure 14. Urban development, constrained by topography on two sides, sprawled out exponentially in the 20th Century.
subject to protection and control. Bromley and Jones sum up their evaluation of the second phase of conservation planning in Quito by lamenting that neither intervention nor control was successful during this period:

Despite the recognition of the historic center as a special study area in the Plan Quito of 1980, which encouraged a move away from the preservation of individual buildings to embrace an area approach, the period witnessed little positive intervention by the state (1995:45).

Nevertheless, Quito had made progress from the idea of conserving singular monuments to a concept of area wide planning and protection. The groundwork had been laid for the phase of conservation policy.

*From Disaster to Revitalization*

The earthquake of March 1987 prompted the creation of new institutions to deal with both the repair of buildings and future development in the historic core. This disaster followed a period of growing pressure for action in the historic center, combined with a growing concern for social problems in the area. A new organization called FONSAL (*Fondo de Salvamento*) was established in December 1987, which was responsible in conjunction with the municipality for managing restoration projects and raising funds. A second institution, Fundacion Caspicara was set up as a semi-autonomous "private" body with a major fundraising role. Finally, an extensive inventory in 1989 of all historic buildings highlighted 998 buildings that needed assistance, prompting a new ordinance to be passed giving the commission for the historic center considerable authority to control development in the delimited area (Bromley and Jones, 1995).

The natural disaster had once more focused international attention on Quito, prompting renewed vigor in preservation activities. The earthquake damaged mostly religious monuments and a few private properties, but its impact was magnified and successfully used as a catalyst to leverage international technical assistance and funding (Bromley and Jones, 1995). Technical assistance was provided by Japan, Bulgaria, Poland, Italy and Belgium. FONSAL was able to channel funding from the Spanish government, the *Junta de Andalucia*, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ), the Organiza-

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14 FONSAL’s revenue was derived from a 3 percent levy on entrance fees to public entertainment shows, 10 percent of the budget of the Federal Emergency Program (FONEN), an 8 percent levy on income tax within Quito and private tax-deductible donations (Bromley and Jones, 1995).
tion of American States (OAS) and the Getty Foundation (Bromley and Jones, 1995). While much of the aid was designated toward earthquake related activities, some organizations initiated a broader emphasis on the revitalization of Quito (Figure 15).\textsuperscript{15}

The Getty Foundation’s involvement began in 1990 by cosponsoring a conference with the Municipality and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on the conservation of historic centers. In describing his organizations approach to Quito, Miguel Angel Corzo, Director of the Getty Conservation Institute in 1994 stated: “We do not view our involvement in Quito as only a technical exercise in architectural conservation . . . Rather, we see it as a contribution to improving the human condition in a place that in the past has contributed so much to enriching the human spirit” (Afshar, 1994). With this humanistic vision as a guide, the Institute began a study of \textit{Calle Garcia Moreno} in 1992.

Getty’s involvement may not have directly resulted in socio-economic improvements, but its presence and collaboration with local organizations and residents helped renew the self-image they had of their urban center. The site was chosen precisely because of its “abundance of outstanding colonial and post-colonial religious, civic, and residential buildings” (Afshar, 1994). The final report included complete photo-documentation and mapping of eight city blocks in addition to comprehensive paint analysis and the development of a detailed historic color scheme. No sooner had the report been finished then some owners began to voluntarily paint their buildings according to the guidelines. The main challenge identified by Getty was to “collectively

\textbf{Figure 15.} Quito has always been known for its ecclesiastical architecture and after the earthquake of 1987, foreign governments and organizations rushed in to assist in the rebuilding efforts.

\textsuperscript{15} It should noted that the Getty Conservation Institute also participated in this realm by cosponsoring an international colloquium on seismic stabilization followed by a training workshop for architects and engineers employed by the city and other official organizations. In addition the Getty Grant Program awarded grants for the structural stabilization of the Church of La Merced, damaged in the 1987 earthquake.
find approaches that respect the built environment without overlooking human needs, ones that bridge the gap between strictly purist and pragmatic conservation strategies” (Afshar, 1994) (Figure 16). The main challenge left for Quito in the wake of a flood of international attention, was to find ways to more effectively include the existing low-income residents during subsequent revitalization efforts.16

_Housing for the Poor: Early Stages_

Quito accepted the challenge of planning for low-income residents and in 1994 established the _Empresa del Centro Historico de Quito_ (ECH).17 The primary mechanism for undertaking rehabilitation projects was a unique condition allowing ECH to form partnerships with the private sector, making it more appealing by shouldering the burden of financial risk. In collaboration with the national government, the ECH began a pilot program to preserve a mix of land uses while minimizing any adverse impact on poor households in the historic area, implementing a low-cost housing program focusing on the rehabilitation of residential buildings. The ECH was designed to function primarily as a real estate promoter and developer, concerned with real estate ventures that have the greatest impact on the rehabilitation of the historic city regardless of their profitability (Rojas, 1999).

In 1994, the IDB approved a $41 million loan to help finance the ECH’s first six years of existence. By 1995, 75 percent of the approximately 17,000 housing units in the historic center were rented by low-income tenants. The majority of the residents lived in overcrowded conditions, almost 75 percent in multi-family homes, with half of them sharing with three or four other families (Rojas, 1999). It was clear that the housing conditions were only worsening and a solution was desperately needed. To combat this, ECH

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16 Rosemary D. F. Bromley (1998) strongly urges us to consider the fate of the street vendors after revitalization in “Informal Commerce: Expansion and Exclusion in the Historic Center of the Latin American City.” This population, of course, is also part of a low-income community utilizing Quito’s urban core, but is beyond the scope of my current research focusing primarily on residents of the historic center.

17 Roughly translated as the “Semi-Public Corporation for Development of the Historic City Center.”
developed a low-income housing program with a goal of providing 1000 housing units in rehabilitated historic buildings over a five-year period (Figure 17). PACT-ARIM 93, a French non-governmental organization specializing on slum revitalization provided additional technical assistance. Target groups were households with monthly incomes of $280 to $800 that do not own their own homes but have some savings. Up to one-third of the cost of the apartment can be subsidized by the Ministry of Urbanization and Housing. The money recovered from the mortgages and down payments was recycled by ECH to finance the rehabilitation of more units (Mangurian, 1999). After the initial investment, the housing program was established to act as a self-financing revolving fund.

The ECH coordinated and managed practically all real estate activities related to the project. They purchased all the buildings to be rehabilitated that were not already government owned; identified beneficiaries, some who were current tenants and occupants and others from a list of applicants; prepared project documents including permitting; developed financing plans; coordinated temporary relocation of occupant during renovation; supervised projects; marketed finished units; and assumed temporary management of the buildings when they were first occupied (Rojas, 1999). The political and economic crisis of 1999 slowed down a process that had been well underway since the mid 1990s. The projects that were started have been completed and as long as the costs are maintained at $300/square meter, the $2 million revolving fund will continue to feed into future projects (Rojas, 2000). So far, 400 housing units have already been renovated and sold in the historic center.18

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18 Diego Ponce, former Equadorian Minister of Housing, discussed the current status and challenges with the low-income housing program in an IDB Seminar “New Directions in Heritage Preservation in Latin America and the Caribbean,” held in conjunction with their annual meeting in New Orleans, on March 28th, 2000.
It remained unclear which segment of the low-income community ECH’s project was meant to benefit. The minimum monthly household income for four in 1994 was $164 and the target groups for the housing project were those with monthly household incomes nearly two to five times this amount. Additionally, tenants were required to make a 25 percent down payment. This alone may have been cost prohibitive for the poor, even if necessary to ensure the project’s financial viability (Figure 18). While rehabilitated buildings have generally opened additional capacity because they made more rational use of space, this increased capacity was also a result of the condition that not all current occupants met the requirements in terms of minimum savings or ability to pay (Rojas, 1999). It is arguable that it was not feasible to accommodate households without significant savings and monthly incomes over $200, but the question remains: What would happen to those below this economic barrier? How could this segment of the population be planned for? What steps could be taken to provide housing for them?

Quito has begun a remarkable initiative to provide housing for the existing lower income community in its historic city center. There are still many questions lingering about how the project will proceed in the coming years and how the poorest of the poor will be accommodated. The project is still too young to fully ascertain its influence at a broader scale, but preliminary analysis has shown positive implications for the future of low cost housing in the historic city. Wealthier people are beginning to move back and private capital is slowly returning to the city center. Some caution that, in order to more fruitfully move forward, Quito will have to fully break free of its reliance on overseas funding. Bromley and Jones worry about the increasing conditionality of foreign assis-

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Figure 18. There is a vast improvement in housing conditions as shown here at Calle Caldas, but not everyone can afford to buy.

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In order to derive a baseline monthly household income I used the per capital minimum wage of $41 for Ecuador from 1990-94, as cited in the World Bank’s 1999 World Development Indicators, and multiplied it by four.
tance, pointing toward the IDB condition that the work be profitable and the Getty seeking a more supervisory role (Bromley and Jones, 1995). Their concern is valid, nevertheless the Municipality and its partners have been able to make great strides in the physical realm. Quito's history with revitalization in its historic center is long, yet its experience with low-income housing there is still young. While the city has much to learn from its early initiatives, its efforts in a relatively short time span have been nothing less than commendable.
Chapter Five. Directions for Intervention

There are many differences inherent in the revitalization of the Media in Tunis and of the Historic Center of Quito. Among these are the initial impetus for preservation, the timing of international support of local initiatives, and the mechanisms through which each project intended to reach the poor. Yet the experiences of Tunis and Quito also share some common features. Central to this thesis is the fact that projects in both cases have reached at least a portion of the low-income residents. Further, the process through which this was achieved was carried out in the context of four common elements, namely resident participation, an effective semi-public development agency, an outside catalyst, and improvement of image, locally, nationally and internationally. Each of these are discussed below:

1. Resident Participation – “Policies are urgently required which involve the participation and interests of the low-income residents themselves, and which respond to the socio-economic realities and real needs” (Lawless, 1986:160). Both cases incorporated these recommendations into their plans. ASM began their project in the Médina with a socio-economic survey. By doing so they not only collected data on what the existing residents felt was important, but they also ensured that they would maintain a vested interest in the successful implementation of the project. In Quito, residents were closely involved with the design of the low-income housing program, ensuring that financially affordable payment plans were established. This helped ensure that the initial units developed were quickly sold to low-income residents.

2. Semi-Public Development Agency – The planning and implementation of complex revitalization projects can be significantly facilitated by semi-autonomous development agencies. In Tunis, the ASM was able to utilize different funding sources for each phase of their work. Using city financing, a World Bank loan and a loan from the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (FADES), they were able to undertake three major initiatives over the same number of decades. ECH was established in Quito as a semi-public agency to act primarily as real estate developer concerned with ventures that achieve socially-oriented goals, regardless of their profitability. This unique arrangement allowed for the agency to shoulder financial risks encouraging private real estate investors. Additionally, ECH coordinated the multi-lateral funding by the IDB and with technical assistance from the French non-profit organization PACT-ARIM 93. The flexibility and fiscal freedom from governmental bureaucracy has enabled ECH and ASM
to carry out projects targeted toward low-income residents with an efficiency and expediency that would be otherwise difficult to achieve through traditional channels.

3. *International Catalyst* – The recognition of World Heritage listing has been used to galvanize local support and enlist international funding and technical assistance for Tunis and Quito. The preparation of a nomination entailed an exhaustive survey, taking note of both architectural and socio-economic conditions. Denis Lesage, an architect for the project in Tunis describes the World Bank’s greatest contribution as not the financing, but the organizational and technical capacity building required by them before the first construction began.²⁰ He credits them with helping to emphasize local social issues and bringing organizations and agencies together who had not previously worked as a team.

In Quito, it had been nearly a decade since World Heritage listing and little progress had been made in revitalizing the historic center. When the earthquake of 1987 hit, the world suddenly awoke to deteriorating conditions in the city. Numerous countries rushed in with emergency assistance. Quito was able to tap into the attention by developing projects beyond the scope of disaster relief, collaborating on short-term projects with the Getty and developing a long-term low-income housing solution with the IDB. Local capacity to harness the momentum of international interventions has sparked a new wave of revitalization projects in historic centers around the world.

4. *Improving Image* – The value of improving the international, national and, most importantly, the local image of a historic center cannot be overlooked. The recognition by UNESCO certainly heightened the perceptions of areas of the city that had been abandoned by the wealthy class left to the poor without the resources to maintain the architectural fabric. Physical decay accompanied a deterioration of image in Tunis and Quito over the last half-century. However with World Heritage listing in 1979, suddenly the world was paying attention to the heritage of these two cities. The striking image of the Hafsia I project was so strong it was given an Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA) in 1983, despite its failure to achieve its social goals. So desperate was the need of a model for revitalization in historic Islamic cities that the jury recognized Hafsia’s intentions rather than complete achievements. Suha Ozkan, Director General of the AKAA attributed the award with providing enough momentum from the first phase (Hafsia I) of a

²⁰ I spoke at length with Denis Lesage in his offices at the *Institute National du Patrimone* in Tunis, where he currently is the Coordinator of the *Cours de Tunis*, a training program organized by ICCROM and funded by the European Union, to train local architects in the practices of restoration and renovation in historic cities.
broader revitalization agenda, to enable Hafsia II to come to fruition. Hafsia II built off the lessons learned from the past, building the low-income housing they had intended to in the first phase, and in turn won an AKAA in 1995. Getty’s collaborative Calle Garcia Moreno project has been criticized for its superficiality, focusing primarily on a color scheme for building facades. Yet, it is difficult to ignore the impact on the image of the old city this project had on existing residents and potential private investors. In both Tunis and Quito, image improvement has led to significant changes in perceptions and thus contributed to revitalization efforts, increasing local pride and securing a broad base of support.

In this thesis, I have discussed how these four elements have contributed to revitalization projects that have to some extent benefited poor residents. I offer these not as a template for success, but as one more step toward a better understanding of how to make historic preservation compatible with social and economic gains of underprivileged communities in developing countries.

For every question I raised in the course of this research, many new questions emerged. Answering some of these would have undoubtedly strengthened my understanding of these cases and the analysis I derived from them (advantages of hindsight!). Others were beyond the scope of this paper, yet nevertheless fundamental in understanding the social, economic and political processes underlying, or accompanying, the changes in physical structure resulting from revitalization projects. I close then, by presenting some of these questions, particularly those pertaining to 1) the role of charters on the practice of revitalization, 2) the influence of external funding on the design and implementation of revitalization projects, and 3) the social and economic impacts of these projects on low-income communities.

First, in my discussion of charters, very little is offered in the way of explaining how the ideology embodied in these documents is actually translated into practice. No guidance is provided as to appropriate institutional arrangements, funding mechanisms, or the incorporation of public participation in the development and implementation of revitalization projects. In what ways do charters really influence the design of revitalization projects? What is the process by which countries learn to incorporate the principles of

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21 In a recent presentation at MIT entitled “Validation and Change: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture,” Suha Ozkan described the role and impact of this recognition on the revitalizations efforts in the Médina.
revitalization in the context of their own projects?

Second, external influence on domestic preservation strategies is transmitted not only through international charters and conventions, but perhaps even more strongly through international sources of funding. To what extent do agencies like the World Bank and the IDB influence the design and implementation of these projects? How are the technical assistance and guidance provided by these agencies institutionalized in the receiving country? How does dependence on external funding constrain local action? Is indigenous knowledge on preservation incorporated in outside funded projects, or do countries have to follow outside “experts”?

Finally, my precursory analysis shows that low-income communities have benefited to some extent from revitalization projects in Tunis and Quito. The extent to which they benefit, however, remains to be seen. How has improved housing or relocation influenced their standards of living? Have traditional communal ties been damaged by the alterations of the physical environment? Is displacement banishment from society or an opportunity for a new life? Have some segments of the low-income population gained more than others from these projects? And in what ways can we incorporate the poorest of the poor in the revitalization of our historic centers?

The questions are numerous and each in turn lead to other sets of inter-related questions. The task of answering them is daunting if taken together, but faced singly they are more manageable. An incremental approach is by far the most effective way to start. Tunis and Quito have already begun, and by doing so invited the world to learn from their challenges and celebrate their achievements.
Appendix A. Definition of Terms

It is interesting note that very few charters or project documents include in them a set of definitions. The Burra Charter is significant not only for its ideology but also for its structure. It introduces its principles with a set of definitions, interpreting the meanings of terms critical to participating in a common dialogue. For the purpose of this thesis I will use the definitions listed below from the Burra Charter, in addition to on which I have added defining urban revitalization.

*Conservation* means all the processes of looking after a place so as to retain its cultural significance. It includes maintenance and may according to circumstances include preservation, restoration, reconstruction and adaptation and will be commonly a combination of more than one of these.

*Cultural Significance* means aesthetic, historic, scientific or social value for past, present or future generations.

*Fabric* means all the physical material of a place.

*Maintenance* means the continuous protective care of the fabric, contents and setting of a place, and is to be distinguished from repair. Repair involves restoration and reconstruction and should be treated accordingly.

*Place* means site, area, building or other work, group of buildings or other works together with associated contents and surrounds.

*Preservation* means maintaining the fabric of a place in its existing state and retarding deterioration.

*Restoration* means returning the existing fabric of a place to a known earlier state by removing accretions or by reassembling existing components without the introduction of new material.

*Urban Revitalization* means regenerating not only the fabric, but also the socio-economic conditions and accompanying cultural contexts of a place.
Appendix B. Glossary of International Organizations

*The Aga Khan Trust for Culture* focuses on the improvements of built environments in countries with predominant or significant Muslim populations. Contact: Dr Stefano Bianca, Box 2049, 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. Tel: 41-22-909-7200; fax: 41-22-909-7292; e-mail: aktc@atge.

*The Getty Conservation Institute* works internationally to further appreciation and preservation of the world's cultural heritage. Contact: Getty Conservation Institute, 1200 Getty Center Drive, Suite 700, Los Angeles, CA 90049-1684, USA. Tel: 310-440-7325; fax: 310-40-7702; Web site: http://www.getty.edu/gci.

*International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM)*, an intergovernmental organization created by UNESCO, is mandated to create or improve conditions for the effective conservation of cultural heritage resources worldwide. Contact: ICCROM, 13 Via di San Michele, I-00153 Rome, Italy. Tel: 39-6-585-531; fax: 39-6-5855-3349; e-mail: iccrom@iccrom.org; Web site: http://www.iccrom.org.

*International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)* is an international nongovernmental organization dedicated to the world's historic monuments and sites. ICOMOS is UNESCO's principle advisor in matters concerning the conservation and protection of monuments and sites. Contact: ICOMOS, 49-51 rue de la Federation, 75015 Paris, France. Tel: 331-4567-6770; fax: 331-4566-0622; e-mail: secretariat@icomos.org.

*Organization of World Heritage Cities (OWHC)*, a network of cities listed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, facilitates exchange of knowledge, management techniques and financial resources for protecting monuments and sites. Contact: OWHC, 56 rue Saint-Pierre, Quebec G1K 4A1, Canada. Tel: 1-418-692-0000; fax: 1-418-692-5558; e-mail: secretariat@ovpm.org; Web site: http://www.ovpm.org.


*World Monuments Fund (WMF)* is a private, nonprofit organization that brings together public and private support to safeguard monuments and works of art. Contact: WMF, 949 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10028, USA. Tel: 212-517-9367; fax: 212-517-9494; Web site: http://worldmonuments.org.

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1 This glossary was adapted from the World Bank's Urban Age online publication (http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/urb_age/culture/chcalendar.html)
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Figure 5. Photographed by D. Cooper, 1979, courtesy of MIT Rotch Visual Collections.

Figure 7. From Architecture Mediterraneene, Tunisie: International Architectural Review (ISSN 0709-7909).


Figure 14. and the locator map on page 30. Created by graphic designer Valkira Amoaro Peizer for Old Cities, New Assets: Preserving Latin America's Urban Heritage.

Figure 15. Courtesy MIT Rotch Visual Collections.

Figure 16. Photographed by Eduardo Rojas.

Figure 17. Created by graphic designer Valkira Amoaro Peizer for Old Cities, New Assets: Preserving Latin America's Urban Heritage.

Figure 18. Photographed by Eduardo Rojas.