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# Classical vs Keynesian Theory

# To sum up: What is an Equilibrium?

SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM:  $AD = SRAS$  and  $IS = LM$

- **The Labor Market need not be in equilibrium**
- We need not be at the potential level of GDP  $Y^*$
- If  $Y < Y^*$  we are in a **recession**, if  $Y > Y^*$  in a **boom**

LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM:  $AD = SRAS = Y^*$  and  $IS = LM = Y^*$  and  $N_d = N_s = N^*$

- **By definition, the labor market will clear**
- By definition, we will move to  $Y^*$

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# **Classical Theory**

# Real Business Cycle (RBC)

- What really drives the business cycle?
- **Kydland and Prescott developed the RBC theory that argues that real shocks to the economy are the primary cause of business cycle.**
- Real shocks are shocks that affect the production function, the size of the labor force, the spending and savings decisions,...Nominal shocks are shocks to money supply or demand
- In particular the RBC theory refer to **productivity shocks**
- The RBC theory is consistent with our IS-LM and AD-AS models. A negative productivity shock ( $A$  decreases) has two effects:
  - 1) reduces MPN and hence the demand for labor and  $N^*$
  - 2) Decreases  $Y^*$  directly
- Both effects make  $Y^*$  to decrease (LRAS) and hence LM has to adjust!

# Real Business Cycle (RBC)




Figure by MIT OpenCourseWare.

# Real Business Cycle: Facts

- Consistent with the following stylized facts:
  - 1) Continuous productivity shocks generate recurrent fluctuations
  - 2) Employment will move procyclically
  - 3) Real Wages will be higher in booms
  - 4) Average labor productivity is procyclical
- Fact 4 is crucial: with no productivity shocks, the expansion of employment during booms will tend to reduce average labor productivity because of diminishing marginal returns!
- **Fact against RBC: inflation tends to slow down during or immediately after recessions** (is this evidence controversial?)
- For RBC theory a negative shock is associated with inflation!

# Real Business Cycle: Calibration




Figure by MIT OpenCourseWare.

# Classical Economists

- Classical Economists believe that adjust instantaneously
- This implies that money is neutral, that is, monetary shocks do not affect real variables
- **Evidence: money is very procyclical!**
- Sometimes it can be reverse causation... (Money demand depends both on current and on expected future output!)
- However, more recently there is consensus that money is non-neutral! A classic study is **“A Monetary History of United States, 1867-1960”** by **Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz**. Their findings:
  - 1) Money is procyclical
  - 2) The interrelation between monetary and economic changes has been stable
  - 3) Monetary changes have often had independent origin, they have not been simply a reflection of changes in economic activity (gold discoveries, changes in monetary institutions,...)



# The Misperceptions Theory (Friedman, Lucas)

- A theory to explain an upward sloping aggregate supply, with classical principles
- Extra assumption: producers have imperfect information about the general price level.
- Hence, they sometimes can misinterpret changes in the general price level as changes in the relative prices of the goods that they produce.
- Even though prices are not slow to adjust, the aggregate supply curve can be upward sloping in the short run and money can be non-neutral!
- **The aggregate quantity of output supplied rises above the potential level when aggregate price level is higher than expected.**

# The Misperceptions Theory: Intuition

- Consider a bakery owned and operated by a single baker
- Then the price of bread is the baker's nominal wage and the price of bread relative to the general price level is his real wage!
- Imagine the baker sees that the price of bread goes up. There can be two situations:
  - 1) The price of all goods went up
  - 2) The price of bread went up relative to the price of other goods
- If the price of bread goes up by 5% and the baker expects all prices to go up by 5%, then he believes that his real wage does not change!
- If the price of bread goes up by 5% and the baker expects all prices to go up by 3%, then he thinks that his real wage went up and increases the production of bread!

## The Misperceptions Theory: Intuition (continued)

- Everybody thinks the same!
- The amount of output produced will depend on the actual general price level compared to the expected general price level
- If actual prices are higher than expected producers are fooled into thinking that the relative price of their own goods increased
- A possible representation:


$$Y = Y^* + b^*(P - P^e)$$

- Output exceeds its potential level when prices are higher than expected!
- In the long run people learn what happens to prices and change their expectations accordingly ( $P = P^e$ )!

# Unanticipated Changes in M are non-netural!


- According to the Misperception Theory, unanticipated changes in monetary policy have real effects in the short run.
- The reason: producers are fooled!
- Anticipated changes in monetary policy do not have real effects because the SRAS shifts accordingly.
- Are monetary policy good?
- Not clear because if agents have **rational expectations**, they will predict that the monetary authority will react to shocks and there will be no unexpected monetary policies!

# Unanticipated Increase in M




# Unanticipated Increase in M

Money is non-neutral in the short run!




# Unanticipated Increase in M

In the long run is neutral!




# Anticipated Increase in M





# Anticipated Increase in M

Money is neutral!



As  $M$  increases the AD shifts to the right but also expected prices increase!

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# **Keynesian Theory**

# Road Map


- Recessions may be driven by:
  - **demand shocks** (e.g. current recession)  $\longrightarrow$  P and Y co-move
  - **supply shocks** (e.g. oil shocks)  $\longrightarrow$  P and Y move in  $\neq$  directions
- How to get out from a recession? Self-Correcting Mechanism, Monetary Policy, or Fiscal Policy
- Brief History of the Fed policy: from output targeting to Taylor Rule
- Should the Fed react to asset price bubbles?

## Example 1: Loss in Consumer Confidence

- Consider a loss in consumer confidence as in 1991 (and in the current recession!)
- Change in expectations about the future can have dramatic effects even if not founded!
- What does a loss of consumer confidence affect?
  - No effect on labor demand: **A hasn't really changed**
  - Consumption changes and the **AD and IS curves shift**
  - Some effect on labor supply (income effect): **PVLR decreased**
- **Assumptions for the following example:**
  1. **No income effect on labor supply (labor supply does not move)**
  2. **No change in  $A$  or  $A^f$**
  3. **Consumers are standard PIH, no liquidity constrained, and non-ricardian**
  4. **Upward-sloping SRAS: sticky wages**


# Consumer Confidence: 1978M1 – 2009M1

University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment: Index 1st Quarter 1966=100



# Example 1: Graphical Representation

Assume we start at  $Y^*$




## Example 2: Increase in Oil Prices

- Consider a negative supply shock: an increase in the oil price (as in 1974 and 1979)
- If oil prices increase, firms produce less with same  $N$  and  $K$  (it is like a decrease in  $A$ !)
- What does a permanent increase in oil prices affect?
  - Effect on supply: both **SRAS and LRAS ( $Y^*$ ) shifts to the left**
  - Labor demand shifts to the left: **MPN decreases**
  - Labor supply shifts a bit to the right (income effect): **PVLR is lower**
  - $I$  decreases (MPK lower) and  $C$  decreases (PVLR lower): **AD and IS shift left**
- Assumptions for the following example:
  1. **No income effect on labor supply (labor supply does not move)**
  2. **Consumers are standard PIH, no liquidity constrained, and non-ricardian**
  3. **Upward-sloping SRAS: sticky wages**

## Example 2: Graphical Representation

Responsible (partially) for the 1975 and 1979-1980 recession (OPEC I and II)





# Analyzing Demand and Supply Shocks

- **DEMAND SHOCK:** unemployment and prices move in opposite directions if there are no policies!
- Example: loss in consumer confidence (negative), increase in M (positive)
- **SUPPLY SHOCK:** unemployment and prices to move in the same direction if there are no policies!
- Example: oil shocks (negative) or increase in productivity (positive)
- A negative supply shock is BAD!!!

STAGFLATION: increase in inflation + increase in unemployment

# Reviewing The Data

From First Class:


1. Some falls in GDP were associated with **no increase in prices**.
2. Some falls in GDP were associated with large **increase in prices**.

Do our theories reconcile these facts?

- **YES!** Demand shocks explain (1)
- **YES!** Supply shocks explain (2)

You should really understand the difference between **demand shocks** (things that primarily affect AD) and **supply shocks** (things that primarily affect AS) on the economy - their implications are much different!

# Historical Inflation: 1970M1 - 2008M12



Black line - trend in CPI over time (left axis)

Red line - trend in CPI inflation rate (percentage change in CPI) over time (right axis)

Shaded areas represent "official" recession dates (as calculated by National Bureau of Economic Research)

## Reinterpreting the Business Cycle Data 1970-2008


1970 recession:	Inflation increasing at start of recession! Supply shock: oil price + productivity + misguided Fed policy
1981 recession:	Dramatic decrease in inflation at start of recession Demand shock: Volker (Fed starts to worry about inflation!)
1990 recession:	Little increase in inflation/but low level of inflation Demand shock: fall in consumer confidence
Rapid growth in mid 1990s:	No inflation Positive Supply shock: IT revolution
2001 recession:	No inflation Demand shock: firms overconfidence: inventory adjustment
Current recession:	Inflation first up and then down. Supply: oil shock Demand: credit crunch, confidence loss, drop in wealth

# Self-Correcting Mechanism

- What would happen in the **long-run** after a negative shock if there was no policy?
- A Self-Correcting Mechanism will bring the economy **back to the potential  $Y^*$**
- Mechanism: workers would like to work more, so firms at some point will decrease nominal wages, so that the labor market goes back to equilibrium!
- As nominal wages decrease, it is cheaper to produce and the **SRAS will shift to the right!**
- As wages decrease, prices decrease, the real value of money supply increase and the **LM shifts to the right!**
- As  $M/P$  increases, the equilibrium interest rate has to decrease, stimulating  $I$  and  $C$ !


# Example 1: Self-Correcting Mechanism

Loss of Consumers' Confidence



## Example 2: Self-Correcting Mechanism

Oil price increase



# Fed Policy versus Self-correcting Mechanism

- The Fed may decide to conduct an expansionary monetary policy (increase M) to fight the recession
- Trade-off: Fed policy may speed up the recovery, but pushes prices up!


## COMPARISON:

1. Real variables go back to the same long run equilibrium (both Fed or self-correcting mechanism)
2. BUT prices and nominal wages behave differently: risk of inflation!
3. Fed can increase the speed of adjustment ...




# Example 1: Monetary Policy

Loss of Consumers' Confidence



## Example 2: Monetary Policy

Oil price increase



## The Fed in the '70s: push inflation

- After the negative supply shocks in the mid/late '70s, the Fed adopted a policy mainly based on **fighting the recession by increasing M**
- The Fed believed that the potential was still  $Y_0^*$
- The Fed tried to bring Y back to the **wrong potential,  $Y_0^*$  instead of  $Y_1^*$ !**
- This pushed prices up and then, through the adjustment of the labor market, wages even higher!
- This pushed the SRAS in, pushing inflation up! Say back to  $Y_1^*$ .
- But the Fed wants to go to  $Y_0^*$ , so increases M again...
- Amplifying mechanism: if workers expect high inflation they will try to get higher nominal wages!

# New Fed view: Inflation Targeting

- Late '70s: inflation was out of control also because of bad Fed policies!
- Friedman: the Fed has to control inflation! **Reset, expected inflation rates.**
- —→ **1982: Volker Recession**
- Cold Turkey money cut to reduce inflation and change **individuals' perception** of Fed policy (not try to stabilize output at the expense of inflation!)
- Cut inflation from double digits to 4%!
- However, this caused **a short deep recession.**

## On unemployment and inflation...

- In the short run, the SRAS tells us that if output is high, or unemployment low, typically prices are high!
- If  $Y < Y^*$ , or  $u > u^*$ , output stabilization policies tend to generate inflation...
- If  $Y = Y^*$ , or  $u = u^*$ , but  $P$  high, inflation control policies generate a recession...
- Phillips curve = relationship between inflation and unemployment: one-to-one relationship with the AS!
- **Phillips** discovered a negative correlation between unemployment rate and inflation rate across time in the 1950s (**Phillips curve**)
- Old Keynesians in the 1960s: there is a stable, exploitable trade-off between the rate inflation and unemployment. **Maybe can permanently lower unemployment at the cost of permanently higher inflation!**

## Friedman: evidence killed it!

- Milton Friedman in 1968: the long run Phillips Curve is vertical at  $u^*$ .
- This is because the LRAS is vertical at  $Y^*$ !
- Vindicating evidence: the Phillips Curve broke down after 1970, as the Fed was trying to push  $Y$  above  $Y^*$
- Over time in the U.S., higher money growth just lead to more inflation and no higher real GDP
- Across countries, higher money growth just leads to more inflation and no higher real GDP.
- If anything, in the long run, real GDP appears to be hindered by high levels of inflation!

## To sum up ...

- In the **SHORT RUN** there is a tradeoff between the unemployment rate and inflation rate *changes*:
  - Inflation tends to fall in years following  $U > U^*$ .  
The cost of a **permanently** lower inflation rate is a **temporarily** higher unemployment rate.
  - Inflation tends to rise in years following  $U < U^*$ .  
The cost of **temporarily** lowering the unemployment rate is a **permanently** higher inflation rate.
- In the **LONG RUN** the unemployment rate is fixed at  $u^*$  and any monetary policy will have only effects on the inflation rate

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