MANY BLOODY HANDS: RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

by

Malaika Konjit Kamunanwire

B.A. Political Science
Spelman College, 1995

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 1998

© 1998 Malaika K. Kamunanwire. All rights reserved.

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

Signature of Author: ________________________________

Department of Political Science
June 8, 1998

Certified by: __________________________

Stephen W. Van Evera
Associate Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by: ________________________________

Barry R. Posen
Professor of Political Science
Chairman, Graduate Program Committee
MANY BLOODY HANDS: RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

by

Malaika Konjit Kamunanwire

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
on June 8, 1998 in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in
Political Science

ABSTRACT

The civil war in Rwanda included one of the bloodiest genocides of the twentieth century. This thesis explores the question of who is responsible for a crime that has claimed the lives of close to 1 million Rwandese and continues to be Rwanda's scourge.

The thesis focuses on the most recent 1994 genocide in a historical context. It blames the traditional Tutsi monarchy, European colonialism, Hutu political extremists and both the indifference and inappropriate response of France, the United States and the United Nations for the evolution of the current crisis in Rwanda.

The author found all of the accused partially or significantly responsible for the genocide. This thesis is an indictment of the guilty.

Thesis Supervisor: Stephen W. Van Evera
Title: Associate Professor of Political Science
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With sincere gratitude, I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Professor Steve Van Evera and Professor Melissa Nobles for their guidance and wisdom. I would also like to thank the Office of the Vice President of the Republic of Rwanda and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations for their willingness to provide in-depth information. I am grateful for my family whose love, emotional support and encouragement helped me throughout the writing of this thesis. I would like to thank my colleagues and friends, especially Tina Savage, who helped me know that I could finish this project.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of those who lost their lives in the 1994 genocide, in the hope that by helping to reveal the horrid responsibilities, this devastation will not be repeated.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page--------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Abstract--------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------ 3
Table of Contents----------------------------------------------------- 4

CHAPTERS

I. Introduction---------------------------------------------------------- 7

A. Presentation of Thesis question-
   1) Question- who is responsible for the Rwandan genocide
   2) Review of literature- who has the literature held accountable?

B. Hypotheses and related issues of why the genocide occurred and who is responsible?
   1) Main argument of paper and early conclusions- distinction between what phenomena caused the genocide and who is responsible for the genocide
   2) Discussion of 4 Hypotheses: past Tutsi elite oppression of Hutu, Belgian colonialism, political strategy to maintain Hutu elite power and control, and international apathy and inappropriate action
   3) Organization of paper- brief outline of chapters

II. Genesis of the conflict in Rwanda------------------------------------ 21

A. What accounts for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (2 puzzles):
   1) How did early instances of mass killing impact the events in 1994
   2) How much of an impact did Rwandese history have in the 1994 genocide

B. Traditional relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi "ethnic" groups in Rwanda
   1) Political and socio-economic exploitation of the Hutu and non-elite Tutsi under the traditional Tutsi monarchy
      i. Ubuhake- cattle clientship
      ii. Ubukonde- land clientship
   2) Impact of 19th century European racial theories on the Hutu/Tutsi identities
      i. General contribution of European racial theories to Rwanda
      ii. John Hanning Speke and Richard Burton's introduction of an ethnic dimension to the Hutu/ Tutsi relationship

C. Impact of European Colonialism
   1) German policy of indirect rule (1884-1919)
      i. Assertion of German power through the Rwandese (Tutsi) monarchy-Mwami Rwabugiri

4
ii. Role of the Roman Catholic missionaries
2) Belgian Colonial Administration (1919-1962)
   a. Favourism of Tutsi monarchy
      i. Preferences to Tutsi elites in the civil service, education, religion and the military.
   ii. Ethnic identity cards
   iii. Ubureetwa - forced labor on Hutu and position of power for Tutsi
b. Empowerment of the Hutu and reversal of Tutsi as "buffer class"
   i. Dismantling of Tutsi aristocracy
   ii. Development of ethnic-based political parties - UNAR and PARMEHUTU
   iii. Involvement in the 1959 mass killing/ genocide of Tutsi elite
D. The consolidation of a new ethnic elite under the Hutu Republic
   1) President Kayibanda (1961-1973)
      a. Purging of Tutsis from all political forms of power in Rwanda - ethnic pogroms in mid 60s
      b. MDR-PARMEHUTU government's struggle for Hutu solidarity and power
   2) President Habyarimana (1973-1994)
      a. Maintenance of Hutu power and political extremism
         i. Allowing policy of mass killing to continue (1973)
         ii. Rwandan refugee crisis deterring Tutsi refugees in neighboring states from returning to Rwanda
         iii. Significance of Tutsi refugees in Uganda/ birth of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
         iv. Civil strife in Rwanda - outbreak of civil war (1990-1994)
         v. United Nations - Arusha Accords powersharing agreement between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Habyarimana's regime

III. 1994 Rwanda Genocide and its aftermath

A. Interim government - MRND and other Hutu political extremists (April- August 1994): Setting the stage for genocide
   1) Preparing for the genocide
      a. Radio stations such as RTLMC (Radio television libres des Milles Collines preaching anti-Tutsi propaganda
      b. Creation of Interhamwe Militias
      c. Rwandese population accept genocide as rational
         a. Hutu elite
            i. Maintain Hutu political power in Rwanda
            ii. Hatred and fear of past oppression by Tutsi elites
b. Peasants
   i. Deference of masses to authority figures in Rwandese society
   ii. Economic incentive of genocide—promised land, etc.
   iii. Great belief in Hutu ideology and mythmaking of Tutsi as oppressors of Hutu
B. April-June massacres
   1) Who were the victims and killers and what was the order of the killings?
      a. The killing of Hutu political opponents of MRND, and later all Tutsi in Rwanda
      b. The killers—high level Hutu politicians, interhamwe and trained killers and armed Hutu civilians
      c. The massacres—Use of machetes (pangas), burning of bodies, machine guns etc.
C. Who has been accused in relation to who is responsible—weighing the evidence
   1) Tutsi elites for past economic and political oppression of Hutu
   2) Belgian/German colonialists and Catholic missionaries for exacerbating ethnic distinctions between the two groups
   3) Hutu political extremists—Kayibanda and Habyarimana for using propaganda and inciting past hatred to fuel genocide
   4) French for their financial and military support of Habyarimana's restrictive regime and training of Hutu militias
   5) U.S. (Clinton Administration) decision to follow Directive #25—ineffectiveness and delaying tactics to avoid a U.S. military or financial commitment
   6) United Nations for ignoring the warning signs and lacking the political will to respond

IV. Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 121

A. Evaluation of arguments and evidence presented
B. Aftermath of Rwanda Genocide
   1) Invasion and military victory of RPF
   2) Goma Refugee crisis and the role of NGOs—international apathy for Rwanda genocide shifts to aid for refugees
   3) The obstacles facing the new (RPF) regime and the continuing crisis
C. Larger implication of Rwandan genocide—how small injustices compound themselves and when ignored become horrible major real world events
D. Future research—what more needs to be done on the subject

Bibliography---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 131
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses the question; who should history hold accountable for the Rwandan genocide? Since the country's independence from Belgian colonialism, Rwanda has faced three intense and violent genocides in 1959, 1973 and 1994. In April-June of 1994, the greatest of the killings occurred. Hutu extremists slaughtered approximately one million Rwandese, in an effort to eliminate all Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus.

Unlike the majority of the recent literature on Rwanda, I will address the question of who, rather then what phenomena caused the wave of violence in 1994. Aside from the machete wielding militias who are directly responsible for the killings, there are many silent co-conspirators who set the atmosphere for Apocalypse of 1994. I place the largest blame on the impact of German and Belgian colonialism and the political dominance of the Tutsi monarchy prior to European arrival, and the Hutu political extremists after Rwanda's independence from Belgium, in igniting an atmosphere ethnic animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi. This tension further aggravated by French Francophone interests, the United States' apprehensiveness and the U.N.'s inappropriate and untimely response in Rwanda. My research provides cause to indict these internal and external culprits who must acknowledge their role in this crime against humanity. If they are not held
accountable, history will inevitably repeat itself.

**Review of the Literature**

The main argument of this thesis is based on a comprehensive survey of all of the relevant literature on the conflict in Rwanda. The writings of Omaar & de Waal, Prunier, Gourevitch and testimony of Burkhalter were especially germane to this paper. Many of these writers disagree on who is responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Scholars like Lemarchand and Newbury explain identify the Tutsi monarchy and European colonialists as the culprits behind the 1959 and 1973 ethnic massacres.

Omaar & de Waal, Prunier, Burkhalter and Gourevitch analyze the role of France, the U.S. and the United nations on the 1994 Rwandese genocide. I will discuss the literature that directly addresses my argument determining the responsibility of internal and external players in Rwanda's cycle of violence.

In *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, Omaar and de Waal directly blame the Hutu political extremists and killers for the 1994 genocide. While they denounce European colonialism and the international community's slow and inappropriate reaction to the crisis, they find the Hutu leaders and masses most responsible for the violence. In a chronology of the 1994 genocide, Omaar and de Waal focus on who organized and executed the massacres, discuss how the killings took place, and identify international
supporters of the interhamwe militias. This African Rights edition gives a very detailed account of the 1994 genocide, but merely recounts the history of what happened. Hence, Omaar and de Waal fail to develop an analytical base for understanding why this wave of brutality occurred in 1994.

Prunier's *The Rwanda Crisis: History of A Genocide* presents the most multilayered and in depth analysis of the conflict by accusing Tutsi elites and Hutu political extremists after independence as well as France, the U.S., Belgium and the U.N. of indirectly assisting the 1994 genocide. However, his argument focuses mainly on what phenomena rather than who caused the violence. Moreover, Prunier is criticized for biases toward the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the new Rwandan regime.

My argument indicting the United Nations emerges from Gourevitch's article "Annals of Diplomacy: The Genocide Facts." Gourevitch argues that the U.N. knew about the plan to slaughter Tutsis and moderate Hutus three months before the April-June genocide of 1994. Gourevitch states that Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian Commander of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Rwanda, sent a fax detailing the genocide on January 11, 1994 and asking for permission to raid the Hutu militias arms and weapons cache.

Dallaire's fax states that an informant, former member of Habyarimana's security staff, was instructed to compile lists of
Tutsis for extermination. This informant requested protection in exchange for information and his help in infiltrating the Hutu militias weapons and arms cache. Gourevitch accuses the United Nations leadership, Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and then head of Peacekeeping Operations (Current Secretary General) Kofi Annan of ignoring the early warning signs and not taking the necessary preventive actions to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

I also find the United States responsible for failing to respond to the Rwanda crisis. In Dr. Burkhalter's testimony to the Congress on U.S. policy in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, she blames the Clinton Administration for using Presidential Decision Directive #25 to delay an international response which would have prevented the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese during the 1994 genocide. Therefore, the U.S. appeared fearful of dispatching troops to Rwanda because of the American experience in Somalia.

**Main Argument and Preliminary Conclusions**

There are limits on what we know about the evolution of the Rwandan conflict. Without the benefit of strong national archives in Rwanda and marginal statistical evidence, most of the arguments will be evaluated through deductive analysis based on what we can interpret from existing sources. Under the umbrella
of the question why genocide occurred in Rwanda, there are two major research issues that this paper will address: 1) what historical events caused or contributed to the 1994 genocide; 2) who should history hold accountable for the 1994 genocide.

This paper will deal with the question of events and phenomena embedded within this story, but the major research issue will identify and try the perpetrators of this crime in a broader sense. Beyond those who directly organized and participated in the killings, the traditional Tutsi elites, European colonialist, Hutu political extremists, France, the U.S. and the United Nations are the reticent participants who must accept responsibility for their role in the brutal massacre of over 1 million Rwandese.

Further sections will elaborate on the role of those accused of this crime and the degree to which they are responsible. The following hypotheses deal with who is responsible:

HYPOTHESES

This paper will test four main hypotheses to analyze the role of who has been accused and determine who should be accused. This thesis proposes two major arguments surrounding responsibility for Rwanda's cycle of genocide. With the support of Lemarchand and Newbury's literature, I developed an argument blaming Belgian colonialism, political strategies of Hutu elite,
and the traditional domination of the Tutsi monarchy to evolution of an atmosphere of ethnic hatred and violence.

This argument provides an initial dialogue on the Rwanda crisis, but the reasons and motivations are far more complex than history suggest. I hold the international community most accountable for the recent wave of massacres in the country. First, French military and financial aid helped Hutu extremists organize and commit the 1994 genocide. Finally, the United States' indifference and the United Nation's slow and delayed response allowed the massacres to take place. The four main hypotheses analyze the impact of all these actors who played a substantial or marginal role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. These hypotheses are developed through my analysis of what the current literature both addresses and ignores.

Hypothesis #1
Genocide is a result of traditional clientelist discrimination by Tutsi elites against all Hutu and non-elite Tutsi. Under the traditional Tutsi monarchy, traditional political and economic institutions accounts for the historic animosity between the two groups. The political and socio-economic dominance of the Tutsi monarchy created an atmosphere of resentment among the Hutu which led to the 1959 ethnic pogroms.

A. The system of Ubufake (cattle clientship) and Ubukonde (land
clientship) resulted in the socio-economic exploitation of all non-elite Tutsis and Hutu. This exploitation appears to be less ethnic in nature since the Hutu could be "dehutuised or tutsified" through the ownership of cattle and land. These institutions were used to reduce Hutu socio-economic status in Rwanda, hence creating strong resentment for Tutsi elites and the mass killing of 1959.

B. Under Mwami Rwabugiri, a Tutsi King, Tutsi elites asserted political dominance in pre-colonial Rwanda. He conquered several of the existing Hutu principalities and reigned over both Hutus and Tutsis. The Tutsi monarchy prevented the growth of a Hutu powerbase in Rwanda. The political and socio-economic dominance of the Tutsi monarchy would be used by Hutu politicians in the nineteen-fifties to create a pan-Hutu solidarity against the Tutsi elite. Hence, Hutu politicians would use this rhetoric to summon the killing of Tutsi elites or the commit the 1959 massacres.

**Hypothesis #2**

European colonialism and the Catholic Church exacerbated pre-existing ethnic and socio-economic tension in Rwanda which led to the first genocide in 1959.
Germans

a. The Germans supported the authority of the Tutsi monarchy
during the reign of Mwami Rwabugiri

1) Germans helped the Tutsi monarchy defeat the Hutu chiefdoms
in Northern Rwanda. Hence, this support helped the Tutsi
aristocracy expand and centralize their control which led
to Tutsi domination of Rwanda.

Catholic Missionaries

A. The Catholic Church aided the Belgian colonialists in
   protecting the power of the Tutsi elites.

1) In Catholic educational institutions, Tutsis were educated and
   trained to work in the Belgian civil service, clergy and
   military.

2) Only a small number of Hutu were granted access to education.

B. In the 1950s, the Catholic missionaries fueled the growth of
   chauvinist Hutu intellectuals

1) The Catholic clergy created the coffee cooperative TRAFIPRO
   (work, fidelity and progress) to provide economic and
   leadership opportunities for the Hutu. The Church also fueled
   the growth of PARMEHUTU, which gave Hutus new political status
to counter Tutsi elite power.

2) Catholic missionaries also supported the anti-Tutsi propaganda
spread by Hutu intellectuals through the publishing of early Hutu periodicals such as Kinyamateka which spread the Hutu ideology of hate used to incite the 1959 violence.

Belgians

a. The Belgian Colonial Administration placed Tutsis,
   particularly Tutsi elites in a position of prestige.

1) Belgians granted preferences to Tutsis in the civil service, education, religion and the military. Hutus had no status in Belgian colonial society. Thus, these preferences created mass Hutu resentment of Tutsis which led to the killings of 1959.

2) Tutsis received "buffer class" status and served as enforcers of Belgian objectives in colonial administration. Hence, this led to Hutu resentment of the privileged status of Tutsis.

b. Belgian colonialists in the nineteen-fifties used anti-Tutsi propaganda to empower the Hutu and aid in the growth of the Hutu counter-elite.

1) Belgians fueled the growth of the PARMEHUTU party and Hutu political power in Rwanda by giving traditionally Tutsi positions to rising Hutu politicians. This gave the Hutu elites a platform for anti-Tutsi hate propaganda, used to incite the rage of the masses in the 1959 mass killing.
2) The Belgians reversed the status of Hutu and Tutsi in the 1950s. This provided the Hutu political extremists with a powerbase to exact revenge on the Tutsi monarchy.

**Hypothesis #3**

Genocide in Rwanda was a strategy employed by Hutu political extremists to maintain power and control of the country. This includes the actions of: Kayibanda and Hutu elites in the early nineteen-fifties, Habyarimana and his supporters, and the Interim government in Rwanda (April–July 1994).

A. Hutu elites believe that genocide is a logical political weapon for resolving a perceived threat to internal power.

1) The 1973 genocide consolidated the Hutu extremist power base as well as provided a signal that Tutsi refugees are not welcome in Rwanda.

2) The 1990–1994 massacres were designed to deter the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

B. External influences lead Hutu politicians to chose genocide as a rational policy option.

1) The French government politically and economically supported Habyarimana's regime to protect maintain a Francophone and pro-Hutu regime in Rwanda at all costs.

2) The Arusha Accords powersharing agreement (1993) between Habyarimana's regime and the RPF provoked Hutu
3) The "Mysterious" plane crash of Rwandan President Habyarimana triggered sudden and bloody genocide. Through hate radio broadcasts and speeches, Hutu extremists convinced the Hutu masses that Habyarimana was murdered by the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front which fueled the 1994 massacre of Tutsi and Hutu political moderates.

**Hypothesis #4**

The international community helped cause the genocide by its apathy and the inappropriate, biased actions of France, the U.S. and the United Nations.

France

A. French endorsed the oppressive and extremist Habyarimana regime (1973-1994)

1) French financially supported Habyarimana's MRND political party which in part, purchased the weapons for the 1994 massacres.

2) The French military trained the interhamwe militia who were responsible for the 1994 killings.
A. The U.S. (Clinton administration) position in Rwanda operated through Presidential Decision Directive #25 which served as a delaying tactic in the Rwanda crisis.

1) U.S. indifference and inaction in preventing the massacres.
2) U.S. policy of refusing to declare the crisis a genocide.

United Nations

1) The U.N. ignored warnings of 1994 massacre
2) The U.N. lacked the political will to stop the killings once they started.

Organization of Paper

Chapter 1 introduces the main question of this thesis. Who is responsible for Rwanda's cycle of genocide? After introducing the relevant literature, I present the 4 main hypotheses of the thesis. I blame traditional Tutsi monarchy, European colonialism and Hutu political extremists for creating an atmosphere of animosity and hatred between Tutsis and Hutus which caused the 1959, 1973 and 1994 massacres. I accuse France, the U.S. and the United Nations for not stopping the most violent 1994 genocide in Rwanda, once it started.

Chapter 2, "Genesis of the Conflict in Rwanda," provides a historical evolution of the current Rwandese conflict. After an
initial discussion of early mass killings, the chapter first considers the impact of the traditional Tutsi elites in the political and socio-economic oppression of the Hutu and non-elite Tutsi. I also discuss the role of external players such as 19th century European explorers, Belgian and German colonialist and the Catholic Church for using ethnic and racial theories to create two distinct "Hutu" and "Tutsi" identities, first by upholding Tutsi monarchy's power and later, reversing European support to fuel the growth of a Hutu counter-elite.

The final section of the chapter presents the consolidation of Hutu political extremists under the Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana (1973-1994) regime. Both of these post-independent Rwandese government used anti-Tutsi rhetoric and a policy of mass killing (1959 and 1973) against Tutsis to protect the Hutu political and economic control of Rwanda. The chapter ends with the emergence of civil war between Habyarimana's regime and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (1990-1994) and the U.N.'s Arusha Accords (1993), calling for a ceasefire in Rwanda.

Chapter 3, "1994 Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath," initially discusses the 1994 April-June genocide in terms of: the planners and organizers, the killers (Interhamwe militias and civilians), the victims, and how the genocide was adopted as a rational policy by Hutu elites and civilians. The second part of the chapter deals with weighing the evidence against the indicted
internal and external players. Tutsi elites are held accountable for economic and political oppression of the Hutu. European colonialists are responsible for exacerbating ethnic animosity between the two groups.

Hutu political extremists under Kayibanda's and Habyarimana's regimes are responsible for using anti-Tutsi propaganda and past hatred to fuel the policy of mass killing in Rwanda (1959, 1973 and 1994). France is blamed for their financial and military support of Habyarimana's government and using French military personnel to train the Hutu militias who would commit the 1994 genocide. The U.S. and the United Nation's are accused of delaying an international response which would have stopped the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Chapter 4 summarizes the main arguments, evidence and conclusions presented in the third chapter. In this conclusion, I also discuss the aftermath of the 1994 genocide: the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Hutu refugee crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the major obstacles facing the new RPF government. Finally, I give suggestions on future research related to the topic.
CHAPTER II: GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA

This chapter explores two main puzzles and give a more in depth historical background of the events leading up to 1994. The first of the two main puzzles that will be addressed is the impact of early instances of mass killing (1959 and 1973) on the events of April-June 1994. Secondly, this section will analyze the role of European colonialism, past oppression by Tutsi monarchy and the growth of Hutu political extremism in the 1994 genocide.

Despite the fact that there have been five instances of mass killing (1959-62, 1967, 1973-74, 1990-93, and 1994) in Rwanda, most scholars consider only three of these episodes of mass killing related to the 1994 genocide.¹ The three most notorious massacres occurred from 1959-62, 1973-4 and 1994. The Rwandan case presents a clear example of such a conspiracy aimed at the total destruction of Tutsi and political moderate Hutu and required a concerted plan of action.

Although this paper primarily focuses on the 1994 genocide, past instances of mass killing provide a clear precedence for comprehending this most recent wave of violence in Rwanda. The organizers of the 1994 genocide used the ethnic pogroms of 1959

---
¹Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995), 68.
and 1973 as a model to enrage and incite the killers. The anti-Tutsi propaganda from the nineteen-fifties such as The Bahutu Manifesto served to remind the Hutu masses of past exploitation at the hand of Tutsi elites. The terror tactics used in previous mass killings such as burning Tutsi homes and the use of machetes resurfaced in 1994 genocide. Moreover, the top level of Hutu leaders systematically controlled the massacres from the cities to rural villages.

In addition to the influence of past mass killings, the various contradictions and complexities inherent in Rwandese history present a clearer picture of the conflict. This section of the paper will provide a historical context for understanding why genocide occurred in Rwanda. In particular, it will consider the role of traditional Tutsi elite clientelism, the manipulation of ethnicity under European colonialism, the rise of Hutu political extremists and the 1959 refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region as instrumental to the current conflict.

---

Traditional Ties Between the Hutu and the Tutsi

Traditional Rwandese society was linguistically and culturally homogenous; but Rwandese divided themselves into three distinct groups, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.³

Most historians and anthropologists support the theory that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers known as the Twa, who have lived in Rwanda for thousands of years.⁴ The Twa are usually ignored by current scholars because they constitute only 1-2% of the Rwandese population.

While the Twa were classified as the "pygmoid" hunters and gatherers, the Hutu were a group of Bantu clans who migrated to Rwanda between the fourth and seventh centuries AD.⁵ The European invaders described the Tutsis as "the bronze Caucasian" cattle herders and developed theories linking their origin to ancient Egyptians and Ethiopians.⁶ Historical data suggests that the Tutsis arrived in Rwanda between the 11th and 12th centuries.⁷ Though not theoretically validated, it is widely accepted that the Tutsi were a tribe of nomadic pastoralists who

⁴Ibid., 6.
⁶Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6-7.
⁷The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2.
migrated from the Gallas of Ethiopia.⁸ The Tutsi clans migrated in a slow and relatively peaceful fashion into Rwanda between the 11th-15th centuries.⁹

After the fifteenth century, the Hutu agriculturalists and Tutsi cattle-holders (85% / 13-14% respectively) would comprise the vast majority of the Rwandese population.¹⁰ These three main groups share a common language (Kinyarwanda), culture, religion and territory.¹¹ Although we don't know the exact origins of Kinyarwanda, European racial theories suggest that the Rwandese national language is an offspring of the Bantu (Hutu related) family of languages.¹² On the other hand, the Hutu masses accepted Tutsi monarchy as the principal political authority in the country. The Tutsi Mwami or King dictated Rwandese mores, rules and religion.¹³ Hence, Rwandese culture was a fusion of both the Tutsi and Hutu traditions.

Rwandan mythology describes the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as "brothers" whose distinctions are solely based on the different tasks they play in society. These groups traditionally appear

⁹The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2-3.
¹⁰Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 5.
¹¹Ibid.
¹²Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6.
¹³Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 3.
more socially than ethnically distinguishable. History challenges this notion that Tutsi and Hutu were clearly defined ethnic identities. The traditional relationship between the two groups developed as separate economic and political classes, rather than distinct ethnic or racial identities. Hence, "Hutu" and "Tutsi" evolved through changes in politics, social or occupational status as well as ancestry.

**POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION UNDER TUTSI MONARCHY:**

Through the formation of Abiru (royal court), the Mwami (King) Barimbas's inner circle or royal court overpowered the pre-existing central and southern Hutu chieftaincies. The only military and political opposition that the Tutsi received was from the Hutu northern principalities known as the Abahinza. In the 15th century, the Tutsi Mwami (King) Barimba and the elite Tutsi clan Nyiginya utilized their military strength to consolidate control over central and southern Rwanda. The Abahinza remained politically dominant in northern Rwanda until the arrival of the German colonialists.

According to Tutsi oral history, the first Tutsi King, Mwami Ruganzu I Bwimba's reign began at the end of the fifteenth

---

14Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 3.

15Ibid.
century. The Tutsi monarchy's structure changed between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. Mwami Rwabugiri created a highly organized and hierarchical system of Tutsi chiefs to help consolidate elite Tutsi control of Rwanda. While the Abiru or guardians of traditions played a significant political role, in the early nineteenth century, all access to political and financial power was through the King.

During the reign of Mwami (King) Kigeri IV Rwabugiri (1853-95), the Tutsi monarchy began to accommodate more clans and chiefdoms and Hutu chiefs were assimilated into the Tutsi elite. The traditional clientelist systems such as Ubufake (cattle) and Ubufonde (land) altered the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi from clan or tribal distinctions to one of social mobility. Both lower caste Tutsis and Hutus were discriminated against by the Rwandese aristocracy. The Tutsi monarchy created a caste system that was oppressive and exploitive. Though this system was plagued by inequality, through the acquisition of land or cattle, Hutus and low-ranking Tutsi could elevate their status in Rwandese society. Hence, these groups were more socially than ethnically distinguishable.

---


17 Ibid, 8-9.

UBUHAKE- CATTLE CLIENTSHIP:

Before the arrival of the European explorers, the Tutsi clan politically dominated Rwandese society. The Tutsi monarchy's ideology was based on a mutual help contract between the three groups, the King, the Tutsi village chiefs and the client. Ubuhake was a system consisting of several different types of patron and client relationships. For instance, Umheto was a type of cattle clientship (Ubuhake) in which the village chiefs were the patrons under the direct control of the King.\(^{19}\)

Ubuhake, generally was a clientelist contract between two men in which the ownership of cattle was deemed a sign of wealth.\(^{20}\) In this system, a Tutsi patron donated a cow to a Hutu client. The client could seldom repay the debt, hence Ubuhake perpetuated a system of continual servitude. Although Ubuhake was an economically exploitive system, the Hutu and Tutsi identities were not rigidly defined. In fact, prior to German and Belgian colonialism, Hutus were often "dehutuised" or "tutsified" by intermarriage and the accumulation or ownership of cattle. Therefore, since wealth was based on the number of cattle a man possessed, the labels "Hutu" and "Tutsi" were not


\(^{20}\)Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 13-14.
defined solely in terms of ethnic and racial identity.

UBUKONDE- LAND CLIENTSHIP:
Another type of traditional systematic oppression was Ubukonde land clientship which was originally administered by the Hutu principalities in northern Rwanda, but adopted by Hutu sub-chiefs of the Mwami Rwabugiri. Ubukonde land chiefs or patrons donated agricultural produce and land to clients while the patrons maintained sole ownership of this property. According to Tutsi mythology, after years of service and work for the patrons, clients often moved to the position of a low ranking chief.

History paints a different picture of Ubuhake in which Tutsi and Hutu elites benefited from the labor of subordinated members of both groups. The Hutu political elite in the nineteen-fifties would later recognize this forms of clientship as a type of enslavement by their "Tutsi masters." Ubuhake and Ubukonde were tools utilized by Tutsi elites to exploit and oppress both low level Tutsi and Hutu.

However, it is inaccurate to classify these traditional forms of Tutsi clientelism as simply friendly elements of social

---

22 Ibid., 79.
23 Ibid.
cohesion or forms of slavery. The economic, social and political power in Rwanda was exclusively Tutsi. Ubukonde and Ubuhake were important tools of socio-economic oppression impacting the definition of the Tutsi and Hutu identities. The arrival of the European colonialists would permanently alter the meanings of Hutu and Tutsi in the twentieth century. The change in the meaning of two these identities would support mythmaking and other forms of propaganda as a substitute for real historical events.

**IMPACT OF EUROPEAN RACIAL THEORIES ON HUTU/TUTSI IDENTITIES:**

It is necessary to consider the importance of nineteenth century European racial classifications on the Rwanda story. Along with Prunier, Omaar and de Waal and Lemarchand, the author of this research effort believes that the mass killings of 1959, 1973, and 1994 were in large part, influenced by formation of clear Tutsi and Hutu identities in Rwanda. Although political and economic changes had an effect on the experience of ethnicity in the country, this section will consider the role of European explorers like John Hanning Speke and Richard Burton in racially distinguishing between peoples of East and Central Africa, particularly Rwanda and Burundi.

As discussed in previous sections, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa shared a common cultural, religious and linguistic heritage
before the arrival of the European explorers. The age of European exploration had a long historical impact on humankind's concept of race. It was the dawn of racist theories and practices in Europe. European racial theories expressed ideas of "natural selection" designating some races, mainly European, as born to rule.\textsuperscript{24} Through the eyes of European explorers, assumptions and stereotypes were formed about the "savage" or non-Caucasian races. This part of the paper will focus on the role of European racial classifications/theories in the nineteenth century and the writings of explorers such as Speke and Burton in transforming the definition of Tutsi and Hutu.

In the case of Africa, anthropologists and explorers' assumed the superiority of the Caucasian race. German anthropologist J. F. Blumenblach, in \textit{On the Natural Variety of Mankind}, devised a hierarchically based fivefold system of racial classification with Europeans at the top and Africans on the bottom.\textsuperscript{25} Nineteenth century thought was particularly influenced by the racial theories of Count Gobineau, the father of racist ideology. Gobineau was a French historian and journalist who had a particular fascination with the Indian caste system because it

\textsuperscript{24}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 8.

provided a connection between race and class.\textsuperscript{26} Utilizing the work of Blumenblach and Thierry, Gobineau attempted to further present the biological and social differences amongst races. These physical or phenotypical differences were often associated with distinctions in intelligence, capability and appearance. While insisting on the superiority of the Aryan/European race, Gobineau admired the Hindu and Egyptian cultures and placed them as a buffer between the Caucasian and Negro races.\textsuperscript{27}

Nineteenth century European racial Theory changed the experience of ethnicity and race in Rwanda. The writings of European explorers John Hanning Speke and Richard Burton were influenced by Gobineau's work and linked his theories to the indigenous population of East Africa. Speke and Burton believed that all races and civilizations were the offspring of the European race.

In Rwanda, Speke and Burton declared the Tutsis of Rwanda as the "bronze Caucasians" who migrated from the "superior" civilizations of Ethiopia and Egypt.\textsuperscript{28} The European explorers selected the Tutsi as "natural leaders" because of their "European" looking features and the traditional authority of the


\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{28}Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 6-7.
Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda. The observations and writings of the early explorers would affect the practices of European colonialists and alter the Rwandese mythology of the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. The manipulation of Rwanda's historical mythology would lead to the use of ethnic propaganda and misinformation to fuel Rwanda's experience with genocide.

John Hanning Speke and Richard Burton were British explorers in the late nineteenth century who wrote about the racial and ethnic composition of people on the Eastern coast of Africa in *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*. As members of the British aristocracy, Speke and Burton were led to the Great Lakes Region in search of the source of the Nile river. This area comprises the current East and Central African countries of Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.\(^\text{29}\) Although these British explorers were clearly interested in the climate and natural resources of the region, Speke and Burton developed theories about the origins of different groups in East Africa.

Speke and Burton's expedition began in 1857, with Burton concentrating on the diverse political systems and cultures in the region. On the other hand, Speke was fascinated by differences in complexion, features, and height amongst the

indigenous East Africans. Hence, this would influence the creation of racial categories in Rwanda. Speke postulated that the Tutsi were a part of the "Hamitic" race, the lowest branch of Aryan or Caucasoid, it is widely known as the "Hamitic hypothesis".\textsuperscript{30} He describes the Tutsi, Hima and Toro (of present day Uganda) as members of the Wahuma, ancient Abyssian.\textsuperscript{31}

Speke's writings had the most significant impact on Rwanda and Burundi because the Tutsi and Hutu represented the majority of the Rwandese population, rather than a single tribe in a largely multi-ethnic state.

"The Wahuma are a pastoral clan from the Asiatic side who took the government of Abyssinia and other parts of East Africa and ruled over them, by intermarriage with Africans, the texture of their hair and color have changed to a certain extent, but they still maintain a high stamp of Asian features, of which a marked characteristic is a bridgeless nose."\textsuperscript{32}

John Hanning Speke attempted to explain the conquest of inferior races by superior races. Speke particularly concentrated on a group called the Wahuma who he associated with the Gallas of Ethiopia and Egypt. According to his writing, the Wahuma migrated to East and Central Africa and "conquered"

\textsuperscript{30}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 7-8.


\textsuperscript{32}Ibid, 246-247.
inferior races. In the case of Rwanda, Speke believed that the Tutsi were Wahuma nomads who migrated from Ethiopia in the fifteenth century.  

"...the Wahuma are a small residue of the original European stock driven from the land... the Watutsi are related to the Wahuma, though their language and culture have changed. we cannot mistake the physical appearance of this remarkable race as a certain clue to their Shem-hamitic origin...their kingdom is as different from the surrounding nations as those of Europe compared to Asia."  

In his Journal, Speke describes the Tutsi as possessing the "cunning, superior and phlegmatic" temperament of Europeans. Similar to the nineteenth century racial thought in the U.S., Speke related physical appearance with intelligence, personality and capability. While Tutsis were deemed intelligent, beautiful etc., Speke's "Hamitic hypothesis" designated Hutus to the inferior status of slaves or chattel of their Tutsi "masters".  

Since Spekes' journal was one of the first accounts of the races of East Africa, it set the tone for future literature on ethnicity in Africa. Many anthropologists would later adopt the term Nilo-Hamite to refer to ethnic groups such as the

---

33Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6.
35Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 8.
36Ibid.
from Egypt and Ethiopia, European racial hypotheses in the
nineteenth century supported this rather dubious theory. Thus,
Speke's observations permanently changed the meaning of "Hutu"
and "Tutsi". Tutsi was associated with socio-economic, ethnic
and political superiority, while Hutu was equated with
powerlessness in Rwandese society. Consequently, the racial
theories of 19th century European explorers are responsible for
creating racial distinctions in Rwanda which would used by
European colonialists and native elites to foster ethnic
animosity between Tutsis and Hutus.

**Impact of European Colonialism**

It was a common tactic of European colonialists to establish
or worsen ethnic distinctions amongst the indigenous population.

In the case of Ruanda-Urundi (colonial Rwanda and Burundi), the
German and Belgian colonialists and Catholic Missionaries
perpetuated a system of preferences toward the Tutsi class that
would alter the meaning of the "Hutu" and "Tutsi" identities.
This is not to suggest that European colonialism solely caused
the current 1994 crisis, but it played a major role in sowing the
seeds of the conflict. Hence, this section discusses the
emergence of a system of triple oppression in Ruanda-Urundi

---

administered by the European colonialists, the Catholic Church and the Tutsi elite.\(^{41}\)

**GERMAN POLICY OF INDIRECT RULE (1884-1919):**

After the 1884-5 partition of Africa, unlike the direct German imperial expansion in most of East Africa, Rwanda and Burundi (Ruanda-Urundi) were jointly administered through a policy of indirect rule. King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri was in power at the time of German arrival. Under the leadership of Tutsi King Rwabugiri, Germany maintained control of Ruanda-Urundi and in return the Tutsi King enlarged the territorial bases of his authority.\(^{42}\) The German colonialists allowed the Tutsi court to extend its control to the northern parts of Rwanda. Thus, the Tutsi monarchy centralized its control over Ruanda-Urundi and finally defeated the Abahinza Hutu chiefs in the northern region with the support of the German colonialists.

This relationship between the Tutsi elite and the German colonialists created a system of strict clientage in which the Tutsi monarchy manipulated colonial support to subordinate both Hutu and lower ranking Tutsi.\(^{43}\) Using the European colonial


\(^{43}\)Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 24-25.
tactics of "divide and rule, the Germans maintained the socio-
political distinctions between the two groups. Though the Hutu
and Tutsi already divided themselves into two different groups,
German and Belgian colonialism would intensify these distinctions
in two ways. First, the Germans, Belgians and the Catholic
clergy favored the growth of Tutsi elite power. Finally, the
Belgians and Catholic church would dismantle the Tutsi hierarchy
and empower the Hutu.

In 1895, Rwabugiri's death started a bitter and intense
power struggle amongst the Abiru elites. Under rules of
succession amongst Tutsi lineages, the son of the queen mother
becomes the successor. Hence, Rwabugiri selected Rutarindwa as
his co-ruler before his death, but tradition prevailed. The
political ties of Rwabugiri's primary wife, Kanjogera determined
the succession of the next king, Mwami Yuhi V Musinga.\(^\text{44}\) Musinga
was depicted as a weak and irresolute ruler who needed the
support of Queen Mother Kanjogera and her brother Kabera to
uphold the Tutsi monarchy.

One of the major mistakes of the German colonial authorities
was the incorporation of the Abahinza, the northern Hutu
principalities into the centralized Tutsi-dominated monarchy.
Until this time, the northern area was independent of the Mwami
court and disassociated themselves from the Hutu of the center

\(^{44}\text{Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 58.}\)
and south, whom they considered the servants of the Tutsi monarchy. The Tutsi monarchy with German support crushed the 1912 rebellion of the Abahinza and relegated the northern Hutu principalities to a subordinate position, until Rwanda's independence.\textsuperscript{45}

The Germans imposed a system of exclusive colonial rule through Musinga's Tutsi court and started a system of "dual colonialism."\textsuperscript{46} Since the Germans maintained a relatively small presence in Ruanda-Urundi (approximately 96 Europeans in 1914), they depended on the Tutsi monarchy and local Ubuhake cattle chiefs to secure German control.\textsuperscript{47} While socio-economic biases were inherent in traditional Rwandese society, the preferential treatment of Tutsi elites marks the beginning of ethnic and racial tension in Ruanda-Urundi.\textsuperscript{48} Germany finally lost colonial Ruanda-Urundi, along with their other overseas territories, after the first world war.

\textsuperscript{45}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Rwanda: death, Despair and Defiance, 6.

\textsuperscript{46}Evans-Smith, Rwanda: A Country Study, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{47}Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 25.

\textsuperscript{48}Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 63-64.
ROLE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The Catholic church also contributed to ethnically based interpretation of society that regarded the Tutsi as inherently superior to the Hutu. According to scholar of Rwandese politics, Rene Lemarchand, the Catholic Church ensured preferences to Tutsis in terms of access to education and positions within the clergy. Important members of the clergy such as the first Bishop of Rwanda, Mgr. Leon Classe, and Father Pages, identified the Tutsi as the lost tribe of Christendom.\(^{49}\) According to Father Pages' book, *Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de l' Afrique*, the Tutsi were originally Ethiopian Coptic Christians whose religion had been lost in their migration.\(^{50}\)

In 1931, the Tutsi King converted to Christianity and adopted the Hamitic hypothesis/theory to justify the dominance of the monarchy. Prior to this mass conversion, the Tutsi remained loyal to traditional Rwandese religion which worshiped the King as the living symbol of God on earth.\(^{51}\) Despite the late conversion of the elite Tutsi, the Catholic church embraced the authority of the Tutsi monarchy. This is significant because the Tutsi gained access to education and positions as native clergy

\(^{49}\text{Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 9.}\)

\(^{50}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{51}\text{Ibid., 8-9.}\)
through the Catholic missionaries blind acceptance of European racial theories asserting that the Tutsi belonged to the civilized "Hamitic" race. Hence, the Catholic clergy appeared to truly believe in Tutsi ethnic superiority, it was more than merely a tactic of European "divide and rule".

The Catholic church controlled the Rwandese educational system. As an important element in Belgian reorganization of Rwanda after the German departure, the Catholic church gave educational priority to the Tutsi as the "natural-born chiefs."\(^{52}\)

According to enrollment figures at Butare (formerly Astrida) College, there were 45 Tutsi and 9 Hutu pupils in 1932.\(^{53}\) The Tutsi were granted educational training to pursue careers in the Belgian civil service, military or as the high ranking part of the indigenous clergy. Hutus were blocked from all avenues of higher education except the priesthood.\(^{54}\) Thus, the Catholic missionaries supported the Belgian policy of blindly supporting the Tutsi elites and subordinating the Hutu. This policy would play a significant role in 1959 social upheaval.

\(^{52}\)Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 33.

\(^{53}\)Ibid.

\(^{54}\)Ibid., 32.
BELGIAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION (1919-1962):

The Germans lost Ruanda-Urundi after the first world war and the colony became a mandate territory of Belgium in 1916. Unlike the Germans, the Belgians established direct rule in the territory and continued a system of preferences towards the Tutsi. As mentioned in the previous section, with the support of Catholic missionaries, Tutsis were trained, educated and given jobs in the Belgian Colonial civil service.\textsuperscript{55}

This section of the paper will consider the influence of such Belgian tactics as favoring Tutsi elites in the nineteen-twenties, empowering the Hutu in the nineteen-fifties and the dismantling of Tutsi power, and fueling the growth of ethnic political parties on the cycle of genocide.

FAVORITISM OF THE TUTSI ELITE:

The primary stage of Belgian colonialism created an intermediate or buffer class under the authority of the Tutsi monarchy. In this first stage, Tutsi elites were granted access to positions of power. While the Tutsi patrons of Ubuhake maintained a socio-economically rewarding position in Rwandese society, all vestiges of the privileged status of the Hutu

\textsuperscript{55}Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 151-152.
land chiefs were abolished.\textsuperscript{56} In fact, by the late nineteen-twenties, increased access to the civil service, clergy and military provided Tutsi chiefs with an alternate means to accumulate wealth and power. Hence, ethnic stratification between Hutu and Tutsi increased in Rwandese society.

Through the creation of "ethnic" identity cards and a system of forced labor (Ubureetwa) upon Hutu peasantry, Hutus were systematically excluded from positions of authority. The policies of Belgian colonialists in large part, fueled ethnic resentment between the Tutsi and Hutu. Belgian colonial preferences appeared to be influenced by European racial theories of Tutsi ethnic superiority. This was clear to both the Tutsi and Hutu population in Rwanda. The Belgian colonialist used ethnic identity cards to administer high (Tutsi) and low (Hutu) level positions in Rwanda.

The Belgian colonialists clearly identified the Tutsis as the "natural native leaders" by granting them access to all positions of power and prestige. In contrast, the Hutu and Twa, members of the Bantu or Negroid race, were given menial tasks positions of indentured servitude.\textsuperscript{57} Hence, Hutus and Tutsis internalized the false racial identities constructed by European

\textsuperscript{56}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 5.

\textsuperscript{57}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 8.
colonialists and missionaries, affecting the ethnic hatred.

ETHNIC IDENTITY CARDS

The Belgian colonialists imposed a system of exclusive rule through the Tutsi monarchy more efficiently than the Germans. One of the most divisive instruments of Belgian rule was the implementation of ethnic identity cards. In 1933-4, the Belgian civil service conducted the first national census and issued ethnic identity cards on the Rwandese population. Unlike the original system which granted Tutsi status through the ownership of cattle, the Belgian policy also utilized physical appearance to designate ethnic status.

Although low ranking Tutsi did not share wealth and privileges of the Tutsi elite, as members of the Tutsi "race", they did not participate in the forced labor imposed upon the Hutu masses in the nineteen-thirties. The Belgian colonialists created Ubureetwa, a system of compulsory work in which Tutsi chiefs administered the forced labor of the Hutu and Twa masses. It was legally impossible to alter one's ethnic identity under this system. All Hutus were automatically forced to participate in Ubureetwa. Thus, it created a permanent underclass with the subordination of the Hutu and Twa.

58Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 6.

UBUREETWA- SYSTEM OF FORCED LABOR

There is some debate about the origins of the system of forced labor, Ubureetwa. Scholars like Prunier insists that Ubureetwa was developed by the Tutsi chiefs in the early nineteenth century, but more scholars believe that this compulsory system of labor was started during Belgian colonialism (1919-1962). This involved the active recruitment of labor, tax collection and the encouragement of cash-crop production.\(^60\)

The famine in the nineteen-twenties and the international depression which followed, appears to be a turning point in Belgian policy. The Belgians chose to rely on the strength of the traditional Tutsi chiefs to institute the new economic policies. Ubureetwa had a social impact on Rwandese society with respect to ethnicity. Through the Tutsi, the Belgians created an intermediate or buffer class that carried out the colonialists' economic policies.\(^61\)

The crucial element of the Belgian policy involved a commitment of the colonialists to reinforce and respect the indigenous authority of the Tutsi chiefs.\(^62\) The rural Tutsi chiefs supervised the cash-crop and food production process and

\(^{60}\)Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 152.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., 156.

\(^{62}\)Ibid., 155.
recruited primarily Hutu and a small number of Twa. The Hutu elite were also slighted because the traditional Ubukonde land chiefs were replaced by Tutsi chiefs to implement Ubureetwa.

Ubureetwa also involved the enforcement of labor for road building, reforestation and building state infrastructures. As a result of harsh labor conditions and the cruelty of several Tutsi chiefs, in the nineteen-forties, Ubureetwa led to the mass migration of hundreds of thousands of Hutus into Uganda. In the nineteen-fifties, the Hutu elite described Ubureetwa as a harsh and oppressive form of Tutsi "colonialism". Thus, during the Hutu empowerment period, northern and southern Hutus would form a pan-Hutu solidarity, bound by common resentment for the Tutsi.

**EMPOWERMENT OF THE HUTU ELITE**

The demand and struggle for independence, after World War II, was generally rejected and resisted by the colonial powers in Africa, especially by the Belgians. During the mid-nineteen fifties, the relationship between the Tutsi elites and the Belgians soured as this favored class started to push for long awaited self-determination and sovereignty. This section of the paper will analyze the motivations behind the change in the

---


64 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 35.
Belgian Colonial policy. Scholars of African studies such as Prunier and Lemarchand suggest that the reversal in Belgian policy was a turning point in the Hutu/Tutsi relationship.

The Belgian colonial policy appears to be in three stages: replacing Tutsi aristocracy's political position with rising Hutu elite; supporting Hutu political parties (PARMEHUTU and APROMOSA); and participating in the 1959 mass killing and genocide of the Tutsi aristocracy.

**DISMANTLING OF TUTSI ARISTOCRACY**

After upholding the power of the Tutsi monarchy since 1916, in the early nineteen-fifties, the Belgian colonialists and the Catholic missionaries empowered Hutu intellectuals to use their majority status to destroy minority Tutsi control.\(^65\) Several sources suggest that the reversal in Belgian colonial policy's aim was to end the ethnic elitism amongst the Tutsi which they helped to create. The primary reason for the reversal of colonial support away from the Tutsi elite was a result of the change in the Tutsi monarchy's behavior. The Tutsi elite were influenced by the radical wave of pan-Africanism sweeping the continent in the early nineteen-fifties and began demanding Rwanda-Burundi's independence.\(^66\)


Although the Tutsis were actively requesting self-government, they became more insistent after the death of Mwami Mutara in 1959.\textsuperscript{67} Many Tutsi accused the Belgians of murdering the King and in the same year, the Mwami Kigeli V ascended to the throne and founded UNAR, Rwanda National Union. The Belgians were disgruntled about birth of UNAR and the Tutsi monarchy's attempt to gain international recognition for "native" struggle.

After the first U.N. mission to Ruanda-Urundi (1948), the Belgians believed that they had to make visible constitutional reforms to a system plagued by racial preferences.\textsuperscript{68} The Belgian colonial administration also felt betrayed by the Tutsi monarchy's demands for independence and sovereignty from colonialism. Through the political party UNAR, the Tutsi aristocracy also advocated racial equality between the Belgians and the native Rwandese, particular Tutsi. Hence, the Belgians

\textsuperscript{67}Mwami Mutara actively campaigned for the end to colonial rule in Rwanda-Burundi, believing that he, along with the Tutsi Akazu (his ruling court) should ascend as the political leaders of the newly independent country. Several members believe that the Belgians and the Roman Catholic Church murdered Mutara because they perceived his actions as a threat to European control of the colony. Mutara "mysteriously" died in Bujumbura (Burundi) after being given an injection by a Belgian doctor. A Tutsi doctor and supporter of the monarchy rejected this accusation and maintains that the King died from anaphylactic shock (sudden allergic reaction to penicillin which Mutara was using to treat a venereal disease. However, the Tutsi monarchy as a whole blamed the Belgians for his death.

\textsuperscript{68}Rene Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, 79.
decided to dismantle Tutsi elite's political and socio-economic presence in Rwanda-Burundi. The last Belgian vice-governor general in Rwanda-Burundi, Jean-Paul Harroy, stated in his memoirs:

"From then on, the unspoken agreement which the (Belgian) administration had made with the Tutsi ruling caste in order to further economic development...was allowed to collapse. The Tutsi wanted independence and were trying to get it as quickly as possible by sabotaging Belgian actions, whether technical or political...The administration was forced to toughen its attitude when faced with such obstruction and hostility coming from chiefs and sub-chiefs with whom we had collaborated for many years."\(^69\)

The Belgian colonial administration's policy abolished all vestiges of Ubuhahe and other socio-economic institutions giving preferences to Tutsi.\(^70\) Most importantly, the Belgian colonialists initially created the electoral native councils to train and protect the authority of the Tutsi aristocracy in the nineteen-thirties. After the Tutsi elite and Belgian relationship soured, in the late nineteen-fifties, the Belgian colonialists destroyed the political power of the Tutsi elite by establishing democratically elected organs of local and central government for the growing Hutu counter-elite.\(^71\) Thus, the Hutu majority (approximately 85% of population) seized political and

\(^69\)Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 47-48.

\(^70\)Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 42.

\(^71\)Ibid., 80-81.
economic power for the first time in the Belgian colony.

The Roman Catholic Church was also responsible for the reversal of ethnic preferences in Rwanda-Burundi. After recognizing the Tutsi monarchy's "natural" right to rule for decades, the Catholic church began to support the rise of Hutu intellectuals. Since the late nineteen-thirties, the original members of the Catholic clergy in Rwanda were members of the political and socio-economic elite in France and Belgium. The new members of the clergy were from working class backgrounds and identified with the subordinate position of the Hutu. Hence, the clergy no longer endorsed the racial justification for Tutsi rule.

Initially, the Catholic Church favored the growth of a Hutu intellectual elite to counter the Tutsi monarchy's growing demands for sovereignty. Since the Tutsi aristocracy began preaching the new ideas of racial equality and self-government, the Catholic church and the Belgian administration recognized that an independent Rwanda-Burundi under Tutsi leadership would undermine their political power. Therefore, these two colonial institutions decided that aiding in the growth of a Hutu counter-elite would protect European interests in the country for two

\footnote{Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 44.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 43.}
reasons: (1) The Hutu intellectuals would be more likely to depend on the political "expertise" of their former colonizers than the Tutsi aristocracy; (2) In a more practical sense, the Belgians realized that after Rwanda-Burundi received independence the Hutu majority would have the strongest power base in the country. 

DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC-BASED POLITICAL PARTIES

In the late nineteen-fifties, the Rwandese population's demand for independence led to the rise of several political parties. UNAR and PARMEHUTU, in particular, became the political voice of two ethnically distinct communities in Rwanda. UNAR or Rwanda National Union served as the driving force behind the quest for Rwandese and Burundese independence. Although all three ethnic groups were members of UNAR, the elected leader of UNAR was Mwami Kigeli V who had been ostracized by the Belgians

---

75 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 43-44.

76 In 1959, several political parties were founded as the population's demands for independence increased. Political parties such as APROMOSA (Association for the Social Betterment of the Masses- Hutu majority, but recognition of Tutsi elite oppression of both Hutu and non-elite Tutsi) and RADER (Rwanda Democratic Rally- representing the younger and more liberal Tutsi) represented the will of the masses and did not discriminate with respect to ethnicity. However, as ethnic tension increased, the rise of extremist and conservative political parties such as PARMEHUTU and UNAR overshadowed the more liberal and democratic RADER and APROMOSA. See Rwanda: A Country Study pp.18-24 and Prunier's *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* pp.42-54.

77 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 171.
for accepting diplomatic support from the Communist states in the 
U.N. Trusteeship Council.\textsuperscript{78} The party was comprised 
predominantly of elite and conservative Tutsi who demanded the 
 immediate and total independence of Rwanda-Burundi under the 
authority of the Tutsi monarchy.\textsuperscript{79} The top level leadership of 
UNAR publicly accused Belgian colonial administrators and 
Catholic missionaries of creating a permanent ethnic divide 
amongst the Tutsi and Hutu, while ignoring the role of the Tutsi 
monarchy in establishing a system of ethnic preferences.\textsuperscript{80} 

Many of the Hutu masses distrusted the conservative elements 
of UNAR and rejected the political authority of the Tutsi 
monarchy after independence. The rising Hutu intellectuals 
trained in seminary schools by the Catholic clergy, denounced the 
Tutsi aristocracy for their participation in oppressive and 
exploitative forced labor, Ubureetwa. Though this was a Belgian 
policy, the Tutsi chiefs brutality and cruelty towards the Hutu 
laborers led to the Hutu mass migration to Uganda in the 
nineteen-thirties. The northern Hutu elite detested the Tutsi 
monarchy for their role in 1912 annexation of Abahinza territory. 

With the support of the Belgian colonialists and Catholic 
Missionaries, the rising Hutu intellectuals created PARMEHUTU 

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., 47. 


\textsuperscript{80}Ibid.
(the Political Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu) in 1958-59 to crush UNAR's demands for independence. Unlike the Tutsi aristocracy, the PARMEHUTU's leaders were willing to slow and gradual departure of the European colonialism.

Gregoire Kayibanda, one of the major leaders of the Hutu struggle for socio-economic and political equality, helped to create a pan-Hutu solidarity. Hutus divided along socio-economic and geographic lines were united against the possibility of future Tutsi oppression and exploitation. Yet, the PARMEHUTU's racist and anti-Tutsi rhetoric suggests that Kayibanda's was enacting revenge rather than equality.

Kayibanda summoned all Hutus to unite against the Tutsi oligarchy and to work for the upliftment of the "true" Rwandese people, the Hutu. With the financial support of the Catholic clergy, Kayibanda and the rising Hutu intellectual elite published Kinyamateka, this periodical became one of the most widely read organs in Rwanda. Kinyamateka became the voice of Hutu grievances and relentlessly attacked the wealth and privileges of the Tutsi aristocracy.

---


82 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 151.

83 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 45.

84 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 108.
The creation of TRAFIPRO (work, fidelity and progress) a coffee cooperative financially supported by the Catholic clergy provided economic opportunities and leadership training for the growing Hutu intellectual elite.\textsuperscript{85} Kayibanda and other members of the Hutu elite used Kinyamateka and TRAFIPRO to spread the message of a pan-Hutu solidarity and created PARMEHUTU political party in 1959.\textsuperscript{86} Kayibanda emerged as the party leader and published the "Manifesto of the Hutu" which more specifically outlined Hutu elites grievances and goals.

The "Bahutu Manifesto: A note on the social aspects of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda" was the first open expression calling for an end to Tutsi domination of the Hutu.\textsuperscript{87}

"The problem is the political monopoly of one race, the Mutusi. In the present circumstances, this political monopoly has turned into an economic and social monopoly...given the de facto selection in school..this becomes a cultural monopoly which condemns the desperate Bahutu to be subordinate workers... In order to monitor the race monopoly, we are strongly opposed ...to removing the labels Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Their suppression would create a risk of statistical law, from creating a reality of fact.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86}Evans-Smith, Rwanda: A Country Study, 17.


\textsuperscript{88}Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 46.
This first generation of Hutu intellectuals educated in seminary schools rallied behind the banner of ethnic separatism. The movement was separatists because the Clergy was training Hutu intellectuals to counter the Tutsi hierarchy in Rwanda. According to the teachings of the Catholic missionaries, the Tutsi monarchy dominated the Hutu for centuries before the arrival of the European colonialists. 5 Thus, the Hutu intellectuals must struggle against the anti-Christian and democratic actions of Tutsi elites.

Kayibanda and other Hutu intellectuals were influenced by the ideas of "Christian Socialism" which espoused a commitment to democracy, equality and social progress for all members of the society. 90 The Hutu elite convinced the Hutu masses that the Tutsis were feudalist invaders from Ethiopia and that they alone were the native people of Rwanda. 91 Kayibanda and the Hutu elite called for an immediate end to what they perceived as "Tutsi feudalism", but insisted that the Belgian Trusteeship monitor Rwanda's independence. 92

89Ibid.

90Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 42.

91Ibid., 43.

This was a savvy political move by the Hutu intellectuals to ignore the brutality of Belgian colonialism and gain Belgian support in the struggle for independence. In the highly racially charged atmosphere between the Tutsi monarchy and growing Hutu intellectual elite, Colonel Logiest, the former commander of the Belgian civil and military authorities in of January 1960, insisted that the Belgians could no longer remain neutral and should support the Hutu.\textsuperscript{93} The PARMEHUTU political leaders were more willing than the UNAR to comply with a slower decolonization process. The colonial authorities organized communal elections in July of 1960 and PARMEHUTU emerged as the political choice of the Rwandese population.\textsuperscript{94} The Belgian colonial administration began replacing the original Tutsi chiefs with members of the Hutu elite.\textsuperscript{95} Hence, the reversal in the Belgian colonial administration's policy created an atmosphere foreshadowing the violent events of 1959-62.

1959 MASSACRE

The first episode of mass killing occurred during the "struggle" for independence from Belgium rule. The political objective of this genocide was to exterminate the Tutsi elite.

\textsuperscript{93}Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 51.

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., 52.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 51.
As sporadic fighting developed between PARMEHUTU and UNAR supporters in 1959, the Hutu elite started an active campaign of burning Tutsi homes.\textsuperscript{96} The initial violence against the Tutsi elite spread to the wider Tutsi community. This period was known as the Muyaga, a Kinyarwanda term meaning "a strong but variable wind, with unpredictable destructive gusts", which occurred in Rwanda after 1959. This 1959 mass killing would affect the experience of future genocides in Rwanda. Around the country, Tutsis were hunted and murdered with machetes, garden hoes and axes.\textsuperscript{97}

The Rwandan Revolution of 1959-62 claimed the lives of approximately 20,000 Tutsi and led hundreds of thousands to flee the violence and settle in Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and Burundi.\textsuperscript{98}

The 1959 pogroms are often referred to as the dress rehearsal or preamble for the most recent genocide in 1994.

\textbf{Consolidation of the Hutu Elite}

Independence was granted in 1962 and Rwanda-Jrundi was separated into the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi.\textsuperscript{99} Through neo-colonial ties Rwanda would remain an


\textsuperscript{97}Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 51.

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid, 53-54.

instrument of Belgian control after independence. The racial justification for Tutsi rule was now reversed by the Belgian colonialists and Catholic church to encourage the rise of the Hutu elite under the Republic of Rwanda. This section will analyze the period of approximately thirty years of changes in Rwanda's political and socio-economic atmosphere.

PRESIDENT KAYIBANDA (1961-1973)

Under the (Mouvement Democratique Republicain)MDR-PARMEHUTU government, elected President Kayibanda established a republican government that permanently reversed the ethnic hierarchy in Rwanda. The main objective of Kayibanda's regime was to dismantle all remaining vestiges of Tutsi elite power and prestige. Hence, Tutsi dominated institutions were replaced by Hutu dominated ones.

For instance, the PARMEHUTU government abolished the traditional cattle clientship of Ubuhake and restored Ubukonde land clientship which was dominated by the Hutu chiefs. This change reasserted the authority of the Hutu land chiefs and undermined the traditional power of the Tutsi monarchy. Clearly, the main objective of the PARMEHUTU regime was twofold, the ousting of Tutsis from all positions of power and consolidating

---

100 Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 12.
Hutu power in both the central and local governments.

**THE PURGING OF THE TUTSI**

Instead of establishing equality and democracy, the new government promoted a system of racial biases whereby the Hutu were now the beneficiaries and the Tutsi the subordinates. The Hutu elite utilized the ethnic identity cards from the colonial period, which were now used to systematically exclude Tutsis from their previous monopoly of the civil service and armed forces.\(^\text{101}\)

However, while the PARMEHUTU political appointees dominated the army, police force and civil service, the Tutsi monopoly continued in the areas of commerce and academia.\(^\text{102}\)

During the nineteen-sixties, Rwanda's political atmosphere was marked by insecurity and violence. On the borders of neighboring states\(^\text{103}\), the Tutsi exiles formed guerilla bands called the Inyenzi (cockroaches) and attacked the PARMEHUTU regime.\(^\text{104}\) With the aid of Belgian Paratroopers, the central government crushed the Inyenzi incursions.\(^\text{105}\) The Inyenzi attacks

\(^{101}\)Ibid.


\(^{103}\)Tutsi refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire attacked the PARMEHUTU government.

\(^{104}\)Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 12.

\(^{105}\)Ibid.
intensified the purges against Tutsis left in Rwanda. In a government inspired assault, Hutu gangs murdered an estimated ten thousand non-elite Tutsis after an Inyenzi attack from Burundi in 1963.\textsuperscript{106} Unlike the 1959 pogroms, all Tutsi, not merely the Tutsi elite were the target of attacks.

\textbf{PARMEHUTU- STRUGGLE FOR HUTU SOLIDARITY}

The Kayibanda regime also attempted to unify the Hutu masses. Although Hutu extremists were firmly united against "Tutsi colonialism", most Hutus were divided along class and geographic lines. The majority of the Hutu peasantry felt alienated by the political elite, while Hutus from northern Rwanda perceived the central and southern Hutus as collaborators with the Tutsi monarchy. Though the Abahinza chiefs reclaimed control of land in the north, the central and southern Hutus gained the greatest access to positions in government.

The PARMEHUTU government appeared to be the ideal center of Christian morals and values. However, under the Christian teachings of the Catholic church, Kayibanda's regime justified the purges against Tutsis by declaring them foreign invaders from Ethiopia who had colonized and dominated the Hutu masses. Rwanda became a country in which criminals were punished and the majority of the native population were industrious peasants who

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
regularly attended Mass.\textsuperscript{107} Eventually, Under the Kayibanda regime, Rwanda became a hostile and tense environment in which Tutsis were consistently harassed and murdered. By mid-1972, Kayibanda regime was weak and fearful of growing Hutu political opposition and the Inyenzi border attacks.\textsuperscript{108}

The PARMEHUTU government, architects of the Hutu racist ideology, failed to deliver Hutu solidarity and emancipation. The majority of the population has lost faith in the government. In 1973, senior army commander and Minister of Defense, Juneval Habyarimana seized power, defeating the weakened Kayibanda regime.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{PRESIDENT JUNEVAL HABYARIMANA (1973-1994)}

Under the regime of Juneval Habyarimana, a strong anti-Tutsi policy continued with the political objective of eliminating all Tutsi, not simply the elite, from any privileged positions.\textsuperscript{110} In 1973-4, Habyarimana and other Hutu political extremists succeeded, finishing the 1959 political objective of removing tens of thousands of Tutsi (approximately 30-50,000) from or in

\textsuperscript{107}Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 59.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 60.

\textsuperscript{109}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Not So Innocent}, 18.

\textsuperscript{110}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 573.
positions of power in education, the Catholic Church and the civil service.\(^{111}\) At first, the vigilante committees murdered university students and members of the Tutsi clergy. This rapidly developed into a complete physical extermination of Tutsis and the purging of Tutsis from all educational facilities.\(^{112}\)

The mass killings in 1973-4 sparked the beginning of the consolidation of Hutu political extremists with the aim of maintaining a power monopoly at all costs. Habyarimana's regime used the 1973 pogroms to eliminate PARMEHUTU opposition, but mainly to destroy the lingering Tutsi presence in education and commerce.

**POLITICAL EXTREMISM: HABYARIMANA'S ONE PARTY STATE**

In 1975, Habyarimana established a one party system under MRND, Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement which emphasized a policy of national unity, economic development and political stability.\(^{113}\) After 1973 massacres, Rwanda experienced a fairly peaceful period with minimal violence. Habyarimana, the first northern Hutu to rule Rwanda, enacted a

\(^{111}\)Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 82.

\(^{112}\)Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Rwanda Not So Innocent*, 18.

\(^{113}\)Ibid., 19.
policy of "establishing ethnic and regional balance".\textsuperscript{114}

This policy used quotas to both protect the Hutu monopoly of power and ensure that the northern Hutu would gain greater access to the country's resources. These quotas determined how jobs and resources were allocated to the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. For example, since the Tutsi comprised 10% of the Rwandese population, only 10% of the Tutsi were given access to military, civil service, seminary and education.\textsuperscript{115}

Habyarimana's regime became increasingly more corrupt and authoritarian. The majority of the power and prestige in the country rested in Habyarimana's Akazu, inner circle of supporters from north-western Rwanda.\textsuperscript{116} While the Tutsi monarchy and the Belgian colonialists determined access to wealth and power in colonial Rwanda-Urundi, in an Orwellian fashion\textsuperscript{117}, the MRND politicians reinstated the clientele networks and employed their own friends and family members into the Rwandese civil service.

Habyarimana would also have to deal with several external factors impeding the progress of his regime. The following


\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Rwanda Not So Innocent, 19.

\textsuperscript{117}This phrase refers to a famous quote for George Orwell's Animal Farm, "The more things change, the more they stay the same."
factors greatly influenced the dynamics of the ethnic conflict in Rwanda and political decisions of Habyarimana's regime: the presence of Tutsi refugees in neighboring states remained an ongoing dilemma for the Habyarimana regime, particularly the Tutsi refugees in Uganda who would emerge as the Rwandan Patriotic Front; the rise of multi-partism and internal division amongst Hutu politicians; and the United Nation's Arusha Accords ceasefire and powersharing agreement between the RPF and Habyarimana's MRND.

**RWANDAN REFUGEE CRISIS**

In 1973, a second round of anti-Tutsi massacres led to mass exodus of approximately 700,000 Tutsis refugees, since 1959, to neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. The MRND government received pressure from the neighboring states and the international community to resettle the Tutsi refugees. Habyarimana maintained that overpopulation and economic problems prevented Rwanda from accommodating large numbers of Tutsi refugees. The Tutsi refugee crisis remained an obstacle for Habyarimana, particularly the mobilizing refugees in Uganda, who later formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

---

118Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 63.

IMPORTANCE OF THE TUTSI REFUGEES IN UGANDA

While Rwandan refugees in Tanzania settled with minimal difficulty, Tutsis in neighboring Uganda and Zaire suffered extreme discrimination. This section will focus on the Tutsi refugees in Uganda who would later attack Habyarimana's regime as the Rwandan Patriotic Front. It will discuss these Tutsi refugees in relation to citizenship restrictions, economic survival and military training in Uganda.

Under the regime of Milton Obote, the Tutsi refugees were persecuted, expelled and denied basic civil rights in Uganda.\(^{120}\) Though Uganda was initially willing to protect the Rwandan refugees in compliance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Ugandan government remained unwilling to grant the Tutsi refugees citizenship rights.\(^{121}\) The Ugandan Constitution was silent on the issue of refugees, but the Control of Alien Refugees Act made provisions granting temporary asylum for refugees in Uganda. All refugees who entered Uganda after June 30, 1960 needed a permit.

\(^{120}\)The Tutsi refugees suffered tremendously under the second Obote regime (1978-1986). In particular, his regime began an active campaign in 1982 of "Chasing the Banyarwanda (term to refer to Tutsi refugees in Uganda) out of the country" because of their support of Idi Amin. Hence, the Tutsi refugees were later targeted in Obote's counter-insurgency campaign which was responsible for killing close to 1 million civilians in Uganda's notorious Luwero Triangle.

\(^{121}\)Khiddhu-Makubuya, "Voluntary Repatriation by Force: The Case Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Uganda," 144.
to remain in Uganda.¹²² This act was directly addressing the Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda after the 1959 and 1973 ethnic massacres. It ensured that refugees could be detained or expelled from Uganda without providing safeguards to protect them.

International organizations had difficulty resolving the Rwandan refugee crisis in Uganda because of the Ugandan government's rigid citizenship law and Habyarimana's refusal to reintegrate the refugees back into Rwandese society.¹²³ During the late 1960-80s, civil unrest in Uganda resulted in poverty, scarcity, and serious violations of human rights.¹²⁴ In an overpopulated and impoverished state, many Ugandans developed a strong resentment towards the well-educated Tutsi refugees.

Unlike the Hutu migrants who fled Rwanda in the nineteen-thirties, many Ugandans were openly hostile toward the Tutsi refugees who threatened the jobs and educational opportunities of Ugandan citizens. The Tutsi refugees who fled the 1959 pogroms were part of the Tutsi educational elite as well as the former members of the Rwanda civil service. Naturally, the Tutsi refugees pursued careers in education and business. During Idi

¹²²Ibid., 145.


Amin's reign (1971-1979), a few Tutsi refugees were given positions in government.\textsuperscript{125}

The Tutsi refugees The Tutsi refugees sought refuge with the Hima of Ankole, a region in Southwestern Uganda. The Hima were cattle-herders who sympathized with the plight of the Tutsi refugees.\textsuperscript{126} Despite on-going talks about the return of the Tutsi refugees, Habyarimana continued to reject their return by claiming that Rwanda was overpopulated. As in the Uganda case, the Tutsi refugees were never completely integrated into their host communities around the Great Lakes Region. Hence, most of the refugees never lost hope of returning to Rwanda, even if it was by force.

\textbf{THE CREATION OF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT}

The experience of Tutsi refugees in Uganda led to the creation of the guerilla force that would defeat Habyarimana's regime, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The current Ugandan regime, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) played a tremendous role

\textsuperscript{125}Khiddhu-Makubuya, "Voluntary Repatriation by Force: The Case of the Rwandan Refugees in Uganda," 149-150.

\textsuperscript{126}The Hima, cattle-herders of Ankole were part of (British explorers 19th century) Speke and Burton's Wahuma of the "Hamitic" Hypothesis. The Hima Monarchy politically and socio-economically dominated Ankole, in South-Western Uganda. The ethnic composition of the Ankole was similar to Rwanda with the Hima (related to the Tutsi) and Bairu (Bantu group related to the Hutu). Genocide did not take place in Uganda along the same lines because Ankole is one district in a multi-ethnic state (Uganda). See \textit{Uganda: A Country Study} edited by Rita Byrnes.
in the development of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) by providing military and strategic training to these former members of Museveni's NRM. Hence, many media sources characterize the RPF as extension of Ugandan President Museveni's external interests. Though Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) was instrumental in the formation of the RPF, the Tutsi refugees clearly had their own objective, the "liberation" of Rwanda.

In the 1980s, a large number of Tutsi refugees joined Yoweri Museveni's anti-government guerilla group, the National Resistance Army (NRA). Many international sources suggest that Museveni gained the support of the Tutsi refugees by promising to assist their efforts to eventually return to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{127} After Museveni seized power of Uganda in 1986\textsuperscript{128}, many of the Tutsi refugees like Fred Rwigema\textsuperscript{129} and Paul Kagame\textsuperscript{130} occupied senior

\textsuperscript{127} Khiddu-Makubuya, "Voluntary Repatriation by Force: The Case of the Rwandan Refugees in Uganda," 16.

\textsuperscript{128} The Ugandan Civil War (1981-1986) was a struggle against the violent and corrupt second regime of Milton Obote. During the second Obote administration (1981-1985), Museveni began his "War in the Bush" emanating from the rigged elections in 1980. Under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni, the National Resistance Army would defeat Obote's regime.

\textsuperscript{129} Fred Rwigema would later become the first military commander and revered leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). He was killed in the RPF first invasion of Rwanda in 1990.

\textsuperscript{130} Paul Kagame who was once head of the NRA's military intelligence, would rise as one of the most prominent military and political figures in Rwanda. A respected military strategist, Kagame became the military commander after Fred
positions in the government and army.\textsuperscript{131} In September of 1990, Rwigema and Kagame convinced several thousand children of Tutsi refugees in Uganda to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Tutsi refugees, who were now members of the RPF guerilla unit, used the Ugandan Civil War as a vehicle for military strategizing and training. On the first of October (1990), the RPF forces launched the first invasion into Rwanda.\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{CIVIL STRIFE IN RWANDA (1990-1993)}

The Rwanda Civil War (1990-1994) was triggered by the RPF attack in 1990. In response to the RPF attack, the Habyarimana regime deliberately pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing against the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda from 1990-1992. Hutu political extremists promptly responded to the 1990 RPF invasion by starting the slaughter of the Tutsi population in the country, particularly in Northwestern Rwanda.\textsuperscript{133} The MRND government mistakenly believed these massacres of Tutsis in the country would deter military action by the RPF. The RPF, however, continued its military initiative with the intention of

\textsuperscript{131}Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 28.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid.

destroying the Habyarimana government.

The international community, generally, remained indifferent to civil strife in Rwanda. France perceived the RPF invasion as an "Anglo-Saxon" plot to destroy a member state of Francophone Africa.\textsuperscript{134} Since the RPF were Tutsi refugees trained in Uganda, a former British colony, they were seen as a threat to French neocolonial interests in Rwanda. The French government increased its financial and military aid to Habyarimana's government with little consideration for the regime's human rights abuses against the Tutsi population. Clearly, France appeared most concerned with maintaining its influence in the region.\textsuperscript{135}

In the meantime, the RPF continued to move across the Rwandan and Ugandan border collecting weapons and ammunition to fuel the war. After the death of Rwigema, Paul Kagame became the Major General of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and sought the financial support of both Tutsi and Hutu exiles who were against the MRND regime. The on-going attacks by the RPF weakened the authority of Habyarimana's regime.

Moreover, internal opposition surfaced in the wake of political instability and Habyarimana was forced to abandon his one party system. During this political insecurity and unrest, the international community pressured the MRND regime to create

\textsuperscript{134}Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 106.

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., 108.
political parties. Several political parties emerged such as PSR (socialist party), RTD (workers party), PECO (Muslim party), but the political party that presented a challenge to the MRND was CDR, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic.

Under the pressure of the international community, Habyarimana halted the massacre of Tutsis. CDR, a radical Hutu racist party, denounced Habyarimana's regime for pursuing this "soft" policy, against the RPF and the Tutsi population in Rwanda by stopping the murder of Tutsis.\textsuperscript{136} The new multi-party government was solely to appease the demands of the international donor community - International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In fact, the emergence of more Hutu political extremists placed greater pressure on Habyarimana's regime to encourage the mass killing of Tutsis in Rwanda.

ARUSHA ACCORDS: AN INTERNATIONAL SEARCH FOR PEACE

In the wake of mass killing and civil strife in Rwanda, the United Nations signed the Arusha Accords in July of 1992 to call for talks between leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Habyarimana's regime. The Arusha Accords created a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) uniting the RPF rebels and MRND government to discuss a powersharing arrangement, ceasefire and the repatriation of Rwandese (mainly Tutsi) refugees throughout

\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., 128.
the Great Lakes Region. In 1993, the U.N. set up the United Nations Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission (UNUROM) and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) to protect the authority of the Arusha Accords.

In the middle of the negotiation process, extremist elements within Habyarimana's political party, the MRND, began broadcasting hate-filled propaganda against all Tutsi and any Hutus who supported the Arusha Accords. Unwilling to accept the Arusha Accords, these Hutu extremists in government and the army created the Interhamwe militias, in Kinyarwanda, "those who attack together." The Interhamwe militia underwent extensive military training, collected weapons and ammunition, mobilized the support of the Hutu masses and organized an extermination list of all Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu.

In April of 1994, the sudden death of President Habyarimana and the former President of Burundi, Ntaryamira, in a mysterious plane crash seemed to trigger the Interhamwe's bloody and violent massacres, permanently ending the Arusha Accords. Thus, Rwanda welcomed the 1994 Apocalypse, the systematic and deliberate genocide of 1 million Rwandese.

---

137 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 192.


CHAPTER 3: 1994 GENOCIDE

The 1994 genocide, April-June, claimed the lives of approximately 1 million Rwandese. Tutsis and politically moderate Hutu were brutally slaughtered in hospitals, churches, schools and other places of refuge, by Hutu extremists. In the Rwandese case, genocide was more than simply killing Tutsi civilians. The Hutu masses were convinced to do "whatever was necessary" to protect Hutu power.

Ordinary Rwandese citizens were encouraged to serve the Hutu cause by patrolling roadblocks, spreading the Hutu ideology and revealing the identity of Tutsis, including neighbors, relatives, and friends. Rwanda had an organized civil service, defined geographic borders, an obedient population, a fairly good communication system and a clear and strong Hutu ideology which were critical tools used to advance the extremists' genocidal campaign.\(^{140}\)

The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, I will provide a historical account of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This section will identify the organizers, killers, victims and provide significant background information on Rwanda's most recent genocide. Finally, I will analyze the main argument of the thesis: who should history hold accountable for Rwanda's cycle of genocide and mass killing? My assessment of the role of

\(^{140}\)Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 238.
these international and Rwandese actors is not based on international law. Rather, I am using a combination of cause and effect reasoning and my moral judgement to determine who took actions that caused the genocide and who had the freedom to change their decisions.

Interim Government (April-July 1994): Setting the Stage for the Genocide

After President Habyarimana's fatal plane crash in April 1994, a right-wing group of MRND and CDR supporters created an interim government. The sudden death of the President caused immediate rioting and violence. These Hutu political extremists used the death of Habyarimana to manipulate the masses into participating in the 1994 genocide. It is rumored that Hutu political extremists are responsible for the fatal plane crash. Under the constant pressure of the international community, Habyarimana accepted the terms of the Arusha Accords and agreed on a powersharing arrangement with the Rwandan Patriotic Front.¹⁴¹ Several members of Habyarimana's Akazu (or inner circle) began to view the President as failing to protect the Hutu power base. Hence, on April 8, MRND hardliners along with the aid of the Presidential Guard staged a coup d'etat.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 224.
As President of the new interim government (April-July 1994), Dr. Theodore Sindikuwabo feigned some semblance of a multi-party democratic regime, while enforcing the MRND's policy of genocide to deter the RPF from returning to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{142} This elite core of Hutu extremist organized and planned the April-June genocide during the period of 1990-1993, by using local administrators and Rwandan media sources, radio and news papers, to preach Hutu Hate propaganda against the Tutsi and Hutu political moderates. Finally, the interhamwe militias, "those who stand together" were trained to fulfill the regime's final solution, extermination of the Tutsi race and all Hutu political opponents.

\textbf{PREPARING FOR THE GENOCIDE}

The interim government manipulated the Hutu masses to commit the genocide through the constant preaching of anti-Tutsi propaganda. Historical grievances of past exploitation by Tutsi monarchy were exaggerated to incite the rage of the Hutu masses against all Tutsi. Hutu extremism combined both the desire to uphold Hutu political power at all costs and to maintain Hutu status as victims of past oppression at the hands of Tutsi

\textsuperscript{142}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 102-3.
elites.\textsuperscript{143} Hutu extremists reiterated calls to continue or finish the 1959 "Social Revolution" by killing the children of Tutsis who escaped the first genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front and their Tutsi "cousins" in the country.\textsuperscript{144} They claimed that the RPF was returning to re-establish Tutsi rule and exploitation of the Hutu population in Rwanda.

There were two clear differences between the preaching of anti-Tutsi messages during the previous mass killings and this recent wave of Hutu extremism: 1) The enemy of the Hutu population or "true Rwandese" were all Tutsi, not solely the Tutsi aristocracy; 2) The new Hutu extremists had radio stations, television and high level politicians calling for the decimation of the entire Tutsi race and any Hutus opposed to the genocide. The next section will discuss the importance of the Rwandan media in mobilizing mass support for the genocide as well as the growth of the Interhamwe militias.

\textbf{RTLM - RWANDA'S HATE RADIO}

One of the major mediums of Hutu Hate propaganda was RTLM (Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines), a private radio station used to rally and incite the rage of Hutu masses. Radical Hutu politicians encouraged the Hutu population to

\footnote{\textsuperscript{143}Ibid., 39.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{144}ibid.}

76
participate in the massacres through the local administrators. Many of these local politicians were wealthy businessmen who owned radio stations and newspapers to spread the Hutu gospel. On April 6, the RTLM extremist radio station began emphasizing themes that all Tutsis were guilty of subordinating and oppressing the Hutu, even the peasants and Tutsi exiles who benefited from past Tutsi domination. The broadcasts appealed to Hutu pride and reminded Hutus that Tutsis were "Hamitic" invaders who must be punished. Hence, genocide was the only solution to preventing the RPF from re-creating Tutsi supremacy in Rwanda.

Similar to the Kangura newspaper in the 1950s, RTLM became the voice of the Hutu extremists, spouting racist rhetoric like the "Hutu Ten Commandments." For instance, the first commandment warns Hutu men that Tutsi women work for the benefit of the Tutsi ethnic groups as a whole and any Hutu who marries, befriends or employs a Tutsi woman is considered a traitor. Hutu extremist politicians, academics and journalists used RTLM as the mouthpiece to indoctrinate the Hutu masses to achieve the

---

145 RTLM radio station would broadcast the Hutu Ten Commandments on an on-going basis after the death of Habyarimana. The commandments demanded that no Hutu should marry, befriend, enter a business partnership with a Tutsi. Moreover, it demanded that the army, educational sectors, and politics should all be under Hutu control and all Hutus must be taught Hutu ideology and unite against all Tutsi. See Omaar and de Waal's *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, p.42-43.

146 Omaar and de Waal, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 42.
"final solution", the extermination of all Tutsis. An RTLM radio personality (Ananie Nkurunziza) reminded the Hutu population that the "enemy" must be killed:

"Even those Tutsis who were not rulers, they were still on the King's side (Tutsi Mwami). As far as I can see, it is nothing else but the wish to dominate, thinking that they are special people... their true motive (RPF) is to set up an extended Tutsi-Hima Kingdom in the Bantu area of the Great Lakes region. It should be recalled that in identification with the Aryan race, both ethnic groups (Tutsi and Hima) consider themselves as being superior to other ethnic groups."[147]

The RTLM broadcasts continued to portray the RPF as an extension of Tutsi supremacy throughout East Africa. Ugandan President Museveni's was a Hima from Ankole, an ethnic group related to the Tutsi according to nineteenth century European racial theories. As suggested in previous sections, Hutu extremists used the RPF's close ties with Museveni's regime to frighten the Hutu masses. During the early stages of the genocide, RTLM told their Hutu listeners that "they had to reach for the top part of the house" because the Tutsis were evil and must be punished.[148] Therefore, like the Kangura in the nineteen-fifties, RTLM became the voice of Hutu racial extremism, mobilizing the Hutu masses for the goal of decimating the Tutsi

[147] Ibid., 40-41.

[148] This phrase refers to the place in most Rwandese homes where weapons were usually hung. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 211.
population in Rwanda.

CREATION OF INTERHAMWE MILITIAS

The Interhamwe militias were formed before the fatal plane crash of President Habyarimana. In opposition to the power-sharing agreement of the Arusha Accords, Habyarimana and the MRND elites threatened to slaughter the Tutsi population and politically moderate Hutus in Rwanda. Hence, Habyarimana and his inner circle of supporters, formed a group known as "Zero Network", an elite group of MRND politicians and military men. "Zero Network" planned the April-June 1994 genocide and created the Interhamwe, the first civilian militia unit carry out the early killings of Hutu political opposition in 1992.

Habyarimana sought international support, primarily from the France, to help train and arm the Interhamwe militias. After the first invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Habyarimana's MRND regime was able to solicit the financial and military aid of the French government. France supported the

---

149 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 168.

150 French government saw the RPF invasion as an "Anglo-Saxon plot to destabilize a member of Francophone Africa. The RPF was trained in English speaking Uganda and thus, appeared to feel no attachment to France's "neocolonial" relationship with Rwanda. France would later become even more involved in the Rwanda conflict in what was known as Operation Turquoise. Operation Turquoise was the French military advance allegedly attempting to stop the genocide, but has also been accused of allowing the killers to escape along the border of the Republic of Congo (former Zaire). See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 281.
Hutu extremists who as the Interhamwe, organized the 1994 genocide. France perceived the RPF invasion of 1990 as an "an Anglo-Saxon threat" which would hinder Francophone interests in Rwanda. Thus, through French military and financial aid, Hutu extremists underwent extensive military training, collected weapons and ammunition, and recruited support from the Hutu masses to engage in a policy of genocide.

RWANDESE ACCEPTANCE OF GENOCIDE

Many scholars and academics question how genocide could be so easily accepted by the Rwandese population. On a superficial level, one might assume that the anti-Tutsi rhetoric and Hutu Hate teaching convinced an entire community to slaughter its fellow countrymen. Yet, the participation of intellectuals and members of the clergy in the massacres undermines this argument. How can educated and religious people assist the killers or become killers themselves?

Moreover, how can scholars explain Tutsis being killed by their neighbors, family members and friends? I suggest that the most compelling explanation is embedded in the history of Rwandese culture. Though it is almost impossible to understand the true motives of the killers, this sections will discuss or offer five reasons why Hutu elites and ordinary citizens participated in the genocide.
GENOCIDE AS AN OBJECTIVE OF HUTU ELITES

The primary reason Hutu elites organized and planned the April-June 1994 genocide is to maintain political power in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{151} Past Tutsi oppression and control of Rwanda made the Hutu elite fear the return of educated Tutsi with political aspirations. During German and Belgian colonialism, the traditional Hutu aristocracy was stripped of its political and socio-economic position, particularly in Northwestern Rwanda. The Hutu elites resented the collapse of the Abahinza, northern Hutu principalities and the dismantling of Ubukonde Hutu land chiefs. Belgian colonialism specifically favored the Tutsi monarchy, while it stripped the Hutu aristocracy of traditional positions of power and prestige.

Moreover, after the 1959 struggle for independence destroyed the control of the Tutsi monarchy, Hutu elites continued to fight the Tutsi presence in education, the military and the civil service. In fact, the ethnic pogroms of Tutsi elites in 1959 and 1973 proved effective in upholding Hutu political and economic power. When the RPF 1990 invasion of Rwanda and the power-sharing agreement in the 1993 Arusha Accords posed a direct threat to Hutu power base in the country, Hutu political extremists embraced genocide as a the only logical solution.

\textsuperscript{151}Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 36.
HUTU MASSES' ACCEPTANCE OF GENOCIDE

While peasants participated in the previous massacres of 1959 and 1973, thousands of ordinary Hutus slaughtered Tutsis in this most recent genocide. How did the 1994 genocide differ from past episodes of mass killing and why did the Hutu masses overwhelmingly embrace the genocide as a necessary and rational objective? The Hutu peasants were not solely influenced by racist anti-Tutsi propaganda and Hutu Hate ideology. This section will attempt to explain why ordinary Hutu citizens participated in the 1994 genocide. The most compelling arguments include the Hutu masses' deference to authority figures, an economic incentive to participate in the massacres, and the fear of past oppression administered by the Tutsi elites.

In traditional Rwandese culture, the Tutsi and Hutu masses obeyed individuals in positions of authority. The Tutsi Monarchy dominated all aspects of native in life in pre-colonial Rwanda. The Rwandese King's (Mwami) power was supreme, second only to the will of God (Imana).152 Belgian and German colonialism perpetuated this hierarchical system in Rwanda along political, ethnic and socio-economic lines. After Rwanda's independence from Belgium, the new Hutu elites perpetuated a system in which the Rwandese masses blindly obeyed the decisions of individuals

152 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 32.

82
in positions of authority.

Habyarimana's MRND supporters even adopted Tutsi monarchy titles like Akazu, meaning royal court. The Hutu masses may have deferred to the judgement of Hutu political extremists in government. It was the Hutu population's belief in the hate ideology and obedience to the authority of the state and one's social group which justified their collective participation in genocide. Innocent Nsengiyumva, a Hutu genocide suspect explains why ordinary civilians participated in the genocide:

"If you were there...Things were strange. Can you imagine the radio saying, 'Go kill these people?' The message got to the local authorities. They mobilized the soldiers and the militias, and they were going to the village to kill people. We accepted. They said we were fighting for the country...Nobody refused to kill."

There also appeared to be an economic incentive for the Hutu peasantry to participate in the genocide. Rwanda is a developing country plagued by overpopulation, starvation, disease and economic disparity. Rwanda is one of world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in which the state is the main employer of the Rwandese population and the national economy relies on Coffee and tea for trade. In the face of such financial desperation, greed may become a motivation for mass killing. During the four

---


154 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 11-12.
months of mass killing, local bands of Hutu peasants looted households and stole cattle from the victims.\textsuperscript{155} The killers also stole clothing, money and other material items from Tutsi corpses.\textsuperscript{156} After the massacres, the Hutu killers would have a large feast. Another participant in the massacres stated:

"When someone is your enemy killing them is nice...People were getting rich from killing. Those who were killing were boys and bandits...The same machete that killed killed a man, killed a cow. I am eating the cow, so I am eating the man."\textsuperscript{157}

Moreover, it was a common practice of local administrators to promise the peasants land and homes of Tutsi victims. In an RTLM broadcast on May 23, Hutu journalist, Kanto Habimana told his audience:

"Those helping the roadblocks will be rewarded after the war is finished. Those very active within the government and army and who really "work" are well known. They will get very nice rewards. Those who do not work will receive no reward at all. This is not the time to fall ill.\textsuperscript{158}

While the Hutu elite retained political and economic power, the peasants seized tangible benefits from the killings. Thus, greed presented an additional incentive for the Hutu masses to

\textsuperscript{155}Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 248.

\textsuperscript{156}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda Not So Innocent: When Women Become Killers}, 81.

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., 72-73.

\textsuperscript{158}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 1003.
participate.

The final motivation for participating in the genocide was fear. Members of the interim government used extremists propaganda to enrage and frighten the population. One of the most common tactics was to declare that the RPF would massacre the Hutu population for their involvement in the genocide.\textsuperscript{159} The Hutu masses were bombarded with rhetoric claiming that the RPF would restore the past Tutsi monarchy's socio-economic exploitation of the Hutu population. In a pamphlet "An Ignominious War- with Gruesome Objectives," Hutu political extremists alleged that the RPF would "restore the Tutsi monarchy, exterminate the Hutu ethnic group, slaughter political and administrative authorities, and punish Tutsis who refused to collaborate with RPF forces."\textsuperscript{160} Thus, the ordinary Hutu citizen's participation in the 1994 genocide is most likely a result of obedience, greed and fear of authority figures.

\textbf{APRIL-JUNE 1994 GENOCIDE}

The April-June 1994 genocide does not only illustrate the killing of elite Tutsi for political or strategic aims, but the destruction of the Tutsi ethnic group without regard to socio-

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., 69.

\textsuperscript{160}Ibid., 69-70.
economic status or political affiliation. During the civil war in Rwanda (1990-94), Hutu political extremists in the country adopted a policy of genocide to deter the RPF from entering the country. Between April and June 1994, Interhamwe militias and bands of armed citizens slaughtered approximately 1 million Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus in their homes, hospitals, churches, and schools by the Interhamwe, soldiers and bands of armed civilians. This section will first identify the killers or perpetrators of the genocide. Secondly, the section will identify the victims of the 1994 genocide.

The killers or perpetrators of the 1994 April-June genocide can be separated into three distinct groups: organizers and planners, trained militia and soldiers, and ordinary Rwandese citizens (eg. peasants, street kids). The first group were members of Habyarimana's elite Akazu, inner circle and high level MRND/CDR politicians who organized the murder squads, distributed

---

The term genocide was coined by Polish-born advisor to the U.S. War Ministry, Raphael Lemkin after the second World War. The etymology of the word comes from the Greek "genos" meaning race or tribe and the Latin suffix "cide" defined as to kill. According to Alain Destexhe, Rwanda is more closely related to the Jewish Holocaust than Bosnia because though the Bosnian case clearly represented the brutality of ethnonationalism, the primary objective was territory and power, not people. In the Rwanda case, Hutu extremists devised a systematic plan to exterminate individuals exclusively and simply because they were Tutsi. See Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, vii-5.
ammunition and relayed instructions at a high level.\textsuperscript{162} The trained killers were mainly members of the Interhamwe and Presidential Guard who set up roadblocks and death squads. Finally, the Interhamwe and other trained killers recruited and armed thousands of ordinary Rwandese citizens. These civilians slaughtered Tutsis and looted the victims homes, contributing to an atmosphere of violence and chaos.\textsuperscript{163}

There appears to be two distinct targets of the interim government's policy of genocide, Hutu political moderates and all Tutsis in the country. On the evening of April 6th, Habyarimana's Presidential Guard and the Interhamwe militias assassinated prominent politicians, senior level civil servants, wealthy businessmen with connections to opposition parties as well as human rights activists and journalists who were critical of the MRND regime.\textsuperscript{164} Throughout the country, local armed citizens killed doctors, teachers, and other intellectuals considered a threat to the interim government were killed.

The main targets of the Hutu extremists were members of the Tutsi "ethnic" group. No one was spared. Hutu extremists slaughtered Tutsi women, children and peasants despite gender or socio-economic status. In this phase of the genocide, the

\textsuperscript{162}Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 239.

\textsuperscript{163}Ibid., 243.

\textsuperscript{164}Ibid., 177.
Interhamwe militias encouraged the participation of ordinary Rwandese citizens. After supplying their supporters with machetes and automatic rifles, the Interhamwe and local bands of armed citizens butchered Tutsis around the country. The killers formed roadblocks and used ethnic identity cards to pinpoint Tutsis.\textsuperscript{165} Neighbors, friends and often family members were forced to identify Tutsis when identity papers had been destroyed or altered.

While machetes, semi-automatic rifles and the burning of bodies were the most common forms of death, the killers found other ways to physically and psychologically torture victims. Members of the Interhamwe and local Hutu peasants often raped and sexually assaulted Tutsi women.\textsuperscript{166} This form of genocide was used to humiliate individuals and the Tutsi community as a whole. The Hutu extremists seemingly endless genocidal rampage exterminated hundreds of thousands of people in their homes, neighboring fields, swamps and hills.\textsuperscript{167} During the April-June months, the

\textsuperscript{165} Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana’s regime (1973-1994) continued to use the ethnic identity cards from the Belgian colonial administration to maintain Hutu control in education, the clergy, the military and government. During the interim government, these ID cards were used to identify the Tutsis.


\textsuperscript{167}Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 572.
interim government was still fighting the RPF forces. On July 4th, 1994, the RPF seized control of the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and the genocide was finally over. Hutu extremists in government fled to the former Zaire and Tanzania with most of the Rwandese treasury and approximately 2 million Hutu refugees.

Weighing the Evidence: Indictment of the Guilty

This section will analyze the issue of responsibility for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Beyond the organizers and killers of the April-June mass killing, there are silent co-conspirators who helped to foster an atmosphere of animosity and resentment that caused the massacres. In some cases, the apathy or inappropriate reaction of internal and external culprits resulted in the violence.

European colonialism and Tutsi elite oppression of the Hutu were necessary, but insufficient preconditions for the 1994 genocide. More immediate factors were the Hutu extremists, abetted by French financial and military support, who planned, organized and committed the killings. Under these conditions, the April-June genocide of 1994 seems inevitable. However, the U.S. and the United Nations had the opportunity, military and financial ability to stop the 1994 massacre before it started.

This following section will weigh the impact of the Tutsi
monarchy, European colonialism, Hutu political extremism, French covert military and financial action, U.S. fear and the United Nations' inappropriate action in the crisis in Rwanda. This section is an indictment of the guilty.

1. TUTSI ELITE

This thesis places blame on the Tutsi monarchy for fueling resentment of the Hutu masses which surfaced in the rhetoric of Hutu political extremists during the 1959, 1973 and 1994 ethnic pogroms. The 1959 mass killing, in particular, is a result of Tutsi elite discrimination against all Hutu and non-elite Tutsi.

This section will evaluate the responsibility of Tutsi elites in contributing to an atmosphere of the ethnic resentment and tension in two distinct stages of Rwandese history: 1) Prior to European colonialism, the Tutsi monarchy dominated socio-economic and political life in central and southern Rwanda; 2) the Tutsi monarchy later participated in a kind of "dual colonialism" with European colonizers to centralize and strengthen their control.

The Tutsi monarchy controlled socio-economic and political power in Rwanda through the clientelist institutions of Ubuhake and Ubukonde. As mentioned previously, Ubuhake (cattle) and Ubukonde (land) were types of clientelist discrimination inflicted on the Hutu and non-elite Tutsi masses. Under the leadership of Mwami (King) Rwabugiri and the elite Nyinginya clan

90
(1853-1895), the central and southern Hutu chiefdoms were assimilated into the Tutsi aristocracy and all economic, social, and political power became exclusively Tutsi.\textsuperscript{168}

However, the Tutsi monarchy was not a caste system in the conventional sense. Hutu elites and chiefs were "Tutsified" through intermarriage with Tutsi aristocrats or the accumulation of cattle and land.\textsuperscript{169} Thus, this exploitive and oppressive system was more socio-economic and political, than ethnic in nature. Hutu elites could become a part of the Tutsi aristocracy, while Hutu and non-elite Tutsi maintained a subordinate role in society with little hope of social mobility. Hutu politicians in the nineteen-fifties would incite resentment and animosity in the masses towards the Tutsi monarchy for their traditional domination of social, political and economic life in Rwanda. Hence, this resentment for past clientelists discrimination of the Tutsi aristocracy led to the 1959 massacres.

The Tutsi aristocracy also participated in a "dual colonialism" with both the German and Belgian colonizers. Initially, the German colonialists established their indirect rule of Rwanda-Urundi under the exclusive authority of the Tutsi.


\textsuperscript{169}Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 78-79.
monarchy.\textsuperscript{170} In 1912, Tutsi elites utilized the support of the Germans to centralize their control by conquering the Hutu (Abahinza) land chiefs in northern Rwanda.\textsuperscript{171} The northern Hutu politicians would use this dismantling of Abahinza power by the Tutsi elite to enrage the Hutu masses.

Another significant contribution of Tutsi elites to the atmosphere of violence was their participation in Ubureetwa, the forced labor system imposed upon them in the nineteen-thirties.\textsuperscript{172} Tutsi chiefs (elites) administered this repressive and exploitive Belgian colonial system which later led to the mass exodus of Hutu migrants to Uganda in the late nineteen thirties and early forties.\textsuperscript{173} This mass migration of hundreds of thousands created a solidarity amongst southern and northern Hutus and a common resentment for the Tutsi elite.

Though there is no data measuring the degree to which Tutsi clientelism dominated pre-colonial Rwanda, the secondary literatures' recording of Rwandese traditional history suggests that the Tutsi monarchy gained access to all economic, social and

\textsuperscript{170}Although Rwanda and Burundi were jointly administered by European colonialism, they were two separate kingdoms which retained individual characteristics and culture (ie: language, king and social mores).

\textsuperscript{171}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 8.

\textsuperscript{172}Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 151.

\textsuperscript{173}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 7.
political power in Rwanda, at the expense of Hutus and non-elite Tutsi. Furthermore, the Hutu masses would never forget the Tutsi aristocracy's position enforcing Ubureetwa.

Under the leadership of Mwamis (Kings) Rwabugiri (1853-1895) to Kigeli V in the Rwandese independence period, the Tutsi monarchy is responsible for perpetuating a system of political, ethnic and socio-economic inequality between Tutsis and Hutus. Despite class distinctions amongst the masses and the aristocracy, in the traditional and early colonial period, Tutsis benefited from simply being Tutsi. Traditional Tutsi domination and favoritism during colonialism would ignite mass Hutu resentment and hate propaganda in the nineteen-fifties. Therefore, Hutu political extremists would use past Tutsi elite clientelists exploitation and oppression of the Hutu masses to fuel the 1959, 1973 and 1994 massacres.

Early Tutsi elites would excuse their past exploitation of the Hutu on the grounds that most societies have systems based upon the socio-economic and/or ethnic hierarchy of one group over another. Whether we are looking at the European and North American slave trade of millions of Africans, the Spanish and English subordination of native Americans, the British domination of the Irish, or Zulu domination of most of southern Africa, all ethnic groups with the political, socio-economic or military power, oppress "inferior" communities. Hence, Tutsi elites
would state that most ethnic groups to took privileges when they could.

In a comparative perspective, the Tutsi monarchy's oppression of the Hutu appears no better or worse than other cases of subordination. However, we cannot ignore the impact of traditional Tutsi elite conduct on Rwanda's violent history of ethnic animosity. When analyzing the causes of interstate war or civil strife within a country, social scientists and historians always consider what internal and external influences contributed the conflict. Genocide is no different. Therefore, the Tutsi monarchy's participation in "dual colonialism" with European colonizers helped to create an atmosphere of ethnic hatred and resentment, necessary for genocide in Rwanda.

2. EUROPEAN COLONIALISM

European colonialism is responsible for intensifying pre-existing socio-economic and ethnic divisions in Rwanda. In the late nineteen-fifties, Hutu and Tutsi emerged as two distinct ethnic groups, in large part, a symptom of European colonialism. This section will determine the role that German and Belgian colonialism and Catholic church played in redefining Tutsi and Hutu and intensifying ethnic animosity between the two groups, such that ethnic genocide was inevitable in Rwanda.
GERMAN COLONIALISM

Through a system of indirect rule, the Germans established exclusive colonial rule under the Tutsi monarchy. As previously stated, under the authority of German colonialism, the Tutsi monarchy defeated the Abahinza Hutu chiefdoms in northern Rwanda. This centralized Tutsi elite power in Rwanda. With a relatively limited German presence in the colony, the Germans depended on the Tutsi monarchy to secure their authority.\(^{174}\) German colonialism started the first phase of preference toward the Tutsi monarchy whose authority was protected and centralized throughout Ruanda-Urundi.

German colonialists would defend their actions on the grounds that they did not alter the power structure in Rwanda. Before the arrival of the Germans, the Tutsi monarchy dominated all aspects of political and socio-economic life in southern and central Rwanda. While the German colonialist's actions appear less antagonistic than the other European colonialists in Rwanda, German expansion of the Tutsi monarchy's authority in the country set the tone for the conduct of the Belgian colonialists and the Catholic church.

\(^{174}\)Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 25.
CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES

The Catholic church is responsible for intensifying racial animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu by protecting the power of the Tutsi monarchy and later, reversing their support to the growth of chauvinist Hutu intellectuals. In 1931, the Catholic church converted the Tutsi king and masses to Christianity and recognized the Tutsi as natural-born chiefs.\textsuperscript{175} More importantly, as administrators of the Rwandese academic institutions, the Catholic church trained and educated the Tutsi for positions in the clergy, military and the Belgian colonial civil service, while the Hutu population was excluded from Rwandese higher education except seminary school.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{175}Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{176}Ibid., 32.
TABLE 1—Enrollment figures for Astrida College (Groupe Scholaire)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TUTSI</th>
<th>HUTU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Territorial origins unavailable.
- Enrollment figures for 1936-44, and 1950-52, are unavailable.

Hence, the enrollment records at Astrida College, the leading Catholic academic institution in Rwanda (presently Butare University) displayed clear disparities between the number of Hutu and Tutsi students during Belgian colonialism.
After the Tutsi monarchy's demand for colonial independence in the nineteen-fifties, the Catholic church reversed their support of the Tutsi elites and fueled the growth of the Hutu intellectuals with the PARMEHUTU political party.\textsuperscript{177} The PARMEHUTU political party became the voice of pan-Hutu solidarity against the oppression of the Tutsi monarchy. In addition, the Catholic clergy provided financial support and leadership training to the Hutu counter elite through the creation TRAFIPRO (work, fidelity and progress) coffee cooperative.\textsuperscript{178} The Catholic church also financially supported the creation of anti-Tutsi propaganda in Kinyamatake, the periodical spreading pan-Hutu solidarity against Tutsi elite power.\textsuperscript{179} Therefore, European Priests, mostly Flemish played a large role in pitting the Hutu and Tutsi population against one another, breeding an atmosphere of animosity and resentment.

I've had the most difficult time understanding the motives of the Catholic church. In the nineteen-fifties, the Catholic clergy residing in Rwanda changed from French and Belgian aristocrats to Belgian priests, mostly of Flemish origin and working class backgrounds.\textsuperscript{180} The new Catholic clergy seemed to

\textsuperscript{177} Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 45.


\textsuperscript{180} Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 43-44.
identify with the subordinate position of the Hutu in Rwandese society. Hence, the new Flemish clergy presence reversed the local Catholic church's support of the Tutsi to endorse the Hutu.  

BELGIAN COLONIALISM

Belgian colonial administration's policy of direct rule in Ruanda-Urundi had enormous impact on the evolution of the Tutsi and Hutu identities. With the support of the Catholic clergy, Belgian colonialists granted a preferential racial status to Tutsi elites through the administration of ethnic identity cards (1935) as well as exclusive access to positions in the civil service, military and clergy.

On the other hand, Hutus were relegated to the status of servant or worker. The Belgian system also maintained the Tutsi chiefs power through Ubufake (cattle clientship) and abolished the Hutu Ubukonde (land) clientship which originally benefited the Hutu (Abahinza) chiefs from Northwestern Rwanda. Moreover,

---

181 I really have the toughest time inventing an excuse for the conduct of Catholic church in Rwanda. How can we explain Christianity's acceptance of slavery, in North and South America or European colonialism around the world? Rwanda is no different. This change in the European clergy (from French and Belgian aristocrats to Flemish working class) may account for the reversal of the Catholic church's support of the Tutsi. However, it does not explain how a leading moral and religious institution can participate in exploitation and oppression.

182 Ubukonde was originally administered through the Abahinza, Hutu land chiefs, but later was adopted by the Tutsi monarchy.
all of the Belgian colonial administrative-appointed chiefs were Tutsi, empowered to oppress the Hutu though exploitive institutions such as Ubureetwa, forced labor. Thus, this first stage of Belgian colonialism served to exclude Hutus from administrative positions and education. The term Tutsi would become synonymous with power and prestige, while Hutu represented powerlessness in the early stages of Belgian colonialism. This discrimination established two distinct "ethnic" Tutsi and Hutu identities which created a strong sense of pan-Hutu solidarity, essential to the future genocides.

In particular, Belgian colonialism is blamed for reversing their support of the Tutsi elite and for supporting the empowerment of Hutu intellectuals in the late nineteen-fifties. Since the Hutu intellectuals were more willing to embrace a policy of "gradual" decolonization, the Belgians replaced Tutsi chiefs and civil servants with growing numbers of educated Hutus. As the ethnic tension increased between Tutsis and

These Hutu land chiefs were infiltrated into the Tutsi monarchy and continued to control Ubukonde. European colonialists destroyed the role of the Hutu land chiefs and placed Ubukonde solely in the hands of Tutsi elites.

183 Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 6.

184 The Hutu intellectuals in the nineteen-fifties were committed to a slow and gradual process of independence because it gave them a chance to train and educate the Hutu population. Even though the Hutu maintained an 80% majority in Rwanda, the Tutsi dominated all avenues of socio-economic and political power. See Omaar and de Waal's Rwanda: Death, Despair and
Hutus in Rwanda, the Belgian military intervened and ended the 1959-1962 massacre of Tutsi elites, forming the Republic of Rwanda under the control of Kayibanda and the PARMEHUTU political party.185

While several scholars attempt to minimize the role of European colonialism, it is evident that these external players played a substantial role in shaping the Rwandese Tutsi and Hutu identities. German and Belgian colonialists and the Catholic clergy served to exacerbate ethnic and class distinctions in Rwanda.

These three groups are held accountable for constructing to distinctly separate "Tutsi" and "Hutu" identities that Hutu political extremists manipulated and used to justify genocide in the post-independence era. Therefore, along with the Catholic church, German and Belgian colonialism worsened the socio-economic and ethnic animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu which led to a cycle of genocide in Rwanda.

Although African states are currently plagued by numerous divisions with respect to ethnicity, religion and class, the anti-colonial movement in appeared to unify the native population on the continent against the French, British and Dutch colonizers. This was not the case in Rwanda. Belgian colonialists

---

185Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 51.
would excuse their actions on the grounds that all colonial powers played "divide and rule" games and their conduct was not unusual. Belgian colonialists would argue that genocide was an unforeseeable outcome of their behavior.

As former Belgian colonies, Rwanda and Burundi have a history of violent mass killings between Tutsi and Hutu.\textsuperscript{186} Through "unique" divide and rule tactics, Belgium forged two separate and antagonistic Tutsi and Hutu identities.\textsuperscript{187} Newbury and Lemarchand both suggest that Belgian colonial practices exacerbated ethnic animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu, a necessary condition for the genocide in Rwanda.

3. **HUTU POLITICAL EXTREMISTS**

Genocide was employed by Hutu political extremists to maintain Hutu power and control of the country. As members of

\textsuperscript{186}In Rwanda, the Hutu political extremists massacred Tutsis in 1959, 1973 and 1994 genocide. Burundi experienced a ethnic purges waged by both Tutsi and Hutu against one another. For instance, the 1972 Hutu killing of approximately 100,000 Tutsis, the Tutsis slaughtering Hutus in 1988 (estimated 20,000) and finally the 1993 Hutu butchering of close to 200,000 Tutsis. See Lemarchand [Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, xvi-xvii].

\textsuperscript{187}"Unique" is merely used to emphasize the severity of Belgian colonial policies in Rwanda and Burundi. Although most European colonies engaged in some form of "divide and rule", the nature and structure of Belgian colonialism pitted the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities in such a way to inform present day animosities. (in Rwanda- favoring the Tutsi and later endorsing the rise of racist and chauvinistic Hutu politicians)
Habyarimana's inner core elite, (April-July of 1994) the interim government in Rwanda is blamed for planning and executing the 1994 massacres. Though the organizers and killer are directly responsible for the 1994 mass killing, Kayibanda and the PARMEHUTU government (1962-1973) and (1973-1994) Habyarimana's MRND regime were instrumental in creating an atmosphere which welcomed the 1959, 1973 and 1994 cycle of genocide. This section will argue Kayibanda and Habyarimana's regimes are responsible for organizing, mobilizing and arming the masses to commit genocide.

KAYIBANDA'S MDR-PARMEHUTU GOVERNMENT- (1962-1973)

Kayibanda's MDR-PARMEHUTU (Democratic Republican Movement) regime is responsible for affecting the most recent genocide in three ways: the destruction of Tutsi socio-economic, and political power in Rwanda; causing the Tutsi Refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region; and launching the consolidation of Hutu political extremism.

The first step of Kayibanda's government was to dismantle the Tutsi power in Rwanda. The new government promoted a system of racial biases in favor of the Hutu. Through the ethnic identity cards of the Belgian colonial period, Tutsis were excluded from high level government and the military.  

---

188 Omaar and de Waal, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 12.
Patterned after the old Tutsi monarchy, President Kayibanda personally appointed and nominated all members of his administration. By 1969, the MDR-PARMEHUTU government and the National Assembly were exclusively Hutu.\textsuperscript{189} A small number of Tutsis still retained positions in the lower echelons of the civil service, but the higher posts were controlled by Hutus.\textsuperscript{190}

The MDR-PARMEHUTU government allowed smaller massacres to purge the remaining Tutsi intellectuals from positions in government, academia and the clergy until 1967.\textsuperscript{191} After the 1959-62 mass killing, the government continued to murder thousands of elite Tutsi, particularly members of UNAR. Therefore, Kayibanda's regime began a mass Hutu culture of killing enemies to protect Hutu political power in Rwanda. This government sponsored massacres which would profoundly affect the 1994 genocide.

Kayibanda's government also introduced a new dimension to Rwanda conflict, the Tutsi refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region. As a result of the 1959-1962 mass killing, The MDR-PARMEHUTU caused approximately 200,000 Rwandese Tutsi refugees to

\textsuperscript{189}Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, 197.

\textsuperscript{190}Ibid., 197-198.

\textsuperscript{191}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda Not So Innocent: When Women Become Killers}, 18-19.
flee to neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.\textsuperscript{192} This number of refugees would increase after the 1964-1973 ethnic pogroms.\textsuperscript{193} Many of the Tutsi refugees had a difficult time integrating into their host environment. As previously mentioned, the Tutsi refugees would suffer extreme discrimination in Uganda. Hence, the PARMEHUTU government started the Tutsi refugee crisis which would plague the Rwanda for over thirty years. Since they were not fully accepted in Uganda, the Tutsi refugees never lost hope of returning to Rwanda. This remains one of root causes for the RPF 1990 invasion of Kigali.

The most detrimental effect of Kayibanda's regime was the creation of a mass Hutu extremist culture which embraced genocide as a rational political objective. Through Anti-Tutsi rhetoric and the Hutu hate ideology, particularly reminders of past Hutu oppression by Tutsi elites, Kayibanda's government adopted Hutu political extremism. As the Hutu "Mwami", Kayibanda style of leadership was characterized by authoritarianism, secretiveness and deliberate remoteness, while the Hutu masses were expected to embrace the ideals of social equality, justice, moralism,

\textsuperscript{192}Khiddu-Makubuya, "Voluntary Repatriation by Force: The Case of the Rwandan Refugees in Uganda," 144.

\textsuperscript{193}During the period of 1964-73, Rwanda was marked by ethnic tension and violence. The Inyenzi (cockroaches) would attack Rwanda from borders of neighboring states. After the 1963 attack on Burundi, the government sanctioned groups of Hutu gangs killed close to 10,000 Tutsis.

105
progress and obedience to authority figures.¹⁹⁴ In particular, the unquestioning obedience of the Hutu masses would play tragic and central role in the unfolding of the 1994 genocide. As the first President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kayibanda would set the tone for Hutu political extremism in Habyarimana's regime. Thus, Kayibanda's MDR-PARMEHUTU government implementation of mass killing, political authoritarianism and the preaching of anti-Tutsi propaganda would influence the recent events of 1994.

HABYARIMANA'S MRND REGIME- (1973-1994)

Habyarimana's twenty-one year old dictatorship is responsible for executing the 1973 ethnic pogroms, deterring the return of Tutsi refugees in the region and planning the 1994 April-June genocide. After defeating Kayibanda in a military coup d'etat, Habyarimana's MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development) government embarked upon a policy of "establishing an ethnic and regional balance."¹⁹⁵ One of the integral parts of this policy was the 1973 purges of all Tutsis from educational and seminary institutions in Rwanda as well as murdering high level PARMEHUTU political adversaries from Southern Rwanda.¹⁹⁶ These 1973 killings foreshadowed the horror

¹⁹⁴Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 57.


¹⁹⁶Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 106

Habyarimana's constant rejection of the Tutsi refugees from the 1959 and 1973 massacres increased refugees desire return which bred the 1994 violence. Despite pressure from neighboring states and the international community, the MRND government refused to repatriate the Tutsi refugees, claiming overpopulation and economic problems in Rwanda. After thirty years in exile, a group of Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and in 1990, launched an attack in Kigali. Hence, Habyarimana's unwillingness to accept the Tutsi refugees left the RPF with one option, a military strike in Rwanda.

The most influential decision of Habyarimana's regime on Rwanda's recent crisis is planning the 1994 genocide. The United Nations 1993 Arusha Accords powershaing arrangement between the RPF and the MRND government compelled Hutu political extremists to advance a more hardline policy to maintain and protect the Hutu powerbase. Habyarimana and his Akazu (inner circle) were committed to protecting a "pure" Hutu republic by enacting the "final solution", genocide.


198Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 45.
"There is overwhelming evidence that the extermination of Tutsis was planned well in advance of 7 April 1994. From shortly after the RPF invasion in October 1990, there were frequent reports that machetes were being sharpened in preparation for D-Day."\textsuperscript{199}

Though Habyarimana personally may not have been fully committed to a policy of genocide, he is responsible for fueling the growth of a Hutu ideology which bred genocidal murderers, many of whom were members of his family and the Akazu elite. Politicians, senior government officials, and soldiers ordered the high and low-tech weapons and organized the killers during the 1990-1993 period.

Hutu civilians often used traditional weapons such as machetes, spears, knives and clubs to kill Tutsi victims. In fact, the majority of the machetes used in the 1994 massacres were ordered from Chinese and Kenyan suppliers in the period between 1990-1993.\textsuperscript{200} Some Tutsis paid Hutu civilians to kill them with a gun rather than suffering the slow and painful death of the machetes.\textsuperscript{201}

The Interhamwe militias ordered high powered artillery for

\textsuperscript{199}Ibid., 46.

\textsuperscript{200}Ibid., 66.

\textsuperscript{201}Omaar and de Waal, \textit{Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance}, 66.
the 1994 genocide to fight RPF forces attacking Rwanda. With the French government's financial support, Habyarimana and high level members of government and the military purchased six million dollars worth of arms from Egypt in 1991.

TABLE 2- Egyptian Arms Supplies to Rwanda in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS ORDERED IN 1991</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalashnikov Assault Rifles</td>
<td>450 / 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>50 / 16,000 mortar shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket-Propelled Grenades</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Personnel Land Mines</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Artillery Guns</td>
<td>6 / 3,000 shells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


South African Arms manufacturers also supplied sold Habyarimana's regime approximately ten thousand grenades and machine guns. For a nearly bankrupt country, the Rwandan government bought

\[202\text{Ibid.}, 67.\]

\[203\text{Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 67-68.}\]

\[204\text{Ibid.}, 68.\]
considerable military supplies and ammunition from arms dealers. The IMF and World Bank supplied $260,000,000 as part of the structural adjustment package to the Rwandese Ministry of Finance.\(^{205}\) Along with the international financial institutions, Belgium and Germany loaned the MRND government millions of dollars that were also used to expand the army and buy equipment.\(^{206}\)

Habyarimana, MRND supporters and the CDR extremist used the RTLM radio station and national periodicals such as the Kangura and Kinyamateka to mobilize the masses. Prior to April 7, 1994, Hutu political extremists used anti-Tutsi hate propaganda to form civilian militias. Particularly, "Zero Network" formed, trained, and armed the Interhamwe, the first civilian militia to carry out the early killings of 1990-1992.\(^{207}\) The Interhamwe would later arm the Hutu masses to commit the April-June 1994 genocide of Tutsis and Hutu moderates.

Although Habyarimana did not execute the genocide, he and his Akazu elite were the orchestrators and planners of the "final solution." The evening of the President's fatal plane crash, April 6 1994, the bloody massacres erupted with a methodical and

---


\(^{206}\) Ibid.

\(^{207}\) Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 168.
violent ease. Therefore, Habyarimana's regime is responsible for committing the 1973 massacres, deterring the return of Tutsi refugees and planning the 1994 April-June genocide.

In response to this accusation, Hutu extremist could justify their actions in two ways: 1) past domination by Tutsi elites provoked the 1959 ethnic pogroms; and 2) The Tutsi refugees in neighboring states posed an internal security threat to Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes. Moreover, Hutu extremists in Rwanda point to the behavior of Burundi's Tutsis who sponsored revenge killings against Hutus in 1988.\textsuperscript{208} Fear and past exploitation by Tutsi elites does not justify the massacre of helpless Tutsi peasants. Clearly, Hutu political extremists from Kayibanda to the Habyarimana's regime are most identifiably responsible for creating an ideology of hate and pursuing a policy of genocide to maintain their economic and political power in Rwanda.

4. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Many scholars believe that the April-June 1994 genocide was simply a product of Tutsi elite oppression of the Hutu, European colonialism and Hutu political extremism after Rwanda's independence from Belgium. While these external and internal players are directly accountable for the Rwandese conflict, the

international community is partly or equally accountable for the 1994 genocide. I accuse the United Nations and the U.S. for displaying indifference towards the organized murder of Rwandese civilians, assisting the Hutu militias before and after the crisis as well as ignoring the warning signs, and failing to stop the genocide. The following section will focus on the role of the most significant international players: France, the U.S. and the United Nations.

FRANCE

France, by far, remained the most ardent international supporter of Habyarimana's regime. The French government was a major participant in the 1994 genocide in two ways: it provided financial aid to Habyarimana's MRND political party, which spread Hutu hate messages, purchased weapons and mobilized the masses to commit the massacres; trained the Interhamwe militias to carry out the April-June massacres of 1994.

The first stage of French responsibility is in the form of financial support to the Habyarimana dictatorship (1973-1994). Francophone interest in Africa played a critical role in this decision. While strategic and commercial interest in Rwanda are limited, France believes that in order to maintain the nation's global power and prestige, the French language must be widely
spoken.\textsuperscript{209} Francois Mitterand wrote almost forty years ago, "Without Africa, France will have no history in the twenty-first century."\textsuperscript{210} France recognized the RPF military advance on Rwanda as the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy.\textsuperscript{211} As mentioned in the previous section, France remained the major international financier of the Habyarimana regime. French government officials and diplomatic staff were rumored to have given Hutu extremists six million dollars worth of French equipment, including light artillery, mortars, armored cars and helicopters.\textsuperscript{212}

In addition to French financial support, Francois Mitterand's son, Jean-Christophe was a special advisor at the Elysee Palace and close personal friend of the Habyarimana family. Jean-Christophe gave Habyarimana an airplane.\textsuperscript{213} The French military also played an enormous role in the genocide by

\textsuperscript{209}Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 1104.

\textsuperscript{210}Ibid., 1104-1105.

\textsuperscript{211}The former Minister of Finance during Habyarimana's regime said that French diplomats in Rwanda often complained about the RPF strike because these refugees were educated in Uganda and raised speaking English. Hence, Rwanda would become a part of English-speaking East Africa. See Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 1105, Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 29-30 and Prunier The Rwanda Crisis, 338-340.

\textsuperscript{212}Ibid., 67.

\textsuperscript{213}Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 1106.
training the Interhamwe militias. The group of civilian militias received the nickname "Mitteramwe" in Rwanda because of French involvement. The French army instructors trained MRND and CDR military officers who created the Interhamwe.\textsuperscript{214}

France excuses their military and financial support of Hutu extremists as an attempt to protect Rwanda from the external threat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. It is possible that French politicians were unaware of the Hutu extremists plot to kill Tutsis, but this does change the fact that French military and financial aid was used to commit genocide in Rwanda. The French government must accept responsibility that their conduct was fueled by Francophone interest with no consideration for the fate of the Tutsi population in Rwanda. Thus, with French financial and military support, Hutu political extremists in Habyarimana regime purchased weapons, planned and executed the 1994 genocide.

UNITED STATES

The United States also had a profound impact on the 1994 massacres. Though the U.S. appeared indifferent to the genocide in Rwanda, in actuality, the Clinton administration's policy of non-intervention was a symptom of the American experience in Somalia. Thus, the U.S. position was one of fear rather than

\textsuperscript{214}Ibid., 67.
apathy. Presidential Decision Directive #25 was the U.S.'s guideline for participation in or support of international peacekeeping endeavors. Directive #25 had three conditions to the dispatchment of troops: a ceasefire; the deployment of a few hundred troops; and thorough pre-planning.

Thus, in the Rwanda case, Directive #25 served as a delaying tactic, to avoid immediate U.S. military and financial assistance. On May 17, 1994, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to support UNAMIR II, the second U.N. military mission to end the April-June genocide in Rwanda with the deployment of troops. The U.S. alone was able to exert its power to prevent execution of UNAMIR II, despite the fact that no U.S. troops or funds were committed. Two days later, the U.N. requested fifty APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers). After agreeing to provide them within two weeks, the U.S. managed to stall for two months while Rwanda's death toll continued to increase. Thus, the U.S. did nothing during the genocide.

The U.S. excuses their conduct on the grounds that states rarely intervened in humanitarian emergencies until the nineteen-

---


216 Ibid.

217 Ibid.
nineties. After the U.S. experience in Somalia, the Clinton administration was to unwilling to risk the possibility of American casualties in what they considered another African civil war. However, the U.S. sent troops to end "ethnic-cleansing" in Bosnia. This is a clear example of the selectivity of U.S. involvement in humanitarian crises.

Although the United States has since apologized for their slow response to the crisis in Rwanda, the Clinton Administration has failed to alter the policies, such as Directive #25, which frustrated an international response. The U.S. also sabotaged an international effort by refusing to declare the crisis a genocide. On June 10, 1994, a spokesperson for the States Department, Christine Shelly stated:

"Although there have been acts of genocide in Rwanda, all the murders cannot be put into that category."\(^{218}\)

The United States was avoiding a response in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The U.N. Convention made it mandatory for the international community to take immediate action once genocide has been clearly identified.\(^ {219}\) Therefore, the U.S. is responsible for delaying international intervention during the

\(^ {218}\)Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 274.

\(^ {219}\)Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, 75.
Rwandan genocide which claimed the lives of 1 million Rwandese civilians.

UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is blamed for assisting the 1994 April-June genocide by ignoring the warning signs that the massacres were coming and lacking the political will to end the killings, once they started. Yet, one cannot ignore the fact the United Nations needs the financial and military support of the U.S. to respond to international conflicts. Hence, the U.S. runs the United Nations and is equally responsible for the slow international response to the Rwanda crisis.

Several scholars of African affairs believe that the U.N. failed the victims of the 1994 massacre and have characterized the response as "benign neglect." On January 11, 1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian Commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), sent a fax detailing the horrors to come.220 A Hutu informant told Dallaire that he had been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali for the purposes of extermination. Dallaire immediately informed senior U.N. officials, particularly Kofi Annan, then, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.221 Dallaire also notified

220Burkhalter, Congressional Testimony.

221Ibid.
U.N. officials that the plan included provoking Belgian troops (comprising the bulk of the UNAMIR forces) and killing them to ensure that Belgium would withdraw its troops.\textsuperscript{222} This is precisely what happened.

The U.N. failed to respond and through its representative in Kigali, Mr. Booh Booh, insisted that U.N. must be recognized as neutral. Many Rwandese were horrified by the U.N. neutrality in the face of genocide, when the U.N. presented none of these inhibitions in the Bosnian crisis. Hence, the U.N. had prior knowledge of the genocide and ignored the warnings of a pending genocide.

The U.N. is responsible for lacking the "political will" to stop the genocide once it started. The RPF government and the survivors of the genocide expressed anger that the U.N. stood idly by and allowed the slaughter of Rwandese civilians. While the United Nations' response was hindered by U.S. delaying tactics, the U.N. still chose to respond to the crisis with inadequate measures. Dallaire requested additional Peacekeeping troops to neutralize the crisis before it swelled out of control. The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution withdrawing troops, ignoring the Commanders warnings.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{222}Ibid.

Kofi Annan, the current United Nations Secretary General, was snubbed by RPF senior government officials on May 7th, 1998 during what he called a "healing mission" to Rwanda. In his speech, the Secretary General admitted that the U.N. had done little to halt the killings, but he stopped short of giving an apology.\textsuperscript{224} Mr. Annan stated:

"Rwanda's tragedy was the world's tragedy. All of us who witnessed its suffering, fervently wish that we could have prevented the genocide...Looking back now, we see the signs that were not recognized. Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough to save Rwanda from itself...In the face of genocide there can be no looking away, no neutrality."\textsuperscript{225}

After Mr. Annan's speech, the Rwandese President Bizimungu and Vice-President Kagame refused to attend a reception in Annan's honor because they were insulted by his unwillingness to accept responsibility for the genocide personally and for the U.N. as a whole.\textsuperscript{226}

To some extent, it appears unfair to blame the international community for intrastate conflict in Rwanda. In the Secretary General's speech, the United Nations excuses its conduct on the grounds that it did not realize the severity of the situation in


\textsuperscript{225}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{226}Ibid.
Rwanda. Clearly, this allegation is refuted by Major General Dallaire who warned his superiors at the U.N. of a genocide three months before it took place. Thus, the United Nations failed to uphold its commitment to peace and security during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda by ignoring the warning signs and lacking the political will to provide relief.

France, the U.S. and the United Nations were the international actors who had the largest impact on the Rwandese conflict. They reveal the significant role of external players by military and financial assistance to killers, delaying an international response and lacking the desire and political will to end the slaughter. Hence, these international players are responsible for not preventing the senseless massacre of Rwandese civilians.
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

It is a vicious reality that the higher the body count, the easier it is for the world to ignore its victims. In the Rwandan crisis, the term "genocide" tends to obscure the reality of the torture, pain and death, occurring one individual at a time.\textsuperscript{227} Beyond the obvious accountability of machete wielding militias and the hate preaching of Hutu political extremists, there are many bloody hands. This thesis reveals that the cycle of genocide in Rwanda is a result of Rwandese history and the inappropriate, if not self-serving actions of domestic and international players.

Responsibility for this horror lies in the hands of three groups: Rwandese and European actors who contributed to an atmosphere of animosity and hostility; Hutu extremists who organized and committed the massacres; and international actors who played a supporting role, by not preventing the 1994 genocide. The traditional Tutsi Monarchy and European colonialists are accountable for creating a system with inherent ethnic and class biases. More importantly, Hutu politicians, intellectuals and businessmen built an ideology of hate and used past economic and political grievances to justify a policy of genocide.

\textsuperscript{227}Burhalter, Congressional Testimony.

121
The role of international actors in the Rwandan conflict is contentious and inconsistent at best. While French military and financial assistance to Hutu extremists abetted the genocide, the U. S.'s policy of non-intervention and the United Nations' delayed response allowed the world to watch the slaughter of unarmed Rwandese civilians. Hence, I blame both domestic and international culprits for contributing to an atmosphere of hate and whose actions could have prevented the horror of 1994.

Aftermath of 1994 Genocide

After three months of genocide and four years of guerilla warfare between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Hutu political extremists, the RPF seized Kigali on July 4, 1994. This ended the brutal slaughter of approximately 1 million Tutsis and politically moderate Hutu.\textsuperscript{228} The RPF victory appears bitter sweet. After the RPF successfully launched an attack on Habyarimana's regime, members of the provisional government and the Interhamwe fled to Zaire with most of the treasury and approximately 2 million Hutu refugees.\textsuperscript{229}

Under the leadership of President Bizimungu and Vice-President Kagame, the current Rwandan government presents the

\textsuperscript{228}Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 291.

image of a power sharing between the two main ethnic groups. Although the regime appears to have an even balance of Hutu and Tutsis representatives within its cabinet, the Tutsis appear to control the political system in Rwanda. In addition to dealing with the typical problems of a state emerging from war such as rebuilding its infrastructure, government institutions and ministries, the new Rwandese regime has faced three major obstacles: the Goma refugee crisis; the prosecution of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide; and the political and military threat of Hutu militias.

RWANDAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN REGION

An important issue facing the new Rwandese regime is the movement of Rwandese refugees in and outside of the country. The government has to deal with the return of Tutsi refugees from the previous mass killings and Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda with the Hutu militias. Rwanda's refugee problem predates this most recent genocidal episode. The 1959-1962 massacres led to the exodus of approximately 200,000 Tutsi for safe havens in Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.\textsuperscript{230} Despite on-going talks about the return of the 1959 Tutsi refugees, the Habyarimana regime continually

\textsuperscript{230}Edward Khiddu-Makubuya, "Voluntary Repatriation by Force: The Case of the Rwandan Refugees in Uganda," 144.
rejected the return of the refugees citing overpopulation.\textsuperscript{231}\  

The Hutu refugees who fled after the RPF victory were separated into sub-categories: Hutu civilians who were hostages of the Interhamwe militias and Hutu extremists in the Goma camps\textsuperscript{232}; and soldiers, militias and members of the former Provisional government responsible for the 1994 genocide.\textsuperscript{233} The current (RPF) regime comprised of Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus, watched as international human rights organizations, the U.S. and the United Nations rushed to the Goma camps to provide aid for the refugees, while ignoring the psychological wounds and needs of the 1994 genocide's survivors.\textsuperscript{234} The U.S., the UNHCR

\textsuperscript{231}Rwanda is one of the most densely-populated countries in Africa. Prior to the genocide, Rwanda's population was estimated at 7 million. However, the country's problems with overpopulation have been exploited by Rwandese politicians. For instance, Habyarimana's regime (1973-1994) prevented the return of the Tutsi refugees living in neighboring Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo for close to thirty years.

\textsuperscript{232}Approximately 600,000 of these refugees started to leave the Goma camps in November 1996. The last batch of refugees in Goma (Democratic Republic of Congo) were repatriated from December of 1996- January 1997. Information given by Rwandan Mission to the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{233}The author collected this information from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, Ambassador Gideon Kainamura to the United Nations. Ambassador Kainamura expresses the RPF's interpretation of the Rwandan refugee crisis.

\textsuperscript{234}The new Rwandan regime was disturbed by the growing concern and immediate response of the international community for three reasons: 1) there was no response by the international community while hundreds of thousands of Rwandese were being slaughtered shortly before the exodus of the refugees; 2) Some of the refugees were forced to flee against their will and have been
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and a host of international organizations such as the Red Cross supplied food and medical supplies to the Hutu refugees in the Goma camps.\textsuperscript{235} Unfortunately, Hutu militias in the Goma camps sold food and medical supplies for weapons to fund their on-going counterattack against the RPF in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{236}

The RPF government is currently settling land and housing disputes between Tutsi and Hutu refugees. Some cases are solving themselves with people coming to a peaceful solution amongst themselves by splitting the land or through monetary compensation.\textsuperscript{237} Ugandan returnees are moving to the Eastern part of Rwanda to ensure the development of the country outside of Kigali. The RPF regime is currently providing loans to the former refugees to build their own homes and restore misplaced


\textsuperscript{236}R.W. Apple, "In Battleground State, Weapons are Falling Silent," \textit{New York Times} 7 November 1996.

\textsuperscript{237}Vice-President of Rwanda Paul Kagame, Interview by author. 11 August 1997 in Kigali, Rwanda.
belongings.\textsuperscript{238}

GENOCIDE TRIALS

The RPF government and the international community are currently prosecuting participants in the 1990-1994 genocide. The International War Crimes Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania is attempting to try high level politicians who organized and ordered the killing of thousands of Rwandese. After two years of proceedings in Arusha, the International Tribunal has yet to convict any of the suspects of the 1994 genocide that it has in custody.\textsuperscript{239} The Rwandese government faced constant pressure from survivors of the 1994 massacres who were frustrated with the slow proceedings and results of the International Tribunal. As a result, many RPF soldiers and Tutsi civilians have participated in revenge killings of Hutus. The Rwandese government decided to try, arrest and punish alleged perpetrators in Rwandese courts in 1996. Thus, the impetus for the Rwandese trials is in large part pressure from the public, but also an attempt by the new

\textsuperscript{238}The Rwandan government received funds for the housing project through the National Budget and from the United Nations Pledging fund, a group states that donate money to countries in need. (not given exact monetary amount of aid) The RPF government has also been criticized for using prisoners (genocide suspects awaiting trial) to build houses for refugees. Information given by Vice-President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame.

government to establish credibility by trying participants in the 1994 genocide.

Rwanda sought the aid of lawyers and judges from West Africa as well as international legal assistance through the NGO, Lawyers Without Borders. The arrest of hundreds of thousands of Hutu civilians by the current government has raised questions about the objectivity and fairness of the Rwandan courts. Currently, Of 346 people who have been tried in the Rwandan courts: a third were sentenced to death; approximately 115 received lesser sentences; and 26 were acquitted. ²⁴⁰ There are still about 125,000 people in prison awaiting trial. ²⁴¹

Public executions in Rwanda raise international concern. The United Nations and other members of the international community remain skeptical about the motivations behind the regime's attempt to try suspects of the 1994 genocide. Despite claims that the Rwanda National Court is part of national rehabilitation process, many believe that this court is simply a means of revenge by Tutsis in government.

THREAT OF HUTU MILITIAS

The Hutu militias and extremists who organized and committed the 1994 genocide, remain another obstacle facing the new RPF

²⁴⁰Ibid.
²⁴¹Ibid.
regime. In the Northwestern part of Rwanda, Hutu militias continue to free local Hutu prisoners and kill Tutsi civilians.\textsuperscript{242} On the fourth anniversary of the 1994 genocide, April 6th, Hutu militias started massacring Tutsis in the countryside in large numbers. The death toll increases daily in Rwanda. According to the RPF government, Hutu militias have killed approximately 1000 Tutsi civilians since the genocide.\textsuperscript{243}

\textbf{Larger Implications of Rwandan Crisis}

There is an argument that smaller injustices, when ignored, become horrific major real world events. Rwanda is such a case. Perpetrators of genocide remained unpunished after years of organized killing. I believe that international indifference allowed extremists to plan the 1994 genocide. Through an immediate and appropriate response, the international community may have prevented both the 1994 genocide and its aftermath.

"Impunity in itself is an encouragement of future atrocities...No one has ever been punished for the massacres in the past...If those who were responsible for massacres in the past had been punished, I don't think that what happened today would have been possible."\textsuperscript{244}


\textsuperscript{243} Information given to author by Rwandan Mission to the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{244} Frederic Mutagwera, a lawyer in private practice in Kigali. Interviewed in Kigali, 17 June 1994, by Rakiya Omaar and...
The mobilization of Hutu civilians and the massacres continued as the world watched in horror, yet remained unwilling to stop the killing. While the Rwandan genocide has shocked the international community, it has most profoundly affected the East and Central African region. In particular, Rwanda's crisis has placed the citizens of Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) on opposing sides of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic divide.

**Future research on Rwandan Genocide**

The emphasis of this thesis rested specifically on the issue of responsibility for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. However, I do not suggest that this research effort completely addresses all of the issues related to the current Rwandan conflict. This thesis is an indictment of those guilty domestic and international actors who directly and indirectly caused the massacres. There needs to be more research on Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a whole. I will propose a few research ideas related to this topic.

1) The culture of violence in Rwanda—This is an issue particularly with respect to future generations of Rwandese. According to the RPF government figures, 70% of Rwanda is under

---

Alex de Waal *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, 1168

129
the age of 16. Many of these children have witnessed and/or participated in the genocide. I suggest looking at the impact of the massacres on a human level. Rwanda, Bosnia, Israel and South Africa are all faced with a burgeoning culture of violence.

2) Another subject which should be explored is national reconciliation. To what extent, is the current Rwandan government committed to healing and reconciliation in the country? What role has the RPF played in healing process? One might focus on the Rwandan government's creation of local defense councils to uphold peace and stability in Rwanda.

3) The rehabilitation of victims, particularly Rwandese women who were raped and tortured during the 1994 genocide. I also propose looking at the large numbers of children born from rape. How has or will this dynamic affected Rwanda?

4) The demand for justice is an extremely important issue related to the 1994 genocide. The Rwandese courts are being scrutinized and criticized by the international community. The RPF government also feels internal pressure from survivors of the 1994 massacres to bring the perpetrators to justice. It would be interesting to analyze the motivations behind this decision to create a national court to try the participants of the genocide.

Why hasn't the current regime tried RPF soldiers and Tutsi revenge killers with the same vigor. Is the RPF government using the genocide trials to enact justice or revenge?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Kuper, Leo. *The Pity of It All: Polarization of Racial and Ethnic*


