Images of Entanglement :
Wittgensteinian Spatial Practices between Architecture and Philosophy

by

Nana D. Last

Master in Architecture (1986)
Harvard University

Submitted to the Department of Architecture
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture, Art and Environmental Studies

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

February 1999

Signature of Author . . . . . .
Department of Architecture
July 24 1998

Certified by . . . . . .
Mark Jarzombek
Associate Professor of History and Architecture
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by. . . . . .
Stanford Anderson
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students

Thesis Readers

Norman Bryson
Professor of Fine Arts
Harvard University Department of Fine Arts

Professor Stanley Cavell
Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and General Theory of Value
Harvard University Department of Philosophy

K. Michael Hays
Professor of Architectural Theory
Harvard University Graduate School of Design

Leila Kinney
Assistant Professor of Art History
MIT Department of Architecture

Images of Entanglement:
Wittgensteinian Spatial Practices between Architecture and Philosophy

by

Nana D. Last

Submitted to the Department of Architecture
on July 24, 1998 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Architecture, Art and Environmental Studies

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the deep spatio-linguistic relationship between the Austrian born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's practices of philosophy and of architecture. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is notable for its sharply distinguished early and late work; with the early work most strongly associated with his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) and the later frequently designated by his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). Following the completion of the early work Wittgenstein abandoned philosophy for a period of ten years, spending the years from 1926 to 1929 engaged in the design and construction of a house in Vienna for his sister Margarethe Stonborough. The thesis considers the ways in which the intervening practice of architecture infiltrated, altered, influenced and manifested itself in the later philosophy by focusing on the spatial, temporal, conceptual and cognitive gaps in the philosophy.

The importance and the prevalence of the practice of architecture for Wittgenstein's later philosophy are exhibited in a variety of ways that together broaden, reconceive and resituate the functioning of language and philosophy. The thesis considers these developments in the philosophy as they are revealed in the visual and spatial language, thinking and construction of the philosophical texts. This analysis reveals a shift from the removed, idealized and flattened picture theory of the *Tractatus* to the production of the spatially complex and ambiguous images of entanglement in the *Investigations*. The Stonborough house, itself, is analyzed through its production of cognitive and spatial practices and problematics. Wittgenstein's practice of architecture is shown to utilize, develop, challenge and reveal related spatial concepts found in the philosophy. These include the ideas of limits, boundaries, inner/outer dichotomies, the relationship between showing and saying, the idea of correspondence and the practices of representation, assembly, resemblance, construction, building and rearrangement.

Thesis Supervisor : Mark Jarzombek
Associate Professor of History and Architecture

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

Figure 10. p.161.
Stonborough House, exterior, present situation, photograph by Margherita Krischanitz, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 11. p.161.
Stonborough House, central hall, present situation, photograph by Margherita Krischanitz, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 12. p.162.
Stonborough House, central hall, view toward terrace, spring 1929 courtesy of Michael Nedo, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 13. p.162.
Stonborough House, central hall, present situation, photograph by Margherita Krischanitz, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 14. p.162.
Stonborough House, central hall, present situation, photograph by Margherita Krischanitz, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 15. p.163.
Stonborough House, dining room doors with translucent glass, present situation, photograph by Margherita Krischanitz, as reprinted in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 16. p.164.
Stonborough House, door to pantry and stairs to basement, photograph by Paul Wijdeveld, in Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994).

Figure 17. p.169.
Mel Bochner, "Language is not Transparent", 1969, Rubber stamp on 4 ruled notecards, each 5x8, in Richard Field, ed., *Mel Bochner: Thought Made Visible 1966-1973*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Art Gallery, 1995.)



Maurizio Nannucci, *Does This image fill your concept of philosophy?* 1995, detail.

Introduction : **Acts of location and relocation**

During a two and a half year period beginning in the autumn of 1926, the Austrian born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein(1889-1951) designed and built a house in Vienna for his sister Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein. The history of the house's production - designed as it is by a philosopher who is nearly as known for his dramatic entry, departure and return to philosophy[1], as for his philosophical work - challenges the viewer to decipher within its walls some affinity between Wittgenstein's architecture and his philosophy. Approaching the house thus presents a unique set of questions that force the reconsideration of what the act of viewing involves. In response to this situation, most of the discussions of the house attempt to define some such link. The association, however, remains strained based in two largely separate approaches: the discussion of the architecture on the one hand and the discussion of the philosophy on the other. What seemingly demands interdisciplinarity ends up reinforcing a sort of bidisciplinarity.

The reasons for this seem, at first, to be straightforward. The vast majority of the study of Wittgenstein's work comes from within the discourse of philosophy, and, almost without exception, does not deal seriously with Wittgenstein's architecture, even when given an ideal opportunity to enter into this discussion. For example, when a philosophical journal of aesthetics and art criticism reviewed Paul Wijdeveld's book : *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, disciplinary separation was enforced; philosophy and aesthetics were placed to one side, the house and architecture to the other. After summarizing the book's discussion of the relation between

[1]During that period Wittgenstein had limited contact with other philosophers, with the exceptions of that needed to get the *Tractatus* published. Beyond that his primary philosophical contacts were his talks with Frank Ramsey, and his meetings with Schlick. There are almost no philosophical writing from this period.

Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture, the reviewer concluded: "For the philosopher there are two questions. Does [the author] correctly understand Wittgenstein's thinking about aesthetics, and does that thinking help us resolve philosophical problems about aesthetics? These, however, are questions for another day."[2]

The reviewer's concerns, posed in this way, divorce the interpretation of a Wittgensteinian aesthetics from its architectural associations. Once disconnected from their origin, they are displaced to within the 'secure' bounds of philosophy. These questions, had in effect, served to relocate those concerns to a place where the house has no acknowledged role despite its being the generator of the interpretation of Wittgenstein's aesthetics in question.

Unfortunately, the reviewer is not solely at fault, as Wijdeveld's book, itself, does not find a way to fully bridge this gap, declaring at a critical point :

> (I)t still remains difficult to compare the connections between architectural precision, consisting in visual - spatial - tactile relationships and in a certain use of building elements, with philosophical or linguistic precision, consisting in semantic relationships and in a certain use of words and concepts.[3]

A logical site for this discussion between architecture and philosophy would seem to be that of aesthetics itself. Aesthetics, however, is notoriously slippery territory within philosophy. (The history of aesthetics provides clues to the dissolution of clear demarcations between disciplines.) The reviewers position parallels the discipline of philosophy's reticence to acknowledge the centrality of aesthetic thinking and practice, even as it often claims a foundational position regarding aesthetic questions. What had been a major component of philosophy, along with epistemology, metaphysics, logic and ethics; aesthetics as a part of philosophy has become a diminished, deserted territory in the philosophy of the twentieth century, transforming and refounding itself largely into the separate field of art theory. Its separation from philosophy is

---

[2] *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Volume 53, Number 4, Fall 1995, p. 451.

[3] Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect.* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994), p.194.

hardly clear, however as art theory has frequently relied on ideas from within philosophy as well as from other discourses. The twentieth century linguistic turn fueled this process, with its understanding of knowledge as linguistic, including aesthetic knowledge and practices, thereby laying the ground for an interdisciplinary discourse that ultimately challenges the borders between discourses and aesthetic objects.

From within the discipline of architecture, however, much of the interest in the Stonborough house undoubtedly stems from Wittgenstein's stature as a philosopher rather than solely from the building he designed. As such, the architectural concern often tries to identify aspects of the philosophy within the house, replicating a common procedure from art/architecture theory that tries to apply, relate or extend ideas or procedures developed within philosophy to aesthetic practices, products and readings.

This split in approach from philosophy to architecture suggests the thinking whereby the mute objects of architecture are too often considered the recipient of applied theories developed elsewhere rather than as constructive constituents of theory formation. The resulting paradox simultaneously denigrates and elevates the aesthetic objects seemingly at the core of theory: displacing them at once to a secondary status where they are incapable of providing substantially more than an example of an otherwise stated and formed thinking, while elevating them through the implicit acknowledgment of their importance that the desire to theorize such 'objects' suggests. Wittgenstein's early philosophy in its show-say distinction replicates this structural paradox while the later philosophy's emphasis on practice dismantles it with Wittgenstein's practice of architecture situated between early and late philosophies. This is to say that the Stonborough house, in forcing the architecture/philosophy discussion, defines a unique, and oddly both contentious and desolate place.

To move beyond this paradox and delve into the philosophy-architecture association in Wittgenstein's work thus requires looking beyond ways in which the philosophy is legible within the architecture. It necessitates a reciprocal spatial maneuver that shifts the site of study from within the walls of the house to encompass the pages of the text. This shift accomplishes three things: it reveals the primordial role of spatial and visual thinking in Wittgenstein's philosophy, it allows the practice of architecture to be considered an integral component rather than an isolated digression of his philosophical development, and most importantly, it acknowledges a shared territory between philosophy and architecture.

Wittgenstein's two main texts, *Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus* published in 1922 and *Philosophical Investigations* published in 1953 two years after his death, suggest very different relations between philosophy and architecture. In both texts, Wittgenstein was concerned with the scope and limits of language and philosophy, but what he believed language capable of communicating sensibly changed drastically from one to the other. The *Tractatus* had attempted to define the limits of "what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought."(4.114) Beyond these bounds of the thinkable or sayable was that which could only be shown. Effectively, this thinking subdivided philosophy's traditional territory; leaving epistemology within the limits of the thinkable (if nonsensibly), while aesthetics and ethics were cast out to the realm of showing and practice. Logic in the *Tractatus* held the privileged position of connecting saying and showing and thereby allowing language to represent the world.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language provides a possible alternative to this dichotomy in that it mediates between these two disciplines. In contrast to the belief that epistemology and metaphysics should be the center of the philosopher's concern, Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as lacking its own subject matter, a position that leaves epistemology and metaphysics both empty and bankrupt. Against this, Wittgenstein has stated, though not developed, the idea that aesthetics and ethics *have* content and therefore are productive areas of concern.

The *Investigations* removed the limits that the *Tractatus* had imposed on language and philosophy by rejecting the *Tractatus'* view that language represents the world in accordance with the rules of logic. Instead, Wittgenstein saw that the proper task of philosophy was to reconnect the philosophical study of language with the everyday practice of language. As he stated in the *Investigations*: "What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." (¶116) As a result, the representative function of logic lost its centrality and the every-day practice of language replaced logic as the model for philosophical thinking. This reconceptualization of both language and philosophy exposed the *Tractatus'* thinking as idealized and problematic. Ethics and aesthetics, although still undiscussed, were no longer defined as outside the realm of the sayable, rather, their realm of practice became the philosophical basis for studying language.

While the subtitle of this study, *Wittgensteinian spatial practices between architecture and philosophy*, speaks of a possible mediation between architecture and philosophy, the defining of a shared territory, it needs to also be understood as an oscillation between the two disciplines. As Wittgenstein's life and work were themselves structured by a series of breaks and shifts followed by subsequent returns and re-engagements with people, places, ideas, practices and disciplines - location and relocation came to lie at the very heart of Wittgenstein's attempts to position the subject in relation to philosophy, and philosophy in relation to other disciplines and every-day life. These practices also define the order of the *Investigations* which Wittgenstein described in the preface to the book as : "*remarks*" or "short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" and sometimes sudden changes, "jumping from one topic to another".

The 'object' of investigation in the *Philosophical Investigations* is language in its multitude guises, some of which Wittgenstein lists in ¶23 :

¶23. But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command? -- There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a *rough picture* of this from the changes in mathematics.)

Here the term "language-*game*" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them--
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements --
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) --
Reporting an event --
Speculating about an event --
Forming and testing a hypothesis --
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams --
Making up a story; and reading it --
Play-acting --
Singing catches --
Guessing riddles --
Making a joke; telling it --
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic --
Translating from one language into another --
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.*)

This list makes it clear that language in the *Investigations* includes far more than what may have been expected: describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements and constructing an object from a description (a drawing). What this makes clear is that these investigations incorporate the aesthetic and the architectural, the spoken and the shown, that Wittgenstein, rather than dividing the territory of language in accordance with logic, as in the *Tractatus* - is investigating the shared territory of language as found in practice.

My goal here is to plot a series of courses through this shared territory that focus specifically on the architecture - philosophy relation as it is manifested in Wittgenstein's philosophy. One set,

what I call transgressions and inhabitations, focus on a number of the more or less distinct oscillations in Wittgenstein's life and work between : disciplines, views, positions, dichotomies, places, practices, methods and so on. This series follows the breaks, gaps, and sudden changes in topics in Wittgenstein's work by chronicling his conceptual, textual and historical movements, including his architectural production.

This set of courses includes both the move from the early to the late philosophy and the focus on a critical juncture in the *Philosophical Investigations* where that text enacts the move from without to within, from transgression to inhabitation. Specifically focusing on sections 103-133, where the overriding importance of space and a continually changing vision confronts and dismantles the singularity and rigidity of vision and the resulting fixity of image in the *Tractatus*.

The second course of study takes its cue from the two related suggestions made by Wittgenstein in the preface to the *Investigations*, the first proposes that the nature of the investigation of language at hand becomes "crippled" when forced in any "single direction against their natural inclination" and as a result "compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction." The second tells the reader that this is not a vicarious journey, but one that must be re-enacted in order to be understood, one that is already central to our lives, and concluding by emphasizing the need for the reader to re-enact these and other journeys. "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own".

The results of these travels "criss-cross in every direction" are a multitude of associations that produce what I call "images of entanglement" and coalesce into sites in Wittgenstein's work - both textural and architectural - where the enmeshment of these associations emerge through a specific image. Examples of this include Wittgenstein's definition of language as a labyrinth of paths, his discussion of the philosopher's involvement with philosophical problems as the attempt

to repair a torn spider's web with one's fingers, his description of meaning as akin to the intertwining of characteristics that produce a family resemblance and, the ordering of the *Investigations* itself, with its interwoven concepts and interrupting interlocutor.

The final course plots the development of these images of entanglement, which were first suggested by certain aspects of the architecture as they emerged in Wittgenstein's 1929 lecture on ethics and were developed in the *Investigations*. It is in this development that the influence of Wittgenstein's immersion in spatial practices and his development of the view from within become fully apparent, as it is there where Wt's reconceived understanding of space produces a new criterion of clarity, one that arises from entanglement.

These two approaches, the snapshot-like images of entanglement, and the journal-like chronicling of the ins and outs of the transgressions and inhabitations that define the later work emerged together from within the central space of the sole work of architecture Wittgenstein designed.

Section one : **Transgressions and inhabitations**

Transgressions



In 1914, Ludwig Wittgenstein had built a traditional wooden house on the edge of a cliff overlooking a fjord outside of the small town of Skjolden in Norway. He lived there for over six months working out ideas that would form the basis for the *Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus*. What makes this picture of Wittgenstein perched in his house, looking down from above to the fjord below, while defining the limits of language so alluring, is the temptation to compare the view he would have had of the world below his window, with the view of language that he constructed in the *Tractatus*. It is equally tempting to contrast this scene, to that of the scene of much of his later work, the colleges of Cambridge University, that Wittgenstein had previously abandoned in search of isolation.

If this house in Skjolden, Norway is not the image most associated with the *Tractatus*, then the text of the *Tractatus* is. With its hierarchically ordered and numbered propositions calibrated to the fifth decimal place, the *Tractatus* presents a unique image in the history of philosophical texts. This structure, far more than an idiosyncratic gesture, is part of Wittgenstein's fundamental attempt to control the meaning of the text through its form. In the only footnote of the *Tractatus*, appearing on the first page of the text, Wittgenstein commented on this system:

> The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. are comments on proposition no. n.m; and so on.

The propositions of the *Tractatus* are organized around seven main propositions that occupy the positions of the whole numbers 1-7. Between any two whole numbers, or main propositions, lie anywhere from 6 (in between propositions 1.0 and 2.0) up to 149 (in between propositions 5.0 and 6.0)[4] additional propositions. These are organized so that any one proposition either continues on to another proposition at the same decimal place (and thus degree of logical importance) or has any number of increasingly subservient propositions organized between that one and the next of equal or greater importance. This complex system both organizes and constructs meaning by stressing which propositions are of greater or lesser "logical importance" and by delineating which propositions any set of other propositions refers to or follows from.

The *Tractatus'* numbering system parallels the fundamental relationship the text defines between word and meaning. That understanding of language was later summed up by Wittgenstein in the opening paragraph of the *Investigations* : "In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands." The numbering system, with its with its hierarchical construction and exacting association of elements, in effect, adds an additional correlate to that between word and meaning, that of place by situating each proposition in a specific place in relation to the others and to the whole of the *Tractatus*.

Locating propositions in this manner acts to fix a series of associations and meanings that are offered as logically determined relations. The relations are not, however, just a given, but, instead, their structure is an attempt, as with the *Tractatus'* focus on the inherent logical structure

[4] There are no propositions following number 7, the final proposition of the text.

of language, to be the final arbiter of meaning. The numbering system thus initiates a logical-structuring of meaning based on a spatial structuring of propositions, in effect creating a trio of correspondence between word, meaning, and place.

Despite its attempt, however, the numbering system ultimately fails to fix meaning. Rather, it ultimately contributes toward the unraveling of the *Tractatus'* conception of language that it was instituted to safeguard. The introduction of this spatial component into the discussion of the correspondence between words and meaning also makes explicit the spatial implications of the concept of correspondence. The incorporation of spatial relations into the *Tractatus*, had created an additional set of requirements that had to be fulfilled in order for the *Tractatus'* conception of language to be maintained. Challenges to those spatial associations or to the *Tractatus'* conception of space from which they arose equally became challenges to the series of correspondences between word, meaning and place upon which the *Tractatus* relies.

These challenges are manifested in two ways. The first is through the spatial implications of the numbering system itself that implies a unique order - the way the propositions of the *Tractatus* should be taken. But, inherent within the system lies the possibility of other orders that equally fulfill the duel purposes laid out in the footnote. Those possibilities suggests a conflict between the spatial implications of the numbering system as a series of associations, stresses and references, and the more linear idea of numbering as incremental counting. For example, consider these sequences that occur in the *Tractatus* : 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.12, 1.13, 1.2, 1.21 - 5.6, 5.61, 5.62, 5.621, 5.63, 5.631 - 3, 3.001, 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 3.031, 3.032, 3.04, 3.05,3.1, 3.11.

Wittgenstein tells us in the footnote, that the decimal numbers indicate the logical importance or stress laid on the propositions. Accordingly, the whole numbers are most important, followed decreasingly by those with one decimal place and so on down to the fifth and final decimal place.

Equally he tells us that the propositions n.1, n.2, etc. are comments on propositions no. n and that the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. are comments on n.m, and so on, again down to the final decimal place. Given this, the first two examples - 1 to 1.21 and from 5.6 to 5.631 seem in order. The third example, however, throws all that into question by suggesting other possibilities. How is it, for example, that proposition 3.001 can precede proposition 3.01. Importantly, this is not an isolated situation, but occurs throughout the text as in the sequence : 4, 4.001, 4.002, 4.003, 4.0031, 4.01. This is to ask how can a comment be made on an as yet unstated proposition. Organized spatially in accordance with the rule of reference Wittgenstein outlines, the order from 3 to 3.1 would seem to have other possibilities than the one Wittgenstein chose. Following a different spatial organization, then the third example could be : 3, 3.1, 3.01, 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 3.031, 3.032, 3.04, 3.05, 3.11. Or, perhaps : 3, 3.01, 3.001, and so on, ending as in the *Tractatus*. It is not that these are necessarily any more correct, but that they seem equally possible. What it seems to reveal is a conflict between Wittgenstein's desire for a given proposition to be have a certain degree of stress and for it to occupy a particular location or place of reference.



All this is to point to the fact that the numbering system is not completely fixed but could be re-arranged or re-ordered. What happens then, seems to be, that Wittgenstein in an attempt to balance the aim of numbering according to an assignment of logical importance or emphasis

with a strict ordering as counting or increasing numbers so that each successive number is, throughout the text, higher than the previous one, but at the cost of sacrificing spatial association and logical reference. Which is also to say that the flattened image of the *Tractatus*, which claims or at least suggests that it is a unique logical order or structure, when spatially laid out has multiple possibilities. The seeming exacting numbering of the propositions thus belies its inherent and unexplored spatial conflicts.

The second[5] way in which the implication of space instituted by the numbering system begins to unravel the series of correspondences defining the *Tractatus* is through the rethinking of spatial associations that resulted from Wittgenstein's practice of architecture in his design and construction of his sister's house. In many ways architecture is exactly what was missing from Wittgenstein's early work. At first glance, the *Tractatus* seems more 'architectural' than the *Philosophical Investigations* with its strictly ordered and structured sections. But it represents a purely two-dimensional, visual order based in a one to one to one correlation of language, meaning and place. The practice of architecture, however, challenged those strict associations by introducing a new spatiality and the idea of practice which, combined, destroyed the singular view of the *Tractatus*, leaving in its place the realization that the absolute correlation of meaning and place was not a given reality but a particular way of seeing, one dependent upon a fixed viewer. The *Investigations* instead constructed other views of language that disrupted the fixity of the view from above, revealing it to be an internal constraint, not an absolute limit of language. The element of place that held meaning and word fixed in a specific relationship, once dislodged, removed, the one to one series of correspondences replacing them with the more complex spatial association of family resemblance in which word and meaning are inextricably interwoven through practice, rather than directly correlated.

[5] This topic is discussed at length in the discussion of the Stonborough House.

Beyond explaining the numbering system, the footnote does two additional things : 1. It reiterates the transgressive construction of meaning and view in the entirety of the *Tractatus*, and 2. It points to the contingency of the logical structuring of the propositions of the *Tractatus*. In the first instance, acknowledged in the second to last proposition of the text (¶6.54), transgression of the limits of language and sense becomes a necessary part of Wittgenstein's defining of the limits of language.

> 6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -- as steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
>
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

The structure of the footnote, which allows Wittgenstein to explain the numbering system outside of the propositions themselves, parallels the transgressive structure of the *Tractatus* with its need to go beyond the limits of language to see those limits and thereby produce the text. In this way, as the discussion of the ladder makes explicit, Wittgenstein's view of language is that from both outside and above. The importance of this cannot be overstated as it is the organizing spatial, visual and epistemological construct of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein's description of the transgressive structure of the text, with the climbing up the ladder, substantiates this. Putting aside the viability of Wittgenstein's claim, the ladder he uses to make it, provides a ready image of those hierarchically organized propositions. This discrete image can be contrasted to a range of images of entanglement that Wittgenstein develops in the *Investigations* and which serve to give an image of the structure of the *Investigations* itself.

The moves beyond both language and text form a double transgression of the bounds of the *Tractatus*. As moving beyond the limits of language is required (if impossible) in order to see the whole of language, the graphic and conceptual constructions of the view from above become necessary participants in the claims of the *Tractatus*. At the same time, the numbering system,

with its footnoted explanation, by making inseparable meaning, logical place and spatial location employs literal and metaphorical understandings of spatial relations in order to enforce a given reading of the *Tractatus*.

Even if the *Tractatus'* numbering system performed ideally, however, it does not insure the reading that Wittgenstein intended. That is, despite Wittgenstein's extreme efforts to impart the logical ordering of these propositions, the propositions remain in ordinary language, with all its ambiguities, that still may elude the logical form embedded within them and the logical scaffolding of the numbering system that structures them. And although Wittgenstein deals extensively with problems of logic in the *Tractatus*, the focus of the book is on language, its limits, its role in the formation of philosophical problems and its relation to logic, values, facts, meaning, the written page, the world and so on. The numbering system's instituting of a spatial order becomes ultimately more than a way of structuring the propositions on a page, it defines how we approach the surface of language. The footnote, thus, rather than removing all doubt or ambiguity and securing the order, points, simultaneously, to the fragility and contingency of meaning by exaggerating the method of controlling it.



Reliance upon absolute correspondence was further dismantled in the later philosophy by replacing the strictly structured ordering of the *Tractatus* and instituting an otherwise

undifferentiated and open-ended seriality. The *Investigations* replaces the hierarchical ordering of the *Tractatus*, with 693 sequentially ordered and numbered paragraphs ranging in length from one line to over one page,[6] and from a single paragraph to a complex of several short or long paragraphs, lists and diagrams. The complex sections are a development from the more isolated propositions of the *Tractatus*. The preface of the *Investigations* acknowledges the importance of the structure of the text by proceeding immediately from a discussion of the topics in the text to a discussion of the form of the text itself - described as remarks or short paragraphs. The composition of the text as a series of numbered remarks, rather than the more traditional chapters and sections, allows for the ordering of the topics to follow in Wittgenstein's words "sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" while also allowing for "a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another." Because of the structuring and focus of the text, the spaces between the paragraphs become as important to the process of reading the text as the paragraphs themselves. The remarks themselves, remain undisturbed by these jumps, as they no more belie shifts in topic than they do continuity. The apparent unity of form then succeeds where Wittgenstein though he had failed - in welding the results of investigation into a whole that proceeds in a natural order and without breaks.

Of course, taken another way, the *Investigations'* structure necessarily institutes as least as many breaks as it does continuity by disrupting any unbroken unity that a "long chain about the same subject" may try to impose. The breaks are myriad, occurring both between and within the paragraphs where they erupt as the voice of another - the interlocutor(s) presented in quotation marks or as Wittgenstein's own series of questions about the topic and his recurring doubts about philosophy. Not only do these various breaks interrupt a given discussion - shifting on to another topic and returning to the original one only later - they interrupt even the closest of examinations of a particular concept either by shifting the focus or frame of reference in the rephrasing of a question, or by stubbornly refusing to give up a preoccupation, returning to it just as the text

---

[6] Part One

seemed to finally have moved on. This patterning is very different than the *Tractatus* which groups concerns and topics together as in the development of the picture theory between 2 and 3.

The text of the *Investigations* itself ends without interruption of this pattern of paragraph and space between, allowing closure and continuity to merge in the ambiguity over whether the text ends with the final numbered paragraph or with the space following it. All this Wittgenstein tells us is connected with the very nature of the investigation. That is, the subject of study - language - produces such a structure or method.

Wittgenstein focuses the frame of view of the *Investigations* onto the surface of our language, its materiality, where he wants us to see it as much as marks on paper as it is language and as it is practice. Writing in the *Investigations* is not a graphic interpretation or representation of language, but is itself language. Philosophy, Wittgenstein stresses, is no exception to this but needs to be treated as any other word.

In 1933, Wittgenstein dictated a description of his philosophical methods of working to his student Alice Ambrose. The description also serves to give a picture of how the *Investigations* functions and what it produces.

> . . . One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we have no map, or else a map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language, and the geography its grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but forced to make a map, we go wrong. A map will show different roads through the same country, any one of which we can take, though not two, just as in philosophy we must take up problems one by one though in fact each problem leads to a multitude of others. We must wait until we come round to the starting point before we can proceed to another section, that is, before we can either treat of the problem we first attacked or proceed to another. In philosophy matters are not simple enough for us to say 'Let's get a rough idea', for we do not know the country except by knowing the connections between the roads. So I suggest repetition as a means of surveying the connections.[7]

---

[7] Alice Ambrose, *Wittgenstein's Lectures*, Oxford 1979, quoted in Michael Nedo, ed., Introduction, *Wittgenstein: Wiener Ausgabe*. (Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993), p. 53.

In the *Investigations* the reader no longer is asked to transcend its propositions, but is instead forced to stay within the elliptical structuring of the surface of language, vision and the text that results from the view from within.

The view from the ladder

The *Tractatus'* understanding of language and philosophy is dependent upon the positioning of the viewer as if above and outside of language, looking downward so as to clearly discern a particular relation between language, logic and philosophy. From that viewpoint, all three seem to share a coincident series of boundaries. The *Tractatus* defined these as a series of spatial limits with particular emphasis on the limits of thought and language.

Philosophy in the *Tractatus* is a severely constrained activity which aims to define the limits to thought and language. Central to this goal is the ability to distinguish between what language is capable of saying and what it is capable of showing, the so-called show-say distinction. In discussing this distinction between showing and saying, it is important to keep in mind that this is a distinction *within* language. As such, the distinction is not the distinction between the visual and the verbal, but between what Wittgenstein will call sense and nonsense, so that in the *Tractatus*, the ability to say something, is, more specifically, the ability to say something sensible or meaningful. The *Tractatus*, as such, offers a series of rules of sense, of what language can sensibly or meaningful say compared to what it can only show. Attempting to say something that can only be shown produces nonsense which importantly, usually appears as grammatically correct ordinary language. This is the place Wittgenstein sees problems beginning for philosophy : how to distinguish between what only appears in to be meaningful and what actually is meaningful. From the start , language is a visual problem of language.

In order to distinguish between sense and nonsense the *Tractatus* relies on the understanding that logic is the necessary *a priori* structure of thought. This binding together of language and logic provides precise criteria for the determination of sense and thought by adopting logic's requirement that sense be determinate. That initial association is part of an entire chain of associations dispersed throughout the *Tractatus* beginning with its opening lines that define a series of limits of the world, of logic, of the self, of the sayable, and ultimately of silence, each coincident with the limits of language.

1	The world is all that is the case.
1.1	The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
5.6	The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61	Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'
5.632	The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.
7	What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

In this view, sensible propositions are those propositions about the world, such as Wittgenstein's example of the propositions from the natural sciences, which he strongly distinguishes from those of philosophy. The realm of thought and sense thus becomes tied to the ability to make (true) statements about the world. Much of language, including all of aesthetics and ethics cannot in this view be put into words as they do not, strictly speaking, define 'facts' about the world but deal with 'values'. What is beyond the world of the knowable and the sayable is the realm of value which can only be shown. This, however, does not mean that what lies beyond the sayable is unimportant. Instead Wittgenstein tells us it is of the utmost importance in our lives.

With the *Tractatus*' definition of the limits of the 'sayable' as the limits within which the use of language remains sensible, it was in part continuing the work of G E. Moore and Bertrand Russell who also were working to define a completely clarified form of expression in which the laws of

logic and of language coincide. Wittgenstein used this method of the logical clarification of language as a way of tackling not just specific philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics and logic, but to expose the underlying cause all of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's analysis revealed that philosophical problems are produced by misunderstandings in the ordinary language in which those problems were formulated. Clarifying the language by identifying through analysis, the logical form underlying the propositions was thought to resolve those misunderstandings, dissolving the problem in the process. Once the seemingly 'ordinary' use of language in the forming of philosophical problems was completely clarified, those problems were shown to be illusory, the result of the inability, when looking at the *surface* of language, to *see* the properly analyzed form of the proposition embedded beneath the surface.

Equally, analysis is meant to yield philosophy's vacuity as defining the proper logical form of a philosophical problem does not facilitate solving that problem, but in dissolving the problem, yielding an ultimately transparent but empty philosophy. Analysis in the *Tractatus*, in revealing the logical structure of a proposition in symbolic logic, acted to dissolve rather than to solve philosophical problems. What appeared to be problems in epistemology or metaphysics, problems somehow in and of the world, were shown to be produced by our inability to completely understand our own language or more specifically, to see the logical structure contained within that language. This misunderstanding was seen to arise from within the gap between a proposition and the logical form underlying it. In understanding philosophical problems to arise from an inability to see the correct logical form beneath the language, Wittgenstein had defined a specified spatial relation between language, logic and vision.

The propositions of philosophy are largely what Wittgenstein calls pseudo-propositions or nonsense that result from misuses of language. The proper task of philosophy then becomes the activity of logical clarification of its own propositions and their resultant misunderstandings and

confusions which masquerade as important problems. To achieve this the *Tractatus* offers one "strictly correct" method made clear at the end of the text :

> 6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following : to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science -- i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy -- and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- *this* method would be the only strictly correct one.

Philosophy for Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* thus is a sort of self correcting mechanism through the activity of logical analysis in response to the ambiguity and opacity of the language used in the formation of traditional philosophical problems. Logical clarification becomes the appropriate method due to its ability to rid language of its ambiguity, rendering it and philosophical problems transparent. The result aims at a fully clarified form of expression that reveals philosophical problems to be pseudo-problems that seem to be saying something about the world but in effect are only the result of language confusion and misuse. As such when the language is clarified the problems are dissolved in the process.

The philosophical method of the *Tractatus* was however an extremely limited activity involved with defining the limits of sense and thought. This limit was important as Wittgenstein thought that many philosophical problems arose from confusion over this boundary leaving philosophy attempting to say what can only be shown and thereby creating pseudo-problems. Logical clarification, by dissolving these problems, rids philosophy of a useless activity. This achievement, however, has limited value. As Wittgenstein writes in the preface :

> ... the *truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.[8]

---

[8]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. preface), p. 4.

Importantly, the propositions of the *Tractatus* violate the very rules that it posits, producing what is often referred to as illuminating nonsense. If the primary aim of the *Tractatus* is to set limits to what can be thought by a clear presentation of what can be said, the *Tractatus* violates this dictum by trying to say what can only be shown, the limits of language and the world. It does this by taking a position outside of language and the world (in its view from above) in order to describe the relation between the two, instead of doing what he claims is the only possible thing - using language to describe states of affairs, or facts, within the world. As a result, the statements of the *Tractatus* are, themselves, nonsense. Wittgenstein's belief, however, as declared at the end of the *Tractatus* is that these propositions are, even as admitted nonsense, useful in that they help the reader to understand how language functions and thereby how to avoid misusing it.

Given all of that, the rules that Wittgenstein lays out in the *Tractatus* for distinguishing between showing and saying are not absolutely clear. Consider the following (incomplete) list of rules that the *Tractatus* presents :

> 4.022 A proposition *shows* its sense.
> A proposition *shows* how things stand if it is true. And it *says that* they do so stand.
>
> 4.114 [Philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought.
> It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought.
>
> 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form : it is mirrored in them.
> What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
> What expresses *itself* in language, I cannot express by means of language.
> Propositions *show* the logical form of reality.
> They display it.
>
> 4.1212 What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said.
>
> 4.461 Propositions show what they say : tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
> A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true : and a contradiction is true on no condition.
> Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)

(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.)

5.61 Logic pervades the world : the limits of the world are also its limits.

So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot *say* either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

For what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be *said*, but makes itself manifest.

The world is my world : this is manifest in the fact that the limits of *language* (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of *my* world.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way : There are laws of nature.

But of course that cannot be said " it makes itself manifest.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

The show-say distinction has several important implications for philosophy and for Wittgenstein's study of philosophy. Metaphysics and epistemology are shown to be empty categories, composed entirely of pseudo-problems, dissolved in the transformation of language into logic. Logic holds the unique and privileged position of belonging equally to the realm of the nonfactual and the transcendental, allowing it to form the connection between the world and language. Logic itself, however, can only be shown - but unlike aesthetics and ethics that are viewed as complementary to 'the world', logic is understood to be inextricably bound to it sharing the same limits. Aesthetics and ethics by virtue of occupying the realm beyond the sayable, are expelled from the world, jettisoned into silence, only entering into the work of the *Tractatus* by way of exclusion. Yet they can, given the method of the *Tractatus*, be understood as its subject - defined from the outside, by what and where they are not. Because they are defined in the *Tractatus* from beyond

their limits they are entirely dependent upon the *Tractatus'* understanding of (spatial) limits and boundaries.

The show-say distinction is dismantled by Wittgenstein in two ways. The first occurs as much in the *Tractatus* as in the *Investigations*. Although the *Tractatus* relies on the sharp distinction between showing and saying for its coherence, it knowingly transcends or defies that distinction in order to make its claims. The *Tractatus*, in necessarily having to transgress the bounds of language, produces a series of paradoxes or illusions. The first of these maintains the necessity of distinguishing between showing and saying in order for the clarity required by the method of philosophy. In the end the *Tractatus* necessarily acknowledges that it has transgressed into the realm of showing by trying to say what (it claims) can only be shown (the limits of language) on the one hand, and by trying to construct the view from the ladder (from outside and above) on the other. The inability of the *Tractatus* to maintain the very distinction at hand, leaves the *Investigations* with the choice of either accepting that paradox, remaking the *Tractatus'* so as to maintain that distinction, or trying to understand and describe language's shared territory of showing and saying.

The *Investigations* embraces that shared territory of showing and saying with the realization that the view of language in the *Tractatus*, the view from the ladder, is just that, *a view*. As such the traits attributed to language and philosophy are the result of this particular visual framework which exhibits a series of specific characteristics : it lies below, it is framed, it is presented as a horizontal surface and it is dependent upon a fixed viewer. The view from the ladder is the view looking down upon the world. When the reader climbs up the ladder to "see the world aright," the view is from above and outside, looking down, where language and the world are reduced to a flat, horizontal, bounded image. This reinforces the position of the *Tractatus* of having transgressed a boundary. This position also locates the place of viewing at the limits of the subject, tying together the limits of the subject and language and therefore of vision as well. But

fixed to that limit, the subject is immobilized and the view is fixed. By positioning the reader/viewer in the ideal position outside of language from which all of language is visible. Wittgenstein has effectively worked him and us outside of the sayable and into the realm of supposed silence, the realm of showing.

The realization of a view works backward to the realization of a viewer and to the understanding that a viewer needs to be located both in space and in history. Although the subject shares (nominally) these limits, the philosophy of the *Tractatus* in making no room for the subject, finds instead that: the subject "must", according to the text, "transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." "(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)"(6.54) That is, the subject had to move beyond what the philosophy of the *Tractatus* defined as thinkable. I take this transgression as an initial and incomplete act, one that literally leaves the reader suspended in mid air. Having climbed up the ladder the subject is stranded, incapable of movement, left solely with vision as the way of perceiving or interacting with the world. By revealing the viewer, the idealized viewpoint of the *Tractatus* is also revealed. At the same time the *Investigations* confirms that the *Tractatus* is as much about visuality, showing and the realm of aesthetics and ethics, as it is about the sayable. This is the case even as the text continues to maintain that philosophy cannot talk about that realm, but can only show it. Understanding the position of the viewer is vital to this issue as it is the ideal position of the viewer constructed by the *Tractatus* that allows for the distinction between showing and saying. The move from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, thus, allows for the understanding via the realization of the flatness of the implied space of the *Tractatus*, that space and vision are neither wholly interchangeable nor entirely separable.

The concepts of boundary, limit, transgression, and so on, fundamental to Wittgenstein's work cannot, however, be conceived of without committing to certain conceptions of space. The *Tractatus* in attempting to define the limits of the thinkable is itself unthinkable outside of the

severely restricted understanding of space which I have characterized as the view from above. The practice of architecture challenged the earlier understanding of space by disrupting the fixed point of view and forcing Wittgenstein to confront a series of complex spatial constructs irreducible to a single view or representation. The resulting reconceptualized space required the development of a new understanding of philosophy and language.

The *Investigations* responded to the *Tractatus'* act(s) of transgression by reconceptualizing philosophy as inhabitation. Wittgenstein accomplished this in two main ways: by displacing the exiled viewpoint back to within language and by reconceiving philosophy as constructive with the invention of "the builders". The effects of these two force a series of shifts in the make up of philosophy that allow the later work to incorporate the realm of ethics and aesthetics, practice and the subject within the limits of language. From the vantage point of the *Investigations*, then, the transgression of philosophy enacted by the *Tractatus* was a necessary stage of development. That transgression beyond the restrictions of the *Tractatus* (as defined by the view from above) allowed for a more inclusive practice of philosophy and understanding of language, a move that allowed for the inhabitation of both language and philosophy. What initially seemed to be Wittgenstein's movement outside of philosophy both beyond the bounds of the *Tractatus* and into other practices such as architecture ultimately served to form the basis for both his re-engagement with and re-conceptualization of the discipline.

2. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and his assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stone, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out: —B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.—Conceive this as a complete primitive language.

The building of inhabitation



One of Wittgenstein's later criticisms of philosophy was that it was closed from the outside or larger culture from which it presumably arose. While the early philosophy began with those same limitations it had moved inward to rework and redefine the basis of philosophical problems in epistemology and metaphysics as problems of language and logic, dissolving the original problems in the process. The later philosophy of the *Investigations* instead moves outward from those self-imposed disciplinary limits to construct a space of inhabitation arising from the realm of every-day practices.

The creation of habitable space allowed for the construction of the view from within the space of language. This view differs dramatically from the view from without in the way it positions the subject in relation to language and to the study of language. The view from within is incapable of offering the clarity of that from above with its implication that everything is available to vision.

As a result, vision is no longer privileged, but becomes one of the many possible ways of interacting with the world. Another way of understanding this distinction is to see the aerial view of the *Tractatus* as having been replaced by the view from the streets, a view that would later form the every-day of Lefebvre and de Certeau.

The *Investigations* has a dual beginning. It begins, literally, with the words and memory of another, Augustine. It begins secondly, and metaphorically with the act of building in Wittgenstein's language-game of the builders. The "builders" are offered variously as: the first language-game, the first of his examples, as a primitive language, a language more primitive than ours, and as an origin or example of the learning of language. Putting these last together we get the idea of learning language through the act of building, not just as a given practice of building, but through the acquisition of that practice.

At the core of he construction of the space of inhabitation are the figures of "the builders". The work of the *Investigations* begins with the scene of the builders. Their simple language is based on a series of four words: "block", "pillar", "slab", and "beam" with an associated series of actions. The builders' language is the first model for the use of language the *Investigations* offers. It forms the basis for the rejection of a *Tractatus*-like conception of language. By defining the realm of practice as within philosophy, the builders allow for the simultaneous construction and inhabitation of the space of language.

Philosophical Investigations opens with a passage from the *Confessions* wherein Augustine describes his memory of his acquisition of language as the learning to apply names to objects.

> ¶1, "When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in

> various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." (Augustine, Confessions, I. 8.)

Immediately following, in ¶2, Wittgenstein introduces the builders and their language in what is offered as an example of Augustine's description of language. But, the scene of the builders does more than that: it simultaneously illustrates both Augustine's description of language and the failure of that description to characterize all of language. The builders' language conforms to Augustine's picture of language in two ways. First, it manifests the notion that words in language name objects in that each of the builders' four words name a particular type of building stone: "block", "pillar", "slab" and "beam" refer respectively to blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. This use of words by the builders upholds the idea that the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, and as all of the words are used in this way, it upholds Augustine's description that all of language acts in this way, as all of the builders' language seems to. Secondly, this way of using words exhibits a particular exercise or training by which words may be learned, "A calls them out: B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call" Stanley Cavell understands both the builders' language and Augustine's description of language to be not so much the description or example *of* a language, but *of the learning* of a language,[9] and thus Wittgenstein to be revealing that our idea of what a language is, is bound up with our ideas about acquiring that language.

This association of language with its acquisition serves to initiate its redefinition from an object to a practice, a shift that begins to undermine Augustine's description of language by requiring and allowing words to do more than just label objects. The builders use of "slab", which had seemingly conformed to Augustine's description by referring to a particular kind of building stone, needed also to function as what Wittgenstein calls the command "Slab!" in order for the builders to communicate. This transforms "slab" from its role as label to something more like the

---

[9] Stanley Cavell, "The opening of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", unpublished manuscript.

phrase "Bring me a slab," and highlights language's need to be understood as extending beyond the labeling of an object to allow for language to function and to explain why B bringing the stone is a fulfillment of A's call.

The example of the builders is offered in direct comparison to Augustine's memory. With the example, Wittgenstein offers his own memory of learning (about) language through the practice of building and through learning to build, so that the act of entering into building that forms Wittgenstein's opening words in the *Investigations* as his response to Augustine's characterization of language. The language of the builders, with its mechanical and repetitive nature is initially less akin to the understanding of language Wittgenstein develops in the *Philosophical Investigations* than to the *Tractatus*. But, simultaneously the builders' language offers itself as a vehicle by which to develop a new understanding of language through the practice of building. As such, the builders' language is at once a simulation of what Augustine's words describe and a move away from them, "That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours." (¶2) The practice of building with its inherent implication of progress allows for a development impossible in memory. Equally, building by associating a public and external practice with the acquisition of language enacts a shift in the *Philosophical Investigations* from the individual learning of language to the social construction of language through practice.

The duality of this opening forms the starting point of Wittgenstein's re-entry into philosophy and his simultaneous redefining of philosophy's scope and practice. The example of the builders trace Wittgenstein's way back to philosophy. Whereas the quote from Augustine represents pre-existing philosophical problems with which Wittgenstein had engaged in the *Tractatus*, it also recalls an individual memory of the acquisition of language. That individual memory in that it is a commonly held view of language is also a shared memory that Wittgenstein understands must be addressed. However, Wittgenstein separates himself from that memory by offering it in

another's word and contrasting it or added it to Wittgenstein's, not memory, but construction or restaging of an early or primitive use/acquisition of language in the example of the builders which involve not a child, but (presumably) two adults. The 'memory' or example employed to counter Augustine is of the use of language, its construction, made visible as practice, and relocated to the practice of building thus emphasizing how the memory of acquiring language is of the acquiring of a practice, like building. I see this act of constructed memory as Wittgenstein's acquiring of not language, but a new understanding of language.

The building process and the builders, while metaphors of Wittgenstein's view of language and its acquisition, are equally real, a shorthand memory for Wittgenstein's experience as an architect. Wittgenstein's work as an architect thus became the site and process by which he came to see among other things, language's complexity and multiplicity. Wittgenstein thus adds his own memory to Augustine's.

The duality of the opening of the *Investigations* (Augustine and the builders) brings with it also an understanding of the *Investigations'* relation to the *Tractatus*. Augustine's description of language, although not exactly that of the *Tractatus* shares with it a narrowness of conception that the practice of building challenges. Immediately following the example of the builders, Wittgenstein finds that Augustine's words describe "a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is that system." The limitations of the description make it "appropriate but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what it is claiming to describe." (¶3) spatially insinuating itself into the discussion and providing another image for consideration, the builders, and by further extension the practice of architecture make apparent the narrowness of the Augustinian picture of language. The introduction of the builders and their (primitive) language forms an initial commonality or compatibility with Augustine's description. Each word - "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam" - names a specified object - blocks, pillars, slabs, beams. At the same time, however, each word corresponds to a given practice to act

as a command, becoming what Wittgenstein later refers to as the elliptical sentence "Bring me a slab!" or "Bring me a block!". As the scene of the builders is described by Wittgenstein, the words name objects as much as they describe actions, and in that way introduce a fundamental ambiguity or complexity of language, ultimately combining words, objects, practices, commands and so on.

The builders' act of construction (of whatever it may be) serves to metaphorically suggest the ongoing development or construction of language by introducing a language inseparable from a given set of actions or what Wittgenstein later calls "forms of life". What I want to suggest, is that embedded in the beginning of the *Investigations* is both the development of - through the practice of architecture - a new understanding of language and philosophy - and, an understanding of the relation between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. That relation is equally poised between commonality and opposition, beginning with the shared concerns of the *Tractatus*, but also with the challenge to the *Tractatus*, posed by Wittgenstein's practice of architecture, which effectually broadened the limits of philosophy for Wittgenstein, extending them beyond those thinkable by the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein makes explicit the association between communication and building towards the later part of the *Investigations*. In ¶491 he writes: "Not: 'without language we could not communicate with one another' -- but for sure: without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-such ways; cannot build roads and machines, etc." The next section further associates language with "inventing" practice and building.

> (¶492) "To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game.
>
> Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word "language , by connecting it with the grammar of the word "invent".

Architecture suggests itself in yet another way with the builders. In ¶6 Wittgenstein raises the issue of what it is to understand the call "Slab!". The question arises from his discussion of the establishing of an "association between the word and the thing" and the "ostensive teaching" of words. Rather than basing the association on mental (essentially private) images, Wittgenstein claims, "[I]n the language of ¶2 it is *not* the purpose of the words to evoke images." Instead Wittgenstein looks to the calls, actions and responses between the builders, to their outward, visible practice to gauge understanding. "Don't you understand the call 'Slab!' if you act upon it in such and such a way?" This shifts understanding from the association of word and thing to the association of word and action or practice. The object of the word, its referent, becomes poised between the thing - a slab - and the command or action of bringing a slab.[10]

Cavell finds the builder's language's unmediated directness between word and action too mechanical, in that the use of their words affords the builders no alternatives to the actions they perform. He sees this lack of possibilities in their lives extending to their language; a lack which threatens to leave the builders short both of using language and of being human.

The need for language to allow for alternative possibilities is also central to Rush Rhees' understanding of the builders' language. In his *Wittgenstein's Builders*, Rhees also finds the builders' calls and actions falling short of speech based on the inflexibility of those calls and the life he envisions accompanying such a restricted use of words. As Rhees points out, the inflexibility of language becomes an impediment even to their task of building by not allowing for communication when construction does not proceed precisely as planned. At those times, Rhees notes that as their words cannot be used for any other purposes then A asking and B bringing the appropriate stone, they can neither discuss the trouble nor how to alleviate it. Additionally, Rhees finds that their calls are unusable outside of their particular routine. This is

[10]Whether "Slab!" means "slab' or "Bring me a slab!" - a one word or a four word sentence is discussed at length by Wittgenstein in ¶20 of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

important, as it is the use of language elsewhere that typically defines the way we come to know whether and how language makes sense in a particular instance. The problem with the builders language is that it seems to preclude this basis for understanding.

It is not just the limited vocabulary in the sense of the actual number of words that calls the builders language into question, but, as has been pointed out, the sense that either their actions and communications would have to be so restricted, or they would need to invent a new word for every new occasion in order to communicate anything. It is this reciprocal need for development of both their language and their lives that also offers their greatest hope. It is possible then, to understand the builders language as a language that is developing, not by simply adding to itself, but by beginning to take on some of the connectedness to and use in other situations that Rhees spoke of as absent. That process might be seen to begin the first time that something goes wrong in the building process, the point at which construction can no longer continue in the same manner the given commands would be useless. In that sense, the builders' language becomes understandable as a 'complete primitive language' if we understand the language to not be frozen forever in time, but to be an ongoing process where just the kind of occasions that do arise and which require, not just new words, but new kinds of words, were added so that building becomes directed by its own needs. Although it is clearly not our language, it also seems possible to imagine it developing, perhaps rapidly, into something we would recognize as language.

Another possibility suggests itself, however. The response to the command "Slab!" associates the object slab with the structure that it is being used to build, giving it new role - its place in the structure being built and producing another understanding of the word "slab", and another possible criterion for its use. Even if this seems, initially, to be beyond the assistant builder's (B's) actions- it plays an equally strong role in B's learning to understand "Slab!" by providing a function or effect of the slab used in the structure. The builder's language looses

some of its mechanical nature by not ending with B's correct retrieval and A's implied approval. Rather, the criteria by which B understands the correctness of his actions are in the structure which B is helping to build. The extended understanding involves knowing that a slab is the correct building stone to bring by its role in the stage of the construction. This process of learning/building may have proceeded in any number of ways, allowing, for example, for a stage whereby following the call "Slab!", B brought a pillar instead and was shown by A that a pillar was inappropriate for the work at hand, did not, for example, fit the space allotted or allow for a level area or for continued building, and so on. "A" could have pointed to the lack of fit - suggested the dimension and form of the stone required at that time and in that place allowing B to learn the difference between slabs and pillars or the call "Slab!" and the call "Pillar!'. It is easy to see that as the building process changed or became more complicated or as unexpected things occurred, the builders could expand both building processes and words as required in order to continue.

It remains unclear, however, what the structure being built is (if it is a structure) or how, where or if it is to be found in the *Investigations* at all. A possible answer lies in what preceded the *Investigations*, in the house Wittgenstein built in Vienna for his sister which immediately precipitated his return to philosophy, a return itself contingent upon Wittgenstein finding a new understanding, not just of language, but of philosophical problems that would suggest, against the declaration of the *Tractatus*, that all philosophical problems had not been solved or at least that the dissolution/emptying of philosophy could not proceed as planned. Although it cannot fully account for it, undeniably, Wittgenstein's re-entry into philosophy is through the practice of architecture introduced in the opening paragraphs of the *Investigations* where the builders intervene to transform the development of language.

How, then, does the builders' language (if it does) develop from their primitive language of section two? The *Investigation's* first development of the language-game of the builders

reinforced the existence of some form of structure under construction with specific references to the building site. It occurs in ¶8 in the form of the order "this-there" given by A and accompanied by the act of pointing to the desired stones and to the specified spot on the building site.

Remembering Wittgenstein's exhortation to the reader regarding the builder's language to "Conceive this as a complete primitive language" raises the question of what it means for a language to be complete. This question becomes all the more interesting in that it arises from a scene of ongoing construction. This juxtaposition hints at what Wittgenstein will later state very explicitly: that the idea of a continually developing language does not imply that prior to that development the language was incomplete. What appears incomplete in the scene of the builders and their language of orders, is Wittgenstein's focus itself. And it is that incompleteness that accounts for the stultified language (or not quite language) that Cavell and Rhees point to. That is, the incompleteness points exactly to the narrowness of Augustine's description of language.

As Wittgenstein will later examine in the *Investigations*, the *Tractatus'* view of language is the result of a similarly restricted focus. Although, the builders' language is the result of a severely restricted focus and view devised to comply with Augustine's description, it maintains an inherent break from that thinking, arising around the act of construction and the implication of a wider scene of which A and B are a small part. In that sense, the extent of the limitation of the focus on the scene of the builders varies throughout the *Philosophical Investigations* in relation to how far along the act of construction has proceeded. Accordingly, the focus or view changes as the language expands in the *Investigations* in contrast to the *Tractatus'* reliance upon a fixed image.

The initial scene of the builders can thus be understood as a fixed image from the *Tractatus*, but one that suggests or demands, through the continued piling up and rearranging, of building

stones, something else. Because of this inherent possibility, the builders are capable of constructing an extended world and produce new views of that emerging reality. In that way, language ¶2 offers as much an example of a language-game, the core of Wittgenstein's study of language in the *Investigations* as it does an example of the limited view with which Wittgenstein explicitly associates the *Tractatus*. The ambiguity of the image rejects a fixed view[11] by shifting the focus back to the viewer, to the site and the practice of viewing.

Given this, it makes it all the more interesting that what begins to expand the builders' primitive language is the existence of the building site. The development their language takes is from the objects of building, more readily coincident with naming, to the more complex notion of site with the words "there" and "this". The addition of these words, along with numerals and colors, forms the beginning of the differentiation of types of words in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Unlike the discussion of whether "Slab!" is a simple reference to a particular object, or a sort of shorthand for the order "Bring me a slab!", the differentiation of types of words into nouns, colors, numbers, and indexical terms such as "this" and "there", further raises the concept of use. "It will be possible to say: In language (8) [the expanded language] we have different *kinds of word*. For the functions of the word "slab" and the word "block" are more alike than those of "slab" and "d" [used to designate different colors] But how we group words into kinds will depend on the aim of the classification, --and on our own inclination." (¶17)

Wittgenstein rejects attempts to assimilate the descriptions of uses of words, finding that it "cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely unlike." (¶10) Distinguishing between different types of words questions the idea of language as the applying of labels which would hold largely for nouns, rather than number terms or indexical ones. These differences Wittgenstein likens to the varying types of tools in a tool box. The

---

[11] This ambiguity can be compared to the fixity in the shifting from an image of a duck to the image of a rabbit in Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing - as and the "duck-rabbit" image discussed in the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

differentiation of language via the metaphor of the tools acts as if to give life to the building stones by offering potential ways of manipulating them. Literally Wittgenstein is bringing in the tools by which the building stones, and our ability to act with and on them, are greatly enhanced, allowing for the learning of how to build by learning the tools involved.

> 11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. ---The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)
>
> Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their *application* is not presented to us clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!

The association with the builders, although not explicit, is implied. The ability for the builders to continue and further their work is based on their abilities to differentiate materials, types of construction, particulars of the situation and so on. The multiplicity of language is central to the development of language - not just for the builders but in the development from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*. "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)" (¶23)

Similarly, later in Wittgenstein's discussion of different types of words, numbers, lengths, colors, he raises the issue of how these different types of words are defined. The question is: how do we understand a number to be a number type of word when we use it, without already having a definition of what "number" means. That is, how do we learn to use numbers in the language-games Wittgenstein is discussing, the call, say, for "five slabs!". The issue, however, comes to include all of language as all our definitions of words are by means of other words. The search for continued definitions of the definitions produces a reiterative chain that threatens to become endless or circular. Asking: "And what about the last definition in this chain? Wittgenstein turns to architecture, building and the city to understand language as if construction's move forward

works as if to balance the backing up of one definition by another "(Do not say: 'There isn't a "last" definition'. That is just as if you chose to say: 'There isn't a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one'.)" (¶29)

But Wittgenstein also does not want us to dismiss the possibility of their being a language consisting solely of orders. Wittgenstein's admonition that we should "not be troubled by the fact that languages(2) and (8) consist only of orders." (¶18) suggests another kind of differentiation, that between the many kinds of sentences. The seeming limitation of language with the builders is tied to the idea of what a more full or more complete language would be. Wittgenstein's understanding of language questions the concept of a "complete" language in two ways. The first is based on the limited language of the builders, while the second relies on the understanding that those limitations can be understood as one of endless possible types of sentences or language-games.

> (¶23) But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? — There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.

Wittgenstein includes a list of possible language-games beginning with the language of the builders and including explicit extensions of that language into architectural practices: "Giving orders and obeying them– describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements – Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) – " and so on. While items on the list are readily considered types of language use, such things as constructing an object from a description or drawing, or presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams, do not. They do, however readily tie into what I like to think of as the builders extended activities.

Wittgenstein begins by considering the desire for a "complete" language and responds by appealing to the multiplicity of kinds of language-games. Some of which involve constructing

objects in accordance with drawings, a process akin to the constructing of a building from a set of architectural drawings. The multiplicity of language-games involved in the construction process, either as a previous or future stage, result from a continually changing language, one which was never completed but was also never incomplete. That is, language did not lag behind building, but developed with it.

In ¶18 of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein uses the builders specifically to address the demand for completeness in language. Again the builders language is of concern as it only consists of orders and the response is to compare it to a more developed image of building.

> 18. Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that this shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete; -- whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.

The description of language as an ancient city is a spatial/historical description of how a city, such as Vienna, grew from a Medieval maze-like series of streets outward around that inner core to twentieth century subdivisions. By beginning with the language of the builders and again making specific references to the ways that a city develops architecturally and urbanistically, Wittgenstein reinforces the association between the builders and the practice of architecture, in effect placing the builders in the context of the practice of architecture and the practice of language simultaneously.

Architectural references in the *Investigations* serve as ways of visualizing the repeated demands for completion, finality and foundation. In these sections, architecture is offered as a possible criterion of finality, failing, however, along with the language it is brought in to support. Wittgenstein appeals to architecture as possible justification in two cases in particular. First in

¶118 Wittgenstein compares the structure of the language based philosophical problems which he has been dismantling, to the structure potentially resulting from the building process of language.

> Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.

The invocation of building raises the possibility that the builders' constructions potentially led to these buildings/structures that are now endangered. This suggests, that along with or instead of language, the builders were constructing the edifices of philosophy, which in destroying them, reveals the emptiness of their constructions. Wittgenstein likens what is being destroyed to houses of cards which can first be understood to readily fail as they lack structure, foundation and cohesion. But I think even more importantly for this discussion, a house of cards can be understood as incapable of being inhabited. It has no flexibility; any pressure will cause it to fail and perhaps most importantly it is at a scale we cannot inhabit, leaving us permanently outside. The activity of "clearing up the ground of language" again invokes the builders in all their multiplicity. Here they can be seen to be both participating in the, perhaps pointless or empty or even destructive, building of philosophical problems as well as being understood to be "clearing" the ground of language (by returning to a more primitive language and starting from there?) or building up from the cleared ground of the *Tractatus*.

In Wittgenstein's discussion of the justification for following a rule in a particular way, he reaches a similar problem to that of what constitutes a final definition, that of the feeling that every justification itself seems in need of further and other justifications. Architecture is again summoned as the final form of justification. But architecture in the end is offered less as a foundation than as a superfluous formal gesture. In fact, 'solid" foundations are themselves shown to be a barrier to the continual search for(further) justification rather than a provider of ultimate justifications.

> 217. "How am I to obey a rule?" --if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
>
> If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

The act of reaching bedrock, rather than providing ultimate justification, provided only the endpoint of moving in a particular direction, after which the spade is turned, only capable of continuing in some other manner. Wittgenstein is left, not with justification, but rather with the realization that there is no ultimate justification apart from the functioning of language in our lives. The search for justification in the use of language gives way to investigation of the practice(s) of language itself. "This is simply what I do." can then be taken not as the justification for action - but as the site in which to study it, to consider what it is we do, to see how everyday language functions. The spade is turned in the direction of an examination of practice following which architecture re-enters the discussion as the possibility of another kind of criterion.

> (¶217). (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing.)

Architecture here is shown to be incapable of adding more than the image of a foundation or justification. But again it is compared to language that had already failed to provide an absolute, external justification. What the "definition" has provided, if as ornamental coping it supports nothing, it still remains a part of the structure, and having failed no more than a foundation.

Wittgenstein also he invokes architectural drawings as explanatory.

> What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what it is like. (These pictures are as it were idle.) (¶291)

Later in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein again associates "pictures" with scale drawings. In both cases architectural drawings are functioning within language in much the way architecture functions within the *Investigations*. Like language-games they serve as a model for Wittgenstein and the *Investigations*.

Locating the Stonborough house within Wittgenstein's thought involves reading the gaps within the philosophy, both between the texts and within them. The *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* are very different works written over a decade apart,[12] yet their association remains intimate. Wittgenstein even had attempted to have the texts published together so as to literally place the two works side by side. As he wrote in the preface of the *Investigations*: "Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." While he failed in the attempt to publish the works together (the publisher of the *Tractatus* did not allow it) Wittgenstein did succeed in bringing the ideas contained in each together in another way, within the pages of the *Investigations*, often around visual, spatial and architectural constructs. There they exist not side by side, but interwoven and overlapping, continuing a process that was begun within the house. Through this process, the gap between the works is not covered over but forms the site from which the late work emerges. The fight for space on the page within the text can also be understood as a fight waged by space as it is through the spatial thinking employed by the *Investigations* that the limitations of the *Tractatus*' thinking are revealed.

The question of how the two texts can be seen together without obliterating or covering over the space between them - a space that includes Wittgenstein's practice of architecture- then becomes

---

[12] *Tractatus* - 1921 - 22 and the *Investigations* from 1930 to 1946 published posthumously in 1953.

another way of asking how Wittgenstein's practices of architecture and philosophy are related. All of the occupations that Wittgenstein pursued during his ten year break with philosophy are in ways present in the *Investigations* - most explicitly: soldiering in the repeated example of a language composed entirely of orders or commands, teaching in the extensive discussions of the learning of language and the learning to read or to follow a rule, and architecture beginning with the builders and continuing through the *Investigations* to encompass references to architectural drawings, projections, measurement, spatiality, rooms, houses, architectural details and building foundations. The particular trajectory of the uses and references to architecture reiterates the understanding that the importance of architecture to Wittgenstein lies in its practice out of which both the objects of architecture and the meaning they hold for Wittgenstein follow.

The shift from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* is most commonly characterized in relation to philosophy and language. But, another way to characterize that difference is by comparing the associations each constructs between language, visuality and spatiality, particularly in Wittgenstein's use of a series of visual and spatial concepts as organizing principle's for his overriding concerns for the limits and boundaries of language. Specifically, questions arise as to how each of these texts depicts, constructs, organizes and locates language and meaning. The *Tractatus* functions by defining two levels of language outside of the main propositions of the *Tractatus*: the level of logic hidden beneath or within the language, (making explicit appearances in the form of symbolic logic) and the realm of showing that transgresses sensible language. Each of these levels of language is unseen, the first existing within ordinary language, the second beyond it and the observable surface of language residing between the two. Together these otherwise hidden levels are responsible for the production of meaning.

From without to within



If the view from without can best be understood to summarize how the *Tractatus* depicts language, then the view from within is what best summarizes the construction of language in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The view from within develops in the space and pages of the *Investigations* where the idealized thinking that had defined and limited the frame of vision and the space of action in the *Tractatus* is confronted by the *Investigations'* spatial practices. Those begin with the builders and reach a sort of spatial crisis between sections 103 - 108 of the *Investigations*, although the entirety ranges from the discussion of logic that begins twenty sections earlier to the discussion of methods of philosophy some twenty sections later. On a smaller scale, this pattern, pitting an idealized conception of space against physical and social spatial practices re-emerges throughout the book, as if to test the limits and workings of the competing images of language.

103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. –Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

The emerging spatial crisis begins with the acknowledgment that the ideal view of language presented in the *Tractatus* was just that, a view: The explicit introduction of the subject of vision launches Wittgenstein's examination of the relation between language and vision in the *Tractatus*. This section associates three things: "the ideal", "a pair of glasses", and "whatever we look at" around the spatial construct of inner and outer. The ideal here refers to the idealized

understanding of language in the *Tractatus* which required that sense be determinate and that showing be sharply distinguished from saying. The inclusion of the glasses points to the distinction between an imposed focus of vision defined by something external to the subject and unaided or ordinary vision. Ordinary vision is thus subject to the glasses as the viewer is either unaware, unwilling or incapable of removing them. Glasses normally suggest that they assisted or 'correct' vision making it sharper, clearer and with a greater range of focus. The distinction Wittgenstein sets up is thus between the ordinary or everyday unaided vision and the 'improved' vision of the ideal associated with the glasses. The exact nature of the glasses, however, initially remains unclear, they may even be plain glass, as it is impossible to determine the degree of distortion, until they can be taken off and the view compared. Ordinary or unaided vision in this respect is itself undetermined as it is defined in response to a set of criteria for "correct vision" that are in question. As a result, it is not immediately clear or simple what view the removal of the glasses leaves us with, except that it is that of unaided vision.

Wittgenstein's foremost concern at this point is to realize the presence of glasses, defining or obscuring ordinary vision in much the same way as the *Tractatus* understood ordinary language to obscure the logical form of a proposition. Wittgenstein's association of the glasses with 'the ideal', however, involves acknowledging the pre-specified

requirements (the lens) of how we see language while removing them is associated with the attempt to investigate language as it is found. The immanent rejection of the ideal avows that language is not a prescribed way of looking requiring a special focus to be meaningful or functional, even for the philosopher. Equally, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that philosophy should focus its efforts on producing and understanding a special rather than everyday view of language.

The structure of ¶103 functions by inverting the *Tractatus*' ordering of vision, space and language in order to make the glasses apparent, acting as if to provide a mirror in which the subject can see her/himself and her/his everyday practices that the *Tractatus* had shielded. Logic's relation to vision, one of the central themes and main metaphors of the *Tractatus*, is rendered unclear by this realization. Logic in the *Investigations* comes into question not in its functioning within itself - but in its hold on the viewing subject. The glasses as the prescribed view described in 103 are thus less an aid to ordinary vision than a usurping of it. To look at ¶103 another way, it is not necessarily the demands of logic or vision, but of philosophy that are at stake which Wittgenstein makes explicit by asking: "Where does this idea come from?" The 'where' Wittgenstein refers to is both a disciplinary concern and a spatial one.

The questioning of the ideal of logic as defined by the view through the glasses, leads in ¶103 to an immediate spatial questioning in attempt to locate the ideal in relation to the newly acknowledged subject. (But who is that subject - is it the philosophizing self hiding the everyday self?) The realization with this, the subject becomes aware for the first time of the narrowness of the space of the ideal. This realization brings with it a sense of confinement and with that, the simultaneous desires to escape the limits of the ideal and the fear of being outside of them. Section 103 thus brings with it a threat to language and meaning by threatening the system previously understood to secure the functioning and use of language in philosophy. As with the *Tractatus*, the reader/viewer is forced to transgress those encroaching limits in order to see them. Here the transgression is acknowledged up front as part of the investigation of language, not after the fact. Vision comes into being through this act of transgression where logic reveals itself not as language, but as an imposition on language, as a limited view and a limitation on viewing.

The ideal begins to be seen as imprisoning. "You can never get outside it; you must always turn back." The view from outside is what had defined the *Tractatus* by providing a position of safety from which to view the world and language. From that position, in its fiction, the world is contained and appears to be in perfect - or perfectible order. So that outside of that system of logic it is as if you cannot breathe. But the fear also

arise that logic's external repositioning of order may itself be unattainable or at least unsustainable

Breath beyond those bounds however becomes possible once it is understood that the necessity and existence of the ideal in language arises from a particular view of language. The idea of being inside the system of logic, of being bounded, can then be understood as the fundamental misconception/misperception of the *Tractatus*. It is only from the *Investigations*, with the realization of the frame of vision defined by the glasses, that we can see the limits of "the ideal". This spatial reconfiguration allows the *Investigations* to define itself as the view from the outside, not of language but of the *Tractatus*. Not coincidentally, this is exactly the position the subject has been pushed into, with the climb up the ladder and the movement beyond the bounds of what the *Tractatus* had understood to be language. Inside of language, but outside of the *Tractatus'* limited view of language.

The next section, ¶104, reiterates that the discussion is about vision and representation by pointing to the initial conflation (in the *Tractatus*) of logic as a method of representation with what it is representing, thus blurring what the *Tractatus'* show/say distinction was instituted to resist. Logic's position as both divider (between sense and nonsense) and joiner (between showing and saying) is shown to be itself in conflict. "We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of

104. We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.

representing it." The search for essence develops from this implication of universality. "Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality." That is, by following the demands of logic, we are led to such ideas as the existence of a general from of a proposition in which all of language conforms to a specified model. The clarity called for in seeing such an order within language is based on the idea that the relation between language and meaning is transparent. When logic no longer remains the sole visual component of language, transparency is no longer guaranteed. Wittgenstein instead, finds in the *Investigations* that showing and saying cannot and do not in practice remain distinct and in their rightful places. Once this distinction is realized, the situation changes. Logic, in showing itself as a view rather as coincident with language in 103, can no longer immediately demand conformity with what is said. The attempt or belief in the complete separation of showing and saying - *within language* - collapses upon itself when it becomes apparent that the sharpness of that distinction cannot always be upheld.

105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called 'propositions', 'words', 'signs'.

The proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the *real* sign. — It is perhaps the *idea* of the sign? or the idea at the present moment?

Section 105 points to the way in which the ideal of logic, once accepted, makes ordinary language by comparison appear inadequate. Drawn into this way of thinking, into being overwhelmed by an unreachable ideal, the response is as an attempt to "rack our brains over the nature of the *real* sign." That is, Wittgenstein shows how the acceptance of the ideal of

logic leads philosophy into a metaphysical view of language itself, one that questions the nature of both reality and signs, but without any real understanding of what criteria would define that reality. We are led to believe we would know it when we see it, (the transparency not of language but of criteria) but, as Wittgenstein has already questioned our vision - what can be relied upon? "It is perhaps the *idea* of the sign? or the idea at the present moment?" As it becomes clear that the logical form within language is not readily found, identified or maintained ("or the idea at the present moment"), it becomes unclear whether even logic can fulfill the ideal criteria.

The challenge to the representative and descriptive abilities of language continues in ¶106. The inability for language to conform to an ideal (hence the failed search for the 'real sign') forces language to supplant logic as the only possible form of representation, description and thought. Wittgenstein's writing in response to this failed ideal becomes more metaphorical or literary, culminating with his conclusion that "we feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers." This expression emphasizes the distance between our lives (and thus our language) and the demands of logic; demands that we feel compelled to fulfill despite the realization that "we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all

106. Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up, -- to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers.

quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal." Those means are, of course, language where part of the lack of descriptive ability can be attributed to literal language - and so metaphorical language takes over to fill the gap left by logic.

The (logical) requirement of clarity and transparency yields its final dissolution in ¶107, initially producing the trilogy of emptiness, silence and immobility. Having reached the point in the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein understands that the requirement of logic cannot be either found or fulfilled, he begins to imagine a world in which it is fulfilled. The result renders visible the gap between the requirement and everyday practices of language. "The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty." The dizziness of this continual loop of attempts and unfulfilled ideals creates an almost literal conflict between the desire to move and the desire for the transparency that had fixed the viewer in place "We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!" Turning back toward the rough ground, by allowing movement, defuses the emerging crisis dissolving into the implied space of movement. The frozen stance that had resulted from the imposed ideal of crystalline purity.

107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a *result of investigation*: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. — We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal. but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!

Starting with the act of walking begun in the previous section, Wittgenstein adds direction in ¶108: "The *preconceived idea* of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say : the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)" Movement and space in the form of rotation used by Wittgenstein to remove from the point of focus the preconceived ideal image to which language was meant to comply. Stripping away the requirement of logic becomes akin to the removal of the glasses, but, as with the glasses, it is not immediately clear with what the removal or the requirement leaves us, as it is both the start of the investigation of everyday language, yet it is also the result of investigation that had led to this point. This rotation changes the relative positions of logic, language and vision so that the limits of the view of language are no longer coincident with the bounds of logic. The act is one of positioning logic within our lives as well as in relation to language and the world rather than allowing the order of logic to serve a defining role. In this new place, logic at first seems to have been altered: "for how can it lose its rigour?" This leaves Wittgenstein asking: "But what becomes of logic now?" That is to ask both, "How has this change come about?" and "How can the investigation proceed?" What is the defining method for philosophy?

The investigation about the fixed point of our real need (real as in not ideal) begins by claiming that: "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language' has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another," and then leads to the conclusion that: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm."

Everyday language is acknowledged by Wittgenstein as part of the world a spatio-temporal way that logic could not be. But language is also distinguished from logic through the publicness of its practice. Although logic was always publicly accessible in the sense of a private (i.e. mental)/public split - it was at the same time hidden both within language and within the discourses of philosophy and mathematics, leaving it at odds with the publicness and pervasiveness of everyday discourse.

Section 108 returns to the issue of representation. When raised in ¶104, it had not allowed any distinction between method of representation and the thing represented. After the rotation of 108, Wittgenstein focuses on the appearance of language itself and its fundamental ambiguities of meaning, writing or ornament: "the philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say e.g. 'Here is a Chinese

108. We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. ---- But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here. ____ But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear? ____ For how can it lose its rigour? Of course not by bargaining any of its rigour out of it. -- The *preconceived idea* of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say e.g. "Here is a Chinese sentence", or "No, that only looks like writing; it is actually just an ornament" and so on.

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note in margin: Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties.

The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"

sentence', or 'No, that only looks like writing; it is actually just an ornament' and so on." His example of Chinese writing emphasizes language's graphic component, its existence as marks on a page, by pointing to an alien image not immediately readable. The second example uses the first one to allude to the inherent ambiguity and duality of language, is it writing or is it ornament, meaningful language is it or marks on a page.

The examples in ¶108 make Wittgenstein's focus on the visible, graphic and physical aspects of language explicit. These examples themselves reveal their function in the section as it is only following them that Wittgenstein declares language to be a "spatial and temporal phenomenon". Throughout the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein repeatedly uses examples that emphasize the graphic nature of language to focus on both the social and material aspects of reading, learning to read, expressing pain, recording private sensations, following a rule and describing a geometrical projection.

Sections 81 - 102 consider the depth of vision and the space of logic prior to the realization that the ideal of logic is a particular view of language rather than the entirety of language. In these sections, which lead up to the crisis of ¶'s 103-108, Wittgenstein introduces ideas later reconsidered on the other side of the crisis, including the crucial concepts

81. F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game. — But if you say that our languages only *approximate* to such calculi you are standing on the very brink of misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an *ideal* language. As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum. – Whereas logic does not treat of language – or of thought – in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said if that we *construct* ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.

around language's depth, accessibility and degree of transparency. The discussion begins in section 81[1] which is situated between a discussion of boundaries and a discussion of rules. In this slot of space Wittgenstein introduces the idea of logic's relation to language. Logic in the *Investigations* as it had in the *Tractatus* lies on a boundary - but here the very nature of that boundary is what is in question, making explicit what was repressed in the *Tractatus* - the concern with boundaries themselves. He begins by *looking* at boundaries as spatial entities recognizing first that they have a dimension, and that they have depth. In ¶81 Wittgenstein associates F.P. Ramsey's idea that logic is a 'normative science' with the ways in which the use of words in philosophy are often compared with games and calculi having fixed rules. He is quick to point out that, with language you cannot say that someone is operating with definite rules.

82. What do I call 'the rule by which he proceeds'? – The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rule which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in reply if we ask him what his rule is? – But what if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings non to light? -- For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he understood by "N", but he was prepared to withdraw and alter it. -- So how am I to determine the rule according to which he is playing? He does not know it himself. -- Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the expression "the rule by which he proceeds" supposed to have left to it here?

In the final paragraph, Wittgenstein makes direct reference to his previous understanding of the language/logic relation in the *Tractatus*: "All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules."

---

[1] Although as frequently happens with discussions in the *Philosophical Investigations*, an origin is located elsewhere - the discussion of the subliming of language begun in ¶81 refers to the subliming the "logic of our language" in the attempt to demand all acts of naming to comply with a single notion in ¶38.

The discussion of rules begun here does not reach its crisis until in a discussion some hundred sections later where Wittgenstein proclaims: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here." (¶201) In the following section, the idea of rule is subverted to the idea of practice producing a spatial organization based on inhabitation and the publicness of practice rather than on a pre-conceived and often hidden meaning. "And hence also obeying a rule is a practice. And to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not to possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it."

83. Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly in the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw.

And is there not also the case where we play and – make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them – as we go along.

Sections 82-88 initiate a search for the rule(s) for the use of signs with the idea that such rules would form a "hypothesis that satisfactorily describes [the] use of words". (82) The search is counterbalanced by the fear that no such rule will emerge. "But what if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light?" (82) The encroaching sense of fear turns inward to threaten the very concept of a rule jeopardizes the search, as the criteria for such a rule are absent. The circularity of the argument

exposes its lack of direction: "Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the expression 'the rule by which he proceeds' supposed to have left to it here?" (82)

Wittgenstein responds to this loss of direction by interspersing this questioning or searching in two main ways: the first moves the questioning into the realm of practice and the second spatializes the problem as a way of redefining it. The effect is to *expand the field of space* allowing vision to be part of an activated practice requiring interpretation and contextualization rather than a passive and completely pre-determined object. Section 83 unites this concept of practice with philosophical method through the example of games which moves the language user from spectator to participant.

84. I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where it might? -- Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a rule, and a doubt which *it* removes – and so on?

But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right) – but that does not make me doubt in the same case.

In sections ¶85-¶87 Wittgenstein considers the close relation between rules and explanations. He begins by spatializing, externalizing and materializing a rule, reinventing it as a sign post. Explanations are then examined in these sections for their spatial and material properties in an attempt to locate them in the spatial order. "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!' – As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one." (87) Another reminder of practice emerges immediately following:

85. A rule stands there like a sign-post. -- Does the sign post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? – And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground -- is there only *one* way of interpreting them? – So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.

"If I tell someone 'Stand roughly here' - may not this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?
But isn't it an inexact explanation? - Yes; why shouldn't we call it 'inexact'? Only let us understand what 'inexact' means. For it does not mean 'unusable'."

Next, Wittgenstein spatializes the measure of exactitude, "And let us consider what we call an 'exact' explanation in contrast with this one. Perhaps something like drawing a chalk line round an area? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour-edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still go a function here: isn't the engine idling?'" (88) This discussion leads to the pronouncement "These considerations bring us up to the problem: In what sense is logic something sublime?" (89) Which is his asking in what ways does logic seem to contain a "peculiar depth" or "universal significance".

While section 89 had declared a visual goal, the desire "to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand"; ¶90 introduces another understanding of where meaning lies. It begins: "We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomenon." That is, to penetrate the surface and 'move beyond' what is in plain view.

86. Imagine a language-game like (2) played with the help of a table. The signs given to B by A are now written ones. B has a table; in the first column are the signs used in the game, in the second picture of building stones. A shews B such a written sign; B looks it up in the table, looks at the picture opposite, and so on. So the table is a rule which he follows in executing orders. -- One learns to look the picture up in the table by receiving a training, and part of this training consists perhaps in the pupil's learning to pass with his finger horizontally from left to right; and so, as it were, to draw a series of horizontal lines on the table.

Suppose different ways of reading a table were now introduced; one time, as above, according to the schema:

(diagram)

another time like this:

(diagram)

or in some other way. -- Such a schema is supplied with the table as the rule for its use.

Can we not now imagine further rules to explain *this* one? And, on the other hand, was that first table incomplete without the schema of arrows? And are other tables incomplete without their schemas?

In the *Tractatus*, in order to clear up philosophical problems, the logical form of language had to be exposed. As such the *Tractatus* had acted to unveil it, thus setting up and reinforcing the idea that the meaning of language lies in its depth and not on its surface. But for logic's showing of itself from within language in the *Tractatus*, language must be understood as transparent. Transparency allows the view from *above* to be the view *through* language to its logical structure on one hand and to the representation of the world or the other (the picture theory of the *Tractatus*).

The embeddedness of meaning within language was reinforced by the way in which the *Tractatus* was structured which began with 'pictures' of the relation of language to the world and then moved in - penetrating language to reach the logic beneath. The transparency of the structure of the *Tractatus* defined a series of relations beginning with the "world" - then language - then logic - then the move beyond the realm of language. The understanding of language as if it were transparent extends the visual metaphors of the *Tractatus* even as it tries to control the terms of vision.

87. Suppose I give this explanation: "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever he may or may not have done besides." -- But similar doubts to those about "Moses" are possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling "Egypt", whom the "Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these questions come to an end when we got down to words like "red", "dark", "sweet". -- "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!" -- As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another -- unless *we* require it to prevent a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding --- one, that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not every one that I can imagine.

It may easily look as if every doubt merely *revealed* an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

The first sign-post is in order -- if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose.

The association in ¶90 with the ideas of clarity and analysis from the *Tractatus*, leads in ¶91 to the fear that any acts of analysis imply or demand a final form of analysis. Wittgenstein suggests that the claim of analysis or of clarity does not have to be the claim to some ultimate or unique form. Instead, he posits the idea of a multiplicity of criteria for analysis based on the specifics of context. The problem here is that the generalization and universalization of a standard functions similarly to the prerequisite requirement of logic. But logic (as skepticism and meaning) proves itself to be equally uncontainable despite the attempt at limits in the *Tractatus*. This explains the *Tractatus'* emphasis on limits and boundaries allowing that the view from above is not an attempt to see such limits, but is an attempt to define a place from which to impose and enforce them.

Also foreseen is the *Investigation's* later discussion in ¶104 about the relation of logic as a form of representation to what it represents. The view from above similarly superimposes the two so that it is unclear whether the view created the understanding of language in the *Tractatus*, or whether the understanding demanded that view in order to represent itself. The view from above is the position of control by which to combat a fear of language in its usual state. Despite that, logic never quite obeys the limits placed on it, or which it places, but becomes interminably interwoven with language in the creation of philosophical problems in the *Tractatus*. As such,

88. If I tell someone "Stand roughly here" may not this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?

But isn't it an exact explanation? – Yes; why shouldn't we call it "inexact"? Only let us understand what "inexact" means. For it does not mean "unuseable". And let us consider what we call an "exact" explanation in contrast with this one. Perhaps something like drawing a chalk line round an area? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour-edge would be more exact. But this exactness still got a function here: isn't the engine idling? And remember too that we have not yet defined what is to count as overstepping this exact boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be established. And so on.

We understand what it means to set a pocket watch to the exact time or to regulate it to be exact. But what if it were asked: is this exactness ideal exactness, or how nearly does it approach the ideal? – Of course, we can speak of measurements of time in which there is a different, and as we should say a greater, exactness than in the measurement of time by a pocket-watch; in the words "to set the clock to the exact time" have a different, though related meaning, and 'to tell the time' is a different process and so on. -- Now, if I tell someone: "You should come to dinner more punctually; you know it begins at one o'clock exactly" – is there really no question of *exactness* here? because it is possible to say: "Think of the determination of time in the laboratory or the observatory; *there* you see what 'exactness' means"?

"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?

No *single* ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head – unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you.

the claim of a problem in the logical form of philosophical problems becomes the claim of a problem with language itself. Wittgenstein continues in ¶91, "That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved." But what problems - the traditional philosophical problems of epistemology and metaphysics or some new problem of language. "It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investigation." Performing according to the rules of logic (which regarding language became nearly impossible to pin down), the goal of complete exactness had been the aim in the *Tractatus*, but in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein questions whether that measure of exactitude is necessary for the study, use and understanding of language - even in philosophy.

Despite this, a visual search for the criteria of complete exactness begins in ¶92, as if to locate it and make it visible in order to compare it to that produced in philosophical propositions. But this seemingly visual search cannot be contained to a purely visual activity as its need to get beneath the surface of language forces it to become a spatial one. Space is both demanded and denied in the desire to penetrate

89. These considerations bring us up to the problem: In what sense is logic something sublime?

For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth -- a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. -- For logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that. — It takes rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp casual connexions: but from an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything *new* by it. We want to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand.

Augustine says in the *Confessions* "quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio". -- This could not be said about a question of natural science ("What is the specific gravity of hydrogen?" for instance). Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need to *remind* ourselves of. (And it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.)

phenomena. Revealing this "hidden" spatial component allows for the space necessary to separate language and logic, a space that had collapsed in the *Tractatus'* construction of a visual space of control.

In these sections, the belief that the 'essence' of language is somehow hidden within language shifts from being the underlying goal of philosophy to one of its foremost problems The belief that the essence of language is that which cannot be seen (except through analysis of a particular kind - if then) is a response to language's multiplicity of images and ways of meaning on its surface. Wittgenstein later gives up trying to evade this multiplicity and begins to work with it so that meaning is a matter of arrangement of what is visible without dependence on the 'hidden' or 'unseen' (the two forms of blindness in the book). Logic, in simultaneously underlying the surface of language and overseeing it, creates another spatial collapse in *the Tractatus*. Refocusing on to the surface of language in the *Philosophical Investigations* arises from the understanding that the 'depth' of meaning of language does not, and cannot, reveal itself at once. Practice reveals 'depth of meaning' over time and in specific situations rather than at once as the search through language to get to meaning implies.

The idea that the essence of language is hidden from us removes language from practice and objectifies it, producing a

90. We feel as if we had to *penetrate* phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the *'possibilities'* of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the *kind of statement* that we make about phenomena. Thus Augustine recalls to mind the different statements that are made about the duration, past present or future, of events. (These are, of course, not *philosophical* statements about time, the past, the present and the future.)

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. – Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart.

91. But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a *single* completely resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved.

It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investigation.

new metaphysical questioning. The questions: '*What is* language?' '*What is* a proposition?' asked in isolation disallow the possibility of answering them. Where can the answer be? Language, once called into question, leads us in a speechless search through a language that seems odd and unfamiliar. "*What is* language?" Such questioning is problematic, not because it calls language into question - but because it does so by turning language into an alien object rather than by looking at everyday practices. It is that approach which had led to the *Tractatus'* contradictory belief that it is only outside of language from which the essence of language is revealed. Segregating language from its context left its location in question so that approaching it becomes a literal mystery. Philosophical problems in this view become the space of mystery, later defined as taking the form "I don't know my way about." (123).

92. This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. – For if we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language - its function, its structure, -- yet *this* is not what those questions have in view. For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies *beneath* the surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look *into* the thing, and which an analysis digs out.

The essence is hidden from us': this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: "*What is language?*", "*What is a proposition?*" And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all; and independently of any future experience.

The following sections, 93 to 97, examine the view of language, propositions and thought produced by this estrangement The desire to overcome the resulting distance from language initially confirms the belief that we need to penetrate phenomenon in order to know it. The *Investigations* turns this situation around by suggesting that what we view has been shrouded by our approach to create the haze of distance. Wittgenstein continues by comparing the views. "One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary thing in the world" and another: "A proposition - that's

93. One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary thing in the world" and another: "A proposition -- that's something very queer!" _____ And the latter is unable to simply to look and see how propositions really work. The forms that we use in expressing ourselves about propositions and thought stand in the way.

Why do we say a proposition is something remarkable? On the one and, because of the enormous importance attaching to it. (And that is correct). On the other hand this, together with a misunderstanding of the logic of language, seduce into thinking that something extraordinary, something unique, must be achieved by propositions. – A *misunderstanding* makes it look to us as if a proposition *did* something queer.

something very queer!" --And the latter is unable simply to look and see how propositions really work." (93) The first view suggests "something extraordinary or unique about propositions but offers few clues as to where to go or how to proceed. Instead, it produces the starting point of a state of being lost. It becomes clear now, that Wittgenstein had, in order to counteract that state, sought a state of complete transparency. This idea, necessitating a pure intermediary between language and the world, is that chimera which is as problematic in its suggestion of a pure intermediary as in its separation of language and the world.

Section 96 continues to focus on this illusion. "Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world." Wittgenstein here lays out the series of associations of limits drawn in the *Tractatus*, showing how each marks the same boundary with different titles and reiterating the spatial/visual collapse of the *Tractatus* - where each frame lies directly behind the others. "These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each." The view from above requires that each of these must be transparent so as to allow the ones behind to be seen. Whereas the suggestion of transparency allows us to get directly to the 'essence'; the implied equality and transparency however makes it unclear what each boundary contains.

94. 'A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of logic.
The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional *signs* and the facts. Or even to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves. -- For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.

95. "Thought must be something unique". When we say, and *mean*, that such-and-such is the case, we – and our meaning – do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: *this - is -so*. But this paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be expressed in this way: *Thought* can be of what is not the case.

96. Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.)

Viewing becomes a 'purely visual' act - an exercise in empty vision (yet another kind of blindness). Why, for example, is the final level any less transparent, empty, or insufficient than the other ones?

Section ¶97 describes the chimera produced by this situation: thought is seen as if "surrounded by a halo." (suggesting WB's ideas on aura that also keep us at a distance.) Thought and language seem separated from us. We mistake this halo, Wittgenstein tells us, for the very essence of language (another confusion between inner and outer) and take it as simultaneously providing and presenting the *a priori* order common to both thought and world, a view that separates us from 'the world' it claims to define - "no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it – It must rather be of the purest crystal." The mention of crystalline purity foreshadows and defines the point of crisis between an ideal and practice in Wittgenstein's defining moment on the ice.

Sections 98 - 100 associate sense with issues of space (boundaries) and practice (rules). The question in these sections revolves around the implications and prerequisites involved in using and understanding sentences. Wittgenstein is questioning how far (at what distance) from the ideal a proposition can move and still retain meaning. Two examples are offered: that of an indefinite boundary and that of a game with some vagueness in its rules. In both cases, Wittgenstein

97. Thought is surrounded by a halo. -- Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of *possibilities*, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be *utterly simple*. It is *prior* to all experience, must be run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it ---- It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the *hardest* thing there is (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* No. 5.5563).

We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a *super*-order between -- so to speak -- *super*-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door".

turns to spatial demarcations and practices to determine how language functions.

Wittgenstein repeats this process in ¶100 with a discussion of the necessity of a game's reliance on definite rules to be a game. " 'But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness *in the rules*.' – But *does* this prevent its being a game?" The pattern seems the same, but a shift has been enacted. Wittgenstein now poses the questions not as from himself but from the point of another - the so-called interlocutor. By placing the question in quotation marks, Wittgenstein takes another step beyond his previous thinking. Although it is already clear in the text that neither games, boundaries, nor rules need to be ideal to function, the question remains whether the use of *words* like "game", "boundary", "rule" can also function in this manner and maintain their sense. In so doing, Wittgenstein is asking whether the same thinking applies to words and to practices. He concludes the section with "But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the word 'game' clearly."

The following section gets to the heart of this discussion by returning to the subject and functioning of logic. The return is however from a new position, one recognizing that in practice we often call something with vague rules a game and

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language 'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not s*triving after* an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us. – On the other hand it seems clear that where there is a sense there must be perfect order. — So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.

99. The sense of a sentence – one would like to say -- may, of course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless have *a* definite sense. An indefinite sense -- that would really not be a sense *at all*. – This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the man up fast in the room -- there is only one door left open" -- then I simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all". An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as *none*. – But is that true?

100. "But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness *in the rules*". – But *does* this prevent its being a game? -- "Perhaps you'll call it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game." This means: it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure article. – But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the word "game" clearly.

something with an incomplete or fuzzy edge a boundary. The practices and elements have retained their sense even when their functioning was no longer ideal. The focus shift to logic, was initially challenged by this encroaching vagueness. But an interesting thing happens when logic is now reconsidered - the demand for the ideal itself seems, impossible unless it too is found in practice. Language and practice once separated, defined and limited by logic, now demand logic to abide by their rules of practice.

As an inner requirement, logic was understood not to arise from an investigation of what is out there before our eyes, but as an illusion we have projected into the space in front of us. "We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there." (¶101) In revealing logic as an inner requirement (which, if we follow, causes us to mistake what we see), Wittgenstein shows that philosophical problems can arise from a confusion between inner and outer requirements which blur the distinction between what is real and what is unreal. This is not to imply that Wittgenstein is denying the reality, the existence of the inner or mental; but rather, that he is trying to clarify where these conceptions about reality are located and from where they arise. As Cora Diamond points out, the aim is to draw our attention to the unrealism in philosophy; to the unrealism in the questions we are asking. She states that we ask philosophical questions "about our concepts in the grip of

101. We want to say that there can't be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal *'must'* be found in reality. Meanwhile we do not as yet see *how* it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this "must". We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.

an unrealistic conception of what knowing about them would be."[2]

The reality that Wittgenstein refers to is both the obvious - the in the world and in language - and that in philosophy. Wittgenstein's questioning here is as much about his relation to philosophy as logic's relation to language. If logic is losing its place in language, is philosophy also losing its place in discourse or in our lives? Is philosophy still philosophy without these ideals, topics, and methods; without the rigors of logic or traditional argument and form?

102. The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background -- hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something.

Logic in ¶102 emerges again as that which is behind, hidden or embedded within the sensible use of language - "hidden in the medium of the understanding." But what is that medium: language, philosophy, vision, space? Section 103 declares that the medium is the frame and lens that defines the practices of observation and investigation, the glasses on our nose. The lens of the glasses is thus caught between the transparent and the hidden - between inside and out, unreachable in one and unmoveable in the other.

Sections 109-133 _____

Section 108 had ended with the comparison of a word and a chess piece as both elements in a game or parts of a practice.

---

[2]Cora Diamond, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind*,, (Cambridge, MA: M I T Press, 1991), p.66.

The point of the analogy was to assist in defining our "real need" in the study of language. That real need being not some ontological or metaphysical discussion *into* a word's nature or essence creating a removed, and ineffectual language, but rather a discussion of the functioning of language, a surface discussion that focuses on the everyday use of language. Section 109 begins from this position to draw the conclusions and problems for philosophy suggested by the previous twenty sections beginning with the reconsideration of the nature and method of investigation and the idea of our "real need". As a method, the rejection or limiting of explanation that Wittgenstein has hinted at since the book's opening paragraphs is explicitly dealt with here with arrangement and description in their many guises emerges the most viable practices.

This declaration is Wittgenstein's attempt to redefine the territory of philosophy which for him must be done in relation to other discourses and other uses of language: science, logic, everyday language, varying games, building and so on. This activity demands both transgression of the discipline and inhabitation within it as Wittgenstein's movements in and out of philosophy mark the territory he is trying to describe. This aspect is very different from the knowledge and visibility of the fixed places and points of view of the *Tractatus*, replaced hereby methods of arranging made possible only by moving through space to achieve a multitude of viewpoints and

depiction of the resulting views. Vision remains indispensable, but movement makes the practices of vision possible and productive, turning it from a requirement of a particular view into an investigation.

The section concludes with a famous but not unproblematic statement : "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." This immediately brings to mind the example of the Chinese sentence in ¶108 and the question of whether it is writing or ornament with its implied suspicion that the line between writing and ornament needs to be drawn (i.e. another boundary) for fear that it could become blurred. But the statement itself - a defining statement of philosophy - seems at odds with what has been stated up to this point. It would seem to make more sense the other way around - language is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of philosophy. Philosophy, which had seemed to be in danger through the dissolution of its substance of philosophical problems, now seems to be in the position of directing language in response to problems inherent within language itself - *not* to ones created by philosophy's propensity for mishandling, mistreatment, or misrecognition. But Wittgenstein has indeed rotated the axis - to leave us with the suggestion and position that our real need is in understanding the space of language rather than the space of philosophy. Language is primary. In so doing, he has given philosophy a purpose - one that can

109. It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and -such' -- whatever they may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets it light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

finally be entered into and inhabited. Wittgenstein with this declaration of a philosophical activity (battle), has begun to inhabit philosophy as a subject of everyday language.

Philosophy also declares itself as a spatial practice, one of finding one's place in contrast to philosophical problems as defining a state of being lost as in ¶123. Rotating the axis has rearranged what we see by 180 degrees. Where as it would have been impossible earlier, and now still remains somewhat of a shock - Wittgenstein has declared a place, however convoluted, for philosophy to continue in relation to language. The emphasis on battle also emphasizes the ongoing nature of this process which can neither be avoided nor simply won.

Sections 110-111 consider the appearance of these philosophical/grammatical problems that in battle become entangled with language . Confusions in appearances are what Wittgenstein in ¶110 calls grammatical illusions. Such an illusion was that language (or thought) is something strange or involving a unique practice. In response to visual confusion Wittgenstein again spatializes the problem in order to create a palace and ways to fully examine this implied illusionary space. "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*."

110. "Language (or thought) is something unique" -- this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.
And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems.

Depth of language as described in these sections of the *Investigations* alludes to, but differs from, the depth given to language in the *Tractatus* by the logical form hidden within it. In the *Tractatus*, that depth was both the site of philosophical problems as well as the place from which they were expunged. Logic was at once collapsed into language and held apart from it or at least away from an explicit appearance on the surface. To see that (hidden) logical form and close the gap between it and the surface of ordinary language was the philosopher's work. (An unacknowledged spatial problem.) The depth created was, however, mysterious with its simultaneous demands of penetration and distance. In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein is refers to an implied depth in both language and ourselves, but it is depth itself which is being examined, inviting the reader to enter into a space shared by the subject and language that had previously prohibited or escaped examination. The question then of "Why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*?" is one of self-examination as to why do we see a separation between such things as thought and language or language and grammar. Wittgenstein is questioning both the supposed private nature of thought and the possibility of language being separate from grammar, or of words being separate from their meanings. Wittgenstein uses this examination to further define the space of philosophy, equating the depth of a grammatical joke with the depth of philosophy.

111. The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. --- Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.)

In sections 112 - 123 the persistent idea from the *Tractatus* of the existence of a general form of a proposition underlying language reappears. Over the next ten sections this idea becomes transformed from the search for the general form of a proposition to the understanding that it is *philosophical problems* that have a general form. In response to the *Tractatus'* 4.5 "The general form of propositions is : This is how things are." the *Philosophical Investigation's* proclaims that : "A philosophical problem has the form : '" don't know my way about.'"(¶123) These statements stand in diametrical symmetry, together forming the corollary to the shift enacted in ¶109 from an ideal language with philosophical problems arising from the inability to see that ideal, to the view that language is not ideal and philosophical problems arise in the failure to see everyday language. Sections 112-123 parallel that shift by moving from the demand and the belief that language conform to a specific structure in relation to the world - offering a picture of it - to the belief that philosophical problems themselves, not language, have a specific form in relation to language.

112. A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. "But *this* isn't how it is!" – we say. "Yet *this* is how it has to be!"

Out of the grammatical illusions and misinterpretations of our forms of language Wittgenstein points to the deep association of philosophical problems with language. With Wittgenstein's rejection of the hidden element in language is his equal rejection of hidden elements in philosophical problems. The grammatical illusion or character of depth in the

misinterpretations of our forms of language is shown to be a misreading of surface by mistaking (implied) spatial associations. The emphasis on surface in the *Investigations* destroys the hierarchical production of space that had, despite attempts otherwise, created confusion between the inner and the outer. Misinterpretation, however, is no longer seen to arise from the misalignment between language and logical form which had spawned the *Tractatus'* attempts to align them. Illusions disrupt clear readings of the space, suggesting that there may be no clear readings of language itself, that philosophy is in fact engaged with language in a battle brought about through misinterpretation, illusion, etc. The combination of misinterpretation and illusion is itself telling in its consistent pairing of the visual and the verbal.

Wittgenstein in order to adjust the reader's focus has redefined the space of language from a segregated language to a shared social space of practice. This understanding leads to a related understanding of depth: the "deep disquietudes" brought about through the misinterpretation of our forms of language. Wittgenstein finds these disquietudes to be as deep in us and as significant and important as language itself. By so doing, he is not simply dismissing or dissolving those problems - rather he is discussing our involvement with them - both in the practice of philosophy and in our everyday use of language. Depth has been internalized, solidifying philosophical problems as our problems rather than ones we

simply found in the world. Searching for the problems beyond and distinct from ourselves proves to be a confusion between inner and outer by not understanding that many resulted from self-imposed ideals and requirements. Responding to philosophical problems - as in defining the territory of philosophy thus involves negotiating the relationship between inner and outer in a multitude of ways.

The shift from the search for the general form of a proposition to the understanding that it is philosophical problems - not language - that follow a general form, begins with a questioning of the appearance of language. "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us." (112) This "false appearance" produces confusion that seems at first to require what Wittgenstein has called for all along - clear vision. To decide what the case is, what is a false vision and what we see correctly, Wittgenstein speaks of the attempt to see absolutely clearly in order to make a final determination. "'But this is how it is ------' I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter." (¶113) Vision, the main form of clarity in the *Tractatus*, persists in the *Investigations*, but alongside, rather than above, other practices. Absolute clarity of vision which went hand in hand with the idea of a transparent language, had allowed vision alone to be sufficient because it was

thought to be total. The *Philosophical Investigations* in questioning other beliefs from the *Tractatus*, questions this one as well. That is, the *Philosophical Investigations* questions the practice of vision in the *Tractatus* by first recognizing that it is a practice and then understanding that it is not the only possible practice but one of many.

The *Investigations* reconsiders the role of the visual in philosophy, in language and logic on the assumption that if clear vision was an integral component in the dissolution of philosophical problems, then vision itself must be investigated. The *Tractatus* had made the visual-verbal relation in language explicit in the distinction between showing and saying. But at the same time vision itself functioned in some kind of haze - in an unsayable and potentially unstable way. Vision, which had been discussed as if transparent in the *Tractatus*, reemerges tarnished in the *Investigations* through association with a viewer. Vision itself in some way did not exist in the *Tractatus*, although, and perhaps consequently, it was always demanded. Although implied throughout, vision was in some way lacking in the *Tractatus* exactly because the process was not discussed as to do so would bring in other factors such as a subject, space, and so on, all of which the dominance on logical space and determinate sense were meant to exclude. The *Tractatus* had no functioning *practice* of vision, only an idealized model.

113. "But *this* is how it is ---" I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter.

In ¶114, Wittgenstein explicitly transforms the idea of a general form of a proposition into the frames of the glasses themselves. The confusion or mediation of inner/outer is here defined by the frame which mediates between viewer and viewed. Confusion results from the inability to distinguish between that which is found and that which is produced, between the requirements of investigation and the results. This distinction, clear in the *Tractatus*, is now also in question. Wittgenstein, in re-examining the world that is found, in realizing that the *Tractatus'* view was the requirement and not the result of investigation, questions not just the requirement, but the distinction between the found and the produced. The distinction comes apart in the *Investigations* around the act of looking with the realization that it fails not at the point of the object in sight, but around the act of viewing as signified and materialized by the glasses.

114. (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are." ---- That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.

Section 115 further dismantles the fixed view by focusing on how it is inextricable from language. "A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." The picture refers to the picture theory of the *Tractatus* and to the view constructed by the *Tractatus*. While ¶114 had associated a particular framed view with a central notion from the *Tractatus*, ¶115 collapsed that frame with language and ¶116 began to dislodge language from the frame by placing

115. A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.

side by side the frame and the image within it, comparing the metaphysical and the everyday uses.

Section 115 also points to the deep association of the verbal and the visual. This is the situation then - the acts of repetition - of our tracing round the frame over and over again - and the correlative repetition of an image by language. We are caught in somewhat obsessive and blind acts. These acts go nowhere, suggesting the idea of an engine idling, reinforcing the same frame and same image, and thus pointing to the image of repetition itself. It is the mechanization of the view attempted in the *Tractatus*, here acted out.

Section 116 examines the boundary between philosophical and everyday language, proceeding by moving in and out of philosophy and in and out of vision. The section focuses on the distinction between the use of words in everyday language and in more traditional philosophical, i.e., non-Wittgensteinian usage. Wittgenstein in response sees the work of the Investigations as a reversal of the traditional philosophical approach. "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." The "we" are philosophers, or more specifically, philosophers using methodology akin to that of the *Investigations*. Philosophy here is a mediating activity that begins to explain its relation to Wittgenstein's own movements in and out of the discourse as if on missions of rescuing and returning language. That

activity blurs the boundaries even as it defines them. The blur can be seen as a measure of the movement back and forth across those boundaries as a still photograph capturing a moving image. Inhabitation becomes the place in which words have a use and the concept of home is directly reiterative of that practice of inhabitation.

Wittgenstein's understanding of language-games as homes - as ways of inhabiting language, are offered in contrast to the metaphysical use of language that can only be understood as pure transgression - as words in exile. The metaphysical in its alienating and estranging approach cannot provide context because it does not provide a place, but is an illusion. By creating an unsatisfiable demand it refers to a place that can never be reached - a utopia. Such is the site of the ice in ¶107 which at first seems ideal and exactly because it is, it is incapable of allowing movement or inhabitation.

116. When philosophers use a word – "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" – and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? –

What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

The examples Wittgenstein offers - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" are all words that philosophy has taken into the metaphysical, abandoning their everyday use for some mythical or illusory essence. Specifically illusory in that it cannot be located in space or found in practice. Essence was associated with depth, with what lay at the thing's core and what seems to make something what it uniquely is to distinguish it (unquestionably) from everything else. Surface is rejected as the site of essence as there are too

many similarities between surfaces. This possibility of confusion had called for an absolute clarity but the surface did not supply that image. Essence thus is located where it cannot be seen and at the cost of spatial clarity as it cannot be precisely located but is sited in some infinite regress to produce a completely clarified level of language ultimately lost within the Tractatus' layers of transparency. It is for this reason that in the metaphysical use, essence, originality and ontological status have the false appearance of 'home'. By contrast, the original home or language-game becomes of importance not because of some ontological claim, but because meaning for Wittgenstein arises out of social practices.

Wittgenstein turns this concept around by suggesting that it is the unwillingness to deal with those surface similarities, those potentially false appearances that account for the move to the metaphysical and the search for the unique meaning and appearance of a word. His response is to return the word to its everyday site as a "spatial-temporal phenomenon" - not an *intangible essence*. If essence, ontology, metaphysics demand a unique place and meaning they cannot allow words to be used in other ways, they cannot be 'moved'. But, the move from the everyday to the metaphysical requires transgression. That is, essence rather than being pure, arises from a paradox: it is reliant upon a one to one correlation of meaning and place, while simultaneously it is dependent on the transgression of the everyday practices from which words arise.

As a result, the metaphysical use takes words away from their origins in the search of their essence and despite its claims, essence can only be a secondary home, existing in a sort of nonplace removed from social functioning.

In ¶117 Wittgenstein considers how a language game's original home functions in everyday use by considering the sense of a sentence. Here, the interlocutor (as the voice from outside the *Investigations* but at the same time integral to it - as is the *Tractatus* states: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then — I am using it in the sense you are familiar with." To which Wittgenstein comments "As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application." Sense once placed in relation to the spatiality and physicality of language becomes that which needs to be investigated. One line of investigation is to consider sense in relation to phenomena or aura. Both terms imply a word existing within a sort of haze with a potentially more exact core of meaning at some (unreachable) center. In this way sense and the word seem kept, if not at a distance, at least not directly on top of each other. The image of the word in this case is it sitting within its sense which spreads out around it and sustains its ability to mean, as does atmosphere for breath. The atmosphere by this way of thinking provides the general possibility for specific meanings as it moves with the word from place to place with sense becoming something like life support.

117. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then – I am using it in the sense you are familiar with." -- As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application.

If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here" (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.

There is another sense of support suggested here by what the interlocutor says. The possibility exists for sense to function akin to explanation and so with the same problems. With Wittgenstein's reference to the support or lack of it for explanation in ¶87, Wittgenstein had asked how an explanation can be useful if it is not the final one. That is, if it is not the ultimate explanation. To which the interlocutor, in realizing the potential instability of the situation exclaims, "'But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!'" Wittgenstein responds by again alluding to some indefinable atmosphere: "As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one."

Wittgenstein's rotation of the search for a support for language comes around his concept of language-games as a response to the search for a metaphysical foundation of meaning that Wittgenstein finds hazy at best. He replaces this distancing haze with an infinite number of possible observable practices of language or language-games through which meaning emerged. Wittgenstein's point is that the way to understand language is to look at the use of words, not to isolate the words in a surrounding fog. And the suggestion is that attempts to penetrate phenomena are misguided because they are attempts to understand the physical property of words

when understanding language is more akin to studying or observing the rules of the game(s).

The grammatical illusions is that words have depth rather than that they exist in space. As an example Wittgenstein offers a proposition that along with its accompanying gesture seems to carry its sense with it. And yet, Wittgenstein uses it to point to its very specificity. "If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here" (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense." To say that sense arises from the language-game which was its original home is thus to say that meaning arises from practice and inhabitation. Sense can thus be fully transportable as it arises from practices in a multitude of contexts.

Both transgression and inhabitation are therefore necessary components to the functioning of language as the basis of any language-game is its positing of an original home and in its transgression of that locale. The *Tractatus* in its singular act of transgression can now be seen not to be as much in error, but as in having been arrested midstep. Rather than having misstepped, the *Tractatus* has walked too little, leaving it to posit as complete what was only a beginning.

Making sense, then, in many ways turns out to be as much an act of making as one of sense. To that end, a word does not and cannot carry with it its sense as an atmosphere accompanying it, but it can carry with it its language-game (its history of practices) as generative - part of the act of *making* sense. The language-game in this way does not serve to bind a word to a given place but like a rule, it allows the word to *make* sense in other locations. "This is here" along with its accompanying gesture in Wittgenstein's example is offered - not to be analyzed as to its structure, but to be recognized as part of our lives.

Section 118 takes the inevitable step of questioning Wittgenstein's current practice of investigation. The image he offers is telling in its return to the concept of building. With it he inverts the traditional view of metaphysics as ground, depicting that which seemed to define philosophy as built upon the ground of language. Furthering this, Wittgenstein suggests that the inquiries of metaphysics only appear to be buildings, while in fact that image is another illusion. What had been thought to be buildings turned out to be houses of cards, buildings without structure or any possibility for inhabitation. This idea stands in sharp contrast to Wittgenstein's own practice of building with which he began the *Investigations*.

Clarity becomes a literalized practice in ¶118 with the idea of clearing up the ground of language. Clearing as an activity replaces a given clarity as the building of language had replaced discussing a complete language. Clearing instead turns out to be an activity (in this case) of scale - what had been thought to be buildings were really just houses of cards as what had been thought to be the limits of language had turned out only to be limits within language. (Another confusion of the inner and the outer.)

118. Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.

Section 119 reconfigures the already revised metaphor of ground now associated with language - shifting it from the image of a foundations to build upon, to that of spatial container. In this shift, Wittgenstein underscores the movement away from the view from above constituted by the *Tractatus*. While the image of a ground of language potentially reinforced that view, Wittgenstein for the first time within the *Investigations* specifically refers to the "limits of language," simultaneously constructing a new understanding of them. Wittgenstein is doing more here than in his previous discussions of boundaries that had allowed for imprecision and indefinability; the discussion is now being organized around a limit which not only is *not* clearly in view, but is one which we cannot see directly at all, a fundamentally new kind

of limit - one which gives the sense of what it is to be inside, a sense distinctly absent from the *Tractatus*.[3]

The image then, of spatial containment, the view from inside, becomes exactly not a view. The vantage point of the *Investigations* has not just created another picture, but has suggested another way of understanding. While the first sentence of this section seems to reiterate the redirecting of philosophy as a response to the misdirection of traditional metaphysics, the second sentence points to its value. The results of philosophy are at least dual, they uncover two distinctly different kinds of traces, that of the nonsensical objects of philosophical production (metaphysics etc.) and the painful(?) traces on ourselves of that practice. But Wittgenstein says that those bumps on the head "make us see the value of the discovery." (Still, the idea that bumps on the head make us see the value of the discovery does suggest a rather questionable discovery.)

The suggestion that we run into the limits of language is for two most probable reasons: we could either not see the limits, or we thought they were moveable and would give way. The first is a lack of awareness of the existence or placement of these limits while the second is a testing of them. The continued bumps suggest again the inability to see, but as

119. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery.

[3]Wittgnstein's discussion of the philosophy of psychology and the subjection in the *Tractatus* doesn't really enter this territory, but simply re-inscribes its limits, as if delineating a missing space in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein places the value in the bumps themselves, that is he does not visualize this activity - I take it that the limit is not visible. It is not drawn, because as Wittgenstein has noted, drawn limits have width, and more importantly, they have two sides, they imply a (possible) transgression even as they try to contain it. The limit Wittgenstein is discussing in ¶119 cannot be drawn and, as suggested by these bumps, it is not readily located. In fact, the bumps and nonsense are the (indirect) signs we get of it, they are the way we know that language and sense have limits. In that way, the limit acts somewhat like the appearances of the unconscious in language, making itself known without being seen, drawing a boundary of which we are only aware indirectly, and yet one that is still capable of offering a way of explaining aspects of our practices.

Wittgenstein in sections 120 - 121 starts to discuss the use and meaning of words in order to clarify when we tend to push up against the limits of language. He begins by looking at the ability of our language to speak about itself, to perform exactly the kind of inquiry that Wittgenstein is pursuing in the *Investigations*. It questions the limits of language's - and thus Wittgenstein's and the reader's - ability to do the work at hand. Such a discussion had in many ways broken down with the *Tractatus* by its use of symbolic logic to achieve certain goals and by the limitations resulting from the defining of a sharp show-say distinction that always threatened silence. All of this marked, if not the failure of language, at least its

limitations for self-reflection without transgression into silence. The question itself of language's and philosophy's self-reflective abilities is fundamental to the *Investigations* work.

120. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? *Then how is another one to be constructed*? – And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!

In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.

Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? – Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask!

And your scruples are misunderstandings.

Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.

You say: the pint isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)

Put another way, Wittgenstein is asking whether language needs to transgress itself in order to be self-descriptive. That is, it asks whether the view from inside, from within the limitations of language marked by those bumps on the head, is capable of providing sufficient description for the purposes at hand.

This section again raises the relation between the interior and the exterior of a word and the continuing desire to penetrate phenomena. The concluding part of ¶120 specifically focuses on the relation between 'words' and 'meanings'.

> "You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different form the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)"

Wittgenstein's point is that everyday language *functions* meaningfully; meaning is not a separate entity or component, "here the word, there the meaning". The focus on the meaning of a word's surface and into its practice is emphasized by the example of "orthography" in the following section. Meaning then has no place to reside outside of what is seen, it is neither somehow an appendage nor that which is

embedded within the word, hidden from view. The idea of use, however, differentiates this association from the correlation of meaning and a word in the *Tractatus* which had treated of them as separate entities in need of a spatial practice to define their association.

The following section, asks similar questions about philosophy's ability for self-reflection. The analogy made between philosophy and orthography is telling, again demanding that philosophy *look* at language and particularly at the surface or exterior of language. The graphic aspect of language is thus not secondary, but is an inseparable part of language and our practices of meaning. As such the *Investigations* allows for the examination of both "philosophy" and philosophy as material constructions. In the *Investigations* there is the understanding that part of what is represented by language, is language, hence the example of orthography, so that language simultaneously constructs and represents itself as part of it s functioning. Wittgenstein is insisting that "philosophy"/philosophy not be treated any differently than any other word or topic..

121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order.

Vision follows suit here with the continual oscillation of the visual and the verbal, re-emerging explicitly in ¶122 by focusing on the shift from looking as a passive activity to a constructive one.

This section posits the critical shift from the *Tractatus'* demand for clarification, dependent on stability and a clear view to the more complex spatial understanding and functioning of vision and language in the *Investigations*. It begins with the acceptance that with language viewed from within we cannot command the clear view implied from the outside. "Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity." The emphasis then moves to the need to develop a form of perspicuity dependent not on seeing all of language but on working within language by "seeing connexions" and then with the emphasis on activity, of "finding and inventing *intermediate cases*."

> 122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.
>
> The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

Wittgenstein thus introduces a new criterion of seeing/functioning to go with the new position of the viewer - the idea of a "perspicuous representation." "The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give the way we look at things." That is, the demands of a new way of looking create the development of new forms of representation, hence the distinction between the structure of the *Tractatus* and the structure of the *Investigations*. The section thus begins with the acceptance of the failure of language to offer the critical distance found in the view from above. By placing the viewer within language, the viewer becomes a user and viewing itself becomes an active part of the construction of language.

The limitations of the scope of the view from within are thus allowed to function not as the end point, as a limit of language, but as the beginning. As we cannot see all of language we need to make connections between what we see, remember, arrange, locate, etc. The move from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* can be seen as the move from an overt clarity to a continual process of having to make connections. The sketches, reminders and games that form the *Investigations* are thus attempts at perspicuous representation, suggesting that it cannot be a single image, but must be a series of connections or intermediate cases rather than the overview of the *Tractatus*. Additionally, the spatial practices of editing, cutting down, fresh approaches and rearrangement are all involved. Perspicuity itself is being investigated, leaving its form open and (conceivably) continually changing.

123. A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about".

One problem of the view from within of the *Investigations* is that it has nothing *over* the state of philosophical problems. " A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.'" (¶123) This definition bears an uncanny similarity to the description of language found in ¶ 203. "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." The two images coalesce into a dual description of the spatial ordering of both philosophical problems and language. The demand for the need to understand language and philosophy as spatial

constructs and practices is overwhelming. Not knowing the way about continues the discussion of the inability to see all of language as in the view from within. As there is no other possible view in the *Investigations*, then, that is the condition of using language. Equally, however, Wittgenstein in offering a series of reminders of everyday language practices, points to the fact that this is deeply familiar territory. To that end, the idea of the view from within, in denying the possibility of any other view denies any possible inner/outer distinction. The recurrent spatiality in these examples underscores the knowledge that working in and with language is a spatial practice and needs to be understood as such.

Sections 124 - 133 forms the *Investigation's* response to 6.53 of the *Tractatus* which outlined the limited possibilities and one "strictly correct method" for the practice of philosophy. Section 124 makes clear that the methods used in philosophy and the possibilities for the practice of philosophy are inseparable from the limits of the discipline of philosophy itself, limits Wittgenstein continually redefines, transforms and transgresses. Wittgenstein's concerns with philosophy at its limits conjoined with his moving in and out of the practice of philosophy define spatial practices. His examination of the discourse of philosophy simultaneously defines a spatial discourse allowing philosophical problems, understood as linguistic or grammatical problems, also to be understood as spatial problems. The relation between inner and outer

defined around the subject forms a core understanding of the spatiality in the practice of language in that the public nature of language involves defining of the boundary between the realms of inner and outer space. The correlate of these beliefs is that it is necessary to understand the space of a practice in order to understand the practice. This connects with Wittgenstein's understanding that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (19)

In many ways Wittgenstein had acknowledged, if not the spatial, at least the visual in the *Tractatus*, with his emphasis on showing. Despite its restricted role allowed in the *Tractatus*, that role is crucial. It is the act of showing through which the logical structure of a proposition is known. And it is the logical structure of a proposition which it is necessary to understand, or again, see correctly, in order to find the root of philosophical problems. Those problems had been dissolved or silenced in this act of making the structure of a proposition clear. The association between dissolution and silence further blurs the distinction by locating a place in which showing and saying come together. Clarity emerges as a location in which the two meet.

124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.

For it cannot give it any foundation either.

It leaves everything as it is.

It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us a problem of mathematics like any other.

In ¶6.53 of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein had distinguished philosophy from the natural sciences; in ¶124 of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein emphasizes philosophy's separateness from mathematical logic. As a result,

mathematical logic no longer has the privileged place it held in the *Tractatus*. Equally philosophy has no special relation to language. It is just one of an infinite number of topics that philosophy may discuss. And, just as logic no longer provides the structural foundation of meaningful language, philosophy is not foundational to other discourses. It offers neither their advancement nor their foundation. "It leaves everything as it is." This lays open new interdisciplinary possibilities. Without any special relation to language and knowledge (as the foundation of knowledge upon which other discourses can build) philosophy itself becomes open to the action of other discourses. Its borders become more permeable and less well defined. Philosophy as Wittgenstein describes comes into being along with other discourses, made of the same language and describing them rather than preceding them. Philosophy also no longer provides the sole frame for looking, but instead defines and structures itself around *what it sees*. It is this situation which allows the acknowledgment of the discourses of spatiality, visuality and architecture to inhabit the *Investigations* along with any number of other topics that Wittgenstein lists in the preface to the *Investigations*, including "the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness and other things."

Section 125 continues trying to situate philosophy by moving back through philosophy's history of self construction to the

point at which it intersects with our everyday practices and the society of which they are part. Wittgenstein again begins with the topic of mathematical logic and the question of any special relation it might hold in the solution, resolution, or dissolution of a philosophical problem and, as in the previous section, dismissing the idea that it holds a unique relation to philosophy while raising the question : What relation does it have? Mathematical logic in no longer providing a framework, that disallowed conflict as contradiction so that philosophy's place of action becomes one of conflict rather than of resolution.

What is initially at stake when the unique relation with logic is dismantled is both the practice and the representation of philosophy. What changes is how deeply philosophy is intertwined with the practice of language. That is, the distinct barriers and limits associated with logic which had demanded a unique association of language and philosophy, once dismantled, take with them the related ideas of clarity of vision as the association of logic with a fixed perspective view once dismantled takes with it the view itself. The associated criterion of clarity no longer holds. Wittgenstein's parenthetical comment that constructing/determining a clear view of the state of mathematics (or whatever) before the resolution of conflict and contradiction is not a sidestepping of the challenge such a resolution poses, underscores

125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping s difficulty.)

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).

It throws light on our concept of *meaning* something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is, just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that."

The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.

Wittgenstein's recognition of the difficulty in describing, depicting or accepting a state of conflict.

The shift to inhabitation in the *Investigations* is evidenced in ¶125 where Wittgenstein offers a different sense of "we". The "we" here is more than a nominal "we", but one in which the practice of philosophy is troubling. With the inclusion of the subject in the *Investigations*, the self becomes part of what is viewed and the subject is implicated in the act of viewing and construction of views. In this sense, part of what we need to get a clear view of is the self, ourselves and achieving a clear view of a state of contradiction becomes integrally associated with the acceptance of the possibility of discord, not just in mathematical logic, but as a fundamentally human discord.

> The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.
>
> This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of.) (¶125)

This understanding defines the move from an external discussion of rules to a discussion of what it is like to simultaneously follow and become entangled in those rules. The view from inside language and our lives is made clear in its inability to limit the meanings within the language we use. The shift then has been made from the more philosophical/technical discussion of logico - mathematical

contradictions to a common everyday contradiction in the practice of language. "For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: 'I didn't mean it like that.'" Contradiction and meaning are shown to be intertwined in practice, to the location of meaning not in the intentionality of the speaker, but within the practice of language. The speaker, incapable of completely controlling the meaning of language can only comment on it : "I didn't mean it like that." - statement that points as much to our helplessness as to our indignity. The position as developed in the *Investigations* of the subject within language thus exists in sharp contrast to the controlling position outside of language that would allow us to 'see' the full use of our words, to see where they lead and plan accordingly.

Wittgenstein makes our involvement with language clear in the subtleties of the last lines of ¶125 . "The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life : there is the philosophical problem." This understanding of philosophical problems complements ¶123's statement of the form of a philosophical problem. "I don't know my way about." Philosophical problems are thus defined in two ways in the *Investigations*, as spatial and as social (thus pointing to the intersection of the spatial and social). This understanding places philosophy as part of the world, rather than the discrete, strictly bounded practice of the *Tractatus*. Philosophy

as defined in ¶125 is therefore a public activity with which the private intentionality of meaning becomes subsumed to a publicly accessible language, and as such civil life is the arena of philosophical problems. The subject is located here not between epistemology and metaphysics on the one hand and ethics, aesthetics on the other (as with the *Tractatus*), but exists between the potential privateness of an interiority and the publicness of language and practice, lost in philosophical problems and at odds with civil life. Philosophy's integration and understanding as a socio-spatial problem allows for Wittgenstein to finally approach problems and spheres of philosophy (ethics and aesthetics for example) that he could not within the *Tractatus*.

Given ¶125's laying bare of the contradiction in our use of language and within our selves and society, ¶126 seems to back down or away from that state of conflict, instead offering a state of calm in which Wittgenstein can achieve a "clear view" of "the state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved.", a clear view of philosophy's territory. This move is part of the continued positioning and repositioning of the discipline or practice of philosophy in relation to other social practices. Where as ¶125 defined the state of entanglement with language and society, ¶126 extricates the practice of philosophy not by conflict resolution but by conflict revelation. Which is not to say that philosophy serves to reveal conflicts otherwise hidden, but rather it serves up a state of conflict that

was less hidden than ignored. "One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions."

126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.

Wittgenstein's emphasis in sections 126 - 129 is on the refocusing of the vision of philosophy, a subject that he has touched on since the discovery of the coincidence of vision and philosophy in the frames, if not the lenses, of the glasses. Yet, positioning and repositioning, fundamental acts of the *Investigations*, demand that Wittgenstein go over the same territory, repeatedly on varying paths and finding new positions. The repetition allows these sections to be more than the initial uncovering of vision. As Wittgenstein is now operating within the socio-spatial field of philosophy, the idea of clarity has been transformed by the repositioning of philosophy with civil life, the rotation about our real needs of ¶108.

Section 126 potentially defines a place of what Wittgenstein later calls "peace". Spatial limitations play a strong role in defining the possibility for 'philosophical peace' which might be understood as the ability to be still rather than the inability to move. The attempt at calm is nearly audible in the sentences. The realms defined here are no longer however the sayable/unsayable of the *Tractatus*, but rather the visible/nonvisible. The shift invokes parallel repositionings in subject and object. In ¶126 the subject seems to be almost

stilled within a space of action defined by vision. Not, however, in a place where there is or can be no action, but at time that it is not required. There is no work involved in maintaining the situation, except in the negative sense. It is a moment that attempts to profoundly maintain the present, to exist fully on the surface. Such suggestion seems at odds with the scene of conflict in ¶125, but 127 goes on to suggest some of the work to be done in this space of philosophy by defining activities that begin with what we have before us rather than uncovering that which is hidden (logical structure, the interiority of the subject, intentionality). Section 127 thus provides possible action for the philosopher given the form and social status of a philosophical problem. "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose."

127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.

As ¶127 offers activity it also sheds a new reading on the calm of ¶126. The stillness of ¶126, as Wittgenstein has noted does not sidestep difficulties. The oscillation between these three sections from conflict to consensus to conflict is repeated in sections 128 and 129. The idea of reminders marks a space between the visible and the hidden, between surface and depth. The assembling of reminders is actually an act of redefining the surface of vision by reassembling that which we have available to us. Reminders make visible what is or has been. They are meant not to be new information, but are again the act of return or stasis in what happens before

new discoveries, before conflict resolution, before the point in which work is normally seen to begin. To that end, Wittgenstein is shifting the practice of philosophy as he had shifted its focus, away from hidden depth or future resolution - both stages that hide the surface of conflict that Wittgenstein wants to make visible. The reminder of what is visible points to the very material of philosophy, of text and discourse. Wittgenstein's demand in the assembling of reminders is thus for the redefining of the field and surface of vision around some particular purpose as he does in the *Investigations*.

128. If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.

Section 128 parallels the stillness of 126, furthering the sense of inaction and seemingly even more at odds with the idea of philosophy as a space of conflict. "If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them." Wittgenstein here is sharply distinguishing between the practice of philosophy, its activity of assembling reminders for a particular purpose, and the development of some solely philosophical thesis. That is, the space of conflict in which philosophy engages is, for Wittgenstein, part of the larger space of social - linguistic - spatial action. And the purposes of philosophy are to return what had been taken to be the sphere of philosophy and return it back to its everyday use. Reminders are reminders of a particular action/practice, one not originally philosophical. Theses in philosophy are akin to the

establishing of the view from outside, a space removed from conflict and hence creating one of inevitable agreement.

Section 129 challenges both the nature and importance of that which is hidden making it clear that the emphasis is on our vision rather than on the object of that vision. "One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes." The specter of the glasses, however, continues to cast a shadow by raising the question of how do we know if we are looking through the distorted or prefocused lens or looking with our "own" vision. The criterion of vision always seems to remain in question. Wittgenstein never counteracts this within vision itself, instead he responds in the *Investigations* by adding other criteria. Vision proves to be not enough on its own, clear views come to be understood not as the starting point of investigation, but the result of it. Clarity of view can not be given, it can only be constructed and continually reconstructed within philosophy. Philosophy turns out to be a practice not of seeing clearly and philosophy does not look out at other disciplines (the view from outside) and solve problems or resolve contradictions. Instead it turns out to be a process of finding one's way, of developing clear views, of assembling reminders, a *process* of continual construction.

Rather than relying on clarity of vision as the criterion, the *Investigations* offers practice, examples and comparisons. Wittgenstein constructs the *Investigations* as both a method

129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language -- as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as *objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

and practice of philosophy, not a thesis of philosophy. He works within philosophy to construct such a space. Section 130 confronts the practices within the *Investigations*. "The language-games are rather set up as *objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities." Theses are the view from without philosophy, which is possible, unlike language. But, Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* wants something else, not a way out of philosophy, but a way of continuing within it, a way of practicing philosophy without losing sight of that practice, a way for philosophy to work, rather than idle.

131. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison -- as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality *must* correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)

The language-games Wittgenstein refers to in ¶130 are specifically discussed in ¶131 as forming criteria of functioning language. Importantly, Wittgenstein's focus is on their materiality. They are not idealized or theoretically posited functions of language, but are as such, examples of the actual thing - involving "friction and air resistance". He continues in this section to describe the functioning of language-games as models not just of how language functions, but as a model for how philosophy may function. Functioning in this case becomes akin to the idea of doing work, the opposite of what ¶132 will describe as an idling engine. Intertwined with Wittgenstein's study of language is his continual questioning and search for ways in which philosophy may function, for ways in which philosophy is not just an

engine idling. Language-games become the model and the measuring rod of both language and a working philosophy. Importantly, and as further distancing from the stance of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein emphasizes that they are not a model to follow, a predetermined ideal but one for comparison. They are a found measuring rod derived from everyday practices of language.

Section 132 presses the distinction between working in accordance with a preconceived idea to which the results of that work must correspond, and working with a particular end in view. One distinction is that a preconceived result too narrowly defines the work to be done - leading to, for example, the *Tractatus'* insistence on language's functioning in accordance with an (unseen yet defined by logical showing) underlying structure. The *Investigations* instead stresses the multiplicity and unpredictability in the ways in which language is meaningful. " We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order." The range of order and meaningfulness of language is thus widened to include any of the ways language functions in everyday use. At the same time, the *Investigations* narrows the range of the philosopher's task re: language. The idea of language being in a general need of reform is denied while the reformation of the philosopher's discussion of language is affirmed. How and to what ends is language of interest and

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language.

Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.

importance to the philosopher is itself in question. Having moved beyond the specific - preconceived search for a fully clarified form of expression that had occupied the work of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein searches for a new role for philosophy - one in which the idea of a clear view is itself at stake. "Clarity" as the measuring rod needs to be reinterpreted within the revised understanding of language.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between the reformation of language and the possibility of improvement in terminology as a means of preventing misunderstanding in the work of the philosopher, although leaving the range of work unspecified. It is, however, not associated with everyday practice - a practice not in need of reform despite its possibilities for misunderstandings. That is not the role of philosophy. As Wittgenstein has stated before, philosophy leaves everything (including language) as is. Instead Wittgenstein focuses on a particular class of confusions within language that gave rise to philosophical problems. "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work." The idling engine is an activity that produces confusion by masquerading fixity as action. Philosophy then is what is in need of reform - not because of what it does, but exactly because it does not go anywhere, because it cannot move - yet Wittgenstein's own movements in and out of philosophy created an activated philosophy.

The very scope of philosophy is in question. Do philosophical problems completely exhaust philosophy? Wittgenstein answers this question - at least in part - with the understanding that philosophy may not have any subject matter of its own -although it does have methods and practices, exactly what is needed for motion. That is, Wittgenstein cannot and will not try to say what comprises philosophy, what its scope or essence is - but he will, as with the idea of the language-game, give examples and speak of its practices, creating new surfaces, spaces and territories of philosophy. Philosophical methods are thus presented in direct relation to language-games, that take form in the *Investigations* as a series or set of examples. Where as the *Tractatus* suggested that language needs to be reformed in order to clarify and clear up philosophical problems, the *Investigations* instead looks to everyday language, as itself the model of reform for philosophical problems.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of words in unheard-of-ways.

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. -- The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question. -- Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. -- Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a *single* problem.

There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.

Section 133 offers another type of stillness Rather than the immobility or fixity induced within the space of philosophical problems, ¶133 offers a desired stopping - the corollary to the wanting to walk and another possible method. The desire to stop highlights the dual nature of being stuck, of the engine idling. For in that state there exists along with the inability to go somewhere, the inability to stop trying to, as with the attempts to get outside of language. Instead these same actions are repeated over and again - the idling engine. The

inability to see becomes coupled with the inability to move. Section 133 underscores that association between the demand for clarity and the inability to find one's way. Or, in a more constructive sense, between (yet another understanding of) clarity and the ability to stop. Stopping doing philosophy in this state is associated with the ability to go on - but not necessarily with philosophy or with a given problem, but potentially, to move beyond philosophy. This desired transgression joins with the (inhabited) notion of peace and exists in contrast to the forced transgression of the *Tractatus*.

In ¶133 the criterion of complete clarity which had ruled the *Tractatus* is transformed. The locus of clarity had been strictly defined around the dissolution of philosophical problems, the clearing of the haze which made finding one's way so difficult. The clarity now demanded is structured according to the specific aims of given philosophical problems. As with language-games, Wittgenstein is trying to establish the multiplicity of these problems, the many different ways in which they are defined and hence the many types or aspects of perspicuity which might be suitable.

Tractatus, house logic and the view from without

The Stonborough house did not enter into the discourse of modern architecture until over forty years after it was built Once it did, however, beginning with Bernhard Leitner's 1970 article[1] in *Artforum* and followed by his 1973 more complete documentation of the work in his *The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein*, the house was not discussed without at least acknowledging the question of the relation it bears to Wittgenstein's philosophy.

The existing literature on the house treats this problem in a variety of ways. A main purpose of Bernhard Leitner's 1973 inaugural book was to document and publicize the house prior to its threatened sale and destruction. The documentation includes a short history of the house, a reprint from Hermine Wittgenstein's[2] family recollections about her brother, a few formal analytical remarks by Leitner, and a limited quote from Georg Henrik von Wright, a philosopher and former student of Wittgenstein's. This last inclusion, while only minimally defining a relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture and philosophy has had a surprisingly strong and enduring influence.

Two sentences from von Wright's statement are of particular interest. Von Wright declared that the beauty of the architecture of the Kundmanngasse[3] "is of the same simple and static kind that belongs to a sentence of the *Tractatus*." But, at the same time, von Wright finds a "striking contrast between the restlessness, the continual searching and changing in Wittgenstein's life and

---

[1] The first publication of the house was in the 1969 Viennese journal *Bau*, which printed the official plans of the house. The 1970 *Artforum* publication was the first extensive documentation.

[2] Hermine was the younger of Wittgenstein's two sisters, Margarethe for whom the house was built was the older.

[3] The house is referred to as the Kundmanngasse in accordance with the Viennese tradition of naming the house for the street in which it stands.

personality, and the perfection and elegance of his finished work."[4] To this, Leitner added that the "hall on the main floor and the spaces surrounding it are highly characteristic of this balanced and static quality."[5]

These comments by von Wright have done much to set both the tone and parameters for the philosophical study of the house, although problematically, or, interestingly enough, they are unable to locate it. In so doing, they replicate the philosophical inability to reconcile the indeterminate status of aesthetics and aesthetic objects with a simultaneous desire to found that study. Interestingly, the difference in the reception of Wittgenstein's early and late work reappears in the house, so that the acceptance and use of the early work (for example, the interest by members of the Vienna Circle) resurfaces around the house, while the difficulties and uniqueness of the later work eludes grasp within the discussion of the architecture.

In von Wright's first statement, the house is seemingly presented in aesthetic or formal relation to the *Tractatus* with their shared type of beauty. The second statement contrasts the house to the shifts, phases and continual searching definitive of Wittgenstein's 'life and personality'. Taken together these comments set Wittgenstein's life against his work - conceiving the 'work' to be static and perfected and the 'life' to be fragmented and in continual flux.

Despite its apparent similarity with the perfected elegance of the *Tractatus* and implied separation from the "restlessness" of Wittgenstein's life and personality, however, the house cannot help but be associated with (if not actually definitive of) that restlessness. As a notable aspect of Wittgenstein's continual searching is the drama of the ten year period during which he abandoned philosophy, Wittgenstein's two and a half year practice of architecture strongly contributed to this designation. Equally, that break with its dramatic shifts and returns, far from

---

[4]Bernard Leitner. *The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein.* (New York: New York University Press. 1976), p.50. - (referring to both Wittgenstein's house and Wittgenstein's one piece of sculpture done at that time)
[5]Ibid, p. 50.

separating the two, contributes to the inseparability of Wittgenstein's 'life' and 'work'. Beyond even the importance of the specific intervening events, the movement in and out of philosophy and other disciplines acts not simply as a disruption of or break in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Instead, it contributes to the development of his philosophy which itself exhibits related shifts, not just of topic, but of scope and view, moving from without to within and developing from stasis to transgression to inhabitation. The house, on this thinking, and given von Wright's, comments exhibits both aspects of stasis and movement, leaving it paradoxically caught between the two - left indecipherable as to whether it is part of Wittgenstein's 'life' or of 'work'. (The house, as will be discussed later, literally exhibits aspects of both of these.)

While von Wright associates the house's formal simplicity and static qualities with the *Tractatus* and contrasts it to both the restlessness and series of phases and shifts in Wittgenstein's life and personality, von Wright also clearly dissociates the architecture from the philosophy. Viewed more closely, von Wright was not suggesting that the architecture is like the *philosophy* of the *Tractatus* - but *only like the form* of the *Tractatus* - possessing similar qualities to a "sentence of the *Tractatus*."[6] This statement thus simultaneously distances not only architecture from philosophy, but form from content, while paradoxically emphasizing the *Tractatus'* unique form. Focusing on the 'form' of the *Tractatus* apart from its 'thinking', however, cannot bring the architecture and philosophy into comparison, as it shifts the line of division to within the philosophy, leaving the architecture and philosophy distinctly separate.

Von Wright's association of the image of the house and the image of the *Tractatus*, thus limits the architecture-philosophy association to the *Tractatus* in more ways than one. While this approach may initially seem obvious, as the *Tractatus was* Wittgenstein's only philosophy for a long period, by ignoring the later philosophy of the *Investigations*, von Wright ignored a philosophy that is neither simple nor static. (it as a philosophy that both looks and functions differently.) But

---

[6] This already suggests another part of this study - the need to look at the form of the writing of the *Tractatus* itself.

because of the positioning of the house in Wittgenstein's life and work any philosophical frame for viewing the house cannot just be the early philosophy of the *Tractatus* - but is literally the formation of the early-late distinction around the period that includes the house. The order of Wittgenstein's productions - philosophy - architecture- philosophy when reduced in this way to philosophy-architecture has two effects : it suggests that the latter be seen in the receptive and reflective mode, which disallows the positioning of it as constructive of the later philosophy and leaving architecture, no longer the middle term, to appear solely as the product of the earlier philosophy. And, secondly, it limits possible associations when philosophy and architecture by limiting the terms by which the house is considered. This is not just a problem of excluding the architecture from consideration regarding the philosophy, but is an epistemological concern in that it is not just important to the understanding of the house to see what ideas, practices, etc. may have contributed to it, but to also see what ideas, etc. it produced.

Approaching the house from the standpoint of the early philosophy supposes any understanding of it on the *Tractatus* in more ways than one. Beyond the (often rejected) possibility of the house revealing, reflecting, exploring or otherwise instituting ideas from the *Tractatus*, the *Tractatus* is reinscribed in the house in a more important way: It employs ideas and distinctions based in the *Tractatus* or a *Tractatus*-like way of thinking in which sense is determinate, and showing is sharply distinguished from saying. That is, von Wright's thinking viewed the house as if through the conceptual lens of the *Tractatus*, with all the baggage that implies.

The *Tractatus* - Stonborough house association also reinforces the line of thinking which demands that architecture be understood as structured, concrete and absolute. Turned back on the *Tractatus*, this substantiates the (erroneous) view that the *Tractatus* is, itself, architectural with its exacting "static" ordering and demand that all its elements, thoughts and meanings be contained in, and defined by, that order. Equally, von Wright's split thinking reiterates the *Tractatus* - *Investigations* break that sees the later philosophy only in a direct relation to the earlier,

eliminating everything in between as inconsequential, house included. Von Wright in mimicking the *Tractatus'* exclusion of life, subjecthood and practice from its pages and its philosophy, forces the distinction between product and process, omitting practice along the way. The result further separates if from Wittgenstein's 'work' in the exclusion from discussion of the practice based philosophy of the *Investigations*. The life/work separation does more, however, to define the *Tractatus-Investigations* split than to locate the practice of architecture. The corollary, of course, is that locating the house in relation to these texts, relocating it really, reveals much about these texts as well. Locating and relocating thus, as they were central to Wittgenstein's life, can also be understood as central to his work and to understanding and engaging with that work.

Leitner confirmed the need to define a relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture, life and philosophy by his reprinting an excerpt from a family recollection written in the 1940's by another of Wittgenstein's sisters, Hermine Wittgenstein. Leitner's own conclusions seem greatly influenced by this. The recollection offers an image of Wittgenstein's involvement with architecture and other aesthetic practices.[7] Several things Hermine writes have been quoted repeatedly and her recollections as with Von Wright's comments have greatly contributed to both the understanding and mythology of Wittgenstein's practice of architecture. The reprinted section focuses on her brother's development from childhood through the period in which he worked on the house and serves to broach the question, by attempting to provide a foundation for it, of how a philosopher, otherwise untrained in the discipline, came to practice architecture.

Hermine recalls Wittgenstein's history of involvements with architecture, 'technical', and 'aesthetic' activities, with the technical and aesthetic offered as if components of the architectural. She begins by explaining that in "his youth Ludwig showed great interest in technical things." The example she offers is of a ten year old Wittgenstein constructing from wood sticks and wire a

[7] Unfortunately Paul Engelmann's much later *Letters from Wittgenstein With a Memoir* which might be expected to discuss at length Wittgenstein's involvement with architecture and the house during the period of collaboration, does not discuss this period.

model sewing machine capable of sewing a few stitches. Hermine describes what she refers to as Wittgenstein's 'other interests' from the period of the house's design and construction, all of which involve the arts, including Wittgenstein's relationship with a sculptor named Michael Drobil. During the house design/construction period Wittgenstein "became very much interested in the sculptural projects which the artist had embarked upon, and even influenced him in a way. . . . He even began to sculpt, since he was tempted to make his own version of a head which he had disliked in one of Drobil's sculptures. He actually managed to produce something very graceful. and the plaster cast of the head was set up by Gretl in her house."[8] In anther example, she describes some related primary school lectures Wittgenstein gave while a teacher at the boys occupational school prior to his work on the house. In these he had the students invent a steam engine, draw a sketch construction of a tower on the blackboard, and depict moving human figures.

Wittgenstein's lifelong interest in "technical matters" and issues of construction, although often suggested as the reason that Wittgenstein's sister Margarethe proposed he work on the house along with the idea that it would be a sort of therapy for the mental state he had been in since the end of the war. Wittgenstein's interest in the spatial, the technical and the constructional - all considered as outside the bounds of philosophy, have been segregated from his philosophical production, discussed instead as a series of discrete episodes on their own, with any connections made to his philosophical work limited and largely unidirectional. Wittgenstein although rightly taken first as a philosopher, needs to be recognized as a philosopher for whom the visual and spatial are themselves "central" or "foundational" to the philosophical thought.

Hermine outlines Wittgenstein's education beginning with his attending the Technische Hochschule in Berlin from 1906 to 1908, during which "he occupied himself extensively with questions concerning aerodynamics and experiments." The recollections emphasize how exactly

[8]Leitner, Op. cit., p. 22. Gretl is Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein

at the time that he "was suddenly seized so strongly and so completely against his will by philosophy, i.e., by reflections about philosophical problems, that he suffered severely under this double and conflicting calling, and felt inwardly divided." As described, this period is the reverse of Wittgenstein's having suddenly left philosophy after the completion of the *Tractatus*, here dropping a previous course of study for philosophy, and, as such serves, to define another datum against which his life and work may be seen.

Although Hermine offers Wittgenstein's intense interest in philosophical questions as a sudden personal crisis causing Wittgenstein to choose between courses of study, his actions also suggest that for Wittgenstein philosophical concerns arose from within an immersion in the technical and the mechanical. If you take the emphasis of her recollections - to not simply outline Wittgenstein's engagements with the arts and "technical matters" - but to show within Wittgenstein a long and continual interest in such matters - then two possibilities emerge which are useful here. First, Wittgenstein might not, as Hermine suggests, have been as much seized by something external to what he was studying, but by something he knew to be deeply connected with it. And given that, secondly, the possibility that these technical and aesthetic interests not only intermingle within or even pervade his philosophy - but that they may play an active and formative role within that philosophy. It is this understanding of Wittgenstein's not dual, but deeply interrelated thinking that I want to develop here and which I see as indicative of the philosophy-architecture association in his work. It is my belief that the practice of architecture played such an influential role in his philosophical development not because it was unrelated to his previous work, or presupposed an entirely separate set of issues, but that it is exactly because he was already concerned with related and shared issues that the practice of architecture, in offering and demanding a new but associated way of thinking, forced the reconceptualization of his philosophical practice.

In the confrontation with architecture, with necessarily having to work and thus being forced to conceptualizing in other ways, not only did Wittgenstein's thinking change, but ideas arising from the architecture emerge and enter into the later philosophy. The resulting intersection of ideas, constructs and themes are not simply the result of Wittgenstein's having been a philosopher who then worked on a house, but whose philosophy and methods themselves already contained related ideas, of one whose philosophy already understood that the bounds of philosophy are not only potentially arbitrary and permeable, but must necessarily be transgressed in its construction. Through the work on the house, in the literalization, manifestation and materialization of the architectural process, the thinking of the *Tractatus* becomes concretized and reemerges transformed in the later philosophy's reliance on "the builders" and issues of spatiality, visuality, limits, boundaries and inhabitation.

Wittgenstein had initially intended to do advanced study neither in philosophy nor mechanical engineering, but in physics with Ludwig Boltzmann at the University of Vienna. Boltzman, however, committed suicide just prior to Wittgenstein's entry into the program. In response, Wittgenstein abandoned his plans and chose to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin. Two years later, Wittgenstein's interests brought him to the study of aeronautics at the University of Manchester in England, and while there, further pursuit brought him to the foundations of mathematics and ultimately to philosophy. This last move was precipitated by the incorporation of the foundations of mathematics into the central concerns of philosophy in large part through the work of the German mathematician turned philosopher, Gottlob Frege and by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell.

Frege, somewhat similarly to Wittgenstein, had not entered philosophy directly. He began his work as a mathematician, but in his search for the foundations of arithmetic he was led to problems of logic and the philosophy of language. The turning point in his work was his attempt

to define the concept of number. Frege began with the mathematical and ontological question - "What is a number?' but transformed it to answer instead how it is we use "number words" in language. Frege thus reconceived the mathematical and ontological concern of the nature of "number" as a problem of language, leading him to pose such questions as how can we distinguish between a number and Julius Caesar.[9] Wittgenstein's interest in this work led him to visit Frege and it was he who suggested that Wittgenstein leave for Cambridge to study philosophy with Russell. Wittgenstein took this advice and in September, 1911 went to Cambridge and began his official engagement with philosophy.

Almost immediately upon his entry into philosophy at Cambridge, Wittgenstein began advanced work in logic. Hermine Wittgenstein reports that when she visited Ludwig in Cambridge in 1912 Russell surprised her by saying: "We expect the next big step in philosophy to be taken by your brother."[10] In the next two years Wittgenstein searched for a place of seclusion in which to work , a search that led him to the house in Skjolden in Norway where he stayed off and on until the outbreak of W.W.I and his decision to return to Austria and enlist in the army.

Wittgenstein continued his work on the *Tractatus* while he was in the army, completing it in 1918 just prior to being taken prisoner of war in Italy where he remained for six months. He was released in August 1919 and returned to Vienna whereupon he gave up his family wealth, dividing it among his siblings (excluding Margarethe who unlike the others had retained most of her wealth through the war). He then decided to choose what he thought of as a "completely unpretentious" vocation and become a primary school teacher in a small Austrian village. Planning for that vocation, Wittgenstein entered the Teacher's Training College in Vienna, after which, following a short period where he worked as an assistant gardener in a seminary outside of Vienna, he spent the period from late 1920 until the spring of 1926 teaching in first one and

---

[9] Gottlob Frege. *The Foundations of Arithmetic.* trans. J.L. Austin. (Oxford, 1974), p. 68.
[10] Op. cit., p.18.

then another Austrian village primary school. Then in almost an act of symmetry, he returned to Vienna and again worked as an assistant gardener until October 1926. It was during this last period, toward the end of Wittgenstein's work as a primary school teacher, that his sister, Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein suggested that he join herself and the architect Paul Engelmann in the design of her city house.

Hermine Wittgenstein summarized her recollections about Wittgenstein's architecture with an interpretation of the house derived from the *Tractatus*. With it, she describes Wittgenstein as a logician who transferred that thinking to architecture. This often quoted remark, similarly to von Wright's, emphasizes the tie between the house and the *Tractatus*.

> For instance even though I admired the house very much, I always knew that I neither wanted to, nor could live in it myself. It seemed indeed to be much more a dwelling for the gods than for a small mortal like me, and at first I even had to overcome a faint inner opposition to this 'house turned logic' as I called it, to this perfection and monument size.[11]

During the design and construction of the house, Wittgenstein, although in demand philosophically, largely shunned the philosophical community. Margarethe attempted to reinvolve Wittgenstein with philosophy by mediating between Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick, philosopher and member of the Vienna Circle. Schlick, interested in discussing the philosophy of the *Tractatus* with Wittgenstein, had initiated contact by writing to him in December of 1924. Through Margarethe, Wittgenstein agreed to meet with Schlick, but only individually, rather than with the entire group, as he believed that only by meeting one on one, would he be able to judge whether "he would still be capable of formulating any significant philosophical thought." Wittgenstein also did not participate in formal gatherings of the Vienna Circle, except for the one occasion he attended a lecture given by Schlick. They first met in February of 1927 and had regular meetings, although Wittgenstein was "not always receptive to philosophical discussion." In those

[11] Op. cit., p.23.

instances Wittgenstein preferred to read poetry. Of these meetings, "Many years later Wittgenstein told his student K. E. Tranoy that thanks to the discussions with members of the Vienna Circle 'I felt at that time that I had thought more, and more successfully, about certain problems than others had done.' "

Existing Literature

Two studies that specifically focus on the relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture and his philosophy by defining two of the possible approaches to that relationship are: Francesco Amendolagine's article entitled "The House of Wittgenstein" published in 1982 and Paul Wijdeveld's 1994 book *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect.* While Amendolagine begins to take up the affect Wittgenstein's work on the house had on his philosophy, for Wijdeveld the question is how to relate the architectural categories, ranging from traditional architectural designations of classical and modern, to philosophical ones including the more promising *Tractatus* inspired idea of aesthetic and philosophical clarification. Wijdeveld's book employs categories.

One part of the book considers the house as an architectural object, analyzing both its formal and its historical attributes. Wijdeveld situates the house historically as a product of both classicist and modernist thinking, citing Wittgenstein's admiration for the Viennese baroque, his appreciation of Viennese Biedermeier classicism and his upbringing in traditional Viennese aristocratic Palais architecture, on the one hand and his association with Loos and contemporary Viennese architecture on the other. Uniting the two approaches Wijdeveld summarizes Wittgenstein's architecture as a gesture caught between the classical and the modern. What Wijdeveld calls Wittgenstein's 'architectural gesture' began with Paul Engelmann's (Wittgenstein's initial collaborator) preliminary design. Wittgenstein according to Wijdeveld acted to purify and clarify Engelmann's "classicizing" design by removing all ornament, taking volumetric clarity to its limit, and accentuating the asymmetry.

Wijdeveld looks at the house as not just an architectural undertaking but also as a "significant landmark" of early 20th c. Viennese culture. His belief is that Wittgenstein was striving for "an 'authentically modern' design. Consequently, he attempted to determine Wittgenstein's idea of

modernity and the relation of that view to the architecture of the time which he limits largely to a comparison of Loos' and Wittgenstein's "implicit conceptions" of architecture.

Wijdeveld denies any 'simplistic' claims that the house somehow represents the philosophy or that it is a physical, literal translation or materialization of it.[12] Wijdeveld also denies that Wittgenstein intended any resemblance between the two as that would contradict his conception of philosophy and aesthetics as he developed in the *Tractatus*. Despite these rejections, Wijdeveld does take up the idea of a presumed stylistic similarity or identity between the *Tractatus* and the Stonborough house by attempting to see what such ideas as simplicity, precision, and clarification mean in each realm along with certain 'stylistic' terms such as classical, monumental, unadorned.

The question of Wittgenstein's aesthetics is central to Wijdeveld who finds that the "house appears to be, at first, an unattributable example of early modern architecture, but looked at more closely "the design and the many peculiar details of its construction are so unique within the context of early twentieth century architecture that one is led to suspect that it must be the result of the deliberate application of 'the' principles of 'Wittgensteinian aesthetics' under the direct supervision of the philosopher himself."[13]

Wijdeveld formulates the architecture-philosophy problematic by asking how the relationship between an architectural object and a conceptual structure can be meaningfully established. "To

---

[12]This is a more or less standard denial of what is seen as a simplistic association by which architecture represents philosophy. Yet, as much as the denial may be apt, such an achievement of representing the philosophy of the *Tractatus* seems itself in no way trivial, but instead would be a major achievement. My opposition to such a view lies in the implication that architecture can only function in the receptive mode, not that it might at times or in some ways.

[13]This statement seems at odds with Wijdeveld's dismissal that the house in some way represents the philosophy or is a translation of it. What of the application of Wittgensteinian aesthetics. Does he mean to imply that aesthetics is not part of philosophy - or not part of Wittgenstein's philosophy? as he adds that "unlike most philosophers Wittgenstein never developed a systematic theory of aesthetics and wrote only a little on the subject." Given the state of 20th c. aesthetics and the general dissolution of systems of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries , this seems quite an odd comment. Is the central concept for Wijdeveld then the distinction between applying and representing the philosophy?

establish a meaningful connection between Ludwig Wittgenstein's classicizing 'architectural gesture' and his philosophical thinking, based on the imperative of an intuitively clear 'rule' of absolute beauty, we should begin with the assessment of his ideas on philosophical aesthetics during the period of the design and construction of the Kundmanngasse."[14] This approach, thus, begins by accepting philosophy and architecture as separate realms following which Wijdeveld attempts to connect them through the mediating (and *Tractatus* dependent) concept of showing and the *Tractatus'* goal of philosophical clarification.

Wijdeveld begins this comparison by considering what there is of Wittgenstein's aesthetic ideas in the *Tractatus.* To more fully establish Wittgenstein's view of aesthetics at the time of his practice of architecture, he further looked to Wittgenstein's 1929 thoughts on aesthetics as they emerged in his lecture on ethics given to a Cambridge popular society called *The Heretics* in 1929, the year following Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and to philosophy. The lecture confirmed for Wijdeveld that Wittgenstein's ideas on aesthetics were unchanged from the time and text of the *Tractatus.* (Wijdeveld does not take up the importance of Wittgenstein turning to this subject at this time.) The relevant conception he finds in both texts is the view of aesthetics as an act of (philosophical) clarification based on the limited mentions Wittgenstein made on aesthetics and the associated ideas of a rule governing the principle/mechanism of showing both from the *Tractatus.* Wijdeveld sees Wittgenstein as having transposed and transformed the act of philosophical clarification developed in the *Tractatus* to the clarification of classical architecture, as he would have been presented with in Engelmann's preliminary designs. That is, he sees Wittgenstein's 'aesthetic gesture' as acting to clarify Engelmann's initial classical ideas to produce a purified and modernized version of the design.[15]

---

[14] Paul Wijdeveld. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect.* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994), p.183.

[15] Cacciari in his *Architecture and Nihilism* offers another take on the *Tractatus'* use of showing and silence which fits well with his negative dialectics but problematically remains dependent on the *Tractatus* and on a particular reading of the *Tractatus.*

Amendolagine offers another approach to the philosophy-architecture problematic in Wittgenstein's work, one that allows the house to be considered a stage in Wittgenstein's philosophical research which fundamentally altered Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. For Amendolagine, Wittgenstein's philosophical research within the house functions in two stages, almost as action and reaction. The first phase is seemingly directly reiterative of Wittgenstein's work on the *Tractatus*, and involves analyzing the house as a sort of logical circuit. The suggestion is that throughout the house Wittgenstein leads us through a path in which we periodically have to make a decision between one of two choices, left or right, continue or turn. Amendolagine sees these decisions as paralleling the form of logic's bi-polar structure, as in the *Tractatus*, in which we always have to decide between one of two opposing poles - right or wrong, true or false. The second phase, not specifically located by Amendolagine, amounts to the simultaneous verification and surmounting of the ideas in the *Tractatus* and of the rigidity of the logical circuit.

The ability to surmount the ideas contained in the *Tractatus* arose for Amendolagine, through Wittgenstein's involvement with "everyday facts" in the design and construction of the house. It occurs as the logical circuit adapts over time to other uses so that it is no longer just a matter of true or false, and the house is not used as a logical circuit involving a continual series of yes-no, right-left choices. Use and time are thus seen to alter the idealized design of the house as a "logical circuit." Amendolagine does not indicate how this occurs, as the house would retain those built in logical 'circuits', and the series through the house remains unchanged from its initial design. Additionally, Wittgenstein would not have lived in the house to experience this circuit breakdown.

Perhaps, more importantly it is not clear why Amend sees the house as having been designed as a logical circuit in the first place, except that Amendolagine posited that view in accord with the *Tractatus* in an attempt to link the architecture and philosophy. Even if the plan works as he says it seems as if many more or less traditional house plans would also, without having been

designed as such, in that presumably a path through would create a series of left, right, straight, turn choices. For that matter, it is unclear how Wittgenstein's house does create a logical circuit with its multiple entries and exits to and from rooms, leaving the choices often clearly more than bi-polar.

The importance of the breakdown of the logical circuit, the most intriguing part of Amendolagine's article, is that it allows for the transformation of the house into the machine that Wittgenstein envisaged in his later work, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, which Amendolagine quotes : (chk)

> "The machine (its structure) as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine - I might say at first - seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean? We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could do nothing else. How is this - do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?"[16]

The move from the perfected logic of the plan to the fallible machine of use highlights Amendolagine's central understanding and interest in this phase of Wittgenstein's work. As a mathematician, Amendolagine's concern was with how the house functions as a stage of Wittgenstein's work in the foundations of mathematics. Amendolagine's belief is that working on the house restimulated Wittgenstein's interest in the foundations of mathematics - an interest that had first led Wittgenstein into philosophy, and which Amendolagine sees as playing that role again.

While Amendolagine allows for Wittgenstein's interest in machines to arise from within his work on mathematics, Wijdeveld discusses the incorporation of actual mechanical elements by Wittgenstein into the architecture. He includes in this category not just the actual mechanical devices, but also the construction of the metal doors and windows and their locks and handles along with the elevator, and the heating system. He then ties these architectural elements to the

[16] Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. ed. G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe. trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford, 1956 first edition, 1978 third edition), p. 84, №122.

Tractatus where he finds the view of the machine as the efficiently functioning mechanical system serving also as the paradigm of the philosophical explanation of the world, including the good and the beautiful. (Which he directly correlates to the ethical and aesthetic) That is, for Wijdeveld the machine acts as the criterion of rightness and beauty, and the philosophy becomes a logical demonstration of that. For example, the door and window frames for which Wittgenstein designed all the fastenings, latches and locks are for Wijdeveld mechanical interpretations of simplicity or clarification, paralleling the precision and goals of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wijdeveld also emphasized the importance of Wittgenstein's training as a mechanical engineer as having influence on his interest in machines, the design of the house, and the idea of the machine he finds in the *Tractatus*, concluding with the idea that Wittgenstein's ethical-aesthetic association in the *Tractatus* ties together the activities of the engineer, the designer and the artist.(check 17 - 26) Thus while Amendolagine points to the imperfect machine of the post-house period, Wijdeveld ties the actual machines of the house to their ideals in the *Tractatus*.

Despite the importance that Amendolagine places on the house for Wittgenstein's philosophy, he curiously defuses the focus on architecture, relegating it to logic and mathematics on the one hand and the confrontation with everyday facts on the other. Amendolagine, for example, points to Wittgenstein's entry into the 'everyday', but he does not differentiate the confrontation with the architecture 'everyday' from the other 'everydays' that Wittgenstein had made during his departure from philosophy. By that way of thinking, it remains indistinguishable from a soldiering, teaching, and even gardening everyday.[17] The question that needs to be asked by Amendolagine is instead how does the architecture "everyday" differ from these others. To truly examine the impact of working on the house, a shift in focus must be made from the general understanding or 'everyday' facts to Wittgenstein's actual practice of architecture as manifested in the design and construction of the house for his sister.

---

[17] They too, particularly the teaching make regular appearances in the *Investigations*. Stanley Cavell for example in his "The Argument of the Ordinary: Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke" in his *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, implicitly refers to the practice of teaching primary school in the *Investigations*.

Wittgenstein clearly had an interest in the everyday before it became part of - or more to the point - the fundamental basis for his later understanding of language. His leaving philosophy for various "unpretentious vocations" (would architecture be included?) was part of this. The question is: how was Wittgenstein able to incorporate that thinking into philosophy, or how did it came to incorporate itself? That shift of focus requires more than just the involvement with everyday facts but the mechanisms which caused Wittgenstein to reconsider the functioning and basis of language as not some logical essence, but an everyday functioning..

The Stonborough house

The Stonborough house appears on the exterior as an unadorned, white, asymmetric cubic building with a main central block and a largely regular grid of vertical windows. Because of these basic characteristics, the exterior is repeatedly compared to the architecture of Adolf Loos while the interior is what Leitner calls unique and Wijdeveld writes the "house appears to be at first- an unattributable example of early modern architecture -but looked at more closely, "the design and the many peculiar details of its construction are so unique within the context of early twentieth century architecture

The house contains on the ground floor a salon, a library/informal living room, a dining room, breakfast room, Margarethe Stonborough's private rooms and the central hall around which many of the rooms are situated. The upper floors also contain her husband's rooms, the children's rooms, guest rooms, rooms for a governess, secretary and dress maker, servants rooms, and bathrooms. In the basement was the kitchen, an additional servant's room and another bath. The house thus in size and program was to be traditionally aristocratic - although the architecture of the house was always meant to be modern in accordance with Margarethe's thinking.[18]

Materials act in the house as a fundamental transmitter of meaning, largely of place and difference. To begin, surfaces are emphasized due to the absolute simplicity of the architecture and materials used: the exterior walls are finished with fine grained plaster, the interior walls are

[18]Neither Wittgenstein nor Engelmann had professional experience in building and so relied on Jacques Groag (engineer) who had also worked in Loos' office to design the structure of the Stonborough house in accordance with some of the more technologically advanced building techniques of the time. The structure of the house divides between inner and outer with the outer walls structural and load bearing, composed of stuccoed brick and the interior structured with a framework of concrete supports, some of which are reinforced. The inner walls are prefabricated and non-load bearing. The floors are formed of concrete ribs and crossbeams that rest on either interior concrete columns or the outer load bearing walls. (see Wijdeveld for a fuller discussion.)

off white plaster, ceilings are white or off white, most of the ground floor is made of xylolite - a gray/black artificial stone flooring, floors on upper levels are parquet and the kitchen and bathrooms are tile. . The doors on the ground floor and all the windows were made of glass and steel and were designed during the building period. The salon doors are plain metal and doors on the upper floors are wood.

Definitive building plans of the Stonborough house date from the official purchase of the site on 22 October 1926. The building plans were approved a few weeks later on the thirteenth of November. The Kundmanngasse site where the house was built was however not the original one. The original site was similarly park like, although located instead near Wittgenstein's parental home on the Alleegasse in a more aristocratic and residential district of Vienna, which would have been a far more traditional choice for the type and scale of house Margarethe planned to build. The new site was found and purchased by Margarethe when the designs were nearly complete, but as all phases of Engelmann's sketches had placed the building in the northern section of the site which worked ideally for the new site, the design, despite the change in site, was not altered.

Margarethe's choice of the Kundmanngasse property was very unconventional. The 32,000 square foot site occupied the larger section of a city block in the third municipal district of Vienna. Formerly it had been an horticultural nursery and had only recently been rezoned for residential use, and the unbuilt section was to remain densely covered with trees, as a form of garden or park. The site originally sloped downward along the street, leaving the northern end of the site, where the house was to be situated, at the lowest point. The decision was made to greatly alter the site by building a retaining wall that allowed for the northern end to be raised above the street, making it level with the highest section of the site and situating the house a full story above the street. The wall thus created an enclosed plinth upon which the house was

placed. This, coupled with the grove of trees at the southern end, effectively isolated the house from the city beyond.

The entrance to the site was originally along the Kundmanngasse, where the entry drive began at the rear of the house and curved through the park/garden, behind the house, to the main entrance located on the opposite, Parkgasse side. The entrance was thus an inversion of the traditional, moving from the rear of the house, around to the front. This reversal, while a response to the elevation of the northern end, furthers the sense that the house is more a part of its site than of the street. In 1971, however, that all changed. The house and property were sold by Margarethe's son and heir, Thomas Stonborough to a real estate developer who wanted to build an office tower on the site. Bernhard Leitner, in opposition to the house's immanent destruction organized a protest that included architects, art historians and philosophers from around the world. The protest succeeded in having the house declared a protected monument[19] just prior to its scheduled destruction. Although the house was saved, the remaining section of the site was allowed to be sold to the developer which forced the demolition of the drive and the relocation of the main entrance of the site to the Parkgasse side.

That Stonborough house was conceived of beginning in November 1925. At that time Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein first mentioned the idea of building a large city house in Vienna for which she engaged the architect Paul Engelmann (1891-1965), a family friend and a student of Adolf Loos. Her brother had been introduced to Engelmann through Loos ten years prior during the war, when Wittgenstein was sent for officer training to Olmutz, Engelmann's

[19] From 1973-5 the building, although saved from destruction was without funds and fell into decay until in 1975 the Bulgarian Embassy purchased the building to house its Cultural Institute which still occupies the house. During the period from 1976-7 the Kundmanngasse was poorly renovated by local architects. At the same time a group of students made an extensive survey of the house and were able to record much important data, although some had already been destroyed. Wijdeveld's book in a more extensive account includes this updated information.

family home. Engelmann ultimately became a friend of both Wittgenstein and his family, and acted previously as the architect for the interiors of their brother Paul's apartment in Berlin.

In April and May of 1926 Engelmann, in what Hermine described as "close cooperation" with Margarethe,[20] drew a series of sketches of possible designs for the house. The sketches focused on the massing of the building as well as the basic layout of the rooms on the ground floor. It is unclear what the extent of Wittgenstein's influence was in the early phases of the design. As Hermine's recollections suggest, he would have at least commented on the various phases of the sketches during that period[21]. It is clear, however, that despite her much stronger role in the design with Engelmann, Margarethe gave her brother, once he became involved, "a free hand in all matters concerning the house." As Hermine recounts, Wittgenstein's comments on these sketches formed the beginning of his gradual involvement in the project.

> At this point Ludwig joined them, showed in his usual intense way great interest in the plans and models, began to alter them, and became more and more absorbed in the matter until he finally took it over completely. Engelmann had to give way to the much stronger personality, and the house was then built, down to these smallest detail, according to Ludwig's plans and under his supervision. (20)

Engelmann's final sketches, dated 18 May 1926 form the starting point of Wittgenstein's revisions.[22] Wittgenstein waited until the fall of 1926, however, to leave his job as gardener and devote himself to the full time role of architect, officially becoming co-architect in September 1926 as evidenced by the inclusion of his name along with Engelmann's on the drawings. Later Engelmann's name disappeared from the completed plans . As usual, Wittgenstein's life and work were inseparable, so that Wittgenstein, once part of the project, became completely

---

[20] Engelmann later presented these sketches to Margarethe in Christmas 1926 in the form of a book. The sketchbook is currently in the Reserve Collections of the Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities in Santa Monica, California.

[21] Wijdeveld suggests the possibility that Wittgenstein's ideas may be reflected by the lack or limited amount of adornment from phase three of the sketches on, or by the verticality of the windows from phase six on, both aspects of which were realized in the house.

[22] Wittgenstein officially became co-architect in September 1926- as evidenced by the inclusion of his name his name along with Engelmann's on the drawings. Later Engelmann's name disappeared from the plans.

absorbed in it, going so far as to move onto the site and live in the small house which existed there and served as the architecture office for the project. As Wittgenstein entered into and took over the design process, the collaboration with Engelmann completely fell apart. During the period of collaboration, according to Engelmann, Wittgenstein pushed his own plans through in such an "uncompromising manner" that Engelmann felt he no longer played a role in the design. In February 1928, Engelmann went to his hometown of Olomouc and did not return until after the Stonborough house was completed. It was following that time, that the interior of the house was designed and built, a task wholly appropriated by Wittgenstein. Later on Engelmann wrote regarding the dissolution of the collaboration that: "This solution proved to be a very happy one, for him [Wittgenstein] as well as for the building. From that moment he was the actual architect, not I, and though the plans were ready when he joined the undertaking, I regard the result as his achievement, not mine."

Wijdeveld, in his book *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect*, analyzes the sketchbook Engelmann presented to Margarethe in December 1926, dividing the sketches into ten distinct phases. They range from a traditional and classical version of an aristocratic house with which Engelmann began to a range of possibilities that included a curving main facade at one phase and a forty five degree angle cutting through the center of the plan at another.

As the sketches progressed, Engelmann's design became more asymmetrical and simplified. Even in the later phases however, Engelmann continued to suggest ideas ultimately rejected for the final design, including planning the building based on a modular grid which he attempted to meld with the building's massing. The last phases began to suggest the final cubic composition, defined by a tall central block with two main wings and several smaller asymmetrically placed volumes with the final design phase in the sketchbook as the closest to what was eventually built.

The beginning of the basic layout of the built design of the ground floor first appeared in Engelmann's sketches about half way through, although the massing of the volumes remained still largely symmetric and lacked the clarity of the final design. Following that phase, the first design with a dominant central block akin to the final design emerged. This initial version was much grander and more 'ornamental' than what Wittgenstein built. It included an additional story and an attic as well as a continuous balustrade along the entire roof line.

Engelmann's also made sketches for the central entry hall that were similar in proportion to what was built. As developed in subsequent phases, his version of the main hall had many of the general ideas of the built one but with very different materials, details, finishes, and proportions. For example, although Engelmann did show large glass doors leading from the hall to the terrace, and a ceiling with visible beams, the proportions were different and the columns/pilasters had ornate capitals. Wittgenstein instead left the columns devoid of ornament and simply recessed the capitals while keeping the beams exposed and changed the details and design of the glass doors.

Wittgenstein's altered the final plans with which Engelmann was involved in four main ways : 1. He enlarged the building by adding a continuous horizontal block with an angled skylit roof running along the entire rear of the building at the level of the basement and ground floors. Both the angled roof with continuous skylight and the window organization make this section of the building noticeably different from the rest of the house. This addition allowed Wittgenstein to situate all of Margarethe's private rooms on the ground floor as she had wanted, but that Engelmann had not provided. Wittgenstein's extension included Margarethe's private rooms - salon, dressing room, bathroom, and a servant's room with a private corridor connecting them and provided a second corridor apart from the main path through the house that linked her rooms as a separate apartment. Additionally, this allowed for Wittgenstein's larger reorganization of the ground floor, whereby he interchanged the library and Margarethe's private living room,

placing the library at the front of the house. This move achieved two things - first it allowed for the grouping of all of Margarethe's private rooms together on the ground floor, and secondly it collected and separated the more private from the more public spaces with Margarethe's private living room as the connecting element.

2. Wittgenstein removed the mock attic story, the balustrades and ornament that had been part of Engelmann's design. 3. Wittgenstein, in various ways, reproportioned or relocated elements from Engelmann's collaboration or designs. He revised the proportions of the entire building and of individual rooms, elevated the breakfast room on the ground floor to provide the height necessary for a cloakroom below, and omitted, reproportioned and redesigned window and interior openings throughout the building. These changes tended to elaborate the asymmetry of Engelmann's design by, for example, moving the main entrance off center of the central block and adding a lower entrance portal projecting slightly from the south east facade of the house. Wittgenstein also extended the steps leading to the south terrace along the terrace's entire width in contrast to the small perpendicularly oriented flight of stairs descending from the north terrace.

4. Finally, Wittgenstein designed all elements on the interior, including choosing all materials and finishes, details, mechanical, plumbing and electrical systems, and designing elements such as the stair/elevator combination with its concrete frame, glass elevator cage and glass enclosure of the elevator mechanism that allows the elevator mechanism to be seen even as the stair wraps around it.

Engelmann himself commented on how the house had changed after his departure from what he had envisioned. In a letter he wrote in response to photographs of the house that Hermine had sent to him after the house's completion Engelmann wrote :

> The pictures of the rooms in the Kundmanngasse pleased me extraordinarily and I thank you very much for that. As pictures they are truly exceptionally beautiful. That is your achievement. In addition, one can also see the achievement of your sister and your brother. So, even though I have no share at all in these pictures, I am satisfied with the thought that I had something to do with the origin of such beautiful things, regrettably more in a negative than in a positive way: at that time I wanted something different, something of myself. Now that the work of your brother can be seen in them in its final form, it is clear how much this something of myself would have paled in comparison to this accomplishment, which is better, and which at that time I barely understood. Unfortunately one only becomes wise after the event and therefore I then acted rather as a hindrance than a help. Anyway, I was there, if that can be said to be an achievement.

Because the design of the Stonborough house includes two main people - Engelmann and Wittgenstein, the question of attribution arises. This is also where the question of how to relate Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture takes center stage - for to enter into that question it seems necessary to carefully delineate Engelmann's contribution from Wittgenstein's and thus indicate to what extent, and in what elements, the philosophy may be located. This act defines the limits of Wittgenstein's architecture by insuring the object in question. Declaring the house, or aspects of the house, to be solely or largely Wittgenstein's allows for it to be in some necessary association with his philosophy.

This is also the place where the question of the point at which Engelmann's contribution stopped and Wittgenstein's began becomes of interest not because of possible answers, but because of the question itself. While the clarity of the separation between Engelmann's and Wittgenstein's respective contributions might be important for certain readings of the architecture-philosophy relation, Wittgenstein's architectural practice cannot be simply equated with the house. Instead, it is possible to see Wittgenstein's architecture - philosophy relation not solely to revolve about the 'object' in question. My contention is that Wittgenstein's architecture needs to be situated not simply within the object produced (the house), but within the *practice* of architecture - a place where the exact limits of Wittgenstein's contribution or the espoused architectural value of the house (another question requiring legitimation of the object as worthy of study) are neither central nor foundational. Understanding the house to be a series of concepts and problems

situated within a practice suggests the need to look at Wittgenstein's engagement or confrontation with the practice of architecture as a way of looking at "the house." Furthermore the shift to practice - or from product - allows the Stonborough house not to be seen solely as Wittgenstein's (the philosopher's) contribution to architecture, but rather as representative of architecture's (i.e. the practice of) contribution to (his practice) of philosophy. Wittgenstein's architecture is thus not coincident with the house he designed, but must be understood within his engagement with the practice of architecture, as it is through architecture that Wittgenstein found a way to overcome the idealized solipsism of the *Tractatus* so as to reintegrate both the subject and the practice of philosophy with the wider culture.

Practice is a key concept that Wittgenstein develops in his later philosophy. While Amendolagine recognized the possibility and importance that working on the house affected Wittgenstein's philosophy - he did not look to the philosophy itself for signs of architecture - but only for signs of change. Wittgenstein's practice of architecture, however, acted as far more than a catalyst, a confrontation with the everyday, or as a repository of aesthetic thinking. The house instead makes manifest what had been implied in, but missing from the early philosophy. The *Tractatus'* discussion of boundaries, it's flattened and restricted visual space, its defining of the limits of the ethical and aesthetic from without, and its emphasis on showing, all exhibit and describe a severely restricted and idealized use and understanding of space. Exactly because of that, the practice of architecture was in a position to fundamentally change the way in which architecture inhabits Wittgenstein's philosophical work. That is, to change the definition and understanding of space in the text itself. This is apparent in the development from the pre-house *Tractatus* to the post house *Philosophical Investigation*. Also, Wittgenstein's confrontation with the 'everyday' in architecture can be seen as a confrontation with the literal, as the literal spatial and visual, limits, borders, structure, etc., are all re-evaluated in the later work in intimate association with their philosophical counterparts.

The point of view of practice allows the house to be conceived less as a product of the *Tractatus*, by allowing for the possibility that the *Investigations* is in part a product of Wittgenstein's practice of architecture. The practice of architecture is not limited to a series of operations to produce an object, but, rather is a productive and informative practice in its specifics. As with Wittgenstein's jettisoning the search for an essence of language by considering the multiplicity of practices that are involved in language, understanding the Stonborough house as the compilation and interpenetration of a series of practices allows architecture to not be synonymous with its objects. As such, the Stonborough house is no longer an object in comparison to philosophy, but a process that, as with the philosophy of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, is concerned with a series of topics - such as boundaries, limits, visuality, spatiality, inner-outer, relationships, rule following, meaning, representation and so on. This view neither forces Wittgenstein's work to be viewed as a continuum, nor as a series of shifts and phases, but one that takes continuity and disjunctions equally. Not coincidentally, this shift in method and practice is also a way of understanding the move from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, from the applied method of logical analysis in the *Tractatus* to the investigation and description of the multitude of practices that comprise language in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The practice of architecture

The Stonborough house is often associated with its austere exterior image of asymmetrically grouped cubic white blocks with regular vertical windows. This is the image of the house that has been most taken to parallel the seemingly similar austerity and precision of the writing of the *Tractatus*. Both of these are what I define as the view from without. I want to contrast that image with one from the interior, with the view from within, the scene of inhabitation.

Upon entering the house, one moves through the front glass doors into the small vestibule, with its light walls and dark floor, through the next set of glass doors, up the dark stone stairs and into the central hall. To the left, a glass wall and doors let light into the hall and lead out to the terrace. To the right, are a pair of metal doors leading to the salon. Straight ahead is a wall with two pairs of translucent glass doors off to either side, with those on the left leading to the dining room and those on the right to a hallway, staircase, and the owners private rooms. Turning around one hundred eighty degrees to face the front doors reveals three sets of glass doors : the central doors leading to the entry vestibule, the pair of doors to the salon side, leading to the library, and to the other side, raised up two steps, the doors leading to the breakfast room. The dark stairs recessed into the center of this space are framed at their end by two white columns

The central hall thus presents itself, defined by this series of seven paired glass and steel doors on six different surfaces, set into both solid wall and glass plane, and leading into the house from the main entry, out to the south-west terrace, the dining room, breakfast room, library and to the staircase and upper floors beyond. The doors are tall and structured by thin metal frames with one vertical division in each glass panel and no horizontal divisions. The one exception to this is the pair of doors connecting vestibule and hall in which the glass is not sub-divided, but allows for a clear view of the main entry beyond. As counterpoint the hall also displays the plain metal,

bi-paneled doors leading to the salon. The hall thus remains poised between the simplicity and austerity of the exterior and the almost mazelike series of reflections formed by these paired glass doors erupting from three sides and defining the movement through the hall as that between the practices of vision and of space. There in the central hall of the house, the visitor is presented with a scene of quiet conflict where the idealized pictorial view presented in the *Tractatus* fully encounters the spatial practices of architecture.

At the moment of arrival into the house, the austerity, monumentality and isolation of the house gives way to almost a maze of these like designed, paired glass and steel doors, each reflecting and reiterating the others. It is the repetition of this image that forms the focus of the house, both inside and on the exterior. Repetition is not, however, the sole activity here. a More precisely, the image is not exactly repeated, but exhibits coincident subtle shifts of detail each time it is relocated.

In ¶122 Wittgenstein presents the challenge to clarity posed by the view from within.

> A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.
>
> The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give the way we look at things. (Is this a '*Weltanschauung*'?)

Wittgenstein's is an architecture that comes into being as connections - visual, physical, spatial and epistemological. The doors visible from the entry hall, in their varying locations and degrees of illumination, are a prime example of this. The doors also differ in size, with even doors in close proximity exhibiting subtle changes. For example, the flanking sets of doors on either side of the stairs and leading to the living room/library on one side, breakfast room on the other at differing elevations and of different heights. The door handles are at varying heights according

to door type: glass door handles are at 5 feet 3 inches, marking the intersection of their diagonals, and placing them near eye level. The salon door handles are a little lower at 4 feet 8 1/2 inches, and the handles on the glass entrance doors are still lower at 4 feet 1 inch. There is also a difference of size between the door handles on the ground and those on the upper floors.

The continual transformation or mutation of the glass doors produces what will be a major theme of the *Investigations*, the repeated locating and relocating of an element as a way of understanding a word or practice. By examining it in a multitude of positions and in a variety of places Wittgenstein also focuses on the act of "seeing connections" and in the "finding and inventing of intermediate cases". This creates the situation that later plays a defining role in the Investigations whereby a thing approached from one direction appears quite different when approached from another. "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." (¶203)

The central hall, thus, when considered outside of the *Tractatus'* frame, cannot be simply understood in terms of the stasis often attributed to it. Instead, it multiplies effects and situations, and in so doing defines and works out philosophical issues. As they multiply in the space of the hall their clarity and 'transparency' is destroyed both literally and metaphorically. The compiling of transparent and translucent glass forms the basis of a discussion of transparency and correspondence. The doors and windows of the house both encode what lies on either side of them and in their repetition act out variations on a theme played out in multiple situations. Similarly, in the move from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* the singularity of view is destroyed. There is no longer *one* view, but a series. The repetition of an element or relationship in varying contexts works to shift the focus from specific views to the connections between them. The central hall acts to allow Wittgenstein to create a series of intermediary connections and cases as

later called for in the *Investigations* as the necessary activity by which philosophy may achieve a clear view.

The doors themselves are an intricate construction, creating a complex boundary between spaces. Because of the climate, double exterior windows were a necessary and common practice in Austria. But, Wittgenstein extended this idea to the interior. With the exception of the doors to the breakfast room, and those connecting vestibule and hall, all of the glass and steel doors in the interior are bi-paneled, double doors that always open out into the rooms in both directions. On the exterior where these double glass and steel doors occur, the two sides contain the same transparent glass, but in the interior, that is not always the case. While the mediation between interior and exterior is equalized and conventionalized so as to present the same image on either side, the complexity of spatial relations on the interior destroys any singularity of approach. The series of glass doors in the central hall, instead, define a range of possibilities. While the doors connecting the living room and hall repeat the exterior condition of clear glass on both sides, those between dining room and central hall and staircase and central hall differentiate between the two sides. Each of these paired doors are clear glass on the hall-side and translucent glass on the other, thus allowing for varying degrees of separation and privacy provided by both the visual coding and the restriction of vision depending on which panels are open and which closed.

In each of the instances in the hall where two different materials or degrees of transparency are brought together, the less transparent material is placed on the more private side of the doors and the more transparent on the more public side. But, what seems to be a simple declarative principle, confronts in spatial practices a complex series of relationships to yield at times curious reversals of association. Examples of this occur in the dining room and in the salon. In the dining room the doors to the hall are aligned on a wall with three similar sets of paired glass and steel doors that lead directly outside to the south-west terrace. This situation creates a dilemma as to whether the dining-room to hall doors should exactly match the other three sets along the

same wall, as they do in size and detail, or whether they should also mark what is on their other side. To which room and which wall do the doors belong? What boundaries do they define? Wittgenstein's decision to place translucent glass on the dining room side and clear glass on the hall side clearly distinguishes the two spaces even as it connects them. It also highlights the complex nature of the boundary, allowing it to present different faces as it is approached from opposite sides.



A similar situation occurs with the double doors leading from the salon to Margarethe Stonborough's private living room. The twist here is that all of the interior doors leading to the salon are plain metal so that these doors combine not two types of glass to create the transparent/translucent pairing, but glass and metal to form a transparent/opaque combination. This connection illustrates further the kind of boundary clashes Wittgenstein was faced with in the design of the house. Similarly, as with the dining room - hall connection, the doors in question occur along a plane that also contains exterior doors to a terrace. While the sets of paired doors leading out to the terrace are of clear glass, the interior doors connecting hall and salon and the library/family living room are plain metal doors. The metal is important here in that the salon is the only room in the house to possess such doors. They exist in sharp contrast both in material and the resulting differences in opacity to the glass doors of the central hall and throughout the public rooms and entries at the ground floor. As such, metal comes to

be identified solely with the salon. The connection between salon and private living room thus had to navigate a series of three conflicting rules: the continuation of the glass doors along the exterior wall, the placing of the more opaque material on the more private side, and the rule that all interior doors to the salon and only to the salon, are plain metal. All of these could not be satisfied at once. Instead Wittgenstein opted to place metal on the salon side and clear glass on the private living room side. This allowed the metal doors to remain solely associated with the salon but it disrupted the series of glass doors along the same wall and left the private living space designated by the more transparent material.

My point in this discussion of this series of boundary rules and their accompanying and almost endless list of exceptions is that what started with an apparent singular and repeated image gives way to a multitude of possibilities arising from the specifics of site and the demands of use. What began as an attempt for absolute clarity and differentiation ultimately yielded a series of functioning ambiguities.

The paired doors in the central hall function in several other ways to break down the absolute correlation of place, element and meaning. That is, to break down the fundamental relation of correspondence as constructed by the *Tractatus*. The conflicting reflections by each pair of doors in the other creates a visual - spatial collapse. When looked at directly, the two layers composing a pair of the double doors coincide so that the front metal frame completely obscures the frame beyond. Moving off to one side disrupts the singular image to reveal a double image emerging as a spatial dislocation. The importance of this - and of related circumstances that rely on the visual alignment of architectural elements in space, is their ability to reveal their dependence on a fixed observer. Movement through space destroys that singular, fixed image and reveals it as an idealized condition that gives way to the vicissitudes of movement and space. This is an important effect of the design of the central hall as in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein distinctly associates movement through space with everyday language and in contrast to the fixity that

results from the *Tractatus'* collapse of language and logic, realized most succinctly in the contrast between the immobility of the ice and the desire to walk.

> 107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a *result of investigation*: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. - We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!

Similar spatial issues occur with the location and alignment of the floor joints, location of window and door openings on inside and out, problems of localized symmetry within the asymmetric plan, as well as issues of proportions, lighting, materials, the various mechanical systems, and so on. Unlike what Wittgenstein said about philosophical problems in the *Tractatus*, these problems do not dissolve through analysis but arise from it.

Design and construction issues with which Wittgenstein was confronted also arose in the navigation from a two dimensional set of drawings to the three dimensional house. That translation did not always go smoothly for Wittgenstein as various anecdotes reveal. After the initial construction, Wittgenstein remained dissatisfied with several aspects of the design which he proceeded to alter. These changes most infamously include his raising of the ceiling of the salon by about three inches. (A move that sounds slightly more outrageous and trivial than it really is. While three inches may seem like an insignificant amount in relation to the entire height of the wall it is substantially more critical in relation to the datum line created by the top of the doors displaced around the room leaving only about two feet to the ceiling.) At the end of the construction process, when Wittgenstein was finally forced to complete the work, he still remained dissatisfied with three windows on the rear facade along the staircase. This situation created the one time Wittgenstein bemoaned having relinquished his share in the family wealth which would have allowed him to pay for the cost of further reconstruction, leaving him later confessing to purchasing a lottery ticket with the hope of winning the money to cover the costs

It is not that these are such profound or unusual activities or issues arising from the design and construction processes, but exactly that they are typical of the experience of design that Wittgenstein encountered. It is this set of problems, introduced to Wittgenstein in the practice of architecture, which in spatializing his understanding of limits, boundaries, relations, practice, and correspondence, literally defined a place from which Wittgenstein could reconsider the limits and functioning of language and philosophy. The movement through space and the disposition of use that fostered the reconsideration of limits, boundaries, the relation of the visual and the spatial, complex associations and identities, and so on, reveals how spatial concepts cannot be discarded to leave the philosophical problems intact. This understanding lends itself towards the creation of a practice based aesthetics by showing that spatial problems share territory with traditional philosophical problems in logic and epistemology. It is in the reworking of that shared territory that Wittgenstein came to describe the reconceived ways in which he understood language.

Importantly, spatial issues and problems in providing examples of the functioning language in the *Investigations* are offered there as an inseparable part of the language itself, in exactly the same way that all meanings of a word, or examples of a practice, contribute to our understanding of the word or concept. As Wittgenstein tells us when he offers these examples, often without further explanation, he does not offer less than he knows himself. He is thus offering the spatial examples as one of the ways in which he knows language to function. Wittgenstein, through these discussions and examples is revealing, not just what he himself knows, but the ways in which he came to understand a given series of concepts. The linguistic and the spatial are inseparable, although, importantly, they are not identical.

Precision/measurement/exactness



Both inspection of the house and endless stories about it reveal an emphasis on the precision of the design and construction of the doors and windows, their fittings, latches and locks, the radiators, metal curtains, and mechanical systems of the Stonborough house. Repeatedly they are referred to as having been designed as if they were precision instruments. They form much of the visual focus of the house as any photograph or experience, particularly of the entry hall and rooms on the ground floor, will show. The glass doors for example, had metal curtains that could be raised from within the floor just below the inner pair of doors. The glass doors and windows were difficult to construct and required a great deal of communication between Wittgenstein and the fabricators because of the extreme rigidity needed to prevent the narrow and tall glass panes from breaking, the largest of which measures 10 7/8 inches by 9 feet 10 inches. As Hermine wrote in her family recollections :

> Ludwig designed every window, door, window-bar and radiator in the noblest proportions and with such exactitude that they might have been precision instruments. Then he forged ahead with his uncompromising energy, so that everything was exactly manufactured with the same exactness. I can still hear the locksmith, who asked him with regard to a keyhole, 'Tell me, Herr Ingenieur, is a millimetre here really that important for you?' and even before he had finished the sentence, the loud, energetic 'Ja', that almost startled him."[23]

[23] Op. cit., p. 20.

But, as much as the idea of precision can be readily associated with the exacting demands of logic as in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's experience with these elements in the practice of architecture can be as strongly affiliated with his critique of the over-exacting demands for precision in the *Tractatus*. For example, the *Investigations* frequently questions the *Tractatus'* requirements by offering examples of physical and spatial measurements. The same may be said for his comments on proportion in his 1938 lecture on aesthetics that used the example of finding the right dimension for doors and windows. In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein writes: "Am I inexact when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?".(¶88) The inter-related concepts of exactness, precision and measurement that Wittgenstein discusses in the Investigations serves to recall his own battle with the exactness of dimension and precision of construction he encountered in the design and construction of his sister's house.

Symmetry/asymmetry - (further acts of location and relocation)

The central hall is not, however, the only 'center' of the house. The salon, located between the entry hall, the library, the western terrace and Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein's private rooms, acts as a competing 'center', distributor of space and datum of meaning. As much as variations of glass and light define the hall and movement through it, the datum material of the salon is metal to which the glass is sharply contrasted, forming an interior/exterior distinction except at the crucial juncture of the public/private relation with the entry doors to Margarethe' private rooms.

Both the central hall and the salon occupy complex positions as simultaneous programmatic/conceptual centers and spatial centers within the ground floor plan and within the house. The salon is the central room on the ground floor paralleling the importance and functioning of the central hall. Each is integrally connected on all sides, so as to organize the spaces around them. Each one also acts as an interior connection leading on all sides to other rooms including the outdoor rooms of the terraces. From the central hall, the salon clearly distinguishes itself with the metal doors that connect the two spaces. Other spaces share to a lesser extent some of these properties- with Margarethe's private living room also acting as a connection between her private rooms, their internal corridor, the salon and the terrace. Her private living room, however, is already once removed from the centrality or publicness of the hall. On the upper floors any central space or sense of connection is severely limited to the literal hall running down the center of the building and leading to the stair-elevator at one end to the main room at the other with a series of private rooms and storage spaces along both sides.

In the massing of the building with its main central block, two not quite symmetric wings and their similar, but rotated terraces on either side, one facing forward, the other one to the side, the house involves a continual series of shifts from the asymmetry of the overall plan to the localized symmetry of many of the spaces, rooms and elevations. This condition occurs in the massing of the building, in the elevations (both interior and exterior) and in the plans. In addition, these shifts define the fundamental condition of moving through the house. The oscillation between these two spatial principles takes form as a series of asymmetrical moves and reciprocal shifts to create or restore local symmetries that commence at the point of entry. The conflict between the overall asymmetry of the house and the localized symmetries that he desired, caused Wittgenstein to make a series of adjustments to create symmetric rooms. In the library, for example, Wittgenstein created a structurally unnecessary column along the same wall as a structural one in order to create a symmetric wall.

The series of shifts and moves thus begins from the outside with the creation of a projecting entry block that disrupts the symmetry of the front elevation, leaving the door/entry off center from that of the windows above, and disrupting the symmetry and regularity of the left bay and the front facade. Additionally, while the door defines the center of the front hall, it occupies from the exterior the left bay of the central block. The projecting entry block thus creates a situation of asymmetry while the door centered within it restores a local symmetry to the entrance that resonates through the house as it aligns with the interior central axis. The shift to the left of the entry thus simultaneously aligns the front door with the center of the interior while removing it from both the center of the front facade and the regularity of its grid of windows on that facade. The result is to disengage or dislocate the exterior line of center from the interior, about the point of entry.



Another example of this constant recentering lies in the markings and orientation in the flooring. The floor material found throughout the ground floor was a poured artificial stone that allowed for subdivisions in nearly unlimited ways. The joints in the flooring are so as to at times suggest a ground plane that spreads out beyond the dividing walls, while at other times to be clearly demarcating individual rooms. Where it suggests a continual ground plane, however, as when the grid is not coincident with or contained by the walls, as, for example, in the library, that view is deceptive. The floor grids rather are always room or area specific, employed to produce,

extend or emphasize spatial relations. The grids created change both alignment, patterning, size and shape from room to room in order to mark local centers of doors, or align with windows and openings. At one extreme is the central hall which has the most unique and complex pattern (marking some of the only visible structure in the house) and at the other is the first floor hallway, which is entirely undelineated as if there were no associations to mark whatsoever.

Various design decisions - such as Wittgenstein would have been deeply involved with in the rearranging of rooms on the ground floor and in the reproportioning of those rooms, windows and exterior elevations, set up a pattern of establishing and re-establishing local symmetries and alignments. Importantly, such localized associations and relations do not involve an overview as would total symmetry. Rather, it is something encountered in glimpses, in rooms and in moving through the house in contrast to an entirely symmetric plan that would not be as readily experienced, but would exist largely on paper or in conceptual reconstructions that act as if the entire house is seen from beyond and above. Beyond the specific aspects and resolutions of these problems, these issues point to the problems Wittgenstein would have faced for the first time as an architect. This situation curiously reappears in some of the discussions of Wittgenstein's work, written as if the writers were themselves confronting architectural problems themselves for the first time, and as a result see Wittgenstein's concerns with such issues as the aligning of the joints in the floor with the center lines of doors and windows as particularly striking.

Interior/exterior

For someone designing a building for the first time the inner-outer relation exhibits a surprising lack of coincidence, revealing a previously non-apparent series of dissociations that exposes the inner-outer relation to be less transparent than it initially seems, not unlike the relation between a word and meaning

In a deceptively simple building such as the Stonborough house (particularly from its exterior) the relation across a wall from interior to exterior, or between interior spaces, would seem to be that of a direct correspondence, as they simply share the wall. But, that is not always the case, as with, for example, the attempt to construct a symmetric, centered window in the breakfast room on both interior and exterior elevations, here problems arise due to the thickness of the wall disrupting the symmetry of adjoining spaces. In this instance, Wittgenstein had to slightly project into the room part of the window wall on the interior to account for the perpendicular wall on the exterior which had determined the original frame of reference and center of the window. The protrusion in the wall served to create an equal length of wall on either side of the window on the interior.

The mediation between interior and exterior, while clearly one of the main themes of the house also exists in the philosophy. As Stanley Cavell wrote in *The Claim of Reason* it is also one of the main themes of the *Investigations*: "I would have been glad to have suggested that the correct relation between inner and outer, between the soul and its society, is the theme of the *Investigations* as a whole."[24] Two main aspects of Wittgenstein's house seem to relate to this - the split he develops and encodes between the public areas of the house and the private ones, and the idea of making connections: philosophical, spatial and visual in addition to the more obvious interior/exterior of the building. It is on the interior of the house where most of the emphasis exists as it is from there that these issues are most often defined and considered. The explicit interior/exterior connection is perhaps better understood as a subset of a series of interior connections.

---

[24] Stanley Cavell. Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism and Tragedy. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.329.

The house both in coding and zoning sets up a public/private discussion. Functional groupings in the house define three zones on the ground floor The section with the line of pantry - dining - breakfast-room with the kitchen below it, the central zone defines passage, containing entry, central hall, stair/elevator combination and the connecting hallway, and the third area contains the living areas including Margarethe's private rooms, the salon and the library/music room, with the further distinction of the more private rooms placed in the back and accessed, not from the central hall, but from the salon or internal hallway, and more public rooms, the library and salon to the front.

The doors again become of importance here, acting as almost literal signs - of enter, don't enter, open, closed, and defining an array of possible actions to be taken or options that Wittgenstein offers. They draw attention as well as organize movement, hovering between the defining of physical and visual space. The doors in the public rooms of the Stonborough house, however, blur the strict dichotomy between open and closed. Although all glass doors may similarly be seen to blur such distinctions, the Stonborough house defines a complete range from open to closed all within the space of the central hall, while the salon lives at the extremes - solid metal or clear glass only. The hall thus emphasizes the varying (visual) degrees between open and closed, between visually accessible and separated, between being a continuation of visual space and a disruption of it.

In contrast to the ground floor, the upper floors are of quite another character. The upper floor plans seem to be determined largely by practical considerations with only the front room on the first floor of 'aesthetic' note. Except for the area of circulation with the stair and the elevator, the spaces on the upper floors act largely as closed or isolated spaces with limited connections between them. In what seems to be a design problem of filling a largely predetermined volume, large storage areas lining the hallway were created. The storage units, in taking up the space between the hall and the private rooms, act as a sort of buffer zone between the two, a barrier of

uninhabited, unactivated space. The hallway floor although of the same artificial stone flooring as the ground floor, is undifferentiated with no joints to mark alignments, make connections, or suggest direction. The floor material of the rooms on the upper floors are, by contrast, wood, and the wooden doors of these rooms define a different language than that of the more public rooms downstairs. As such, they signify another system, some other type of separation, suggesting that, without the public component, there seems to be no 'space' and no discourse.

In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein considers the possibility of a so-called 'private language' as a central component of his discussion of the relation between the interior of the individual and the public, externality of language. Where as many of he examples of the *Investigations* involve what is necessarily publicly accessible language, the private language argument considers the possibility of a private language, one that theoretically is impossible to teach or convey to another person. Wittgenstein, however, rejects, if not the possibility of the existence of such a language, at least the possibility of discussing it.[25] Yet, the question, once asked, persists. In effect, this posits a new unsayable, a new realm of silence, one unlike that of the *Tractatus*, in that it truly cannot be located in language, even as a transgression of sense and is not definitive of the realm of the showable.

[25] See *The Claim of Reason* for an extensive discussion of this topic.



Stonborough House, 1926-28.

Stonborough House, central hall.



Stonborough House, central hall views towards terrace.



Stonborough House, central hall views across hallway.



Stonborough House, central hallway, dining room doors with translucent glass.



Stonborough House, door to pantry and stairs to basement.

Visual space and the visual room

Wittgenstein gave, in the end, over two years of his time to the design and construction of the house for his sister. In January 1929, immediately following the completion of the house, he returned to Cambridge and to philosophy. In a letter he wrote at that time to Moritz Schlick, the philosopher of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein spoke of his decision to remain in Cambridge "for a few terms and work on visual space (*Gesichtsraum*) and other things."[26]

Architecture had provided the starting point and final impetus for Wittgenstein's so-called "later work", by providing and defining the site of his interests in visual space, it is not clear what visual space is. While the architecture of the central hall provides some clues to this term with glass serving as a pre-eminent material for the study of visual space, Wittgenstein's discussion of "the visual room" in the Investigations offers some additional ones.

Wittgenstein's sections in the *Investigations* on the visual room reveal the space of architecture as a space of philosophical concern. That space defines sites of philosophical problems, and in so doing, continues the construction of a shared territory that began with the builders. Wittgenstein's question of "Who does the visual room belong to?", "Who owns it?" can also be understood as questions of what disciplinary concerns are in question. The questions focus on the boundaries of ideas as well as of space. The problematics of the move from two dimensional space to three dimensional space are played out repeatedly in the *Investigations*. One form of this is the examples in the Investigations that focus on the multiple possibilities suggested by a two dimensional drawing of a three dimensional geometric projection and the resultant ambiguities that arise from its implication of more than one possible three dimensional form fitting the description or depiction.

---

[26]Nedo, Op. cit., p. 28.

Wittgenstein's curious discussion of the "visual room" constructs another association between drawings and architecture. The discussion while invoking architectural drawings, landscapes and houses, is most interesting for its association of the subject, the self and the question of the inhabitation of language. The visual room serves as a way of envisioning what it is like to have a visual image, either real or imagined, of a spatial 'object'. While the visual room might be consolidated under Wittgenstein's discussion of the relation between the inner and outer, private mental imagery and publicly accessible language, as with his discussion of pain sensations; the situation here is markedly different. Rather than 'language' forming the specific outward criterion as in the earlier examples, here the visual, spatial and architectural are the primary form of comparison. And, if only because of the example chosen, the act of envisioning a room that is not yet there, suggests an activity Wittgenstein would have encountered in the practice of architecture.

> 398 "But when I imagine something, or even actually *see* objects, I have *got* something which my neighbour has not." ---- I understand you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have got THIS." ---What are these words for? They serve no purpose. ---- Can one not add: "There is here no question of a 'seeing' ---- and therefore none of a 'having' ---- nor of a subject, nor therefore of 'I" either"? Might I not ask: In what sense have you *got* what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even *see* it. Must you not really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.
>
> But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I knew within myself what you meant. But this meant that I knew how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one's looking and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about one in this case ---- and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of the 'visual room'. The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one else's it is not mine either. In other words, it does not belong to me *because* I want to use the same form of expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need not mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the visual room *cannot* have any owner. "For" — one might say ---- "it has no master, outside or in."
>
> Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. ---- Someone asks "Whose house is that?" ---- The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house.

The question of ownership that Wittgenstein introduces here is interesting. When you design a house, a room for someone else, whose is it? It is the product of the designer's thinking, yet it is certainly not owned by him or her. The concept also raises questions of privacy and accessibility, ideas repeatedly examined by Wittgenstein. The impossibility of entering into the *Tractatus'* conception of language if as solipsism (hence the view from without)- is revealed as the impossibility of entering into a non-public language, is contrasted here with the demand for inhabitation of the physical, not just mental kind. That is, the exclusion of private mental space is shown, literally, to be akin to the impossibility of others entering and inhabiting that space, marking it as spatially inaccessible.

The distinction drawn at the end of the middle paragraph between "ownership" of a physical - rather than a "visual" room - brings with it the question of the connection between the two. A question concerning, among other things, issues of space and inhabitation. The visual room cannot have an owner "outside or in". While this excludes ownership of the visual room it does it on the basis of the ambiguous position that the "visual room" maintains between outside and in. And, the visual room, as it turns out, in ¶399 is very much like language in that it has no outside. "One might also say: Surely the owner of the visual room would have to be the same kind of thing as it is; but he is not to be found in it, and there is no outside."

The space between outside and in is equally the space between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. Whereas we are not assuredly outside the *Tractatus* (and language) in the view from the ladder, the *Investigations* brings with it inhabitation and the understanding that we are more certainly within language. By understanding that we are utterly and inescapably within language – the *Investigations* also brings with it the impossibility of being outside of it. That admission begins to dismantle the inner/outer distinctions and positioning in relation to language. As we cannot be outside of language - being inside also loses its meaning. The outside,

as with Wittgenstein's discussion of ownership, begins to lose its meaning as we have no way of understanding, describing, depicting or speaking about it.

Architecture, then, becomes an even more intriguing example here. While clearly a physical room can be inhabited, owned, entered, exited, etc., - a visual room, that which arises in the attempt to understand a proposition (non-coincidentally is about a room) is akin to language, which is equally ambiguous in its relationship to ownership. With the discussion of the visual room, Wittgenstein's discussion of a private language can be understood to be examined at three different scales in relation to the subject : on par with the subject in the discussion of a private language, pain and sensation, on a smaller, external scale, in the discussion of the beetle in the box, and, at the third scale, in the implied enclosure of the subject with the discussion of the visual room. The discussion of the visual room thereby solidifies the association of the spatial and the linguistic in the inner/outer, private/public discussion.

The visual room proves its usefulness in the understanding of language one paragraph later. "The 'visual room' seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a new way of speaking, a new comparison; it might be called a new sensation." (¶400) The practice of architecture has thus produced a new way of speaking and a new understanding of language. The association again of architecture and language, here particularly the idea of the visual room, offers a new way of speaking, and a new understanding of language in the *Investigations* that ties together architecture, the subject and language.


LANGUAGE IS NOT TRANSPARENT


LANGUAGE IS NOT TRANSPARENT





Section two : **Images of Entanglement**

The landscape of language

In the preface to *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein constructs two analogies as a means of explaining the text that follows. The first is between the investigations of language and a series of "long and involved journeyings" - "criss-cross in every direction", while the second is between the "philosophical remarks" that form the book and "a number of sketches of landscapes" made during those journeys. Together these analogies equate philosophical, and thus Wittgensteinian, investigations to the sketches, and language to the landscape the sketches traverse.

Wittgenstein describes the text of the *Investigations* as a collection and "arrangement" of these sketches that together offer a "picture of the landscape" rather than a finalized version of a single sketch, leading to the conclusion that the book "is really only an album". The sketches are presented in much the manner in which the structuring of the remarks that form the text are, with a similar concern for how each is formed into a 'whole'. Introducing the question of how and when the sketches are made, the criteria by which they are judged, the practices by which they are combined, the rejections, repetitions, editing, cropping, arrangement and rearrangement provides the tools for an understanding of how the landscape sketches serve to describe the surface of the landscape of language.

> The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written down all of these thoughts as *remarks*, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I

> sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another. --- It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks.
>
> After several attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. ------- And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.---The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.
>
> The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of these were badly drawn or uncharacteristic, marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected a number of tolerable ones were left, which now had to be arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked at them you could get a picture of the landscape. Thus this book is only an album.[1]

Wittgenstein, from the start, through the intimate association he constructs between landscape sketches and viewer (or draughtsperson), relies upon spatial thinking to define his philosophical objectives. The metaphor of the landscape and the journeying through it allows for the admittance of a subject into language and philosophy who had been missing from the *Tractatus*. The importance of understanding language as a landscape stems from the landscape's implied inclusivity, defining the investigation of language from within. The stated need to traverse the landscape, criss-cross in every direction, in order to see and know it, insists that both language and the *Philosophical Investigations*, cannot simply be 'understood', but must be re-enacted by the reader in order to be known.

The imagery of the landscape set up by the preface re-engages the study of language at definitive junctures within the body of the text. This association is best summed up by paragraph 203, in which Wittgenstein directly equates the landscape with language:

> 203. Language is a labyrinth of paths: you approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.

---

[1]Preface of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Landscape sketches and the depicted landscape itself are both metaphors for the relation between viewer and language, or between language user and terrain - each combining a visual and verbal component. But, the spatial organizations they suggest are of essentially different kinds. The subject is positioned in relation to each in very different ways. A sketch is something which we view from the outside, a pictorial image with defined boundaries. Sketches also suggest a rough rather than 'finished' drawing or description, potentially as preliminary or preparatory for future work. Wittgenstein's discussion of the sketches dependence on a "draughtsman", reinforces the association between the viewer and the construction of language. The landscape, on the other hand, is three dimensional; it is something we are, or can be, in. It surrounds the viewer with no defined boundaries, or perhaps no boundaries at all. Considering this very landscape as a two-dimensional image, by depicting it, necessarily creates boundaries that limit the view of the landscape. Altering the viewer's position in relation to the landscape by moving through it overcomes some of those limitations. It is this latter approach that defines Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and which integrally ties together the act of viewing and the landscape of language in the construction of the text.

Wittgenstein's remarks in the preface to the *Investigations* regarding the writing of the text are equally remarks about how to read the *Investigations*. These instructions focus on the form and construction of the text in relation to the subjects of study. The preface does not begin with the image of a landscape, however, but it begins by describing the (seemingly) literal organization of the *Investigations*, stating that the book is composed of "remarks" or "short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" but which at times jumps from one topic to another. This description is then interrupted with what Wittgenstein refers to as his 'previous' intention of 'welding' the results of these investigations into a unity in which the thoughts would "proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks." In acknowledgedly having failed to achieve this goal, Wittgenstein finds instead that his "thoughts

were soon crippled" if he tried to force them in any "single direction against their natural inclination", leading to the conclusion that this result "was of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation." It is at this crucial point, where the "very nature of the investigation" comes into contact with the method of that investigation that Wittgenstein's writing turns to analogy and metaphor, where he begins speaking of landscapes and sketches.

The analogies do more than provide a useful metaphor, they spatialize the process of philosophical investigation to allow what began with an attempted linear ordering of subject matter and concern for potential disruptions in the unity of thought, to end with the construction of an extended horizontal network of investigation thereby restructuring the text and providing a new model of meaning. Through this spatial framework, Wittgenstein replaced the linear, serial, vertical, fixed and hierarchical *Tractatus* with a complex and interwoven network of thought, language, meaning, images and practices.

Wittgenstein's declaration of the necessity to move through the landscape in this manner marks the ultimate break with the rigidly defined structure of the *Tractatus*. As a result, the philosophical remarks that compose the text cannot remain the simple compilation of more or less traditional philosophical subjects : the concepts of meaning, understanding and so on that Wittgenstein lists at the beginning of the preface. Instead, they are constituted by the way in which they define the extended surface of language through which these same subjects are defined and via which they will be repeatedly studied and located throughout the text. The surface, or landscape of language, thus provides both the content and ground for the "long and involved journeys" by providing the means for self-examination. As Wittgenstein reiterates throughout the text, language as landscape is both the object and means of study.

As both form and content, the investigation of language in the *Investigations* undertakes a series of observations manifested in, not just recorded by, the sketches of the landscape made at various

places and times. The sketches define the surface that they study rather than simply observe it from a distance, and as such, necessarily and equally become their own source of investigation. Where as the *Tractatus'* thinking had proceeded along a series of predetermined and more or less discrete topics, the construction and understanding according to the logic of surface disallows the *Tractatus'* hierarchical structure, implementing in its place a redefined nature and method of approach. Topics become sites on the surface, accessible through their spatial locating and visual depiction. This method of working, the traversing and surveying of the landscape, destroys the clarity and singularity of the view from above or map produced by the *Tractatus*. The *Investigations*, incapable of offering the clarity and completeness of a well defined and ordered language, undertakes a search for connections between the many sketches that the collection, in producing an album, is meant to facilitate.

The multiplicity of views in the *Investigations* brings with it choice, beginning with the preface's initial possibility of movement, and in direct opposition to the preset and confined frames of the *Tractatus*. Because the *Tractatus* had only been able to develop in accordance with its one strictly correct method, it effectively offered not method but correctness, the blind following of a rule. However, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein's explicit concern is with method emphasized through its suggestion of multiple possible ones that emerge from the diverse journeys and methods of constructing and arranging the sketched depictions of the journey.

In the shifts from remarks to sketches and back, the preface readily offers or moves from what seems to be purely linguistic or verbal issues of understanding language, to the understanding that language has visual and spatial components that also require study. Understanding language for Wittgenstein becomes the process of coordinating our movements through space with our visual processing and depictions of those processes. The philosophical remarks that result from this travel are the landscape sketches that attempt to depict the journey or parts of it. Approaching the same places from new directions redefines (and redepicts) the landscape into a

series sketches that together produce an album. The album in how it was produced and the role it plays in determining the method of investigation, exists in contrast to a pre-existing map.

The goal of the *Investigations*' journey, to give (or get) a picture of the landscape lies in contrast to the construction of a map, or its use, in navigating that landscape. Wittgenstein uses this metaphor for two main reasons: to show that we go awry when we try to construct a map (overview) of the geography, and that we go wrong, when as philosophers, we offer a map to others as a way to save others the problem of thinking for themselves. Instead Wittgenstein constructs the *Investigations* as a series of sketches or an album of reminders and images which act as sites to encounter or recall issues of language, meaning, understanding and so on.

Family Resemblance

There are several terms readily associated with the *Philosophical Investigations* - ordinary language, family resemblance, language-games, practice, the private language argument and rule following. There are also a series of images associated with the *Investigations*, although they are not often discussed as such.[2] A number of these images - the overlapping fibres that form the thread of family resemblance, the depiction of an immobilized Wittgenstein stuck out on an extended plane of frozen ice, the delicate spider's web that the philosopher's crude fingers are incapable of repairing, the crystalline purity of the structure of logic and the endlessly criss-crossing labyrinthine paths used to describe both language and our engagement with it - form what I call "images of entanglement".

Images of entanglement are what might be seen as a specific series of landscape sketches; sites in which the enmeshment of associations that Wittgenstein brings together in the *Investigations* coalesce into a specific image. They are spatial configurations manifested through the processes of philosophical investigation that define the reconceived spaces, practices, methods, structure and content of the *Investigations*. Beginning with their proto-formation in Wittgenstein's 1929 lecture on ethics, and developed extensively in the *Investigations*. Wittgenstein repeatedly posits this structure to describe and construct both the meaning and image of language.

Entanglement emerges in the *Philosophical Investigations* most succinctly in two inter-related passages: the assertion in ¶125 that: "This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of)." and the statement, a page earlier, in ¶122 where Wittgenstein outlines the conditions for such a clear view: "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is

---

[2] Derek Jarman's film, *Wittgenstein* (1993), uses these images as central to his depiction of Wittgenstein.

lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'."

Together the two passages call for the construction of clear images of entanglement, or rather more precisely, clear constructions or views of the entanglement with our own rules. The unexpected union of clarity and entanglement developed in these passages is definitive of the work of the *Philosophical Investigations* in its aim to describe the functioning of language by depicting the complex surface of language.

The first suggestion of an image of entanglement occurred in an untitled 1929 lecture on ethics. The lecture was delivered to a popular society known as 'the heretics' shortly after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. In it, Wittgenstein presented an early version of his yet un-named idea of family resemblance using the Sir Francis Galton's experiments employing photography as his example. The *Investigations* Wittgenstein develops this construct into a fundamental model for the functioning of language in practice.

> I will now begin. My subject, as you know is Ethics and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Professor Moore has given in his book *Principia Ethica*. He says: "Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good." Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense in fact which includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics. And to make you see as clearly as possible what I take to be the subject matter of Ethics I will put before you a number of more or less synonymous expressions each of which could be substituted for the above definition, and by enumerating them I want to produce the same sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos of different faces on the same photographic plate in order to get the picture of the typical features they all had in common. And as by showing to you such a collective photo I could make you see what is the typical - say - Chinese face; so if you look through the row of synonyms which I will put before you, you will, I hope, be able to see the characteristic features of Ethics. Now instead of saying "Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with. . . . [3]

---

[3]Ludwig Wittgenstein, "(Untitled) "A Lecture on Ethics" *Philosophical Review*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell, Vol. LXXIV 1965. This lecture was prepared by Wittgenstein sometime between September 1929 and December 1930. It was

The lecture takes the example of Galton's composite photographs and uses then as a model for the re-examination of Moore's definitive statement that "Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good". The example works by setting up a comparison between the ability of a single photograph of a Chinese person's face to be an example of a "typical" Chinese face, and the ability of a singular expression to account for the range of what is called 'Ethics'. This opening discussion of Galton's photographs achieves more, however, than a widening of Moore's explanation of "ethics". Rather, the example opens up entirely new possibilities for both ethics and language by allowing the image of these composite photographs to become the basis for the transformation of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Galton's aim had been to construct a series of composite photographs of given 'types' of people in order to produce essentialist physiognomies of race, class, religion, disease and criminality. His method involved taking successive exposures on one photographic plate of the individuals in the sample group. Each exposure time was the inverse of the total number of exposures so that if there were nine total images combined on one plate, each exposure would receive one-ninth of the total exposure time. The result of this process was to emphasize the features in common through more combined exposure time and to de-emphasize or even drop out more unusual or idiosyncratic characteristics.

Wittgenstein's employing a visual practice as the basis for redefining a philosophical/verbal undertaking is in many ways the flip side to the *Tractatus'* attempt to define the scope of sensible language. The *Tractatus* was about ethics to the extent that it was setting limits "to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought." Wittgenstein united ethics and aesthetics in the *Tractatus*, not because they shared subject matter, but by virtue of the method

---

given to the Cambridge society "The Heretics" and is the only popular lecture ever composed or delivered by Wittgenstein.

through which they were constituted in language, or more precisely, by their being outside of sensible language in contrast to the model he constructed of facts in the *Tractatus*, where he wrote:

> 6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
> Ethics is transcendental.
> (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

In the lecture on ethics Wittgenstein seemingly remains in the quandary of language, boundaries, facts, nonsense and ethics that he did in the *Tractatus* - but there are several important distinctions between the *Tractatus* and the 1929 lecture, not the least of these is Wittgenstein's having given the lecture on the topic of ethics at all.

Wittgenstein concludes the lecture on ethics by saying that :

> . . . I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just *to go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.

Something is amiss, however, in the example: Galton's search for something essential - biologically so, in a given group of people, through the super-imposition of photographic images yields, not a typical face, but a blurred or distorted one. Using this process Galton tried to identify what was essential to each group. The process, however, began with multiple samples and ended with one, while Wittgenstein's expansion of Moore's expression does quite the opposite. The model Galton offers Wittgenstein is thus not one of method. Wittgenstein, instead, tells us that he wanted to achieve the same sort of effect as Galton through the substitution of multiple expressions for Moore's single one.

That effect could not be essence, or at least not the essence of the type from the *Tractatus* because of the ultimate blurring of even the most emphasized of features. And this is part of what Wittgenstein claims in the lecture regarding ethics - that despite its appearance of producing definitive statements, or facts which defined the world of the *Tractatus*. Statements of ethics in producing and expressing values that appear as facts, as with Moore's definition, are nonsensical. The blur then becomes of interest in its suggestion, not of essence, but of the non-absolute realm of values. And Wittgenstein's use of the image as a model, coupled with the series of substitutions he offers, imply the ability to do with words exactly what he says cannot be done by seeing the definition as a composite rather than singular expression.

These distinctions, coupled with the introduction of the proto-concept of family resemblance at the opening of the talk, form a significant movement beyond the idealized thinking of the *Tractatus* that had previously barred such an extended discussion of the topic of ethics, but could only explain why it was unspeakable. As is the case in the *Tractatus*, despite some of what Wittgenstein himself says, his interest in presenting a lecture on ethics to a popular audience immediately after his return to philosophy following his practice of architecture, says something he could find no way to talk about directly in the *Tractatus*. It forms the beginning of the remaking of the boundaries of the *Tractatus* and it opens up a new realm of philosophical enquiry for Wittgenstein into the concept, not of clarity, but of entanglement by acknowledging the inseparability of the discussions of ethics, vision and spatiality and the philosophy of language.

Wittgenstein's reliance on Galton's composite photographs as a model of the functioning of language serves to inscribe both aesthetics and ethics at the core of his philosophy. Rather than exiling ethics as had happened in the *Tractatus*, the lecture on ethics uses the *Tractatus'* positioning of "ethics" within language and within philosophy to begin the study. Galton's photographs combined with ethics and its multiple and unplaceable meanings become the root

of Wittgenstein's later understanding of language. Through the lecture on ethics, Wittgenstein thus began to redefine that which had been marginalized and even evicted from the sphere of sensible language in the *Tractatus*, resurrecting it as the unacknowledged core of linguistic expansion in the *Investigations*.

The second aspect which enables the transformation of the role and understanding of ethics in philosophy to occur is offered in the closing remarks of the lecture that refer to the boundaries of language, philosophy, sense, ethics, etc. (lecture summary and quote) It is here that Wittgenstein offers the key element by which ethics/aesthetics become a model for the functioning of language in the *Investigations*. The spatial concept of boundary lies at the center of this reconceptualization of language. These remade boundaries now allow for a perspicuous entanglement in a way previously impossible in the *Tractatus'* rigid structure.

The *Investigations'* expansion of the use and importance of the ideas of association in Galton's photographs, take what had been initially presented as a model for understanding "ethics" to become, in the *Investigations*, the model for the overlapping of not just expressions, but of practices, and the constitution of meaning. To this last, Wittgenstein gives the name 'family resemblance' recalling and reassociating genetic associations in a more limited and more reasonable extent than Galton.

Family resemblance is the name that Wittgenstein employs in the *Investigations* to characterize the relationship between the various meanings and uses of a word, or the various kinds of words that comprise language. The idea of family resemblance is introduced and summarized in sections 66 and 67. The description begins with an act of vision, by looking at the various practices understood as "games". Wittgenstein leads of the reader, through a variety of everyday practices of games rather than considering the term in an isolated way traditionally associated with philosophy. His concern is that we should not accept what we assume to be the associations

between the different uses of a word, assuming for instance that they all share a common essence or element, but that, instead, we need to survey the uses as they appear in everyday practices.

> 66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? ---- Don't say: "There *must* be something common, or they would not all be called 'games' - but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! --- Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.
>
> And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
>
> 67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family, build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. --- And I shall say: 'games' form a family.
>
> And for instance, the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a - direct - relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
>
> But if someone wished to say : "There is something common to all these constructions -- namely the disjunction of all their common properties" --- I should reply : Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say : "Something runs through the whole thread --- namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".

The example Wittgenstein uses of games is telling, both in its obviously being a practice, and in its association with the other fundamental appearance of "game" in the *Investigations* - the concept

of language-game as first introduced by the builder's language. Wittgenstein uses these language-games, he tells us, to serve as models or examples of how we use language. The importance of this activity cannot be overstressed, as it is the fundamental philosophical method Wittgenstein advances in the *Investigations*, describing it as the main way in which we learn and explain the meanings of words and concepts.

Wittgenstein employs the concept of family resemblance, not simply to explain the multiple meanings of a given word or expression, but to describe how the 'whole' of language can be understood without having to posit any single aspect common to all of it. That is, he uses it to explain how language functions without an essence and therefore why the search for the general form of propositions in the *Tractatus* was literally misguided.

> 65. Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. ---For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language."
>
> And this is true. -- Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 'language'.

Family resemblance forms an image of entanglement through the entwining of multiple and inseparable meanings of a word, the entwining of meaning with practice, and in the image of the fibres of the twine itself. It is the most defined and far reaching of the images of entanglement Wittgenstein produces. Where as the others arise within specific discussions, family resemblance, initially the result of observation, quickly becomes its guiding principle. Throughout the *Investigations* Wittgenstein employs the idea of family resemblance in discussions of the practices of reading, calculating, rule following, agreement, boundaries and the image of entanglement itself. Beginning with the example of "games", which quickly becomes an example for all of

language, Wittgenstein offers a series of examples of family resemblance throughout the text. The concept also serves to associate the meaning of one word to another, such as the interwoven practices of "agreement" and "rule".

> 224. The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are *related* to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
>
> 225. The use of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are interwoven. (As are the use of "proposition" and the use of "true".)

A paradigmatic example is Wittgenstein's discussion of the experience of being guided in diverse cases. The example intimately associates family resemblance with the landscape of language the diverse situations of which seemingly act out the variants of the criss-crossing of the landscape, as if to emphasize how no one aspect is common to all manners of traversing it.

> 172. Let us consider the experience of being guided, and ask ourselves: what does this experience consist in when for instance our *course* is guided? --- Imagine the following cases:
>
> You are in a playing field with your eyes bandaged, and someone leads you by the hand, sometimes left, sometimes right; you have constantly to be ready for the tug of his hand, and must also take care not to stumble when he gives an unexpected tug.
>
> Or again: someone leads you by the hand where you are unwilling to go, by force.
>
> Or: you are guided by a partner in a dance; you make yourself as receptive as possible, in order to guess his intention and obey the slightest pressure.
>
> Or: someone takes you for a walk; you are having a conversation; you go wherever he does.
>
> Or: you walk along a field-track, simply following it.
>
> All these situations are similar to one another; but what is common to all the experiences?

Images of entanglement

There are two types of images of entanglement that emerge in the *Investigations*. Each defines a specific relation between philosophy and language. The first form of entanglement arises with the view from without constructed by the *Tractatus*. This image tends towards associations with fixity, or repetitiveness of problems and situations emerging as images of nets, spider webs and immobility. The second form of entanglement is produced in association with the view from within. In opposition to the fixity of the first form, they develop in the movement through space as acts of spatial location and dislocation, manifesting as images of mazes, paths and roads. The first type of entanglement, although only developed as such in the *Investigations*, is reiterative of the thought of the *Tractatus*. The second type of entanglement makes its first appearance in the preface to the *Investigations* in the criss-cross movement across the surface of language. That action sets up the spatial production of images of entanglement that had been disallowed by the neatly defined and hierarchically distributed levels of language in the *Tractatus*, only to emerge in the *Investigations* as definitive of the text's structure

Nets and webs

In ¶106 of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein portrays a primary example of the first kind of entanglement. The example depicts the *Tractatus*' search for absolute clarity of expression as the confrontation with a spider's web, in the face of which, the subject is removed and helpless.

> 106. Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up, — to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers.

The spider's web is an image constructed by the view from without. Confronted with the torn web, the attempt or compulsion is to try and repair it. That compulsion threatens to draw the reader into the web: "it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up". The web threatens to entangle the reader by seemingly demanding the reader to intervene at its level of intricacy and scale without the tools necessary to make that feasible. The threat produced by our attempted engagement with the web is, as it were, a spatial illusion, a trick of scale. The problem as presented is that we are too large, our hands too crude in their functioning, to engage with the web, not that it can engulf us, yet that threat remains. It is a spatial fear that disallows any room for movement, or any space in which to succeed as the reader is at once too large to enter the web, but as the fear of being pulled in suggests, too small to withstand its attraction. It is as if the exactness demanded by the criterion of logic, the need "to describe extreme subtleties" leaves no space in which the reader may act. Given this threat, the view from without developed in the *Tractatus* can now be understood as an attempt to evade the image of entanglement presented by the surface of language, in response to which the *Tractatus* pulls back in order to view it from above, rather than to engage with its misleading and conflicting appearance.

In another section of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein again relies on the association of an image of entanglement with the view from without in order to examine the *Tractatus*' insistence on the one-to-one correlation of thought and meaning. Here Wittgenstein sets up a similar problem to that of the spider's web, only it is not the surface of everyday language, but our own capacity to think that takes on a sense of estrangement.

> 428. "This queer thing, thought" ---- but it does not strike us as queer when we are thinking. Thought does not strike us as mysterious while we are thinking, but only when we say, as it were retrospectively: "How was thought possible?" How was it possible for thought to deal with the very object *itself*? We feel as if by means of it we had caught reality in a net.

The image of thought attempting to capture reality in a net refers to the *Tractatus*' correlation of thought and reality - here presented as if the two, having lost the determinate, *a priori* connection

of the *Tractatus*, are disconnected. This sense leaves language continually searching for a way to hook onto or entrap the world to which it refers. The net becomes the means by which language connects to some otherwise amorphous world, as if it were catching butterflies in the air, or fish in the ocean. Although the net here is in our control, as opposed to the spider's web that had threatened to engulf us, the two have more in common than not. In each passage the image arises with a discussion that compares everyday thinking to some unreachable ideal in whose light the everyday seems clumsy and ineffectual. In ¶106 the idealized and intricate structure of the spider's web cannot be engaged with the tools we have at hand, our fingers, revealing the ineffectuality of responding to entanglement from without. This inability produces a gap or estrangement between us and the literal task at hand, implying that our everyday language or thinking is too crude to be able to engage the extreme subtleties of the spider's web, or by extension, the ability to describe extreme subtleties, with an imprecise language.

The image of the net constructs a similar situation to that of the web, despite the fact that the image initially seems reversed. In ¶106 we had been unable to engage with the web, in ¶428 Wittgenstein acts out this scenario from a different viewpoint, offering the image as estrangement itself, in its absurdity. With it, again our everyday thinking is examined for the gap between it and some "reality beyond", as if the connection between the two now were missing. The search for a connection or correlation of language and the world provides no certainty, and so posits in its place a missing connector in the form of a net. The net, as the web, is offered in place of the lost or hidden connection that logic and a transparent language had previously provided, and now obscured by language's ambiguous and opaque surface. The net emerges as the embodiment of the persistent doubt of language's ability to function without an exact correlation of word and meaning.

Crystalline purity

An example that arises immediately following the image of the web in ¶106, is the ice of ¶107, where again, a fixed view, constructed to be in our control, ends up controlling us. Through this example Wittgenstein directly confronts the thought of the *Tractatus* by explicitly introducing the crystalline purity of logic itself as the express image of what Wittgenstein has called "the entanglement with our own rules". Yet the image itself of a crystalline structure - compounded by the addition of purity and the association with logic - initially suggests quite the opposite.

The discussion of the crystalline purity of logic imposed upon language in the *Tractatus*, shows, however, that the attempts at a completely clarified form of expression produce what would seem to be the furthest thing away - entanglement, here arising in the form of a fixity akin to the frozen position of the view from without.

> 107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a *result of investigation*: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. — We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!

The image of crystalline purity, as presented, creates a very similar situation to the spider's web in the previous section in that each image is of a latticework of interwoven strands and segments, despite the fact that crystalline structures are typically offered as articulate, and webs as confusing.

Wittgenstein uses this duality of crystalline structures to allow for an important development in the text from an image of fixity (web, immobility) - to one of movement and spatial dislocation. The *Investigation's* persistent demands for movement provide the necessary impetus to transform the image of entanglement from without to one from within, as required to journey across the

landscape of language. The spatial crisis of these sections requires that the subject/philosopher/reader successfully work to define ways to engage entanglement rather than to be immobilized by it. It is a similar crisis to that at the end of the *Tractatus* which forced the transgression of its limits. And, it similarly demands transgression, literally in the form of movement which transforms the image of entanglement into something that can be inhabited.

The image of the crystalline purity of the ice, once posited, becomes explicitly associated with the scope, limits, and demands of logic, through its depiction of an extended and idealized plane. Offered at the onset as complete clarity, in its entrapment of Wittgenstein on the ice, it becomes yet another image of entanglement, as if the act of depicting the image had transformed it. The immobility enforced by the ideality of the surface of the ice acts here, to entrap anyone who steps onto it. The narrowness of the scope or frame of examination fostered by the crystalline structure of logic once understood as the essence of language, is thus shown to produce not ultimate clarity as hoped for, but intolerable conflict in the form of a fixity that results in the inability to move, a failure akin to the inability to repair the torn spider's web with our fingers. The transformation occurs when the ice does not yield the expected ideal results. The shock of the resultant suspended movement, in revealing the ice's true nature, acted as if to shatter the illusion that the ice could fulfill the desire for frictionless motion.

The desire to move ultimately wins out, making it necessary to disentangle oneself from the ideality of crystalline purity. This is accomplished by first recognizing that the criterion of crystalline purity imposed on language is itself a form of entanglement, however ideal the structure. Extrication from the crystalline image/structure involves redefining the aims of philosophy, and specifically of the philosophical study of language. The aim to construct a completely clarified form of expression, once depicted, is clearly seen to conflict with the desire to walk because the requirement leaves no room in which to move. But, by exactly correlating

meaning and language, the crystalline structure of logic had equally specified place, thereby disallowing movement by turning any possible movement into transgression.

The desire to move forces Wittgenstein to venture onto the rough ground of the landscape of language described in the preface, bringing the reader halfway to the second image of entanglement, that from within. Associating language and the landscape collapses the distance between the subject and language to construct a subject who inhabits everyday language, entangled, opaque and ambiguous as it appears, rather than one who remains helplessly removed when confronted with the image of entanglement.

Labyrinths and mazes

The second form of images of entanglement, those from within, unlike the first, are not produced solely by vision, but by the continuous dislocation of vision produced by moving through space, as found in the spatial field of language. That movement disrupts any one to one correlation of an image and a place so that the image no longer appears as a whole, but is continually constructed in the association of the subject and language. From *within* a spatial understanding of language Wittgenstein can finally begin to engage philosophical problems in a way unavailable in the *Tractatus*.

It is only following this production of images of entanglement from within that Wittgenstein is able to explicitly proclaim the spatiality and temporality of language against the ideality of logic: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm." (¶108) And following that newly defined space of language Wittgenstein can, finally, fully confront the image of language as the image of entanglement,

concluding in ¶109 that: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."

The *Investigations* in revealing the inseparability of the visual, verbal and spatial, undertakes philosophical problems in ways that engage all three. These problems include Wittgenstein's quest to define the scope, limits and functioning of language. They hinge on such central issues as the defining of boundaries and the correspondence of word and meaning integral to philosophy. The *Tractatus* had instead tried to draw clear demarcations in these relations with its picture theory, show-say distinction, one correct method and sharp categories of sense and nonsense. Engagement of philosophical problems and the understanding of language thus results in the *Investigations* from the spatial confusion produced by the inability to completely understand a three dimensional space from a single image or place of viewing, ultimately forcing Wittgenstein to search for a new criterion of clarity and meaning to replace that of logic.

Throughout the text, Wittgenstein continues to discuss language in its spatial configurations. In identical parenthetical comments at the ends of passages 525 and 534, each of which discuss the importance of context in understanding language, Wittgenstein writes: "A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction." And, in ¶426 Wittgenstein explicitly compares the view from without, the complete view, with the occluded view. The inhabiting of language in all of its ambiguities, incapable of yielding the clarity of the view from above, thus produces sketches of the landscape as images of entanglement .

The multiple meanings of many concepts and contradictions, or ways of viewing, in the *Investigations* suggests that the work of philosophy is not for philosophy simply to find its place within these sets of polarities, but to reconsider the polarity of our thinking. That is, to reconsider the limits within which we place and define our concepts. The multiplicity of methods in the *Investigations* additionally works toward defining new forms of clarity that result from redefined

limits and boundaries of relations and expressions. To this end, the visual- spatial metaphor of the sketch serves a purpose other than analogy and description: in constructing and imagining new forms of clarity that provide perspicuity in a manner not previously thought possible, Wittgenstein shows that the clarity we once thought necessary, may not even be possible.

> ¶426: A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense *unambiguously*. The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we get the same thing as in set theory: the form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose.
>
> In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side-roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed.

The philosophical problem

The image of philosophical problems and of the surface of language completely collapse around the image of entanglement in the *Investigations* to produce nearly identical definitions:

> 123. A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about".
>
> 203. Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.

The images of entanglement produced in the *Philosophical Investigations* thus function simultaneously as a description of the surface of language and of the philosophical problems that develop from the misreadings of that surface. Philosophical problems for Wittgenstein are not produced by this entanglement with our own rules, but are that entanglement itself. As with other images of entanglement, they arise in passages that search for relations between language and meaning and compare the philosophical/logical solution to that found in everyday language.

The image is posited in place of the (picture of) logic in the *Tractatus*. It is the image logic was meant to repress or to efface.

If philosophical problems have a certain form, what of philosophical solutions? The implication would be that the solution to not knowing one's way about is to find it. The defining relations of entanglement, however, changes the *Investigations*. In ¶125 Wittgenstein dispels the idea that the response to a philosophical problem is search for a solution to it.

> 125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that trouble us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.. . . .

The *Tractatus* had treated language as if it were transparent, as if you could see clearly through its surface to the meaning and logical form beneath and so it posited logic as the image of language - believing it to be a faithful one. It was this transparency and non-materiality of language in the *Tractatus* that seemed in need of a connection to its 'objects'. The situation in the *Investigations* is quite different. Accepting the complexity and ambiguity of language, leaves language no longer transparent. Language in the *Investigations*, as a spatial and temporal phenomenon is always already part of the world and philosophy in the *Investigations* can no longer deny or ignore the surface of language. Instead, it must now try to explain it and philosophy's entanglement with language and with logic.

> 125. . . . The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.
>
> This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).
>
> It throws light on our concept of *meaning* something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean it like that." . . .

This image of entanglement recalls the landscape and our paths across it even as it associates that image with the construction of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's stress on the role of the subject - "*we* lay down rule", "*we* follow the rules", "*we* are . . . entangled in *our own* rules" - in the creation of philosophical problems emphasizes the importance of considering the position of the subject in the response to these problems - "*we* want to understand", "That is just what *we* say". The role of the self, rather than being denied, is central to the understanding that *we* position ourselves *within* philosophical issues. Not realizing our own role in the creation of philosophical problems leads us to think that we are outside of the problem and thus, as with the web, incapable of affecting it, when, in reality, we are already entangled in our rules.

The discussion of entanglement immediately calls the criterion of clarity into question in the constructing defining and judging of the clarity of the views created. Clear views, however, need to be distinguished from the ability to obtain a complete view. The view from within in the *Investigations* supports no such illusion of completeness or clarity. The preface was the first site to consider the relation between clarity and completeness by considering how the sketches give or allow us to get "a picture of the landscape". That is, it raised the question of how a series of not necessarily complete or all inclusive sketches can, satisfactorily, depict an equally undefined yet extensive landscape. The uncertainty created between what is meant by sketch and landscape, whether there are one or many, fundamentally disturbs even any initial attempt at defining a new basis for clarity of vision. The question as to what extent the clarity of the view is contingent upon seeing the complete view becomes exacerbated by the potential for many views of many landscapes. The *Tractatus* had erred both in the attempt to produce a clear view and in the belief that such a view was necessary in order to understand language and respond to philosophical problems. To do that it constructed the view from without which created the illusion that a complete view was somehow available. But as with the example of the spider's web, the *Investigations* denies that the view from without leaves us capable of interacting at all meaningfully with what is viewed.

Albums

Wittgenstein's proclamation that the *Philosophical Investigations* "is only an album", made at the conclusion to his discussion of the landscape sketches, suggests that the book is, at least metaphorically, a sketch album. And in many ways, that is the intention of the *Investigations*, to construct, edit, select, assemble and collect depictions of the landscape of language.

Collecting and assembling are not, however, neutral activities, but involve a great deal of work on what is collected, as Wittgenstein acknowledged in the preface. In addition to how the collections are made, selected, edited, arranged and assembled, there remains the important question of what types or categories of things are being collected. Beyond the landscape sketches, the idea of an album couples with Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance and its origin in Galton's work to also suggest a family photo album.

Galton's photographs had resulted from overlaying multiple images to produce a composite surface that constituted a complex network of facial structures and familial associations. While these could be connected to form an album, each photographic image, is on its own, a collection or album of sorts. The collection and production of these complex images transforms the typical idea of an album as a serial, chronological cataloguing of examples, into a coincident network of multiple images that focuses, not just on the distinct images collected, but on the network of associations between images emerging within a singular photograph. Each photograph acts as in this way as a model of family resemblance.

The album thus produces images of entanglement in the depiction of the relationships between the landscape and the sketches similarly to that between the specific features of individuals and those that come together to produce a family resemblance. As with Galton's superimposed

images, the album is the collective construction of images of language. It brings together, onto one extended surface, the diverse elements that are language along with the (some of the) various practices and meanings that constitute a word or expression.

But, there are also a number of other types of things that the *Philosophical Investigations* collects, and other ways that it is an album. To begin with, the idea of an album suggests either a book with blank pages used for making a collection, or the collection itself. The idea that a philosophy book is only an album substantially challenges its status by suggesting that it is only a collection or set of blank pages waiting for, or conveying, some outside content. This idea reiterates Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as both lacking its own subject matter and as incapable of supplying a foundation for any other discourse. Philosophy's role instead becomes limited to that of collecting and assembling. Wittgenstein's claim in ¶127 upholds this view by specifying what is being collected: "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose."

The philosopher is portrayed here as an assembler or constructor, potentially not unlike the builders who in assembling the building stones are assembling the reminders of their language. The *Investigations* collects and arranges the everyday practices of language we encounter to produce a series of reminders of the multitude of ways and places in which we encounter language in contrast to the *Tractatus'* singular picture. The series of examples of various uses of language and the language games of the *Investigations* are reminders of these practices. But, they are less definitive reminders of what language is, than directives for the reader to examine or recall certain practices in which a given word or expression is used. In the example of games, for instance, it is suggested that the reader search not solely her/his memory but her/his environment as well. The reminders, supporting the idea of a photographic album, are often visual reminders and the assembling and arraying of those reminders are spatial practices.

Many of the reminders that Wittgenstein assembles are specifically aimed at the practice of philosophy. A common one is that it is a mistake to think that in doing philosophy something is hidden (in language) that is of relevance to the work. Section 126 envisions a philosophy of collecting by asking that philosophy simply put "everything before us" without explaining or deducing anything. Wittgenstein adds to this point that "one might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions." The series of examples that Wittgenstein puts forth and the reminders that he assembles reiterate this understanding. Wittgenstein places the burden of vision on the viewer rather than on the availability of the 'object' to vision, emphasizing the activity of collecting. Modified by the awareness that what is visible is not fixed by the object alone, it becomes clear that our practices of vision and our movement through space affect what becomes included in the album.

One example of the way in which Wittgenstein makes visible reminders is in his use of a sign post. The signpost in the landscape serves to recall the landscape sketches even as it questions the role and functioning of reminders, dispelling the view that there is a self-interpreting sign. The repeated image of the sign post points to the way topics, examples, doubts, questions, compulsions, and reminders are repeated throughout the text. Repetition serves an important purpose in the *Investigations*, by reinforcing Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as offering "reminders" of what we, by virtue of our being language users, already know. Philosophy, as such, becomes the process of presenting and revisiting everyday practices of language in contrast to the idea of philosophy as offering information, being revelatory or overseeing those practices to comment on them.. The *Investigations'* concern is consequently to construct a method of philosophy that functions by reminding the reader of these practices as they occur in the everyday use of language, not as they occur in, a removed and isolated practice of metaphysics.

In ¶140 while discussing the various uses of a given word, Wittgenstein offers an example of how reminders function within the philosophy of language, here with the practices of picturing a three dimensional geometrical object projected onto a two-dimensional plane.

> 140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a particular use on me? How could I think that? What *did* I think? Is there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application on us: so that my mistake lay in confusing one picture with another? – For we might also be inclined to express ourselves like this: we are at most under a psychological, not a logical, compulsion. And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of case.
>
> What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and -such a picture, such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
>
> What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the *same* meaning both times? I think we shall say not.

Understanding philosophy as a collection or assembly of reminders explains in part Wittgenstein's declaration that the *Investigations* is "only an album." As with a (family) photo album, the *Investigations* is meant not to show us something unfamiliar, but to remind us of that which is familiar. It is a look at ourselves, our pasts, our practices, our language and "forms of life" rather than to attempt to isolate the work of philosophy, or to use it to look at and comment on other practices from a foundational or (literally) superior position.

Importantly, the reminders in the *Investigations* also differ from a family photo album, in that they are based in uses of language and *assembled* from the public memory. These everyday uses of language, even when not familiar in their specific form, remind the reader of similar events and uses of language s/he may have encountered or can envision. The idea of memory once again recalls the opening of the *Investigations* with Augustine's memory of the acquisition of

language and Wittgenstein's added memory of the practice of building as manifested in the primitive language of the builders.

The idea of album suggests as well the construction of a sort of history. History in the *Investigations* becomes part of the method of the *Investigations*, for example, in the inseparability of its 'theory' from its writing. History arises in Wittgenstein's recalling his intellectual history of the *Tractatus* as well as his response to the history of philosophy in its formation of philosophical propositions and problems. This recalling of history is reiterated in the process of considering a philosophical problem, in emphasizing how it came about; turning the investigation not on where it leads - to some 'solution' but on how it arose, from its initial misconception and misdirection. The act of reminding thus has a double role. The reminders are not always about what we need to remember, to do, to think, but about where certain ways of thinking lead - say down the wrong path to the construction of 'pseudo' problems.

Rearrangement as a surface practice

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein repeatedly demands that the reader maintain his or her focus on what is visible *on the surface of language*. The production of the album was based on a series of surface practices, including those stated in the preface: rearrangement, editing and cropping. These processes by which the album was constructed from the sketches divide into two primary forms - those that alter the sketches themselves by such means as cropping and editing, and those that act upon the sketches as a whole, such as rejecting, repositioning, rearranging or regrouping. The surface practices of editing and rearrangement in the *Investigations* are offered in direct contrast to the *Tractatus'* attempts to get beneath the surface of language to the hidden "essence" of language.

The importance of surface for Wittgenstein cannot be overemphasized. Words and meaning together form the surface of language so that meaning is itself a function of surface and meaning, as language, can be seen to not only reside in, but to produce an external, public space. The insistence on the surface of language alters the implied correspondence of word and meaning as found in the *Tractatus* by disrupting the inner/essence - outer/surface dichotomy to, in effect, spread meaning across the surface of language rather than connect points through the surface.

The desire for essence is discussed in the *Investigations* as a search for a state of complete exactness. That search replaces the, at once more direct, yet elusive surveying of the surface of language by claiming that something not readily available to vision is the real goal of investigation. The surface practices of the *Investigations* denies any essence that succeeds by positing what could not be found through everyday vision and surface practices of rearrangement. Focusing on the surface of language discovers images of entanglement that

Wittgenstein had tried to evade in the *Tractatus*. In so doing, the surface formed by the everyday use of language was effaced, and philosophy was placed, despite the claims of the *Tractatus*, in the privileged position of accessing that structure - for where else could such a logical analysis occur. Wittgenstein's claim that this was necessary in order to clarify philosophical problems does not entirely mitigate that privilege. The *Investigation's* responded to the eradication of everyday vision by re-emphasizing it to focus the view back onto the visible surface of language to produce everyday views of language assembled in the *Investigations*.

> 92. This [search for a state of complete exactness in language] finds expression in questions as to the *essence* of language, of propositions, of thought. — For if we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language — its function, its structure, – yet *this* is not what those questions have in view. For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look *into* the thing, and which an analysis digs out.

The concept of assembly joins with that of reminders to define a space in which philosophy acts, one that limits its effect on language and yet demands an intimate association between the two. Philosophy as Wittgenstein tells us: "may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." (¶124) This enjoinder effectively prohibits philosophy from redefining the core of language as in the *Tractatus*, while at the same time it collapses the association of philosophy and language. It is in that collapse that philosophy is redefined in relation to everyday language. By no longer aiming to uncover the purity and essence of language embedded within it, philosophy is forced to describe the surface of language as it appears in practice.

In ¶109 of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein explores the deep affiliation between philosophy and language as one of arrangement. In this passage Wittgenstein explicitly associates what is surveyed - the workings of language - with the production of bewitchment that belies philosophical problems and estranges language.

> 109. It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and such" -- whatever that may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

The battle Wittgenstein alludes to was first waged by him with the *Tractatus* in the attempt to become unentangled from language and thereby attain a completely clear view of it and of philosophy. Such a view was only obtainable by distancing oneself from language. This disengaged view of the *Tractatus* insisted that language itself reflect that clarity of the prescribed philosophical vision, the requirement that language be made over in the image of clarity, the language of logic, an image that seemed as far from entanglement and bewitchment as possible. The *Investigations* in reconsidering the *Tractatus'* attempt necessarily reconsiders the image and criterion of clarity itself. Clarity arises in the *Investigations* not in opposition to, but along side the image of entanglement. The *Investigations'* battle lies in the attempt to reconcile clarity and entanglement, to produce clear views or sketches of our entanglement with language and of the shared territory of language and philosophy.

Arrangement thus emerges as the fundamental practice of philosophy and the study of language for Wittgenstein as a result of the fact that the philosopher always has to work within language and with words. This inescapability of language defines the view from within that allows for the inhabitation of language. Rearrangement produces and defines Wittgenstein's reconceived views on meaning, language and method in the *Investigations* as surface practices, inseparable from words themselves. The necessity to stay on the surface of language reinforces Wittgenstein's emphasis on everyday language in our actual use of words.

120. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? *Then how is another one to be constructed?*– And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!
In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language.
Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? -- Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was to be anything to ask!
And your scruples are misunderstandings.
Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)

Wittgenstein outlines a series of distinctions in this passage - that between the interior and exterior of words, between words and meanings, and most curiously- less a distinction than a relation - between scruples and misunderstandings. What initially seem like a series of obvious distinctions, (for the first two in the list at least) becomes when carefully examined, more and more difficult to maintain. The point is that traditional philosophy has through its search for the connection between the two, suggested that words and meanings are essentially different. The split between the two, as Wittgenstein points out, is, however, no more nebulous, than its connection.

"Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words." Words along with meaning as the surface of language, each becomes equally available to vision. Scruples enter the picture here referring to the seemingly ethical underpinning of the demand for absolute clarity, and in so doing, reassociating the ethical and philosophical (philosophy of language, logic, epistemology) that were divided in the *Tractatus*. But "scruples" is an interesting choice of word in its suggestion of an ethical consideration or principle that inhibits action or a reluctance on grounds of conscience. As this refers to ethics, it also recalls Wittgenstein's image of the idling engine and the view that philosophy is not productive work.

The suggestion that the 'ethical principles' overriding the *Tractatus* were themselves problematic is shown in the paradoxical demands for the absolute exactness and correlation of language and logical meaning while at the same time unable to make room for ethical propositions. By understanding ethics in the *Investigations* to be beyond scruples, beyond the hesitations to act on some unmentioned grounds of conscience, Wittgenstein allows for practice, ethics, etc. to enter into a general philosophy of language and theory of meaning. That is, the remaking of the model of meaning on the ethical/aesthetic, in relation to, rather than in contrast to a wider understanding of language and philosophy results from the new ability or the new impossibility of fully separating word and meaning, inner and outer, ethics and logic.

The assembly, arrangement, cutting down and dropping out of various sketches, constructs a description of what now can be understood for what it is - both an image of entanglement and one of perspicuity. The act of arranging thus continues to be a method for achieving clarity, but the view has changed. As such, these images produced in surveying and depicting that surface are no longer the clearly defined series of boundaries and limits defining the *Tractatus*, but are images of entanglement.

Boundaries

Wittgenstein's discussion of boundaries arises in the *Investigations* on the heels of his introduction of the concept of family resemblance. It begins in the *Investigations* as might be expected with consideration of how the concept of "game" is bounded. The multitude of practices comprising games suggests that the word "game" has neither a closed nor an absolute boundary. As a result, by observing the ways in which "game" or Wittgenstein's other example of "number" function in everyday practices of language, the concept of boundary itself comes to be reconsidered.

> 68. "All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the logical sum of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way the concept of a game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts." -- It need not be so. For I *can* give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is *not* closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can *draw* one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word "game".)
>
> "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated." ---- It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules of how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.

In the passage immediately following, the discussion of the boundaries of a word, concept or practice evolves into an explicit discussion of spatial limits and practices such as those involved in the practices of architectural drawings, measurement and building construction.

> 69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe *games* to him, and we might add: "This *and similar things* are called 'games'". And do we know any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is? -- But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary -- for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took the definition 1 pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one. -- Though you still owe me a definition of exactness.

The suggestion that we often operate without having exactly defined, and even more specifically, drawn boundaries, leads to the discussion of boundaries that are themselves not sharply defined, such as fuzzy pictures and roughly indicated places in order to test how indistinct boundaries function in everyday practices.

> 71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges. --- "But is a blurred concept a concept at all?" --- Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?
>
> Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. --- But is it senseless to say "Stand roughly there"? Suppose that I were standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand --- as if I were indicating a particular spot. Ands this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. – I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I – for some reason -- was unable to express; but that he is now to *employ* those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an *indirect* means of explaining – in default of a better. For any general definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that *this* is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game".)

The realization of undemarcated boundaries defining games raises the question of the nature of that and similar boundaries that separate word from word, concept from concept. Indistinct boundaries challenge, not just the concept defined, but the concept of boundary itself. As Wittgenstein draws no line between an abstracted concept of boundary and actual spatial and physical boundaries we may encounter, the shift from the functioning of boundaries in our use of language to a discussion of visual and spatial boundaries themselves is fluid. All uses of boundary, as of game participate in our understanding of the concept of boundary - as the concept of family resemblance assures us. Family resemblance can now be understood in terms beyond the defining of Wittgenstein's understanding of language to emerge as a spatial practice. In so doing, it reveals itself to be unthinkable without challenging the concept of boundary central to the *Tractatus*, including its ability to sharply distinguish showing from saying.

The breakdown of the show-say distinction lies in the suggestion that showing this way - the pointing with the hand or the giving of or pointing to examples - is not about an inability to express in a better or more precise manner. That is, showing does not start from the place at which saying fails as the *Tractatus* suggested, nor is it an inferior method. Instead showing focuses on practices, a focus that the *Tractatus* had denied. Practice in the *Investigations* prevails, not because saying had failed in its inability to define essence, but because of the concrete historical failure illustrated by the construction of philosophical theories, as compared with the successes of everyday forms of communication. That failure now becomes clear: practice provides a method of counteracting the hierarchy of saying over showing in philosophy that had produced mistakes based on appearance which, importantly, philosophy, by largely excluding the visual, was untrained in, and thus unable to, detect. As the *Investigations* claims, the ability to distinguish between the appearance of words is central in doing philosophy. But, philosophy in overlooking the visual/spatial/practical components of language had also overlooked those components through which distinctions in appearance of language were revealed.

The boundaries in the *Investigations* define, not just the distance from their counterparts in the *Tractatus*, but act to fundamentally reconfigure philosophy. The specific discussions of boundaries within the *Investigations* based in, and resulting from, the spatial practices of design and construction he encountered in the practice of architecture form the foundation of this thinking. Where as the *Tractatus* discussed the limits of language, of philosophy, the subject etc. - the nature and formation of the boundaries themselves were never discussed. Rather, as the *Investigations* acknowledges, they were repeatedly reinscribed in accordance with the (non-materialized) order of logic and, in contrast to, the *Investigations* continuously evolving construction of and challenge to, those same boundaries.

The question throughout the *Investigations* is one of context and function. What is the purpose of the boundary in question? The question as to what is gained (or lost) by an unattainable

criterion of exactitude echoes Wittgenstein's questioning of the requirement that language conform to logic. Conversely, many of the challenges to logic take form in the *Investigations* as spatial and physical measurement. The *Investigations* continually brings the concerns for spatial, linguistic and philosophical boundaries together in order to overcome the problems created in philosophy in its ignorance of these aspects of language.

Wittgenstein's remade boundaries of philosophy and language also act to redefine the idea of sense and nonsense that arise around diverse types of boundaries - many of which function in ways that could not, and more importantly, were not prescribed by the *Tractatus*. As it is the purpose of the boundary that determines the nature of the boundary desired, and by which we judge whether it has fulfilled its function; the nature or form of the boundary contributes to how it may function and thus what purposes it may serve.

> 499. To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.

Spatial angst

Acknowledging the spatial and temporal nature of language changes what it means to transgress or to inhabit language as its boundaries have been transformed. The transgression of the bounds of sense possible in the *Tractatus* have to confront the actualized boundaries of the *Investigations* that disallow the hypothetical transgression of language upon which the *Tractatus* was based.

This thinking supports Wittgenstein's demand in the *Investigations* that we can no longer command a clear view in our use of words as our grammar is lacking in (that) sort of

perspicuity. Clarity is dependent on a place from which one can command a 'clear view,' but where can that be with language? Not from seeing the whole of language because there can be no such position. Clarity and perspicuity arise from within, as any attempt to be from without is unobtainable, i.e. lacking in our language. As with Wittgenstein's question as to what becomes of logic now, this question becomes what becomes of clarity now? This raises a central problem with such a spatial metaphor, the problematic (seemingly contradictory) implication of an external standpoint. In that way, speaking of an inside is problematic to the extent that it implies something inaccessible beyond.

This concern associated with the transgression or even defining of boundaries arises in Wittgenstein's text as a certain amount of spatial angst associated with these remade, poorly defined, and potentially ever shifting boundaries. Passage 84 begins with the realization that as the meaning and use of a word "is not everywhere bounded by rules" the use of words themselves is not an absolutely defined practice. Uncertainty immediately takes on a spatial dimension, becoming a sort of inverse boundary in the landscape, one that emerges at the juncture of landscape and building. It is this same boundary, the one separating indoors from out, and moving us from looking at the landscape to being in it, which also forms the operative shift between images of entanglement.

> 84. I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where *it* might ? — Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a rule, and a doubt which it removes — and so on?
>
> But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right) — but that does not make me doubt in the same case.

The suggestion that there is something beyond, which we cannot get to, arises along with the declaration or implication of a boundary. This understanding in denying that there can be a

purely external or internal standpoint destroys the thinking that supports a dichotomy between the inner and the outer. The desire to be outside and be able to see the complete picture is no longer a possibility. (The sketches were not merely preparatory for a final version.) This same idea is reflected in Wittgenstein's understanding of philosophy's ability to discuss itself, in the understanding that philosophy does not have to get outside itself to define its own bounds or in order to "see" itself.

> 121. One might think: : if philosophy speaks of the use of "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so : it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order.

Wittgenstein's employment of the visual/spatial and family resemblance discussion of boundaries also serves to reassess the emerging practice of philosophy and the association of its component parts, including the practices of aesthetics and ethics. This produces the only time that Wittgenstein specifically mentions aesthetics/ethics in the *Investigations*.[4] It is not coincidental that the concepts of aesthetics and ethics, the make up of the boundaries of philosophy, and the realm of language and meaning as characterized by family resemblance should emerge together at this point in the *Investigations*. The juncture specifically ties together Wittgenstein's aim in the *Tractatus* of defining the scope and limits of language/philosophy, with an understanding that such a goal is a spatial practice - one remade with the new understanding of space, boundaries, practice, correspondence, agreement, etc. The working out of spatial problems in this section enters philosophy anew with the reference to aesthetics/ethics. These areas which had previously for Wittgenstein been marked by their functioning outside of the bounds of sense, become in the *Investigations* the site from which the new understanding of boundaries and meaning explicitly enter the *Investigations*.

> 77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp picture *can* resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course --- several such

[4] In the first and main part of the *Investigations*.

sharply defined rectangles can be drawn to correspond to the indefinite one. — But if the colors in the original merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart as a rectangle, for all the colors merge. Anything — and nothing — is right." — And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetic or ethics.

In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we *learn* the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

Shared Territory

Through the incorporation of aesthetics and ethics, practice, etc., into the philosophy of language Wittgenstein reconceived the functioning of language. The philosophy of language, i.e. the ostensible work of the *Investigations*, is thus irreparably altered. Aesthetics, ethics, practice epistemology, meaning, logic, etc are all entangled in the formation of the family resemblance of philosophy. The thread of logic that ran through all parts of language and philosophy in the *Tractatus* is no longer understood as the essence of language, hidden or otherwise. Instead, it remains a fibre in the twine, but as with all of the others, it does not run through all of language or philosophy, yet it remains a part of it. Equally, its placement is not obvious but is at times obscured, and its length is indeterminate. Yet, it remains logic. Logic, thus, along with aesthetics, ethics, and so on, forms the image of entanglement that emerges in the *Investigations*. The *Investigations* begins with that image and works to produce methods whereby it can be examined rather than replaced with a "clearer" model of what is unseen. The crystalline structure of language developed in the *Tractatus* itself becomes, when examined in the *Investigations*, another form of entanglement, not despite of, but as a direct result of its goal of absolute clarity.

The development of family resemblance and its proximity and lead in to the discussion of the breakdown of absolute boundaries culminated in the reference to ethics/aesthetics as if to reaffirm how meaning in the *Investigations* came to be modeled on aesthetics/ethics and not on logic. The breakdown of absolute boundaries brought with it the destruction of the one to one correspondence of word and meaning in the *Investigations'* ultimate repudiation of the requirement that sense be determinate. The discussion progresses so that it is not just about vague and sharp boundaries, but about the boundary between vague and sharp, whether that boundary be a wall, fence in a field or a delineation of concepts. With that, the *Investigations* reveals itself as the view from the *Tractatus*, defined from across the boundary the *Tractatus* had

attempted to draw. It is from there that Wittgenstein redraws the landscape. Aesthetics/ethics in the shift from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, has supplanted logic as the structuring order of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. But exactly because of that, what it means to structure language or philosophy is entirely changed.

Aesthetics and ethics reveal their importance by being the first site in which definitions and depictions are understood to not necessarily became more useful when made more absolute. This however does not remain solely the case for aesthetics and ethics. Rather as Wittgenstein's primary examples of the word "game" and the concept of language itself, such functioning is far more extensive. And as the discussion of boundaries in ¶77 reveals, there is no sharp line between vagueness and sharpness itself, in contrast to the *Tractatus* which drew, or attempted to draw, a sharp boundary between epistemology and ethics/aesthetics. They thus enter as a defining practice of the later philosophy, in effect, becoming the model language-game that was the original home, where this use of language was first learned. (116)

In the "Lecture on Ethics" Wittgenstein began a process that ultimately posited a collage, photomontage, aesthetic practice, at the center of his philosophy by remaking the philosophy of language in that image. Language becomes both knowable and understandable as family resemblance through an image capable of incorporating inseparably, multiple images to create new ones. The importance of the image of entanglement providing both the inspiration and explanation for language in the *Investigations*, turns out to be the effect of method in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As the *Investigations* functions through a series of examples and models the image of entanglement becomes the ultimate example, capable of revealing the language-game to itself be one of entanglement.

The *Tractatus* maintained the method of defining the outer by the inner, the excluded by the included. This left ethics/aesthetics/practice/showing paradoxically both privileged and

marginalized. Aesthetics and ethics become the site of his renewed interest in philosophy initially through the lecture on ethics and in the production of the *Investigations*. Although arguably still underground in the *Investigations* when read traditionally as subject matter, aesthetics/ethics comes to the forefront when read in accordance with the *Investigations'* emphasis on method and example. The return to the everyday as the model for philosophy is the site of the aesthetic and ethical. Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations* reincorporates aesthetics and ethics into philosophy along with the everyday to serve as the corrective model for philosophy. This does not limit aesthetics and the visual, spatial, the practices as art and architecture, to philosophy, but yields an alternative to the emptying of philosophy in the *Tractatus*.

Aesthetic practices lie at the center of Wittgenstein's philosophy in the *Investigations*, guiding the methods and examples. This is so, not simply because Wittgenstein's practice of architecture, his introduction of the builders, his placing a series of photographs as the first examples, or his emphasis on the visual and the spatial, or even because of the construction of images of entanglement, but rather because of the very functioning of language as entanglement. That functioning allows for aesthetics, practice, logic, epistemology, facts and the natural sciences all to be entwined in language, destroying the previously impermeable borders drawn with the *Tractatus*. The *Investigations* thus begins from the boundaries of sense drawn by the *Tractatus* and redefines the location and nature of that boundary, redefining the relations of philosophy, sense, language, practice, showing and saying in the process

In placing ethics and aesthetics at the center of his understanding of his later philosophy the *Investigations* thus moves outside of the self imposed bounds of the *Tractatus* to incorporate what previously could only be defined from without. Aesthetics and ethics thus replace, in one way, the role logic played in the *Tractatus*. Their inclusion of aesthetics/ethics provides more than just the ability to dismantle traditional philosophy, but creates the basis for building a philosophy. Logic as Wittgenstein tells us remains intact in the *Investigations*, but serves a

different more limited function, becoming a topic of investigation rather than maintaining its privileged role as the method of investigation. This reversal of modes of investigation show how changes in tools, media and approaches produce different understandings of reality, philosophy and language, supporting a main theme of the *Investigations* that methods, form, processes - i.e. the ways that we do philosophy - are a crucial part of philosophy.

The emphasis on and the multiplicity of methods in the later philosophy can be seen in Wittgenstein's work within architecture which introduced a multitude of new practices, methods and approaches to problems, as well as creating the field in which he could experiment and see the results of these experiments with methods of design, construction and thought. The practice of architecture that might have shored up Wittgenstein's view of the definitive nature of boundaries in the walls of a building, instead, led, him to see how diverse boundaries may be. These distinctions served to clearly differentiate boundaries from the limits of the *Tractatus*. Boundaries developed from practice in the *Investigations* where their specific qualities were determined by their required uses. In his practice of architecture, boundaries had emerged in a multitude of forms, as walls, windows, doors, openings, elevational changes, stairs, lines in the floor, and as solid, transparent, translucent and implied. In the later philosophy, this same thinking produces a use and context dependent structure for language and philosophy that is permeable at times, more definitive at others, allowing boundaries that had previously been solely exclusionary, re-emerge to produce a shared territory of philosophy and language, showing and saying, vision and space.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The Blue and Brown Books.* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Culture and Value.* ed. G.H. von Wright with Heikki Nyman. trans. Peter Winch. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. "A Lecture on Ethics". *Philosophical Review* 74, (1965), pp. 3-12.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.* ed. Cyril Barret. (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1967).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig., Notebooks, 1914-196, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford, 1961).

Witgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations.* third ed. trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Remarks.* ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Remarks on Color.* Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. L. McAlister and M. Schatle. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,* ed. G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford, 1956 first edition, 1978 third edition).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* Trans. D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).

Secondary Sources

Amendolagine, Francesco. "The House of Wittgenstein" *9H* No. 4, (London, 1982).

Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus.* (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1959).

Block, Irving., ed. *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein.* (Oxford,1984)

Bouveresse, Jacques. *Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious.* (Princeton University Press, 1995).

Brill, Susan. *Wittgenstein and Critical Theory.*(Ohio University Press, 1995)

Cacciari, Massimo. *Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture.* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993).

Cavell, Stanley. "Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy", in Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969) pp. 73-96.

Cavell, Stanley. "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy". in Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?*(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969) pp. 44-72.

Cavell, Stanley. *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism and Tragedy.* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

Cavell, Stanley. "Declining Decline" in Cavell, *This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lecturees after Emerson after Wittgenstein.* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Living Batch Press, 1989). pp. 29-76.

Cavell, Stanley. "The Argument of the Ordinary: Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in Cavell. *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).

Damisch, Hubert. *The Origin of Perspective.* trans. John Goodman. (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1994).

Danto, Arthur C. *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.)

Derrida, Jacques. "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" trans. Alan Bass,. in Derrida, *Margins of Philoosphy.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Diamond, Cora. *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind.* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1991).

Dummett, Michael. *Origins of Analytical Philosophy.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Engelmann, Paul. *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein.* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967).

Frege, Gottlob. *The Foundations of Arithmetic.* trans. J.L. Austin, (Oxford, 1974)

Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion.* (Oxford: University Press 1972).

Harbison, Robert. *Thirteen Ways: Theoretical Investigations in Architecture.* (Camridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1997).

Hollier, Dennis *Against Architecture: The Writings of George Bataille.* (Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press 1989)

Janik, Allan and Toulman, Stephen. *Wittgenstein's Vienna,*(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

Jay, Martin. *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Karatani, Kojin. *Architecture as Metaphor: Language, Number, Money.* (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1995).

Kenny, Anthony. *Wittgenstein.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973)

Koethe, John. *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought.* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Kripke, Saul. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

Leitner, Bernhard. *The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein.* (New York: New York University Press, 1976)

McGuiness, ed. *Wittgenstein and His Times.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Mitchell, W.J.T., ed. *The Language of Images,* (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1980).

Mitchell, W.J. T. *Picture Theory,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Monk, Ray. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

Mulhall, Stephen. *On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects.* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990).

Nedo, Michael. ed. *Introduction. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Wiener Ausgabe.* (Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993).

Rhees, Rush. *Discussions of Wittgenstein.* (London: 1970).

Sluga, Hans. "Between Modernism and Postmodernity: The Case of Wittgenstein and his Architecture" unpublished manuscript.

Staten, Henry. *Wittgenstein and Derrida.* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

Wijdeveld, Paul. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect.* (Cambidge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994),

Wigley, Mark. *The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt*. (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1993).

Winch, Peter. "Language Thought and World in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, " in Winch, *Trying to Make Sense*. (Oxford, 1987), pp. 3-17.