Knights in Shining Armor?
When Humanitarian Military Intervention Works and When It Does Not

by

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ABSTRACT

Military intervention for stated humanitarian purposes has been undertaken on several occasions since the end of the Cold War. It is bound to be attempted again, yet academics and policy makers have left fundamental questions unanswered. Have past humanitarian military interventions saved lives? Under what conditions is humanitarian intervention likely to save lives in the future?

Case studies of humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq from 1991 through 1996, Somalia from 1992 to 1995, and Rwanda in 1994 reveal that seven out of ten military operations saved more lives than would have been saved in the absence of intervention. However, the number of lives saved was lower than is commonly believed, ranging from thousands in Iraq to tens of thousands in Rwanda, not the hundreds of thousands governments claim. Humanitarian intervention saved lives in all three countries, suggesting that contextual variables -- such as the immediate causes of death and the particular causes of political break down -- do not determine success or failure.

Five factors determine success and failure. They are the (1) balance between an intervenor’s humanitarian and political objectives, (2) strategy employed by the intervening force, (3) intervenor’s capabilities, (4) level of coordination: between humanitarian and military organizations, and (5) length of delay before an international response.

My research suggests humanitarian intervention is very likely to save lives when the intervenor(s) has political objectives as well as humanitarian ones, follows an operational strategy that is determined by needs on the ground rather than preconceptions, has the capability to dominate the battlefield and communicate with the local population, actively coordinates the interaction between humanitarian and military organizations, and responds to a humanitarian emergency quickly. In most cases, the optimal conditions for humanitarian intervention are not present because the states that are capable of intervening do not feel their national interests are engaged. As a result, they respond slowly (timing), do not plan their actions well (strategy and coordination), and have little motivation to persist when costs begin to rise (objectives and capabilities).

Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Van Evera
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For Susan Weber Seybold

She willingly gave me more support and encouragement than I ever could have asked for.
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Chapter One

The Nature of Humanitarian Intervention

Introduction

Iraqi Kurds, Somalia, Rwanda: the very words evoke thoughts of disaster and massive human suffering. They elicit contradictory impulses to help and to avoid getting involved. Violent conflicts in places such as these characterize the world of war at the very end of the twentieth century. Wars occur within state borders, but spill over in the form of refugees, in calls for humanitarian assistance, and in the potential to spread violence to other states. Combatants and non-combatants are often indistinct. Huge numbers of civilians suffer privation and death. According to the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, from 1985 to 1989 an average of five manmade humanitarian emergencies occurred each year. In 1990, there were 20 ongoing humanitarian emergencies. The number peaked at 26 in 1994.¹

What is humanitarian intervention?

The contexts within which these humanitarian emergencies take place are extremely complex. Political systems have crumbled; loosely commanded armed factions vie for power. Many of the countries in question suffer from chronic poverty, serious environmental problems, and political groups that base their identity on ethnic (thus supposedly immutable) differences with their neighbors. Emergency relief, long-term assistance, conflict resolution, and institution-

building have become entwined. These are truly "complex emergencies," to use a term popular in the humanitarian relief community.

Usually the security and economic interests of developed and powerful countries are not threatened by these bloody internal wars. Consequently, there is confusion about what role outside countries should play. One of the most dramatic and controversial responses is military intervention to assist humanitarian relief efforts, known as humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention has been attempted several times since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the Kurds of Iraq in 1991 and continuing today in the former Yugoslavia. It has met with varying degrees of success.

The growing body of experience has raised more questions than it has answered. Humanitarian intervention has saved the lives of thousands of people, yet it has cost the lives of soldiers and aid workers. It has provided desperate populations with the bare necessities of life, but it has perpetuated the violent conflicts that create the humanitarian crisis in the first place. Humanitarian intervention has turned the traditional roles of aid workers and soldiers on their heads by militarizing humanitarian aid and forcing militaries to become service providers.

Opportunities for humanitarian intervention will surely arise in the future. When they do, politicians will often be asked to do more than provide blankets and biscuits for distant and desperate people. The stakes are highest when they consider military involvement. Therefore, fundamental questions about the efficacy of humanitarian military intervention should be answered. Should military intervention ever be a response to humanitarian need? On what basis are we to make this judgement? If military intervention is sometimes an appropriate response, under what conditions is it? What should be the purpose of military involvement? How should
that purpose be pursued?

This dissertation joins a growing number of studies intended to answer these questions. It takes a consequentialist approach. In contrast to normative studies on the duty to protect fellow humans and legalistic studies on the right to intervene in sovereign states,\(^2\) my answers to the above questions are based on the material effect of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. I submit that countries should consider military involvement if such involvement is likely to dramatically help the local population.

I define humanitarian intervention to be military intervention in an on-going violent conflict for the stated purpose of helping the population of the target country. The military action can be forcible or non-forcible; it can be multilateral or unilateral; it can involve combat or not. Peacekeeping operations do not fall within this definition, since they take place where there is a cease-fire or peace settlement, not on-going violence. Military responses to emergencies caused by natural disasters also do not fall within this definition of humanitarian intervention.\(^3\)

Has humanitarian intervention saved lives in the past?

How are we to judge when humanitarian intervention worked? I consider humanitarian intervention to succeed when it saves lives. This is a narrow, short-term standard. It does not take into account many potential benefits of humanitarian intervention, such as allowing people

\(^2\) According to Dissertation Abstracts International, almost all dissertations on the topic of humanitarian intervention address its legality and morality. The second most common approach is to investigate ways to strengthen the United Nations' institutional capacity.

\(^3\) The definition I use is not unusual, though the term humanitarian intervention is sometimes used by others to mean a much broader class of events, including peacekeeping operations and military responses to natural disasters. The term is sometimes used to refer to non-military responses to humanitarian emergencies by international relief organizations.
to return to their homes and contributing to the termination of conflict. It also does not
encompass the unintended negative consequences that can arise, such as perpetuating the conflict
and creating economic dependency.

There are several reasons to measure a humanitarian intervention’s success or failure
according to how many people it saves from imminent death. First, lives saved is the lowest
common denominator in the confused debate about humanitarian intervention. Everyone agrees
that saving lives is a minimal threshold for judging an operation to be a success. In that sense I
set up an easy test for the efficacy of humanitarian intervention. Second, the standard is not as
low as it appears at first, and therefore is not as easy a test of humanitarian intervention as one
might think. Many people who receive assistance die anyway. Furthermore, most of the people
who receive assistance would not die even in the absence of external help. Therefore, to credit
an intervention only with saving the lives of those people who would have died if they did not
receive help, and did not die because they received help, is to set a pretty high standard, narrow
though it may be.4 Third, the number of lives saved is quantifiable. The same can not be said of
steps toward rebuilding civil society, for example. Fourth, counting lives saved encompasses
other quantifiable measures used by relief organizations, such as geographic area covered and
number of people who receive assistance. Fifth, using the number of lives saved as my
dependent variable does not preclude discussion of the political consequences of humanitarian
intervention. Finally, no one to my knowledge has carefully investigated and answered the basic

4 “Many of those at risk of death die anyway, despite receiving assistance. More important, however, is
the fact that the majority of the population that benefited would not have died whether they had received aid or not.
In general, the greater the aid coverage of a large population, the lower is the marginal effectiveness of such aid in
question that should underlie any serious discussion of humanitarian intervention.

Therefore, the first question this dissertation answers is, has humanitarian intervention saved lives in the past? I argue that military intervention for humanitarian purposes has often saved more lives than could have been saved in the absence of military action.\textsuperscript{5} Table 1-1 summarizes the numbers that my research supports.\textsuperscript{6}

Table 1-1: Approximate Number of Lives Lost and Lives Saved by Military Operations in Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Lives Saved *</th>
<th>Net Gain?</th>
<th>Lives Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>&gt; 7,500 camps; &gt; 20,000 safe zone</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&gt; 6,200 camps; ~20,000 rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Guards in Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>&gt; 27,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UN Operation Somalia I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>~ 83,000 - 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>~ 10,000 (?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restore Hope (UNITAF)</td>
<td>≥ 10,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 10,000 - 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Operation Somalia II</td>
<td>~ 2,000 (?)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>~ 1,000 - 1,500 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>~ 22,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 94,000 - 126,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
<td>~ 65,000 - 70,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission</td>
<td>~ 20,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turquoise</td>
<td>~ 13,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Hope</td>
<td>1,000s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>~ 100,000 - 115,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 860,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The numbers in this column refer only to those people saved through military activities.

\textsuperscript{5} By military action, I mean the deployment of military forces, from logistics experts to combat troops.
\textsuperscript{6} I arrived at these numbers by comparing epidemiological data with humanitarian and military activities, as detailed in the case studies.
People saved through humanitarian activities alone during the same time period are not counted. ** This is the number of people killed by UN/QRF forces, not the number who died from other causes. Therefore, it is not comparable to the other numbers in this column. I include it because (a) there is no good data on the overall number of people who died during this period and (b) it highlights the criticism of UNOSOM II that it did as much harm as good.

From 1991 to 1995 there were ten distinct military operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda -- the three countries treated in this dissertation. Seven of them saved lives, although in all but one case more people died during the complex emergency than were saved from death. Further, it is worth noting that the number of lives saved was often lower than commonly believed, sometimes far lower. It is also important to note that humanitarian intervention saved lives in all three countries, suggesting that contextual factors are not determinant.

In northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort saved the lives of about 7,500 people in refugee camps just over the Turkish border by providing the bare necessities of life. The operation saved a further 20,000 or more lives by establishing and sustaining the safe zone inside Iraq. This was the only humanitarian intervention that saved as many lives as the number that were lost. The United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq, in contrast, was ineffective at protecting aid organizations, and did not save any lives.

In Somalia, the first United Nations Operation (UNOSOM I) was unable to protect aid organizations and saved no lives. The airlift known as Operation Provide Relief fulfilled a need for extraordinary logistical capacity and delivered emergency supplies that saved approximately 10,000 lives in southern Somalia. The large American Operation Restore Hope also saved about 10,000 lives by protecting aid organizations and providing logistical assistance, primarily in the
capital city of Mogadishu. The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) probably saved a couple thousand lives in the countryside by protecting aid organizations, but it also killed over a thousand Somalis in Mogadishu and severely curtailed the activities of humanitarian workers. I consider it to be the third intervention that did not save lives, at least in terms of net gain.

In Rwanda, the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Army saved approximately 65,000 to 70,000 people from death by pursuing a successful offensive war to defeat the genocidal government.\footnote{In the empirical chapter on Rwanda I explain why I include the rebel offensive in my analysis of humanitarian intervention.} The very small United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) managed to save about 20,000 people by protecting several large groups in the capital Kigali. The controversial French Operation Turquoise saved between 13,000 and 20,000 people by establishing a safe zone and lightly patrolling it. The American Operation Support Hope that responded to the refugee crisis in Zaire after the genocide was over saved several thousand people by providing logistical support.

When is humanitarian intervention likely to save lives?

A number of questions regularly arise about the practice of humanitarian intervention. The key issues concern the nature of humanitarian action itself. In particular, they concern the compatibility of humanitarianism with the politicization inevitable in complex emergencies, and the militarization of aid that is often unavoidable when soldiers are part of the international
response. Does feeding people also feed the conflict? Can intervention stop the killing as well as the dying? Does military intervention jeopardize the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian organizations? What is the proper role of humanitarian assistance in managing complex emergencies? Do non-governmental organizations risk losing their autonomy when they are part of a large coordinated international response? Has attention to humanitarian intervention indicated an avoidance of serious policy-making? How can humanitarian intervention be made more effective?

There are many answers to these questions and little agreement. About the only thing the array of authors agrees on is that military intervention in the name of humanitarian objectives has the potential to save the lives of civilians in complex emergencies. Disagreements about how great that potential is, and what must be done to realize it, do not constitute a debate so much as a shouting match. To date, there has been precious little synthesis. This dissertation attempts to make sense of the cacophony. It asks, under what circumstances is humanitarian intervention likely to save lives?

I argue that the primary determinants of successful humanitarian intervention are factors that intervening states can control, at least in theory. They are (1) the objectives of the intervenor, (2) the type of strategy employed by the intervening force, (3) the capabilities of the

---


intervening force in comparison to the needs on the ground, (4) the level of coordination between humanitarian and military organizations, and (5) the timing of the intervention. Authors otly debate some of these -- for example, the proper balance between political and humanitarian objectives -- and virtually ignore others -- for example, the strengths and weaknesses of different strategies. In the next section I lay out contending arguments for each factor and critique them.

**Critical Factors**

It is important to focus on the factors of objectives, strategy, capabilities, coordination, and timing for several reasons. First, they highlight points of disagreement in the literature on humanitarian intervention. I summarize the most prominent disagreements below. Second, the five factors cover what appears to be most important for determining the likely success or failure of humanitarian military intervention. Third, established theories of international relations, comparative politics, and military intervention do not provide an adequate basis for a full analysis of both the effects and process of humanitarian intervention. My analysis of the five factors is informed by existing theories and attempts to move forward in largely uncharted theoretical territory. Fourth, since these five factors are manipulable, they lie at the center of the “we-can-do-it-better” debate.

**Objectives**

Every time a government responds to a humanitarian crises in another state, questions arise about its motives and intentions. Is it really interested in helping another state’s citizens, or does it have a political objective hidden behind the humanitarian rhetoric? This dissertation
considers the objectives of an intervenor, whether a coalition of states or the UN, to exist along a continuum from purely humanitarian to purely political.

Military action for purely humanitarian objectives is rare, but has occurred. An example is the 1991 American Operation Sea Angle in response to tropical cyclone “Marian” that devastated Bangladesh. The U.S. devoted military assets already in the area to the relief effort. Notably, the occasion was a natural disaster, not a political upheaval. Military action for purely political objectives is common. Most instances of intervention throughout history fall into this category. I do not consider them to fall into the class of events called humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian military interventions in response to complex emergencies usually exhibit a mixture of humanitarian and political objectives. Academic analysts disagree on the desired balance of humanitarian and political objectives. Practitioners, on the other hand, are largely united behind the view that view mixed objectives are highly problematic. Two questions regularly arise as a result. When should a state or the UN get militarily involved in a humanitarian crisis? Should humanitarian and political objectives be kept separate when responding to a complex emergency?

There are two positions regarding when to get involved. The first is that moral concerns are sufficient to warrant international action. Adherents argue that when people are dying in great numbers, members of the international community have a responsibility to respond, whether they have political interests at stake or not. They assert that state sovereignty can be

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over ridden if the government in question does not do enough to address massive violations of
basic human rights and deprivation of the bare necessities of life (food, water, shelter, and
peace). More importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, they contend that moral concern
can provide sufficient incentive to commit the resources necessary to succeed.12

The second position is that military action should only be undertaken when political
concerns are at stake in addition to moral ones. Morality alone can not be a guide for
humanitarian intervention for two reasons. First, there are many more places in the world that
have a moral claim to help due to their desperate condition than there are resources available to
provide help. Therefore a second standard must be used in addition to moral concern. That
criterion should be the level of political interest the country in question holds for the potential
intervenor.13 Second, the presence of political objectives will increase the chances that other
important factors will be present, such as adequate resources and commitment to persevere in the
face of adversity.14

There are also two positions on whether or not political and humanitarian objectives
should be kept separate when responding to complex emergencies. Many of the same people
who maintain that moral concern ought to be a sufficient incentive also argue strenuously that

Affairs, Vol. 6 (1992), pp. 95-118.
12 A prime example is Allison Des Forges’ book on what could have been done in Rwanda (forthcoming, 1999).
humanitarian and political objectives must be kept entirely separate.\textsuperscript{15} Military and humanitarian action must also be kept conceptually and operationally distinct. If they are not, local actors will see humanitarian relief as a tool for their own political objectives. Adherents of this position argue that the failure to clearly separate political and humanitarian objectives and actors endangers the political neutrality and impartiality of aid agencies. Lack of neutrality leads to a situation in which humanitarian action is corrupted, emergency relief is politicized, relief delivery efforts are inhibited, and aid workers lives are endangered.\textsuperscript{16}

In opposition to this set of authors are those who maintain that humanitarian and political objectives can not be kept separate from each other. Complex emergencies are war zones. Frequently the civilian population is a deliberate target of one or more sides in the war. In such circumstances, providing succor to civilians is a political activity. Therefore, all outside actors, particularly military forces, must be prepared to be treated and respond as political actors. They must have at least some notion of their political objectives if they are to act in a consistent and coherent manner.\textsuperscript{17} The strongest advocates in this camp argue that humanitarian intervention is most likely to succeed when the political interests of the intervening states are strongly engaged,


My own position is that it is critically important for an intervenor to have a political component to its objectives. Altruistic acts that provide only abstract benefits to the intervenor do not stand up well to the concrete costs of intervention. The intervenor must believe that it too is benefiting in some way. That benefit should be political because the costs are political. The stronger the political objectives, the more likely a potential intervenor is to act quickly, commit adequate resources, take risks, and stay the course when costs rise.

At the same time, it is important that an intervenor’s humanitarian and political objectives are compatible and do not clash. The pursuit of non-humanitarian objectives must produce humanitarian results, or at a minimum must not stand in the way of them. Such was the case with the safe zone established by Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. It protected the Kurds and aid organizations while also allowing the United States and its allies to keep a thorn in Saddam Hussein’s side and prevent a large influx of Kurdish people into Turkey. When humanitarian and political objectives clash, political concerns will inevitably overrun humanitarian ones.

I argue objectives that are heavily, or even exclusively, humanitarian can yield a successful outcome in terms of saving lives only when the likely costs of intervention are low, that is, when people are dying of privation as opposed to violence and local actors consent to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Even then, outsiders are more likely to act in a timely manner when they are politically motivated. In contrast, political objectives are necessary when
people are dying of violence and local consent for the operation is provisional or absent. Complex emergencies tend to resemble the second set of circumstances. Therefore, humanitarian intervention must usually have a political element to its objectives if it is to succeed. In the interest of minimizing the abuse of humanitarian rhetoric as a cover for traditional politically motivated intervention, any state that undertakes a purported humanitarian intervention should seek the prior approval of the United Nations Security Council and accept oversight from the same.

**Strategy**

The term strategy in this dissertation refers to operational approaches used to achieve stated objectives. It does not refer to the larger question of whether or not to intervene. Nor does it imply political coherence. Past military deployments in response to humanitarian crises have used a number of different strategies. Two main questions arise with regard to the choice and implementation of strategies. How hard is humanitarian military intervention? Which strategies work best and which are counter-productive?

The question of difficulty plays out in two diametrically opposed positions. One argument is that a small military force can do a lot of good. The opposing argument is that a large military force can do a little good. Adherents of the first position point out that many indigenous armed forces are small, poorly trained, lightly equipped and disorganized. In most cases, it does not take very many crack troops from a developed country to have a significant
impact on the level of violence, and thus the mortality rate, in a complex emergency. The best known example of this position is the claim by Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. He commanded approximately 400 UN troops who remained in Rwanda throughout the genocide in 1994. Since then he has often repeated the claim that if he had been immediately provided with a well-equipped battalion of 5,000 Canadian soldiers, he could have stopped the genocide and saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

The counter argument is that it takes a large and robust military force to do much good in a complex emergency. Adherents point out that humanitarian intervention occurs in places where one or more armed party does not give its consent. Except for the strategy of providing logistical assistance, these operations involve either compellence or active defense in the event of deterrence failure and require “the application of deadly force as a defense against deadly force.” Therefore, intervening forces not only should be able to fight, but they should be able to dominate the battlefield in order to obtain their objectives quickly with as few “friendly” casualties as possible. Dominating the battlefield almost always requires significant air forces and ground forces (if they are used at all), as well as a large organizational infrastructure to support them. Supporters of this position cite as evidence the October 3, 1993, fire fight in Mogadishu, Somalia, that resulted in the deaths of 18 Americans, one Malaysian, and hundreds

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22 Zinni, p. 28.
of Somalis. They also point to the 1995 massacre of Muslims by Serbs in Srebrenica, Bosnia, despite the presence of a small unit of UN peacekeepers and NATO warplanes in the area.

My own argument is that the degree of difficulty depends on the strategy pursued. Airlifts can have a significant impact on mortality rates in crisis situations and do not require a large expenditure of resources by military standards. As one scales up the roster of alternative strategies (see below), the military requirements become more stringent. I agree with the skeptical observers that strategies which potentially involve fighting are more difficult than many people believe.

The question of which strategies work best is poorly handled in the literature. The full range of strategic options is rarely considered by either the people who plan the operations\(^\text{23}\) or the people to later analyze them.\(^\text{24}\) As I see it, there are four broad types of strategy for military forces intervening in a complex emergency. Within each type several variations are possible. I categorize the strategies along two dimensions: the problem they address and the local actors on which they focus. Table 1-2 on the next page provides a visual summary.

In this typology the four strategies are: (1) provide aid organizations with logistical capacity and/or offer direct relief assistance to the affected population; (2) physically protect humanitarian aid personnel, facilities, and supplies;\(^\text{25}\) (3) physically protect the population; and


\(^{25}\) The word “physically” is important, since according to international humanitarian law protection should be offered to aid operations by the local belligerents in light of humanitarian relief’s politically neutral position. Similarly, when the UNHCR uses the term protection, it is referring to protection under the law that ought to be
(4) defeat the perpetrators. It is common for a single intervention force to pursue more than one strategy simultaneously.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address Privation</th>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
<th>Focus on Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>provide logistics and direct assistance</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>protect aid personnel, facilities and supplies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- non-combat</td>
<td></td>
<td>-- defense and deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-- point or area protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>protect the population</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>defeat the perpetrators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- defense and deterrence</td>
<td></td>
<td>-- compellence, i.e. offensive action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- point or area protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the four types of strategies can take several specific forms. The first strategy, as the name implies, can offer logistical assistance to aid organizations or direct relief to the suffering population. Logistical assistance usually takes the form of strategic airlift to bring large quantities emergency supplies to a crisis region rapidly, theater airlift to move supplies to locations that are difficult to reach due to terrain or violence, cargo handling equipment, and personnel with the expertise to move and keep track of tons of material in rapidly changing environments. Logistical services have been provided in every humanitarian intervention to date, from Bosnia to Zaire. Direct assistance to the population entails the distribution of food, water and tenting; medical treatment; and engineering, from digging latrines to restoring electric power

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26 As far as I know, there is no typology of strategies in the existing literature on military doctrine, post hoc evaluations previous interventions, or calls for more effective action. What follows is my own analytic construction.

supplies. Military units engage in direct assistance less frequently, but sometimes play critical roles, as they did in tending to the Iraqi Kurds before humanitarian organizations arrived. This is the only one of the four types that is a non-combat strategy.

The second general strategy -- physical protection of aid operations and personnel -- can be offered at specific locations (called point protection), or over a wide area (called area protection). Ground troops, aircraft or both attempt to deter attacks on aid operations. If deterrence fails, military personnel must fight to defend their charges. Whether military forces offer protection at specific locations or over a wide area is a decision that must be made at the national capital level. In contrast, the dynamic of the environment determines when protection requires deterrence (passive use of force) and when it requires defense (active fighting). If an intervenor chooses to pursue a strategy of aid protection, it must be prepared to fight since the need for protection in the first place implies less than full consent by local parties.

The third type of strategy -- physical protection of the local population -- also can be offered at specific locations or over a wide area. As with the protection of aid operations, troops attempt to deter attacks and if deterrence fails they must defend the population. Point protection -- the protection of specific sites -- is usually easier in the short term than covering a large area. However, it tends to create and perpetuate situations in which people are separated

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28 Point deterrence and defense, as I conceive them, include the protection of convoys as well as fixed locations.
29 Most humanitarian NGOs, UN agencies, and even the majority of diplomats have been very reluctant to accept this basic concept. Until repeated experience forced them to change their minds, they clung to the peacekeeping mind set in which external forces monitor events but do not fight. This is the wrong way to think when there is no peace to keep.
30 The strategies of aid protection and population protection overlap when they are offered over a wide area. Any population under a protective umbrella will attract aid organizations which will then receive the same level of protection.
from their homes and normal sources of livelihood, making them entirely dependent on outside assistance. Area protection -- protection of everyone in a wide region -- avoids this problem but at the cost of preventing only large-scale violence while small-scale attacks on civilians continue. The reason is that intervening forces never have the manpower and knowledge to police large, populated areas. Like the second strategy, this one requires the intervenor to be prepared for combat.

The fourth strategy -- defeat the perpetrator(s) -- can take a number of forms. On the most ambitious end of the scale, an intervenor can try to end the conflict by dominating all sides and creating a comparatively peaceful environment. The intervener also can pick a party and help it to win, which is easier than dominating all parties, but still very hard.31 A third alternative, rather than seeking total defeat, is to push perpetrators out of certain locations to create safe areas that then offer protection to a population and the aid organizations attending to them. The safe zone in northern Iraq is an example. All forms of this strategy involve combat to compel the perpetrator(s) to cease the activity that is causing human suffering (or to compel their opponents to stop resisting).

Interveners often appear to be unaware of the conceptual distinctions between strategies and their consequent operational implications. The literature on humanitarian intervention does not offer adequate guidance. In my view, this is a very dangerous state of affairs. When an

31 It is possible for this strategy to take a form opposite to what its name implies. That is, to support the perpetrator. The logic is that the best way to end human suffering is to end the war causing it. Since the perpetrator is usually the stronger party, helping them will end the war more quickly. Historically, governments have often supported the perpetrators of human rights abuses and humanitarian crimes, but to achieve political rather than humanitarian ends. Supporting perpetrators has almost never had humanitarian consequences and has not been publicly justified on humanitarian grounds. In Bosnia, for example, it would have meant helping the Serbs to defeat the Muslims and Croats.
intervenor does not clarify for itself whether it is addressing privation or violence and whether it is focusing on the victims or the perpetrators, it is likely to under or over estimate the task at hand, arrive with inappropriate equipment, mandate, and rules of engagement, and have a hard time knowing when it has fulfilled its objectives. It is critically important for the success of an operation that the intervenor know which strategy or strategies it is following, use strategies that address the causes of death, and understand the requirements of the strategies used.

Capabilities

The term capabilities refers to the combat and non-combat capabilities of military forces: force size, composition, equipment, training, and rules of engagement. The capabilities required of humanitarian relief organizations are not featured in this dissertation, since the activity under investigation is military intervention not humanitarian relief by itself.

There is wide-spread recognition that military forces are uniquely capable of providing physical protection in violent environments. There is also a general recognition that Western military forces posses tremendous logistics and engineering capabilities, both of which are critically important for attending to the needs of displaced persons. They have the equipment and expertise to move huge quantities of material to remote locations rapidly and often can

32 A military force’s rules of engagement provide guidance to soldiers about when they are allowed to use force, how much force, and against whom. I include the rules of engagement in the capability of an intervention force because it is an important factor determining how effective the force will be in the field. If the rules of engagement do not allow troops to respond to violence, then even impressive physical capability might not prevent continued violence, as was shown by the beating death of a Haitian man by the paramilitary, right in front of American soldiers who had orders not to interfere. On the other end of the spectrum, if the rules of engagement are not restrictive enough, they can open the door to excessive use of violence by the intervening force.

33 In dangerous environments where there is no foreign military presence, humanitarian organizations often seek protection by hiring armed guards from the local population. The guards are fairly effective at warding off bandits but utterly unsuitable for protecting expatriates or the local population from the ravages of war.
initiate large-scale relief more quickly than humanitarian organizations. Military forces also have the equipment and personnel to build roads, dig latrines and mass graves, repair power generators, and so on. Humanitarian organizations can hire commercial contractors to do the same tasks, but usually they are slower to arrive and require more oversight.

The one point of contention about capabilities is how much combat power is needed. One set of authors believes relatively small infantry units can provide a great deal of stability and protection. Their arguments are based on the peacekeeping model of foreign military intervention. An opposing set of authors contends that a very strong force is needed in most cases. They work from deterrence and war-fighting assumptions. The arguments run parallel to those about the difficulty of humanitarian intervention, which I discussed in the previous section.

I argue that the military capabilities necessary for success depend on the strategy pursued. For the strategy of logistics support, it is self evident that plentiful logistics capabilities are required. For the strategies of aid protection, population protection, and defeating the perpetrator of violence, an intervenor should commit a force that is large, highly combat capable, and

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possesses an unusually large combat support element. Such a force is better able to deter attacks. If deterrence fails, a large force is better equipped to win a battle quickly. The fighting might be intense, but it is less likely to be drawn out than when the intervention force is not much stronger that the local belligerents.

Small military units are useful, but only in the right circumstances. The most important condition is that small units are backed up by a much larger force. Local Somali warlords who capitulated to several dozen UNITAF soldiers knew there were thousands more foreign troops just over the horizon. The UN troops who protected isolated buildings in Rwanda could not have held out for long and were essentially rescued when the rebel army captured the capital.

Coordination

Coordination, broadly defined, is the orchestration of efforts of diverse organizations. Organization theory and simple observation tell us many organizations are disinclined to cooperate with others, particularly when they compete for resources and control of their environment. Yet when diverse humanitarian, political, and military organizations jostle one another in a complex emergency, resources will be squandered and people will die unless there is a concerted effort to overcome parochial organizational interests. Coordination between

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38 Combat support includes military police, civil affairs officers, communications specialists (including linguists), engineers, and logistics specialists.

39 The experience of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia is an example of how an intervention force can prolong fighting, rather than shorten it. ECOMOG was not very strong. Equally important, it was not an impartial actor, but became a partisan in the conflict. Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 145-176.

40 There has been a great deal of work on this problem, particularly within the United Nations, which has an Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Among other initiatives, OCHA maintains ReliefWeb, a world wide web site designed to quickly and widely disseminate information ranging from daily updates from various hot spots around the world to more in-depth reports. It is available at
humanitarian and military actors is particularly hard to achieve. Soldiers and aid workers are ideologically predisposed to distrust each other. Furthermore, their organizational cultures promote radically different operating procedures.\(^{41}\) The question arises, what is the best way to achieve productive interaction of humanitarian and military organizations?

The debate centers on disagreements about the proper degree of organizational autonomy and possible trade-offs between autonomy and efficiency. In one camp are non-governmental organizations, for whom independence of action is a defining characteristic. If they are constrained by an agenda set by others, the argument goes, they lose their ability to agilely respond to rapidly changing circumstances -- an ability that is essential in chaotic environments. They believe the best way to overcome the problems generated by diverse organizations working in the same place simultaneously is to establish and encourage standards of professional behavior for individuals and organizations.\(^{42}\) Advocates of a high level of organizational autonomy favor the voluntary exchange of information in informal forums. The purpose is to generate an overall picture of a particular humanitarian emergency to gain an understanding of gaps and redundancies in service. Specialists can then focus on their areas of expertise while keeping in


\(^{41}\) Military organizations operate according to a regimented hierarchy. Humanitarian organizations operate in a much more horizontal, open and consensual manner.

\(^{42}\) Examples of this thinking put into practice are the "best practices" publications by InterAction, as well as its code of conduct. (InterAction, however, does not believe specialization and professionalization alone are sufficient.)
mind the needs generated by the overall emergency situation. This approach also allows humanitarian actors to maintain their distance from soldiers and thus minimize the politicization of aid.43

In opposition to this position are UN agencies, military officers, and many academic observers. For them, good coordination goes well beyond simple information sharing and professionalization. It entails humanitarian and military actors participating in loosely institutionalized forums to collaboratively set agendas for action. They argue such coordination mechanisms dramatically increase the efficiency of a relief effort and do not unduly restrict the operational independence of organizations.44 Good coordination also involves humanitarian organizations making a single, common representation to local actors, intervening military forces, and international donors. In the absence of common representation, local actors can more easily exploit the foreign presence (for example by charging ridiculously high rent for office space) and military forces and donors have trouble prioritizing myriad pleas for assistance.45

The pursuit of more ambitious coordination efforts leads to a question that is hotly debated in some circles: is coordination best achieved with the “coordination agency” model or the “lead agency” model?46 The coordination agency model is promoted by people who see


themselves as striking a balance between organizational autonomy and overall efficiency. A coordinating agency, such as the UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs\footnote{This office, located within the UN Secretariat, i.e. not an independent agency, was formerly known as the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Created in 1991, it suffered through growing pains for several years, then was reorganized and renamed in 1997. It shows up in the case study chapters under its first name, DHA.} can establish a coordination office on the ground that is designed to facilitate information sharing and agenda setting in a structured environment that is recognized by all as the designated coordination mechanism. It serves primarily as a conduit for information.

The beginning premise of the lead agency model is that effective coordination takes power and authority. Without these, independent minded organizations can ignore coordination efforts, sometimes disrupting comprehensive relief efforts. Power and authority are derived from control over resources, official recognition of an authoritative role, and a proven track record of effective action.\footnote{Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Humanitarian Aid and Effects, Study 3, (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), pp. 122-141.} In the area of refugee relief, for example, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) often plays the role of lead agency.

My own position is in line with the advocates of the lead agency model. It is obvious from the empirical record that the more coordinated the overall relief effort, the more efficiently resources are used. A high degree of coordination can result in clearly identified gaps in coverage and can encourage individual relief organizations to fill those gaps. This is much more easily done when there is a lead agency with resources and authority to induce others to act. In some cases, a lead agency can also limit the number of relief organizations that are allowed into an emergency zone, thus reducing confusion.\footnote{Such was the case in Tanzania in 1994 when UNHCR initially played a strong lead agency role and limited the number of organizations tending to Rwandan refugees to about a dozen. The effect was beneficial,} That is not to say the coordination agency model
is without merit. Information exchange is vitally important, particularly when aid organizations are trying to figure out what is happening in new crises. 50 Nevertheless, information collection and exchange is limited in its ability to induce organizations to work together.

I also contend that the amount of coordination required between military and humanitarian organizations depends on the type of strategy the military forces pursue. Table 1-3 summarizes the relationship between the type of strategy and the need for coordination.

Table 1-3: Types of Strategies and the Need for Humanitarian-Military Coordination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
<th>Focus on Perpetrators</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address Privation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Focus on Perpetrators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 provide logistics and direct assistance</td>
<td>2 protect aid personnel, facilities and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- high degree of coordination needed</td>
<td>-- high degree for point protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-- low degree for area protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address Violence</strong></td>
<td><strong>defeat the perpetrators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 protect the population</td>
<td>4 -- low degree of coordination needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- high degree for point protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- low degree for area protection</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

When military forces provide logistical assistance they must work closely with humanitarian organizations to determine what gets transported when and to where. When they provide point protection for aid organizations they must agree on sites to be protected, convoy routes and schedules, and so on. When they provide point protection to populations, all parties particularly in contrast to the competition among 200 NGOs that responded to the Goma, Zaire, refugee crisis. 50 I present a favorable interpretation of the coordination agency model in Rwanda in Taylor B. Seybolt, *Coordination in Rwanda: The Humanitarian Response to Genocide and Civil War*, Conflict Management Group Working Paper (Cambridge: Conflict Management Group, February 1997).
must know what sort of relief aid the population needs, who is going to deliver it and when. The need for coordination is lower when military forces provide area protection for aid operations and the local population, and when they actively attempt to defeat one or more belligerents. For these strategies, aid organizations simply need to know where military forces will be so they can enter protected areas and avoid war zones.

**Timing**

Timing refers to the length of delay between the onset of a crisis and the response of international military forces. A rapid response constitutes good timing; a long delay constitutes bad timing. This factor is as important as it is straightforward, yet most academic writers ignore it. Aid workers, in contrast, are quite concerned with timing.

The length of delay before international actors arrive to assist the affected population is critically important because mortality risk factors often increase dramatically in chaotic and violent environments. When governmental authority is weak, as is the case in complex emergencies, the number of violent assaults increases. More dramatically, the population can suddenly find itself trapped on the front line of a civil war. An increased level of violence has two effects: more people are killed directly and people commonly leave their homes to become either refugees or internally displaced persons.\(^{51}\) When people leave their homes, they leave their food and water sources, most of their possessions, and their social safety net. As a result they are

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\(^{51}\)The formal definition of a refugee is someone who flees their country of citizenship because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on ethnic origin or religion. An internally displaced person is similar to a refugee, but does not cross an international border. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has a legal mandate to protect and care for refugees. There is no organization that is officially designated to do the same for internally displaced persons. UNHCR has begun to take on this role, most notably in Bosnia.
highly vulnerable to death due to privation, that is, disease, hunger, dehydration and exposure. As the very high mortality rates experienced by a number of refugee populations around the world indicate, in the absence of a rapid humanitarian response, a large number of people can die in a short amount of time.  

Among those writers who stop to think about timing, there is general agreement that the more rapid the reaction the better. Beyond this general agreement, opinions about timing diverge in three directions. Adherents of the first position insist that while a rapid response is desirable, humanitarian action must not be undertaken before local parties have given their consent for an international humanitarian presence. This is especially important when the international presence will include military troops, since a non-consensual military presence can easily escalate the level of violence, which is fundamentally contrary to the humanitarian endeavor. Most of the people who make this argument are employees of the United Nations or non-governmental organizations, although some academics also do.  

Adherents of the other two positions disagree. International humanitarian and military presence is certainly easier when local actors give their consent, but, they argue, there are situations in which waiting for consent is disastrous. They point out that in many cases the central government, rebel groups, or locally powerful warlords are responsible for creating and perpetuating the humanitarian crisis as part of their larger political-military strategy. Expecting all parties to a conflict to give their unconditional consent for humanitarian relief activities is

naive. Waiting for consent will only make reaction times worse.\textsuperscript{54}

The second set of authors assumes the major barriers to better response times in the past have been organizational and institutional. According to this group, several instrumental changes will lead to improved response times in the future. One proposed change is better early warning systems that not only identify potential trouble spots, but bring them to the attention of national leaders rather than mid-level bureaucrats. Another is identification in advance of personnel and equipment (military and non-military) that can be quickly mobilized. A third is joint training between humanitarian and military organizations so that the two types of actors become familiar with each others strengths, weaknesses and ways of operating.\textsuperscript{55}

Adherents of the third position dismiss the idea that bad timing is due to organizational and institutional problems. They argue that timing almost always has been bad for political reasons. Moreover, timing almost always will be bad in the future. The argument has three parts. First, humanitarian crises usually occur in places outside traditional areas of great power interest, so countries with the ability to act do not pay sufficient attention to see disasters coming. Second, political leaders are unwilling to commit military forces to conflicts they do not perceive as threatening to their national interests. Their reluctance is sometimes overcome by public outcry from other political leaders, but this process takes time. Third, concerns for legitimacy indicate the need for multilateral ratification through the United Nations Security Council, which


is a slow process when no powerful state feels its vital interests are at stake.\textsuperscript{56}

My own argument about timing is similar to what I described as the third position. There are two key points: waiting for consent in a war zone is disastrous, and bad timing has a political cause that is not likely to change. There have been instrumental improvements in humanitarian response mechanisms since the beginning of the 1990s. The improvements lie mostly in the areas of education, training, and coordination. They do not affect intervention response time so much as the effectiveness of humanitarian action once an intervention has been undertaken.

Other Factors

The above are not the only possible factors on which to focus a study of humanitarian military intervention. Other authors have looked at structural factors, such as the local culture, the size of country and the size of the population, and the importance of the target country to the potential intervenor. Political factors that have received attention include the political acumen and negotiating skills of people on ground, political will, policy inconsistency, and the strength of the host government. Still other authors focus on military variables such as geography, topography, external support for belligerents, and local fighting forces’ size and equipment.

These are important considerations that I do not entirely ignore. My discussion of the political and military context at the beginning of each case study takes several of them into account, such as geography, local military strength, and the underlying causes of the conflict. Other factors, for example policy inconsistency and the size of the population are subsumed by

my treatment of the variables I identified above as strategy and capabilities. Some factors I do not entertain, such as negotiating skills. Each one of these perspectives deserves more attention than it has received to date. Humanitarian intervention is an area where a great deal of research remains to be done.

Making sense of multiple arguments

It seems obvious, once it has been said, that the likely success or failure of a humanitarian intervention is highly dependent on an intervenor’s objectives, strategy, capabilities, coordination, and timing. Yet the vast majority of writers focus on only one or two of the factors. Very few have attempted to establish an overall analytic framework for understanding the process and outcome of humanitarian intervention. This dissertation attempts to provide such a framework. The array of arguments about the conditions under which humanitarian intervention is likely to succeed is daunting, even when they are organized around five factors. For the purpose of clarity, the following paragraphs summarize in one place what I believe to be the conditions under which humanitarian intervention is most likely to succeed.

When humanitarian intervention works and when it does not

I contend that humanitarian military intervention has saved lives more often than not in the past and therefore should remain a policy option in the future. That said, humanitarian

intervention should be attempted very sparingly. Past operations have not saved as many people
as is commonly believed. In addition, humanitarian intervention is a difficult, costly and
dangerous activity, the long-term consequences of which are uncertain. There are a number of
measures potential humanitarian intervenors can take to increase their chances of success.
However, some of the necessary conditions are unlikely to be met.

First, military action is most likely to save lives when the intervenor has a combination of
political and humanitarian objectives, rather than just humanitarian ones. Equally important, an
intervenor’s humanitarian and political motives must mesh, not clash. If they clash,
humanitarian concerns are very likely to fall by the wayside. Complex emergencies are highly
politicized environments in which local parties will consider all intervenors, particularly
militaries, to be political actors. They must be prepared to act accordingly. The greater the
balance of political objectives to humanitarian ones, the more likely an intervenor is to respond
quickly, arrive with adequate resources, endure costs without fleeing, and overcome resistance
from local actors. At the same time, the political objectives of individual states must be

Second, there are four general types of strategy that intervening forces can employ.
Which strategy is appropriate depends on whether people are dying of privation or directly from
violence. If people are dying of privation, military units can help save lives by providing
logistical assistance to aid organizations. They also can protect aid organizations from bandits
and war. The second option is more difficult, but often useful, since complex emergencies are
very dangerous places for aid organizations to operate. If people are dying of violence, military
units can protect the population, or they can actively pursue the perpetrators of violence to
compel them to cease and desist. Population protection can be highly effective in the short-term, but the intervenor can face the choice of staying on indefinitely or leaving the population vulnerable in the absence of a negotiated cease-fire. Defeating the perpetrator usually raises the level of violence in the short-term, but if it is successful (an uncertain proposition), it provides a longer-term solution than any of the other strategies. Potential intervenors must recognize that all strategies except logistics assistance are potentially combat situations, with all the risks and costs those entail.

Third, the intervening force must have formidable combat and non-combat capabilities to carry out the strategies. Western governments will not tolerate casualties among their own soldiers, so their militaries must be able to dominate the battlefield. For any strategy other than logistics, that means a large force, with heavy weapons (often held in reserve) and a mandate and rules of engagement that allow soldiers to fire before being fired upon. The ability to quickly prevail will prevent violent confrontations from becoming drawn out and further complicating the humanitarian effort. Non-combat capabilities such as engineering, communications, police, and civil affairs specialists are essential to communicate with humanitarian organizations and the local population, help keep order, and provide basic infrastructure repairs, all of which are necessary in a complex emergency.

Fourth, humanitarian and military organizations must develop consensus-based coordination mechanisms that allow for joint planning and problem solving in response to rapidly changing conditions on the ground. These mechanisms work best when there is a lead agency with the resources and authority to implement decisions.

Fifth, an intervention must occur soon after the humanitarian crisis begins. Most
complex emergencies rapidly reach a point past which the civilian mortality rate radically increases. Waiting for the consent of all local parties before acting only plays in to the hands of the most ruthless, who often target the very people an intervention is meant to help.

When all five of these conditions are present, a humanitarian intervention is very likely to save lives, at least in the short-term. If any one of them is missing, the efficacy of humanitarian intervention drops, often dramatically. In most cases, the optimal conditions for humanitarian intervention are not present because the states that are capable of intervening do not feel their national interests are engaged. As a result, they respond slowly (timing), do not plan their actions well (strategy and coordination), and have little motivation to persist when costs begin to rise (objectives and capabilities).

Implications

This argument has a number of policy implications. The first is that potential intervenors can succeed at saving lives if they really want to do so. The five key factors of success are all more or less within the ability of the intervenor(s) to control. Moreover, contextual factors such as the political cause of the conflict, population settlement patterns, and the immediate causes of death, affect the degree of difficulty of intervention but do not present a barrier to success. The question is whether an intervenor is willing to pay the price necessary to succeed. The powerful countries of the world need to have explicit public debates about the balance between moral obligation to help fellow human beings and the difficulty and dangers of using military force to
do it. How do the citizens of this country and others want their militaries to be used?\textsuperscript{58}

A related implication is that, baring a redefinition of national interests, the practice of humanitarian intervention is not likely to improve significantly in the foreseeable future. Humanitarian intervention is hard. To succeed requires a substantial effort. All the conditions for success are more likely to exist when political leaders of powerful states perceive that their political interests coincide with humanitarian objectives. Since most humanitarian crises happen in places of little strategic importance to powerful states, political and humanitarian objectives rarely coincide. As a result, instances of humanitarian intervention in the future will be few and many of those attempts will meet with limited success, much like the cases examined here.

If a country or the United Nations does decide to undertake humanitarian intervention, the requirements for success will depend to a great extent on what is happening on the ground. The following paragraphs look at when alternative strategies are appropriate, and the requirements to make them work. I consider seven generic strategies derived from the typology of strategies introduced above. The first four are potentially appropriate when people are dying from privation. The remaining three are potentially appropriate when people are dying from direct exposure to violence. Table 1-4 provides a summary.

\textsuperscript{58} A treatment of this question is Matthew S. Klimow, \textit{Moral Versus Practical: the Future of US Armed Humanitarian Intervention}, Martello Paper No. 14 (Kingston, Ontario: Center for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Strategies</th>
<th>When cause of death is:</th>
<th>Conditions for success:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>privation</td>
<td>violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide aid directly</td>
<td>no aid organizations present</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistics assistance</td>
<td>almost always appropriate</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point protection for aid</td>
<td>when small attacks are the problem</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area protection for aid</td>
<td>when major violence is the problem</td>
<td>medium to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point protection for pop.</td>
<td>intermixed pop. and civilians targeted</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area protection for pop.</td>
<td>-- civilians targeted but population segregated -- war front</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defeat perpetrator</td>
<td>-- resolve conflict through force -- only way to protect pop.</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military forces can provide assistance directly to the needy population when people are dying of privation. This strategy should almost never be pursued. Soldiers are not trained or equipped to provide the kind of nutrition, rehydration, and medical attention needed by people.
suffering from acute hunger, dehydration and water-borne diseases. They are trained to cope with healthy young men who have traumatic injuries -- a very different sort of population. The only exception to this rule is when there are no aid agencies around to tend to the needy. In those cases, such as during the initial response to the Kurdish refugees along the Turkish border with Iraq, direct military assistance is much better than no assistance at all. Most of the time, however, aid agencies are present in complex emergencies well before troops arrive and remain there long after they leave.

The second strategy option is to provide logistical assistance to aid agencies. This strategy also is appropriate if people are dying of privation. If an intervenor’s level of political interest in a complex emergency is low, the only strategy worth pursuing is logistical assistance. Airlifts, in particular, are useful during initial emergency response or when geography or fighting preclude the use of land routes. A successful logistics strategy requires only enough combat troops to protect personnel at airfields, ports, and possibly mobile engineering units. If the strategy takes the form of airdrops or rapid unloading in safe places, as was the case in Somalia during Provide Relief, then no combat troops are needed. The major personnel requirement is for logisticians, engineers, and civil affairs officers. In the U.S. military, people with these specialties often are in the Reserves, rather than on active duty. A special presidential decision is necessary to call them to action, which constitutes a significant political barrier to their deployment. Successful logistical assistance also requires a high level of humanitarian-military coordination. Unless there is constant communication and joint planning it will not be possible to deliver the right material to the right place at a mutually agreed time. An effective coordination mechanism for this is the Civil-Military Operations Center, which is analyzed in the
case studies.

The strategy of providing point protection to aid operations can be highly effective, as long as the threat is from banditry and small-scale attacks, not large-scale violence and war. This was the appropriate strategy in Somalia, for example. In most cases it requires the intervenor to have a moderate level of political objectives, in addition to humanitarian ones. The existence of political objectives will induce a potential intervenor to act in the first place. Political objectives also increase the chance that an intervenor will not withdraw after the first ambush. The intervening force must possess a significant combat capability to defend itself and its charges, but since the threat is small in scale, overwhelming combat power does not require heavy forces. The level of coordination must be high for point protection of aid operations to work. Humanitarian and military organizations must work closely together to determine their agenda and resolve problems. As with all the strategies, the sooner a humanitarian intervention force arrives, the more good it is able to do.

The fourth alternative strategy is to provide area protection for aid operations. By area protection I mean a large region, not a small location such as a single town. It is appropriate to consider this strategy when people are dying of privation and the threat faced by aid agencies is large-scale, such as a battle front. A safe zone can keep the front from advancing into the region where aid organizations are operating. Safe zones are not effective at addressing small-scale, ambush type violence because number of troops required to police large areas makes it an untenable option.59 A high level of political objectives is necessary because local parties are

likely to violently oppose the safe zone. This is because safe zones often stand in the way of objectives that at least one belligerent views as vitally important. As a rule, it is wise for an intervenor to assume the worst and arrive with a highly combat capable force. Coordination between humanitarian and military organizations is not very important for this strategy to succeed. However, communication about locations and movements is useful.

In contrast to the above strategies, point protection for the population is one of several possibly appropriate responses when the population is dying from violence rather than privation. In particular, point protection can be effective when civilians are explicitly the targets of violence (as opposed to being caught in cross-fire) and the victims and perpetrators are not geographically separated. The intervenor must have a high degree of political motivation because inserting troops in a war zone is difficult and there is a fairly good chance they will be attacked by the perpetrators. The combat capabilities of intervention force must fall in the medium to high range for the same reasons. Exactly how much capability is needed depends on the circumstances. It takes less power to ward off militiamen armed with assault rifles (e.g. Rwanda) than it takes to defend against army units armed with artillery and tanks (e.g. Bosnia). Coordination between humanitarian and military actors must be fairly good so that relief agencies can tend to the population without compromising the security of the population, themselves, or the soldiers providing protection. Point protection of the population can be highly effective in the short-term if these conditions are met. However, it is an extremely difficult strategy to sustain for a long period of time. Therefore it requires either resolution of the conflict or a larger military rescue operation.

Area protection of the population is the sixth alternative strategy. It too is potentially
appropriate when the local population is dying from exposure to violence. In particular, it is useful as a way of protecting civilians from the cross-fire of war by preventing battle fronts from sweeping over designated areas. It is also useful if civilians are targeted, but the victims and perpetrators are geographically separated, or can be separated, as was the case in northern Iraq. An area protection strategy undertaken when the victims and perpetrators are inter-mixed geographically is unlikely to succeed because of the huge manpower requirements for policing the zone. This was one of the problems with the zone set up by the French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. The intervenor must have a high degree of political interest because it is sending troops into a war zone where they must be prepared to fight. Rarely will a local belligerent allow an outside force to designate a large area off limits without putting up some sort of resistance. For the same reason, the intervening force must be highly combat capable. The coordination requirements for this strategy are low, as long as there is an understanding that aid agencies can move freely within the protected zone. A final consideration is that in many cases a protected zone will result in a *de facto* successionist region under international protection. The intervenor is then faced with the choice of offering protection indefinitely, recognizing the new state and helping it to create its own defense forces, negotiating a peace agreement, or withdrawing and exposing the population to violence once again. This is the dilemma currently faced by the U.S. and Britain with regard to the Kurdish protected zone in northern Iraq.

The final strategic alternative is to attempt to create peace by defeating one or more of the local belligerents. It is the third out of seven that is potentially appropriate when people are dying from violence. However, it is very likely to raise the level of violence in the short-term, and maybe for a long time. (An increased level of violence is not inevitable, as the example of
the American invasion of Haiti in 1994 indicates.) If the strategy fails, the problem it is intended to fix is only made worse. Thus it should be attempted only if there is no other way to protect the population, as was the case with the need to defeat the genocidal government in Rwanda. To succeed, the intervenor must have a very high degree of political motivation and dominant combat capabilities. We are talking here about fighting a war and winning it in short order. It is a difficult task, fraught with risks and costs. As with all humanitarian interventions, but especially in this case, the intervenor should secure the approval of the United Nations Security Council prior to acting. A Security Council mandate will act as a check on the self-interested use of intervention. It will also confer a certain amount of legitimacy on the intervenor.

None of these strategies is exclusive of the others and in most cases pursuing two or more simultaneously will yield the greatest number of lives saved. Nevertheless, it is critically important for policy makers (and academics) to understand the conceptual distinctions between them. To succeed at saving lives, an intervenor must know the conditions for necessary for success. To know the conditions for success, an intervenor must know exactly what it is trying to achieve and why.

Methodology

I identified the five factors I consider to be critical to the success or failure of a humanitarian intervention through a survey of the literature and review of a number of cases that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Some of the factors have received a great deal of attention and others have not, as indicated above during the discussion of critical issues. I have distilled from the work of other authors several competing propositions about each factor.
To determine which of the competing propositions are right, I compare the predictions of each to the empirical record. In some cases previous authors have explicitly made cause and effect predictions. In other cases the predictions are implicit and I have drawn them out. The propositions whose predictions are borne out most often or most completely form the basis of my own argument and its implications.

I test the competing propositions in detailed case studies of complex emergencies in three countries: northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda. My specific methodologies for comparing the propositions and their predictions to the historical record are multiple congruence procedures and process tracing.\(^{60}\) The cases I study lend themselves to these two methods because they allow multiple observations of the independent and dependent variables, and the values on the independent and dependent variables vary sharply over time and distance.

I test the propositions within each case and between them. Each country I study experienced two or more separate military interventions, some of which were more successful at saving lives than others. Therefore, I am able to conduct structured, focused comparisons between different military interventions within one country. Analysis of within-case variation of the independent and dependent variables sheds light on the role of the intervening factors while holding constant the context of the intervention.

Analyzing interventions in several countries enables me to test the propositions in different contexts. The political, military, and mortality contexts of Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda

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were very different from each other. Cross-case comparison allows me to determine whether my findings are context-dependent or if they hold true in a variety of political, military, and humanitarian contexts.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{Case Selection}

I have chosen to study humanitarian interventions in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1991 to 1996, Somalia from 1992 to 1995 and Rwanda in 1994. They share the basic characteristics of being recent complex emergencies to which a wide variety of organizations responded. Each was the subject of one or more high profile military operations.\textsuperscript{62} That is to say the cases are selected on the independent variable -- military intervention in a complex emergency for avowed humanitarian reasons. The cases are dissimilar enough to inspire confidence that the findings of this dissertation may be applied beyond the particular interventions studied. The humanitarian crises in Somalia, Rwanda and northern Iraq were caused by different types of conflicts. In some instances the humanitarian effects of conflict were exacerbated by natural disaster. The proximate causes of death within and across the cases cover the range of famine, disease, cross-fire and slaughter. The cases also exhibit a mixture of motives for intervention, from mostly humanitarian to largely political.


\textsuperscript{62} I do not investigate several other humanitarian interventions that are obvious candidates, particularly Bosnia and Liberia. They should be studied, but time and space constraints preclude that work in this dissertation. They do not offer obvious methodological advantages over the three cases used here. Haiti is sometimes also included in the list of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, although it is more properly seen as an effort to install a democratic government rather than to save lives.
A coalitional military intervention in northern Iraq began in April 1991 after a Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein failed and the population fled into the border regions of Turkey and Iran. The military operation, called Operation Provide Comfort, initially included ground and air forces, after which the ground forces were withdrawn, leaving only air cover for the protected zone. Military and humanitarian organizations worked together closely to help people in the mountains and bring them back down to more suitable environs. It was a watershed event from the perspective of international law, the definition of national interest, and the international humanitarian response to complex emergencies -- one that was later tempered by experiences in Somalia and Rwanda. A small follow-on mission called the United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq was assigned the task of protecting aid organizations in the protected zone. It had little effect.

Somalia was the object of intense international attention beginning in December 1992 when American troops arrived, but had been in a state of crisis for more than a year. A United Nations intervention force had been on its soil since September 1992. For a period of three years (until March 1995) humanitarians and war fighters were thrown together in difficult circumstances. Hundreds of thousands of people needed relief from agricultural failure due to war and drought and protection from local warlords in the absence of a central government. All foreign troops and practically all relief organizations have left the country now. Lack of government and natural disasters still wrack the Somali people. There were four distinct military interventions in Somalia: the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); an airlift know as Operation Provide Relief; the American-led United Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope; and the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).
Each displayed very different characteristics and had very different effects on the course of events in Somalia.

Rwanda burst upon the scene in April 1994 when extremist members of the majority Hutu group carried out a lightening-fast genocide against the minority Tutsi and a politicide against all moderates. The genocide rekindled a civil war, in which the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Army led to the end of the extremists’ rule and the genocide. Foreign governments and the United Nations played timid political and military roles, with the exception of France. Hundreds of international aid organizations rushed in after the fighting stopped. Though the acute war and genocide have ended, the conflict is far from over. Many perpetrators of genocide fled to Zaire, along with over a million largely innocent Hutu who feared reprisals. The outbreak of civil war in eastern Zaire in the fall of 1996 drove most Rwandans home. Since then security has deteriorated markedly in Rwanda, particularly in the northwestern area. Members of the former Rwandan army and militia have resumed killing Tutsi and witnesses to the genocide. The government of Rwanda is carrying out a counter-insurgency campaign. The Rwanda case is interesting in part because military intervention to stop the genocide was not attempted by foreign powers but was accomplished by an indigenous rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Army. There was enough foreign military presence, in the forms of a very weak UN contingent (the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, UNAMIR) and a brief but forceful French foray (Operation Turquoise), to allow fruitful contrasts between the three separate military operations. Once the tidal wave of refugees crashed on Rwanda’s neighbors, foreign military units became involved in the emergency relief efforts. I look at the American military response to the refugee crisis, Operation Support Hope.
Independent Variable

I define humanitarian military intervention as the use of foreign combat or logistics units for the expressed purpose of assisting humanitarian relief work in places where there it is ongoing violence of a political nature. The definition it is intentionally broad and has several aspects that should be noted. Humanitarian interventions can be unilateral, multilateral or coalitional (the term multilateral being reserved for United Nations operations and the term coalitional referring to more than one country but not under UN command, like NATO). They can be sanctioned by the United Nations or not, though in practice since the end of the Cold War no country has acted on proclaimed humanitarian motives without first getting UN Security Council approval. The intervention can be undertaken with or without the consent of the “host” government and local parties. It may have a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate under the Charter of the United Nations.63

In any avowed humanitarian military intervention it is wise to question the intentions of the intervening party, be it a single country, a collection of countries, or an international organization. I investigate the match between rhetoric and reality during my analysis of the objectives of each intervention. Practically all interventions have a mix of humanitarian and political motives. The relevant question is the balance between them.

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63 Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations allows the deployment of UN-sanctioned troops to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes. The troops can only use their weapons in self-defense. Chapter VII of the Charter allows the UN security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (Article 42) UN-sanctioned troops can use their weapons aggressively if such action it is necessary to fulfill the mandate handed down by the Security Council.
Dependent Variable

How do we know if a particular military intervention did any good? Before investigating the process of an intervention, it is necessary to establish whether or not it actually had an effect on the mortality rate and what that effect was. In methodological terms, did the independent variable have the expected causal effect on the dependent variable?

To determine the effect of military intervention on the number of lives saved, I begin by investigating the immediate causes of death. Were people dying because they were subjected to violence or suffering from disease and hunger? If they were dying from violence, were they caught in the crossfire of battle or were they directly targeted? If they were dying from disease, what kinds of diseases? (Death from disease is indirectly caused by violence in the cases I study. Violence forces people to leave their homes, where they have at least a little food and water, and often congregate in squalid camps, where disease spreads rapidly.)

It is also necessary to establish the mortality rate prior to and following the intervention. Did the mortality rate change after the intervention? If so, can the change be traced to military activities? For example, refugees in camps are frequently the victims of diarrheal diseases, which can be treated with oral rehydration therapy and prevented through sanitation and clean water programs. If the incidence of deadly diarrhea declines after a military intervention, the intervention can be credited with saving lives if it played a role in improving sanitation, increasing the supply of potable water, instituting oral rehydration therapy, or any combination of the three.

It is not enough to know that military intervention had an effect on the mortality rate. To gauge the benefits of such costly activities we ought to know the magnitude of the effect. How
much good (or harm) did the particular military intervention do in the immediate crisis? This can be presented as changes in mortality rates and also in raw numbers of people dying. The latter is accomplished by applying the mortality rate to the total size of the population at risk. Did the number of people dying decrease (or increase) a lot or a little after the intervention? The number of lives saved can be roughly estimated by projecting the course of events in the absence of intervention, whether it is the life cycle of a disease or the objectives and duration of a military campaign. Comparing actual changes in the mortality rate with projected counter-factual events yields an approximation of the number of people saved from death by military intervention.

How reliable is this methodology? How good is the data? The data on immediate causes of death and mortality rates in the populations I study is reasonably good. I rely on epidemiological studies reported in the medical journals The Lancet and the Journal of the American Medical Association and by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. The authors of the studies are certain of the causes of death and generally are sure of the mortality rates reported within an eight-five percent confidence interval or better. However there are uncertainties due to survey procedures and estimates of the total population size. What this means is that we can have strong confidence that we know why people were dying and in the overall mortality trends and the timing of changes. The data

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64 A report by the Centers for Disease Control that is widely cited in the public health literature discusses some of the uncertainties. “Among the many problems encountered in estimating mortality under emergency conditions are recall bias in surveys, families’ failure to report perinatal deaths, inaccurate denominators (overall population size, births, age-specific populations), and lack of standard reporting procedures. In general, bias tends to underestimate mortality rates, since deaths are usually under reported or undercounted, and population size is often exaggerated.” Centers for Disease Control, “Famine-Affected, Refugee, and Displaced Populations: Recommendations for Public Health Issues,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Recommendations and Reports, Vol. 41, No. RR-13 (July 24, 1992), p. 5.
becomes less certain when translated from mortality rates to numbers of people dying. I have tried to minimize this uncertainty by using total population estimates that have emerged over time as the consensus estimates.

Next step is to investigate the causative role of the independent variable. We can be confident in an accurate picture of military and humanitarian activities. I draw on many sources to determine what military and humanitarian actors did and when they did it, including humanitarian situation reports from the field, military after action reviews, personal interviews, and secondary sources that are based on extensive research of primary documents and interviews with participants. By closely correlating military and humanitarian activities with changes in mortality rates, I am able to determine whether military action resulted in fewer people dying. (Alternative explanations for declining mortality rates include humanitarian action independent of what military units did and the natural progression of events regardless of military activity, e.g. famine cycles.)

The final step is the least certain, but there is reason to be confident here, too. Recall that the measure of success is lives saved. Therefore, to know how much good an intervention did, if any, we need to know not just how many people were attended to or how many people survived, but how many people were kept alive who would have died in the absence of military action. Projecting the course of events to arrive at this counter-factual number is often not as difficult as it may appear at first. For example, it is fairly certain that had the Rwandan “genocidaires” not been curbed by the advancing rebel army, the small UN presence and the eventual French intervention, they would have killed close to 100 percent of the Tutsis in the country. Tutsis protected by these three military operations can be counted as saved. In another instance, along
the Iraqi-Turkish border the sanitation, water and food situations were deteriorating by the day in Kurdish refugee camps until outside help arrived. It took humanitarian organizations about three weeks longer than military organizations to establish relief operations. Therefore, decreases in mortality during this three week period offer a minimum number of lives saved with which military action should be credited.65

Political and Military Context

The final consideration is the political and military context within which occur humanitarian crises and responses to them. How are we to judge whether a particular strategy was appropriate or not without being tautological -- “X strategy was evidently inappropriate because it failed to save lives”? Similarly, how do we know if timing was good or bad and if local actors gave their consent for intervention, other than to look at the effects of the intervention? Further, what does listing the military capabilities of an intervention force tell us if we do not know what it is up against?

To avoid tautology, I establish the political and military context prior to military intervention. This includes the long-term causes of the crisis, who the local actors were, their military capabilities and level of consent for intervention, and the speed with which events unfolded. I also include brief notes on geography, terrain and culture. Once I establish the context I have a basis for judging the five critical factors -- the intervening variables.

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation has four remaining chapters. Chapters two through four are case studies of Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda. Each chapter it is structured in the same way. They begin with a review of the political and military context of the complex emergency, then move on to the speed with which events unfolded and the response time of international actors. I correlate changes in mortality rates with periods of military intervention in a section called “death and military responses.” My analysis shifts from correlation to causation in the section of each chapter that looks at the strategies followed and their implementation. A short section addresses the political consequences of intervention. Each chapter ends with a summary comparison of the competing propositions in light of the evidence. Chapter five it is the conclusion. It summarizes my findings and draws some policy implications.
Chapter Two

State Oppression of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, 1991 - 1996

Introduction

The flight of the Kurds from northern Iraq was not the worse humanitarian disaster in history, but it was one of the most dramatic. It happened in a matter of days, involved a hated dictator, was revealed in all its squalid splendor by television cameras, garnered a visit to refugee camps by the American Secretary of State, elicited airdrops of supplies and a large military operation, and resulted in a de facto autonomous zone in Iraq against the will of the government.

Immediately after the American-led coalition defeated Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s army in the Gulf War in February 1991, rebellious Shi’as in the south of Iraq and Kurds in the north rose up in an attempt to overthrow Hussein. He quickly smashed the rebellion in the south, killing thousands of people and driving a million more into deadly swamps on the Iranian border. He then turned his attention northward. By the end of March about a million and a half Kurds and other people in the northern provinces fled their homes in the face of a brutal military onslaught that did not distinguish armed fighters from unarmed civilians. All were the targets of gunfire, phosphorous bombs and torture. More than a million of the displaced sought refuge in Iran, while just under half a million fled to the mountains on the border of Turkey.

The speed and scale of the exodus were unprecedented at the time. Media coverage, strategic considerations for the interests of Turkey, and a vague sense of responsibility for the plight of the Kurds on the part of Western governments led to an equally rapid humanitarian military intervention beginning in early April. All international attention was on the people at
the Iraqi-Turkish border. Those who fled to Iran were virtually ignored. This chapter investigates the effect of the multi-national humanitarian intervention from 1991 through 1996 which tended to the immediate needs of the displaced, relocated them out of the mountains, and established a safe zone in northern Iraq that remains (in scaled-back form) to this day.

I address ten questions. What were the objectives of the intervenors? How quickly did they respond? Did the international military response save lives? If so, how many and how? Were the strategies employed appropriate, given the remote and proximate causes of death? Did the intervening forces have the capabilities necessary to carry out the strategies? What were the specific ways in which the strategies were implemented? What role did organizational coordination play? In contrast to a good deal of the writing on UN Security Council resolution 688 and Operation Provide Comfort I am not very concerned with the legal and institutional precedents set by international involvement in northern Iraq.\(^{66}\)

I find that the emergency phase of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), in which military forces provided direct humanitarian assistance to the refugees and logistical support to aid organizations, was highly successful. It saved the lives of over 7,000 Kurdish refugees out of a total population of 400,000, while just over 6,000 (1.55 percent) died. In contrast, Kurds who fled to Iran received almost no international assistance and about 23,000 (2.3 percent) died out of

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\(^{66}\) Jane Stromseth, for example, calls the international response "'precedential' in at least four respects": the Security Council is willing to define internal repression as a threat to international peace and stability when it results in substantial refugee flows, the Security council is simultaneously reluctant to authorize the use of force to stop the repression, it spurred institutional reforms to make the UN humanitarian response system more efficient, and it reveals a preference for viewing crises in humanitarian terms while sidestepping the hard political issues. Jane E. Stromseth, "Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: collective Responses and Continuing Challenges," in Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 76-117, at p. 79. The last of these observations is very important to the investigation of this dissertation; legal and institutional changes are less so.
a population of 1,000,000. The second phase, in which OPC provided area protection to both aid operations and the Kurdish population, was highly successful in its initial stage when ground forces were present. When it became an air operation only OPC was successful at preventing large-scale violence but not small scale attacks on aid agencies and civilians. The safe zone probably saved the lives of over 20,000 people by preventing a renewed invasion by the Iraqi army. A small follow-on ground operation called the United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) that operated within the safe zone was not able to fulfill its mission of protecting aid operations through point defense.

Perceived national interests as well as humanitarian concern drove the decisions of France, Britain, and the United States to get involved and stay involved. The choice of operational strategies was largely driven by needs on the ground, focusing first on logistics and direct provision of assistance, then changing to area protection, all of which were appropriate responses. Military forces used a wide array of capabilities, from civil affairs to war fighting, the provision of which was greatly facilitated by the fact that troops and equipment were already in the area, having been deployed for the Gulf War. Innovative coordination efforts between humanitarian and military organizations facilitated their interaction. Coordination could have been much better in the mountain camps, but was surprisingly good during the effort to bring the Kurds out of the mountains.

The rest of the chapter unfolds in six parts. The second section establishes the political and military context of the interventions, including the background to the 1991 Kurdish uprising.

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67 The refugees in Iran were helped by the Iranian Red Crescent Society, the local population, and UNHCR which flew in some supplies.
and flight, the objectives and capabilities of the local parties, and their level of consent for intervention. The third section reviews the speed with which the flight occurred and the response time of international actors, both military and humanitarian. Section four investigates the dependent variable: how many people died and what they died from; how many people were saved and what saved them. Section five analyses the strategies followed by Operation Provide Comfort and the UN Guard Contingent in Iraq. It looks at the objectives of the intervenors, the types of strategies employed, the specific forms the strategies took, and how they were implemented including capabilities and coordination. The sixth section addresses the political impact of Provide Comfort and some of the long-term difficulties involved. The last section is a summary conclusion.

**Political and Military Context**

In the wake of World War One and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres called for an autonomous Kurdish area east of the Euphrates, among other things. Upon approval of the League of Nations, the region would become an independent state. The British, who took control of Iraq and part of the autonomous Kurdish region disapproved of the idea of independence, not least because it would deprive the Crown of open access to prolific oil fields in the area. The new government in Turkey strongly disagreed with the treaty, insisting all Kurds were Turks. Three years later the Treaty of Lausanne that established modern Turkey divided Kurdistan between Turkey, Iran and Iraq and made no mention of Kurdish (or Armenian)
aspirations for independence.\textsuperscript{68}

From before that time and ever since, the fate of the Kurdish people has been tossed around in the game of power politics. The players that are deemed most important are the region's three largest states: Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Any time Kurdish aspirations for autonomy come close to disrupting the balance of power between these three states, the Kurds lose their international support. At the same time, regional states and distant great powers continually support one or more Kurdish faction as a way to harass the government in whose territory they reside. Factional leaders accept the support and participate in the divisive games of outsiders as a way of promoting themselves and their group relative to rival factions. The events of 1991 should be seen in this light.

Fighting between Iraqi Kurds and the Baath government in Baghdad in 1960s and 1970s produced as many as 90,000 casualties and over 100,000 Kurds fled to Iran.\textsuperscript{69} After the government defeated the Kurds in 1975 the Iraqi government destroyed over 1,000 Kurdish villages and relocated as many as 600,000 Kurds to areas outside Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{70} Saddam Hussein, who came to power in 1979, has continued to maintain control over the Kurds in Iraq through a combination of negotiations to drive wedges between rival parities, economic dependency, and brutal repression. The most horrific bout of repression was the Anfal campaign of 1988.

The prelude to the Anfal campaign was Kurdish restiveness and cooperation with Iran during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war. Iranian support for the Kurdish insurgency in the

\textsuperscript{69} McDowall, pp. 326-340.
previous two decades had led Iraq to bomb locations inside Iran. Tensions between the two states increased until their dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway erupted into war in 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran gave the Kurds another opportunity to try to break free of Baghdad and rejuvenated the alliance between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran that had been broken by Iran in 1975. The Baath regime was not pleased. In 1982 it rounded up 8,000 males of all ages from the Barzani tribe -- one of the primary sources of Kurdish nationalism -- and paraded them through the streets of Baghdad before executing them for cooperating with Iran.\(^{71}\)

By 1986 the two largest political organizations, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, along with a number of smaller parties, decided to present a unified front to Baghdad. They received substantial support from Iran, which wanted to draw Iraqi troops away from the southern battle front. The cooperation and military support changed the nature of the Kurdish war from hit and run guerilla actions to heavy attacks designed to capture and hold population centers. In response, Hussein appointed his cousin General Ali Hasan al Majid in 1987 to wipe out the Kurds and vested him with nearly absolute power in the northern governorates. Majid followed a scorched earth strategy accompanied by mass executions and deportations. He used poisonous gas starting in April 1997, attacking over 30 locations in the Arbil and Sulaymaniya governorates with mustard gas, tabun and sarin in a five day period.\(^{72}\)

Operation Anfal began in February 1988 after Iran focused its attack on Iraq in the north with the support of the Kurds, its battle front to the south having ground to a halt. The reorientation of the Iran-Iraq war northward gave General Majid the troops and resources he

\(^{71}\) McDowall, p. 349.
needed to finally resolve the Kurdish problem. With genocidal zeal he stepped up his use of indiscriminate bombing, mass arrests and disappearances, and the use of chemical weapons in flagrant violation of the 1925 Protocol prohibiting the use of gas in warfare. The largest single attack was on the town of Halabja in the southern reaches of Kurdish territory, near the Iranian border. An estimated 5,000 people died. Anfal continued after Iran agreed to a cease-fire in July, sweeping west and then north. By the time it was over, at least 150,000 to 200,000 people had died, another one and a half million were forcibly resettled, and 4,000 villages were destroyed. Even after the violence subsided Baghdad continued to move people out. By July 1989, 45,000 of the 75,000 square kilometers of Iraqi Kurdistan had been cleared of Kurds.\textsuperscript{73}

Throughout this period there were two primary Kurdish political-military organizations. One was the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), lead by Massoud Barzani. The other was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani. They had their respective strongholds in separate geographic and linguistic areas: the KDP in the northwest along the Turkish border; the PUK in the east along the Iranian border. A bitter enmity between Barzani and Talabani extended over many years and took the form not only of political rivalry but military ambushes and skirmishes. Each was about as powerful as the other in terms of how many people they could claim as adherents, the number of men under arms, access to resources, and so on.

Somewhat astonishingly, after the Anfal campaign both factions remained in place, although their military capabilities were vastly diminished. They were no longer able to take and hold territory, but both continued to set ambushes and make quick strikes. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the international response gave them an unexpected and welcome respite.

\textsuperscript{73} McDowall, pp. 357-363.
The Gulf War provided another opportunity for the Kurds to assert their independence. The Coalition ground offensive, which followed six weeks of aerial bombardment, began on February 24, 1991 and quickly overran Iraqi defensive positions in Kuwait and Iraq.\textsuperscript{74} From February 27 to March 4 Kurdish peshmergas mounted 50 attacks on military positions in the north of the country.\textsuperscript{75} In response to Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War, the pressure on his regime from a large Shi’a uprising in the south, and hope that the West would back them up, Kurds spontaneously rose up against administrative headquarters, police forces and army troops. The popular uprising began March 4 in the town of Raniya and spread rapidly. By March 10 most of Kurdistan was in rebel hands, including the important towns of Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniya. Zakho fell on March 13 and Kirkuk, “the jewel in the Kurdish crown,” succumbed March 19.\textsuperscript{76}

The KDP and PUK -- the only parties with organized forces -- had not ordered the insurrection and were taken by surprise.\textsuperscript{77} The rebel factions kept their forces out of the major towns and there was little fighting involved. By and large, local Kurdish civil authorities convinced local army units to lay down their arms and leave. They derived their leverage from jash who were loyal to them, rather than to the central government.\textsuperscript{78} The jash were government auxiliaries -- Kurds recruited to fight against insurgent Kurds -- organized on a tribal basis under


\textsuperscript{76} McDowall, pp. 371-372.

\textsuperscript{77} O’Balance, p. 185. Massoud Barzani told *The Independent* newspaper, “The uprising came from the people themselves. We didn’t expect it.” Quoted in McDowall, p. 371.

\textsuperscript{78} McDowall, p. 371.
landlords and local strongmen. They received only general directions from Iraqi military commanders. Although, they were not a disciplined fighting force, they played a significant role during the 1960s, '70s, and '80s in rounding up Kurds and scorching the earth. Most of them were half-hearted and in it for the employment. The 1991 rebellion briefly turned them from objects of scorn into national heros.

The military capabilities of the Kurds in 1991 were not impressive. The majority of people who participated in the rebellion were "mobs of untrained, excited and slightly bewildered volunteers, lacking leadership structure." The jash numbered about 30,000, but they had minimal military training, no heavy weapons, and no single command structure. When the tide turned, they proved more interested in looting than standing up to the Iraqi military. There were about 200,000 Kurds in the national military during the Gulf War, a large number of whom deserted and returned to the north. However they too lacked organizational structure and the will to fight, having seen enough of battle already. The KDP, PUK and other rebel factions had organized into a loosely unified Front after Anfal and could field about 3,000 peshmergas in early 1991. They were armed with assault rifles, heavy machine guns, a few grenade launchers and mortars, and some artillery. All their weapons were old and inaccurate.

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79 The term "jash" is a derisive one that means "little donkeys." O'Balance, p. 57-58.
80 McDowall, p. 356.
81 The basis for their shift in allegiance was laid in November 1990 when the Kurdish Front offered amnesty to any jash who deserted. Larry M. Forster, "Operation Provide Comfort: A Shield for Humanitarian Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan," unpublished paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (April 20, 1996), p. 15.
82 O'Balance, p. 185-187.
83 McDowall, p. 369.
When the government counter attack began, Talabani of the PUK and Barzani of the KDP hoped desperately for Western countries to come to their rescue. To avoid the impression of betrayal in the Muslim world they wanted to avoid being seen to openly side with the United States, but they lobbied for help nonetheless. They had some reason to believe help might be forthcoming. Just before the ground war began in Kuwait, the Voice of America broadcast a speech by President Bush in which he said, “there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” Saudi Arabian radio stations directed at Iraq also broadcast the speech, translated into Kurdish and Arabic.\(^5\) Talabani had visited Washington and Paris in August and September 1990.\(^6\) In March, Barzani called on the U.S., Britain, France, and Saudi Arabia to press for a UN intervention to protect the Kurds.\(^7\) In short, the Kurdish leaders gave their consent for military intervention.

The Iraqi government reaction to the uprising was swift and crushing. Most of Saddam’s best troops -- the Republican Guard -- survived the Gulf War, since he had held them in reserve and the Coalition declared a cease-fire before destroying them. By the third week in March they had broken the back of the Shi’a uprising in the south and moved their tanks, helicopters, and artillery northward. The United States had forbidden the Iraqi government to use fixed wing aircraft, but it said nothing about the attack helicopters that were used to devastating effect.\(^8\) The Kurds did not stand a chance against the trained, organized and heavily equipped Iraqi army.

\(^5\) Quoted in McDowall, p. 372.  
\(^6\) McDowall, p. 369.  
\(^7\) O’Balance, p. 186.  
\(^8\) McDowall, p. 372. He suggests the U.S. allowed the use of helicopters as a way of reassuring Turkey in the north and Saudi Arabia in the south that the rebellions would not be allowed to break up the state of Iraq. The U.S. was probably just as anxious to reassure itself of the same thing.

The Republican Guard counterattack began on March 28. Within 48 hours Kirkuk was recaptured; within 72 hours people were fleeing headlong in front of the advancing army. By April 1 Arbil, Dohuk and Zakho were back in government hands. By April 3 Sulaymaniya fell and hundreds of thousands of displaced people had reached the borders of Iran and Turkey.\footnote{Forster, "Operation Provide Comfort," p. 16. O'Balance, p. 186.} Despite the rapid military victory, Saddam Hussein's government had very little strength after the Gulf War and with rebellions on two fronts. On April 1 Saddam proposed a settlement based on the principle of confederation, which Kurdish leaders agreed to discuss. Government forces ceased their advance after the first week in April in the face of stiff opposition by 150 of Barzani's \textit{peshmergas} and the possibility of intervention by members of the Gulf War Coalition.\footnote{It seems the Iraqi military did not know how thin the Kurdish ability to fight was and took the spirited resistance of a few soldiers as an indication of greater strength. McDowall, pp. 375-376.}

The Baath regime gave absolutely no consent for outside intervention and opposed all suggestions of international protection for the Kurds. When Operation Provide Comfort commenced, Hussein denounced it as meddling in Iraqi's internal affairs -- a position supported by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.\footnote{UN relief agencies did manage to secure Baghdad's agreement for the presence of humanitarian relief centers in mid-April and even for a small UN guard force for the aid programs in May. As discussed below, the UN Guards had no mandate to protect the population.\footnote{Stromseth, p. 90.}} UN relief agencies did manage to secure Baghdad's agreement for the presence of humanitarian relief centers in mid-April and even for a small UN guard force for the aid programs in May. As discussed below, the UN Guards had no mandate to protect the population.\footnote{Stromseth, p. 91.}
It is in this context that the Kurds fled into Iran and Turkey, triggering Operation Provide Comfort. The cause of the humanitarian crisis was a military offensive by the Iraqi government in response to a sudden uprising by Kurds in the wake of the Gulf War. The objective of the Kurds was to establish an autonomous region in northern Iraq, but they did not have the military power to prevail. When the fortunes of war turned against them they fled and their political leaders asked for international help. The Iraqi government followed past practice in an operation to retake territory that gave no quarter to the civilian population. Due to its own weakness, it halted the military advance before making a full genocidal press in the nature of the previous Anfal campaign. When outside states announced their intention to intervene on behalf of the Kurds, the Baghdad government strongly protested and resisted to the extent it was able.

**Speed of Onset and the International Response**

The flight of the Kurds was "one of the largest and fastest refugee movements in recent history." Over a million people sought refuge in Iran. The first 2,000 refugees to enter Turkey were reported on April 2; by April 15 they numbered 400,000. It is no wonder the Kurds ran: they easily remembered Baghdad's willingness and ability to kill on a massive scale. In January 1991 the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council invoked the memory of Anfal to keep the Kurds in line. "If you have forgotten Halabja," he said. "I would remind you that we are ready to repeat the operation." It is estimated that government troops captured 100,000

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94 *State of the World's Refugees 1993*, p. 84.
Kurds and Tukomans and killed as many as 20,000 in their onslaught. Rebel forces disintegrated as fighters helped their families to flee.97

Iran allowed the asylum seekers on its border to enter the country where they were tended to in schools, mosques and homes by Iranian Kurds and the Iranian Red Cross. The UNHCR played a small role in helping them as well. The people who fled toward Turkey were not so fortunate. Ankara could not stop them from spilling into Turkey, but prevented them from moving beyond the immediate border area out of fear that their presence would feed the fire of their own Kurdish separatist movement. As a result they came to reside helter-skelter in makeshift camps scattered across the inhospitable mountains that divide the two countries. It was, to say the least, "an immense logistical problem."98 Because they had fled with no supplies, the weather was harsh, and sanitation in the camps was almost nonexistent, people began to die of exposure and disease immediately, at a rate of hundreds per day.

At first members of the international community did not respond to the Kurdish rebellion and subsequent refugee crisis. Far from taking action, neither the Arab League nor the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned Iraq’s treatment of the Kurds or the Shi’a. It was not until regional governments made traditional security-based arguments that action was taken. Turkey and Iran both argued in the United Nations on April 2 and 3 that the flow of refugees across their borders, as well as the prospect of Iraqi military incursions constituted a threat to the stability and security of the region and should be a concern to the Security Council. France took up the call on April 4. On April 5, the Security Council adopted resolution 688.99

97 McDowall, p. 372-373.
98 State of the World's Refugees 1993, p. 84.
99 Stromseth, pp. 84-85.
Within a day American special forces were on the ground locating camps, identifying needs, and preparing for the delivery of emergency assistance. A Joint Task Force headquarters (later to become a coalition headquarters, i.e. including soldiers from more than one country) was established at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey on April 6. By the third day of the mission, 27 tons of supplies had been dropped by U.S. Air Force planes at several camp locations. The launch of the operation was made much faster and easier by the fact that most of the necessary resources, as well as people who knew the area, were already located at Incirlik because of the Gulf War.\footnote{Forster, “Operation Provide Comfort,” pp. 16-17. Forster, “Post-Cold War Peace Operations.”}

Turkey’s President Turgut Ozal, with the strong backing of British Prime Minister John Major, urged the Coalition to establish a safe zone inside Iraq to encourage the Kurds to return home. President Bush reluctantly signed on under intense European pressure and the idea was formally endorsed by a meeting of European leaders on April 12. Operation Provide Comfort was reorganized to include a ground combat component under Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili on April 16. On the 17th troops moved into Iraq for the first time to establish a safe area. Operation Provide Comfort rapidly grew until it consisted of 14,000 - 15,000 thousand troops inside Iraq, 7,000 more in Turkey, and a humanitarian and combat air operation consisting of over 100 aircraft.\footnote{Colonel Larry Forster interview with author, April 25, 1996, Cambridge, Mass. Forster, “Operation Provide Comfort,” pp. 16-17.}

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were slower to arrive than the military. They had not had a presence in northern Iraq prior to the rebellion and exodus. The first to arrive was Medecins sans Frontieres on April 12.\footnote{Bernard Fecoul and Philippe Malfait, letter to the editor, \textit{The Lancet}, Vol. 338 (July 20, 1991), p. 190.} On April 15 the emergency-rule governor of eastern

Turkey had said Turkey could not handle the humanitarian crisis itself and would officially support an international relief effort. There was no substantial NGO presence until about April 20, and never a significant UN presence in the mountains. Soon after the border town of Silopi became a relief hub and eventually 50 NGOs participated.\textsuperscript{103} United Nations relief agencies were also slow to react, seeking the consent of the Turkish and Iraqi governments before beginning their operations. An agreement between UNHCR and the Iraqi government was signed on April 18, allowing UN humanitarian centers to be established on Iraqi soil, but the agency did not assume responsibility for the overall humanitarian operation until coalition forces withdrew in mid-July.\textsuperscript{104}

The basic structure to move the Kurds back to northern Iraq was in place by April 22. Once they were certain of protection, the displaced population quickly descended to more hospitable locations. By May 13 the UN took ceremonial control of Zakho town, the primary transition site between the Kurds in the mountains and their original homes. CARE took over food distribution from the military on June 1. On June 6 the border camps were officially closed, although about 10,000 people remained in them. About 200,000 refugees remained in Iran as of July 4. OPC ground troops quickly withdrew and left Iraqi territory on July 15. The first phase of Operation Provide Comfort was over.

The second phase, Operation Provide Comfort II as it became known, relied on air power and a small observation and coordination post in Zakho to give general protection to the Kurdish population and aid organizations working in the area. OPC II consisted of forces from Turkey,

\textsuperscript{103} Seiple, p. 24; O'Balance, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{104} State of the World's Refugees 1993, p. 84.
the U.S., Britain, and France. It ended the last day of 1996 after the lone ground observation post stood down and France withdrew. Air cover has been provided since then under a restructured operation known as Operation Northern Watch.105

To summarize, in a period of one month the Kurds took control of all Iraqi Kurdistan, lost it again, were driven to Iran and Turkey, and began to die at a rapid pace along the Turkish border. Western states were reluctant to intervene, but quickly changed their tune as regional governments called for help and television images of dying Kurds began to tarnish the shine of the recent Gulf War victory. Once the decision to intervene was made, a U.S.-led coalition acted with lightening speed to deliver humanitarian assistance and establish a safe haven. As we will see immediately below, the speed with which the humanitarian crisis unfolded and the speed of the military reaction had strong countervailing influences on mortality rates among the displaced.

Death and Military Responses

Two empirical questions must be answered. How many people died on the Iraqi-Turkish border in 1991 and what killed them? Once military and humanitarian organizations responded to the crisis, how many people were saved from death and how were they saved? The immediate humanitarian crisis and response were of a very different nature from the long-term need for protection. The following analysis, therefore, is separated into two sections corresponding to the nature of the threat to people’s lives.

Immediate Crisis

The 400,000 refugees in Turkey found themselves in terrible conditions. The mountain passes in which they settled were between 5,000 and 8,000 feet high, night time temperatures dropped below freezing, they arrived empty handed, there was no locally available food or shelter, and the only water in most locations came from melting snow. The few roads in the area were narrow, muddy and nearly impassible due to severe weather, making it difficult for help to arrive. The one thing they had going for them was that prior to fleeing they had been a stable, urban population (mostly from Dohuk), with generally good health and nutritional conditions.\textsuperscript{106}

They quickly began to die. The American Centers for Disease Control reported “an estimated minimum 6,700 persons died while camped on the Turkey-Iraq border” from March 29 to May 24. Of these, about 500 would have died in Iraq under normal conditions. Most refugees had descended from the mountains by the end of the reporting period. The crude mortality rate (CMR) among the 10,000 or so refugees who remained in the camps in early June was at or below one person per day, so the remainder population would not significantly alter the above figure. Therefore, a minimum estimate of excess deaths is 6,200. This number is consistent with data collected by other organizations in the refugee camps.\textsuperscript{107}

Other studies indicate the scale of the problem. A Turkish official reported in the British


\textsuperscript{107} The estimate was reached after surveying over 17,800 people who passed through one of the Zakho transit camps. The crude mortality rate over the March 29 - May 24 period was 169 deaths per 10,000 people. In a population of 400,000 that equals 6,760 deaths in two months. “International Notes: Public Health Consequences of Acute Displacement of Iraqi Citizens -- March-May 1991,” \textit{Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report}, (hereafter \textit{MMWR}) Vol. 40, No. 26 (July 5, 1991), p. 444.
medical journal *The Lancet* that 1,500 refugees died in Turkey from April 2 to 7 -- a rate of 300 per day. A Physicians for Human Rights assessment team estimated during the April 8 to 12 period the maximum number of people dying per day was between 240 and 400. More than 60 percent of all deaths occurred in children less than five years old, who comprised about 18 percent of the population. It should be noted that the daily mortality rate, while very high, was not as high as commonly believed. A rate of up to 1,000 deaths per day was regularly reported in the press and often appears in analyses of the situation.

The most common immediate causes of death were communicable diseases, such as diarrhea and acute respiratory infections, and trauma or injury. In early April as many as 70 percent of all refugees had diarrhea. Among people older that five years of age exposure to cold and war casualties were the most common causes of death. Most of the injuries were the result of napalm and phosphorous that had been dropped on people as they fled by the Iraqi air force. Other common killers in refugee populations were not present, namely malnutrition and measles. The refugees benefited from the stable nature of their population before they fled and

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106 Fidaner, p. 190.
109 This is based on a crude mortality rate of 6-10 deaths per 10,000 people per day in Cukurca camp. The conditions in Cukurca were worse than in some other locations, so it is likely the CMR was as high or higher there than elsewhere. Initially the total refugee population was estimated to be 750,000, rather than the figure of 400,000 that is generally accepted now. Projecting a CMR of 6-10/10,000/day onto a population of 750,000 yields a daily death count of 450 to 750. Sandler, et al., p. 639.
111 For example, General Shalikashvili reported the number to a Congressional committee hearing.
113 Yip and Sharp, p. 589.
114 Fidaner, p. 190.
the high rate of childhood vaccinations.\textsuperscript{115} This is in contrast with most refugee populations which suffer through famine and prolonged war before fleeing.

The high incidence of communicable diseases was due primarily to a near complete lack of sanitation and potable water in the first weeks of April. Added to this were low temperatures, limited food, and severe over crowding.\textsuperscript{116} The situation at Cukurca camp was among the worst. It was "a sea of thick mud" with one latrine, no clean water and grossly inadequate supplies of tents and blankets. Not surprisingly, the camp experienced one of the highest mortality rates, if not the highest.\textsuperscript{117}

Relief efforts quickly improved the horrific environment and subsequently drew down the death rate. From April 4 to 18, the number of deaths per 10,000 population per day ranged between 4.0 and 10.4, depending on the location and date. Beginning about April 12 mortality and morbidity surveillance systems were established and data became more accurate. The peak rate of death occurred from April 13 to 26 when the mean CMR reached 5.7/10,000/day. The rate dropped precipitously after that time, with a CMR of 2.2/10,000/day for the period from April 27 to May 10. From May 9 to 24, the CMR had declined to 0.9/10,000/day.\textsuperscript{118} The changes are shown graphically in Chart 2-1.

\textsuperscript{115} "International Notes," \textit{MMWR}, p. 445.
\textsuperscript{117} Sandler, et al., pp. 638-639.
\textsuperscript{118} "International Notes," \textit{MMWR}, p. 443; Yip and Sharp, p. 589-590; Sandler, et al., p. 639.
Chart 2-1: Crude Mortality Rates Among Kurdish Refugees in Turkey, April 4 - May 24, 1991.

We now know approximately how many people died, what they died of, and that their rate of death changed over time. The next question is how was the mortality rate brought down and who was responsible? The short answer is that improved sanitation and access to clean water reduced the incidence of diarrhea; distribution of tents and blankets reduced exposure; and distribution of food prevented malnutrition. For example, at Cukurca water availability from protected sources before April 17 was seven liters per person per day. By April 25 each person could get 15 liters per day.\(^{119}\) (UNHCR recommends refugees get 20 liters per person per day for drinking, cooking and washing.) The importance of clean water and adequate sanitation can be seen in Chart 2-2, which shows the decreasing proportion of clinic outpatients with diarrhea as water availability and sanitation improved at Isikvaren refugee camp.

\(^{119}\) Pecoul and Malfait, p. 190.
Chart 2-2: Proportion of outpatients with diarrhea at Isikvaren refugee camp, April-May 1991.  

The military units of Operation Provide Comfort deserve most of the credit for bringing down the mortality rate in the first crucial weeks before non-governmental relief organizations and UN aid agencies could get their programs up and running. The critical factors for saving lives were speed of response and logistical capacity. By the end of the first week of the refugee influx the U.S. Army 10th Special Forces were beginning to locate the camps, assess needs, and organize food, tent and blanket delivery and distribution systems. The first NGO presence was a week later (April 12) and they set up no significant relief programs until the end of the month, after the crude mortality rate began to drop. As stated by a careful study of the operation, based primarily on interviews with participants, “Thanks to the universally acclaimed efforts of the

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121 The Turkish government also deserves recognition for its role. Although Ankara did not want any more Kurds on its territory than it already had, it made major contributions in the form of health care -- the first groups of health workers arrived in the border area within a few days -- road building, and provision of water and electricity. Fidaner, p. 190.
10th Special Forces Group, the stopping of the dying and suffering was well on its way to being accomplished, as the NGOs began to compliment the military’s response in an ad hoc manner.”

Not only did American and other militaries get there “firstest,” they got there with the “mostest.” In the three and a half months between April 6 and July 24, OPC aircraft had air-dropped 6,153 short tons of supplies, flown in another 6,251 tons by helicopter, and delivered a further 4,417 tons by truck, for a total of 16,821 tons. (That is an average of 152.9 short tons per day for 110 days.) In contrast, UNHCR mounted one of its most ambitious airlifts ever to help the Kurds who had fled to Iran. In April and May it managed to deliver 6,100 metric tons (or 6,700 short tons). (That is an average of 121.8 short tons per day for 55 days.) OPC did more than just carry supplies. Most donated relief supplies were received in a large central warehouse at Incirlik Air Base, where military personnel worked with relief organizations to catalog, store, prioritize, and distribute materials. The U.S. military in particular is well equipped to manage and execute complex transportation and logistics operations for field sustainment.

If military forces played the central role in saving lives among the Kurdish refugees in

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122 Seiple, p. 34.
123 The reference here is to American Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s admonition that the way to win a battle is to “Get there firstest with the mostest.”
125 State of the World’s Refugees 1993, p. 84. A short ton is 2,000 pounds; a metric ton is 2,200 pounds.
Turkey, but how much good did they actually do?\textsuperscript{127} It is safe to say that the emergency phase of Operation Provide Comfort saved well over 7,000 lives in two months. No mean feat! The estimate is conservative, as the following assumptions show.

Let us assume first that military forces undertook no direct humanitarian assistance. Let us further assume that the crude mortality rate remained at its high point of 5.7/10,000/day in the absence of improvements in sanitation, clean water supply, food and shelter provision, and medical assistance. Working from the CMR figures above, an added 1,820 people would have died from April 27 to May 9 and added 3,070 people would have died from May 9 to 24.\textsuperscript{128} In the absence of data, assume that the CMR from the end of May until the camps closed on June 6 remained at the 0.9 rate of the previous period.\textsuperscript{129} That would mean another 2,490 did not die in this period who otherwise would have. The number of people who would have died from April 27 to June 6 if the CMR had remained constant, but who did not die because the CMR was brought down, adds up to 7,380.

The number of lives saved might have been significantly higher, if we relax the assumption about the CMR remaining at its recorded peak of 5.7/10,000/day. It is not unreasonable to assume the crude mortality rate would have risen, rather than remain constant or decrease, since the conditions in the camps would have deteriorated rather than improved. While 70 percent of the population in early April had diarrhea, the proportion easily could have gotten

\textsuperscript{127} Recall that the standard used in this dissertation is to count only people who would have died in the absence of assistance, not the number of people who received assistance.

\textsuperscript{128} The CMR from April 27 to May 9 was 2.2, or 3.5 lower than the peak rate. A difference of 3.5/10,000/day in a population of 400,000 yields 140 lives per day, multiplied by 13 days equals 1,820 (3.5x40x13=1,820). For the period May 9 to 24, the CMR was 4.8 lower than the peak: 4.8x40x16=3,070.

\textsuperscript{129} In actuality the CMR probably decreased since the weakest refugee would already have died and the situation in the camps was continually improving.
higher in conditions were sanitary conditions worsened and potable water was not made available. Cases of cholera and dysentery were detected which, if not controlled early on, could have had a devastating impact. Those who did not fall victim to disease would have to withstand winter weather without tents or blankets, increasing the number of people who died from exposure. Compounding these problems, malnutrition would have set in in the absence of food deliveries. Malnourished people are less able to withstand diseases and trauma.

The counter argument is that humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies would have been present and would have brought down the mortality rate. However, it is unlikely relief organizations could have done more in the absence of the military units than they did with military assistance. UN agencies never played a significant role in the mountain camps. NGOs did not have viable assistance programs in the camps until the end of April, and even then the effort was small in comparison to the need. CARE, which specializes in food distribution, did not take over responsibility from the military in that functional sector until June 1. Furthermore, without military airdrops and helicopter deliveries, any programs on the ground would have been sorely lacking in basic supplies. Finally, it is likely that the movement out of the mountains would have begun later in the absence of the trust built between soldiers, aid workers and Kurdish leaders during the hands-on delivery of emergency assistance. The longer the refugees stayed in the mountains, the greater the number of deaths.

Long-term Protection

The Kurds began to return to Iraq within six weeks of the start of the exodus. The protection phase of Provide Comfort came to the fore as the emergency relief operation phased
out. Humanitarian aid organizations continued to provided relief assistance in Iraq for years but
the primary strategy preventing a large number of people from meeting an untimely demise was
protection provided by troops on the ground in a small area surrounding Zakho and the no-fly
zone north of the 36th parallel.

In a sense, the protection phase of OPC was a preventive deployment, even though it was
in reaction to an ongoing complex emergency. It prevented attacks by Baghdad and thus
prevented the refugee crisis from recurring. The first question above -- how many were dying
and what was killing them -- does not apply in this circumstance. The second question does:
how many people were saved and how were they saved? A detailed response to the latter part of
the question is given in the section below on strategies that addressed violence. A brief response
is offered here.

There is a general consensus that in the absence of international protection the Iraqi army
would invade Kurdish territory again with two likely results. Following past precedent the
military would kill as many people as it could, especially men and boys. The massacres and
advance of the army would trigger another pell-mell run for the border, resulting in a refugee
crisis similar to the one in 1991.

The Kurds are no more able to resist the Iraqi military now than they were after the Gulf
War, and probably less so. Since October 1991 Iraqi Kurdistan has suffered an internal
economic embargo imposed by Saddam Hussein, which together with the international embargo
on all of Iraq has crippled the economy in the north. No economy, no strength. Despite efforts
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to use the Kurds to overthrow Saddam, neither the KDP,
the PUK, nor any other party has received significant military assistance. On the other side of
the divide, the Baath regime has rebuilt much of the military strength it lost in the Gulf War. An
illustration of the imbalance could be seen in the number of forces on each side in 1993. The
Kurdish forces were estimated to number about 30,000. Encamped just outside the Kurdish
region were about 100,000 government troops.

Speculation on the number of lives saved by Provide Comfort in the long-term protection
phase is just that -- speculation. Some guidance is offered by the events of 1991. As mentioned
above, as many as 20,000 people were killed by Iraqi government troops immediately following
the abortive rebellion. More than 6,000 additional people died in the camps in Turkey. As many
as 23,000 Kurdish refugees died in Iran.

The onset of a new crisis would probably be just as brutal and swift as before. The
international reaction time would probably be slower. In 1991 Incirlik already hosted an
American Special Forces group and a large number of aircraft that had been stationed there for
the coalition war against Hussein. The on-going air cover operation out of Incirlik does not have
anything like the capacity of that residual force, particularly for ground operations. If the Kurds
were forced to flee again, it would not be surprising if more of them died in squalid camps than
did in 1991. In short, Operation Provide Comfort and the follow-on Operation Northern Watch
may well be preventing the death of tens of thousands of people.

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130 Jim Hoagland, “How CIA’s Secret War on Saddam Collapsed,” The Washington Post, (June 26, 1997),
131 David Keen, “Short-term interventions and long-term problems: the case of the Kurds in Iraq,” in John
Strategies and Their Implementation

The previous discussion has revealed several strategies used during the international military response to the Kurdish refugee crisis. This section specifically identifies and analyzes the strategies used by Operation Provide Comfort and by the small UN Guard Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI). It looks at the objectives of the intervenors, the types of strategies employed, the specific forms the strategies took, and how they were implemented including capabilities and coordination. The matrix of possible humanitarian intervention strategies below indicates which strategies each military operation followed.

Table 2-1: Type of Strategy Followed by Each Intervention Force

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
<th>Focus on Perpetrators</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>provide logistics and aid</strong> (non-combat)</td>
<td><strong>protect aid operations</strong> (defense and deterrence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>OPC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNGCI</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>protect population</strong> (defense and deterrence)</td>
<td><strong>defeat perpetrators</strong> (compellence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
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</table>

Provide Comfort consisted of two separate ground components organized as Joint Task Forces. (The Joint Task Forces became Combined Task Forces when American troops were joined by soldiers from other countries.) Task Force Alpha was responsible for assisting the refugees, coordinating with relief agencies, and preparing for the transit of people back to Iraq. Together with OPC aircraft (a combined air task force), it followed a strategy of providing aid
and logistical assistance. Task Force Bravo was responsible for carving out a security zone on the ground in Iraq. It followed overlapping strategies of protecting aid operations and protecting the population. OPC aircraft also played a pivotal role in assisting JTF-Bravo. The UN Guard Contingent in Iraq was assigned to protect aid operations and its strategy reflected that.

The sub-section immediately following analyzes Task Force Alpha and the UNGCI. The next sub-section analyzes Task Force Bravo. Although one of the strategies followed by Bravo lies in the category of addressing privation, I cover it together with the strategy that addressed violence. The reason is not only grace of composition. In practice, establishing a protected zone for the population (addressing violence) simultaneously created a protected zone into which aid organizations flowed, such that protecting aid operations was a secondary effect. Both sub-sections conclude with comparative assessments of the three schools of thought.

Strategies that Addressed Privation

Joint Task Force Alpha of Operation Provide Comfort followed a strategy of providing logistics and direct assistance primarily when the Kurds were in the mountain camps. It did an excellent job. The UN Guard Contingent in Iraq came into being after the assistance stage of Provide Comfort had ended, but while the Kurds were still in need of significant international support. It proved unable to adequately carry out its mission of protecting aid operations.

Operation Provide Comfort

Operation Provide Comfort was indirectly authorized by United Nations Security Council resolution 688, adopted April 5, 1991. The resolution condemned Iraq’s repression of its civilian
population, characterized the refugee flows that resulted from the repression as a threat to international peace and security, demanded that Iraq end the repression, insisted that Iraq allow immediate access to people in need of assistance, and appealed to member states to contribute to the relief efforts of the Secretary-General and humanitarian organizations. Since the resolution did not specifically authorize any military deployment, it did not mention either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\footnote{Security Council Resolution 688, S/RES/688 (1991).}

The initial declared objective of OPC was to provide emergency assistance to the Kurds along the Turkish-Iraqi border. (The intent to create a safe haven was not announced until mid-April and will be discussed below.) There is little doubt this was the actual objective at the operational level. Troops assigned to JTF-Alpha provided direct assistance to refugees and displaced persons, worked closely with humanitarian organizations, and did not conduct combat operations.

Yet there is equally little doubt the operations were driven by undeclared political objectives at the strategic level. Britain and the United States in particular did not want the crisis to put further pressure on the government of Turkey, which had already made great financial sacrifices by agreeing to the embargo on Iraq and had stuck its political neck out by siding with the West against a Muslim country in the Gulf War. On the domestic political front, Western governments were shamed into helping the refugees by unflattering comparisons in the media of their willingness to fight for oil, but not commit to help the helpless.

Contrasts with international responses to the Kurds who fled to Iran and the Shi’as in the
south support the point. Needs were no less among those populations, but the response was practically non-existent. Despite a larger number of refugees in Iran, the international humanitarian effort was confined to little more than efforts by the UNHCR. Iran was not an ally of the West and did not welcome international television crews to publicize the situation. In southern Iraq, the Baath regime was at least as brutal in response to the Shi’a uprising as it was against the Kurds: tens of thousands were killed, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced, and over a million fled into exile, primarily in Iran. Coalition states established Operation Southern Watch to enforce a no-fly zone, but did nothing to help people on the ground.

To accomplish the humanitarian objective with political overtones, Operation Provide Comfort followed a strategy of providing direct aid to the refugees and logistical assistance to humanitarian organizations. The specific form of direct aid was Special Forces working in the camps to provide the bare necessities of life, bring some order to the chaos, and lay the groundwork for a quick handoff of responsibility to relief organizations. Logistical capacity was specifically in the form of controlling air operations at Incirlik and in the area of the camps, handling and storing relief materials, and providing transportation equipment such as aircraft, helicopters and trucks.

Combined Task Force Alpha, under the command of American Brigadier General Richard Potter consisted of the American 10th Special Forces Group (Green Berets), the 40th Battalion of the 3d Commando (Royal Marines), and the American 39th Special Operations

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134 State of the World’s Refugees 1993, p. 84.
135 Byman, p. 8.
Wing. It was activated April 6 and deactivated June 8, the day after it transferred responsibility to UNHCR.\textsuperscript{136} The American forces had been based at Incirlik during the Gulf War as an emergency personnel recovery force in support of U.S. Air force units. They were familiar with the terrain and many were familiar with Kurdish culture and language. This knowledge proved invaluable in carrying out their mission and winning the trust of the refugee population and relief organizations.\textsuperscript{137}

The deployment had four stages, though they were not articulated in an official plan. The assessment stage lasted about five days, starting April 6, during which detachments deployed to figure out what was going on at 43 different locations with concentrations of displaced people. Initial airdrops of supplies began simultaneously. The second stage, lasting until about April 26, involved the creation of infrastructure support such as communications, security, and landing/drop zones for supplies. Soon aircraft from the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain were delivering material. Stage three consisted of sustainment and support, including activities such as working with the Kurds to become familiar with their leaders and clan structure, integrating NGOs into ongoing activities, and developing technical engineering and medical teams. The final stage was the relocation of the Kurds out of the mountains, which began in mid-May.\textsuperscript{138}

When NGOs began to trickle in during the second stage of the military deployment, two very different organizational cultures came into close contact for the first time in an unfamiliar

\textsuperscript{138} Seiple, p. 38; Cavanaugh, p. 9.
situation. It was critically important that military and humanitarian personnel coordinate their work, but the initial impression each had of the other was negative. Military personnel resented NGOs “just appearing” wanting to help or inspect the human rights practices of the Special Forces. The “disaster junkies/groupies” seemed to know each other from other crises, went wherever they wanted, and did whatever they pleased without regard for the territorial sectors established by the military. For their part, many humanitarian personnel had come of age after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and viewed military types as trained to kill, not save lives. They feared the military was a “big, cumbersome bureaucracy that couldn’t learn quickly.”¹³⁹ Some humanitarian organizations kept their distance from the military, but most soon participated in a constructive and mutually respectful relationship.

Coordination between military and humanitarian personnel in the camps was extremely decentralized and consisted primarily of information exchange at daily meetings where attendance was voluntary. Meetings were convened under the auspices of the UNHCR and were attended by a constantly shifting selection of people who announced what they were doing and where they were working.¹⁴⁰ Moving up from the grass roots to operational hubs at Zakho, Iraq and Dyarbakir, Turkey, to Provide Comfort headquarters at Incirlik Air base, coordination mechanisms became more coherent.

Stereotypes were overcome through one-on-one interaction between people with a common goal. Aid workers were impressed with the cultural sensitivity of the Special Forces officers and their willingness to take advice on public health issues, then get the job done.¹⁴¹ The

¹³⁹ Seiple, p. 39. Quotes from interviews conducted by Seiple.
¹⁴⁰ Seiple, p. 40.
¹⁴¹ Seiple, pp. 40-41.
team leader for CARE -- one of the largest and most effective NGOs in the emergency relief business -- said humanitarian personnel had a lot to learn from the military. He credits the presence of "crack troops" with improving the overall behavior of NGO personnel. 142 Likewise, military personnel came to respect the emergency relief expertise of NGOs and the dedication of their staffs. 143

Provide Comfort was the first time a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was used to manage the interface between military and humanitarian organizations. It was adapted from civil affairs units that normally act as a liaison between the U.S. military and the government of the host country. The basic tasks of the CMOCs were to transfer information between the military and humanitarian communities and to prioritize who got what, when and where. There were informal CMOCs at Zakho, through which most NGOs entered Iraq, and at Dyarbakir, which was located half way between Incirlik and Zakho and became a major staging area for the humanitarian supply operation. 144 These consisted of one officer who plugged into the NGO daily coordinating meetings to exchange information and interpretations of what was going on. The arrangement worked because both the military and humanitarian sides felt they benefited from a mutual exchange. 145 The CMOC at Incirlik was larger but fulfilled the same function. Its focus was on the throughput of material available based on the needs communicated from the field.

Critical to effective military-humanitarian interaction at all levels was the presence of a

142 Interview with Rowland Roome by author, September 27, 1996, Kigali, Rwanda.
143 Interview with Henderson; interview with Forster; Seiple, p. 41.
144 Interview with Forster.
145 Seiple, p. 41-44.
Disaster Assistance Response Team from the American Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA-DART). The members of the small team (ranging between 12 and 30 over time) were recognized by the NGOs as experts in their field and were respected for their past efforts. The military felt comfortable with them because DART personnel understood military procedures. Their expertise, organic communications and self-sustainment capacities, and ability to grant U.S. government funds to NGOs on the spot went a long way to oiling the gears of a complicated and confusing multi-organizational humanitarian response.\footnote{Seiple, p. 35.}

To summarize, the direct assistance strategy of Operation Provide Comfort, implemented by Joint/Combined Task Force Alpha, was effective at saving lives for several reasons. Highly skilled personnel with access to an impressive array of communications and transportation equipment arrived within days of the refugee exodus. The operational objective (if not the background motive) was truly humanitarian and the strategy followed addressed the immediate causes of death. Not least, military and humanitarian personnel quickly developed a good working relationship that allowed them to take advantage of the flood of relief supplies that soon arrived.

*United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq*

The United Nations reached an agreement with the Iraqi government in late May 1991 for a deployment of UN guards. The agreement came within the framework of the April 18 memorandum of understanding that allowed UN humanitarian relief agencies to work in Iraq
with the consent of the regime in Baghdad. The UNGCI arrived in Iraq in June to provide protection to UN aid personnel after Provide Comfort troops left. Population protection was explicitly not part of the agreement. The actual objective of the deployment was similar to the stated objective, though there was hope among some NGOs and UN agencies that the guards would deter attacks on Iraqi civilians by their mere presence.\textsuperscript{147}

It should be stressed that the UNGCI was not a peacekeeping force. Its purpose was to protect aid personnel and property from small-scale attacks. The specific form of the UNGCI’s aid protection strategy was point defense and deterrence. They protected UN and NGO personnel; guarded UN property, warehouses, and offices; and provided numerous escorts for aid convoys.\textsuperscript{148} This was very different from the general area protection provided by the Coalition ground forces, who withdrew in July 1991.

The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs stated the Guards played an “instrumental” role in protecting aid operations from isolated attacks.\textsuperscript{149} While it is likely the Guards’ presence deterred some banditry and pot-shots, it is clear they did not have the ability to offer any protection against serious violence. Iraqi government forces shelled two towns on the “border” of the Kurdish autonomous region, despite the presence of UNGCI personnel. The lightly armed Guards fled. Nor have they always been successful at deterring terrorist-type attacks on aid agencies. Such attacks typically consisted of bombs placed under vehicles, grenades thrown into places where staff congregated, and buildings and vehicles fired on by automatic weapons.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Keen, p. 171; Stromseth, p. 91-92.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{DHA News, 1993 in Review}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{150} Keen, pp. 171-172.
is believed most of the attacks were carried out by people in the employ of Baghdad, with the intent of tightening the economic strangulation of the Kurds.\textsuperscript{151}

The main reason for the marginal ability of the UNGCI to protect aid operations was its small size and limited military capability. The Guard Contingent was authorized to have up to 500 personnel, but it rarely enjoyed that level of staffing. At a low point, in October 1992, there were only 30 guards in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{152} In 1993 there were 300 men, primarily located at Erbil which is where the majority of relief organizations were located.\textsuperscript{153} They had only light arms. Protection from large-scale violence was provided to aid organizations, the population, and the UN Guards alike by the air cover of Operation Provide Comfort.

\textbf{Strategies that Addressed Violence}

In addition to addressing privation through direct assistance, logistics support and protecting aid operations, Operation Provide Comfort addressed violence. It is this concern that kept OPC going beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis. The way in which the operation addressed violence is analyzed below.

\textit{Operation Provide Comfort}

On April 16 Coalition governments officially decided that the Kurds could not be indefinitely sustained in the mountains. Arrangements had to be made to move them back to Iraq (since Turkey would not grant them asylum). Operation Provide Comfort entered a new stage

\textsuperscript{151} McDowall, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{152} Keen, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{DHA News, 1993 in Review}, pp. 27, 29.
intended to create a secure area to which the Kurds could return. Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili was placed in command of the restructured operation and arrived in Turkey April 17. On April 18 Joint Task Force Bravo was formed under the command of Major General Jay Garner. Its mission was to create a secure area, set up transit camps, receive and care for the returnees, turn relief operations over to civilian organizations, and withdraw from Iraq.\footnote{Maurice L. Todd, \textit{Army Tactical Requirements for Peace Support Operations}, Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY93-94 (December 1993), p. 19; Cavanaugh, p. 12-13.}

There is no reason to believe the stated objectives were not the actual \textit{operational} objectives of the Task Force Bravo portion of Provide Comfort. As with the rest of the operation, however, humanitarian concerns were subordinate to political ones. A U.S. diplomat said "our main concern [was that] refugee concentrations in Turkey were threatening to become semi-permanent locations for the Kurds that could spell political and economic headache for Ankara for years to come."\footnote{Quoted in Stromseth, p. 109, note 84.}

The political aspect became more evident in the decision not to take military control of the provincial capital of Dohuk, even though it was home to many of the people who fled to Turkey and a militarily important location. Western governments were concerned that military occupation of a provincial capital was too politically sensitive, given Iraq's lack of consent for any foreign military presence. They also did not want to get stuck administering the town, which would necessitate a long-term commitment. In the end a diplomatic agreement led to light armed presence by the Iraqi government, the Kurds, and the UN, with Iraq providing the civilian administration.\footnote{Cavanaugh, pp. 24, 27, 29.}
political ones not to -- politics won. Contrary to expectations, the question of refugee
repatriation was not a big stumbling block: there was general agreement even among the
humanitarian relief organizations that it was infeasible to maintain the mountain camps in the
long term. Although some organizations worried the return amounted to selling the Kurds down
the river.\footnote{157}

Joint Task Force Bravo\footnote{158} followed overlapping strategies of protecting the population
and protecting aid operations. As the assigned mission indicates, it also provided some direct
humanitarian support. The direct support consisted of setting up transit camps and rehabilitating
basic infrastructure in Zakho and Dohuk. These engineering tasks were accomplished with speed
and professionalism but were not the main concern of Bravo and will not be discussed here.\footnote{159}
General Garner interpreted his primary mission to be one of security so that the Kurds could
return to their homes without anyone spending lots of time and resources on the transit camps.\footnote{160}

Population protection and aid protection could be pursued simultaneously because the
specific form employed was area deterrence. By providing protection in a geographic area, there
was no need to chose whether to protect aid workers and facilities or local civilians, as is often
the case when the specific form of protection is point deterrence and defense. While deterrence
was the mode of protection, carving out the secure zone in the first place required compellence.
As one military participant described it, JTF soldiers found themselves “in an extremely dynamic

\footnote{157 Interview with Roome.}
\footnote{158 The Task Force incorporated units from several countries, but was never designated a Combined Task
Force because the headquarters staff was entirely American. There was not time in the fast-moving pace of events
to integrate officers from other countries. Cavanaugh, p. 16.}
\footnote{159 In 17 days the U.S. Army 18th Engineer Brigade completed two camps, each with 4,000 tents, 960
latrines, 6 miles of roads, and 100,000 gallon water storage capacity. Forster, "Operation Provide Comfort," p. 21.}
\footnote{160 Cavanaugh, p. 15, 23.
environment that required constant offensive maneuver to eject Iraqi forces from the zone.\textsuperscript{161}

JTF-Bravo was comprised of troops from eight countries representing the combat equivalent of a light division.\textsuperscript{162} Yet it had only about half the artillery required so it relied heavily on combat air patrols. The rules of engagement were restricted to self defense and the force necessary to provide security for humanitarian relief programs. They allowed coalition forces flexibility, but the rules prohibited them from seeking combat.\textsuperscript{163} Under these circumstances Bravo used aggressive maneuver and threat of action to eject Iraqi troops from the security zone.

General Shalikashvili personally delivered a demarche to the Iraqi deputy commander on April 19, indicating the intention of coalition forces to enter Iraq the next day for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance. Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz denounced the plan as infringing on Iraq's territorial sovereignty.\textsuperscript{164} The next day the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit made an unopposed combat air assault on Zakho and induced the Iraqi army to withdraw after several days of confrontations, none of which broke out into fighting. The Iraqi troops were replaced with about 300 secret police, who harassed coalition forces and intimidated the Kurds.\textsuperscript{165}

In response the British 40th Commando Regiment was brought in fresh from Northern

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{161} Todd, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{162} American forces included the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit including the 3/325 Airborne combat Team, the 4th Aviation Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division, the 18th Engineer Brigade, and the 18th Military Police Brigade. British forces included the 3d Commando Brigade and the 40th Commando Regiment. A Dutch Marine battalion was attached to the British 3d Brigade. The Spanish sent an Expeditionary Force; the Italians sent the Fologore Brigade. France sent substantial troops, and Luxembourg sent troops. Forster, “Operation Provide Comfort,” p. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{163} Todd, pp. 19, 21; Cavanaugh, pp. 16, 26.
\textsuperscript{164} Cavanaugh, pp. 14-15.
\textsuperscript{165} Cavanaugh, pp. 19-20.
\end{footnotesize}
Ireland. General Garner capitalized on their expertise at urban patrolling to have them aggressively patrol the streets of Zakho on foot while U.S. Marines patrolled in Light Armored Vehicles and American aircraft flew combat patrols at tree-top level. A week after Bravo’s initial entry the secret police had been herded into five compounds and an Iraqi Major General had them removed.\(^{166}\)

Once Zakho was secure, Bravo moved south and east with British and French troops responsible for eastward expansion. The eastern limit of the secure zone was established 45 kilometers from the Iranian border out of sensitivity for possible complications arising Iran’s security concerns.\(^{167}\) The challenge facing coalition forces was to get uncooperative Iraqi forces to move out of the area without initiating combat, since the operation was designated as humanitarian in nature. A member of the 3-325 Air Battalion Combat Team described the process as follows:

[I]n a typical meeting engagement, the battalion deployed infantry in defensive positions in view of the enemy, brought up supporting TOW carriers to overwatch the position, and began to maneuver another force around the enemy’s flanks, all the while keeping air cover circling over the enemy’s position. This tactic was normally sufficient to force Iraqi withdrawal.\(^{168}\)

As the security zone was expanded it became evident that the majority of Kurds -- as many as 300,000 of whom lived in Dohuk -- would not return until they felt that city was safe.\(^{169}\) Provide Comfort military commanders requested permission from their political leaders to enter Dohuk, but were turned down, as noted above. Southward movement consequently stalled, but

\(^{166}\) Cavanaugh, p. 22; Todd, p. 21.
\(^{167}\) Cavanaugh, p. 24.
\(^{168}\) Todd, pp. 21-22.
\(^{169}\) Seiple, p. 37.
resumed once the diplomatic settlement was reached. Coalition forces entered Dohuk May 25 and stayed for three weeks to clean up the city (which Iraqi troops had looted in anticipation of losing it), restore food and water distribution points, and collect unexpended ordnance. Once these tasks were accomplished the Kurds flooded back.¹⁷⁰

The ground security zone covered an area 160 kilometers west to east and 60 kilometers north to south. One could drive the length of it in three hours.¹⁷¹ It is important to note that the security zone on the ground, the no-fly zone, and the region of Kurdish habitation in Iraq were not coterminous. As the map on the following page indicates, the Kurdish region extends from Iraq’s northern border with Turkey to the east and south along the border with Iran. The no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel incorporates about half the Kurdish region, as well as an area that is not primarily occupied by Kurds. The security zone on the ground covers only about one quarter of the Kurdish area.

After the agreement between the UN and Iraq to allow the UN Guards to enter the country, the coalition forces executed their withdrawal from Iraq, completing it on July 15. The only Provide Comfort troops left in Iraq were officers in the Military Coordination Center, located in Zakho. The ground component of Provide Comfort (known as OPC I) had ended. Joint Task Forces Alpha and Bravo ceased to exist, but the air patrols of the no-fly zone (known as OPC II) continued to provide a certain level of protection.

The Military Coordination Center (MCC) at Zakho was established soon after Provide Comfort troops had secured the city. It was the primary inter-organizational coordination

¹⁷⁰ Cavanaugh, pp. 29-30.
¹⁷¹ Interview with Roome.
mechanism used during the second phase of OPC. The MCC reported to Incirlik rather then to JTF-Bravo, but was collocated with Bravo so the two could work closely together. It was a “great innovation” that served to diffuse a number of confrontational situations through face-to-face communication, including during the “dynamic maneuver” operations described above. It was similar to the CMOCs used to increase the low of information between military and humanitarian actors and to coordinate their activities, except that it was a mechanism for military to military communication. Members of the MCC were officers from Provide Comfort and the Iraqi military, as well as Kurdish leaders.

When Bravo was expanding the security zone, the senior Iraqi representative at the MCC, Brigadier General Nashwan, would receive a demarche 24 hours prior to a forward movement. If the Iraqi troops refused to retreat in the face of coalition maneuvering, the MCC would fly General Nashwan by helicopter to the unit and he would order it to withdraw. The MCC also proved useful as a liaison between coalition forces and Kurdish peshmergas, who fired on Task Force Bravo more than once as they were not allowed to enter the security zone with arms and had them confiscated at checkpoints.

Once JTF-Bravo withdrew, the MCC was responsible for overseeing security in the zone. For a few months it was backed up by a quick reaction ground combat force of 2,500 to 3,000 mostly Turkish troops stationed in Silopji Turkey. The force stood down in September 1991 without ever having been called upon. After that the MCC relied for support on air cover out of

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172 Interview with Forster; Cavanaugh, p. 18.
173 Cavanaugh, pp. 18, 25.
174 Interview with Forster; Cavanaugh, p. 32.
Incirlik. The MCC was not a fighting force, but a mediating and monitoring body, as well as the eyes and ears for OPC headquarters located at Incirlik.

After OPC ground elements left, MCC coordination tasks extended beyond military organizations to include the UN and various NGOs operating in the security zone. The good working relationship established between OPC and humanitarian organizations in the mountains continued, although there were differences of opinion on the appropriate level of relief and rehabilitation involvement.176

All was not quiet on the northern front, despite the no-fly zone and the presence of the Military Coordination Center. Iraqi troops were allowed to have ground forces in the no-fly zone, as long as they stayed out of the ground security zone around Zahko. It was not a no-drive zone, after all. Saddam Hussein used his troops to regularly test the coalition’s commitment to protecting the Kurds. The first big test was in April 1992 when government troops skirmished with Kurds along the Kurdish-Iraqi cease-fire line and the Iraqis brought up surface to air missiles and radar tracking equipment. They backed down after a strong warning from the U.S., Britain, and France -- the three remaining members of Provide Comfort, in addition to the Turks.177 Since then Iraqi challenges have led to isolated OPC bombing attacks on military sights.

Furthermore, the U.S., Britain and France turned a blind eye to Turkish incursions into Iraq as it seeks to wipe out a violent Kurdish separatist movement of its own (the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK). Turkey carried out a large-scale invasion from October to December

176 Interview with Henderson.
177 O’Balance, p. 198.
1992 and established military outposts in Iraq in 1995.\(^{178}\) The official Turkish estimate of the number of Kurds killed is 20,000! On top of this, the Kurdish factions have regularly fought among themselves, though on a small scale.

Military-to-military talks in the MCC ended in 1993 at the request of the Iraqis. In September 1996 the Iraqi military made a full assault on Erbil, at the invitation of KDP leader Massoud Barzani to expel the rival PUK from the city. (Erbil is north of the 36th parallel and inside Kurdish territory.) The United States made a few bombing runs and did a lot of saber rattling, but did not take any effective action. After that incident the MCC was permanently removed. Operation Provide Comfort became Operation Northern Watch at the end of 1996 when the French withdrew making the argument that without the MCC, OPC was no longer a humanitarian operation. As of April 1997 Iraqi military troops still had not entered the ground security zone.\(^{179}\)

In summary, Task Force Bravo accomplished all its objectives with dispatch. As a means of achieving its objectives, it followed appropriate and overlapping strategies of population protection and aid protection. It was able to provide area deterrence for Kurds and relief organizations because a highly capable ground and air force was allowed by political leaders to take considerable risks to force Iraqi troops to give ground and remain at bay. An innovative military coordination mechanism helped to prevent confrontations from escalating to battle. Full protection, however, only extended to the limits of the ground security zone. Beyond that air cover extended over half of Kurdish territory. The long-term operation, Provide Comfort II, has

\(^{178}\) McDowall, p. 384; Ciment, pp. 190-192.

\(^{179}\) Interview with Henderson.
prevented the recurrence of a large-scale invasion. Yet as an air operation, is inherently unable to address the regular life-threatening harassment suffered by aid workers or the devastating economic embargo Baghdad has imposed on the Kurdish region. The primary reasons it has deterred a major military advance are its proven capacity to destroy military assets and an apparent continued willingness to use that capacity.

**Political Success?**

We have seen that Operation Provide Comfort was a success in terms of saving lives, both during the immediate crisis and over the years. Part of the reason is that behind the declared humanitarian objectives of the military operations, political considerations have always been present. Politics drove the decisions about getting involved, getting ground forces out quickly, and maintaining air cover for the long term. If OPC was a humanitarian success, can we say it was a political one as well?

In 1991 Provide Comfort served the political purpose of demonstrating that Western and Turkish political leaders were willing to “do something” about massive human suffering. They no longer had to face accusations of caring more about cheap oil than about human life. The initial response demonstrably improving the lot of the Kurds. Excited talk of the “new world order” following the Cold War could continue. From a geostrategic perspective, the intervention

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180 Provide Comfort was not perfect and has been criticized on humanitarian grounds. Public health specialists have found fault with the emergency response. See, for example, Michael J. Toole, “The Public Health Consequences of Inaction: Lessons Learned in Responding to Sudden Population Displacements,” in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., *A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters* (New York: Basic Books and Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), at pp. 155-157. Others have criticized the lack of sustained protection on the ground and failure to provide rehabilitation assistance to the Kurds. See, for example, David Keen, *The Kurds in Iraq: How Safe is Their Haven Now?* (London: Save the Children Fund, 1993).
further weakened Saddam Hussein without creating a power vacuum in the Middle East by causing Iraq to collapse. Western leaders could have their cake and eat it too.

Political benefits continued for the intervening countries -- particularly the United States and Turkey -- through the end of Provide Comfort in 1996 and into Operation Northern Watch, which is ongoing. Iraqi Kurdistan occupies a strategically important location between Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The United States has committed itself to protect the Kurds which allows it to maintain a military presence in the region; keep an eye on all the players; keep a thorn in Saddam’s side; and assist the interests of Turkey, its one ally in the region.\textsuperscript{181} For its part, Turkey does not have to worry excessively about a sudden and massive Kurdish refugee influx. Furthermore, the “safe zone” has not prevented it from pursuing its own brutal counter-insurgency campaign against PKK rear bases inside Iraq. Last but not least, while the no-fly zone has enabled a \textit{de facto} Kurdish autonomous region to exist, no state has recognized an autonomous Kurdish political authority to which Ankara is adamantly opposed.\textsuperscript{182}

There have been some political problems too. No one has declared whether the safe haven under the no-fly zone is temporary or permanent. If it is permanent, what exactly is its status and the status of the parties within it? There does not appear to be a way for the United States to end its involvement -- there is no exit strategy. (The question of whether or not it wants to get out aside.) The Kurds are not in a position to fend for themselves because they have no economy and factions continually fight one another. If Baghdad is given free rein again, there is no doubt another refugee crisis would follow and pressure would mount to repeat a difficult.

\textsuperscript{181} Interview with Henderson; Ciment, pp. 183-184.
\textsuperscript{182} Interview with Forster; Ciment, pp. 192-193.
costly and risky intervention.\textsuperscript{183} Continued instability created by the current situation is not in the interest of the U.S. or regional states.

In the broader picture, the success of Operation Provide Comfort and its apparent ease gave national governments (particularly the American government) and the United Nations a sense that humanitarian intervention could have great benefits at relatively low cost. At the end of 1992 this perception likely played a role in the decision of the Bush administration to step into Somalia to help deliver humanitarian assistance. The Somalia intervention did save lives, but it was also a chastening experience that had negative political and humanitarian consequences.

From the Kurd’s point of view Provide Comfort was the occasion for great political hopes and harsh political realities. What began as a humanitarian intervention evolved into sustained support for an unofficial autonomous Kurdish region. The Kurds held elections in 1992, in which the KDP and PUK split control of the government, with minority participation from other parties. They created an executive council, national assembly and policy committees, but were unable to turn a multi-group, rivalrous guerilla movement into a viable administration. The UN and state governments would not work with the Kurds for fear of lending legitimacy to their “government”.\textsuperscript{184} By mid-1994 the factions were openly fighting again. In the absence of an imminent threat from Baghdad they were unable to maintain peace among themselves. Making matters worse, the political limbo has forestalled any infrastructure rehabilitation or redevelopment assistance. A large number of Kurds remain displaced from their original homes due to poverty, land mines and lack of infrastructure. Eighty percent of the men are unemployed.

\textsuperscript{183} Forster, “Post-Cold War Peace Operations;” interview with Henderson.
\textsuperscript{184} McDowall, pp. 380-383; O’Balance, p. 199.
Most people are farmers, but they operate at a subsistence level out of depressed "collective towns." Without a viable economy they can not maintain political cohesion.\textsuperscript{185} Though they are protected from being slaughtered, the situation of the Iraqi Kurds is comfortless.

Summary

Operation Provide Comfort saved more lives than could have been saved without military intervention. Military operations in the mountain camps were instrumental in saving at least 7,000 people from death by providing water, food, shelter and medical attention. The safe zone probably saved well over 20,000 people. The UN Guard Contingent in Iraq was not very effective. We know that it offered limited protection to aid convoys, but there is not enough data to say whether the aid delivered saved lives or merely made people's existence less miserable. It might have saved a very small number of lives. Table 2-2 on the next page summarizes the reasons for the success of Operation Provide Comfort and the failure of the UN Guard Contingent.

Operation Provide Comfort was successful because it exhibited all the necessary conditions. The intervenors had a mixture of humanitarian and political objectives, with political ones in a prominent role. Powerful states perceive their national interests to be threatened, which was a large part of the reason for their very quick response. The other reasons for the rapid response were widespread television coverage of refugees and pre-positioned equipment and forces at Incirlik airbase -- a result of the Gulf War. The rapid response was critically important

\textsuperscript{185} Keen, pp. 173-179, 182; Forster, "Post-Cold War Peace Operations."
Table 2-2: Summary of strategies employed and whether the conditions for success were present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Employed</th>
<th>Address causes of death?</th>
<th>Where the conditions for success present?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct aid</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistics</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>area aid protection</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area pop. protection</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To saving lives during the initial emergency. Political objectives also induced the intervenors to commit substantial resources and take risks. Transport aircraft and helicopters, communications equipment and special operations troops played the central role in implementing the strategies of direct assistance and logistical support to relief organizations. Highly capable ground combat troops and aircraft, together with a willingness to engage in battle were the key to creating the safe zone. Implementation was also successful because military and humanitarian actors worked together to plan their activities and solve operational problems. Coordination efforts left something to be desired in the mountain camps, but were quite good during the effort to move the Kurds back down to the plains.

The United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq was not effective at saving lives primarily for two reasons. First, at the time it operated there were not as many people in imminent danger of death, thus there was less opportunity to save them. Most of the people who benefited from
the UNGCI presence fell into the category of people who received assistance but would not have died if they did not receive help. Second, the UN Guards did not have the capability to offer aid organizations protection against any serious threat. They were a small group with light weapons and a restrictive mandate and rules of engagement.
Chapter Three


Introduction

International military involvement in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 was a seminal series of events. It was seen as a manifestation of the brave new world order and as a confirmation of the right to intervene, after the precedent had been set in Iraq. It was a test of the United Nations political and military abilities. It became a cautionary lesson on the costs and limits of coercion. Not least, it was a laboratory for humanitarian intervention.

A number of distinct military operations occurred, three to help the emergency humanitarian relief effort to end the famine, and one to promote a political resolution of the chaotic civil war. This chapter looks at the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I); the airlift Operation Provide Relief; the United Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope; and the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), including the American Quick Reaction Force and Task Force Ranger, both of which supported the UN operation but were under separate command.

The first United Nations Operation in Somalia took place from mid-1992 to March 1993. It consisted of 50 unarmed military observers from several countries and 500 lightly armed Pakistani infantrymen. The military observers were mandated to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the two strongest faction leaders in southern Somalia: Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aideed. The infantrymen were mandated to protect aid agencies from bandits and looters so they could deliver desperately needed food to civilians in the capital city Mogadishu and in the
countryside. This chapter focuses on the second set of troops.

UNOSOM I did not save any lives. Its strategy of providing point protection to aid organizations was an appropriate response to the needs on the ground, where people were starving to death and relief workers could not assist them because of marauding gunmen. However, Somalia generated very little interest in national capitals around the world. As a result the military capabilities provided -- troops, equipment, and mandate -- were no where near sufficient to meet the challenge of protection in a hostile environment. Furthermore, there was no understanding that a UN force with a peacekeeping mandate would be ineffective where there was no peace to keep and where they were not welcome. A second, less important but not insignificant, shortcoming was the total lack of coordination between the humanitarian community and the military force.

As a response to UNOSOM’s failure, American President George Bush ordered an airlift effort dubbed Operation Provide Relief that extended from August 1992 to February 1993. It consisted mostly of U.S. Air Force planes, with participation from Canada and Germany. The strategy was to provide logistical support to aid organizations so they could reach people in the area of Somalia that was hit hardest by the famine. It was an appropriate strategy, given the need for food and the unavailability of land routes due to constant ambushes.

Provide Relief helped save the lives of 10,000 or more people. Although the famine had already taken many lives, the airlift was launched in time to assist people who otherwise would have died. The operation succeeded primarily because military units provided logistical capacity far beyond what humanitarian organizations could muster. They moved thousands of tons of food, water and medical supplies from the port of Mombasa, Kenya, to towns in Somalia. The
airlift was particularly effective because humanitarian and military organizations worked closely together to determine how to safely deliver the right supplies to the places of greatest need. Purely humanitarian objectives were sufficient because the operation was neither costly nor dangerous relative to other military operations.

The Somali war and famine began to garner significant international media coverage by mid-1992, largely as a result of angry humanitarian groups shouting for attention. Partly for this reason, the United States offered to lead a much larger military operation to assist the humanitarian cause. The United Nations Security Council readily agreed. Operation Restore Hope, or the United Task Force (UNITAF), began in December 1992 and ended in May 1993. Restore Hope entailed dual strategies of providing logistical assistance and point protection to aid organizations. Both strategies addressed the need on the ground, which was to get food, water, and medicine past militiamen and independent bandits to civilians who were dying of privation.

Restore Hope saved the lives of approximately 10,000 people and killed about 100 others. It did not save more lives because it was undertaken too late. Although the situation remained desperate, the famine had begun to pass: the weakest people had died and the price of food was beginning to drop. The lack of strategic interest in Somalia on the part of powerful states is the primary reason the operation was launched late. Restore Hope saved as many lives as it did primarily because of the enormous logistical and combat capabilities it brought to bear. Military units rehabilitated the seaports, airports, and main roads, provided transportation equipment, and committed a huge number of logistics personnel to the effort. The fighting ability of many national units that were sent was far superior to the militiamen and bandits who had stymied aid
workers. Restore Hope also employed an effective coordination mechanism called a Civil-Military Operations Center that greatly facilitated the interaction of humanitarian and military organizations, though it by no means removed all their mutual suspicions.

The American-led Restore Hope handed off responsibility to the second UN Operation in Somalia in May 1993. The UN force remained in place until March 1995 with a series of increasingly ambitious mandates. UNOSOM II was intended to assist the continuing humanitarian effort and also to help create a new national government where none had existed for three years. The strategy used to achieve the first task was point protection of aid operations. It was an appropriate strategy, given the continuing need to deliver relief materials and the constant threat of banditry and looting. The strategy used as part of the effort to achieve the second task was to defeat General Aideed, who was identified as the main obstacle to the United Nations political plan -- the perpetrator in the language of this dissertation. It was an entirely inappropriate strategy from humanitarian and political points of view. The idea that a new political system could be built while excluding the country’s most powerful player is ludicrous. Although the humanitarian situation would have benefited from a government that could provide order, any government that excluded General Aideed would not be able to control him and thus could not provide order.

The second UN Operation in Somalia probably saved the lives of a couple thousand people outside of Mogadishu, but it also killed about a thousand people in Mogadishu and wounded many more. It could have saved more lives if it had pursued only the strategy of point protection. Although its combat capabilities were significantly less than those of Restore Hope, it was able to hold off small-scale attacks. As it was, the UN operation made a bad situation
worse by labeling Aideed public enemy number one and trying to defeat him in battle. Even if this had been an appropriate strategy, the UN force did not have anywhere near enough fighting capability to pull it off. The mismatch between strategy and capabilities was the result of overly ambitious political objectives on the part of the UN Secretariat and lack of strong political objectives on the part of member states who must always supply the wherewithal to carry out UN mandates. Regardless of the confrontation with Aideed, the number of lives UNOSOM II could have saved was greatly diminished by the timing of the operation: it came after the worst of the crisis was past. Another constraint on UNOSOM’s effectiveness was the near total breakdown in coordination with humanitarian organizations, particularly in the capital city, where most supplies entered the country.

The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. The next section presents the political and military context of the international interventions, including the causes of the famine, the local military actors and their strengths, and the level of consent for international involvement. The section following analyzes the dependent variable by identifying how many people died, what they died of, and how many people were saved from death. It also correlates mortality rates with each intervention period. The section after that reviews the long delay before a significant international effort was undertaken to respond to the famine. The fifth section addresses the strategies of the four military interventions that took place from 1992 to 1995. The analysis moves from correlation between the independent and dependent variables to causation. A brief section addresses the political failure of international involvement. The final section summarizes the number of lives saved and the reasons for each operation’s success or failure.
Political and Military Context

Somalia is a largely arid country about the size of Texas, located on the Horn of Africa. A small area around Hargesia in the north-west and a large region between the Shabelle and Jubba rivers in the south usually get good enough rainfall to plant crops. In the 1980s, agricultural output accounted for about 63 percent of the gross domestic product. About half the population of five to six million were pastoralist and a quarter were settled farmers.\textsuperscript{186}

The single most important feature of Somali society is the clan and lineage system. There are six major clans which are split into sub-clans, and further into hundreds of lineages.\textsuperscript{187} Somalis are of one ethnic group, sharing common language, culture and history. That has not precluded a long history of strife: the traditional social structure is characterized by competition and conflict along family lines. Most disagreements arose over access to grazing areas and water, as the economy was primarily pastoral.\textsuperscript{188} Disagreements and crimes were usually resolved by elders who worked out reparation payments.

In 1960 Italy and the United Kingdom relinquished their colonial claims and the country of Somalia came into being. General Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a military coup in October 1969, declared himself president and exercised dictatorial rule until his military defeat in January, 1991. Like most dictators, Barre pitted groups within his country against each other to deflect attention from economic problems, ill-fated foreign military ventures, and his own lack of accountability. The fractured clan system offered him fertile ground. By the last years of his

\textsuperscript{187} The six major clans are the Digil, Rahanwein, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye, and Darood. Barre belonged to the Marehan sub-clan of the Darood; Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed both belonged to the Hawiye clan -- Aideed to the Habr Gedir sub-clan and Mahdi to the Abgal sub-clan. See the lineage chart, next page.
\textsuperscript{188} Makinda, p. 18.
reign Somali politics were completely militarized.

President Barre launched a widely popular military campaign in 1978 to take the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in which many ethnic Somalis reside. Somalia lost the war and Barre looked for scapegoats. His strategy over the next 13 years of increasingly harsh repression and clan manipulation to maintain his hold on power eventually led to his downfall. He relied heavily on support from the Darood clan in the southern part of the country, especially the Marehan, Dolbahante, and Ogaden sub-clans. (See diagram of major clans and political movements, next page.) As insurgent fighting continued, the national economy collapsed in the mid-1980s, largely due to a sharp decline in export prices for petroleum and livestock. The country became even more heavily dependent than it had been on international aid.\textsuperscript{189} In 1988 all American aid was withdrawn in response to Barre’s repressive policies. He no longer had the means to maintain his support base.\textsuperscript{190}

As a result of the 1988 peace agreement with Ethiopia, Ogadeni groups who had resided across the border, established bases inside Somalia. They felt Barre had abandoned their dream of a greater Somalia and began an insurgency.\textsuperscript{191} Uncontrolled fighting throughout the country finally led President Barre to declare a state of emergency in December, 1990, as the civil war swept into the capital.\textsuperscript{192} Barre fled Mogadishu January 26, 1991, to take up residence in his


\textsuperscript{191} Makinda, p. 20-21.

traditional homeland in the Darood-controlled Gedo region near Kenya. The national army had become little more than his personal militia -- one among many.\textsuperscript{193} The Somali state ceased to exist.

In the northwest, the Somali National Movement declared the independent republic of Somaliland in the former English colonial territory, on May 18, 1991. The republic has not been recognized internationally. The northern portion of Somalia was gravely troubled but did not suffer to the same extent as the south. Fighting centered on Mogadishu, with high levels of violence to the south and west, especially around the towns of Kismayo, Bardera, and Baidoa. Endless war and drought brought crop failures and famine. The region between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers experienced the worst of the famine and eventually became the focus of the international community, after considerable delay. It did not take long after Barre fled for the United Somali Congress of the Hawiye clan to seize control of Mogadishu. The body did not live up to its united name and quickly split into two sub-clan based factions.\textsuperscript{194}

General Mohammed Farah Aideed controlled the United Somali Congress' Habr Gedir sub-clan militia until his death in August 1996.\textsuperscript{195} He had attained the rank of general in the former national military under Siad Barre, despite Barre's personal animosity toward him. During that time, he received training from Soviet officers, as did many other Somali army officers. Aideed's faction was more politically important and militarily capable than any other in

\textsuperscript{193} Lyons and Samatar, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{195} General Aideed died in early August, 1996, from wounds received in battle. His sub-clan appointed his son to replace him. Ironically, his son, who has spent most of his life in the United States, served with the US Marine Corps in Somalia in 1992.
the southern and central parts of the country. He controlled the southern portion of the capital, which included the port and airport. Together with his allies, he also controlled most of the territory around Mogadishu, particularly to the south.

Allied with Aideed was Colonel Omar Jess of the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darood clan. They and several smaller factions formed the Somali National Alliance in August, 1992 -- one of the most enduring alliances throughout the free-for-all. Colonel Jess commanded a substantial number of fighters and claimed quite a bit of equipment. He came prominently to international attention when he was forced out of Kismayo by General Morgan, counter-attacked, was repulsed by Belgian UNOSOM II forces, and several months later retook control of the city.  

Ali Mahdi Mohammed was General Aideed's arch rival and leader of the Abgal sub-clan portion of the USC. He was selected "Interim President" by portions of the USC while Aideed was away pursuing Barre's army in the southwest. Aideed never recognized Mahdi's claim to the position, although the United Nations did. Mahdi was a hotelier, not a soldier. His militia was not as large or as strong as that of Aideed, hence the territory of northern Mogadishu that he controlled was not as large, nor as important.

Mahdi entered an alliance with General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan," who was a son-in-law of Siad Barre. He led one of two rival factions of the Somali Patriotic Movement. His fighters came largely from parts of the former national military that had dispersed along both sides of the Somali-Kenyan border. General Morgan successfully ousted Colonel Jess from

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196 He did not exert any influence in the northern portion of the country. The north-west has been declared the independent country of Somaliland by the Somali National Movement. The north-east is controlled by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front.

197 The struggle to control Kismayo between Colonel Jess and General Morgan was politically significant for the UNOSOM operation. It is discussed below.
Kismayo right under the noses of UNITAF troops. His militia was not large and never played much of a role outside the immediate Kismayo area.

It is difficult to enumerate the fighters each faction leader controlled. Leaders entered into frequently shifting alliances, sometimes befriending their former antagonists. Individuals seem to have felt only tenuous loyalty to their leaders, sometimes choosing not to follow orders. A man with a gun might be a member of Jess's militia one day, an independent bandit that same night and an NGO guard the next week.

The United Nations estimates that in late 1992 "troops in Mogadishu numbered several thousand when counting all the clans, sub-clans and free-roaming bandits." On several occasions, General Aideed claimed to have command of 30,000 troops. There is no way to confirm this, but as one close observer commented, no Somali leader could claim control over such a large group for long. A generally well informed source said in August, 1992, that pitched battles between factions usually had only 2,000 to 3,000 fighters per side. The "regular" forces of the SNM, SSDF, USC/Abgal, and USC/Habr Gedir were estimated to "number no more than 5-6,000 men each." The irregular forces were more numerous. At the time of Barre's flight, this source estimates the Hawiye clan had 25-30,000 irregulars, but they belonged to different sub-clans that felt little allegiance to each other. When the conflict between UNOSOM II and General Aideed escalated in June, 1993, UNOSOM intelligence estimated that the Habr Gedir clan had a readily deployable militia of only about 500 men.

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198 The Blue Helmets, p. 293.
199 Makinda, p. 33.
201 Tom Farer, "Report of an Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia, Executive Summary," paragraph 17. S/26351 (August 24, 1993). It is worth noting that UNOSOM II intelligence underestimated General Aideed's ability to cause damage to the UN force and to avoid capture. They
It is safe to say that no single commander controlled as many people as constituted UNITAF or UNOSOM II, including the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) -- a number that ranged over time roughly from 18,000 at the beginning of UNOSOM II to 37,000 at the beginning of UNITAF.²⁰² It is equally safe to say that the Somalis who were members of militia were battle hardened. They knew how to use their weapons and were not afraid to fight.

It is important to note that a large number of gunmen did not regularly take orders from anyone. These freelancers were armed with a variety of weapons, from handguns, to hand grenades, and even technicals. They did not pose a serious threat to military forces, but they

²⁰² Two common sources for data on military strength put personnel numbers for the major militias at between 1,000 and 10,000 over the 1990 to 1995 period. Data from the IISS Military Balance and the SIPRI Yearbook yield the following table:

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<td>Barre government</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aideed</td>
<td></td>
<td>500*</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>1-3,000*</td>
<td>10,000**</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi</td>
<td>500*</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>1-3,000*</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jess</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1-3,000</td>
<td>5-10,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The these numbers are from IISS which does not distinguish between the Aideed and Mahdi factions until 1993. I have evenly split the number allotted to the USC.

were extremely disruptive of humanitarian supply efforts. As a consequence, even when faction leaders decided to cooperate with the relief effort, as they occasionally did, they could not stop much of the banditry.

Accounting for equipment is no easier.\textsuperscript{203} The Barre government was a large recipient of both American and Soviet military largess during the Cold War. Heavy and light equipment of the national military was "inherited" by various militias, particularly the Aideed and Mahdi factions of the USC that drove the final nail in Barre's coffin.\textsuperscript{204} Much of the equipment was in a poor state of repair or inoperable by the end of the Barre regime, but not all of it. When Italian forces destroyed SNA arms caches in Belet Weyne in June, 1993, they found some of the heavy equipment to be unusable, but much that was still serviceable.\textsuperscript{205} It does not appear Somalis used tanks or armored personnel carriers, but they did use weaponry capable of countering armor: artillery, heavy recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, as well as mortars and other heavy weapons. The UNOSOM I Force Commander reported in November, 1992, that:

In Mogadishu South alone, there are approximately 150 'technical' vehicles. Each vehicle carries a heavy machine gun or a 106mm RR anti-tank gun. In each of these vehicles there are 8 to 12 soldiers armed mainly with AK-47s, G3 rifles and anti-armor RPG-7s. The local forces have no uniforms and no communication.

\textsuperscript{203} The International Institute for Strategic Studies gave up accounting for Somali weapons in the 1991-92 edition of the \textit{Military Balance}. They say simply "Military equipment captured from the Siad Barre government has been divided between the competing insurgent groups and is in a poor state of repair or inoperable; no attempt has been made to itemize and quantify equipment." IISS, \textit{The Military Balance, 1991/1992} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 119.

\textsuperscript{204} The last year for which the IISS \textit{Military Balance} contains data on Somalia is 1990. At that time, it listed the following holdings for Barre's government, all of which it categorized as being in doubtful condition. Army: 290 main battle tanks, 20 light tanks, 85 reconnaissance vehicles, 484 armored personnel carriers, 296 towed artillery pieces (120-155mm), 370 mortars (81-120mm), 100 anti-tank guided weapons, 300 rocket launchers, 60 recoilless rifles, 258 air defense guns, and 71 surface-to-air missiles. Air Force: 56 combat aircraft, no armored helicopters. Navy: a small number of missile and torpedo craft. IISS, \textit{The Military Balance, 1990/1991} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 117.

Vehicles are of different types, colours, patterns and shapes. The state of training of these troops is unknown but almost all would have had some kind of combat experience and they know how to operate all their weapons. The condition of their weapons is surprisingly good; ammunition is old put plentiful and still operational. In addition, they have several operational armored wheeled vehicles with cannons of 20mm and dump trucks with twin 30mm AA guns. It must be assumed that the equivalent military force exists in Mogadishu North. Both sides have indirect fire capabilities (mortars, field guns, and free flight rockets.206

The UN Security Council imposed "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia" in January, 1992.207 The embargo did little to stem the flow of arms into the country.208 From January to August, 1993, US and UN forces confiscated and destroyed tons of weapons and ammunition, including more than 200 machine guns, more than 200 rocket launchers and mortars, 50 armored vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled guns), over 400 artillery pieces, and thousands of smaller weapons.209 Yet the Secretary-General could still say in August, 1993, there was an "over-abundance of heavy, medium, and light weapons in the southern part of the city,"210 and one can surmise, in the northern part as well.

Beyond the bean count, Somali factions had several strengths that fall in the categories of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), and political advantage. Despite the UNOSOM I Force Commander's contention that Somali fighters had no uniforms and no

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210 Ibid., paragraph 16.
communication, a 1994 UN Commission of Inquiry report stated, "The Somali armed men fighting UNOSOM were not a bunch of rag-tag armed militia but a reasonably well-organized and trained group under a good command structure."\(^{211}\) The SNA demonstrated their C3I capabilities in the June 5, 1993, attack. They orchestrated nearly simultaneous attacks on UN units in several different parts of the city. When UNOSOM II headquarters sent reinforcements, they were attacked en route. In the battle that resulted in the deaths of the Pakistani soldiers, militia fighters demonstrated sophisticated use of location and camouflage, ability to sustain fire for over five hours, coordination of cross-fire, and successful flank protection against UN maneuvers.\(^{212}\)

The October 3 firefight that resulted in the death of 18 Americans and one Malaysian again highlighted the SNA's C3I capabilities, even after it had been under attack by the Quick Reaction Force and specially trained U.S. Rangers and Green Berets. The Ranger attack followed the same tactical plan as several previous attacks. SNA members had observed these attacks and quickly learned how to counter them.\(^{213}\) This knowledge underlay the results of the battle that permanently changed the course of international involvement in Somalia.

The SNA took advantage of contradictory UN objectives to increase its intelligence gathering. While the UN was conducting combat operations, it also wanted to rebuild the country by hiring local workers. Because the UN offices were in southern Mogadishu, where the


\(^{212}\) Farer, paragraphs 11 - 13. Commission of Inquiry, paragraphs 104 - 117.

\(^{213}\) Task Force Ranger had carried out five operations in September. SNA officers learned that the tactical template was for Delta commandos to blitz the targeted building to take prisoners, while Rangers ringed the building to offer protection and helicopters hovered to control crowds and provide umbrella cover. Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 94.
SNA controlled most of the population, perhaps as many as half of the local UN employees were Aideed supporters. Aideed's brother was reportedly a cook at the UN headquarters compound at one point.\textsuperscript{214}

The final consideration in assessing Somali military capabilities is a political one. Somali fighters of all stripes could rely on several inherent advantages. The territory was theirs. This gave them great advantages in terms of knowing the lay of the land (and streets), motivation to fight for their causes, and the likelihood of gathering popular support. The hunt for Aideed, for example, served not to demonize him in the eyes of Somalis, but to glorify him as the only person capable of standing up to a UN military presence that had come to be seen as an occupation force.\textsuperscript{215} To disrupt the military intervention and the humanitarian program, they only had to conduct guerilla operations, not defeat an army. Urban guerilla warfare is very hard to successfully counter, particularly if the interveners' political concerns prevent harsh counter-insurgency measures or the sustainment of high casualties. Somalis did not have to labor under a sensitivity to casualties. The killing of civilians by foreign troops angered the population, spurring them to harden their resistance rather than give up the fight as many of the intervening states did after sustaining a comparatively minuscule number of deaths. Finally, Somali faction leaders knew that sooner or later the foreign troops would leave, no matter what they did. The fighting and maneuvering that when on during the international military presence was more


\textsuperscript{215} According to a Somali analyst, the Somali people constantly fight among themselves but always share a common opposition to threats from the outside. Makinda, p.??, When the UN made General Aideed its enemy, it also made itself the enemy of the Somali people. Hence, if Aideed could stand up to the enemy of the people, he gained stature.
about gaining local advantage than about driving the foreigners out. The foreigners were going at some point no matter what happened.

Consent for international military presence in Somalia was problematic at the best of times. To begin with, there was no central government to give consent. This was particularly troubling to the United Nations, which always seeks to interact with recognized political authorities. By way of a solution, the UN recognized Ali Mahdi’s claim to the presidency--a position conferred on him by his allies while his rival General Aideed was out of Mogadishu delivering the final blow to Siad Barre’s army.

As a result of this formal recognition Mahdi was inclined to favor UN activities. He also hoped that a military intervention would consolidate his hold on power. UN peacekeeping forces are designed to maintain the status quo, which was in the interest of Mahdi, who was militarily weaker than Aideed. In point of fact, Mahdi’s consent was fickle. During the period of time when the first United Nations Operation in Somalia was supposed to enable the delivery of humanitarian supplies, Mahdi’s troops fired on ships that approached the harbor. Yet Mahdi’s forces were never a serious concern for any of the military interventions that took place.

General Aideed and his military were a different matter. He was adamantly opposed to any foreign military presence that would undermine his dominant position in the country. It took Mohamed Sahnoun, the top UN diplomat in the country, weeks of negotiating to secure Aideed’s agreement for the arrival of 50 unarmed cease-fire observers called for in the resolution that

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216 It is not clear why they acted this way, but speculation yields at least one plausible answer. UNOSOM I was obviously incapable of reinforcing the status quo against a recalcitrant General Aideed. Nor was it capable of preventing aid supplies from being looted. Since the port was in Aideed’s territory, any supplies that arrived inevitably benefited Aideed more than Mahdi. If the UN could not prevent this, Mahdi would.
authorized UNOSOM I. During those negotiations an airplane with UN markings landed in Mahdi’s portion of Mogadishu loaded with currency and weapons. Aideed’s suspicions of the UN deepened.

Eventually Aideed agreed to the deployment of 500 security personnel to protect aid operations from banditry. Any additional deployment was to be negotiated with the Somali faction leaders. After Aideed had given his consent for the security presence, but before the troops had arrived, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s recommendation to expand UNOSOM I to a strength of 3,500 military personnel. No one in Somalia had been consulted or informed, not even the Secretary-General’s Special Representative. Needless to say, Aideed was furious. In mid-October 1992, several weeks after UN troops arrived, Aideed declared UN soldiers would not be tolerated on the streets of Mogadishu, rejected the deployment of UNOSOM forces to Kismayo and Berbera, and demanded the expulsion of UNOSOM’s Humanitarian Coordinator.\(^{217}\)

General Aideed was not much happier about the U.S.-led UNITAF operation, but he gave grudging consent after speaking with its civilian head, Robert Oakley. Given the recent display of power in the Persian Gulf, he likely felt he had no choice. When the UN took over again under UNOSOM II, Aideed’s hostility resurfaced immediately, as manifested in direct attacks on UN forces.

Throughout the humanitarian relief effort banditry and wholesale looting were major problems for aid organizations. At no point did the independent bandits give their consent for military operations designed to thwart their activities.

\(^{217}\) Bluebook, “Chronology,” p. 94.
In sum, southern Somalia was a tough neighborhood. The Somali people had a martial culture, they had an abundance of weapons, and no central government to exert control. The political process and much of civil society had been shattered, replaced by the law of the jungle. The level of consent for foreign intervention ranged from minimal to zero.

Death and Military Responses

Somalia was not only a tough neighborhood, but a hungry, disease ridden and desperate one. People were dying by the thousands as a result of famine brought on by draught and war. Despite the unwelcoming atmosphere, foreign governments and the UN eventually felt compelled to do something about the heart wrenching vision of starving babies with distended stomachs and flies crawling on their listless faces.

This section of the chapter cuts to the chase and answers two questions. How many people died and what killed them? How many people were saved and how were they saved? It is generally accepted that UNOSOM I had no impact on the mortality rate. Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) is much more hotly debated. Participants and secondary sources exhibit a wide range of claims about the impact of the American-led operation on the mortality rate. Most people believe that UNITAF helped save a large number of lives. The Secretary-General of the United Nations claimed "[m]ore than 250,000 lives are estimated to have been saved" during UNITAF and UNOSOM II. The boldest claim was made by a CARE representative in Somalia: "The bottom line is we have saved millions of lives." U.S. President William Clinton:

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claimed in a speech that one million lives may have been saved. 220 Robert Oakley, former civilian head of Operation Restore Hope, has written that "the United States saved perhaps a million Somalis from almost certain death." 221

In contrast, a donor official estimated that UNITAF "helped save 10,000 Somali lives." 222 This is a significant number of people, but ten to one hundred times less than others believed. A highly skeptical observer writes, "The evidence that the intervention had any impact on mortality in general is . . . extremely slender." 223 Zero to millions is quite a range! I believe the evidence supports the contention that UNITAF helped save about 10,000 lives.

The claims for UNOSOM II are highly conjectural. Some observers say that things would have been worse in its absence. They point out that the famine did not return. 224 Critics note that UNOSOM II and QRF forces killed and wounded a large number of Somalis people in combat, both military and civilian. 225 A strong case can be made that UNOSOM II did more harm than good both in terms of the number of Somali deaths during its tenure and the political environment it left in its wake.

The primary causes of death in Somalia were (and are) disease, starvation, bullets, and

221 Robert Oakley, on the back cover of Philip Johnston, Somalia Diary (Atlanta: Longstreet Press, 1994). In his own account, which was published the following year, Oakley was far more circumspect -- to the point of making no claim at all about the number of people Operation Restore Hope helped to save. Hirsch and Oakley, passim.
222 Anonymous official cited in Prendergast, p. 112.
223 de Waal, p. 158. Emphasis added.
landmines. The two events directly responsible for generating the causes of death where the civil war and the famine. The war killed people directly -- though combat -- and indirectly -- by exacerbating the famine. The famine was brought on by lack of rain and by complete disruption of the agricultural economy due to scorched earth fighting tactics that destroyed the primitive infrastructure and forced people to flee their sources of livelihood. Most Somali lives were saved by the efforts of humanitarian organizations to combat famine and disease. Military intervention, particularly Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore Hope, facilitated this effort by dedicating logistical assets to the cause and stabilizing the security environment.

Prior to UNOSOM I

Using the best available data approximately 15-40,000 people were killed by fighting and 131-152,000 died due to starvation from January, 1991, through August, 1992.\textsuperscript{226} (Barre was overthrown in January, 1991. The famine period began in March, 1992. UNOSOM I military observers were on the ground by mid-July.) During this period, relief organizations were able partially to fulfill the requirement of providing for immediate medical and nutritional needs, but only for a fraction of the population. They did not attempt to stop the fighting, though they did have limited success overcoming looting and banditry. They did so by creating "humanitarian space" through negotiation of safe passage and toleration of high loss rates for supplies.

Operations were severely circumscribed in terms of geographic reach. For the most part, aid agencies served camps of displaced persons in Mogadishu and border regions. Their work

\textsuperscript{226} Hansch, et al., pp. 15-25.
focused on rudimentary medical care for war wounded and therapeutic feeding. Beginning in early 1992, these organizations expanded their operations over greater areas and put more emphasis on primary care and food aid. ICRC in particular moved into high gear, bringing in food by small boat and aircraft. In April they began to open "wet feeding" kitchens across much of the country, administered by the Somali Red Crescent Society. Despite rapidly expanding relief efforts, famine-caused mortality hit its peak during April to October 1992.

About half the number of people who were in or near the feeding centers in the first half of 1992 died from starvation and disease -- approximately 70,000 to 100,000. The other half survived to return home. Those who survived benefited almost entirely from food programs, rather than water or health care. Based on malnutrition and mortality correlations in emergency settings (particularly among displace populations) across a number of countries, it is reasonable to assume that about half the survivors would have died without food aid. Thus, an estimate of the total number of lives saved before the commencement of UNOSOM I is 35,000 to 50,000.

The UNOSOM I and Provide Relief period

From the time UNOSOM I military personnel were present (at first only 50 cease-fire observers to maintain the peace) until UNITAF was fully under way -- September to December 1992 -- approximately 2-5,000 were killed by fighting and 81-96,000 died due to starvation and disease. The absolute number of people saved went down, but the absolute number of people

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227 Hansch, et al., p. 28.
228 Ibid., p. 29. Wet feeding kitchens provide cooked meals rather than handing out dry, uncooked food. They have the advantages of providing cooked food to people who often do not have the means to cook themselves, and stymying efforts to hoard or divert food as often occurs with dry rations. They are also a more demanding form of assistance for an aid organization to sustain.
229 Hansch, et al., pp. 29-30.
who died dropped further. Thus the proportion of people saved from imminent death increased almost two-fold.\footnote{230}

The UN force had virtually nothing to do with the changes. The absolute numbers went down for three reasons. First, the period covered is shorter. Second, the worst of the fighting had ended before September. (The most copious bloodshed occurred in 1991 as the USC and others chased Aideed across the countryside where both sides used scorched earth tactics. The UN mediated cease-fire was signed in March, 1992.) Third, the famine cycle was coming to an end in most regions.

The proportion of lives saved to lives lost jumped because a few aid organizations had set up extensive assistance programs by this time, independent of the military presence. The NGO humanitarian relief effort rapidly expanded during this period, partly in response to the more stable environment engendered by diplomatic efforts and partly because organizations had had time to plan and prepare. By the end of the year there were more than 1,000 feeding centers across the country. CARE, CRS, and other NGOs entered the effort in a large way. The Operation Provide Relief airlift and increased haulage overland greatly enhanced the ability of relief workers to reach rural areas. By November, 1992, the price of food throughout the country had plummeted, indicating a greater supply. At the same time, "mortality rates associated with the famine were steeply declining."\footnote{231}

The civilian side of UNOSOM I deserves credit for saving lives, though it is not possible to know how many. By engaging the faction leaders in conversation rather than confrontation,
Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, prevented battle casualties and population displacement. Sahnoun worked assiduously to build communication between Aideed, Mahdi, warlords outside Mogadishu, clan elders who were the traditional arbiters of disputes, and various civic groups. His work helped to maintain the cease-fire, but could not contain banditry and looting, which increased over the period.\textsuperscript{232} The relative stability allowed many people to return home, where they were far less likely to succumb to communicable disease than in the IDP camps.

A little-known airlift operation that ran from September 1992 through February 1993 deserves credit for a good proportion of the lives saved during this period, though it is unclear just how many. Operation Provide Relief flew 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies from Kenya to the worst-hit areas at a time when there was no other way of getting quantities of material so far inland.

The number of people benefiting from aid increased markedly, as did the proportion of people saved from imminent death. The absolute number of lives saved declined. The peak of deaths had come and gone before the Provide Relief airlift and increase in NGO activity. The famine seemed to be burning itself out in most locations by the end of the year, so the number of people at risk of death was fewer than in previous months. The number of lives saved was between 20,000 and 60,000, depending on the scenario portrayed. A reasonable estimate is 40,000.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., p. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., p. 31.
The UNITAF period

The UNITAF period saw a dramatic increase in military intervention and a dramatic decrease in the number of lives saved. This is contrary to popular belief. It is true that fewer people died, but equally true that fewer people would have died in the absence of UNITAF. The absolute numbers went down because factional fighting had subsided so aid operations had increased and the famine had subsided too as the weakest had already died. This time though the intervention force deserves credit for further reducing factional fighting and significantly reducing banditry.

The UNITAF military force that arrived in December 1992 deserves credit for improvements in size of the humanitarian assistance program. It made substantial contributions to providing for the immediate medical and nutritional needs of the population and to reducing factional fighting and banditry. The capacity of humanitarian operations increased in quantity, geographic reach, and diversity of services and items provided. Aid organizations provided mass feeding, therapeutic feeding, oral rehydration, water pumps and water cleaning, immunizations, community health workers, clinical medical services, and other services.\textsuperscript{234} The emphasis continued to be on providing food, though immunization programs and other medical attention did grow. The relatively peaceful environment, together with seeds and tools provided by some NGOs, allowed farmers to plant in time to reap the Deyr harvest in the winter of 1992/93. The Deyr is smaller than the summer Gu harvest but unquestionably contributed to the availability of food in 1993.

Humanitarian organizations were able to feed an estimated one million people at the peak

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., p. 14.
of their activity in 1993. *Prior* to this, the mortality rates across the country declined sharply after September and October 1992 (prior to UNITAF), though around Baidoa and Bardera in the south they remained high.\(^{235}\) The excess number (above normal mortality) of people who died from December 1992 through March 1993 was 10,000 to 25,000.\(^{236}\) As in all famines, the proximate cause of death was most often a communicable disease such as measles or dysentery. Weakened immune systems and crowded, unsanitary living conditions make famine victims highly susceptible to such diseases. There were not a significant number of fighting deaths while UNITAF was present.

Although the proportion of people who received international assistance indisputably increased under UNITAF, comparatively few of them were in imminent danger of death, so the proportion of lives saved remained about stable or decreased. "The combined UNITAF and relief effort interventions might be said to have speeded up the conclusion of the famine curve by *one full month.*"\(^{237}\) Even though more people benefited from emergency relief efforts, the number of lives saved "was perhaps as low as 10,000."\(^{238}\) The famine was essentially over. Not as many people were in danger of death, therefore not as many lives were saved.

While several observers are critical of the paucity of actions to combat disease,\(^{239}\) probably little more than was already done in the medical field could have been undertaken in 1993 to save those who died. "Perhaps most of those deaths resulted from months of cumulative malnutrition and illness, and not new health risks [although there was a malaria outbreak in

\(^{236}\) Ibid., p. 32.
\(^{237}\) Hansch, et al., p. 32. Emphasis added.
\(^{238}\) Ibid.
\(^{239}\) See, for example, de Waal, p. 156; Hansch et al., p. 33.
January]. Therefore, many of these deaths were very likely to occur with or without UNITAF's intercession. On the other hand, the peace-induced return of IDPs reduced the exposure of many people to diseases in the camps. Keep in mind that UNITAF deserves only partial credit for the return of IDPs, since a cease-fire had been generally respected for months before the troops arrived and the IDP return had already begun with the waning of the famine.

On a more conjectural note, UNITAF reduced the likelihood of war and subsequent food scarcity. It is plausible that UNITAF prevented some battle deaths and a large number of starvation deaths. I believe this argument is weakened by evidence from the periods between which the American-led intervention is sandwiched. Before UNITAF, diplomatic efforts had already brought an end to the worst fighting in 1992. After UNITAF, the upswing in violence under UNOSOM II did not result in another famine, thanks to rain and aid efforts.

The UNOSOM II period

When the second UN-led operation began in May, 1993, relief agencies were doing a good job of providing for the immediate needs of the population and had begun rehabilitation and development efforts to get Somalis back on their feet. After early June, most relief and rehabilitation programs were severely curtailed in the face of escalating violence and decreased protection from banditry. By late 1993, a number of NGOs had withdrawn from the country altogether, partly because the famine had ended and partly because of security concerns. The number of lives saved through humanitarian action fell as the immediate crisis had receded and

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240 Hansch, et al., pp. 31-32.
241 Sahnoun, p.*
242 Sommer, pp. 44 and 86.
sustainment programs were forced to scale back in the dangerous environment. Malnutrition was endemic and the threat of another human disaster was ever-present.

The number of Somali military and civilian deaths from combat rose to their highest point since early 1992. International forces -- primarily the American Quick Reaction Force and Task Force Ranger -- were directly responsible for a large proportion of the casualties, particularly during the hunt for Aideed. It is impossible to find concrete numbers, but one can safely say the number of Somalis killed by UNOSOM/QRF forces was between 625 and 1,500. The number of wounded was between 1,000 and 8,000. Numbers at the higher end of the range appear more likely to be correct. Also killed in the fighting were 143 UN military personnel and 4 UN civilian staff.\footnote{The Blue Helmets, p. 722.}\footnote{"Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 855 (1993), Annex 5: Synopsis of the attacks on the personnel of UNOSOM II which led to casualties among them as drawn from official reports and other documents." S/1994/653, June 1, 1994.}

The UN Commission of Inquiry, established to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel (thus concerned with UN casualties, not Somali ones), counted between 624 and 824 Somali deaths and more than 1020 wounded from May 7 to November 13, 1993. For many reported security incidents, some of them large, there were no Somali casualties reported, indicated that actual casualty numbers are higher than those documented.\footnote{Two sources provide this information, but disagree on what constitutes "casualties". Gary Anderson (a military officer) says Aideed claimed 10,000 died. Anderson, p. 280, fn. 25. Jolüt Sommer (a civilian) says the number constitutes the number "dead and wounded." Sommer, pp. 72 and 104, fn. 34. Emphasis in the original.}

General Aideed told Major-General Anthony Zinni and Ambassador Oakley that there were 10,000 Somalis casualties in the events of June 5 to October 3.\footnote{Two sources provide this information, but disagree on what constitutes "casualties". Gary Anderson (a military officer) says Aideed claimed 10,000 died. Anderson, p. 280, fn. 25. Jolüt Sommer (a civilian) says the number constitutes the number "dead and wounded." Sommer, pp. 72 and 104, fn. 34. Emphasis in the original.} This is almost certainly an exaggeration, according to common sense and intelligence officials. Yet it is probably not as
far off the mark as one might think. Aideed had already "won" and was not about to gain the sympathy of the U.S., so the advantage of inflating the figures was diminished. One source that accepts a modified version of the Aideed claim says up to 100 were killed by UNITAF, while UNOSOM II killed 1,500 and wounded 6-8,000.  

The *International Herald Tribune* in March, 1994, reported 6-10,000 Somalis dead or wounded during the June to October period. Two-thirds were said to be women and children, who were the victims of both UNOSOM operations and clan fighting. A reporter who was in Somalia and Kenya during that time has written that there were as many as 500 SNA fighters killed in the summer of 1993 and more than 300 Somalis killed in the October 3 fire-fight, roughly a third of whom were women and children. The Hirsch and Oakley account says that thousands were killed and wounded in the summer and fall of 1993, including hundreds in a series of incidents from September 5 to 15 and 500-1000 on October 3.

For an ostensibly humanitarian mission, these casualty figures are shocking. It is possible that foreign troops killed or wounded as many people after March, 1993 as humanitarian organizations managed to save during the UNITAF deployment.

On the positive side of the ledger, UNOSOM presence did help to maintain a certain level of access to the population in need outside of Mogadishu. Despite the lasting damage done to the security environment by the fighting in the capital and increasing banditry inland, relief organizations had enough presence throughout the country to quell a cholera epidemic in early to

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246 Sommer, p. 72.
247 Ibid., p. 104, fn.34.
248 Stevenson, pp. 95 and 115.
249 Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 125, 127, 131. The UN Commission of Inquiry recounts heavy fighting during the ten days in September, but mentions no casualties.
mid-1994. Of 24,650 identified cases between February and June, only 872 people (or 3.53 percent) were reported to have died from the disease. The humanitarian community deserves credit for saving a number of lives in this particular case. In light of the steady restriction of humanitarian access due to insecurity that followed UNOSOM II's retrenchment and eventual departure, the military operation also deserves some credit for the lives that were saved.

Summary of Lives Lost and Saved

Table 3-1 compares the number of people who died, the number of people who were saved, and the proportion of people in danger of imminent death who were saved for each of the four periods reviewed above.

Table 3-1: Comparison of Mortality Rates Prior to and During Periods of Military Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th># who died</th>
<th># who were saved</th>
<th>proportion saved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prior to UNOSOM I (Jan '91 - Aug '92)</td>
<td>146,000 - 192,000</td>
<td>35,000 - 50,000</td>
<td>15.4 - 25.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I period (Sept '92 - Dec '92)</td>
<td>83,000 - 101,000</td>
<td>~40,000</td>
<td>39.6 - 48.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF period (Dec '92 - May '93)</td>
<td>10,000 - 25,000</td>
<td>~10,000</td>
<td>28.6 - 50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II period (May '93 - Mar '95)</td>
<td>625-1,500^255</td>
<td>probably thousands</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^251 The proportion of people saved is presented as a percentage of the total number of people who likely would have died in the absence of emergency assistance. % saved = # saved / (# killed by fighting + # killed by hunger and disease + # who would have died w/o help)
^252 35,000 / (192,000+35,000) = 0.154; 50,000 / (146,000 + 50,000) = 0.255
^253 40,000 / (83,000 + 40,000) = 0.482; 40,000 / (101,000 + 40,000) = 0.396
^254 10,000 / (10,000 + 10,000) = 0.5; 10,000 / (25,000 + 10,000) = 0.286

^255 This is the number of Somalis killed by fighting in Mogadishu only. It does not count those who succumbed to hunger and disease in the capital and elsewhere. Therefore it is not comparable to the numbers offered in the other time periods.
The data for the UNOSOM II period are not comparable to the prior periods, since the emergency phase of the humanitarian crisis had ended and epidemiological records are not available. There is no doubt that more people died during that time than are listed. On the other hand, the famine was over and aid organizations had well-established programs by the time UNOSOM II began, so far fewer people succumbed to hunger and disease than in earlier months.

The numbers presented here are approximations. Even if they are off the mark significantly, the fact that they were derived using a consistent set of data and methodology allows us to make several observations. First, the mortality rate dropped steadily during the period under study. Second, the number of people saved from death also dropped over time. This is in contrast to widely held beliefs about the relative effect of the massive American-led operation. Third, the greatest proportional jump in lives saved occurred before any major military intervention. Nevertheless, UNITAF may have saved up to half the people who could have died while it was underway.

Most deaths were caused by privation rather than violence and the vast majority of people were saved by humanitarian assistance rather than physical protection. The two military operations that enabled the humanitarian assistance were Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore Hope. To the extent that the above numbers do not reflect the benefits of relative peace prior to the second UN operation, they are underestimates.

This section has provided correlations between variations of the dependent variable and independent variable. The remainder of the chapter will substantiate arguments introduced above that UNOSOM I was ineffectual, Provide Relief and UNITAF were instrumental, and UNOSOM
II was a wash in the short run and detrimental in the long run. As the next section indicates, even the interventions that helped did not live up to their potential because they were undertaken late.

**International Response Times**

It took state governments and the United Nations a long time to launch their various responses to the civil war and famine in Somalia. Many NGOs also hesitated to respond due to insecurity. The impressive number of lives saved by a few NGOs in 1991 gives some indication of what might have been achieved if outsiders had imposed a stable environment earlier. The poor timing was not due to rapid onset of the famine nor lack of warning. Aid agencies in the ground predicted dire circumstances months in advance of the most deadly period. Nor was it an operational problem, as the rapid deployment of the American-led operation showed. The poor timing was due to lack of political interest.

At the beginning of 1991 there were no functioning embassies in Somalia.\(^{256}\) International attention was on the break up of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia. Even most international humanitarian aid agencies had evacuated their personnel from Mogadishu for safety reasons. Minimal relief operations did continue, mainly in the north, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, Save the Children, Medicines Sans Frontier, SOS, and a few other non-governmental organizations. Then in December, 1991, the UN authorized UNICEF to reopen its Mogadishu offices and out-going Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar sent a letter to the Security Council voicing support for the OAU’s belief that the Council’s involvement would facilitate a

\(^{256}\) Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” Bluebook, p. 16.
peaceful settlement. Soon after Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the new Secretary General, the Security Council adopted its first resolution with regard to the Somali conflict on 23 January 1992. Resolution 733 called for all parties to cease hostilities and facilitate humanitarian assistance. The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on the country.257

While the ICRC and other organizations launched unprecedented relief efforts, the UN repeatedly sent technical assessment teams on short visits that accomplished little.258 The bad taste that was left in the mouths of the Somalis and NGOs never fully disappeared. Consequently, the UN found it hard to build the necessary level of trust for effective communication and coordination.

With UN mediation, Aideed and Ali Mahdi finally agreed to a cease-fire in Mogadishu on March 3, 1992, to be monitored by UN peacekeepers. The Security Council passed resolution 751 on April 24, establishing UNOSOM and urged the international community to support the 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.259 By the end of the month, a technical team led by Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mohamed Sahnoun, secured each leader's agreement to 50 cease-fire observers and "adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized."260 UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu throughout the month of July.

The abrupt dismissal-cum-resignation of Mohamed Sahnoun at the end of October, 1992,

258 Sahnoun, p. 20.
was the result of the surprise announcement from New York about the 3,000 additional peacekeeping troops that caused General Aideed's consent to evaporate. His sudden departure came at a point when he was arguably making headway on laying the groundwork for political reconciliation through intensive grassroots mediation. After Sahnoun left, his replacement Ismat Kittani allowed the bottom-up effort at political reconciliation to dissipate and the security situation in Mogadishu and elsewhere deteriorated rapidly. Had Boutros-Ghali accepted Sahnoun's offer to stay on as his special envoy, responsible only to him, the diplomatic momentum built over the preceding months stood a much better chance of continuing. By getting rid of the one person in a position to secure a safe environment for humanitarian operations at a time when he had local leaders talking about peace, the Secretary-General virtually assured the need for more drastic action.

On November 25, soon after losing his re-election bid, U.S. President George Bush proposed to Boutros-Ghali that the United States take the lead in organizing and commanding a military operation to help deliver aid supplies to the most desperate parts of the country. The Secretary-General gratefully accepted and on December 3, 1992, the Security Council passed resolution 794 establishing the Unified Task Force.²⁶¹

Impressive though it was, UNITAF had the major faults of starting too late and ending too soon. As pointed out above, the American-led intervention occurred after the nadir of the famine had past. Even observers critical of the operation agree that had it taken place in early

²⁶¹ The resolution demanded that all parties in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, facilitate the efforts of humanitarian agencies, and ensure the safety of personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid, including military forces. More importantly, it authorized a military operation under Chapter VII of the UN charter to use all necessary means "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible." UN Security Council Resolution 794. S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992.
1992, many of the lives lost would have been saved.\textsuperscript{262}

The first UNITAF soldiers hit the beach six days after passage of the authorizing resolution, on December 9, 1992. In January 1993 UNITAF reached its peak strength of more than 38,000 troops from 21 countries, including more than 25,000 Americans.\textsuperscript{263} (Several thousand of the U.S. troops were stationed off shore as precautionary reinforcements and never set foot on Somali soil.) The presence in Mogadishu of 10,000 troops from France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, and Morocco by the second half of December allowed rapid extension inland.\textsuperscript{264} The operation formally ended when it handed over responsibility to UNOSOM II on May 4, 1993.

Some observers argue the worst problems under UNOSOM II could have been avoided or mitigated if UNITAF had stayed on longer to allow the UN adequate time to gear up for its most ambitious undertaking ever.\textsuperscript{265} Robert Oakley and John Hirsch -- the civilian in charge of UNITAF and his deputy -- disagree. They believe a slightly prolonged UNITAF presence would not have changed the military situation on the ground in the summer of 1993. They argue that the problem was not early United States withdrawal, but United Nations lack of preparation in the areas of strategy, tactics, special skills, doctrine, equipment, and command and control.\textsuperscript{266}

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{262} Sommer, p. 18 and fn.47.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Of the 38,301 soldiers, 25,426 were American and 12,875 were from other countries. Contributing countries were Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe. After the U.S., the largest contributors were France, Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, and Canada. Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 63-64. Adibe, p. 56.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Aid agencies criticized the military for what they believed was excessively slow movement inland where the famine was worst. From the military perspective, inland operations took place rapidly ahead of schedule in the absence of Somali opposition.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Chopra, et al., p. 105.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 157.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
The Secretary-General, concerned that UNITAF would not fully establish a secure environment, recommended to the Security Council at the beginning of March 1993 that UNITAF not hand off to the weak UNOSOM operation, but to a new UNOSOM II operation that would have Chapter VII enforcement power. At the end of February, the tenuousness of the peace in Somalia was made plain when General Hersi Morgan, an ally of Mahdi, captured the port city of Kismayo from Colonel Omar Jess, an ally of Aideed. The fighting was the first major breach of the cease fire established in the Addis Ababa Accord. The attack and UNITAF lack of response set an unfortunate precedent. After the Kismayo fighting, the Security Council adopted the Secretary General’s recommendation on 26 March in Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II with an expansive Chapter VII mandate.

**Strategies and Their Implementation**

In the pages above I have established the political and military context of Somalia at the time of foreign intervention, including the remote causes of the humanitarian disaster, the local parties involved and their capabilities and level of consent for foreign involvement. I also reviewed the variance on the dependent variable and correlated it with periods of military intervention. I noted the slow international response times immediately above. Getting to a crisis in time to save those who might died is a key aspect of successful humanitarian intervention.

My analysis now turns to the strategies employed by four separate military interventions: UNOSOM I, the Operation Provide Relief airlift, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II. Equal in importance to timing is employing the right strategy. An intervention can not effectively save
lives if it does not address the causes of death. Given the causes of death and their context, did the strategies pursued address the problems? How were strategies implemented? Did the military forces deployed have the capabilities necessary to carry out their mission? Was the interaction between military and humanitarian organizations productive? I address these questions by taking each intervention in turn and analyzing its objectives, the type of strategy used, the specific form of the strategy and how it was implemented, including consideration of capabilities and inter-organizational coordination.

The matrix below indicates which interventions pursued which types of strategies. As established in chapter two, strategies of humanitarian intervention are defined in this dissertation by the problem they address and the local actors on which they focus.

Table 3-2: Type of Strategy Followed by Each Intervention Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
<th>Focus on Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address Privation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide logistics and aid (non-combat)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Provide Relief UNITAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protect population (defense and deterrence)</td>
<td>actively oppose perpetrators (compellence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three of the four possible types of strategy were pursued. Population protection was not attempted and was not needed, since by 1992 many people were dying of privation and few directly from violence. UNOSOM I followed a strategy of protecting aid operations; Operation
Provide Relief provided logistical assistance; UNITAF provided logistical assistance and protected aid operations; UNOSOM II protected aid operations and actively opposed perpetrators. The following analysis looks first at the strategies that addressed privation and then at the one that addressed violence.

**Strategies that Addressed Privation**

All four military interventions addressed the need to supply Somalis with food, water and medical attention. The two most successful in terms of their contribution to saving lives were Operation Provide Relief and UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope). UNOSOM I and II were significantly less successful. The differences lie in each operation’s capabilities and the strategies they followed.

*UNOSOM I*

UNOSOM I was established by Security Council Resolution 751 on April 24, 1992. It carried on until March 26, 1993, at which point it was given a new mandate and the title UNOSOM II. It did not end when UNITAF began. Rather it took advantage of the cover offered by the U.S.-led coalition to expand its activities around the airport and port of Mogadishu. UNOSOM I headquarters maintained a liaison office with UNITAF, but remained separated by mandate and command structure.

The mandated objectives of the UN troops were (a) to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and (b) to provide security for humanitarian operations in the Mogadishu area. The first objective was to be carried out by 50 unarmed military observers. They were separate from
the humanitarian operation and do not receive attention here. A second armed component consisted of a security force to protect UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the port and airport in Mogadishu, and to escort the delivery of humanitarian supplies in the Mogadishu vicinity.\textsuperscript{267}

There is no reason to believe that the UN force had objectives other than those formally stated. Part of the mandate was political -- 50 observers to monitor the cease fire -- and part was humanitarian -- 500 blue helmets to protect aid operations (with an additional 3,000 later authorized). Regardless of UNOSOM's intent, the Somali faction leaders were acutely aware of the balance of power ramifications of the UN military presence. (Something that did not dawn on most outsiders for a year). They therefore responded to the UNOSOM I military presence as if its sole objective were political.

The particular form of the mandated strategy of aid protection was point deterrence. UNOSOM's mandate did not allow it to do policing activities. UNOSOM I troops never engaged in point defense, even though aid workers continued to be threatened and aid supplies continued to be stolen. When deterrence failed the result was not fighting but looting.

The behavior of the UN security force does not yield much information because the troops did almost nothing. The security situation in Mogadishu improved noticeably prior to the arrival of UN troops. This was a consequence of the cease-fire agreement between the major belligerents in the capital that was a necessary precondition for the establishment of the peacekeeping operation. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James Johna met with Ali

Mahdi and Aideed in Somali in early January, 1992, with no immediate effect. The trip did have
the benefit of setting up a February meeting of faction representatives in New York, during
which both sides pledged to cease hostilities. On March 3, Mr. Johna succeeded in getting
Mahdi and Aideed to agree on the implementation of a cease-fire and a UN monitoring
mechanism.²⁶⁸ The cease-fire was subject to occasional breaches, but for the most part both sides
held to the agreement.²⁶⁹ Diplomacy had succeeded for the moment at stopping the battle of
Mogadishu. The cessation of factional fighting in the capital was enough to bring back UN relief
agencies and to encourage more international NGOs to return.

Despite the cease-fire in Mogadishu between Aideed and Mahdi, fighting continued in
other parts of the country. Most notably, General Aideed's side of the USC and allied factions
continued their campaign against Siad Barre's Somali National Front in the southwestern Bay
and Gedo regions. A series of battles took place from April to June that resulted in a large
number of casualties in the traditionally agricultural area between the Jubba and the Shabelle
rivers. After driving Barre from Mogadishu, the USC had given the largely defenseless farmers
of the Rahanwein clan arms and some experienced officers with which to fight the ex-president
who was trying to establish a new base. Barre's forces soundly defeated the Rahanwein and took
reprisals against the civilian population.²⁷⁰ Barre was eventually forced to retreat across the
border to Kenya. In October, Barre retook the town of Bardera for a short period.²⁷¹ The rivalry

between Colonel Jess and General Morgan for control of the southern port town of Kismayu developed during this time as well. Although less bloody than the fighting inland, it entailed its share of casualties. The violence prevented significant aid operations and UNOSOM I was unable to help.

Looting and banditry continued to be rampant throughout the country, getting worse rather than better as more food arrived. A representative quote from the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council indicates the state of affairs from April through November, 1991.

"[A]t the airport in Mogadishu on 31 May 1991 . . . an ICRC Cessna aircraft transporting about one metric tonne of medicine and a World Food Program Antonov aircraft that had delivered six metric tonnes of high-protein food mix (UNIMIX) for UNICEF . . . were looted of all their consignments by armed elements."272

Somali Red Crescent Society workers estimated that half of what the ICRC brought in was stolen, diverted, or extorted, though ICRC publicly claimed it lost no more than 20 percent (still a large amount).273

This state of affairs did not improve after UNOSOM's arrival. The soon-to-be UN Humanitarian Coordinator recounted a commonly observed event from September 1992, after UNOSOM troops had arrived. Trucks from northern Mogadishu, driven by Mahdi supporters, arrived at the port (in Aideed territory) to be loaded with grain by CARE staff. When they attempted to return northward, through the southern security guards, two trucks were stopped under the pretext that they had been stolen from southern owners. Despite attempts by CARE personnel to mediate on the spot, Aideed's men drove the trucks away. "Once again, food

273 de Waal, p. 146.
delivery was thwarted." According to OFDA situation reports, even though the volume of food entering the country increased significantly in the fall of 1992, the proportion (not the net amount) actually reaching the people in dire need fell by 40 percent.

A large part of the reason UNOSOM I never effectively provided protection to humanitarian operations was General Aideed’s opposition to it. By the time the Pakistani “security personnel” arrived on September 14 an agreement between Aideed and SRSG Sahnoun severely limited what the soldiers were permitted to do.

The Pakistani troops who comprised the force were flown into Mogadishu airport by American aircraft that were participating in Operation Provide Relief. They encamped outside the perimeter of the airport, since a faction allied with Aideed controlled the airport itself and would not allow the UN force to remain there. Force Commander General Shaheen eventually negotiated to gain control of the facility with the intention of providing security for the humanitarian relief effort. Aideed was furious and immediately shelled the place. When the artillery barrage stopped UNOSOM remained at the airport, but was not able to offer much protection.

In addition to UNOSOM I’s negotiated weakness, it suffered physical weakness and mandated restrictions. The security component, as agreed by Aideed, Mahdi, and Sahnoun in early August, consisted of 500 soldiers from a light infantry unit. Following the Secretary-

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274 Ibid., p. 25.
275 Cited in Hirsch and Oakley, p. 25.
General's recommendation, the Security Council authorized a UN military presence of 3,000 additional troops and three logistical units, for a total of 3,500 troops, 50 observers, and 719 support personnel. The move had never been briefed to anyone in Somalia. It led directly to Sahnoun's resignation/dismissal and was effectively blocked by General Aideed. As it turned out, the maximum strength reached was 893 troops.278

The UNOSOM troops were so understaffed and ill-equipped that they could neither monitor the cease-fire, nor provide protection to humanitarian operations, as their mandate stipulated. The mandate itself made convoy escorts useless. The troops were allowed to fire their weapons only in self defense under Chapter VI of the UN charter, rendering them helpless onlookers when bandits threatened to shoot, but did not actually do so. Valuing their lives more than food rations, drivers would yield their cargo when threatened.

To summarize, UNOSOM I had an appropriate strategy in terms of the needs on the ground. Aid organizations and supplies certainly needed protection. It failed to implement the strategy effectively because it was not physically capable of opposing General Aideed. Moreover, it operated under peacekeeping rules of engagement. To be effective they needed the consent of local actors, which they did not have.

Operation Provide Relief

The military airlift of emergency humanitarian supplies, known as Operation Provide Relief, was authorized by the UN Security Council on July 27, 1992. It officially began

278 The Blue Helmets, pp. 292 and 721. In addition to those provided by Pakistan, soldiers came from Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway.
operations on August 15, though it took another two weeks to arrange diplomatic clearances and gather the necessary personnel. The airlift operated until late February, 1993. The mandate provided by the Security Council called for the facilitation of the emergency humanitarian effort by UN agencies and NGOs to accelerate the delivery of assistance.

Provide Relief’s objective was to deliver relief supplies to the hardest hit inland areas where NGO personnel would distribute them. It was purely humanitarian in nature and sought successfully to avoid any military confrontation. The US military interpreted their mission to involve three tasks: deploy a civilian Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Kenya and Somali to assess requirements; activate a Joint Task Force to airlift food and supplies to Somalia and north Kenya (where there were Somali refugee camps); and deploy aircraft to north Kenya for daily relief sorties into Somalia were the environment was safe and permissive.

The American commander was Brigadier General Frank Libutti of the Marine Corps. He was entirely independent from UNOSOM and reported to US Central Command in the United States. Under his direction was a military and civilian team, a central component of which was a Disaster Assistance Response Team provided by the US Agency for International Development. The DART functioned as a coordinating arm and helped the military work with the relief organizations.

At its height in late 1992, Operation Provide Relief had a staff of 600-800, most of whom were in Kenya. The port town of Mombasa, Kenya was used as a transhipment point for flights.

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279 Sommer, Hope Restored?, p. 23.
280 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 25.
283 Sommer, p. 24.
into Somalia. The United States provided 14 C-130 and one C-12 cargo planes; Canada provided three C-130s Germany provided two C-160s; and Belgium provided one C-130. The Operation conducted an average of 20 sorties per day and delivered over 28,000 metric tones of supplies -- equal to 112 million meals -- to relief organizations in Baidoa, Bardera, Belet Weyne, and Hoddur.  

The rules of engagement were to not engage. Aircraft were prohibited from flying unless assured of safe landing conditions by NGO personnel at the airstrips. Operation Provide Relief military personnel did not play a role inside Somalia, minimizing the chance of running into hostile actors.

The strategy followed and the capabilities committed made Operation Provide Relief appropriate to the situation. The coordination role played by the DART was essential for humanitarian and military organizations to understand each other and work together. The lesson was carried over to UNITAF. Although the amount of supplies was small compared to the need, it was an impressive supply operation. Provide Relief fulfilled its objectives and had a positive impact on the mortality rate in southern Somalia.

UNITAF

The objectives of the American-led UNITAF operation (a.k.a. Operation Restore Hope) were about as close to entirely humanitarian as we can ever expect to see. UNITAF was

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286 Even strong skeptics recognize the humanitarian character of UNITAF. See de Waal, p. 154.
mandated by the UN Security Council "to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."\textsuperscript{287} No mention was made in the Security Council resolution of political settlement, a peace process, or national reconciliation. Nor was the hot potato of disarmament picked up. The vague term "secure environment" could have been interpreted by U.S. forces as a call to conduct general disarmament, a mission that would have gotten them deeply involved politically. Indeed the Secretary-General argued strenuously for such an interpretation from the beginning of UNITAF until after it ended.\textsuperscript{288} President George Bush seemed to equivocate. In his original announcement of the operation he said, "Our mission is humanitarian, \textit{but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people}, condemning them to death by starvation. General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops \textit{and the lives of Somalia's people}."\textsuperscript{289} This confusion may reflect the last minute deletion of disarmament as a stated objective from the resolution at the insistence of the U.S. military brass.

The behavior of UNITAF troops supports the contention that the operation was humanitarian, not political. In a decision that led to strong disagreement between the UN and the U.S., the American military refused to define a "secure environment" as anything more than temporary control of weapons in their areas of responsibility -- arms control as opposed to disarmament. They protected themselves and the personnel, equipment, and supplies of relief

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\end{itemize}
organizations only for the duration of the operation. Near the end of the operation UNITAF command conceded that some disarmament was necessary to create a stable environment after they left. The resulting operational orders reflected a half-hearted interest in a task thrust upon the military, not a determined disarmament effort.\textsuperscript{290}

Ambassador Oakley, the civilian head of Operation Restore Hope, carried out political activities in an attempt to get the factions to settle their dispute. However, his job was primarily to promote the stated humanitarian objectives of the operation. "He himself pointed out in January 1993 that any diplomatic advances he had forged were but 'ancillary benefits' in support of a limited humanitarian objective."\textsuperscript{291} In contrast to the civilian heads of the UN operations between which the U.S. effort was sandwiched, the lead diplomat did not define his job in primarily political terms.

The avoidance of peacemaking efforts by Operation Restore Hope has been the source of much criticism. How, it is asked, can a massive military deployment in a war zone and the provision of huge quantities of food in a derelict economy be undertaken without admitting the political role of these actions? By ignoring the political effects, the leadership of UNITAF made things worse in the long run. The criticism has merit. However, it is also true that the avoidance of political objectives enabled the operation to be successful in the short run by avoiding serious confrontation with the warlords -- a problem that plagued the UN follow-on mission.

The short (five month) duration of the operation is a further indication of the non-political objective of the United States. It was evident to all involved that no political settlement was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{290} For an extensive discussion of the disarmament issue, see Adibe, \textit{Managing Arms on Peace Processes: Somalia}, pp. 69-101.
\item \textsuperscript{291} Stevenson, p. 51.
\end{itemize}
forthcoming between the Somali factions. If the objective of UNITAF had been to foster such a settlement, it is reasonable to expect the operation would have been extended. As it was, UNITAF was brought to a close almost as soon as humanitarian organizations gained consistent access to the needy population inland. If the U.S. had gotten its way, it would have handed off responsibility to UNOSOM II even earlier than it did.

People who did not favor the intervention have argued that the American administration and the United Nations secretariat were working on hidden agendas.²⁹² It may be true that an American-led intervention with the UN's blessing was believed by President Bush, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and others to serve their private interests. That does not discount the centrality of humanitarian concern, nor the resolutely non-political nature of the operation.

The United States and other troop donors did have one competing objective that likely colored strategic decisions about what was to be achieved and the time limit of the deployment: minimal casualties. This meant that the U.S. was all too eager to pull up stakes and get out, leaving a shaky UN force to provide security.

Operation Restore Hope employed two strategies to achieve its stated objective of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. One was to protect aid operations in southern Somalia, in response to the Security Council’s directive to create a secure environment.

²⁹² Bush is purported to have sought a concrete example to buttress his rhetoric of a new world order. Somalia seemed the perfect opportunity. See Stevenson, pp. 98-99. A source close to the administration contends President Bush’s advisors were looking for a way to buck up their president’s spirits after his failed bid to be re-elected. A quick operation to feed starving people and promote the "new world order" looked like a good way to do it. Confidential conversation. Some believe the U.S. intervened to protect American oil companies' interests. See Mark Fineman, "The Oil Factor in Somalia," Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1993, p. A1. The argument has little merit. Boutros-Ghali is said to have used the opportunity to promote a more activist role for the UN at the beginning of his term as Secretary-General -- his own agenda for the new world order.
The second strategy was to provide logistical support to humanitarian organizations. This was not mentioned in the UN mandate but was necessary for the operation to succeed. In the following pages I analyze aid protection first and logistics second.

Protection for aid operations took the specific forms of point deterrence and defense. UNITAF soldiers guarded the airport, seaport, warehouses, and distribution points in the city of Mogadishu. They provided convoy escorts within the city and from the city to points inland. Forces stationed inland guarded warehouses and distribution points and provided escorts for regular forays out of the main towns.

Beyond their immediate areas of operation UNITAF forces were not able to offer any protection. That is, they did not engage in area deterrence or defense. Aid workers who traveled without UNITAF escort or their own hired guards were likely to be hijacked. A partial exception was Mogadishu, in which the foreign military presence was so pervasive from December 1992 to May 1993 that area deterrence emerged as a by-product. An indication of this was the cantonment or withdrawal of all "technicals" from Mogadishu during UNITAF’s tenure.293

UNITAF did not follow a strategy of directly opposing the warring parties by trying to disarm them. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali insisted from the beginning that a central component of the secure environment named in the authorizing resolution was the disarming of Somali gunmen throughout the country, from heavy weapons to handguns.294 The United States,

293 "Technical vehicles are trucks refitted to carry crew-served weapons." Adibe, p. 74, fn. 9. A crew-served weapon is one that requires more than one person to operate. Typically, technicals carry .50 caliber heavy machine guns. "The term 'technical vehicle' came from the humanitarian relief organizations, which justified expenses for gunmen and security guards as 'technical assistants." F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," Parameters (Winter 1993-94): 40, fn. 3.

294 The Secretary-General specifically called for disarmament in formal communications to the Security Council and the President of the United States. "Letter dated November 29, 1992 from the Secretary-General to the
particularly its military leaders, maintained that general disarmament was not part of their
mission. However, voluntary disarmament was encouraged and US forces were given the
capability and discretion to carry out forceful disarmament in situations deemed threatening to
the soldiers. In the end, coalition forces established confiscation policies that led them
primarily to disarm the Somali guards who had been hired by UN agencies and NGOs, rather
than pursue a comprehensive disarmament campaign to disarm factional combatants. Needless
to say, such action soured relations between military and humanitarian actors and led to a great
deal of confusion about whether UNITAF troops were in the business of disarmament or not.

The disagreement sprang from disparate organizational interests and concepts of what
constituted the containment of violence, which led to different interpretations of the mandate
written into the authorizing resolution. The UN secretariat wanted to focus on disarmament as a
route to peace and political settlement but did not have the ability to do it. The United States had
the ability to achieve at least partial disarmament but did not have the will to carry it out. As two
key U.S. diplomats observe, "This failure to clarify the UN-UNITAF relationship at the outset
was to plague both parties and create a myriad of problems, small and large, on the ground."

Aid protection was implemented as a coalitional military operation firmly under U.S.
military control. Lieutenant General Robert Johnston of the First Marine Expeditionary Force

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Secretary-General to President Bush,” not issued as a United Nations document. Available in The United Nations

73-74.

296 For a detailed evaluation of the disarmament issue in Somalia, see Clement Adibe Managing Arms in

297 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 47.
had overall command, including operational control of contingents from other countries. The Deputy JTF Commander was Major General Steve Arnold of the Army 10th Mountain Division. Deputy Commanding General, Brigadier General Lawson Magruder of the 10th Mt., was in command of Task Force Kismayo (in the second largest seaport). General Johnston reported to General Joseph Hoar, commander in chief of Central Command. Reporting responsibilities followed the established chain of command through the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the president. The civilian leader of Restore Hope was Ambassador Robert Oakley, who headed the U.S. Liaison Office (in lieu of an embassy). Oakley and Johnston worked closely and discussed plans on a daily basis; neither had authority over the other. UNITAF command kept the UN Secretariat informed through regular reports. It did not take any orders from the UN.

U.S. control over forces from other countries was de facto rather than de jure. Officers were able to appeal U.S. commands to their own authorities, though this never constituted a problem for UNITAF. Commanders of national units received direction from UNITAF headquarters and were given considerable operational and tactical discretion over how those orders were to be carried out. This latitude allowed for differences in doctrine, training, equipment, extent of territory covered, and the degree of imminent threat. The American military also conducted extensive liaison efforts with its partner units and enjoyed a high level of prestige, both of which contributed to smooth command relationships.

The first troops of Restore Hope to come ashore were from the 15th Marine

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298 Hodges, pp. 66-67.
299 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 49.
300 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 76.
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) who hit the beaches of Mogadishu in the glare of television lights.\textsuperscript{301}

They immediately established a high profile, confident and powerful presence. Although the MEU ashore never numbered more than 1,800, they did not hide behind sandbags or confine themselves to the port and airport. General Greg Newbold, commander of the MEU, believes if they had laid low until reinforcements arrived, Somali gunmen would have sensed weakness. An immediate expression of control was critical.\textsuperscript{302}

Although the new military presence rapidly expanded, as more U.S. Marines and members of the French Foreign Legion arrived at the airport and hovercraft brought vehicles ashore, violent attacks on relief organizations continued. Somali gunmen set up a roadblock between the UN Development Program and the ICRC; two vehicles with UN markings were hit with bullets; and the ICRC's offices in Baidoa were looted.\textsuperscript{303} In fact, since gunmen believed their days of unimpeded thievery were numbered, the incidence of looting and banditry increased in most of the country as soon as UNITAF arrived.\textsuperscript{304}

UNITAF forces acted strongly to counter violent tests of the international force's abilities and resolve. Marine Major General Wilhelm recounted an early example. "I believe it was about the second or third day we were there, a Fiat armored car and a technical vehicle took a couple of random shots at a helicopter, and we speared both vehicles in the streets of southern Mogadishu. From that point forward, the word seemed to get out that these people are here to help, but they

\textsuperscript{301} The Marines had not been warned that television crews would be on the shore shining lights into their eyes as they approached the beach. Because they could not see who was shining the lights, it took more than a little restraint not to open fire.


\textsuperscript{303} Johnston, p. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{304} de Waal, p. 155. Hirsch and Oakley, p. 64. Johnston, p. 84.
are not going to take any nonsense."305

First impressions were also considered critical as UNITAF extended inland. The arrival of UNITAF forces in each humanitarian relief sector was carefully choreographed to provide maximum protection to aid organizations and military personnel while avoiding outbreaks of violence. Of central import was the emphasis on the humanitarian intent of the new military operation.

In each new location experienced staff from the American Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and military intelligence personnel would visit the area to be occupied, talk to the NGO personnel present and survey the site. A day or two later Ambassador Oakley, accompanied by military and political officers would arrive to explain to NGOs and the Somali people that troops would arrive the next day and that the troops were there to help them. In due course, UNITAF troops would arrive the next day by helicopter, APC, and truck. It was of utmost importance that the first troops bring with them emergency relief supplies as a testament to their humanitarian mission. In once instance, movement to Hoddar was delayed a day because relief organizations could not provide humanitarian supplies for military vehicles to carry with them. UNITAF forces relied for success not only on superior firepower, but the trust of the local population and NGO workers. The diplomatic preparation and simultaneous arrival of troops and supplies went a long way toward winning over Somalis and NGOs.306

Looting and banditry dropped off precipitously once UNITAF established presence in a particular location. Warehouse looting had been endemic and became incidental. All the escorted food convoys (about 70 per month) got through to their destinations. Only one came under fire. In Baidoa, a few weeks after UNITAF’s arrival the local hospitals were only dealing with a few gunshot wounds from isolated incidents.

Military presence and absence of banditry and looting were not merely coincidental, as evidenced by the following three anecdotes. The original segmentation of the theater of operations into eight "humanitarian relief sectors" did not specifically cover Merca, about 50 miles south of Mogadishu. At the end of December, continued hostile activity against relief organizations there made it necessary to designate the town and its surroundings as a separate sector. Once that was done violence diminished.

The ICRC did not participate in the military convoys at first due to its strong inhibition against actions that compromise its impartiality. By late January, the organization had changed its stance in the face of continued assaults, which were not being suffered by organizations that accepted military escort.

The humanitarian situation in Baidoa rapidly improved as emergency relief and rehabilitation programs churned into high gear. Mass starvation and unchecked disease were immediately addressed by UN agencies and NGOs; markets came to life again. Besides providing food, medicine, and health care, military forces, UN agencies, and relief NGOs

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307 Zvijac and McGrady, pp. 3 and 26.
308 Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 71-72.
309 Ibid., pp. 27 and 51.
310 Within a couple of days of initial troop arrival a convoy arrived with 80 tons of supplies, fulfilling promises made at the meeting a few days earlier. Supply convoys arrived regularly after that. Newbold interview.
repaired schools and clinics, built roads, dug wells, and undertook agricultural assistance programs. Much the same process and organization were pursued in each of the humanitarian relief sectors.

In Baidoa, as in other areas, military and humanitarian organizations ascribed negative stereotypes to each other. Yet before long they developed congenial relations and worked well together. Specific actions also went a long way toward building a positive relationship. At one point early on troops responded promptly to Somali and NGO requests to stop violent banditry by the same armed group that had meet them with open arms at the Baidoa airport. The Marines "took down" the bandits' compound without firing a shot and turned their leader over to the Somalis and the vehicles over to the NGO workers, all of whom became convinced the troops were there to help.

Mogadishu was the most difficult sector to control, despite the presence of thousands of troops. As the most important city in the country, it was a primary focus of factional rivalry. Aideed's and Mahdi's forces, smaller militias, and hundreds of freelance hoodlums had large hidden stockpiles of arms and ammunition in a city ten times as populous as the next largest town. Nonetheless, the primary faction leaders reaffirmed their cease-fire agreement in the early days of the operation and factional fighting was contained for the most part.

On December 31, coalition forces began to establish cantonment areas in which the factions could store their weapons, in accord with an agreement signed by Aideed and Mahdi

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311 The change in attitudes was not unusual outside Mogadishu where there were fewer soldiers and aid workers and people got to know each other on a personal basis. In Mogadishu the stereotypes persisted.
312 Newbold interview.
313 Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 60-61.
twenty days earlier under the auspices of Ambassador Oakley. Faction members were not allowed to remove the weapons and the sites were subject to inspection by UNITAF with no advanced warning.\textsuperscript{314} On January 7, U.S. Marines attacked two of Aideed's storage sites, in response to a series of incidents in previous days involving artillery, gunfire and hostile acts against UNITAF.\textsuperscript{315} By mid-February, Mahdi had turned over all his cantoned technicals to UNITAF, but Aideed had managed to remove most of his and place them (along with much of his other military equipment) near the town of Galcaio in central Somalia, outside the geographic boundary of UNITAF operations.\textsuperscript{316} The removal of heavy weapons from Mogadishu greatly increased freedom of movement for aid organizations.

Kismayo proved to be as troublesome as Mogadishu, with humanitarian and political consequences. It was the locus of a feud between Colonel Jess -- allied with Aideed -- and General Morgan -- a Barre loyalist (and son-in-law) who was allied by convenience to Mahdi. General Morgan controlled about 1,000 well-organized fighters from the former national army who were based near the Kenyan border (beyond UNITAF's range). Colonel Jess nominally controlled several thousand militiamen in and around Kismayo, but they were disorganized. On January 24, in clear violation of the cease-fire agreement, Morgan attacked Jess's men who were

\textsuperscript{314} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 57. Zvijac and McGrady, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{315} Zvijac and McGrady, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{316} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 58. Aideed's action was one of the points of disagreement between the UN and the U.S. regarding conditions for transfer of authority at the end of Operation Restore Hope. The U.S. military maintained that they mission was to make the theater of operations safe for humanitarian relief organizations to do their thing. By forcing technicals and other weaponry either into cantonments or to other parts of the country they had fulfilled their mission. The Secretary-General insisted that making Somalia safe for humanitarian operations meant removing weapons from the control of the factions, not just getting them out of the area of operations for the time being. This disagreement over arms control versus disarmament contributed to a conscious decision on the part of the UN to drag its feet, leaving it understaffed and unprepared to take over control from UNITAF at the beginning of May.
encamped at a UNITAF designated compound outside the city. U.S. helicopter gunships and Belgian armor counterattacked the following day, destroying a large number of Morgan's technicals and artillery pieces. Negotiations between city elders and Task Force Kismayo quelled the situation by February 1.

Fighting broke out again on February 22, after Morgan had managed to infiltrate the city despite the continued presence of Belgian forces.317 The Belgians secured all humanitarian relief organization compounds and warehouses. Ambassador Oakley and UNITAF commander General Johnston issued an ultimatum to both sides. Over the next several days a U.S. Army Quick Reaction Force (established January 17) conducted disarmament operations in the city. Morgan withdrew and forces loyal to Jess began to canton their heavy weapons in early March. Hostilities continued, with Belgian units receiving and returning fire.

On May 7, Belgian forces engaged Colonel Jess as he advanced on Kismayo from Mogadishu, heavily armed and without permission. This left General Morgan in control of the port for the time being.318 The May encounter occurred three days after UNOSOM II took over operational command. The ramifications were highly detrimental for UN relations with General Aideed who saw a disadvantageous double standard in the international responses to the Morgan and Jess predations.

The success of UNITAF at protecting aid operations and the political troubles the

317 Gunmen had arrived in twos and threes, disguised as herders bringing their animals to town for export. They subsequently recovered weapons hidden within the city limits. Hirsch and Oakley, p. 77.
318 The most complete accounts of these events can be found in Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 76-78, and Zvijac and McGrady, pp. 59-63. Stevenson offers a good interpretation of why Kismayo was so important to Aideed. His analysis draws on clan rivalries (Aideed's versus Morgan's and Barre's), as well as the strategic importance of the port. Stevenson, p. 82.
operation created were both largely a function of the impressive combat capability the coalition force possessed. Following the U.S. Marines and French Legionnaires into Somalia were the American Army 10th Mountain Division, which had responsibility for Mogadishu along with the elements of the Marine Corps. A 850 member Belgian paratroop battalion was in charge of the embattled port town of Kismayo. Hoddur came under the control of 2,000 French troops; 2,500 Italian troops controlled Jiallalaqsi; Belet Weyne was under an 850 man Canadian unit; and 650 Australian troops took over Baidoa from the American in mid-January. Smaller contingents from other states provided perimeter security at Mogadishu airport and guarded specified locations and feeding operations. The Italians, Moroccans, and Pakistanis lent significant help to the U.S. Marines in patrolling Mogadishu. Although many of soldiers from smaller countries were virtually unequipped before they arrived, the level of discipline and training was generally good, according to a civilian observers. As soon as the intervention force reached its peak strength in mid-January, the U.S. began to withdraw its Marine units that had constituted the advance parties. By early February, UNITAF forces numbered 24,000.

In combination with overwhelming combat capability and good humanitarian-military coordination (discussed below) the rules of engagement enabled UNITAF forces to effectively project aid operations. The rules of engagement (ROE) were fairly permissive, though they were

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320 Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 74-75.

based on peace time or peacekeeping rules rather than combat rules.\textsuperscript{322} Each national contingent had its own ROE, but they did not differ significantly. Contrary to the claims of some observers, the rules of engagement were not the reason the United States eventually got into trouble in Somalia.\textsuperscript{323} The ROE did emphasize the non-combat nature of the operation and the importance of two fundamental principles of international and humanitarian law with regard to war, namely proportionality and minimal use of force. On the other hand, they allowed soldiers to take personal initiative in challenging individuals and groups who they considered threatening and to use deadly force when individual soldiers or their commanders deemed it appropriate.

The second UNITAF strategy -- providing logistical support -- was clearly needed. CARE estimated in mid-1992 (several months before UNITAF commenced) that combating the famine required the delivery to feeding centers of 35,000 tons of food per month.\textsuperscript{324} Only a fraction of that amount arrived throughout the year. Mogadishu port was closed for security

\textsuperscript{322} The ROE reference card that each American soldier carried read as follows: Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit. A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack. B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act. C. When U.S. forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, U.S. forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat. D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission. E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense. Remember 1. The United States is not at war. 2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect. 3. Use minimum force to carry out mission. 4. Always be prepared to act in self-defense.


\textsuperscript{323} For example, a former commander of another UN operation made the following statement in 1994, during a not-for-attribution seminar. "In order to establish the conditions for the arrival of humanitarian aid, it may be necessary to use military force. In Somalia, the United States got drawn into just such a mission. Thought the US sent decisive military force, those troops were handicapped by being sent into a war zone with rules of engagement that were appropriate only for delivering aid."

\textsuperscript{324} Johnston, p. 22.
reasons in December, 1991 and reopened in April, 1992. For the remainder of the year it was consistently under used. In October "no more than 3,000 to 4,000 tons of food relief were moving through every few days," which was barely a third of what was needed just for Mogadishu.325 Only one large ship reached the port between June and November, and the off loaded food remained in warehouses.326

The ICRC, however, never considered the port closed. It docked a ship per month, rapidly moving the contents out of the port to distribution points.327 The organization continually expanded its operations during 1992 and by the end of the year had delivered 180,000 tons of relief supplies, more than all other organizations combined.328 Yet this astounding effort by one organization only put a dent in the estimated 420,000 tons needed. Constant, large-scale port operations were necessary.

The condition of the port contributed to the low through-put. When the first U.S. troops arrived in December, they found that, "Trash and excrement covered the piers and warehouse floors. . . . Derelict cranes, forklifts, and vehicles littered the operating areas. Warehouses were half full of bags of grain and half full of litter."329 This assessment came months after the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Philip Johnston, had arranged with General Aideed to make some improvements.330 Despite the poor conditions of the port, the basic infrastructure could

325 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 29.
326 Ibid., p. 32. de Waal, p. 149.
327 de Waal, p. 149.
328 de Waal, pp. 144-145.
329 Zvijac and McGrady, p. 38.
330 Johnston, p. 28
support a much higher operating rate.\textsuperscript{331}

The story at Mogadishu airport was similar. The runway could accommodate any type of aircraft, labor was available, and the road leading to the airport was in good shape.\textsuperscript{332} However, there were no landing lights, no air traffic control system, and no perimeter fencing.\textsuperscript{333} An alternate landing strip outside Mogadishu could receive only C-130 and Antonov-12 small cargo aircraft. Use of the airstrip was further hampered by a road that was no more than a sandy strip which became problematic in rainy weather.\textsuperscript{334}

Beyond the major points of entry, the road and bridge system was in critical disrepair. Bridges were destroyed, surfaces were disintegrated, and many roads contained anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.\textsuperscript{335} One example was the road between Mogadishu and Baidoa, which is 248 kilometers long. In December, the trip was estimated to take eight to ten hours. One of the major routes in the country, it could afford truck convoys an average speed of only 17 miles per hour. The vast majority of roads were no more than dirt tracks that could not support even that rate of progress.\textsuperscript{336}

UNITAF was well equipped to take on the challenges of improving the transportation infrastructure, controlling air traffic, and managing port operations. Of the approximately 28,000 American troops committed, three-quarters were dedicated to logistics. The engineering

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., Annex paragraph 6.
\textsuperscript{333} Johnston, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{334} "90-day Plan of Action," Annex paragraph 6.
\textsuperscript{335} Zvijac and McGrady, pp. 47 and 53. McGrady, pp. 23 and 63.
\textsuperscript{336} Johnston, p. 41.
complement alone was 7,000 strong. Military personnel with military equipment managed and used far more seaport space and runway time than was used before. They repaired and maintained hundreds of miles of roads. They also transported relief supplies around Mogadishu and inland. Relief organizations sought and often received military technical assistance and physical assets for civic projects, from school repair to dam building.

Logistical capacity jumped as security was provided and the physical conditions of seaports, airports, and roads were improved. Between December 10 and January 20, thirteen vessels with humanitarian supplies berthed at Mogadishu port. Approximately 40,000 tons of food, drugs, seeds, and tools were delivered through the port and main airport. Prior to UNITAF, the port was operating at 10 percent of capacity. By late December, Mogadishu was the busiest port in Africa. Sixty-three percent of the early activity was devoted to military operations, which irked humanitarian organizations, but humanitarian operations certainly benefited from military logistical equipment and expertise. Kismayo port had been closed since September, 1992, but extensive salvage operations revived it and a ship carrying grain birthed at the end of January, 1993.

At Mogadishu airport UNITAF rapidly installed a new control tower, communications

337 Sommer, p. 31.
338 Dworkin, p. 28.
341 For examples of grumbling, see Francois Jean, ed., Life, Death and Aid: the Medecins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 104. de Waal, p. 155. In the first 35 days, 48 ships off loaded 114,000 tons of military equipment, including 6,668 vehicles and 96 helicopters. Five million gallons of fuel and over 800,000 gallons of water were pumped ashore. Hirsch and Oakley, p. 59.
342 "Progress report of the Secretary-General," paragraphs 25 and 31.
reader, and air traffic control capabilities. Electric lighting was installed, security was
provided by UNOSOM and UNITAF contingents, and operations continued around the clock. Airfields were important to UNITAF operations, so considerable attention was devoted to runway repair and maintenance right from the start. Over the first two months, military engineers upgraded eight airfields: Mogadishu, Baledogle, Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera, Jialalaqsi, Belet Huen, and Kismayo. All had to be C-130 capable; Mogadishu and Kismayo had to be C-5 or C-141 capable. Mogadishu's main airport's runway was in good shape, in contrast to many of the airfields inland, which were overgrown with vegetation. The runways at some airfields required upgrading to accommodate heavy aircraft and frequent use. The capacity of some airfields was increased by creating parking ramps and turn-around aprons with special matting designed to be used for constructing expeditionary airfields.

Military engineers repaired or built 2,500 kilometers of roads. By late January, 11 separate routes were in the process of being improved. The road to Kismayo was reopened when a bridge was reinstalled. The trips from Baidoa to Bardera and Baledogle to Baidoa (both major supply routes) took half as long as before the repairs.

Prior to the military's arrival relief organizations hired Somali trucks to transport supplies. The rent was high and always included several gunmen to guard the vehicle (not its

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343 Somalia had no air traffic control authorities or facilities of its own. Air space was management from U.S. Navy ships offshore. McGrady, pp. 56.
345 In some places airfields were the primary means to bring in forces, military logistics support, and humanitarian relief supplies. McGrady, p. 84.
346 McGrady, p. 65. C-5 and C-141 aircraft are used for strategic (long-distance, large load) airlift. The smaller C-130 is used for theater airlift.
347 Hirsch and Oakley, p. 67.
348 McGrady, p. 64.
contents). After UNITAF's arrival humanitarian supplies were still carried in Somali trucks sometimes, but their owners had to compete economically with military aircraft, helicopters, and trucks, as well as commercial and UN-owned aircraft and equipment that was allowed to enter the more secure environment.\textsuperscript{349} The WFP, for example, brought in a fleet of trucks from Ethiopia. As a result, the volume of supplies transported mushroomed and the cost of Somali trucking dropped by 30 percent.\textsuperscript{350}

In short, protecting aid operations from banditry and renewed factional fighting was half of what was needed to gain access to the needy population. A massive logistical effort, from infrastructure repair to delivery services, was the other half of what was needed. UNITAF had the capability to provide both.

Coordination between humanitarian and military was almost as important to the success of both strategies as were physical capabilities. U.S. military leaders and Ambassador Oakley were well aware of this. UNITAF built on the Civil Military Operation Center concept developed during Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and drew on the personal experience of individuals from OFDA-DART and American military forces who participated in the Operation Provide Relief airlift. The UNITAF operation displayed several successful methods of coordination by consensus. They provided institutionalized fora for humanitarian, military, and political players to exchange information and establish a common agenda.

\textsuperscript{349} It is more expensive to use military transportation assets than commercial ones because military security precautions require aircraft and vehicles to carry more fuel and less cargo. Commercial owners are also willing to push their equipment much harder, completing more runs per asset per time unit than military equipment. However, from the perspective of an NGO, taking advantage of military assets is free since militaries do not charge relief organizations rental fees. Interview by author with Ben Parker. Nairobi, Kenya, September 17, 1996.

Meetings among top-level officials are a simple and straightforward means of coordinating operations. Their value is easy to overlook, but as described in the UNOSOM II section below, their absence can have disastrous consequences. Regularity and frequency increase the value of meetings by providing constantly updated information to those involved and encouraging problem solving by groups of individuals who can draw on diverse resources and expertise.

Relief organizations sometimes complained of spending too much time talking and not enough time acting. Inter-organizational meetings, however, enabled international and Somali actors to exchange information, coordinate plans, overcome problems, and develop policy. The vast majority of organizations recognized these benefits. Accordingly, frequent meetings took place, from the leadership in Mogadishu down to the implementing units in the field.

An important and unusual conduit for information exchange and agenda setting between Somali militia leaders and foreign military commanders was the Combined Security Committee. The Committee was established by the Somalis at the encouragement of Restore Hope civilian leaders. It was a largely Somali gathering, composed of senior military leaders from Aideed's and Mahdi's factions, sometimes including the faction heads themselves. Also regularly involved were senior UNITAF and U.S. Liaison Office military and civilian officers, though they were occasionally not invited.

The committee met almost daily between January and April, 1993. Meetings were held on neutral ground in the Conoco Oil Corporation compound, where the U.S. Liaison Office was located. Because the compound was in southern Mogadishu which was controlled by Aideed, UNITAF troops provided escort for Mahdi and his men from northern Mogadishu and security
during the meetings. The meetings encouraged dialogue between Somalis and Americans on specific issues such as heavy weapon cantonment and on more general conflict prevention and resolution. On more than one occasion the Combined Security Committee helped to avoid the kind of confrontation that engulfed UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{351}

In addition to high-level meetings, daily operational coordination was made possible by meetings at the Humanitarian Operations Centers in Mogadishu and each of the nine humanitarian relief sectors. These meetings were open to all international organizations who wished to attend. They served as forums for information exchange, agenda setting, cooperative planning, and policy discussion.

When Operation Restore Hope began one of its first activities was to establish the Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC) structure. It built on the two humanitarian coordination mechanisms in place during UNOSOM I and compensated for their weaknesses, namely the lack of contact with military personnel and a paucity of resources. The office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator was the official center of coordination efforts, but was not very effective. The Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for Somalia was much more effective at gathering and sharing information and avoiding duplication of effort. However, the Committee members did not see themselves as appropriately responsible for the overall humanitarian response in Somalia and consequently did not undertake the effort.

UNITAF collocated its Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) with the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator, thus creating the Humanitarian Operation Center in Mogadishu.

\textsuperscript{351} Allard, p.73. Hirsch and Oakley, p.58
The staff of the HOC was kept to a minimum to keep it focused on coordination and information exchange, rather than undertaking activities itself.\textsuperscript{352}

The functional liaison cell around which most activity was concentrated was the Civil-Military Operations Center, which was directed by the military deputy director of the HOC. As with the HOC, the CMOC staff was kept small.\textsuperscript{353} Its most important task was to coordinate UNITAF responses to NGO requests for food convoy escorts, provision of security, "space-available" flights,\textsuperscript{354} and technical assistance. Staff would receive and validate requests, then task UNITAF component commands (US military services) or coalition forces.\textsuperscript{355} In time, they developed a data matrix showing the status of food relief supplies throughout the area of operations and the availability of convoy assets.\textsuperscript{356}

The CMOC also served as UNITAF liaison to UNOSOM headquarters and the humanitarian community, functioned as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office, and monitored military support in the regional HOCs. Eventually the CMOC took on additional duties, such as processing identification cards for relief workers, and functioning as the emergency military response team for international relief personnel.\textsuperscript{357}

On the humanitarian side of the HOC was a unit called the NGO Consortium, which had grown out of the Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee. The Consortium provided a forum for a

\textsuperscript{352} Allard, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{353} CMOC-Mogadishu staff consisted of about a dozen officers and enlisted personnel, plus part-time liaison officers from coalition forces at the regional HOCs. Allard, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{354} NGO representatives could fly on military aircraft if there was space available after the primary mission function was fulfilled. Allard, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{355} Dworkin, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{356} Allard, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{357} Kennedy, p. 104.
low level of framework coordination, i.e. agenda setting. At regular meetings humanitarian organizations of all types and sizes gathered to talk among themselves and determine a set of priorities. U.S. Colonels Kennedy and McPherson from the CMOC were occasionally invited as observers. The Consortium proved to be an important coordinating mechanism because it relieved the HOC and CMOC from the burden of addressing and receiving requests from a multitude of single NGOs.

The relations between the soldiers of the CMOC and the humanitarian community were good, but the coordination mechanism was not able to overcome the distrustful stereotypes most soldiers and aid workers believed of each other. The basic reason was that they remained two separate entities, most of whose members hardly interacted with the other side. UNITAF headquarters was separated by a mile from the Humanitarian Operation Center, which meant the CMOC was not so much and operations center as it was a liaison office. NGO and UN agency requests for protection were referred by CMOC staff to a faceless UNITAF chain of command. Decisions emanating from UNITAF headquarters were relayed to relief agencies that had little concept of, or influence on, the military operation center.

In contrast, the CMOCs in the Humanitarian Relief Sectors other than Mogadishu were true civilian-military undertakings. In the sectoral HOCs, Requests for Action were not referred to UNITAF headquarters, unless the circumstances or request were exceptional. Requests were

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358 Colonel Kennedy was assisted by Col Robert McPherson. Both had experience with relief activities and civilian agencies during Operation Provide Relief which preceded UNITAF. As the military Deputy Director of the national HOC Kennedy focused on CMOC relations with NGOs and UN agencies; McPherson focused on CMOC relations with UNITAF. Hirsch and Oakley, p. 67. Seiple, pp. 166 and 168.

359 Seiple, p. 168.

360 Seiple, p. 170 -175.
decided on by the local commander. This engendered a closer working relationship between humanitarians and soldiers than would have been possible if the regional HOC was just used as a communication link to the national headquarters. Difficulties were addressed by representatives from both communities together over the same table, rather than one solution being worked out in a humanitarian operation center and another in a military operation center.\textsuperscript{361}

While operational coordination was good, it was severely limited in what it could achieve without strategic policy guidance. No one in a position to make themselves heard in either the U.S. or the UN had a coherent concept of how to integrate military presence, diplomatic maneuvering, and humanitarian relief efforts. It was assumed that these three elements, when thrown together, would enjoy synergistic effects and lead to the resolution of Somalia's problems. Instead, the result was (surprisingly effective) reactive policy making on the ground, which had minimal lasting effects. Underlying the entire UNITAF endeavor was the refusal in Washington to recognize the fundamentally political nature of the problems in Somalia. The UN Secretary-General saw the importance of political solutions but, as the follow-on UNOSOM II experience showed, they were a little too ambitious.

To summarize the UNITAF effort, more assistance got through to more people with the commencement of Operation Restore Hope. The military operation was directly responsible for enabling this increase. With improved security and logistics, the number of NGOs doubled from 21 in December, 1992, to 44 in March, 1993.\textsuperscript{362} Concurrently, the extent and geographic reach of

\textsuperscript{361} Seiple, personal correspondence with author, May 14, 1997.

\textsuperscript{362} The number of UN agencies present remained constant at six; the number of Red Cross organizations remained constant at two (the ICRC and the Somali Red Crescent Society). There was no linear relationship between the number of relief organizations and access to the needy, since there was a great deal of antagonism and competition between them. Dworken, Table 1, p. 14. Problems with coordination and the resulting inefficiencies
their operations grew. Supplies were being delivered to places relief organizations "never considered to be accessible." In every relief sector, access improved immediately upon arrival of foreign troops. The expansion of UNITAF inland simultaneously addressed the problems of security for aid operations and logistical problems.

The success of UNITAF can be attributed to its humanitarian objective, the strategies it employed, its combat and logistical capabilities, and its coordination with humanitarian and political actors. The immediate effect on the number of lives saved was dampened by the operation’s late arrival. In the longer term UNITAF’s achievements were overshadowed by the disaster of UNOSOM II. A good portion of the reason for that disaster was the complete lack of a political plan during Restore Hope, for which the UN operation over compensated with a devastatingly ambitious political agenda.

UNOSOM II

When the UN took over from UNITAF on May 4, 1993 the objectives of the intervention reverted to being both political and humanitarian, this time with a strong emphasis on the political. In March, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the Secretary-General's suggestion to endow UNOSOM II with a hugely expanded mandate in resolution 814.364

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364 It has become de rigueur to criticize the UN for screwing up a perfectly good humanitarian intervention. What people tend to forget is that every member of the Security Council -- with the United States in the lead -- supported UNOSOM II actions right up to the October 3 firefight. The administration of President Clinton started the blame-the-UN bandwagon rolling as a means of deflecting criticism from itself. What goes unmentioned is that the first draft of UN Security Council Resolution 814 authorizing the expanded mission of UNOSOM II was written in the Pentagon. Clarke, in Clarke and Herbst, p. 9.
Boutros-Ghali's report asking for the resolution identifies the "parallel steps" of "cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian peace force, rehabilitation along side political dialogue." It goes on to talk of "encamped and disarmed" militias as part of a cease-fire concept that "would continue as long as required or until a Somali government was functioning effectively." It spoke of ways to "place political pressure on factions that seek to delay or fail to comply . . . ." The report also called for protection of the personnel, equipment and installations of relief organizations, as well as "[c]ontinued efforts to assist relief activity . . . ." The humanitarian objectives clearly were secondary.\textsuperscript{365} The Security Council reaffirmed the dual humanitarian-political objectives in September, 1993.\textsuperscript{366}

After the American withdrawal from the coalition at the end of 1993, the weak and shaken UN operation received a new mandate that focused on humanitarian objectives, while trying to promote a political reconciliation through diplomatic means -- a role it was no longer in a position to play. By July 1994, UNOSOM forces were merely endeavoring "to maintain security at key installations, escort relief convoys and protect personnel . . . ." Despite increasing inter-clan fighting and banditry, some of which caused UN military casualties, the UN force stayed out of the way as much as possible.\textsuperscript{367} UNOSOM II had entered a period of steady retrenchment; to the extent that the military component continued to play a role its activities reflected humanitarian objectives.

There were four distinct military operations during the UNOSOM II period. The largest

one was the second United Nations Operation in Somalia force. It was tasked with aid protection
and opposing General Aideed, who was singled out as the worst perpetrator of violence.
Attached to UNOSOM II was an American Quick Reaction Force (QRF) under separate
command. It had been part of UNITAF and stayed on as the rapid response, heavy combat
element of the UN presence. It was used primarily to oppose Aideed. Another American unit,
known as Task Force Ranger (TFR), under a third line of command was deployed in August
1993 to chase down General Aideed. The fourth operation was Operation United Shield, a
coalition force deployed briefly in 1995 to extricate all foreign troops at the end of UNOSOM II.
I do not discuss United Shield, since it was oriented toward getting out of Somalia rather than
doing anything in Somalia.

The second United Nations Operation in Somalia pursued its humanitarian objective
through a strategy of protecting aid operations, just as UNITAF had done and UNOSOM I was
intended to do. The job fell to troops under UN command (not the QRF or TFR). It pursued the
political objectives mandated by the Security Council through a strategy of directly opposing
General Aideed and his Somali National Alliance. This second strategy is discussed below in the
section on strategies that addressed violence. It involved all three elements: UN-commanded
troops, the QFR and TFR. The analytical separation is artificial since the two strategies were
followed simultaneously. Yet it serves the purpose of identifying the source of UNOSOM II's
biggest problems -- they were in the political objectives, not the humanitarian ones.

The specific form of the aid protection strategy was point deterrence and defense. Since
the UN force was not as successful at deterring attacks as had been the coalition led by the U.S.,
it was forced to engage in a significant amount of defensive action. It is somewhat misleading,
however, to say that UNOSOM II defended aid operations, for in most instances it was defending only itself.

Humanitarian organizations ability to move supplies through and out of Mogadishu changed for the worse with the advent of fighting between UNOSOM II and the SNA in June 1993. By mid-August, the threat of surface-to-air missiles had closed Mogadishu airport to all but military helicopters.368 All humanitarian activities in the city and immediate vicinity were brought to "an almost total standstill" from early June to mid-October. Delivery shortfalls due to the insecure environment continued after the fighting died down in Mogadishu. As UNOSOM II followed a policy of retrenchment, banditry increased further and supply through-put became increasingly hard, if not impossible.

About one million people were still in need of assistance with food, water, medical attention, and shelter at the end of 1993. Fortunately, the access relief organizations had managed to secure under UNITAF remained well into the UNOSOM II period in many parts of the country that were removed from the capital. At the end of 1993 there were more than 30 hospitals, 80 maternal and child health centers, and 100 mobile vaccination teams in Somalia. Sanitation and food-for-work projects continued throughout the country.369 In February, 1994, an outbreak of cholera spread from the north-west southward. Over a period of five months a total of 24,650 cases were identified and 872 fatalities reported.370 But for an aggressive and coordinated response by the international relief community the number of cases and deaths

would have been considerably higher. The achievement indicates continued wide-spread access outside Mogadishu in early 1994, at least for rapid response medical teams.\footnote{371}

Yet despite some success at maintaining access, the general trend was for greater and greater restrictions on the ability to reach the people who still needed help. Relief organizations could not overcome the rising insecurity. They had become primarily reliant on the military, rather than following their accustomed practice of negotiating with local faction leaders and elders to secure agreements on "humanitarian space," whereby gunmen would agree not to attack the NGOs in exchange for the organizations helping the local populace (and by extension the gunmen). This reliance on the military to gain access had been a feature of the relief effort in Somalia since UNITAF. As UNOSOM II found it increasingly difficult to maintain the required range and number of convoy escorts, relief organizations had little alternative but to curtail their excursions and evacuate their personnel.\footnote{372}

The closer one got to Mogadishu, the greater the problem of banditry became. This was most unfortunate, since Mogadishu was the point of entry for most relief supplies. In August, 1993, a U.S. government inter-agency assessment team found that banditry was not a significant problem in any part of southern Somalia, but from that point on general lawlessness increased and was often directed against relief organizations.\footnote{373} It was not unusual for personnel from NGOs, UN relief agencies, and UNOSOM to be threatened, attacked, or kidnapped. As the remaining American forces withdrew in February a March, 1994, NGO offices were looted in

\footnote{371} Though subject to roadblocks and hostility, medical teams do not carry supplies that are as easy as food for bandits to store and use.
\footnote{373} Sommer, pp. 44 and 47.
Baidoa, Belet Weyne, and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{374} By mid-1994, "[i]ncreased banditry and inter-clan and inter-factional fighting, together with attacks directed at humanitarian agencies and their staff, [had] forced a number of United Nations organizations and NGOs to suspend their assistance programmes and reduce or withdraw their staff."\textsuperscript{375}

The pattern continued as UNOSOM gradually withdrew from everywhere but Baidoa, Kismayo, and Mogadishu by October, 1994. Even in these locations, the UN force hunkered down, seldom venturing out of their compounds and allowing a great deal of fighting and banditry to go on around it.\textsuperscript{376} In Mogadishu, technicals could be seen on a daily basis again and small arms fire was continuously heard. In Baledogle, Afgoi, Belet Weyne, Baidoa, and other places throughout southern Somalia foreigners were attacked with impunity. The Secretary-General described the situation in September as "very volatile and virtually uncontrollable."\textsuperscript{377}

Although the situation was bad while UNOSOM was there, it got worse when the military operation ended. When UNOSOM withdrew, Mogadishu airport closed. The seaport remained ostensibly operational, but factional clashes and labor disputes resulted in frequent cessation of operations.\textsuperscript{378} Because these were the two main points of entry, relief and rehabilitation supplies to the entire southern and central portions of the country were severely restricted. Some 40 NGOs and 8 UN agencies maintained operations for at least a while, taking a low-profile, regional approach in areas where the security of their personnel could be

\textsuperscript{374} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{376} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 145, fn. 55.
guaranteed.\textsuperscript{379} The parts of the country where access was most important were by and large the same areas where it was no longer possible: the inter-riverine region.

The ineffectiveness of the aid protection strategy was determined primarily by the actions taken to oppose General Aideed. The UN military operation came into direct conflict with the Somali National Alliance and tried to fight its way to victory. The resulting mini-war between the UN/US and the Somali National Alliance pushed humanitarian protection to the bottom of the agenda for several months.

In addition to the confrontational approach and political priorities of the UNOSOM II leadership (see below), aid protection was hampered by the weak civilian and military capabilities available. When Jonathan Howe arrived in Mogadishu in March 1993 to take up his position as the new SRSR, he was astonished to find no strategy for implementing resolution 814 (which authorized UNOSOM II), no plans for the handoff, and necessary personnel and equipment leaving the country rather than coming in.\textsuperscript{380}

At the time it assumed control, UNOSOM II was disgracefully understaffed on the civilian side. The United Nations is infamously slow to find personnel for its operations and this instance was worse than most. As a means of pressuring the U.S. to maintain UNITAF until it had carried out general disarmament in Somalia, the UN Secretariat did not begin preparing for the handover until very late in the game. The extraordinarily slow recruitment of the civilian staff retarded the development of a non-military operational approach.\textsuperscript{381} The plain fact that it took the new SRSR, Jonathan Howe, months to get even 100 people on staff, as opposed to an

\textsuperscript{380} Howe interview.
\textsuperscript{381} Chopra, et al., p. 105.
authorized 800, meant that the far larger military component was bound to dominate operation considerations.\textsuperscript{382}

Troop levels were in flux during the entire period. In April 1993, just before the UN took command from Operation Restore Hope, UNOSOM II had 18,000 troops, most drawn from India, Pakistan, and Egypt.\textsuperscript{383} At the end of July 1993, well after the UN and the SNA were at war, troop strength was a little over 20,000 (2,000 below the number authorized). They were drawn from 27 different countries and consisted mostly of infantry battalions with some movement control, aviation, signals, medical, and other units. The Secretary-General admitted to "acute growing pains" in the first critical months. Troops did not arrive in country as scheduled and many who did arrive were not adequately equipped.\textsuperscript{384} Actual and authorized troop numbers came into line eventually and by the end of October 1993 UNOSOM II had 29,284 personnel, including civilian headquarters support.\textsuperscript{385}

The way in which troops were deployed further reduced their effectiveness. More than half of the units were concentrated at Mogadishu airport and the UN compound. In early 1994, 13,430 troops were in Mogadishu compared to only 10,770 outside the capital. This was a force that was supposed to exert control over the entire country. In contrast, UNITAF had deployed only one-third of its troops in Mogadishu. Nor did UNOSOM units really control the areas in which they were present. Tactical deployments tended to be small pockets centered on defensive

\textsuperscript{382} Poor quality personnel hurt UNOSOM II as well. Rosegrant and Watkins, part B, p. 2. Incredibly, there was no one on the military staff with previous peacekeeping experience -- they did not know how to do anything other than treat Aideed as an enemy, even before the June 5 incident.
\textsuperscript{383} Adibe, p. 64.
bases. Units only patrolled narrow corridors and left territorial control to the Somali factions.\textsuperscript{386} It is no wonder aid operations subject to assault.

Just as capabilities deteriorated under UNOSOM II, compared to its predecessor, so did coordination between military and humanitarian organizations. The leadership of UNOSCM II allowed most of the coordination mechanisms of the previous period to disintegrate. They began their tour of duty worrying about basic constraints like how to acquire the authorized civilian staff and how to maintain security with a significantly weakened military component. They did not consider putting scarce resources into coordinating mechanisms. As a result, they did not replace the CMOC, they did not provide a secure forum for the Somali Combined Security Committee, and by design they were unable to establish a clear chain of military command.

Communication and planning between international actors and with Somalis came to an end. The bad relations between the UN and NGOs came to the fore again in the absence of a strong center of gravity to draw them together. This further disabled the strategy of aid protection. When protection takes the form of point, rather than area, deterrence and defense soldiers and aid workers need to communicate constantly. When the mechanisms of communication break down, aid protection suffers.

To summarize, the strategy of aid protection was not a total failure during UNOSOM II, but it suffered tremendous problems that got progressively worse from May 1993 to March 1995. In Mogadishu the force quickly became engaged in a battle with the strongest war lord in the country which had the dual effect of directly endangering aid operations and distracting UN

\textsuperscript{386} Chopra, et al., p. 70. Logan interview.
forces from their aid protection mission. Outside the city the situation was better, but it steadily
deteriorated to the point where banditry and looting became commonplace once more. Aid
organizations that had come to rely on military protection found they could no longer effectively
negotiate “humanitarian space” in the absence of that protection. In addition to being
preoccupied with the war in Mogadishu, UNOSOM II could not offer the level of protection to
aid organizations that UNITAF did for several reasons: it had too few troops in the field; most of
those troops were lightly armed; they tended to be very cautious and remain in defensive
positions from which they could offer little help; and communication between soldiers and aid
workers broke down.

Strategies that Addressed Violence

Operation Restore Hope addressed violence through the activities of its civilian leader
Robert Oakley and his able staff. Their diplomatic efforts were important because they laid the
groundwork for further political rehabilitation (which was squandered, just as SRSG Sahnoun’s
diplomatic work had been). The military side of UNITAF, however, did not play a significant
role in this endeavor and should not be considered to have engaged in a strategy that addressed
violence. When it used force or the threat of force it was to create a temporarily secure
environment for emergency humanitarian relief.

The only military intervention in Somalia to employ a strategy that addressed violence
was the second UN Operation in Somalia. UNOSOM II offensive military actions were part of a
larger political plan put together at UN headquarters in New York to reconstruct the Somali
political system from the ground up. A number of diplomatic initiatives toward this end were
undertaken, including several UN-sponsored conferences involving Somali participants from a multitude of sub-clans and social positions.

Ali Mahdi and a number of smaller faction leaders favored a political resolution, believing it was their best chance to legitimate and consolidate their political positions. Aideed did not want any political resolution over which he did not have complete control. He believed he could gain more through force than negotiation and he had reason not to trust the good offices of the United Nations. It was in this context that UN military operations took place.

UNOSOM II

As noted above, the Security Council mandate for UNOSOM II clearly stated both political and humanitarian objectives. The actions of UNOSOM II and associated forces during the first six months of the operation reflected the political emphasis of the mandate to the virtual exclusion of humanitarian considerations. From June to October, 1993, the primary objective was not only political, but pointedly so: capture and detain General Aideed. This section focuses on the activities of UNOSOM, the Quick Reaction Force, and Task Force Ranger during that period, after which time military activity reverted to lackluster attempts to protect aid operations.

When UNOSOM II took the reins from UNITAF on May 4, 1993, everyone anticipated it would be tested by General Aideed and possibly other factions. The test seemed to come immediately. Colonel Jess, who had been expelled from Kismayo by General Morgan counter-attacked and was repelled by UNOSOM II units. Aideed's SNA saw an overt double standard by the UN which did nothing to stop the advance of General Morgan -- their enemy -- but acted
decisively against Colonel Jess -- their ally. From this point on Aideed and UNOSOM II had an antagonistic relationship that soon became quite violent.

A second critical test of UNOSOM II military capabilities and resolve came on June 5 when militiamen attacked Pakistani soldiers in southern Mogadishu, killing 24 and wounding 56. The next day, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning the attack and authorizing UNOSOM "to take all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . including . . . their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." The resolution was a de facto declaration of war against Aideed and the SNA. It named the SNA as the likely culprit, but refrained from naming General Aideed at the urging of the United States. Less than two weeks later, SRSG Howe named Aideed as the responsible agent and issued a warrant for his arrest. The decision to single out Aideed originated in the SRSG's office and was approved the UN Secretary-General. UNOSOM II and the Quick Reaction Force had become a faction in the battle for Mogadishu.

From that point on, the level of violence in southern Mogadishu increased precipitously. Between June 12 and 17, after recalling the bulk of the QRF that had been deployed in Kismayo, UNOSOM II attacked several SNA weapon storage sights, Radio Mogadishu (an important means for Aideed to disseminate propaganda), and Aideed's command

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387 There may have been a double standard at work, but the different tactics of Morgan and Jess account for the different reactions by the Belgians. General Morgan snuck gunmen in disguised as herders and conducted a focused strike on the houses of several of Jess's top henchmen. The henchmen fled. Colonel Jess chose to make a high profile frontal assault on the city, which the Belgians were obliged to oppose.
391 Maps at the end of the chapter show the location of the major confrontations mentioned here.
center in a multilateral cordon and search operation, using AC-130 gunships and ground forces. The next major operation was carried out by Pakistani troops on June 28 against "Atto's Garage," Mr. Atto Osman was a strong political and financial supporter of General Aideed. On July 2, Italian forces conducted a large search operation in the Heliuuaa Village area. On July 12, the QRF followed a unilateral U.S. decision to bomb the "Abdi House," an SNA command center. Previously, attacks had been announced in advance in order to give people a chance to get out of harm's way (in a nod to the avowedly humanitarian nature of the intervention). This time the occupants of the house were a prime target, so no warning was given. Militiamen and civilians had been killed in all the UNOSOM/QRF actions, but this yielded a particularly high body count: the ICRC estimated 54 Somalis were killed and 161 injured.

After the July 2 and 12 incidents, UNOSOM became more cautious as the SNA became more bold. The militia used small arms, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), machine guns, mortars, and command detonated mines to ambush UN vehicles throughout south Mogadishu. In August, helicopters increasingly came under fire from RPGs and machine guns.

393 Prior to following UNOSOM orders, the Italian commander checked with his national authorities in Rome. Italy had been advocating a softer approach ever since June 12. The incident received considerable attention, led Boutros-Ghali to call for the Italian general's recall (which did not happen), and set a precedent for commanders of other national units to double check UN commands with their capitals. The effect was to significantly weaken UNOSOM command authority, with detrimental operational consequences.
394 The U.S. also decided not to forewarn UN forces as a security precaution. The decision "created a major friction inside the coalition" according to an officer in Somalia. Rosegrant and Watkins, p. 10.
396 Part of the reason for the increased caution was that few Somalis remained willing to provide UNOSOM with information, so the operation's situational awareness decreased. Since the beginning of UNITAF Somali citizens had been one of the best sources of intelligence about the location of arms caches and militia movement. Newbold interview with author.
Gunmen often would shield themselves in crowds of women and children -- a tactic that cause UNOSOM great operational difficulty and led to the death of many civilians.397

Foreign troops retook the initiative in late August when U.S. President Clinton and his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake agreed to a longstanding request for special operations capable troops by SRSG Howe and his number two man U.S. Army General Montgomery. Recent American casualties convinced them to override the misgivings of top military brass and send 400 Delta Force Commandos and Army Rangers under the code name Task Force Ranger.398 Their mission was to kidnap Mohamed Farah Aideed.

On October 3, 1993, TFR made its seventh unsuccessful attempt to snatch the Somali general, though they rounded up 24 of his associates. During the operation, two helicopters were shot down by RPGs. Fifteen hours later when the rescue mission ended, 18 Americans and one Malaysian had died; 78 Americans, 9 Malaysians, and 3 Pakistanis had been wounded; and one American captured. Approximately 300 Somalis had been killed and 800 wounded.399

The United States immediately decided not to hunt Aideed any more. The UN/US disengaged and the SNA declared a unilateral cease-fire. Having won the "war," Aideed continued to be threatening and obstructionist.

Outside Mogadishu the amount of factional violence was not nearly as high, though it increased steadily from mid-1993. The contested town of Kismayo and its surrounding Lower

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398 Rosegrant and Watkins, p. 12.
Jubba region were the focus of intensive local and regional diplomatic initiatives. They succeeded in avoiding major confrontations until February, 1994, when fighting between rival factions resumed, followed by another peace accord in June, and continued sporadic fighting after that.\textsuperscript{400} In May, 1994, the Secretary-General of the UN reported that inter-clan fighting had broken out in Merca, Mogadishu again, Belet Weyne, and Baidoa.\textsuperscript{401}

Why did UN-SNA relations turn so sour so rapidly? The two main reasons were Aideed's belief that the international presence was blocking his full assumption of power and very poor diplomacy by UN actors. The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General was retired admiral Jonathan Howe. He may have been a good military officer in the U.S. Navy but he proved to be a terrible diplomat who relied almost exclusively on heavy coercion to reach a political solution. He had a skeletal staff, many of whom incompetent. Howe characterized some of his employees as "people that nobody else wants."\textsuperscript{402}

In the month between UNOSOM II's assumption of command and the SNA attack on the Pakistani patrol, several incidents had raised Aideed's hackles. If the weapons inspection had not taken place in their wake, or if it had not been presented as a \textit{fait accompli}, the attack probably would not have happened.\textsuperscript{403} As noted, relations got off to a bad start three days into UNOSOM II when the Belgian contingent in Kismayo repelled the advance of Colonel Jess, who was attempting to retake the city from General Morgan.

Secondly, in mid-May General Aideed attempted to arrange a peace conference in

\textsuperscript{400} Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," para. 188 and 198.
\textsuperscript{402} Rosegrant and Watkins, Part B, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{403} Given the overall adversarial position of Aideed and the UN, however, a clash was likely at some point. Radio Mogadishu is like Pleiku is like a streetcar.
Galcayo, a town in central Somalia. At first, UNOSOM II agreed to participate, but when it realized Aideed meant to establish the agenda and preside over the meeting, it tried to include one of Aideed's political rivals, and failing that sabotaged the conference.404 In a separate matter, Aideed was upset at the process UNOSOM had established to select a new national judiciary and police.

Furthermore, there had been discussions in UNOSOM civilian and military meetings about the possibility of shutting down Radio Mogadishu, which was under Aideed's sole control and was the source of vitriolic anti-UN propaganda. Aideed knew about these discussions and feared for the fate of his prized means of communicating to the population.

Finally, the Combined Security Committee ceased to exist when UNITAF ended. It had been a body established during UNITAF to facilitate communication between Somali factions and foreign forces regarding military activities. The conflict resolution role played by Committee was sorely missed at times such as the June 4 delivery of a letter to Aideed’s deputy announcing the imminent inspection of Radio Mogadishu.

It was in this atmosphere that UNOSOM II decided to challenge Aideed. On June 4, a letter was delivered to his deputy while the general was out of town. The letter: notified the SNA of the weapon storage site inspection at Radio Mogadishu planned for the next day. When the deputy read the letter in the presence of UN personnel, he said that the SNA needed time to respond. If UNOSOM conducted the inspection as planned, he said, it would lead to war. The

404 Historical footnote: at this time April Glaspie, infamous for her role in precipitating the Gulf War, was seconded to UNOSOM II as a temporary replacement or the politically astute Deputy SRSO. She played a key role in the UN reversal.
UN did not give the SNA time to respond. The result was war.

Why did the United Nations lose the war with the SNA? Setting aside the question of whether or not the UN would have been able to create a stable political system if it had captured Aideed (a doubtful proposition), there are several related reasons UN and American forces lost the war in Somalia. They have to do with the nature of the conflict and the capabilities of each side.

The confrontation was essentially a counter-insurgency operation in which the SNA played the role of the insurgency and the UN played the role of the government. But there was a critical difference from normal counter-insurgency. The UN was not the national government and, as involved in the country as it was, it did not have the vested interests needed to persevere. Successful counter-insurgency requires vital interests to be at stake and political capital to be expended in large amounts. The UN and the U.S. did not have vital interests at stake and the United States in particular was not willing to expend political capital. When the going got rough, the Americans got out. That left the UN with barely a leg to stand on.

The headquarters staff did not have the requisite experience to execute the tasks assigned to it. Nor was the mission equipped for serious fighting. In general UNOSOM II was lightly armed, with few APCs and very little close air support available. Many of the national forces had been in the country a short time and did not know the lay of the land yet. They did not have time to familiarize themselves with the cultural and political environment of a country in a state of civil war. UNOSOM II had not even developed standard operating procedures to gather

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information and carry out tasks.\textsuperscript{406}

General Civik Bir, the UNOSOM II Force Commander nominally had 28,000 troops under his control, but the number of useable troops was far smaller. Within Mogadishu national governments put multiple restrictions on their troops so the Force Commander only had the Pakistani units and the QRF to patrol the volatile southern portion of the city. The Pakistanis did not have any armor.\textsuperscript{407}

The Quick Reaction Force was a fighting force, but a small one. It consisted of roughly 1,300 troops from the Army's 10th Mountain Division. It was intended to conduct military operations in situations beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II forces, act as an initial entry force into areas not yet under UNOSOM II control, and act as a reinforcement force in the full range of contingency operations.\textsuperscript{408} In a reflection of the broader UN operation, it did not have the means to cope with all it was asked to do.

The QRF was equipped with Blackhawk attack helicopters, humvees, armored personnel carriers, light machine guns, and it had night fighting capability.\textsuperscript{409} When fighting burst out in Mogadishu, SRSG Howe and General Montgomery repeatedly asked U.S. Central Command to provide military augmentation. They wanted M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, more attack helicopters, mine removal equipment, and additional troop support. The requests went all the way up to then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, but were not approved.\textsuperscript{410}

Complicated command and control arrangements further weakened UNOSOM II. The

\textsuperscript{407} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{408} Chopra, et al, pp. 81 and 89.
\textsuperscript{409} Chopra, et al., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{410} Rosecrance and Watkins (B), p. 12.
Force Commander could never rely on his orders being carried out. The Quick Reaction Force -- theoretically the Force Commander's main fighting force -- was under a separate chain of command that extended directly back to the United States. In an attempt to integrate the QRF into UNOSOM II while keeping it under American command, two American officers were given both UN and U.S. command positions. The Deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM II, General Montgomery, was also the Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia. The Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia was also Commander of UNOSOM II Logistics Forces Command. The arrangement created the fiction that American forces were under UN control, when in fact the UN Force Commander did not have control of the QRF or other U.S. forces.

All U.S. forces assigned to Somalia remained under the command of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, who assigned operational control to the Commander of U.S. Forces Somalia. When directed, the Commander of U.S. Forces Somalia would assume tactical control of the QRF. The UN Force Commander could not decide without being second-guessed when and how to use the QRF, TFR, nor even U.S. logistics personnel.

Other governments and national commanders reacted to this precedent by maintaining de facto veto power over what their soldiers assigned to the UN would do. In effect, the chain of command was turned upside down. The Force commander had to check with each national commander, or with the contributing government, before assigning tasks and giving orders. This put subordinate contingent commanders in a position to participate in decision-making

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411 Chopra, et al., p. 86.
412 The situation could have been improved if the Force Commander had a list from each contributing government stating what it would and would not allow its troops to do. He never had any such lists. Chopra, et al., p. 88.
above the Force Commanders' head. To make matters worse, within UNOSOM II itself there were 27 different countries, each with their own language, doctrine and procedures.\textsuperscript{413} The lack of command flexibility had disastrous consequences. It aggravated UNOSOM II's greatest difficulties between June and October 1993, when the mini-war with General Aideed occurred. There was disagreement among participating countries about how to interpret and implement Security Council Resolution 814 (that established the second UN operation). When the bullets started to fly, national commanders' practice of referring orders to national capitals for approval became commonplace.\textsuperscript{414}

If the force Commander had little actual command authority, the rules of engagement might have served as a point of reference around which the disparate national units could come together. Instead they further complicated matters. Some national contingents, such as the Germans, participated with the explicit understanding that they would not engage in combat. They essentially devised their own RoE, often based on those of traditional peacekeeping. The contingents that submitted to the Chapter VII nature of UNOSOM II were provided rules of engagement that were long and complicated. There were six sections: when deadly force could be used, how to challenge before using deadly force, principles for the use of force, specific rules, definitions, and identification of whom could change the RoE. There were six specific rules, four general definitions, three principles for the use of force, and two types of circumstances in which deadly force could be used.

\textsuperscript{413} Rosecrance and Watkins (B), p. 2. Chopra, et al., p. 72.

\textsuperscript{414} The best known example occurred in July when the Italian commander refused to follow the Force Commander's orders, after checking with Rome. Public calls for his recall and replacement went unheeded, underscoring the impotence of the Force Commander and the Secretary-General.
Not only was there too much for a soldier to hold in his head in a very tense environment, some key passages were open to diverse interpretation. Section 3.c. stated, "Minimum force is to be used at all times." Yet the very first rule stated, "UNOSOM personnel may use deadly force to defend themselves, other UN lives, or persons and areas under their protection against hostile acts or hostile intent." It should surprise no one that different understandings developed of what it meant to use minimum deadly force to defend areas under their protection from hostile intent. The differences of interpretation widened as the fighting progressed.

The weak UN force and QRF were reinforced by shock troops from elite American special operations units: Army Rangers, Delta Force commandos and Navy Seals. Task Force Ranger was authorized by President Clinton on August 22 1993, with the reluctant consent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose was to capture General Aideed and remove him from the country, the authority for which was interpreted to reside in Security Council Resolution 837 that specifically mentioned the "arrest and detention" of those people responsible for the June 5 attack on UNOSOM II troops.

Task Force Ranger's chain of command was separate from UNOSOM and from the QRF. The commanding officer reported to a new Joint Special Operations Command that reported to Central Command. Due to this formal separation and the desire to keep their plans secret, Task Force Ranger did not tell UNOSOM II headquarters when or where they would conduct raids until just before the operations took place. This practice was largely responsible for the long delay before a rescue mission was put together on October 3 after the seventh and last snatch

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415 Adibe, pp. 84-86.
operation turned bloody. UNOSOM and the QRF had been given no advanced warning so they had done no contingency planning. The resulting death of 18 Americans and wounding of over 75 more (as well as one dead Malaysian soldier) marked the end of the attempt to oppose Aideed and the SNA with force. There simply was not the will to sustain the costs involved in a counter-insurgency operation.

After the October 3 disaster, the United States quickly sent a joint task force to reinforce the QRF. Within three days the decision had been made to send an additional 5,300 troops, extra AC-130 gunships and more than 100 armored vehicles, including M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Ironically, this vastly stronger force would not continue the policy of aggressively confronting the SNA, nor would it be used to pursue humanitarian objectives as part of the UN operation. Its sole purpose was to avoid any more American casualties and assist the safe withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the following March.416 The QRF became a quiet retreat force. The UN had lost the war against the SNA.

To summarize, UNOSOM II followed a strategy of offensively opposing General Aideed, but it had none of the characteristics necessary to make a group of soldiers into an effective fighting force. Put another way, UNOSOM II rarely met any of the time honored principles of war as developed in Western military theory. It did have mass, in the sense of large numbers of soldiers, but the Force Commander had little control over them. It had virtually no ability to maneuver. There was no consensus on the objectives of the force. Most of the time the force behaved defensively, rather than taking the offensive initiative. There was no unity of command.

416 Rosecrance and Watkins (B), p. 15.
There was no simplicity, with troops from 27 countries each with its own way of using soldiers, and cumbersome rules of engagement. The element of surprise lay with the Somalis rather than the UN, since Somali intelligence resources were superior and the UN operation was ambivalent about surprise attacks in a supposedly humanitarian operation. UNOSOM II was physically and organizationally capable of doing little more than deterring banditry. It was not a fighting force.

The SNA, on the other hand, was an effective urban guerilla force that protected its leader until the intervenors felt too much pain and gave up. The strategy of opposing the perpetrator failed. Consequently, the entire political plan for Somalia failed. No political resolution was possible without the participation of the most powerful person intervention the country. General Aideed was not inclined to help the UN realize its objectives.

**Political Failure**

After the last UNOSOM II mandate extension in November 1994, the UN humanitarian oversight committee, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Somalia, declared its continuing commitment to emergency and rehabilitation work after the end of UNOSOM II. UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and donors worked together through the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body to develop and implement criteria for continuing rehabilitation and development assistance. When all foreign troops had left, eight UN organizations and about 40 international NGOs remained in Somalia to carry on their work.

Six months after the departure of UNOSOM II, there was no full-blown civil war as had been feared, but sporadic factional fighting, constant banditry, and attacks on relief personnel forced relief organizations to withdraw personnel from a number of places where economic and
social recovery remained fragile.\textsuperscript{417}

Immediately following the death of General Mohammed Farah Aideed in August 1996, there was a tenuous calm in the country. But by mid-December 1996, a string of political assassinations, reprisal killings, looting and general banditry led to the worst fighting in Mogadishu since 1992. The ICRC estimated that 1,500 people were wounded and almost 300 killed, many of whom where women and children. By June 1997, relative peace had returned, though sporadic fighting and random banditry continued.

Five years, billions of dollars and many deaths later, the situation was largely unchanged from June 1992, except that the level of malnutrition was not severe enough to be called a famine. It was as if there had never been large-scale humanitarian military intervention in Somalia. In 1997 over a million Somalis remained dependent on external food aid, most of them within the boundaries of Somalia.\textsuperscript{418} Humanitarian relief efforts continue to this day. The political climate remains fractured and violent. There is no Somali state.

**Summary**

The disintegration of the Somali state caused hundreds of thousands of Somali people to die from both violence and privation from 1991 through 1995. During the height of the fighting in 1991 and early 1992, between 15,000 and 40,000 people were killed by violence. Approximately 130,000 to 150,000 more died from starvation and disease. There was no outside military involvement. Humanitarian relief organizations managed to save the lives of about


35,000 to 50,000 people. In the final months of 1992 an additional 80,000 to 100,000 people died, mostly from privation, not directly from violence. The small military operations known as UNOSOM I and Provide Relief took place during this time. Relief efforts saved approximately 40,000 people from death. From the end of 1992 through mid-1993 another 10,000 to 25,000 people died. During this time UNITAF took place and relief efforts saved the lives of approximately 10,000 people. From mid-1993 through March 1995 relief efforts continued in the presence of the second UN military operation, UNOSOM II. The number of deaths and lives saved both dropped to a few thousand.

Did the military interventions have anything to do with the changes in mortality, or are the correlations spurious? Evidence from epidemiological studies, public health surveys, humanitarian field reports, and military after action reviews indicates that some, but by no means all, of the decrease in mortality was the result of military action. UNOSOM I had no effect on the mortality rate. Provide Comfort had a substantial beneficial effect and should be given credit for a significant proportion of the 40,000 lives saved in late 1992 -- probably more than a quarter. UNITAF also had a substantial beneficial effect and was responsible for vastly increasing the quantity of material delivered to needy people, as well as increasing the area covered. However, because it came after the famine had largely subsided, the number of lives it helped save was about 10,000 -- a figure much lower than is generally believed. UNOSOM II probably helped to save the lives of a few thousand people in rural areas, but it also was directly responsible for killing approximately a thousand Somalis in Mogadishu.

Operation Provide Relief and UNITAF were more effective at saving lives than UNOSOM I and II because the two American-led operations possessed nearly all the conditions
for success and the two UN operations possessed few of them. Table 3-3 summarizes the strategies pursued by each operation and whether the conditions for success were present.

Table 3-3: Summary of strategies employed and whether the conditions for success were present.

<table>
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<th>Strategy Employed</th>
<th>Address causes of death?</th>
<th>Where the conditions for success present?</th>
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Provide Relief followed the strategy of providing logistical support in the form of an airlift, which was appropriate given the inability of aid organizations to move supplies overland or to generate and pay for a massive airlift on their own. The participating air forces possessed the required capabilities in terms of equipment and expertise. There was a high level of coordination between humanitarian and military actors that enabled cargo aircraft to deliver the appropriate material to the appropriate locations at moments when physical danger to the aircraft was low. Finally, Provide Relief took place at a time when the famine persisted and the need for
supplies was desperate.

Restore Hope followed simultaneous strategies of dramatically increasing the logistical capacity of the port, airport, and road system, and of protecting aid operations by means of point defense and deterrence. As a result of the dual strategies, much more aid got to the people who needed it. UNITAF was able to implement the strategies because it had dominant combat capability and impressive logistical capabilities. The operation developed fairly effective coordination mechanisms that enabled humanitarian and military actors to work together. It could have saved more lives if it arrived before or at the peak of the famine rather than at its end.

UNITAF's shortcomings were due to the fact that the intervening states had humanitarian objectives but no political ones. This explains why the operation was undertaken so late. It also explains why Restore Hope had no plan to use its enormous strength and authority to help resolve the political problems of Somalia. Powerful states were interested only in delivering food, not in finding an enduring solution to the cause of the famine. This hands-off attitude set the stage for the failure of UNOSOM II.

The first UN Operation in Somalia was launched in time to save lives and had an appropriate strategy. Its critical shortcoming was its total lack of capabilities. Since General Aideed withdrew his consent for the operation, the UN would have had to fight to establish a presence. It did not have the mandate or the means to oppose recalcitrant local actors. Therefore it was useless.

UNOSOM II continued to protect humanitarian organizations in the countryside, where politics did not dominate the mission. However, troops and aid workers alike were forced to withdraw as the fighting in Mogadishu escalated. The strategy of defeating the perceived
perpetrator was not appropriate under the circumstances. It is hard to imagine an outside body creating an entirely new political apparatus while simultaneously seeking to destroy the most powerful man in the country. Success would require a level of political commitment never displayed by any of the participating states. Furthermore, it was never clear how capturing Aideed would have led to a political solution to Somalia’s problems. There was no clear connection between the military strategy and the political objectives. The strategic blunder was accompanied by a military force with insufficient strength to achieve its mission at an acceptable cost (and probably at any cost). Added to these problems were convoluted military command and control arrangements and the disintegration of communication between humanitarian, military, and political actors.
Chapter Four

Genocide and Civil War in Rwanda, 1994

Introduction

On 13 May, the soldiers and militiamen came in eight busses, vans and lorries that were being used for building the road between Kibuye and Gitarama, and a lot of other vehicles owned by soldiers and the authorities. Other people came on foot, wielding machetes; they were singing and whistling and beating drums. They surrounded us and then began to throw grenades at us. Then they made their advance. The soldiers shot bullets at us and the militiamen finished the Tutsi people off with machetes. They killed practically all the women and children that day. My family was also killed. These militia were wearing red and white cloths, They also had grass on their heads. Some of them were speaking the Igikiea dialect spoken by people from the region in the north of the country. I heard them say that the soldiers had come from different prefectures and that they knew how to “work,” meaning kill the Tutsis... I was in Kazirandimwe with my wife, children and mother Adele Nyiramahe. We had been hanging around there because the militiamen had not come for a few days. We therefore thought that the militiamen had stopped the attacks. The militiamen arrived in a great number of cars. We trembled when we saw all this. I went behind my family and together we ran to Mayira. My wife could not run because she was pregnant and my children were small. Due to the bullets that were coming from all directions, we dispersed. As I was running, I fell in a ditch and above me was a big rock. I stayed there, trembling with fear. I could hear people crying as they died. In the evening, when the militiamen had gone, I left the ditch. I couldn’t find my way because there were bodies everywhere. The militiamen had killed that day in a very unusual way. They either cut off someone’s head or their feet and hands. After having taken off their cloths, they would then abandon them. Women and girls were killed in a barbaric way. The killers stabbed their vaginas with sharpened bamboo sticks. That day more than 20,000 people were killed. On 13 May, I looked tirelessly for the bodies of my people... I remained in Bisesero, with all the bodies around me. I couldn’t find anything to eat or drink. I was very thin and my hair was dirty. My skin was all scaly because I hadn’t been able to wash myself for two months. I could not walk so I stayed in the bush for a long time. During the day I saw the militiamen coming to kill us. I had put a lot of grass on me as camouflage. At night the dogs fought each other when they came to eat the corpses. I stayed where I was without any medical care and without eating. I was afraid of being killed. Towards the beginning of June, we had about fifteen guns belonging to assassins we had killed. When we were fighting, our objective was to kill someone who had a gun or a grenade, even if it meant losing a lot of people on our side. As there were no more bushes to hide behind, I had to lie down and put bodies on top of me. When the militiamen attacked, they did not touch the rotten bodies to find us. There was a terrible odor. It was impossible to breath underneath the corpses. The insects which came to eat the bodies sting me... The killers used to come a lot towards the end of June, because
buses and vehicles belonging to the authorities used to come to see how the Tutsis of Bisesero were continuing to resist. Because we had nothing to save, we fought, aware of our predicament. That is why the French found so few people still alive. . . . I did not have any strength left and could no longer eat. I had no more cloths. I was like an old animal. I saw the dogs devouring the corpses.⁴¹⁹

These are the memories of survivors of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. They live in the Bisesero hills of western Rwanda near the shores of Lake Kivu. The Tutsi there fought to survive as best they could with rocks, sticks, machetes and an occasional gun. By the time the French soldiers of Operation Turquoise arrived, 2,000 Tutsi were left alive; nearly 50,000 had been killed. A thousand more were killed after the arrival of the French. Bisesero was unusual in three respects: it had a high concentration of Tutsis, which grew during the genocide as people fled to the pocket of resistance; the people there resisted longer and harder than in many other places; and it lay within the French area of operation. Yet in important ways the events in Bisesero were like those nearly everywhere else in Rwanda from April through mid-July 1994. Tutsis were targeted for extermination; they gathered in churches and on hilltops out of fear and to attempt a defense; soldiers led the attacks against them with guns and grenades to break the resistance, then local militiamen and others brought in by vehicle continued the killing in a bloody, macabre work-a-day fashion. Nearly every Tutsi in the country was killed in a period of three months. The onslaught ended only when an outside military force arrived. In most of the country that force was the Rwandan Patriotic Army. In the south-west it was the French Legionnaires.

This chapter investigates events in Rwanda and the Goma region of Zaire in 1994 and

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analyzes the military responses to them. A number of distinct military operations were undertaken. I look at four of them, plus a hypothetical intervention. The first operation I analyze is the offensive by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which was the military arm of the rebel movement that eventually defeated the genocidal government.\textsuperscript{420} Second, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was present when violence erupted and maintained a minimal presence throughout the genocide and civil war. Third, the French government, with authorization from the UN Security Council, undertook Operation Turquoise, which occupied a portion of Rwanda for two months. Fourth, the United States responded to the ensuing refugee crisis in Zaire with a small deployment known as Operation SupportHope. The hypothetical intervention I consider is the one proposed by the commander of UNAMIR, who propounds a scenario of what could have been done to stop the genocide but was not.

All four military operations were instrumental in saving lives. The RPA offensive saved the most people, with approximately 65,000 to 70,000 lives to its credit. The anemic UNAMIR force managed to save roughly 20,000 people. This is a surprisingly large number, given the small size and terrible circumstances of the UN force. The much more robust Operation Turquoise likely saved between 13,000 and 20,000 people -- far fewer than the French government claims. The total number of lives saved by all three operations is only one-eighth of the 800,000 people who perished in 100 days in Rwanda. In Zaire, Operation Support Hope

\textsuperscript{420} It is unusual to consider a violent rebel invasion as a form of humanitarian intervention. I do so for the following reasons. First, the RPA offensive was one of two major features of events in Rwanda in 1994, the other being the genocide. No investigation would be complete without a close look at it. Second, the RPA saved a large number of lives -- it had a humanitarian effect. Third, one of the possible military strategies during a humanitarian operation is to defeat the perpetrator. That is exactly what the RPA did. Fourth, a close look at the RPA offensive sheds light on what it takes to save lives in utterly extreme circumstances.
played a useful role in the initial emergency response to the outbreak of disease, but it is impossible to say how many lives it saved.421

If humanitarian intervention in Rwanda and Zaire succeeded in saving at least some lives, how did it do so? In Rwanda, people died as a result of violent attacks by government-sponsored militia and the military. They did not die because they were caught in the cross-fire of the civil war. Nor did they die from privation. Any effort to stop the dying had to confront the genocide. In Zaire, the vast majority of people died from disease, dehydration and exhaustion. To save them, outsiders had to provide the bare necessities of life.

The three operations in Rwanda confronted the genocide in different ways. The Rwandan Patriotic Army fought an offensive war that defeated the government and stopped the genocide. The rebels vital interests were engaged, which led them to act quickly, commit all their resources, take risks and sustain high costs. Their superior combat capability was the central element in their success. Although they were roughly equal to the government military in terms of numbers and equipment, they were led by more competent officers and were not distracted from their war-fighting by the “need” to kill civilians, as were their opponents. Rapid response was also crucial to saving lives. The genocide spread like wildfire as thousands of people were murdered every day. Every hour it lasted meant hundreds more deaths. If the rebels’ military strength had been greater, they could have advance more quickly and saved more lives. As the RPA advanced through the country, it provided area protection to the population and aid organizations behind its front line. The strategy of area protection prevented continued slaughter

421 All these numbers are explained and fully footnoted in the body of the chapter.
and allowed aid organizations to sustain the people who survived the genocide and civil war. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda attempted a variety of strategies to deal with the civil war, the genocide, and the need for emergency relief assistance. It was unable to do anything about the civil war. UN headquarters in New York City directed the UN Force Commander to try to stop the civil war by negotiating a cease-fire, which he did to no avail. The UN troops on the ground took it upon themselves, with no direction from headquarters, to address the genocide by providing point protection to small pockets of people in the capital city of Kigali. They were surprisingly effective despite being only handful of soldiers armed with rifles. The reasons they could save anyone at all were personal bravery, timing, and luck. UNAMIR’s presence in Rwanda when the carnage began enabled it to cope with one of the genocide’s standout features: it speed. Their good fortune, if the UN troops can be said to have had any, was the rebel advance, which effectively served as a rescue operation. The small and unsupplied UN force could not have held out against a concerted attack by government forces or even the militia. These same elements enabled the UN troops to provide point protection to a very small humanitarian presence in the capital. The fundamental weakness of UNAMIR was its near total lack of capabilities. A few days into the genocide, 10 UN troops were killed, prompting the withdrawal of all but 400 out of an initial force of 2,500. If the member states of the United Nations had not run away, UNAMIR could have saved many more lives. However, I do not believe the Force Commander is right in his contention that he could have stopped the carnage with a few thousand good soldiers.

422 I argue below that if he had succeeded in bringing about a cease-fire, the genocide would have lasted longer. A cease-fire would not have stopped the slaughter of civilians, which was a separate activity, but it would have stopped or delayed the rebel victory.
The primary strategies of the third operation in Rwanda, the French Operation Turquoise, were area protection for the population and aid organizations. Traditional political interests of the French in Africa to explain why they acted when no other country did.\textsuperscript{423} Political interest also explains why they took risks and committed substantial resources to the effort. The true motives behind Operation Turquoise remain obscure, but most observers suspect the French government intended to help the Hutu government that it had strongly supported for many years as one of the Francophone states of Africa. As it turned out, French soldiers arrived too late to save their erstwhile ally from defeat, if that was their intent. Instead, they set up a protected zone in the south-west corner of the country that prevented the front line of the civil war from advancing and significantly reduced, but did not stop, the genocidal killing in the area. Operation Turquoise’s dominant combat capabilities and clear command and control arrangements enabled it to implement successfully the strategy of area protection. While the “safe” zone provided aid organizations with freedom of movement, coordination between the French military and humanitarian organizations was terrible. The exception was a successful effort to prevent panic among the internally displaced population in the protected zone when the French withdrew.

Turquoise could have saved more lives if it had a greater capacity to police the zone it occupied. A great deal of killing continued in the south-west after the French arrived because there were too few soldiers to maintain a presence throughout the zone. The French also lacked trucks to transport Tutsis to guarded areas. This argument assumes the French were actually

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{423} Ghana deserves recognition for keeping its soldiers with UNAMIR even after the Security council authorized their withdrawal.
\end{footnote}
interested in saving Tutsi lives, an assumption that might not be warranted. If the French did
want to rescue Tutsis, then they also could have saved more lives by launching Turquoise sooner.

The American Operation Support Hope came in response to the refugee crisis in Zaire
that occurred when the retreating Hutu government leaders and their army coerced hundreds of
thousands of Hutus to flee the on-coming RPF. Support Hope followed the strategies of
providing logistical assistance to aid organizations and direct relief to the population. The
objectives of Support Hope were entirely humanitarian in nature, which facilitated interaction
with humanitarian organizations. Absence of political objectives is also the reason the operation
did nothing to break the control of the Hutu extremists over the refugee camps. The strategy of
logistical assistance was appropriate to the need for massive rapid supply of water, food, shelter,
and medical material for close to a million people. The forces deployed had extensive logistical
capabilities and arrived soon after the refugee influx. Support Hope could have been more
effective if it improved its coordination with humanitarian agencies and focused solely on
logistical assistance, rather than providing largely inappropriate direct aid.

The rest of the chapter investigates these points in detail. The next section describes the
political and military context of the interventions. It looks at the physical environment and the
nature of the conflict. It identifies the indigenous parties’ interests and abilities, as well as their
level of consent for intervention. The third section reviews the timing of the international
responses. As we have seen in Iraq and Somalia, the speed of the response has a large impact on
the potential good of an intervention. The fourth section parses out the causes of death, the
number of people who died, and the effect of military intervention on mortality rates. This tells
us approximately how many lives each intervention saved and how. The fifth section analyzes
the strategies employed by four military operations and the capabilities of the military forces. I look at the objectives of each military operation, the types of strategies employed, and their implementation, including intervenors’ capabilities and coordination. A short section notes the failure of outsiders to take meaningful political action. The final section of the chapter summarizes the findings of my analysis.

Political and Military Context

This section reviews the background to the genocide, identifies the local parties involved and their military capabilities, and considers whether the local parties consented to outside military involvement. A separate subsection considers these same three factors -- causes, actors and consent -- for the mass exodus to Zaire. The immediate causes of death and the speed with which events unfolded are treated in subsequent sections.

Rwanda

Rwanda covers 10,169 square miles (slightly larger than Vermont) in the heart of Africa. Its “thousand hills” are lush with crops and natural vegetation. Dwellings are dispersed across the land, connected by an extensive network of roads (nearly all dirt), with few towns or villages. It is the most densely populated country on the continent. Ninety-five percent of roughly seven and a half million Rwandans live in the country side, scratching out a

subsistence living on the steep hills.

Prior to the genocide, the population was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. There is an unresolved debate as to whether the Hutu and Tutsi are ethnically distinct. They speak the same language, follow the same religion, inter-marry and share the same history as far back as the 16th century, but the "official" Hutu government position was that the Tutsi were foreign invaders. Until the new government ended the practice in 1994, all Rwandans were required to carry identification cards that classified them as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.

The majority Hutu are traditionally subsistence farmers, while the minority Tutsi are traditionally aristocratic land and cattle owners. For the most part, Hutus were bound to Tutsis as vassals and clients. However, it used to be the case that a family could pass from one group to the other, depending on how many head of livestock they owned. In present day Rwanda, the vast majority of both Tutsi and Hutu are subsistence farmers.

When Germans in 1890 and then Belgians in 1916 colonized the area they reinforced group distinctions as a way of controlling the population. The Belgians originally supported the aristocratic position of the Tutsis, believing them to be superior because their facial features are more European-looking than the Hutus'. Near the end of their imperial tenure the Belgians began to sympathize with Hutu claims against Tutsi oppression. In 1959, Hutus forced the Tutsi king and thousands of Tutsi supporters into exile in Uganda. Three years later, the Republic of Rwanda gained independence with a Hutu government. The government was monopolized by the Parmehutu party under the leadership of President Gregoire Kayibanda, from 1962 to 1973. In 1973 General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power, killed most of the former government, and
established an autocratic military dictatorship, which he ruled until his death in 1994.\textsuperscript{425}

Under Habyarimana the Parmehutu party was renamed the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) and continued to dominate the government. It was entirely composed of Hutus and led by families from the northern region of the country. Within the governing elite was a small and centrally important group of extremists known as the "Akazu"\textsuperscript{426} centered around Madam Habyarimana and her family. They represent the hard core Hutu supremacists who seized on the idea of maintaining their power by exterminating all the Tutsis. The civilians were supported by the national military apparatus, consisting of the Presidential Guard, the army, and gendarmes. Like the civilian side of the power structure, the Presidential Guard and army were entirely Hutu and were dominated by northerners who tended to see Hutus from the south as troublesome. Most of the gendarmes and local police under them were also Hutus.

In political opposition to the government was a coalition of parties dominated by the Republican Democratic Movement. Posing a physical as well as political threat was the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). These two groups shared opposition to the Habyarimana regime but disagreed on the tactics to use — the former favored working within the political system, the latter from without. The RPF, based in neighboring Uganda to the north, consisted primarily of Tutsi people who had fled Rwanda 35 years earlier when the king was overthrown. Most members of the Front's armed forces (Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPA) had


\textsuperscript{426} Literally "the little house." A name given to the inner circle of the Royal Court. It was applied to the inner circle of the Habyarimana regime after 1985, with a strongly critical connotation of power abuse. Prunier, p. 367.
received training as insurgents against Uganda's President Obote and then as troops in President Museveni's army.

The RPF began a civil war against the Habyarimana regime in October 1990, managing to gain control over a narrow strip of territory near the border. Upon the outbreak of civil war France, Belgium, and Zaire sent 1,000 paratroopers to Rwanda's capital city Kigali to shore up the Habyarimana government. The RPA was rebuffed but the war was not settled and the rebels continued low level incursions. In June 1993, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution to send 105 peacekeeping troops to Uganda to patrol the border with Rwanda and prevent the RPF from smuggling arms. The operation, known as the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, was under-staffed and not very successful.

The political and military pressure on Habyarimana was accompanied by economic troubles. Beginning in 1985 the international price of coffee, Rwanda's major export, dropped continuously until 1993. Gross domestic production per capita dropped significantly and the country's foreign debt jumped. During the same period a severe food crisis enveloped Rwanda as a result of climactic fluctuations, soil degradation and inappropriate development practices. Farmers did not produced enough to maintain an adequate diet for their families.\textsuperscript{427} As a result, the regime faced rising discontent among urban and rural populations alike.

The ruling elite's grip on power was further threatened by international diplomatic pressure to open the political system. On August 4 1993, RPF leaders Paul Kagame and Alexis Kenyarengwe and Rwandan President Habyarimana signed an accord in Arusha, Tanzania,

\textsuperscript{427} Uvin, p. 29.
ending the civil war. The Arusha accord provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until elections, repatriation of refugees, and integration of the military forces of the two sides. It also called for a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda.

Habyarimana's government was faced with a military threat, economic weakness and attendant popular dissatisfaction, and international pressure to share power with its enemies. It was loathed to implement the talks, but moved slowly forward under constant prodding from the United Nations, regional governments, and international aid donors.428

At the same time, the government continued a practice it had begun when the RPA first attacked in 1990. That was a return to the time-tested strategy of fostering ethnic hatred in a bid to unite the majority Hutu, undermine the political opposition, and make elections impossible. Extremist political parties were created that openly preached hatred and violence. Contrived attacks by the army associated all Tutsis in Rwanda with the rebels -- the enemy within. Massacres of Tutsis had not occurred since the early years of Habyarimana's power, but began again in 1990 as "mobs" killed under the direction of local authorities and police. Very much like preparations for genocide in other countries, these processes "successfully sought to spread ethnic fear throughout the country; to organize, legitimize, and routinize the forces of violence and genocide; and to desensitize people to violence."429 The stage was set.

On April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying President Habyarimana, Burundian President

428 A strong case is made that members of the international community who pushed the Habyarimana regime to live up to the Arusha accord did so without adequate understanding of the possible repercussions. In this way they are responsible for the pursuit of genocide in Rwanda. See Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other: Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage Than Good," *SAIS Review* (Winter-Spring 1996): 221-240. Also see Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: the Perils of Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no.2: 193-210.
429 Uvin, pp. 31-32.
Cyprien Ntaryamira and several of Habyarimana's top aids was shot down over Kigali when returning from talks held in Tanzania, mediated by regional leaders and intended to bring about realization of the Arusha accord. To date all evidence is circumstantial, but the strongest argument implicates the Akazu within Habyarimana's own government who strongly disapproved of his movement (halting though it was) toward implementing the peace accord that would allow the RPF to share power.\textsuperscript{430} A consensus has developed that members of the Presidential Guard shot down their own president's plane.\textsuperscript{431}

Within half an hour, members of the Presidential Guard and "interhamwe"\textsuperscript{432} began killing moderate Hutu politicians and Tutsi leaders in Kigali.\textsuperscript{433} Road blocks were set up throughout the city before the president's death was publicly announced.\textsuperscript{434} The first violence in Kigali was politically directed, targeting moderate Hutu opposition members, the intelligentsia, and RPF supporters. The killing began simultaneously in nearly every part of the countryside.

\textsuperscript{430} Raymond Bonner, "Unsolved Rwanda Mystery: The President's Plane Crash," \textit{New York Times} (November 12, 1994), Sec.1, p.1. It is likely the plane was shot down by Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles of the Strela series. It is also nearly certain the missiles were fired from the Kanombe military camp where the Presidential Guard were housed. Furthermore, it is possible that two French soldiers from the Military Assistance Training Detachment (DAMI) were directly involved in firing the missiles while working for the extremist political party Coalition for the Defense of the Republic. Colette Braeckman, "Rwandan Plane Shot Down by Two Frenchmen," \textit{Le Soir}, June 17, 1994, p. 1. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Africa [hereafter FBIS-AFR]-94-118, June 20, 1994, p. 7-8.)


\textsuperscript{432} The militia was created in 1992 to massacre Tutsis. The translation of the word into English is flexible. Prunier's glossary says it means "those who work together." Prunier, p. 367. African Rights say it means "those who stand together" or "those with a common goal." The name was taken from a popular 1950s pro-independence song and the communal work parties of the 1970s and 1980s. African Rights, pp. 54-55.


where all Tutsis and any Hutus who helped them were targets.

It is important to emphasize that in contrast to general belief, killing did not originate solely in Kigali and spread across the country like a growing pool of blood. Massacres began in hundreds of locations simultaneously one or two days after Habyarimana’s death. In just over two weeks even the hold-out regions had succumbed. It appears that by the end of the month the majority of victims had already fallen. The speed with which the genocide was carried out is frightening. It was also one of the primary constraints on the efficacy of intervention. As will be discussed below, by the time outside governments realized a genocide was underway, there was simply not time to save the majority of people who were killed.436

The agents of the genocide fall into four categories: political masters, national security apparatus, police, and the militia and general public. The political impetus extended down from the “Akazu” through every level of the dense Rwandan administrative structure.437 Public

435 The recent Carnegie study on the plausibility of military intervention to stop the Rwandan genocide provides an example of the mistaken image of the killing moving out from the capital. “More specifically, forces appropriately trained, equipped, and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, preventing its spread into the countryside...” In an accompanying footnote the author acknowledges there are differing views on the rate of spread of the violence, but he does not seem to see the fundamental difference of the pattern of violence. It did spread, but from hundreds of points simultaneously. Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the early use of force might have succeeded in Rwanda, Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998), p. 3 and endnote 7, p. 52. It is unfortunate that this study, like many others, promotes a misconception of the pattern of the genocide. If lessons are to be learned about the efficacy of using military force to counter such events, it is important to get the story right. Major studies are not getting the story right. As a consequence, the wrong “solutions” are being promoted.

436 This is a controversial statement. The best argument in support of it that I have seen is Alan Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect: could U.S. Force Have Prevented Genocide?” Unpublished working draft, MIT, May 1997. Even after governments realized Rwanda was in the throws of a genocide, they declined to get involved. Therefore analyses of what might have been done with a rapid military intervention rest on a large counter-factual assumption.

437 “All prefets, sous-prefets and bourgmestres are Presidential appointments. Assistant bourgmestres are normally proposed by the Minister of the Interior but must be approved by the President...”. After almost two decades in power, the MRND reached every corner of the administration. Loyalists occupied most positions, and great pressure could be exerted on non-loyalists to comply.” African Rights, 1995, p. 52.
incitement came from Radio Rwanda and Radio Mille Collines, which not only called for killings in general, but also identified specific locations (hiding places) where “work” (murder) needed to be done. Local authorities usually directed the killings and watched as they occurred. If the process was carried out “too slowly” or with “insufficient enthusiasm” communal meetings were called by a higher official or army officer who would demand and incite greater ferocity and blood letting.

The principle instruments of the genocide were the army and militia, aided by the local police. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives at roadblocks, in their homes, and in other numerous, but small scale situations. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives in more carefully organized and executed massacres. Typically, initial murders caused large groups of people to congregate in public buildings -- schools, parish grounds, etc. -- in search of protection.\footnote{438} These groups were able to hold militia men and even local police at bay using stones, sticks and other simple implements, but they could not fend off the army. Often the local police would arrive at the planned site of a massacre shortly before the soldiers to seal off all exits and make sure the area was well surrounded by militia.\footnote{439} When the soldiers arrived they used military assault rifles and hand grenades to slaughter the Tutsis, regardless of whether they fought back or begged for mercy. The interhamwe used machetes, hoes and nail-studded clubs to cut down anyone who tried to escape. They then entered the “sanctuaries” to finish off people who survived the initial onslaught. The scene was repeated over and over again.

The Army was highly effective at slaughtering unarmed civilians. It was totally

\footnote{438} In previous years when massacres happened people had found safety in numbers. \footnote{439} African Rights, 1995, p. 52.
incompetent as a fighting force. At the beginning of April there were officially only 5,000 army troops armed with automatic rifles, hand grenades, mortars, and a few artillery pieces.\textsuperscript{440} In fact, the number was probably closer to 30,000 troops. They were not capable of sustained large-scale operations as soldiers and supplies were transported in small trucks or on foot. Ammunition supplies were very low: interim government forces immediately ran short after the UN imposed an arms embargo on May 17. The weakness of the army was demonstrated by the rapid advance of the RPA, a well lead but poorly equipped rebel military with a primitive logistics train.

The Presidential Guard are widely believed to have numbered about 1,500, although the official number was 700. They had been created shortly after the civil war began in 1990 and were trained and armed by the French government. Drawn almost exclusively from President Habyarimana’s home district, membership was based on loyalty to the president, his wife and the ideology for which they stood. The Presidential Guard played a key role in organizing, training and arming the interhamwe.\textsuperscript{441} But they did not show themselves to be an effective fighting force, despite receiving plane loads of small arms from France in 1994 and earlier.\textsuperscript{442}

When the genocide began there were about 1,700 “professional” interhamwe who had received training in camps outside Kigali, according to information given to the head of

\textsuperscript{440} Officially, the Rwandan Armed Forces had the following equipment: 28 reconnaissance vehicles, 16 armored personnel carriers, eight 81mm mortars, several 83mm rocket launchers, nine 105mm howitzers, six 57mm ATK guns, 16 helicopters (none armed), and six fixed wing aircraft. International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{The Military Balance, 1993/1994} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

\textsuperscript{441} African Rights, 1995, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{442} Examples are a January 22, 1994 shipment confiscated by UNAMIR in Kigali because arms shipments were in violation of the Arusha accord. France argued the shipment was part of an old contract and therefore technically legal. On April 9, 1994, after the genocide had begun, UNAMIR reported another planeload of arms arrived from France. The French government has categorically denied any shipment. \textit{Joint Evaluation, Study 2}, pp. 38-39. For an in depth look at French arms transfers to Rwanda, see Human Rights Watch, “Arming Rwanda: the Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War,” (Washington: Human Rights Watch, January 1994).
UNAMIR by a high-ranking member of the interhamwe. They were organized into teams to kill Tutsis in Kigali who had been registered by the militia.\textsuperscript{443} Thousands rapidly joined the militia once the killing began. They came largely from camps of displaced persons who had been forced to move by the RPA since 1990. "Normal" people also joined. Sometimes they were coerced with threats of death; sometimes they joined out of greed for the looting and rape that accompanied the killing; sometimes they believed the propaganda that if they did not kill the Tutsis, the Tutsis would kill them. Again, this category of killers was terrifyingly good at murder, but was not a military fighting force or a guerilla force of any kind. They fled when confronted by the RPA and acted innocent when confronted by UNAMIR or Operation Turquoise troops.

In sum, the parties responsible for perpetrating the genocide did not have meaningful military capability when measured by western standards. Like most developing countries, Rwanda had light infantry who were poorly trained, possessed small arms and a small number of indirect fire weapons, and lacked logistical support. It had no aerial combat capacity. The government forces were good at controlling (and killing) the population but had trouble holding their own against invasion by a neighbor, as RPA advances in 1990 and 1994 showed. They would have been no match whatsoever for a robust intervention force.

How likely would these politically strong but militarily weak parties have been to oppose foreign intervention? Their level of consent depended entirely on what they believed was the objective of the intervening force. The torture and murder of the Belgian peacekeeping troops

who were assigned to protect the Prime Minister is a stark indication that the perpetrators of genocide did not want UNAMIR around.\textsuperscript{444} One reason so little was known at the time (and to this day) about what was occurring was a concerted effort to hide the extent of the killing from the eyes of foreigners. Inducing the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from the UN mission was a key part of the strategy. As the Belgians left and others followed suit UNAMIR’s ability to see what was happening was drastically curtailed. In fact, they had no presence outside Kigali at all. UNAMIR was also eviscerated as a potential fighting force against the Hutu extremists. At that point, the remaining 400 UN troops were not the target of attacks.\textsuperscript{445}

Initially the interim Hutu government welcomed the news of a French intervention, believing their allies were intent on opposing the RPA. It turned out Operation Turquoise did not overtly support the extremists.\textsuperscript{446} Yet by the time it was evident the French were not there to rescue the interim government, consent or lack thereof by that government was largely irrelevant. Their defeat at the hands of the RPA was imminent and they continued to pursue the genocide. Between these two priorities, the extremists had no material means to oppose the French troops.

Troops from any country other than France would very likely have been opposed by the Hutu government. It is clear that opposition would not have translated into significant military engagements, given the weak nature of the military and paramilitary, their preoccupation with killing Tutsis, and the critical pressure applied to them by the RPA. Their strategy would likely

\textsuperscript{444} There had been a plan for some time to kill a number of Belgian troops in an attempt to have their government withdraw them, a la the United States in Somalia. Connaughton, pp. 8 and 10.

\textsuperscript{445} That is not to say life was easy or safe for the UN troops who remained. Communications capabilities had left with the civilians, food stocks were exhausted by mid-April, and there was no potable water. Troops were also taking casualties from sporadic gun fire around them. Connaughton, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{446} There is considerable controversy over whether or not the French forces helped their erstwhile allies. Just what Operation Turquoise did with regard to the Hutu government and fighters is discussed below.
have been similar to that employed against UNAMIR: carry out isolated attacks in an effort to kill a few soldiers and scare away the intervenor. The effectiveness of the strategy would have depended on the force protection capabilities of the intervening units and the political willingness to sustain casualties. (The casualty pain threshold of the United States in particular has been shown to be very low.)

The Rwandan Patriotic Army obviously was militarily superior to the forces just reviewed, since it won the civil war. Yet it too was no match for a robust intervention force. There is little information available on the rebel’s equipment, but it is safe to say that they had nothing more, and probably less, than the Rwandan military. In the course of the war they captured ammunition and equipment from retreating government forces. The rebels primarily used assault rifles and machine guns, with the addition of artillery and mortars around the capital. Although they advanced rapidly in the eastern portion of the country, the rebels had a primitive logistics capacity just like their adversaries, moving on foot and in a limited number of light trucks.\(^4^{47}\) The RPA had rear bases in Uganda through which they could supply themselves. They also greatly benefited from war material captured during their advance.

At the beginning of April 1994, the RPA had about 20-25,000 soldiers primarily drawn from the Tutsi diaspora but with some Hutu members as well. As the war progressed the rebels began to recruit massively and much less selectively. Several thousand were put under training in the last weeks of May when Kigali and more than half the countryside was still in Hutu

\(^4^{47}\) UN Force Commander General Dallaire reported that in the battle for Kigali rebels brought in supplies and evacuated casualties in small trucks and “on their backs.” He noted both the government and rebels forces were small and neither could sustain a big offensive. Annie Thomas, *AFP*, May 11, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-092, May 12, 1994, p. 1-2.)
The soldiers were led by a competent officer corps that had gained experience fighting in Uganda on behalf of President Museveni. They were commanded by General Paul Kagame who had received some instruction in the United States as part of a foreign officer training program but left the program early to join the RPA when the civil war commenced in 1990.

Although the RPA would not have been able to defeat a determined intervention force, they could have thwarted a number of different missions using guerilla tactics and conventional engagements. As with the interim government, the level of consent for a foreign intervention depended on the perceived objectives of the intervening force. When the genocide began the Rwandan Patriotic Front called for the UN to intervene to stop the killing, yet it was opposed to UN efforts to bring about a cease-fire in the civil war unless the genocide was stopped first. RPF interest in a UN military presence seems to have been genuine. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Rwanda in May 1998, he was publicly scolded and snubbed by top Rwandan government officials who held him personally responsible for not supporting UNAMIR Force Commander General Dallaire’s request to take an aggressive stand against the genocide.449

In mid-May 1994, when the Security Council debated increasing the UN military presence, the genocide was mostly completed and the RPA had the upper hand in the civil war. RPF leader General Paul Kagame stated, “We have no problem whatsoever with troops being

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448 Prunier, p. 270.
449 James C. McKinley, “U.N. Leader Gets Chilly Reception in Rwanda,” *New York Times* (May 8, 1998), electronic edition. Annan was the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in 1994 with direct political control over peacekeeping operations in the field. In response to General Dallaire’s request to interpret his mandate proactively to allow him to seize weapons caches, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations informed him that such action went beyond the mandate given to UNAMIR. Furthermore, it instructed the Force Commander to share his information with President Habyarimana. Boutros-Ghali, *The UN and Rwanda*, p. 32.
sent here under the aegis of the United Nations or any other entity if the intention is to provide humanitarian assistance. . . . On the other hand we don’t agree with what some call an intervention force. . . . such a force would in fact protect those who are responsible for the genocide.”

He was right.

Not surprisingly the RPF was opposed to Operation Turquoise. Rebel leaders publicly expressed their belief that the French were there to help the interim government and stated that they would be treated as a hostile presence. Had the French operation overtly assisted the interim government or tried to position itself between the two sides in the civil war, the RPA would very likely have attacked it.\footnote{An internal UNAMIR report said the RPA planned to confront any French advance by building up their supply of men and equipment in the northern town of Byumba, then conducting guerilla raids throughout the country. “UNAMIR Situation Report (Restricted/Internal),” June 28, 1994.} An example of their willingness to engage was a short but intense firefight on July 3 when a French reconnaissance column in Butare stumbled across an RPA unit at a blockade that had been erected by the interhamwe.\footnote{Connaughton, p. 22.}

To summarize the contextual variables in Rwanda, the causes of the genocide were political, military, and economic pressures on the regime of President Habyarimana that encouraged hardcore Hutu supremacists to seek a “final solution” to challenges to their power. The civil war which was launched by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1990 was a critical one of these causes and also became the single most important response to the genocide. The speed of the genocidal slaughter has never been matched in recorded history. Across the country large numbers of Hutu simultaneously massacred even larger numbers of Tutsis. The vast majority of the target population was killed in a span of three months. The perpetrators of the genocide

\footnote{FBIS-AFR . . .}
ranged from the political elite who conceived and directed it, down through the national security apparatus, to local police and a loose network of trained and untrained militia. The strict bureaucratic structure of the political system was used to bring together diverse categories of killers in specific locations at particular times, which made the slaughter very efficient. The degree of consent for these three military operations depended on their perceived objectives. The interim Hutu government opposed the RPA and UNAMIR but initially welcomed Turquoise. The RPF opposed UN efforts to stop the civil war but welcomed efforts to protect the population. It also initially opposed Turquoise, then grudgingly consented to the French presence.

**Goma**

The context of military intervention in Goma, Zaire was entirely different from Rwanda, with the sole exception that the terrain is equally difficult to cross on both sides of the border. This sub-section reviews the speed of the exodus, the cause of the outpouring, the composition of the refugee population, the extent of the extremist’s control over the population, and the level of consent for intervention by the government of Zaire and the refugee leaders.

In less than a week in mid-July an estimated one million Rwandans crashed into the North Kivu district of Zaire, and its largest town Goma, in a tidal wave of distressed humanity. The mass movement began the night of July 14 and continued until July 18 when the RPA arrived at the border and sealed it.\textsuperscript{453} At checkpoints along the border the number of people walking on the roads were counted in the thousands per hour. It was as if an entire city

\textsuperscript{453} *Joint Evaluation, Study 3*, p. 35.
population had picked up and moved *en masse*, but of course they could not bring a city infrastructure with them to support a large number of people in a small amount of space. Indeed, most of the refugees brought hardly anything at all as they were traveling on foot and had left their homes in great haste and confusion. In a strange reflection of the scale of the genocide, the refugee movement was unprecedented in its combination of size and speed.\textsuperscript{454} The crush of tired, hungry, dehydrated and scared people was too much for the under-prepared humanitarian organizations to handle.

Camps in the Goma area

![Map of camps in the Goma area](source: Redrawn from UNHCR map)

Source: *Joint Evaluation, Study 3*, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{454} There have been larger numbers of refugees but the movements took place over a longer period of time. The flight of approximately one million Kurds from northern Iraq in 1991 was similar to the Rwandan exodus in its speed.
Much of the reason there were more refugees than anticipated was the dual nature of the cause of the refugee flow. The exodus from Rwanda came at the end of the civil war (and thus the end of the genocide), when the Hutu government was forced to retreat rapidly. The RPA had finally defeated the interim government troops in Ruhengeri to the north and were about to take Kigali. With the south-western prefectures of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibuye under French control and off limits, the only the area open to the Hutu government was Habyarimana’s home prefecture of Gisenyi (on the Zairian border). Soon it too fell to the advancing RPA. As the interim Hutu government suffered its final collapse officials, members of the military, their closest supporters and all their families fled the country.

However, this accounts for only a small portion of the people who crossed the border. Estimates are that about 30,000 of the people in the Goma area were “genocidaires” — a mere three percent of the total initial population of one million. If we assume every person who participated in the genocide had ten family members who followed them, that still accounts for only thirty percent of the people who fled to Goma. Obviously more people than just the guilty and their families would have feared for their lives under the circumstances, but the majority of people who crossed into Zaire probably would not have done so of their own volition. They were herded across the border under duress by the politicians and soldiers who were responsible for the genocide. The extremists were highly successful at getting hundreds

455 Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 58.
456 UNHCR estimated that the number of ex-FAR soldiers, milia men, ex-government officials, other people who participated in the genocide and all their relatives who lived in the camps numbered between 200,000 and 300,000. Joel Boutroue, “Missed Opportunities: the role of the international community in the return of the Rwandan refugees from eastern Zaire, July 1994 - December 1996,” unpublished manuscript. (MIT, Center for International Studies, 1997), p. 5.
457 Boutroue, p. 4.
of thousands of people to leave their homes. They took advantage of a country with a culture of obedience to authority, which had just been ripped asunder by genocide and civil war, and where propaganda continued to be aired about the murderous intentions of all Tutsis (but not Hutus!).

It was a brilliant strategic move, if less than humane. The intention of the former Rwandan leaders was to remain temporarily in Zaire, gather strength and fight their way back to power.\textsuperscript{458} By taking a huge number of people with them, the extremists accomplished several objectives. The refugee crisis attracted extensive world-wide attention and an outpouring of emergency relief. The inability and unwillingness of outsiders to separate the genocidaires from the rest of the population allowed the defeated government and its supporters to live off international largess while they prepared to invade Rwanda. The exodus of such a large proportion of the population from the north-west portion of the country also undermined the new Tutsi government's attempts to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the Rwandan people. As one Hutu leaders said, the RPF might control the country but it will be an empty country.\textsuperscript{459} Finally, the refugee population provided a fertile recruiting ground for future guerilla fighters and provided the leadership with a captive audience whom they continued to imbue with their ideology of hatred. The refugee camps became a key element in a continuing cycle of conflict that eventually involved not only Rwanda and Zaire, but Burundi, Uganda, and even Angola and Congo-Brazzaville.

The grip of the Hutu leadership on the refugee population is a critical aspect of the overall refugee situation. It affected the delivery of humanitarian aid, the propensity of the refugees to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[458] Boutroue, p. 4.
\item[459] Source
\end{footnotes}
return to Rwanda, and the usefulness of the refugee camps for the leadership’s strategy of counter-attack. It also quickly became a bone of contention between UNHCR and other organizations, who called for forcible separation of the genocidaires, and members of the UN Security Council who refused to commit themselves to such an operation.

The extremists’ tight reign was disrupted by the cholera outbreak of July and August. During that time about 200,000 people returned to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{460} Before long, however, former bourgmestres and other local officials reasserted themselves with the assistance of militiamen and the former army (ex-FAR). A campaign of intimidation took place throughout the autumn, including killing, extortion and rape. The army, militia and civilians were thoroughly mixed. Though they had been deprived of their heavy armaments at the border, most soldiers and militiamen carried light arms with them. Those who were disarmed at the border by Zairian troops often quickly recovered or replaced them with the assistance of other Zairian soldiers.\textsuperscript{461}

The influence of the extremists was clear to aid workers on the ground within a few weeks.\textsuperscript{462} The ethical dilemma they faced by feeding legitimate civilians and genocidaires alike was only slightly eased by the fact that the ex-FAR established themselves and their families in a separate camp at Mugunga. They could still move in and out of the camps at will.\textsuperscript{463}

The level of violence was so great in November 1994 that 18 relief agencies collectively called on the UN Secretary-General to deploy a security force to the camps. The same month MSF-France and CARE withdrew from the Goma camps. Nevertheless, no concrete steps to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{460} Boutroue, p. 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{461} Joint Evaluation, Study 2, pp. 58-59.
  \item \textsuperscript{462} Boutroue, p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{463} Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 59.
\end{itemize}
address the violence were taken until March 1995 when a contingent of Zairian troops was deployed with UNHCR financing.464

This brings us to the degree of consent for military intervention on the part of the Zairian government and the refugee leaders.465 Mobutu Sese Seko had welcomed the opportunity to provide rear bases to Operation Turquoise. Since 1991 his country had been under severe restrictions on international assistance owing to his refusal to move forward with governmental reforms. By turning over control of the Goma and Bukavu airfields to French forces, Mobutu significantly enhanced his reputation with Belgium and the United States. Needless to say, his relationship with France improved too.466 However, the French were allowed to carry out only logistics missions on Zairian soil. Zaire also allowed non-combat -- and thus non-threatening -- operations by the Americans, Dutch, Israelis and Japanese. Furthermore, Mobutu seemed prepared to give his consent to a UN-commanded force assigned to the camps. During the drawn out discussions that led to UNHCR covering the expenses of a Zairian camp security force, a proposal by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to send a peacekeeping force to the camps drew no objection from Zaire.467 Whether or not he would have allowed a state-led combat force to operate within Zaire is open to speculation, but it was not entirely unlikely.

There is no question the political and military leaders among the refugees would have strenuously objected to the deployment of an international security force within the camps. After

464 *Joint Evaluation, Study* 3, p. 52.
465 Legally the refugee leaders had not right of refusal, of course, since they no longer governed a sovereign state. But in practical terms they had the potential to make life very hard for anyone they did not want to have around.
466 Prunier, p. 317-320.
467 *Joint Evaluation, Study* 2, p. 93, note 122.
all, the force would have been tasked with controlling them. The strength of the negative reaction would have depended on the mission of the intervening force. If the international force provided protection to aid workers, or carried out broader policing within the camps, or patrolled the border with Rwanda to prevent infiltration of guerillas, then they probably would not have met stiff resistance. On the other hand, if the intervention force attempted to single out and disarm the militia and ex-FAR it is quite likely a high level of violence would have ensued. Without their arms, the extremists would lose control over many of the refugees and would have little hope of mounting a counter-attack into Rwanda. They would also find it hard to resist segregation from the civilians who acted as a shield against capture and prosecution.

In summary, the refugees arrived in Zaire in an overwhelming and chaotic wave of people who were fleeing the RPA, prodded on by their genocidal leaders. They spread out over inhospitable terrain, where they were tended to by hundreds of NGOs. The Huu political and military leaders rapidly re-established control over the population and benefited from the humanitarian aid pouring into the camps. Zaire may have given its consent for military operations to create a secure environment, but the “genocidaires” would have made any security activity very hard.

**Speed of Onset and Intervention Response Times**

Timing was not everything, but it was critical. The genocide took place with a rapidity that is difficult to comprehend. It was at the time, and continues to be, one of the important

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468 The situation would have been extremely hazardous nevertheless. Remember, these were the people who conceived of removing all foreign eyes from the genocide by killing a handful of Belgian soldiers. They may well have tried hit and run attacks against a camp security force.
features of the Rwandan genocide that is little understood. Any attempt to stop the killing had to be nearly immediate. The refugee exodus to Zaire was just as impressive in its speed. It was well documented as it happened. Response times for security provision by great powers and the UN were as bad as they could get. The RPA, in contrast, responded immediately to events in Rwanda. Response times of humanitarian relief organizations in Zaire and even in Rwanda were surprisingly good. The failure of international actors to provide a security presence in a timely manner is one of the main stories to emerge from the Rwanda experience.

A brief review of Rwanda’s ten prefectures gives an idea of the unprecedented pace of the killing. The south-western portion of Rwanda consists of the prefectures of Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Kibuye. "Rwandese agree that the massacre of Tutsi in [Gikongoro] was carried out systematically and speedily, to an extent unmatched elsewhere except for Kibuye and Cyangugu." The prefect of Cyangugu sealed the border with Zaire on April 7. Large-scale massacres took place within a week. At the Parish of Nyamasheke, for example, at least 5,000 people were killed between April 15 and 17. In Kibuye initial attacks occurred on April 7. The prefect then took two weeks, under the guise of providing protection, to patiently herd frightened Tutsis into the prefectural capital’s main church, its stadium and hospital. There followed "the most intensive killing campaign in all of Rwanda." The RPF, citing the president of the interim Hutu government, said the genocide was essentially complete in these three prefectures by mid-May.

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472 (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura [the rebel radio station], May 18, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-097, May 19, 1994, p. 1.)
In the prefecture of Kigali, which extends from the capital all the way down to the border with Burundi, the population also began to experience the genocide on April 7. Hutu and Tutsi alike erected and successfully defended barriers against local militiamen for a week in the town of Natarama and elsewhere. But by April 15 well-armed soldiers arrived to break the resistance. By the end of the month most of the killing was done.\textsuperscript{473} In neighboring Kibungo prefecture to the east, on the border with Tanzania, the killings started at once. "On the morning of 7 April, interhamwe were systematically murdering Tutsis, and within days there were massacres." The killing continued until the RPF arrived, which was April 22 in Kibungo town.\textsuperscript{474}

Byumba prefecture in the north-eastern corner of Rwanda suffered early massacres as well. On April 6 the military began marking the houses of Tutsis, who were told to stay home under a curfew. Three days later the killing began but it was cut short by the RPA who overran most of the prefecture in a matter of days, driving the national army and interhamwe before them.\textsuperscript{475}

In the north-west are the prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Just as in most other places, the massacres began the morning after Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. Again the largest massacres took place in the month of April, though militiamen continued their gruesome work for several months. Because these two prefectures had been the heartland of Hutu extremism for years (Habyarimana came from Gisenyi), there were few Tutsis still living there. So although the north-west was the last place controlled by the RPA, comparatively few people

\textsuperscript{473} African Rights, 1995, pp. 262-264.
\textsuperscript{474} African Rights, 1995, pp. 368 and 378.
died in the area.\textsuperscript{476}

In the central prefecture of Gitarama and in Butare to its south, the genocide did not commence in earnest until mid-April, nearly two weeks later than everywhere else. Gitarama was the stronghold of political opposition to the governing MRND and extremists had not previously penetrated the area. Yet, by April 12 the RPA had forced the interim Hutu government to flee Kigali and set up its temporary seat in the town of Gitarama. Massacres became widespread in the following days.\textsuperscript{477} The worst killing did not happen in Gitarama until the end of May, when the RPA was quickly approaching and soldiers and militia men went into a frenzy before fleeing.\textsuperscript{478}

Butare had the only Tutsi prefect in all Rwanda. He did everything in his power to welcome refugees from other prefects and prevent massacres. Sub-prefects, bourgmestre s and councillors were cowed by his authority and forced to follow his policies. Between April 7 and 19 individual Tutsis were killed and their property vandalized, but things remained relatively calm. On April 18 the prefect was removed from office and subsequently killed. His replacement was a hard-line military officer from Gisenyi, who brought in troops from Kigali and Gitarama (where the interim government was by then encamped). “Meanwhile, the junior officials whom the refugees had come to trust turned on them with extraordinary ferocity. Starting on the day of the prefect’s dismissal, the prefecture of Butare suffered some of the biggest massacres that Rwanda experienced after 6 April.”\textsuperscript{479}

\textsuperscript{476} African Rights, 1995, pp. 543-548.
\textsuperscript{477} African Rights, 1995, pp. 360-363.
\textsuperscript{478} African Rights, 1995, p. 714.
\textsuperscript{479} African Rights, 1995, pp. 336-337.
Given the speed with which the genocide progressed, any attempt to stop it had to be very rapid indeed. The only two countries capable of a large-scale, rapid response were the United States and France -- the U.S. because of its massive strategic lift capacity and France because it maintains a presence in Africa. A United Nations force would have depended on American participation. The point is moot since an early attempt by world powers to prevent or stop the slaughter was never in the cards.

The first failure to respond came in the early months of 1994 when there were clear indications that government-sanctioned large-scale killing of Tutsis was planned. Many people knew that organized extremist forces existed. A pattern of violence was discernable and the state apparatus was clearly implicated in the distribution of arms to the para-military and extremist propaganda. (Radio Rwanda, one of two stations that spouted incitements to kill Tutsis, was state owned.) The issue never got high-level attention and no preventive action was taken, despite information such as the following.

In January 1994 the CIA did an analysis at the country desk level that included future worst case scenarios resulting in the death of half a million people.480 Throughout 1994 the Belgian government was receiving intelligence from the 1st paratroop battalion serving with UNAMIR. The unit reported directly to the Belgian military headquarters outside Brussels on arms caches and plans by leaders of the MRND and interhamwe to isolate and harass the Belgian UN contingent. Arms shipment regularly arrived in the country. Hutu supremacist rhetoric

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480 Joint Evaluation, Study 2, pp. 66-71. This study provides an in depth analysis of what early warning indicators were available and why they did not catch the attention of high-level policy makers who had the authority to respond. They locate “problems of receiving clear and unequivocal signals . . . [in] contradictions in the international system; the UN structure; attitudes of senior officials towards messengers and inadequacies in the messages sent; and interference.”
became increasingly vocal and public.\(^{481}\)

The United Nations had direct evidence of imminent trouble. On January 11, UN Force Commander General Romeo Dallaire sent a cable to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The cable notified the Under-Secretary-General of shocking information secretly provided by a high ranking official involved in training the interhamwe.

The Rwandese government informant had revealed the extremists' plan to assassinate politicians at the scheduled ceremony for swearing in the transitional government [part of the Arusha peace process]. In the process, they would provoke an encounter with Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, expecting that by killing some, the entire UN contingent would leave Rwanda. As the RPF would be instigated to resume war, 1,700 interhamwe who had been training in camps outside Kigali were staged to sew insecurity throughout the city; teams of 40 each were organized within Kigali to kill all the Tutsi who had been registered by the militia. The informer estimated his units could kill 1,000 persons per 20 minutes.\(^{482}\)

The Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not approve General Dallaire's request to take action and he did not pass the incriminating evidence on to the Security Council or the Secretary-General.

Because the warning signals never progressed far beyond the points of contact in the UN and national executive branches, nearly everyone was taken by surprise when all hell broke loose following Habyarimana's death. The reaction was to withdraw rather than engage. The April 21 Security Council decision to reduce UNAMIR's size was practically a foregone conclusion after Belgium decided to quit the operation.\(^{483}\) UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had a sudden

\(^{481}\) Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 38.

\(^{482}\) Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 37.

\(^{483}\) A U.S. State Department official noted, "You can't overestimate the impact on our policy process of the Belgians leaving. People were saying, 'How can we get in, if it is so bad the Belgians have to leave?"' Quoted in Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocide," p. 46.
change of heart soon after the resolution was passed and worked hard to beef up the UN military presence -- to no avail. His failure was due to obstructionism by member states and to excruciatingly slow UN bureaucratic procedures.

The Belgian public and government were in no mood to place more troops in Rwanda, having just lost 10 soldiers. To the contrary, when Brussels announced it was pulling out of UNAMIR, it argued strongly in the UN Security Council to have other countries remove their contingents as well. The action was widely seen as an effort to legitimize their own withdrawal.\textsuperscript{484} On April 10, 250 Belgian troops arrived in Kigali to evacuate all Belgian nationals, civilian and military.

Exactly what was going on in the Belgian government is uncertain. Gerard Prunier relates two divergent impulses. Foreign Minister Willy Claes asked the United Nations to modify UNAMIR’s mandate to allow soldiers to stop the slaughter. There were nascent plans to have the arriving Belgian paratroopers join the Belgian UN unit already in the country. Yet after the troops repatriated the chief of staff told the Foreign Minister that the army would never again participate in a peacekeeping mission under UN command.\textsuperscript{485} The Joint Evaluation says Claes “panicked a bit” and called Washington, London and Paris to plead for withdrawal, invoking NATO solidarity.\textsuperscript{486} Whatever the details were, Belgium pulled out and was supported by other major powers.

As with most UN Chapter VII operations, little could happen without the United States. But the U.S. had no interest in getting involved in Rwanda for several reasons. It was occupied

\textsuperscript{484} Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{485} Prunier, pp. 234 and 274.
\textsuperscript{486} Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 90, fn. 78.
at the time with events in Bosnia and to a lesser extent in northern Iraq and Haiti. Rwanda is far away, in a strategically meaningless part of the world. There were no foreign television correspondents in Rwanda to beam images of the slaughter into peoples’ homes. There is no Rwandan political constituency in the United States to lobby the government for action. And the country fell apart a mere five months after the firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia that killed 18 U.S. soldiers and created a political headache for the Clinton administration. As the genocide proceeded, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 that established strict criteria for American involvement in peacekeeping operations. Rwanda did not meet any of the criteria. According to the executive branch of the U.S. government had a policy of not admitting a genocide was underway. To do so would have obliged the U.S. to act under the 1949 Genocide Convention. Instead the State Department and the National Security Council agreed to use the phrase “acts of genocide may have occurred.”

Ironically, when those responsible for the genocide fled to Zaire, the U.S. and many other countries responded quickly. The situation was easy to paint as a human tragedy with only victims and no armed threat, even though American Secretary of State Warren Christopher had admitted by that time that a genocide had occurred. More importantly, the refugees garnered huge media attention which contributed to political pressure to “do something.”

489 The Secretary finally invoked the term in mid-June in response to a rash of criticism in the Congress and press. Burkhalter, p. 47.
490 By the end of July there were an estimated 500 journalists and media technicians in Goma. Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 37. Contrast that with only two foreign reporters on April 6 and a maximum of 15 in Kigali during the genocide. Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 46.
France was the only state to act against the genocide, but it initially had no interest in opposing the Hutu government. Its close political ties with the Habyarimana regime continued after the president’s death. Soon after April 6, the French government evacuated Madam Habyarimana and 15 members of her family to France.491 Two top officials directly involved in the genocide arrived in Paris April 27 (after it was becoming readily apparent what was happening). They were quietly but officially received by President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.492 In addition to personal ties there were organizational ties to the Rwandan government. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation in particular had invested their interests and resources in the country. Within the Ministry of Cooperation there were frantic behind the scenes attempts to “save our allies” by supplying arms to the Rwandan army via Goma even into June.493 Eventually public outcry, political considerations, and organizational interests converged to change French behavior. Operation Turquoise was launched June 22 for a period of two months. The reasons for the change of heart are discussed below.

The one intervening party that did react quickly was the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They restarted their military operations the night of April 8, two days after Habyarimana was shot down.494 RPA units were on the outskirts of Kigali by April 11 and had swept through northeastern Rwanda by April 22.495 In a little over three months they controlled all but the Turquoise

492 Prunier, p. 277.
493 Prunier, p. 278. He cites an interview with a former secret service official serving in the office of the Minister of Cooperation.
495 Prunier, p. 268.
zone and declared a new government in Kigali. It was an amazingly rapid military victory, but it was too slow to prevent the still more rapid genocide.

The RPA perspective was entirely different from that of international actors and gave them strong incentive to engage the army and militia immediately. In the first place, six hundred of the best RPA troops were stationed in Kigali in April as part of the Arusha process. One of the rebel priorities was to link up with this unit to prevent it from being overwhelmed. Second, the RPF -- a largely Tutsi organization -- knew it was Tutsis who were the target of the slaughter. Many people in the Front had family members who still lived in Rwanda, whom they wanted to protect. Third, unlike foreigners, the RPF could not simply run to the safety of a far away home. The purpose of the Front was to return to Rwanda, not to lead a permanent diaspora.

In the humanitarian sphere, international actors responded much more quickly. The UN Rwanda Emergency Office was established in Nairobi, Kenya on April 21. Inside Rwanda a UN Advanced Humanitarian Team was operational in Kigali starting April 22. Together they played a critical role in assessing emergency relief needs and coordinating early responses by a multitude of aid organizations. A variety of aid organizations began working behind RPA lines before the civil war and genocide were over. In Zaire and other refugee receiving countries rapid assistance operations saved the lives of thousands of people by establishing camps and providing the bare necessities of life within days of the refugees arrival. In every case, however, the delivery of humanitarian assistance was limited, sometimes severely, by the high level of insecurity.

To summarize, there was no chance of a rapid international military response to the genocide. Belgium was more interested in getting out than getting in; France was initially most interested in quietly supporting its allies; the United States was not interested in sending soldiers to Africa; and the United Nations could do nothing without the support of these three countries. The RPF reacted very quickly, as one would expect. Humanitarian organizations also responded quickly and were eventually joined by national militaries in Goma.

**Death and Military Responses**

This section addresses the same two questions as the previous empirical chapters. How many people died in 1994 and what killed them? How many people were saved from death and how were they saved? It takes events in Rwanda and Goma in turn. The bottom line is that hundreds of thousands of people were killed by violence in Rwanda and tens of thousands of people died of disease in Zaire. Military action saved the lives of a large number of people in Rwanda and made a contribution to saving lives in the refugee camps.

**How many people died in 1994 and what killed them?**

From April 6 through mid-July 1994 approximately 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis lost their lives. They were killed simply because they were Tutsis. In addition, between 10,000 and 30,000 Hutus lost their lives because they were politically moderate or dared to help Tutsis.497

There is some debate about how many people were killed. Many major news outlets refer

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to "more than 500,000." The most detailed account of the genocide, put out by African Rights, does not offer a number. The source generally recognized as the most authoritative and comprehensive study of the Rwandan crisis and its aftermath, the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, noncommittally says the number is "an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people." The United Nations issued a report in October 1994 that gave a range between 500,000 and one million. An updated report a month later put the number at 500,000, which then became accepted wisdom, though it is probably low. The Rwandan government claims the number killed was over one million.

The estimate of "between 800,000 and 850,000" comes from Gerard Prunier in The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. He begins his calculations with the last census, taken in 1991, and extrapolates an April 1994 population of 7.776 million, given an annual growth rate of 3.2 percent. He then estimates 12 percent of the population were Tutsis, which yields about 933,000 Tutsis living in Rwanda in early 1994. We know that the best estimate of Tutsis surviving in camps in Rwanda and Burundi was 105,000. Add to that a guesstimate of 25,000 who survived by hiding in the bush and you get about 130,000 Tutsi survivors, which means 800,000 were killed. Prunier does not claim certainty: "This figure should not be taken as a

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498 For example, the New York Times typically says "more than 500,000" were killed, and sometimes says that "as many as 800,000."

499 They point out it is hard to count people when they are killed in large massacres, "at roadblocks, hunted down in their houses, or murdered in the fields, swamps and hills." African Rights, p. 572.


501 A commission set up by the Rwandan Ministry of Education reported that the number of people killed in the genocide was 1,364,000. The commission arrived at this number by conducting a commune by commune survey. It is the first time a number has been based on more than broad estimates and percentages. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa, "IRIN Update No. 419 for Central and Eastern Africa (Tuesday 19 May 1998)." Electronic posting, May 19, 1998.
factual body-count but as the least bad possible in late 1994.\textsuperscript{502} In my view it remains a well reasoned estimate, though the actual number of people killed may be higher.

In most humanitarian crises the majority of deaths are caused by disease. People drink water contaminated with fecal matter or other pollutants and are especially susceptible because their immune systems have been weakened by malnutrition, exposure and stress. Not so in Rwanda. The vast majority of people who died were killed outright through direct violence.\textsuperscript{503} The largest massacres happened at stadiums, hotels, hospitals, and most frequently in churches to which people fled when militiamen and neighbors began to attack them in their homes. Once concentrated, they were slaughtered by the thousands by the Presidential Guard and the regular army who used assault rifles and hand grenades to brake any resistance and begin the carnage. People left alive after the initial onslaught were methodically killed by militiamen and “normal” Hutus using machetes, hoes and studded clubs.\textsuperscript{504}

It is by now well known, but deserves to be said again: people were not dying because they were caught in a civil war. They were being killed in a pre-planned, rapidly executed genocide. The simple fact bears repeating because of confusion at the time and because extremists continue to this day to insist that there was no genocide but mutual aggression between Hutu and Tutsi. At the time, most outside observers were uncertain what was happening and did not become aware of the extent of the massacres for a number of weeks. This

\begin{footnotes}
\item[502] Prunier, pp. 263-265.
\item[503] It is true that concentrations of displaced people within the country suffered the ravages of untreated dysentery and possibly cholera. Yet little mention is made of starvation or disease in the accounts of those few who survived.
\end{footnotes}
was due in part to deliberate deception in which communications lines were cut, roadblocks prevented movement, killings were toned down in the presence of foreigners, and the interim Hutu government waged a deliberate campaign of disinformation.\textsuperscript{505} It was also due to poor international intelligence assets and little media coverage in an unimportant country.

Incredible as it may seem, the disinformation campaign and denial of genocide is alive (if not entirely well) today. In April 1998, genocide suspect Georges Ruggiu, an Italo-Belgian journalist accused of inciting genocide over the extremist Mille Collines radio station, gave an interview when he who was being held at the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda's detention facilities in Tanzania. He said the 1994 massacres were a "collective madness" that was not planned but "that took hold of people."\textsuperscript{506}

The major international response was not to the genocide, but to the refugee surge into Zaire that followed it. The refugees received far more international press coverage than the genocide. The effect has been for the refugee crisis to be equated with the genocide in its tragedy and severity. This is a grotesque distortion. The first distinction is a moral one: one event was the calculated killing of civilians while the other was the flight of the killers, their supporters, and others under their control. The second distinction is one of numbers. A great number of people fled Rwanda in horrid conditions, but the number who died as a result is more than an order of magnitude lower than the number killed in the genocide.

During the genocide about 30,000 Tutsis fled to Burundi; as the RPF advanced about

\textsuperscript{505} African Rights, chapter 6, "Killing the Truth: concealing the crime and sowing confusion," pp. 235-257.  
500,000 Hutus fled to Tanzania. By far the largest exodus was of about a million Hutus who burst into eastern Zaire in a period of a few days in mid-July when the RPF defeated the Hutu government. The fleeing Hutu extremists encouraged and forced much of the population in the north-west to flee with them. It is this last group of refugees that has received the most attention. I also focus on them, since it is in Goma that foreign militaries contributed to the emergency response.

About 50,000 people died in and round Goma during the first month of the refugee influx. Over 90 percent of the people succumbed to disease, not violence. Most died from cholera which swept through the population with incredible speed almost as soon as the refugees arrived, then subsided after four weeks. In one epidemiological survey covering the period from July 14 (when the mass influx began) to August 4, the average crude mortality rate in Katale camp was 41.3 per 10,000 per day. Assuming a refugee population of 800,000 in the

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508 Goma Epidemiology Group, "Public health impact of Rwandan refugee crisis: what happened in Goma, Zaire, in July, 1994?" The Lancet, Vol. 345 (February 11, 1995), p. 339. Published accounts of epidemiological surveys are the best information available on refugee mortality but admittedly suffer from measurement errors. As experts from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control have written, "among the many problems in estimating mortality under emergency conditions are recall bias in surveys, families' failure to report early infant death, inaccurate population estimates, and lack of standard reporting procedures. In general, however, bias tends to underestimate mortality rates, since deaths are usually under reported and population size is often exaggerated." Michael J. Toole and Ronald J. Waldman, "Prevention of Excess Mortality in Refugee and Displaced Populations in Developing Countries," Journal of the American Medical Association Vol. 263, No. 24 (June 27, 1990), p. 3297.
509 A rough estimate of the number of people killed by violence in the refugee camps during the first month after the influx is 4,200. This is based on a retrospective survey conducted in Mugunga camp which found eight percent of deaths were attributed to "traumatic injury." Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 52.
Goma area (there were more people to the south, along Lake Kivu and around Bukavu). The average crude mortality rate across all camps in the Goma region, from July 14 to August 14 was 19.5 per 10,000 per day. (The baseline crude mortality rate in Rwanda before April was about 0.6 per 10,000 per day.) Ninety percent of deaths during this first month were caused by cholera, dysentery or other diarrheal diseases. Less prevalent causes of death were malaria, measles, meningitis, acute respiratory disease, dehydration, and "exhaustion." Malnutrition was an associated cause in many cases, but not the primary cause of death. By August 15 the crude mortality rate in the Goma refugee population as a whole was down to about 5 per 10,000 per day, or 375 deaths per day in a total population estimated at 750,000 (the original population of 800,000 minus 50,000 dead). The mortality rate continued to drop from there, though at a slower pace. By August 22 the rate was 2 per 10,000 per day, and a week later it was 1 per 10,000 per day. By mid-September the crude mortality rate was below 1 per 10,000 per day.

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512 Estimates of refugee populations are always subject to doubt. I use the number 800,000 for several reasons. Initial UNHCR reports claimed as many as 1.2 million refugees crossed into Goma, Zaire in July. However, there is a general tendency to over estimate the size of a refugee population both by the refugee leaders, who want as much assistance as they can get, and by the organizations serving them, who want to make sure they have enough material available. The most authoritative single source on the Rwanda crisis reports the 1.2 million figure was revised downward in August 1994 to 850,000, based on aerial photography by American and French military airplanes. At the end of September, 1994 there was a further downward revision to 740,000. Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 106. If there were about 740,000 refugees at the end of September, there were about 800,000 in mid-July, assuming data on the number of dead is in the ballpark. Furthermore, the forced dispersal of the refugee camps by Zairian rebels and Rwandan army troops in October and November 1996 indicated a population of about 750,000 around Goma (with 200,000 to 300,000 more in the Bukavu region on the south end of Lake Kivu). The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance reported that as of November 19, 1996 about 600,000 Rwandans had returned home and 150,000 were unaccounted for around Goma. "Great Lakes Complex Emergency Situation Report #2, Fiscal Year 1997, (November 19, 1996)." The U.S. Committee for Refugees, which has provided statistical information on refugee crises since 1958, estimated in April 1996 that the total number of Rwandans in Zaire (from Goma to Bukavu) was approximately 900,000. U.S. Committee for Refugees, "How many refugees are in eastern Zaire? Why estimates vary widely," press release, (November 26, 1996), electronically posted by the African Policy Information Center.

513 Goma Epidemiological Group, p. 340 and Table 1, p. 340.


515 Les Roberts and Michael J. Toole, figure, p. 1431.
these numbers, a rough estimate of the total number of refugees who died in the Goma area in 1994 is 60,000. This is a tragic number but one that is only seven and a half percent of the number who were kill in Rwanda!

**How many people were saved from death and how were they saved?**

Estimating the number of people who would have died but did not is a hard thing to do. Fortunately, there is enough information available to make approximations adequate to shed light on the central questions at hand, namely, whether and how military intervention saved lives. In the case of Rwanda, there is reason to believe more than 100,000 people were saved from the genocide by the combined efforts of the RPA, UNAMIR, and Operation Turquoise. In the refugee camps around Goma, tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands were saved, depending on the scenario one spins out. Most refugees were saved through the efforts of humanitarian organizations, not military ones, though military assets played important roles during the early response period.

Given the thoroughness with which the genocide was carried out, the willingness of the participants to continue their “work” even within the French occupation zone, and the unending murder of genocide survivors by clandestine bands of militiamen through 1998, it is safe to say that had nothing been done, virtually every Tutsi in the country eventually would have been killed or died where they hid. Therefore, every Tutsi left alive inside Rwanda should be counted as saved as a direct result of military intervention.

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516 60,000 is the sum of 50,000 from July 14 to August 14, plus 1,000 the third week of August (CMR of 2), plus 500 the last week of August (CMR of 1), plus 8,500 from the beginning of September through the end of December (CMR between 0.9 and 0.6).
If we take Prunier’s numbers, then there were about 100,000 Rwandan Tutsis left alive in
the country on July 14. The number might be a little low. When counting up the number of
survivors, Prunier looks at internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Rwanda and estimates the
number of people hiding in forests, houses, and so on. There is room to quibble with the
numbers he attaches to these locations.\footnote{For example, Prunier lists the Nayarushishi camp in the far south-western corner of the country as
holding 10,000 people when the French arrived. African Rights, which is highly critical of Operation Turquoise,
reports 11,000 to 12,000 in the same camp. Prunier, p. 254. African Rights, p. 1147.}
He also neglects another possibility. We know that the
RPA grew in strength as it advanced through the country. Many new recruits came from outside
the Rwanda, but undoubtedly male Tutsis within Rwanda also joined. They would not shown up
in camp statistics. This reasoning does not tell us how many people escaped, but it does tell us
that Prunier undercounted survivors.\footnote{If Prunier undercounted survivors, one of two possibilities exists for his estimate of the number of
people killed. If we accept his population figure and his estimate of the proportion that was Tutsi, then fewer people
were killed than he suggests. Alternatively, if we take 14 percent of the population as Tutsi rather than 12 percent,
(a difference of 155,000 people) the number of survivors can be significantly undercounted and the number killed
would still be higher than he suggests. A number of sources say Tutsis accounted for 14 percent of the population
prior to the genocide.} A reasonable, though admittedly rough, estimate of the
number of people saved by all interventions in Rwanda is between 98,000 and 110,000.

The break out in Table 4-1 indicates the comparative impact of each military intervention
on the genocide.\footnote{Numbers are drawn from Prunier, pp. 264, 297 fn. 37 and African Rights, p. 1147.} The Rwandan Patriotic Front saved by far the most lives by gaining control
of the north and east of the country and the outskirts of Kigali. The UN mission gets credit for
all the Tutsis left alive in Kigali town, which may be generous since the RPA soon put pressure
on the military units who carried out much of the slaughter in the capital. The French saved
fewer lives than the UN by controlling the south-west from late June. The American operation
began after the genocide ended so it did not save anyone from violence.
Table 4-1: Comparison of Lives Saved in Rwanda by Four Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Byumba camp</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>65,000 - 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East camp</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rilima camp</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hiding</td>
<td>20,000 - 25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Kigali town</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Nayarushishi camp</td>
<td>10,000 - 12,000</td>
<td>13,000 - 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hiding</td>
<td>3,000 - 8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>98,000 - 110,000</td>
<td>98,000 - 110,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the refugee population around Goma, the number of people saved by outside assistance is much more complicated and open to conjecture. As terrible and chaotic as the situation was after the influx, the public health situation rapidly improved and stabilized after the first month. Such dramatic changes are not the norm in refugee crises and would not have occurred without a massive emergency relief response.\(^{520}\)

Refugees who are wholly dependent on aid need a minimum of 1,900 calories per day per person to prevent malnutrition and increased susceptibility to disease, according to accepted standards. Each person also should have 20 liters of clean water per day for drinking, cooking and washing.\(^{521}\) These together with basic sanitation and immunization prevent most

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\(^{521}\) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, *Famine-Affected, Refugee, and Displaced Populations: Recommendations for Public Health Issues*. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, Recommendations and Reports, Vol. 41, No. RR-13 (July 24, 1992), pp. 10, 44, 58. These amounts of food and water can be significantly reduced in emergencies. In the Goma region, for example, the UNHCR immediate target was to provide 5 liters/person/day. That goal was reached August 10. John Barton, et al., *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Study 3, Humanitarian Aid and Effects* (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 70.
communicable diseases, which are the primary causes of death among displaced persons.\(^{522}\) The Goma area was not able to provide anywhere near adequate supplies of food, clean water, sanitation facilities, or immunization capacity. Any place in the world would have trouble coping with an influx of close to a million exhausted people, but several features made the Goma region particularly harsh. The ground is volcanic rock, making it nearly impossible to bury corpses or dig pit latrines. Lake Kivu, the primary source of water, has a very slow rate of flow, so it is easily polluted. Furthermore, it was inaccessible to most of the population simply because there were so many people. The native population is relatively sparse, so there is little infrastructure, virtually no excess shelter, and almost no excess cultivation.

Without rapid, massive international assistance some combination of three things would have happened. First, tens of thousands of people would have died on the spot from cholera, dysentery, dehydration, and exhaustion. As we know, a large number of people did die, despite the international response, but the mortality rate would have been at least 20 to 50 percent worse in the first month.\(^{523}\) Second, tens of thousands more would have continued further into Zaire in search of food, water and shelter. Many of them would have died in the jungle, as evidenced by

\(^{522}\) *Famine-Affected, Refugee, and Displaced Populations*, pp. 8 and 17.

\(^{523}\) An indication of the impact of emergency assistance can be seen in the results of direct medical attention to patients with diarrhoeal disease during the first month of the crisis. Between July 21 and August 13, clinics reported just over 64,000 cases of diarrhoeal disease. The case fatality rate (CFR) in the clinics dropped rapidly from 22% at the start to 4% six days later. Among the many people who never made it to a clinic, the case fatality rate was estimated to be between 25% and 50% (i.e. between one quarter and one half the people who exhibited symptoms of diarrhoeal disease died from it). If we chart the difference between the case fatality rate in the clinics and out of the clinics, we can estimate how many clinic patients would have died without the care they received. Depending on whether the untreated CFR was 25% or 50%, direct medical attention for diarrhoeal disease saved the lives of between 10,500 and 26,500 people in the first month. (Compare to the 50,000 estimated to have died.) My numbers are extrapolated from Goma Epidemiology Group, p. 341 and Figure 3. They are consistent with a Centers for Disease Control report from August 14 that covered the period July 21 to August 9. CDC report cited in *Joint Evaluation, Study 3*, p73.
the movement of people at the end of 1996. Third, those who were strong enough and able to break free from the grip of the extremist leadership would have returned to Rwanda. Most of these people would have survived.

UN humanitarian agencies and international NGOs would have responded regardless of whether or not national military units did. The questions of import here are: how quickly would they have been able to respond without military support? And what critical capacities would they have lacked? The two largest military operations were the French Operation Turquoise and American Operation Support Hope. Israeli, Dutch and Japanese contingents also played a role in Goma and a rejuvenated UNAMIR operated in Rwanda. In answer to the first question, it seems the presence of military forces had a noticeable but small effect on the timing of the international humanitarian response. The major UN agencies -- UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF -- were on the ground and operational in Goma before all military contingents except the French (who had arrived three weeks before the refugee crisis to address problems inside Rwanda). Major NGOs were also present independently of military assistance.

Since none of the military contingents was there for the purpose of providing security to either the refugees or the aid operations in Zaire, the only other way they could speed up the humanitarian response was with the direct provision of assistance. This was done to some extent by the French, who helped run the Goma airport, and the Americans, who provided airlift resources to the UNHCR Air Operation Cell which was responsible for coordinating and running

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524 The first and largest national military presence in Goma was Operation Turquoise, present from June 22 to August 22. A small Israeli medical contingent was present from July 22 to September 5. U.S. Operation Support Hope was in the region from July 24 until the last day of August. A Dutch contingent was present in Goma from August 1 until the first week of October, at which point a Japanese contingent showed up and stayed until the second half of December. Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 53.
the airlift operation from Entebbe to Goma, Bukavu and Kigali.

Military forces supplied some critical capacities early on in the areas of water purification, sanitation and medical response to diseases. One of the most touted U.S. military contributions was the use of two Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units beginning on July 26. They helped, but were the wrong tool for the job. They produced high quality water (of the sort American soldiers expect) in small quantities. What was needed was pathogen-free water in massive quantities.\textsuperscript{525} Much more useful was a large capacity pump supplied and operated by the Portable Water Supply System Company, located in California. It could pump 3.5 million liters per day out of Lake Kivu, straight into tanker trucks which were then injected with chlorine before driving out to the camps. The U.S. Air Force played a role by flying the company non-stop from San Francisco to Goma. The need then shifted to tanker trucks. It took a month before the 60 trucks needed were operational, with 15 supplied by the U.S. military and 4 by the Dutch military.\textsuperscript{526}

Military assistance also played a role in the sanitation sector, though again not to the extent it might have. The French greatly increased the body collection and burial capacity early on by using a bulldozer and trucks, but they abruptly withdrew from this task. Because of the volcanic rock underfoot, there was a great need for heavy equipment to build access roads, improve camp layout to alleviate overcrowding, dig latrines, and dig mass graves. There were very few large pieces of machinery available for hire locally, so they had to be brought in. The U.S. military maintained an adequate supply of equipment in Europe, but due to low priority

\textsuperscript{525} Together the ROWPUUs had a capacity of 57,600 liters per day. UNHCR’s minimum target of 5 liters/person/day in a population of 800,000 required 4 million liters per day.

\textsuperscript{526} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, pp. 70-71.
ranking the request was not acted on for some time. Eventually the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provided a grant to a British NGO to supply and operate the necessary equipment. An adequate supply of heavy equipment did not arrive for two months, by which time the worse of the crisis was over.\footnote{Joint Evaluation, Study 3, pp. 58 and 72-73.}

Another critical capacity provided by military forces was technical assistance in responding to cholera and dysentery. This was probably the functional sector where the most value was added. A company called BioForce maintained a medical lab in Goma to support Operation Turquoise. Together with laboratories in the U.S. and Germany, BioForce identified the particular strains of cholera and dysentery that attacked the refugees. The U.S. Air Force played an important role by delivering samples to the U.S. and Germany and also by transporting daily epidemiological reports from clinics to a rear base where they were compiled, copied, and sent back to the field within 48 hours. These two types of information were critical to combating the major killers in the camps. The strain of dysentery identified was resistant to the two common antibiotics used to combat the disease in the developing world. A third drug is much more expensive. The U.S. Army provided a large supply of this third antibiotic which was nearing its expiration date. As a result of the first-rate field medical lab and the availability of the expensive antibiotic, the population around Goma fared much better in the dysentery epidemic than those in camps in Tanzania and Rwanda.\footnote{Joint Evaluation, Study 3, pp. 58, 73, and 79-80.} The Israeli military also helped with the disease response by providing personnel and supplies to a Goma hospital.\footnote{Cite}

In sum, military units helped with the emergency response to the refugee crisis in Goma.
to some degree, primarily by providing technical assistance and airlift capacity. It is impossible to determine how many lives were saved by these efforts, but it is safe to say they did some good. However, the use of military assets raises a number of operational questions with regard to their effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, predictable availability, and ability to collaborate with non-military relief organizations.

The review of how many people died from particular causes and how many people were saved by particular responses reveals two primary points on the use of military assets in Rwanda and Zaire. First, the vast majority of deaths were caused by direct violence. The most effective response was by the RPA which had a political agenda rather than a humanitarian one. Outside states, individually and through the UN, failed to effectively counter the genocide. A partial reason for the failure was the lack of understanding about what was going on: for a time many believed that the main problem was civil war rather than genocide. A more significant reason was lack of “political will” once governments realized a genocide was underway.

Second, military assistance to refugees and displaced persons was a small part of the overall emergency relief effort. Military assets had a beneficial effect early on in Goma and to a much lesser extent inside Rwanda, before aid organizations were fully up and running. However, what the various militaries supplied -- equipment and technical expertise -- theoretically could have been supplied by civilian agencies and in fact it was in most cases. Security for aid personnel and/or refugees was not provided in Goma, though it would have helped the relief effort. Inside Rwanda aid organizations took advantage of relatively secure conditions in the areas controlled by the RPA and Operation Turquoise.
Strategies and their Implementation

Thus far I have identified critical elements of the political and military context within which military interventions took place. I have also noted the failure of the great powers and the UN to respond to the genocide in a timely manner and pointed to lack of national interest as the reason. Immediately above I established the variance on the dependent variable and its immediate causes. I turn now to the strategies employed by the four intervenors.

Given the causes of death and their context, did the strategies pursued address the problems? If the purpose of a humanitarian intervention is to save lives, it is paramount that it employ a strategy aimed at terminating the immediate cause of death. Just as an intervening force can save few lives if it arrives after nearly everyone at risk has already died, neither can it save many lives if it pursues a strategy that does not focus on what is killing people. How the strategy is implemented is equally important. How was the strategy pursued on the ground? Did the military forces employed have the capacity to carry out their missions? Was the interaction between military and humanitarian organizations productive or counter-productive? These are the questions addressed in this section.

I compare four different military operations: the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, the French Operation Turquoise, the American Operation Support Hope, and the offensive by the Rwandan Patriotic Army. To characterize the RPA invasion as a humanitarian intervention is somewhat unusual -- it was a rebel army that took over the country. I argue below that the motives of the RPF were humanitarian as well as political. Furthermore, there is no doubt the invasion had a humanitarian effect. To quote African Rights, who are sympathetic to
the rebels, the RPF victory in the civil war “was the chief reason why the killings were halted.”

Recall from chapter two that there are four possible types of strategy, which can be arrayed in a two-by-two matrix. It is common for a single intervention force to pursue elements of more than one of these ideal type strategies. Table 4-2 identifies which military operations in Rwanda pursued which strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
<th>Focus on Perpetrators</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Address Privation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>provide logistics and aid</strong> (non-combat)</td>
<td><strong>protect aid operations</strong> (defense and deterrence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>RPA</td>
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<td>Turquoise</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
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<td>Support Hope</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Victims</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Address Violence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>protect population</strong> (defense and deterrence)</td>
<td><strong>defeat perpetrators</strong> (compellence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turquoise</td>
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Since most people who died in Rwanda and Zaire were the victims of violence, I will discuss the interventions that addressed violence first. After that I turn to the interventions that addressed privation. The investigation of each intervention has several parts. First I recount the intervenor’s stated objectives, then consider whether they were the true objectives. Next I identify the type of strategy or strategies used to pursue the objectives and ask whether they were

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530 They also argue “that the RPF advance should be seen, in terms of international law, as a humanitarian intervention,” because it was a legally recognized body upholding the Genocide Convention. African Rights, 1995, pp. 1062, 1070.
an appropriate means to the desired ends, particularly the objective of saving lives. Finally I look at the specific form of the strategies, as well as the capabilities and the political will of the intervenor. For the strategies that addressed privation I also look at coordination between humanitarian and military organizations.

**Strategies that Addressed Violence**

The three military operations that addressed violence as an immediate cause of death where the Rwandan Patriotic Army advance, the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda, and Operation Turquoise. They differed in their mix of objectives and the priority ranking of the objectives, but all three were concerned with saving lives. While none of the interventions prevented the slaughter of most Tutsis, the RPA was more successful than either UNAMIR or Turquoise.

**Rwandan Patriotic Front**

The Rwandan Patriotic Front had three objectives: save their battalion stationed in Kigali, stop the genocide, and defeat the Hutu government. They advanced all three objectives by the strategies of opposing the perpetrators and protecting the population. These strategies were successful at saving the battalion and defeating the government. They also directly addressed the genocide -- less successfully, though to greater effect than any other intervention. As noted earlier, the RPA is credited with saving the lives of approximately 65,000 to 70,000 Tutsis. The rebels succeeded to the degree they did because of the specific ways they implemented the strategies and because they had a very high level of political will to persist. They could have met
with greater success if their capability had not been limited by lack of resources and manpower.

Since the RPA had no formal or public mandate, we must judge their objectives by their public statements and actions. Since their actions conformed to their stated objectives we can be fairly certain that their public statements reflected their true intentions. What the rebels’ claimed to want was fairly consistent but changed in emphasis as they became aware of what was occurring and the war progressed. On April 9 an RPF spokesman said the RPA was advancing on Kigali to relieve its 600-man battalion stationed in the capital and to “assist the UNAMIR and those other forces who want peace and security restored in Kigali.” He said they would consider taking over if it was necessary to regain security in Kigali.

On April 11 the rebel radio station said over 10,000 people had already been killed and cited three reasons the RPF had decided to resume fighting. “First, to support the RPF combatants in the [National Development Council] compound [in Kigali], who have been and continue to be attacked by the Presidential Guard. Second, to stop the killings of innocent people. Third, to restore peace in the country.”

A day later the “primary objective” was to make the Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie incapable of “liquidating the people,” according to an RPF military spokesman. Apparently the RPF knew within a week of Habyarimana’s death that there were massacres going on outside

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531 There may have been other objectives, such as revenge killing. Reprisal massacres apparently occurred in RPF occupied areas but they were fairly unusual. It seems they were never a serious objective of the leadership. On RPA human rights abuses see African Rights, 1995, pp. 1075-1086.
533 (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, April 11, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-070, April 12, 1994, p. 5.)
534 Dr. Emmanuel Ndagire interview with Robin White, BBC World Service, April 12, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-071, April 13, 1994, p. 4.)
Kigali, but was not aware of how comprehensive the bloodletting was. Several days later (April 17) RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe told foreign journalists that what was happening in the country was not just killings but genocide. He said the “first objective was to rescue the innocent people being killed and to reinforce the RPF battalion in the parliament building. He also added the war against the clique continued.” The “clique” referred to the interim Hutu government.

By early May it appears the tide in the civil war had changed, and with it the emphasis in rebel objectives. The RPF was rejecting any international intervention and would not negotiate with the interim government whom they did not recognize. Rescue of the Kigali battalion was not mentioned anymore and talk of controlling the country -- not just restoring peace -- began to come to the fore. The concern for protecting the Tutsi population continued to be strong, with language now of genocide and bringing the “bloodsuckers” to legal justice. In mid-June the RPF’s Major General Paul Kagame said the continued fighting was aimed at stopping the killings. It was evident they also intended to take over the country: the RPF held local “elections” in Byumba prefecture.

The primary strategy used to achieve all three objectives was to defeat the perpetrators by prosecuting an offensive war. The fighting between the RPA and the Rwandan Armed Forces

535 “The Presidential Guards and the MRND youthwingers are conducting killings in other prefectures of Rwanda [besides Kigali], notably Cyangugu and Gisenyi.” (Clandestine) Radio Muhubura, April 14, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-073, April 15, 1994, p. 2.) At the time massacres were also taking place in Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Gikongoro and Kibungo. The RPA already controlled Byumba prefecture.

536 (Clandestine) Radio Muhubura, April 19, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-076, April 20, 1994, pp. 5-6.)


(FAR) was a hybrid of conventional and guerilla warfare. It was "a war of skirmishes" -- a war for strategic hilltops. Evidence of sustained fighting in the countryside was scanty. Kigali was the one site of a pitched battle, where intense fighting continued for three months. Even there physical damage was confined to a few locations, such as the airport.  

The basic contours of the military advance were as follows. The rebels moved in three directions out of the slice of territory in northern Rwanda designated to them during the Arusha process. The main thrust was toward Kigali where more than 15,000 troops used artillery, mortars, machine guns and automatic rifles in their assault. RPA units arrived on the outskirts of the capital within three days (April 11), but they did not take the airport until May 11 and the city itself until July 4. The maps on the following page show the rebel advance.  

A small detachment moved westward into the stronghold of the Hutu extremists. It was stopped outside the prefectural capital of Ruhengeri and could not advance until after the fall of Kigali and the important southern town of Butare. The RPA captured Ruhengeri on July 12 when the FAR abandoned it. By July 16 the rebels completed their westward advance with the capture of Gisenyi, the capital of the other north-western prefecture which lies on the border of Zaire (now Congo).  

A third contingent of over 5,000 troops moved eastward into Byumba prefecture, reaching the Tanzanian border on April 22. It then moved steadily southward through Kibungo

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540 Prunier, p. 270.
542 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 27.
Approximate location of RPF/FAR front line, September 1993 to July 1994

4a Location of the demilitarized zone as of September 1993

4b Front line as of May 1994

4c Front line on the eve of Opération Turquoise (21 June 1994)

4d Front line as of 1 July 1994 and designated area of Opération Turquoise safe zone

4e Front line as of 14 July 1994
prefecture with little resistance from the few army troops stationed there.\textsuperscript{545} At the border with Burundi these troops swept westward, encircling Kigali and pushing toward the south-western part of the country. On June 12, Rebels captured the prefectural capital of Gitarama in the center of the country.\textsuperscript{546} Gitarama was politically significant because it was where the interim government fled to from Kigali. It was strategically significant because of its location in the center of the country, with major roads leading north, south, east and west. The rebels then turned to the southern prefectural capital of Butare, which they did not capture until July 4. The same day the French determined to establish the outer limit of their safe zone at the town of Gikongoro, about 30 kilometers away.\textsuperscript{547} The RPA halted its advance in the face of the zone occupied by Operation Turquoise. When the RPF proclaimed itself as the new government of Rwanda on July 14, the rebel army had occupied all but the three prefectures controlled by the French and a narrow strip of land running from the Burundian border northward along the French zone to the Zairian border.\textsuperscript{548}

As they advanced, the rebels employed a second strategy of population protection. Specifically, they attempted to deter militiamen and soldiers from resuming their genocidal activities in rebel-held areas. They did this by maintaining military rule in RPF-controlled areas. An important tool in this effort was a tight system of check points through which the population was screened. The RPA did not have enough soldiers to police the entire area they soon

\textsuperscript{545} Prunier, p. 268. By April 23 the RPF was claiming control over the eastern prefectures of Byumba and Kibungo. \textit{(Clandestine) Radio Muhabura}, April 26, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-080, April 26, 1994, pp. 4-5.) Their claims of military advances were generally accurate when compared to other sources of information.

\textsuperscript{546} AFP, June 15, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-116, June 16, 1994, p. 8.)

\textsuperscript{547} France-2 Television Network, July 4, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-128, July 5, 1994, pp. 4-5.)

\textsuperscript{548} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, Figure 4, p. 27.
controlled, so they tried to sift out militia members before they moved on.\textsuperscript{549} They were only partially successful at this strategy. The RPA advance caused most soldiers and interhamwe to flee, but some remained, particularly members of the militia. The ones who were not caught continued to kill, rape and maim, though in isolated attacks rather than organized massacres.\textsuperscript{550}

The strategy of population protection was also pursued in the unusual form of offensive rescue missions. Two notable examples of this occurred in Kigali in June, before the RPA controlled the capital. A large number of civilians had sought refuge in the churches of St. Paul and St. Famile, where they were subject to attack by the interhamwe. The rebels managed to save the people in only one of the churches. They also escorted hundreds of people at Amahoro Stadium and King Faisal Hospital to safety in Byumba.\textsuperscript{551} Rescue missions are not a common tactic during humanitarian intervention because they are high risk operations and the intervenor rarely believes the potential benefit (local lives saved) outweighs the potential cost (foreign lives lost). In the same vein, the RPA invasion was not a typical humanitarian operation. I return to this point below in the discussion of RPF political will.

These strategies -- oppose the perpetrators and protect the population -- and their specific variants -- offensive war, area-wide deterrence and rescue missions -- succeeded in saving more lives than any other intervention for three reasons. First, the rebels reacted to the genocide within a day and were conducting operations within two days. Second, the rebels had a very high level of political will to pursue these difficult strategies. Third, they had the military capability to implement the strategies, but could have saved more lives if their capabilities had

\textsuperscript{549} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 34 and fn. 18.
\textsuperscript{550} African Rights, 1995, p. 1073.
\textsuperscript{551} African Rights, 1995, p. 1068
been greater.

The issue of political will takes very different forms depending on whether the actor in question is indigenous or foreign. Local actors are assumed to have a relatively high level of tolerance for costs and risks because they have vital interests at stake. Such was the case in Rwanda. As noted above, the RPF had three self-interested motives: to save one of its best battalions; to save the lives of family members, friends and ethnic brethren; and to control the country politically, or at least expand its foothold. These motives served to support high risk, high cost strategies like offensive war and rescue missions. The important point here is that the RPF had hardcore political and personal incentives to act, as opposed to much softer normative incentives which characterize most humanitarian interventions by foreign powers.

Since the Rwandan army and extremists also had vital interests at stake, and thus we can assume a high level of political will, we must turn to RPA military capabilities to help explain their success. The RPA was a quasi-guerilla, quasi-conventional force equipped for the most part with light weapons. It numbered between 20,000 and 25,000 in April and grew in strength in the succeeding months. Five factors gave them superiority over the FAR, who were similarly armed and staffed. The first was that the interim government forces were distracted from the war by the primary objective of the extremists, namely slaying the Tutsis. Second, the rebels had a superior officer corps. Many of the senior officers had extensive experience with insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare in Uganda from the 1980s onward. They knew how to maintain an effective fighting force. FAR officers, in contrast, had little experience in battle and did not have a clear idea how to mobilize, supply, and maintain their troops. From 1990 on they had relied heavily on the French and Zairians for assistance. Third, the rebels had higher moral than the FAR. The
pursuit of genocide was not universally welcomed by the rank and file military. Conversely, the rebels saw themselves as saviors. Plus they enjoyed regular military victories. Fourth, the rebels commanders maintained tight discipline among their subordinates. RPA soldiers were subject to harsh punishment for disobeying orders or abusing civilians. Finally, these organizational advantages were supplemented by the spoils of victory -- that is, access to stockpiles of ammunition and fuel. One of the largest supplies of material was at the Byumba army base that was over run almost immediately. The rebels also used their ammunition to prosecute the war, whereas government forces used up a huge amount of ammunition killing civilians.552

Despite these advantages the RPA could not control the country quickly enough to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. To do this they would have had to possess several dozen vehicles to transport troops. Trucks would have sufficed but armored personnel carriers would have been more effective. They would also have benefited greatly from several helicopters for reconnaissance and transportation. The rebels could have captured the capital much more quickly if they had possessed tanks and attack helicopters. Large quantities of fuel and spare parts would have been necessary to keep the vehicles and helicopters running. This sort of equipment was far in excess of what the RPF was capable of acquiring or employing.

In short, the RPA was successful at saving lives because it reacted quickly, was highly motivated and willing to incur costs, was more capable that its opponent, and followed the only strategy that could stop the genocide. It would have saved more lives if it could have advanced more quickly.

United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda had three objectives after April 6: to stop the civil war between the interim government and the RPF; to protect civilians from being killed; and to assist in the provision of emergency relief aid. The priority each received changed over time. There was also a divergence of priorities between UN headquarters in New York and the field commander, with the latter placing more importance on protecting civilians.

UNAMIR was established October 5, 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 872 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire agreement, investigate instances of non-compliance with the Arusha accord, contribute to the security of Kigali, and monitor the repatriation of refugees. It was a classic peacekeeping mandate, which at the time was perfectly reasonable. Problems arose when the peacekeeping nature of the force was reiterated after April 6 in an environment where there was no peace to keep and where termination of the civil war would have thwarted the one action that finally ended the genocide: military victory by the rebel army.

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554 Not everyone agrees that an RPF victory was the only way to stop the genocide. To the contrary, they say the rebel advance intensified the killing. The argument is that the army had moderate factions that might have restrained the killers if a cease-fire had been obtained. Stopping the RPF advance would also have dampened the fear and rage among Hutu who reportedly attacked Tutsis with extra vengeance when they were fleeing the rebel front line. UN military observers claim a cease-fire would have freed up government troops to reign in the militia. The authors of Joint Evaluation, Study 2 suggest the Chief of Staff of the interim government, General Bizimungu, might have been able to reign in the killers since he told the UN Special Rapporteur the government would stop the killings only after the RPF agreed to a cease-fire. Joint Evaluation, Study 2, pp. 45-46 and endnote 87. My own opinion is that this perspective is naive. It is true there were moderate elements of the army. It is unlikely they were strong enough to oppose the extremist factions and the Presidential Guard who received preferential equipment and training. I also doubt they were numerous enough to control all the local government officials who were enthusiastically carrying out the orders of their extremist leaders. It is also a leap of faith that General Bizimungu, an important one of those leaders, had any intention of stopping the killing. He was considered a hard-liner and was placed in the position of Chief of Staff because the first person to fill the position in the interim government was considered by the Akazu to be too moderate. (African Rights, 1995, p. 113.) Furthermore, most of the killing happened well away from the battle front. The killers did not have to be on the run to get whipped up into a bloody frenzy.
In the immediate aftermath of the president’s death, General Dallaire and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ambassador Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh were instructed by New York to obtain an cease-fire between the interim government and the RPF and restart the Arusha process. On 21 April, the Security Council passed Resolution 912 formalized the cease-fire objective and reduced the authorized size of the force by 90% to 250.\textsuperscript{555} The language of the resolution and the debate leading up to it betrayed a complete misunderstanding of events. The Secretary-General and member states directed their attention exclusively to the civil war. In his report to the Security Council prior to the resolution revising the mandate, Boutros-Ghali wrote “the most urgent of [several tasks was] securing an agreement on an cease-fire.” No mention was made of the one-sided, organized nature of the killings. The interim government’s military was seen as a stabilizing force.\textsuperscript{556}

The mandate changed again on May 17 when the Security Council passed Resolution 918, reflecting a turn around in the attitude and behavior of the Secretariat and UN headquarters in general. The new mandate was expanded to include explicitly the active protection of civilians and humanitarian relief operations. This time the resolution and the report of the Secretary-General leading up to it recognized widespread massacres, but did not use the word genocide and still focused on stopping the civil war. The resolution reaffirmed all the objectives of previous resolutions, including implementation of a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{557}

\textsuperscript{555} In fact, approximately 450 troops remained in Rwanda, primarily from Ghana and Bangladesh.


The Force Commander followed the directives of his political leaders, but he gave more emphasis to protecting civilians. Indeed, the third version of his mandate was a reflection of what the UN troops were already doing rather than an innovation handed down from above. General Dallaire seemed to understand that mass killing was at least as big a problem as the civil war, and he tried to implement the Security Council mandates accordingly, to the extent political and material constraints allowed.\footnote{Prior to the reduction in UNAMIR’s size, Dallaire told the Secretary-General his recommendation was to provide reinforcements, equipment and a mandate to allow him to act with aggression. At the time his troops were doing all they could to protect people. Connaughton, pp. 11-12.}

UNAMIR tried to protect aid operations and the population with the strategy of “defeating” the perpetrators. Defeat is a misnomer in this instance and I use it only to maintain consistency. The UN did not want to defeat either side but sought to oppose them diplomatically with the goal of stopping the civil war. To that end, it viewed both sides as perpetrators. The particular form of the strategy was to negotiate a cease-fire agreement.\footnote{Cease-fire negotiations are not commonly considered a strategy of opposing the warring parties, particularly by the United Nations which sees itself as a neutral third party. However, in this case UN headquarters viewed the rebels as the primary troublemakers (true to its institutional bias toward seated governments). A cease-fire agreement was directly in opposition to one of the rebel’s primary objectives (saving lives). In that sense, cease-fire negotiations opposed the perpetrators. The problem was the UN misunderstood who the perpetrators were. The interim government was willing to agree to a cease-fire because the UN never connected such an agreement to ending the genocide. The extremists would have greatly benefited from an arrangement that stopped the RPA advance but did not stop the slaughter. This is exactly why the RPF agreed to respect a cease-fire only on condition that the genocide was stopped first.} Top officials in the UN Secretariat believed that achieving a cease-fire would stop the civil war, protect civilians, and assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. If the civil war had really been the problem, they would have been right. Unfortunately the real problem was genocide.

Revealing an incredible lack of understanding, Boutros-Ghali wrote in mid-May (after his supposed late April epiphany about the need to do something), “Obviously, a cease-fire
agreement is the first step in establishing a stable and secure environment in the country, thus allowing the organized, coordinated and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and the reactivation of the Arusha peace process. \^560 Despite fairly accurate reports from General Dallaire and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative about the nature of the killing, the Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to believe most people were dying in the cross-fire of the war, rather than being targeted in a horrific orgy of communal bloodletting. \^561

The Secretariat was not alone within the UN in its failure to comprehend the basic facts. On May 24 the Geneva-based UN Commission on Human Rights condemned the silence of the interim government regarding the massacres. As the RPF radio station observed, “What the UN Commission of Human Rights failed to pronounce is that the illegitimate government in Rwanda . . . directed the massacres.” \^562

The implementation of the strategy was straightforward. The Force Commander shuttled

\^560 "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, noting that for UNAMIR to provide safe conditions for persons in need and to assist the provision of humanitarian assistance, the mission would need to be at least 5,500 troops and be rapidly deployed,” S/194/565, May 13, 1994, para. 4. Reprinted in UN and Rwanda, pp. 277-282.

\^561 There is some question about the accuracy of Ambassador Booh-Booh’s reporting. His public statements reveal a failure to comprehend that a genocide was underway and that the government was behind it. He strove to be neutral in his statements and insisted a cease-fire was the most important objective. When he was recalled to New York, he held the Hutu government and the RPF equally responsible for the genocide: “The reality is that the RPF and the Rwandan Government have prepared for war and not peace and will have to bear their responsibility in history for the genocide they are inflicting on their own people.” He said he was glad to leave Rwanda where people “do not like each other.” Quoted by ???, June 15, 1994. FBIS-AFR-94-116, June 16, 1994, p. 7. On the other hand, his private communications to the Under-Secretary-General were more accurate, at least some of the time. On April 8 he sent a cable to Kofi Annan reporting “a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror.” (Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 42.) It is hard for me to understand how this UN diplomat could continue literally in the face of genocide to be so bound by institutional biases toward neutrality and seated governments that he disguised his knowledge in public statements. As Prunier comments, the RPF’s demand that he be sacked on the grounds of incompetence was “not altogether unfounded.” Prunier, p. 276.

back and forth between his base in Kigali, the interim government’s new location in Gitarama, and the RPF headquarters in Mulinde along the Ugandan border. After the departure of the Belgians, neither side in the civil war saw UNAMIR as threatening, so Dallaire enjoyed relative freedom of passage, although militia roadblocks slowed his travels.\textsuperscript{563} The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Booh-Booh, played no role. He had recognized the interim Hutu government as legitimate, so the RPF would not talk to him. He took refuge in a luxury hotel and was soon evacuated.\textsuperscript{564}

General Dallaire reported the UN mission “maintained a dialog” between the rebels, interim government, and moderates in the former government, but that was about all he could do.\textsuperscript{565} The RPF refused to consider a cease-fire until the massacres were stopped. The interim government refused to stop the massacres until the RPF agreed to a cease-fire. The moderates in the former government who were still alive were powerless.

UNAMIR’s secondary strategy was to protect the population. The specific forms were deterring attacks on particular locations -- what I call point deterrence -- and rescue raids. Instances of point deterrent consisted of stationing guards at Amahoro Stadium, King Faisal Hospital, Hotel Mille Collines, and the Meridian Hotel. Active rescue operations were few, but dramatic. They ranged from touring the capital in a jeep and plucking Tutsis off the street, to smashing down barricades to release prisoners. Point deterrence was limited in its application by

\textsuperscript{563} Connaughton, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{564} Connaughton, p. 10.
too few soldiers. Rescue raids were limited by too few soldiers and lack of authorization.⁵⁶⁶

In the case of UNAMIR, I consider the protection of specific locations to be a deterrent action rather than a defensive one because the UN troops never were attacked seriously, although they did receive sporadic fire. They did not have to defend their locations; their presence was enough to ward off those who would kill the Tutsis inside. At Amahoro Stadium, for example, just 12 soldiers armed with only automatic rifles and barbed wire protected thousands of civilians. Likewise, a handful of soldiers protected over 600 Rwandans at the Hotel Mille Collines. In Kigali and many other places, organized, well-equipped army units did not play a role in killing people. Victims were slowly hacked to death instead. The very small UN military presence had "a significant deterrent effect" against the militia who roamed the streets.⁵⁶⁷

Dallaire later lamented that his troops could not be more proactive in protecting people. The national capitals of the units that composed UNAMIR did not issue mandates for anything more than operations prescribed under routine peace operations. That is, they were authorized to use force only in self defense. "Therefore," Dallaire writes, "the Force consolidated in a few reasonably defendable sites and opened its doors to those who could reach the sites and who sought protection."⁵⁶⁸

It is not clear how active UNAMIR would have been outside the capital even under different circumstances. Like everyone else, the Force Commander exhibited less understanding of events at the time than he did in retrospect. In an April 17 interview he referred to the militia

⁵⁶⁶ Connaughton, pp. 11-12. He distinguishes "passive defense" at fixed sites (what I call point deterrence), "active mode" such as the jeep example, and "overt operations" such as barricade removal.
as “self-defense groups” and said that aside from the capital and a small pocket in the north “the rest of the [battle] line is essentially quite quiet and people are simply sending off patrols.” At the time, we now know, the country was on fire with carnage.

If Dallaire could have sent off some of his own patrols he and the world may have known better. On the other hand, habitual blinders may have strengthened the perception that it was the civil war at fault, since it was the war front that would have attracted UNAMIR's attention. Given their mandate and perception of the problem, UN patrols probably would not have ventured into other parts of the country and so would not have seen what was happening. After returning to Canada in late 1994 the general was still suggesting the civil war as the main threat to civilians. He wrote of saving the lives of people “caught between the lines” and helping to “preserve truces and cease-fires.”

There is no need to speculate about the actual circumstances of UNAMIR after April 6. Foreign capitals exhibited no political will to incur any costs in Rwanda, therefore the UN force was deprived of all military capabilities. In the confused and confusing noise emanating from the tiny central African country one signal stood out sharply: the murder of 10 European soldiers. The signal echoed loudly in capitals still smarting from the debacle in Somalia several months earlier, especially in Washington, D.C. National governments, the UN Secretariat and the Security Council drew a distorted picture of Rwanda as a failed state with spontaneous mobs killing each other, rogue troops and no authority structure. (Contributing to this perception was a

569 Interview with Gen. Dallaire by Herbert Sallah, BBC World Service, April 17, 1994. (FBIS-AFR-94-074, April 18, 1994, pp. 4-5.)
hugely successful propaganda campaign by the all too capable Hutu authority structure.) When the Belgians lobbied other Western governments to follow them out of Rwanda they could not have had a more receptive audience.

UN peacekeeping missions are chronically under resourced. UNAMIR was no exception. Its budget was not formally approved until April 4, 1994. Troops arrived several months after they were scheduled and many were ill equipped. Force Commander Brigadier-General Dallaire (Canada) never received adequate equipment or supplies to operate effectively, lacking even basics like ammunition and petty cash. The force had only a small civilian policy unit, no human rights cell, and no official intelligence unit.\textsuperscript{571} Things only got worse.

The departure of the Belgians included the departure of UNAMIR’s intelligence gathering capability and its communications equipment. It was clear to General Dallaire that he would need either massive reinforcement, which he requested, or a radical reduction in the number of troops under his command. “UNAMIR had little or no ammunition, only a few days of food and water left, no medical stores and no means of evacuation except for sporadic flights by a Canadian C-130 aircraft. To make matters worse, there was no resupply of any description expected in the immediate future.”\textsuperscript{572} The UN force dropped to 450 soldiers that had “barely a third of the minimum operational equipment needed in theater.” Nor did the Force Commander have any means to oppose the inflammatory radio broadcasts that were so critical to prosecution of the genocide.\textsuperscript{573} He could have use jamming equipment, a rival radio station, or a well-placed

\textsuperscript{571} Joint Evaluation, Study 2, pp. 36-37.  
\textsuperscript{573} Dallaire, “UNAMIR,” p. 69.
explosive devise.

When the Security Council resolved to rebuild the mission they had earlier eviscerated, the UN force continued to suffer from slow troop deployments and inadequate equipment and supplies. The lack of capacity had detrimental effects, particularly in south-western Rwanda where there were approximately one and a half million displaced people who received only a shadow of the attention and aid of the refugees at Goma.\textsuperscript{574}

Such a dramatic capability deficit tied UNAMIR's hands no matter what strategy they attempted to follow. That they accomplished as much as they did is extraordinary. Obviously with more troops and equipment UNAMIR could have achieved more -- huddled masses were in need of protection in churches, schools and so on throughout Kigali and the country. How much more would have been done is investigated immediately below.

\textit{The Dallaire Scenario}

General Dallaire told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in late July, 1994, "If I had had the mandate, the men and the equipment, hundreds of thousands of people would be alive today."\textsuperscript{575} He has often repeated the claim. The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict sponsored a conference of top military officers, mainly from the United States, to investigate this assertion. The conference report found "a modern force of 5,000 troops, drawn primarily from one country and sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and 21, 1994,

\textsuperscript{575} Quoted in African Rights, 1995, p. 1101.
could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict." This scenario assumes a high degree of political will and fairly impressive military capability. I have already indicated my doubts about the existence of political will to respond. In the following pages I address two other questions. What types of strategies did General Dallaire propose? How did he intend to implement them?

In Dallaire's plan, the force would have been directed to do five tasks: "(1) stop the genocide; (2) conduct a peace enforcement mission; (3) assist in the return of refugees and displaced persons; (4) ensure the successful delivery of humanitarian aid; and (5) assist in a cessation of hostilities." Tasks three and four fall under a strategy of providing logistics and direct assistance which will not be considered here. Tasks one (and three to some extent) would require a strategy of population protection. Tasks two and five would require a strategy of opposing the perpetrators. Did the Force Commander know enough at the time to successfully implement a strategy of population protection? When opposing the perpetrators, against whom would the peace enforcement mission have been directed? Answers to these questions will give some indication of the likelihood that a robust UNAMIR inserted early with strong political backing could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

Briefly, I think General Dallaire and his troops could have saved the lives of a large number of people, but not as many as he and his supporters believe. Many observers have commented on the speed of the genocide. There is no doubt that its rapidity doomed a very large number of innocent people to death, and this is generally recognized. Yet speed was not the only

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577 Feil, p. 8.
impediment to preventing the genocide. Two misconceptions stood in the way of a robust force saving the maximum number of lives possible.

The first was failure to distinguish between the genocide and the civil war, which I have dwelled on above. To save lives it was fundamentally important to stop the genocide, yet there is no doubt New York would have directed the Force Commander to focus on peace enforcement to stop the civil war opposing both the RPF and FAR (i.e. ceasing hostilities in the civil war). Resources and time spent in this manner could not have been used to stop the genocide.

The troops on the ground had a better idea of what was happening and surely would have given more attention than New York to protecting the population, as indeed they did. Dallaire’s January cable relaying information on the preparations for massacres, together with a UNAMIR spokesmen speaking of “Hutu killing squads roaming the streets” in mid-April reveal an understanding of what was going on in Kigali, if not elsewhere.\(^{578}\) Furthermore, UNAMIR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had a very close working relationship from April to July, and the ICRC displayed an accurate understanding of events in Kigali.\(^{579}\)

Nevertheless, we can not be certain the Force Commander would have gotten it right: General Dallaire consistently focused on the civil war rather than the genocide. In radio interviews on April 17 and 18 he spoke exclusively about the civil war. Even when asked open-ended questions about fighting he did not mention massacres.\(^{580}\) In a book chapter he wrote, the

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\(^{579}\) Interview with Lance Clarke by author, United Nations, New York, April 11, 1996.

central section is entitled "The Civil War." There is no section entitled "The Genocide," though he uses the word in the text. He says a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR would have led to "an even more intolerable escalation of hostilities," as if there is something more intolerable than the brutal slaughter of 800,000 people in 100 days.\textsuperscript{581}

The second misconception was that the genocide began in Kigali and spread outward. Even to this day close observers of the genocide, including General Dallaire, know the massacres happened very quickly, but they do not understand the \textit{pattern} of the genocide.\textsuperscript{582} In fact, it began simultaneously in nearly every corner of the country, as recounted above. Unfortunately this failure of comprehension is likely to continue. It has led some people who favor military intervention in Rwanda to claim a relatively small force could have protected itself and Tutsis in the capital and sent a signal to extremists in the rest of the country not to act.\textsuperscript{583} Because the killing was everywhere immediately, a much larger and more mobile force would have been needed than most people believe.

A close look at Dallaire's plan reveals that by not recognizing the pattern of the genocide, he could not save most of its victims. He conceived of five infantry battalions with a small number of armored personnel carriers and associated support acting in five phases.\textsuperscript{584} (The maps on the following page show phases I through III.)

\textsuperscript{582} Scott Feil, author of the Carnegie report recounts that part of General Dallaire's intervention plan was to send a battalion to Ruhengeri \textit{"to prevent the spread of violence outward from the capital"} (p. 13, emphasis added). It is a fairly safe assumption Dallaire read a draft of this report and did not feel he was misunderstood.
\textsuperscript{583} An example of its perpetuation is the testimony of Holly Burkhalter, director of Physicians for Human Rights, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations, May 5, 1998. She cited the faulty Feil report under discussion here. Worse still, she said, "When the decision was made [to reduce the size of UNAMIR] killings were still largely confined to Kigali and its environs . . . ." This is just plain wrong.
\textsuperscript{584} All the following information comes from Feil, pp. 12-14.
Figure 1. Dallaire plan: Secure Kigali, the Kigali Weapons Secure Area, and the eastern part of the country.

Figure 2. Phase II, Dallaire plan: Secure the northwest.

Figure 3. Phase III, Dallaire plan: Secure the southwest and assume duties as sector headquarters. In phases IV, V, and VI, the force would begin demobilization, provide security, and engage in traditional peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI of the UN Charter).
In Phase I, two battalions would enter Kigali by air to secure the capital and the Kigali Weapons Secure Area (a vestige of the Arusha accord). Special forces would silence the extremist radio broadcasts. A third battalion would move overland from Uganda down the eastern side of the country. The objectives would be to stop all violence in the capital and return RPA and FAR forces to pre-April 6 positions. In Phase II, one of the two remaining battalions would move south-west through Ruhengeri and the final battalion would enter Kigali by air, then move west in the direction of Gitarama and Kibuye. The objective would be to prevent violence from spreading out from the capital. In Phase III, three battalions would continue moving west and south toward Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Butare. In Phase IV, priority would shift to control of refugee movements and assistance with humanitarian aid. In Phase V, the force would revert to traditional peacekeeping.

Several barriers to saving most Tutsis lives jump to the fore. In the first phase, a great many lives would have been saved in Kigali, but the RPA was in control of the eastern side of the country very early, so the killing there had largely stopped. The second phase concentrated on the north-west where few Tutsi lived since it was the traditional homeland of Hutu extremists, so the scale of killing was relatively small there as well. On the bright side, a military presence in the central prefecture of Gitarama could have save very many people since the massacres did not start there until April 19. In the third phase, the UN force would have entered the heart of the killing zone, but the chances are it would have gotten there too late to save the majority of people, as most massacres were over by late April. No time estimates are offered for the phased plan, so it is not possible to know how General Dallaire conceived his strategy in comparison with the speed of the killing. It would be surprising if he envisioned controlling the entire
country in three or four weeks.

Despite these drawbacks and uncertainties, there is no doubt that a robust rapid intervention force could have saved many more lives than the anemic UN force that actually existed -- perhaps even in the hundreds of thousands, given the scale of the tragedy.\textsuperscript{585} The Force Commander correctly identified the need for strategies of protecting the population and defeat the perpetrators. Questions of effect revolve around the specific manner in which they would have been implemented.

\textit{Operation Turquoise}

Operation Turquoise is credited in this study with saving the lives of 13,000 to 20,000 people. It succeeded to the extent that it did because it employed an appropriate strategy which the French government had the political will to implement. Turquoise could have saved more people if it were launched earlier and if it had better policing and transportation capabilities.

The objectives of the French intervention in Rwanda from June to August 1994 are the subject of considerable disagreement. Officially the French acted to protect displaced persons, refugees, and other civilians at risk. Skeptics contend ulterior motives lurking behind the window dressing ranged from a belated attempt to rescue the Hutu government to asserting dominance in Francophone Africa. It is likely that some combination of altruistic and less-than-honorable motives lay behind Turquoise.

\textsuperscript{585} For an attempt to determine the maximum number of lives that could have been saved by military intervention, see Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect." He estimates a robust and rapid response by the U.S. as soon as the government became aware of the genocidal nature of the violence could have saved 100,000 to 250,000 people.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 authorized “Member States” to use “all necessary means” to contribute “in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda. . . .” The mission was authorized for a period of two months, which was intended to give UNAMIR time to rebuild its force level to the point that it could provide protection throughout the country.\footnote{United Nations Security Council Resolution 929, S/RES/929 (1994), June 22, 1994. Reprinted in \textit{UN and Rwanda}, pp. 308-209.} There was no question who the Member States were. The previous day France’s ambassador to the UN sent a letter to the Secretary-General stating “the Governments of France and Senegal are prepared to send a force in without delay . . . The objectives assigned to that force would be the same ones assigned to UNAMIR . . . .”\footnote{“Letter dated 20 June from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/1994/734, June 21, 1994. Reprinted in \textit{UN and Rwanda}, p. 307.} In short, France was authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect civilians, including by the establishment of “safe humanitarian areas.” The operation was not to interfere with the military balance between the local parties.

For a number of reasons there was great skepticism about French motives when they volunteered to help out in Rwanda.\footnote{The Security Council passed resolution 929 with 10 votes in favor and five abstentions. (A majority of eight is required.) Two of the votes came from France and Rwanda. Rwanda held a rotating seat on the Council at the time, which was occupied by a representative of the interim Hutu government. \textit{African Rights}, 1995, p. 1138.} The government of France had been the strongest foreign supporter of the Habyarimana regime since the RPF initiated the civil war in 1990 (surpassing the Belgian government which withdrew military assistance soon after the civil war began). Along with diplomatic and financial support, France gave direct military assistance in the form of training, arms, and even French soldiers on the ground in October 1990 and November
France created, trained, and armed the Presidential Guard after 1990. It was the Guard who created, trained, and armed the militia, then worked hand in hand with them to commit genocide.

The particular reasons for doubting French motives were overlaid on France’s peculiar relationship with Africa. After European countries withdrew their overt colonial presence in Africa following the Second World War, France was the only state that continued to cultivate a special relationship with French-speaking former colonies, both its own and Belgium’s. The relationship has continued a long tradition of military intervention in Africa. Following defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, conquest on the African continent took on a quality of compensation—a way to remain an important player in Europe. The geo-strategic association remains to this day. Francophone Africa is France’s sphere of influence and an important part of its claim to great power status.

Threats to that status from English-speaking quarters elicit a visceral reaction from important segments of the French establishment. Since the RPF originated in Uganda, a former British colony, they were seen as agents of the great Anglo-Saxon conspiracy to belittle France. Gerard Prunier calls this deadly serious and absurd view of the world the “Fashoda syndrome.”

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589 In both cases, several hundred French troops were stationed in Kigali and by the airport. They did not see combat but had a considerable impact on the war. Belgium also sent troops in October 1990, but later reconsidered and ended its support of Habyarimana. Prunier, pp. 100-102 and 176-178.


591 Prunier, p. 105. (In 1898 French and British troops confronted each other in Fashoda, southern Sudan, in the culmination of the two country’s rivalry over control of Egypt. France was compelled to back down in humiliation.) A Frenchman and former government official who writes in English, Prunier has his tongue firmly in his cheek when he writes: “Everybody in France knows that ‘les Anglais’ are among the worst enemies the French ever had: they burnt Jeanne d’Arc alive, they stole Canada and India from us in 1763, they exiled Napoleon to a ridiculous little rock in the South Atlantic, and they sank our battle fleet at Mars-el-Kebir in 1940. And to top it all, their women are ugly and their food is terrible, traits which show a basic lack of civilization” (p. 104).
An explicit expression of this view point came from the French Chief of Staff, General Jacques Lanxade, who spoke of “the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy” to a British newspaper reporter. When a French magazine interviewed the vice-president of the defense committee in the National Assembly about Operation Turquoise, he said the RPA soldiers in Kigali “are threatening the privileged position of France there.” He went on to praise Turquoise, saying, “we have just proved that we are still capable of acting in Africa. Fast and well.”

Add to this domestic political jockeying in Paris and one begins to understand why France intervened when it did. Pressure from media coverage and some NGO lobbying put the question of intervention on the map. An election was coming in 1995 and leading contenders for President wanted to prove their humanitarian credentials. The Socialist Party, to which President Mitterrand belonged, wanted to appear to once again have the “monopoly of the heart” which always irritated the Conservative Party, to which Prime Minister Edouard Balladur belonged.

Once the idea of intervention had been publicly entertained by top-level politicians, none could afford to oppose it. In mid-May former Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs (in the Socialist government), Bernard Kouchner, was filmed in Kigali braving shellfire. On June 13 South African President Nelson Mandela at an Organization of African Unity meeting said Rwanda was a rebuke to African states and indicated a will to “change all that.” Prunier says it was a “clarion call” in Paris where a representative of the Anglo-Saxon world was seen to be

594 Prunier, pp. 281-282 and fn. 3.
seriously moving toward intervention in French-speaking Africa. At a cabinet meeting the next
day President Mitterrand announced the decision to intervene.\textsuperscript{596}

The Rwandan Patriot Front lashed out at the prospect of a French-led operation, claiming
a variety of underhanded reasons for French intervention. They asserted (with some
circumstantial backing) that French military personnel played a direct role in shooting down
President Habyarimana’s plane. One reason for the intervention, consequently, was that there
were “embarrassing witnesses who could call France into question and who ought to be
eliminated.” Secondly, some French soldiers were reportedly discovered in Kigali military
camps and “the current operation also has the aim of bringing them out.” Third, France was field
testing “[l]ight mountain tanks and combat helicopters with about a dozen rockets on each side”
which it did not want to fall into the RPA’s hands. Fourth, “[t]he French president wants at all
costs to save those responsible for the crime of genocide under the guise of humanitarian
action.”\textsuperscript{597} The first three allegations are absurd, since the objectives could be much better served
by small, covert operations rather than a full-up intervention. They are interesting because they
show the extremely distrustful attitude of the RPF \textit{vis-a-vis} Operation Turquoise.

The allegation that the French government really was interested in saving its Hutu allies
has been voiced by less partisan observers and merits a second look.\textsuperscript{598} It seems likely that a few

\textsuperscript{596} Prunier, pp. 281-282.

\textsuperscript{597} Interview with RPF Political Bureau member Dr. Jacques Bihozagara by Colette Braeckman, \textit{Le Soir},
June 20, 1994. RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe on \textit{(Clandestine) Radio Muhabura}, June 19, 1994. (FBIS-
1994, p. 1.)

\textsuperscript{598} A number of African states raised this possibility, as did the Secretary-General of the OAU. One of the
most striking reactions to the news of the intervention came from General Dallaire who knew of the secret French
arms deliveries to the FAR. He said, “If they land here to deliver their damn weapons to the government, I’ll have
their planes shot down.” Quoted in Prunier, p. 287, fn. 14.
segments of the government wanted to save the genocidal regime, while others wanted to save lives. Like any other government, the French government does not think with a single mind. When it comes to Africa, six distinct ministries and offices are able to independently formulate policies. The Ministry of Defense, which obviously implemented Turquoise, contained a number of officers and civilians who were sympathetic to the Hutu side. Shortly after the operation began a senior French official visited the troops and said the RPF could not be allowed to achieve military victory. Some French soldiers told journalists they were briefed to believe the Tutsi were the bad guys and the Hutu the victims. While Turquoise generally did what it could on the ground to deter killing and even disarmed army elements that entered the protected area, they did not attempt to detain ringleaders, even when they were identified. To the contrary, the commander of Ethiopia's contingent within UNAMIR reported seeing French vehicles ferry FAR officers into Zaire. The BBC's correspondent in Goma saw former Rwandan chief of staff General Bizimungu riding in a French military vehicle.

The overall plan and behavior of Operation Turquoise, however, suggest saving lives was a stronger motive than saving the Hutu government. (Keeping in mind that either would serve to display French dominance in Africa.) Originally the Ministry of Defense planned to enter

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600 Joint Evaluation, Study 2, p. 55.
Rwanda through Gisenyi in the northeast. This was the center of Hutu extremism, it was an area where there would be virtually no Tutsis left to save, and it was perilously close to the civil war front. If the idea was to help the interim government, the plan could not have been better. It turned out, though, that the plan was driven by Defense Ministry financial considerations. A determined advocate for the southern entry point, with detailed knowledge of Rwanda, managed to change the minds of the general in charge of planning and the Defense Minister. The argument that he believes “finally won the day was that at Nyarushishi camp near Cyanugu we could find the large stock of surviving Tutsi whom we needed for display to TV cameras.”

(More than half the Tutsis saved by Turquoise were in Nayarushishi.) Operation Turquoise abided by the UN mandate, pulled out when promised, and worked hard behind the scenes to allay RPF concerns about direct confrontation and French advances toward Kigali.

What ever intent of the intervention, the type of strategy pursued was population protection. Specifically, French troops established a large protected area that was both a safe zone (protecting people where they lived) and a safe haven (protecting displaced persons.) The safe area served to deter the forward advance of the civil war front, deter conventional military operations within the area, and sometimes deter further attacks by militiamen on civilians within the area.

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606 To enter through Cyanugu, as they eventually did, the French had to unload the strategic lift aircraft (Boeing 747s and Antonov 124s) in Goma and reload the material onto smaller Transall aircraft that could land at Bukavu airport.
607 Prunier saw the decision whether to enter from the north or south as a litmus test. Prunier, pp. 283-286.
From a military point of view Operation Turquoise was a cleanly executed success, even though on the day Turquoise was launched it was not clear exactly how the population protection strategy was to be implemented. “[T]he complete operational plan . . . was written on two sheets of paper.” Movement of troops to bases in Goma and Bukavu (at the north and south ends of Lake Kivu, respectively) began June 19 (before the authorizing resolution passed the Security Council). As soon as the Security council passed resolution 929 they began making incursions into southwestern Rwanda. On the first day Turquoise troops began protecting Nayarushishi camp.

Infantry and armored columns pushed eastward from both Goma and Bukavu to a north-south line just west of Gitarama; within a week all French presence north of Kibuye was removed. By day six, the French reported their first reconnaissance mission as far as Gikongoro 100 kilometers from the Zaire border and 20 kilometers short of the front line. Within 12 days (July 3) Turquoise established a full-time presence in Rwanda with a forward base at Gikongoro and another at Kibuye. These marked the outer edge of the safe area. French commander General Lafourcade formally proposed the “humanitarian neutral zone” on July 2. The RPF formally accepted it July 6.

During the early days of the French operation all parties in Rwanda appeared to believe the troops were coming to act on the Hutu’s behalf. Interim government soldiers rejoiced, the

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610 Prunier, p. 289.
611 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 43.
612 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 43.
RPF made contingency plans and issued stern warnings, and the militia gained renewed confidence and energy. 617 Interhamwe killing increased after Turquoise began and continued strongly even when it started to be apparent the French were not there to help them. Militia resisted French soldiers’ attempts to evacuate people in danger in areas south of Kibuye and probably elsewhere. 618

By the beginning of July the militia, interim government and rebels realized Operation Turquoise was not going to help kill Tutsis or beat back the RPA. Militiamen began to flee parts of the country where the French operated, FAR moral dropped along with their military position (they evacuated Kigali the night of July 3), and the RPF gave the French clearance to evacuate 600 orphans from Butare. 619 From this point on Operation Turquoise substantially improved security within its zone, though it only had the capacity to stop the killing in limited areas.

Fighting between the RPA and Operation Turquoise forces was kept to a minimum in three ways. First, direct and indirect communication with the Operation Turquoise commander allayed the suspicions of RPF leaders. The boundaries of the French zone of occupation, identified by geographic features, were decided during 4-5 days of consultations involving the French, General Kagame, and UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General Shaharyar Kahn. 620 Second, the French did not try to interfere with the central objectives of the rebel army, namely defeating the interim government and stopping the genocide. Indeed, by occupying the

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619 "UNAMIR Situation Report (Restricted/Internal),” July 2, July 3, 1994. Interim government forces’ moral also dropped “due to lack of food, clothing, beer and other war supplies.” (July 3 Situation Report, emphasis added.)
620 Connaughton, p. 22.
south-western portion of the country and not allowing military units of any side to stay there, the
French assisted the RPA effort to wrest control of the country from the interim government.

Third, the RPA was already stretched to its limit trying to control over half the county and
capture the capital. They simply did not have the resources of manpower necessary to take on
the French as long as Operation Turquoise stayed in the south-west corner.

Operation Turquoise was a highly capable combat force, especially in the context of
Africa where indigenous forces are weak. However, it lacked essential capabilities for saving the
lives of Tutsis threatened by “low-tech” militiamen. The force structure consisted of 2,555
French troops, most from the elite Foreign Legion, as well as 350 soldiers from Senegal. They
were equipped with over 100 armored vehicles, a battery of 120mm Marine mortars, two light
Gazelle and eight heavy Super Puma helicopters, four Mirage F1CT ground-attack aircraft, four
Jaguar fighter-bombers, and four Mirage F1CR reconnaissance craft.621 Turquoise’s firepower,
 mobility, and training deterred nearly all violent confrontations.622

Turquoise lacked adequate transportation capability to carry many Tutsis to safety. All
the logistical units but one were related to combat support. The exception was a military hospital
put at civilian disposal.623 On numerous occasions Tutsis would come out of hiding when they
saw the French troops, but the soldiers, who were too few to provide protection, would tell them
to wait until trucks could arrive. By the time the Frenchmen returned most of the Tutsis had

622 Turquoise troops clashed with RPA soldiers one near Kibuye and another time near Butare. They also
had “a number of unrecorded confrontations” with elements of the FAR and interhamwe as they attempted to
disarm them. *Joint Evaluation, Study 3*, p. 43.
623 Connaughton, p. 18.
been killed.\textsuperscript{624} Because Turquoise was conceived as a combat operation rather than a rescue mission, it had too much armor and not enough trucks.\textsuperscript{625}

In remote areas where the French did not venture, militiamen continued to hunt down and butcher their victims.\textsuperscript{626} The Turquoise zone covered about one-fifth of Rwanda, or 2,000 square miles. It contained about two and a half million people, three-fifths of whom had fled there from other parts of the country. The perpetrators of genocide were enthusiastic and existed on every hill. French commander General Lafourcade never had more than half his troops in Rwanda. Under these circumstances, the demands of adequate policing completely overwhelmed what Turquoise could provide.\textsuperscript{627}

In sum, Operation Turquoise had mixed motives that led it to pursue humanitarian ends while providing the political will to undertake a dangerous and costly operation. It succeeded in saving as many lives as it did because it had an assertive mandate and the combat capacity to establish a deterrent presence. Behind the scenes communication between the French and the rebels, with UNAMIR mediation, was instrumental in avoiding serious confrontation. Turquoise benefited from the peculiar circumstance of being welcomed by the very people it ultimately

\textsuperscript{624} For example, in Bisaessero about 2,000 Tutsis had managed to survive until the French came on June 26 in four jeeps. One survivor recalls, “We all emerged from our hiding place. . . . The French took photos of us. The militia were there with them, carrying their weapons. The soldiers then left and said that they would be returning. When the French had gone the militia came back to kill. They killed a lot of us that day because people had come out of their hiding places when they saw the French soldiers.” African Rights, \textit{Resisting Genocide}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{625} The top planner in the Ministry of Defense had recently returned from Bosnia and did not want to be caught unprepared. Prunier, p. 289. Ironically the operation was unprepared to carry out an important protection task.

\textsuperscript{626} Prunier, pp. 292-293.

\textsuperscript{627} The troop-to-population ratio was 1:2,000 (1,250 troops, 2.5 million people). With these numbers, there is no way to police a population, many of whom are hell-bent on perpetrating a crime. In the U.S. and many European countries, the police to population ratio is 2.2:1,000, and that is in peaceful countries. When the U.S. invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965, it enjoyed a ratio of 6.6:1,000. In Northern Ireland the British maintained a ratio of 20:1,000. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” \textit{Parameters: U.S. army War College Quarterly}, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 59-69.
opposed, making the operation much easier. Finally, a common language between the intervenors and the local population facilitated policing activities. Turquoise could have saved more lives if a number of things had been different. Foremost was earlier action; second was non-combat oriented logistics units, especially trucks; third was taking down the extremist radio that continued to operate in the safe area; and finally was a clearer understanding throughout the French government and military that their Hutu allies were the perpetrators.

**Strategies that Addressed Privation**

Four military forces employed strategies that addressed privation: the RPA, UNAMIR, Operation Turquoise, and the American Operation Support Hope. The UN, French and American operations provided logistics and direct relief assistance. The UN and France also protected aid operations, as did the Rwandan Patriotic Army. As with strategies that addressed violence, my analysis of the strategies that addressed privation will consider each intervention’s objectives, the type of strategy followed, the specific form of the strategy, how the strategy was implemented, and the capacity of the intervenor to carry it out.

The discussion of implementation is heavily influenced by the issue of inter-organizational coordination. When soldiers and relief workers both address privation a critical part of implementation is coordination between military and humanitarian organizations. This organizational interaction sets humanitarian intervention apart from more common types of military intervention where the welfare of the population is not a high priority. It also sets humanitarian intervention apart from "normal" humanitarian relief efforts where relief work occurs within its own culture and is not as overtly political.
Rwandan Patriotic Front

For the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the corollary objective of stopping the genocide and defeating the Hutu government was to provide for the population in RPA-held territory. If the people remaining in areas held by the RPA had access to the bare necessities of life, then the areas would be less volatile and the RPA would gain legitimacy. Obviously, the goal of keeping people alive would also be served. The Rwandan Patriotic Front had no capacity to do this itself, so it accepted NGO requests to work in parts of the country it controlled. In effect, the RPF followed a strategy of protecting aid operations. The specific form was area deterrence with restricted NGO access. The RPA had the capability provide a relatively secure operating space, but the restrictions it placed on humanitarian organizations limited the aid they could provide.

Protecting aid operations occurred hand-in-hand with the strategies of opposing the perpetrators and protecting the population. Relief workers were threatened by the interim government army and the militia who did not want word of the genocide to get out and also did not want anyone giving succor to their victims. Once the RPA screened the population and either killed or drove off (most of) the perpetrators of genocide, foreign personnel were far less likely to come under attack. In contrast, the areas still under interim government control saw no abatement in militia roadblocks, checkpoints, and other means of finding “undesirables,” including aid workers.\(^{628}\)

Prior to April 6, the World Food Program and the ICRC had been providing assistance to northern Rwanda. They gained agreement from the RPF to resume their efforts from across the

\(^{628}\) "UNAMIR Situation Report (Restricted/Internal),” June 20, 1994. MSF-Holland tried to operate in interim government controlled areas, but its ambulances kept being stopped and people pulled out of them and killed. They pulled out. Interview with Rowland Roome by author, Kigali, Rwanda. September 27, 1996.
Ugandan border. During April and May a number of relief organizations assembled in southern Uganda in the hope of establishing operations inside Rwanda. By June about 40 NGOs were involved in relief efforts in RPF areas. They provided food, water and shelter in specific locations where there were high concentrations (over 500) of internally displaced persons.629

The rebels interacted with the United Nations coordinating body in Rwanda -- the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) -- to facilitate the protection of aid operations and the delivery of material. The RPF’s Social Wing, in the northern Rwandan town of Mulinde, maintained a liaison with the UNREO office in Kabale, southern Ugandan. The existence of the UNREO-Kabale office enabled the exchange of information between UN agencies, NGOs, and the RPF. Yet information exchange was as far as the RPF would allow the coordination meetings to go. The management of the relief activities -- where aid organizations could go and when -- was jealously reserved by the RPF.630

The RPA did not provide specific defense or deterrence services within their zone, such as convoy escorts. (Largely because they did not have the manpower to do it.) They did require that all UN and NGO vehicles be accompanied by a “guide.” Further, only a half dozen NGOs were allowed to keep personnel in Rwanda over night. These were organizations that had been working in RPF-occupied areas since 1991 and had gained the rebel’s trust.631

The RPA’s limited capabilities had an impact on their ability to coordinate with relief organizations. In the early weeks, the rebels had no trouble controlling the aid agencies who wanted to work in their territory, as the territory and number of organizations were both small.

629 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, pp. 34-35.
630 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 124 and note 34 p. 139.
631 Interview with Rowland Roome.
The organizations sought the rebel’s permission and agreed to a set of operating principles.\textsuperscript{632} Over time, particularly when the rebels became the government and the country was considered safe, they lost their capacity to control the entry and actions of aid agencies, which ballooned in number and began to operate throughout the country. By December 1994 relations between the government and NGOs were so bad the government expelled 42 organizations.\textsuperscript{633}

In sum, the RPF followed a strategy of protecting aid operations by making their territory relatively safe through a process of population screening and area deterrence. Their coordination efforts helped address privation to the extent that they led to an exchange of information about security for the aid organizations and reassured the rebels about the intentions of those organizations. However, the RPF also used the coordination mechanism to limit and direct the flow of aid, no doubt using it to political ends.

\textit{United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda}

One of UNAMIR’s mandated objectives was to assist in the delivery and coordination of humanitarian relief supplies. The types of strategy the Force Commander used in pursuit of this objective were to protect aid operations and provide direct assistance. Specifically, UNAMIR provided aid workers with point defense and deterrence as well as a limited number of escorts. As time passed, the area of operation expanded from Kigali (during the genocide and civil war) to most major towns in the country (at the end of 1994). The direct provision of assistance took the form of sporadic food and water delivery to concentrations of people in Kigali during the

\textsuperscript{632} \textit{Joint Evaluation, Study 3}, p. 34.  
\textsuperscript{633} Interview with Jette Isaksen by author. Nairobi, Kenya, September 11, 1996.
height of hostilities. UNAMIR made a difference but was not particularly effective at either strategy because it had such severely restricted capabilities.

Each of the Security Council resolutions authorizing UNAMIR identified one of the objectives to be assisting in the provision of humanitarian aid. The language changed slightly in response to changes on the ground. The initial resolution stipulated UNAMIR should "assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations." In recognition of its reduced ability when UNAMIR was cut to its bare bones, it was supposed "to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible." The renewed UNAMIR was authorized "to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations."

Ironically the UN force probably made its greatest relative contributions to providing direct assistance and protection to relief organizations when it was at its weakest. After the start of the genocide the only civilian expatriates who did not evacuate were a courageous few who worked for the ICRC and for MSF-France. They were soon joined by a members of a UN Advanced Humanitarian Team (AHT) established to try to assess needs and the state of local infrastructure. Even the skeletal UNAMIR could make noticeable contributions in these conditions.

When the AHT arrived in Kigali, it had access only to the airport, the UNAMIR

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headquarters compound, King Faisal Hospital, and Amahoro Stadium.\textsuperscript{637} UNAMIR provided the AHT with work space in its command compound, which was the only safe place to be, and it too occasionally came under fire.\textsuperscript{638} General Dallaire had already taken the step of establishing a Humanitarian Assistance Cell within the UN force by the time the AHT arrived.\textsuperscript{639} This greatly facilitated information exchange between the military and civilian UN personnel in Kigali.

Needless to say, the humanitarian organizations in Kigali found the ability to deliver assistance extremely limited. World Food Program stocks in Kigali were inaccessible. Even if they could have been reached, large scale distribution might have increased the level of violence. As it was, threatened populations who were provided with limited supplies were then targeted by the militia.\textsuperscript{640} UNAMIR -- lacking armored personnel carriers, troops, and ammunition -- was too weak to provide protection. Despite UNAMIR’s limited ability to protect aid workers beyond its own compound, the military and humanitarian organizations developed “an extraordinary synergy.”\textsuperscript{641}

After the violence abated and the new government was in place, the rebuilt UN force continued to provide security for aid agencies. Many of the new contingents sent by member states were oriented toward rehabilitation. They partook in substantial multi-agency efforts to do key infrastructure repair and rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{642} By late 1994 UNAMIR was able to operate more effectively and over a larger area. For example, it conducted daily and nightly patrols in vehicles

\textsuperscript{637} DHA Situation Report No. 8.
\textsuperscript{638} Interview with Lance Clarke by author. UN Headquarters, New York, New York. April 11, 1996.
\textsuperscript{639} UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs “Situation Report Number 6 (1994).”
\textsuperscript{640} Study 3, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{641} Connaughton, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{642} Study 3, p. 45.
and on foot in several key towns; it provided escorts for NGOs; and it guarded some warehouses. The force could offer more protection to aid operations than it could at the height of the genocide because it was larger, it had more vehicles, and the level of violence was minimal. UNAMIR was also on call to provide security for civilian UN personnel. It usually responded, though humanitarian workers sometimes criticized UNAMIR for not doing more, believing the soldiers to be operating under guidelines that were too cautious.

Several specific coordination mechanisms were employed by UNAMIR to improve its interaction with humanitarian organizations. As noted, General Dallaire established a Humanitarian Assistance Cell that worked very closely with the UN Advanced Humanitarian Team in the early days of the crisis. When things began to settle down and the AHT was replaced by the larger UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO), UNAMIR’s Humanitarian Cell maintained liaison with this central humanitarian coordinating body in Rwanda. The Cell connected UNAMIR to the rest of the UN system by exchanging information and acting as a conduit for providing logistical assistance.

Did these coordination efforts overcome organizational barriers to effective military-humanitarian action? Yes and no: when the UN force was small and the humanitarian presence was small they worked very well together; but when both grew the tight working relationship fell apart. The collaborative effort between the AHT and UNAMIR was due in part to the extreme

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644 Even the presence of unarmed Military Observers deterred banditry and theft. Interview with Isaksen
645 For example, near the southern town of Gikongoro a UN civilian employee requested an escort to rescue an aid worker and his family who were trapped in their house by threatening marauders. The armored personnel carrier that accompanied her would not leave the main road, so two unarmed civilians drove a car to the house to retrieve the family. Interview with Jette Isaksen.
646 Donini and Niland, p. 3.
pressure of the situation and in part to the very small number of actors who had to work together.\textsuperscript{647} Lance Clark, the head of AHT, described a sense of the Alamo about their situation in the early days of the crisis. They constantly expected extremist militia members to climb over the walls of the UNAMIR compound. Another helpful factor was Clark's close personal relationship with General Dallaire. UNAMIR personnel in general had respect for the humanitarian workers in Kigali because they saw them taking personal risks and not hiding behind the military. The humanitarian personnel, in turn, respected the UNAMIR troops for their commitment to save as many people as they could in an impossible situation.\textsuperscript{648}

On the other hand, a number of NGOs that entered Rwanda had an ingrained distrust of all things military. As far as they could see, it was in their interest to keep UNAMIR at arms length, relying on it only for security reports. In addition, as large NGOs and UN agencies established programs in Rwanda, they became less reliant on the humanitarian coordination office, much less the UN military force. UNREO faded in importance and with it the coordination between UNAMIR and humanitarian organizations.

An emergency coordination office should fade in importance as the emergency comes under control. Yet a problem arises as the process continues. In the absence of an office like UNREO, there is little joint planning on the humanitarian front in the UN system. Each agency has a tendency to assume the coordinator role in its sector of specialization. At best agencies inform each other of their plans, without prior consultation to avoid redundancy and fill gaps. There are plenty of instances of agencies taking actions that affect others without prior

\textsuperscript{647} Study 3, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{648} Lance Clark, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Interview by author, 11 April 1996, New York.
notification. The most striking example occurred when UNAMIR dropped leaflets over refugee camps in Zaire that encouraged the refugees to return to Rwanda. UNHCR was never informed this would happen and at the time did not think it wise to encourage repatriation, given uncertainty about the safety of people who returned.\textsuperscript{649}

In sum, UNAMIR was successful at protecting aid operations in the first few months after April 6 by providing point: defense and deterrence to the small humanitarian presence in Kigali. It also played an important, though small, role in providing food and water to the Rwandan’s under its protection. The UN force was able to accomplish these things because its efforts at coordination overcame barriers to implementation. After the RPF victory that ended the genocide and the civil war, UNAMIR was overwhelmed by the number of humanitarian organizations that arrived and by the larger territory it had to cover. Nevertheless, it helped protect aid operations through point deterrence at major distribution points and warehouses, as well as provided occasional specific protection to UN personnel. Limited resources and significant weakening of the coordination mechanisms used meant UNAMIR was less able to make a significant contribution to aid protection and direct assistance as time went on.

\textit{Operation Turquoise}

Operation Turquoise wanted to provide people with the bare necessities of life and to be seen doing it. It pursued these objectives through the strategies of providing direct assistance and protecting aid operations. Specifically, Turquoise troops brought food, water and basic medical

\textsuperscript{649} Study 3, pp. 133-134. Donini and Niland, p. 17.
assistance to concentrations of internally displaced persons in the south-west. They also lent the services of their trucks, aircraft, and some heavy equipment both inside Rwanda and at the Goma refugee camps. Protection took the form of area deterrence and guarding food stocks from looters. The French troops were quite capable of making their area of operation generally safe for aid organizations to operate. They were less capable at direct delivery of assistance, and they had a very poor ability to interact with humanitarian organizations.

Some, including the RPF, contend the French government’s desire to do good grew from a feeling of guilt over support for the genocidal government. Whether the product of a guilty conscience or not, helping down-trodden civilians would certainly help burnish France’s recently smudged international image. From a less cynical point of view, by proving their good intentions through action, the French may have hoped to win the trust of humanitarian organizations and draw them into the Turquoise zone to care for the massive number of internally displaced persons there.

It seems likely that being seen to do good was as important to the French as actually doing good. When Turquoise troops rescued the Tutsis at Nayarushishi camp and brought them food, they had film crews in tow. As they drove through the countryside looking for Tutsis soldiers were accompanied by journalists in military jeeps. There is nothing wrong with these sorts of publicity stunts, but when journalists get rides and humanitarian workers do not, one must wonder about priorities.

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650 FBIS-AFR-94-???. African Rights ??
651 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 43.
653 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 56.
Within the protected zone Turquoise implemented its strategy of direct assistance by transporting wounded to medical centers, including one of its own field hospitals. Delivering food and water to the internally displaced was another important part of the mission. This no doubt saved the lives of many people who had survived literally by eating grass and leaves. Until it left on August 22, the French military continued to coordinate and control activities NGOs and UN agencies were unable to do, such as air delivery, the provision of vehicles, helicopters, and aircraft, and assistance with water supplies.⁶⁵⁴

Yet Turquoise was not conceived as a way of delivering aid. The French operation engaged in direct assistance because it had little choice if it was going to save lives. Not only were the residents of the south-west in desperate shape, particularly the Tutsis, but a huge number of internally displaced people settled in camps in the French zone. At the close of the operation IDPs in the zone numbered approximately 1.7 million.⁶⁵⁵ If actual delivery of humanitarian aid were the primary concern, then it is likely more attention would have been given to providing appropriate logistical expertise and resources. Operation Turquoise was intended to create an environment secure enough for others to provide relief.

The French urged relief organizations to work in the Operation Turquoise safe zone and attempted to ally the suspicions of NGOs who almost universally doubted French humanitarian objectives. They made their Humanitarian Cell a civilian-run operation separate from the

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⁶⁵⁴ Connaughton, p. 20.
military operations cell. (In contrast to American military-run CMOCs.) The Cell divided its interests between UN agencies and NGOs.\textsuperscript{656} Despite this effort, NGOs remained wary of interacting with the French. Not only did they distrust French motives, they did not want to appear to compromise their neutrality by associating with a political actor. To avoid the French Humanitarian Cell at Cyangugu, 20 NGOs interested in building up humanitarian efforts in the area asked UNREO to fulfill the coordinator function. In response, the lines of communication were altered in mid-July so that the humanitarian-military linkage passed through UNREO, rather than Operation Turquoise.\textsuperscript{657} The effect was to further distance military and humanitarian organizations from any coherent working relationship.

Despite the reluctance of NGOs to work in the French area of operations, there was a rapid increase in the number of agencies in the south-west during August.\textsuperscript{658} Relief organizations found they were able to operate behind Turquoise lines with fewer constraints on their actions than behind RPA lines.\textsuperscript{659} Aid personnel verified that greater security afforded them better access to the region occupied by the intervention force.

Operation Turquoise did not follow a strategy of protecting aid operations in Goma. It did, however, offer some direct assistance. Prior to the July influx Turquoise provided no support and very little information to aid organizations. After the influx it provided substantial logistical capacity, including earth-moving equipment to help lay out camps, forklifts and trucks to move material, and the use of helicopters to quickly gather information.\textsuperscript{660} Turquoise also

\textsuperscript{656} Connaughton, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{657} Connaughton, p. 18 and fn. 75.
\textsuperscript{658} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{659} Niland interview.
\textsuperscript{660} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 55.
helped in the fight against disease. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, refugees were dying by the thousands every day in July and August. To prevent even worse epidemics than were already underway, it was essential to bury the bodies. French troops worked with the NGO Caritas to collect and bury bodies. They provided a bulldozer to dig large trenches in the volcanic soil, trucks to carry corpses, and manpower to pick up the bodies.661

These efforts at direct assistance in Rwanda and Goma, as well as protection of aid operations in Rwanda were counter balanced by a seemingly schizophrenic attitude on the part of Turquoise. Inside Rwanda troops often moved people to easily accessible areas to facilitate the food distribution, and to protect scattered groups of people. In many cases they lodged killers and victims side by side. When Tutsis requested to be transported to RPF territory the French troops would sometimes retaliate by refusing to feed them. In the end, however, they came to understand the Tutsis fears and did transport a large number of people out of the Turquoise zone.662 In another example, Turquoise refused to lend its trucks to the World Food Program to transport a consignment of French food aid from Bujumbura, Burundi.663 In Goma, Turquoise withdrew from the body collection effort without any warning. It took some time for Caritas to find new partners, so there was an accumulation of rotting corpses.664

The poor working relationship between Turquoise and relief organizations was further weakened by problems larger than these inconsistencies. Operation Turquoise did not coordinate well with UNREO or other organizations working on the humanitarian effort. Situation reports

661 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p 129.
662 African Rights, Resisting Genocide, pp. 63-64.
663 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 56.
664 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p 129.
from UNREO and UNAMIR show a striking lack of the most basic regular interaction between the French operation and the UN humanitarian agencies. Even internal communications from UNREO field offices in the south-west to UNREO-Kigali make very little mention of Operation Turquoise.\textsuperscript{665} The Turquoise Humanitarian Cell was not set up in support of UNREO, as the American CMOCs were, but rather as an alternative to it. The NGOs’ request for UNREO’s assistance in the southwest suggests the French Cell could have played a constructive role if it had subordinated itself to the UN coordinating body. Such an arrangement might have mitigated the discomfort and reluctance many relief NGOs felt about working with the French military.

Finally, Turquoise had a deleterious effect on overall planning and preparation for IDP and refugee assistance. The French intervention began just as UNHCR completed its North Kivu Contingency Plan to handle an influx of 50,000 refugees. An UNREO-led IDP assessment project also reached completion in the third week of June. French actions quickly altered the dynamic of the conflict, thus rendering moot theses planning efforts.\textsuperscript{666} The effect on the civil war of closing off the south-west was to corner the interim government and its failing army into the north-west where the RPA could concentrate on their rapid defeat without having to worry about maintaining control over a significant chunk of territory. Consequently, the civil war ended even faster, resulting in a more intense flow of refugees into Goma.\textsuperscript{667} Furthermore, French leaders decided against providing security in the north-west, necessary for humanitarian agencies to assess and respond adequately to needs in the region. Finally, the dampening of

\textsuperscript{665} DHA Situation Reports Nos. 15-31. UNAMIR Situation Reports 20 June - 21 August. UNREO-Alpha, -Bravo, -Charlie, -Delta field reports.
\textsuperscript{666} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{667} Interview with Eric Morris by author. Cambridge, Mass (September 20, 1995).
conflict in the south-west diverted attention of donor governments, UN agencies, and NGOs to the IDPs in the south-west at a critical time for those in the north-west.\textsuperscript{668} It is not reasonable to expect to be able to avoid all harmful outcomes that are the result of coincidental timing. Nevertheless, many of the above problems could have been mitigated if Operation Turquoise’s planners had consulted humanitarian organizations.

Despite the difficulties just identified, one of the great coordination success stories took place in the south-west. Everyone feared a massive exodus of Hutus at the close of Operation Turquoise. It never happened. This was due almost entirely to advance planning and coordinated effort on the part of UNREO, UNAMIR, Turquoise, the Government of Rwanda, the SRSG, and various UN agencies and NGOs. The importance of early warning, coordinated planning, and preemptive action were clearly demonstrated. UNREO, the SRSG, and UNAMIR generated a consensus in the relief community, mobilized an international presence to calm the population, and established an emergency support system while the French were still on the ground.\textsuperscript{669}

In sum, Operation Turquoise’s strategy of protecting aid operations by making the south-west safe to enter was largely successful. Humanitarian organizations did not take full advantage of the opportunity, due largely to distrust engendered by the history of French behavior in Rwanda and the failure of Turquoise to coordinate with aid agencies during the planning and implementation phases. Like every other military intervention, Turquoise did not offer protection to aid workers in the Goma camps -- an omission that would later contribute major

\textsuperscript{668} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{669} Donini and Niland, p. 15.
political transformations in the region. To the extent that Turquoise followed a strategy of direct assistance, it was inconsistent in both Rwanda and Goma. When they did provide equipment and goods they made a significant contribution, but again the failure to apprise aid organizations of what would be offered or withdrawn and when made it impossible to establish a coherent assistance program.

*Operation Support Hope*

American military involvement, known as Operation Support Hope, was the only intervention designed exclusively to address privation. Its stated objectives were to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the refugees in Goma and to encourage their return to Rwanda. Support Hope pursued these objectives with a strategy of providing direct assistance. It explicitly did not offer protection to aid operations. The specific forms of assistance provided were increased logistical capacity, water purification and a little engineering. The capabilities of the force were more than adequate for most of the tasks it undertook, though lack of knowledge about technical needs in humanitarian emergencies limited its contribution in some areas. The coordination mechanisms used by Support Hope helped to overcome most of the organizational barriers to cooperation with humanitarian agencies, but political caution continued to impede full interaction.

While it failed miserably to do anything about the genocide, the US government donated generously to the emergency relief effort. In July, President Clinton responded to the widely

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reported Goma refugee emergency by authorizing a small military operation to assist with the
logistics of emergency food and water delivery. Operation Support Hope was “purely
humanitarian” with only enough combat capability for force protection. The mission statement
given to the operation’s commander identified six objectives: “stop the dying” by providing
assistance to humanitarian agencies, provide immediate assistance for water purification and
distribution in Goma, establish an airhead at Entebbe, provide airfield support at Goma and
protection was by no means the least important, despite being listed last.\footnote{The summary of the Army After Action Review states, “The dilemma faced by the JTF commander was
to protect his force in this charged atmosphere, meet his mission requirements, and reposition his force out of
theater . . . .” \textit{After Action Review}, p. 9.}

Support Hope’s headquarters were at the airfield in Entebbe, Uganda, with Joint Task
Force A in Goma and Joint Task Force B in Kigali.\footnote{Connaughton, p. 25.} It operated completely outside the UN
authority structure. At its height, there were about 3,600 troops in the region, most in Uganda.
That number quickly dwindled and all US military personnel were gone by the end of
September.\footnote{\textit{After Action Review}, pp. 13 and 16.}

The first priority was to help tackle the cholera and dysentery epidemics in the Goma
camps,\footnote{\textit{After Action Review}, p. 11.} to which end Support Hope set up water purification units and transported lab samples
from the field so the specific strain of each disease could be determined. The inadequacy of the
low-capacity, high-quality water purifiers used has been covered in the section on how people
were saved, above. The real contribution of the American operation in the water sector was the
C-5 flight that delivered the privately owned high capacity water pump from California. As this and other systems came on line, estimated daily mortality dropped from 6,500 on July 27 to less than 500 on August 6.\textsuperscript{676}

Other contributions to the humanitarian effort included increasing the flow of information in the theater of operations, sanitation projects, and operating and coordinating tactical and strategic airlift. The increased flow of information is covered below in discussion of the coordination mechanisms used. Sanitation efforts consisted of making engineering units available to UNHCR for some construction work. However, as a result of poor communication between UNHCR and Support Hope the heavy equipment needed for site lay out and access work was not provided by the US military even though it was available in Germany.\textsuperscript{677}

The airlift had the most to offer during its opening weeks when the situation was most desperate and before aid organizations could establish their own transportation and communication systems. Air Force planes flew 380 long distance sorties (mostly from the U.S.) and 996 regional sorties, delivering 15,331 tons of supplies (a portion of which was for sustainment of the US force). They also provided intra-theater movement for UN agencies and NGOs.\textsuperscript{678} Support Hope did not carry food. That was the purview of the World Food Program which ran an overland supply operation.

Even this aspect of the American intervention had its drawbacks. Lack of security, ground handling equipment, coordination, and information on incoming flights at Goma made the start up chaotic and inefficient. Furthermore, the airlift continued long past the time when

\textsuperscript{676} After Action Review, p. 14.  
\textsuperscript{677} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 58.  
\textsuperscript{678} Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 58.
land routes were in use. The result was a high cost in efficiency, since ground transport is far cheaper and capable of moving far more material. One of the primary reasons the airlift was maintained past its efficient utility was the provision by the U.S. Air Force of copious aircraft to the UNHCR Air Operation Cell. The resources were available and “free” so they were used, regardless of whether or not they were the best solution to the need for transportation.  

The U.S. used two coordinating mechanisms to match its services with the work of humanitarian organizations. The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), sent by the U.S. Agency for International Development, provided technical assistance to UNREO and UNHCR (the two UN coordination bodies) and to individual relief organizations. Operation Support Hope also established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to interact with UNREO and UNHCR. It was severely constrained and despite the best efforts of personnel within the Center it did not manage to dovetail the activities of US military forces with those of UN agencies and NGOs working in the same functional sector or geographical area. This inability stemmed from general organizational distrust and arrogance on both sides of the humanitarian-military divide that the small CMOC was not able to overcome.

As in the Somalia study, I take a close look at the Civil-Military Operations Center here. It is the only institutionalized military mechanism from any country of which I am aware dedicated to working with humanitarian organizations in emergencies. Institutionalized coordination mechanisms such as this are essential if military and humanitarian organizations are

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679 Joint Evaluation, Study 3, pp. 58 and 98-103.
680 For example, Oxfam played a central role in the water sector but had trouble working with the military personnel running the American water purification units. At one point the US officer in charge stated, “I take my orders from Mannheim.” Joint Evaluation, Study 3, p. 66, note 18.
to work together in the field. Yet even if the CMOC itself interacts well with the humanitarian community, it does not guarantee the rest of the military force will.

CMOCs were set up in Entebbe, Goma and Kigali. In Entebbe and Goma the link was with the UNHCR coordination office; in Kigali it was with UNREO. CMOC-Entebbe was established 28 July, four days after the first US military personnel arrived. The primary task was to facilitate the transportation of relief supplies by air to Zaire and Rwanda. It was collocated with JTF headquarters in the airport terminal with an office across the hall from the operations planning office. The proximity of the CMOC to the operations office helped to overcome conceptual problems about the goals of the American force. It took more than a little work to convince a military trained to fight and support itself that the objective was to not fight and support others.

There was no official direct military-NGO contact: all NGO requests were routed through UNHCR (in Zaire) or UNREO (in Rwanda). The CMOC's function was to receive requests already prioritized by the UN coordination agencies and provide logistical assistance accordingly. Nonetheless, CMOC officers attended the general and sectoral coordination meetings where humanitarian organizations did much of their joint planning and information exchange. They also made their services known by visiting NGOs in the field. CMOC personnel were assisted in their interactions with civilian organizations by DART personnel who were civilian experts in humanitarian emergencies and also comfortable with military procedures.

The US military was very clear in its statements and actions that it was there to facilitate

681 Seiple, pp. 212 and 226.
682 Seiple, p. 232.
683 Seiple, p. 236.
the activities of humanitarian organizations, not replace them. Examples of CMOC activities include providing aerial photography of population movements to inform aid agency planning, posting a Rwandan government map of known land mines around Kigali, and calling in a Movement/Control team from European Command to coordinate the fleet of trucks in Rwanda that grew to more than 400.684

Some humanitarian personnel criticize the CMOC and US military for not doing as much as they could have. These critics focus not on the US commander’s “facilitate-don't-do” rule, but on the extreme casualty sensitivity of the Americans and their desire to be minimally involved. US officers often were very slow to response to requests, despite the urgency of many situations. This prohibited other actors from forward planning and relying on the provision of American equipment. For example, clean water was a priority need in Kigali and tanker trucks were an important part of making it available. At a time when distribution was a key problem, the U.S. military had water trucks parked at Kigali airport, but did not release them, despite entreaties by UN Force Commander General Dallaire.685

The American preoccupation with safety included strict interpretation of security guidelines that led to strange sights such as troops constantly in full battle dress, traveling only in guarded convoys, and not leaving their compounds after dark. Meanwhile civilian NGO workers were unarmed, unprotected, often traveled in single vehicles, and frequently did not return from a day’s work until after dark.686

Finally, many in the humanitarian community felt the US pulled out earlier than was

appropriate. They also point to inefficient use of resources such as duplication of effort at Kigali airport where American personnel set up cargo operations that substantially overlapped with work already being done by Canadian troops under UNAMIR command.687

In sum, the airlift assets and airport control services offered by Support Hope were a great benefit during the critical early weeks of the refugee crisis in Zaire. As a UNHCR retrospective states, "[T]he Great Lakes underlined that in special, overwhelming circumstances only a well organized military logistics operation, especially the use of heavy lift aircraft, could help save so many people in such a short time."688 The US intervention force was less successful at the direct provision of assistance to the population, as it brought the wrong tool for the job of water purification. It was also less successful at providing other services to aid organizations, such as the use of heavy equipment. These shortcomings were partially due to poor communication. The CMOC mechanism can theoretically remove most communication problems if it is used as a true operations center where military and humanitarian officers hash out solutions at the same table. The CMOC was used in Support Hope as a liaison office, which was useful but limited. A second reason US capabilities were not used to their fullest extent was extreme casualty sensitivity. There is not simple technical fix for this impediment. It is a matter of politics.

Political Failure

The genocide in Rwanda, the refugee crisis, and all the ensuing events in the Great Lakes region were occasions of absolute failure of the great powers to take political action. While

people were being killed at an average rate of 8,000 per day from April to July, governments chose to flee. Belgium worked fervently behind the scenes to cut UNAMIR to the bone. It was pushing on an open door. The United States -- the most powerful country in the world -- dared not call the genocide by its real name, lest it be forced to act. France, with publicly identified national interests in Rwanda, finally found the courage to return. It contributed to the humanitarian effort, but made no contribution to stabilizing the political environment and found itself entirely unaccountable for the actions of its former client. The UN Secretariat did take political action by trying to negotiate a cease-fire, but that could not end the genocide.

It was clear within a month of their creation that the refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire were controlled by the same extremists who had perpetrated the genocide. They benefited from the humanitarian aid entering the camps, they prevented refugees from returning to Rwanda, and they used the camps as staging grounds for cross-border guerilla attacks aimed at destabilizing the new Rwandan government and continuing the genocide. The UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Refugees repeatedly asked member states to separate the killers from the legitimate refugees as a way of solving these problems, for humanitarian organizations themselves had no means to do so. There was no positive response. Governments and pundits criticized aid agencies for feeding the killers, but offered no coherent alternative. The political ulcer was left to fester, covered with a humanitarian bandage.

Three years later a rebellion began in eastern Zaire that rapidly overthrew one of Africa’s longest surviving dictators. The uprising was intimately linked to the presence of Hutu

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689 For several extraordinary statements by the Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin and President Mitterrand, see Prunier, pp. 337-340.
extremists who had tried to carve out a Hutuland in North Kivu province and had fomented anti-Tutsi action by local administrators in South Kivu. The first targets of the Zairian rebels, who were directly supported by the Rwandan armed forces, were the refugee camps. As another politically driven humanitarian disaster unfolded, foreign governments turned their attention to the Great Lakes region for the first time since 1994. Again no political action was taken. There was talk of multilateral military action to ensure the safe return of camp residents to Rwanda. Canada even offered to lead the intervention and advance reconnaissance teams were sent to the area. After several weeks of dithering the rapidly changing situation on the ground made military intervention untenable. Tens of thousands more people died from disease and violence as they were pushed by Hutu extremists, Rwandan troops and their own fears ever deeper into the jungles of Zaire.

Should we be morally repulsed by what happened? Yes. Few are they who say that it is acceptable to stand aside as genocide takes place.\(^{690}\) No religion condones mass killing, though religion has frequently been used as a pretext for killing. No generally accepted moral philosophy allows it. The thought of a child being hacked to death by someone he knows as he begs for mercy churns the stomach. Dispensing charity to the killer after he runs away is repugnant.

Should we be surprised that no political action was taken? No. National interests trump moral suasion. The incentive to take risks and spend blood and treasure in Rwanda and Zaire

was entirely moral (the RPF and to some extent France being the exceptions). The Great Lakes
of Africa are far away from anything the governments of most great powers hold dear. They are
easy to ignore, as the denial of what was happening in 1994 made painfully clear. Even the
moral argument seemed distant: the people there are different, we don’t know anything about
them, they are less real.

The analysis in this chapter indicates military action to achieve political objectives in
Rwanda or Zaire in 1994 or 1997 would have required massive effort in chaotic and treacherous
circumstances. It has also shown that only politically motivated action could begin to address
the genocide and its aftermath. We are faced with the question of how likely a forceful response
to genocide will be in the future.

The case of Rwanda indicates that to elicit a political response a humanitarian crisis, even
a genocide, must engage a government’s national interests. That is, it must occur in a
strategically important location, as was the case with Iraq; threaten important allies, as in Bosnia;
have spill-over effects with a direct impact on the government in question, as in Haiti; or involve
Western military forces in such a way that they can not be easily extricated, as in Iraq and
Bosnia. Even when political interests are engaged, military response is often not rapid, as
demonstrated by the cases of Bosnia, Haiti, and France in Rwanda.

In Rwanda the vital interests of the Rwandan Patriotic Front were directly threatened.
The RPF immediately launched an offensive war that stopped the genocide (too late) and
removed its architects from power. France also had its national interests at stake, though not its
vital interests. It acted only after delay and evidently with considerable political equivocation.
Uganda was the only other country with interests at stake that was capable of taking politically
significant action. It pursued its interests by giving material support to the RPF.

The opposing argument is that democracies do not operate purely on the logic of \textit{realpolitik}. Not only do moral considerations matter, but political leaders may find it in their own interest, if not the national interest, to undertake political action involving military forces in high risk situations. Public outcry at horrors can generate pressure to act. Political lobbies often penetrate the open structure of Western states and push for action. There is also high-level lobbying of the executive branch by legislators and foreign governments.\textsuperscript{691} The key to more rapid and substantial action in the future, therefore, is to make public the horrors that are occurring and insist that powerful states move to stop them.

I believe the former argument is the stronger of the two. Thus we are faced with a second question. What are the consequences of humanitarian responses in the absence of political interest? It is impossible to know all the consequences of political non-response to a complex emergency. In general terms, the Rwanda case tells us about several. First, in extraordinary cases like genocide, very little humanitarian action is possible without political action. No political action means the genocide will continue. Second, in most circumstances, humanitarian intervention without political motives can save lives in the short-term but it also perpetuates the political problems that are the cause of the humanitarian crisis. It does this by sustaining the parties without seeking ways to manage or resolve the conflict. The conflict is likely to flair up and cost lives again. Third, continuing violence makes it extremely hard to rebuild a state’s economy after a war. The government can not give infrastructure improvements the attention

\textsuperscript{691} This seems to be what moved the Clinton administration to seriously consider joining a multilateral intervention in eastern Zaire in 1997.
they require; foreign investors are scared away; and farmers who are the backbone of the
economy in many developing countries dare not tend their fields. Fourth, lack of political action
by outsiders forces local governments to solve their problems themselves. As a rule this is a
good thing: they are the ones who know the situation best and they must develop practices and
institutions that do not depend on outsiders who could lose interest at any time. However, the
ways in which they try to solve their problems are often less than pleasant. The Rwandan
government since 1994 has jailed over 130,000 people in squalid conditions, massacred Hutu
extremists and their supporters in Zaire, and engaged in a bloody counter-insurgency campaign
in the western portion of the country.

Summary

All four of the military operations investigated in this chapter had some positive effect on
the number of lives saved. The absolute numbers are fairly impressive -- a total in Rwanda of
about 100,000. However, when compared to the 800,000 people who were killed, it is painfully
obvious that a far greater effort was required to effectively respond to the genocide. Only the
Rwandan Patriotic Front and its army were willing to pay the price. Table 4-3, below,
summarizes the strategies of the four military operations studied in this chapter and indicates
whether the conditions necessary for their success were present.

The Rwandan Patriotic Army saved approximately 65,000 to 70,000 people -- far more
than any other operation. The rebels pursued strategies of defeating the perpetrator, providing
area protection for the population, and providing area protection for aid organizations. The
strategy of defeating the perpetrator did the most good, followed by area protection for the
population. Area protection for aid organizations was less important, since for the most part the people behind RPA lines, while traumatized, were not in danger of dying from privation. The rebels succeeded because their vital interests were at stake, namely the safety of one of their best military units, the lives of their fellow Tutsi, and control of the Rwandan government.

Table 4-3: Summary of strategies employed and whether the conditions for success were present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Employed</th>
<th>Address causes of death?</th>
<th>Where the conditions for success present?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>objectives</td>
<td>capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defeat perpetrator</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area pop. protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area aid protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point pop. protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point aid protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turquoise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area pop. protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area aid protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Hope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The heavily political objectives caused the RPA to react immediately, which was a critical factor in this case because the genocide occurred with unprecedented speed. Political objectives also induced the rebels to pursue a high risk strategy and made them willing to sustain high costs in order to prevail against a foe of roughly equal strength. In many ways, the RPA’s civil war offensive is not comparable to third party humanitarian interventions. Yet it provides several instructive lessons. When a genocide occurs, the most effective way to save lives is get the perpetrator to stop. Most of the time this will mean fighting a war -- a very hard and costly endeavor. The Rwandan Patriotic Front did what no state contemplated.

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, surprisingly, managed to save about 20,000 people in Kigali. It pursued strategies of point protection for the population and for aid personnel. Obviously the former was more important for saving lives in the immediate term. The latter strategy set the stage for humanitarian efforts in Rwanda and Zaire following the genocide and war. UNAMIR saved a small proportion of the at-risk population despite the fact that it had no political backing from member states at the UN and virtually no capacity to fight. The capabilities UNAMIR possessed at the beginning of April were quickly withdrawn by the contributing states in a shameful display of callous disregard for the plight of hundreds of thousands of people. The UN force saved as many lives as it did primarily because it happened to be present when the genocide began and the few soldiers who stayed behind exhibited great bravery in hellish circumstances. UNAMIR also benefited, if one can use the word, from unusual circumstances. The lightly armed Hutu killers had many undefended targets, so a military force with very little capability to fight could protect people in defensible buildings for a few weeks. The carnage in Rwanda was so extensive that even a minor impediment to it could
save a large number of lives. Eventually the Hutu government army would have attacked the UN troops or forced them to leave if the RPA had not rescued them when it captured Kigali. In direct contrast to the strong political motives of the rebels, the story of UNAMIR demonstrates the incapacity of a humanitarian force in a hostile environment when the participating states do not have any political interest in the country.

Operation Turquoise saved between 13,000 and 20,000 people, most of whom were concentrated in one camp awaiting extermination. The primary strategies followed by the French troops were concurrent area protection for the population and aid organizations, with a secondary strategy of point protection for the population. Area protection for the population succeeded, but only saved a small proportion of the total population at risk. It was successfully executed because the French government had political objectives that prompted it to commit sufficient resources to pursue an ambitious and risky strategy. The Legionnaires possessed enough combat capability that they had little trouble establishing and maintaining the protected zone. Area protection did not save more lives partly because the French arrived near the end of the genocide and partly because it was not a sufficient strategy by itself. Militiamen continued to kill Tutsis in the south-west after the French were present. Turquoise could have saved more lives if it had devoted greater effort to policing the zone and providing point protection. French commanders did not see a need to do this, either out of ignorance or a willful disregard for what was happening. Even if they had recognized the need, they did not possess enough troops to police the zone and had virtually no trucks with which to transport Tutsis to safe points. The relative

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692 In absolute terms, 20,000 is a large number, but it was only 2.2 percent of the people at risk. (20,000/900,000).
freedom of access that the Turquoise zone provided aid organizations was important because there were approximately one million internally displaced people in the south-west. However, aid workers did not trust the French and Turquoise coordination efforts were terrible, thus potential benefits were diminished.

It is not possible to calculate how many lives Operation Support Hope helped save, though it certainly provided critical capabilities to help address the dire problems of cholera and dysentery in the early days of the refugee crisis in Zaire. Support Hope’s strategy of logistical assistance addressed a critical need, but its attempt to provide direct assistance was flawed. The transportation and cargo handling capabilities and were instrumental in the early days of the refugee response, particularly for delivering heavy equipment and rapidly disseminating medical reports from laboratories. The use of inappropriate water purification methods was a clear example of why direct assistance is usually best left to the experts. Support Hope could have been more effective if it had coordinated better with aid organizations. Clear communication of priorities, would have resulted in the provision of desperately needed earth-moving equipment, among other things. The operation’s objectives were entirely humanitarian, which was sufficient for non-combat strategies. However, it also meant that Support Hope did nothing about the need to separate the “genocidaires” from the legitimate refugee population. The long-term consequences were disastrous.
Chapter Five

Conclusion

This study analyzed ten military operations in three countries -- two in Iraq, four in Somalia, and four in Rwanda. Each of the operations was a humanitarian intervention -- a military intervention in a violent conflict for the stated purpose of helping the population of the target country. I chose to study humanitarian intervention by explicitly concentrating on its short-term effects and their causes. The core objective of any humanitarian action, military or civilian, must be to save lives. Without this baseline, no other social benefits can be achieved. Accordingly, the measure of success in this study is the number of people whose lives were saved. Two questions drove my work. Has humanitarian intervention saved lives in the past? What are the conditions under which it is likely to do so in the future?

Findings

Seven of the ten military operations I studied helped to save more people from death than available non-military alternatives could have done. The seven are Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq; Operation Provide Relief and the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia; and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) offensive, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

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693 Some of the ten operations conform more closely to this definition than others. For example, the UN Guard Contingent in Iraq took place in the relatively peaceful environment created by its predecessor. The invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Army explicitly stated one of its objectives was to protect the population, but they were obviously interested in more than just accomplishing a humanitarian good.

694 As noted in the first chapter, the number of lives saved is a much higher standard than the number of people served, the amount of material delivered, or the size of the area protected. It is also a more accurate measure of how much good a humanitarian effort is doing.
(UNAMIR), Operation Turquoise, and Operation Support Hope in Rwanda. Of the three operations that did not result in a net gain in lives saved, the UN Guard Contingent in Iraq and the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) were ineffectual. The third, UNOSOM II, killed or wounded as many people as it helped to save in the short-term and had a detrimental effect on the conflict in the long-term. The numbers are summarized in the following table, which is replicated from the first chapter.

Table 5-1: Approximate Number of Lives Saved by Military Operations in Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Lives Saved *</th>
<th>Net Gain?</th>
<th>Lives Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>&gt; 7,500 camps;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&gt; 6,200 camps; ~20,000 rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 20,000 safe zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Guards in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 27,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UN Operation Somalia I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>~ 83,000 - 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>~ 10,000 (?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restore Hope (UNITAF)</td>
<td>≥ 10,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 10,000 - 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Operation Somalia II</td>
<td>~ 2,000 (?)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>~ 1,000 - 1,500 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 22,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 94,000 - 126,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
<td>~ 65,000 - 70,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission</td>
<td>~ 20,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turquoise</td>
<td>~ 13,000 - 20,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Hope</td>
<td>1,000s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>~ 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 100,000 - 115,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>~ 860,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The numbers in this column refer only to those people saved through military activities. People saved through humanitarian activities alone during the same time period are not counted.

** This is the number of people killed by UN/QRF forces, not the number who died from other causes. Therefore, it is not comparable to the other numbers in this column. I include it because
(a) there is no good data on the overall number of people who died during this period and (b) it highlights the criticism of UNOSOM II that it did as much harm as good.

Although the majority of interventions were successful, the number of people saved in most cases was nowhere near as high as is commonly believed. Careful analysis of epidemiological, public health, military after action, and humanitarian field reports reveals that the number of lives saved by military action is in the range of thousands to tens of thousands, not tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.

Humanitarian intervention has the potential to succeed, at least in the short-term, in a variety of contexts. In Iraq, Provide Comfort helped refugees in nearly inaccessible camps. It also allowed them to return to their land, protected from the army of a brutal dictatorship. In Somalia, Provide Relief and the United Task Force helped internally displaced persons who suffered from famine due to the disintegration of the state and lack of rain. In Rwanda, three operations protected civilians from a popular genocide in the midst of a civil war. A fourth operation helped refugees in Zaire, much like in Iraq.

The determinants of success can be categorized as five variables, all more or less under the control of the intervening states. The first factor was the types of strategy pursued by the intervenor(s). In situations where people were dying of privation, massive logistical capacity and sometimes protection for aid workers were needed. Where people were dying of violence, protection for the population was needed. In addition, when people were dying of violence, the intervenor could defeat the perpetrator, as was done by the RPA in Rwanda and attempted by UNOSOM II in Somalia.

Most of the operations I studied employed strategies that addressed the causes of death.
UNOSOM II and the directives to UNAMIR from UN headquarters are counter examples. The effectiveness of the strategies depended on whether or not the other conditions for success were present. Was the strategy commensurate with the intervenor's level of political interest? Did the intervenor have the capabilities to implement the strategy? Did the intervenor coordinate well with humanitarian organizations? Did the intervenor respond quickly?

An intervenor's objectives can vary from purely humanitarian to purely political. The balance between humanitarian and political objectives, more specifically the level of political interest, was a primary determinant of the degree of success. In a few cases I studied, the objectives of the intervenor were entirely humanitarian, with no discernable political content. Those cases were the UN Guards in Iraq, Provide Relief in Somalia, and Support Hope in Rwanda. In the other seven operations, the intervenor had a combination of humanitarian and political objectives. Sometimes the political considerations were minor, such as during UNITAF, and sometimes they were dominant, such as during the RPA offensive. In general, the more politically oriented the intervenor's objectives, the more likely it was to respond quickly, pursue an ambitious strategy, and commit substantial resources to the effort. This observation leads to the counter-intuitive finding that in conflict environments the more politically motivated an intervention, the more likely it is to save lives.

Such a broad statement requires some bounds, for it is not true that humanitarian benefits always require political objectives, nor that political objectives always beget humanitarian benefits. Operations such as the Provide Relief airlift, which had no political agenda, can save a great many lives by acting in time and dedicating critical resources when people are dying of privation. Alternatively, if political objectives lead to ambitious strategies but do not produce the
resources or will to implement those strategies, disaster can result. The standout example is UNOSOM II, which had political objectives and pursued the ambitious strategy of trying to defeat General Aideed, but it did not have a coherent political plan or the necessary military means. Furthermore, political concerns alone are not likely to lead to humanitarian benefits. Humanitarian objectives must be an explicit part of the equation. Despite these caveats, it does seem to be the case that political objectives, in concert with humanitarian ones, increase the chances that a military intervention will have the characteristics that enable it to save lives.\textsuperscript{695} This is particularly true when people are dying from violence. Military intervention to oppose violence against civilians is dangerous and can be costly. It requires the intervenors to be motivated by more than altruistic intent.

The third factor was the logistical and combat capabilities of the intervening force. Most operations that addressed privation required military units with the equipment, personnel and technical knowledge to quickly increase the transportation and cargo handling capacity of the target region. These were non-combat missions, such as the initial stage of Provide Comfort in Iraq, Provide Relief in Somalia, and Support Hope in Rwanda/Zaire. Privation could also be addressed by protecting the humanitarian aid organizations that were attending to the population. Protection required combat capabilities. The strategies that addressed violence -- protecting the population and defeating the perpetrator -- also required combat capabilities. How capable the combat units needed to be depended on the fighting ability of the local parties who opposed the intervenor and on the willingness of the intervenor to sustain casualties. The stronger the local

\textsuperscript{695} The exception is military airlifts to isolated populations, which are non-combat missions. Timing is the key variable in those cases.
opposition and the more casualty sensitive the intervenor, the more militarily capable the intervenor needed to be. In Rwanda, the RPA was not much stronger than the interim government forces, but it was willing to sustain high costs to prevail. It succeeded. In Somalia, UNAMIR II was not much stronger than the Somali National Alliance and the contributor of the best troops (the United States) was also not willing to sustain more than minimal costs. It failed.

The fourth factor was coordination between humanitarian and military organizations. Coordination was particularly important for strategies of logistical assistance and point protection of aid operations. At a minimum, soldiers and aid workers needed to exchange information about the situation on the ground and their intended activities. Implementation was more effective when coordination mechanisms were designed to include joint planning so that both communities had similar expectations and could take advantage of each other’s strengths. For instance, Operation Provide Comfort and UNITAF were successful, in part, because of intensive coordination efforts between military and humanitarian actors. UNOSOM II and Operation Turquoise are examples of operations that suffered from inadequate coordination.

The fifth factor was the length of delay between the onset of the crisis and the intervention. The faster the reaction, the more potential the intervention had to save lives. Most of the operations I studied were late to arrive. They occurred late because states with the ability to act lacked strong political interests in the places were crises took place. The exceptions were Provide Comfort in Iraq and the RPA in Rwanda.  

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696 Coordination of humanitarian and military action with diplomatic initiatives was also important, but it mostly concerned the longer-term consequences of humanitarian intervention and therefore was not a subject to which I devoted much attention.
697 UNAMIR also reacted quickly, but only because it was already on the scene for a different purpose. The quick reaction of troop contributing states was to run away and deny the existence of genocide. The few
Implications

It is within the ability of states to save lives in complex emergencies. The context of a humanitarian crisis does not determine its outcome, but it does strongly influence the degree of difficulty of a particular intervention. Although the five factors of success are under the control of potential intervenors, at least in theory, saving lives is not easy to do. This is particularly true when people are dying from violence, when the intervenor must directly confront the perpetrators of violence. No matter what the context, if humanitarian intervention is not done well, it has the potential to make bad situations even worse. Usually unintended negative consequences include prolonging or intensifying the war (e.g. Somalia), causing instability to spread to neighboring states (e.g. Rwanda/Zaire), and creating dependence among the population on long-term external protection and relief assistance (e.g. Iraq). Furthermore, while it has the potential to save lives in the short run, humanitarian intervention can not solve political problems. It should not be used by governments as an alternative to political action, as it has been in the past.

The central question is whether or not the governments of powerful states have the political interest and will to do what is necessary to succeed at humanitarian intervention. The question merits an explicit public discussion that deals with the pragmatic difficulties of humanitarian intervention. More fundamentally, policy makers and the concerned public ought to talk about the balance between a moral obligation to help people in need and the practical requirements and limits of fulfilling that obligation.698

I stated in the first chapter what I believe are the conditions necessary for a humanitarian

soldiers who remained in Rwanda quickly acted to protect any civilians they could.

698 Discussions of this sort take place at universities, in aid organizations, at the UN, and at low levels within at least some governments. All too frequently such discussions fail to tackle the hardest problems.
intervention to save lives in various circumstances. I offer the summary table again, but will not repeat what I have said. Instead I will consider some of the wider policy implications of a serious effort to improve the practice of humanitarian intervention.

Table 5-2: Conditions under which alternative strategies are appropriate and likely to succeed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Strategies</th>
<th>When cause of death is:</th>
<th>Conditions for success:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>privation</td>
<td>violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide aid directly</td>
<td>no aid organizations present</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistics assistance</td>
<td>almost always appropriate</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point protection for aid</td>
<td>when small attacks are the problem</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area protection for aid</td>
<td>when major violence is the problem</td>
<td>medium to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>point protection for pop.</td>
<td>intermixed pop. and civilians targeted</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area protection for pop.</td>
<td>-- civilians targeted but population segregated -- war front</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defeat perpetrator</td>
<td>-- resolve conflict through force -- only way to protect pop.</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A primary determinant of which strategies policy makers decide to pursue ought to be the immediate causes of death of the local population. Indeed, in most past cases the strategies followed have addressed the cause of death. It is not particularly difficult to discern why people are dying. However, two shortcomings have been common. First, assessments have been slow. Second, the particular knowledge needed to be most effective has sometimes proven elusive. For example, it was clear in Rwanda that people were dying of violence, but the initial perception was of mutual killing between Tutsi and Hutu, not a one-sided genocide.\footnote{Even after governments figured out what was happening, most chose to continue to characterize the violence as mutual tribal slaughter rather than publicly recognize the genocide for what it was.}

The problem lies not the availability of information, but in its collection and analysis. Even in the most god-forsaken places there are people with the ability to observe what is happening and communicate it to the outside world. Potential intelligence gathering sources cover a broad range that includes embassy personnel, local media outlets, employees of relief and development agencies, and private businessmen. The national intelligence apparatuses of powerful states (and the UN, to the extent it has any) do not take full advantage of most of these sources. In large part this is because they are oriented to traditional concerns with conflict between states, not within them. Even if relevant information on disasters in remote locations is gathered and analyzed, it is rarely passed very far up the bureaucratic chain to people with the authority to make policy decisions. More rapid and accurate responses to future humanitarian crises will require changes in the information gathering and decision making processes of national governments that respond to a wider circle of intelligence sources and place importance on events and geographic areas that are largely ignored at present. It appears these sorts of
changes have not begun to occur.  

A second long-term consideration is the need to develop the capabilities to effectively implement humanitarian intervention. One area in need of improvement is the interaction of military units and humanitarian organizations. At the simplest level this entails education about each other's organization culture, what each is capable and not capable of doing, and how they operate. Direct experience is particularly useful and should be pursued through joint training exercises on a regular basis. A second possible change is a division of labor between national militaries, along the lines of the African Response Force initiative sponsored by the United States. The U.S. and other major militaries can provide transportation and communication support, while other countries with less casualty sensitivity or greater political interest provide troops. It is possible that this will lead to a "ghettoization" of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, one can argue that is an improvement over the disregard for most humanitarian crises that currently prevails.

A third implication of a serious interest in improving the process of humanitarian intervention is conceptual. Terms such as peace-making, peace-enforcement and operations other than war have been used to try to strike a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting. In general, the doctrines behind these labels view military responses to complex emergencies as a variant of traditional peacekeeping. Important insights and

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700 Sarah Sewall, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, suggested the need for institutional changes such as these. She does not think they are happening in the United States. "Rwanda: What Could Have Been Done?" panel presentation in the Institute of P-itics' Forum series at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 14, 1998.

701 Some such exercises already exist, such as the U.S. Marine Corps' Emerald Express.

doctrinal lessons have come from this. For example, intervening militaries must use force in a constrained manner, since they are there to help the local population and create “humanitarian space,” not to win a war.

However, an important point has been missed. In non-consensual environments, humanitarian intervention often is more like war fighting than peacekeeping. This is particularly true when the intervenor tries to protect the population or defeat the perceived perpetrator. In Iraq, ground and air forces engaged in full combat maneuvers to push the Iraqi army out of the safe zone. In Somalia, the UN and American troops engaged in urban combat in an attempt to defeat General Aideed. In Rwanda, the only way to stop the genocide was to defeat the government, which the rebels eventually did. In Bosnia, the combination of NATO air strikes and a Croatian ground offensive induced the Serbs to negotiate a settlement. If a humanitarian intervention is to entail anything more than logistics support, policy makers and military leaders must realize that they are contemplating the possibility (and in some cases the probability) of small-scale war.

Since humanitarian intervention in on-going conflicts often entails the risk of war, it should be done by coalitions of national militaries, not multinational UN forces. Military forces under the command of the United Nations are fine for consensual peacekeeping operations, but they have consistently shown themselves to be bad at fighting. The reasons range from ill-conceived political plans to soldiers of poor quality and include most elements in between. National coalitions have shown themselves to be far more competent than UN forces on the

battlefield. Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations Security Council has sanctioned and monitored interventions by national coalitions from Bosnia to Zaire. The UN has, in effect, subcontracted its intervention work to willing states. Security Council oversight decreases the likelihood that a state will pursue its own interests over those of the people it is supposedly helping. It also gives international legal protection and a certain degree of legitimacy to military meddling in other state’s internal affairs. For some reason, subcontracting is still seen as an exceptional behavior. It ought to be explicitly recognized as a standard operation procedure.

Some of these recommendations involve ambitious changes in national priorities and the definition of national interests. Such changes are not likely to occur in the near future and are not currently on the national agenda. However, since humanitarian military intervention will inevitably occur in the future, and since it has the potential to do some good, questions of how to do it better deserve serious attention.

This dissertation established that past humanitarian interventions have often saved lives. It also identified the conditions under which success at saving lives is most likely. Some of those conditions are difficult to meet, particularly in the most egregious cases of violence against civilians. Whether or not the conditions for success will be met for any particular intervention and whether broader steps toward a better humanitarian intervention capacity are taken depend on the interests of political leaders in powerful states. If they decide that humanitarian intervention is worth a great deal of effort, then it will save many lives in the future. If they do not, then future humanitarian intervention efforts will resemble past ones. They will do some good, but not a lot.
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