

## 24.400

Proseminar in philosophy I

Fall 2003

*Notes on miscellaneous topics – II*Frege's assertion sign

See the attached quote from Geach (from Kenny's *Frege*).

The concept *horse*, and the grammatical predicate 'is red'

See the attached excerpt from Kenny, *Frege*. A prize is available for an explanation of Kenny's point.

The view of "On Sense and Reference"

According to the *Begriffsschrift* (§8), identity is a relation between *names*, not the *referents* of names (objects). According to the *standard interpretation* (see Beaney, 21-2), in "On Sense and Reference" Frege rejects his earlier *name view* in favor of the *object view*; identity is now taken to be a relation between objects, and the informativeness of identity statements is explained in terms of a difference in sense. According to Thau and Caplan, "What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?", *CJP* 31, 2001, Frege *doesn't* reject the name view in "On Sense and Reference". Heck responds on behalf of orthodoxy (you can find this on his website), and Thau and Caplan respond to Heck (forthcoming).

The Mates Problem

In 1950, Benson Mates pointed out that (by way of criticizing Carnap) that instances of:

- (1) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that **D**, believes that **D**.
- (2) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that **D**, believes that **D'**.

can apparently differ in truth value when the substituends for 'D' and 'D'' differ only by synonyms (e.g. 'the holiday lasted for a fortnight', 'the holiday lasted for a period of fourteen days'). This raises obvious problems for the view that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together.

See Mates, "Synonymity", in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Linsky, and also: Church, "Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief", in *Propositions and Attitudes*, ed. Salmon and Soames; Putnam, "Synonymity, and the Analysis of Belief Sentences", *Analysis* 1954.

### Mereology

Mereology has one primitive, 'is a part of'.

#### *Definition*

$x$  overlaps  $y$  iff there is some  $z$  such that  $z$  is a part of  $x$  and  $z$  is a part of  $y$ .

#### *Definition*

$x$  is a *fusion* of some things iff  $x$  has all of those things as parts and every part of  $x$  overlaps one them.

The axioms of mereology are just three:

(*Transitivity*) If  $x$  is a part of  $y$ , and  $y$  is a part of  $z$ , then  $x$  is a part of  $z$ .

(*Unrestricted Composition*) If there are some things, there is a fusion of those things.

(*Uniqueness of Composition*) Any fusion of some things is the only fusion of those things.

For more details and references, see Lewis, *Parts of Classes*. If *Unrestricted Composition* is true, there is an object that has G. E. Moore,  $\pi$ , and my copy of *Principia Ethica* as parts, which might be thought counterintuitive. For an argument against *Unrestricted*

*Composition*, see van Inwagen, *Material Beings*. See also Rosen and Dorr, "Composition as a Fiction", *Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, ed. Gale.

"I falsely believe that p"

Crimmins' paper is in *Analysis* 1992. See also Stoljar and Hájek, "Crimmins, Gonzales, and Moore", *Analysis* 2001, and Rosenthal, "Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case", *Analysis* 2002.

Analyticity, a priority, necessity

A nice pre-Kripke/before-the-fall paper is Quinton, "The A Priori and the Analytic", *PAS* 59, 1963/4.

Contextualism

Stewart Cohen, "How to be a fallibilist," in James Tomberlin, ed.

*Philosophical Perspectives* 2 (1988), 91-123

Stewart Cohen, "Skepticism and everyday knowledge attributions," in Michael

D. Roth and Glenn Ross, eds. *Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism* (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990), 161-9

Stewart Cohen, "Skepticism, relevance, and relativity," in Brian

McLaughlin, ed. *Dretske and His Critics* (Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 17-37

Stephen Schiffer, "Contextualist solutions to skepticism," *Proc. Arist.*

*Soc.* 96 (1996), 317-33

Keith DeRose, "Solving the skeptical problem," *Phil. Rev.* 104 (1995), 1-52

David Lewis, "Elusive knowledge," *AJP* 74 (1996), 549-67

The suggestion that 'Moore knows that he has a hand' might express a true proposition on the Clapham Omnibus and a false one in a philosophy seminar was first made by

David Lewis in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (see p. 247 of *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1).

### Weakness of will and akrasia

They aren't the same: Holton, “Intention and Weakness of Will”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 96 (1999): 241-62

### Personal identity

Animalism (“I was once a fetus”): Olson, *The Human Animal*.

The closest continuer theory: Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, ch. 1.

Relative identity (x is the same F as y, but x is not the same G as y): Geach, *Reference and Identity* (pro); Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance* (con).

Fission does not increase the number of people: Lewis, “Survival and Identity” (*Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1).

Parfit's view: *Reasons and Persons*, and *Reading Parfit*, ed. Dancy.

A useful survey: Noonan, *Personal Identity*.

Do objects persist over time by having temporal parts?: Sider, *Four-dimensionalism*; Haslinger and Fay, eds., *Persistence*, MIT Press, forthcoming.

### Austin

An influential anti-sense data paper is Barnes, “The Myth of Sense Data”, *PAS* 45, 1944/5 (reprinted in Swartz, *Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing*). For a recent sympathetic

discussion of the argument from illusion, see Smith, *The Problem of Perception* (Harvard, 2002).

Dreams are not experiences: Malcolm, *Dreaming* (a minor Wittgensteinian/verificationist classic).

Austin and “disjunctivism”: Thau, “What is disjunctivism?”, *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.

The arguments from illusion and hallucination: Thau, *ibid.*; Smith, *The Problem of Perception*.