THE POLITICS OF AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT:
THE JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI IN PAKISTAN

by

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

B.A. International Relations, Tufts University (1983)
M.A.L.D. International Politics, The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (1984)

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Signature of the Author

Department of Political Science

April 8, 1991

Signature redacted

Certified by

Myron Weiner

Ford Professor of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Signature redacted

Accepted by

Donald L.M. Blackmer

Chair, Graduate Program Committee
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Submitted to the Department of Political Science on April 8, 1991 in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

ABSTRACT

Although much has been written about Islamic revivalism in recent years, few have provided a comprehensive account of the origins, working, and sociopolitical relevance of movements which have spear-headed the resurgence of Islam. An in depth examination of an Islamic movement - one as central to the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism as Jama'at-i Islami - therefore, sheds much light on the inner dynamics of Muslim societies, and discerns the dialectics of the interactions between religion and power in those social settings.

This dissertation is a study of the life and works of Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-'Ala Mawdudi, and the manifestation of his revivalist ideology in the ethos, organizational structure and political practice of the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan. It not only seeks to construct an all-inclusive account of the history and ideology of this Islamic movement, but also contends with a number of theoretical postulates.

The Jama'at-i Islami is one of the oldest and historically most significant of the contemporary Islamic revivalist movements. Dating as far back as 1932, Mawdudi's activist interpretation of Islam provides valuable insights into the dynamics of the historical growth, and the routinization of the charisma of Islamic revivalist expressions. Jama'at-i Islami's extended history also lends itself to an examination of the social and class bases of Islamic revivalism, and hence the extent and direction of relations between Islamic values and symbols, and social movements predicated upon changes in the structure of economic relations and the societal order.

Moreover, Jama'at-i Islami emerged at a time of great cultural and political activity in South Asia in the face of the passing of British rule. Mawdudi's intellectual and political career is reflective of the growing Muslim political consciousness of the time, and the manner in which Islam became the focus of the Muslim political discourse. The case of Jama'at-i Islami is of great relevance to the debate on the direction of the interaction between Islam and politics in South Asia in particular and the Muslim world in general. While confirming the centrality of the compelling charisma of Islamic symbols to the Islamization of political discourse, Jama'at-i Islami's history points to the importance of
the manipulation of Islamic symbols by Muslim elite and lay activists. The case of the Jama'at points to the manner in which Islam can become a vehicle for expression of dissent and an efficacious means for projection of power.

The history of Jama'at-i Islami's political activity in Pakistan, furthermore, provides insights into the impact of political action on the pattern of routinization of revivalist charisma, and conversely, the sacralization of the milieu in which social, economic and political contracts and interactions between the state, the intermediary institutions and the masses take place.

The issues examined by this study are also theoretically significant in that, they shed light upon the reasons for the Jama'at's success in articulating and propagating its ideological perspective, and yet, inability to capitalize on this success in the political arena. The discrepancy which is apparent between the organization's ideological success and political failure, within the context of Pakistani society and politics, has significant implications for understanding the role of Islamic ideology in sociopolitical action in the Muslims world. The case of the Jama'at puts to question the widely-held belief in the unqualified political efficacy of Islamic revivalist ideology, and as such will provide new theoretical insights into the working of revivalism in the political arena.

The research for this dissertation was conducted in Pakistan under the auspices of a grant by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. Extensive use of primary sources, in the form of Jama'at-i Islami publications, oral interviews, and membership and electoral data have been made in constructing a comprehensive account of the movement's history, ideology and pattern of interactions with the Pakistan state.

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Myron Weiner  
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science

Thesis Advisors:  Professor Lucian Pye and  
Professor John L. Esposito
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SOURCES

There are frequent references made to original sources, toponomies and personal names in this study. An explanatory note in this regard is therefore, required. All Urdu, Arabic, or Persian names have been cited according to simplified transliteration system, wherein diacritical marks other than 'ayn and hamzah do not feature. Vowels are marked by \( i, u, \) and \( a \). On occasion, \( e \) or \( o \) have also been utilized to relay a more exact spelling and pronunciation of the name or source cited in the original language. Certain ambiguity has existed in using \( u \) or \( w \), and \( ia \) as opposed to \( iya \). In such circumstances the choice reflects the closest approximation of the pronunciation of the name or source in question.

Personal names are cited in accordance with the transliteration rules cited here even when spelled differently by the persons in question. The only exceptions are names such as Bhutto or Ayub Khan, a particular spelling of which has been established in the Western literature. In transliterating personal names, the collapse of vowels and particular pronunciation of Arabic or Persian words typical of Urdu have been retained. Hence, Hashmi rather than Hashimi appears in the text. Whenever the transliteration method of a directly quoted source differs from the one employed here, the variations have been respected.

A note is also in order with regard to the references. The names of all interviewees who have contributed to this study has been cited both in the footnotes and in the bibliography. The date of the interviews are cited only in the bibliography. On occasion, upon the request of an interviewee his/her name has been withheld. In such circumstances the term "interviews" has been used. Direct quotations and references, whenever possible, are drawn from official and published English translations of the original Urdu works. However, when required, reference has been made to the original Urdu source. The translation of the title of Arabic, Urdu, or Persian works appear only in the bibliography.
### ABBREVIATIONS

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<td><em>Haftroza Zindagi</em> (Lahore), Mawdudi Number (September 29-October 5, 1989).</td>
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<td>Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, <em>Jama'at-i Islami ki Untis Sal</em> (Lahore: Sh'bah-i Nashr'u Isha'at-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1970). This is the text of Mawdudi's speech before the annual gathering of the Jama'at in 1970.</td>
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**QDMN**  
*Qaumi Digest* (Lahore), Mawdudi Number (1980).

**RJI**  
*Rudad-i Jama'at-i Islami*, 6 vols., (Lahore, 1938-83). These volumes contain the proceedings of the various Jama'at congresses between 1941 and 1955. The seventh volume is currently under print.

**SAAM**  

**SDMN**  
*Sayyarah Digest* (Lahore), Mawdudi Number (December 1979).

**SSMN**  
*Sayyarah* (Lahore), Sayyid Mawdudi Number (April-May 1980).

**TQ**  
*Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an* (Hyderabad, Pathankot, and Lahore), (1932-present). *TQ* has been the main forum for the exposition of Mawlana Mawdudi's theological views since 1932, and has also been the Jama'at's official ideological journal since 1941. It was edited by Mawdudi from 1932 to 1979, and is currently edited by Na'im Siddiqi.

**TT**  

**TUTQ**  
INTRODUCTION

"Reality has a manifestation in every epoch;
illuminated is the world thus, by a Name [Allah]"

‘Abd al-Rahman Jami
Developments in the Muslim world over the course of the past decade have precipitated significant debates in the social sciences concerning the place of religion in sociopolitical change. The evident politicization of religion and sacralization of politics across the Muslim world has meant that modernizing change can no longer be viewed as a process which, definitively and necessarily, will harbinger privatization of faith and the passing of olden values.¹ Nor can religion be seen as merely a set of traditional rites and static beliefs, impervious to change and irrelevant to the working of modernization.

New vistas have therefore been opened with view to understanding the patterns of continuity and change in modernizing societies.² The task before the social sciences is therefore, one of reconciling the seemingly idiosyncratic notion of the emergence of hitherto moribund values and loyalties in the political arena, with the directives of time-honored social science perspectives on the content, nature and direction of change towards modernity.

The challenge put before the social sciences has led to a concerted effort directed towards understanding the origins, sociopolitical role, and mode of operation of movements predicated upon the revival of the Islamic faith and its active participation in politics - shaping and reshaping theories, and interpreting existing templates and


typologies in light of novel realities.

The study of the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism has thus far been concentrated primarily on the experiences of Iran and the Arab world, and has as a result, been somewhat restricted in its theoretical outlook.\(^3\) While the existing studies have provided greater understanding of Islamic revivalism, a comprehensive theoretical approach to this subject will not be plausible without the examination of important instances of revivalist activity elsewhere in the Muslim world. Of great importance in this regard is the contemporary history of Islam in South Asia, wherein the structure of sociopolitical thought and practice has been molded in light of the preponderant role of religious revivalism. Two centuries of religiopolitical activism from the emergence of the tradition of reform and renewal associated with Shah Waliu’llah of Delhi in the eighteenth century, to the rise of the Fara’izi reformists in the Bengal and the advent of new initiatives for reassertion of Islamic values in the form of the Deoband, Aligarh, Ahl-i Hadith, Brailwi and Nadwi schools of thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to the advent of the Khilafat and eventually Pakistan movements, has fused religious loyalties and political identity in a symbiotic relationship.\(^4\) The historical growth of South Asian Islam in modern times therefore, provides valuable insights into the origins of revivalism, and its pattern of development and political action. Jama‘at-i Islami (Association or Party of Islam), as heir to the legacy of religiopolitical activism among Indian Muslims, is an

\(^3\) Esposito, "Presidential Address", P.3.

\(^4\) For more on this subject see, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1977), pp.206-91. These movements will also be discussed further in the following chapters.
important case study in this regard.

The Jama'at is also one of the oldest, and ideologically most influential of the Islamic revivalist movements of the twentieth century. Intellectually prolific and politically vociferous, the Jama'at during the course of its more than five decades of activism has had a significant and unmistakable impact on Islamic revivalist thinking across the Muslim world, and the history of Pakistan since the country's creation in 1947. Although never successful in securing power in Pakistan, and often a declining force in electoral politics, the Jama'at remains a consequential Islamic movement, whose long history and pattern of historical development sheds much light on the origins and working of Islamic revivalism, the trajectory along which it is expected to evolve, and generally, the nature of Islam's role in politics and claim to power in the Muslim world.

Jama'at-i Islami, has not thus far received academic scrutiny commensurate to the movement's significance. There exist a number of descriptive accounts of the Jama'at's ideology. They have, by and large, focused on the place of the Jama'at's program in, and

5 While there also exist sizable Jama'at-i Islami organizations in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, our focus in this study will be on the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan; for, led by Mawlana Mawdudi, and hence, the source of the movement's ideology, it became the most significant organizational and political expression of Mawdudi's program, with influence far beyond the boundaries of South Asia. Moreover, the Jama'at-i Islami, despite its ubiquitous presence in South Asia, has remained acephalous. The various Jama'at-i Islami's of South Asia have independent organizational structures, and operate with view to the particular needs of the political environment of their country. While rooted in the same ideology, they are sufficiently autonomous of one another so as to constitute separate case studies.

its implications for, contemporary Islamic thought. The political dimension of the movement's history, however, has received only scant attention. Consequently, important considerations such as the movement's social basis, its organizational development, or the pattern of its interactions with various political actors, remain unexplored. A more comprehensive examination of the history and ideology of Jama'at-i Islami can therefore, shed greater light upon the manner in which charismatic leadership, politicization of religious doctrine, and the sacralization of popular participation in politics have related Islam's theological paradigms and historical unfolding to the vicissitudes of the passage of Muslim societies into modernity.

These themes will be explored in this study through an examination of the ideological foundations, social bases, organizational structure, and political impetus and *modus operandi* of the Jama'at. Our aim will be to identify both the sociopolitical contingencies which engendered a reviverist response in the form of the Jama'at, and the requisite circumstances which promoted and sustained the movement's political activism.

The contribution of a study such as this, however, extends beyond outlining the various attributes of an Islamic revivalist movement. The case of the Jama'at is also theoretically significant, and will be instructive with regards to the direction and extent of interaction of the imperatives of the Islamic belief system with the factors and processes

(New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977). Bahadur's study does focus on the political dimensions of the Jama'at's history; however, the focus of the study remains in the ideological orientation of the movement. Also of significance in this regard is, Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). However, Binder's excellent study of the Jama'at's role in the constitutional debates following the creation of Pakistan is limited to the years 1947-56.

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which produce and sustain social and political movements in Muslim countries.\(^7\) The complexities of determining the nature of this relation are, no doubt, legion, especially in the context of South Asian Islam, where the causes for Muslim communal consciousness and the Islamization of their political discourse since the nineteenth century remain subject to scholarly debate. The history, ideological development and political *modus operandi* of the Jama'at, however, can shed much light on a number of theoretical concerns in the study of the role of Islam in the politics of Muslim societies.

Studies conducted on Muslim political movements in South Asia in the last century, such as those by Metcalf on the Deoband educational tradition, Lelyveld on the Aligarh reformers, and Minault on the Khilafat Movement\(^8\) have correlated the Islamization of the political discourse in South Asia with advancement in education among Muslims.\(^9\) The pattern of development of the Jama'at-i Islami, and the movement's social composition tends to lend support to this position.

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9 See David Gilmartin, "The Shahidganj Mosque Incident: A Prelude to Pakistan", in Burke and Lapidus, eds., *Islam*, pp.146-68.
More importantly, scholars have debated the direction of the relation between Islam and politics in producing an Islamized political discourse in South Asia. Studies such as that of Robinson have viewed the emotive power and potential of the history of Muslims of the Subcontinent as the source of and impetus for sacralization of their political consciousness. Others, such as Brass, have argued that, the ability and willingness of the Muslim elite and political leaders to utilize Islamic values and symbols with view to mobilizing viable social movements goes a long way to explain the communalist and, by implication, sacral nature of Muslim political consciousness in South Asia.

Mawdudi's intellectual and political career, while reflective of the emotive potential of the Islamic tradition, confirms the teleological importance of the manipulation of Islamic symbols in both the emergence and final shape of the Muslim political discourse in South Asia. Moreover, the history of Jama'at-i Islami, provides a vista for examining the linkages between Islamic symbols and paradigmatic outlooks on the one hand, and the social and political exigencies facing Muslims in British India, and later in Pakistan, on the other. The workings of this nexus and the forces which control and limit its efficacy, needless to add, have been consequential in the emergence, growth, and final shape of Islamic revivalist movements across the Muslim world.

The most important theoretical implication of our study of the case of the Jama'at, however, pertains to the discrepancy which is apparent between the organization's


ideological appeal and lackluster political performance. Although the Jama'at has been intellectually prolific, ideologically articulate, and organizationally adept, it has failed to translate the religious enthusiasm which it has generated into a successful political campaign. The organization's ability to influence the popular political discourse has in effect proved ineffectual in the political arena.

The case of the Jama'at, therefore, raises important questions about the efficacy of Islamic ideology as a vehicle for political mobilization; and instead brings to attention those factors - operating in Pakistani society or related to the Jama'at's policy choices - upon which a successful translation of an Islamic ideological perspective into political power is contingent. The facile culmination of revivalist ideology in political power which was witnessed in Iran, or is evident in Jordan or Algeria, is not inherent to the process of idealization of Islam. Far from a universal norm to be expected of any and all expressions of revivalism, the success Islamic revivalism as a sociopolitical movement is contingent upon the confluence of the ideological perspective and popular political concerns. The issue which ultimately presents itself in this study is, therefore, the extent of Islamic revivalism's efficacy as vehicle for the realization of political power.

Central to a better understanding of wherefrom and whither Islamic revivalism is the paradigm of 
tajdid
(renewal), its historical significance, and its expression in modern Islamic political thought and practice. 

tajdid
, and the symbolisms associated with it have constituted the central focus of Islamic revivalism's discourse, and approach to politics; and have formed the framework for the propagation of its agenda. A cursory review of the sociopolitical significance of this doctrine, and its place in contemporary Islamic
revivalism at this juncture, before delving into the case of the Jama'at, will therefore shed greater light on the issues of concern to this study.

**Renewal and Reform in Islamic History**

Islamic history is replete with instances of charismatic-millenarian responses to theodicical\(^\text{12}\) as well as sociopolitical crises\(^\text{13}\). Movements born of these crises have


been significant forces in the unfolding of Islamic history. They have emerged as chiliastic tendencies, predicated upon the doctrine of *mahdiism*\(^\text{14}\), and thus proclaiming the revival of Islam and the restoration of the ideal Islamic order. The institutionalization of their charisma has not always heralded the recreation of the ideal Islamic order and a resurgence of pristine religious values, but has also facilitated the emergence of denominations or heterodox sects within the pale of Islam\(^\text{15}\) or alternately, led to the rise of entirely new religious perspectives.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^{14}\) *Mahdiism* is a messianic doctrine in Islam, according to which, a descendent of the Prophet of Islam, known as al-Mahdi, will arise to revive Islam, and free the world from evil. For a definition of *mahdiism* see, D.B. Macdonald, *al-Mahdi*, in EI(1); and W. Madelung, *al-Mahdi*, in EI(2). Also see, Williams, *Themes*; Blichfeldt, *Early Mahdism*; and Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*.


\(^{16}\) See Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal*; Mangol Bayat, *Mysticism and Dissent; Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982); D.M.
These movements have served as a dynamic force in Islamic history by capturing the quintessential psychological impetus of Islamic idealism, perpetuating the leitmotif of authority in Islam, and projecting the values of the religion onto societies faced with cognitive dissonances. They have meted out directives, through which the Islamic world view has, time and again, found manifestation in a temporal order. More to the point, charismatic-millenarian movements have served as bulwarks for the "renewal" (tajdid) and "reform" (islah) of Islam - movements directed at reaffirmation of pristine orthodoxy, 

MacEoin, Bab, in EIr; idem., Babism, EIr; and J. Cole et al., Bahaism, in EIr, for examples of this phenomenon in Shi‘ism, and Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) for an example from Sunnism. 


the periodic occurrence of which has determined the pattern of continuity and change in Islamic history, and the consolidation of religious ideals in sociopolitical institutions.

Hodgson saw this process as central to the historical progression of Islam; for it conditioned the interactions between the Islamic message and various sociocultural orders, and hence determined the form and content of the Islamic civilization.\textsuperscript{18} The historical dynamics produced by revivalism decides the manner in which Islam's synthesis with parochial cultures creates "Muslim" orders, which then strive to become "Islamic". It is this process, one which moves societies from "Islamic" to "Muslim", and then again to "Islamic" that Hodgson identified as the primary impetus of Islamic history.\textsuperscript{19}

In Hodgson’s view Islamic civilization consists of concentric circles, each of which is formed around a synthesis between religious ideals and parochial cultural institutions. As the circles get wider and move further afar from the core, they lose their religious vitality - they move from "Islamic" to "Muslim". Yet, since these circles remain anchored in the teachings of Islam and the ideals of the faith, the reduced echo of orthodoxy does not obviate its influence on the various Muslim sociocultural orders.\textsuperscript{20} The Islamic ideal, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Aziz Ahmad, \textit{Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964} (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).


\textsuperscript{19} A variation of this theory is presented by Akbar S. Ahmed, who sees Islamic history as the product of the workings of fluxes and refluxes, produced by tensions inherent in the continuing importance of religious idealism in the face of pressures for synthesis, created by the expansion of the cultural purview of Islam. See, Akbar S. Ahmed, \textit{Discovering Islam; making Sense of Muslim History and Society} (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), pp. 30-88.

\textsuperscript{20} Hodgson, \textit{Venture of Islam}, vol, I, pp. 78, 85-87, 93.
regardless of how distant Muslim livelihoods may drift from it in accommodating syntheses with parochial cultural expressions, continues to act as a salient factor in the life of Muslims and hence, in the cultural or social crises which they confront.

Renewal and reform therefore, act in a cathartic capacity, as manifestations and guarantors of the underlying orthodoxy which relates all Muslim societies to the fundamentals of the faith. As a paradigm for religious interpretation and political action, revivalism occupies a cardinal position in the Muslim sociopolitical world view, which is more clearly manifested in the often non-revolutionary, and even apolitical emergence of instances of revivalism in Islamic history. Revival of religious sentiments, however, often has broad social and political implications. Directed at recreating a utopian order capable of serving as a remedy for theodical circumstances, they emanate from cultural and religious considerations, as well as from sociopolitical crises and catastrophes. Revivalism therefore, remains an ever-present factor in the religiopolitical equation of Muslim societies.

For Gellner, the pendulum-like oscillations of Muslim societies between "Muslim" and "Islamic" expressions is not so much a feature of Islam’s territorial expansion and civilizational growth, but rather, is a product of the dominant paradigm of government formation among Muslims.\(^{21}\) Reassertive orthodoxy, Gellner argues, is an urban phenomenon, associated with the ethics of the Muslim mercantile classes. The esoteric, heterodox and culturally syncretic "Muslim" trait is a characteristic of the nomadic and tribal peoples. In Muslim societies from Central Asia to Morocco, tribes have traditionally

provided the government, and revived the vitality of the central political and administrative orders. Therefore, the emergence and subsequent routinization of Islamic revivalism has been a by-product of the larger political process. Concentration of power in the urban centers, Gellner argues, can be correlated with the advent of greater assertion of orthodoxy. The decline and demise of power in the urban centers moreover, coincides with the routinization of revivalism and its subsequent replacement by the more mystical religious ethics of the new order. In modern times, the complete and irreversible hegemony of power by urban centers has resulted in the entrenchment of greater orthodoxy, and hence the more visible assertion of Islamic ideals.

Studies conducted by Geertz on revivalism while cognizant of the historical perspective presented by Hodgson and Gellner, concentrates to a greater extent on the social and political origins, as well as the function of the contemporary manifestations of revivalism. While Geertz's typology, in its emphasis on the discrete nature of the syntheses between Islam and various cultural orders parts with Hodgson's arguments regarding the ultimate anchoring of all expressions of Islam in the perennial ideals of the orthodoxy, the two scholars share similar outlooks on the role of Islamic revivalism in the historical unfolding of Islam.

Geertz's explication of the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism is based on the importance which he accords to the pattern of synthesis between Islamic ideals and parochial cultural institutions in determining the place and role of Islam in various social
settings. Geertz argues that, although central to the formation and continued existence of Muslim societies, the synthesis between Islamic ideals and indigenous cultural institutions is tenuous and impermanent. Changes in the structure of social and political relations, due to the imperialist penetration of Muslim lands and socioeconomic dislocations engendered by the development process, will necessitate renewed syntheses and more importantly, a reaffirmation of religious ideals. The resultant idealization of faith, what Geertz has termed "scripturalism", provides "an ideological stance for Islam in the modern world."


23 For the relation between political marginalization of Muslims under the British in India and its impact on the rise of Muslim communalism and revivalism see, Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 46-86; and Gilmartin, "The Shahidganj Mosque", pp. 146-68.


Binder too, argues that revivalism is a search for cultural purity in the face of Western challenges:

"If Latin America is concerned about economic exploitation, the Middle East is most concerned about protecting its cultural heritage."

This pattern is most evident in the modern times; for, the Muslim experience with imperialism has created a feeling of cultural constriction and hence a sense of anomie, compounded in the case of South Asia with an experience of political dislocation. Hence, revival and reform in Geertz's view is not only a primary impetus in the formation and growth of Islamic civilization, guaranteeing the continuity of the ideals of orthodoxy with view to accommodating the requirements of Islam's expansion into new cultural domains, but is the means through which the temporal reality finds meaning in terms of Islam's moral imperatives. Revivalist tendencies act to resolve the cognitive dissonance and the sense of theodicy created by the change in the sociopolitical fabric of Muslim societies which resulted from their encounter with the Western civilization, its political and economic manifestations in the Muslim world, and the problems wrought by the process.

Others have related the impact of the West with parochial factors. Arjomand has pointed to the importance of cultural anomie, social dislocations and experience of relative deprivation in giving rise to instances of revivalism; see, Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.189-202. Mardin, in his illuminating examination of the perdurability of Islam in Turkey, has pointed to the importance of resistance to the holistic structure of the secular social structure of modern Turkey in reversion to traditional idioms and espousal of a revivalist world view; see, Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1989). Esposito presents a comprehensive account, which examines economic, ethnic and political factors in conjunction with the cultural impact of imperialism; see, Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, especially pp. 211-39; also see, Piscatori, *Islam and the Political Process*.

25 Geertz, *Islam Observed*, P. 39. Generally, Geertz's view of religion as a "cultural system" is particularly useful in relating the emergence of new worldviews to both the indigenous socioreligious ethos, and to the use of religious symbolisms in understanding and communicating with the outside world. See, Clifford Geertz, "Religion as Cultural System", in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 88-90.
of socioeconomic development.\footnote{Talmon has detected similar processes at work in the emergence of secular messianic movements in nineteenth century Europe: 

"It is no mean paradox that the idolization of HISTORY should have been the outcome of and sequel to the collapse of concrete historic community embodied in organized religion..."}

Geertz, therefore, sees "scripturalism", as it is reflected in latter-day revivalism, as a pattern of social and religious behavior which is symptomatic of a process of becoming.\footnote{Geertz's position has, interestingly, found support in the works of Arendt, who also associated activist idealism based on tradition with the breakdown of a hitherto sacrosanct worldview: 

"The end of tradition does not necessarily mean that traditional concepts have lost their power over the minds of men. On the contrary, it sometimes seams that this power of well-worn notions and categories becomes more tyrannical as the tradition loses its living force and as the memory of its beginning recedes..."}

for it purports to the vicissitudes of the synthesis between Islamic orthodoxy and the modernizing cultural reality of today's Muslim societies. Revivalism both determines and defines the nature and terms of this latest cultural synthesis in Islamic history, and seeks to confirm the place of orthodoxy therein.

Instances of revivalist activism in South Asia, however, point to the salience of yet another factor, namely, "communalism". While the communalist element has not been a distinguishing feature of Islamic revivalism in the Subcontinent, it has, nevertheless, served

\footnote{See, Jacob Talmon, Political Messianism; the Romantic Phase (New York: Praeger, 1960), P. 24.}

as the handmaiden in the emergence and subsequent growth of revivalist movements such as the Jama'at. In the revivalist perspective, the greater ascendancy of the Hindu community, which followed the establishment of colonial rule in India, occurred at the cost of the reversal of the Muslim political status during the same period. Consequently, the renewal and reform of Islam has been propagated within the context of the Hindu-Muslim communal rivalry, which characterized Indian politics during the colonial era.

Yet, despite its communalist provenance and political impetus, the revivalist discourse in South Asia has remained anchored in a debate with modernity. The most spirited instance of Muslim political activism of the last century, the jihad (holy war) of Sayyid Isma'il Shahid (1786-1831) in the 1820s, was waged against the background of the Sikh, but more importantly, the British infringement on the autonomy of Muslim power in northern India. Other movements heralding a revival of Islam since the nineteenth century too, found shape in a debate with the colonial order. For, they emerged against the background of the sack of Delhi and the fall of the Mughuls at the hands of the British in 1857-58. While conscious of the Hindu threat, Metcalf points out, it was the colonial culture which kept the attention of these movements. The pattern of religious exegesis and political thought, initiated by those earlier movements persist in the world view of contemporary revivalist movements in South Asia.


30 Metcalf, Islamic Revival.
The origins of the Jama'at can be traced to the communal nature of the South Asian social structure. The movement's world view has been predicated upon the psychological anxieties and the political directives which are intrinsic to a communalist sociopolitical setting. At the ideological level, however, the Jama'at conforms both to the precedent set by movements of Islamic revival which came before it in India; and the general pattern along which the contemporary revivalist discourse has taken form.

The Sociopolitical Roots of Islamic Revivalism

The emergence of Islamic revivalism in modernizing Muslim societies, as Arjomand has observed in the case of Iran, confirms Weber's belief that, the nature of social evolution is primarily determined by cultural values and institutions. Yet, revivalism is not always or solely predicated upon a Weberian compulsion to social action by those who firmly believe in the tenets of a world view now under challenge. Revivalism, as Lapidus writes, is also an outcome of search for a new political order in societies besieged by socioeconomic crises, cultural and political imperialism, communalist antagonisms, and questions of legitimacy and state formation. "In traditional societies", writes Smith, "religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not....religion can serve as the means by which the masses become politicized". Hence, in societies where Islam continues to be

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32 Lapidus, "Islamic Political Movements". Also see, Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*.

essential to all social organization and the most efficacious vehicle for political integration, 
new political coalitions and means of discourse cannot be divorced of Islam. For so long 
as Islamic modes of authority and the symbolisms associated with them hold sway over the 
masses, politics cannot be immune to the lure of sacralization.

Islamic revivalism is therefore a species of necessity, and has to function with roots 
in the social classes most concerned with the new political coalitions and changes in the 
existing balance of power in the polity. The social classes most closely identified with the 
emergence of revivalist movements across the Muslim world in recent years are those who 
have experienced relative deprivation and a sense of cultural anomie in the existing 
structure of economic, or as was the case in British India, communal relations, and 
more generally, the lower middle class - the petit-bourgeoisie. Expressions of revivalism 
in modern times are therefore, the outward forms of movements, which are predicated on 
class, ethnic or communal interests, and are born of the exigencies caused by social 
dysfunctions and political dilemmas evident at times of critical societal and economic 
change. Their intellectual structure and political modus operandi is determined by this 
sociopolitical function, and is therefore determined by the nature of the political order in 
which the revivalist agenda is elaborated. In polities which are themselves the hybrid


35 See, Binder, Islamic Liberalism for a discussion of the class bases of revivalism. Also 
see, Michael M.J. Fischer, "Islam and the Revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie", in Daedalus, 
Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", in International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 12:4 (December 1980), pp.423-53; and Roy Mottahedeh, Mantle of the 
products of a marriage between tradition and modernity, wherein, as Sharabi illustrates, traditional patriarchies have not only withstood the pressures of modernization, but have actually been reinforced by it, revivalism too, is expressed in the language and symbolisms of "neo-patriarchy".\textsuperscript{36}

In providing meaning to the increasingly crisis-ridden Muslim sociocultural institutions, revivalism has utilized the promise of otherworldly salvation in formulating an integrative response to social dislocations.\textsuperscript{37} This novel response, above and beyond the provenance of individual instances of revivalism, is understood and defined through a debate with the modern world.\textsuperscript{38} The contemporary revivalist oeuvre is a synthesis between the modern and the Islamic. It has absorbed certain aspects of the Western civilization, notably its philosophy of scientific knowledge, and yet strives to define a nativist Islamic identity in contrast to the "other", which is, more often than not, a


distorted and simplistic image - a parody - of the West.39

Seeking to accommodate forces which are anchored in sociopolitical conflicts, Islamic revivalism has been compelled to reinterpret Islamic symbols and historical paradigms, and define its own agenda, in light of the political exigencies and ideological pressures extant in the social and cultural milieu in which it emerges and operates. It has reinterpreted, idealized and, as such rationalized religious faith and practice. It is essentially a hybrid world view, which facilitates the extension of religion's moral imperatives into the conduct of politics40 - the metamorphosis of religion into an all-encompass-

39 The notion of defining the "self" in debate with and contrast to the "other" has been explored and outlined by Michel Foucault in such studies as, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, Richard Howard, trans., (New York: Pantheon, 1965); idem, The Birth of the Clinic; Archaeology of Medical Perception, A.M. Sheriden Smith, trans., (New York: Pantheon, 1973); and especially, idem, The Archaeology of Knowledge, A.M. Sheriden Smith, trans., (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1972). Foucault’s approach has been studied in the context of relations between the Middle East and the West by Edward Said in Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Also in this regard see Partha Chaterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1986). In the case of the Jama’at, the "other" is also Hinduism.

40 Modern revivalist thinking, in fact, parts with traditional Islam in a qualitative manner. Scholars have utilized a number of terms such as "scripturalism" (Geertz), "radical Islam" (Sivan) or "traditionalism" (Arjomand), (see note 11), to capture the essence of that qualitative difference. Also instructive in this regard are Binder, Islamic Liberalism, and works by Shayegan cited in note 37. Shayegan’s work is particularly instructive in that it details the manner in which revivalism emerges as the rationalization and idealization of religion in the face of the challenge of modernity. Also See, Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown; Arendt, "Tradition", pp. 28-39; Victor Lidz, "Religion and Cybernetic Concepts in Theory of Action", Sociological Analysis, 43:4 (Winter 1982), P.293; Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 350-51; and Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (New York: Anchor Books, 1980), pp. 20-21 for general theoretical explications of rationalizing change in traditional and religious perspectives.
ing ideology. While the political aims of revivalism appear to be most foreboding, the ramifications of its social impact are even greater. As revivalism shapes social ethos, it influences the interface between state and society; and as such, the direction and extent of political development.

Elements of a typology of Islamic revivalism are evident in the foregoing theoretical elaboration. Islamic revivalism has been identified as a discrete and increasingly formalized mode of sociopolitical action, with a distinct aim and function, and a discernable social base. Yet, as mentioned earlier, beyond these basic theoretical postulates, fundamental questions regarding the origins, pattern of development, and especially the future prospects of Islamic revivalism, remain unanswered. Most notably, issues pertaining to the origins of Islamic revivalism and the nature of its political discourse should be separated from those pertaining to its role in the political process, and its efficacy as a vehicle for the realization of political power. For, while revivalism has emerged as a significant sociopolitical force, and has enjoyed success in influencing the political discourse, it has proved far less capable in operating as an effective political

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movement. The process which has produced Islamic revivalism, and sustained its growth thus far, does not necessarily culminate in the movement’s take over of power. Factors which account for the rise of revivalism are therefore, not the same as those which can sustain and expand the movement. Unless able to control those factors which can translate ideological instincts into political power, Islamic revivalism may well prove to be a limited phenomenon, ideologically consequential, but politically constrained. Discerning the factors which account for the rise of Islamic revivalism, those which control the unfolding of its ideological and political agenda, and those which mitigate its unimpeded growth will be a central concern of this study.

An interpretive endeavor, such as this, which hopes to present a more lucid account of revivalism, will have to contend with these issues, and especially the issue of the limitations to the success of Islamic revivalism. With this agenda in mind, eight related themes will inform the analytical narrative and heuristic aim of this study. They are, 1) the extent and nature of the influence of socioeconomic imperatives on Islamic revivalism; 2) the role of political actors in promoting, articulating, and directing Islamic revivalism; and the relation of "Islamic ideology" to social action 3) the nature of the revivalist ideology, and the directives of the discourse which has produced it; 4) the place of history, especially pattern of changes in Muslim life and thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the making of the revivalist world view and program of action; 5) the social basis of Islamic revivalism; 6) the nature of relations between Islamic revivalism, communalism and nationalism, as elaborated ideologically and as it has taken shape in practice; 7) the scope and nature of the forces which have governed the process of routinization and
institutionalization of Islamic revivalism's chiliastic idealism, and the direction which this process has taken; 8) the extent of influence of revivalism on the pattern of sociopolitical change, and the limits to the efficacy of the revivalist ideology and program of action. In examining these themes, special attention will be given to the role of tensions inherent in the implementation of an ideological perspective in a particular social setting in shaping the pattern of its historical evolution. The case of the Jama'at, given the length of its history and the importance of its ideology to Islamic revivalism as a whole, presents a suitable case study for addressing these questions. In addition, this study will seek to move beyond a discussion of causes of revivalism and circumstances in which it occurs, and to identify those intellectual, cultural, social and political factors and influences which coalesce to determine the final shape of a revivalist movement, in this case, the Jama'at-i Islami.

Jama'at-i Islami: The Sociopolitical Context of Revivalism

No part of the Muslim world has been witness to the trials and tribulations of Islamic revivalism, politicization of religious sentiments, and identification of political imperatives in terms of religious symbolisms more than the Indian subcontinent. For an examination of mahdiist movements in the Subcontinent see, Williams, Aspects, pp. 215-16 and 224-29; For instances of mahdiism since the last century, especially the movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid see, Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp. 54-63; and Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, Mawj-i Kawthar, 15th ed., (Lahore: Idarah-i Thiqafat-i Islam, 1988), pp. 13-39.
of Delhi (1703-62)\textsuperscript{44} has become the medium through which the indigenous sociopolitical ethos has understood and related to the changes occurring in its surroundings. It has therefore, served as the means for the formulation and exposition of ideas which could both make sense of the prevailing theodicies and crises, and provide the panacea for them by reestablishing the ideal Islamic order.\textsuperscript{45} Succinctly put, renewal and reform have become institutionalized forms of religiopolitical expression in Indian Islam, and therefore, feature prominently in the Muslim sociopolitical debates and movements in South Asia. It is in the context of this historical framework that, the emergence of the Jama'at will be examined.

The political awakening of India in the face of British imperialism was, moreover, from inception associated with the rise of communal political sentiments among Muslims.\textsuperscript{46} The history of British colonial rule in India and the division of the Subcontinent along communal lines has been amply discussed elsewhere, and need not concern us here. Yet, the legacy of the politics of India during the colonial era has

\textsuperscript{44} Sirhindi was known as the \textit{mujaddid-i alf-i thani} (renewer of the second millennium). Sirhindi's revivalism was institutionalized in his Sufi order, the Naqshbandis, some of whose branches are known by the title Mujaddidi. For more on Sirhindi see, Yohanan Friedmann, \textit{Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity} (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1971). On Shah Waliullah see, N. Jalbani, \textit{Teachings of Shah Waliullah of Delhi} (Lahore, 1973), and Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, \textit{Shah Wali-Allah and His Times} (Canberra: Ma'rifat, 1980). On the role of Sirhindi and Shah Waliullah and their place in the Islamic revivalist tradition of the Subcontinent see, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}, pp. 16-86.

\textsuperscript{45} For the theoretical perspective in this regard see, Geertz, "Religion as Cultural System", pp. 88-90.

\textsuperscript{46} See, Paul Brass, \textit{Language, Religion and Politics in North India} (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
continued to shape the political language and mode of operation of the Muslims of South Asia. This point is more readily evident in the case of Pakistan. Not only is the impact of revivalism manifest in the successive constitutions of the country, in 1956, 1963 and 1973; the state’s professed ethos, and the symbolisms and mechanics of its politics, but has also to a great extent transformed the cultural vestiges of Pakistani life. The place of Islam in the cultural life and politics of Pakistan owes much to the activism of revivalist movements the most significant of which is the Jama'at-i Islami, a movement of paramount importance in Pakistani history with roots in the Indian politics of the inter-war years and the legacy of Islamic revivalist discourse in India.

The origins of Jama'at-i Islami precede its creation in 1941. They are to be found in the education and thinking of its founder and long time leader, Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903-79). Mawdudi’s religiopolitical awareness began in Hyderabad, in the Deccan, during a period when the Nizam’s power, symbolic of the centuries-long tradition of Muslim rule over India, had begun to wane; and where Hindu political awakening had altered the balance of power. What was evident in Hyderabad was a process which began with the fall of the Mughul Dynasty following the Great Mutiny of 1857 and the entrenchment of the British Raj. Much of Muslim politics, religious thinking,

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47 In the Constitutions of 1956 and 1973 Pakistan is officially referred to as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

48 For more in this regard see, Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, and Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1986).

49 Nizam was the official title of the rulers of the Asifiyah dynasty of Hyderabad.
and social organizations, from Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s (1817-98)\textsuperscript{50} Aligarh movement to Muslim agitations in Bengal and the Punjab\textsuperscript{51} since the nineteenth century had been directed at reversing the continuous occlusion of Muslim political power before the rise in the fortunes of the British, and subsequently, the Hindus.\textsuperscript{52}

Mawdudi came of age at a time of the eclipse of colonial power and assertion of Indian national consciousness. This was also a time when much of Muslim effort directed at salvaging their social status and restoring the political prominence which they lost at the outset of the colonial era, came to a naught. Accommodationist experiments with the writ of imperial rule, such as those of Sayyid Ahmad Khan or Punjab’s Unionist Party\textsuperscript{53} had proven futile in stemming the tide of Hindu supremacy, or assuaging the ever increasing anxiety of the Muslim masses.

The Muslims of India had begun to view the restoration of Muslim political power as the means to assert their identity the sole protector of their political interests as well

\textsuperscript{50} Sayyid Ahmad Khan was a notable Muslim intellectual of Delhi, who sought to ameliorate the declining status of the Muslims following the Great Mutiny by educating Muslims in modern subjects, promoting their participation in the working of the Raj as loyal subjects, and a reform of Islam to support the first two objectives. For more on Sayyid Ahmad see, Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation; and J.M.S. Baljon, Jr., The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949).


\textsuperscript{52} On the impact of this trend of events on the Indian ‘ulama see, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}, pp. 16-86.

\textsuperscript{53} The Unionist Party was a political grouping of the landed elite of the Punjab, which espoused a policy of communal unity and loyalty to the Raj. On the Unionist Party see, Gilmartin, \textit{Empire and Islam}. 

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as the panacea to their existing social predicaments. Consequently, during the inter-war years, the Muslims of India, turned to an increasing extent to communalism, channeling their political aspirations and energies into the formulation of political agendas, whose prowess and efficacy lay in their manipulation of Islamic symbolisms. As a result, the in 1920s and the 1930s Islam was catapulted into the political arena, and its symbols were politicized and utilized for purposes of mass mobilization.

However, communal agitations did not prove to be the panacea which the Muslims had hoped for. The earliest movement directed at creating Muslim communal and political unity and organization, the Khilafat Movement, in which Mawdudi also participated, and upon which the hopes, aspirations and frustrations of the Muslims of India rode collapsed; leaving in its wake bitter experiences for Indian Muslims, including Mawdudi. The legacy of the Khilafat Movement was, however, to lead the Muslims to greater expressions of communalism throughout the following decade.

Meanwhile, the Swaraj (Home Rule) effort, initiated by the Congress Party in 1924 had also come to a naught. Hence, following the Government of India Act of 1935 and

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54 Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Separatism", pp. 78-112; and Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.44-69.

55 See in this regard, Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963)

56 The Khilafat Movement, 1920-24, emerged in India as movement of protest against British rule, elaborated and operationalized around the issue of the threat by the Allies to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph during World War I. For more on the Khilafat Movement see, Minault, The Khilafat Movement.

57 Mawdudi has reflected on the Khilafat Movement and its impact on him in his autobiographical address before the proceedings commemorating the twenty ninth anniversary of Jama'at-i Islami, held in Lahore on August 26, 1970. See, JIKUS.
the subsequent elections of 1937, the Congress began to make serious overtures to Muslims, which enticed some like the Jam‘iat-i ‘Ulama-i Hind (JUH, Association of Indian ‘Ulama) to serve as junior partners to the Congress, acknowledging in a de facto fashion the Hindu political ascendancy. Others, in the Muslim League reacted to the same realization by opting out of India, demanding a separate state for the Muslims.

Mawdudi, meanwhile, stood for the rejection of Hindu ascendancy and the continuation of the Muslim claim to India. He appealed for a return to a pure and


61 The Muslim League, formed in 1906, emerged as a party for the preservation of Muslim communal interests. In the 1930s and the 1940s, under the leadership of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah (d.1948), it became the focus of Muslim secessionist politics. For more on the history and politics of the Muslim League see, Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League; Its History, Activities, and Achievements* (Agra: Agra Books, 1954); Wolpert, *Jinnah*; Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*. 

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unadulterated Islam, and the restoration of Muslim rule over the whole of India. However, acutely conscious of the fears and anxieties of his community regarding the rise of a Hindu "Raj", Mawdudi was by no means beyond the lure of communalist solutions, and in practice recognized the "two nation theory" in a *de facto* fashion. For, the struggle for power in India had to begin, in the first place, with the preservation of Muslim identity in the face of imminent Hindu challenges.

The increasingly communal character of the Indian politics of the time, and the appeal made to religious symbolisms in the formulation of new political alliances and programs by various Muslim groupings as well as the Muslim League leaders, created

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64 See, *TQ*, (October-December 1938), pp. 85-320, where Mawdudi presented a "two nation" scheme of his own. For more on this issue see chapter 4.

65 Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Separatism", P. 78.


Usage of religion for political ends continued following the partition in the conduct of politics in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders resorted to Islamic symbolisms to an increasing extent as they confronted problems in the economic sphere, in state-building, in settlement of refugees, or over the Kashmir issue; see, Binder, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 117-232.

Mawdudi clearly understood the appeal of the Muslim League to be based on its use of Islamic symbolisms, and the party's claim to be the standard-bearer of Islam;
a climate wherein Mawdudi's theological discourse found meaning and relevance. The use
of Islamic motifs in Muslim politics had, in fact, become so prevalent that, as Hardy puts
it, the Muslim League by the mid-1940s resembled "a chiliastic movement rather than a
pragmatic political party". Moreover, the emergence of a number of Muslim religious
and communal organizations, some of which remained nothing more than a proposal, such
as Abu'l-Kalam Azad's Hizbu'llah in Calcutta; Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan's Shabban al-Muslimin
in Aligarh; 'Inayatu'lllah Mashriqi's Khaksar Tahrik, Sayyid 'Atau'lllah Shah Bukhari's
Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, and Pir Fazl Shah's Hizbu'llah in the Punjab, Jam'iat-i 'Ulama-i
Hind in Northern India and the Muslim League itself, had pointed to the importance of
religiopolitical organizations in promoting Muslim political consciousness and communal
interests. Jama'at-i Islami emerged within the milieu of this organized Muslim activism,
which by the early 1940s had become an accepted channel for the expression of Muslim
religiopolitical sentiments.

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see, JIKUS, pp. 72-79.

On the emergence of novel expressions of Muslim political identity with view to
forming larger political coalitions see, Sandria Freitag, "The Roots of Muslim Separatism
in South Asia: Personal Practice and Public Structures in Kanpur and Bombay", in Burke
and Lapidus, Islam, pp. 115-45; and Gilmartin, "The Shahidganj Mosque".

67 Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1972), P.239.

68 Mawdudi was clearly conscious of the importance of organizations from very early
on. He wrote on the importance of organizations among Muslims in some of his earliest
writings on Muslim politics in India; see, TQ, December 1937, P. 300.

It is important to note that examples of religiopolitical organizations had also
emerged in this period among other communities in India, noteworthy among them being,
the Akali Dal among the Sikhs and the Arya Samaj among the Hindus. See in this regard,
Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978), and Kenneth W. Jones,
Arya Dharm (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)
Mawdudi's Aurangzaiban vision emerged at a time of feelings of insecurity and fear of extinction among Muslims, which Akbar S. Ahmed has identified as the preponderant religiopolitical predicament and hence motivation of Indian Muslims of Hyderabad. The eclipse of Hyderabad's magnificent Muslim culture and the marginalization of its Muslim community following the collapse of the Nizam's state in 1948 was to haunt Mawdudi in the subsequent years. The fate of Hyderabad's Muslim order imbued Mawdudi's persona with a feeling of tragedy, and informed his ideas with a sense of desperation and urgency, directed at saving Islam from decline and eventual extinction. These motifs began to emerge in Mawdudi's writings even before the partition, and continued to appear in his works thenceforth.

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69 Reference here is to Aurangzaib 'Alamgir (d. 1707), the last great Mughul emperor, who was known for his pristine orthodoxy, and his zeal in confirming the political supremacy of Islam in India; see, Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Rud-i Kawthar*, 12th ed., (Lahore: Idarah-i Thiqafat-i Islam, 1988), pp. 454-92.


73 Regarding Mawdudi's views on the fall of Hyderabad see, Syed Asad Gilani, *Maududi; Thought and Movement* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), pp. 64-65. Mawdudi, referred to the case of Hyderabad as a symbol of the impending danger of the eclipse of Islam. For instance, in a eulogy which he wrote for Hyderabad in the *TQ* of September 1948, Mawdudi equated the event with the Fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1492, and the abrogation of the Mughul Empire in 1858. In later years, he equated the loss of East Pakistan with the fall of Hyderabad; see, *SAAM*, vol. 2, pp. 317-18.

Meanwhile, the cycle of increasing Hindu bellicosity and Muslim activism continued to arouse the fears of the Muslim masses, and determined the pattern of political activism of Muslim leaders and religious thinkers. Following the collapse of the Khilafat Movement in 1924, an explosion of feelings of frustration among Muslims led to widespread acts of violence against Hindus across the Subcontinent. The Hindu response was spear-headed by revivalist movements such as the Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj, who launched aggressive anti-Muslim public campaigns, the most noteworthy of which was the *Shuddhi* (conversions) campaign. It was directed at reconverting unwilling low caste converts to Islam back to Hinduism. The *Shuddhi* campaign was not free of direct affronts to Muslim articles of faith, and moreover, by implication, challenged the place of Islam in India. The campaign therefore, provoked angry responses from Muslims, resulting in communal strife.

One instance of such communal strife in 1925 resulted in the assassination of the Shuddhi activist, Swami Shradhanand. Shradhanand's murder caused much anti-Muslim sentiments in the Indian press, and among the Hindus, who were quick to criticize Muslims for their violent tendencies. The backlash from this episode precipitated a feeling of desperation and apologetic resignation among the Muslims across India.

It was the aftermath of this incident, which in 1929 prompted Mawdudi, who was

The fear of extinction of Islam - an "Andalusian" fate for Muslims was real for Mawdudi. In a telegram to Shaikh Mujibur Rahman in March 1971, Mawdudi warned the Awami League leader against creating a debacle greater than the tragedy of "Islamic Spain"; cited in Sarwat Saulat, *Maulana Maududi* (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1979), P. 80; elsewhere, Mawdudi referred to the eclipse of Islam from the centers of power in India as the "tragedy of Andalusia"; see, Mawdudi, *Tahrir-i Islami*, P. 134; Akbar S. Ahmed has termed this anxiety about a Moorish fate the "Andalus Syndrome"; Ahmed, *Discovering Islam*, P. 2.
then resident in Delhi, to action, determining the direction of his subsequent efforts. Mawdudi's famous book, *al-Jihad fi'l-Islam* (*jihad* in Islam) was not only a response to Hindu challenges to Islam following Shradhanand's death, but was also a prolegomenon to Mawdudi's lifetime of religious and political efforts directed at the revival of Islam's temporal power, first in India, then in Pakistan, and ultimately in the Islamic world. The result being a movement, which Mawdudi's followers view as heir to the tradition of Islamic *tajdid*, and as its greatest manifestation in modern times.75

In this effort, Mawdudi's primary target were the Muslim allies of the Congress Party, who had acquiesced to the specter of a Hindu "Raj". However, his greatest rivals remained the Muslim Leaguers.76 As the reality of Pakistan became imminent, Mawdudi's polemic attacks on the Muslim League also increased. Mawdudi disagreed with the premises of their ideas77, which in effect, was directed at excluding Islam from India, surrendering the domain of the Mughul Empire to the Hindus, and facilitating the eventual extinction of Islam altogether.78

Resolved to the reality of partition by the mid-1940s, Mawdudi nevertheless,

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77 This attitude may go back to the dislike which Khilafat leaders such as the Ali brothers, with whom Mawdudi was very impressed, had shown to Jinnah. For the attitude of the Ali brothers towards Jinnah see, Wolpert, *Jinnah*, P. 72.

78 See, Gilani, *Maududi*, P. 120.
continued to distrust the intent of Muslim League's nationalist agenda, and especially the secular pretensions of the League's program. The lessons of Kamalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran in this regard had, no doubt, served as a warning to the Muslims of the Subcontinent in general, and to Mawdudi in particular.

Increasingly, the policies of the Muslim League, its trials and tribulations became Mawdudi's callings, and the League's conception of Pakistan became the singular subject

79 On Muslim League politics see, Bahadur, The Muslim League; Jalal, The Sole Spokesman; and Wolpert, Jinnah.

80 For a discussion of Jinnah's secular tendencies see, Wolpert, Jinnah; and Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, P. 120. It was known by those close to Jinnah that he emphatically discouraged the sacralization of politics, and the use of the term "Islamic state". On one occasion he prevented his close associate, a one time President and a generous patron of the League, Raja Mahmudabad from addressing a gathering for the fear of the Raja's reference to the term "Islamic state"; interview with Sayyid Amjad 'Ali, Lahore.

Moreover, it is likely that Mawdudi distrusted Jinnah for the latter was an Isma'ili (although later on in his life Jinnah became a Twelver Shi'i, see, Wolpert, Jinnah, P. 4). Mawdudi had revealed a tendency to associated "misguided" modernism and secularism with "obscurantist" Islamic beliefs, of which he viewed Shi'ism to be one. He once expressed his displeasure with the modernist ideas of the famous disciple of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Chiragh 'Ali, arguing that his misguided reading of faith can be attributed to the fact that he was a Shi'i; see, Correspondences Between Maulana Maudoodi and Maryam Jameelah, 4th ed., (Lahore: Muhammad Yusuf Khan & Sons, 1986), pp. 57-58.

81 Mawdudi's association with the Khilafat Movement had made him particularly suspicious of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, and came to view Kamalism as a symbol of godless secularism posing danger to Muslim societies. Mas'ud 'Alam Nadwi, a leading Jama'at thinker, openly alluded to the Muslim Leaguers, in a derogatory fashion, as "Kamalists", cited in RJI, vol. 6, 175-77. For similar expressions of abhorrence of Kamalism see, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Adabiyat-i Mawdudi (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972), pp. 296-302; Mawdudi, Tanqihat, pp. 96-110; Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol 1, pp. 297-78; Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Jama'at-i Islami; Tarikh, Maqsad, AWR La'ih-i 'Amal (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963), pp. 34-35; and idem., Shahhisiyat, Sami'ullah and Khalid Humayun, eds., (Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, nd.), pp. 207-08. Similar references also exist in the Jama'at literature regarding Pahlavi Iran; see, Kawthar (Lahore), February 21, 1948, P. 21, where Mawdudi specifies that Pakistan should not be modelled after Iran or Turkey.
of his greatest attacks. He denounced nationalism as a viable ideology, and berated secular politics as *kufr* (disbelief).

Following the 1937 defeat of the League at the polls, Mawdudi’s call found an increasingly political content, and following the Lahore Resolution of 1940, whereby the Muslim League committed itself to Pakistan, Jama‘at-i Islami was born as the "counter-League".\(^{82}\) This vision originally emerged as a program for reverting the evident political ascendancy of the Hindus by converting the whole of India to Islam, and hence, forever terminating the uncertainty which was inherent in the minority status of Muslims in the polyglot culture of India. However, as Muslims of India became preoccupied with the issue of partition of the Subcontinent following the elections of 1937, Mawdudi’s political outlook underwent change. Increasingly conscious of the inevitability of some form of partition of India, his attention turned completely away from the Congress Party to the Muslim League and to its secular nationalist program. Mawdudi’s opposition to the League did not revolve around his objection to Jinnah’s open call for Muslim autonomy, but emanated from the fact that Mawdudi had charged himself with the task of creating and leading an Islamic state if Pakistan was to be. As India moved closer to partition, Mawdudi’s political thinking became increasingly conscious of the reality of the polity in which his vision would eventually have to be implemented.

When in 1947 Mawdudi was escorted to safety, from the violence which followed the Partition in the Gurdaspur District of Punjab, to Lahore, by units of the Pakistan

\(^{82}\) Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore; and Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", P.105.
Army, his struggle for the soul of Pakistan emerged into the open. Calling the bluff of Muslim League leaders, who had continuously appealed to Islamic symbolisms in their drive to mobilize support for Pakistan, Mawdudi demanded an Islamic state where he had once dreamt of an "Islamic empire". His program was no longer to save India, but to conquer Pakistan.³³

The political program of the Jama‘at in the pre-partition years had become firmly entrenched into the psychology and corporatist identity of the organization. Mawdudi’s restorationist vision, and belief in the power and promise of the revival and reform of Islam therefore, continued to dominate the Jama‘at’s social thought and political practice. Meanwhile, the manner in which the concept of Pakistan had embodied the notion of an Islamic community, which demanded personal commitment from individual Muslims and was defined in terms of religious piety,⁴⁺ produced a political climate which was conducive to revivalist activism.⁵⁵ Pakistan’s particularly arduous experiences with nation-building and consolidation of state apparatuses in the subsequent years, the surreptitious and yet prevalent fractiousness of its polity, uneasy coexistence between democracy and military rule, and civil war and secession of the majority of its population, moreover, made the emotive power of Islam more appealing, and its promise of unity increasingly poignant.

³³ Mas’ud ‘Alam Nadwi argued that, faced with the reality of Muslim separatism, Mawdudi focused his attention on protecting the minority Muslims of India and also defeating the possibility of a secular state in Pakistan; see RJI, VI, 180-95. Also see in this regard, Gilani, Maududi, pp. 73-74; and Kawthar (Lahore), July 5, 1947, P.1.

⁴⁺ On this issue see, Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, pp. 189-224.

⁵⁵ See Binder, Religion and Politics, pp. 117-232.
It was in this context that, following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Jama'at-i Islami embarked upon a program directed at training a vanguard "Islamic elite", who would oversee the revival of Islam at the national scale and mobilize the masses based on religious symbolisms and ideals, with the objective of influencing the nature and development of the nascent state. The Jama'at, based in Lahore, organized a tightly-knit and well-structured network of activists and sympathizers, which not only propagated Mawdudi's views among the masses, but also vested the organization with the power to influence the course of development of Pakistani politics. Mawdudi, meanwhile, continued to articulate his views on Islam, systematizing his call for renewal and reform in religious faith and practice, producing a corpus of ideas with a distinct tone and content. In addition, the Jama'at took an active role in Pakistani politics, putting forth specific proposals on numerous social and political concerns. The Jama'at's program soon became a religiopolitical platform, wherein political realities and social concerns found meaning in the context of Jama'at's greater concern for the renewal and reform of Islam.

While antagonistic towards traditional Islam,\(^6\) following the creation of Pakistan, Mawdudi and the Jama'at quickly closed ranks with the 'ulama and other self-styled religious movements in pressing the newly-formed state for an "Islamic" constitution.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) For more on this subject see, chapters 1 and 2.

\(^7\) Binder reports that, the 'ulama approached Mawdudi and actively solicited his assistance. See, Binder, *Religion and Politics*, P.95. The Jama'at was moreover, instrumental in fostering unity among the various 'ulama factions such as the Jam'i-at-i 'Ulama-i Islam and the Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Pakistan. The Jama'at also acted as the bulwark behind various 'ulama conferences held in the 1947-56 period which formulated the policy positions of the religious alliance *vis a vis* the government. For more on this theme see, chapters 6, 11 and 13.
Jama'at’s ideas and policy positions featured prominently in the ongoing debates between the government and the religious alliance from 1947 to 1956. Jama'at’s activism in these years eventually culminated in the movement’s open confrontation with the government over the role of religion in politics. In 1948 the Jama'at took issue with the government’s position on the declaration of a jihad in Kashmir, and later in 1953, they went further, challenging the very legitimacy of the government during the anti-Ahmadi agitations.

Mawdudi challenged the legitimacy of the declaration of a jihad in Kashmir when Pakistan was not engaged in open hostilities with India. He argued that, either the government should formally go to war with India over Kashmir, or abide by the terms of the cease fire to which it had agreed to. Jihad, he opined, could not be invoked in circumstances of "hypocrisy". Mawdudi’s persnickety arguments not only placed the government in a defensive position politically, questioning the wisdom of its policy of cessation of conflict with India over Kashmir, but also revealed their susceptibility to criticism from the religious quarters. The incident led to Mawdudi’s arrest and placement under protective custody. For, India had found Mawdudi’s declaration to be of considerable political value. It was broadcast to India’s restless Kashmiri subjects as a

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88 ibid., pp. 102-04. Noteworthy in this regard was Jama’at’s role in both creating a united front among the various religious groupings, and in formulating a coherent political platform for the religious alliance. The impact of the Jama’at’s activism was evident in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, acceded by the Constituent Assembly in the face of pressure from the religious alliance. See, chapter 11 for more on this topic.

89 The arrest made on October 4, 1948 under the provisions of the Punjab Safety Act also included two other Jama’at leaders, Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi and Mian Tufayl Muhammad.
fatwa (religious decree) against resisting Indian rule. In light of the Indian enthusiasm for Mawdudi’s declaration, Pakistani authorities, in turn, found occasion to accuse Mawdudi of pro-Indian sympathies and anti-Pakistan activities.

The entire episode acted to confirm Mawdudi’s place in the ongoing sociopolitical and constitutional debates in Pakistan, and to increase the government’s sensitivity to religious activism. It was, however, the anti-Ahmadi agitations in Punjab in 1953-54 which catapulted the Jama'at to the forefront of Pakistani politics more definitively.

The Ahmadis are a controversial sect born of Sunni Islam, in the Punjab at the turn of the century. The Ahmadis have always caused much consternation in various Muslim circles for the claim of their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), to prophecy. Contempt for the Ahmadis, whom the 'ulama have viewed as outside the pale of Islam, had throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, and thenceforth, served as a major rallying point for various religious factions. Therefore, when in 1953, Pakistan’s Ahmadi Foreign Minister and eminent Muslim Leaguer, Sir Zafaru'llah Khan, decided to address a public Ahmadi religious gathering in Karachi, religious sentiments were, not surprisingly, riled, precipitating a political crisis. Objections to Zafaru’llah Khan’s decision soon erupted into a flare in Lahore. Agitators, organized and led by the

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90 The fact the Kabul and Srinagar Radios reported Mawdudi’s fatwa (religious decree), with the intent of discouraging popular resistance in Kashmir, in of itself, gave Mawdudi greater religious stature. See, Binder, Religion and Politics, P. 137 regarding the radio broadcasts and their implications.

91 On the Ahmadis, also known as Mirzai’s after their leader, or Qadiyanis after the city of Qadiyan, in the Punjab, where the movement emerged, see, Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous.

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‘ulama and religious activists, demanded the dismissal of Zafaru’llah Khan, which they argued was the litmus test for the government’s commitment to Islam. Eager to bring down the central government, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, sought to manipulate the situation by permitting the disturbances to fester. Continued civil strife in Punjab, however, eventually compelled the central government and the armed forces to intervene, remove Daultana, place Punjab under martial law, and clamp down on the agitators.

While the agitations were caused and supported by the ‘ulama and religious groups such as the Ahrar, Mawdudi’s role in providing convincing justification for the activities of the religious elements, in the form of a book,\(^\text{92}\) proved critical. In fact, the government, which reacted to the agitations with the intention of extricating religion from politics, viewed the legitimizing role of the Jama‘at in the agitations with greater alarm and as more invidious than the provocative activities of the Ahrar and the ‘ulama. As a result, Mawlana Mawdudi and a number of prominent Jama‘at leaders were apprehended by the government, and were put on trial. Mawdudi was tried on charges of sedition and was subsequently sentenced to death. That sentence was, however, later on reversed by the Country’s Supreme Court.\(^\text{93}\)

The anti-Ahmadi issue while far from a victory for the Jama‘at, increased their prestige and following. Moreover, the anti-Ahmadi agitations much like the preceding

\(^{92}\) Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Qadiyani Mas’alah* (Lahore, 1953).

\(^{93}\) For a full account of the anti-Ahmadi agitations, and the Jama‘at’s ordeal with the government regarding the issue see, Binder, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 251-59.
religiopolitical activism of the Jama'at and its newly-found allies acted to place Islam more definitively at the center of the constitutional debates regarding the nature of the Pakistani state.\(^94\)

With religion occupying an increasingly central role in the debates concerning Pakistan's constitution, and the issues surrounding the rise and fall of various governments between 1953 and 1958, organizations such as Jama'at-i Islami found greater ability to formulate religiopolitical programs, and to exert direct influence in the political arena. The religious groups utilized their growing power, and the weakness of the state before the call for an Islamic order, to once again precipitate a political crisis, this time around the issue of the Constitution of 1956.\(^95\)

The continued pressure exerted by the religious groups over the issue of an Islamic constitution had proved fruitful during the last phase of the Constituent Assembly's debates. In the aftermath of the anti-Ahmadi disturbances, and with the religiously-inclined Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali as Prime Minister, the Constitutional Assembly began to accommodate the religious activists to an increasing extent. Consequently, upon the conclusion of the constitutional debates which produced the Constitution of 1956, the

\(^{94}\) This fact is very much evident in the objectives and proceedings of the special Court of Inquiry which was set up by the government to look into the matter. The Court did not concern itself with the legal ramifications of the agitations, but rather put the debate between religious groups and the secular state on trial. See, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act 11 of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government of Punjab, 1954); the report is also known as the Munir Report after the presiding justice in the case, Muhammad Munir, who gained fame for his daring intellectual challenges to the religious ideologues.

\(^{95}\) The constitutional debates had continued between 1947 and 1956. See, Binder, Religion and Politics.
Jama'at and its allies among the 'ulama were able to claim victory. This victory was, however, short-lived. For, the armed forces of Pakistan, under the command of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (d. 1969), and with a modernizing agenda which disparaged the encroachment of religion into politics, took over power in 1958.\(^{96}\)

As the political establishment became dominated by an authoritarian and bureaucratic elite, the state began advocating religious modernism. Advocates of religious revival and an Islamic state were increasingly pressed into retreat. Jama'at-i Islami became the subject of direct challenges by the government. Jama'at offices were closed down, its leaders were attacked in government-sponsored publications, and its activities, organizational networks and operations were restricted. Mawdudi himself was imprisoned twice during Ayub Khan's rule. The government had launched an offensive against religio-political activism with the hope of freeing Pakistan and General Ayub's modernization schemes of the menace of the clamor for Islamicity.

Unable to freely advocate the cause of Islam in the political arena, Jama'at-i Islami became more concerned with the removal of Ayub Khan and the restoration of a political climate which would be conducive to religiopolitical activism.\(^{97}\) Moreover, the Jama'at's experiences with Ayub Khan's government forced the movement to look for new allies

\(^{96}\) For more on the Ayub Khan years see, Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan 1958-69 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

\(^{97}\) Maryam Jameelah recollects that, Mawdudi had posited the argument that, restoration of democracy in Pakistan would promote religiopolitical activism, and pave the way for the establishment of an Islamic state. See, Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Maulana Sayyid Ala Maudoodi's Life and Thought", The Islamic Quarterly, XXX:2 (Second Quarter 1987), P.124.
outside of the circle of religious revivalists. Consequently, the Jama‘at joined the alliance for restoration of democracy and end to Ayub Khan’s hegemony of power in Pakistan. The Ayub era politicized the Jama‘at further, transforming the movement, more definitively, into a political "party" with greater involvement in the vicissitudes of Pakistani politics.

This transformation became even more apparent in the post-Ayub period. Following the fall of the Ayub Khan government to popular agitations for democracy, the rise of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto (d. 1979) to power, and the secession of East Pakistan, the Jama‘at quickly regrouped, not only as a religious movement, but as a confirmed political actor. The socialist content of Pakistan People’s Party’s political program was particularly instrumental in prompting Mawdudi and the Jama‘at into action.8 Viewing Bhutto’s populism as a direct challenge to the Islamic basis of Pakistan, and to Jama‘at’s place in the country’s political order, the Jama‘at became a major critic of the Bhutto regime, directly confronting the government on numerous political issues while utilizing Islamic symbolisms to challenge its legitimacy.9

The Jama‘at and its allies among the religious movements, consciously appealed to religious sentiments with view to shifting the focus of Pakistani politics, once again anchoring it in the debate around the place of Islam in Pakistan. While the opposition to Ayub had brought religious groups into an alliance for democracy, opposition to Bhutto took shape under the banner of religion. The Jama‘at’s religiopolitical program proved in-

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9 See, chapter 13.
strumental in the formation of this alliance - the Nizam-i Mustafa (order of the Prophet) movement - and in managing the country-wide agitations which eventually succeeded in overthrowing the Bhutto government in 1977 by provoking a military coup.¹⁰⁰

Islamic symbolisms proved so efficacious in galvanizing the opposition to the populist government of Prime Minister Bhutto that, they became the basis for the program of the new regime. The cause of the revivalists, now enjoying wide-scale popularity, could not be ignored by the martial law administration of General Muhammad Ziyau’l-Haq (d. 1988), which in its search for legitimacy was quick to appease the demands of the Nizam-i Mustafa movement.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the eleven years of rule by General Ziya, from 1977 to 1988, was a period of unprecedented success and political influence for the Jama’at, and other revivalist and ‘ulama groups. During the Ziya period, the Jama’at, once a movement of dissent outside the pale of mainstream politics, became a political and ideological force at the helm of power. Jama’at leaders occupied important government offices, and the movement’s programs were adopted as official state policy.¹⁰²

The rise in the fortunes of the Jama’at during the Ziya period, however, proved to be a pyrrhic victory, for despite the prominence accorded to the Jama’at, the organization proved unable to expand its social base or political influence outside of the channels

¹⁰⁰ See, chapter 13.


¹⁰² See, chapter 14.
provided by the government. Unable to utilize its newly-found prominence to advance its own political position, or to distinguish its program and identity from those of the government, the Jama'at became an instrument of government policy making and was therefore, effectively coopted by the government.

Jama'at's experience with the Ziya regime not only dealt a blow to the organization's morale and prestige, but placed them in a position of great political vulnerability. For, as the government of General Ziya and his Islamization policies gradually fell out of favor with the masses, so did the Jama'at witness a turn in its political fortunes. The Jama'at's predicament manifested itself in the organization's modest showings in Pakistan's national elections of 1985, 1988, and 1990.

Yet, despite the electoral set backs, it was apparent by 1988 that Jama'at-i Islami had become a powerful political force with significant social and cultural influence, mainly derived from its organizational structure and ability to manipulate the religious factor in Pakistan's political balance. In fact, the Jama'at's ability to continuously project power beyond that which is warranted by its size has safeguarded the organization's political fortunes against any lasting damages by its electoral showings. While unable to increase its political prowess in the Pakistani parliament, the Jama'at remains an important political party capable of influencing the course of politics through the use of its organizational fiat. Jama'at's political stature can be gauged by the prominent position which it occupies in the Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI) -Islamic Democratic Alliance - a coalition of Islamic and right of center parties which emerged following the death of General Ziya to challenge the Pakistan People's Party in the elections of November 1988, and in
October 1990 when it formed the government.

The transformation of Jama'at-i Islami from a movement for revival and reform of Islam in the Subcontinent to a religiously-inspired Pakistani political party has been conditioned by the sociopolitical context in which the Jama'at has operated since 1941. The history of the movement, changes in its structure and social base, and the development of its religiopolitical world view, have determined the nature and direction of the interactions of the Jama'at with its sociopolitical milieu. These factors also reflect the impact of the movement's political activism on its evolution and ultimate form. Yet, the ideology of the Jama'at, its *modus operandi*, and posturing *vis a vis* the state cannot be understood in terms of socioeconomic cleavages or problems wrought by modernization, but are rather, predicated upon the movement's reaction and opposition to the political structures and cultural context of the Pakistani state.  

As such, the Jama'at has operationalized and further politicized the religiopolitical program which it developed in India before the partition, in the context of Pakistani politics. The movement, while engaged in debates pertaining to the socioeconomic cleavages of Pakistani society, has directed its energies at the transformation of the political apparatuses and ideology of the state as a discrete and paramount concern, autonomous from the socioeconomic imperatives extant in the society. Mawdudi's aim was therefore,

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103 Lisa Anderson has discussed the importance of the political nature and agenda of dissent as opposed to a purely socioeconomic understanding of the phenomenon. See, Lisa Anderson, "Lawless Governments and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East", in *Journal of International Affairs*, 40:2 (Winter/Spring 1987), pp. 219-32.
to subsume all social and political cleavages into the quest for the transformation of the underlying cultural identity of the state, and the creation of an "Islamic" order. 104 Although in recent years, the Jama'at has somewhat moved away from this position, and began to address popular socioeconomic interests to a greater extent, this aspect of the movement's history continues to be of great interest to the students of the social sciences.

While far from successful in achieving its political aims, Jama'at-i Islami has done much to transform the popular understanding of Islam, and hence the character of Pakistani politics. Probably a measure of Mawdudi's success and significance can be seen in the institutionalization of religiopolitical activism in Pakistan, and in the mushrooming of a genre of movements which emulate the example of the Jama'at, such as Israr Ahmad's Tanzim-i Islami (Islamic Organization), and Tahiru'l-Qadri's Minhaju'l-Qur'an (Path of the Qur'an) and Pakistan Awami Tahrik (Pakistan National Movement). 105 These movements have taken their intellectual cue from Mawdudi, their organizational structure from the Jama'at, and their followers from the fertile ground prepared by five decades of Jama'at activity. 106

104 Binder points to the importance of the quest for cultural authenticity, separate from socioeconomic concerns, in understanding contemporary Islamic revivalism; see, Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, P. 83.

105 See the testimony of the eminent Pakistani statesman, Allahbukhsh K. Brohi in this regard in, A.K. Brohi, "Mawdudi, Pakistan ka Sab Se Bara Wakil", in *HRZ*, pp. 33-36. In addition to the works of Mawdudi, writings of other Jama'at thinkers such as Sayyid As'ad Gilani, Na'im Siddiqi and Maryam Jameelah have been of great importance in promoting a sacral sociocultural environment in Pakistan.

106 Mawdudi's works and the cassette recordings of his lectures have large demand in Pakistan, sufficiently so as to cause a conflict between the Mawdudi family and the Jama'at-i Islami over their copyrights and proceeds. The Lahore High Court is currently reviewing a suit brought by the Mawdudi family against Jama'at-i Islami for copyright
The Islamization of the political discourse, however, occurred along side the movement’s increasing commitment to the electoral process. The Jama'at revised its ideological orientation and political program to justify its shifting political outlook. As such, it routinized its original idealism, and formalized its organizational structure into a bureaucratic mold. Politicization became the vehicle for the institutionalization of the Jama'at. It spelled the end of ideology and revolution, and hence, a significant transformation of the initial revivalist agenda, but notably, did not pave the way for the Jama'at's rise to power. The case of the Jama'at, in the final analysis, provides valuable insights into the working of forces which limit the efficacy of revivalism, and thence, influence the dynamics and nature of its subsequent transformation.

Continuity and Change in the Organizational Structure

During the course of its five decades of existence, the Jama'at has undergone important internal changes, which have influenced its vision and political behavior. The movement, as will be discussed in Part III, has gone through a number of purges and reorganizations, as well as periods of uncertainty and redirection, none more significant than the transition from one leader to another.

Since its creation, the Jama'at has been led by three Amirs, and gone through two succession periods: Sayyid Abul-A'la Mawdudi (1941-72), Mian Tufayl Muhammad

107 The term amir in Arabic means "leader", and is the official title of the leader of the Jama'at. For more on this see, chapter 8.
(1972-87), and Qazi Husain Ahmad (1987-present). The transition from Mawlana Mawdudi, who had ruled the Jama'at for thirty six years, to Mian Tufayl, and again from Mian Tufayl to Qazi Husain has produced important changes in the structure and mode of operation of the Jama'at.

Of equal importance in this regard has been changes in the social base of the Jama'at. The Jama'at has, at one point or the other, been associated with a definite constituency or ethnic group, most notably, the urban middle classes, the petit-bourgeoisie, the Muhajirs and the Punjabis. The organization in its concern for Islamization of the state has eschewed populist politics, and instead, sought to gain a following among the intelligentsia. As such, the Jama'at has failed to inculcate support among any one social class. While the Jama'at has enjoyed certain following among the urban middle and lower middle classes, the Muhajir community of Sind, as well as among professional and labor unions, the movement has been particularly successful among students - Pakistan's future politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectual leaders. It is this ability to create a base among students that best explains the Jama'at's incremental rise in importance in the bureaucracy.

108 During Mawdudi's incarceration in 1948-50, 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi and 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan were jointly provisional Amirs. According to one account, Mas'ud 'Alam Nadwi also served briefly as Amir during this period, between 1949 and 1950; see RJI, vol. 6, pp. 144-45. In 1953-55 when Mawdudi was again imprisoned, first Sultan Ahmad and later, Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi served as provisional Amirs. In 1956 when Mawdudi was away on a tour of the Arab world, 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan served as the overseer of the organization. Finally, in 1969 when Mawdudi underwent medical treatment in England, Mian Tufayl Muhammad served as the Acting Amir.

109 The term muhajir, meaning migrant or refugee, refers to the Urdu speaking community which migrated to Pakistan from India following the partition of the Subcontinent, and is resident in Pakistan today.
and the civil service, and sheds light on Mawdudi’s doctrine of change from within, and from above; revolution through education and conversion rather than by coercion.\textsuperscript{110}

A number of secondary sources have informed the analytical narrative of this study, notably, Barbara Metcalf’s examination of changes in Islamic thought and institutions in nineteenth century India; Gail Minault’s account of the Khilafat Movement; Stanley Wolpert’s work on the origins of Jinnah’s authority, and its role in shaping the Pakistan Movement; Said Amir Arjomand’s applications of Weberian typologies to analysis of patterns of continuity and change in Muslim societies; and finally, Charles J. Adams and Leonard Binder’s pioneering works on the ideology of Mawdudi and the early history of the Jama’at. Conclusions reached in this study, however, are for the most part, based on primary sources examined during a research stay in Pakistan. These sources include Mawdudi’s writings, speeches and interviews, some of which have remained unpublished and hence, have scarcely been consulted; Jama‘at-i Islami documents and archival material, kept at the library of Idarah-i Ma‘arif-i Islami (Institute of Islamic Research) located at Jama’at-i Islami headquarters in Lahore; papers, documents, and rare pamphlets available at Punjab Public Library, as well as in a number of private libraries; and oral interviews conducted with those who have been privy to the historical unfolding of the Jama‘at. These sources have brought to the fore hitherto unaddressed issues, and helped uncover information which has enabled this study to draw a comprehensive picture of Mawdudi’s life and thought, the Jama‘at’s ideology, and the historical development of

\textsuperscript{110} See Part II for more on Mawdudi’s views on change.
the movement in the context of Pakistani politics. Given the lack of detailed archival information, an inaccessibility of records on many aspects of the Jama'at's history and political activism, oral interviews proved particularly rewarding in shedding light on the inner workings of the organization and its political *modus operandi*, as well as in constructing a thorough account of its history.

The subsequent chapters, divided into four parts, have utilized these sources to formulate an all-inclusive account of the intellectual and political history of the Jama'at, the religiopolitical context in which it has appeared and thrived, and the movement's relation to the revivalist modality of thought and practice. Part I will examine the education, persona and the leadership style of Mawlana Mawdudi in order to discern the origins of his world view, and the ingredients of his charisma and authority; hence, determining the place of Mawdudi in the genre of revivalist thinkers and activists in South Asia in particular, and in the Muslim world in general. Part II will be concerned with the manner in which Mawdudi's interpretation of Islam and the future of Pakistan has shaped the Jama'at's world view and pattern of political behavior. Part III will outline the organizational structure and social basis of the Jama'at, and also appraise the role of socioeconomic imperatives in shaping the movement's political stance. Part IV will examine the dynamics of relations between ideology and social action by charting the pattern of interactions between the Jama'at and the Pakistan state with view to discerning the nature and scope of the Jama'at's impact on the process of political change, and by the same token, identifies factors which have influenced the pattern of development of the Jama'at in light of its ideological and political agenda.
PART I

THE \textit{MUJADDID FROM HYDERABAD: THE PERSONA, EDUCATION, AND LEADERSHIP STYLE OF MAWLANA MAWDUDI}

"Everyone who is left far from his sources

Wises back the time when he was united with it."

Jalal al-Din Rumi
CHAPTER 1
THE MAKING OF THE MUJADDID: THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1903-41

This chapter will examine the making of Mawlana Mawdudi’s authority and leadership style by identifying those events and experiences in his background which have contributed to their development. It will probe into the persona of Mawdudi, outline the pattern of his political socialization, and trace the subsequent transformation of his incipient ideas into an all-inclusive world view. It will narrate Mawdudi’s life from inception until 1941 (thenceforth, Mawdudi’s life and thought were embodied in the history of the Jama'at, and will therefore be fully considered in Parts III and IV) and critically examine his biography with view to the determining the nature of his persona, the pattern of his political socialization, and the controlling factors in the formulation of his ideological perspective.

Legacy of the Past: Mawdudi’s Lineage and Family History

Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi was born on September 25, 1903 (Rajab 3, 1321 A.H.) in Aurangabad, Deccan, where Aurangzaib 'Alamgir, the last great Mughul Emperor known for his puritanism and religious zealotry is buried. Abu'l-A'la was the youngest of Sayyid Ahmad Hasan Mawdudi's five children, and the second son from his second marriage.1

The Mawdudis claimed a proud heritage, and association with the very origins of Islam in India. Some of Mawdudi’s biographers have traced the lineage of the family to a certain Arab relator of Hadith (Prophetic Traditions) - a muhaddith, by the name of

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Mawdud, who accompanied the Arab conqueror of Sind, Muhammad ibn Qasim to India in the 7th century.2 However, the Mawdudi family has more often been related to another source of Indian Islam, namely, Sufism. As the scion of one of the most prominent branches of the Chishti Sufi order,3 Mawdudi has been associated with the authority of a primary institution of the Islamic culture of the Subcontinent, and was thus, able to utilize its intrinsic charisma.4 In an autobiographical tract written in 1932, he wrote:

"I belong to one such family that has a 1300 year history of guiding, asceticism and Sufism."6

The Chishtis from whom Mawdudi claims descent trace their origins back to a family of "sayyids" of the ahlu’l-bayt7 - a mark of nobility among Muslims of South

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2 See, Maryam Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi? (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), P.1; similar citation also appears in Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), P.79.

3 For more on the Chishtis see, Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Čishtiyya, EI(2); and Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, "Chishtiyah", in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed., Islamic Spirituality (New York: Crossroad, 1991), vol.2, pp.127-43.


5 KN, P.24.

6 Sayyids are descendants of the Prophet of Islam through the progeny of his daughter Fatimah. See,

7 Ahlu’l-bayt, meaning people of the house, refers to the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. It is a term associated with the Shi’is.

8 KN, P.24. Mawdudi traced his lineage to both grandsons of the Prophet, Hasan ibn ‘Ali (d. 670), and Husain ibn ‘Ali (d. 680).
Asia - who in the tenth century initiated "the exalted Chishtiyyah Sufi silsilah (lineage)" in Afghanistan. Mawdudi traced his lineage directly to Khwaja Qutbu’ddin Mawdud Chishti (d.1133), from whom the Mawdudi sayyids have taken their name, and whom Mawdudi refers to as "the shaikhul-shuyukh (master of the masters) of all the Chishti orders of India". Later Chishti spiritual luminaries such as Khwajah Mu’inu’ddin Muhammad Chishti (1132-1246), buried at the Shrine of Ajmer, were from the spiritual line of Qutbu’ddin Mawdud. The progeny of Qutbu’ddin Mawdud, known as the Mawdudiyah, however, continued to play an important role in the history of the Chishti Sufi order. Noteworthy among them was Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (d.1527), Mawdudi’s namesake, who moved from Afghanistan to India during the reign of Sikandar Lodhi (d. circa 1517). Mawdudi credits this ancestor with establishing the Chishti order in the Subcontinent, and therefore by implication, associates himself with the very provenance of India’s preeminent Sufi order which had been instrumental in the spread of Islam in Northern India.


10 ibid, P.5; and KN, P.25; also see, Qazi Hasan Moizuddin, "Syed Abul A’la Maududi", in The Muslim Luminaries; Leaders of Religious, Intellectual and Political Revival in South Asia (Islamabad: National Hijra Council, 1988), P.382.

11 Mawdudi writes that Khwajah Mu’inu’ddin’s Sufi master was ‘Uthman Harwani, whose master was Jami Sharif Zindani, whose master was Qutbu’ddin Mawdud; see, ibid.

12 ibid.


14 ibid.
Little is recorded of the fate of the Mawdudis following their migration to India. Mawdudi himself, reports that, during the time of the Mughul Emperor, Shah 'Alam (d.1712), the family settled in Delhi, a city with which the family has continued to identify closely. Mawdudi, who was six generations removed from those of his ancestors who settled in Delhi, never parted with the vestiges of the Muslim culture of that city.

Mawdudi’s father, Sayyid Ahmad Hasan was born in 1855 in Delhi to Mir Sayyid Hasan, a well-respected notable of the city, a man of learning and piety, and a Sufi pir (spiritual master) of modest stature. Mir Sayyid had also been a man of worldly influence, and had been close to the courtiers of last Mughul Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (d.1862). The impact of the British sack of Delhi in 1858, and the subsequent fall of the Mughuls marginalized the Mawdudis socially and politically. The resultant feeling of frustration, born of the plight of sociopolitical dislocation, left an indelible mark on Mawdudi’s thinking, and political consciousness.

Since the Mawdudis were related to Sayyid Ahmad Khan through Ahmad Hasan’s mother, many of the young men of the family, including the young Ahmad Hasan were recruited to attend the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. In fact, Mawdudi reports that,

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15 ibid.


18 KN, P.27; and Gilani, Maududi, P.25.

19 Abu Mahmud Mawdudi, "Himara Khandan", in Munir, Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, P.11.
his father was among Aligarh's very first students, boasting that he was the contemporary of Sir Muhammad Rafiq and Sir Buland Jang.20

The family's commitment to the Aligarh experiment was, however, far from firm. The Mawdudis had been closely affiliated with the Muslim culture of Delhi and the various institutions of Mughul rule; they had suffered as a result of the establishment of the Raj in 1858, and therefore harbored anti-British sentiments. Therefore, in their capacity as the leaders of their community, they had hitherto remained detached from the culture and mores of the colonial establishment. It was therefore with great reluctance that, Ahmad Hasan's father acceded to his son's enrollment at Aligarh. It was only because of the respect which the family had for Sayyid Ahmad Khan, reports Mawdudi, that his father was permitted to attend Aligarh.21 The family's suspicions about Sayyid Ahmad's experiment, characteristic of the attitude of traditional Muslims at the time towards Aligarh, however, remained unabated.22

In fact, Ahmad Hasan was compelled to leave Aligarh when his father learned that he had played cricket, wearing kafir (unbeliever, English) clothes.23 Ahmad Hasan therefore, never finished his modernist education. He was instead sent to Allahabad to study law.24 The imprint of Aligarh modernism, however, remained with Ahmad Hasan

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20 KN, P.27.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
24 ibid. Mawdudi, however, does not report the name of the school in Allahabad where his father attended.
for many years to follow.\textsuperscript{25}

Upon completing his education in law, Ahmad Hasan moved to Deogarh, where he was employed by the Maharaja as the tutor of the Crown Prince. Following intrigues at the court of the Maharaja, Ahmad Hasan left Deogarh for Meerut, where he began to practice law.\textsuperscript{26} In 1896 his services were solicited for the defence of a case in Aurangabad, where in those days Mawlvi Muhyu’ddin Khan was the Chief Justice.\textsuperscript{27} Muhyu’ddin Khan was related to the Mawdudis, and hence took a special interest in Ahmad Hasan, insisting that Ahmad Hasan settle in Aurangabad.

Ahmad Hasan’s practice met with great success in Aurangabad. However, Aurangabad was to have yet a more significant and lasting impact on the life of this Aligarh educated lawyer, and subsequently, the education of his son. For, it was in Aurangabad that Ahmad Hasan, under the influence of Mawlvi Muhyu’ddin, who was also a Chishti Sufi \textit{pir}, abandoned his hitherto British ways, and adopted the ways of his religion and native culture.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1900 Ahmad Hasan, and possibly his wife,\textsuperscript{29} embraced Sufism and "took bai’ah

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] \textit{ibid}; also see Misbahul Islam Faruqi, \textit{Introducing Maudoodi} (Karachi, 1968), P.19.
\item[27] \textit{KN}, P.28.
\item[28] \textit{ibid}.
\item[29] Gilani reports that Mawdudi’s mother, Ruqiyyah Begum, was also a Sufi. It is quite possible that she had embraced Sufism at the same time as her husband, and that the two followed the same master. See, Gilani, \textit{Maududi}, P.28.
\end{footnotes}
(oath of allegiance to a Sufi master)\textsuperscript{30} with Mawlvi Muhyu’ddin. Thenceforth, pursuit of the mystical path became Ahmad Hasan’s sole concern. So much of his time was spent in meditation and ascetic practices that his legal profession began to suffer from neglect. In 1904, when Mawdudi was a year old, Ahmad Hasan forsook his profession altogether and adopted a hermetic life style.\textsuperscript{31} He sold all his property and left Aurangabad, along with his family, for Delhi where the family settled at the Arab Sara’i village near the Shrine of Nizamu’ddin Auliya’. For the three years during which Ahmad Hasan was in Delhi, he became completely immersed in his mystical activities while his family fell destitute.\textsuperscript{32} Mawdudi’s antagonism towards Sufism in general, and its devotional dimension in particular, were no doubt in part a reaction to the excesses of his father.

In 1907 Mawlvi Muhyu’ddin summoned his disciple back to Aurangabad, where he chastised Ahmad Hasan for his excesses.\textsuperscript{33} Acting on the advice of his \textit{pir}, Ahmad Hasan returned to his practice, vowing, however, to never defend a case based on deceit. Thenceforth, he would review each case thoroughly, and would accept to represent only those whom he deemed to be in the right. Ahmad Hasan’s position was, in later years, reiterated by his son in his expositions on the Islamic State. Mawdudi echoed his father’s sentiments when in 1948 he not only declared that, defending those in fault was religiously reprehensible, but furthermore opined that, the whole institution of legal representation

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{ibid.} Also see, \textit{KN}, P.28.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{32} Gilani, \textit{Maududi}, pp.25-28.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{KN}, P.28.
had no place in Islam, for it was premised on making wrong prevail upon right.\textsuperscript{34}

While Ahmad Hasan’s sanctimonious attitude gave him great peace of mind, the number of his clients continued to dwindle. He had a modest income from his practice and collected about a hundred rupees a month from the rent of the family’s buildings in Delhi.\textsuperscript{35} He continued to practice law in Aurangabad until 1915, when for reasons which Mawdudi fails to explain he moved to Hyderabad, and subsequently, to Bhopal.\textsuperscript{36} In Bhopal, Ahmad Hasan suffered a stroke which paralyzed him. He remained in that state in Bhopal for four years until he died in 1920 at the age of sixty five.\textsuperscript{37} Ahmad Hasan’s tragic life was symbolic of the trials and tribulations of erstwhile Muslim gentry during colonial rule; and of their anguish, suffering, and cultural confusion. His life also underlined to the importance of "return to Islam" - Sufism in this case - in the Muslim search for solace during turbulent changes in a crumbling social order. These poignant lessons of this tangible manifestation of the plight of Indian Muslims were not lost on Ahmad Hasan’s son.

Mawdudi’s mother was from a family of Turkish origin - itself a mark of nobility - who had migrated to India during the reign of Aurangzaib. The family had served the Mughuls and later the Asifiyah Nazims of Hyderabad as military generals. As a result, the

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\textsuperscript{34} Syed Abul ‘Ala Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law and Constitution}, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami Publications, 1955). For more on this issue see Part II.

\textsuperscript{35} Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, P.79.

\textsuperscript{36} Abu Mahmud Mawdudi, "Himara Khandan", P.12.

\textsuperscript{37} KN, pp.28-29.
\end{flushright}
family had risen to prominence in Delhi, and later, in Hyderabad, and had become a family of *nawwabs* and *jagirdars*. In his autobiography Mawdudi narrated the glorious tradition and the aristocratic heritage of his maternal family in detail and with great pride.

Mawdudi’s maternal grandfather, Mirza Qurban ‘Ali Baig Khan Salik had also been a poet and a writer, and close to the circle around Mirza Asadu’llah Ghalib (1796-1869) in Delhi. In 1862, Salik was charged by Salar Jang ‘Azam to oversee Hyderabad’s educational affairs. In that capacity and under the aegis of Nawwab ‘Imaddu’dawlah Bilgirami he prepared an article entitled, "Makhazin al-fawa’id" (Sources of Benefits), in praise of which Mawdudi has written,

"[A]lthough Hyderabad had, since olden times, been a center of literary activities, it ["Makhazin al-fawa’id"] is one of its more important accomplishments."  

This literary heritage - of which Mawdudi wrote so proudly - imbued his character with a taste for scholarship and the letters, which were instrumental in shaping his later career.

The young Abu’l-A’la, as his autobiography indicates, was very much enamored with his Chishti lineage and his maternal family’s aristocratic heritage, and its tradition of chivalry, statesmanship, and literary accomplishment. His outlook continued to be informed with a sense of pride and appreciation for the regal nature of the history of Islam in India. It was his keen awareness of Muslim historical legacy which also explains

38 A *jagirdar* is the hereditary holder of a title to land. *Nawwab* was an honorific title of Muslim rulers and noblemen in India.


the acute sense of despair which he felt upon witnessing the visible decline of Muslim
power, especially in Delhi and Hyderabad where Mawdudi’s family had been associated
with Muslim courts.41

Mawdudi’s Childhood, Upbringing and Early Education, 1903-15

Abu’l-A’la was born to Ahmad Hasan and Ruqiyyah Begum at a time of flux in
their lives. Yet, his birth, wrote Mawdudi in the style of hagiographers, had been augured
well by a "great man"42 who had visited the Ahmad Hasan three to four years earlier.43
The sage had advised him to name his son Abu’l-A’la, after his great ancestor who had
brought the family to India.44 Mawdudi’s name was therefore endowed with a charisma
of lineage, and vested his persona with a sense of history.

Abu’l-'Ala was a beautiful child, the favorite of his father, and the recipient of
much paternal attention.45 Mawdudi’s autobiographical account suggests that his father

41 It is interesting to note at this juncture that, scions of eminent families whose
fortunes had been reversed during British rule were closely associated with the
dissemination of revivalist thinking. The puritanical Ahl-i Hadith school of thought, writes
Metcalf, emerged and grew in the nineteenth century among those who had descended
from the Mughuls or other princely families, or traced their lineage to the landed or
literary families which had been associated with Muslim rule, and whose social status and
economic prowess had declined during the colonial era. See, Barbara Metcalf, Islamic
pp.268-69.

42 KN, P.29.

43 'Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.49.

44 KN, P.29; and Gilani, Maududi, P.28.

45 This fact was related by Mawdudi’s full brother, Sayyid Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi;
interview with Ja’far Qasmi, Faisalabad. Also see, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, "Mira
Bachpan", in Muhammad Yusuf Buhtah, Mawlana Mawdudi; Apni Awr Dusrun ki Nazar
was a great influence on him. Mawdudi was very impressed with his father's piety, humility and altruism. In the *khud Nivisht* Mawdudi narrates the story of his father's interview for employment at Deogarh with a clear moral lesson to be learnt. He writes:

"The Maharaja of Deogarh had called two people from Delhi in order to choose one as the tutor of his son. One of the two was my father, and the other it so happened, was a former professor (ustad) of my father. Upon arriving at Deogarh, my father found out that he was to compete with his former professor. He therefore, sent a message to the Maharaja explaining that, since he was unable to compete with his teacher he wished to beg leave. Meanwhile, my father's former professor had responded to the same situation by saying that, he [Ahmad Hasan] has been my student, is a child before me, and will be unable to match me in teaching. Having witnessed the reactions of the two, the Maharaja said: ‘this professor is not necessary, I prefer the student.’"47

While far from sanguine about Ahmad Hasan’s hermetic ways, Mawdudi was much impressed with his religiosity. In fact, Mawdudi’s character was shaped in compliance with, as well as contrast to, his father’s approach to religion. Mawdudi’s childhood was a time of great financial struggles, augmenting the sense of deprivation which was present in a "Delhiite" family, which had become displaced following the fall of the Mughuls, and lived an exilic life in the Deccan, where again Muslim power was on the decline. Yet, Ahmad Hasan’s esoteric outlook on religion, and his devotion and piety had left an

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47 *KN*, P.27.


49 This fact is evident in the tenacious manner in which Ahmad Hasan guarded his family’s abeyance by the Muslim culture of Delhi; see, Gilani, *Maududi*, pp. 1-15.

50 See, Mawdudi, "Mira Bachpan", pp. 17-22 on the feeling of anxiety which his family experienced regarding the fate of Hyderabad.
indelible imprint on the psyche of his son. Mawdudi's somewhat ambivalent attitude toward his father and his early childhood is best captured in the following passage:

"A year after I was born my father washed his hands of the world, and for three years lived like an ascetic. Later on, although he had returned to the world, it was not to his old world which he returned, but to a purely religious one. The result of this revolution in his life was that as I opened my eyes and gained my senses, I found myself in a religious setting. My father and mother's lives had a distinct religious coloring. Their example and our upbringing imprinted my heart and mind with religious fervor."\(^{51}\)

It was, however, in Mawdudi's education, more than anywhere else, that Ahmad Hasan's influence was apparent. Despite his religious preoccupations, he took great interest in the education of his sons, and supervised them personally. Ahmad Hasan had wanted Abu'l-A'la to become a mawhvi, a theologian and religious scholar.\(^{52}\) Mawdudi's early education therefore, began with the study of Persian and Urdu, and soon included Arabic, fiqh (jurisprudence) and Hadith. The study of English or Western sciences and thought were deliberately excluded from Abu'l-A'la's curriculum.\(^{53}\)

Ahmad Hasan greatly emphasized ethics and proper behavior in the education of his sons. He moreover, took pains to inculcate an unadulterated understanding of their heritage in their young minds. At night time Ahmad Hasan would sit at their bedside and tell his sons stories about the great men of Islam, and narrate the glories of Islamic

\(^{51}\) KN, pp. 29-30. According to Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi, Abu'l-A'la revealed a strong attachment to religion since the infantile age of four; cited in 'Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.52.

\(^{52}\) KN, P.30; and Gilani, Maududi, P.33.

\(^{53}\) KN, P.30.
history. Mawdudi writes: "these interesting stories imbedded my mind with a deep feeling for religion." Ahmad Hasan also used to read to his children from the emotional articles of *al-Hilal*, Abu’l-Kalam Azad’s (1888-1958) widely-read exordium to contemporary reviveralist thinking in the Subcontinent.

The Mawdudis viewed themselves as "Delhiites". Their exilic lives in the Deccan had in fact, reinforced their identification with the culture and mores of Delhi. Ahmad Hasan consciously sought to implant a strong affinity with the city of his origins in his sons. Mawdudi writes,

"Special attention was paid to our talking and vernacular. I lived in the Deccan for twenty years without adopting a single local pronunciation, and continued to speak in pure Urdu."

Consequently, Ahmad Hasan prevented his sons from mixing with other children, encouraging them instead, to fill their hours of loneliness with reading and studying. His vigilance in this regard was such that, "if he heard any of us or the bearer utter a wrong word, or pronounce a word incorrectly, he would make us stop, and would correct us." Ahmad Hasan’s discipline was not only reflected in Abu’l-A’la’s strong fidelity to

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54 *ibid.*

55 *ibid.*


57 *KN*, P.30.

58 Ahmad Hasan often encouraged his sons to read from Azad’s articles in *al-Hilal* in order to improve their Urdu. See Shami, "Karan Se", P.31.

59 *ibid.*
his cultural roots and his self-reliant and distant demeanor, but also in his lucid style and powerful command of Urdu.60

Mawdudi was initially educated at home.61 There he was instructed in Arabic grammar, literature and introductory books on fiqh by private tutors.62 Although he harbored a strong desire for writing, "chances for writing seldom presented themselves"; his father who was primarily concerned with their general education, encouraged him instead to read.63 When he was eleven, at the behest of his instructor, Mawlvi Nadimu'llah Husaini, he was enrolled in the eighth grade at the Rushdiyah Section of the Madrasah-i Fauqaniyah of Aurangabad.64 The school was affiliated with the ‘Uthmaniyyah University of Hyderabad and taught both traditional and modern subjects.65 A few months later, Mawdudi was compelled to take the exams of the Rushdiyah Section. The young Abu’l-A’la did well in all subjects other than mathematics, which had not been included in Ahmad Hasan’s curriculum. However, the principal of the school, Muddaris Mulla Dawud, making an exception, permitted Mawdudi to enroll in the more advanced

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60 In fact Mawdudi himself attests to this fact. See, Mawdudi, "Mira Bachpan", pp.19-20.

61 ibid, pp.20-21; and Gilani, Maududi, pp.34-35.

62 KN, P.30.

63 ibid, pp.37-38.

64 Gilani explains that Fauqaniyah was the name of a new system of high school education, which was initiated by Nawwab ‘Imadu’l-Mulk Bilgirami, the curriculum of which was drawn up by Mawlanas Shibli Nu’mani and Hamidu’ddin Farahi. The medium of instruction was in Urdu, and the subjects of study included Arabic, fiqh, Hadith, and mantiq (logic), as well as natural sciences. See, Gilani, Maududi, P.36.

65 Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, pp.188-89.
Mawlvi Section of the school. It was here that Mawdudi became for the first time acquainted with the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{66}

Mawdudi, however, continued his education in religious subjects as well. At the Mawlvi Section he studied the \textit{Book of Miqat} in \textit{mantiq}, the \textit{Book of Quduri} in \textit{fiqh} and the \textit{Book of Shama'il Tirmizi} in \textit{Hadith}.\textsuperscript{67} His mastery of Arabic was such that in 1914 at the age of eleven, he translated the book, \textit{Al-Mirat al-Jadidah (Modern Women)} from Arabic into Urdu. Interestingly, this celebrated work by Qasim Amin, the renowned Egyptian modernist thinker, was a criticism of the status of women in Islam and presented strong arguments for initiating such reforms as abolition of the \textit{purdah} system (Muslim practice whereby women are segregated from men).\textsuperscript{68} It suggests that despite his impressive intellectual calibre, the young Abu'l-A'la had not as yet developed strong ideological orientations, nor were the parameters of his religious loyalties clear. The translation, however, confirmed Mawdudi's great talent in writing. He recollects of this translation,

"During this period [1914] my brother encouraged me to translate Qasim Amin's book, \textit{Al-Mirat al-jadidah} from Arabic to Urdu. God knows where the pages of that translation are today, but I remember that the lucidity of that translation made my father very happy, and even encouraged my brother [Abu'l-Khayr] to write. This was my first work."\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{66} KN, P.31.

\textsuperscript{67} Gilani, \textit{Maududi}, pp. 36-37.

\textsuperscript{68} KN, P.38; 'Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, P.59. Shahpuri, in \textit{Tarikh}, Vol.1, P.189 writes that Mawdudi undertook this translation when he was fourteen, i.e., in 1917. However, this date contradicts Mawdudi's own account in \textit{KN}.

\textsuperscript{69} KN, P.38.
Attending a school for a child who had been raised in seclusion, however, proved socially difficult. His command of Urdu, and his knowledge of public issues, and ability to master difficult texts exceeded the expectations of his teachers, and set him apart from his classmates. Reticent, and reluctant to engage in games, Mawdudi found himself to be distant from others of his age. Mawdudi justified his introversion in the following terms,

"Since I had originally been kept secluded, in this there existed benefits as well as drawbacks for me, such that when I became involved in society I was conscious and aware. My father in his talks and education had taught me how to distinguish between good and evil. My early education at his hand had left an indelible mark upon me such that I would not easily fall under the sway of various influences.

Moreover, Mawdudi's overtly intellectual orientation at such a young age had made him phlegmatic, and sublimated his emotions in favor of a mechanical outlook on human relations. Mawdudi writes in this regard:

"In those days [1914] a close relative, Mr. Ishfaq Ahmad Zahidi...who had enthusiasm for writing came to Aurangabad and stayed with us for a while. My brother [Abu'l-Khayr] and I had developed a taste for writing....Once he examined our capabilities. He gave us a subject to write about in which I was to assume that I had fallen in love with a girl, and I was to write her a letter describing my attraction to her, and detailing my emotional pains. We were not prepared for such a theme. Although I had studied the Gulistan and the Bustan [works of the Persian poet, Sa'di (1184-1292), which, in fact, are not romantic in content, but are on ethics], my life had

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70 Mawdudi, "Mira Bachpan", pp. 21-22.
71 ibid, pp.37-38.
72 ibid, P.22.
73 ibid.
74 KN, P.31.
been such that, I had no mental capacity for love or the beloved. I had
come to believe that love was a form of a disease...\textsuperscript{75}

There existed an undercurrent of conceit and haughtiness in Mawdudi’s aloofness -
a feeling of superiority and distinction which was intrinsic to the intellectual and yet lone-
some environment in which he was raised. He was known for his laconic comport and
recalcitrant and condescending self-righteousness throughout his life. These qualities not
only characterized his persona, but also had conditioned his psyche, permitting him to
claim the mantle of leadership of the Muslims and to view himself as the veritable
interpreter of their faith.

\textit{A Time of Flux: Journalism and the Khilafat Movement, 1915-24}

Mawdudi lived in Aurangabad until 1915, when he was twelve years old.\textsuperscript{76} In that
year his family moved to Hyderabad. Once in Hyderabad Mawdudi enrolled at the Mawlvi
Section of the Daru’l-‘Ulum. The principal of the Daru’l-‘Ulum in those days was
Mawlana Hamidu’ddin Farahi (d.1930). Farahi had been a graduate of Aligarh and a close
associate of Shibli Nu’mani (1857-1914), an erudite commentator on the Qur’an and a
patron of Muslim education whose ideas were manifested in the ‘Uthmaniyyah University
of Hyderabad and the Madrasatu’l-Islah of Sara’i-i Mir, A’zamgarh.\textsuperscript{77}

Mawdudi, however, was unable to benefit fully from the education at the Daru’l-

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{ibid}, P.37.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{KN}, P.29. In "Mira Bachpan", P.17, Mawdudi has written that the family moved to
Hyderabad when he was thirteen or fourteen. However, the age cited in \textit{KN} corroborates
with dates of events reported elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{77} For more on Farahi’s life and his school of thought see, Mustansir Mir, \textit{Coherence

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Ulum. For, the decision to move to Hyderabad was the result of Ahmad Hasan's growing professional and health problems.\textsuperscript{78} It therefore, did not augur well for the family. Soon after their arrival in Hyderabad Ahmad Hasan fell ill and moved on to Bhopal, leaving Abu'l-'Ala behind in the care of his mother to continue with his education. However, six months later Ahmad Hasan suffered a stroke and was subsequently paralysed. Upon receiving this news Mawdudi left Hyderabad for Bhopal in order to attend to his father.\textsuperscript{79} Ahmad Hasan's prolonged illness, and the family's deteriorating financial conditions compelled Mawdudi to abandon his studies and "to experience some of life's bitter realities.\textsuperscript{60} The traumatic experience of Ahmad Hasan's illness taught Mawdudi self-reliance, and compelled him to seek a livelihood at the young age of fifteen.

While in Bhopal, he became acquainted with Mawlana Niyaz Fatihpuri, who having witnessed the prowess of Mawdudi's pen greatly encouraged him to pursue a career in writing.\textsuperscript{81} The desire to write was very strong in him; yet his style was still "that of a novice.\textsuperscript{82} Mawdudi, however, continued to polish his writing style, such that, "by 1921 [he] had [his] own style, and did not copy anyone.\textsuperscript{83} Thenceforth, writing became an important cornerstone of his activities, and his style of Urdu became a source of power

\textsuperscript{78} ibid, P.31.
\textsuperscript{79} KN, pp.31-32.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid, P.32.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} ibid, P.38.
\textsuperscript{83} ibid.
and prominence, one which he utilized with prudence,

"I believe that every thought has its own vocabulary and each thought has to be expressed in the proper balance of words. Therefore, I believe it is enough to choose the right words, and there is no need for unnecessary entanglements. I was able to economize on writing and to devote most of my time to gathering information, evidence, and sources for my thoughts. Having ordered my thoughts in my mind, transferring them to the paper do not require much. I pay so little attention to playing with words that, I usually do not read a written text of mine for a second time, unless a certain responsibility be involved in the content."\(^{84}\)

In 1918 Mawdudi finally decided to pursue a career in writing. He moved to Bijnur in the United Provinces, where his brother, Abu'l-Khayr was the editor of a journal entitled *Madinah*. Mawdudi's stint as a journalist at *Madinah* lasted for only two months, whence the two brothers proceeded to Delhi.\(^{85}\)

In those days Delhi was embroiled in great political activism. The young Abu'l-A'la was captivated by the cosmopolitan ambience of the city of his origins, and soon became engrossed in its politics.\(^{86}\) He immersed himself in reading and exchange of ideas,\(^{87}\) and given his family's anti-colonialist proclivity, soon gravitated towards the freedom movement. He was then greatly impressed by the poetry of Ghalib (d.1869), Mu'min

\(^{84}\) *ibid*, pp.38-39.

\(^{85}\) *ibid*, P.31. Also see, Sarwat Saulat, *Maulana Maududi* (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1979), P.3

\(^{86}\) *KN*, pp.38-39.

\(^{87}\) Mawdudi recollects that in this period he was a voracious reader, and would spend all his income on the purchase of books. See, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, "Mira Mutala'ah", reprinted in *SSMN*, pp. 390-92.
(1799-1851)\textsuperscript{88} and Iqbal (1877-1938),\textsuperscript{89} and read even the works of modernist (\textit{taraqqi-pasand}) thinkers who he claimed he had always abhorred.\textsuperscript{90} His readings on modernity and the West were, however, profound and hence, made him acutely conscious of the intellectual lure as well as the challenge of modern scientific thought.\textsuperscript{91} While skeptical about the premises of modernist thought and suspicious of its intent, he nevertheless, made a serious effort to understand it, and to resolve the apparent dichotomy between tradition and modernity. It was during this period that he started to learn English, which in turn made a more diverse selection of works on Western thought available to him.\textsuperscript{92} Mawdudi became particularly interested in facilitating an understanding of the theoretical bases and practical application of modern scientific thought in the context of a nativist

\textsuperscript{88} Mu'min was interestingly, known for his powerful love poetry.

\textsuperscript{89} Jawsh Malihabadi recollects that, Mawdudi maintained a keen interest in poetry at the time. Cited in, Munir, \textit{Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi}, P.97.

\textsuperscript{90} Mawdudi, "Mira Mutala'ah", pp.390-91. In addition to the works of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in Delhi Mawdudi became acquainted with the works of the like of Khayri brothers with whom, Abu'l-Kayr Mawdudi recollected, his younger brother was greatly impressed; interview with Ja'far Qasmi, Faisalabad. Khayri brother, 'Abdu'l-Sattar and 'Abdu'l-Jabbar, were German educated socialist who were prominent in the intellectual circles of Delhi in the 1920s, and were proponents of Muslim self-determination; for more on the see, K.K. Aziz, \textit{A History of the Idea of Pakistan} (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), vol.1, pp.88-92.

\textsuperscript{91} Mawdudi's works often made reference to Western thinkers such as, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Libniz, Kant, Saint Simon, Comte, Goethe, Hegel, Nietzsche, Darwin, Fichte, Marx, Lenin and Bernard Shaw. Mawdudi shows sufficient knowledge of the positions of these thinkers to prove that he was familiar with their works. For an example of Mawdudi's analysis of the works of Marx and Lenin see, his interview with \textit{al-Nadwah} (A'zamgarh), Book Number (1943), pp.14-18.

\textsuperscript{92} Mawdudi writes that he began to learn English when he was fifteen or sixteen and was proficient in the language by the age of twenty two. See, 'Asim Nu'mani, ed., \textit{Makatib-i Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1977), vol.2, P.348.
world view. In 1918, when still fifteen years of age he wrote an article in the *Ma'arif* journal of A'zamgarh entitled, "Barq ya Kahruba"93 - Electricity or Electricity - the word *barq* was a modern word for electricity, whereas *kahruba* was used in the same capacity in the classical Islamic texts. The article was a an attempt to explicate a scientific phenomenon which was associated with the West by couching it in terminologies which would be palatable for his countrymen.94 Interestingly, Mawdudi’s approach showed an unmistakable resemblance to the *nichari* (naturalist)95 position associated with Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Aligarh modernists, whose works Mawdudi had read and yet abhorred. Mawdudi remained keenly interested in modern scientific thought throughout his life.96 In later years, however concern for incorporating modern scientific ideas in the corpus of Islamic thought replaced the vague nativism of his earlier days. Mawdudi’s intellectual awakening in Delhi occurred in tandem with his increasing interest in politics and participation in the freedom movement.97 Soon after he arrived in Delhi he helped form the Anjuman-i I'anat-i Nazarbandan-i Islam (the Society for Assistance to Muslim


94 Metcalf writes that, this approach was extant among those associated with Delhi College, and was also typical of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s earlier writings on Islam; see, *Islamic Revival*, pp.320-23.

95 This sobriquet was used in a derogatory fashion by the critics of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s writings on modern science and Islam.

96 See for instance Mawdudi’s euphoric reaction to the first landing on the moon; interview with *Asia* (Lahore), (July 25, 1969), P.2.

97 *KN*, pp. 32-33.
Prisoners), which was formed to collect funds for Muslim political prisoners.\textsuperscript{98} Yet, it is important to note that, his political activities during this period were not based on communal or religious feelings, but were essentially directed against British rule. India was in those years in the throes of great political change. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the Rowlatt Act, and the massacre at Jullianwala Bagh, all of which occurred in 1919, had acted to further politicize the Indian masses in favor of the freedom movement. Mawdudi’s political sentiments were no exception to this general rule. He too, became immersed in the freedom movement as an Indian nationalist. In fact, in 1918 he wrote a laudatory biography of Pandit Madan Muhan Malawiyah (1861-1946), the prominent Hindu politician who had served as the President of the Congress Party in 1909 and 1918, and as the Chancellor of Benares Hindu University from 1919 until 1940.\textsuperscript{99} In 1919 he wrote a similar biography of Gandhi,\textsuperscript{100} a man whom in later years he viewed with contempt.\textsuperscript{101} This biography was confiscated by the police following a complaint by one of Mawdudi’s relatives, and was therefore never published.\textsuperscript{102}

With the onset of the Khilafat and the Swaraj movements in 1919, Mawdudi became fully embroiled in politics, placing his trust in these efforts and in their

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{ibid}, P.32.

\textsuperscript{99} The article is reprinted in \textit{Khudabakhsh Library Journal} (Patna), No. 50 (1989), pp.1-32. Also see, \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (November 30, 1989), P.42.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{KN}, pp.32-33.

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Maryam Jameelah, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{KN}, P.33.
leaders. Moreover, as he became increasingly involved in the nationalist agitations, his political activities found expression in his intellectual endeavors. In 1919 in Delhi he met one the patrons of the Anjuman-i I’anat by the name of Taju’ddin. Taju’ddin edited a pro-Congress weekly newspaper in Jubalpur, in the Central Provinces, by the name of Taj. Both Abu’l-Khayr and Abu’l-A’la agreed to work for Taju’ddin as the editors of his newspaper, and were therefore dispatched to Jubalpur.

The editing of the Taj in the increasingly politicized environment of Northern India proved to be an arduous task. It was not long after they began their work at the Taj that the newspaper was closed down, and the two brothers were compelled to leave Jubalpur. They went from there first to Bhopal and eventually back to Delhi.

Mawdudi’s experiences at the Taj convinced him to pursue his education in English more seriously. In Delhi he met a reputable tutor of English named Mawlvi Muhammad Fazil. Mawdudi studied English with Fazil for some five months, after which he felt confident enough to continue his study of that language on his own. For two years he persevered in his study of English, reading books, journals and magazines on a variety of subjects, "using a dictionary until the correct meaning and usage of various words
became known to [him], and until [he] could study history, philosophy, political science, economics, religion, natural sciences and social studies in English without difficulty."\textsuperscript{109} It was through these efforts that Mawdudi learnt about Western thought, a process of self-education which continued throughout his life.\textsuperscript{110}

In 1920 the two brothers, who had worked together since their stay in Bijnur, parted ways. Abu’l-Khayr left the field of journalism altogether while Abu’l-A’la became totally immersed in it.\textsuperscript{111} Taju’ddin had started to publish the \textit{Taj} again in Jubalpur, and Mawdudi was invited to act as its editor.\textsuperscript{112} Jubalpur had been at the center of Khilafat activism, and Taju’ddin, was a sympathizer of the Congress and the Khilafat Movement. Through him Mawdudi became involved in the movement’s agitations. He delivered many public speeches, and became "one of the Muslims who joined hands with the Congress."\textsuperscript{113} He writes of his activities in Jubalpur that:

"Beside the editorial work of the \textit{Taj} I did political work also. I helped in organizing the Khilafat Movement in Jubalpur, and had a share in bringing the Muslims of the town into the fold of the Congress."\textsuperscript{114}

Once again, Mawdudi’s stay at Jubalpur did not last for long. Following an article which

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{109} \textit{ibid.}
\footnote{110} Adams, "The Ideology", P.372.
\footnote{111} Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi later became a respected scholar of Islam. He was a contemporary of Manazir Ahsan Gilani at the ‘Uthmaniyyah University in Hyderabad. Following the creation of Pakistan he moved to Lahore where he lived until his death.
\footnote{112} ‘Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp. 64-67. Soon after Mawdudi joined the \textit{Taj} again the paper became a daily.
\footnote{113} \textit{KN}, P.34.
\footnote{114} Mawdudi, \textit{Da’wah}, P.3.
\end{footnotes}
Mawdudi wrote in criticism of the colonial government in the *Taj* in late 1920, the newspaper was closed down, and a suit was initiated by the authorities against Taju’ddin. Mawdudi wrote of this episode that, "[t]his was a great burden for me and I promised myself never to have others bear the responsibility for my work, and to always be responsible for my pen."115

The experience of living alone, and participation in political agitations in Jubalpur transformed Mawdudi’s character. His central role in the city’s pro-Khilafat activities gave the young political novice great self-confidence and a sense of responsibility. The events in Jubalpur had given Mawdudi exposure to the working of politics, and had moreover, placed him in the limelight, imparting on the young journalist social stature, communal identity and a sense of purpose. He therefore, became aware of his own intellectual and political abilities, and developed a feeling of self-worth. He writes in this regard:

"[In Jubalpur] I sensed that there existed some hidden power within me which would rise in me and assist me at time of need. Thenceforth, I never shrugged from accepting responsibility."116

Moreover, his reporting of and participation in the Khilafat Movement accentuated his anti-colonialist tendencies. His articles during this period in the *Taj* as well as in other notable newspapers such as *Zamindar* of Lahore revealed a deep-seated feeling of national consciousness and antagonism towards British rule.117

Mawdudi left Jubalpur for Delhi, where he continued his political activities. He

115 *KN*, pp. 34-35.

116 *ibid*, P.34.

117 *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.41-45.
joined a secret society for a brief period, and also participated in the Tahrik-i Hijrat, which was a movement of opposition to British rule over India. Having concluded that India was no longer *dar al-Islam* (land of Islam), the Tahrik encouraged all Indian Muslims to migrate *en masse* to Afghanistan, where Islam continued to reign at the helm of power. Mawdudi, however, soon broke away from the ill-fated movement as a result of disagreements with its leadership.

Then early in 1921 Mawdudi met Mawlanas Mufti Kifayatu'llah and Ahmad Sa'id, two prominent Deobandi 'ulama who were the *sadr* (president) and *nazim* (secretary) of Jam'iat-i 'Ulama-i Hind (JUH) respectively. JUH had at that time begun to publish a newspaper entitled, *Muslim*. Mawdudi was offered to serve as the editor of the *Muslim*, a position which Mawdudi continued to occupy until 1923 when the paper ceased to appear in print.

While the editing of the *Muslim* consumed most of Mawdudi's time, he remained true to his intellectual vocation. The intellectual environment of Delhi had once again...

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118 For more on this movement see, F.S. Briggs, "The Indian Hijrat of 1920", *The Muslim World*, XX:2 (April 1930), pp.167-86.


120 *ibid*.

121 *KN*, P.35.

122 Binder finds it interesting that, JUH felt compelled to turn to an outsider such as Mawdudi rather than to one of the Deoband's many graduates for editorship of this paper, and later that of *al-Jami'at; Religion and Politics*, P.80.
awakened Mawdudi's desire for learning. This time, however, it was the company of the towering religious figures of JUH, with whom he worked, that was most influential in giving direction to Mawdudi's continuing education.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, when in 1921 Mawdudi decided to resume his studies, "it was in Arabic, \textit{tafsir} (Qur'anic commentary), \textit{Hadith}, \textit{fiqh}, \textit{mantiq}, and philosophy that [he] sought to gain competence."\textsuperscript{124} Mawdudi studied Arabic with the eminent religious scholar, Mawlana 'Abdu'ssalam Niyazi (d.1966).\textsuperscript{125} Mawdudi's father had been a devotee of Niyazi, and when the family had been settled in the Arab Sara'i village, 'Abu'l-A'la, then only an infant, had been sent to the great Mawlana to study Arabic.\textsuperscript{126} Others have suggested that Mawdudi along with his brother Abu'l-Khayr had studied \textit{dars-i nizami} with Niyazi.\textsuperscript{127} Shahpuri reports that Mawdudi studied \textit{fiqh}, \textit{adab} (literature or etiquette), \textit{mantiq}, and \textit{kalam} (theology) with Niyazi.\textsuperscript{128} Qasmi confirms Shahpuri's account, but contends that Mawdudi never completed the \textit{dars} with Niyazi.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{123} 'Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, P.65.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{KN}, P.35.

\textsuperscript{125} 'Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, P.61.

\textsuperscript{126} 'Asim Nu'mani, "Recollections", in Rana and Khalid, \textit{Tazkirah}, P.834.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Dars-i nizami} is a syllabus of religious education, taught at religious schools in South Asia since the eighteenth century. For more on this see, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}, P.31; and Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, \textit{Rud-i Kawthar}, reprint, (Lahore: Idarah-i Thaqafat-i Islam, 1988), pp.605-09.

\textsuperscript{128} Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, pp.197-99.

\textsuperscript{129} Ja'far Qasmi, "Mujhe Yad Hey Sab Zara Zara...", in \textit{Nida} (Lahore) (April 17, 1990), pp.28-34.
This may well have been the result of the interruption in the publication of the *Muslim*. Mawdudi reports that, following the closure of the *Muslim* in 1923 he left Delhi for Bhopal, where he spent the next one and a half years in pursuit of his studies.\(^{130}\)

The city then bore a strong influence of the Ahl-i Hadith, whose puritanical reformism and spirit of independent religious thinking, as will be discussed in Part II, found an echo in Mawdudi’s thought and style. While there exists no hard evidence to confirm Mawdudi’s association with the Ahl-i Hadith in Bhopal, it is hard to imagine that Mawdudi would have remained oblivious to the Ahl-i Hadith’s highly intellectual discourse and the movement’s pervasive influence in that city. As such, Mawdudi’s otherwise uneventful period of stay in Bhopal is the most likely time when he became acquainted with the teachings of the Ahl-i Hadith.

Mawdudi left Bhopal and returned to Delhi in 1924. There he met the famous Muslim leader and Khilafat activist, Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali Jawhar (1878-1931).\(^{131}\) Muhammad ‘Ali invited Mawdudi to work with him on his newspaper, *Hamdard*. However, Mawlana Ahmad Sa‘id of JUH with whom Mawdudi was acquainted since his days at the *Muslim* was also preparing a new newspaper, *al-Jami’at*, and he too, was eager to obtain Mawdudi’s services. Mawdudi chose to work at the *al-Jami’at* as the

\(^{130}\) KN, P.35.

newspaper's editor and began his activities there in 1925.\textsuperscript{132}

Once in Delhi, Mawdudi resumed his study of the \textit{dars-i nizami}, this time with two Deobandi \textit{'ulama} at the Fatihpuri Madrasah.\textsuperscript{133} The Madrasah was located at the Fatihpuri Mosque in old Delhi, and had also served as the home of the Nazaratu’l-Ma‘arifu’l-Qur’aniyah school of the Qur’an, which was established by Mawlana Mahmudu’l-Hasan of Deoband and his disciple ‘Ubaidu’llah Sindhi with the purpose of increasing the influence of the \textit{'ulama} among Westernized Muslims.\textsuperscript{134} At the Fatihpuri Mawdudi studied \textit{Hadith, fiqh, adab}, and Sufism\textsuperscript{135} with Mawlana Ishfaqu’l-Rahman Kandihlawi, and the \textit{Tafsir-i Baizawi, balaghat} (rhetoric), \textit{‘ilm-i ma’ani} (interpretive sciences) and \textit{fiqh} with Mawlana Muhammad Sharifu’llah.\textsuperscript{136} Mawdudi received his \textit{ijazahs} (certificates to teach the religious sciences)\textsuperscript{137} from the Fatihpuri Madrasah in

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\textsuperscript{133} Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, pp.197-99.

\textsuperscript{134} See, Minault, \textit{The Khilafat Movement}, pp.28 and 30.

\textsuperscript{135} In Mawdudi’s \textit{ijazah}, Mawlana Kandihlawi writes that Mawdudi had studied texts on \textit{madarij-i sama‘} (gradations of mystical ecstasy) under his supervision. See, Mawdudi, \textit{Watha’iq-i Mawdudi}, P.13.


\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ijazat} or \textit{ijazah} is their recognition that a student has completed his requirements and may now teach other students in those subjects. For more see, G. Vajda, \textit{Idjaza, EI}(2).
\end{flushright}
1926 (1344 A.H.)\(^{138}\) By obtaining these *ijazahs* Mawdudi had become a Deobandi ‘*alim* and a member of the sodality associated with that school. In one *ijazah*, Kandihlawi has included Mawdudi in the chain of illustrious scholars of Islam which extends back from the Deobandi ‘*ulama* of Fatihpuri, to Khalil Ahmad Ambahtawi, the *sarparast* (overseer) of the Deobandi Mazahiru’l-‘Ulum Madrasah at Saharanpur and a great Deobandi ‘*alim* of the turn of the century, to Mawlana Muhammad Mazhar Nanautawi, one of the Deoband Daru’l-‘Ulum’s most famous teachers of *Hadith* and the school’s one time principal,\(^{139}\) to Shah ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz and Shah Waliullah of Delhi, and finally, to Imam Malik ibn Anas (716-95), the founder of the Maliki school of Sunni law.\(^{140}\)

Although he never acknowledged it, Mawdudi imbibed many of the ideas of the Deobandis. He shared his mentors’ concerns over the intrusion of the colonial culture into the lives of Muslims. Like the Deobandis, Mawdudi too sought to emulate "the practice of an authentic text or an idealized historical period;"\(^{141}\) to exalt religious law and teach it at the popular level; and to disparage popular religious rites and customs such as the celebration of ‘*urs*.\(^{142}\)

Mawdudi, however, never publicized his Deobandi academic lineage, nor his ties

\(^{138}\) For reproductions of Mawdudi’s two *ijazahs* see Mawdudi, *Watha’iq*, pp.12-14.

\(^{139}\) For more on Khalil Ahmad and Mawlana Nanautawi see, Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp. 75, 129 and 131-32.


\(^{141}\) The following description of the Deoband is based on Metcalf’s analysis; see, Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, pp.252-58.

\(^{142}\) Literally means marriage; it is a ceremony celebrating the “marriage” of the Sufi saint with God which occurred upon his death, on annual bases.
to the 'ulama. In fact, it was not until after his death that his ijazahs were discovered, and references to them began to appear in the Jama'at-i Islami literature. In later years Mawdudi explained that during his stay in Delhi he had concluded that the division of education into traditional and modern among Muslims at the time, and the absence of any nexuses between the two was not only unproductive but actually dangerous.\textsuperscript{143} He therefore had decided not to be restricted to the regimen of either educational system, but to benefit from both.\textsuperscript{144} He wrote in this regard,

"I do not have the prerogative to belong to the class of Ulema...I am a man of the middle cadre, who has imbibed something from both the systems of education, the new and the old; and has gathered my knowledge by traversing both paths. By virtue of my inner light, I conclude that neither the old school is totally on the right nor the new."\textsuperscript{145}

Therefore Mawdudi complimented his education in dars-i nizami with readings in other subjects during this period. He started to learn German, but had to abandon this endeavor when his tutor left Delhi after a few months.\textsuperscript{146} This was also a period of great political activity for Mawdudi, which again found expression in his intellectual creativity. His articles in the \textit{al-Jami'at}, his defence of Turkey against challenges by its

\textsuperscript{143} JIKUS, P.19.

\textsuperscript{144} The discussion of a middle path in Muslim education surfaced on numerous occasions in Mawdudi's writings in the subsequent years, and was a reason why he viewed the Nadwatul-'Ulama favorably. Examples of some of Mawdudi's early writings on the subject can be found in the very first issue of \textit{Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an} which he edited in March 1933. For text of a lecture which he delivered on this subject at the Nadwatul-'Ulama in Lucknow in January 1941 see, \textit{TQ}, December 1940-January 1941, pp. 347-71. For more on the Nadwatul-'Ulama see, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}, pp.315-47.


\textsuperscript{146} \textit{KN}, P.36.
European adversaries in his pamphlets, *The State of Christians in Turkey* (1922) and *Tyrannies of the Greeks in Smyrna* (1922),\(^{147}\) his translation of the famous Egyptian nationalist and a hero for Indian Muslims at the time,\(^{148}\) Mustafa Kamil’s book, *Al-Mas’alah-i Mashriqiyah* (*The Eastern Question*) from Arabic to Urdu (1923-24)\(^{149}\), and his book on Hyderabad entitled *Dawlat-i Asifiyah wa Hukumat-i Britaniyah* (*Asifiyah government and Britain*) (1924)\(^{150}\) show that, despite his increasing interest in religion, it was politics and the freedom movement that continued to serve as the primary focus of his thinking.

Mawdudi had been deeply involved in the Khilafat Movement through his association with Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali, the JUH, and his work at *al-Jami‘at.*\(^{151}\) He had become acquainted with the works and ideas of such Khilafat leaders as the ‘Ali brothers, ‘Ubaidu’llah Sindhi (d.1944)\(^{152}\) and Abu’l-Kalam Azad. From the Khilafat activists he learnt about the West and about politics; he learnt the value of social mobilization and political propaganda, as well as the utility of putting religious idioms and symbolisms to communalist and political use. Many of the ideas of the Khilafat movement

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\(^{147}\) Cited in *SAAM*, vol.1, P.40.


\(^{150}\) *KN*, P.36.

\(^{151}\) Binder, *Religion and Politics*, pp.80-81; and *SDMN*, pp. 63-64.

\(^{152}\) On the influence of Sindhi on Mawdudi see, Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Maulana Sayyid Ala Maudoodi's Life and Thought", in *The Islamic Quarterly*, XXXI:2 (Second Quarter 1987), P.118.
such as its anti-imperialism, attempt to unite the various expressions of Islam in India, appeal to pan-Islamic sentiments, use of religious symbolisms in enunciating political ends, and the belief in the viability and desirability of resuscitation of the institution of Caliphate remained hallmarks of Mawdudi's political thought. Yet, Mawdudi’s understanding of these ideas, and especially his views on the political relevance of Islamic institutions such as the Caliphate at this time was not premised on religious doctrine but on historical analysis. He had become convinced of the relevance of Islam's historical paradigm to the problems confronting Muslims, but did not as yet see Islam as an all-encompassing sociopolitical template. In 1925 he wrote a series of articles in al-Jami'at entitled "Islam ka Sarchashmih-i Qudrat" (The Sources of Islam's Power). The articles revealed Mawdudi's belief in the efficacy of utilizing the roots of Muslim glories of the past in providing solutions to the existing Muslim predicaments. His outlook at this time was clearly distinguishable from the views of other reform movements such as the Deoband or the Aligarh. Those movements, although each in a different way, had emphasized return to strict observance of religious law, and had eschewed popular religious

153 SDMN, pp.63-64.

154 See Minault, The Khilafat Movement, pp.7-8; Minault points out that Khilafat movement should be understood as an attempt to create a "pan-Indian Islam".

155 With regards to Mawdudi's continued belief in the viability and efficacy of the institution of Caliphate see, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Khilafat'u Mulukiyyat (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966). In this work he not only presented a model for Islamic state in terms of the institution of Caliphate, but saw the revival of the institution as the harbinger of the desired Islamic order.

Mawdudi also remained greatly impressed by Mawlana Muhammad 'Ali, one of Khilafat Movement's chief architects long after he parted with the movement.

practices in their efforts to reconstruct a homogeneous Muslim community capable of social action and political reassertion.\textsuperscript{157}

The collapse of the Khilafat Movement in October 1924 following the official abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Turkish government was a bitter experience for Mawdudi, one which changed his entire perspective on religion and politics. He saw the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate as a consequence of the machinations of Westernized Turkish nationalists on the one hand, and the betrayal of Islam by Arab nationalists on the other.\textsuperscript{158} He therefore, developed deep-seated suspicions towards both nationalism and westernism. It was then that Mawdudi became convinced that nationalism would never protect the interests of Islam, for it is secular by nature. His bitterness was reflected in his writings in 1924-25, where he criticized Muslim flirtations with nationalist solutions in Turkey, Egypt and Afghanistan, and he derided the ideas of Mustafa Kamil of Egypt, whose book he had translated into Urdu only a year earlier.\textsuperscript{159}

Meanwhile, Mawdudi had found cause to also distrust nationalism in India. The Congress Party had developed an increasingly Hindu identity under the leadership of Gandhi following the onset of the \textit{Swaraj} effort. Mawdudi concluded from this that democracy as the objective of the Indian nationalist effort would only serve the aspirations of the majority who were the Hindus. In later years he recollected that, he had become

\textsuperscript{157} See, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{JIKUS}, P.8.

\textsuperscript{159} These criticisms appeared in \textit{Nigar} and \textit{al-Jami'at} in Delhi throughout 1925 and 1926. See, \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.41-45.
greatly alarmed when in 1929 Gandhi taunted the Muslims, "we will get freedom with you or without you, or in spite of you". Democracy, Mawdudi concluded, could be a viable option for Muslims only if the majority of India would be Muslim. Mawdudi was no longer convinced of the wisdom of Azad’s well-known argument that, Muslims should not merely participate in the struggle for independence, but rather, through revitalizing their religious heritage, should act as its leaders. Mawdudi qualified Azad’s dictum by stipulating that, participation in the freedom movement would be ill-advised until such day that Muslims would be able to demonstrate a modicum of "political power, order and will", which would enable them to confront the arrogant attitude of the Hindus and contest their domination of the struggle for freedom. Therefore, as Mawdudi lost faith in the Congress Party and its Muslim allies, he turned, to an increasing extent, to Islam and the revival of its institutions in formulating a political strategy for safeguarding Muslim interests. He had set upon the intellectual journey which took him from identification with his community to communalism and then to Islamic revivalism.

The failure of the Khilafat Movement had, above all else, convinced Mawdudi of the futility of vesting hope in an institution over whose fate the Muslims of India had no control. The Khilafat Movement had moreover, demonstrated the limits to the efficacy of

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160 JIKUS, pp.19-20.
161 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, P.42.
162 JIKUS, pp.19-20.
163 ibid.
164 ibid, P.9.
political agitations when directed at preserving moribund institutions which lacked social roots and an ideological raison d’être. Yet, he had not wavered in his belief in the viability or incumbency of the Caliphate. He therefore, concluded that if Muslim Caliphate was to be it would have to be built anew with roots in a society which would have religious motives rather than sentimental attachments or political interests in the institution. This was not the task of a journalist, nor was a newspaper the proper forum for propagating this cause. With these conclusions in mind, Mawdudi became increasingly disenchanted with his profession, viewing it as a "mental torment"\textsuperscript{165} - a restriction and a handicap in light of the task before him. Therefore, in 1928, after ten years of work as a journalist he decided to "seek new horizons,"\textsuperscript{166} and left al-Jami’at.\textsuperscript{167} While Mawdudi makes no reference to any disagreements with JUH leaders in regard to his decision, it can be surmised from the new directions which his thinking had taken that, he no longer was of one mind with the pro-Congress JUH.

Scholarship, Religious Consciousness and Political Activism, 1924-32

The Khilafat Movement had ushered in an era of Muslim communal consciousness in which Mawdudi’s political, and more importantly scholarly activities found expression. In the aftermath of the Khilafat imbroglio, Indian Muslims, politicized along communal lines and frustrated in the face of defeat, became increasingly conscious of the particular

\textsuperscript{165} KN, P.36.

\textsuperscript{166} Gilani, Maududi, P.42.

\textsuperscript{167} Binder argues that Mawdudi was frustrated with the increasingly evident shortcomings of the ‘ulama of JUH, and was therefore compelled to leave them. See, Binder, Religion and Politics, P.81

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interests of their community. In their efforts to define new parameters for their political activism Muslims encountered resistance and challenges from the colonial government as well as the secular nationalist forces. Moreover, the growing Muslim communalism found expression in instances of communal strife which not only put to test the wisdom of the drift of Muslim politics towards communalism, but more importantly, engendered direct challenges by the British and the Hindus against the Islamic faith. These denunciations created a sense of resignation and desperation among the Muslims masses. They moreover, presented Muslim intellectuals with a gauntlet which elicited response from such unlikely personages as the young editor of *al-Jami'at*.

In 1924 a number of Ahmadi missionaries were put to death in Afghanistan on charges of apostasy. The British criticized the executions and the religious laws which sanctioned them. Mawdudi found the British invective to be a condemnation of Islam as a whole. He, however, understood that the Muslim response would have to be unemotional and rational.\(^{168}\)

Meanwhile, the violent reaction of Muslims to the collapse of the Khilafat Movement in 1924 had led to communal strife across India. Hindus reacted to Muslim belligerence by organizing communal political bodies of their own, which acted to escalate the inter-communal conflict. The Hindu Mahasabha, and more specifically, the Arya Samaj organized the Shuddhi movement. The movement was designed to proselytize among nominal Muslims who abided by Hindu norms, and low caste converts to Islam,

\(^{168}\) Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
harkening them to return to Hinduism. The movement, in its forceful drive for reconversion, greatly antagonized Muslims and insulted their religious sensibilities. Mawdudi took notice of the rising Hindu revivalist sentiments and viewed the Shuddhi campaign as proof of the inherent animosity of Hindus towards Islam, and the beginning of the end of Islam in India. He concluded then that, to prevent the extinction of Islam in India Muslims had to adopt a proselytical attitude. He was therefore greatly disturbed with the Muslims's lackluster response to the Shuddhi campaign. He said in later years that when, in 1919, he saw the Shuddhi leader, Swami Shradhanand, deliver a sermon from the pulpit of the Jama' Masjid of Delhi he felt deeply humiliated.

As the Shuddhi campaign gained momentum it did elicit emotional responses from the Muslim masses, provoking greater hostilities and acrimonious exchanges between the two communities. The ensuing violence finally, in 1925, led to the assassination of Swami Shradhanand, who had slighted Muslim beliefs. The outrage at the murder of Shradhanand led to a public campaign against Islam in the Indian press. Islam was criticized for its violent predisposition. It was noted that even Gandhi derided Islam "as

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170 On Muslim reaction to the *Shuddhi* movement see, Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, pp.193-95.

171 *JIKUS*, pp.11-12.

172 *ibid*, pp.12-14.

173 *ibid*, pp.11-12, Swami Shradhanand had appeared at the Jama' Masjid in April 1919 in relation to a Hindu-Muslim unity meeting regarding Gandhi's *satyagraha*; see, Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, P.70.
the religion of the sword.\textsuperscript{174} This was a challenge which Muslims were hard-pressed to respond to given the liberal political context in which the issue was put to debate. More often than not, the Muslim response, especially that of those who were more Westernized, to the mounting criticism against their religion was muted and apologetic.

The anti-Islamic backlash from these two episodes, the impotence of Muslim intellectual leaders in adequately defending their religion, and the climate of helplessness and resignation which prevailed among the Muslim masses had a major impact on Mawdudi. The intellectual transformation which had been kindled by the collapse of the Khilafat Movement now found occasion to express itself in action.

In a sermon during the Friday Prayers at Jama‘ Masjid of Delhi in 1926, the revered Muslim leader, Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali Jawhar is believed to have echoed the sentiments of many in saying, "I wish a servant of God would stand up and provide the true Islamic position as a response [to the charges leveled against Islam].\textsuperscript{175} It was Jauhar’s lament that day in the Jama‘ Masjid that beckoned a "clean-shaven Mawdudi,"\textsuperscript{176} who was present in the crowd to rise in defense of his religion.

Mawdudi set out to provide a rational exposition of the Islamic doctrine of \textit{jihad},

\textsuperscript{174} Cited in \textit{ibid}, P.15, and in Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, P.82. Binder, however, is of the opinion that the quote does not belong to Gandhi, and that it was later attempts to mythicize Mawdudi’s role in this issue that ascribed the quote to Gandhi. However, Mawdudi in later years referred to this episode directly in JIKUS.

\textsuperscript{175} Cited in Muhammad Salahu’ddin, "Tajziah", in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi) (September 28, 1989), P.31. Allahwala also cites the same episode. Here, however, Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali is quoted as saying, "would none rise up to explain Islam’s veritable position". See, Mahmud Ahmad Allahwala, "Mard-i Haqq Agah", in \textit{Takbir}, (September 28, 1989), pp.41-43.

\textsuperscript{176} Allahwala, "Mard-i Haqq Agah", P.41.
which had come under attack as the most visible vestige of Islam's violent nature.

Mawdudi's approach parted with the pedantic and syllogistic style of traditional religious texts. Conscious of the fact that in addition to reassuring Muslims of their faith, he was to provide a response to non-Muslims, Mawdudi sought to present his arguments in a modern scholarly style. While reiterating the religious incumbency of the Islamic doctrine of *jihad*, the main focus of this endeavor was to prove the logic of the doctrine, and to underline the juridical limitations to its use. Mawdudi's arguments were formulated in debate with Western thought, and the doctrine of *jihad* was discussed in the context of the laws of war and peace to which the British adhered.\(^{177}\) Numerous references to Western legal sources in Mawdudi's exposition not only attested to his vast reading in English by this time, but also to his conscious effort to legitimize *jihad* utilizing the legal arguments and sensibilities of those who were self-righteously condemning the doctrine as wanton violence.\(^{178}\)

Mawdudi's research on *jihad* in Islam lasted for six months.\(^{179}\) His exposition on the subject appeared under the title, "Islam ka Qanun-i Jang" (Islam's Law of War), in twenty two issues of *al-Jami'at* seriatim, beginning in February 1927 and ending in May

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\(^{178}\) For Mawdudi's references see *ibid*, also see, Mawdudi, *Watha'iq*, P.92, where the original drafts of Mawdudi's writings are reproduced.

\(^{179}\) Faruqi, "Hayat-i Javidan", P.23.
of the same year.\textsuperscript{180} The articles were received well in Muslim intellectual and political circles. Mawdudi was lauded for his service to Islam by Muhammad Iqbal, Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali,\textsuperscript{181} Mawlana Ahmad Sa’id of JUH who wrote a complimentary note to the first installment of the article,\textsuperscript{182} and the eminent ‘alim, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi who facilitated the publication of the articles in the form of the book, \textit{Al-Jihad fi’l-Islam}, at the Daru’l-Musannifin publishing house in A’zamgarh in 1930.\textsuperscript{183} The accolade for Mawdudi’s daring effort and his erudite rendition of the doctrine of jihad, no doubt, boosted the ego of the young journalist. He became conscious of his scholarly potential and the power of his pen.\textsuperscript{184} It too, convinced him that his calling lay not in journalism, but in a higher vocation.\textsuperscript{185}

For reasons which remain unclear, Mawdudi did not find the intellectual climate of Delhi to be conducive to the kind of scholarly activity which he now intended to pursue.\textsuperscript{186} He therefore left Delhi in 1928 for Hyderabad, where he remained until 1930, hence commencing a process of intellectual transformation first from journalist to

\textsuperscript{180} Ahmad and Ansari, "Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi", P.361. Facsimiles of the first and last installments of the article can be found in Mawdudi, \textit{Watha’iq}, pp.90-91.

\textsuperscript{181} Ahmad and Ansari, "Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi", P.361.

\textsuperscript{182} See Mawdudi, \textit{Watha’iq}, P.90.

\textsuperscript{183} Faruqi, "Hayat-i Javidan", P.23. Daru’l-Musannifin was established by Shibli Nu’mani and was closely associated with the Nadwatu’l-Ulama in Lucknow.


\textsuperscript{185} \textit{ibid}, P.57.

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{KN}, P.36.

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scholar, and later to a renewer and reformer of Islam. Mawdudi spent those two years in academic research. Aside from an article which he wrote in the Ma'arif journal of A'zamgarh on the merits of adopting indigenous dress in lieu of the Western dress code, his attention was focused on historiography of Islam. Between 1928 and 1930 he produced a history of the Saljuqid dynasty, which ruled the central lands of Islam from 1038 until 1194, and translated those portions of Ibn Khallikan's (d.1282) "history of Egypt" which pertained to the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171) from Arabic into Urdu.

In August 1930 Mawdudi fell ill, and subsequently left Hyderabad for Delhi, where he remained briefly before proceeding to Bhopal. There, Mawdudi recovered from his ill health, and began gathering material for an extensive history of the Deccan. Mawdudi continued this project in Hyderabad where to he had returned in July 1931. His efforts culminated in a biography of Nizamu'l-Mulk Asifjah of Hyderabad, and a brief history of the Deccan, "which sold out quickly." Mawdudi's works between 1928 and 1931 indicate that, while it was his efforts on behalf of Islam which had led him to leave his career in journalism, he was still far from a political leader or an advocate of revivalism. It was the desire to be a scholar which consumed his intellectual passions, and it was concern for the glories of Islamic history and Muslim culture of India that held his attention. His interest in the Fatimids, who were Isma'ili Shi'is and whose religious views were deemed by the Sunnis to be obscurantist at

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187 Cited in JIKUS, P.17, and in Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.206.


189 KN, P.36.
best, is particularly instructive in this regard. It is illustrative of the fact that Mawdudi was not yet ideologically motivated, but interested in Islam’s historical paradigm and its political ramifications. He was eager to discern the sources of the grandeur of Islamic civilization with view to replicating them in India.

Mawdudi’s brother, Abu’l-Khayr was at this time at Hyderabad’s ‘Uthmaniyah University, and was an associate of Sayyid Manazir Ahsan Gilani at the University’s renowned Translation Office, Daru’l-Tarjumah. The Translation Office was at that time an elite institution, led by Gilani, where a team of distinguished scholars and linguists such as ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi were engaged in translating important works on philosophy and intellectual history, from the works of Plato to those of nineteenth century British thinkers to the seminal works of Islamic philosophy, into Urdu. The Office was particularly active in providing Urdu translations of English sources. The Office had acted as a means for introducing Western philosophers and schools of thought to India with view to promoting debate between modern intellectual thought and Indian culture in general, and Islam in particular. As such the Translation Office boasted an active intellectual environment wherein new ideas were presented and discussed, and many Western texts were available in the original language as well as in the published or draft form of their Urdu renditions. The Office was the most likely source for Mawdudi’s

190 Masudul Hasan, however, suggests that, Mawdudi’s translation of Ibn Khallikan’s work commissioned by ‘Uthmaniyah University’s Translation Office, and therefore, had not been chosen by Mawdudi himself; *SAAM*, vol.1, P.75.

acquaintance with many Western ideas and authors, and provided him an intellectual
environment wherein his Weltanschauung took form in debate with Western thought.
Mawdudi had become affiliated with the Office through his brother while in Hyderabad,
and probably maintained that affiliation until 1937 when he left that city for the Punjab.
According to one account, Mawdudi had translated segments of Ibn Khallikan's history
for the Translation Office in 1928-29 period. Then in 1931 Mawdudi was asked by
the Office to assist with the Urdu translation of the Asfar-i Arba'ah (The Four Journeys)
of Sadru'ddin Shirazi, Mulla Sadra (1571-1640), the acclaimed Persian philosopher.
The Asfar is a voluminous work on theosophy and mysticism in Arabic, and is one of
Islamic philosophy’s most difficult, and yet intellectually sophisticated texts. The project
was to be supervised by Manazir Ahsan Gilani himself. The services of several translators,
including Mawdudi, had been solicited for undertaking the project. The translation, two
out of four volumes of which were published in 1932, was a serious one. The first two
volumes of translation, covering the first two safars (journeys) extended into 3500 pages,
and lasted eight months.

Mawdudi writes of this project in the Khud Nivisht, but provides few details other
than commenting on the difficulty of the text. Mawdudi’s biographers have suggested that
he translated either the entirety, or the last two safars, which incidentally were

192 SAAM, vol.1, P.75.
193 For more on the Asfar see, F. Rahman, Al-Asfar al-Arba’a, in EIr.
194 SAAM, Vol.1, P.74

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never published. In fact, Mawdudi was assigned to work on only a few segments of the
text in cooperation with another translator named Miranbakhsh.\textsuperscript{196} The project, never-
theless provided Mawdudi with an opportunity to study and work on the \textit{Asfar}, a primary
text of Islamic philosophy in Muslim religious schools in India,\textsuperscript{197} and itself a measure
of scholastic excellence,\textsuperscript{198} and to become acquainted with Gilani, who was then one
of the leading Muslim intellectuals of his time.

Mawdudi did not remain unaffected by Sadra’s philosophical perspective. The
Sadraian notion of man’s ability to transcend the worldly realm, to realize God, and to
travel with God and in God in the world, outlined in the \textit{Asfar}, provide a powerful bases
for putting forth a charismatic claim, providing the contender with moral superiority and
enabling him to thus reinterpret Islam.\textsuperscript{199}

Sadra’s ideas, moreover, have found reflection in Mawdudi’s thinking in a more
concrete fashion. The notions of rejuvenation of history, and the necessity of the reign of
the \textit{shari'ah} for the spiritual ascension of man have been treated by Sadra in his
theosophical framework. Sadra’s notion of \textit{tashkik} (gradation) argued that all existence

\textsuperscript{196} This evidence is available in the published volumes of the Urdu rendition.

\textsuperscript{197} Sadra’s \textit{Asfar} and \textit{Sharh-i al-hidayah al-Athariyah} were taught at Farangi Mahall,
Jama‘i Sultaniyah and the Daru‘l-‘Ulum of Deoband; see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, \textit{Ma’arif-i

\textsuperscript{198} In fact the term \textit{Sadra-khandah} (read in Sadra) was a hallmark of intellectual
advancement among members of the Muslim religious sodalities in India. On this issue
and use of \textit{Asfar} in curricula of Muslim religious schools see, Nasr, \textit{Ma’arif}, pp. 123-32.
Also interview with Mawlana Muhammad Matin Hashmi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{199} On Sadra’s views see, Fazlur Rahman, \textit{Al-Asfar al-Arba‘a}, in \textit{Elr}; and Seyyed
Hossein Nasr, \textit{Sadr al-Din Shirazi and His Transcendent Theosophy} (Tehran: Imperial
Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1978).
takes form in movement away from God through changes in the essence of being (*harakah jawhariyah*). Worldly existence is therefore, by definition a privation of God. Realization of God, as the objective of human spirituality can only materialize if the rejuvenation of existence is reoriented towards God. In this endeavor the *shari'ah* provides society with guidelines which can nudge the process of becoming in the desired direction, back towards its Divine origin. It harbingers an order most conducive to man’s spiritual ascension. The Sadraian formulation finds reflection, albeit indirectly, in Mawdudi’s understanding of the relevance of religion to social change.

Mystical elements in Mawdudi’s thought are not simply conjectural. Mawdudi was sufficiently well-read in mystical sources to imbibe their world view and gain competence in using its metaphors, idioms and terminologies. For instance, the following verse by Mawdudi,

"Every idol’s manifestation reflects Thee;  
Thou worshipeth Thyself, O Creator of the house of idols"

utilizes the notion of "*tajalli* (reflection) of God", ubiquitous in Sufi poetry, in a fashion which is indistinguishable from the poetry of the like of Mir, the Urdu mystic-poet,

"Rose and mirror and sun and moon - what are they?"

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Wherever one looked, there was always Thy face.203

Mawdudi's intellectual transformation was, however, impelled more definitively by events outside of company of his mentors and the coterie of his friends. Two years of stay in his natal city confronted Mawdudi with the unavoidable reality of the rise in the power of the Hindus. Writing on the glories of Islamic history, and resident in the last remnant of the legacy of Muslim rule over India, Mawdudi was pained to witness the steady erosion of the power of the Nizam. In later years Mawdudi lamented that, while Hyderabad was ruled by the Nizam 'Uthman 'Ali Pasha, all commerce lay in the hands of the Hindus who constituted the majority of the population of that princely state.204

Mawdudi moreover, came to identify the communists who advocated the economic emancipation of Hyderabad's underprivileged, who were for the main part Hindu peasants - as agents of a conspiracy against Muslim rule, and hence, responsible for the rising Hindu belligerency towards the Nizam.205 Mawdudi had, no doubt, misunderstood the socioeconomic grievances of the poor. Furthermore, enraptured with the glories of Islamic history and the symbolic meaning of the Nizam's state, he proved unable to distinguish between protecting the political rights of Muslims and defending an unjust sociopolitical order. Mawdudi was therefore, effectively locked in a communalist outlook, where the gamut of social and political issues were reduced to the Hindu-Muslim conflict.

Viewing the motives of the Hindus as sinister, Mawdudi became increasingly

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204 *JKUS*, pp.21-22.

205 *ibid*, P.18.
distrustful of the direction of their politics and hence his views on the salient issues, ideas and movements of his time became distorted. Associating the left with Hindu communalism Mawdudi developed a deep-seated distrust of populist politics, and socioeconomic and class based movements. The communalist outlook vitiated his ability to relate to sociopolitical realities. Hence, Mawdudi’s crusade for the preservation and propagation of Islam, despite its visible political tenor remained divorced of real political and social issues. Mawdudi never became a populist politician, nor a thinker in whose works the interests and grievances of society would find expression. His political views were rather, formed in the abstract; they had little to do with the actual political dynamics of the society which they sought to address. The intermittent confluence of aims between the Jama'at’s program and the salient political issues of Pakistani society have been born of conjecture rather than ideological and political calculations. This "apolitical" approach to political thought and practice has not only remained a mark of Mawdudi’s movement, but has distinguished him from other revivalist leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini (d.1989) who maintained a more syncretic approach towards the left, and premised his ideas on the prevailing socioeconomic concerns of Iranian society.\footnote{Said Amir Arjomand, \textit{The Turban for the Crown; the Islamic Revolution in Iran} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and \textit{idem.}, "Shi‘ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", \textit{Government and Opposition}, 16:3 (Summer 1981), pp.293-316. In fact, Mawdudi was known to have been well-read in the communist literature, and to be familiar with the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, and to have been influenced with certain aspects of their ideas. His encounter with this literature was, however, from inception antagonistic. He read them to learn about "the enemy". Interview with Ja'far Qasmi, Lahore.} Moreover, emergence of Mawdudi as a prominent religiopolitical leader whose persona and style cannot be readily classified as populist or charismatic, and the continued development of
the Jama‘at as a political force which has, by and large, eschewed populist politics defies the conventional wisdom regarding the origins and pattern of development of social and political movements. The case of Mawdudi and the Jama‘at (which will be discussed in Part IV) raises the possibility of the emergence and continued existence, albeit marginally, of political leaders and movements whose ideological perspective and program of action are not predicated upon socioeconomic concerns.

The Revivalist Awakening: From Scholarship to Da‘wah\textsuperscript{207}, 1932-37

The intrinsic urgency of the situation in Hyderabad forced Mawdudi to abandon his scholarly endeavors and brought him into the political arena in defense of an order which his forefathers had once served, and which he now viewed, symbolically, as the last bastion of Muslim rule in India.

In 1930 Mawdudi accepted an offer from Nawwab Salar Jang, a leading statesman of Hyderabad to prepare a scheme for propagating Islam in that state.\textsuperscript{208} However, when the Nawwab ignored Mawdudi’s counsel he lost faith in the Nizam’s government.\textsuperscript{209} Mawdudi concluded that the old ruling establishment was oblivious to the dangers before it and was moreover, ill-equipped to defend itself. The classical institutions of Islamic history, of which the Muslim princely states were one, much like the institution of Caliphate, could neither be easily resuscitated nor readily replicated. Mawdudi

\textsuperscript{207} This term, meaning call, refers to revivalist movements’ call to observance of Islamic norms. It suggests as proselytical posture which seeks to reinforce Islamicity. For more on this concept see, M. Canard, Da‘wa, in EI(2).

\textsuperscript{208} Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.209

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{ibid.}
therefore, began to look to Islam itself, and to the revival of its values and the
reconstruction of its institutions as the key to the reversal of the decline in Muslim power
in India.

In 1932 Mawdudi began writing more directly on religious topics. In the July and
August of 1932 issues of Ma'rifat his newly found orientation was reflected in a two part
article on the subject of 'ibadah (worship). Then in the same year, at the behest of
Manazir Ahsan Gilani, he wrote the Risalah-i Diniyyat, published in English in the
same year under the title, Towards Understanding Islam. The book was meant to be
used by Hyderabad's Directorate of Education, which was then under the aegis of
Gilani, as "a required text for senior matriculation students in various colleges
throughout India." Mawdudi completed the book, which was to become one of his
most widely-read, in merely fifteen days. Towards Understanding Islam was an
introductory book on Islam which outlined the basic beliefs and tenets of the faith. It was
aimed at introducing Islam anew with view to reinforcing adherence to the faith among

\[\text{210 Binder reports that the request for writing the book came from the Nizam himself; see Religion and Politics, P.82.}\]


\[\text{212 Saulat, Maulana Maududi, P.5.}\]

\[\text{213 Binder, Religion and Politics, P.82.}\]

\[\text{214 See Khurshid Ahmad's preface to the edition cited in note 196, pp. vi-viii. Binder writes that the book was translated into Arabic and was thus influential on the Muslim Brotherhood; Religion and Politics, P.82.}\]

\[\text{215 Saulat, Maulana Maududi, P.5.}\]
Muslims, and plausibly, inviting Hindus to the religion. It reflected Mawdudi's increasingly doctrinal and proselytical approach to resolving the political questions before the Muslims of Hyderabad. The project was also a confirmation of Mawdudi's religious and academic standing. The fact that Gilani and the government of the Nizam had turned to Mawdudi to write a text book on Islam to be taught in the state's educational institutions, no doubt, conferred great honor upon the young thinker.

While the emphatic tone of the *Risalah-i Diniyat* suggests a definitive change in Mawdudi's intellectual orientation, his personal commitment to what he had begun to advocate publicly remained circumspect at this time. His appeal for fastidious abeyance to Islamic dictums and mores in his public utterances was not as yet clearly reflected in his own conduct. When in 1925 Mawdudi was appointed as the editor of JUH's organ, *al-Jami'at*, his clean-shaven face caused an uproar among the 'ulama which ceased only after Mawlana Ahmad Sa'id interceded on behalf of the young editor.\footnote{Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.194} Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fari recollects that when he met Mawdudi, sometime around 1932, he found him to be religiously-inclined but clean-shaven and in Western attire.\footnote{Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fri, "Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi", in *SSMN*, P.214.} It should be noted that three years earlier, in 1929, Mawdudi had written in the *Ma'arif* on the virtues of adopting native attire. Mawdudi's own appearance and attire, however, did not undergo significant change until 1937. Ra'is Ahmad provides another description of Mawdudi, this time from 1937:

"On a chilly evening in 1937, a stranger was seen in the Khilafat House; a
man of middling stature rather plump with English-cut hair, clean shaven, wearing a Fez cap, Aligarh fashion trousers and Hyderabadi close collar long coat.\textsuperscript{218}

It was not before Mawdudi moved to Pathankot, in the Punjab that he grew a beard,\textsuperscript{219} and not until 1938 or 1939 that he abandoned the Fez.\textsuperscript{220} His life-style and the question of his beard, however, continued to stir controversy until 1942. In that year Mawlana Muhammad Manzur Nu'mani resigned from the Jama'at in protest to Mawdudi’s negligent conduct and the inadequate length of his beard.\textsuperscript{221}

The foregoing is not so much suggestive of hypocrisy as some of the Jama'at's detractors have suggested,\textsuperscript{222} but the reflection of Mawdudi’s struggle with the meaning and nature of his faith, and the coming to terms with the logical conclusion of an approach to religion which was prompted by communal concerns. What is evident from both the discrepancies between Mawdudi’s ideas and life-style on the one hand, and the gradual change therein on the other, is the working of a process through which a politically-motivated appeal to religion consolidates into a comprehensive religiopolitical

\textsuperscript{218} Cited in M.R. Khan, \textit{The Delusion of Grandeur: Maulana Maudoodi and His Jamaat} (Karachi: Lahore Book House, 1964), P.16.

\textsuperscript{219} Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi’s Concept of Islam", \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, 17:4 (October 1981), P.494.

\textsuperscript{220} This fact can be ascertained from examination of the photographs of Mawdudi dating to this period. See for instance, Munir, \textit{Mawlana Abu’l A’la Mawdudi}, P.18.


\textsuperscript{222} Khan, \textit{The Delusion}, pp.16-17.
platform. That platform, which is premised on religion demands conformity of those who abide by it. It therefore acts to sacralize the views and actions of the political activist.\textsuperscript{223}

It is apparent from Mawdudi's biography that, during the very years that Mawdudi was enjoining Muslims to follow the teachings of their faith more rigorously, he himself was struggling with his own faith in Islam. The notion of an intellectual transformation and an "internal conversion" surfaces in his biography alongside his political awakening. In fact, the Jama'at and its da'wah were premised on the notion of conversion back to Islam.\textsuperscript{224} Gradual changes in the content of Mawdudi's writings, from anti-colonialism to historiography of Islam and finally to doctrinal expositions of the faith, furthermore, confirm the working of this process. As the case of Mawdudi indicates this transformation can be real and with widespread implications.

The years that preceded Mawdudi's adoption of a revivalist position in Hyderabad were periods of great intellectual and religious uncertainty for him. In fact, as late as 1932 the extent and direction of his religiosity remained open to question. Masudul Hasan writes that in these years Mawdudi's faith in Islam actually wavered.\textsuperscript{225} Mawdudi's

\textsuperscript{223} Paul Brass has argued that the Muslim elite's willingness and ability to appeal to and manipulate religious symbols has been significant in the sacralization of Muslim politics in South Asia. See, Paul Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among Muslims of South Asia," in David Taylor and Malcom Yapp, eds., \textit{Political Identity in South Asia} (London: Curzon Press, 1979), pp.35-77.

\textsuperscript{224} See chapters 3 and 6 on this issue.

\textsuperscript{225} \textit{ibid}.  

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poetry from this period\textsuperscript{226} moreover, reveal hitherto hidden mystical tendencies which were far removed from the reformist posture which he would soon adopt. The poems written under the pen-name Talib (seeker) not only harbor clear Sufi influences, but also reveal a deep-seated sense of cognitive dissonance, confusion and yearning. The poetry describe a world in which the sage (\textit{farzanah}) is indistinguishable from the insane (\textit{diwanah}): "The maddest of all men is in fact the wisest among them".\textsuperscript{227} It is a world wherein "friendship is reciprocated with treachery...faithfulness with betrayal", where "the healer" (\textit{masiha}) plays with the fate of those ailing", where "poison and its antidote come in the same wine cup", where "sinners are pelted with stones as well as with flowers", and where "in the robes of success failures are hidden." It is an impermanent world, one wherein "a drop can cause commotions". The world which he depicts is not one which is typified by stability (\textit{sukun}) but "by a continuous and courageous revolt."\textsuperscript{228} His conclusion from all this is encapsulated in the following telling verse,

\begin{quote}
O, Talib! satiation of the heart and the soul is difficult, but still attainable if you have manly courage (\textit{jur'at-i rindani})\textsuperscript{229}
\end{quote}

The poems provide a rare glimpse into Mawdudi’s thinking at this critical juncture in his life. Although ominous in its concluding counsel, the poems reflect a mystical and poetic soul in anguish and confronted with an "unjust" world wherein realities belie ideals.

\textsuperscript{226} The two poems reproduced in Munir \textit{Mawlana Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi}, P.125, and \textit{SDMN}, pp. 75-76 are dated July 18 and 24, 1932.

\textsuperscript{227} Munir, \textit{Mawlana Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi}, P.125

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{ibid}.
Yet, Mawdudi is not prepared to renounce such a world, nor is he satisfied with other worldly recompense or hermetic seclusion which are the lot of a veritable mystic, but rather seeks to change it, to recreate reality in the shape of the ideals,

"We seek cash (naqd) and hold no value for credit (tise),
So why narrate to us the story of paradise."\(^{230}\)

In later years Mawdudi recollected that he began his path to faith from doubt, from \textit{la ilah} (there is no god) to \textit{illa'llah} (other than God).\(^{231}\) His return to Islam was, however, based on solid grounds, his education at the Fatihpuri Madrasah and his personal reading of the Qur'an.\(^{232}\) Mawdudi himself credits the latter for transforming his outlook and reconverting him to his faith.\(^{233}\)

"There was a time when I was also a believer of traditional and hereditary religion and practiced it....At last I paid attention to the Holy Book and the Prophet's Sunnah. I understood Islam and renewed my faith in it voluntarily. Thereafter I tried to find out and understand the Islamic system in detail. When I was satisfied in this I began to invite others to the truth..."\(^{234}\)

This reconversion was, however, from inception divorced from the traditional Islam, and from the institution of the 'ulama. Mawdudi not only shunned his own affiliation with

\(^{230}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{231}\) Reference is to the testimony of faith in Islam, the \textit{shahadah}. This fact was related through interview with Begum 'Abidah Gurmani, Lahore. It is interesting to note that the formulation described by Mawdudi resembles the Sufi teachings on contemplation and meditation (zikr), where the incantations emphasize the distinction between \textit{la ilah} and \textit{illa'llah}, and carry the Sufi from the former to the latter. See Metcalf's discussion of this theme in \textit{Islamic Revival}, P.187.

\(^{232}\) This point is made by Khurshid Ahmad in his preface to \textit{TUTQ}, P.xii.

\(^{233}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{234}\) \textit{RJI}, vol.1, pp.5-6. This testimony dates back to 1932.
the Deobandi sodality, but reserved a particularly vituperative invective for the 'ulama. It is not clear from the existing sources when or why Mawdudi developed his dislike for the 'ulama. What is apparent, however, is that he did not believe in the effectiveness of traditional Islam - of both the 'ulama and the Sufi pirs - in addressing the political predicaments which had brought him to the study of religion in the first place. In later years when he became interested in organizing Muslims politically, he viewed the various 'ulama groupings as rivals, and hence impediments to the realization of his objectives. Moreover, educated in modern subjects, and already confident of his own scholarly and plausibly political promise, Mawdudi had little patience for the intrinsic restrictions of the hierocratic institutions of the 'ulama. He elaborated on these sentiments, writing,

"There was a time during my early childhood when I myself acquiesced in the traditional orthodox religion and conventionally followed it but when I gained direction, this dormant practice of "we follow upon where we found our father..." (Qur'an, 2:17) struck me as completely meaningless."²³⁵

Mawdudi's castigation of the 'ulama was not free from a patronizing sense of superiority which, at least in part, had emanated from the esteem in which Mawdudi held his own familiarity with modern thought.

Mawdudi's emerging views on Islam very quickly found an organ, a journal, which in addition to systematically outlining Mawdudi's syntheses, combined his journalistic, scholarly and revivalist traits. In September 1932 Mawdudi acquired the journal Tarjumatu'l-Qur'an, which was published in Hyderabad, from its editor, Abu Muhammad

Muslih Sahsaram. Sahsaram had been an admirer of Abu’l-Kalam Azad, and had named his journal, which had began to appear in print in March 1932, after Azad’s seminal translation of and commentary on the Qur’an. Mawdudi produced the *Tarjuman* from his residence in the Mu‘azzam Jahi Market of Hyderabad. He wrote most of the articles of the journal and did all the editing. He, however, found much support from the government of Hyderabad as well as from the city’s literati. The Nizam’s administration took interest in Mawdudi’s venture in the form of subscriptions, which in 1935 stood at 300, half of *Tarjuman’s* circulation. Hyderabad’s ‘ulama and Muslim religious and intellectual leaders, men such as Manazir Ahsan Gilani, ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi, Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi, Mawlana ‘Abdu’llah ‘Amadi and Mawlana Abu’l-Khayr Muhammad Khayru’llah, wrote articles for the *Tarjuman*, thereby giving it credibility and stature.

In its early years (1932-36) *Tarjuman* presented no new political platform. The journal possessed a missionary and pedantic tone, enjoining the readers to return to pristine religious values. Mawdudi’s writings on political issues in this period were

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237 *ibid*.

238 Mahiru’l-Qadri, "Tarikhsaz Shakhsiyyat", in *SSMN*, P.216.

239 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.107.


241 An issue which was passionately discussed in the early years of *TQ*, and which is indicative of the journal’s orientation, was disparagement of listening to music. See, *SAAM*, vol.1, P.108.
reiteration of his earlier anti-colonial sentiments, which echoed the position of the JUH at the time.\textsuperscript{242}

The \textit{Tarjuman} soon consumed all of Mawdudi's attention, and became the vehicle for the realization of his aspirations and "the mission of his life."\textsuperscript{243} Yet, despite Mawdudi's expectations, the impact of the \textit{Tarjuman} remained limited. As was mentioned before, as late as 1935 half of the journal's circulation of 600 was purchased by the government of Hyderabad in a gesture of support and favor.\textsuperscript{244} Of the remaining 300 copies published, 200 were purchased by Muslim institutions and libraries across India.\textsuperscript{245} Moreover, a number of copies of the journal were sent to various Muslim leaders \textit{gratis}.\textsuperscript{246} In short, less than 100 individual Muslims had subscribed to the \textit{Tarjuman}. Following his experience with the Khilafat Movement and the publication of his book on \textit{jihad}, Mawdudi had expected an enthusiastic reception for his journal, and was therefore greatly disappointed by the "Muslim apathy", and lamented this state of affairs in his editorials in the \textit{Tarjuman}.\textsuperscript{247} He, however, refused to be disheartened. Aware of \textit{Tarjuman}'s financial difficulties, in 1935 Manazir Ahsan Gilani and Abu‘l-Khayr

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\textsuperscript{242} Nu‘mani, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath}, P.24.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{TQ}, (August 1936), P.483.
\textsuperscript{244} Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, pp.228-32.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.107.
\textsuperscript{246} Reference to dispatch of complimentary copies of the journal surfaces in Jama‘at’s literature, for instance, to Iqbal. See, Abu Rashid Faruqi, \textit{Iqbal Awr Mawdudi} (Lahore: Maktabah-i Ta‘mir-i Insaniyat, 1977), pp.77-79.
\textsuperscript{247} See for instance, \textit{TQ} (April 1935), pp.82-91; (May 1935), pp.162-70, and (June 1935), pp.242-52.
\end{flushright}
Mawdudi offered Mawdudi a teaching position at the ‘Uthmaniyyah University. Unwilling to alter his course, Mawdudi turned down the offer. He remained the editor of *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an* until his last days in 1979.

Mawdudi’s acquisition of the *Tarjuman*, no doubt, marked a clear turning point in his life. It was with the editorship of this journal that Mawdudi’s sense of a religious and ultimately political calling found a manifestation, and his outlook on Islam was elaborated and systematized. The editorship of the *Tarjuman*, in turn, permitted Mawdudi to put many of his early conceptions to test, and hence acted to refine and rationalize his vision. Finally, the *Tarjuman*, despite its modest following, confirmed Mawdudi’s scholarly potential, and cast him as a leader of the Muslim community of India.

The dynamics of Mawdudi’s intellectual transformation in these years, both in the period immediately preceding the acquisition of the *Tarjuman*, as well as his years as the journal’s editor in Hyderabad, are not readily discernable. Clues do exist in this regard which could shed light on the reasons for and the manner in which Mawdudi’s persona and intellectual disposition lent themselves to the propagation of a revivalist program, and subsequently encouraged its continued elaboration and extension into the political arena.

Mawdudi’s religiopolitical vision found shape against the dominant themes of social decline and political frustrations - theodicy and imminent crisis - which the Muslims of India had begun to experience since 1857, and which became more pronounced with the collapse of the Khilafat Movement in 1924. In fact, Mawdudi’s ideas emerged in the

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249 JIKUS, P.22.
political vacuum which followed the demise of the Khilafat Movement and its efforts to unite the Muslims across India.\textsuperscript{250} The period between 1924 and 1932 was one of great uncertainty and tumult for Muslims out of which were born new ideas and political directions. Manzur Nu'mani, one of the Jama'at-i Islami's founding members, argues that the social and political turmoil of those years was of great consequence in compelling Muslims to desperately search for new solutions. He writes that the Shuddhi campaign, the intensification of the Ahmadi missionary activity, and the fall of Sharif Husain of Mecca to the Wahhabi movement of 'Abdu'l-Aziz Ibn Saud (d.1953) in 1924 and the subsequent upheavals in Mecca and Madinah, all acted to create an environment of uncertainty and an expectation of impending doom among Muslims. It was these feelings, writes Nu'mani, that compelled Mawdudi to action and also attracted many to his writings.\textsuperscript{251}

The situation confronting Hyderabad was particularly disturbing to Mawdudi, and it therefore served as a catalyst in transforming his ideals and outlook. In fact, while Mawdudi has argued that his intellectual transformation began at the age of twenty one, i.e. in 1924, when he began to read the Qur'an,\textsuperscript{252} qualitative changes in Mawdudi's character did not begin in earnest until his return to Hyderabad in 1930. He wrote of his

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\textsuperscript{252} Cited in Gilani, \textit{Maududi}, P.35.
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anxiety for Hyderabad in the *Tarjuman*,

"This city [Hyderabad] has for some 200 years been the seat of Islamic culture and civilization. Great 'ulama, men of virtue, generals and courtiers are buried here...what a pity that their legacy is alive in stone [monuments of the city] and dead in the people....In this old Islamic settlement my eyes have searched and found neither a great man of God nor a skilled traditional craftsman...every search of mine attests to the death of that nation."\(^{253}\)

He was so disturbed by what he saw in Hyderabad that, he could envision no future possible for himself other than resisting the inevitable through the only means he deemed possible - a revival of Islam. Mawdudi's anguish at the visible decline of Hyderabad was accentuated by the bond which existed between him and the Nizam's regime. Not only had his forefathers worked for this order and did much to add to its glories, but he too, had interest in the continuation of the government of the Nizam, and also maintained ties with some of the leading personages in the state. Personal relations with the Hyderabadi ruling establishment made the plight of the state more immediate, tangible and urgent for Mawdudi.\(^{254}\)

Mawdudi has himself pointed to 1933 as the time when his ideals and outlook

\(^{253}\) *TQ*, (March 1936), pp.4-5.

\(^{254}\) It was mentioned earlier that, Mawdudi had enjoyed ties with a number of government bodies and affiliated institutions such as the Directorate of Education and the 'Uthmaniyyah University. Moreover, the government of Hyderabad was the main source of support for *Tarjumanul-Qur'an*. In addition, Mawdudi maintained close relations with a number of the Hyderabad government's leading personages. Deputy Commissioner of Hyderabad, Nawwab Nisar Jang was a personal friend of Mawdudi; see, Mahiru'l-Qadri, "Tarikhsaz", P.216. Nawwab Zulqadr Jang too, was an admirer of Mawdudi. It was he who arranged for the government to purchase 300 copies of the *Tarjuman*; see, *SAAM*, vol.1, P.107. On Mawdudi's trip to Hyderabad in 1943, and the official reception he received see, Naqi 'Ali, *Sayyid Mawdudi*, pp.227ff.
underwent qualitative change. In 1952 he reflected on his own intellectual transformation stating,

"I can divide my forty nine years into two parts. The first thirty was spent in reading, listening, thinking, observing, and experiencing, and also in finding a goal in life. My thoughts are the products of reasoning of all those years of intellectual activity. Then I set my goal to strive in the path of truth, to propagate its cause, and to bring my vision into reality."\textsuperscript{255}

It was therefore, in 1933, that he experienced a "conversion" and declared: "dar haqiqat mey ik naw-musulman hun" (in reality I am a new Muslim).\textsuperscript{256}

Mawdudi's turn towards a revivalist solution and his own reconversion to Islam, however, was not expressed in political terms until later on. His biographers place the date for the visible politicization of his nascent revivalism and the genesis of a discernable new religiopolitical orientation in his expositions at 1937.

In that year Mawdudi travelled to Delhi. This trip had an important effect on Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{257} He had been away from Delhi for some seven years, and was virtually startled at the changes he saw in that city. Delhi showed visible signs of Hindu political ascendancy as well as more secularization among the Muslims. Mawdudi correlated the advent of the former with the emergence of the latter. For instance, he associated the noticeable decline in adherence to the purdah system among Muslim women with the greater salience of Hindu culture in Delhi, and in turn viewed such lax behavior as the

\textsuperscript{255} Cited in Buhtah, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi}, pp.54-55.

\textsuperscript{256} Cited in Khurshid Ahmad, "Jama'at-i Islami Kiya Hey, Uski Zarurat Kiya Thi", in \textit{Haftrozah Zindagi} (Lahore), (November 10-16, 1989), P.13.

\textsuperscript{257} Cited from Mawdudi's speech at the annual session of the Jama'at in 1970 in \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.122-23.
handmaiden of the gains made by the Hindus.\textsuperscript{258}

Travelling back to Hyderabad by train, Mawdudi shared a compartment with B.G. Kher, the Chief Minister of Bombay and the leader of the Congress Party in that city.\textsuperscript{259} Mawdudi, who was already apprehensive about the Congress Ministries formed following the Government of India Act of 1935,\textsuperscript{260} was so taken aback by Kher's highhanded treatment of Muslims during the trip that, he decided there and then, never to live under a Hindu government.\textsuperscript{261} It was, in fact, as a result of his encounter with Kher that Mawdudi began writing his vehemently anti-Congress attacks in the \textit{Tarjuman}, which were eventually compiled and published as the first volume of \textit{Musulman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash} (Muslims and the Current Political Struggle in India) (1939).\textsuperscript{262} Mawdudi’s essays severely excoriated the Congress Party, equating their claim of nationalism with a veiled Hindu drive for supremacy. He moreover, challenged the Congress’ assurances to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[258] \textit{ibid.}
\item[259] It is interesting to note that Mawdudi was travelling in a class on the train which would put him in the same compartment as B.G. Kher. Mawdudi had got married during that trip to a girl from a wealthy family. See later in this chapter for more on his marriage.
\item[260] See Khurram Murad’s forward in Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us Be Muslims}, P.37, and Nu’mai, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath}, pp.24-25.
\item[261] Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore. The story of this incident is also cited in \textit{CRTIN}, P.299, and in \textit{JIKUS}, P.23. On his decision never to live under a Hindu regime see, \textquote{Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp.200-01.
\item[262] \textquote{Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp.106-20; \textit{JIKUS}, P.23, and Nu’mani, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath}, pp.24-25. The essays which later on constituted \textit{Musulman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash} first appeared in \textit{TQ} (December 1937), pp.243-44, and were then elaborated further in \textit{TQ} (January 1938), the entirety of which was dedicated to this topic.
\end{footnotes}
Muslims, and therefore, questioned the wisdom of Muslim support for that party.\textsuperscript{263} These criticisms were immediately found germane by Indian Muslims. The Congress Party had at that time launched its Mass contact movement which was directed at breaking up Muslim communalism and mobilizing support for the nationalist struggle among the Muslim masses.\textsuperscript{264}

Mawdudi's desperation, and hence commitment, now reached a climax.\textsuperscript{265} His feelings are reflected in the following answer which he gave to his brother upon the latter's insistence that he abandon his increasingly political activities and return to scholarly endeavors:

"The crisis has come. I can foresee that the horrors ahead would wipe out the traumatic events of 1857....Muslims may face yet greater misery. If a warning is not given by me, as I foresee it, the danger is imminent. I have resolved to serve the Muslim cause, to the farthest extent of my struggle."\textsuperscript{266}

Mawdudi's writings now began to display a coherent political outlook. His increasingly systematic arguments parted with his disparate pronouncements on diverse issues.\textsuperscript{267} Mawdudi's position became all-encompassing in its vision, articulate in its arguments, and lucidly related to his revivalist position which had begun to take shape in 1932.

\textsuperscript{263} Later on Mawdudi was to extend this line of attack to include Congress' socialism; see, text of Mawdudi's speech at the Madras gathering of the Jama'at in 1947, cited in \textit{RJI}, vol.5, pp. 191-93.


\textsuperscript{265} Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, 233.

\textsuperscript{266} Cited in Gilani, \textit{Mawdudi}, P.65.

\textsuperscript{267} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.145-47.
Mawdudi’s discourse was addressed to the Muslim supporters of the Congress on the one hand, and those targeted by the Mass Contact effort of the Party on the other. Mawdudi had set out to undo the inroads made by the Congress among the Muslims by challenging the political viability and the religious wisdom of the nationalist platform, and by reinforcing Muslim communal consciousness.\(^{268}\) Mawdudi’s line of argument soon brought him into conflict with the Muslim supporters of the Congress, noteworthy among them, Mawdudi’s former employers and mentors, the Jam‘iat-i ‘Ulama-i Hind. JUH’s leader at the time, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, was vehemently anti-British and therefore an ardent supporter of the nationalist platform. He was active in gathering Muslim support for the Congress, and had detailed his views in a pamphlet entitled, \textit{Mutahhidah Qaumiyat Awr Islam (United Nationalism and Islam)} (1939).\(^{269}\) Mawdudi censured Madani openly and challenged his political and ultimately religious authority, accusing him of sacrificing Islam at the alter of his anti-British sentiments.\(^{270}\) Mawdudi’s poignant arguments appealed to both the political savvy and religious passion of Muslims. He not only undermined JUH’s more intangible and elusive political promises, but by challenging the religious bases of Madani’s position limited JUH’s ability to resort to religious decree in order to mobilize support for the Congress. Qureshi reports that, Mawdudi’s arguments were so well formulated that Mufti Kifayatu’llah advised his

\(^{268}\) JIKUS, pp.24-25.

\(^{269}\) Cited in Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, \textit{Ulema in Politics; A Study Relating to the Political Activities of the Ulema in South Asian Subcontinent from 1566-1947} (Karachi: Ma‘aref, 1972), P.351.

\(^{270}\) These views were reflected in Mawdudi’s \textit{Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash} and \textit{idem, Mas’alah-i Qaumiyat}, reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1982).
colleagues to desist from pursuing the debate with Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{271} Mawdudi's challenge to Madani and the JUH, widely publicized by the Muslim League, was popular with many Muslims and acted to further his prestige and standing in his community.\textsuperscript{272}

The genesis of a new political outlook and style completed Mawdudi's already emerging revivalist orientation. The content of the subsequent religiopolitical program was not, however, solely a politicization of Mawdudi's revivalist posture, nor was it simply deduced from his impressions of the Congress Party. Mawdudi's novel perspectives on religion and communal politics were, at least in part, rooted in his continued reading and encounter with Western literary sources. Mahiru’l-Qadri met Mawdudi in Delhi in 1937 at the house of Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, with whom Mawdudi was staying. Qadri has recollected that Mawdudi's bed was surrounded with books, many of which were in English. Interestingly, a number of books surrounding Mawdudi were noted communist works.\textsuperscript{273} Mawdudi never acknowledged his debt to the Western, nor for that matter indigenous, sources from which he learnt and borrowed. Yet, the imprint of Western ideas, as it will be elucidated in Part II, on Mawdudi's religiopolitical conceptions has been significant. Mawdudi utilized Western and modern ideas in producing hybrid political views which best suited his own disposition and the post-traditional reality of his society. Conversely, many of Mawdudi's views were formed

\textsuperscript{271} Qureshi, \textit{Ulema in Politics}, P.352.

\textsuperscript{272} See, Qureshi, \textit{Ulema in Politics}, pp.351-53; and interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore. Also see chapter 10 for more on this issue.

\textsuperscript{273} Mahiru’l-Qadri, "Chand Nuqush-i Zindagi", in Buhtah, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi}, pp.241-42. Qadri also recollects that Mawdudi had purchased the entire set of \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, and was busy studying its various volumes.
in debate and contrast, rather than in conformity, with Western sources. His discourse produced an ideological orientation, which was indigenous on the surface but was based on the world view of the very culture and corpus of thought that he sought to reject.

As such, Mawdudi's eclectic intellectual and ideological formulations, and his own educational background fit the typology which Anderson presented in his study of Indonesian nationalist thinkers and movements. Anderson correlated the advent and development of nationalist movements in colonial settings to the emergence of a class of "bi-lingual" state functionaries, whose knowledge of things Western lay at the roots of their articulation of nationalist sentiments and the delineation of "an imagined community" to advocate its aspirations. While Anderson's typology best applies to the case of the Aligarh modernists in the context of Muslim India, it also sheds light on the role of

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274 Mawdudi's major books between 1932 and 1937, *Tafhimat, Purdah, Islami Tahzib Awr Uski Mahadi*, and *Risalah-i Diniyyat* were all efforts at loosening the hold of the West on Muslim intellectuals, and were therefore written in debate with the West. A later and more clear example of this approach can be seen in Sayyid Abul A'ala Maududi, *Economic System of Islam*, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Riaz Husain, trans., reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984). Here the entire economic system of Islam is explicated in contrast to capitalism and socialism.

It should be furthermore noted that debate with the vestiges of the colonial culture, be it Christian missionary activities or Western scientific thinking, had been instrumental in the development of Islam in India since the eighteenth century. From the Deoband revivalist 'ulama to Iqbal to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad all conceived of their ideas, to some extent, in debate with Western (or Christian) challenges.


Mawdudi and the importance of his background in formulating and disseminating a revivalist ideology, which acted as a parallel and surrogate to nationalist sentiments. While not of the Aligarh culture, Mawdudi was still a member of the "vanguard intelligentsia" who created and continued to articulate the struggle for cultural and political freedom. Not only did Mawdudi's background resemble that of his nationalist cohorts, but moreover, Mawdudi's initiation into politics and to political thought had come about through the aegis of the Muslim as well as the Hindu Congress activists and thinkers.

Despite his increasingly overt appeals to religious symbolisms and open call for revival of Islam, certain aspects of Mawdudi's private life continued to cast doubt on the extent of his personal commitment to the cause which he advocated. Noteworthy in this regard being the issue of his marriage. Confirming his ties to Delhi, in 1937 Mawdudi travelled from Hyderabad to that city in order to seek a wife.277 There he married Mahmudah Begum, a distant cousin of his from his maternal side.278 Mahmudah Begum came from a wealthy family, which was in government service and also owned some land.279 The family was a scion of the Bukhari family of Delhi, who continue to serve as the hereditary imams of Delhi's Jami' Masjid.280 Others contend that the wealth of the family came from its business dealings, notably, money-lending. Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi is quoted as saying that Mahmudah Begum was the daughter of Delhi's "biggest Muslim

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277 'Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.47; and SAAM, vol.1, pp.122-23.
278 'Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.47.
279 Interview with Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, Lahore.
280 ibid.
There is little doubt that the family's financial resources were considerable, and its effect was immediately noticeable in Mawdudi's life. As was mentioned earlier, Mawdudi returned to Hyderabad from Delhi sharing a compartment with the Chief Minister of Bombay. Begum Mawdudi recollects that later in the same year when they moved to Pathankot to establish Daru’l-Islam, there existed only three houses, one of which belonged to the Mawdudis, who also owned a tonga and employed a bearer. In fact, Mawdudi's considerably more comfortable accommodations there eventually created tensions, and was one of the causes which led Mawlana Manzur Nu‘mani to oppose Mawdudi's leadership in 1942. Royalties from books or the proceeds from *Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an* were still too meager to support his household, and yet Mawdudi was able to forgo all outside income as he spent his time in research and political activity in Lahore between 1939 and 1941. Finally, shortly after the formation of the Jama‘at, the organization was able to purchase a large area of land in the Attok District near

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281 Cited in Qasmi, "Mujhe Yad Hey", P.31; also interview with Ja‘far Qasmi, Lahore and Faisalabad. This fact is important to note for not only does Islam ban usury (*riba’*), but also Muslims of India were at that time particularly perturbed by the pressures of Hindu money-lenders, and were therefore sensitive to this practice. Moreover, Muslims view money earned through means forbidden by Islam as *haram* (forbidden), and therefore, shun association with it.


284 Begum Mawdudi recollects that neither in Pathankot nor in Lahore did they ever experience financial difficulties; interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.
Mahmudah Begum was moreover, quite liberated and modern in her ways at the time of her marriage, and even thenceforth. She used to ride a bicycle around Delhi before her marriage, and did not observe purdah at the time. It is important to note that Mawdudi (as it was mentioned earlier) had cited the absence of strict observation of the purdah, which he witnessed during the very trip in which he got married, as one of the primary causes of his deep-seated sense of dismay and subsequent embarkment on a more active propagation of his cause.

Mawdudi's relation to his strong-willed, liberal and independent-minded wife was one of love. He therefore, showed a great deal more patience with her than with other Muslims in general. The standards which were prevalent at his home belied his emphatic prescriptions to others, and the compromises which he was willing to make with

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285 Interview with Sayyid As'ad Gilani, Lahore.

286 Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, "Mawlana Mawdudi"; also interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore. In fact Begum Mawdudi continued to shun observance of the purdah as late as the 1960s. Maryam Jameelah, who used to live at the Mawlana's house at the time ran afoul of Mawdudi after she protested Begum Mawdudi's lax attitude towards the purdah; interviews, Lahore.

287 Impressions of Begum Mawdudi's character were gathered through several interviews.

288 Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, "Mawlana Mawdudi", pp.261-65. She furthermore said of him: "I was not what his view of a perfect Muslim wife was. But I admire his patience with me, and that he did not force me. I came to his ways gradually"; interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.

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her were not afforded to other Muslims in general, nor to members of the Jama’at in particular.\textsuperscript{289}

The Daru’l-Islam and the Operationalization of the Revivalist Agenda, 1937-39

Following his return to Hyderabad from Delhi, Mawdudi decided to expand the purview of his \textit{da’wah} by purchasing land in Hyderabad for the purposes of erecting an Islamic institution upon it.\textsuperscript{290} Meanwhile, Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali, a retired civil servant, who was acquainted with Azad, Sulaiman Nadwi and Iqbal,\textsuperscript{291} had been in correspondence with Mawdudi since 1935 regarding his intentions to establish an endowment (\textit{waqf})\textsuperscript{292} for religious purposes using a piece of land which he possessed in Pathankot, a small village in the Gurdaspur District of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{293} Mawdudi wrote to Niyaz ‘Ali in April 1937, following his return from Delhi. He informed Niyaz ‘Ali of his own intentions regarding an Islamic institution in Hyderabad, and suggested that the \textit{waqf} be utilized for that purpose.\textsuperscript{294}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{289} Begum Mawdudi’s lax attitude in observing \textit{purdah}, and the evident exception accorded to her by Mawdudi, were cited by Nu’mani as one of the reasons for leaving the Jama’at. See, Nu’mani, \textit{Mawlana Mawdu’i Miri Sath}, and chapter 3.

\footnote{290} From the text of a note written by Mawdudi on April 16, 1938; reproduced in, Mawdudi, \textit{Watha’iq}, P.61.

\footnote{291} Faruqi, \textit{Iqbal Awr Mawdu’i}, P.18.

\footnote{292} For more on \textit{waqf} see, ?.Heffening, \textit{Wakf}, in \textit{EI(1)}.

\footnote{293} Mawdudi, \textit{Wath’iq}, P.61.

\footnote{294} \textit{ibid}, P.62; and \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.122.
\end{footnotesize}
Niyaz 'Ali had meanwhile also corresponded with Iqbal regarding his intentions. In fact, Niyaz 'Ali had met with Iqbal and Sayyid Nazir Niyazi as early as 1935 to discuss the details of the *waqf* project. Iqbal had taken interest in Niyazi's proposition. Since his speech at the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in 1930, where he had pointed to the need for a Muslim homeland in Northern India, Iqbal had been keen to bolster Muslim consciousness in that area. Moreover, Iqbal was aware of the need for Muslim political organization, and had discussed this topic with a number of his cohorts, noteworthy among them, Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan (d.1951) of Aligarh University - a Kantian philosopher of renown who had been a proponent of the two-nation theory, who had put forth a proposal for a Muslim political organization by the name of Shabbanu'l-Muslimin (Muslim Youth).

Iqbal was not, however, organizationally minded and saw education as the veritable harbinger of Muslim reawakening. He favored the erection of a model *daru'l-'ulum* (religious school - *madrasah*) in the Punjab as the means for laying the foundations of a new Islamic world view to precede and facilitate the Muslim national homeland. Iqbal's aim was evident in a letter which he wrote, in conjunction with his discussions with

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296 Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.356.

297 Interview with Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, Lahore.

298 For more on this institution see, J. Jomier and A.S. Bazmee Ansari, *Dar al-'Ulum*, in *EI(2).*

299 For more see, J. Pederson-[G.Makdisi] *et al.*, *Madrasa*, in *EI(2).*

300 Interview with Javid Iqbal, Lahore.
Niyaz ‘Ali, to the Rector of Al-Azhar, Shaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi, requesting a director for the intended *daru'l-‘ulum*.\(^{301}\) In that letter Iqbal asked the Egyptian ‘alim for a man who was not only well-versed in the religious sciences, but also in English, the natural sciences, economics and politics. The letter was drafted in Arabic by Mawdudi at the behest of Niyaz ‘Ali.\(^{302}\) The letter was dated August 15, 1937, some four months after Mawdudi had informed Niyaz ‘Ali about his own plans for an Islamic institution.

A short while later, al-Maraghi responded to Iqbal’s query, informing him that he could think of no person who could match Iqbal’s description. Iqbal was thus disappointed, and conceded the task of selecting a suitable overseer for the *waqf* to Niyaz ‘Ali, but continued to favor the use of the *waqf* for purposes of establishing a *daru'l-‘ulum*.\(^{303}\)

Niyaz ‘Ali, had meanwhile, conducted a search for a suitable administrator of his *waqf* independent from Iqbal. He had attempted to secure the agreement of the famous Deobandi ‘alim, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi (d.1943) for leading his *waqf* project.\(^{304}\) By May 1937 Thanwi had rejected the offer, leading Niyaz ‘Ali to look to Mawdudi. Niyaz ‘Ali had been in contact with Mawdudi, and convinced of Mawdudi’s qualifications by a mutual friend, Mistri Muhammad Siddiq, had been considering Mawdudi for leading the

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\(^{302}\) ibid, P.982.

\(^{303}\) ibid.

project.\footnote{Rahman Siddiqi, "Mawlana Azad Awr Mawlana Mawdudi ki Mabain ik Gumshudah Kari", in Nida (Lahore), (February 7-13, 1990), P.21.} In fact, Niyaz ‘Ali had encouraged Mawdudi to move to the Punjab as early as May of 1937.\footnote{Mawdudi, Watha’iq, P.62.} However, Niyaz ‘Ali had made no direct offers to Mawdudi at this time, and had merely kept Mawdudi in mind as a possible alternative. Moreover, certain disagreements existed between the views of the two. Foremost among them being Niyaz ‘Ali’s insistence that Mawdudi consult with Thanwi regarding the project, which Mawdudi, then at loggerheads with the Deobandi JUH and adamant to distance himself from traditional Islam, was not willing to do.\footnote{Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, pp.372-73.} These disagreements, however, did not persist as the two men came to develop a mutual need.

Meanwhile, aware of the increasingly fragile situation of Hyderabad, Mawdudi had come to the conclusion that his natal city was not the best possible arena for launching his efforts directed at the revival of Islam.\footnote{JIKUS, pp.21-22.} Therefore, by June 1937 Mawdudi had become more openly interested in Niyaz ‘Ali’s project and hence, informed him of his desire to move to the Punjab. Mawdudi’s letters to Niyaz ‘Ali in May and June of 1937 clearly indicate that he actively solicited the administration of the waqf.\footnote{Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.380; and Mawdudi, Watha’iq, P.62. Especially see letter no. 18, dated May 25, and June 7, 1937, provided by Sayyid As’ad Gilani in Shahpuri, P.380.} Meanwhile, unable to find any other suitable candidates Niyaz ‘Ali too, had become receptive to Mawdudi’s overtures. However, since the final decision regarding the waqf had to await
the result of Iqbal's August of 1937 correspondence with al-Maraghi, Niyaz 'Ali avoided giving Mawdudi a definitive answer. He rather, sought to accommodate Mawdudi through other means. In July 1937 Niyaz 'Ali wrote to Mawdudi, assuring him of his interest in Mawdudi's plans and promising him of some form of future assistance, possibly in the form of a second institution to serve Mawdudi's needs.310 Meanwhile, Niyaz 'Ali convinced Iqbal to write to Mawdudi and to invite him to settle in the Punjab.311 Iqbal who was then keen to attract Muslim intellectuals to the Punjab wrote to Mawdudi in July 1937 and invited him to settle in Lahore, and to serve as the imam of the Badshahi Masjid of Lahore at the salary of Rs.100 per month. Iqbal moreover, encouraged Mawdudi to partake in the former's plans for rejuvenation of Islam, "Umraniat-i Islami ki Tashkil-i Jadid" (New Coalition for Development of Islam).312 Mawdudi turned down Iqbal's offer, arguing that he did not wish to be engaged in a salary-paying job, which would impose restrictions on his freedom of expression.313 Following al-Maraghi's response, Niyaz 'Ali suggested the name of Mawdudi as the overseer of the waqf and secured Iqbal's agreement to this appointment.

In October 1937 Mawdudi travelled to Delhi to attend a gathering. There he met Mistri Muhammad Siddiq and 'Abdu'l-'Aziz Sharqi with whom he discussed his ideas and plans for leading the waqf. After three days in Delhi, Mawdudi and Sharqi proceeded to

310 Mawdudi, Watha'iq, P.63.

311 Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.382.

312 *ibid*.

313 *ibid*, P.383.
Jullundar in the Punjab to meet with Niyaz ‘Ali. Mawdudi had written to Niyaz ‘Ali in July 1937, informing him that his interests lay in creating a da’wah movement, and more importantly, an alternative for the Muslims to both the Congress and the Muslim League. During their meeting in Jullundar, Mawdudi reiterated his objective, and furthermore, asserted that he wished to have complete freedom of action in leading the waqf. Although Mawdudi’s plans were substantially different from Iqbal’s vision of an exemplary daru’l-'ulum, no disagreements rose between Mawdudi and Niyaz ‘Ali in that meeting. Eager to secure Iqbal’s blessings and to finalize the project, and possibly to use Iqbal to contend with the rambunctious Mawdudi,15 Niyaz ‘Ali took Mawdudi to Lahore for a meeting with Iqbal.16

The meeting with Iqbal in Lahore confirmed Mawdudi’s appointment to lead Niyaz ‘Ali’s waqf.17 However, Iqbal insisted on the necessity of creation of some form of an educational institution with a clearly defined curricula at Pathankot.18 Mawdudi, accepted Iqbal’s scheme, and agreed to utilize the waqf to train a number of capable Muslim students and young leaders in Islamic law as well as modern subjects.19 While

314 Mawdudi, Watha’iq, P.63.
315 ibid, P.64.
318 Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.394.
the project was effectively an educational endeavor, the imprint of Mawdudi's political inclinations was evident in the name of the project, Daru’l-Islam (house/land of Islam).\textsuperscript{320} Upon the suggestion of Iqbal moreover, Mawdudi later contacted Dr. Zafaru’l-Hasan informing him of the final form of the Pathankot project.

Such abeyance by anyone’s wishes was highly uncharacteristic of the independently minded and self-righteous Mawdudi. It is clear from his pronouncements immediately prior to his departure for Pathankot that he had by no means abandoned his political objectives.\textsuperscript{321} His acceptance of Iqbal’s position was therefore, both an indication of the respect which he had for celebrated poet, and the eagerness with which he anticipated taking charge of the waqf.

There existed several reasons why Mawdudi decided to leave Hyderabad for Pathankot. Foremost among these was the impending instability of Hyderabad, and the increasingly marginal role of its Muslim community in the political mainstream of Indian Muslims. Mawdudi was aware of the fact that the future of Indian Muslims was to be determined in the Northern and especially Northwestern provinces, and therefore to be of consequence in that future he had to migrate to those regions.\textsuperscript{322} Situated far from the centers of Muslim political activity, Mawdudi’s journal, Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an, could hardly be of any influence. It enjoyed a modest subscription and survived thanks to the

\textsuperscript{320} For more on the meaning of this concept see, A. Abel, Dar al-Islam, in EI(2).

\textsuperscript{321} See for instance, Mawdudi, Watha’iq, pp.62-64; and TQ, (December 1937), pp.40-51, where in an article entitled, "The Malady and the Remedy", Mawdudi reiterates his revivalist position.

\textsuperscript{322} See the text of a letter by Mawdudi, dated June 2, 1937, reproduced in Mawdudi, Watha’iq, P.83.
generosity of Mawdudi’s friends in the Nizam’s government. Conscious of his own historical role and potential, and with an agenda whose purview far exceeded the boundaries of Hyderabad, Mawdudi was not content with the city’s predominantly cultural and academic activities. Moreover, the Punjab, the strategic, economic and political heartland of the Muslim dominated Northwest provinces, was at the time also one of the most pro-British of the Indian provinces. The exceedingly anti-Western and revivalist Mawdudi believed that his *da’wah* would be of great significance for the fate of the Northwestern provinces if he would take his battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim intellectuals to that province. Mawdudi became so convinced of the wisdom of his move to the Punjab that when Manazir Ahsan Gilani and Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi attempted to convince him to stay in Hyderabad with the lucrative offer of Heading the Department of Islamiyat at the ‘Uthmaniyyah University at a salary of Rs.850, he flatly refused the offer.

Following their meeting with Iqbal, Mawdudi and Niyaz ‘Ali finalized the terms of Mawdudi position as the overseer of the *waqf*. Niyaz ‘Ali included Mawdudi in the *waqf*’s governing committee, the Daru’l-Islam Trust. He also guaranteed Mawdudi the autonomy which he had solicited, but did not give him a mandate for political activity.

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325 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.138.
326 Mawdudi, *Watha’iq*, pp.65-66. Interestingly, the famous Muslim scholar of Austrian origin, Muhammad Asad was also named as a trustee of the *waqf*. See, Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.409.
Their agreement with Iqbal regarding the nature of the *waqf*’s projects already precluded openly partaking in political matters. Mawdudi agreed to Niyaz ‘Ali’s terms, and interestingly, did act true to form by insisting to pay for his own house at Pathankot, thereby retaining a modicum of independence. In the November 1937 edition of the *Tarjuman* it was announced that the journal would be moving from Hyderabad to Pathankot. Mawdudi arrived in Pathankot on March 16, 1938.

The story of Daru’l-Islam also brings to the fore another important and interesting aspect of Mawdudi’s biography and hence persona, namely, the exact nature of his relation to Iqbal. Insofar as Iqbal has become the poet laureate of Pakistan, and furthermore, an infallible and omniscient philosopher and sage, his character and name possesses a charisma which bestows legitimacy upon ideas or programs which are associated with him. Iqbal has gained an almost prophetic quality in Pakistan which far exceeds the claims of the humble poet and thinker of Lahore. His ideas and sayings are

\[\text{327} \text{ ibid, P.67.}\]
\[\text{328} \text{ Shahpuri, } \text{Tarikh,} \text{ vol.1, P.399.}\]
\[\text{329} \text{ Saulat, } \text{Maulana Maududi,} \text{ P.8; and Shahpuri, } \text{Tarikh,} \text{ vol.1, P.405.}\]
\[\text{330} \text{ For more on Iqbal see, Aziz Ahmad, } \text{Iqbal and the Recent Exposition of Islamic Political Thought} \text{ (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1950); Annemarie Schimmel, } \text{Gabriel's Wing} \text{ (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), and Hafeez Malik, ed., } \text{Iqbal; Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan} \text{ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).}\]
\[\text{331} \text{ Iqbal's image has grown in stature steadily over the course of the years. Today he is routinely referred to as } \text{‘Allamah} \text{ (the most learned), a title which did not accompany his name during his lifetime or immediately then after. There are two government supported research institutions concerned with the life and works of Iqbal, the Iqbal Academy of Pakistan and Bazm-i Iqbal, both situated in Lahore. Iqbal-shinasi or Iqbaliyat (Iqbal Studies) have become self-contained fields of study, offered at universities as a whole discipline.}\]

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consciously invoked to legitimize various policies, "sanctify" the sundry of views and decisions, and to silence opposition and criticism. In short, for Pakistanis Iqbal has become a figure larger than life and history, a repository of great wisdom and charisma, which the gamut of views in the political spectrum from the communist left to the religious right, Mawdudi and the Jama‘at included, have attempted to benefit from by confirming their intellectual and historical affiliation with him.\textsuperscript{332}

There exists a general attempt in the Jama‘at literature to relate Mawdudi’s cause and mission on the one hand, and his intellectual and political endeavors on the other, to Iqbal. The charge of anti-Pakistan activities which is usually leveled against the Jama‘at by its detractors further encourages members of the organization to look to Iqbal for redeeming their vitiated political image. Daru’l-Islam, insofar as it facilitated a direct contact between Iqbal and Mawdudi has naturally become the central focus of efforts directed at accruing legitimacy and power from Iqbal’s charisma.\textsuperscript{333}

Before the introduction by Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali in Lahore, Iqbal had met Mawdudi once in Hyderabad in 1929 while engaged in the "Reconstruction of Islamic Thought" lectures.\textsuperscript{334} Iqbal had originally come to know of Mawdudi through the latter’s \textit{Al-Jihad

\textsuperscript{332} It should be noted that some academic studies on Mawdudi have also placed emphasis on his relation to Iqbal. They have traced the evolution of Mawdudi’s revivalism to Iqbal’s own sentiments in this regard. See for instance, Freeland Abbott, "The Jama‘at-i-Islami of Pakistan", in \textit{The Middle East Journal}, 11:1 (Winter 1957), P.38; and Aziz Ahmad, "Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan", \textit{The Middle East Journal}, 21:3 (Summer 1967), P.369.

\textsuperscript{333} See for instance, Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, \textit{Iqbal, Daru’l-Islam Awr Mawdudi} (Lahore: Islami Academy, 1978).

\textsuperscript{334} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.67-68, and 129.
fi'l-Islam and through the *Tarjuman*, which was sent to Iqbal regularly since 1932. There, however, exists no clear indication that Iqbal was particularly enthralled by Mawdudi's revivalist agenda.

Jama'at-i Islami leaders have sought to prove the existence of an umbilical chord between Iqbal and their movement by arguing that Daru'l-Islam had been Iqbal's brain-child. More to the point, Mawdudi has referred to Iqbal as his "spiritual guide", and the patron of and participant in his movement:

"But alas! he [Iqbal] was in last days of his life. The very next month he breathed his last and I was left alone for the uphill task we had decided to undertake jointly." (Emphasis added)

Such depictions are not, however, entirely correct. Iqbal, as it was demonstrated earlier, did not conceive of the Daru'l-Islam project as it eventually unfolded. Mawdudi was not Iqbal's choice to lead the project, nor was Iqbal eager about Mawdudi's political agenda. Even when the two met in Lahore in 1937, Iqbal's opinion of Mawdudi remained guarded at best. Mian Muhammad Shafi', Iqbal's secretary, recollects that following the meeting

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335 *ibid*, vol.1, P.121; on Iqbal's familiarity with the *Tarjuman* see, Mawdudi's letter to Mawlana 'Aziz Zubaidi, dated April 7, 1951; cited in Faruqi, *Iqbal Awr Mawdudi*, pp. 77-79.


337 *MMKT*, vol.1, pp.182-87.

with Mawdudi Iqbal concluded that Mawdudi was just a *mullah* (a petty cleric)\(^{339}\) - someone more suited to lead the prayers at the Badshahi Masjid than to oversee a pioneering educational project.

Daru’l-Islam began with some twelve people, not the educated leaders that Iqbal had intended, but an amorphous group mainly consisting from residents of the nearby towns and villages.\(^{340}\) Besides Mawdudi only four other educated men joined the endeavor at this time, Sayyid ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz Sharqi, Sayyid Muhammad Shah, Mistri Muhammad Siddiq, and Sadru’ddin Islahi (later the first Amir of Jama’at-i Islami of India following the partition).\(^{341}\) Despite Mawdudi’s efforts no other person of consequence joined the project at its inception. Soon after Mawdudi’s arrival at Pathankot, on April 21, 1938, Iqbal died.\(^{342}\) Mawdudi was greatly dismayed at this development.\(^{343}\) However, Iqbal’s death freed Mawdudi from restrictions to which he had acceded in Lahore.\(^{344}\)

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\(^{339}\) Interviews with Mian Muhammad Shafi’ and Javid Iqbal, Lahore.

\(^{340}\) *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.143-45; and *Jasarat* (Karachi), (August 6, 1973), P.2.

\(^{341}\) Cited in *RJI*, vol.1, P.10.

\(^{342}\) On April 18, 1938 Nazir Niyazi, Iqbal’s secretary had summoned Mawdudi to Lahore, informing him that if the latter wished to meet with Iqbal this was the last opportunity. Mawdudi was, however, unable to meet with Iqbal; see, Mawdudi, *Watha’iq*, P.98, and Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, in Rana and Khalid, *Tazkirah*, P.292.

\(^{343}\) Saulat, *Maulana Maududi*, P.8. In *TQ*, (March 1938), P.3, Mawdudi had written of Iqbal’s indispensable importance to both the *Tarjuman* and Daru’l-Islam.

\(^{344}\) In October 1938 the trustees of the *waqf* reconfirmed Mawdudi’s appointment and gave him a new and freer mandate. See, Saulat, *Maulana Maududi*, P.8.
Mawdudi began his stay in Pathankot with great enthusiasm. His primary interest was to train a "multifaceted" leadership cadre - men who would be able to operate in the secular political arena, and yet be conscious of their religious loyalties. Siddiq who had been an associate of Azad, and had in fact been sent to Punjab to acquire bai‘ahs (oaths of allegiance) on Azad's behalf with regard to the latter's plans to become Amiru’l-Hind was of great importance to Mawdudi's thinking in this respect. Siddiq was politically motivated and experienced in organizational matters. Mawdudi's belief that the political failures of the Muslims in the past was due to their lack of organization, and his conviction that organizations were essential to the success of any future Muslim political endeavors, can be traced to Siddiq's company at this time. However, in general, Mawdudi's coterie at Pathankot presented certain limitation regarding the establishment of either an educational institution or a political movement. Daru‘l-Islam therefore, increasingly took the shape of an experiment at constructing an ummah (holy community),

345 In TQ, (April 1938), pp.82-93 he wrote that his desire to guide Muslims had become an obsession and a vocation.


348 Siddiqi, "Mawlana Azad Awr Mawlana Mawdudi", P.21. It should be pointed out that, while Mawdudi's views on the importance and nature of organizational activity may have been unclear, he had nevertheless thought on the matter and was therefore receptive to Siddiq's ideas. Mawdudi had, no doubt, been familiar with Azad's works from earlier on. Moreover, he had presented certain views of his own on this matter too. For instance, in TQ, (July 1933), P.275 he wrote that the enforcement of the Muslim injunction of ‘amr-i bi ma’ruf wa nahi ‘an-l-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the reprehensible) was tantamount to creating a jama‘at (party) for Muslims.
which even then remained a "Herculean" task in Mawdudi's own words.\(^{349}\) The institution's political potential and objective, however, continued to motivate Mawdudi's activities. In July 1938 he wrote that the project at Pathankot had been named Daru‘l-Islam because its objective was to make India *daru‘l-Islam* (the domain of Islam), and that Pathankot was the "nerve center" of Muslim revival in India.\(^{350}\) Mawdudi's agenda had found a manifestation and therefore his political ambitions were now expressed more openly. The shift from ideas to practice, meanwhile, had a cathartic impact on Mawdudi, forcing him to resolve the contradiction between his prescriptions and personal behavior. His beard began to grow, and his conduct altered, corresponding more exactly to his public pronouncements.\(^{351}\)

He became convinced of the importance of his mission. Daru‘l-Islam was to provide the Muslim community of India with its leaders, and to serve as the foundation-stone of a genuine religious movement of political deliverance.\(^{352}\) As such the project at Pathankot was to act both as an evolving intellectual and political force, and serve as a ideal Muslim community, whose example and eventual expansion would revolutionize Indian politics. Mawdudi took these notions seriously. In October 1938 he began writing about his plans for Daru‘l-Islam to his peers and mentors, forty in all, seeking their opinion and tactfully inviting them to join his cause. Among those with whom Mawdudi


\(^{350}\) *TQ*, (July 1938), pp.3-4.


\(^{352}\) Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, pp.415-16. Mawdudi compared Daru‘l-Islam’s function to one of "providing water to the thirsty."
corresponded were ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi, Manazir Ahsan Gilani, Dr. Zafaru’l-Hasan, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, Mufti Kifayatu’llah, Mawlana Ahmad Sa‘id, Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani, Amin Ahsan Islahi, Sayyid Nazir Niyazi, Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali, and Chaudhri Ghulam Ahmad Parwez. Of these, the first three were renowned scholars of Islam, and the second three were among India most prominent ‘ulama. Islahi and Nu‘mani, both of whom later joined the Jama‘at were young religious leaders and editors of religious journals. Niyazi was Iqbal’s secretary, Niyaz ‘Ali was the patron of Daru’l-Islam, and Parwez was to become one of Muslim India and later Pakistan’s most controversial religious thinkers. Some like Zafaru’l-Hasan, Daryabadi and Parwez wrote back to Mawdudi, and eleven of the forty visited him at Pathankot between October 14 and 16, 1938. Manzur Nu‘mani was among those who visited Pathankot. He recollects that, at that time he did not find Mawdudi’s life in full compliance with the "pure Islamic way of life", and therefore did not join Daru’l-Islam. Mawdudi was, however, receptive to Nu‘mani’s criticism in this regard which is a rare occurrence throughout Mawdudi’s life.

353 ibid, P.423.

354 Nu‘mani was then and continues to be the editor of al-Furqan of Lucknow, while Islahi was the editor of al-Islah of Sara‘i-i Mir.


356 Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.423.

357 Nu‘mani, Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath, pp.28-30.
and responded that his life was still changing and he would soon become a complete
*mutishari‘* (one who abides by and implements the *shari‘ah*). 358

Following the visits in October 1938 Mawdudi began to organize the Pathankot community, introducing the concepts of *rukn* (member), *shura‘* (consultative body) consisting of five, and *sadr* (president) who was Mawdudi. Mawdudi and Sadru’ddin Islahi were put in charge of organizational affairs. This embryonic organization was to serve as the bases for Jama‘at-i Islami.

Soon then after he began preparing books and pamphlets, propagating his views and his project, 359 arguing that since enough people were not joining Daru’l-Islam, the movement should go to them. 360 In the meantime Mawdudi continued to write on political issues in the *Tarjuman*, which was now prepared at Pathankot. Inclined to promote organized Muslim political activity and to train an alternative leadership for his community, Mawdudi’s attention had by this time turned from the Congress to the Muslim League - from the enemy without to the rival within. While the political bases of Mawdudi’s opposition to the League at this time were not yet clearly enumerated Mawdudi’s antagonism towards the pro-British and Westernized Muslims who constituted the League’s intellectual and political leadership was well-known and fully elaborated in his earlier writings. His clash with the Muslim League, after Mawdudi’s turn towards

358 *ibid*, P.29.

359 Mawdudi’s works along with publications of Daru’l-Islam were sent at this time to all the major Muslim educational centers of India, Aligarh University, Deoband Daru’l-‘Ulum, Jami‘ah-i Milliyah, Nadwatu’l-‘Ulama, and Madrisatu’l-Islah. See, *ibid*, P.429.

360 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.149.
revivalism in 1932 and the League’s increasing importance after 1937, was in many ways inevitable.

Mawdudi’s outspoken criticism of Muslim League soon precipitated a disagreement between him and Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali. Niyaz ‘Ali was a fervent Muslim Leaguer and was therefore greatly disturbed by Mawdudi’s invective. He was moreover, greatly distraught by the increasing politicization of Daru’l-Islam, and cited the use of the term islamî hukumat (Islamic government) in Mawdudi’s discussions of Daru’l-Islam as clear evidence of Mawdudi’s violation of their original intent and agreement. Niyaz ‘Ali sought to curb Mawdudi’s politicization and anti-League activism by appealing to the trustees of the waqf, reminding them of Daru’l-Islam’s apolitical intentions, and Iqbal’s specific instructions regarding the institution’s educational objectives. The trustees sided with Niyaz ‘Ali and declared that Mawdudi had parted from the agreements which he had made with Iqbal and the waqf’s trustees. Mawdudi remained defiant, declaring that separation of religion from politics had no place in Islam, and if Niyaz ‘Ali wished to make such distinctions he should remove the title "Islamic" from his waqf and instead call it the "Niyaz ‘Ali Trust". Mawdudi, in effect, acknowledged his deviation from the original agreement over the waqf, but viewing the issue as essential to his position would not acquiesce to Niyaz ‘Ali’s interference with his running of Daru’l-Islam, and was

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361 This point is presented in Iqbal Ahmad Nadwi’s editorial piece in Zindagi-i Naw (Rampur), (April 1978), P.12.


364 Ibid, P.293.
therefore not willing to restrict his activities in any fashion.\textsuperscript{365} The disagreements, despite Mistri Muhammad Siddiq's intercession, soon led to a confrontation between Mawdudi and Niyaz 'Ali.\textsuperscript{366} Meanwhile, the members of Daru’l-Islam sided with Mawdudi, voted to confirm him as sadr and to move Daru’l-Islam elsewhere.\textsuperscript{367} Consequently, in January 1939\textsuperscript{368} Mawdudi resigned from his position in the waqf and left Pathankot for Lahore.\textsuperscript{369}

**The Road to Jama'at- Islami, 1939-41**

After three months of stay at Pathankot, Daru’l-Islam moved to a new city, where its organization claimed a nominal existence but its spirit was reinvigorated.\textsuperscript{370} At first, Mawdudi and his followers from Pathankot sought to collect money and to reestablish Daru’l-Islam as a thriving institution.\textsuperscript{371} However, in Lahore, a major metropolitan center with a large Muslim community, Mawdudi became more intensely political.\textsuperscript{372} Mawdudi, writes Nu’mani, viewed the crisis before the Muslims as too acute to await long-

\textsuperscript{365} *TQ*, (January 1939), pp.3-4.

\textsuperscript{366} Sharqi, in Rana and Khalid, *Tazkirah*, P.294.

\textsuperscript{367} *ibid*, P.294.

\textsuperscript{368} Saulat puts this date at December 1938; see, *Maulana Maududi*, P.8.

\textsuperscript{369} Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.429. The Daru’l-Islam community at first decided to go to Jullundar, but later on resolved to go to Lahore; see, Sharqi, P.294.

\textsuperscript{370} Interview with Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{371} Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.436.

\textsuperscript{372} Sharqi, in Rana and Khalid, *Tazkirah*, P.296.
run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, run solutions, and hence, saw no point in pursuing a cumbersome educational project at that time. He became noticeably keener on organizational matters, and increasingly interested in creating a "jama'at" (party). Talk of such an undertaking was not limited to Mawdudi at that time, and was a subject of discussion among many Muslim leaders of Lahore. Whether or not Mawdudi took part in any of these discussions remains unclear.

Moreover, his political views came into sharper focus. He not only continued his incessant fulminations against the Muslim League in the *Tarijuman* (now published in Lahore) which were eventually published in the form of the second and third volumes of *Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash*, but began to fully elaborate and espouse his notion of *iqamat-i din* (erection of a religious order). He also continued to attack colonialism which soon created problems for him with the provincial authorities. In the September of 1939 issue of the *Tarijuman*, Mawdudi wrote an article entitled, "Aqwam-i Maghrib ka 'Ibratnak Anjam" (The Lesson From the Western Nations' Fate)

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373 Khurshid Ahmad reports that Mawdudi had at first considered creating a research academy, but abandoned this idea in favor of a political movement; see, *Jasarat* (Karachi), Ijtima'-i 'Am Number (November 1989), P.14.


376 Nu'mani, *Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath*, pp.30-33; also interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.

377 *Nu'mani, Mawlana Mawdudi Miri Sath*, pp.32-33.


379 Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, 440-42.
wherein he objected to lending support to the British war effort; that issue of the *Tarjuman* was censored by the Press Branch of the Punjab Government.\(^ {380} \)

In September 1939 Mawdudi also accepted a teaching position at Lahore’s Islamiyah College, but weary of his experience with Niyaz ‘Ali, refused any pay.\(^ {381} \) His overtly political lectures soon found a following at the College\(^ {382} \) and hence, precipitated concern among its administration. The Unionist Party government of the Punjab, which had already censored the *Tarjuman*, found Mawdudi’s lectures inflammatory and became concerned over his rising popularity.\(^ {383} \) Sikandar Hayat Khan’s Ministry pressed the school’s administration to dismiss Mawdudi.\(^ {384} \) The administration felt it was more prudent to adopt other means to control him, and therefore, offered Mawdudi a paying position with view to inhibiting his politicization of the student body.\(^ {385} \) Mawdudi refused the offer and left the College in the summer of 1940. This experience


\(^ {382} \) See the College’s newspaper, *Crescent*, (December 1939), P.11. A number of prominent Jama‘at members such as, Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Shaikh Faqir Husain, and Chaudhri Ghulam Gilani were students at the College at the time, and became Mawdudi’s followers after hearing his lectures; see, Shahnur, *Tarikh*, vol.1, pp.356-57. On Mawdudi’s lectures at the College see, Bashir Sajjad, in *SSMN*, pp.52-53; Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, in *QDMN*, pp.27-29; Chaudhri Ghulam Gilani, in *Jasarat* (Karachi), (1979), P.4. Gilani writes that Mawdudi’s lectures were not academic but rhetorical, and followed no particular structure or syllabus.


convincing Mawdudi that the work of Islamic da‘wah cannot succeed for as long as the political power is hostile to the cause. From this point onwards, in Mawdudi’s mind, the fate of Islamic da‘wah and the control of the centers of power became interdependent.

Mawdudi now began to actively work towards creating a Muslim political organization. He wrote and travelled extensively during this period, delivering numerous lectures on the relation of Islam to politics, some of which were later compiled in the form of his books.\textsuperscript{386} His audience was, by and large, the Muslim intellectuals; and as such, his discourse remained focused on educational concerns. During his tours he frequently visited such educational institutions as Aligarh University, M.A.O. College of Amritsar, Islamiyah College of Peshawar and Nadwatu‘l-Ulama in Lucknow, where in addition to articulating his political concerns he criticized the existing systems of education, and especially the absence of a nexus between the traditional and the modern educational methods and subjects of study.\textsuperscript{387}

Opposed to the Muslim League, and conscious of the collapse of the efforts of the like of Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali and Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1928), Mawdudi saw the only alternative to the accommodationist position of the Unionist Party or the pro-Congress Muslims to lay in the creation of a new party.\textsuperscript{388} He began discussing the


\textsuperscript{387} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.176. At these institutions he often criticized both the traditional and the secular modern systems of education, arguing instead for an eclectic system which would teach modern subjects in light of Islamic teachings.

\textsuperscript{388} Ahmad, in \textit{Jasarat}, P.14.
notion of developing an organization as early as 1939, viewing it as the logical end of any struggle in the path of Islam.\footnote{389 \textit{TQ}, (May 1939), pp.2-13.} He viewed the development of an Islamic political organization as the concomitant and harbinger of a successful \textit{tajdid} movement.\footnote{390 See Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, "Ihya'-i Nizam-i Islam", \textit{Al-Furqan} (Lucknow), Shah Waliu'llah Number (1940), P.18.} His concern for a successful revival of Islam not only underlined his increased politicization, but attested to his belief in his own historic role and calling. A new and even somewhat modernized \textit{tajdid} effort\footnote{391 'Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp.158-64 outlines Mawdudi’s exposition of this idea. ‘Abd writes that Mawdudi was highly aware of the history of \textit{tajdid} movements, and especially about the reasons for their failure. He moreover, pondered much on applications of the doctrine to more modern settings. Muhammad Yahya in "Sikandarpur se Lahore tak", in \textit{HRZ}, P.132 writes of Mawdudi’s great awareness of the history of \textit{tajdid} in Islam. On his discussion of modernization of the doctrine of \textit{tajdid} see, Mawdudi, "Ihya’-i Nizam-i Islam", P.18.} to be embodied in an organization conceived and led by him would give him a unique position of authority with wide-ranging powers. His ambitions in this regard, it can be argued, actually superseded his concern for the organization that was to remedy the predicaments before the Muslims of India. With no organization yet in the making, in August 1940, Mawdudi wrote to Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi at the Nadwatu’l-‘Ulama of Lucknow, requesting the services of an Arabist who could translate his writings on \textit{iqamat-i din} into Arabic for the benefit of the Arab world.\footnote{392 Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, P.466.} Moreover, Mawdudi’s ambition for leadership of Muslims overrode his antagonism towards the Muslim League when he accepted the invitation of Nawwab Sir Isma’il Khan, President of the Muslim League in the United Provinces, to travel to Lucknow in January 1941, and
to serve in an advisory capacity to the League. His perceptions of his own abilities were moreover, confirmed by the approval with which his works were being received at this time. Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi was ostensibly impressed with Mawdudi's *Tanqihat* (Inquiries) (1939), while the famous Khilafat activist 'Ubaidu'llah Sindhi was approving of Mawdudi's articles in the *Tarjuman*. Such accolade also encouraged him to air his views more directly, and announce his plans more openly.

In particular he began to discuss his views on a new organizational solution various Muslim leaders. It was in these discussions that his conception of the Jama'at took form. In a telling letter to Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan, dated 23 Rabi'u'l-Thani 1357 A.H. (1938-39), Mawdudi wrote of the urgency of the political predicament before the Muslims, of the Muslim League's inability to present a solid ideological position, and of the need for immediate steps to alleviate the situation. Alluding to his personal ambitions he furthermore wrote, "preferably, such Muslim luminaries as 'Allamah Mashriqi, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Dr. Khayri, Mawlana Azad Subhani or Mr. Durani should initiate and lead this effort, but since the prospects of such a development remains remote,"

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393 *ibid*, p.467. For more on this trip and its implications see, chapter 10.


395 *ibid*, pp.156-57; and interview with Na'îm Siddiqi, Lahore.

396 Interview with Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, Lucknow. Mawdudi also met with 'Ubaidu'llah Sindhi, who was then resident in Lahore in 1939-40; interview with Na'îm Siddiqi, Lahore; also cited in ‘Abd, *Mufakkir-i Islam*, pp.156-57.


398 *ibid*, p.249.
the mantle of leadership Mawdudi implied, would by default fall on his shoulders. The names cited by Mawdudi covered the gamut of political opinion among Muslims; having found them incapable of providing what the Muslims needed, Mawdudi was testifying to the unique nature of his own leadership. Mawdudi’s lines to Zafaru’l-Hasan also revealed the extent to which Mawdudi’s thinking was influenced by the politics of the Muslim League. For, “the envisioned veritable organization,” of which he wrote to Zafaru’l-Hasan was, was to “serve as a ‘rear guard’ (the same word was utilized in latin alphabet in the letter) to the Muslim League.”3 The influence of the League in the subsequent developments which led to the creation of the Jama’at in 1941 will be discussed in chapter 10. The role of the League in the development of Mawdudi’s political thinking at this time, however, requires greater elaboration.

**Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Making of Mawdudi’s Leadership Role**

Mawdudi’s discourse at this time was directed at creating viable political structures which would be capable of launching and sustaining a broad based movement in a community which was on the decline; a community which lacked political consensus and a united leadership, had no widely-shared ideology, nor mass-based political linkages. Mawdudi’s audience was a community which was divided along linguistic and ethnic lines, and continued to be dominated by the traditional structures of authority. Mawdudi’s concern, much like those of the Khilafat Movement, was to create larger and more efficacious political units, rooted in the cultural symbolisms of the community, yet able to operate in a modern political context.

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399 *ibid*, P.250.
As such Mawdudi’s political views were shaped against a struggle to assert Indian Muslims’ identity before the ethos of the colonial order at a time where such an assertion was demanded by the sociopolitical exigencies wrought by the gradual passing of the British Raj. The need for this assertion was inherent in the very communal character of the Indian polity, of which Mawdudi became increasingly aware in the post-Khilafat period through his encounters with the Shuddhi Movement and the increasingly Hindu character of the Congress Party under Gandhi. While a reassertion of native cultural values was a concomitant of any definition of Indian identity, Hindu as well as Muslim, in the face of the reality of the British Raj, the communal sociopolitical context of the struggle for independence from the mid-1920s onwards necessitated an active mobilization of those values. The very notion of Muslim communal consciousness was tantamount to eventual sacralization of politics. Islamic symbolisms not only defined the Muslim community, a fact which even the secular leaders of the Muslim League could not ignore, but was the most efficacious means for galvanizing support in and mobilizing that community for purposes of political action. In this regard, Mawdudi’s discourse reflected the need for identity, unity and accord among Muslims - the desire for a lasting political consensus and a more uniform community, one which was capable of directly addressing the needs of the Muslim community at the national level.

400 See Chatterjee’s analysis regarding the interaction of political consciousness in the Third World with the ethos of the colonial establishment in Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought.

The content of this discourse was therefore premised on two separate sources. First, it emanated from the essential values and symbols of the fundamental characteristic by which the boundaries of the community were demarcated, i.e., Islam and the modalities of authority associated with it. Second, it drew upon the corpus of intellectual and political ideas and values against the background of which the community sought to assert its identity, i.e., the colonial culture and the Western conceptions of social and political relations. The particular understanding and use of Islamic symbolisms and values in Mawdudi’s discourse was furthermore, articulated in debate with, and hence in contradistinction to alternative religious interpretations and the institutionalized modalities of authority associated with them be they the ‘ulama, the pirs or the modernist and secularist rank and file of the Muslim League. While the former two institutions with which Mawdudi had been associated were instrumental in forming Mawdudi’s religious outlook, it was the latter genre of Muslims and especially the party which embodied their vision that was most significant in shaping Mawdudi’s political program.

As mentioned earlier, Mawdudi’s perception of himself as a, if not the, leader of the Muslims of India capable of delivering his community from its predicaments, became more pronounced during his stay in Lahore between 1939 and 1941. His works on Islam and his political views on the Congress and the Muslim League had already made him a man of stature. Yet, Mawdudi harbored greater ambitions - to lead the Muslim

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\[402\] Sayyid Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi writes that his younger brother viewed himself as a great leader of his community; see, Sayyid Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi, in *Nigar* (Karachi), (September 1963), P.63. Mawdudi’s career in later years further confirmed these tendencies, see for instance, Amin Ahsan Islahi’s critical letter to Mawdudi, dated January 16, 1958, reprinted in *Nida* (Lahore), (March 7 1989), P.28.
community of India, not only as a venerable scholar, but also as a renewer of the faith and ultimately as its supreme political leader. His interest in propagating his works in this period was a sign of his concern for establishing his claim to the leadership of the Muslims. These concerns were, in turn, reflected in his political discourse, and his opposition to the Muslim League.

Mawdudi's writings on the political issues of his time are compiled in the three volumes of Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash. The arguments presented in this book reveal that, he was opposed to both accommodating the Hindu-led Congress Party and the pro-British communalist nationalism of the Muslim League. Many observers have concluded that Mawdudi therefore favored the preservation of the unity of India under Muslim rule, facilitated by a wide scale conversion of the populace to Islam. They argue that he opposed the Congress for its Hindu tendencies and the Muslim League because it favored partition of India. However, closer examination of the evidence at hand presents a different picture.

While at an earlier time Mawdudi had thought in all-India terms, his views by the time he moved to Lahore in 1939 had undergone significant change and become more communalist in nature. He had moved from Hyderabad, in part, because he believed that the social and political ascendancy of the Hindus in Southern India was irreversible. Moreover, his experiences with the Shuddhi campaign, the Congress Party's attitude

403 The view that Mawdudi opposed the Pakistan Movement and the partition of the Subcontinent is believed across the board in Pakistan, mainly because of anti-Jama'at propaganda campaigns by successive governments which sought to depict the Jama'at as unpatriotic. This view has also gained currency in academia. See for instance, Ahmad, "Mawlana Mawdudi"; Bahadur, The Jama'at; or Abbott, Islam in Pakistan.
towards the Muslims following the Khilafat Movement and his personal experiences such as his encounter with B.G. Kher, had convinced him that the Muslims were destined for a servile coexistence with the Hindus in a united India, a future which he wished to have no part in. Cognizant of the limitation of time, Mawdudi did not hold high hopes for the wide scale conversion of Hindus to Islam. Therefore, between 1939 and 1947, while the Jama'at continued to operate across India, Mawdudi’s attention was increasingly focused on the Northwestern provinces and their future. He clearly preferred for the Muslims to rule the united India. Faced with the prospects of the alternative of living under a Hindu political order, he was no longer inimical about the partition of India, and actually began to tailor his program to take advantage of such an eventuality. In the December of 1938 issue of the Tarjuman he adumbrated a "two-nation" theory of his own within the context of a united India:

"We are a distinct people whose social life is based on a particular ethical and cultural norm. We differ in fundamental ways with the majority population....no compromise or reconciliation will be possible."

Although Mawdudi did not speak of partition, leaving the door open to the conversion of the whole of India to Islam, he was acquiescing to the political realities of his time. His plan, much like those of other Muslims leaders of the time, was set in the context of a united India. Its inner logic, however, purported to more, and nudded the Muslims closer to partition.

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404 TQ, (December 1938), pp.302-20; see chapter 4 for greater discussion of this proposal.

405 ibid, pp.304-05.
In later years Mawdudi reflected on his thoughts during this period, stating that, he never opposed the League’s demand for partition, but rather the party’s secularist ethos.\textsuperscript{406}

“Our concern then [1941-47] was Islam, and the ability of those who sought to represent it.”\textsuperscript{407}

Mawdudi’s relations with the Muslim League will be discussed later on in Part IV, what is of concern to us here is the manner in which Mawdudi’s attitude towards the League was reflective of his own ambitions and the dynamics of his program.

Mawdudi’s belief in his own leadership position was neither gauged in comparison with the ‘ulama, nor the pirs, nor with the other self-styled Muslim leaders such as ‘Allamah Mashriqi (1888-1963)\textsuperscript{408} or Azad, but with Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) the Qa’id-i ‘Azam (Supreme Leader) and the leader of the Muslim League. Mawdudi, no doubt, viewed the anglicized style and the secular beliefs of Jinnah with contempt. More importantly, however, he viewed Jinnah as his arch-rival, and eyed Jinnah’s popularity and prominence among the Muslims of India with a certain degree of envy. Jinnah’s success as a political leader moreover, convinced Mawdudi of his own potential. For, Mawdudi concluded that if a Westernized lawyer could sway the masses in the name

\textsuperscript{406} Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, "Ham ne Tahrik Pakistan ke Sath Nehin Diya Tha", \textit{Nawa’i Waqt} (Lahore), (August 15, 1975), P.3. This was the text of a speech delivered at Lahore’s Jinnah Hall on Independence Day (August 14), 1975.

\textsuperscript{407} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{408} For more on ‘Allamah Mashriqi see, Syed Shabbir Hussain, "Inayat Ullah Khan El-Mashriqi", in \textit{The Muslim Luminaries}, pp.246-75.
of Islam, as Mawdudi understood the case to be,\textsuperscript{409} then a "true" Muslim leader would certainly attain even greater success. Jinnah's success, in effect, enticed Mawdudi into politics more definitively, and also gave him the false expectation that as soon as his message was heard by the Muslims of India, and later those of Pakistan, he would be swept to heights of power. Abu'l-A'la not only compared himself to Jinnah, recollected Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi, but viewed himself as even a greater leader than Jinnah.\textsuperscript{410} Jinnah's power, Mawdudi had concluded, was tenuous - predicated upon Islam to which Jinnah had no real attachments. Jinnah's example therefore, guided and yet misguided Mawdudi. It reinforced his political ambitions and effectively committed him to communal politics, the end result of which was Pakistan. Yet, it also led him to shun the Muslim League, awaiting the League's eventual fall, which Mawdudi believed was inevitable in light of the discrepancy between that party's Islamic claim and secular reality.

Moreover, Mawdudi saw the Muslim League as essentially a one man show, whereas his movement was organizationally inclined and therefore better poised to manipulate Muslim politics. The Jama'at, Mawdudi believed, was what the League pretended to be and was not.\textsuperscript{411} Mawdudi never understood the League's appeal to emanate from the intransigence of the Congress Party \textit{vis a vis} Muslim demands, but from

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[409]{Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrik-i Pakistan Aur Jama'at-i Islami} (Multan: Ikhwan Publications, nd.), P.6.}

\footnotetext[410]{Cited in Qasmi, "Mujhe Yad Hey", P.32.}

\footnotetext[411]{Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrik-i Pakistan}, pp.7-8.}
\end{footnotes}
the League’s appeal to Islamic symbolisms. Therefore, he concluded that the Jama’at was the only party equipped to deliver to the Muslims what the League had promised them. Having understood the politics of the Muslims of India solely in terms of religion, Mawdudi became oblivious to the actual political dynamics of his community, a trait which continued to characterize his approach to politics during his years in Pakistan. Mawdudi, convinced of this eventuality, groomed the Jama’at as the “true Muslim League”, as the "rear guard" about which he wrote to Zafaru’l-Hasan - and prepared it to take advantage of the League’s expected demise. Mawdudi therefore, was not opposed to Pakistan, but to the League. It was the expectation of realization of his own leadership potential that motivated Mawdudi’s position towards the League, both before and after the creation of Pakistan, and not the issue of the partition of the Subcontinent.

A Taxonomy of Mawdudi’s Life and Career

The transformation of Mawdudi’s intellectual and political outlook, from communal identity to revivalism, can be divided into stages. Up to 1932 his attachment to Islam was not pronounced, and was for the main part mystical in nature. From 1932 to 1947 his religious and political ideas became both increasingly combative and idealistic. By 1951 (as will be detailed in Parts III and IV) his political behavior became pragmatic, and his

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412 This issue will be discussed further in chapter 10. However, for more on the League’s appeal to Muslim symbolisms see, David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). The Jama’at literature often draw attention to the League’s slogan: "Pakistan ka matlab kiya hey? La ilaha illa’llah" (What is Pakistan about? There is no god but God - the Muslim testimony of faith).

413 ibid, pp.7-8.

414 Mawdudi, in Al-Ma’arif.
idealism was effectively routinized. It was in that year that the Jama'at decided to participate in the elections in Pakistan and Mawdudi moved to bridge sectarian gaps between the various 'ulama groupings in the interests of political considerations. Finally, in 1962, under pressure from a military regime, Mawdudi's intellectual politicization found more visible practical manifestation, as he became a full-fledged Pakistani politician. From this time on Mawdudi's career became anchored in the vicissitudes of his movement and its campaign for an Islamic state. By the late 1960s Mawdudi was touring the country, giving speeches, issuing statements, and appearing in the national media not as an 'alim but as the leader of one of Pakistan's political parties.

Mawdudi's activism from 1932 onwards can be broken down further, into stages, the order of which sheds light upon the pattern of change in Mawdudi's religious thinking and political practice. Mawdudi himself argues that the years 1928 until 1937 were spent in advocating the revival of Islam and the elaboration and propagation of its doctrines. In 1937, he writes, his attention turned to politics and he began denouncing

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415 Reference here is to the Jama'at sponsored Twenty Two points, which was put forth by the 'Ulama Convention of February 1951. There Mawdudi consciously downplayed his religious differences with various Islamic schools from the Shi'i to the Ahl-i Hadith so that there would exist a united religious front before the government. See, MMKT, vol.2, pp.212-17.

416 See in this regard, Mawdudi, Tahrik Islami, P.3.


"Congress' secular nationalism". Then, in 1939 he began to "set an alternate course for Muslims", and therefore found himself in confrontation with the Muslim League. From 1941 onwards, he began to openly advocate and strive for an "Islamic state", an endeavor which continued to his last days. Elsewhere, however, he presents a different breakdown, writing that, his religious activism began in 1933 and continued until 1941, a period during which he wrote nineteen of his most important works on tabligh (propagation of religious doctrine). From 1942 to 1947, he writes, his attention turned from purely religious matters to shaping the structure of his da’wah. Both taxonomies, however, confirm the impact of Jinnah and the Muslim League's political success from 1937 onwards on prompting Mawdudi into greater political activity.

As the study of Mawdudi's life, and even his own efforts at its categorization has indicated, the pattern of his intellectual transformation and incremental politicization evades the inherent limits of a structured taxonomy. For instance, Mawdudi's personal commitment to his cause did not materialize until 1937, while his thinking on organizational activities began in 1933 and was clearly evident in his works from 1937 on.

419 ibid, P.95. Mawdudi cites his books, Musalman Awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash, and Mas'alah-i Qaumiyat as examples of his activities in this period.

420 ibid, pp.96-97.

421 ibid, pp.98-110. Shahpuri in Tarikh, vol.1, pp.240-41, divides Mawdudi's earlier career in the following manner: 1932-37, religious revival and propagation; 1937-41, increasing politicization, and creation of a political space by attacking other parties; and from 1941 onwards, the creation of his own organization and direct political activity.


423 ibid, pp.38-39.
However, the above taxonomy can be useful in giving a framework within which to understand the evolution of Mawdudi’s ideas and political outlook, in the context of the contemporary history of Islam in South Asia, and in relation to the prevalent intellectual trends and sociopolitical questions of his time. The interplay of factors influential in Mawdudi’s education and religiopolitical consciousness - the salient components of his biography - have moreover, informed the genesis of his leadership style, to which we shall now turn.
CHAPTER 2
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MAWDUDI'S AUTHORITY

Having outlined the main features of Mawdudi's biography, and those factors which determined his education, persona, and the nature of his religiopolitical consciousness, we shall now turn our attention to the working of Mawdudi's authority. This chapter will present a profile of Mawdudi as a leader, discerning those ingredients of his style and behavior which interacted with his ideas to cultivate a constituency for his ideas, produce and sustain a movement, and create a religiopolitical language and mode of operation sui generis, which is today associated with him and the Jama‘at, and has had a profound impact on revivalist thought across the Muslim world.

We have thus far drawn a sketch of Mawdudi's biography, outlined the bases and extent of his education, and discerned the controlling influences over his intellectual development during his formative years. The transformation of his original intellectual inclinations into an ideology and the consolidation of his religious and political authority were, however, determined by the nexus which related his ideas and world view to his audience - his persona, charisma and leadership style.

The nature of Mawdudi's towering authority, and hence, his popular appeal were, no doubt, predicated upon his claim to and demonstration of great personal gifts and abilities. The most pervasive of these qualities, which are also readily evident in Mawdudi's biography and works, are his intelligence, erudition, creativity and self-reliance. Yet, the nature of Mawdudi's authority rests on a more complex interaction of divergent factors, which define his persona and charisma to his audience. As such, it creates a milieu wherein the interplay of Mawdudi's style and actions with their popular perception
determined the loci and extent of his authority, leadership, and following. In the remainder of this chapter, we will therefore seek to scrutinize the structure of Mawdudi's authority, identify its components, and decipher its code of conduct with view to his interactions with his audience. This exercise will facilitate a greater understanding of the workings of revivalism, its mode of authority and the sociocultural context in which it emerges. It will also underline the salience of intellectual and political transformations in producing novel positions of authority.

Mawdudi’s persona was molded by his environment and experiences, which transformed his character and reinforced many key inclinations. Mawdudi was not from inception the hardened leader that his followers found him to be. In his earlier years he had possessed a poetic nature, and a love for the poetry of Ghalib. It was his later political activities, sense of frustration at the political quandary of Indian Muslims, the evident eclipse of Islam in his natal city of Hyderabad, and the requirements of his perceived solution to these predicaments that transformed Mawdudi’s persona.

The metamorphosis of Mawdudi’s persona and the emergence of his authority were associated with culturally-specific symbolisms, which in time constituted his "style" as well as the bases for the consolidation of his religious and political authority. These symbolisms

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1 Interview with Jawsh Malihabadi, a friend of the Mawdudi family since their stay in Hyderabad, cited in Ahmad Munir, *Mawlama Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi* (Lahore: Atashfishan Publications, 1986), P.97. Mawdudi, in fact, began composing poetry ever since he was nine, see, Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami, "Karan Se Aftab Tak", in *HRZ*, P.22.

2 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.27; also see, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Shakhsiyyat*, Sami’u’llah and Khalid Humayun, eds., (Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, nd.), pp.209-11. It is interesting to note that Ghalib was an advocate of communal coexistence in India.
have defined Mawdudi’s persona and authority in terms of emotionally charged historical paradigms and religious loyalties, infused with the values of the patrimonial political culture in which he operated. These symbolisms pertained to notions of integrity, resilience in the face of adversity, uncompromising loyalty to Islam in general and one’s principles in particular, the Islamic doctrines of tajdid, jihad, and ‘amr-i bi ma’ruf wa nahy ‘an’l-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the reprehensible), traditional concatenations of authority, and the sense of communal consciousness which was preponderant among the Muslims of India at the time.

While the symbolisms which defined his authority were all premised on Islamic values and doctrines, they were essentially directed at projecting an image of power. For Mawdudi’s claim to leadership did not actually emanate from any religious doctrine. In fact, he repudiated all traditional notions of authority as those of the ‘ulama or the pirs, save for that of the mujaddid. Rather, his claim to leadership was based on his promise of delivering Muslims from their political predicaments. Mawdudi was, in effect, more a Muslim political leader than he was an Islamic figure of authority. It is not, however, always easy to separate the Islamic and the purely political ingredients of Mawdudi’s appeal and authority. The religious bases of his claim to authority often conceal the greater salience of his aura of power in swaying a community which had been experiencing relative deprivation and a reversal of its status. The cornerstone of Mawdudi’s authority lay in the appeal which his persona held for the psychological make-up of the Muslim community of the Subcontinent. However, there have existed many mitigating factors, some present in Mawdudi’s persona itself, which prevented his fusion of religion and
power from producing a more successful political movement. A cursory review of Mawdudi’s style and image as experienced by his audience will shed light on the manner in which he successfully created a paradigm of religiopolitical leadership, as well as demonstrate the limitations of his persona and authority.

**An Aristocrat and A Mujaadid: Mawdudi’s Personal Qualities and Characteristics**

Mawdudi was, first and foremost, a man of principle, a man motivated by his beliefs and ambitions and not by monetary gain. This fact was elucidated in various episodes throughout his life. When resident in Hyderabad, Mawdudi experienced great financial difficulties, yet he refused to request assistance from the Nizam’s government, known for its generous patronage of Muslim scholars. Mawdudi was even less compromising when it came to his vocation and intellectual undertaking. Twice in Hyderabad Mawdudi turned down offers from Manazir Ahsan Gilani to teach at the ‘Uthmaniyyah University, once to continue as the editor of the *Tarjuman* and on the other occasion to undertake responsibilities at Daru’l-Islam. Mawdudi was consumed by his ambition for scholarly fame and political leadership, material returns held no attraction for him. He quickly became aware of his own talents and potential, which he not only guarded carefully, but refused to utilize for any purpose other than the materialization of his expectations. For instance, once he learned of the power of his pen following the

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4 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.102. It is cited here that, Nawab Zulqadar Jang Bahadur took the initiative to instruct the government’s Mahkamah-i Umur-i Mazhabi (Bureau of Religious Affairs) to purchase the *Tarjuman* in bulk once he learned that Mawdudi would not ask for assistance.
publication of *al-jihad fi'l-Islam*, he refused to put his pen to the service of others for a fee.\(^5\) For, it was recognition which Mawdudi strived for and not wealth,\(^6\) a quality which fueled his untiring dedication to realizing his ambitions. A case in point was his decision to leave the cosmopolitan city of Hyderabad for the village life of Pathankot, which in later years reached dramatic proportions and was equated, by his followers, with the exile of Ram Chandra,\(^7\) Buddha’s "decision to forsake his palace to seek salvation in a forest,"\(^8\) and the Prophet Muhammad’s *hijrah* (migration) from Mecca to Madinah in 632 A.D. The decision to move to Pathankot was not an easy one, but for Mawdudi foregoing a career at the ‘Uthmaniyyah University and the arduous challenges of this undertaking were rewarded otherwise. For, he believed that his sacrifices bore great religious significance.\(^9\) The Daru‘l-Islam experiment, he concluded, possessed cataclysmic dimensions - a significant episode in the cavalcade of events which had shaped Muslim history in India since 1857.\(^10\)

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5 Abu‘l-Khayr Mawdudi attests to Mawdudi’s great writing ability, which was one reason his services were solicited by ‘Uthmaniyyah University’s Translation Office; see, Abu‘l-Khayr Mawdudi, in *SDMN*, pp.106-07.

6 Ja‘far Qasmi in "Mujhe Yad Hey, Sab Zara Zara", *Nida* (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), P.32 writes that Mawdudi in 1928-32 period rejected a lucrative offer by Mawlana Niyaz Fatihpuri to write an account of the life of the Prophet, which was to be published in Fatihpuri’s name. Fatihpuri as cited earlier, had met Mawdudi first in Bhopal in 1918 and had encouraged Mawdudi to pursue his writing.

7 The depiction was made by Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, cited in *SAAM*, vol.1, P.138.

8 *ibid*, P.137.

9 *ibid*, pp.137-38.

10 *ibid*, P.139.
Mawdudi was always known for his self-reliance, which at times bordered on self-righteous arrogance. In practice, however, it translated into great dedication to his cause and a selfless effort in realizing it. In a poem, dated July 18, 1932 he reflected,

"You have a fire hidden within you, then why do you need a candle;

It is from the zeal of the moth, that the flame becomes radiant."11

It was from Mawdudi’s zeal that the flame of Islam was to be rekindled. Mawdudi worked long hours every day throughout his life; researching, writing, reading, and yet, attending to the affairs of his movement.12 Immersed in his work, Mawdudi was never much of a family man. While close to his wife, he did not spend much time with his six sons and three daughters, arguing that once he succeeded in erecting the Islamic state - the panacea for all of the ills of the Muslim society - much like all of that state’s citizens his children too, would become veritable Muslims.13 The result was that, he eventually became deeply disappointed with his children. For, none of them, except for his second daughter Asma who was very close to him, ever showed any scholarly promise, nor did their lives reflect his life-time of da’wah.14

Throughout most of his life Mawdudi’s activities were greatly hampered by his

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12 Interview with Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, Lahore.

13 Muhammad Yahya, "Sikandarpur Se Lahore Tak", in *QDMN*, P.181.

14 Interview with Khwajah Amanu'llah, Lahore. Interestingly, none of Mawdudi’s children ever joined the Jama'at, nor do his sons reveal the imprint of their father’s influence.
kidney ailment.\textsuperscript{15} Yet, his pain never retarded the pace of his efforts. Mawdudi was also a practical man. He never dodged responsibilities not in keeping with the image of an intellectual. When in 1947 Pathankot, which was located in a predominantly Hindu and Sikh area, become embroiled in violence, some two thousand Muslim peasants took refuge at Daru'l-Islam. Mawdudi distributed the three guns which were in the possession of the Jama'at at the time, between his followers and then personally took charge of the defense of the establishment.\textsuperscript{16} Such activities were, however, never divorced from religious significance. Mawdudi in later years wrote of the defense of Pathankot,

"At that time I felt that it was the angels who were protecting us. There was a veil which kept us from seeing them. I wished so much the veil may be lifted, so that I would be able to see our protectors."\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout his life, Mawdudi sought to be a scholar, a thinker and a politician. He was seen by his audience as an "analyst" and a "critic" as well as a "reformer". While the image of a multi-faceted leader was a tribute to Mawdudi, a fact which the members of the Jama'at took pride in, it was not free of serious problems for the movement.\textsuperscript{18} Mawdudi, however, never sought to reconcile the intrinsic problems of the

\textsuperscript{15} On numerous occasions in 1945 and 1946, Mawdudi was bedridden due to his kidney problems; see RJI, vol.3 and vol.4. In 1969 amidst the national electoral campaign he was forced to travel to England for treatment. In later years he also suffered from severe arthritis, which at some points virtually paralyzed him; letter from Mawdudi to Maryam Jameelah dated August 26, 1972, examined during interview with Maryam Jameelah, Lahore, and Sarwat Saulat, Maulana Maududi (Karachi: International Islamic Publications, 1979), pp.89, and 104-05.


\textsuperscript{17} ibid, P.225.

\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Javid Ahmadu'l-Ghamidi, Lahore.
compartmentalization of his authority, nor did he attempt to consolidate these divergent functions throughout his life.\(^\text{19}\) While Mawdudi’s interest in politics, at least until 1972,\(^\text{20}\) superseded his scholarly and intellectual considerations,\(^\text{21}\) the latter two roles, nevertheless, interfered with his political instincts and *modus operandi* to the detriment of his movement.\(^\text{22}\) Maryam Jameelah wrote in this regard,

"Maulana Maudoodi is by nature very reserved and speaks about himself and his private affairs with much reluctance....His self-abnegation is so extreme that some of his supporters fear it might prove detrimental to the very cause for which he has dedicated his life."\(^\text{23}\)

In his later years, however, this trend was eventually reversed. When after the 1971 national elections in Pakistan he showed signs of disappointment with the turn in political events he returned to a life of scholarship.\(^\text{24}\) Scholarship once again became the vehicle for the realization of an objective which Mawdudi had hoped would materialize through politics.

Throughout his years of political activity Mawdudi had produced numerous books

\(^{19}\) Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore, and Kawthar Niyazi and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islamabad.

\(^{20}\) See earlier in this chapter for discussion of Mawdudi’s return to scholarship during the last part of his life.

\(^{21}\) Interview with Ansari, Islamabad.

\(^{22}\) Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore, and Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.


\(^{24}\) See chapters 7 and 8 for more on this issue.
and articles. By one count he had produced seventy three books at the time of his death. The most important of these was his Urdu translation of and commentary on the Qur'an, *Tafhimul-Qur'an (Understanding the Qur'an)*, which he began to compile in 1942. This voluminous work, sections of which were written during Mawdudi's incarcerations, was finally completed in 1972. Towards his last years, Mawdudi became increasingly concerned with his scholarly activities. He stepped down from the Jama'at's leadership, in part, to complete the *Tafhim*. Thenceforth, he began yet another major undertaking on the life of the Prophet (the *sirah*). During the remaining seven years of his life he completed two volumes of this work, which remain unpublished. By the time of his death in 1979, Mawdudi's writings, widely translated across the Muslim world, had conferred upon him the status of an international thinker and scholar. Mawdudi received the King Faisal Award in 1979 in recognition of his scholarship.

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26 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.368.

27 Interview with Hafizu'l-Rahman Ihsan, Lahore.

28 During his trip to the U.S. in 1979 for purposes of medical treatment where he passed away, Mawdudi spent much time reviewing Western works on the life of the Prophet; see, *ibid*, and *SAAM*, vol.1, P.368.

29 See chapter 8 for more on this issue.

30 *SAAM*, vol.2, P.478. The proceeds from the Award went to Jama'at's research institute, the Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami; see, *SDMN*, P.74.
During Mawdudi's last years his authority underwent even greater traditionalization and fragmentation. He now showed interest in serving in traditional modes of authority which he had hitherto shunned. Throughout his life, although in private, Mawdudi had practiced Unani tibb (traditional medicine)\textsuperscript{31} as a hakim (or tabib - practitioner of tibb), a tradition which he said he had inherited from his family,\textsuperscript{32} and which was also extant among Deobandi 'ulama. He had diagnosed maladies, prescribed herbal medicine and bestowed amulets. In his later years instances of his practice of tibb became both more frequent and open.\textsuperscript{33} Over the years, he also became less opposed to Sufism and devotional religious practices than his earlier public utterances had suggested. While this tendency never found public expression, it was a significant indication of his eventual traditionalization. In the 1970s he would often be engaged in nawafil (non-obligatory religious practices) and would spend evenings in tahajjud (reading of the Qur'an during the late hours of the night), practices which are associated with Sufism and popular religious devotion and are inveighed against by religious reformers.\textsuperscript{34} Nor was he eventually averse to adopting the mantle of a Sufi master. When one of the members of the Jama'at by the name of Hakim Ni'mat 'Ali from Pattuki wrote a book with the object

\textsuperscript{31} Unani medicine literally meaning Greek medicine refers to the classical medical practices envogue among Muslims for several centuries.

\textsuperscript{32} Interview with Hafizu'l-Rahman Ihsan, Lahore. Abbott writes that the Jama'at utilized the unani medicine in its dispensaries after the creation of Pakistan. See, Freeland K. Abbott, "The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan", in The Middle East Journal, 11:1 (Winter 1957), P.46.


\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Hafizu'l-Rahman Ihsan, Lahore.
of interpreting Mawdudi’s *iqamat-i din* in terms of the Sufi concept of *tazkiyah-i nafs* (cleansing of the soul), Mawdudi not only did not object to the book, but putatively, initiated the Hakim and another man into Sufism by the authority of his Chishti lineage.\(^{35}\)

Although these traditional modes of authority surfaced late in Mawdudi’s career, they had, no doubt, existed in his persona since earlier times. They, however, in the interests of his agenda, had remained concealed. Hence, while Mawdudi was always associated with the more modern modalities of authority, as a thinker, scholar and politician, he was not ultimately divorced of the traditional expressions of religious authority. Above and beyond these modalities of authority, the perception of Mawdudi’s leadership was determined by his personal and public style and the impressions which they made.

It was said of Mawdudi that he had an impressive face, one which showed few expressions.\(^{36}\) He had good composure, an aristocratic demeanor, and impeccable manners (*adab*).\(^{37}\) He was not warm, but sincere and open.\(^{38}\) He spoke in beautiful Urdu enunciated in the Delhi accent. He had a pleasant voice, a poignant sense of humor

\(^{35}\) Interview with Hafizu’l-Rahman Ihsan, Lahore. Ihsan recollects that, Mawdudi ordered Hakim Ni‘mat’s book to be reviewed and edited by a number of Jama‘at figures among them, Ihsan and Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, with view to publishing it. The final manuscript remained with Mawdudi and was never published.

\(^{36}\) Interview with Dr. ‘Alamgir Khan, Lahore. He recollected that Mawdudi while under great pain would hardly reveal that he was perturbed.

\(^{37}\) Interviews with, Ghamidi and Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Lahore.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islamabad.
and a taste for sarcasm. He was very alert, and always displayed great presence of mind. He was, at least in private, a tolerant man, "strict but not rigid." He never forced his views on his family nor on his skeptical visitors; his style on such occasions was rather, one of persuasion. He was patient in the face of adversity, calm and composed, yet unyielding and uncompromising. His obdurate stance, a mark of his confidence and a sign of his power, had a pronounced effect of his followers. He was a reserved man, not easily excitable, taciturn and poised; but was not altogether immune to fits of anger. When his tongue was stopped by a drunken Sikh in Pathankot, an enraged Mawdudi lashed the Sikh and berated his faith.

Mawdudi interacted frequently with members of the Jama'at as well as with those interested in his views. Everyday the time between dusk and evening prayers, held at his residence at 5-A Zaildar Park in the Ichrah neighborhood of Lahore, was spent in

39 Interviews with Begum 'Abidah Gurmani and Ja'far Qasmi, Lahore.

40 These are the words of 'Atiyah 'Inayatu'llah, a Western educated politician and a competent demographer, who visited the Mawdudis often in the 1970s. Interview, Lahore.

41 Interviews with Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi and 'Abidah Gurmani. Both Begum Gurmani and 'Atiyah 'Inayatu'llah confirm the fact that, Mawdudi never asked of them to observe purdah during their private visits to his house.

42 Amin Ahsan Islahi, in Mahnamah-i Chiragh (Lahore), (October 1953), P.10.

43 ibid; also see, editor's comments in, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, The Islamic Movement; Dynamics of Values, Power and Change, Khurram Murad, ed. and trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1984), pp.11-13.

44 Malik Ghulam 'Ali, "Professor Mawdudi ke Sath Sath Islamiyyah College Se Zaildar Park Tak", in HRZ, P.125.
informal discussions with those present. In those gatherings Mawdudi would respond to various questions and would put forth his views on a multitude of religious issues. It was his practice to listen to all arguments patiently before rendering his opinion. Gilani recollects that, Mawdudi always spoke last in a discussion, and as such, had the last word. His opinion would habitually include points from all the arguments presented in the discussion - a compromise which accommodated all. Mawdudi pursued this policy in all gatherings. During the sessions of the Jama‘at Shura’ he again would listen silently to the ongoing debates. He would speak at the very end, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, then would present his own views, which would encompass points from each argument. Mawdudi’s scholarship also revealed the same tendency. Saeed recollects visiting Mawdudi in the early 1940s in Lal Kuan, where Mawdudi was engaged in a study of the various translations of the Qur’an. Some ten different translations including English ones by Pickthall, Yusuf Ali and Rodwell were extant. Mawdudi began his own translation of the Qur’an shortly then after in 1942.

At times, however, Mawdudi’s audience would find themselves unconvinced by his accommodating conclusions. Many were too intimidated by Mawdudi’s demeanor to

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45 Interviews with Maryam Jameelah and Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Lahore.

46 Interview with Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, Lahore.

47 Interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, Lahore. In a similar fashion, many of Mawdudi’s religious views were formed in discussions carried out through the pages of the Tarjuman.

pursue the matter.\textsuperscript{49} With regard to those who would challenge his views and conclusions, Mawdudi’s position was less accommodating. In his earlier years, recollects Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Mawdudi had a more receptive ear, was more engaging in discussions and was willing to convince the few and the sundry.\textsuperscript{50} In those years while he was often pedantic in discussions, answering questions more definitively and rendering opinions, he was nevertheless keen to pursue matters in debate and would not tire of responding to challenges.\textsuperscript{51} However, even then he would lose his patience with those whom he did not convince. Yahya recollects that Mawdudi, on a few occasions, revealed anger during discussions with Ahmadi disputants, and went so far as to threaten them.\textsuperscript{52} As the years progressed Mawdudi became less open to challenges, nor did he remain as interested in convincing others of his views. If asked a question he would answer, but if presented with an argument or a challenge he would avoid a response, remaining silent. "He no longer encouraged discussions, only questions."\textsuperscript{53}

This tendency was further evident in Mawdudi, especially \textit{vis a vis} the members of

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Lahore. The interviewee recollected that Mawdudi’s style and disposition were too awe inspiring for many to dare to challenge him.

\textsuperscript{50} Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, "Professor Mawdudi", P.122. The author's reference is especially to 1939-40.

\textsuperscript{51} Yahya, "Sikandarpur Se", P.174. Yahya observations pertain to the period of their stay at Pathankot, 1941-47.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{ibid.}, P.176.

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore.
the Jama'at after the 1956-57 schism in that organization.\textsuperscript{54} His humble demeanor concealed his rather imperious and patronizing attitude towards those in and around the Jama'at. Islahi complained to Mawdudi of his autocratic haughtiness, "[i]f someone criticizes you they have criticized the Jama'at, and if they criticize the Jama'at they have criticized Islam."\textsuperscript{65} Mawdudi was not interested in the emergence of any independent intellectual poles within the Jama'at, nor was he willing to relinquish any of his religious authority by acknowledging the intellectual worth of those around him.\textsuperscript{56} His attitude was reflective of Bendix's typification a "charismatic leader" as "a man who demands obedience on the basis of the mission he feels called upon to perform."\textsuperscript{67}

The establishment of Mawdudi's authority and the consolidation of his world view may account for his assumption of a more imperious attitude when engaged in intellectual altercations. Yet, for some of those who knew Mawdudi since his earlier days, these traits were not new developments. He had always shocked his peers and mentors with his supercilious confidence in his own abilities, and with his audacity to criticize those beyond his station. Even when a political neophyte in Delhi, Mawdudi recognized no equal - he

\textsuperscript{54} Mawlana Wahidu'ddin Khan, \textit{Din ki Siyasi Ta'bir} (Lahore: Al-Maktabah Al-Ashrafiyah, nd.), pp.7-8.

\textsuperscript{55} Letter from Islahi to Mawdudi, in \textit{Nida}, P.28.

\textsuperscript{56} Interviews with Ghamidi as well as a number of current and former members of the Jama'at.

was the "'aql-i kull" (omnicompetent intellect), an "intellectual autocrat". While those in the Jama'at readily succumbed to Mawdudi's style and display of power, others outside the Jama'at, interpreted his autocratic ways differently. Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi was particularly adamant in exposing his brother's pretensions. When asked by Abu'l-A'la to comment on the first installment of *Tafhimul-Qur'an*, Abu'l-Khayr noted, "you do not as yet have the profundity to be a *mufassir* (commentator on the Qur'an)". After Mawdudi had completed his Qur'anic commentary in 1972 Abu'l-Khayr remarked, "now you have acquired the acumen to be a *mufassir* and should begin the work anew."

In public interactions Mawdudi's style proved quite compelling. Whether in speech or in text, Mawdudi’s views were always presented with great authority and in an articulate and rational style, which appealed to the logic rather than the emotions of his audience. Mawdudi’s expositions were premised on the authority of religious dictums and manipulated the compulsion which ties the faithful to his religion. He would carry his

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58 'Aql-i kull is also a technical term in Sufism which means the Supreme Intellect. In common language it has the meaning of "know-it-all". In the context used by Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi to refer to his younger brother it harbors sarcastic connotations. Interview with Ja'far Qasmi, Lahore.

59 Interview with Retired Air Commodore In'amul-Haq, Lahore. The interviewee knew Mawdudi in Delhi, and remembered that while Mawdudi was known for his anti-British rhetoric as well as for his arrogant style.

60 Interview with Qasmi, Lahore.

61 See Khurram Murad in, Mawdudi, *The Islamic Movement*, P.10; also interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.

audience through the entirety of the structure of the idea which he had posited, presenting a concatenation of rationally discussed arguments seriatim, the conclusions of each of which would carry the listener or the reader to the next argument, and would eventually lead him to the grand conclusion, the sum total of the arguments presented and the idea which he had sought to prove. While during the early part of his career ideas were articulated through catechisms, in his later years Mawdudi's arguments would carry his audience, without interruption in pace or line of thought, from assumptions and premises to conclusions. His final conclusions, however, invariably connected "understanding" to "action". For, Mawdudi never remained content with mere intellectual proofs; he demanded action from his listeners.

Mawdudi's discourse consciously erased areas of compromise, bifurcating issues into right and wrong, Islamic and un-Islamic. He brought moral pressure to bear on his audience, manipulating the psychological impulse which is inherent in a consequential choice between such diametric opposites as, truth and falsehood, or salvation and perdition.


64 See for instance, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, The Islamic Way of Life, Khurram Murad and Khurshid Ahmad, eds. and trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986); also see Mawdudi's introduction to Tafhimu'l-Qur'an, in TUTQ, vol.1, P.25.

65 At times, he elaborated this dichotomy in terms of a comparative study of Islamic teachings with Western notion such as Capitalism and Socialism. Mawdudi would in these cases fully outline the position of the Western idea, then systematically take it apart. See for instance, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, Economic System of Islam, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Riaz Husain, trans., reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984).
Mawdudi’s thinking was firmly rooted in reason. His views in this regard were reminiscent of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s discourse on the relation between Islam and science. Arguing that, "[t]rue reason is Islamic", i.e., not only is faith predicated on reason, but more importantly, reason leads to faith, Mawdudi posited the basic premise of Sayyid Ahmad’s nichari (naturalist) approach to interpretation of Islam. For Mawdudi, however, reason was not merely a means for fostering a dialogue between Islam and modern science, but it was a hermeneutic tool.

However, there existed times when Mawdudi deviated from his rational method, invoking instead the fiat of emotive arguments, most notably in his examinations of the purdah system. In his celebrated work on this subject, *Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam*, Mawdudi deviated from his customary ratiocinations and appeal to religious compulsion, and instead engaged in an ahistorical harangue on Islam’s advocacy of absolute segregation of society on the one hand, and the correlation between women’s emancipation and the fall of civilizations on the other. Mawdudi who otherwise had rejected the sanctity of the writ of Islamic history in favor of strict adherence to the

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66 Cited in Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", in Donald E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P.388. Mawdudi’s position here is reminiscent of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s arguments that, science was intrinsic to Islam, and that the study of the former would lead one to the latter - a position which gained the appellation nichari (naturalist) and for which Sayyid Ahmad was castigated. On this issue see, Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*, P.323.


68 *ibid*, pp.17-37. Also see *TQ* (September 1936), pp.53-80 and (October 1936), pp.126-50 where Mawdudi posits his arguments in debate Western thought and practice.
unadulterated teaching of the primary religious sources, here sought to prove his arguments by confirming the sanctity of custom, going so far as to claim that the practice of purdah sanctioned by the Qur’an.

Mawdudi’s polemics often extended beyond a discussion of faith; by correlating his compelling religious arguments with ideological and political concerns he attached the full weight of soteriological anxieties to political choices. Faced with Mawdudi’s piece-meal presentation of an idea, especially made to participate, albeit passively, in his deductive reasoning and forced to confront a choice between religious truth and falsehood, Mawdudi’s audience, unless secular in outlook, was often disarmed and hence compelled by his presentations.69 Khurram Murad and Khurshid Ahmad write of Mawdudi’s style that,

"Sayyid Mawdudi was blessed not only with erudition and scholarship but with brilliant gifts of exposition. Hence, despite the enormous agenda he set for himself...[he] nevertheless exhibits all the passionate lucidity and the persuasive logic so characteristic of his style. That style has its own charm, yet the argument it carries remains deeply convincing and compelling in its appeal. Such a discourse does not take long to penetrate and capture hearts and minds."70

When presented in writing, Mawdudi’s powerful command of Urdu and his "exceedingly beautiful style",71 reinforced the compulsive logic of his arguments.


70 Mawdudi, The Islamic Way of Life, P.6.

71 Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore. On Mawdudi Urdu style also see, Na’im Siddiqi, "Mawlana Mawdudi Rahmatu’llah Alaih ki Lisani’u Adabi Khadmat", in SSMN, pp.5-12.
Mawdudi's style of Urdu, as alluded to before, was developed consciously with view to the needs of his agenda. He insisted on using Urdu as a vehicle for the propagation of his ideas in order to free Muslim minds of the influence of English. Mawdudi's style of prose was innovative. While in debating religious issues he was influenced by the didactic writings of the Deobandi Mawlana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and the Ahl-i Hadith Mawlana Thanau'llah Amritsari, his literary style, despite his denials in this regard, bore the mark of Azad's al-Hilal (Calcutta) and Shibli Nu'mani's writings as reflected in his articles in the al-Nadwah (Lucknow). Mawdudi's analytical approach, which utilized modern concepts and terminologies, was however, essentially new. Mawdudi's style of prose was especially attractive to the educated Muslims. It is Mawdudi's pen, more than any other medium, which accounts for his following in general, and membership of the Jama'at in particular.

Mawdudi was, however, not a great orator. He never sought to excite his audience, nor did he get excited himself. In fact, he seldom delivered a talk extemporaneous. His reserved style stands in contrast to the impassioned and populist style of religious oratory developed among South Asian Muslim leaders since last century, from Azad to Sayyid 'Ata'u'llah Shah Bukhari of the Ahrar to contemporary activists such as Muhammad

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72 In a lecture at MAO College of Amritsar in September 1939 Mawdudi presented 25 Urdu terms as equivalents for commonly used English political terms. See, Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, pp.109-11.

73 Qasmi, "Mujhe Yad Hey", P.32.


75 Saeed, Lahore, P.223.
Tahiru'l-Qadri. Mawdudi's subdued style also stands in contradistinction to those of his secularist political rivals in Pakistan, men such as, Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto or Altaf Husain of the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (National Movement of Muhajirs, MQM). Siddiqi recollects that in a speech in Amritsar in 1940 Mawdudi explained to his audience that he wished to avoid the flowery and impassioned styles of Shibli Nu'mani or Azad which were envogue then, because he wished to attract students and to pose issues academically. The influence of both men, as noted earlier, was however, present in Mawdudi's writing style.

Interested in swaying the intelligentsia with his sophisticated casuistry, and unwilling to part with physical manifestations of his aristocratic demeanor, such as his Delhi style of clothing, diction and accent seriously limited his ability to gather a following among the masses. Mawdudi did, at times, appeal to populist themes in his expositions. In a rare treatment of the socioeconomic concerns of the masses he wrote,

"Consider these Brahmins and pirs, these Nawabs and ru'asa (sing. ra'is, leader), these jagirdars and feudal lords, these money-lenders and usurers. They all view themselves as superior to the common folk. They are the privileged ones....They are the lords and the others their surfs....They have the privilege to rob, while others are meant to be robbed. To satiate the selfish demands of these it is the life and honor of the common folk which is being sacrificed."

In later years too, Mawdudi appealed to populist themes by emphasizing on Islam's demand for economic justice and equity, but the extent of these appeals remained

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76 Manzuru'l-Haq Siddiqi, "Tahrik-i Pakistan Talib-i 'Ilm ki Yadain", in TT, vol.1, P.94.
77 Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Salamati Ka Rastah (Pathankot: Daru'l-Islam, nd.), P.96.
78 Maududi, Economic System, pp.87-112.
limited as Mawdudi continued to espouse the traditional position that, Islam enjoins economic justice and not egalitarianism.\(^{79}\) Similarly, Mawdudi encouraged independent religious thinking and the practice of *ijtihad* (individual inquiry the application religious law), yet immediately limited the scope of its practice.\(^{80}\) His references to populist themes therefore, as will be also discussed in later Parts, was far too intermittent and transient to identify him with the causes of the masses. Moreover, Mawdudi was inimical to the type of activity which the political manipulation of populist themes may entail. He was always reluctant to cross the boundaries of law, and especially opposed resort to violence.\(^{81}\) The Jama'at, however, was on occasion provoked into clashes with rival forces or the police, increasingly so from the late 1960s onwards. In such occasions Mawdudi was careful to check the Jama'at's activism, and did not permit the movement's practice to be reflected in its official doctrinal position. Violence was never viewed by Mawdudi as a policy tool. He wrote in this regard,

\(^{79}\) Islam's teachings on economics do not advocate absolute equality, but accept variations in income and wealth to the extent that they reflect differences in effort and skill. Moreover, Islam protects the right to private property and does not sanction expropriation of property or its nationalization. For more on Islam's views on economics see, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Towards A Philosophy of Islamic Economics", *The Muslim World*, LXXVII:3-4 (July-October 1987), pp.175-96. For Mawdudi's writings on this issue see, Syed Abul Ala Maududi, *Islamic Economic System: Principles and Objectives*, reprint, (Delhi: Markazi Maktabah Islami, 1980), pp.6-7.

\(^{80}\) He limited the practice of *ijtihad* to those who have faith in the *shari'ah*, knowledge of the Qur'an, the sunnah and other sources of religious law, and are proficient in Arabic. See, Maulana Abul' Ala Maudoodi and Sh. Mohammad Abu Zahra, "The Role of "ijtihad" and the Scope of Legislation in Islam", *The Muslim Digest* (Durban, South Africa), 9:6 (January 1959), pp.15-20.

"...I do feel it is necessary in all these cases [of striving against despotism] to resist the temptation of resorting to the methods and techniques of secret underground movements and bloody revolutions."  

It was until Mawdudi had left the office of the Amir that the Jama‘at and its student wing, Islami Jami‘at Tulabah, became involved in campus violence. Unwilling to force a radical break with the established order, and hesitant to unleash the potential force of populist politics, Mawdudi was ultimately not guided by idealism, but by the sensibilities of the traditional patrimonial order in which he operated. Khurshid Ahmad typified him as a "practical idealist", a leader whose idealism was checked by his rational pragmatism. Mawdudi’s political ambitions never thoroughly overrode either his traditional values, nor did they thwart him from loyalty to his objectives. Convinced of the inherent superiority of his vision and its eventual success, Mawdudi never saw any reason to engage in agitational politics, which would compel him to compromise the values which he espoused, and hence would blemish the image of the utopian order which he advocated. This fact distinguishes Mawdudi from many other revivalist leaders, notably among them, Ayatollah Khomeini. The Jama‘at, however, did not altogether remain immune to the temptation of power, and did resort to means which vitiated its envisioned end. Yet, these incidents never found doctrinal expression in Jama‘at’s ideology, and hence, the

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84 See for instance, Islahi’s letter to Mawdudi regarding the latter’s leadership style. Islahi accuses Mawdudi of machiavellian tactics which sacrifice Islamic values. The letter is reprinted in *Nida*, P.28. Also see chapter 7 on this issue.
organization remained surprisingly resistant to the lure of populist politics. However, Jama'at’s activism did necessitate certain compromises, in the face of which Mawdudi felt compelled to resort to complex and apologetic interpretations. The most notable instances of such apologetic exercises were the Machchi Goth affair in 1956-57 and the Jama'at’s support for the presidential candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah in 1963, both of which will be considered in detail later on. It should, however, be noted here that, although damaging to the Jama'at, these incidents acted to both underscore Mawdudi’s claim to religious authority which he utilized to justify these compromises, and to confirm his essentially political proclivity.

While Mawdudi’s attempts at changing the traditional political order remained circumspect, his discourse was more openly concerned with reshaping the structure of relations between Islam and the Muslims, the sources of the faith and the Muslim community at large. His written works, and his Qur’anic commentary in particular, were written in a simple narrative, avoiding the traditional scholastic terminologies and style. As such, Mawdudi consciously sought to reduce Islamic intellectual discourse to a level where it could be understood by a greater number of people such that, the discourse would cease to be the monopoly of any sodality. The objective of this undertaking was to popularize religion and to facilitate a greater participation of the Muslim masses, and especially the intellectuals, in religious discussions. It, however, also had the effect of

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86 See Zafar Ishaq Ansari’s comments in, *TUTQ*, vol.1, pp.xx and 1-2.

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standardizing the scope and extent of the religious discourse and hence, made it increasingly mundane. His significance does not lie in his scholarly contributions per se, but in creating an intellectual medium wherein modern sociopolitical themes can be discussed and addressed in the context of religion. He moreover, produced a new set of religiopolitical terminologies and novel social and religious references, which in the context of his reductionist religious discourse has shown great success and staying power. Mawdudi has, in effect, set an example for independent religious thinking and activism, a trend which preceded him, but was invigorated and streamlined by Mawdudi, producing a paradigm for religiopolitical activism.

Mawdudi’s discourse, mode of authority and plan of action were in many ways an heir to a tradition of Islamic revivalist activism in India. It emerged among the Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith ‘ulama, but was more importantly manifested, articulated and operationalized by Azad (of the al-Hilal days). The latter was of greater relevance to Mawdudi’s thinking and movement. For, not only was Mawdudi influenced by Azad’s vision and style, but he actually belonged to the same typology of Muslim religiopolitical leader of which Azad was an archetypal example. The background, ideas and modus operandi of the two demonstrate an uncanny resemblance; so much so that Ikram has concluded that, should the Jama‘at succeed in its objectives in Pakistan, the resultant state would be a

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87 Mawdudi was, however, critical of Azad’s later career, his cooperation with the Congress and "moral laxity", for instance with regard to music; see, Mawdudi, Shakhsiyat, pp.271-72.
materialization of Azad’s ideals. Consider the following: Mawdudi, much like Azad a) was a brilliant child, had a poetic and literary predilection, although Mawdudi subsumed this dimension of his character after 1932, b) had discovered his faith through personal study and reflection, c) had a Sufi background which he renounced, d) was a product of and adumbrated an eclectic system of education, one which combined the modern and the Islamic methods and subjects of education, e) favored the resurrection of the bygone glories of Muslim heritage in India and advocated a revival of religion to materialize it, f) was critical of the ‘ulama while close to them, g) was aloof and supercilious, showing disdain for those who remained unconvinced by his ideas, h) harbored notions of leadership, viewing himself as a chosen amir (Amir’ul-Hind in Azad’s case) and savior of Muslims, destined to restore their foregone glory and establish the rule of the faith in the world through a movement of renewal (tajdid), i) combined the functions of journalist, thinker and scholar with that of political leader and was a prolific writer with scholarly ambitions, placing great importance on his Qur’anic translation and commentary, j) saw the shari’ah as a holistic system and favored the introduction of rationalism to the study of Islam, k) viewed organizations as essential for a successful expression of Muslim political aspirations (both men gained much of their political experience and education

88 S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, 2nd ed., (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1965), pp.152-53. Mian Tufayl Muhammad confirms Ikram’s conclusion stating that Mawdudi was deeply influenced by Azad’s romantic views of Muslim glory, and his desire to restore their political power; interview, Lahore.

89 Interestingly, Mawdudi’s emphasis upon the opening chapter of the Qur’an as a prayer to which the rest of the Qur’an is a response builds upon Azad’s special treatment of that chapter in his commentary. Moreover, Mawdudi’s understanding of the Qur’anic concept of rabb (lord) is close to Azad’s understanding of rububiyyat (lordship).
in the Khilafat Movement in which they were involved at different levels); 1) believed and utilized literary style and rhetorical prowess for furthering their cause, although in this last category Mawdudi's practice stands in contrast to Azad's flowery and impassioned style.90

The similitude reflects more than just conjecture, and was not devoid of benefits for Mawdudi's stature either. Azad's career as scholar, propagandist and politician, became a model for religiopolitical leadership with far-reaching emotive hold over Muslim intellectuals and political activists. Azad had not only struck a receptive chord in young Muslim intellectuals such as Mawdudi (which will be discussed at a later point in this study) through al-Hilal, but had so convincingly presented an ideal image of a leader and the path which he should follow, that even after he himself parted with it his image and ideas continued to capture the imagination of Muslim thinkers and activists. Minault writes that Azad was representative of a new pattern of religiopolitical activism among Muslims of India:

"that of the informed individual seeking a cultural orientation which combines elements of East and West - not to imitate the culture of the conqueror, but rather to revitalize his own....[He] sought to revitalize Muslim cultural and social life and to publicize his ideas of how it should be done through educational institutions, cultural organization, and the press....The role model was also emerging: part journalist, part orator, part

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The Azad of the *al-Hilal* days, as the archetype of an ideal leader, continues to be revered for his articulate argumentation, political zeal, brevity, faith, erudition, and the power of his chaste Urdu. His ideas moreover, have laid the foundations for subsequent expressions of Islamic revivalism in the Subcontinent. In short, his image has become institutionalized into the profile of an ideal leader, and a mode of religiopolitical behavior, which is most clearly reflected in the example of Mawdudi. Having outlined the general parameters of Mawdudi's authority we shall now turn to an examination of its nature, popular perception, and manifestation in the Jama'at.

**The Nature of Mawdudi's Authority**

Mawdudi's religious and political authority were predicated upon the legitimacy of his position as an interpreter of Islamic doctrines. Central to Mawdudi's aim of popularizing religion and confirming his own position of religious leadership was to challenge the traditional religious institutions of authority - the 'ulama and the Sufi pirs. In addition to simplifying the language and style of religious discourse, this feat was accomplished actively through undermining the authority of the traditional institutions, especially that of the 'ulama:

"The most significant contribution of Maulana Maududi was to wrest canonical control from the Mullah and to make it possessed by laity." 92

Mawdudi having denied his own affiliation with the 'ulama, stating, "I do not have the

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prerogative to belong to the class of 'ulama...",93 claimed instead that,

"I belong to that school of Islamic Jurisprudence (fuqaha) who claim that every one who is duly lettered must have his own, direct access to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah to seek Commandments and exemplification."94

Mawdudi went even further, first, challenging the exclusive affiliation of South Asian 'ulama, notably that of his mentors among the Deobandis, with the Hanafi school of Islamic law:

"He [a believer] should respect all the Imams of Ijtihad and the famous four: Abu Hanifa, Shafi'i, Maalik and Hanbal (may Allah be pleased with them all!). A duly-lettered and learned man ought not to resort to taqlid (obeying one particular Imam). Follow one Imam, if you will, but do not vow that you shall never obey the others."95

His criticism of the 'ulama then extended further, deriding their efficacy and even deprecated their wisdom, "the poor students" wrote Mawdudi, "if they go to old institutions they will become a prey to religious traders"96 - "the 'ulama who in following their views and programs are bound to go astray."97 It should, however, be noted that Mawdudi sought to open Islamic exegeses to educated Muslims only, which limited the scope of his iconoclastic exercises. These tirades against the 'ulama more directly confirmed Mawdudi's

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95 ibid.

96 Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Musalman Aur Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash (Lahore, 1940), vol.3, P.100.

97 ibid, P.123; also see, Mawdudi’s views on Hadith commentary in, Adams, "The Authority of the Prophetic Hadith", pp.25-47.
own position of religious authority. Free of the limitations of the ties to a sodality, he was able to openly say of his own religious authority and perspicacity, "[n]ow reality glows before my eyes without a mask."

From the examination of Mawdudi’s life and thought in this chapter it is evident that Mawdudi harbored great ambitions of religious and political leadership. His objectives were not always expressed openly. While Mawdudi was accepted by many Muslims as a religious authority of sorts as well as a potential political leader, such notions did not live up to Mawdudi’s own expectations of his leadership. For, Mawdudi aspired to an omnipotent authority, one which would not only encompass religious and political issues, but would reign unchallenged in these spheres. Mawdudi would scarcely express this ambition openly, but its preponderance, albeit implicitly, in his style and expositions is conspicuous,

"Unfortunately, I cannot claim the high degree of learning and knowledge that we would need to guide the community back to the path of redemption nor do I have the power to reform such a large community out of such a hopeless desperation. But God has endowed me with a sensitive and sympathetic mind which prompts me to press into service the little knowledge and insight that I have...I am determined to extend the scope of my endeavour as far as I can."

Mawdudi’s argument, repeated time and again, that Islam had fallen into desuetude, and that it original message had been lost to contemporary Muslims set the stage for his own interpretive exegeses, and legitimized his authority to reorient religious law and practice. See for instance, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Qur’an Ki Char Buniadi Istilahain: Ilah, Rabb, ‘Ibadat, Din, reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1988); and idem, First Principles of the Islamic State, 6th ed., (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1983), P.6.

Cited by Khurshid Ahmad in, TUTQ, vol.1, P.xii.

Such expressions of humility which intermittently appear in Mawdudi’s speeches, belie his somewhat cavalier views on his own abilities, and his veritable beliefs in the primacy of his authority. Islahi unmasked Mawdudi’s pretense of humility by arguing, "[y]ou not only view yourself as the established head of Jama‘at-i Islami, but as that of Islam..."\(^{102}\)

Mawdudi’s claims to unrivaled authority are most clearly manifested in his discussions of the theme of *tajdid* (renewal) in Islamic history but at times extend further to border on *mahdiism* (expectation of the Islamic messiah). Mawdudi’s examination of the vicissitudes of *tajdid*, its historical role, religious incumbency, and the qualities and powers of the *mujaddid* (renewer), although couched in scholarly terminology is an articulation of a religiohistorical paradigm which sanctions the pursuit of a political goal under the aegis of religion. Mawdudi’s historiography moreover, by implication, associates the Jama‘at with the tradition of *tajdid* in Islam, and legitimizes Mawdudi’s claim to consummate authority, bestowing historical significance on his movement’s agenda.\(^{103}\)

Mawdudi viewed Islamic history from the end of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (*Rashidun* Caliphate, 632-61)\(^{104}\) onwards as essentially an era of *jahiliyah*.

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102 Letter from Islahi to Mawdudi *Nida*, P.28.


104 Reference is to the caliphate of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali, the first four elected caliphs, whose reign is viewed by revivalist thinkers as the only period of true Islamic rule following the death of the Prophet.
(ignorance). Save for periodic surges of orthodoxy in the guise of reviverist (tajdid) movements, Muslim life from the seventh century on was defiled by syncretic concessions to heathen tendencies, and the resultant godless practices. The necessity of renewal (tajdid) and reform (islah), of reinstating the rule of pristine religious values and teachings, in such circumstances is therefore self-evident. Mawdudi in fact, identified a number of mujaddids in this regard, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz (an Umayyad Caliph, d.720); the founders of the four schools of Sunni law: Abu Hanifah (700-67), Malik ibn Anas (716-95), al-Shafi’i (767-820) and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855); al-Ghazzali (1058-1111); Ibn Taimiyah (1263-1328); Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1625) and Shah Waliullah (1703-62). Thus he created a chain of tajdid, which significantly, extends from the heartland of Islam to India. Mawdudi argued that all of these great mujaddids were distinguished in history for their insight into the roots of the problems before Muslims, reform of religious practices, initiating an intellectual revolution, defense of Islam in the political sphere, establishing the primacy of the shari’ah, and their opposition to the ostensibly orthodox practices of the ‘ulama. Mawdudi’s typology, accorded a mujaddid

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107 Mawdudi, A Short History, P.30.

108 ibid, pp.44-78.

109 ibid, pp.44-87.
interpretive powers and religiopolitical authority which are more in keeping with his view of his own role and authority,

"Though a mujaddid is not a Prophet, yet in spirit he comes very close to prophethood. He is characterized by a clear mind, penetrating vision, unbiased straight thinking, special ability to see the Right Path [al-sirat al-mustaqim] clear of all extremes and keep balance, power to think independently of the contemporary and centuries-old social and other prejudices, courage to fight against the evils of the time, inherent ability to lead and guide, and an unusual competency to undertake ijtihad [individual inquiry to establish the ruling of the shari'ah] and the work of reconstruction."\(^{10}\)

In fact, Mawdudi distinguished a mujaddid from a prophet only in the fact that the latter received revelation, "...a mujaddid, on the whole, has to undertake and perform the same nature of work as is accomplished by a Prophet,"\(^{11}\) which Mawdudi believed is not so much the transmission of a revelation as it is educational.\(^{12}\)

Mawdudi’s conception of the function and the role of the mujaddid furthermore, encompasses the more messianic doctrine of the mahdi.\(^{13}\) Mawdudi not only identified a mahdi as a mujaddid, but more importantly, reversed this definition, depicting tajdid as synonymous with mahdiism. Throughout Tajdid’u Ihya’-i Din (1952) (translated as A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam), Mawdudi used the two concepts of mahdi and mujaddid interchangeably with indirect references to the function of prophethood implicit in both roles, "[t]he ideal mujaddid (or Imam-al-Mahdi) can be...a true successor to

\(^{10}\) ibid, P.35.

\(^{11}\) ibid, P.36.

\(^{12}\) Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, Towards Understanding Islam, Khurshid Ahmad, trans. and ed., reprint, (Indianapolis: Islamic Teaching Center), pp.36-38.

\(^{13}\) Maududi, A Short History, pp.40-43.
Prophethood. The juxtaposition of \textit{tajdid} with \textit{mahdiism}, and the extension of the recurring function of the latter to the former, no doubt, was of great consequence. The utility of this exercise becomes apparent once Mawdudi begins to associate himself with the tradition of \textit{tajdid} in Islam. This association at times finds clear \textit{mahdiist} tone, especially when premised on the identification of the millenarian circumstance, understood in religious and cultural terms, which Mawdudi believed the Muslim world was in,

"If the expectation that Islam eventually will dominate the world of thought, culture, and politics is genuine, then coming of a Great Leader under whose comprehensive and forceful leadership such Revolution is to come about is also certain."

Mawdudi’s description of the \textit{mahdi} from this point on is highly ambiguous, describing the \textit{mahdi} and his movement in terms which not only suggests that Mawdudi coveted these positions of authority, but also would permit his facile and automatic identification with him,

"In my opinion the Coming One [the \textit{mahdi}] will be a most modern Leader of his age possessing an unusually deep insight in all the current branches of knowledge, and all the major problems of life. Most probably he will not be aware of his being the promised Mahdi. People, however, will recognize him after his death from his works to be one who was to establish ‘Caliphate after the pattern of prophethood’ as mentioned in the

\footnote{Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, \textit{Tajdid’u Ihya’-i Din} (Lahore, 1952), p. 55-60.}

\footnote{Mawdudi, \textit{A Short History}, pp. 36-38. Also see, Mawdudi, \textit{Qur’an ki Char Buniadi Istilahain}, P. 8, where he argues obscurantism has so dominated Islam that three quarters of the practiced faith is defected and incorrect. Such millenarian notions were not new to the Muslim community of India at the turn of the century. Metcalf reports that the Ahl-i Hadith who emerged in the nineteenth century also viewed the Muslim predicaments in apocalyptic terms; see, Metcalf, \textit{Islamic Revival}, pp. 268-70.}

\footnote{Mawdudi, \textit{A Short History}, P. 43.}
prophecies."\(^{117}\) (Emphasis added).

The full implications of the above passages, and similar ones elsewhere in which he truncates and streamlines the image of the \textit{mahdi},\(^{118}\) can best be understood when read in conjunction with accounts of Mawdudi's contributions and historical role.\(^{119}\) Hence, while Mawdudi has articulated his views in light of the doctrine of \textit{tajdid}, his authority appealed, in an indirect fashion, to the more emotionally charged millenarian doctrine of \textit{mahdiism}, creating the bases for the articulation of his charisma.

Significant in this regard is also Mawdudi's open break with the vestiges of the traditional order against the immediate background of which he defined his authority. His emphatic claim to intellectual independence from the existing traditional educational systems,\(^{120}\) his avowed "reconversion" to Islam, and his self-styled hermeneutics, all acted to cast him in a charismatic/millenarian role. 'Abd captures the essence of Mawdudi's break with and yet grounding in tradition in the following description,

\(^{117}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp.41-42.

\(^{118}\) Also see, Mawdudi, \textit{Tajdid'u Ihya'}, P.32, where Mawdudi reduces the grandeur of the Mahdi approximating it to the image projected of himself.

\(^{119}\) See for instance, Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrir Islami ka Ayandah}, pp.87-110; and Yusuf, "While Green in Age", pp.5-6. Also see, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, \textit{Islam Today} (Beirut: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1985), pp.15-17. Also significant in this regard is the Jama'at's efforts to consciously vest Mawdudi's image with a millenarian aura. References to the premonitions of a clairvoyant who visited with Ahmad Hasan Mawdudi, and Mawdudi's own narration of his close escape from death in a car accident in Hyderabad, cited in \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, 108, are often utilized to vest Mawdudi's image with a millenarian aura.

\(^{120}\) Saulat in \textit{Maulana Maududi}, pp.2-3 cites that Mawdudi sought to establish his legitimacy independently, arguing it mattered not with whom he studied, for, such questions should concern those who have no literary or academic work of their own to present.
"He is an extraordinary scholar of the Qur'an, Hadith and Muslim Law, as well as sociology, Philosophy, Economics and Political Science."\textsuperscript{121}

While the very foundations of Mawdudi's authority are based on traditional religious sources of legitimacy, the distinguishing quality of his authority emanated from his claim to proficiency in modern subjects, which he had also cited as a quality of the awaited mahdi. Mawdudi's break with tradition is more clearly evident in his open challenge to the sacrosanct tradition of authenticating the \textit{Hadith} based on the authority of its chain of transmission from the Prophet, which had been canonized by generations of \textit{muhaddithin} (relaters of \textit{Hadith}) and institutionalized as a foundation of the Islamic religious sciences. Mawdudi introduced novel perspectives on transmission of \textit{Hadith},

\begin{quote}
"[w]ith extensive study and practice one can develop a power and can intuitively sense the wishes and desires of the Holy Prophet....Thus...on seeing a \textit{Hadith}, I can tell whether the Holy Prophet could or could not have said it."\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

Similarly he wrote of his Qur'anic translation and commentary

\begin{quote}
"...I have not tried to render the Arabic text of the Qur'an into another language. Instead I have tried to express in my own words, and as faithfully as possible, the meaning conveyed to me by the Qur'anic passages and the impression they make upon me."\textsuperscript{123} (Emphasis added.)
\end{quote}

In outlining a typology of Islamic charismatic leadership, based on the case of the Mahdi of Sudan (1843-85), Dekmajian and Wyszomirski have identified three factors: a)

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Tafhimat} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1965), vol.1, P.202
\item[123] \textit{TUTQ}, P.4.
\end{footnotes}
existence of a social crisis, b) the appearance of an exemplary personality, and c) the initiation of a "value transformation". In the case of Mawdudi these factors were evident. The first factor emerged in the form of cultural and political rather than a social crisis. The last factor, Mawdudi's interpretation of Islam, as will be discussed in Part II, was tantamount to a "value transformation". Although not clearly divorced of the trappings of traditional Islam, Mawdudi was nevertheless an innovator; and as such, imposed a new set of obligations on Muslims in general, and his followers in particular. It is based on this chasm, albeit subtle, between traditional Islam and Mawdudi's interpretation of the religion that, his charismatic role and function was highlighted and took shape.

Whether or not Mawdudi was an exemplary personality may not be readily evident. However, there is little doubt that he was perceived as such by those who have been within the purview of the Jama'at's influence. In their eyes Mawdudi was a "natural leader", one whom Weber identified as a holder "of specific gifts of body and spirit...not accessible to everybody." Outside observers may hesitate to define Mawdudi as a charismatic leader in the Weberian sense of the term. For, Mawdudi never excited the masses sufficiently, nor did he break with tradition clearly enough to fit the Weberian (or any other similar) typology. However, Mawdudi's authority was, to some extent, defined in contradistinction to traditional institutions of authority,

"I recognize no king or ruler above me; nor do I bow before any

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government; nor do I view any law as binding on me...nor do I accept any tradition or custom.\textsuperscript{126}

Mawdudi's eclecticism with regard to modernity, combined with his active stance against the 'ulama constituted an independent interpretation of Islam, which could only materialize through a process of conversion. This process, which will be discussed at greater length in Part II, by implication cast Mawdudi as a "missionary."\textsuperscript{127} Mawdudi's independent interpretation of Islam and his missionary outlook were in turn expressed through the historical doctrine and paradigm of \textit{tajdid}.\textsuperscript{128} Not only was the acceptance of reconversion to Islam as the harbinger for the resurrection of the political fortunes of the Muslims of India tantamount to the invocation of \textit{tajdid}, but Mawdudi's insistence on presenting a qualitatively different interpretation of the faith distinguished his attempt at \textit{tajdid} from those which had preceded him. He argued that his intent was not to only resurrect Islam, but to propagate "true" Islam,\textsuperscript{129} the absence of which in earlier instances of \textit{tajdid} accounted for the failure of those efforts.\textsuperscript{130} The notion of "true" Islam, which began to emerge in Mawdudi's writings from 1932 on, not only reinforced the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Islami Hukumat Kis Tarah Qa'im Huta Hey} (Lahore, nd.), P.28.
\item Mawdudi, in fact, referred to himself as a missionary in \textit{TQ}, (May 1935), P.52.
\item See in this regard, Mawdudi, \textit{A Short History}, P.109. This book which was originally published in Urdu as \textit{Tajdid'u Ihya'-i Din} in Lahore in 1952, is viewed as the must illuminating account of Mawdudi's views on the doctrine of \textit{tajdid} and its historical unfolding. For more on this issues see chapter 2. Interestingly, Mawdudi's views in this regard echoed Azad's notions about the fall and revival of Islam, and his own role as the heir to the great \textit{mujaddid}'s of the past; see, Douglas, \textit{Abul Kalam Azad}, P.164.
\item \textit{JIKUS}, pp.38-39.
\item Mawdudi, \textit{A Short History}, P.109.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
appeal to the doctrine and paradigm of *tajdid*, but invested Mawdudi with a charismatic potential and defined the boundaries of his movement in contradistinction to traditional Islam.

This fact combined with the manner in which his authority was perceived by those whom he impressed and mobilized, suggests that it was based on a charismatic appeal, as the term "charisma" was defined by Weber. "Charisma" wrote Weber refers "to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."\(^{131}\) It is exactly in these terms that Mawdudi's personality and leadership have been understood and described by those within the pale of the Jama'at.

"He (Mawdudi) is...[the] leader of an enthusiastic movement and sponsor of a continuous revolution. Millions have been stirred by his sublime character, noble ideas and progressive movement...[he is the] eminent sage of our time."\(^ {132}\)

Mawdudi's biographers adumbrate tell of his life in a style which is characteristically reserved for saints or central figures of authority, men of great charisma and the possessors of *karamat* and *haybah*.\(^ {133}\) The bases of Mawdudi's "charismata",

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\(^{132}\) See Abul Afaq’s preface to Abd, *Sayyed Maududi*, P.iv.

\(^{133}\) *Karamat* (sing. *karamah*) translates into special grace bestowed by God on chosen men usually Sufi saints. *Karamat* are manifested in the form of prescience, ability to perform miracles, or display extraordinary powers as signs of the divine blessings. *Haybah* can be translated as awe-inspiring. Both of these terms, especially the former have been utilized as an Islamic equivalent for the Weberian notion of charisma. On the debate on this issue see, Hamid Dabashi, *Authority in Islam; From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp.35-
however, extend further, drawing on Islam's repository of millenarian symbolisms and latent chiliastic sentiments.

In the Jama'at's literature Mawdudi is venerated, not only as a leader who is endowed with great gifts, but more importantly, as one who has embarked on a mission ordained by God - "the sage awaited by Muslims". His birth had been foretold; his life had been spared in otherwise fatal accidents and assassination attempts; God responded to his prayers; and his movement was protected while the Jama'at's enemies from Liaqat Ali Khan to Ghulam Muhammad, Shahid Husain Suhrawardi, Ayub Khan, to Nawwab of Kala Bagh and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto fell from grace, and some died dishonorable deaths.

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134 Mawdudi's gifts are not only religious or scholastic in nature. Gilani depicts Mawdudi as a noble man. Mawdudi's aristocratic demeanor, his Delhi accent and style of attire, Gilani argues are signs of his inherent leadership qualities and a confirmation of his superior position; see, Gilani, Maududi, pp.5-12. Maryam Jameelah has meanwhile, placed great emphasis on Mawdudi's abilities as a statesman and a diplomat, citing Mawdudi's travels in Muslim countries, and his meetings with political and religious leaders as proof of his abilities in this regard; see, Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi, pp. 18-20.

135 Saulat, Maulana Maududi, P.x.

136 'Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.49.

137 Syed As'ad Gilani, Sayyid Mawdudi: Bachpan, Jawani, Barhapa (Lahore: Islamic Academy, 1978), P.91; and Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi, P.61.

138 Gilani, Maududi, P.60; the author writes that once in jail, Mawdudi was disturbed by pain from his bladder stone. The pain was relieved soon after he requested it from God in prayer.

139 Reference to this issue can be found in SAAM, vol.2, pp.444-45 and 479. The author cites that, Mawdudi had made reference to the death of Nawwab of Kala Bagh, the Governor of Punjab during the Ayub era, at the hands of his son as proof of God's
Mawdudi is seen, by his admirers, as the "Ibn Taimiyah of his era" and the "lisānu l-‘āṣr" (tongue of the age);\(^{140}\) he is "Imam" Mawdudi, "the founder of a school of thought";\(^{141}\) and the "da‘ī-i ‘awwal" (the foremost missionary);\(^{142}\) his stature is therefore comparable to those of the four founders of Sunni schools of law\(^{143}\) - the veritable bearer of the mantle of Shah Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad Shahid,\(^{144}\) and even Sayyid Ahmad Khan.\(^{145}\)

It was, however, Mawdudi’s courage more than any other singular facet of his leadership that engendered power and as such, appealed to his followers.\(^{146}\) He was the favor for Jama‘at’s cause, and disfavor towards those who opposed it; ‘abd similarly attached similar significance to Ghulam Muhammad’s death; see, Abd, *Sayyed Maududi*, P.17.

\(^{140}\) Muhammad Salahu’ddin, "Qa‘idin-i Jama‘at ki Khadmat Main Chand Ma’ruzat", in *Takbir* (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.9.

\(^{141}\) See Abul Afaq’s preface to Abd, *Sayyed Maududi*, P.iv.

\(^{142}\) This reference was made by Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, cited in Jasarat (Karachi), Ijtima‘-i ‘Amm Number (November 11, 1989), P.7.


\(^{144}\) *ibid*, pp.81-82.

\(^{145}\) Agha Shurish Kashmiri, in *Thalith* (Lahore), 1:34 (November 9-15, 1989), P.22.

\(^{146}\) Throughout accounts given by Jama‘at members and those who followed Mawdudi’s teachings outside of the organization, whether in personal interviews, or in such compilation of accounts of his life by those who knew him such as Buhtah, *Mawlana Mawdudi*; Rana and Khalid, *Tazkirah*, or *HRZ*; *QDMN*; *SDMN*; and *SSMN*, it is Mawdudi’s display of power and strong leadership that stands out, both in the emphasis which is placed on it and in the consistent appearance of references to it. Interesting in this regard is M.A. Malik, "Mawlana Abu’l-‘āla Mawdudi: Apni Hath ki Nuqush Main" in Buhtah, *Mawlana Mawdudi*, pp. 299-319, where the author’s examination of the lines of Mawdudi’s hand, more than any other factor, points to his leadership abilities.
courageous "sayyid", whose uncompromising and obdurate stance in the face of opposition attested to his staunch faith and exemplary quality of leadership. Upon hearing the news of his death sentence in 1953, he responded with a simple "all right", then added,

"[i]f God has so willed, I shall gladly accept this fate but if it is not His will that I must die now, no matter what they try to do, they cannot inflict the least harm upon me." 150

"Unable to mince words out of expediency" Mawdudi remained unapologetic, and despite advice from Islahi and other Jama'at workers he refused to ask for clemency. The impact of Mawdudi's principled stance on the psychology of his followers was immense; one wrote, "[y]ou are marching towards the gallows because you led the

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147 Abd, Sayyed Maududi, pp.18-19. The author puts a great deal of emphasis on Mawdudi being a sayyid.
148 See for instance Amin Ahsan Islahi, in Mahnamah-i Chiragh (Lahore), (October 1953), P.10.
149 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
150 Cited in Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi, P.14; Khurshid Ahmad cites Mawdudi on this occasions in a more daring translation, "...if it (time of death) has not come, they cannot send me to the gallows if they hang themselves upside down in trying to do so." See, Khurshid Ahmad, The Movement of Jama'at-e-Islami, Pakistan (Lahore: Jama'at-e-Islami, Pakistan, 1989), pp.3-4.
151 These words were uttered by Mawdudi in reference to his ordeal later in 1955, see, MMKT, vol.3, pp.12-13.
153 Many outside of the Jama'at were also greatly impressed with Mawdudi's calm and composed determination to stand by his principles, notable among these were, A.K. Brohi and Mian Anwar Muhammad. See, Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi, pp. 14-15, and Allahbukhsh K. Brohi, "Mawlana Abul A'la Mawdudi: The Man, the Scholar, the Reformer", in Ansari and Ahmad, Islamic Perspectives, pp. 294-97.
Ummah of the Holy Prophet.” 154 ‘Abd went further, arguing, "[i]t seems as if, with his bowed head, he is humbly and submissively in discourse in the presence of the Almighty" (emphasis added). 155 Hence, when Mawdudi’s sentence was reversed in 1954 and he was freed without compromising his position, the event was interpreted by his followers as the victory of Islam over "un-Islam", and as ‘Abd concluded, the result of the Prophet’s direct intercession. 156 Similar displays of power, composure and calm, thenceforth, typified Mawdudi’s encounter with adversity; for instance, in 1963 following an attempt on his life and the ensuing clashes with agitators during a Jama’at meeting, 157 and when incarcerated in 1964. 158

Mawdudi’s handling of his ordeals with the government cast him in an historic role and imbued his image with sanctity. Gilani compared Mawdudi’s travails with those of Christ before the Romans; 159 Husain ibn ‘Ali (martyred in Karbala in 680) with the Umayyad Caliph Yazid (d. 683), and the travails of the founders of the Sunni schools of law, Abu Hanifa with Umayyad Caliph Marwan (d. 750), Malik ibn Anas with the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur (d.775), and Ibn Hanbal’s persecution at the hands of the Abbasid

154 Cited in Abd, Sayyed Maududi, P.37.
155 ibid, P.22.
156 Abd, Sayyed Maududi, P.44. The author moreover, argued that Ghulam Muhammad, the Governor-General, and the putative architect of the trial died "shamefully", and was significantly, buried in "the grave of non-Muslims," see, P.17.
157 Jameelah, Who is Maudoodi, P.21; and JIKUS, P.50.
159 Abd, Sayyed Maududi, P.11.

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Caliph, al-Ma'mun (d.817).\textsuperscript{160}

The genesis of Mawdudi's charisma, as perceived by his followers, was premised on more than just display of power. His appeal rather, emanated from his ability to concurrently identify Muslim anxieties to which his exemplary qualities of leadership would be relevant. Weber wrote that charismatic leaders surface "in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, and political distress..."\textsuperscript{161} The recognition of the existence of circumstances which beckon strong leadership completed the charismatic appeal of Mawdudi. Power would only be found attractive if a need for it was perceived. It was Mawdudi's ability to inculcate a yearning for power in his followers that made its display significant to the establishment of his authority. Khurshid Ahmad captured this argument, writing,

"Ours is an age of anxiety and restlessness. A change is imperceptibly overtaking the world. The old order is disintegrating, the new is, however, yet to come. And history tells us that such ages of restlessness have also been periods of birth for new movements and cultures..."\textsuperscript{162}

Elsewhere Ahmad writes in similar terms of the objective of Mawdudi's movement, "...so that peace, contentment and well-being may fill the earth as waters fill the oceans."\textsuperscript{163}

The confluence of his display of power and existence of a circumstance which

\textsuperscript{160} Gilani, \textit{Maududi}, pp.106-14.

\textsuperscript{161} Weber, \textit{From Max Weber}, P.245.

\textsuperscript{162} See Khurshid Ahmad's preface to, Mawdudi, \textit{Towards Understanding Islam}, P.vi.

\textsuperscript{163} Cited in Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam", pp.507-08.
invites its exercise established Mawdudi’s authority in terms of the paradigm of *tajdid*.¹⁶⁴ However, the identification of Mawdudi’s authority with the tradition of *tajdid* was so specific as to border on the more millenarian claim of *mahdiism*. As the heir to the glorious tradition of *tajdid* in Islamic history,¹⁶⁵ and to be more specific, as the "Great Mujaddid of the modern age",¹⁶⁶ Mawdudi proclaimed abeyance to his call as incumbent on Muslims lest they face perdition, a demand which many interpreted as a *mahdiist* claim. In the words of Siddiqi Mawdudi is

"the man who, lifted Islam from its state of decadence...who created a movement in a frozen sea....His popularity cannot be restricted, nor can the power of his message be curtailed."¹⁶⁷

The millenarian content of Mawdudi’s authority is perhaps best demonstrated in Jameelah’s writings. Drawing on the Hadith which describe the conditions for the emergence of the *mahdi*, Jameelah carried the directives of Mawdudi’s authority and his teachings to their natural conclusion, and in no uncertain terms, identified Mawdudi as the promised *mahdi*. She wrote,

"The Holy Prophet predicted that a time would come when the Muslims, although numerous, would be devoid of faith, when they would imitate the Jews and Christians in their mode of life and pious Muslims

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¹⁶⁵ See, Mas’ud Alam Nadwi, in *RJI*, vol.6, pp.173-206.


would suffer severe persecution. The Hadith tells us that in the midst of these calamities, an immensely powerful man would arise in the area now controlled by Israel, deceiving the world....Eventually the Jews and their friends would so much adore him as their hero, they would worship him as God. The Holy Prophet called this man as the *Masih al Dajjal* (the Anti-Christ of the Christian tradition).

The former Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli army and now Israeli Defense Minister, *General Moshe Dayan*, has now become the most popular and revered Jewish leader of our day. It will be not surprising if after he becomes the virtual leader of the Zionist state, he proclaims himself as the *Messiah* the Jews have awaited for more than two thousand years. General Moshe Dayan's physical appearance and his works strikingly correspond to the Hadith's description of the *Masih al Dajjal*.\(^{168}\)

While some in the Jama'at have disparaged the sanctification of Mawdudi's image,\(^{169}\) and open references to Mawdudi as the *mahdi* are not commonplace, such notions have been pervasive enough in the Jama'at literature to engender much consternation among the *ulama*, which (as will be discussed fully in chapter 6) compelled Mawdudi to openly deny any messianic pretensions. Yet, his denials in the face of the *ulama's* caviling were far from convincing, as they were qualified with latent messianic claims. He, for instance wrote,

"*Mahdawiyyat* (*mahdiism*) does not involve a proclamation, it is something which is achieved in action."\(^{170}\)

He moreover, added that the *mahdi* may be recognized as such after his death.\(^{171}\) Significantly, Mawdudi remained silent in the face of requests from his critics to

\(^{168}\) Jameelah, *Who is Maudoodi*, P.68.

\(^{169}\) Hamidi, "*Taqdirul-Rijal*".

\(^{170}\) Mawdudi, *Tajdid'u Ihya'i*, pp.56-57.

\(^{171}\) *ibid.*

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specifically order his followers not to refer to him as the *mahdi* after he died.  

In April of 1979 Mawdudi became seriously ill with a kidney ailment and heart problems. He travelled to the United States in May, and was hospitalized in Buffalo, where his second son works as a physician. Following a number of operations Mawdudi passed away in Buffalo on September 22, 1979. His funeral rites were performed in Buffalo, and his body was buried in his house in Lahore in an unmarked grave following a large procession in the city of Lahore.  

While he has not as yet gained the appellation *mahdi*, nevertheless, his image has been clearly sanctified by his followers. Mawdudi is today not only a revered scholar, politician and thinker, but above all, a hallowed *mujaddid*. 

This chapter has sought to shed light on the making of Mawdudi’s authority, and to identify the form which it ultimately took. That authority then served as the basis for the systematic articulation of an all-encompassing reinterpretation of Islam, which has in turn formed the foundation of a religiopolitical movement, and more importantly, a novel religious and intellectual orientation, to which we shall turn in the following chapters.

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173 *SDMN*, pp.39-40. Mawdudi’s grave was left unmarked in keeping with his last will and testament. It, however, was interpreted by most observers to be reflective of Mawdudi’s Wahhabi sentiments; interviews, Lahore.

174 During my visits to Mawdudi’s residence and also during numerous interviews in Lahore, I gained the sense that Mawdudi’s family, and especially his fourth son Haidar Faruq seek to establish a form of *sajjadah-nishini* (hereditary religious authority associated with Sufi shrines) based on Mawdudi’s venerated image, centered in his house and burial place, 5-A Zaildar Park in Ichrah, Lahore.
PART II

BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY:
THE RATIONALIZATION, MODERNIZATION, AND IDEALIZATION OF ISLAM
IN MAWLANA MAWDUDI'S THOUGHT

"If I had a hand in the universe like God;
I would remove it altogether.
I would create it anew so that,
to the free-spirited fulfillment would come easily."

Omar Khayyam
CHAPTER 3
THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF MAWDUDI’S IDEALIZATION OF ISLAM

This chapter will examine the ideology of Jama’at-i Islami and the movement’s world view, as they have been articulated by Mawlana Mawdudi in his writings, speeches and proclamations. Mawdudi’s teachings on religion and politics are premised on clearly defined and consistently reasoned arguments, which constitute a religious and intellectual orientation sui generis, and an all-inclusive system of thought with a distinct ethos and sociopolitical directive. The underlying parameters of Mawdudi’s corpus not only elucidate his interpretive reading of Islam, but also expand on his understanding of politics; they determine the boundaries of his religiopolitical program. Mawdudi’s discourse on religion and politics, social change and revolution (which will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5), as reflected and canonized in the ideology of the Jama’at, is the product of a complex set of arguments, which bear the influence of a diverse, and often unacknowledged, intellectual heritage. It possesses an inner logic which has determined the modus operandi of the Jama’at separate from the movement’s response to the sociopolitical imperatives of the society’s in which it has operated. Above and beyond its aims and agenda, the dialectic of this discourse was determined by its origin and motivating force, to which we shall turn first.

The Foundations of Mawdudi’s Ideological Perspective

Mawdudi’s ideas were formulated at a time of colonial retraction and the effervescence of Indian national and political consciousness. The ideology of the Jama’at and the organization’s pattern of political activism were not, however, squarely based on the socioeconomic ramifications of imperialism. Despite Mawdudi’s initial political motiva-
tion, his discourse was cultural in its orientation. Its power came from combining politics with culture, but the dynamics of his dealing with the latter was not entirely conditioned by the imperatives of the former. Hence, the history of the Jama'at and its place in the sociopolitical structure of pre-partition India, and subsequently the working of Pakistani politics, cannot be understood through a purely socioeconomic approach. The evolution of an ideological perspective here was divorced of the influence of socioeconomic imperatives, producing instead an autonomous approach to society and politics which was essentially cultural in outlook. Mawdudi's ideas emerged in response to the problems intrinsic to a process of cultural reassertion and political awakening; first, in debate with the colonial order, and eventually, in response to the ineluctable ascendancy of Hinduism in India.¹ His initial political awakening later consolidated around the inner logic of his primarily cultural approach to the sociopolitical problems of Muslims in India, creating an ideological perspective that was not ultimately rooted in the social structure, but purported to superimposing an exogenous political order upon it. This approach had its roots in the nature of Mawdudi's initial political awakening, and the cultural form which it eventually took.

Although aware of the economic impact of imperialism on India,² Mawdudi did not view imperialism in Hobsonian terms. The problem of imperialism, which in


Mawdudi's view had produced and hence encompassed the menace of Hinduism, was essentially cultural, and only as such, economic or political.\(^3\) Mawdudi was primarily concerned with the fissures which imperialism had created in the Islamic world view. For him imperialism was *kulturkampf*. Mawdudi saw the challenge of imperialism in the "realm of mind and spirit",\(^4\) in its propagation of such moral and ethical evils as women's emancipation, secularism and nationalism, which not only ran contrary to the teachings of Islam, but had caused Islam to fall into desuetude and to suffer from atrophy.\(^5\) It was the subsequent occlusion of Islamic culture in India that had in turn engendered an economic and political marginalization and subjugation of Muslims, and it was cultural constriction of Islam by the West that prevented Islam from regaining its position of primacy. The revivalist response which the two-fold problem of imperialism and Hindu ascendancy elicited from Mawdudi was divorced from the kind of economic determinism which is associated with the emergence and unfolding of social movements. Mawdudi did not talk of economic autarky, but of preservation of indigenous dress, alphabet and lifestyle.\(^6\) Mawdudi's expositions on Islamic revolution, state and economics, at closer examination, attest to the central role which the drive for cultural authenticity, what he


\(^5\) *RII*, vol.6, pp.48-52; Mawdudi, *Tanqihat*, pp.6-22; and *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.171-72.

\(^6\) *SAAM*, vol.2, P.305.
termed "intellectual independence", in the face of challenges from the "other" - the colonial as well as the Hindu order - has played in the history of the Jama'at.¹⁰

Mawdudi's discourse was directed at redefining a Muslim, providing him with a new identity. The criteria which controlled this redefinition were born of Mawdudi's dialogue with the "other",⁹ a "discourse" as the term was used by Foucault - a dialogue based on the structure of relations between Islam, Hinduism and the West, one which sought to provide power and identity to Muslims by reversing the balance of power between Islam and the other two.¹⁰ However, the scope of Mawdudi's discourse went even further; it not only defined a Muslim in contradistinction to the Hindu and Western "others", but acquired and assimilated concepts, idioms, and ideas from the intellectual repertoire of those "others."¹¹ Hence, for Mawdudi,⁷

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⁸ The perception of the hidden hand of imperialism being at work is often evident in Mawdudi's writings. See for instance, TQ, (September 1934), pp.9-24.

⁹ Gran and Arjomand find similar a intellectual process at work in new interpretive readings of Islam, which are born of the encounter with the West, and are directed a rationalizing the amorphous corpus of religious thought with view to the needs of the times. See, Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt 1760-1840 (Austin, TX.: University of Texas at Austin, 1979); and Said Amir Arjomand, "History, Structure, and Revolution in the Shi'ite Tradition in Contemporary Iran", International Political Science Review, 10:2 (1989), pp.111-19.


¹¹ TQ, (September 1934), pp.9-24; Abul 'Ala Maudoodi, Nationalism and India (Pathankot: Maktab-e-Jama'at-e-Islami, 1947), pp.6-7; idem, Tanqihat, pp.177ff.; idem, Musalman ka Mazi, pp.8ff.
"Islam was a "revolutionary ideology" and a "dynamic movement", the Jama'at-e-Islami, was a "party", the Shari'ah a complete "code" in Islam's "total scheme of life". His enthusiasm [for Western idioms and concepts] was infectious among those who admired him, encouraging them to implement in Pakistan all his "manifestoes", "programmes" and "schemes", to usher in a true Islamic "renaissance"."^{12}

Mawdudi appropriated myths associated with the appeal and power of his adversary, juxtaposed them with Islamic symbolisms and doctrines, coalescing them into an all-encompassing Islamic world view. He separated that which he identified as Western (which included secular nationalism of Congress Party) - and should therefore be eradicated and avoided - from that which he believed to be scientific and modern, hence value-neutral and open to adaptation and assimilation. Mawdudi’s discourse, as it will be unraveled in this chapter, was in the final analysis, constructed on the bases of his understanding of the sources of power and the working of the "other". It involved a process of modernization under the guise of and in the name of Islam. Mawdudi’s redefined Muslim, beyond his reasserted loyalty to his faith, is a modern creature with modern social linkages, political aspirations, and ultimately, cultural outlook.

The directives and dynamics of this process of redefinition were present in

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Mawdudi’s political education, and understanding of the political exigencies before his community. As a veteran of the Khilafat Movement, Mawdudi’s discourse from inception was concerned with reestablishing the boundaries of the Muslim community, precluding the possibility of Hindu as well as imperialist encroachments into the cultural and political life of the Muslim community. Mawdudi’s discourse was therefore, directed at revising the structure of relations between Islam and Hinduism, but more importantly and also as a result, the structure of relations between Islam and the West.\textsuperscript{13}

The erection of communal boundaries and the search for identity in Mawdudi’s works increasingly cast the world in terms of good and evil, converting history into an arena for an apocalyptic battle between the two. In political terms this meant simultaneous rejection of British rule over India, and the legitimacy of its replacement with any form of Hindu rule. In intellectual and ideological terms, the necessity of instating a reign of virtue - an Islamic order - set Mawdudi on a search for the means which would facilitate a fundamental redefinition and reorganization of Muslim society. The search for new sources of power, however, led Mawdudi, the intellectual who was not all that firmly rooted in tradition and was enamored by the achievements of the West, directly to borrow from the culture which he sought to extricate from Muslim lands. For, the West, to a thinker like Mawdudi, provided a manifest display of power in the modern

\textsuperscript{13} Mawdudi’s discourse was also rooted in his understanding of Muslim history, and the reasons for the eclipse of Islam in India. He admonished Muslim rulers for failing to convert all of India to Islam, and protecting Islam from the influence of Hinduism. For elaboration of this theme by Mas‘ud ‘Alam Nadwi see, \textit{RJI}, vol.6, pp.173-206. Mawdudi was moreover, of the belief that if Muslims would be true to the teachings of their faith, they would convert all of the Hindus to Islam; \textit{RJI}, vol.5, P.101.
world, and hence, was a viable source of emulation, one whose working provided examples for Muslims to follow equally pertinent as those of Islamic history. The romantic view of the past was thus intertwined with Mawdudi’s understanding of the sources of power in the West, producing a uniform view of the objectives of the Muslim community, the task before it, and the role of the individual Muslims therein. The central concern of Mawdudi’s discourse was power and its restitution in Muslim societies, the resurrection of Islam’s civilizational effervescence. Power was what related the ideal of the past to the reality of the modern West. It juxtaposed the two, and facilitated the infusion of the values of the latter into the definition of the former. Modernization was the path through which Muslims would be able to repeat the glories of the past. Mawdudi’s ideal was in the image of the past, but of the nature of the modern world. Therefore, Mawdudi’s binary vision - dividing the world into Islam and un-Islam - often obfuscates the significant intrusion of the culture of the "other" into the redefinition of the "us", a process which was engendered by the discourse between the two. 

14 The dynamics of this process has continued to shape the world view of the Jama‘at and motivate its ideological formulations. With the occlusion of the Hindu element in Pakistan, it has been the phobia of imperialist intentions and actions which conditions the Jama‘at’s thinking and modus operandi. Such perceptions of machinations have, moreover, highlighted the importance of religious revival and its expression in politics as the key to severing the ties to imperialism. See Mawdudi, Al-Jihad, P.19; RJI, vol.6, pp.347-417. The Jama‘at has seen the sinister hand of imperialism behind a host of events in Pakistani history, for example, the assassination of Liaqat ‘Ali Khan in 1958; the replacement of Khwaja Nazimu’ddin as Prime Minister by Muhammad ‘Ali Bugrah in 1953; the suppression of the Jama‘at in the face of the anti-Ahmadi issue; see, Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, "Pakistan ki Khariji Palsi Awr Jama‘at-i Islami", in Chiragh-i Rah (Karachi), (November 1963), pp.10-15; also interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.53.

Mawdudi therefore was greatly opposed to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States in CENTO and SEATO treaty arrangements. See, MMKT, vol.2, pp.79-81, vol.3,
Modernity and the Adumbration of Revivalism

The case of the Jama'at as such, reveals the working of a particular set of intellectual and political presuppositions, and hence, arrives at different conclusions than observed in some of the other Islamic revivalist formulations. Notably, since Mawdudi's vision had been formed in a communalist context with view to altering the balance of power between the contending religious communities of India, it was primarily concerned with political power, and hence, modernization of religious thought and modes of social organization. The Jama'at's vision, therefore, differs from efforts at revitalization of Islam as a reaction or counter-balance to modernization, in a fundamental fashion.

Islamic revivalism, in many instances, has been a response to the advent of modernity and the institution of modern social organization. The transformation of the pattern of social interactions in recent years has produced limitations on cultural expression and produced a sense of anomie among those who have been exposed to the working of modern society, but have not as yet been fully assimilated into its structure. For these Muslims the possibility of return to the traditional mode of social organization which would permit greater cultural expression is the most tangible solution to their feeling of anomie. Islamic revivalism is often the cultural and political manifestation


of this groping for the solace of the traditional order.

Mawdudi was not concerned with the psychological impact of modernization. He was rather compelled by the political consequence of the continued salience of traditional Islam, which he viewed as the shackles which bound Muslims to an anachronistic existence in the modern world. Mawdudi was therefore, very much preoccupied with modernity, and was deeply embroiled in promoting it among Muslims. Rather than a spiritual guide who consoled his community's anxieties before the dehumanizing structure of modern society, he was a fervent advocate of modernization of social organization, the absence of which he believed lay at the root of the political and economic weakness of Muslims:

"[Our aim is] to resolve the problems of twentieth century India, intellectually and practically according to Islamic criteria, and hence prove the relevance of the 1300 year old Islam to modern life, and, to convince Muslims and non-Muslims alike of its dynamism and viability."\(^6\)

He sought to curtail the intrusion of Westernism into the Muslim cultural horizon. Yet, his antagonism towards Westernism did not lessen his appetite for modern ideas and conceptions. His opposition to things Western were manifest only when Western ideas came to Muslims through Western mediums and had the effect of subjugating Muslims to the political writ of the West:

"...the approach of the Islamic movement is to...modernize without compromising on Islamic principles and values....It says "yes" to modernization but "no" to blind westernization."\(^7\)

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\(^6\) TQ, (December 1937), P.286.

Mawdudi was not, however, inimical to the use of modern ideas, which he saw as universal and value-neutral truths to be distinguished from Western ones.\textsuperscript{18} He was unconcerned with the positivist philosophical underpinnings of modern science, forecasting no problems in the coexistence of religious ethics and modern scientific thought.\textsuperscript{19} Once science, value-neutral as Mawdudi assumed it was, became infused with Islamic ethics, it would readily turn into an "Islamic" scientific corpus; "even a bulldozer or computer would be "Islamic" if used in the path of God."\textsuperscript{20} This attitude was reflected in Mawdudi's response to a query regarding the use of loud-speakers for religious purposes:

"The reason to reiterate this is not that I am very much interested in the loud-speaker. My only purpose is to change the attitude of the Muslims here towards modern technological inventions which are pure in origin. But their way of using them as adopted by Western rebellious civilization, is im- \textsuperscript{18} The following passage by Maryam Jameelah is indicative of the Jama'at's attitude in this regard,

\begin{quote}
"We Muslims are therefore determined to make full use of modern knowledge but for our own purposes which will be in conformity to our cultural values and ideals."
\end{quote}

See Maryam Jameelah, \textit{A Manifesto}, P.42. Fazlur Rahman has termed this stance as "Islamic positivism", see, Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Neo-Fundamentalism", in Philip Stoddard \textit{et al.}, eds., \textit{Change and the Muslim World} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), P.25.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{TQ}, (September 1934), pp.2-9, (March 1938), pp.38-54; and Mawdudi, \textit{Tanqihat}, pp.272-76. Also see, Muhammad Riyaz Kirmani, \textit{Basa'ir-i Mawdudi: Tafhimu'l-Qur'an Main Jadid 'Ulum Se Istifadah} (Lahore: Maktabah-i Ta'mir Insaniyat, 1988) on the place of modern scientific thought in Mawdudi's Qur'anic commentary.

There exists the suggestion that, having targeted the educated Muslims, Mawdudi felt compelled to utilize the language and methodology of modern scientific thought, and to attempt to cast Islam in a scientific light; see, Muhammad Yahya, "Sikandarpur se Lahore tak", in \textit{QDMN}, P.177.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Maryam Jameelah, Lahore.
pure. All things which are subjugated by Allah are certainly pure.\textsuperscript{21}

(Emphasis added).

For Mawdudi, science was a "body" which could accommodate any "spirit", just as a radio could broadcast Islamic or Western messages with equal facility.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, Mawdudi's synthesis - a Thomist effort of sorts - did more to modernize the religious world view than to Islamize modern science:

"The process of 'wahy' or revelation might puzzle some persons, but there is nothing improbable therein. If we can communicate with one another through a long distance in no time, a process of communication with the invisible cannot be ruled out."\textsuperscript{23}

Faith was therefore, not only inductive but could be deduced based on scientific principles.

A thin veil separates Mawdudi's position from that of the Islamic modernists. The former sought to appropriate modern scientific thought and Islamize it, whereas the latter accepted modern scientific thought, attempting to interpret Islam according to it. That thin veil was sufficiently distinctive to permit Mawdudi to inveigh against his modernist rivals,


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{TQ}, (December 1937), pp.301-02,

\textsuperscript{23} Cited in \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.96. Mawdudi sought to scientifically prove the existence of God on numerous occasions in his writings; see for instance, \textit{TQ} (December 1933), pp.239-54; Mawdudi, \textit{Tafhimat}, vol.1, P.36; and \textit{idem}, \textit{Tawhid'u Risalat Awr Zindagi: Ba'd Mawt ka 'AQli Subut} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, nd.).
strongly denouncing their enterprise, part and parcel.24

It was with view to assimilating the "pure" scientific truths, one of the most important of which was modern conception of social organization, that he excoriated traditional Islam, its values, mores, and fractious mode of social organization as retrogressive in spirit, and the root cause of the plight of Islam.25 Mawdudi, therefore, sought to modernize Islam (free of Westernism), to restructure its doctrines by consolidating his own syllogistic and rational reading of Islam into a coherent corpus of thought, to create a homogeneous Muslim community capable of united political action; to gain access to the source of power which is available to the West, and had once been a hallmark of Islamic history. While revivalism elsewhere has been concerned with restoring the dignity of the individual before the dehumanizing edifice of modern society, Mawdudi was keen to erect exactly one such society so as to streamline Islamic culture, and hence, to concentrate the fructuous energies of Muslim faith on gaining worldly power and glory.26

Mawdudi’s Conception of Islam

Much has been written on the works and ideas of Mawlana Mawdudi, both by


The distinction which Mawdudi’s saw between Islamic modernism and his own ideas is reflected in his eulogy of Iqbal, praising him for remaining a true Muslim, not in spite of his Western education, but because of it; cited in Muhammad Munir, Mawlana Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (Lahore: Atashfishan Publishing, 1986), pp.129-31.


academicians and followers of the Jama'at. These works have outlined Mawdudi's teachings on the gamut of issues, from Islamic history to women's rights, economics, revolution, politics and religious exgetics. It will serve little to reiterate what has been amply outlined elsewhere. What is of interest to this chapter is rather to define the essence of Mawdudi's message, in distinction to the teaching and world view of traditional Islam, delineate the structure of the system of thought which he has articulated, highlight the directives which are inherent in his corpus of ideas, and determine the pattern and nature of the Jama'at's program of action. This exercise will not only aid us in going beyond a literal reading of Mawdudi's works, but will facilitate a greater understanding of the veritable impulse which is imbedded in the structure of his oeuvre, and conditions the extent and manner of his influence over his audience. The importance of discerning the exact boundaries of Mawdudi's ideology lies in the fact that, his views remained close enough to traditional Islam to make distinctions between the two at times nebulous. It was, therefore, subtle and yet fundamental differences, which defined the contours of Mawdudi's interpretive reading of Islam, culminating in a discrete ideological perspective.

Mawdudi's religiopolitical program, as discussed earlier, was both the reflection of and response to the profound intellectual perplexity and political anxiety which was evident among the Muslims of India during the twilight of the Raj. The Jama'at was

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conceived by Mawdudi as an intellectual and political panacea, and as the means for ameliorating the deteriorating social and political conditions of the Muslim community of India at the time. Mawdudi understood the malady and the remedy in overtly temporal terms.\textsuperscript{28} His vision did not shape around the paradigmatic confusion, which is inherent to the dichotomous framework of the debate between tradition and modernity. Mawdudi was rather, primarily, concerned with the structure of the relation between Islam and the colonial culture, which had engendered that dichotomy, decided the distribution of power within it, and hence, produced the paradigmatic confusion in the first place. The increasingly pronounced political activism of Hinduism during this period, and the resultant fear of which informed Mawdudi’s works with a sense of urgency, moreover, gave greater potency to Mawdudi’s discourse, and provided it with a more tangible target.

Mawdudi’s focus, however, continued to rest with cultural concerns. Nationalism, his erstwhile passion and new found rival, was seen by Mawdudi to be a facade for a Hindu drive for power. Yet, Mawdudi would not become involved in a purely political battle with nationalism, but rather sacralized the entire issue and posed it as a religious and cultural problem. Mawdudi saw nationalism as secular by nature, but derided it as "polytheism", hence, reducing it to a cultural demon.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Esposito writes of Mawdudi’s call that, it reflects his belief that Muslim societies were in a veritable state of decline, threatened by imperialism, confronted with debilitating challenges from modern scientific thought, and hence at a critical political juncture. See, John L. Esposito, \textit{Islam the Straight Path} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), P.153.

\textsuperscript{29} Abul ‘Ala Maudoodi, \textit{Nationalism and India} (Pathankot: Maktab-e Jama’at-e-Islami, 1947), pp.48-49.
Mawdudi’s revivalist response to the problem of imperialism, and its corollary, the Hindu challenge, closely resembled the articulation of the Ahl-i Hadith idealism half a century earlier. The Ahl-i Hadith school was rooted among those who were acutely sensitive to the fluctuating sociopolitical environment of India in the nineteenth century. They saw the reversal in the fortunes of the Muslims in apocalyptic terms, and hence, sought to establish a modicum of stability in their lives through a new interpretation of Islam, to cleanse their faith of cultural accretions, and to reduce to its exoteric dimension. They were fiercely sectarian in their stance, permitting only a single interpretation of Islam, rejecting the four Sunni schools of law and the primary classical sources altogether, encouraging the practice of *ijtihad* and independent individual inquiry into religious issues, and maintaining a condescending attitude towards other Muslims. Moral rectitude and denunciation of traditional Islamic practices and beliefs had convinced the movement’s followers of their superior religious standing during apocalyptic times.

While Mawdudi too saw a need for a new interpretation of Islam in light of the problems put before Indian Muslims by the menace of colonialism, he was not content with only moral rectitude as a guarantee of salvation at a time of impending doom. The new interpretation of Islam therefore, had to serve a purpose more than saving the souls of individual Muslims, it had to restore Islam to its place of glory. For Mawdudi there was nothing inevitable or irreversible in the fall of Islam; nor did he view the Muslim

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predicament as the natural by-product of the political might and material prowess of the
West or the numerical superiority of the Hindus.

Rejecting the notion of the inherent superiority of the Western civilization or the
Hindu savvy for politics and power, Mawdudi felt no compulsion to surrender before the
power of the "other", primarily the West, mimicking its ways in search for insights or
solutions, as had the modernists who preceded him.

Although his synthesis did eventually reveal the imprint of modern influences, it was not essentially syncretic, but rather, revivalist:

"Now the only way open for reform and resuscitation is to rejuvenate Islam
as a movement, and to revive the meaning of the word Muslim anew."

Mawdudi did not masquerade modern ideas, accepted at face value behind a veneer of
Islam, but interpreted and assimilated the foundations of modern thought and social
organization into a creative Islamic formulation. A change in the balance of power
between Islam and the West was to come about as much through a revitalization of
Muslim religious and cultural livelihood, and by way of assimilation of modern ideas into
the structure of Islamic thought. Mawdudi's enterprise was both revivalist and

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31 On modernist thought see, Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity; Transformation of
An Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Albert Hourani,*
Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1931* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962); Malcolm Kerr, *Islamic Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Aziz
Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964* (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 2nd ed., (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1977); David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim

32 Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, *Muslman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (Lahore,
1940), vol.3, P.31.
modernizing, where the former served as a vehicle for the latter, and the latter as the harbinger of the former.

Mawdudi's synthesis began at the very basic level with individual Muslims. They stood responsible for the occlusion of their religion, so were they the ultimate arbiter of its fate:

"The future of the whole world of Islam will depend upon the attitude that the Muslims ultimately adopt towards Islam. If, unfortunately, the present hypocritical attitudes...persist, I am afraid that the newly liberated Muslim nations will not be able to preserve their freedom for a long time..."

The cause of, and hence, the solution to the crisis lay with the Muslims. It was they who had erred in their obedience to God, and as such, had brought about the occlusion of Islam and the relative superiority of the West, and later the Hindus. It was the Muslims who had forfeited their access to the power and glory which their history had shown them to be capable of. The "fall of Islam" in Mawdudi's thinking was not the product of systemic failures or sociopolitical catharses; it was more simply understood as the result of the "fall of individual Muslims". Above and beyond any other historical dynamic at work, the crisis of contemporary Islam was seen as the natural outcome of the preponderance of "partial" Muslims - those who had less than absolute loyalties to God - and the resultant "pollution" of the relation between the Muslims and the Qur'an.


36 See Khurshid Ahmad's preface to *TUTQ*, vol.1, P.xii.

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The rekindling of this relationship was as much rooted in the need for doctrinal fidelity to Islam, as to invoking the power which lies in a more rationalized structure of religious authority.

Therefore, the revival of the faith at the individual level served as the cornerstone of Mawdudi's program, and as such, proved to be intellectually the most complex dimension of his call. It was elaborated meticulously and systematically in the form of a "three-pronged offensive", which sought to both insulate Muslims from Western influences and reaffirm their loyalties to their own faith. Mawdudi explained his undertaking more clearly in the following terms:

"I have ruthlessly attacked the ideological foundations of Western culture....I have expounded as fully as I know how, the ideological bases of Islam....I have offered practical Islamic solutions of important problems which previously even observant Muslims could see no alternative but to follow the West." 

Some of Mawdudi's most renowned works on Islam such as, *Tafhimat* (Understandings, 1940-65), *Purdah* (1939), *Islami Tahzib Awr Uski Usul'u Mabadi* (Islamic Culture and Its Norms and Foundations, 1955), and *Risalah-i Diniyat* (Treatise on Religion, 1932), written between 1932 and 1965 were intended to wrest Muslim intellectuals away from the

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39 *ibid*, pp.30-31.
clutches of Western influence. Mawdudi's call focused on purifying the Islamic faith, explicating its veritable ethos, and operationalizing its teachings, all with view to modernizing Islam, and yet, extricating Western influence from Muslim minds.

In accomplishing this feat, Mawdudi actively sought to condense the intellectual foundations and spiritual expressions of Islam to their most basic elements, truncating Islamic civilization into a parsimonious and discrete "system", and hence producing a reliigiopolitical order which could serve as the basic "common denominator" for all Muslims. The reductionist view of Islam was not only a means for promoting political unity and mobilization in the acephalous, divided, and amorphous Muslim community of India, but in Mawdudi's view, it was the very resurrection of the true faith. Hence, his objective was to "...scientifically prove that Islam is eventually to emerge as the World-Religion to cure Man of all his maladies."

Hence, Mawdudi's da'wah (invitation to Islam), as the embodiment of his reinterpretation and revival of the Islamic faith, ultimately, became a "movement" directed at regimenting the lives of all those who had accepted Islamic ideals and molded their lives

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40 'Abdu'l-Ghani Faruqi, "Hayat-i Javidan", in HRZ, P.26. Even Mawdudi's seminal Qur'anic translation and commentary, *Tafhimu'l-Qur'an* (Understanding the Qur'an, 1949-72) was highly conscious of the Western perspective on the Qur'an in general, and the orientalist allegations regarding the Jewish and Christian origins of Islam in particular. It was a defense of the Qur'an before Muslims.

Also instructive in this regard is Mawdudi's correspondences with the Pope in December 1967, wherein he complained of Christian belligerence towards Islam and Prophet Muhammad, and Christianity's excessive missionary activity in Muslim lands; cited in Mawdudi, *Asr-i Hazir*, pp.274-84.

accordingly, erecting an Islamic order, and eventually, revolutionizing human thought by instilling Islamic values into it.\textsuperscript{42} His scheme was holistic and all-inclusive, it began with the individual Muslim and culminated in a new universal order.\textsuperscript{43}

**Islam and the West**

Although the specter of Hindu dominance over India animated his thinking, for Mawdudi the cultural imprint of the West was too pervasive to allow his attention to ever be thwarted from debate with it. Even when confronted with the reality of what he often termed, a "Hindu Raj", he continued to focus his attention on the vicissitude of his debate with the West.\textsuperscript{44} This choice was also sanctioned by the inner logic of Mawdudi's understanding of the dilemma before Muslims. Loss of ground to Hinduism, felt Mawdudi, followed loss of ground to the West, and was a product of it. Hence, the reversal of the former could only follow, or must be a concomitant of the reversal of the latter. Mawdudi believed that once veritable Islamic teachings were resuscitated, Muslims would become immune to the influence of their Hindu countrymen, and the inevitable glory of Islam would check and subdue Hindu power, and eventually win Hindus over to Islam. If the threat of Hindu supremacy necessitated a revival of Islam, the key to that revival rested elsewhere, in freeing the souls of Muslims from the clutches of the fossilized traditional


\textsuperscript{43} Mawdudi, *Tanqihat*, pp.33ff.

\textsuperscript{44} Metcalf's study of intellectual developments in the Muslim circles in the nineteenth century also indicates a similar preoccupation with the colonial culture, despite the greater activism of the Arya Samaj. See, Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*. 

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Islamic thought and institutions on the one hand, and the imperious influence of the West on the other. The political predicament of Muslims had beckoned a cultural response rooted in Islam, which would oversee a home grown process of modernization. At the heart of this effort, therefore, lay a quest for cultural authenticity as the panacea. This quest was premised on a da’wah - calling Muslims back to their faith, and thereby extricating the insidious influence of the West from their minds and lives. Mawdudi thereby sought to both force the West out of Muslim minds by invoking the writ of Islamic symbolisms, and to also provide a viable indigenous alternative to Westernism by modernizing the structure and content of the Muslim faith. The communalist predicament and the perceived solution to it, therefore, imparted a distinct missionary outlook on Mawdudi’s ideology which remains a mark of the Jama’at’s world view.

For Mawdudi, the source of Muslim weakness, and therefore, the target of Muslim revival was not Hinduism, but Westernism. Islam, he believed was engaged in a kulturkampf with the West, the outcome of which would decide the future of Islam in India, as well as in the world. The Hindu menace was merely a by-product of the “fall of Islam”. Hence, Mawdudi saw no reason to orient his discourse towards Hinduism. For, there was no intellectual allure in Hinduism, it did not compete for the minds of Muslim

45 The latter concern, however, ceased to motivate the Jama’at after the creation of Pakistan, and was replaced with the objective of the establishment of an Islamic state; Israr Ahmad, *Tahrik-i Jama’at-i Islami: Ik Tahqiqi Mutal’ah* (Lahore: Daru’l-Isha’ah-i Islami, 1966), pp.114-15.

intellectuals, nor did the religion pose any particular intellectual challenges to the Muslim world view. The Hindu gauntlet was merely political. It was the West which held the key to Muslim revival. For, it was from the clutches of the West that Muslim souls had to be released, and it was in the West that Muslims had to look for scientific knowledge and the path to progress. Therefore, despite the fact that the passing of the Raj was imminent, the rise in the political fortunes of the Hindus had reached its apogee, and secular nationalism continued to motivate Mawdudi’s thinking, in his concern for restoration of Muslim power, he remained primarily concerned with the challenge and example of the West. His thought remained anchored in a debate with Western thought, in hope of catalyzing a restoration of Muslim glory, which would then, ipso facto, contain the Hindu drive for power.

The task before Mawdudi was one of renewal (tajdid) of Islam and the restoration of its political power.47 It was moreover, this concept which served as the fulcrum of his religiointellectual synthesis, struggle with traditional Islam, and debate with the West. He described its working in great detail, and with the compelling logic of a scientific formula.48 Mawdudi’s reading of the doctrine of tajdid and the paradigm of action sanctioned by it, however, parted with the classical understanding of the role of the revival of the faith in Islam. Mawdudi saw tajdid in a new light, rationalizing the doctrine such that it closely approximated his conception of "invitation to Islam" (da‘wah). Mawdudi’s conception of tajdid, from the diagnosis of the ailment to fostering the intellectual

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48 See for instance, Maududi, A Short History, pp.36-38.
revolution which would harbinger the creation of the cure-all Islamic order, was
predicated on the vicissitudes of the intellectual and political struggle between Islam and
the West. *Tajdid* was not only a vehicle for the revival of the faith, but found a more
dynamic historical role, the dialectics of which have shaped the unfolding of Islamic
history from the end of the Rightly-Guided Caliphate (*Rashidun* Caliphate, 632-61, from
Abu Bakr to 'Ali)\(^49\) and has determined the nature and scope of the existing struggle
before Muslims.\(^50\) For Mawdudi *tajdid* rested at the heart of his historicism, presenting
an integral view of the Muslim historical experience, wherein the clash of good and evil,
Islam and un-Islam, had served as the locomotive of historical progression from the end
of the Prophetic era to modern-day India.\(^51\) His reading of the doctrine of *tajdid* had
provided for a revolutionary interpretation of Islamic history, which clearly bore the mark
of Western historicism.

The revival of the faith was based on a process of reform and reassertion of
religious values, which began at the individual level by defining the term "Muslim" anew,
and eventually encompassed the whole society.\(^52\) Yet, the revival of Islam, ultimately,
involved a qualitative change; it was a process, wherein the traditional world view

\(^49\) On the history of the Caliphate see Sir Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, reprint,

\(^50\) Maududi, *A Short History*, pp.36-38. *Tajdid* was an important cornerstone of the
syllabi of the Jama'at's training of its members; see, interview with Shaikh Mahbub 'Ali,
in *JVNAT*, vol.2, pp.25-27.

\(^51\) For Mawdudi's historiography of Islam in this context see, *TQ*, (September 1934),
pp.2-9, (October 1934), pp.96-106; *idem, Tanqihat*, pp.23-32; and Mas'ud 'Alam Nadwi,
cited in *RI*, vol.6, pp.173-206.

\(^52\) *SAAM*, vol.1, P.386.
progressed in time towards modernity. It harkened Muslims back to Islam, but an Islam which was rationalized and streamlined such that, its social expression would be able to support a viable modern political order. \textit{Tajdid} was the linchpin of this schema; for, it provided Mawdudi with a religious doctrine and historical paradigm which was a repository of tremendous emotive power, related political exigencies to religious faith, lent itself to an apocalyptic activism, and moreover, vested Mawdudi with the authority to reinterpret and rationalize Islamic faith, in spite of the significant vigor of traditional Islam.

In traditional Islam there has existed a balance between religion as individual piety and religion as social order. It is the piety of men which creates and sustains the religious order. In Mawdudi’s formula, while individual piety features prominently, in the final analysis, it is the fiat of the religious order that is charged with the task of guaranteeing the continued existence of individual piety. Political power becomes the guarantor of the faith.

"A very large part of the Islamic system of law, however, needs for its enforcement in all its details the coercive power and authority of the state."

The logical implication of Mawdudi’s position is a different balance between the individual and the society, the needs for individual salvation, and hence the requirements

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54 Wahidu’ddin Khan, \textit{Ta’bir ki Ghalti} (Delhi: Maktabah-i Risalah, 1975); \textit{idem, Din Kiya Hey} (Delhi: Maktabah-i Risalah, 1978).

for the reinvigoration and perpetuation of the Islamic order.

The Doctrine of "Absolute Obedience to God"

Revival and reform of the Islamic faith in Mawdudi's works was premised on a change in the very structure of religious thinking. The intensification of religious loyalties occurred in tandem with placing greater emphasis on linkages in the structure of faith as opposed to the objective of religious practice - salvation. While this change in emphasis was not total, it was, nevertheless, significant in that it permitted a pronounced temporalization of faith. Nowhere was this transformation more apparent, and at the same time more salient, than in the notion of "absolute obedience to God", developed and articulated by Mawdudi as the pillar and sole objective of religious observance.56

What distinguished Mawdudi's view of the relation between man and God from the traditional position on the subject was the fact that, Mawdudi's theology did not revolve around the attributes or the conditions of the supremacy of God, but was directed at explicating what that supremacy entailed - absolute obedience of man to God, and hence the incumbency of a particular mode of personal behavior and social organization.

Mawdudi's interest rested in thwarting man's attention from what he viewed to be narcissistic anthropomorphism, which had caused man to neglect the nature of his relation to God. He sought instead to mobilize individual Muslims around an *active* submission to

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God. This endeavor, argued Mawdudi, was none other the spirit of the Islamic doctrine of *tawhid* (unity),

"Islam is nothing but man's exclusive and total submission to God....True religion means total obedience and submission to God."  

Such obedience was also the very *raison d'être* of human existence,

"You must remember that you are a born slave of God. He has created you for His servitude only."

Man was, in effect, stripped of volition in his abeyance to God,

"Man in this kingdom is, by birth, a subject. That is, it has not been given to him to choose to be or not to be a subject...nor is it possible for him, being born a subject and a natural part of this kingdom, to swerve from the path of obedience followed by other creations. Similarly he does not have the right to choose a way of life for himself or assume whatever duties he likes."

Mawdudi viewed absolute obedience to God as a fundamental right of God, a part of

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62 *ibid*, P.102.

human nature about which man had no real choice.\textsuperscript{64} This relationship was moreover, sanctified by man’s assumption of God’s vice-regency on earth (\textit{khalifatu’lllah fi’l-arz}).\textsuperscript{65} Absolute obedience to God therefore, became the \textit{condito sine qua non} for the healthy operation of the sociopolitical order.\textsuperscript{66} It was the religious incumbency of absolute obedience to God, complimented with the compelling logic of its sociopolitical function, which transformed Islam from a faith into a movement (\textit{tahrik}).\textsuperscript{67}

From this premise Mawdudi proceeded to institutionalize his doctrinal position through an elaborate process of redefinition and interpretation of the pillars and fundamentals of the Islamic faith.\textsuperscript{68} The task began with the very term "\textit{Islam}":

"‘Islam’ is an Arabic word and connotes submission, surrender, and obedience. As a religion, Islam stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah - and that is why it is called ‘ISLAM’"\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64} Buhtah, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi}, P.162.

\textsuperscript{65} Mawdudi, \textit{Qur’an Ki Char}, pp.10-78; \textit{idem}, \textit{Introduction to the Study}, P.7.


\textsuperscript{69} Maududi, \textit{Towards}, pp.1-2. Mawdudi’s assertion was so drastic that his translator, Khurshid Ahmad, felt compelled to explain that, \textit{Islam} also means "peace".
Therefore, in Mawdudi's conception, being a Muslim went beyond adherence to the religion of Islam - it was a facet of the order of nature which encompassed all of God's creatures.\textsuperscript{70} Being a Muslim, Mawdudi argued, was not the definition of one who abided by the rituals of Islam, but accepting first, \textit{obedience} to God,\textsuperscript{71}

"Islam does not consist merely in bowing (\textit{ruku'}), prostration (\textit{sujud}), Fasting (\textit{sawm}) and Pilgrimage (\textit{hajj}); nor is it found in the face and dress of a man. Islam means submission to God and the Messenger. Anyone who refuses to obey them in the conduct of his life-affairs has a heart devoid of the real Islam - 'faith has not yet entered their hearts'. His Prayers, his Fasting and his pious appearance are nothing but deception."\textsuperscript{72}

The bifurcation of Islam into "real" and "deceptive" is indicative of Mawdudi's parting with formal faith, a drive to appropriate Islam \textit{in toto}, and to redefine it anew. From this point on, the adjective "Islamic" does not define orthodoxy \textit{per se}, but invokes the spirit of Mawdudi's \textit{da'wah} - absolute submission to God.

Moreover, herein lay the beginnings of Mawdudi's charismatic posturing and break with tradition. For, the doctrine of absolute obedience to God in lieu of human choice and volition in matters of faith, subtly but surely, challenged the traditional Islamic position. Its ostensible "radical orthodoxy" ruefully rejected the prevalent norms and

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{ibid}, pp.3-4.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{ibid}, pp.3 and 23-26; Maudoodi, \textit{Fundamentals}, pp.74-88; and \textit{idem}, \textit{Qur'an Ki Char}, pp.10-78. In a later and less adamant exposition in 1961, however, Mawdudi wrote to Maryam Jameelah:

"A person who believes in the unity of God, in Muhammad as His last Prophet and in the Holy Qur'an as His word and in the life of Hereafter is really a genuine Muslim regardless of whether he or she was born into a Jewish, a Christian or a pagan home."

See, \textit{Correspondences}, pp.4-5.

\textsuperscript{72} Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us Be Muslims}, P.104.
institutions of Islamic life and thought, and hence, began to articulate a Weberian "charismatic" posturing *vis a vis* "tradition*. It was exactly on this point that, ‘ulama such as, Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, echoing the sentiments of the traditional Islamic establishment of the Subcontinent criticized Mawdudi’s rigid interpretation in the strongest terms, as parting with the fundamental tenet of Islam.73

Mawdudi’s exegetics have depicted choice - what ‘ulama such as Nadwi saw as man’s fundamental right bestowed upon him by God, and a crucial doctrine in light of which the whole notion of belief finds meaning in Islam - as a cause of man’s moral calamities, and hence, sociopolitical predicaments. For Mawdudi, the salvation of man did not rest with his acquisition of knowledge of God and hence exercise of his choice in matters of faith, but was the direct outcome of surrendering all volition in favor of existence in obedience to God. In effect, Divine guidance was an undisputed necessity, and the exercise of choice a possible source of evil. In Mawdudi’s discourse, the virtuous society cannot exist save by the intercession of God, and the dissolution of the human faculties of reason and choice in the divinely-ordained religious order.

Nadwi countered that, Mawdudi had thus truncated the scope of the Islamic faith,  

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73 On criticisms on Mawdudi by Nadwi and Wahidu’ddin Khan see, Christian W. Troll, "The Meaning of Din: Recent Views of Three Eminent Indian Ulama", in Christian W. Troll, ed., *Islam in India: Studies and Commentaries* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982), vol.1, pp.168-77. On the criticism of various ‘ulama of Mawdudi see, Wahidu’ddin Khan, *Din Kiya Hey*; and Nadwi, ‘Asr-i Hazir. The traditional perspective was also outlined by the eminent Deobandi ‘alim, Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi, whose dates preceded the debate precipitated by Mawdudi. However, his works which are a lucid exposition of the traditional position have been reprinted by Deobandis in Pakistan in response to the arguments of Mawdudi; see, Mawlana Muhammad Taqi ‘Uthmani, "Hakim al-Ummat ki Siyasi Afkar", in *al-Bulagh* (Karachi), (March 1990), pp.23-53.
reducing its complex spirituality into a command structure best suited for political purposes; a radical break with the traditional norms, which Nadwi saw as tantamount to decreeing a new set of religious values.\textsuperscript{74}

What Nadwi and his cohorts have seen as a new set of religious values, for Mawdudi is nothing short of \textit{tajdid} and \textit{ihya’} (resurrection) of veritable Islam - the espousal of the very essence of the original faith\textsuperscript{75} - polluted and obfuscated by later accretions, leading to \textit{kufr} (disbelief).\textsuperscript{76} Shrouded in an aura of puritanism, Mawdudi sought to purge Islam of all intellectual and cultural vehicles through which the Islamic revelation had been manifested over the centuries.\textsuperscript{77} Philosophy, literature, the arts, mysticism and especially time-honored customs and cultural mores were all derided by Mawdudi as syncretic and impure adulteration of the Islamic faith. Thwarting the attention of the Muslims from the Divine to the mundane,\textsuperscript{78} Mawdudi accepted only politics as a legitimate vehicle for the manifestation of the Islamic revelation, and as the sole means for the expression of Islamic spirituality. As such, Mawdudi externalized religious experience. The inherent logic of his position correlated piety with political activity, the cleansing of the soul with political liberation, and salvation with utopia.

Central to Mawdudi's argument in this regard was the negation of the sanctity of

\textsuperscript{74} Nadwi, \textit{Asr-i Hazir}, pp.15-16. Also see, Troll, "The Meaning of Din", P.170.

\textsuperscript{75} McDonough, \textit{Muslim Ethics}, P.67.

\textsuperscript{76} Maudoodi, \textit{Fundamentals of Islam}, pp.53-54.

\textsuperscript{77} Mawdudi, \textit{Islami Tahzib}.

\textsuperscript{78} ibid, P.10.
Islamic history, which clearly distinguishes spirit of Mawdudi's oeuvre from the traditional perspective, associated with Ash'ari theology, which views history as the manifestation of Divine will, and hence, sacred. In Mawdudi's perspective, history, as the product of human choice, was corruptible and corrupted. It could not serve as a repository of religious truth, but only as a testimony to human fallibility in the absence of absolute obedience to God,

"History, in the sense of an individual's biography within this world is the ground and process through which each man is required to give an account of himself to his Creator....This is the Divine purpose in creating the space-time." 

Renewal and reform in Mawdudi's thinking was therefore "fundamentalist" in its approach, in that it looked solely to the Qur'an, the Prophetic Traditions, and the canonized jurisprudential (fiqhi) doctrines of Islam as repositories of Divine Truth. Yet, this restrictive outlook was not divorced from an interpretive effort, which extends the purview of religious thought and function beyond its traditional boundaries. Religious sources therefore served a dual function in Mawdudi's thinking; they were the primary means for reformulating the meaning of faith in Islam - assimilation of novel ideas and idioms, and a sociopolitical reading of Islam, all in the guise of greater emphasis upon the

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79 Maududi, *A Short History*. The issue of Mawdudi's departure from the Ash'ari position will be discussed later in this chapter.


exoteric dimensions of the faith - and legitimized the resultant perspective.

Mawdudi therefore, prefaced his expositions with a reaffirmation of the authenticity of the sources of Islamic faith,82 a significant endeavor considering the fact that his audience were primarily Muslim. The emphasis on authenticity of the sources hinted of a return to Islam and its meaning anew, and hence, set the stage for an exclusive monopoly of its interpretation and exposition.83 Mawdudi's definition of "veritable" Islam, as the sole interpretation of the primordial religious truth, found meaning in the context of this reading of the religious sources.84

Mawdudi, in effect, saw himself as the intermediary, whose mission was to restore the relation between religious sources and the faithful.85 He utilized what Khurshid Ahmad has termed fiqhi tafsir (jurisprudential commentary) to discover the true spirit and intent of the Qur'anic Revelation (istinbat-i ahkam), and to capture them in new social legislations.86 The term fiqhi therefore, thinly disguises what was, in effect, a sociopolitical reading of the Qur'an.

In this context, Mawdudi sought to change the status of the religious sources, notably, the Qur'an, from "literature" to socioreligious institution, from a source to the


83 This fact is most clearly reflected in, Mawdudi, Qur'an Ki Char.


85 See Khurshid Ahmad's preface in TUTQ, vol.1, P.xiii-xiv.

86 ibid, vol.1, P.xi.
source, from an aspect to the focus of Muslim life. This endeavor, from inception, was accompanied by the rationalization of the meaning and function of the religious sources, which would lend itself to the more assertive and worldly role which Mawdudi had intended for them. Mawdudi's interpretation of the religious sources moreover, evaded the restriction of the exegeses of any one school of Sunni law. He rather, espoused what Khurshid Ahmad has termed "eclecticism within Islam" - sublimating theological differences in favor of a systemic reading and regimentation of the religious sources.

Questions pertaining to structure, style and methodology therefore, featured prominently in Mawdudi's *tafsir* (commentary) works. Also of great concern to his *tafsir* works was the establishment of the linkages between Islamic teachings and worldly concerns which delineated the boundaries of the systemic view of faith, and subsequently, related faith to action. These were most visibly evident in his commentary on the Qur'an, which was premised on the four inter-related concepts of *ilah* (divinity), *rabb* (lord), *'ibadah* (worship), and *din* (religion). They captured the essence of religious experience, delineated the boundaries of faith, and defined its content. The four terms, general as they seem, were interpreted narrowly by Mawdudi, producing a structured definition of Islam, which conditioned the posture of the faithful towards God, religion

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87 A clear example of this undertaking is, Mawdudi, *Qur'an Ki Char*.  
89 See, Khurshid Ahmad's preface to *TUTQ*, vol.1, P.xvi.  

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and the obligatory rites and duties.

The activist aim of the commentary is evident in its format as well as in Mawdudi's literary style. The commentary was written in modern Urdu, utilizing such stylistic innovations as paragraphs and a subject index, in order to facilitate greater access to the Qur'an by greater numbers, and encouraging direct study and interpretation of the Qur'an in place of mere recitation. Mawdudi's commentary moreover, viewed the Qur'an as an immediate and direct dialogue between God and man, wherein each *ayah* (verse) of the Qur'an constituted a separate conversation, all inter-related and understood in the context of the four aforementioned underlying concepts. This format created a more immediate relation between the Qur'an and Muslims, conditioned the reading of the Qur'an in light of the imperatives suggested in the structure of the framework of *ilah-rabb- 'ibadah-din*, hence, systematizing the religious function of the Qur'an within the boundaries of the four concepts.

Mawdudi argued that the Qur'an was revealed in a piecemeal fashion, each *surah* (chapter) reflecting the circumstances of the time and the particular needs of the nascent Islamic community. This not only explained some of the stylistic variations and enigmatic content of the Qur'an, Mawdudi opined, but also attested to the fact that, the Qur'an was sent down to man in response to the practical needs of the early Muslim

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91 Mawdudi, *Introduction*, pp.36-41; and Khurshid Ahmad's preface to *TUTQ*, vol.1, pp.xv-xvii.

92 *TUTQ*, vol.1, pp.4-5.

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community, and as such, it was and continued to be a socioreligious guide.\textsuperscript{93}

"...the real relation between AL-FATIHAH and the Qur'an is not that of an introduction to a book but that of a prayer and its answer."\textsuperscript{94}

The Qur'an, Mawdudi argued, was not to be merely recited, pondered upon, or investigated for hidden truths; it should rather be read at face value and implemented as such. As an answer to man's prayers, the Qur'an was a solution to social maladies.\textsuperscript{95} The Qur'an's innermost reality, and ultimate function was its testimony to absolute obedience to God, and its guidance as to how that may be attained.

Mawdudi consciously subsumed the spiritual significance of the Qur'an, truncating the scope of the Holy Book in favor of a more narrow and monolithic interpretation, one which belied the place of the Qur'an in the Islamic tradition as the fountainhead of perennial truths and repository of spiritual knowledge. Mawdudi's systemic approach, instead, was informed with the urgency of socioeconomic exigencies, and as such, sought to base the historical and spiritual significance of the Qur'an on temporal contingencies.\textsuperscript{96} In Mawdudi's conception, writes Nadwi, "theocracy replaces spirituality as the objective of Qur'anic revelation."\textsuperscript{97} The Qur'an, thus, becomes a book about the world, and hence, a worldly book,

"Insofar as it seeks to explain the ultimate causes of man's success or failure


\textsuperscript{94} \textit{ibid}, P.44; and \textit{TUTQ}, vol.1, pp.34-35.

\textsuperscript{95} Mawdudi, \textit{Introduction}, pp.43-48.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{TUTQ}, vol.1, pp.17-20.

\textsuperscript{97} Nadwi, \textit{'Asr-i Hazir}, P.16.
the subject of the Book [the Qur'an] is MAN. 98

Similar outlook characterized Mawdudi's approach to the Islamic doctrine of Prophecy (*nubuwwah*), and hence, the Prophetic Traditions (*sunnah, Hadith*). 99 Mawdudi's discussion of the prophecy again began with a reaffirmation of its authenticity. 100 The confirmation of the sanctity of this fundamental article of faith then set the stage for an interpretive reading of its function.Authenticated, the doctrine of prophecy was cast anew, no longer as an autonomous source of spirituality and manifestation of Divine Reality, but as a constituent component of the systemic structure, which was premised on absolute obedience to God and pointed to sociopolitical action. Prophecy, in Mawdudi's view, was the office which was vested with the function to guide and educate man in truths which would lead him to belief in Islam, and which would elicit from man commitment to his religion. 101 For Muslims, prophecy and the prophetic traditions serve as ideals for men to follow, determining the place of Islam in their life and thought. 102 For Mawdudi, however, prophecy was also a historical paradigm, a model for leadership, and a guide to the ideal political order. The Prophet of Islam was not only the ideal Muslim, or a hallowed object of religious devotion; but the first and foremost Muslim leader, and hence, a source of emulation in political matters.

98 *TUTQ*, vol.1, p.12.

99 *ibid*, vol.1, p.28.


101 *ibid*, pp.30-36.

102 *ibid*, pp.33-38.
It was this appropriation of the fundamental sources of Islam, a monolithic reinterpretation of their role within the very framework of the Islamic faith that, permitted Mawdudi to extend personal piety into a quest for political power. The evident idealization and politicization of Islam at Mawdudi’s hands, however, could only follow the rationalization and systematization of the faith.

Rationalization of Islamic Thought

Mawdudi’s discourse on Islam, as was elucidated earlier, extended beyond the revival of the religion, and culminated in a rationalized and systemic view of the faith with visible sociopolitical predilections. In Mawdudi’s conception, Islam ceased to be mere faith in God, nor was it any longer a conglomeration of disparate beliefs and values anchored in the spirituality which envelopes the practice of the faith. Mawdudi’s formulation was rather a distinct and discrete world view. It was premised on Islamic symbolisms and teachings, but was directed at realizing specific temporal objectives, which lay beyond the purview of traditional religious concerns - what Wahiduddin Khan, himself a one time Jama’at votary, has uncharitably described as a distortion of the very purpose

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It has been argued that Mawdudi’s systemic view of Islam was influenced by Iqbal; see, Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.156 and 175; Rosenthal, Islam, P.206, and Jameelah, "An Appraisal", pp.119-20. Mawdudi, however, denies such influence, arguing that, "the commonality of views between ‘Allamah Iqbal and I are limited to our belief that Islamic law should underlie the revival of our religion; my thoughts and intellectual probing are my own"; cited in a letter dated March 2, 1967, reprinted in Abu Rashid Faruqi, Iqbal Awr Mawdudi (Lahore: Maktabah-i Ta’mir Insaniyat, 1977), P.83.
of Islamic piety.\textsuperscript{104} Wahidu’ddin Khan saw an outlandish element in Mawdudi’s puritanical scheme, a tendency also detected by Adams who saw a reflection of German idealism in Mawdudi’s thinking.\textsuperscript{105} The systematization of Islam was more an "Islamic view of modernity" than a reflection upon the fundamentals of the Islamic faith. Yet, the religious underpinnings of Mawdudi’s endeavor were too pronounced to easily reveal the modernizing inclination of its executor. The Islamic bases of the systematization effort camouflaged its subliminal modernization of thought and practice, which often worked in ways which were not readily discernable.

The systematization of faith has possessed a temporalizing impulse. For, the quest for "veritable" Islam, the clear demarcation of the boundaries of the faith, and the restoration of its ideals were not motivated by any soteriological concerns, but by a feeling of anxiety born of social, economic, communal, and political exigencies before the Muslims of India. In this context, "veritable" Islam, became predicated upon a different relation between man and God, one which was not private and inward-looking, but externalized and engaged. The relation between man and God became increasingly predicated upon the former's need for sociopolitical restitution, and a rationalized template which could bestow meaning on the confusion rampant in Muslim lives. The amorphous conception of faith had to be replaced with an ideological one, wherein more tightly-knit and tangible relations of authority with immediate sociopolitical implications would provide a more efficacious definition of community, political action, and even,

\textsuperscript{104} Wahidu’ddin Khan, \textit{Din Kiya Hey}, P.22.

\textsuperscript{105} Adams, "The Ideology", pp.395-97.
salvation. Religion, rationalized and streamlined, would thus, prove more relevant to the fractious, and yet exceedingly modern sociopolitical setting in which it was to operate.\textsuperscript{106} As such, the ideological interpretation would also sequester the religion from the influence of the "other"; the West in the intellectual realm, and Hinduism in the communal structure of Indian politics.\textsuperscript{107} The more engaging, and yet, worldly spirit of this nexus could no longer be captured in the term "Muslim", it was more appropriately expressed through the adjective, "Islamic".

The modernization and systematization of Islam began with erecting impregnable boundaries around the religion. The redefinition of Islam, in contradistinction to the "other", necessitated such a posture. More importantly, a demarcation of the boundaries of Islam was a necessary first step in the direction of constructing an ideological position which drew its legitimacy from Islam. In fact, the requirements of such an ideological formulation, in good measure, determined the nature and scope of the boundary which Mawdudi sought to erect around Islam. The lines of demarcation which defined Islam were \textit{per force} steadfast. There was either Islam as it was understood and defined by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Maududi, \textit{The Process}, pp.22-23; \textit{idem}, \textit{The Religion of Truth}, 14-17. Peter Gran has drawn similar conclusions in his study of developments in Islamic thought in Egypt in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; see, Gran, \textit{Islamic Roots of Capitalism}.
\item Mawdudi was influenced in this regard by his reading of Iqbal. He interpreted Iqbal's concept of "\textit{khudi}" (selfhood) and his "reconstruction of Islamic thought" as the defense and reassertion of Islam before other "-isms" and the Western thought which lay behind them; see, \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.130-32, and Munir, \textit{Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi}, pp.129-32.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Mawdudi, or "un-Islam" (kufr).\textsuperscript{108} The psychological implications of such a dichotomy for Mawdudi’s audience was, no doubt, immense. Conscious of this fact, and eager to both inoculate Muslims against Hindu and Western cultural and political overtures, and mobilize them in a religiopolitical movement, Mawdudi brought the full force of the choice between "veritable" Islam and un-Islam, salvation and perdition, to bear on individual Muslims.

"A Muslim is not a Muslim by appellation or birth, but by virtue of abiding by holy law."\textsuperscript{109}

The distinction between veritable faith and nominal allegiance to it, legitimized Mawdudi’s ideological stance and vested his program of action with a sense of mission. His charge that, of those who claimed to be Muslim "not more than \(\%0.001\) knew what Islam actually was, furthermore justified his stance.\textsuperscript{110} He had, in effect, suggested that, what was widely accepted as "Islamic" was in fact, "un-Islamic".\textsuperscript{111} His invitation to Islam was not only a call for the revival of Islam, but also a daring challenge to traditional Islam, which as will be elucidated later, was not free of sectarian connotations.

The reorganization of Islam into a system required the use of a particular nomenclature, which would both relate the underlying assumptions and aims of the new

\textsuperscript{108} Mawdudi, Towards, pp.4, 11-12, and 18-19; idem, Let Us, pp.53-55; TQ, (September 1946), P.59; RJI, vol.6, pp.347-418.

\textsuperscript{109} Maudoodi, Fundamentals, P.21.


\textsuperscript{111} Although Mawdudi does not assert this point openly, what he implies by "un-Islamic" is as much religious laxity, as Muslim cultural syncretism born of coexistence with Hinduism.
orientation to the basic tenets of the Islamic faith, and serve as key concepts around which
the regimentation of the faithful could take place. Terms such as, *ilah* (divinity), *rabb*
(lord) *'ibadah* (worship), and *din* (religion), injected with new meaning, now invoked a
different world view, and captured the essence of the structure of relations which
operationalized the doctrine of absolute obedience to God in the form of a religiopolitical
program. The four terms were inter-related. From *ilah* (divinity) to *din* (religion), the
novel ideological perspective encompassed the gamut of religious experiences, all in the
framework of a rationalized chain of authority, from God to the individual believer.

The last of the aforementioned terms, *din*, was of particular significance to
Mawdudi's discourse. It was both the linchpin in, and the culmination of the structure of
linkages, which constitute "veritable" Islam. Mawdudi used *din* - literally meaning "religion"
- as a synonym for Islam *the system*, the "real" Islam. *Din* did not refer to Islamic practices
or rituals, but to an all-embracing ethos, posture and world view.\(^{112}\)

Mawdudi defined *din* primarily, as absolute obedience to God.\(^{113}\) The *shari'ah*
as the content of the *din*, in turn, provided linkages between the individual and the

\(^{112}\) See in this regard, Mawdudi, *Qur'an Ki Char; idem, Fundamentals*, pp.56-59; *idem, The Religion of Truth*, pp.18-21; and Troll, "The Meaning of Din", pp.168-77.

Mawdudi's conception of "*din*" has been accepted and institutionalized in the
revivalist discourse in the Subcontinent, expressing Islam's omnipresence in man's social
and political activities. Muhammad Tahiru’l-Qadri, a self-styled Brailwi revivalist thinker
and activist, based in Pakistan, echoes Mawdudi when he asserts: "Islam is not a religion,
it is a *din*"; interview with Tahiru’l-Qadri, Lahore. Also see, Professor Dr. Muhammad
Tahiru’l-Qadri, *Minhaju’l-Afkar* (Lahore: Idarah-i Minhaju’l-Qur’an, 1990), vol.1, pp.405-
16.

\(^{113}\) Maududi, *Towards*, pp. 108-11; *idem, Fundamentals*, pp.81-84.

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society, and hence, the manner in which din was to fulfill its objective. The shari'ah set the guidelines for the performance of religious duties (fara'iz) - 'ibadah, the third pillar of Mawdudi's systemic approach - and governed the believers social transactions. As such, it perpetuates obedience to God - the purpose of din. Hence, the shari'ah extends beyond enactment of religious teachings, worship or piety, to serve as the means for reaffirmation of man's moral commitment to and acceptance of din. 'Ibadah (worship), wrote Mawdudi, was etymologically rooted in the word 'abd (slave); it was the profession of absolute obedience to God. 'Ibadah was "revering, serving and obeying God in our whole lives," it had no other function than to facilitate the recognition of the true meaning of the concepts of ilah and rabb, the first two pillars of Mawdudi's system. Mawdudi's views on a total and engaged obedience to God, also seen in Azad's concept of rububiyat, resembles and is probably influenced by the absolute and unwavering devotion to God which is the basis of mysticism in Islam.

114 Mawdudi, The Religion of Truth, pp.18-21; idem, Qur'an ki Char.

115 Mawdudi, The Religion of Truth, pp.31-32.

116 Maudoodi, Fundamentals, pp.66-67 and 93-100.

117 ibid, pp.93-97; and idem, Let Us, pp.135-141.


119 Mawdudi, Let Us, P.145.

120 Mawdudi, Qur'an ki Char, pp.10ff.

'Ibadah (worship), as the third pillar of Mawdudi's system, was not to cherish or praise God, nor was it meant to serve as a source of spiritual benediction. It was rather, directed at acting out one's absolute obedience to God, and hence, to give meaning to the concept of din.

Traditional Islamic scholars have taken strong exception to Mawdudi's exposition of the concept of the din, and have castigated Mawdudi for his tampering with the very basis of faith in Islam. Nadwi for instance, has rejected Mawdudi's suggestion that religious works and piety are directed at any objective other than the spiritual salvation of man. Muslims will be judged by God, argues Nadwi, for their piety and performance of religious works; 'ibadah should therefore, be directed at the realization of that end, and should not serve as a vehicle for establishing a theocracy, which is at best only a "means" to the higher "end". Nadwi has emphasized the devotional dimension of 'ibadah and has openly criticized Mawdudi for his omission of this aspect of the faith. Iqamat-i din (instituting the din) - the Islamic order about which Mawdudi has written much in his


122 Mawdudi, _Let Us_, P.145.

123 Maudoodi, _Fundamentals_, P.97. In a commentary of the first chapter of the Qur'an, Mawdudi wrote that, 'ibadah had three meanings: worship and devotion, submission and obedience, and subjection and servitude; see, _idem, Introduction_, P.47.

124 Maudoodi, _Fundamentals_, P.97; _idem, Tafhimat_, vol.1, pp.46-73; and _RJI_, vol.6, pp.121-34.

works - Nadwi argued, should encompass every aspect of the faith, and not only its social dimension.126 Similarly, Wahidu'ddin Khan has accused Mawdudi of misinterpreting the meaning of 'ibadah. For, religious worship, argues Wahidu'ddin Khan, is to serve as a means for personal reform, and not as a vehicle for establishing worldly power.127

Implicit in the discussion of din and 'ibadah by Mawdudi was a new commitment on the part of the faithful, and a break with the traditional conception of faith as heretofore understood and practiced by Muslims. Mawdudi's exegesis purported to an internal conversion. For, Mawdudi's call began "in the hearts of believers who [would] commit themselves to struggling for implementation of divine will."128 To become veritable Muslims, Mawdudi argued, the faithful must undergo a conversion experience, to restate the shahadah (Muslim testimony of faith)129 in the spirit of the din, and to purge themselves of alternate belief systems, and thenceforth, live by the holy law.130 For, "a corrupt will", argued Mawdudi, "cannot accept revelation, nor comprehend nature, nor reason effectively."131 The erection of the ideal Islamic order would have to follow that conversion experience, and was therefore, predicated upon a "missionary" outlook.

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126 Nadwi, 'Asr-i Hazir, pp.82-83.

127 Wahidu'ddin Khan, Din Kiya Hey; idem, Din ki Siyasi Ta'bir; idem, Ta'bir ki Ghalti.

128 McDonough, Muslim Ethics, P.67.

129 The testimony is la ilaha illa'IIIah, meaning there is no god but God. Through this testimony one becomes a Muslim. On the notion of "internal conversion" in the Jama'at see, Israr Ahmad, Tahrir-i Jama'at-i Islami, P.85. "Reconversion" to Islam was stipulated as a basic criterion for joining the Jama'at in 1941; RJI, vol.1, P.45.


131 Cited in, McDonough, Muslim Ethics, P.68.
one which began with individual Muslims and culminated in expanding the boundaries of Islam.\textsuperscript{132} The proselytical endeavor was directed at increasing religious observance, purifying society, and ultimately, reshaping Islam.\textsuperscript{133}

Since the conversion process occurred within the framework of Islam, the new faith found its meaning and space through an added emphasis on a varied interpretation of Islamic teachings and doctrines in general, and religious works in particular.\textsuperscript{134} Works, in effect, became the very harbinger of iman (faith), and the embodiment of the Muslims' new commitment.\textsuperscript{135} The added emphasis on works was also a natural conclusion to Mawdudi's definition of a Muslim. Islam, he wrote, is not a birthright, nor a simple proclamation of the shahadah, but a testimony an individual's absolute obedience to God - Islam finds meaning only in the context of works.\textsuperscript{136} The implications of this stance, in the communal social setting of India where nationalism purported to a culturally

\textsuperscript{132} SAAM, vol.1, P.250; RJI, vol.5, P.101, vol.6, pp.173-206; Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, \textit{Hikmat-i Tabligh} (Lahore: Islami Academy, 1987); \textit{JIKUS}, P.13; and Ahmad, \textit{Tahrik-i Jama’at}, pp.51-54. Israr Ahmad argues that, the attention of the Jama’at was diverted from converting non-Muslims for the time being, after the partition of the Subcontinent; \textit{ibid}, pp.114-15.

\textsuperscript{133} Mawdudi, \textit{Hikmat-i Tabligh}; and \textit{RJI}, vol.1, pp.12-13. Absence of a proselytical posture had been viewed by the Jama’at as the cause of eclipse of Islam in India, and hence now lay at the heart of the solution to its predicament; see \textit{RJI}, vol.6, pp.173-206.


\textsuperscript{135} Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us}, pp.26-33.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{ibid}, pp.48-49 and 69-71.
syncretic synthesis, was far-reaching.

In traditional Islam, religion is "essentially a way of knowledge....Islam leads to essential knowledge which integrates our whole being".\textsuperscript{137} Islamic spirituality is therefore, predicated upon knowledge of God, a realization which stands above and beyond the restrictions of exoteric religion. The possibilities of the traditional stance for a transcendental religious dialogue with the Hindu "other" is self-evident.\textsuperscript{138} It is for this reason that, the revivalist discourse in the Subcontinent, insofar as it reflects communal consciousness, has sought to close the door to such an eventuality. For Mawdudi, there existed no possibility of spirituality outside of the \textit{din}, and no knowledge distinct from or transcendental to the works.\textsuperscript{139} The incumbency of the \textit{din} was not premised on the knowledge of God, but acceptance of his absolute obedience.

For this position to be viable, the emphasis upon works would have to be complimented with an interpretation of its constituent rituals and practices. It has been argued that, Mawdudi’s purpose in discussing the central practices of Islam, such as prayers or even the recitation of the Qur’an, was not juridical (\textit{fiqhi}) exposition, but to

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\textsuperscript{138} The possibility of a dialogue and understanding between Islam and Hinduism has been explored since the time of Emperor Akbar (d. 1605) and Prince Dara Shokuh (d. 1658), mainly through the aegis of Sufism; see, Daryush Shayegan, \textit{Hindouisme et Soufisme} (Paris: Editions de la Difference, 1979). Similar attempts were made in modern times by Abu’l-Kalam Azad; see, Ian Henderson Douglas, \textit{Abul Kalam Azad; An Intellectual and Religious Biography}, Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll, eds., (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).
\textsuperscript{139} Mawdudi, \textit{The Islamic Way}, pp.52-58.
\end{flushright}
ascribe to those practices their correct place in the structure of his system.\textsuperscript{140} Mawdudi's objective was to appropriate the meaning and significance of a central Islamic practice, and thereby, to relate the spirit and function of that practice and its associated doctrines to his conception of \textit{din}.\textsuperscript{141} The spirit of religious observance, argued Mawdudi, could be captured, efficiently, in a hierarchic gradation, beginning in \textit{iman} (faith in God), and then proceeding to, \textit{islam} (surrender to God), \textit{taqwa} (consciousness of God), and finally \textit{ihsan} (benediction, but interpreted by Mawdudi as "Godliness").\textsuperscript{142}

This was a piecemeal effort, which nevertheless, strove towards erecting a complete belief system. The investiture of the central Islamic practices with new meaning in the context of Mawdudi's greater emphasis upon works moreover, made religious observance itself a medium for internal conversion:

"That the prayer as such has extraordinary power to make us attain to greater and greater heights of obedience and worship is quite obvious."\textsuperscript{143}

This formulation, moreover, made full use of the believer's concern for salvation. Abeyance by the \textit{din}, Mawdudi had concluded, would find an added compelling justification in the soteriological concerns of Muslims. Mawdudi's \textit{oeuvre} was therefore very much informed by the content and meaning of Islamic eschatological doctrines, and

\textsuperscript{140} See Khurram Murad's introduction to, Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us}, pp.23-24.


\textsuperscript{143} Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us}, P.165. \textit{Hajj} (pilgrimage to Mecca) and \textit{zakat} (obligatory almsgiving) are also treated in the same fashion; see, Maudoodi, \textit{Fundamentals}, pp.153-242.
the religion's conceptions of salvation and perdition. As such, Mawdudi, unlike Ayatollah Khomeini or Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), did not argue exclusively for a utopian order in this world, but was more concerned with initiating the process towards it. Mawdudi's intellectual efforts were directed at realizing a sociopolitical utopian order. However, he never radically broke with the traditional position, in the sense that, his advocacy of the utopian order was tempered by his continued acceptance of the very notion of salvation outside of the purview of that order, which Mawdudi had utilized as a means to foster abeyance by the *din*. The logic of his position, although not in conformity with his zeal for temporalizing religion, was nevertheless, binding on Mawdudi, and as will be discussed later in the following chapters, checked the chiliastic and revolutionary tendency of his formulation. Muslims should not be disheartened if their "revolution" does not materialize, Mawdudi wrote; for, they will be rewarded in the hereafter. A Muslim in the final analysis, is to merely fulfill the will of God, for which he will be rewarded in the hereafter. The appeal to Divine punishment, and more frequently, paradisiacal reward in fostering abeyance by the *din* is so pervasive in Mawdudi's arguments that, it at times obfuscates his original justification for the concept


of the *din*, namely, the utopian Islamic sociopolitical order.

"*Iman* in Allah is not a mere metaphysical concept; it is in the nature of a *contract* by which man barters his life and his possessions in exchange for promise of Paradise in the Hereafter. God, as it were, purchases a Believer’s life and property and promises, in return, the reward of Paradise in the life after death."  

Mawdudi’s attempt to reinforce the incumbency of the *din* by appeal to Muslim eschatological doctrines and soteriological concerns had, in effect, moderated the pace and scope of the temporalization of Islam. As the utopian ideal was made to share the limelight with the Muslim quest for salvation, the urgency of the realization of that order, and hence the revolutionary potential of the drive to realize it were checked. The Jama‘at’s objective from inception, argued Mawdudi in later years, was "to erect a *hukumat-i ilahiyah* (divine government) in the world and hence to win God’s favor in afterlife."  

Allusion to the worldly panacea was juxtaposed and enmeshed with the quest for salvation. Hence, ironically, Mawdudi’s arguments planted the seeds of traditional tendencies in his new approach, a fact which accounts for both the Jama‘at’s ambivalent attitude towards revolution, and Mawdudi’s complex and enigmatic relation to traditional Islam. The implications of this position will be examined in some detail later on.

A worldly outlook, and a concern for the political ramifications of religious exegeses, however, continued to characterize Mawdudi’s thinking and determine the

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course which it took. While his appeal to the theme of salvation suggests a traditionalization of his program, by the same token, his treatment of Muslim eschatological doctrines, true to his style, reinterprets the doctrines with view to the requirements of the *din* and his sociopolitical program. In Mawdudi's conception, man's fate in afterlife, accepted as a primary motive and reward for, religious observance was decided not on the basis of his spiritual stature judged by God in His eternal wisdom, but rationally understood as the automatic outcome of adopting a particular posture towards the world in light of a distinct interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{150} Paraphrasing Mawdudi, Jameelah argued, "paradise is not reward for *mere profession* of the bargain [covenant with God], it is the reward for the faithful's *execution* of it."\textsuperscript{151}

The need to create clearly defined boundaries around the Muslim boundaries of the Muslim community, combined with the posture towards the world demanded of Muslims by Mawdudi, increasingly limited the very definition of a Muslim. It was this aspect of Mawdudi's discourse that brought the discussion of the *din* to its logical conclusion - who is a Muslim? - and moreover, related his cerebral treatment of religion to the life and thought of average Muslims. Being a Muslim, Mawdudi had often argued, was a matter of volition.\textsuperscript{152} The definition of a Muslim as it appears in Mawdudi's expansion on the theme of the *din* was, however, premised on the notion of compulsion.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{RII}, vol.6, pp.434-40.

\textsuperscript{151} Jameelah, \textit{Who is Maudoodi?}, P.15.

\textsuperscript{152} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.22; and \textit{idem, Islami Tahzib}, pp.106-09.
Volition in religious matters, argued Abbott, was applicable only to non-Muslims. For Mawdudi there was no compulsion in becoming a Muslim, but for those who were Muslim, abeyance by the din was not a matter of choice. Mawdudi, Abbott wrote, interpreted the Qur'anic injunction 'there is no compulsion in religion' as 'there is no compulsion in respect to adopting religion'; for, otherwise, "the various penalties and prohibitions found in the Qur'an [were] meaningless."

"When you recite the Kalima [shahadah]...you relinquish your independence in favor of God." Concerned with safeguarding the boundaries of the Muslim community, Mawdudi did not permit apostasy, nor did he sanction individual choice in the manner and extent of orthopraxy.

Mawdudi's views had basis in the classical sources, but were arrived at independently. Islam as a sociopolitical reality was more than just a set of religious beliefs, much like the "American Union", it too, had the right to protect itself. Therefore, the demand for strict adherence to the din was argued to be the condito sine qua non for the

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religiopolitical community’s self-preservation.\textsuperscript{158} Jameelah has elaborated upon Mawdudi’s views:

"...his [the Muslim’s] practical living [must provide] eloquent testimony to his non-Muslim neighbors that he subscribed to the Kalima....A Muslim, in order to be worthy of the name, must actually live an Islamic life."\textsuperscript{159} (emphasis added)

Mawdudi wrote,

"All the Muslims resident in countries, where Islamic revolution is to take place, be given notice that they have discarded their faith...they should declare themselves to be non-Muslims....those who are Muslims because they were born into a Muslim family....must be subjected to Islamic Law; and be compelled to observe the fara’iz and wajibat (obligatory religious works)."\textsuperscript{160}

In effect, the less-than-fully observing Muslim, and the ones who do not abide by Mawdudi’s conception of the \textit{din} were depicted as apostates.\textsuperscript{161} They fall short of fulfilling the requirements of \textit{kalimah-i tayibbah} (pure profession of the Muslim testimony of faith), and live by the \textit{kalimah-i khatibah} (literally-professed testimony).\textsuperscript{162} The latter, Mawdudi argued, had its rooting in \textit{shirk} (polytheism).\textsuperscript{163} Such Muslims, Mawdudi argued, were as the Jews to Moses, and no better than the followers of Emperor Akbar’s

\textsuperscript{158} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, pp.13-46.

\textsuperscript{159} Jameelah, \textit{Who is Maudoodi?}, pp.5-6.

\textsuperscript{160} Mawdudi, \textit{Murtad ki Saza}, P.75.

\textsuperscript{161} McDonough, \textit{Muslim Ethics}, P.70; and Mawdudi, \textit{Musalm* Anwar Mawjudah}, vol.3, P.134.

\textsuperscript{162} Maudoodi, \textit{Fundamentals}, pp.33-40.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{ibid}, pp.36 and 39-40.
eclectic din-i ilahi (divine religion).\textsuperscript{164} In their self-centered obscurantism, they had neglected Islam and failed to defend the faith in the challenges it confronted.\textsuperscript{165} The followers of the din conversely, were deemed as ‘true’ Muslims, those “who [had] completely [merged] into Islam their full personality and entire existence;”\textsuperscript{166} It was they who are responsible for the glories of Islam.\textsuperscript{167}

The only difference between an apostate, and a ‘nominal’ or ‘partial’ Muslim was that, Mawdudi prescribed severe punishment for an actual apostate, but not for the unobservant Muslims. For, Mawdudi never gave up on the latter category of Muslims, and instead, sought to appeal to their religious, intellectual and ultimately political sensibilities.\textsuperscript{168} Mawdudi’s concern ultimately lay with politics, and hence, the extension of the reach of his message and the persuasion of greater numbers to his cause.

Mawdudi’s idealization of Islam, the dialectic of which articulated a systemic view of the faith, wherein the Islamic conceptions of God, society and man were reinterpreted and woven into one whole, was thus complete. Mawdudi’s oeuvre had spawn an all-

\textsuperscript{164} On the first example see, RJI, vol.2, pp.17-18; on the second, Mawdudi, Tanqihat, pp.23-32; and Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Shakhsiyyat, Sami’u’llah and Khalid Humayun, eds, (Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, nd.), pp.155-56. Din-i ilahi was conceived by Emperor Akbar as a creed which encompassed elements from both Islam and Hinduism, with view to uniting the two communities.

\textsuperscript{165} Mauddodi, Fundamentals, pp.68-70.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{ibid}, P.69.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{ibid}, P.70.

inclusive world view, produced an internally-consistent ideological perspective, and introduced a novel method of religious exegesis and political analysis. The resultant intellectual system, in turn, shaped the concept of "Islamic state", and conditioned the nature of the struggle for realizing it. The manner in which Mawdudi’s ideological formulation culminated in a political theology, and subsequently, a discourse on political thought and action will be examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
THE DISCOURSE ON ISLAM AND POLITICS

Much has been written in recent years about the ostensibly political nature of Islam, by both revivalist thinkers and Western academicians. Advocates of this position regard Islam as intrinsically concerned with sociopolitical issues, and therefore, view the revivalist drive for power as the mere reassertion of the true nature of the faith. However, this view is not supported by the evidence from Islamic history, where the ideal of unity of the spiritual and the mundane within the structure of Islam was overshadowed by the institutionalization of a separation between the spiritual and the temporal. The putative inseparability of religion and politics in Islam is a doctrinal viewpoint which is not upheld by the pattern of development and consolidation of traditional Islam, whose time honored institutions are predicated upon a de facto separation of religious and political authorities. This historical reality was moreover, fully canonized in the classical Islamic

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juridical corpus by the thirteenth century.³

The revivalist clamor for an atavist ideal, wherein the two institutions of authority would be united is therefore, premised on a break with traditional Islam, and subsequently, the reconstitution of Islamic faith and practice based on the dictat of that ideal. The resultant "political theology"⁴ stands in opposition to the sanctity of the writ of Islamic history, which lies at the crux of the traditional religious world view. For, the discussion of the fusion of Islam and politics in the image of the religion's original ideal purports to a fundamentally new religious synthesis.⁵ In the words of Smith, the anticipated utopian order, the "Islamic state[,] is not a form of state so much as a form of Islam."⁶ The break with tradition has occurred in tandem with the articulation of the utopian content of the restorationist agenda of revivalism. The millenarian connotations of such an outlook has served as the primary force for the unfolding process of becoming - the transformation of the old into the new, of faith into politics.


Mawdudi's views on the place of Islam in politics, on first impression, suggest a resurrection and yet, modernization of the classical doctrine of Caliphate, uniting afresh its political and religious functions, and creating a polity in which it could rule. At closer examination, however, Mawdudi's exposition reveals the imprint of a more intricate set of arguments, which were premised on both the inner logic of his discussion on the din, and the political as well as the intellectual realities confronting the operationalization of an Islamic state.

Mawdudi's discourse began with a discussion of Islam's concern for the temporal and culminated in the case for an Islamic state. Religion, argued Mawdudi, could not be understood through mere intellection, it could only find meaning when implemented what Mawdudi termed, 'amali shahadat (testimony of faith through practice). Religious truth was predicated upon action, which was the supreme stage of piety. Reiterating the stock argument of revivalism, Mawdudi, time and again, asserted that, Islam recognized no boundaries between the spiritual and the mundane, faith and politics.

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7 Mawdudi, Tahrir-i Islami ka A’indah, pp.27-37 and 120ff.


"The chief characteristic of Islam is that it makes no distinction between the spiritual and the secular life."\(^\text{12}\)

Mawdudi viewed this dictum to be a cardinal tenet of the Islamic faith. Suggestions to the contrary were derided as Western ploys against Islam.\(^\text{13}\) Mawdudi always remained consistent in defending the principle of religion's claim to politics, as a fundamental and logical truism to the point that he endorsed the institution of the Hindu Manu laws as the legal code of India, even to the detriment of the Muslim community of that country.\(^\text{14}\)

Mawdudi's argued his case rationally and with the force of a scientific formula. Ethical concerns, emanating from the heart of religion were superior to worldly concerns; and as such, argued Mawdudi, they must supersede all other considerations in shaping man's sociopolitical existence.\(^\text{15}\) Such a feat could not be accomplished through a reclusive abandonment of the world. Religion, must rather, assert its claim to social

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Main Din ki Tafhim' u Tashrih (Karachi: Majlis-i Nashriyat-i Islam, nd.), pp.74-88.


\(^{13}\) See Khurram Murad's preface to Mawdudi, The Islamic Way, P.22. Interestingly, Khomeini reacted in the same fashion to suggestions that Islam and politics were separate, he derided such suggestions as "imperialist plots against Islam"; see Hamid Algar, trans. and annotated, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley: Mizan Press, pp.139-41.


transactions, and imbue them with its teachings and values.\textsuperscript{16}

"Man's status in the universe having thus been determined it follows logically that he has no right to lay down the law of his conduct and decide the right and wrong of it. This is a function which properly belongs to God."\textsuperscript{17}

At face value, Mawdudi merely restated the primacy of the shari'ah as an all-encompassing body of law.\textsuperscript{18} However, in order to ensure the inviolability of the fusion of religion and politics Mawdudi carried this argument further, superimposing the politicizing logic of the din on the largely apolitical teachings of the shari'ah. That fusion, in turn, was deemed to be a requisite condition for the implementation of the shari'ah in its totality.\textsuperscript{19} For, religion would never be fully implemented unless it control the centers of power. The shari'ah should lay equal claim to the public life of Muslims as it does to their private endeavors. The result was a rationalization the shari'ah's organic and amorphous hold over Muslim social conduct. The new view of the shari'ah was, ipso facto, suggestive of a fusion of religion and politics. A direct causal linkage now related the incumbency of the supremacy of the shari'ah to the concept of hukumat-i ilahiyah (divine


\textsuperscript{17} Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi, The Ethical View-Point of Islam, Maahur al-Din Siddiqi, trans. (Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan, 1953), P.33.

\textsuperscript{18} Adams, "Mawdudi", pp.111-12.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{ibid}, P.112.
Mawdudi's position was not only a product of the inner logic of his exegetics, but had its origins in his reading of Qur'anic injunctions. Ghamidi, who studied Qur'an with Mawdudi for many years, recollects that, Mawdudi's whole approach to the relation between religion and politics was based on his understanding of the Qur'anic verse: "Aqimu'ddin wa la tatafiqu fihi" (Q.XLII:13) (Establish the religion and be not divided therein!) The Qur'anic passage, argues Ghamidi, was interpreted by Mawdudi to be a call for the erection of an Islamic political order, to which Muslims were obligated to give unwavering obedience. For, "establishment of the religion" would not be possible, nor would it hold any meaning lest it be based on the fiat of the political order, which in turn, as subject to the writ of the *shari'ah* must itself be a clear manifestation of the sovereignty of God. From this followed that, the corollary of *iqamat-i din* (establishment of the religion) was *imamat-i salihah* (virtuous leadership) in the political realm.

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22 Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore.


In the absence of the Islamic state the whole reason for revelation comes into question.\textsuperscript{25} For, religious teachings were not sent by God to be ignored.\textsuperscript{26} Hence, not only did veritable faith automatically lead to political action, but the very existence of religion becomes predicated upon the political goal. Islam could have no glory lest it be true to its ethos, which in turn, could not be fully blossom in the absence of a veritable religious order.\textsuperscript{27}

Being a Muslim, as defined by the din was predicated upon the demand for an Islamic state; for, only within the framework of that state the Muslim identity could find shape.\textsuperscript{28} This would be the practical testimony of faith (\textit{\textsuperscript{`}amali shahadat}),\textsuperscript{29} the denial of which would be tantamount to refusal to live fully as a Muslim.\textsuperscript{30} Since there existed no possibility of salvation for a Muslim outside of the structure of his faith,\textsuperscript{31} and since his faith could not be fully implemented without Islamization of the political order,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{25} Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrik-i Islami ka A’indah}, pp.30ff.
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{RJI}, vol.3, pp.193-201; also see, Aziz Ahmad, "Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan", in \textit{The Middle East Journal}, 21:3 (Summer 1967), pp.369-80.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Mawdudi, \textit{Shahadat-i Haqq}, pp.11-19.
\item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{ibid}, pp.17-18.
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{RJI}, vol.3, pp.216-19.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

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Mawdudi concluded, sacralization of politics was a religious obligation.\textsuperscript{32}

"If you believe in God and His Prophet and accept the Qur'an as the Book of God then inevitably you have to use moral principles which Islam teaches and will have to accept the political principles which it has given."\textsuperscript{33}

If there was to be an Islamic order it would have to arrive at the heels of an Islamic state. The kind of Islamic existence which Mawdudi had in mind could only emerge and persist with the support of government fiat. After all Islam had survived in India for so long as Muslims occupied the seats of power.\textsuperscript{34} Maryam Jameelah has narrated Mawdudi's thoughts in this regard:

"Once I asked Maulana Maudoodi why the Jama'at-e-Islami is so intensely involved in political activity. The Maulana replied that preaching, printed literature and even education is of little avail unless Islam can be implemented practically in a full-blooded Islamic state."\textsuperscript{35}

Mawdudi had arrived at this position gradually, beginning with the perceived need for the preservation of the \textit{shari'ah}, and the requisite mobilization of the faithful all with view to safeguarding the interests of Muslims in India. His ideology was originally premised on the need for religion to inform politics with a sense for the sacred. This conclusion was eventually supplanted by the realization that, only political power can


\textsuperscript{35} Maryam Jameelah, \textit{Who is Maudoodi?} (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), P.56.
guarantee the preservation and implementation of the religious norms and values. For, "[i]n the Muslim world, secularism means anti-religion and state-sponsored persecution of the religious elements."³⁶ Without political power, concluded Mawdudi, veritable Islam would remain only an ideal, forever threatened by the specter of annihilation. This realization acted as a transformative influence, whereby, Mawdudi and the Jama'at experienced more complete politicization, and the Islamic state became not only an ideal vision - the end result of Islamization, but the guarantor and harbinger of the entire process.

Mawdudi's conclusion had immediate bearing on the Jama'at's world view and *modus operandi*. It determined the final shape of the Jama'at's activism, the outlines of which were visible by the mid-1950s. In 1956-57, in response to objections raised by a number of Jama'at leaders to direct participation in the upcoming national elections (which will be detailed in Parts III and IV), Mawdudi retorted that, the activities of the Jama'at had no meaning outside of politics, and that, politics was the logical end of Jama'at's activities.³⁷ Politics, he declared, was not merely a means to an end, but had been the very fundamental reason for establishing the Jama'at in the first place - the end itself.³⁸ As politics came to be the *raison d'être* of the Jama'at, the concept of the Islamic state too, found new meaning. The transformation of the Jama'at from a politicized

³⁶ *ibid*, P.57.
³⁸ *ibid*, P.88; and Mawdudi, *Tahrik-i Islami ka A'indah*. 280
religious movement to a religiously-conscious political party, required a new understanding of the Islamic state. Hence, in the final analysis, the Islamic state was not seen as merely a means for creating an Islamic order of life, but a model for perfect government with universal application - a political end for a political movement. Mawdudi seldom compared his proposals or discussions on Islamic state with the ethical teachings of other religions, but with various Western theories and systems of political organization and government. The political teachings of Islam, and subsequently the Islamization of politics therefore, should be implemented, even through coercion.

The force of this argument, however, extended the discussion of the Islamic state further. For, not only was politics subjected to the writ religious values, but religion itself came to be understood in light of politics. The case for the former, in a logical continuum led to the latter. For the Islamic state to function, it would have to be premised on an interpretation of religious law which would be able to justify, and more


40 Mawdudi, The Process, P.46; and idem, Islamic Law, P.31. "Coercion" was not, however, explained fully, and Mawdudi's intent in using this term remains open to interpretation.

41 Cragg writes, for Mawdudi, the Muslim dictum, "there is no god but God" as "there is no law-giver but God"; see Kenneth Cragg, Counsels in Contemporary Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), P.121.
importantly, sustain the functioning of that state.\textsuperscript{42} The manner in which the arguments for an Islamic state - sacralization of politics - acted to politicize Islam can be seen in the following passage:

"Acknowledging that someone is your ruler to whom you must submit means that you have accepted his Din. He now becomes your sovereign and you become his subjects.... Din, therefore, actually means the same thing as state and government; Shari'ah is the law of that state and government; and 'Ibadah amounts to following and complying with that law."\textsuperscript{43}

The continuity between religion and politics, argued Mawdudi, is akin to the relation of "roots with the trunk and the branches with the leaves [of a tree]."\textsuperscript{44} A symbiotic relationship wherein the religious informs the political and the political sustains the religious:

"In Islam the religious, the political, the economic and the social are not separate systems; they are different departments and parts of the same system."\textsuperscript{45}

The convergence of Muslim piety and religious values with political objectives found meaning in the doctrine of \textit{jihad} (holy war). The traditional view of the doctrine bifurcates its application into \textit{jihad-i kubra} (the greater \textit{jihad}) and \textit{jihad-i sughra} (the lesser \textit{jihad}). The former refers to man's struggle with his soul in a quest for spiritual purity, while the latter characterizes the exertion in the path of the truth in the world, and

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\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{TUTQ}, vol.1, pp.10 and 17; and Mawdudi, \textit{Shahadat-i Haqq}, P.6.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Mawdudi, \textit{Let Us}, pp.295-96.
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{idem}, \textit{Islamic Economic System}, P.20.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{ibid}, P.21.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
defense of Islam against the religion's physical enemies.\(^{46}\) In light of Mawdudi's exegesis, the latter definition of *jihad* overrode, albeit not completely, the former.\(^{47}\)

"Brothers in Islam! Why is Jihad so central to Islam? To understand this, let us first recollect the meanings of these keywords: Din, Shari'ah, and 'Ibadah".\(^{48}\)

The identification of faith with politics, spiritual gain with worldly power, and salvation with social utopia was thus complete.\(^{49}\)

"...of all the factors of social life which impinge on culture and morality the most powerful and effective is government....Hence the best way of putting an end to the fitna [mischief] and purifying of life of munkar [that which is reprehensible] is to eliminate all mufsid [corrupt] governments and replace them with those which in theory and practice are based on piety and righteous action, the objective of Islamic Jihad is to put an end to the dominance of the unIslamic systems of governments and replace them with Islamic rule."\(^{60}\)


\(^{49}\) Schleifer, "Jihad", pp.93-94; and Mawdudi, *Tafhimat*, vol.1, 84-92. It should be noted that, Mawdudi’s views on jihad, especially in his later years, were considerably more moderate than other revivalist thinkers. Although he utilized the symbolism of *jihad*, as illustrated here, as a means to compel Muslims to his views, as Ahmed argues, Mawdudi’s position on the doctrine was effectively a suspension of its use; See Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of An Islamic State; An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), P.103. In later years, as will be elucidated in chapter 11, by insisting that only a proper government authority could declare *jihad*, Mawdudi limited the ability of the Pakistan government to use the doctrine in its Kashmir policy.

\(^{50}\) Translation from Mawdudi’s *Al-Jihad fi'l-Islam*, cited in Schleifer, "Jihad", pp.97-98.
Mawdudi’s position, throughout his works and over the years, consolidated into a distinct world view, wherein political power became the logical objective of faith. Faith became an active and dynamic process of becoming - the Islamization of society and politics. The struggle for religious salvation became manifested in a quest for a virtuous order, whereby the community of the faithful (the ummah) would be converted into a movement - hizbu’llah (party of God).\textsuperscript{51} The din thus, found clear political connotations defined through overtly political nomenclature, as the "organization" of the veritable faith:

"Ours is not a jama'at (party) of the enlightened or the religious missionaries. It is a party of God's soldiers. This party therefore, has no option but to take control of political power."\textsuperscript{52}

The Nature of the Islamic State

The concept of the Islamic state has served as the end-point and pinnacle of Mawdudi’s theological discourse. The concept of an Islamic state is also a discussion on politics, which served both as the nexus between Mawdudi’s outlook on Islam and the political exigencies from which his movement drew inspiration, and provided insights into the pattern of politicization of Mawdudi’s thinking. The Islamic state is a static model for

\footnote{\textsuperscript{51} The term hizbu’llah was utilized by Azad in reference to an organization which he had envisioned for the realization of Muslim political aspirations in the late 1910s. See, Ian Henderson Douglas, \textit{Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography}, Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll, eds., (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988). On Mawdudi use of the term see, Mawdudi, \textit{Tafhimat}, vol.1, P.86; \textit{idem, Mas’alah-i Qaumiyat} (Pathankot, 1947), P.103. Also see, Israr Ahmad, \textit{Islam Awr Pakistan: Tarikh Awr Siyasi Awr Thiqafati Pasnazar} (Lahore: Maktabah-i Markazi-i Anjuman-i Khuddamu’l-Qur’an, 1983), pp.84-85.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{52} \textit{TQ}, (May 1939), P.9.}
governance, formed in a dynamic debate with the Western notion of "state". As such, it has served as the loci for the formulation of an indigenous ideological orientation, which above and beyond its atavist idealism, has incorporated concepts, values and ideas from the corpus of thought with which it is in debate. The discussion of the Islamic state as it unravels in Mawdudi’s works, is not a romantic conglomeration of disparate religious dictums, but a political discourse. It should not, therefore, be examined only in light of its operationalization of Islamic teachings on society and politics, but also with view to gauging its efficacy as a discourse on society and politics, one which is rooted in Islam, but purports to an ideological stance vis a vis the West.

Mawdudi’s notion of the "state", as the cornerstone of his expansion on the theme of the Islamic state, was not territorial but cultural. The state was defined in terms of the cultural codes - Islamic symbolisms in Mawdudi’s view - by which its inhabitants are distinguished. It was this cultural outlook which distinguished Mawdudi’s approach from the Pan-Islamic formulations which preceded him and had strove for a territorial unity of Muslim lands. For Mawdudi the Islamic state was more immediately represented by the institution of an imamat-i salihah (virtuous leadership) in a state based on the sovereignty of God, in place of the existing "fussaq'u fujjar ki imamat (leadership

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55 Schleifer, "Jihad", P.97.
of the corrupt) of the "godless" political order.\textsuperscript{56}

The exact nature of Mawdudi's conception of the Islamic state, has been the subject of much political criticism and scholarly analysis.\textsuperscript{57} Those outside the Jama'at have continued to see the notion of a state which vests sovereignty, explicitly and exclusively, in God to be a harbinger of authoritarianism. Mawdudi and his followers have, conversely, gone to great lengths to assure their audience of the veritable democratic nature of the Islamic state. It is along the axis of this exchange that the discourse on the Islamic state has unfolded as a debate with Western conceptions of the state in general, and the liberal formulations on the subject in particular. The defense of the Islamic state before its liberal critics has been the motivating factor in the continued articulation and refinement of the concept. The ideological gauntlet has moreover, found immediate manifestation in the context of Pakistani politics, where the nature of the Islamic state, as the electoral objective of the Jama'at, has unremittingly been put to test by the movement's opponents.

With the criticism of his approach in mind, Mawdudi insisted that the Islamic state was democratic, because the leadership of that state would be duly elected, and would be bound by the writ of Divine law. He captured the gist of these arguments in the terms,

\textsuperscript{56} Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrik-i Islami ki Akhlaqi}, P.3.

"democratic caliphate" and "theodemocracy", which he coined in reference to the structure and operation of the Islamic state. At first glance, the synthesis between Islamic symbolisms and Western political ideals may seem to be a tactical ploy, designed to manipulate the political sensibilities of the educated classes, masquerading otherwise unpalatable proposals behind a veneer of democracy. Yet, the scope and depth of Mawdudi's syntheses belie such facile dismissals. Mawdudi's debate with Western political thought was one of antagonists, yet, it acted as a means for assimilation Western conceptions into his discourse, and hence, into Islam.

Mawdudi’s discourse was not, however, primarily or directly concerned with liberal values. For, it was neither an attempt at democracy nor a program for authoritarian rule, but a means for promoting and safeguarding an Islamic social order. Such eventualities were merely conjectural, and hence of secondary importance to Mawdudi’s original program. The preoccupation with democracy, as an apologetic response to outside criticism, was a later development, which as mentioned above, was an inevitable outcome of Mawdudi’s debate with Western political thought and the Jama‘at’s involvement in electoral politics. These two factors pushed the boundaries of Mawdudi’s discourse, and forced him to contemplate more seriously on the question of democracy. Mawdudi’s treatment of the concept of the Islamic state and the dialectics of its articulation, however, should be primarily examined independent from his later apologia and doctrinal revisions.

As the culmination of the process of sacralization of politics, Mawdudi’s conception of the Islamic state was expressed in ahistorical and atemporal terms. It was an "ideal-type" state, not in that it produced the most efficient machinery of governance, but in that
it created conditions most conducive to salvation of man by fully invoking the writ of the *din*. Such a society was neither democratic nor authoritarian, for, it had no need for governance as the concept is understood in Western political thought. Concern for the mode of government is born of a crisis of governability, legitimacy and efficiency in the face of the demands of political participation and mobilization by the masses, and the management of economic resources. In a polity wherein there are conceivably no socioeconomic grievances, and the government and the citizenry abide by the writ of the same infallible Divine law, there would emerge no concern for democratic rights and procedures. The question of democracy would be mute; for, the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism are defined in contradistinction to one another. If the populace does not perceive of the existence of the latter, demand for the former would not arise. The ideal Islamic state, in Mawdudi’s thinking, was predicated on the establishment of an ideal society based on the *din*, which would not only cure Muslim society of the maladies which have produced chasms and cleavages in other societies, but would also distribute resources and power equitably - a society which would make both government fiat and demand for individual rights unnecessary.

In Mawdudi’s discourse, therefore, democracy originally served as an adjective. It defined the otherwise undefinable virtues of the Islamic state. The Islamic state was defined as democratic, because it was an ideal state, and since the term "democratic", in Western political thought, has the most positive connotations, it was utilized to express the virtues of the Islamic state. Later, democracy featured in Mawdudi’s discussions as a concern to be contended with during the struggle for the Islamic state, and in the state’s
formative stages. Mawdudi’s discussion of the Islamic state encompassed both the nature of the ideal state, and the path leading to it. While the Islamic state was above concerns for democracy and authoritarianism, barring the establishment of that ideal state, Mawdudi admitted, democracy and democratic rights were a central concern for Muslims.

As Mawdudi’s discourse unfolded and his ideas began to target particular social strata, democratic ideals were put to a different use by Mawdudi. Democratic symbolisms and idioms extended the purview of Mawdudi’s ideological formulation into new arenas where it may incorporate the culture and language of Westernized intellectuals, relating Islam to their world view. It was at this stage of his discourse that Mawdudi felt compelled to respond to the criticisms of his detractors, and address the question of democracy to an increasing extent; however, more as a concession to his targeted audience, than a new orientation.

The more the Jama’at became interested in the educated Muslim middle classes and the literati, the more concessions to democracy began to surface in Mawdudi’s discussion of the Islamic state. The need for such concessions was also, ironically, necessitated by Mawdudi’s views on social organization, and by his modernizing tendencies.

Pre-modern societies are anthropocentric, they are based on organic inter-linkages which preserve the central role of the individual in society. Muslim society, despite the holistic appearance of the concept of ummah, has remained true to this typology. Modern society, however, is based on impersonal, rational and contractual interactions which integrate individuals into social units, the objective of which are to serve the greater
interests of the society as a whole. Mawdudi's discourse on *din* and the Islamic state produced an image of society, which blends the individual Muslim into a collective unit, wherein social interactions are rationalized and systematized into contractual arrangements as determined by the writ of the Islamic law. It is the modernization of social structure and its collectivist implications which are to follow the institution of the Islamic state that, have produced apprehensions regarding Mawdudi's agenda among his Westernized critics, as well as those who are bound by traditional social linkages in the periphery of Pakistani (and before that of Indian) society. Among those who have remained skeptical about the democratic nature of the Islamic state, more are wary of the authoritarian tendencies which are inherent to the kind of social modernization which Mawdudi advocated, than they are of the Islamic content of it.\(^{58}\)

The various roles played by democratic symbolisms in Mawdudi's discourse have interacted with the political agenda of the Jama'at to force the movement to articulate its ideological outlook further. Committing itself to the electoral process in Pakistan in 1957, the Jama'at effectively postponed the realization of the ideal Islamic state, and instead, focused on a gradual process leading to it. Mawdudi thereby, sublimated the chiliastic zeal of his movement in favor of pragmatic politics, and focused his attention on the path to the ideal state. Earlier Mawdudi had argued that the Islamic state could only be produced by the confluence of particular religious, social and political ingredients, at the right time,

\(^{58}\) This feeling is particularly evident among the religiously-inclined Pakistani electorate whose support the Jama'at has failed to secure.
and under the right circumstances. The determinism inherent in this view, and the exact nature of the transformative revolution, in effect, proscribed entrusting the fate of the Islamic state to the vicissitudes of a political process which was based on "un-Islamic" principles, and over whose course the Jama'at had no control. Yet, this kind of idealism was to give way to a more pragmatic and flexible approach to Pakistani politics. As the chiliastic zeal of the Jama'at became routinized, political decisions began to influence the unfolding of the ideological discourse. Insofar as Mawdudi’s conception of the Islamic state became idealized into a distant utopia, and he became engaged in political debates and the vicissitudes of an electoral process, the discussion of democracy came to the forefront of his discourse. Increased concern for democracy was therefore, also a function of the routinization of the Jama'at’s idealism, the politicization of its program, and the replacement of the quest for revolution by incremental Islamization.

The Jama'at’s experiences with the various Pakistani governments moreover, reinforced the movement’s commitment to democracy, and made it veritably interested in the protection of individual rights, due process of law, and freedom of political expression.

The focus on the theme of democracy also intensified the cycle of criticism, apologia, and resultant analysis in Mawdudi’s works, and subsequently the program of the Jama'at. The more Mawdudi sought to depict his program as democratic, the more his critics found heart to use democratic yardsticks to scoff at his plans for Pakistan. The


60 For a more detailed discussion of this subject see, Parts III and IV.
democratic pretension made him more vulnerable to criticism, which in turn, intensified his apologetic attempts to assuage his critics.

Democracy therefore featured at different stages in the evolution of Mawdudi's discourse, as an "ideal-type" model, and as part and parcel of introducing Islamic norms and values to the existing political order, to which the Jama'at committed itself in the 1950s. As a means to gauge the efficacy and allure of Mawdudi's political program, democracy has both obfuscated the actual dialectics of Mawdudi's discourse, and yet, revealed the influence of the movement's political decisions on its ideological formulation. For the Jama'at, politics was as much shaped in the image of ideology, as ideology according to the needs of political considerations. Hence, despite Mawdudi's clear logic and systematic argumentation, the concept and goal of the Islamic state, as will be discussed later, has produced confusing directives for the Jama'at.

What is the "Islamic State"

Throughout his works, Mawdudi showed little interest in the actual workings of institutional bodies. He was more eager to engage in abstract theoretical formulations, what Adams argues, were lessons in moral philosophy. Yet, even here definite parameters eventually emerged in Mawdudi's conception of politics, and the role of the Islamic state therein. The first being, the incorporation of the myth and certain features of democracy, as the term is understood in Western political thought, into his conception of the Islamic state, which as was mentioned earlier, occurred at different stages and in different forms. This was an exercise which traditional 'ulama have taken issue with;

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notably, they objected to the use of a secular concept as an ingredient, or a definition for
the attributes of the Islamic state.\textsuperscript{62} Mawdudi, however, saw democracy as a value-
neutral ideal which could be Islamized without surrendering any grounds to the West.\textsuperscript{63}
Hence, undaunted by the castigations of the ‘ulama, the pace and breadth of assimilation
of democratic ideas and values into the structure of the Islamic state increased over the
years, producing more pluralist versions of the model for that state.\textsuperscript{64}

The second, was the invocation of the belief that there existed an Islamic model of
virtuous government, based on the state of Prophet Muhammad in Medinah, the
precepts and example of which continued to be relevant to the social life and political
relations of the Muslims. The Islamic state as such, was a reintroduction of a perennially
valid historical model. While the discussion of democracy pertained to the path to the
Islamic state, and as a means to define its virtues, the actual ingredients of the political
order and mode of governance of the Islamic state were to be found in the Prophetic
element. However, as democratic symbolisms and idioms became a central concern of
Mawdudi’s discourse, the Prophetic model was increasingly, understood and discussed
through a Western value-system, and particularly with reference to the ideal of democracy.
The Islamic state, in the final analysis, was a "God worshipping democratic Caliphate,

\textsuperscript{62} See for instance, Mawlana Muhammad Taqi ‘Uthmani, "Hakimu’l-Ummat ki Siyasi
Afkar", \textit{Al-Bulagh} (Karachi), (March 1990), P.33.

\textsuperscript{63} Syed Abul A’la Maududi, \textit{System of Government Under the Holy Prophet} (Lahore:

\textsuperscript{64} A comparison of Mawdudi’s elaboration upon the Islamic state, for instance as
reflected in \textit{Islamic Law} (1948) and \textit{System of Government} (1978) attest to the increasing
pluralism of the structure of the polity of Islamic state.
founded on the guidance vouchsafed to us through Muhammad...65

History therefore, ceased to be the mere narration of events and spinning out of lives, but was idealized to represent modern values which embodied power.66 It was that power which propelled the rationalization and temporalization of tradition, and its substitution with an idealized view of history.67 The idealization, as the term "democratic caliphate" suggests, also possessed a creative dimension, part romantic and atavist, and part modern. Mawdudi was himself particularly keen on this aspect of his discourse.68 The Islamic state therefore, was neither a species of the past, nor an entirely modern phenomenon, but rather a modernizing one. The terms "democratic caliphate" and "theodemocracy", which were coined by Mawdudi, best capture the modernizing spirit of the Islamic state. Even within Mawdudi's lifetime the concept of the Islamic state evolved


66 Talmon has made similar observations regarding protestant messianism in nineteenth century Europe. See, Jacob Talmon, Political Messianism; the Romantic Phase (New York: Praeger, 1960), P.24. Also see Arendt in this regard:
"The thread of historical continuity was the first substitute for tradition; by means of it, the overwhelming mass of the most divergent values...were reduced to a unilinear, diametrically consistent development actually designed to repudiate not tradition as such but authority of all traditions."

67 Rationalization is used in the Weberian sense:
"Rationalization is the master conception through which cultures define their religious situation....Rationalization comprises first the intellectual clarification, specification and systematization of ideas."

68 Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash (Lahore, 1940), vol.3, pp.59-61. See also Smith, Islam, P.235.
along exceedingly modern, and democratic, lines, filling the skeletal structure of its historical model with modern values, ideals and mechanisms. Pivoted on a debate with democracy, the modernization of Mawdudi's discourse on the Islamic state was drawn to democratic ideals and principles to an increasing extent; such that, in the end democracy was both an objective and an attribute of the Islam state. For Mawdudi the emerging religious and yet democratic cadence of the Islamic state, only confirmed its superiority to secular democracy. The comparison, however, attested to the fact that, the evolution of the Islamic state towards democracy remained far from complete, revealing significant disagreements between the precepts and ideals of the two. Despite its democratic aims, the Islamic state remained anchored in doctrines which hindered greater progress towards democracy. The Islamic state, according to Mawdudi, in spite of changes made in its structure and objectives, remained fundamentally different from secular democracy. No doctrine was a greater impediment to greater democratization of the Islamic state than the fact that, in the Islamic state sovereignty belonged to God alone.

69 Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Khilafat Awr Mulukiyat* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966), Ch.1; and *idem, Islami Riyasat*, P.129.

Mawdudi’s claim to superiority of Islam over secular democracy is often supported by what Esposito has typified as one-sided polemics which compare Islam at its best with selective evils witnessed in the West, which he takes to represent the Western civilization as a whole; see, John L. Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), P.189. A case in point in this regard is Mawdudi’s continuous reference to the issue of slavery and minority rights in the West at earlier times in history; see for instance, Abul A’la Mawdudi, *Human Rights in Islam*, Khurshid Ahmad and Ahmad Said Khan, trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1976), P.19, and *idem, Islamic Law*, P.173. Also instructive in this regard is *idem, Tanqihat*, pp.63-95, where Mawdudi’s objective was not a comparative study of Islamic and Western civilizations, but the proof of the superiority of the former over the latter.

This doctrine was so central to Mawdudi's thinking that no compromise on it was possible. Yet, this was no deterrent to Mawdudi's overtures to democracy. If for Muslims' abeyance by the writ of their religion or the prescription of the din justified the working mechanism of the Islamic state regardless of its democratic merit, for Mawdudi the issues were posed differently. Mawdudi did not seek to absolve the Islamic state of its theocratic transgression, but rather, sought to exonerate theocracy itself as veritable democracy. The popular slogan of the Islami Jami'at Tulabah (Islamic Student Association):71 "rule of man over man is exploitation; submission to Allah the Creator is the only way to emancipation", best captures the essence of Mawdudi's argument. Presenting theocracy behind a veneer of democracy, whether to assuage criticism or to appropriate democratic myths and symbolisms for furthering the cause of the Islamic state, was however, not free of tensions. In theory, as well as in practice, the democratic rather than a purely religious justification for the Islamic state led Mawdudi and the Jama'at into a maze of complex, muddled and often, highly contradictory line of reasoning. The Jama'at became entangled in apologetic responses to liberal critics who persisted in exposing the inherent inconsistency of Mawdudi's position on the one hand, and in warding off of the scorn of the traditional establishment who found Mawdudi's use of a secular idea to define the Islamic state insupportable on the other. The following discussion of the structure of the Islamic state will further elucidate these points.

Mawdudi's approach to Islam sought to summarize the religion, tailoring it to the

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71 Islami Jami'at Tulabah (IJT), as will be discussed fully in chapter 8 is the student wing of the Jama'at.
needs of the Islamic state. The criteria which controlled Mawdudi’s redrawing of the contours of the Islam were the Islamic doctrines of *tawhid* (unity of God), understood as the absolute sovereignty of God; *risalat* (prophecy), understood as the ideal Islamic state;\(^{72}\) and *khilafat* (caliphate), understood as vice-regency of man on behalf of God and hence, the reproduction and perpetuation of the Islamic state in the post-prophetic era.\(^{73}\) While *tawhid* and *risalat* are immutable Islamic beliefs which are used to explicate and legitimize the concept of the Islamic state, it is *khilafat* which governs the intellectual and practical formulations upon which the working of the state will be based.

Mawdudi’s scheme for the Islamic state, was no doubt premised on the absolute sovereignty of God. Mawdudi ascribed to Him the role of the Law-Giver, and the *de jure* head of the sociopolitical order.\(^{74}\) The executive branch in the Islamic state serves as vice-regent to God - a political interpretation of the Islamic belief that man is *khalifatu'llah* (God’s vice-regent) on earth.\(^{75}\) As such, God becomes the *raison d’etre*, guarantor, and actually an integral part of the sociopolitical order.\(^{76}\) As the Islamic state


\(^{73}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, P.81; *idem*, *The Islamic Way*, P.29; *idem*, *Khilafat’u Mulukiyat* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966), Ch.1; *idem*, *Human Rights*, pp.10ff.


\(^{75}\) *ibid*, *Khilafat*, Ch.1. In the classical sources, it is man who is seen as God’s vice-regent. Mawdudi, however, dissolves man’s vice-regency into a collective vice-regency which is vested in the Islamic state and its executive branch; see, *idem*, *Islamic Law*, pp.81-82.

\(^{76}\) See, Ahmed, "Maudoodi’s Islamic State", P.98.
is the sole medium of interaction between man and God, His role and image are temporalized.

Absolute sovereignty of God furthermore, acted to mold the Islamic state in a particular cast. Since the state operated in essentially a "vice-regent" capacity to the "legal sovereignty" of God it was, an executive, managerial and "praetorian" state; a "caretaker" state, in the words of Rosenthal. For Mawdudi, this image of the Islamic state was intended. The Islamic state, he argued, was not an evolving entity, but already a perfect one, requiring no changes of the mundane nature. Man could not improve upon it, but was merely enjoined to implement and subsequently, preserve it. Hence, politics, elections, or legislations could only play a secondary role in that state.

The liberal notion of the state is based on the centrality of the political role of the individual citizen. The legitimacy of the state is directly related to its public accountability. The state is regarded as legitimate as long as it implements the general interests of the public under conditions of freedom of expression. The Islamic state on the other hand, requires the depoliticization of the public sphere, making it malleable to the designs of the state. This feat will be accomplished through the education of the citizenry in Islam -

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78 *idem, Islamic Law*, P.114.

79 *idem, Islami Riyasat*, P.127.


81 Mawdudi for instance, argued that the legislature was to have only an advisory role in the Islamic state; see, Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), P.175.
the din to be specific - which will harmonize public opinion, reduce the role of competing interests in forming political programs, and produce a monolithic outlook on the good of the state and the interests of the citizenry. The centrality of the effort at depoliticizing the citizenry will also justify the right of the state to intervene in society in the role of arbitrator.

Individual expression was also curtailed by the primacy of the "legal" and by implication, political sovereignty of God, as enunciated by Mawdudi;\(^\text{82}\) lest it counter the Divine mandate of the state. As the embodiment and seat of Divine will and man's vice-regency, the state becomes the supreme authority and the sole political actor, as well as the embodiment of popular will.\(^\text{83}\) The individual must relinquish his own vice-regency to that of the Islamic state, which is the expression of a collective vice-regency.\(^\text{84}\) The individual is therefore, bound by the writ of the state, which is backed by the full force of religious law and the more paramount power of collective vice-regency.\(^\text{85}\) The example of the Prophet's rule in Medinah, the idealized historical model for the Islamic state, moreover, confirmed the Islamic state as a centralized body-politique with an


\(^{83}\) idem, Islamic Law, P.115.

\(^{84}\) ibid, pp.81-82.

\(^{85}\) Mawdudi backs his argument also with the Qur'anic injunction: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority" (Qur'an, IV:59), translation from Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, P.85. Mawdudi identified "those...in authority" (ulau'l-amr) as the guardians of the Islamic state - the executive branch and its titular head; see, Mawdudi, Islami Riyasat, pp.185-86; idem, Islamic Law, pp.119-20. For Khomeini's reference to and use of the same Qur'anic passage see, Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.177-78.

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omnipotent executive branch.\textsuperscript{86}

Mawdudi, however, also conceived of a legislature and a judiciary in the Islamic state, limited in their function to advising the executive.\textsuperscript{87} The veritable task of legislation and judicial oversight, should such a need arise, were vested in the state itself, and by implication, in the state's overseer, the executive branch. The task of legislation and interpretation were moreover, limited to issues which did not infringe on the sovereignty of God, and pertained only to mundane affairs.\textsuperscript{88} As the vice-regent to God, Mawdudi permitted the state to exercise \textit{ijtihad} (independent inquiry to establish the ruling of the \textit{shari'ah}),\textsuperscript{89} which has traditionally been the domain of the 'ulama, and was practiced on individual bases. Mawdudi favored wresting the exclusive right to the practice from the doctors of religious law, and instead, vesting it in the state.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{TQ}, (January 1937), pp. 322-33, (December 1937), pp.243-68; and Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.122.
\item \textsuperscript{87} \textit{idem}, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.124. Mawdudi argued that during the time of the Prophet, \textit{qadis} (judges) implemented the \textit{shari'ah} without discussion or the interference of lawyers, whom he argued could obfuscate the truth. See, \textit{idem}, \textit{System of Government}, P.8. The very notion of a judiciary as an independent organ of the state was a concession to Western political thought; see, \textit{System of Government}, pp.9-10.
\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{idem}, \textit{System of Government}, pp.8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{89} The practice of \textit{ijtihad} has, by an large, been suspended by Sunni Muslims, and permitted on points not already decided by the recognized authorities. Modernist and revivalist thinkers since the nineteenth century have favored the reinstitution of \textit{ijtihad} as a means of reforming the faith, and reinterpreting its teachings in light of the requirements of the modern world. For more on \textit{ijtihad} see, D.B. Macdonald and J. Schacht, \textit{Idjtihad, EI}(2). For contemporary discussion on \textit{ijtihad} see N.J. Coulson, \textit{A History of Islamic Law}, reprint, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978), pp.202-17.
\end{itemize}

For Mawdudi's views on \textit{ijtihad} see, Maulana Abul' Ala Maudoodi and Sh. Mohammad Abu Zahra, "The Role of "ijtihad" and the Scope of Legislation in Islam", in \textit{The Muslim Digest} (Durban, South Africa), 9:6 (January 1959), pp.15-20.
The discussion of the working of the Islamic state, from this point on, showed an even more marked imprint of a debate with Western political thought. The Islamic state, ideally above mundane political idioms, was increasingly given shape through the use of unmistakably Western terminologies and theoretical constructs, engendering a seemingly Islamic system, which was in fact, premised on a modernizing ethos. Having put the contentious issue of the absolute sovereignty of God behind, Mawdudi's incorporation and assimilation of borrowed ideas and mechanisms into the structure of his discourse flowed without interruption and with an uncanny efficiency.\textsuperscript{90} The Islamic state duplicated, assimilated and reproduced Western political concepts, structures and operations unfailingly, producing a theory of statecraft, which save for its name, and use of Islamic nomenclature and symbolisms, showed little indigenous influence. The synthesis, while systematic and consistent in its method, was not always free of theoretical inconsistencies and operational handicaps.

The Islamic state, suggested Mawdudi, functioned on the bases of the working of the \textit{shari'ah} on the one hand, and the office of the Amir (leader) or Caliph as he may called, on the other. The one set the boundaries of the state, determining its laws and the operation of its economy, while the other oversaw its affairs.\textsuperscript{91} The titular head of the state, the Amir, was to be elected by the citizenry. Mawdudi, however, did not condone candidacy or electioneering; nor did he countenance the operation of more than one

\textsuperscript{90} See for instance, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, "Political Thought in Early Islam", in Sharif, \textit{A History}, vol.1, pp.656-72.

\textsuperscript{91} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, pp.79-81.
political party in the state. For, there could not exist more than one correct opinion on truth, and it was religious law rather than popular vote that was the judge of the truth.\(^{92}\) How democracy was to take its course, therefore, remained undefined.

The *shari'ah* was meanwhile, charged with the task of guaranteeing the equality of all citizens of the state before the law, providing proper channels for expression of popular grievances against the executive, based on stipulated criteria which were to be in concord with the aims of the state. The concession to freedom of political expression was limited, more so since it could have currency only during the formative stages of the Islamic state, when in the absence of the rule of Divine Law, inconsistencies may persist requiring protection of individual rights. Thenceforth, dissent in a polity based on Divine Law has tenuous basis, and may well be construed as apostasy. With this thought in mind, Mawdudi curbed the extent of individual rights before the state further, stipulating that, unless the citizenry of the Islamic state was able to prove inappropriate intentions or deeds on the part of the executive body, it was bound by its decisions and lead.\(^{93}\) More significantly, Mawdudi argued, that should a legitimate grievance arise among the citizenry regarding the affairs of the state, and it be demonstrated that the government has erred from the path of the *din*,\(^{94}\) care should be taken not to confuse the state, which always remains virtuous, with the holders of office who are prone to be fallible. Dissent therefore, was also restricted to the government and was diverted away from the state. With the


\(^{93}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, P.81.

\(^{94}\) *ibid*, P.116.
legislature and the judiciary occupying mere advisory capacities, it was not certain what channels were open for an orderly expression of dissent, and forcing a transfer of power should the cause of dissent be just. Discussions of popular consultation in Mawdudi’s works were moreover, highly theoretical and hence diffuse. Concrete procedures and mechanisms were supplanted by emphasis upon the famous Prophetic saying: "my community will never agree over error", and its corollary doctrine of *ijma* (consensus). Rather than a mechanism for consultation and expression of popular will, the Islamic state employed these Islamic concepts as the means to reinforce its legitimacy and policy decisions. For, the individual was, in effect, excluded from political activity, unless he could prove the necessity of his interference in the affairs of the state. The burden of proof in such circumstances was, moreover, placed on the shoulders of the individual, who could participate in the process of governance, only at the helm of an irrefutably popular movement of dissent or a clear consensus over a particular program. *Ijma*, by stipulating the possibility of change only as a result of popular consensus, the extent of which is open to interpretation, bolsters the *status quo* vesting power in the heretofore embodiment of popular will, the Islamic state. In short, the individual, while given the right to dissent is hard-pressed to express it. Dissent moreover, will be irrelevant to the working of the state, unless it be expressed by the majority of the citizens of the state.

Mawdudi saw no undemocratic tendencies in his propositions. He conversely,

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95 *ibid*, P.83.

96 *Ijma* - consensus - stipulates that, legal and juridical reforms and changes become established and binding once they enjoy the approval of the majority of the law-makers. For more on this theme see, M. Bernard, *Idjma*, *EI*(2).
argued that the principle of election of the Amir, albeit divorced of a free electoral process, would engender a democratic state, whose continuity would be guaranteed by the presence of a sacrosanct code of law, which is by definition just, and which demands obedience from the few and the sundry. Absent from Mawdudi's list of democratic features of the state were guarantees for democratic procedures, protection of individual rights, and most importantly, a mechanism which would translate popular interests into policy positions. With regard to this last point, by disparaging candidacy and electioneering, Mawdudi had divorced the process of election of leaders from popular concerns, and moreover, cast a shadow on the manner in which the state could reproduce itself and gain continuity.

Mawdudi had, in effect, understood democracy as a static definition, merely in terms of elections and equality before the law. Democracy as a dynamic process whereby social, economic and political concerns are relayed to political actors, and find expression in their programs, policies and decision found no reflection in Mawdudi's thinking. Democracy was understood in parts rather than as a whole, as a concession by the state and not as a system in toto. Binder writes of this tendency in the revivalist discourse in general, in following terms:

"The second form of Islamic liberalism [revivalism] would justify the establishment of liberal institutions (parliament, elections, civil rights) and even some social welfare policies, not on the basis of the absence of any contradictory Islamic legislation, which they are inclined to deduce from canonical sources and from available anecdotal histories of the early

97 Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, pp.81-93.

98 *idem*, *Musalman Awr Mawjudah*, vol.3, pp.70-74.
caliphate. Of course, the result is an anomaly, since the liberal institutions
would not themselves be based upon liberal political, epistemological, and
moral principles...but rather on explicit Islamic legislation of divine
origin. 99

Perhaps Mawdudi thought that, in an ideal state, wherein there exist no grievances
which require the attention of the leadership, where the citizenry willingly submit to the
writ of the state, and moreover, cease to concern themselves with the affairs of the world
and turn to spiritual concerns, and where as a result, the process of becoming ceases to
have meaning, democracy can be reduced to a mere definition for elections and the rule
of law. Similarly, Mawdudi thought, it was conceivable that a powerful and centralized
state, one whose institutions were based on religious sanctions and reflected Divine values,
could be democratic in spirit, provided it was the ideal state.

The picture which emerges from Mawdudi's discourse is one of a state with
commanding authority, based on mass support and guaranteed by the state's fidelity to
Islamic norms. 100 The mass support, engendered by the exposure of the populace to the
veritable teaching of Islam, 101 would reduce the burden of the government and render
the use of compulsion in enforcing its writ unnecessary. 102 A state guided by the tenets
of the shari'ah moreover, is unlikely to manipulate power, or to resort to unjust oppression


101 *TQ*, (January-February, 1936), pp.388-400. Here Mawdudi justifies the Turkish
example which defies his logic, arguing in this regard that, the Turks disbanded the
caliphate and opted for a secular state because they accepted Islam through obscurantist
channels and after the occlusion of Islamic orthodoxy.

of its citizens. It was the corruption ushered in by the Umayyads, argued Mawdudi, that had converted the historical institution of the Caliphate into a tyrannical regime. Otherwise, Islam in its pure form, as seen in the state of the Prophet, was free of authoritarian tendencies. Islam, in its pure form, could never support despotic rule. For, Islam was by nature attuned to the needs of man, and was the best guarantor of his rights. The human rights which the West had to fight for, Mawdudi argued, were already extant in the shari'ah. Hence the advent of the Islamic state would resolve rather than create human rights dilemmas.

The issue of human rights was posed in terms of the objective of Islamicity and not in relation to the epistemological and political bases of the concept. It was seen as the right to demand an Islamic order and to live in it, but not to differ with that state or defy its writ. Hence, rather than providing concrete safe-guards for individual rights, Mawdudi trusted the state with the supervision of the shari'ah, the implementation of which was seen as synonymous with the protection of fundamental human rights. For so long as the Islamic state and its executive branch abided by the shari'ah, their democratic character would be preserved. In the words of Adams, the totalitarian proclivity of the Islamic

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103 Mawdudi, Khilafat, ch.1.


105 Mawdudi, Human Rights, (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1976), pp.10-11. Mawdudi provides the example of slavery in this regard, which was abrogated in the West after much struggling, but has been banned in the shari'ah; see, ibid, P.19, and SAAM, vol.2, pp.68-69.

106 Mawdudi argued that, the Prophet's unwavering abeyance by the shari'ah had preserved the Medinah community under the Prophet, and protected its democratic character. See, Maududi, System of Government, pp.6-7.
state "need cause no one concern, in this unique instance, because God's commands working in the life of the state are just and benevolent". The influence of Islam on the state is such that, democracy, a concept and myth which bore positive connotations for Mawdudi, could be appropriated to describe its working. The Islamic state therefore, was democratic in that its virtues could best be captured by the most laudatory Western political adjective, "democratic". The confusion and inherent contradiction in the use of the term democratic in describing the Islamic state, is thus clarified, for, it is a mark of adulation rather than a point of fact. Islam as the embodiment of the highest moral values, and democracy as the most cherished political ideal were blended into the language of Mawdudi's discourse, giving shape and meaning to an idealized political formulation.

In the final analysis, Mawdudi's conception of the Islamic state, although it seriously grappled with the notion of democracy at various levels, remained at odds with democracy. As the embodiment of the perceived will of the masses and the realization of an ideological vision, rather than a facsimile of a liberal democratic polity, the Islamic state approximated the set-up of a "Popular Democratic Republic".

If elements of authoritarianism continued to surface in lieu of Mawdudi's assurances, it found justification in the fact that, ultimately the Islamicity of the state was to override all other considerations. In the final analysis, the Islamic state was to be judged by its adherence to Islamic teachings, and not for its mode of government. While

ideally Islam and democracy should both shape the Islamic state, the former was clearly a greater concern than the latter. Hence, Mawdudi gave the state broad coercive powers, and exclusive monopoly of such key Islamic doctrines as *jihad*,¹⁰⁸ to protect and perpetuate its rule, to enforce Islamic law,¹⁰⁹ and to ward off "corruption" and "decay" from within.¹¹⁰ The division of power in the state, between the various branches, were designed with the same objective in mind, to augment the power of the executive and therefore, bolster stability and order in the system.

Mawdudi's thinking here echoed the position of medieval Islamic political thought, wherein order was viewed as the greatest ideal, and anarchy as an evil which should be avoided at all costs, even if it meant support for an unjust rule.¹¹¹ Disdain shown for expression of popular political will by a generation of Muslim thinkers from al-Mawardi (d.1058) to al-Ghazzali (d.1111), finds a poignant manifestation in Mawdudi's defense of the rights of the Islamic state.¹¹² Where Mawdudi parted with the medieval theorists was in his recognition of individual rights in principle, and the possibility of their embodiment in the state, a concession which he had made to Western political thought.

The Working of the Islamic State

¹⁰⁸ It was Mawdudi's belief that only a state can declare *jihad* that, led him to oppose Pakistan's covert encouragement of *jihad* in Kashmir in 1948 at a time when it had accepted a formal cease-fire with India. For more on this episode see, chapter 11.


¹¹² Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, P.90.
The path to the Islamic state and the working of that state, as alluded to earlier, rest heavily upon the mode of operation of the executive branch and its titular head, the Amir.\(^{113}\) Mawdudi’s expansion on this theme and the process of selection of the Amir, once again, point to the assimilative dynamic of his thinking on the Islamic state, and his grappling with the notion of democracy.

The Amir is to be selected through an electoral process. Although modeled after the historical institution of the caliphate, and sanctioned by the concern of the state for Islamicity, the legitimacy of the office of Amir was, in large part, predicated upon elections.\(^{114}\) The election process was to guarantee the viability of the office of Amir, above and beyond, its functional utility. Hence, in a state whose structure and functioning is to be legitimated by Islam, the leadership is to receive its mandate from the populace. The inconsistency inherent in implementing democratic mechanisms in an authoritarian state structure is self-evident. Such admixtures of authoritarianism and democracy elucidate the manner in which the nature of Mawdudi’s understanding of the concept of democracy, and his dilemma in incorporating it into his political thinking, coalesced to produce a convoluted and problematic picture of the Islamic state. For instance, in both the Islamic state and the Jama'at-i Islami, where elections have been institutionalized as the principle mechanism for transfer of power, discouragement of candidature, on moral

\(^{113}\) While Mawdudi has often discussed the issue of the Islamic state in conjunction with the institution of caliphate, he used the title, Amir (leader) in reference to the head of the Islamic state.

\(^{114}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, pp.128-29. Mawdudi argued that the Caliphate, before its was corrupted, was also based on elections, and as such democracy and Islamicity were already assimilated into its structure; also see *idem, Khilafat*.  

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and Islamic grounds, has vitiated the complete implementation of a democratic order.\textsuperscript{115} As will be discussed later, democracy without candidature proved to be an inoperable ideal. Mawdudi’s position in this regard, proved an impediment to the cause of the Jama’at once the organization decided to participate in Pakistani politics, and was duly altered. Hence, while candidature is not permitted in the Jama’at’s internal elections, nor has it been incorporated into the working of the ideal Islamic state, from 1957 onwards Mawdudi allowed regular electoral activities for members of the Jama’at and the organization’s allies at the national level.\textsuperscript{116} The discrepancy between the organization’s professed ideal and its practices since 1957 provide a clear example of the distinction which Mawdudi made between values which hold true in the Islamic state and those which are permissible during the struggle for that state - a case of the end justifying the means in spite of the end itself.\textsuperscript{117}

Just as the Islamic state was inspired by the example of the Medinah community and the early years of the caliphate, so was the office of the Amir modeled after the leadership of the Prophet of Islam and those of his immediate successors, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs.\textsuperscript{118} This was a model which, Mawdudi argued, had been put to test and

\textsuperscript{115} On Mawdudi’s discouragement of candidature see, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, \textit{Islam ka Nazariyah Siyasi} (Delhi, 1967), P.86.

\textsuperscript{116} See Parts III and IV.

\textsuperscript{117} This point has been emphasized by former Jama’at stalwarts who separated from the movement over this issue; interviews with Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore, and Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.

found viable.\textsuperscript{119} Mawdudi, however, differed with the position of traditional thinkers who saw the prophetic era and the reign of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs as a unique period in history predicated upon the existence of an exceptional leadership and a veritable ummah (Muslim community). While careful not to diminish the role of the Prophet, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and the early Muslim community in creating a veritable Muslim order, Mawdudi sought to identify the social mechanisms and political institutions which bolstered and sustained the early Islamic polity. With the rigor of a sociologist, he penetrated behind the facade of the prophetic era in search of ways and means which could make that idealized order relevant to and operable in modern times.\textsuperscript{120} Hence, the "democratic caliphate" as the reconstitution of the idealized prophetic era is not entirely an Islamic expression; it is rather a hybrid formulation, molded in part in the image of a modern political concept.\textsuperscript{121} Many of the ideals of the Islamic state are borrowed from the corpus of modern thought, which has also determined Mawdudi's approach to traditional political concepts and institutions. The emphasis on elections, for instance, was in some measure, a means to guarantee against a dynastic usurpation of power in the Islamic state, which Mawdudi believed caused the corruption and decline of the Caliphate in the seventh century. Echoing modern political thought, Mawdudi saw primogeniture in a negative light, and consciously used a modern idea - elections - to


\textsuperscript{120} See, \textit{TQ}, (February 1936), pp.388-400, and (January 1937), pp.322-33.

\textsuperscript{121} On "democratic caliphate" see, Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.151.
preclude the possibility of traditionalization of the Islamic state. It was with the same objective in mind that, Mawdudi imbedded into the ethos of the Islamic state, the belief in the primacy of the state concern for its welfare over the interests of either its leader or that of any of the state's constituent branches. The Amir as a result, is more clearly bound by the law and, in principle, more accountable to the people than was the case with the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. Mawdudi's concept of the Islamic state, therefore, consciously avoided dependence on the role of the leader, which typified the prophetic and the early caliphate states and subsequently all Muslim rule; and instead, sought to anchor all authority in the state itself. As the mainstay of the virtuous order, it will be the state and not a the charisma of its leader which will serve as the object of loyalty and adulation of the citizenry.

The transition from the historical model, wherein authority was based on the central role of leader to the Islamic state, in which authority emanated from the ideological content of the state, however, did not occur smoothly or free of ambiguity. For, the Islamic state was modeled after the reign of the Prophet in Arabia, and as it was finally consolidated in the form of the institution of the caliphate; yet, the Islamic state

122 Mawdudi was always emphatically opposed to primogeniture. He often interpreted historical movements of dissent as rebellions against dynastic rule. In an interesting article, he interpreted the uprising and martyrdom of Husain ibn 'Ali in the same light. See, TQ, (July 1960), pp.194-206.

123 Maudoodi, Islamic Law, P.151; also see, Ahmed, The Concept of An Islamic State, P.113.


125 Mauaddi, Islamic Law, P.114.
is sufficiently different from its historical precedent to obfuscate the umbilical chord which relates the two. Mawdudi replaced the charismatically charged office of the Caliph (as successor to that of prophetic rule) with the "impersonal collective autonomous reality" of the Islamic state. In classical sources it is specified that, the Caliph must be a member of the Quraysh tribe, to which Prophet Muhammad and all other subsequent caliphs also belonged. Mawdudi, in a clear attempt to part from the classical doctrine of the caliphate, argued that any Muslim regardless of caste, color, race or any other affiliations may become the Amir of the Islamic state. In addition, Mawdudi delegated more power, albeit symbolically, to other branches of the government, the judiciary and the legislature.

However, Mawdudi's departure from the traditional position remained half-hearted; the Islamic state stood between the personalized rule of the Caliph and the working of a modern state. Mawdudi appealed to the emotive power of the classical doctrine of caliphate, and yet sought to modernize it. The overt appeals to the symbolism of the

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126 Schleifer, "Jihad", P.97.

127 *ibid*, P.97.

128 It was in light of this stipulation that the Ottoman sultans, who were of Turkish origin, went to great lengths to confirm their Quraysh legitimacy; and it was for this reason also that, the religious establishment had looked askance on their claim to the caliphate.

129 Mawdudi, *Tafhimat*, vol.3, pp.129-52; *idem, Islamic Law*, P.131. Interestingly, Mawdudi's efforts at diffusing the charisma of the office of the caliph echoed the position of the Khawarij sect, who also rejected the Quraysh's monopoly of the office of the Caliph. On the Khawarij see, Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, pp.54-63.

historical model prevented a total break with tradition, which in turn, vitiated the full modernization of Mawdudi's Islamic state. Hence, between the idealized model of the past, and the revised version drawn up with view to contemporary application, there has arisen confusion regarding the source of authority, legitimacy and charisma in the Islamic state; an ambivalence about the loci of power around which the polity is to mobilize its emotive and political potential. This ambivalence, incidentally, also surfaced in the Jama'at with regard to the source of authority within the organization, and the extent of Mawdudi's powers vis a vis the various organs of the Jama'at.

The Amir is described as the omnipotent head of the Islamic state. His source of authority, however, rests elsewhere, in the ideological content of the state. Although modeled after the example of the Prophet and the early caliphate, his power emanates not from the charisma of his persona, lineage, or office, but from the function which he performs as the protector of the Islamic state, and the electoral mandate which he receives from the citizenry. His office demands the loyalty of the citizenry, but is implicitly in competition with the loyalty demanded by the Islamic state itself. Therefore, although conceived as a mobilizational state, the Islamic state's focus remains unspecified. The ramification of this ambivalence is evident in the dynamics of the institutionalization and routinization of Mawdudi's own charisma in the structure and political praxis of the Jama'at-i Islami - which is a preamble to the Islamic state. It moreover, accounts for the Jama'at's equivocal approach to pragmatic politics on the one hand, and the unleashing of its charismatic potential - the concept of Islamic revolution - on the other.131 For, the

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131 See Parts III-IV.
structure of Mawdudi's discourse on the Islamic state, as outlined above, obviated the possibility of consolidation of a charismatic movement, and in its continued attachment to the traditional perspective encouraged routinization of the movement's incipient charisma in favor of pragmatic politics.

Similar continuity, change, and subsequently ambiguity characterized Mawdudi's treatment of organs of the Islamic state. The idea of a legislature found shape against the background of the concept of *shura'* (consultative assembly),\(^{132}\) and the historical Islamic institution of *ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd* (those who unbind and bind).\(^{133}\) Both institutions have, throughout Islamic history, in one form or the other, performed a consultative or legislative function in Muslim political orders. The *Shura',* which also features prominently in the Jama'at at all levels, is compared by Mawdudi to the concept of a parliament in Western political thought.\(^{134}\) The *Shura',* Mawdudi argued, should reflect popular will, reinforce the democratic proclivities of the state, and act as a source for novel legislations. However, the *Shura' was not to possess an autonomous basis of power protected by the constitution of the Islamic state, and was to act only in an advisory capacity. Membership to the *Shura' should be open only to pious Muslims. The criterion of piety, although ambiguous, not only reinforces the Islamicity of the state, precluding the possibility of discord within its ranks, but will also limit the extent of legislative autonomy


\(^{133}\) For more see, Ed., *Ahl al-Hall wa'l-'Aqd, EI(2).*

\(^{134}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law,* pp.136-37; and *idem, Islami Riyasat,* P.325.
vis a vis the executive. The criterion of piety will serve as the means for excluding "undesirable" ideas, politicians and policies from the legislature. This criterion, no doubt, cast aspersions on the democratic intent of Mawdudi's formulation, wherein, democracy remained bound by the overriding ideological concerns of the state.

The legislative powers of the Shura', where applicable, were moreover, based on the practice of ijtihad which was limited by Mawdudi to only a select few, those who in addition to piety are well-versed in modern subjects, the religious sciences, and in Arabic. The scope of the activities of the Shura' were thus limited constitutionally as well as through the stipulation of inhibitive criteria for membership in the legislature. Mawdudi did not view the legislature as a political organ but a legal one. While the concept of the legislature bore Western connotations, it was equated with the time-honored social and religious function of the 'ulama and doctors of Islamic law - the ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd. The relation of the legislature to the executive branch was therefore similar to that of the 'ulama to the Caliphate. The legislature was charged with the task of assisting the executive branch in managing the affairs of the Islamic state with view to preserving its ideological purity. Its efforts were not directed at translating popular demands into policy positions, but interpreting the shari'ah with view to the needs of the state. As such, Mawdudi favored limiting the linkage between members of the legislature and their respective constituencies. He therefore, advocated a system of proportional representation in the elections to the legislature, which would place greater focus on the

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ideological orientation of the contestants, and would reduce the spontaneity which is inherent in a more direct contact between the electorate and their representatives. Proportional representation, moreover, presented the possibility of elections without candidature which was always advocated by Mawdudi. As will be discussed later, the Jama'at also upheld the same position in its various election manifestoes in Pakistan, viewing proportional representation as a more efficacious system with view to the organization's political objectives.

The Shura' was ultimately limited in its powers by the executive branch and the office of the Amir. The idealized examples of the reign of the Prophet and those of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, wherein the divinely ordained rule of the leader overrode other centers of authority in the political order had thwarted Mawdudi's attention from the dangers of vesting too much power in the executive, and led him to limit the powers of the legislature in favor of an omnipotent executive. Mawdudi recognized that, since both the executive and the legislature in the Islamic state are executors, rather than interpreters, of the shari'ah, their functions overlap, and as such, one should be made clearly subservient to the other. Mawdudi, however, did not necessarily foresee conflicts of interest between the two. For, Mawdudi's argument, needless to add, was premised on the assumption that in ideal circumstances which he deemed attainable if the din reigned supreme in the state, no discord would arise between the various organs of the state. The monolithic unity of the din moreover, would preclude the possibility of wide-ranging

136 *TQ*, (October-December 1938), pp.315-16.
disagreements over various policy issues. Disagreements between the executive and the legislature were viewed as a product of deviation from the *din*. Discord was, therefore, regarded with alarm, as both unnatural and religiously reprehensible.\textsuperscript{138} Therefore the state was not designed to manage discord, but to minimize the possibility of its occurrence. Checks and balances of power, and mechanisms for ironing out differences did not feature prominently in Mawdudi's exposition. As a result, the Islamic state remained susceptible to threats of discord, and with no viable means to resolve disagreements, aside from reiteration of the ideological ethos of the state, *din* emerged as the glue which bound the otherwise fragile structure of the Islamic state together. It was with view to this reality that, the Islamic state will appear "less idiosyncratic once society is educated in Islam...[and]...this view of the state would appear most natural."\textsuperscript{139} One implication of Mawdudi's argument was that, Islamization of the society, unlike what other revivalist thinkers such as Khomeini have preached, must precede the establishment of the Islamic state.\textsuperscript{140} This inference, as will be elucidated later on, has caused much confusion about the scope, aim and agenda of the Jama'at's participation in Pakistani politics, which purports to the establishment of the Islamic state before the Islamization of the society and its education in the *din*.

Mawdudi's conception of the working of the Islamic state was eventually put to test in 1956-57, when serious dissent arose within the Jama'at regarding the movement's

\textsuperscript{138} *ibid*, P.151.

\textsuperscript{139} *ibid*, P.138.

\textsuperscript{140} *ibid*, pp.138-39; and *idem*, "Economic and Political Teachings", P.197.
participation in Pakistani politics. While this incidence will examined fully in Part III, its implications for Mawdudi's teachings on the Islamic state should be enumerated here. A number of the Jama'at's members, backed by the resolutions of the organization's Majlis-i Shura', opposed Mawdudi's decision to immerse the Jama'at in the travails of electoral politics scheduled for 1958. Their decision was overruled by Mawdudi who, true to his teachings on the working of the ideal Islamic state, refused to accept the legitimacy of their act of dissent, and openly rejected the decisions of the Majlis-i Shura' as unwarranted infringements on the powers of the Amir. The merits of the issue at the center of the debate were overshadowed by concerns for unity of purpose, and the extent of the rights of the Amir. Mawdudi retorted to criticisms of his decision on future activities of the Jama'at by arguing that the success of the organization hinged on "unity of thought, heart, spirit, and most importantly, action".\textsuperscript{141} Mawdudi argued further that, the position of the Amir should be supreme in the organization, as is that of a military commander in the battle field.\textsuperscript{142} The Machhi Goth incident led to wide scale defections from the Jama'at, sapping the movement of much of its intellectual and political talent. It not only pointed to the inherent weakness of the essentially authoritarian orientation of Mawdudi's conception of the Islamic state, but also revealed the manner in which fidelity to the ideological aim of the state and the fear of its demise, could be employed to augment the powers of the executive, and to further limit those of

\textsuperscript{141} From the original draft of Mawdudi's speech before the extraordinary session of Jama'at-i Islami at Machhi Goth in February of 1957; cited in, \textit{Mithaq} (Lahore), 38:12 (February 1990), P.24.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{ibid}, P.24.
the legislature.

The Islamic State and the Islamic Constitution

It was mentioned earlier that, the success of the Islamic state hinged on the completion of the Islamization of society. As such, Islamization and the erection of the Islamic state were seen as a piece-meal efforts, which were to take place within the framework of a *da’wah* movement, directed at popularizing adherence to the *din*. However, this effort also possessed a political corollary in the form of a legislative struggle to transform the existing apparatuses and mechanisms of the Pakistan state into Islamic ones, and to thereby also create a viable constitution for the future Islamic state. The struggle for an Islamic constitution as it was shaped in Pakistan between 1947 and 1958, was not only a path to the Islamic state, to be contrasted with Islamic revolution which will be discussed later, but also in practice resolved the dilemma of defining the Jama‘at’s participation in Pakistani politics in lieu of a revolutionary struggle directed at establishing the Islamic state. Islamic constitution therefore, became the agenda which both directed the Jama‘at’s efforts towards its ideological aim, and yet carved a niche for its activity within the structure of Pakistani politics. It served as a means by the use of which the path to the Islamic state moved away from revolutionary activism to politics within the existing political order, routinizing and yet politicizing the Jama‘at’s original idealism.

Implicit in Mawdudi’s arguments in this regard, was the belief that the Islamic constitution was an evolving document. It was neither the *shari‘ah*, nor any other ready-made program available to any group or government. It was rather, the axis along which the existing polity would be reformed and reconstituted in the direction of the Islamic
state. He wrote in this regard:

"When we say that this country should have an Islamic Constitution, we do not mean that we possess a Constitution of the Islamic state in a written form and the only thing that is required to be done is to enforce it. The core of the problem is that we want an unwritten Constitution to be transformed into a written one. What we term as Islamic Constitution is in reality an unwritten Constitution. It is contained in certain specific sources, and it is from that we have to evolve a written Constitution in keeping with the present-day requirements of our country." \(^{143}\)

The process of constitution making was therefore a dynamic one, and a integral component of the struggle for the creation of an Islamic state. It also implied the acceptance of the principle of gradual change towards the creation of an Islamic state,\(^{144}\) one which was directed, specifically, at replacing British laws, an agenda which intensified Mawdudi’s debate with the West: \(^{145}\)

"if we wish to promulgate Islamic Law here [in Pakistan], it would mean nothing less than the demolition of the entire structure built by your British masters and the erection of a new one in its place." \(^{146}\)

The Islamic constitution was primarily a religious document, based on the Qur’an, Prophetic Traditions, conventions of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and the canonized

\(^{143}\) Maududi, First Principles, P.1.

\(^{144}\) Mawdudi placed a great deal of emphasis on the need to proceed on the path towards Islamization gradually, lest the entire process be jeopardized. He underlined the necessity of preparing the populace and their leader in the ways and means of the Islamic order through Islam, arguing that it will be a path fraught with difficulties, especially in view of the machinations of the imperialist powers. See, Mauddodi, Islamic Law, pp.52-57.

\(^{145}\) ibid, pp.48-52. Throughout this work Mawdudi refers to British laws and compares his proposals with the British codes which are used in the Pakistani legal system.

\(^{146}\) ibid, P.51.
verdicts of recognized jurists.\textsuperscript{147} However, the Islamic constitution, Mawdudi asserted, was not the same thing as the \textit{shari'ah}. The \textit{shari'ah} will serve as the bases of the legal code of the Islamic state,\textsuperscript{148} but was not structured in the fashion of a constitution.

The \textit{shari'ah}, Mawdudi argued, would have to be tailored to the needs of the Islamic state. The Divine law consisted of two parts, one immutable and binding, and the other, open to interpretation and change.\textsuperscript{149} New legislations would have to be incorporated into the body of the \textit{shari'ah} through \textit{ta'wil} (hermeneutic interpretation), \textit{qiyas} (logical reasoning), \textit{ijtihad} (independent inquiry into Islamic law), \textit{ijma'\textsuperscript{150}} (collective consensus), and \textit{istihsan} (invoking the spirit of the \textit{shari'ah} in novel circumstances), all in keeping with the precepts of the \textit{din}.\textsuperscript{151} Such legislative endeavors were open only to the learned men of the religion or "vanguard" movements such as the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{152} The law-making process was moreover, complimented with the institution of ancillary changes in the infrastructure of society in general, and its system of education in particular. An "Academy of Law", Mawdudi argued, was required as the bases of the constitution making

\textsuperscript{147} ibid, pp.3-6.

\textsuperscript{148} Mawdudi, \textit{Islami Riyasat}, P.325.

\textsuperscript{149} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, pp.32-35.

\textsuperscript{150} ibid, P.43. However, as \textit{ijma'\textsuperscript{1}} is the only mechanism which includes the citizenry of the Islamic state in the constitution making process, its importance as a source for new laws are discounted by Mawdudi. See, Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, pp.320-27.

\textsuperscript{151} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.36.

\textsuperscript{152} ibid, pp.36-38.
process, relating religious knowledge to the contemporary needs of the society and polity.\textsuperscript{153} The Academy would provide a new set of legal minds, ones versed in the religious sciences and yet familiar with modern subjects - a barrier to the entry of the \textit{ulama} into the fray. Similarly, Mawdudi prescribed education in Arabic and judicial issues for the populace as a corollary of the process of constitution making. Finally, concomitant with this process, Islamic legal education should be reformed with view to creating a milieu which would be receptive to the working of an Islamized legal and political order.\textsuperscript{154} All this should take place in tandem with reforms in the existing legal and constitutional structure in Pakistan, bringing them closer to the Islamic perspective.\textsuperscript{155}

The \textit{shari'ah} too, had to be groomed for its role in the Islamic state. It had to be streamlined, reinterpreted and expanded to accommodate the needs of the Islamic state. Most importantly, the \textit{shari'ah} in its classical form does not address questions of governance to the extent required for the working of a modern state. It for instance, does not provide for the relative autonomy of the various branches of the government.\textsuperscript{156} As was evident in Mawdudi's discussion of the issue of the relative autonomy of the legislature, such safe-guards will have to be amended to the existing Islamic legal code.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid}, P.57.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid}, pp.64-65.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid}, pp.67-73. For instance, Mawdudi cites the abolition of the practice of legal defence as incompatible with Islamic values and practices. In later years, Mawdudi moderated his objection to this practice, and the Jama'at formed an Islamic Lawyers Association.

\textsuperscript{156} Maududi, \textit{Economic and Political Teachings}, P.195.
Mawdudi, however, was particularly keen on guaranteeing the relative autonomy of the judiciary from the executive.\(^{157}\) This was not a position to which Mawdudi subscribed from inception, nor did he come to believe in it through the aegis of Western political thought. Rather, it was Mawdudi's experiences with the strongarm tactics of Pakistani governments and the independence of mind and action of the country's judiciary, from 1948 onwards, that convinced him of the wisdom of an autonomous judiciary. When in 1948, 1953 and again in 1963, the Pakistan government moved to crush the Jama'at, it was the judiciary which defended the rights of the organization and gave it new lease on life.\(^{158}\) Hence, Mawdudi and the Jama'at increasingly defended the autonomy of the Pakistani judicial establishment, and the practice of legal defence which Mawdudi had once condemned as immoral and unIslamic.\(^{159}\) What the Jama'at advocated for Pakistan soon began to be reflected in the movement's doctrinal position on the Islamic state.

Mawdudi thenceforth argued that, as a manifestation of equity, itself a cardinal Islamic value,\(^{160}\) justice was the *condito sine qua non* for the existence and operation of the Islamic state.\(^{161}\) The notion of justice and the relative autonomy of the judiciary


\(^{158}\) See Part IV.


\(^{160}\) For a discussion of the themes of equity and justice in modern Islamic political thought see, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Towards A Philosophy of Islamic Economics", in *The Muslim World*, LXXVII:3-4 (July-October 1987), pp.175-96.

\(^{161}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, pp.146-47 and 154-55; *idem*, *Economic and Political Teachings*, P.195; *idem*, *Human Rights*, pp.11-30; and *idem*, "Three Virtues and Three Vices", in *The Muslim Digest* (Durban, South Africa), 9:12 (July 1959), P.14.
were elaborated further through the years, increasingly in debate with the West.\textsuperscript{162} Mawdudi's later writings were significantly different from his earlier proclamations; for instance, "only fear and power can guarantee human rights."\textsuperscript{163}

While his defense of the autonomy of the judiciary may have been lauded by some, many remained skeptical about the nature of the legal establishment of the Islamic state whose autonomy Mawdudi sought to preserve. At the center of the contention were the \textit{hudud} (sing. \textit{hadd}) laws, deemed unpalatable by the Westernized classes which Mawdudi sought to attract to his cause. These laws entail the \textit{shari'ah}'s punitive prescriptions for such crimes as theft, adultery or murder. The laws have often been criticized as retrogressive. Mawdudi tried to mollify this opposition by marginalizing the punitive laws as expounded by the \textit{shari'ah}, and instituting limits to their applicability.

Mawdudi defended the laws in principle, arguing that the cruelty witnessed the West, which provided the yardsticks by which the \textit{hudud} laws were judged, far outweighed the ostensible barbarity of those laws.\textsuperscript{164} From this point on, however, the main directive of his argument was to suspend their application. The \textit{shari'ah}, argued Mawdudi enjoins certain practices, \textit{ma'rufat} (those which are enjoined), and forbids others, \textit{munkarat} (the reprehensibles). For so long as Muslims remain uneducated in the teachings of their faith, which can be widely interpreted to refer to the time preceding the Islamic state, they cannot be punished for the \textit{munkarat}. When a society is imperfect, individuals cannot be

\textsuperscript{162} See, Mawdudi, \textit{Human Rights}.

\textsuperscript{163} Mawdudi, \textit{Al-Jihad}, P.24.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{ibid}, pp.31-32; and \textit{idem}, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.67.
held entirely accountable for deeds which may have either been provoked by their social and economic circumstances, or by their lack knowledge about their faith.\textsuperscript{165} Hudud laws, Mawdudi argued, only make sense in the Islamic state, where the individual has no legitimate excuse for committing the munkarat. Yet, even in the Islamic state the hudud laws are not likely to emerge as a central concern, for, once Muslims become exposed to the teachings of the \textit{din} they will not err from the straight path making the laws redundant.\textsuperscript{166} It should be noted that, Mawdudi's position on the hudud laws changed over the years. In an earlier examination of these laws Mawdudi saw their function not as punitive but to deter the occurrence of crime, which would have favored their imposition at any stage of the Islamization process.\textsuperscript{167} Mawdudi as elucidated here, moved away from this stance, and by placing emphasis on the punitive nature of the laws linked their implementation to the elimination of the causes of crime, postponing the implementation until full Islamization. General Ziya's Hudud Ordinances of 1979, and his invocation of the \textit{shari'ah}'s punitive laws ahead of full Islamization of society ran contrary to Mawdudi's final position on the issue, and as such, caused some difficulties in the Jama'at's alliance with the General's government, and costly doctrinal compromises on the part of the organization.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.56.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{ibid}, P.24.


The years of political activity in Pakistan in particular, and the continuing change in the nature and structure of the concept of the Islamic state in general, forced Mawdudi to examine a number of other doctrinal issues in a new light. Some of the conclusions were reflected in the Jama'at's outlook and policy positions, others have remained practical guidelines which in contradistinction to the movement's doctrinal stance have created anomalies. Mawdudi's later writings and speeches revealed greater weariness of centralization of power in the executive branch.\(^{169}\) He gave greater scope to the rights of the citizenry to "protest against tyranny" in the Islamic state.\(^{170}\) This later position may be contrasted with his earlier declaration that, the Islamic state has the right to expect obedience from its subjects, whether its orders be "palatable or unpalatable, easy or arduous."\(^{171}\)

Mawdudi's later views, however, were not always fully incorporated into the structure of his discourse on the Islamic state. As a result, his proclamations on Pakistani politics were a good deal more liberal than his prescriptions for the Islamic state. The Jama'at demanded rights from Pakistani governments which, in principle, it will not grant in the Islamic state.\(^{172}\) A clear expression of this stance may be seen in Mawdudi's


\(^{170}\) *ibid*, P.28.

\(^{171}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, P.150.

\(^{172}\) For instance, when Mawdudi and a number of Jama'at leaders were incarcerated in 1948-49, the Jama'at began to address the issue of human rights for the first time, demanding the abrogation of the Safety Ordinance Laws under the statutes of which the arrests had occurred. See, *Kawthar* (Lahore), (October 21, 1949), pp.6-9.
attitude towards party politics. As was mentioned earlier, Mawdudi did not favor a party system in the Islamic state.\textsuperscript{173} In an ideal state there existed no need for intermediaries between the state and its subjects, nor did such a state require an elaborate mechanism for translating popular demands into policy positions.\textsuperscript{174} For, the state would be the source of politics and not the masses; the flow of politics would be from top down rather than from the bottom up. The Islamic state, despite its mobilizational outlook, discouraged political participation. Such participation was encouraged only during the struggle for the Islamic state. Thenceforth, popular participation in the affairs of the state was limited to ideological and religious concerns.\textsuperscript{175} Politics would no longer be the domain of the masses. In fact, there is evidence in Mawdudi's works which suggests that he viewed popular political participation with alarm.\textsuperscript{176}

However, in Pakistan Mawdudi begged to differ with his own prescriptions for the Islamic state. When in 1963 Ayub Khan abrogated the multi-party system in favor of his Basic Democracies - something akin to what Mawdudi had in store for the Islamic state - the Jama'at became a mainstay of the struggle for the restoration of the multi-party system.\textsuperscript{177} Mawdudi, however, accepted the legitimacy of the multi-party system

\textsuperscript{173} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.139.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{ibid}, P.161.

\textsuperscript{175} Rosenthal, \textit{Islam in the Modern}, P.145.

\textsuperscript{176} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, P.161.

\textsuperscript{177} See chapter 12.
provided it would be placed in an Islamic framework.\textsuperscript{178} Similarly, in 1978, in response to a query about the possibility of erecting a one-party system in Pakistan Mawdudi said, while in the Islamic state there exists no room for more than one party, a one-party system would be inappropriate otherwise until the society fully commits itself to Islam.\textsuperscript{179} Hence, force of circumstance pushed Mawdudi's discourse in directions not originally envisioned by the thinker himself. As the Jama'at became integrated into Pakistani politics as a political party, Mawdudi accepted parties as a tool in the struggle for the Islamic state, but as one which was to be discarded following the erection of that state.

The Citizens of the Islamic State

The foregoing discussion brings us to a more fundamental issue, the very understanding of the concept of a citizen in the Islamic state. Mawdudi's discourse on the Islamic state revealed greater concern for the collective than for the individual,\textsuperscript{180} and therefore did not provide a concrete definition of the term citizen in the context of the Islamic state, nor did he greatly elaborate upon the extent of his rights and duties. The citizen was bound by the legal code of the state, was enjoined to give obedience to the executive, and since education of the masses should precede the Islamic state, was seen as a devout Muslim and a follower of the \textit{din}. However, the nature and scope of Mawdudi's discussion of the place of the citizenry in the Islamic state was not rooted in

\textsuperscript{178} Maudoodi, \textit{Islamic Law}, pp. 139 and 160-61.

\textsuperscript{179} Cited in \textit{Jasarat} (Karachi), (October 25, 1978), pp.1 and 9.

\textsuperscript{180} Schleifer, "Jihad", P.95.
Islam alone, but in the fractious cultural pluralism of Indian society.

It was pointed out in the chapter 1 that, Mawdudi's political consciousness and religious thinking were molded during an era of increasing communal strife which followed the collapse of the Khilafat Movement. From his revivalist exordium, *Al-Jihad fi'l-Islam* to his desperate attempts to salvage the rule of the Nizam in the predominantly Hindu Hyderabad, to his stance on the Ahmadi issue in Pakistan, Mawdudi's religious and political ideas were shaped and reshaped in light of a perceived threat from the "other". While in his religiopolitical discourse the "other" was the West, in practice, it was the Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis and a host of parochial "others" who motivated and influenced his thinking, and intensified the pace of his debate and dialogue with Western thought. Mawdudi's conception of the Islamic state, although an ideal type model, was intended to be implemented first in India and later in Pakistan. It was therefore forced to confront communalism and the issue of the minorities.\(^{181}\)

Generally, Mawdudi categorized those resident in the Islamic state, hierarchically, based on the extent and types of rights which they were to enjoy, into four groups: male Muslims, female Muslims, *zimmis* ("protected subjects" - followers of a religion recognized by Islam), and non-Muslims, a residual category of those who do not fit the other three, such as the Ahmadis.\(^{\text{182}}\) In practice, Mawdudi only accepted those who fit in the first two categories as citizens of the Islamic state, with men enjoying the full rights of

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citizenship and women only partial rights.183

Muslim men too, are categorized further. There are those who follow the din and those who are nominally Muslim. In a different gradation, there are Hanafi Sunnis,184 to which most Muslims of the Subcontinent belong, whom Mawdudi distinguished from followers of other schools of law as well as from the Shi'is throughout his works, directly as well as indirectly. Similar distinction was made between followers of the Deobandi, Brailwi, Nadwi and the Ahl-i Hadith schools of thought, the first three of which are Hanafis. These gradations are of import in the sense that they reveal the structure of authority and social organization in the Islamic state. Veritable Muslims, followers of the din, stand at the helm of the society and power structure, influencing the nature, working and the future course of the Islamic state. Mawdudi's arguments in this regard were born of his discussion of the din, and as such, found their way into his discourse on the Islamic state. However, following the creation of Pakistan, given the need for a united religious front before the greater threat of secularism, the notion of a gradation of Muslims was by and large muted.185

The issue of the zimmis (members of other recognized

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183 Khurshid Ahmad, Studies in the Family Law of Islam (Karachi: Chiragh-i Rah Publications, 1961), pp.23-25. Women are excluded from the leadership of society, and are generally entrusted to the care of men lest the Islamic state suffer the consequence of their greater freedom; see, Maududi, Purdah, pp.17-37, and idem, Islamic Law, pp.86-87. Mawdudi cited the Qur'anic verse, "Men are in charge of women" (Qur'an, IV:34) and the Prophetic saying: "Verily, that nation would not prosper which hands over the reins of its government to a woman" to bolster his conclusions; see, idem, Islamic Law, pp.139-40.

184 Followers of the school of Abu Hanifah in legal matters.

185 A case in point in this regard is Mawdudi's greater tolerance towards Shi'i following the creation of Pakistan. Yet, the Jama'at continues to look askance upon Shi'ism, and to view its belief and doctrines as heterodox. For instance on June 10, 1962
religions) was of greater relevance to Mawdudi’s discourse in earlier years, when his aims were set on India, and when Pakistan had a sizeable Hindu minority. However, even today the discussion of the Islamic state, whether of the Jama‘at variety or not, becomes immediately anchored in a debate about the rights of Pakistan’s Shi‘i, Isma‘ili, Ahmadi, Parsi and Christian minorities. The Jama‘at’s religious entente with its former rivals among the ‘ulama is still, by and large, within a Sunni framework. The Jama‘at’s increasing tolerance of "others" to this day, aside from the case of the Shi‘is, who thanks to pressures exerted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, have found respite from the Jama‘at’s criticism, does not extend to non-Sunni groupings. As such, the rights of zimmis, as it pertains directly to recognized non-Muslim communities, and to the extent which it reflects on the state’s attitude towards non-Sunni Muslims, continues to be central and sensitive issue in the debate about the Islamic state in Pakistan, and hence a carefully worded section of any draft proposal for such a state, including Mawdudi’s.

Mawdudi’s discussion of the rights of the zimmis in the Islamic state was grounded in the shari‘ah, but was in essence an attempt to respond to the caviling of the critics of the Islamic state, and to assuage the concerns of the minorities themselves, who may be in a position to resist such a state. The Islamic state, Mawdudi argued, will not be a national democratic state, nor one defined by a territorial boundary. It would rather be

Mawdudi appeared before a Shi‘i gathering and delivered a speech; cited in SAAM, vol.2, pp.72-74. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the development of institutional ties between the Jama‘at and the Islamic Republic of Iran, made the Jama‘at more tolerant of Shi‘ism. However, Mawdudi’s conciliatory attitude towards Shi‘is did not extend to the Isma‘ili Shi‘is, whose religious views and practices have been attacked by Mawdudi and the Jama‘at continuously.
an ideological state, wherein Islamic ideology will serve as the harbinger, protector and raison d'etre of the state. The Islamic state would be predicated upon the existence of an monolithic Islamic ummah (community), defined in terms of Islamic values and objectives, which will override social, economic, class, or communal concerns. Hence, preservation of the purity of the underlying ideology of this state was the foremost concern of its architect. The Islamic state therefore, concluded Mawdudi, was justified in excluding from its ruling echelon and positions which permit influencing the working of the state (i.e. right to vote), those who differ with the objectives of the state, and those who do not subscribe to its ethos and ideology. Mawdudi, however, added that, no one (with the possible exception of women) was permanently excluded from the mainstream of political life in the Islamic state. For, the path of conversion to Islam and abeyance by the writ of the din was open to the few and the sundry.

The prohibitive criteria for citizenship of the Islamic state, and the emphasis upon shari'ah injunctions regarding zimmis, have a curious history. Mawdudi’s reasoning in this regard can be traced to his opposition to Congress Party’s overtures to Muslims in the 1937-47 period, when the Party sought to attract Muslims to its cause, and hence, participation in a future secular state. The Islamic state, and the zimmi-Muslim dichotomy, were employed by Mawdudi as a means to immunize Indian Muslims against overtures


\[187\] Maudoodi, Islamic Law, pp.171-72; and idem, Islami Riyasat Main Zimmian ki Huqq (Lahore, 1954).

\[188\] Maudoodi, Islamic Law, pp.172-73.
of the Congress. The Islamic state was not only a means to reaffirm communal identity, but a model which was given currency in contradistinction to the idea of a secular Indian state. The Islamic state was a rejection of the secular alternative in absolute terms; it was elaborated in debate and defiance of secular nationalism. It utilized Islam to reinforce communalism, giving it religious sanction, and hence, effectively curtailing the appeal of Hindu-Muslim cooperation or the possibility of communal reconciliation.

The *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy was assisted in this task by the specter of Hindu Manu laws, whose claim to politics was advocated, albeit implicitly, by none other than Mawdudi. For, the rejection of secular nationalism engendered, in the first place, recognition of the incumbency of the notion of a religious state in general, and hence a political division of society along religious lines in particular. Obviously, Mawdudi favored a Muslim domination of that relation. However, given the demographic realities of India, Mawdudi was in effect sanctioning a Hindu domination of Muslims in a Hindu religious state. Advocating the restructuring of society based the *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy was the flip side of the coin of imposing the Hindu Manu laws on Muslims. The two drew upon the same logic, the primacy of religious considerations in the conduct of politics, and the religious incumbency of communalism. Promoting the former was tantamount to accepting the legitimacy of the latter. This was exactly what Mawdudi did. Secular nationalism could only be snuffed out by the entrenchment of communalism through the aegis of religion, by a pincer attack by Islamic and Hindu revivalism. The logic of this strategy made the two, although surreptitiously, allies in a common cause. Once the pace and breadth of political change in the 1930s and 1940s precluded the possibility of Islamization of the
whole of India, Mawdudi focused his attention on preventing the dissolution of the Muslim community into a Hindu-led political order. He was then after far from inimical to the prospects of the "Hinduization" of Indian politics.

In later years he admitted before the Court of Inquiry into the Disturbances of Punjab in 1954, that he defended the incumbency of a religious state completely and in all instances, even if it would mean the imposition of the writ of Hindu Manu laws on the Muslim populace of India.¹⁸⁹ This was a surprising statement which only makes sense if it is understood that, Mawdudi was so thoroughly opposed to any form of coexistence with the Hindus, or the lowering of communal barriers, that he favored the partition of the Subcontinent. Hindus may, and in fact should, establish a Hindu state, implied Mawdudi, for, it justifies and encourages the institution of an Islamic state. Given his hatred of Hinduism, he would not have defended the idea of a Hindu state if he had believed in the unity of India. His stance was, no doubt, supported by the injunctions of the shari'ah, but the passion with which he argued his case was reflective of the influence of his communalist outlook on politics.

Mawdudi's position, and the changes therein from advocating a solution which would encompass the whole of India to one which revolved around the Muslim community, was not all that different from those of Jinnah. The founder of Pakistan had at one time been the "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". He had turned to communalism, separate electorates and partition, irrespective of its cost for those Muslims who would be left behind in India, after Congress Party and the nationalist movement

¹⁸⁹ Cited in Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, P.65.
were "Hinduized" by Gandhi, closing the door to Jinnah’s political ambitions within the framework of the Congress. Jinnah too, favored a united India to begin with, but wary of a "Hindu Raj" became the staunchest advocate of Muslim communalism, campaigning for Pakistan with an ebullience which closed his eyes to the perilous consequences of his cause for the scores of Muslims who lived in Hindu dominated provinces.190

For Mawdudi the zimmi-Muslim dichotomy, satisfactorily molded the structure of Hindu-Muslim relations in India in favor of Islam, protecting the religion against self-defeating political alliances with the Congress, and the corruptive influence of Hinduism. Social segregation, sanctioned by Islamic law, would not only close the door to insidious Hindu overtures to Muslims, but also set the stage for a thoroughly communalist approach to politics. Hence, separate electorates, and eventually some form of partition, became the natural choice of those who subscribed to Mawdudi’s views. The discussion of the rights of minorities in an Islamic state was therefore, rooted in Mawdudi’s desire to prevent the Congress from dissolving communal boundaries in India.191 It, moreover, served as means for reinforcing those boundaries, separating Muslims from Hindus, a cultural and political stance whose logical conclusion was partition of the Subcontinent.

In Pakistan, however, Mawdudi’s concern revolved around pacifying the liberal critics of the zimmi-Muslim dichotomy. His arguments alluded to the religious incumbency of the principle, and its historical antecedent in the case of Ottoman Empire’s millet

191 Interview with Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Lahore.
However, the lion’s share of his attention was directed at justifying the *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy in terms of Western political perspectives which fueled the criticism of his position. Mawdudi was unapologetic regarding the practice, implying that modern democracies and communist regimes alike, treated their "national and ideological minorities" in similar fashion, but without admitting to doing so. He then rejected suggestions that, the *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy was undemocratic. To force the majority to abide by the *dictat* of the minority, argued Mawdudi, was what deserved to be called "undemocratic". If the majority of Muslims decide to live by the *shari'ah*, which demands the segregation of society based on religious identity, then to prevent them from doing so would be a violation of their fundamental democratic rights.

In an ideological state, moreover, curtailing the rights of those who do not subscribe to the ideology of the state was argued to be a matter of national security, an assertion which was to some extent found pertinent in the xenophobic and anti-Hindu climate of Pakistani politics. Once again, the same argument, no doubt, could have been

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192 The *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire was a case of implementation of Islamic injunctions on *zimmis*, wherein each non-Muslim community in the Empire practiced its own laws within its community, paid the ascribed poll-tax (*jiziyah*) to the state, and was in turn limited in its political influence in the affairs of the state. For more on the *millet* system see, Roderic Davison, *Turkey* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), P.45.


196 Cited in *RJI*, vol.5, P.178.
used by Indians to restrict Muslims in India. Mawdudi was, however, unmoved in the face of such a possibility. For him separation of Muslims and Hindus was of paramount concern - the very life-line of Islam in the Subcontinent.

Mawdudi’s stance brought him into direct conflict with the government of Prime Minister Shahid Husain Suhrawardi in 1956, when the latter advocated joint electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims (mainly Hindus in East Pakistan) in the elections scheduled for 1958. Mawdudi saw Suhrawardi’s proposal as a direct hinderance to the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan, and hence fought tooth and nail with the government to safe-guard the separation of the electorates along religious lines.197

Mawdudi’s advocacy of the *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy in Pakistan was, no doubt, popular with the organization’s main constituency following the creation of Pakistan, the Muhajirs, those who had migrated to Pakistan from majority Hindu areas of India following harrowing experiences, and had settled primarily in Punjab, Sind and East Pakistan, where (in Sind and East Pakistan in particular) sizable Hindu minorities continued to live. For the Muhajirs the *zimmi*-Muslim dichotomy had acted to obfuscate the problems which surrounded the large-scale migration of Urdu speaking people to regions with distinct linguistic and cultural traditions. It moreover, appealed to their anti-Hindu sentiments, and pro-Muslim League position on separate electorates. While the Hindu minority of Pakistan has, for all practical purposes ceased to exist, the issue persists as a point of contention in the Jama‘at’s political program, and is yet another mark of the Islamic state’s uneasy interaction with democracy.

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197 *SAAM*, vol.2, pp.1-3.
The Discourse on the Islamic State and the Modernization of Islamic Political Thought

Mawdudi's discourse on the Islamic state reveals a significant imprint of modern influences. The very notion of a "state" with an elaborate machinery of government, due process and apparatuses to oversee it, a system of checks and balances, and codification and centralization of law and its application, are all modern imports. The process of appropriation and assimilation of modern ideas and practices has not, however, produced a harmonious political theory, nor an efficient working model. Nowhere is the problematic of the Islamic state more manifest than in its democratic pretension. The anomalies evident in the democratic pretensions of Mawdudi's discourse, elucidated in a number of areas in the foregoing discussion, has caused much confusion within and about the Jama'at. Yet, the janus face of Mawdudi's discourse, is more than just arduous apologetics, it is a manifestation of an ongoing debate with Western political thought. The idiosyncratic nature of the Islamic state's claim to democracy and the Jama'at's democratic pretensions may be viewed more charitably, if regarded as a single image from an unfolding sequence of images, one link in an intellectual and ideological chain, which precedes Mawdudi and will no doubt continue to push Islam towards modernity well after him. Mawdudi's Islamic state should not be viewed as independent of the concatenation of ideological debates and formulations which are nudging Islam along a continuum towards modernity. In of itself Mawdudi's Islamic state is imperfect and incongruous, authoritarian by nature and democratic by claim. Yet, its significance lies not in its promise as a viable model for government, but in what it purports to - yet more rational, consistent and democratic formulations. Mawdudi created an ideological outlook based
on an internally consistent exegetical method; which despite its claim was never fully consolidated into an immutable world view. It remained open to change, and as such, is a transformative influence within Islam. Mawdudi's synthesis is an opening in the structure of traditional Islamic thought. Beyond its clamor for revivalism, it has opened a significant debate with Western thought, initiating wholesale assimilation of ideas, idioms and concepts from its adversary. While the Jama'at possesses a retrogressive image, it is in fact a force for the modernization of Islamic thought and institutions. The fruits of its efforts may still be long in coming, but its significance should be seen in initiating and promoting the entire process. Binder perhaps best captures the essence of this argument when he writes,

"Fanatical fundamentalism is not a necessary consequence of something inherent in Islam. Islam is only a ground upon which some special theory has been constructed...From such beginnings movements which are oriented toward a charismatic-martyric ethic may be redirected toward a routinized, nomothetic, ordered, rational and prudential ethic."\textsuperscript{198}

Khurshid Ahmad reflects on the Jama'at's historical role, writing, Islamic revival is a "phase" in the evolutionary history of Muslim people; it is not so much a return to the past as a bridge to the future.\textsuperscript{199} He adds,

"Islamic resurgence is a future oriented movement...It has shown great awareness of the problems of modernity and the challenges of technology, and its emphasis on the original sources of Islam...imparts to its approach a flexibility and capability to innovate."\textsuperscript{200}


\textsuperscript{200} \textit{ibid}, P.226.
It is, in fact, the very inconsistency which is intrinsic in the concept of an "Islamic democracy" as adumbrated by Mawdudi, and the practical problems which it has created for the Jama'at, that will continue to push the movement's ideology and political program towards greater ratiocination, and a more lucid epistemological understanding of the idioms it has borrowed and the ideas with which it is in debate. Nor is the discussion of "Islamic democracy" unique in this regard. Time and again, throughout the movement's history, practical realities have necessitated cumbersome argumentation, justifying disputable political choices within the framework of Mawdudi's ideology and exegetical method. The dynamics of these arduous compromises, to which we shall return in later chapters, has by and large, determined the course of the Jama'at's historical development, and the extent of continuity and change in its ethos and world view.

The discourse on the Islamic state has, moreover, produced a discernable outlook on social change and its political concomitants. As such the Islamic state has become an analytical tool, which controls the Jama'at's interactions with his sociopolitical milieu. These interactions, and the posture and modus operandi which they have engendered, however, are also predicated upon the directives of another dimension of Mawdudi's ideological adumbration - an Islamic view of economics and the dynamics of social change.

The Economy of the Islamic State: A Discourse on Islam, Society, and Economics

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Mawdudi has for long been viewed as a theorist of Islamic economics. While he has addressed the issue prolifically, and hence, influenced the development of this field of study, his concern did not rest with the vicissitudes Islamic economics per se. He was neither concerned with systematizing a scientific discipline, nor with the classification of Islam’s teachings on economic issues.\textsuperscript{202} Economics featured in Mawdudi’s works as a corollary of his discussion of the din and the Islamic state. At face value, his views on economics were a mere conglomeration of the teachings of the shari'ah on economic relations with view to the needs of the Islamic state.\textsuperscript{203} The discussion of Islamic economics in Mawdudi’s works, however, also provides glimpses into his debate with Western thought, shed light upon his understanding of the dynamics of historical change and social evolution, and hence, his understanding of the working of politics.

Mawdudi’s views on economics were cast within the mold of his discourse on the Islamic state, and as such, were concerned with the interests of the multitude rather those of the individual. Since the state is the embodiment of the will and interests of the community as a whole, economics in Mawdudi’s view, found a "statist" outlook, where the state rather than the individual act as the main economic actor.\textsuperscript{204} Interestingly, despite this statist proclivity, Mawdudi’s discussion of economics remained anchored in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{ibid}, P.84.
\end{itemize}
vicissitudes of market operations.\textsuperscript{205}

Mawdudi tread the same tight rope between state control of the economy and individual initiative that did the classical Islamic sources. Islamic law has always protected individual economic rights, and yet, charged the political order to oversee and regulate the economy with view to the interests of the society as a whole. Mawdudi's \textit{via media}, however, was not so much a reflection of his doctrinal fidelity to the classical position, as it underlined his attempt to carve a space for Islam's approach to economics \textit{vis a vis} both capitalism and socialism - the main protagonists of the Islamic state in the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims. Mawdudi was critical of the callousness of both capitalism and socialism towards individual rights and needs.\textsuperscript{206} He saw capitalism and socialism as extremist positions which disturbed the natural equilibrium of social relations. They were bereft of ethical values - secularist world views which could not satisfactorily organize human life. Islam on the other hand, was based on a balance between the good of the many and the interests of the individual economic actor. The classical Islamic position on economics was therefore, understood by Mawdudi in terms of capitalism and socialism and as an alternative to the two, embodying all the virtues of the two systems, and none of their shortcomings. While expressed through the medium of modern economic thought, Islamic economics found an existence separate from capitalism and socialism, as that which the two were not.\textsuperscript{207} Islamic economics was not a marriage of

\textsuperscript{205} For an overview of the debate in Islamic economics on the role of the state see, Nasr, "Towards A Philosophy of Islamic Economics."

\textsuperscript{206} Maududi, \textit{Economic System}, pp.18-19.

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibid}, pp.20-24.
the two Western economic systems, but a superior system which is elaborated on a higher plane. This was a Third Worldist conception of sorts, one which aspired to rise above the two poles of capitalism and socialism, but never fully eluded their magnetic pull.

As a result, while the political working of the Islamic state had placed greater emphasis on the collective interests of the Muslim community, the economic structure of the state, in its effort to strike a balance between capitalism and socialism moved closer to the traditional balance between the society and the individual, and hence, produced a more liberal stance on the role of the individual in the working of the Islamic state.

In practice Mawdudi sought to institute Islamic practices such as *zakat* (alms giving),

\[\text{(alms giving)}\]

or the inheritance laws of Islam; and conversely, to abrogate the *munkarat* (those practices which are rendered reprehensible by Islamic law) such as, *riba* (usury) within the framework of the working of economic mechanism of a modern society.

Should the *shari'ah* prove inapplicable in certain circumstances, he stated, *ijtihad* may be used to adapt Islamic law to the requirements of a modern economic system.

Mawdudi was conscious of the fact that, the enforcement of the Islamic practices and institutions would make the state a more active actor in the economic arena. He was not, however, perturbed by the prospects of such an eventuality, for, the greater role of the state in the economy would be a transient aberration, bound to diminish as the

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208 *Zakat* is an annual flat tax of 2.5% levied on accumulated savings, to be paid voluntarily by Muslims to charitable projects of their own choice.

209 Maududi, "Economic and Political Teachings", pp.178-79; also discussions of *riba* in *TQ* throughout 1935 and 1936.

citizenry become educated in the teachings of Islam, and thenceforth, eager to follow them voluntarily. Implementing Islamic practices would not eventually require the fiat of the state.\textsuperscript{211} The citizenry of the Islamic state, will not be driven by greed and the desire for monetary gain, they will not engage in practices which are ethically wrongful, but rather will be controlled by their spiritual concerns.\textsuperscript{212} By the virtue of their grounding in the \textit{din}, the citizens of the Islamic state will have a different "marginal utility" and foci of consumption and production than otherwise expected; they will not be guided by the desire to maximize their interest in the market, but by their quest for spiritual gratification. Islam therefore, concluded Mawdudi, provides strong moral compulsion, which as a new factor in economic transactions, fosters economic change and social welfare without need for state intervention in market operations, and yet avoids the kind of undesired distortions and injustices which are associated with working of free markets in capitalism.\textsuperscript{213}

Mawdudi therefore, again underlined the importance of "education in Islam" as a prerequisite for the Islamization of society and politics, and the guarantor of the efficient functioning of the Islamic state. An emphasis which distinguishes his stance from the "Islamization first" approach of General Ziya. Mawdudi's stance moreover, although reliant on the state to promote Islamic teachings in the conduct of economic transactions, was careful not to institutionalize the state's presence in the economy, which occurred in

\textsuperscript{211} Maududi, \textit{Economic System}, P.84.

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{ibid}, pp.10-11.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{ibid}, pp.9-10.
Pakistan under the guise of Islamization during General Ziya's rule.\textsuperscript{214} The following passage is indicative of Mawdudi's attitude:

"Islam does not make it binding on society to provide employment for each and everyone of its citizens since this responsibility cannot be accepted without wholesale nationalization of the country's resources."\textsuperscript{215}

The state's role, he argued, should not extend to that of a regulator of economic activities, the state should rather remain dedicated to preserving the economic rights of individual actors.\textsuperscript{216} Islam's teachings on economics, he once said, were tantamount to a "bill of social rights", the bases for a "social contract".\textsuperscript{217} Needless to add that the same ambiguity which characterized the Islamic state's approach to democracy, also exist in Mawdudi's oscillations between a statist economic outlook and his advocacy of free market operations and individual rights.

The question of individual rights in economic affairs brings our discussion to Mawdudi's views on the question of ownership of economic resources, and more fundamentally, to economic justice. These issues had immediate implications for the Jama'at's political program. The rampant economic inequalities, and the chasm between the rich and the poor in Pakistan have presented political parties with the possibility of populist politics, the significant potential of which was demonstrated by the success of


\textsuperscript{216} \textit{ibid}, pp.66 and 123-34.

Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party in 1969-71 period. Despite the centrality of socioeconomic grievances to Pakistani politics, Mawdudi proved reluctant to exploit the issue for political gain. The Jama‘at, while under his command, remained impervious to the suasion of populist themes, concentrating instead on discussions of the Islamic state, divorced of the realities and actual dynamics of Pakistani politics.

Throughout his career Mawdudi remained a staunch defender of individual right to property,\(^{218}\) so much so that, in 1949-50 in spite of clear political road signs questioning his wisdom, he objected to Liaqat ‘Ali Khan’s plans for land reform in the Punjab.\(^{219}\) The backlash from Mawdudi’s naive altruism was so pronounced that he never again so openly challenged political common sense. During the last years of the Ayub era, when industrialization had produced significant discontent among the country’s labor force, producing new social frustrations, which Peoples Party successfully tapped in its drive for power, Mawdudi and the Jama‘at remained disinterested in populist agitations. The political implication of Mawdudi’s stance was that the Jama‘at remained aloof from the flow of national politics, and ill at ease with such popular political issues as land reform or rights of the industrial laborer. The Pakistani electorate reciprocated in the elections of 1970-71, when the Jama‘at suffered its most humiliating electoral defeat.\(^{220}\)

Mawdudi’s position on these issues was in the first place premised on the classical

\(^{218}\) Maududi, "Economic and Political Teachings, pp.179-83.

\(^{219}\) Binder, Religion and Politics, P.211; and MMKT, vol.2, pp.73-77.

\(^{220}\) See chapter 12 for more on this episode.
sources, which he interpreted conservatively in keeping with the position of the 'ulama.\textsuperscript{221} Secondly, consciously disparaging a socialist reading of Islam, Mawdudi depicted the Islamic state as the panacea for all sociopolitical problems, rendering other policies or mechanisms for addressing them redundant. The influence of the classical sources coalesced with his fear of socialism to form his outlook on and response to socioeconomic issues.

Mawdudi went to great lengths to prove that, Islam’s teachings on equity and justice were not tantamount to egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{222} He argued, as have traditional thinkers before him that, Islam is tolerant of difference in income and wealth so long as they reflect variations in effort and skill.\textsuperscript{223} By giving this Islamic injunction political life, the Jama’at shirked responsibility before blatant socioeconomic predicaments, relegating them, instead, to the domain of Divine will.\textsuperscript{224} As a result, the Jama’at’s outlook, as has been argued of revivalist movements in general, has remained "more in the nature of moral revitalization than of substantive change."\textsuperscript{225} The Jama’at politics has, therefore, remained oblivious to the staggering economic inequalities and deepening social cleavages,

\textsuperscript{221} Maududi, Economic System, pp.87-88, and 132ff.

\textsuperscript{222} Maududi, "Economic and Political Teachings, P.179; and idem, Malikiyat-i Zamin Mas’alah (Lahore Islamic Publications, 1982).

\textsuperscript{223} Maududi, Economic System, pp.3-5; on the discussion of this issue in Islamic economics see, Nasr, "Towards a Philosophy of Islamic Economics", pp.186-87.

\textsuperscript{224} Maududi, Economic System, pp.3-5. Also see, Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1982), P.108.

which in Pakistan go beyond variations in effort and skill. Firmly rooted in moral
concerns, however, the organization has proved reluctant to raise the banner of a populist
campaign.226

As mentioned earlier this attitude was rooted in Mawdudi's dislike of socialism,
and the fear that populist politics would encourage "godlessness" at the cost of Islam.
Mawdudi had viewed the left with suspicion since his days in Hyderabad, when he
associated socialism with the Congress and its drive to undermine the Nizam's rule.
Socialism, Mawdudi had concluded, was inherently opposed to the interests of Islam, and
was yet, the ideology most likely to gain a following among Muslims.227 His reactions
to socialism, and by association communism, were impulsive and vehement, they hardly
were focused on the merits of issues, but began and ended with a discussion of
atheism.228 This tendency was compounded with the rising popularity of the Peoples
Party in the late 1960s. Mawdudi's uncompromising antagonism towards the left, born of
his communal consciousness, distinguished him from other revivalist thinkers, such as
Khomeini, who incorporated the slogans and praxis of the left into his ideological
perspective, producing a populist reading of Islam.229


227 Mawdudi saw his suspicions regarding the enmity of socialism towards Islam, and
the inherent affinity of Hinduism and socialism, justified when the Soviet Union came to
the support of India after 1947.

228 ibid, pp.25-26; idem, Capitalism.

229 Hamid Dabashi, "'Islamic Ideology'': The Perils and Promises of a Neologism", in
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manouchehr Parvin, eds., Post-Revolutionary Iran (Boulder,
Mawdudi was, however, fully aware of the lure of socialism. In fact, he viewed socialism as a rival for Islam, and as such his invective against its ideas and policies were not only a response to its atheism, but also directed at preserving Islam’s turf against their encroachments. He sought to create a space for his movement in lieu of the populism of the left, which he saw as the means for mobilizing Muslims along socialist lines, facilitating their political acculturation into that "godless" ideology. Socialism, argued Mawdudi, caused ambiguity among Muslims regarding the true source of their predicaments - the un-Islamic nature of society - and hence diverted their attention from the veritable task before them. Opposition to populist politics much like his advocacy of the zimmi-Muslim dichotomy, was a conscious effort to create steadfast boundaries around Muslims. Eager to immunize Muslims against the lure of socialism, Mawdudi challenged the efficacy of their program, and the truth of their message, presenting in its stead Islam, as the only viable "ideology" for sociopolitical change. Mawdudi sought to refute the promise of socialism, arguing, "there is social justice in Islam only." Islam, asserted Mawdudi, will deliver all that which socialism promises, and will be unable to realize.

Yet, Islam’s promises were neither immediate nor tangible, nor was the Jama’at

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232 ibid, P.103.
233 Interestingly, when in 1990 socialist orders began to crumble in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe, Jama’at leaders viewed the events as a vindication of Mawdudi and a sign of his prescience.
ever reoriented to manipulate socioeconomic issues and address the demands of the economically under-privileged. These were feats which were to be accomplished by the Islamic state, whose advent would *ipso facto* resolve all social predicaments and rectify all economic injustices.\(^{234}\) The attention of the Jama'at and its followers was therefore to remain focused on the realization of that state. Islam, in Mawdudi's works, never made a serious attempt to supplant socialism. Hence, conspicuous by its absence from Mawdudi's works on economics was a discussion of relations between social classes, and distribution of wealth and the means of production in society. No concrete or tangible promises were forthcoming from Mawdudi; and as such, the masses failed to appreciate the wisdom of his "apolitical" stance, nor the intricacy of the logic of his indirect solution to their immediate needs. To the workers and peasants he offered the following advice:

"...you must never take that exaggerated view of your rights which the protagonists of class war present before you."\(^{235}\)

The Jama'at took the brunt of Mawdudi's staunch opposition to populist politics, time and again, at the polls.

Mawdudi stance was also of significance for the organization's struggle for power, and its interpretation and espousal of Islamic revolution, which will be discussed in the next chapter.


CHAPTER 5
THE PATH TO THE ISLAMIC STATE: REVOLUTION THROUGH EDUCATION

The idea of an "Islamic revolution", and the place of revolution in Islam, have captured the attention of academia in recent years, especially in view of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 in Iran. The concept of an Islamic revolution has become enmeshed into the whole phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, its discourse on the Islamic state, and the entire effort for tajdid and islah of Islam. Yet, the place of revolution in Islamic revivalism is not as clear as the example of Iran or the scholarly reflections on it may suggest.

There is little doubt that the ideal of the Islamic state in Mawdudi’s view, as expressed elsewhere in the reviver literature, was predicated on a drastic break with the existing order; for, "a tree [groomed to bear] lemon[s] from its rudimentary stages right up to the state of its completion" cannot "all of a sudden begin producing mangoes".¹ Such a departure from the norm, in turn, involves some form of radical action:

"And History testifies that when they acted according to its [the Qur'an's] directions, it demonstrated its power making them Imam and leader of the world."²

The history of Islam in India, Mawdudi believed, attested to the fact that the success of Islam in the world required its presence at the centers of power; the absence of such an order of events following the decline of the Mughuls had straddled the boundary between


Islam and Hinduism, arrested the spread of Islam, and ultimately caused the eclipse of Islam in India. The Jama'at's trials and tribulations with Pakistani politics, moreover, proved to Mawdudi the limits of the flexibility of a secular political order before the demands of Islamicity. Islam, according to Mawdudi, was not likely to survive its eclipse at the centers of power, especially when those at the helm were hostile to the interests of Islam. A complete change in the political set-up was therefore central to Mawdudi's program of action. The pace and breadth of this change, and the manner in which the logic of Mawdudi's arguments have been reflected in the Jama'at's praxis are, however, open to question. Historical evidence, in fact, indicates that neither Mawdudi nor the Jama'at followed the directive of their doctrinal position literally. Their perception of political change was rather more nuanced, favoring greater interaction with the existing political order.

Mawdudi's teachings have been interpreted to mean "a revolution in the social set-up", for, so long as the social system is based on immoral and atheistic precepts, and as long as the leaders are "disciples of Satan", abiding by such a system is against reason. Yet, to Siddiq's chagrin, entangled in the vicissitudes of Pakistani politics, "abiding by such a system" was exactly what the Jama'at has been doing. If the Jama'at has not been true

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5 Siddiq believed that prior to 1947 Mawdudi had maintained an openly Marxian approach; see preface to *ibid*. Similarly, Binder is of the opinion that the Jama'at's attitude towards revolution changed after 1948 when he accepted the existing Pakistani state as the basis for a future Islamic state. Binder identifies the Objectives Resolution as the
to Siddiq’s reading of a classical revolutionary perspective into the movement’s doctrines, then what propels the movement’s political activism? How has the Jama’at understood and implemented Mawdudi’s notion of complete and thorough political change? What is the praxis involved in attaining an Islamic state? The questions as well as the answers point to a more complex understanding of the concept of revolution by Mawdudi, which is not always in keeping with the Western connotations of the term.

Revolution, in the Western sense of the term, refers to a cataclysmic, and often violent, process of sociopolitical change; a total rejection of and break with the established order, and the institution of fundamentally new relations of power, distribution of economic resources, and social structure. Arendt defines revolution as a process whereby,

"change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom." 6

Tilly, sheds greater light on the dynamics of this process. Revolution, he wrote, is controlled by a set of concomitant factors: first, the existence of contenders who advances a program of action along lines described by Arendt in the above passage; second, the successful dissemination of the program of action and the mobilization of support for it among a significant proportion of the population; third, the unwillingness or inability of

the government to suppress the resultant protest movement.7

In the case of the Jama'at, as it will be demonstrated in the following pages, neither do the activists seek to live up to Arendt's definition, nor do they fulfill Tilly's first condition. The Jama'at has, in fact, consciously veered away from violent social change, and has instead, viewed the path to the Islamic state as an irenic one, lying within the structure of the existing sociopolitical order. All discussion of Islamic revolution in Mawdudi's writings is misleading lest it take stock of these basic facts.

Many have viewed Mawdudi's Islamic state and his plan of action for attaining it as "revolutionary", and bent on overthrowing the existing sociopolitical order through radical means. Mawdudi's rhetoric and political nomenclature - use of such terms as "Islamic ideology" or "Islamic revolution" - has certainly done little to assuage these concerns.8 Read against the background of the Revolution of 1978-79 in Iran, Mawdudi has come to be seen as an avatar of Islamic revolution.9 Part of the problem, as will be


8 See for instance his vituperative language against the ruling political order in India during his Iqbal Day lecture in 1939; cited in *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.168-69. Also see, *TQ*, (March 1939), pp.2-13.

9 For instance, Lerman, having examined Mawdudi through the Arabic translation of his works and in the context of Islamic revivalism in the Arab world, finds him to be an avid revolutionary. The use of Arabic translations produce difficulties of their own; Mawdudi in translation may be conceivably more revolutionary than in Urdu. Even if the accuracy of the translation be accepted at face value, this only attests to his revolutionary influence elsewhere, but not to his revolutionary intent. See, Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 17:4 (October 1981), pp.492-509. Based on Lerman's analysis, Arjomand has seen Mawdudi as the precursor to Khomeini, and as the one who influenced the Iranian revolution; see, Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.97 and 104.
elucidated later, lies in the reading of Mawdudi. For, although Mawdudi was familiar with the communist literature,\(^{10}\) there exists a chasm between his understanding of terms such as "revolution" or "ideology" and the Western connotations of these terms. Moreover, understanding Mawdudi’s intent must rest on discerning his political objectives from his ideological adumbrations. The same ambiguities and motivations which controlled Mawdudi’s use of the term "democracy" also influence his appeal to the term "revolution". Just as "Islamic democracy" is not accepted at face value, similar reservation should be maintained towards "Islamic revolution". Lerman, for instance, cites the following passage from *The Process of Islamic Revolution*,

"Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch...and Jihad denotes the revolutionary struggle."\(^{11}\)

to prove the revolutionary intent and nature of Mawdudi’s program, and the Marxist origins of Mawdudi’s thoughts on the subject.\(^{12}\) Yet, in the same book, if read carefully, Mawdudi outlined revolution in evolutionary terms, as a piecemeal effort predicated upon the exact confluence of a set of requisite social, cultural and psychological factors.\(^{13}\) The exact nature of this confluence precludes the kind of voluntarism and conjecture which

\(^{10}\) Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi recollected that Mawdudi had read the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao; interview with Ja’far Qasmi, Lahore.

\(^{11}\) Lerman, "Mawdudi’s Concept of Islam", P.500.

\(^{12}\) *ibid*, P.499.

\(^{13}\) Enayat has argued that emphasis upon the need for an exact confluence of factors for effecting social change suggests the influence of al-Ghazzali and Ibn Khaldun on Mawdudi; see, Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp.102-03.
the liberating force of a veritable revolution denotes. Mawdudi’s conception of revolution was rather a methodical and determinist process consumed with a passion for orderly transfer of power and ambivalent towards the political system which it challenges. What Mawdudi wrote, excepting for the zeal of his translator in the above passage, is not necessarily what he meant. Behind Western political jargons, Mawdudi issued directives which were not true to the spirit of those terms. He wrote of Prophet Muhammad that he was "the greatest revolutionary", then went on in the same article to extol his "patience and pacifism". In 1941, Mawdudi told the Majlis-i Shura’ of the Jama’at,

"We desire no demonstrations or agitations, no flag waving, slogans, or the like....[for us] such display of uncontrolled emotions will prove deadly....You do not need to capture your audience through impassioned speeches....but you must kindle the light of Islam in your hearts, and as such, change those around you."

Revolution much like democracy was an axis around which Mawdudi conducted his debate with the "other"; these were therefore, changing terms in Mawdudi’s ideological perspective, terms which also gauged the progression of his vision and school of thought towards modernity. Hence, revolution was not a steadfast definition, but part of the parcel of idioms and shibboleths, the assimilation of which served as the locomotive of Mawdudi’s discourse.


16 *TQ*, (February 1936), P.119.

17 *RJI*, vol.1, pp.49-50.
Mawdudi used the idiom of revolution consciously, to conjure up a "progressive" image for Islam in his battle with leftist ideologies for the hearts and minds of Muslims. The idiom related his program to a loci of ideas which had currency among the very people in India and Pakistan who were the target of his proselytization. "Revolution" or its corollary idiom, "ideology", in Mawdudi's conception had no class base. They rather permitted Mawdudi to equip the Jama'at with a repertoire of terminologies which permitted them to stay their ground in debates which were hinged on progress, justice, and political idealism. In appropriating the myth of revolution, Mawdudi hoped to disarm his leftist rivals, to blemish the gloss of their appeal, and to eventually, render their agenda redundant. "Islamic Revolution" was, moreover, a means for defining the nature and scope of changes which he envisioned for Muslim society and polity, the use of a modern concept to capture the essence of the modernizing enterprise in which he was engaged. His use of the term revolution was in reference to the content rather than the process of the change which he proposed.

In practice, Mawdudi consciously steered clear of revolutionary activism. His harangue against the political order in India, and later Pakistan, never extended beyond a simple expression of dissent,\(^18\) and was never systematized into a coherent revolutionary world view:

"The nature and extent of despotism in the different Muslim countries is so varied that it is not possible to suggest any one standard procedure. But what I do feel is necessary in all these cases is the need to resist the temptation of resorting to the methods and techniques of secret

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underground movements and bloody revolutions." 19

When pressed to define Islamic revolution, it was evolution rather than revolution of which Mawdudi spoke. "Immediate revolution is neither possible nor desirable", said Mawdudi in 1948, the Jama'at's objective was rather "gradual change, replicating the Prophetic era".20 As such, Mawdudi did not see revolution as cataclysmic change, but essentially, as a process of reform with view to evolving towards a particular eventuality.21 Mawdudi's analysis here was not emotive, nor did it contradict the basic tenets of his world view. In fact, his prognosis, meticulously reasoned, was set forth with the force of a scientific formula:

"If we really wish to see our Islamic ideals translated into reality, we should not overlook the natural law that all stable changes in the collective life of a people come about gradually. The more sudden a change, the more short-lived it is. For a permanent change it is necessary that it should be free from extremist bias and unbalanced approach..."22

Mawdudi's reasoning indicated that despite his use of idioms associated with Marxian historicism and leftist praxis, his point of reference was Western liberalism:

"Living as slaves of an alien power and deprived of the Islamic influences for a long time, the pattern of our moral, cultural, social economic and political life has undergone a radical change, and is to-day far removed


21 ibid, pp.236-37; and Moulana Syid Abul A'la Maudoodi, "Three Virtues and Three Vices", The Muslim Digest (Durban, South Africa), 9:12 (July 1959), P.14.


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from the Islamic ideals. Under such circumstances it cannot be fruitful, even if it were possible, to change the legal structure of the country all at once, because then the general pattern of life and the legal structure will be poles apart, and the legal change will have to suffer the fate of a sapling planted in an uncongenial soil and facing hostile weather. It is therefore, inevitable that the required reform should be gradual and the changes in the laws should be effected in such manner as to balance favorably the change in the moral, educational, social, cultural and political life of the nation.23

This process was not only modeled after the example of the Prophet’s rule in Medinah and later Mecca, but also the Anglicization of India by the British; legal and social systems which were erected gradually and with great discipline.24 The Islamic state must emerge as a particular entity, it could not be the product of conjecture, nor could it be influenced by disparate forces, which were bound to be the result of an anomie.25 Moreover, Islamic revolution, in pursuance to the prophetic example could not be realized through force.26 The Prophet, Mawdudi argued, persuaded the Arabs to accept the wisdom of his reforms. Islam was established out of faith, hence Islamization, he insisted, must remain true to the prophetic example.27 Muslims in general, and Pakistanis in particular, asserted Mawdudi, should remain focused on the exactitude of their reform

23 ibid, P.52.


26 ibid, P.25.

27 Maududi, System of Government, pp.9-10. In this book Mawdudi goes to great lengths to convince his readers of the peaceful and docile nature of the prophetic reforms, and the society which he established.
efforts on behalf of Islam rather than on the pace and breadth of the reform process.\(^\text{28}\)

Islamic revolution, Mawdudi conceded, was a distant goal;\(^\text{29}\) the Jama'at therefore did not seek immediate action, but rather the creation of the exact circumstances and factors which would harbing the revolution. Since the Islamic revolution could take many years to materialize, the Jama'at was charged with the task of preventing alternative systems of government from taking root and definitive control of Pakistan, lest they be in a position to vitiate the possibility of an Islamic state. This feat was to be accomplished by keeping the Jama'at within the Pakistani political process, it became a primary motive for greater participation by the Jama'at in the political process, hence, catalyzing the routinization of the movement's idealism. Political activism, encouraged by the desire to safe-guard the prospects of the Islamic state, eventually became an end in itself, opening a new doctrinal vista in Mawdudi's thinking and the Jama'at's program of action. In later years Mawdudi became even more convinced of the sagacity of his vision. Governments and constitutions had come and gone in Pakistan, none of which had proved capable of institutionalizing a concrete definition of the Pakistan state. The Jama'at had been active in thwarting all efforts at consolidation of power in governments and constitutions which

\(^{28}\) Maudoodi, *Islamic Law*, pp.99 and 102. Again, Mawdudi's understanding of revolution has become institutionalized in the discourse on revivalism in Pakistan, and has found echo in the proclamations of later movements such as Israr Ahmad's Tanzim-i Islami; see, Dr. Israr Ahmad, *Minhaj-i Inqilab-i Nabawi* (Lahore: Matbu'at-i Tanzim-i Islami, 1987). While Ahmad, unlike Mawdudi, refuses to renounce violence, he reiterates Mawdudi's position when he asserts that by the term revolution he merely means a significant qualitative change between the existing circumstances and what will result, without reference to the process involved.

it deemed hostile to the organization's ultimate objectives. Mawdudi and his movement outlasted all of their "anti-Islamic" rivals from Liaqat 'Ali Khan to Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad to Ayub Khan, and finally to Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto. The movement remained on course, and Pakistan moved increasingly in the direction of its aims. When Mawdudi died in 1979, there existed tangible proof for him of Pakistan's progress towards Islamicity without the need for violent and cataclysmic revolution.30

Following the creation of Pakistan, Mawdudi consciously routinized all incipient revolutionary tendencies in the Jama'at by forcing the movement, at the cost of dissensions and defections in the organization, into accepting the legitimacy of the Pakistan state and committing itself to its political process. As pragmatic political considerations began to substitute revolutionary idealism, it was the portrayal of the Jama'at as a controlled and responsible party, capable of forming a government and ruling the country, that more than any other objective informed Mawdudi's political activism. At Machhi Goth, where Jama'at's new policy was articulated, and those who could not accept it left the Jama'at, Mawdudi put the death nail on the coffin of revolution, declaring:

"...transforming the political system can be done only through constitutional means - elections....transformation of the political order through unconstitutional means is forbidden based on the shari'ah"31

It was during the same period that, Islami Jami'at Tulabah (IJT, Islamic Student

30 SAAM, vol.2, pp.444-45. IJT's victory in the student union elections at the University of Punjab in 1973 was interpreted by the Jama'at as further proof of the possibility of success through the electoral process; for more see Parts III and IV.

Association), the student wing of the Jama'at declared that it did not wish to adopt the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, who were at the time engaged in a revolutionary struggle against Nasser.\textsuperscript{32}

Mawdudi did not waver from his stance even as the Ayub years pushed the organization increasingly towards more radical options. The government of General Ayub Khan did away with the electoral process to which the Jama'at had committed itself, and moreover, conducted a systematic policy of harassment of the Jama'at, directed at first pushing the organization out of the politics, and later, eliminating it altogether. While the government viewed the Jama'at as a subversive movement,\textsuperscript{33} and followed policies which were likely to push the Jama'at to such options, Mawdudi stayed his ground, and kept the organization in the mainstream of Pakistani politics. Although bitter about the strongarm tactics and "un-Islamic" ways of the Ayub Khan administration and the Governor of Punjab at the time, Nawwab of Kala Bagh, Mawdudi and the Jama'at retained their poise and stayed their ground:

"I am in principle opposed to all unlawful, unconstitutional and underground activities. I did not come to this opinion out of consideration of any expediency or in response to any challenge. My opinion is rather the product of contemplation and studying....support for the law is the basic tenet of a civilized society....covert activity is a greater menace to society than the one it seeks to remove..."\textsuperscript{34}

"[C]reating a chaotic situation", argued Mawdudi, would only make it possible for "forces inimical to the interests of Islam (i.e. socialism) [to] find an opportunity to capture power."

\textsuperscript{32} Cited in interview with Khurshid Ahmad, in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, P.126.

\textsuperscript{33} Interview with S.M. Zafar, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Mawdudi in \textit{Nawa'i Waqt} (Lahore), (November 11, 1963), P.4.
With the collapse of the Ayub Khan regime in the late-1960s at a time of increasing socioeconomic as well as political grievances in Pakistan, and a noticeable increase in the appeal of leftist forces, Mawdudi continued to adhere to his earlier conclusions. Nor was the Jama'at allowed to be provoked into clandestine activities when the Peoples Party government initiated a policy of harassment of the Jama'at, during which a Jama'at Member of National Assembly (MNA), Nazir Ahmad was assassinated, Mian Tufayl Muhammad the Amir of the Jama'at at the time and a number of other Jama'at and Jami'at (IJT) leaders were incarcerated, and for the first time seriously abused in prison. In the face of these events Mawdudi again cautioned the Jama'at not to waver from its commitment to constitutional procedures.

Mawdudi was, however, unable to thoroughly control the Jama'at's, and especially the Jami'at's transgression of his stipulations, and the gradual resort of his movement towards violence. Impatient with lack of tangible results, the Jama'at and the Jami'at, were eventually provoked by the PPP government into violence. As a result, the Jama'at while retaining an irenic facade began to respond to government provocations in turn, setting in motion a chain of violence which has left a scar on the moral standing of the Jama'at,


36 Interview with Mawdudi in Chatan (Lahore), (April 14, 1969), P.3. Throughout this period Mawdudi distinguished the Jama'at from the parties of the left in that the former advocated revolution without violence, and the latter favored a violent path to revolution. Cited in SAAM, vol.2, pp.371-72.

and especially the Jami‘at. While gravely concerned about the turn of events, Mawdudi was no longer able to retain effective control over the organization, managing only to prevent the new reality from influencing the movement’s doctrinal position. In his eyes the Jama‘at was merely defending itself against government brutality.\textsuperscript{38} To his last days Mawdudi continued to advocate the use of peaceful means in the pursuit of an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{39}

Mawdudi’s position on such key Islamic doctrines such as \textit{jihad}, moreover, obviated the possibility of revolutionary activism.\textsuperscript{40} His position on \textit{jihad} often paled those of the ‘ulama in its conservatism. In 1948, he became the target of patriotic scorn and government harassment in Pakistan for objecting to Pakistan government’s unofficial policy of \textit{jihad} at a time cease-fire with India. The religious connotation of this politically unwise stance was to insist that, \textit{jihad} be proclaimed only in an official capacity by a government. For non-state actors, such as himself or the Jama‘at, there existed no right to decree \textit{jihad}. Nor did Mawdudi sanction a political or revolutionary understanding of the doctrine. He argued that, \textit{jihad} must not denote "a crazed faith...blood-shot eyes, shouting \textit{Allah’u akbar} (God is great), decapitating an unbeliever wherever they see one,

\textsuperscript{38} Interview with Khwaja Amanu‘llah and Begum ‘Abidah Gurmani, Lahore; also see, Parts III and IV.

\textsuperscript{39} Interview with Mawdudi in \textit{Nawa‘i Waqt} (Lahore), (October 25, 1978), P.1.

\textsuperscript{40} Ishtiaq Ahmed, \textit{The Concept of An Islamic State; An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), P.183.
cutting heads while invoking *La ilaha illa-llah* (there is no god but God)* — the very terms in which *jihad* and its revivalist advocates are seen today. *Jihad*, Mawdudi went on to explain, was not war, but a struggle. A struggle not in the name of God, but a struggle in the path of God - traversing in the path set by him.* There is little here to distinguish Mawdudi’s position from that of the ‘ulama who divide *jihad* into a greater and a lesser struggle, the former against ones soul, and the latter against one’s enemies.* If anything over the years Mawdudi’s position softened further. If in 1939 he declared the military function of *jihad* to be a weapon of last resort, instead pointing to a path to victory for Islam which lay in invitation to belief in God,* in 1954 he told Justice Munir and the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances that, *jihad* could only be declared when the country was actually, and not potentially, at war, and then only if the war was with *daru’l-harb* (house of war, wherever is not land of Islam).*

Mawdudi, as mentioned earlier, had remained oblivious to socioeconomic issues

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*42* *ibid*, P.11.


*44* Mawdudi, *Jihad fi Sabil*, pp.14ff. Binder writes that Mawdudi did not see *jihad* as a harbinger of conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, but only as a weapon to guarantee the right to proselytize Islam; Muslims attacked the Byzantine, Persian and Egyptian Empires in the seventh century, opined Mawdudi, not to force them to Islam, but to preserve the right to spread Islam; Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), P.181.

which rest at the heart of mobilizing mass support for a revolutionary movement. In fact, Mawdudi more often than not, seemed to swim against the current in this regard. In 1950, he openly opposed Liaqat ‘Ali Khan’s proposals regarding land reform in the Punjab. Mawdudi provided religious justification for *jagirdari* (feudalism) based on Islam’s protection of the right to own property, and cautioned the government against confusing the vices of *jagirdari* with the excesses of a few feudal lords. Mawdudi later moderated his defense for feudalism arguing that, *jagirdari* should be dealt with in full compliance with Islamic law, and the protection for right to property therein. Although he tried to change the focus of his position from the merits of feudalism to the Islamicity of government actions, his revised stance was not thoroughly cleansed of pro-feudal sentiments. At the end of his interview he cautioned the government again not to tamper with that which is "lawful *jagirdari*. This was hardly a stance in keeping with a revolutionary agenda.

The ambiguity which is inherent in Mawdudi’s use and misuse of Western idioms has also caused confusion among his coterie within the Jama‘at. Kawkab Siddiq, a one time Jama‘at stalwart and translator of Mawdudi into English, understood the Mawlana in clearly Marxian terms. Siddiq’s translations of Mawdudi bore the imprint of the

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47 For Mawdudi’s thoughts of *jagirdari* see, Mawdudi, *Sunnat’u Bid’at*, pp.33-37.

translator's bias, and possibly confusion regarding what Mawdudi actually meant. Siddiq in an interpretive extrapolation from Mawdudi's ideas wrote of the Islamic state:

"A society in which everyone is a Caliph of God, and an equal participant in this caliphate, cannot tolerate any class divisions of birth and social position. All men enjoy equal status and position in such a society."49

There existed sufficient difference between Mawdudi's intent and Siddiq's reading of it that, the latter finally parted ways with the Jama'at to pursue "permanent revolution under God".50 Siddiq's overtly Marxian reading of Mawdudi forced the issue over Mawdudi's intent to greater clarification. Mawdudi did not concur with Siddiq's rendition of his views, and Siddiq realized in the process that, in his search for revolution he was entangled in the wrong movement. Yet, the ambiguity born of the meaning and place of the idiom of revolution in Mawdudi's discourse persists, and hence, continues to give rise to contradictory intellectual formulations and confused programs of action.

The issue has been brought into sharper focus in light of the revolution in Iran and later, the Afghan Jihad. The Iranian revolution came into fruition in the year Mawdudi died. Hence, the ensuing debate in the Jama'at precipitated by the Iranian experience did not benefit from Mawdudi's input, and has therefore, been based on different


50 Cited in S. Abdullah Schleifer, "Jihad: Sacred Struggle In Islam IV", The Islamic Quarterly, XXVIII:2 (Second Quarter 1984), P.98. Siddiq himself admits that Mawdudi was not keen on class analysis, but believes that this was a later policy adopted after the creation of Pakistan; see, ibid, and Siddique, "Islam", P.6. References to class analysis are extremely rare in Mawdudi's works even before 1947 and the creation of Pakistan; one such occasion being, Mawdudi's Iqbal Day lecture of 1939, cited in SAAM, vol.1, pp.168-69.
interpretations of his teachings. The Iranian revolution not only led to debate within the Jama'at's ranks on the meaning of the term "Islamic revolution", but in its success brought doubts upon the Jama'at's heretofore *modus operandi*. Similarly, the Afghan Jihad proved to the Jama'at leaders, many of whom were closely linked with it, the efficacy of radical action. Qazi Husain Ahmad, the current Amir of the Jama'at and a one time liaison of the Jama'at with the Afghan Mujahidin, argues that "the Afghan case stands as the only tangible victory for Islam", which is more than the Jama'at can boast about its irenic approach to revolution.

The greater homage which is paid to the concept of revolution today by Jama'at members is indicative of the greater visibility of the issue in the political thinking of the Jama'at in recent years, which has also extended the scope of the debate over the form and content of the idea. There are those who are sympathetic towards the Iranian model, noteworthy among whom is Sayyid As'ad Gilani the current Amir of Lahore, who believe that Mawdudi's ideas should be reinterpreted such that the Jama'at may be able

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51 Khurram Murad recollects that during his trip to Paris to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini, members of Khomeini's entourage with the help of an American professor who served as the translator engaged in a severe criticism of the Jama'at's irenic approach to revolution, arguing that the Jama'at should forthwith engage in open revolutionary activism against the Pakistan state; interview with Khurram Murad, Lahore.

52 Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad, Lahore. Qazi Husain repeated this observation in several rallies as a justification for the Jama'at's support for the "Jihad in Kashmir" campaign of 1989-90.

53 However, these references to revolution are often qualified by the explanation that it is not sociopolitical, but a drastic change in society's conception of religion and its aims. See for instance interviews with Khurram Jah Murad and Liaqat Baluch in *Jang* (Lahore), (November 8, 1989), supplement.
to pursue outright revolutionary activism. If the Jama‘at espouses an Islamic revolution, it should also commit itself to a revolutionary struggle. The examples of Iran and also Afghanistan, for this group, have pointed to the mobilizational potential of a veritable revolutionary stance.

However, the Iranian and Afghan models require the Jama‘at to dissociate itself from Pakistani politics, and to reject an order which it has recognized for the past four decades as sufficiently legitimate for the Jama‘at to participate in. Not only is such a volte face difficult, but for many Jama‘at activists the damage engendered by such a move will not be compensated by its political benefits. Moreover, there are those in the Jama‘at, led by ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad currently a Na‘ib Amir (Vice-President) of the Jama‘at, who are committed to the political process in Pakistan. They believe that, the Jama‘at has gained much by its commitment to the electoral process, and hence, see no benefit in rekindling revolutionary fervor in a movement which has already routinized its revolutionary zeal. The position of this group is strengthened by the ever present power and influence of Mawdudi’s teachings among a great number of the rank and file as well as the leadership cadre of the Jama‘at.

This issue which has been put before the Majlis-i Shura’ and the Majlis-i ‘Amilah

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54 Interview with Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, Lahore.

55 Interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi; also see, Muhammad Salahu’ddin, "Qa’din-i Jama‘at-i Islami ki Khadmat Main Chand Ma’zurat", in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), pp.11-13.

56 Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi.
of the Jama‘at continues to be waged in the organization, especially in light of the
Jama‘at’s frustrations with their success in the electoral process to date, and the unlikely
possibility of any significant changes in their showing in a system designed to guarantee
the control of the electoral process by traditional political leaders, land lords, and their
patronage systems. The upshot of this debate to date, has been to stipulate that although
not keen to reorient itself along revolutionary lines as yet, the Jama‘at remains open to
such a possibility in the future. Only our objectives are definite (qat‘i), argue the Jama‘at
leadership, our methods will remain open to interpretation and adaptation (ijtihadi) based
on the exigencies before the Jama‘at at any particular time, and the decisions of the
Jama‘at’s Majlis-i Shura’. This issue, underlines the uncertainty which surrounds the
concept of revolution in the Jama‘at. More importantly, it attests to the fact that what
Mawdudi meant by revolution, is not what many observers of Islamic revivalism have
understood him to mean.

It is clear from the foregoing that Mawdudi, despite his frequent use of the term
and symbolism of revolution, did not advocate sociopolitical change of the kind or scale
which is associated with revolution in Western political thought. It is also apparent that,
he consciously imparted a particular meaning upon the term revolution. The question
which arises at this juncture is, if Mawdudi did not mean "revolution" by revolution, then
what meaning did he impart on that term?

57 Interview with Sayyid As‘ad Gilani in Nida (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), P.12.
58 Interview with a number of Jama‘at leaders, especially, Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi, Lahore.
In short, Mawdudi's Islamic revolution is a gradual and evolutionary process of cultural, social, and political reform.⁵⁹ If its message and activities are aimed at any class or social stratum, it is the leadership of the society whom Mawdudi sought to attract and mobilize. Revolution, he told a Jama'at gathering in 1945, is not directed at the society as a whole, but at its leadership, it is inqilab-i imamat (revolution in leadership).⁶⁰ "It is not the people's thoughts which changes society" argued Mawdudi, "but the minds of the society's movers and leaders."⁶¹

The objective of this revolution will be 'adl (justice) and ihsan (benevolence), neither one of which is understood in socioeconomic terms, but ethical ones.⁶² The obstacles to Islamic revolution were not social consciousness, distribution of resources or any other of the usual postulates of Western thinkers, but fahsha' (immorality), and munkarat (the forbidden acts).⁶³ In the words of Enayat, Mawdudi saw revolution "mainly as a spiritual prerequisite of the Islamic state."⁶⁴

Mawdudi's focus on the leadership of the society rather than its masses, and the

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⁵⁹ In 1989 IJT held its first public convention under the theme, 'azm-i Inqilab (decision to stage a revolution). The revolution was, however, defined as the Islamization, a process which need not entail cataclysmic social and political change; interview with IJT leaders, Lahore.


⁶³ ibid.

⁶⁴ Enayat, Modern Islamic, P.103.
ethical rather than economic and political nature of his approach, in effect, turned revolution on its head, and flew in the face of the conventional wisdom on the subject. Having appropriated the myth of revolution, and operationalized its idioms in an Islamic context, Mawdudi, in effect, eviscerated revolution of its meaning and potency. He utilized revolution in a context where realization of the utopian sociopolitical order was postponed indefinitely, action was no longer immediate or total, and chiliastic zeal was sublimated and routinized. In this regard Mawdudi’s approach is distinguished from that of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. In the case of Iran, it is argued, Islamic revolutionary ideology,

"has been constructed through the unacknowledged appropriation of all technical advantages of the Western ideological movements and political religions with the added or rather the emphatically retained promise of otherworldly salvation."65

Mawdudi’s discourse on revolution approximates the Iranian model in that it sought to produce an ideological outlook utilizing the "technical advantages of Western ideological movements." However, Mawdudi’s "emphatically retained promise of otherworldly salvation" not to invoke revolutionary activism, but to suspend it. Muslims, he said, should not be disheartened with the absence of tangible success; their efforts on behalf of the Islamic state have not been in vein, they will be rewarded in the Hereafter.66 It is more important that they stay the course: "even if the current methods of struggle takes a

century to bear fruit, a non-violent movement shall be our way.\footnote{67 Interview with Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi, Karachi.}

Hence, what Mawdudi meant by the term revolution was a process of change in the ethical bases of society, which should begin at the top, and permeate from there into the lower strata. It was a process of cultural engineering based on definite criteria and postulates, which not only would shape the society in the image of the \textit{din}, but also prepare the ground for an Islamic state. Other social dialectics or aspirations, such as changes in the social structure, were conjectural to this process, but could be accommodated within the framework of the Islamic state.

Evident in Mawdudi’s conception of revolution is his views on social change. Adams writes, "...Mawdudi holds to the belief that societies are built, structured, and controlled from the top down by conscious manipulation of those in power."\footnote{68 Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", in Donald E. Smith, ed., \textit{South Asian Politics and Religion} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.388-89. Interestingly, this position is reminiscent of the Naqshbandi Sufi order’s doctrine of social reform, which served as the basis of the order’s proximity to the courts of emperors and sultans from the time Khwaja Baqi Bi’lIlah (1563-1603) who advised Emperor Akbar. See S.M. Ikram, \textit{Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan}, 2nd ed., (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1965), P.6.} "The objective of the Islamic movement" wrote Mawdudi, "is revolution in leadership."\footnote{69 Mawdudi, \textit{The Islamic Movement}, P.71.} Inherent in Mawdudi’s view is a greater emphasis upon human resolve and volition than Western interpretations of revolution can fathom:\footnote{70 Enayat, \textit{Modern Islamic}, P.103.}

"Strengthening the faith and moral ethics of Muslims in Pakistan is our primary concern and problem. Unless this feat is accomplished no scheme...\textit{\textendash}374
of reform, regardless of how attractive it may look on paper, would be attainable.\textsuperscript{71}

In short, change in the hearts and minds of individuals from the helm of the society downwards, through an educational process - a da‘wah effort - and without the need for any other sociopolitical catalysts, would ipso facto culminate in an Islamic revolution.\textsuperscript{72}

This approach, no doubt, was modeled after Mawdudi's own change of heart and embrace of Islam during the 1928-32 period. It was, however outlined as a religiopolitical doctrine by Mawdudi for the first time during the convocation ceremonies of the M.A.O. College of Amritsar in 1940.\textsuperscript{73} Mawdudi's proposals at Amritsar were translated into policy guidelines during the Jama'at's first forum on education, held in Pathankot in 1944.\textsuperscript{74} From these events it is apparent that, Mawdudi's conception of revolution predated the creation of Pakistan, and was therefore, not predicated on the vicissitudes of the Partition nor those of Pakistani politics, as has been suggested by Binder and Siddiq.

Mawdudi did not see education so much as the rejuvenation of religious observance among Muslim leaders and subsequently, masses, but as the training of a cadre of

\textsuperscript{71} Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Dakter ka Nishtar Ya Daku ka Khanjar} (Lahore: Daru'l-Fikr, nd.), P.5.

\textsuperscript{72} Na'im Siddiqi, \textit{Al-Mawdudi} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1963), pp.216-33.

\textsuperscript{73} For proceedings of that convocation see, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, \textit{Ta'limat} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, nd.), pp.66ff. Mawdudi himself attributes his views on the political function of education to his discussions with Iqbal during their meeting in Lahore in October 1937; see, \textit{MMKT}, vol.1, pp.182-86.

dedicated and pious men, who would form a vanguard movement charged with initiating and subsequently protecting the Islamic revolutionary process. Mawdudi predicted that they would ultimately assume the reigns of government, and thenceforth oversee the process of Islamization:

"An Islamic state does not spring into being all of a sudden like a miracle; it is inevitable for its creation that in the beginning there should grow up a movement having for its basis the view of life, the ideal existence, the standard of morality, and the character and spirit which is in keeping with the fundamentals of Islam." 75

Education, therefore, acts as the primary agent in Mawdudi's conception of revolution; it both gives shape to the leadership cadre, 76 and serves as the primary impetus for the unfolding of the revolution, from the apex of the society to its lowest strata. 77 It lies at the heart of the "Islamic revolutionary ideology", and as such, must precede the revolution, preparing the ground for a successful institution of the Islamic state. 78

"A state-system based on belief in the sovereignty of God and in a sense of responsibility to Him requires for its successful working a special type of individual mass-character and peculiar mental attitude." 79

Mawdudi's demand that, society be first educated in Islam and be prepared for the Islamic

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76 In this regard Mawdudi places great emphasis on the importance of education in the din in extricating Western influence from the hearts and minds of Muslim intellectuals; see, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, Economic System of Islam, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Riaz Husain, trans., reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), pp.100-02.

77 ISIT(1), pp.48-51.


79 ibid, pp.16-17.
revolution and the Islamic state stands in clear contrast to the approaches of both Ayatollah Khomeini and General Ziya, who advocated the use of political fiat to foster Islamization, and therefore, placed primary import on the struggle for political power. Mawdudi did not share their enthusiasm for a singularly political solution, and saw Islamization as an organic process which should emerge out of Islamization of the social culture and only then culminate in the Islamic state. Hence, Mawdudi, in contrast to Khomeini, saw Islamic revolution as essentially a peaceful affair. For, education would harbinger greater abeyance by the *din*, and hence, harmonize society to a greater degree, reducing the utility of force in the revolutionary process. The Islamic revolution, Mawdudi implied in the face of conventional wisdom on the subject, would become more irenic as it unfolded. However, as was the case with his discourse on the Islamic state, the specter of use of force to guarantee Islamicity, especially after the success of the revolution, lurks in the background of this otherwise peaceful process.

By education Mawdudi meant the process which would harbinger revolution. This definition can be unpacked to produce a more lucid understanding. Education was seen by Mawdudi as a process whereby Muslims are "reconverted" to veritable Islam - the *din* - and develop firm loyalties to it. Further probing brings us to yet another more basic definition of the concept in Mawdudi's works, namely, education as the actual means of training Muslims with view to producing a leadership cadre, vanguard movement, and

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eventually, a religiously conscious citizenry. At this basic level, however, education was seen in broader terms. Here, education was not only the abstract "locomotive" of the Islamic revolution, nor simply *da'wah* (invitation to Islam), but a process of learning, of filling minds with a particular body of knowledge imbued with a distinct world view. Education as cultural engineering, lay at the bases of Mawdudi’s call; it was the primary vocation of the Jama‘at, and a primary mechanism for instigating a revival of Islam. Since education was directed to train minds and construct a particular world view with view to the context in which the resultant knowledge was to be put to use, it had to combine Islamic learning with knowledge of modern subjects. Its contribution would lay in producing a class of religious, intellectual, and political leaders, and subsequently a citizenry, whose *weltanschauung* would be culturally authentic, and who would also be at home with modern scientific thought. Education, therefore, possessed an Islamizing as well as a modernizing objective.

The combination of these layers of meaning constituted Mawdudi’s outlook on education. Mawdudi’s thinking on the subject was close to the Nadwi educational model, which also began as an effort to create a nexus between Islamic and modern educational methods and subjects of study with view to training a leadership equally versatile in the Islamic and the modern fields. Mawdudi extolled the Nadwi model as a the sensible via

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82 *ibid*, pp.190-94. The break down of organizational discipline in the Jama‘at during the 1951 Punjab elections, which will be detailed in the following chapters, convinced Mawdudi of the need for greater attention to education at the basic level.

83 *SAAM*, vol.2, pp.70-72. Interestingly, many of Mawdudi’s proposals on education were first put to test in the curricula of the Medinah University of Saudi Arabia, in whose establishment in 1961-62 Mawdudi played a part; see, *ibid*, pp.100-01.
media between the traditional and the modern systems of education, and as a representative example of what he had in mind for Muslim education.84

Although the political enfranchisement of the Jama'at, following the organization's decision to participate in the Pakistani electoral process in 1957, was eventually tantamount to resorting to political means to nudge society towards the Islamic state, at the doctrinal level, the Jama'at remained loyal to the idea of revolution through education - Islamizing society by imparting Islamic values on the hearts and minds of its leaders and members.

Despite the Jama'at's departure from this position in practice, Mawdudi's discourse on revolution has been sufficiently compelling to find manifestation in the ideology of rival revivalist movements in Pakistan which have emerged since the 1970s. Israr Ahmad, a one time member of the Jama'at who left the organization in 1957 following the organization's decision to participate in national elections, has organized Tanzim-i Islami on the pattern of his erstwhile organization, the Jama'at, and based on an ideological outlook similar to Mawdudi's. The Tanzim is different from the Jama'at only in that the former adheres strictly to Mawdudi's doctrinal position of revolution through education, and has thus far

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84 See TQ, (September 1934), pp.2-9, and Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.83-89. The Nadwah was the only traditional institution with which Mawdudi felt affinity, and whose example he sought to emulate. For more on the Nadwis see, Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.335-47. Mawdudi had also been fond of Shibli Nu'mani, an eminent scholar and a founder of the Nadwah; see Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi, "Abu'l-A'la Ka Uslub-i Tahrir", in SSMN, pp.365-66. On possible influence of Nu'mani's attempts to augment the power of 'ulama on Mawdudi's thinking see, Ikram, Modern Muslim India, P.137.
remained aloof from political activities.\textsuperscript{85}

Tahiru’l-Qadri, founded the Minhaju’l-Qur’an organization and the Pakistan Awami Tahrik party, in a different response to Mawdudi’s discourse on revolution. Qadri has discerned a fundamental problem in the Jama’at’s binary vision on revolution - advocating revolution through education at the doctrinal level, and utilizing the electoral process to hasten the advent of the revolution on the practical. Qadri concluded that the Jama’at’s predicament was sufficiently debilitating so as to inhibit the organization’s ability to tap its reservoir of public support and cash in on its electoral potential. He therefore, entered the fray with the objective of filling the void left by the Jama’at’s putative paralysis. Qadri formed his organizations with view to resolving the inconsistency between an apolitical doctrine of revolution and the need to participate in the electoral process. He therefore, separated education from politics, vesting each in a separate organization with different monolithic doctrines. Hence, Minhaju’l-Qur’an acts as a da’wah movement, while the Pakistan Awami Tahrik is a full-fledged political party.\textsuperscript{86} Therefore, the Tanzim, the Minhaj and Pakistan Awami Tahrik are each a different response and also sequel to Mawdudi’s discourse on revolution; but above all, they attest to the centrality of Mawdudi’s discourse to contemporary religiopolitical thought and praxis in Pakistan. Both Israr Ahmad and Tahiru’l-Qadri, however, faithfully reiterate Mawdudi’s irenic view of revolution. The legacy of Mawdudi’s pacification of revolution has stood the challenge of the Iranian revolution, and found roots in Pakistani revivalist thought.

\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Israr Ahmad, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{86} Interview with Tahiru’l-Qadri, Lahore.
At the theoretical level, the foregoing attests to the possibility of enunciation and functioning of an ideological perspective which is not predicated on socioeconomic imperatives. For, not only does Mawdudi’s cultural motivations and ethical points of reference defy the logic of a socioeconomic understanding of the phenomenon of the Jama‘at, but his subsequent ideological adumbration confirm the possibility of emergence and development of a school of thought and a movement, which has functioned, with relative success, divorced of socioeconomic imperatives. This possibility, in turn, attests to both the continuing salience of Islam in Muslim societies on the one hand, and the unique qualities of Mawdudi as a leader and the power which his hybrid and modernizing world view possessed, on the other.

The uncertainty which characterizes the relation between ideology and social action here, moreover, points to a more fundamental and consequential ambiguity in Jama‘at’s stance which requires greater elucidation, namely, the nature and extent of the movement’s relations with the traditional order from the bosom of which it emerged. It is within the context of its relations with traditional Islamic thought and institutions, to which we shall now turn, that the idealization of Islam in Mawdudi’s thought and its subsequent arrested progress towards a veritable revolutionary doctrine, are best explicated.
CHAPTER 6
THE SECTARIAN DIMENSION OF REVIVALISM: MAWDUDI'S PLACE IN THE TOPOGRAPHY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT

The term "sect" in sociology of religion, is defined in contradistinction to "church". Both terms have sociological connotations, and are used to define the parameters of the societal orders which are identified on the basis of religious allegiance. While a church is an institutionalized manifestation of religion, whose interactions with its social context have been normalized, a sect retains an amorphous world view and a conflictive stance vis a vis the society around it. A sectarian tendency emerges from the bosom of a church; it may consolidate into a new religious perspective, or it may remain a mere tendency, ill-at-ease and yet entangled with the order from which it emerged.

In the latter instance, which will be shown here to encompass the case of the Jama'at, the progression towards sectarianism remains arrested. The interaction of factors which create the context from which the sectarian tendency is born do not lend support to the completion of the process. Alternately, factors within the sectarian tendency can coalesce to mitigate the possibility of a total break with tradition. The most important of these factors being the aims and decisions of Mawlana Mawdudi, the Jama'at's rooting in orthopraxy, and the movement's assertive relations to the Islamic idioms, symbolisms and doctrines. Revivalism, even when purporting to a fundamentally new world view cannot, by definition, escape its own center of gravity. It will per force continue to circumambulate tradition. Mawdudi's stance on the issue of *ijtihad* - permitting its practice in principle and

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with view to the needs of the Islamic state, yet effectively limiting its scope, and restricting
its practice to a learned few\(^2\) - is a case in point in this regard.\(^3\) The aforementioned two
factors have in the case of the Jama'at acted to check the organization's sectarian inclina-
tion, keeping the Jama'at at a distance from traditional Islam, and yet within its pale,
which at times makes the distinctions between Mawdudi's stance and that of traditional
Islam blurry. The working of each factor will be considered here.

Mawdudi's conceptions of the *din* and the Islamic state, as elucidated earlier, part
with the traditional Islamic view of orthodoxy, and of the objective of faith, function of
spirituality, and the nature of the relations between religion and society. Moreover, the
revitalization of Islam in Mawdudi's works was essentially a synthesis, wherein new ideas,
views and values have been added, mainly from the repertoire of modern Western
thought. There is an epistemological rupture in the sense described by Foucault, a chasm,

\(^2\) For Mawdudi learnedness was measured in terms of knowledge of the religious
sciences and Arabic, a traditional qualification, as well as in terms of knowledge of
modern subjects, a clear break with tradition; see, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, *Economic
System of Islam*, Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Riaz Husain, trans., (Lahore: Islamic Publications,
1984), P.304.

\(^3\) See, Maulana Abul' Ala Maudoodi and Sh. Mohammad Abu Zahra, "The Role of
"ijtihad" and the scope of Legislation in Islam", *The Muslim Digest* (Durban, South Africa),
9:6 (January 1959), pp.15-20; Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Tafhimat*, (Lahore: Islamic
Publications, 1965), vol.3, pp.5-68; *idem, Economic System*, pp.298-99; Hamid Enayat,
*Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, TX.: University of Texas, 1982), P.101, and
Sheila McDonough, *Muslim Ethics and Modernity: A Comparative Study of the Ethical
Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Mawlana Mawdudi* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred
Laurier University Press, 1984), P.57.

It should be noted that, at least in part, Mawdudi limited the scope of *ijtihad*, to
prevent its use for further corruption of the Islamic faith; see, Mawdudi, *Tafhimat*, vol.3,
pp.11-13.
which separates Mawdudi’s perspective from traditional Islam.⁴

The lines of demarcation between sect and the orthodoxy of the traditional order are not always defined in doctrinal terms. It has been argued that, "[i]t is the political success of a given interpretive reading that renders a religious position "orthodox","⁵ and by implication, "heterodoxy" or sectarianism are products of the political failure of that interpretive position. The case of the Jama‘at confirms the central role of politics in the institutionalization of an interpretive reading of religion. However, here the correlation between political success and orthodoxy runs in the opposite direction. Mawdudi’s interpretation of Islam has not scored a political victory and, therefore, has not become "orthodoxy". Yet, the movement’s political failure rather than institutionalizing the sectarian stance has had a traditionalizing influence, pushing the Jama‘at back into the fold of the orthodoxy of the tradition where from it emerged. The Jama‘at’s stance with reference to Islamic orthodoxy, while born of the movement’s particular interpretive reading of Islam, has remained tied to the vicissitudes of the movement’s political activism. The Jama‘at unable to translate its incipient zeal into a political victory, has over the years gradually drifted back towards tradition and its view of orthodoxy, at first moving closer to the position of the ‘ulama, but eventually to the more obscurantist and popular dimensions of traditional Islam. As will be discussed in later chapters, the political exigencies before the Jama‘at has pushed the movement closer to the ‘ulama, and vestiges


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of popular Islam in India, the abrogation of which was a component of the movement's original agenda. Perception of political success gave shape to the Jama'at as a new interpretive reading of Islam, failure to realize that success has acted to traditionalize the movement.6

How a particular interpretive reading of a religion comes to be identified in sectarian terms also has much to do with the attitude of the reigning orthodoxy. As the case of the Jama'at will reveal, refutation of a new interpretive reading of religious doctrines, and the denunciations of its protagonists will draw clear boundary lines between the existing order and the new one as "church" and "sect".

What is most interesting about Islamic revivalism, and the Jama'at as a representative expression of it is that, despite their sectarian predilection, they remain poised towards the orthodoxy and tradition from which they emerged. Islamic revivalism, as pointed out earlier, remains bound by the fundamental teachings of Islam, which limit its development along sectarian lines. If revivalism is distinguished from the traditional view of orthodoxy, in some measure, by its radical reassertion of the fundamental tenets of Islam, the same posture orients revivalism towards its origins. Revivalism is therefore poised towards traditional orthodoxy, and not away from it.

6 It is interesting to draw parallels here with the recent history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Sivan discusses debates within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian revivalist groups regarding the issue of whether they should leave Muslim society or remain attached to it. Central to the debate as can be discerned in the case of Mawdudi was the issue of the prize at stake: Muslim society as a whole. Mawdudi for instance was keen to win over the whole Muslim society, rather than to give it up and start completely afresh. See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp.83-130.
Charismatic movements, even in their pure form, cannot operate free from the influence of the tradition from the bosom of which they emerged. Therefore, the more subdued and undeveloped a charismatic claim and its associated sectarian tendency remain, the more noticeable and persistent the influence of tradition on them will be. Insofar as Mawdudi’s charisma, as was discussed in chapter 2, remained a potential, the attachment of his movement to tradition remained more pronounced.

Yet, as the case of Mawdudi suggests, there may exist an element of choice and volition involved in the extent of progress of charisma, and hence the extent and direction of the development of the sectarian tendency. Implicit in Mawdudi’s revivalist interpretation of Islam was the desire for conquering the entirety of the faith. The centripetal orientation of Mawdudi’s stance directed the Jama’at’s energies towards traditional Islam rather than away from it. The Jama’at does not have claim to new truths, but better understanding of the original ones, what makes differences between Mawdudi’s views and those of the ‘ulama, significant as they are, to seem nebulous. Hence, barring a conscious break with tradition, the Jama’at is, per force, bound the logic of its own ideology - to be a sect within a tradition, and yet poised to reshape that tradition in its own image.

In the case under study here, these ambiguities in the relation with traditional Islam is evident. While content with a certain distance with traditional Islam, Mawdudi was by no means ready to break with it completely. Mawdudi, moreover, reinforced the inherent ambiguity; for, he saw greater gains in conquering the whole of traditional Islam.

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7 Dabashi sheds much light on this point in his study of the continuity of pre-Islamic Arabian traditions in the institutionalized interpretations of the charismatic movement of the Prophet. See, Dabashi, Authority in Islam.
than in parting with it. The Jama'at has therefore remained suspended in between traditional Islam and sectarianism. This line of reasoning, interestingly, also underlay Mawdudi's ambivalence towards the partition of India. While in the case of the partition the turn of events forced a choice on the Jama'at, absence of a compelling force to push the Jama'at in either direction has thus far reinforced its ambivalence. The very inconsistency of this stance, however, has made it ultimately untenable, requiring the movement to routinize its activist zeal by either breaking with tradition or collapsing back into it. The routinization of the Jama'at's chiliastic tendency over the years, and the political imperatives before the organization have created pressures for the resolution of the Jama'at's ambivalence. A combination of Mawdudi's volition and the Jama'at's centripetal orientation have guided this resolution back towards tradition through greater identification with the traditional view of orthodoxy, as well as with the culturally syncretic popular expressions of Indian Islam.

Mawdudi's relations with traditional Islam were also, in part, predicated upon the dynamics of Mawdudi's confrontation with other sectarian rivals, and his desire to break from the pack of self-styled thinkers and movements some of whom had the support of the modernist and secular bureaucracy and military establishment, from Ghulam Ahmad Parwez to Muhammad Asad and Khalifah 'Abdu'l-Hakim on the one hand, and the Khaksar and the Ahrar movements on the other. These thinkers and movements were

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(and are) producing new interpretations of Islam in competition with Mawdudi and the Jama'at. Mawdudi often looked to traditional Islam for ways of circumventing the influence of his competition. Traditional Islam helped him guard his flanks, providing him with institutional support against competing schools of thought such as Islamic modernism, whose ideas were often quite similar to Mawdudi's. Increasing association with traditional Islam gave Mawdudi the means to condemn his competition for obscurantism and heterodoxy, accusations which could only be hurled from a position of traditional and orthodoxy. For instance, competition with Parwez, led Mawdudi to a debate with the

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The need for distinction from modernism became more pronounced the more the two competed for the same classes, or the classes they represented began to contend for power; Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), P.357.

Interestingly, Parwez had been a contributor to *TQ* during the journals early years; see *TQ*, (June 1938), pp.279-84.
"deniers of Hadith" (munkirin-i Hadith), Parwez and a number of his disciples in the Bazm-i Tulu'-i Qur'an (Celebration of the Dawn of the Qur'an) such as Dr. 'Abdu'l-Wudud. The debate was later extended to include all deniers of the authenticity of the Hadith, and those whose reading of the Hadith was innovative or unorthodox. Seeking to place the detractors of the Hadith beyond the pale of Islam, Mawdudi found himself squarely defending the traditional position. The dynamics of the Jama'at's competitive relations with other self-styled groups and thinkers pushed Mawdudi, who had himself parted with traditional norms of Hadith analysis by permitting intuitive authentication of Hadith and utilizing the corpus as a repository for revivalist activism, into the bosom

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11 Parwez and his school of thought deny the authenticity of the Hadith, and hence reject it as a source of Islamic law and practice. For more on Parwez see, Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968).

Mawdudi also saw the "deniers of Hadith" as leftists. He believed that the Nizam-i Rububiyat (Divine Order) leftist movement to have been based on the works of Parwez, and therefore, between 1960 and 1963, Mawdudi dedicated much effort to rejecting the ideas of Parwez; SAAM, vol.2, pp.146-50.


13 The list of those whom Mawdudi challenged on the issue of Hadith included Chiragh 'Ali (companion of Sayyid Ahmad Khan); the Ahl-i Qur'an leaders, Mawlvi 'Abdu'lllah Chakralwi, Mawlvi Ahmadu'ddin Amritsari and Mawlana Aslam Jairapuri; as well as self-styled thinkers such as, Pirzadah Ibrahim Hanif; Justice Shafi and Justice Rahman; SAAM, vol.1, P.146; vol.2, P.145; and TQ, (March 1934), pp.57-64; (December 1958), pp.29-43.

of traditional orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{The Outlines of Jama'at-\textsc{\textsc{i}} Islami's Sectarian Tendency}

Fissures between Mawdudi's interpretive reading of Islam and the traditional Islamic perspective were imbedded in Mawdudi's works ever since 1932, when he first launched his broadside fulminations against Islamic customs and mores, the \textit{ulama} and the Sufi \textit{pirs}. The sectarian tendency in Mawdudi's program, however, is perhaps most evident in the manner in which the Jama'at was born and subsequently developed. The Jama'at was launched as a "new \textit{ummah} (community of believers)\textsuperscript{16} All those who joined including Mawdudi, did so after uttering the \textit{shahadah} (Muslim testimony of faith) - symbolically undergoing a conversion, albeit an internal one, into a new religious perspective. They were what Geertz has termed "oppositional Muslims", whose intellectual and religious space was delineated in contradistinction to traditional Islam.\textsuperscript{17} The Jama'at's mandate as a "new community of believers", vested with missionary zeal, was underscored subsequently through Mawdudi's continued confrontational stance \textit{vis a vis} the \textit{ulama} and the \textit{pirs},\textsuperscript{18} and the reiteration of his claim to veritable interpretation of

\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Mawdudi had criticized the Ahl-i Hadith who recognized only the Qur'an and the \textit{Hadith}, to the exclusion of the teachings of the schools of law, from the traditional perspective, enjoining adherence to the writ of the legal traditions, when he himself was attempting to break with them; \textit{TQ}, (July-October 1944), pp.83-96.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{17} Clifford Geertz, "'Internal Conversion' in Contemporary Bali", in Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures} (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp.170-89.

Islam.\textsuperscript{19}

The spokesmen of traditional Islam understood Mawdudi’s challenge for what it was, and therefore, were not charitable in their response. No sooner had the Jama’at formed that, the ‘ulama sought to underline Mawdudi’s sectarian tendency, criticizing his use of the title "Amir" as proof of his sectarian pretensions. The charges were sufficiently damaging to compel Mawdudi to explain his use of the title "Amir" in a rather lengthy speech during the Jama‘at’s annual session in Muradpur in 1946.\textsuperscript{20} Later in the same year, in a lecture before the members of the Jama‘at in Lahore, Mawdudi explained that the use of the terms "Amir" or "Jama‘at" do not denote sectarianism, but serve the purpose of consolidating a political organization.\textsuperscript{21} Mawdudi’s desire to assuage the ‘ulama’s anxiety regarding his intentions pushed him to sublimate the Jama‘at’s sectarian inclinations, and to instead present more political definitions of his movement.

The ‘ulama, however, were not interested in Mawdudi’s denials or statements of fidelity to the orthodox position. Their purpose was not to bring back the Jama‘at into their fold, but to unmask its "heterodoxy". The ‘ulama were, in fact, instrumental in confirming the Jama‘at’s sectarian tendency. A case in point in this regard was their use

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of the sobriquet, "Mawdudiyyat" (Mawdudism), in reference to the Jama'at’s doctrinal position. The appellation "Mawdudiyyat" was more damaging and derogatory than its mere connotation of "-ism" suggests. For, similar use of the suffix "-iyat" ("-ism") was made by Deobandi 'ulama in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to denounce the "heretical" preachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadi sect. There, terms such as "Qadiyaniyat" or "Mirzaiyat", which clearly rhyme with "Mawdudiyyat", underlined the un-Islamic nature of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's ideas; a whole fatwa (religious decree) was therefore implied by the use of the "-iyat" suffix in reference to Mawdudi. Implicitly, Mawdudi was, and at times continues to be derided, with the same vehemence as was reserved for the more clearly sectarian movements.

Over the years some rapprochement has taken place between the Jama'at and various 'ulama grouping at the institutional level, and even political alliances have been forged in Pakistan (and also India) with view to promoting political objectives which they have shared. Yet, the differences between Mawdudi and the spokesmen of traditional Islam run deeper, and it is at that level that the true cleavages between "church" and "sect" become apparent.

Mawdudi's ideological orientation, essentially, parts with the "cumulative tradition" of Islam in India. Mawdudi's holistic approach to Islam, "demonstrating
the rational interdependence of Islamic morality, law and political theory\textsuperscript{25} stands in opposition to the ambient culture of traditional Islam. Its overtly and exclusively political reading of Islam is distinguished from the essentially soteriological and spiritual concerns of traditional Islam. Mawdudi was himself conscious of these differences; they were, in fact, proof of the doctrinal authenticity of his views, and the very \textit{raison d'être} of his movement.\textsuperscript{26} Maryam Jameelah wrote in this regard,

"In launching his [Mawdudi] Islamic movement in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent, his aim was not a mere patch-work of reforms, much less did he intend to attempt any restoration of traditional Islamic civilization as it had existed in the pre-colonial days. His goal was a total revolutionary break, with the medieval past and its so-called Muslim society....he strived to build a better universal order..."\textsuperscript{27}

Mawdudi's "better universal order" was based on the fundamental sources of Islam, it was religiously authentic. Yet, by its exclusive reliance upon the fundamentals, and also in his particular interpretation of their intent and meaning, it negated all other component parts of the edifice of traditional Islam, from parochial customs and mores to philosophy, the arts, and the sanctity of history.

\textsuperscript{24} See Nadwi, '\textit{Asr-i Hazir}. Schleifer argues that it was in reliance upon the fundamental sources of Islam rather than the cumulative tradition of Islam in India that, Mawdudi was distinguished from the \textit{'ulama}, and placed outside the pale of traditional Islam; see, S. Abdullah Schleifer, "Jihad: Sacred Struggle in Islam IV", \textit{The Islamic Quarterly}, XXVIII:2 (Second Quarter 1984), P.93.

\textsuperscript{25} Hamid Enayat, \textit{Modern Islamic Political Thought} (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1982), P.102.


\textsuperscript{27} Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Maulana Sayyid Maudoodi's Life and Thought", \textit{The Islamic Quarterly}, XXXI:2 (Second Quarter 1987), P.117.
It was in the refutation of the sanctity of Islamic history, which was discussed in chapter 2, that Mawdudi's role as a *mujaddid* was elaborated. It was by the same refutation which his sectarian tendency was also established.\(^28\)

Traditional Islam, although perturbed by the decline of Islam, did not develop the kind of cognitive dissonance which has propelled revivalists into reinterpretation and action. Traditionalist thinkers, writes Nasr, explained the occlusion of the political power of their religion within the structure of Islamic theology and philosophy, and the religion's eschatological doctrines, acknowledging that,

"[s]omething had gone with the world as God Himself had mentioned in His Book concerning the end of the world and the Blessed Prophet had described in his traditions. In such a case the eclipse of Islam was itself a proof of the validity of the Islamic message..."\(^29\)

Although few traditional thinkers remained steadfast in adhering to this line of reasoning, it remained the doctrinal position of traditional Muslim thinkers, who dabbled in politics, but never substituted spiritual concerns with political ones; and more importantly, while cognizant of the interests of their community did not seek to alter the course of history as an incumbent injunction of their faith. They exhorted orthodoxy, believing that it would in itself produce political results favored by the Muslim community. If more was required

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\(^{29}\) Nasr, "Islam", P.7.
to create a religiously acceptable political order, the traditional divines acted through the existing leaders of society; they advised, petitioned, admonished and on occasion, challenged; but did not trade in their holy mantle for the garb of a politician. It was accepted that political change may, at times, be necessitated by the requirements of Islam, but this order was not reversed - Islam was never reinterpreted with view to the needs of political change.

This position was primarily premised on Ash'ari voluntarism which lies at the bases of mainstream Islamic theology (kalam). Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari (d.935), founded Sunni theology in refutation of Mu'tazili rationalism. Al-Ash'ari had found Mu'tazili rationalism incapable of explaining the existence of evil, and hence, theodicy. Al-Ash'ari, instead, argued that evil was in the domain of God's will, and could not be reasoned. He exalted God's will as beyond human comprehension, and therefore, inscrutable. Man, bound by his cognitive limitations, was not to reason evil, but to accept it as God's will. History as an embodiment of God's will was therefore both sacred and unaccountable to man. Luminaries such as al-Juwaini (d.1085) and al-Ghazzali had elaborated upon and disseminated Ash'arism, making it the cornerstone of Islamic theology. These scholars also weaved Ash'ari theology into political doctrines which enjoined Muslims to submit to their rulers, even if they be unjust. They had argued that, injustice was preferable to anarchy;

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31 Watt, *Islamic Philosophy*, pp.82-89.
for, the latter unlike the former could interfere with the believer's practice of Islam and hence spiritual realization. Since justice was cherished not as an end in itself, but in that it could facilitate greater spirituality, the concern for the end superseded the one for the means.\textsuperscript{32}

The decline of Islam's worldly power has, in recent years, created a significant sense of theodicy, of discrepancy between the ideal and the reality among Muslims. Revivalist thinkers such as Mawdudi have responded to the psychological pressures of this theodicy by parting with the Ash'ari position, seeking instead to reason what is in the domain of God's will, and to even venture to alter it.\textsuperscript{33}

The traditions of Islamic philosophical inquiry (\textit{falsafah}), Sufism, and gnostic illumination ('\textit{irfan}), have, at least since the time of Shah Waliu'llah, become a constituent part of the ambient culture of Muslim India, and have made inroads even into the doctrinal positions of the 'ulama. The philosophical and the mystical perspectives also supported the Ash'ari position.\textsuperscript{34} The transcendental theosophy (\textit{hikmat-i muta'aliyah})


\textsuperscript{34} Shah Waliu'llah was a known Naqshbandi Sufi. He was also influenced with the transcendental theosophy of Mulla Sadra; see Hafiz A. Ghaffar Khan, "Shah Wali Allah: An Analysis of His Metaphysical Thought", dissertation submitted to Department of Religion, Temple University, 1986. Also see Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, \textit{Shah Wali-Allah and His Times} (Canberra: Ma'rifat, 1980).
of Sadru’ddin Shirazi, Mulla Sadra (d.1640),\textsuperscript{35} which is the dominant school of Islamic philosophy in the Subcontinent,\textsuperscript{36} and has weaved the Islamic philosophical and mystical traditions into a single theosophical inquiry, has underlined the Ash’ari position further.\textsuperscript{37}

Muslim philosophers have argued that, in order to contemplate upon Himself, God created the world. If He is the Perfect Good, the universe which has issued from Him is, by definition, less perfect, and increasingly drawn to evil. Yet, since evil is intrinsic to the very creation of the universe, discrepancies between ideals and realities do not connote theodicy, nor does the possibility of reasoning into the nature of evil present itself.

Sufis have similarly, discouraged preoccupation with the reason and justification for evil. In the Sufi conception, evil is a concomitant of the very existence of the world. Existence, as privation of Divine Truth, is naturally prone to evil. As was the case with the teachings of Islamic philosophy, theodicy cannot plausibly present itself where evil is justified as inherent to the order of the world. Moreover, as the world is by definition privation of God, and hence, the source of evil, it cannot possibly serve as the vehicle for realization of the Divine Truth, nor as its embodiment, what Mawdudi intended the


Islamic state to be. In fact, the very notion of a worldly utopian order defies the logic of
the position of Islamic mysticism. Man, the Sufis and the theosophers have argued, may
only combat evil by transcending the worldly reality, escaping from the trappings of the
terrestrial order, and thus by beginning the journey back to God. It is only in Him, and
outside of the worldly order which issued away from Him, that Divine Truth may be
realized.38

The confluence of the theological, philosophical, and the mystical positions on the
source of evil and their position on theodicy had determined the approach of traditional
Islam towards politics in the Subcontinent. The directives of the three have, moreover,
been imparted on the thinking of the Indian ‘ulama through the aegis of Shah Waliu’llah,
whose fused theology, philosophy, mysticism and Hanafi law into a coherent tradition of
Islamic learning. The tradition of renewal and reform, associated with Shah Waliu’llah,
therefore, took shape within the bounds of this religiointellectual construct. It maintained
an active approach towards the world, but did lose sight of the spiritual connotations of
religious life and worldly activities; a worldly utopia never became a surrogate for spiritual
realization, nor the objective of religious practice.39

The Waliu’llahi tradition has been central to the ambient culture and world view
of the ‘ulama in India. As Hanafi jurists, but also theologians, philosophers and Sufis,

38 For more on Sufism see, Martin Lings, What is Sufism? (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975); Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1975); and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sufi Essays

Indian 'ulama have stood as the quintessential representatives of traditional Islam in its entirety. It is for this reason that Mawdudi’s departure from the norms of traditional Islam found shape in a debate with them.

Mawdudi sought to enunciate an all-inclusive school of Islamic thought which was premised on a different response to the theodical implications of the "fall of Islam". For Mawdudi Islamic history was essentially a failure, one which had concrete reasons and tangible solutions. Some of the 'ulama had similar feelings which had motivated their political activism. Where Mawdudi parted with them was in the fact that, for Mawdudi Muslim glory was not merely an means to realize greater spirituality, but was an end in of itself. Politics was not a passing concern, necessitated by force of circumstance, but the very heart of religious belief and practice. This was a communalist need which had been thoroughly translated into a religious position. "Fall of Islam" had by far greater communal implications than religious ones. By equating - or confusing - the two, Mawdudi was shaping religion such that it would address a communalist need. The Islamic state was not only a harbinger of greater religiosity, but its was the very embodiment of religiosity. Manzur Nu'mani, denying Mawdudi any benefit of the doubt, argued that the latter’s approach was a tahrif (purposed misreading) of the Islamic concept of tawhid (unity of God). This tahrif has led Mawdudi to concoct a doctrine of hikmat-i ‘amali (practical

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40 See for instance Sayyid Mawdudi’s Khilafat’u Mulukiyat.

wisdom), which Nu‘mani argued was neo-Khariji in outlook, and ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi saw as the product of a marizanah zihniyat (ill mentality). Hikmat-i ‘amali, argued Mawdudi’s critics among the ‘ulama reduced faith into worldly activism and a drive for political power, converting Islam into an "-ism" indistinguishable from any other. The boundaries between Mawdudi’s views and traditional Islamic thought were thus clear, necessitating a clear dissociation of the former from the latter. This dissociation was clearly manifested in Mawdudi’s break with the Hanafi school of law. Although Mawdudi claimed fidelity to the Hanafi rite, in practice he developed an independent legal approach, one that was "not bound by any school of law".

42 Kharijis (Khawarij) were a revolutionary and puritanical sect which broke away from Sunni Islam in the seventh century. Condemned by the orthodox for their reading of Islam and their violent excesses, they were militarily defeated by the armies of the Caliphs. For more on the Kharijis see, Hamid Dabashi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Islam to the Establishment of the Umayyads (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Books, 1989), ch.4; and W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp.54-57.

43 Cited in Wahidu’ddin Khan, Din Ki Siyasi Ta’bir (Lahore: Al-Maktabah-i Ashrafiyah, nd.), P.5.

44 Nu‘mani, Mawlana Mawdudi, pp.84-85.

45 Wahidu’ddin Khan, Din ki Siyasi Ta’bir, pp.20-21.


47 TQ (July-October 1944), pp.86-93. Also see, TQ (november 1950), pp.9-30, and (February 1951), pp.185-92. Mawdudi encouraged others to choose one school of law after careful consideration, and remain bound by it. In otherwise he gave equal weight to all schools of law, expressing no preference among them; see, Syed Asad Gilani, Maududi; Thought and Movement (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), P.56.
writes Khurshid Ahmad, was rather eclectic,\textsuperscript{48} incorporating elements from other schools of law, notably Hanbali law and the eminent jurist Ibn Taimiyah's (d.1328) reading of it; as well as from Shi'ism, all to widen the horizons of Sunni law. Hence, acquiring a vision which could attract "modern-educated Muslims".\textsuperscript{49} The implications of these interpretive endeavors were significant enough to set the stage for a showdown between the Jama'at and the 'ulama.

\textbf{The Struggle With the Ulama, 1932-47}

It was JUH's inability or unwillingness to cross the boundaries of its traditional stance to accommodate Mawdudi's perspective, more than its support for Congress, that forced Mawdudi to break with them in the 1920s. It was for this reason also that following his resignation from \textit{al-Jami'at}, despite his formal education in the religious sciences, he parted with the methodology of traditional scholarship, and enunciated his religious perspective in a new style, which symbolized his novel and independent approach, engendering a distinct religiointellectual space - a niche - for the elaboration and formalization of a new Islamic world view.\textsuperscript{50} He was not of the 'ulama he proclaimed, his authority rather emanated from the tradition of Ibn Taimiyah and Shah Waliu'llah - as he understood them; it was to be elaborated in lieu of that of the 'ulama.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{48} Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal", P.118.

\textsuperscript{49} Cited in \textit{TUTQ}, vol.1, pp.xvi-xvii.

\textsuperscript{50} Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Watha'iq-i Mawdudi} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1986), P.83.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ibid.}
The 'ulama recognized the secessionist implications of Mawdudi's position clearly. When the Jama'at was formed in 1941, Mawdudi wrote to some seventy-five 'ulama, including Manazir Ahsan Gilani, 'Abdu'l-Majid Daryabadi, Qari Muhammad Tayyib and Husain Ahmad Madani, inviting them to join the Jama'at. A handful replied, only to register their disapproval. Younger 'ulama, however, were more receptive to Mawdudi's call. A number of them, from various educational traditions, (as will be detailed in chapter 7) joined the Jama'at; yet to the dismay of their elders. Amin Ahsan Islahi and Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi recollect that when Mawlana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi - who had praised Mawdudi's book on jihad and helped publish it - learned that the two had joined the Jama'at he became noticeably distressed. Some of the Jama'at's early enthusiasts among the 'ulama, such as Manzur Nu'mani, Wahidu'ddin Khan, and Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi later parted with Jama'at and returned to the fold of traditional Islam.

The elaboration of Mawdudi's restorationist agenda, moreover, brought his conflict with traditional Islam and its spokesmen into sharper focus. Mawdudi saw the 'ulama as the main impediment to the success of his da'wah. Unlike the pirs whom he dismissed as "heterodox", and hence, incapable of resisting the force of the reforms of a veritable

52 TQ, (October 1980), P.26; and Abad Shahpuri, Tarikh-i Jama'at-i Islami (Lahore: Idarah-i Jama'at-i Islami, 1989), vol.1, P.525. During the same period, Mawdudi also made more direct overtures to Nadwi 'ulama. He travelled to Lucknow in 1940, staying at Nadwatul-'Ulama, where he solicited advice and assistance from the establishment regarding the Jama'at; interview with Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, Lucknow.

53 Interviews with Islahi, Lahore; and Nadwi, Lucknow. 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan relates a similar experience with his seniors when he joined the Jama'at; interview, Faisalabad.
"da'wah" movement, the 'ulama, as guardians of orthodoxy operated in the same exoteric realm in which Mawdudi's program was launched. The institutional rivalry over turf and constituency was, therefore, immediate. As a result, Mawdudi unraveled his scheme for the future of Muslims in tandem with a concerted attack on the 'ulama, seeking to loosen their hold over the hearts and minds of the Muslims. Mawdudi's discourse on the Islamic state consciously side-stepped the 'ulama - an anachronistic institution which, he opined, had no place in a reformed and rationalized Islamic order. A resuscitated caliphate and a modern Islamic state would leave no room for the 'ulama as leaders, justices and guardians of the community. By encouraging independent study of Arabic, the Qur'an, Hadith, and other religious sources sought to disrupt the social function of the 'ulama. Muslims, if worthy of the title, did not require any 'ulama to guide them. Similarly, by stipulating such criteria as knowledge of modern subjects for those practicing ijtihad, Mawdudi sought to render the 'ulama, as religious functionaries and as contemporary thinkers, obsolete. Interestingly, Mawdudi's attack remained conscious of the educated Muslims rather than the masses. For, Mawdudi derided the 'ulama for their moribund

54 Metcalf argues that British rule suspended the official execution of Islamic law, creating a void that was filled by the 'ulama; Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revivalism in British India: Deoband 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), P.51. Hence by the time under question here they had developed a significant social role.

55 Syed Abul 'Ala Maudoodi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami Publications, 1955), pp.105-06; and *idem, Tafhimat* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1965), vol.1, P.202. The impact of this approach is clearly evident in the favor shown for an 'ulama-less Islam by Jama'at members, who were educated according to Mawdudi's prescriptions. Their attitudes in this regard are evident in the various interviews published in *JVNAT*.

scholastic style, servile political attitudes, and lack of knowledge about the working of the modern world.\textsuperscript{57} Sayyid As‘ad Gilani reflects Mawdudi’s attitude writing,

"The Modern age is an age of inventions, technology and discoveries. In this age, the inventions and political, economic and social change have created perplexing problems of human life. The new demands of life require modern solutions in the light of Islamic teachings. The old-fashioned \textit{ulema} or religious scholars who are produced by the traditional madrassahs, suffer from a limited intellectual horizon restricted to the old books of Hanafi \textit{fiqh}.\textsuperscript{68}

Mawdudi’s attitude was, in some measure, a response to the deprecating manner in which the \textit{‘ulama} dismissed his educational credential’s with view to the task he had set before himself. The upshot of this altercation was, however, to create a cultural gap between the \textit{‘ulama} and the Jama‘at; one rooted in tradition and hence ambivalent towards politics, and the other modernist in outlook with an overtly political orientation.\textsuperscript{59}

However, as pointed out earlier, Mawdudi’s thought, following its initial parting with tradition, remained centripetal; he remained poised towards the order from which he had emerged. While his modernist attacks on tradition created a space for his program, his attention continued to be focused on traditional Islam. Hence, he made forays into the domain of the \textit{‘ulama}, which underscored both his differences with them, and yet his continued concern with traditional Islam. In numerous books Mawdudi outlined the tenets of Islam and reinterpreted Islamic history in a pretentious tone, to consciously refute the


\textsuperscript{58} Cited in Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal", P.121.

traditional position; confirming the centripetal direction of his movement. Works such as *Khilafat‘u Mulukiyat* (Caliphate and Monarchy) or *Qur‘an ki Char Buniyadi Istilahain* (The Four Basic Qur’anic Terms), as cornerstones of Mawdudi’s conception of *din*, were deliberate intrusions into the domain of the ‘ulama. Through these works Mawdudi sought to undermine the legitimacy of the ‘ulama’s religious standing. He in effect, argued that not only were the ‘ulama unprepared for contending with the problems of the modern world, but had also misunderstood Islam itself. The Jama‘at, however, was not only given form in distinction to traditional Islam, but with view to replacing it. The ‘ulama were blamed for sanctioning the wrongful deeds of the Mughuls who alienated Hindus from Islam, and were subsequently in an alliance with the Congress whose aim was erecting a "Hindu Raj". History bore testimony to their failure, and the modern world had no place for their moribund scholarship.

Mawdudi’s invective against the ‘ulama, questioning their religious knowledge, wisdom and ultimately, utility, found expression in his criticisms of the political choices of his former mentors in JUH. They were not, however, only political remonstrations, but a detailed and documented aspersion cast on the religious sagacity and knowledge, and communal fidelity of the ‘ulama; the religious and social ramifications of which,  

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60 Mas‘ud ‘Alam Nadwi cited in *RJI*, vol.6, pp.182-86.

61 Mawdudi specifically, viewed his campaign against JUH leaders as ending *akabir-parasti* (worshipping the elders), a clear attack against the person of senior ‘ulama and their institutional basis of authority; see Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, P.348. Also see, *TQ*, (July-October 1935), pp.82-88; *idem*, *Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (Lahore, 1939), vols.1 and 2. Mawdudi equated the alliance between Islam and nationalism, Hindu as well as Muslim, with Emperor Akbar’s *din-i ilahi*, as a syncretic pollution of the faith; see, *RJI*, vol.5, pp.182-83. On this issue also see, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, 405
needless to add, were momentous.

The Precarious Entente: Jama'at-i Islami and the 'Ulama, 1947-Present

Mawdudi's attitude towards the 'ulama, however, underwent drastic change with the creation of Pakistan in 1947. As mentioned earlier, politics was to act as a check on Mawdudi's drift away from tradition and, as will be elucidated later, was to traditionalize the original autonomous stance of the Jama'at in the years that followed. Pakistan presented the Jama'at with new political circumstances, and hence, new choices and exigencies. The Jama'at began moving closer to the 'ulama as early as February 1947. At that time Mawdudi charged two of his followers, Amin Ahsan Islahi and Sibghatu'llah Madrasi to contact various 'ulama groupings, and to inform them of the position of the Jama'at.\(^6\)\(^2\) Following the creation Pakistan, faced with the obduracy of the Liaqat 'Ali Khan administration, the Jama'at moved even closer to the 'ulama, forming tactical alliances with his erstwhile enemies. In a public speech in Karachi in April 1948, Mawdudi made a direct appeal to the 'ulama for cooperation over the demand for an Islamic state.\(^6\)\(^3\)

In landmark religious and political events thenceforth, from the Objective Revolution (1949) to debate over the Interim Report (1952), the 'ulama's Twenty Two Point proposals (1952), anti-Ahmadi agitations (1953-54); the 'ulama convention (1960), and opposition to Family Law Ordinance (1961-62) the Jama'at and the 'ulama formed

\(^{62}\) RJI, vol.5, pp.97-98.

\(^{63}\) Cited in SAAM, vol.1, P.352.
a symbiotic relationship directed at preserving the place of Islam in Pakistani politics.64

The Jama'at saw its alliance with the 'ulama as crucial to its survival in Pakistan and the success of its program. When incarcerated on charges of treason in 1948 over the issue of jihad in Kashmir, two young 'ulama leaders of the Jama'at, 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan and 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi, actively lobbied with the 'ulama, and especially with Pakistan's preeminent 'alim at the time, Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad 'Uthmani (d.1952) on Mawdudi's behalf.65 'Uthmani proved instrumental in Mawdudi's release from prison.66

Following the Jama'at's confrontations with the government over the jihad in Kashmir in issue, it became increasingly difficult for the Jama'at to maintain its influence in the constitution making process.67 Mawdudi decided then that, the 'ulama, as influential as they had proved to be at that time, were a convenient mouthpiece for the Jama'at which was being squeezed out of politics.68 The Jama'at, confident of its own intellectual superiority, saw no dangers in this arrangement; the 'ulama had the means and

64 These issues will be treated in greater detail in the next chapters. For an excellent treatment of the relations between the 'ulama, the Jama'at and the state see Binder, Religion and Politics.

65 Interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.


'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan recollects that Mawdudi maintained contact with Mawlana 'Uthmani while in prison through 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi, and advised the eminent 'alim who was then in the Assembly on various issues.

67 This was especially true when in 1949, Mawdudi launched a campaign against the Interim Report. Unable to prove effective on his own, the Jama'at sought to involve the 'ulama in the campaign; see, Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.210-11.

68 Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.
the Jama'at the know-how to build an Islamic state. Mawdudi, therefore, played a central role in fostering greater unity among the 'ulama through such measures as the Twenty Two Point proposals.\(^69\) The unity, Mawdudi concluded, would augment the power and reach of the religious lobby in the constitution making process. Hence, when in 1950 Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi came to Pakistan, Mawdudi openly endorsed his spiritual leadership, a symbolic gesture but, nevertheless, significant in determining the future direction of the Jama'at.\(^70\) Mawdudi’s endorsement of Sulaiman Nadwi was brought about by Mas’ud ‘Alam Nadwi, a close companion of Mawdudi and a favorite student of Sayyid Sulaiman.\(^71\) Mas’ud ‘Alam arranged for Sayyid Sulaiman to visit Mawdudi at the latter’s house in Lahore following his arrival in Pakistan.\(^72\) This incidence along with ‘Abdu’l-Jabbar Ghazi’s rapport with Mawlana Shabbir ‘Uthmani indicate that the young 'ulama in the Jama'at leadership were not only a crucial link between their mentors and the new organization, but were a force for traditionalization within the Jama'at serving as a break to a complete rupture with tradition.

The 'ulama were meanwhile receptive to Mawdudi’s overtures, and helped bring back the Jama'at closer to traditional Islam. For instance, in 1951, when Mawlana

\(^{69}\) Binder points out that Mawdudi was, however, careful not to accede too much ground to the 'ulama. Hence, he did not approve naming the 'ulama as protectors of the shari'ah in the Board of Islamic Education, and managed to remove a proposal to that effect from the Twenty Two Points; Binder, *Religion and Politics*, P.217.


\(^{72}\) Rana and Khalid, *Tazkirah*, P.149.
Ihtishamul-Haq Thanwi, 'Uthmani's successor and putatively an enemy of the Jama'at, convened a conference of the 'ulama, thirty one "ulama" were invited for the occasion, one of whom was Mawdudi. Ihtishamul-Haq was conferring a coveted title upon Mawdudi, and by accepting it, Mawdudi confirmed the traditionalizing influence of Jama'at's political activism.

However, despite the political incentives for cooperation between the 'ulama and the Jama'at, and the concrete steps the two made towards a modus vivendi, the tensions between the traditional perspective, which remained suspicious of Mawdudi, and Mawdudi's interpretive reading of Islam, institutionalized into the structure and world view of the Jama'at, persisted, erupting from time to time in the form of denunciations and recriminations. Despite its rapprochement with the 'ulama for political purposes, the Jama'at had retained its doctrinal independence, confirmed through periodic bursts of attack on the 'ulama. Similarly, there remained many in the ranks of the 'ulama who were not restrained by political considerations, and continued to view the Jama'at with disdain.

Mawdudi had received direct criticism from the 'ulama as early as 1945. The pace and breadth of these attacks only increased following the creation of Pakistan.

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73 Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.213-14.

74 Similarly, eager to foster an alliance with the 'ulama over the Ahmadi issue in 1953-54, Mawdudi accepted their formula for an Islamic state; Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.278-79.

75 RJI, vol.6, pp.93-94.

76 ibid, vol.3, pp. 118 and 128.
Between 1948 and 1950, a period of rapprochement between the Jama'at and the 'ulama in Pakistan, a number of senior religious scholars, notably, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi (1948), Manazir Ahsan Gilani (1950), and 'Abdu'l-Majid Daryabadi (1950) - all of whom lived in India - criticized Mawdudi's views as obscurantist. By 1952 the trickle of criticism from the 'ulama circles had been converted into a flurry of fatwas (religious decrees). In 1951 the Daru'l-'Ulum at Deoband initiated a fatwa campaign against the Jama'at. The campaign was started by Mawlanas Sayyid Mahdi Hasan and Aizaz 'Ali in March 1951. The campaign soon gathered support; notable Deobandis, Mufti Kifayatu'llah, Mawlanas Husain Ahmad Madani, Ahmad Sa'id and Qari Muhammad Tayyib also joined the fray. The first three, having suffered the brunt of Mawdudi's fulminatory attacks on JUH, had an axe to grind with Mawdudi. Additional fatwas came from Saharanpur, Malabar and Lucknow. The fatwas accused Mawdudi of unorthodox Qur'anic and Hadith interpretation, departures from the norms of Hanafi law; issuing unorthodox religious verdicts; belittling the importance of the Prophet of Islam; insulting the companions of the Prophet; Wahabbism; sympathy for Ahmadis; arrogating mahdiist pretensions, and in some cases,

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77 Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, *Jama'at-i Islami par Ik Nazariyah* (Karachi, 1952), pp.88-98. Interestingly, Gilani and Daryabadi had both known Mawdudi in Hyderabad at the 'Uthmaniyyah University, and had contributed to the *Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an in its early years.*


80 In Saharanpur the fatwa was issued by Mufti Sa'id Ahmad of the Daru'l-Fatwa, in Malabar the campaign was headed by Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Thanwi, and in Lucknow by 'Abdu'l-Bari Nadwi; see, Iqbal, *Jama'at-i Islami*, 98-101.
Khariji tendencies.  

The *fatwa* campaign was initiated, in Jama'at's view and justifiably so, at the behest of Pakistan government who was eager to weaken the religious alliance that had taken form against it, and to crush the Jama'at. However, the Jama'at had a clear hand in intensifying it. In June 1951, soon after the initial *fatwas* were issued at the Deoband Daru'l-'Ulum, in response to the query of a reader of the *Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an*, Mawdudi true to his earlier communalist vision, declared India as *daru'l-kafr* (land of blasphemy), forbidding Pakistanis to marry anyone from India, nor to accept inheritance from residents of that country. Indian 'ulama, understandably, took personal insult at Mawdudi's suggestion, as did many Indians and Pakistanis who also pressed their religious leaders to refute Mawdudi's statement. 

The institutional linkages between Indian and Pakistani 'ulama did not favor

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82 See chapter 11.

83 The Brailwi 'alim, Zafar Ahmad 'Uthmani was incensed at Mawdudi's declaration, and derided him in the strongest terms; see, Kawthar Niyazi, *Jama'at-i Islami 'Awami 'Adalat Main* (Lahore: Qaumi Kutubkhanih, 1973), pp.126-28.
Mawdudi's case. The fatwa campaign therefore, gained momentum and soon spread to Pakistan. Jami'at-i Ulama-i Pakistan (JUP), the Barelwi religious organization, in 1952 published a book entitled, Khatrih ki Ghanti (Bell of Alarm),\(^{84}\) wherein Mawdudi was inculpated for harboring mahdiist and "Mirza'i" (i.e. Ahmadi) tendencies. The Barelwi offensive against the Jama'at precipitated a wide-spread discussion regarding the Jama'at's doctrinal position among the 'ulama; discussions which, to the delight of the government, were not politically productive. Soon Mawdudi came under attack from all the schools and groupings of the 'ulama in India and Pakistan.\(^{85}\)

The Jama'at was clearly perturbed by the invidious campaign,\(^{86}\) and took great pains to refute the charges leveled against it. Mawdudi who had always condemned such fatwa campaigns,\(^{87}\) saw the hand of the Pakistan government behind the entire episode, and refused to consider the merit of the 'ulama's carping. Mawdudi saw no reason why his controversial religious proclamations should interfere with the Jama'at's alliance with the 'ulama. In 1952 he wrote, "...this is also wrong that if someone disagrees with my

\(^{84}\) Anonymous, Khatrih ki Ghanti (Lahore: Jami'at-i Ulama-i Pakistan, nd.).

\(^{85}\) For instance among those who attacked Mawdudi through fatwas and books were, Barelwi 'ulama, Sayyid Ahmad Sa'id Kazmi and Zafar Ahmad 'Uthmani of JUP; the Deobandi 'alim, Sayyid 'Abdu'l-Haqq of Jami'at-i Ulama-i Islam (JUI); Mufti Rashid Ahmad of the Ahl-i Hadith; and Abu Tahir Afaqi of the Tablighi Jama'at. Mawlana Ahmad 'Ali cites 54 'ulama who supported the fatwa campaign against Mawdudi in Pakistan; Mawlana Ahmad 'Ali, Haq-Parast 'Ulama, pp.15-50.

\(^{86}\) In areas of Pakistan, such as the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where the 'ulama are of great importance, the fatwa campaign was greatly damaging to the Jama'at.

\(^{87}\) In the August and September 1936 issues of TQ Mawdudi had condemned the practice of condemnations and recriminations by the 'ulama as unproductive, and damaging to Islam.
research he should stop cooperating with me on religious issues. Mawdudi, however, avoided direct involvement in this imbroglio, and consigned the task of responding to the charges leveled against the movement and its doctrines to other Jama'at leaders. In India, Mufti Muhammad Yusuf, later the Amir of the Jama'at-i Islami of India, took the lead in the effort to exonerate Mawdudi. In Pakistan the task of defending Mawdudi fell upon the shoulders of the 'ulama votaries of the Jama'at, such as 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf - those who had already become the nexus between the Jama'at and the 'ulama. Interestingly, in these altercations, the Jama'at did not seek to justify its particular interpretive reading of Islam, nor defend what Mawdudi had emphatically stated in his discourses on the *din* and the Islamic state. They rather sought to defend the Jama'at against charges of obscurantism, denying that they had parted with tradition. All such suggestions, argued the Jama'at, were either born of insidious machinations on the part of a few ill-wishers, or were the result of misunderstandings.

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88 Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Tajdid’u Ihya’i Din* (Lahore, 1952), P.186.


...we have made no undue claims for the position of our Jama‘at; we claim no monopoly of truth. What we say is this: We recognized our duty; therefore, we have formed an organization.\textsuperscript{91}

No mention was made of Mawdudi’s cavalier attacks on the ‘ulama and their vision of Islam, nor of novel ideas which had been the fulcrum of Mawdudi’s message. When confronted with the reality of their stance \textit{vis a vis} tradition, the Jama‘at showed a tendency to reaffirm rather than loosen its links to traditional Islam. The thinker and the movement which had labored to distance itself from tradition, faced with the prospects of a real break with its past, bulked at such a possibility, and instead reasoned its way back into a comfortable distance with traditional Islam.

The Jama‘at’s conciliatory efforts at vindicating itself did exculpate the organization somewhat; and the immediacy of the political question before the religious alliance dampened the zeal of the ‘ulama’s offensive. Hence, cooperations between the two were soon resumed, but disagreements continued to loom in the horizon. For so long as the Jama‘at remained in suspension between tradition and a sectarian break with it, political alliances between the ‘ulama and the Jama‘at were bound to be complicated further by renewed denunciation and recriminations. The Jama‘at remained close to the ‘ulama, but the organization’s corporatist identity was periodically underlined by Mawdudi through his interpretive reading of Islamic doctrines. Mawdudi’s reaffirmations invariably invited the disapproval of the ‘ulama, which at times manifested itself in the form of renewed public denunciations. The government, meanwhile, keen to both weaken the religious alliance

and undermine the Jama’at, did not remain altogether uninvolved in these affairs.

The Jama’at, therefore, was to face new challenges from the ‘ulama in the 1960s; first in 1963 over the Jama’at’s controversial decision to support the candidicy of Fatimah Jinnah for presidency, and again in 1966 following the publication of Mawdudi’s book, *Khilafat’u Mulukiyat*. In the first instance, political expediency forced Mawdudi to make an embarrassing *volte face* on issue of women’s role in politics, which he sought to justify through a creative interpretation of Islamic history and doctrines. The government was quick to point out Mawdudi’s folly and his transgressions from the orthodox position, mobilizing a group of the ‘ulama, some from the government camp, in an anti-Mawdudi *fatwa* campaign.

*Khilafat’u Mulukiyat*, however, presented a greater dilemma for the Jama’at’s *modus vivendi* with the ‘ulama, and was potentially more divisive. In this book Mawdudi made no qualms about his independent legal outlook, parting with the norms of Hanafi law. The book moreover, presented an uncharitable view of Caliph ‘Uthman (one of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs), which regardless of its historical accuracy, was found to be sacrilegious by the ‘ulama. The book opened the door for a more serious discussion of Mawdudi’s perspective and reexamination of some of his earlier writings, notably,

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93 *ibid*, pp.365-66.


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Qur'an ki Char Buniadi Istilahain. The renewed interest in unmasking Mawdudi's departure from traditional norms produced a number of more penetrating and somber criticisms of his thought by his erstwhile followers, Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, Wahidu’ddin Khan, and Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani, all of whom are among the most prominent Muslim scholars of India.95

Although the logic and venomous tone of the fatwa campaign at times acted to vindicate Mawdudi,96 the Jama’at was, by and large hurt by the ‘ulama’s invective.97 The relations between the Jama’at and the ‘ulama became more complicated from the late 1960s onwards. If before this date, political exigencies had led the ‘ulama to ignore the transgressions of a junior partner, the perception of Jama’at’s increasing political prowess from the 1960s onwards led the ‘ulama to reexamine their stance. It was the Jama’at, who in the first place, had done so much to politicize the ‘ulama; the organization now had to contend with their appetite for political activity and their direct

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95 These works which have already been considered in this chapter were all produced in India, where the author was immune from the influence of the exigencies of Pakistani politics in one form or another. For Jama’at responses to these works see, Sayyid Ahmad Qadr, ‘Asr-i Hazir Main Din ki Tafhim’u Tashrih Par Ik Nazar (Lahore: Maktabah-i Ta’mir-i Insaniyat, 1979).

96 For instance one critic of Khilafat‘u Mulukiyat accused Mawdudi of "Husain parasti" (worshipping Husain, i.e. being sympathetic to the Shi‘i), a charge which not only would not damage Mawdudi, but was construed as illogical by the observers. See, Abu Yazid Muhammadu’ddin Butt, Mujaddid-i Tarikh Jinab Mahmud Ahmad Sahab ‘Abbasi ke Khalaf Mawdudi Sahab ki Ghalat Bayaniyun ka Jawab (Lahore: Anjuman-i Muhibbin-i Sahabah, nd.), pp.18-19.

97 See interview with Sayyid As’ad Gilani, in Nida (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), P.12, where the interviewee admits that the Jama’at was disturbed and hurt by the opposition and fatwas of the ‘ulama. Also see, Ahmad Munir, Mawlana Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (Lahore: Atashfishan Publishing, 1986), pp.110-11.
political interests. As the religiopolitical organizations of the ‘ulama, the JUI and the JUP (and later those of the Ahl-i Hadith as well) took form and developed distinct corporatist identities and vested political interests, organizational rivalry between the Jama’at and the ‘ulama parties too, became entrenched. The relations between the Jama’at and the ‘ulama, therefore, became increasingly strained. Wary of the Jama’at’s potential for a solid electoral showing in the elections of 1970-71, the various ‘ulama groupings increased their attacks on the Jama’at. 98 No longer restrained by the need for political unity, but motivated by organizational and political rivalry, these attacks aimed not only at Mawdudi’s thinking, but at the working of the Jama’at. JUI’s leaders, Mufti Mahmud and Mawlana Hizarwi, reacted passionately to the Jama’at’s Yaum-i Shaukat-i Islam (Day of Islamic Glory) rally in 1970. 99 Similarly, JUP purposely contested every ticket in the elections of 1970-71 where there was a Jama’at candidate. 100 The new political and institutional direction of the ‘ulama’s attacks on the Jama’at cost the movement dearly in those elections. 101

Eager to appeal to the mainstream Pakistani voter, the Jama’at was neither content with being cast in a sectarian mold, nor with being identified as an enemy of the ‘ulama.

98 See for instance, Mawlana Qazi Mazhar Husain, Tahaffuz-i Islam Party ka Intikhabi Mauqaf (Chakwal: Tahaffuz-i Islam Party, 1977). Khurshid Ahmad argues that the ‘ulama were particularly perturbed by the Jama’at’s Yaum-i Shaukat-i Islam (Day of Islamic Glory) rally in 1970, which was relatively successful; interview, Islamabad.


100 This fact can be readily ascertained from an examination of the electoral data for the elections of 1970-71; see, Report on General Elections Pakistan 1970-71, 2 vols., (Islamabad: Election Commission, nd.).

101 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
In its effort to silence the 'ulama, the Jama'at has been down playing its controversial doctrinal teachings, and has instead placed increasing emphasis on the imminent danger to Islam from the secular leadership, hoping to persuade the 'ulama into recreating the alliance which the two enjoyed soon after Pakistan was formed. More importantly, the Jama'at has sought to curb the attacks of the 'ulama by becoming increasingly like them, a de facto 'ulama party. Therefore, political considerations, in one form or the other, have continued to push the Jama'at back towards traditional Islam.

The Jama'at also sought to counter the menace of the 'ulama through other means, a long run strategy directed at infiltrating their institutional structure, and at the same time creating ideological and institutional linkages between the Jama'at and the 'ulama. With this objective in mind, the Jama'at launched the Jami'at-i Tulabah-i 'Arabiyyah (JTA, Association of Arabic Students), a student movement directed at religious seminary students in the 1962 in Dacca.\textsuperscript{102} JTA was charged with the task of recruiting seminary students from all madrasahs and daru'l-'ulums across Pakistan, along the lines of student organizations in the universities. The Jama'at hoped that JTA would be able to impart the Jama'at's perspective and influence on the next generation of Pakistani 'ulama, hence, creating more fundamental understandings and relations between the Jama'at and the 'ulama.

In 1963, the Deobandi 'alim and Jama'at stalwart, Mawlana Gulzar Ahmad Mazahiri founded the Jami'at-i Ittihad-i 'Ulama (Association of Unity Among the

\textsuperscript{102} Salim Mansur, "Islami University ka Mutalabah", in \textit{TT}, vol.1, P.192.
'Ulama). This organization was to act as a medium for fostering greater dialogue between the Jama'at and the various 'ulama factions in Pakistan. Mazahiri was, moreover, charged with the task of promoting unity among the 'ulama around the issue of "Islamic revolution", and the protection of the place of Islam in Pakistan. In 1976, Mazahiri founded another Jama'at organ, the 'Ulama Academy, which in addition to working towards a common platform with the 'ulama also acted as a daru'l-'ulum, training Jama'at 'ulama. These Jama'at 'ulama would not only carry the message of the organization to mosques and seminaries in cities, town and villages across Pakistan, reaching hitherto untouched new ground, but would create a new sodality, which would compete with the existing schools of religious thought on both the theological and the institutional level. Convinced of the futility of ad hoc alliances with the 'ulama, Mawdudi decided to infiltrate them, pressurize them from within, and if possible, to replace them with 'ulama of his own. It was a daring offensive into the heart of the 'ulama's domain. This was a policy which the Jama'at had also pursued vis a vis the bureaucracy, and would eventually adopt before the army - faced with uncompromising enemies, disarm them from within, and appropriate their institutional structure, part and parcel. The prospects of Jama'at-i Islami 'ulama, however, ran in the face of much of Mawdudi's original stance against institutional Islam. Unable to unseat the 'ulama, the Jama'at once again found itself collapsing into the fold of traditional Islam.

Over the years, and especially since Mawdudi's death, the purview of the activities

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103 This section has been based on interviews with Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi, Karachi; and Farid Ahmad Parachah, Lahore; as well as a number of 'ulama in JUP and JUI.
of the Jami’at-i Ittihad and the ‘Ulama Academy have extended further. The Jama‘at now operates a number of daru’l-‘ulums across Pakistan, the most important of which is the ‘Ulama Academy in Lahore, begun by Mazahiri in 1976, and opened with 125 students in 1979.104 As a result of these undertakings, the Jama‘at has intensified its interactions with the ‘ulama.105 The liaison with the ‘ulama is now overseen by a Na‘ib Amir of the Jama‘at, Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi. ‘Abbasi has placed the issue of Jama‘at-‘ulama relations in the context of promoting unity among ‘ulama as a whole. He has sought to obfuscate the Jama‘at’s problems with the ‘ulama by underlining the fractious nature the institutional structure of ‘ulama, a strategy which had proved successful in the 1950s when the Jama‘at acted as the broker for unity among the ‘ulama. He has moreover, sought to rally the ‘ulama to the support of causes sponsored by the Jama‘at, such as resistance to the invasion of Western culture and defense of gains made for Islam during the Ziya period; all in the framework of various Jama‘at-sponsored ‘ulama conventions, the Mutahiddah ‘Ulama Council (Council of united ‘ulama) or the Nifaz Shari‘at (Protection of the shari‘ah) movement.106 Under ‘Abbasi, who took over the Jama‘at’s projects on the

104 ISIT(I), pp.44-45. The daru’l-‘ulum was later directed by Mawlanas Fatih Muhammad, Muhammad Chiragh and Gawhar Rahman, all Deobandis, and is administratively under the supervision of Farid Ahmad Parachah.

105 Interview with Farid Ahmad Parachah, Lahore. The notion of a daru’l-‘ulum in the bosom of the Jama‘at was already present in Daru’l-Islam experiment in the late 1930; see SAAM, vol.1, P.166. The first reference to a Jama‘at daru’l-‘ulum came in 1963; see Chaudhry Ghulam Muhammad, Jamaat-e-Islami and Foreign Policy (Karachi: Rajab Ali, 1963), P.11.

106 Interview with Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi, Karachi. Also see, Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi, Khutbah-i Istiqbaliyah, Kull Pakistan ‘Ulama Convention (Lahore: Jama‘at-i Islami, 1989); and ‘Ulama Convention ki Rudad (Lahore: Jami‘at-i Ittihad-i ‘Ulama, 1989) -
'ulama following Mazahiri’s death in 1980, the Jama’at has made a number of significant concessions to the ‘ulama, sublimating Mawdudi’s departures from Hanafi law, and bringing the Jama’at squarely within the Hanafi tradition.\textsuperscript{107} Pakistani ‘ulama, however, have not been assuaged, demanding that the Jama’at renounce a number of Mawdudi’s works.

Significantly, following the retirement of Mian Tufayl Muhammad from position of Amir in 1987, the issue of relations with the ‘ulama emerged as a major criterion for the election of the new Amir. The populist Qazi Husain Ahmad comes from a Deobandi background, and was named after the JUH leader and Mawdudi’s old foe, Husain Ahmad Madani.\textsuperscript{108} Qazi Husain, in his capacity as Amir, and as part of his program of widening the political base of the Jama’at, has since 1987 moved the organization closer to the ‘ulama. This strategy of the Jama’at has bore some fruit, as the organization has been able to cultivate a following in the predominantly Deobandi NWFP province. However, the increasingly political character of Pakistani ‘ulama organizations, each with its own distinct corporatist identity and set of political goals, precludes the possibility of definitive unity among them, and is likely to be a source of continuing rivalry and confrontation, unless

\textsuperscript{107} The Jama’at has also sought to change the maverick image of Mawdudi by arguing that his proclamations were not personal, but official, reflecting the view of the Majlis-i Shura’; interview with Farid Ahmad Pirachah, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad, Lahore. Also see, Khurram Badr, \textit{Qazi Husain Ahmad} (Karachi: Saba Publications, 1988), pp.21-28.

It is probably with the same objective in mind that Mawlana Mawdudi’s Deobandi \textit{ijazahs} have been published and emphasized upon in recent years.
religious parties as a whole be challenged by other political forces.

The Jama'at's answer to the challenges leveled by the 'ulama, while attesting to the organization's gradual shift back towards traditional Islam, also indicates that it has remained adamant in retaining a certain distance with tradition in its capacity as the veritable "vanguards" of Islam. The Jama'at has made conciliatory overtures to the 'ulama, with traditionalizing effects. More importantly, the Jama'at has set out to infiltrate 'ulama organizations, and has itself produced 'ulama, but ones who bore the imprint of the organization's ideological perspective. Above all, however, the Jama'at's 'ulama policy, especially under 'Abbasi and Qazi Husain, is a testimony to the ultimate failure of the Jama'at's original vision and the tenacious staying power and continued political salience of traditional Islam; facts, the realization of which has forced the Jama'at, in its desire for greater political gain, to succumb to the pressures of traditionalization. These observations are, furthermore, apparent in the Jama'at's encounter with and policy towards Sufism.

The Struggle Against Sufism and Popular Islam

The Jama'at's schismatic relation with traditional Islam has also taken shape, at least in part, as a result of Mawdudi's attitude towards Sufism. Like Islamic reformers who preceded him, and true to the spirit of contemporary revivalist thought, Mawdudi and the Jama'at have showed disdain for Sufism and the traditional institutions of authority associated with it.\(^{109}\) In a lecture at the Islamiyah College of Lahore in 1939, Mawdudi argued that the spiritual powers of religious divines (Sufi masters) were as relevant to the


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fundamental questions of existence as were the physical attributes of a wrestler.\textsuperscript{110} Elsewhere, he chastised Sufism for causing the decline of Islam throughout history.\textsuperscript{111} Above all else, true to his modernizing perspective, Mawdudi found Sufism as incompatible with and incongruous with regards to the rationalized world view which he had adumbrated.

Yet, here again, the distance which Mawdudi was creating between the Jama‘at and traditional Islam, was controlled by the political needs of the Jama‘at. Sufism was of great importance to the major ‘ulama groupings in Pakistan, namely the Deobandis and the Brailwis, who found Mawdudi’s attacks on Sufism just as contentious as his religious exegeses elsewhere. Moreover, in Punjab and Sind, at least, Sufism played an important role in the popular culture of the masses, and eventually in their politics.\textsuperscript{112}

Hence, Mawdudi’s anti-Sufi rhetoric soon ran into trouble in Pakistan. Faced with the reproach of the few and the sundry, the Jama‘at felt compelled to explain and exculpate its position. The objective of the Jama‘at here, as was the case with their stance \textit{vis a vis} the ‘ulama, was to minimize any political damages which may accrue from their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Cited in \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.175.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Maududi, \textit{A Short History}, pp.104-05; and Khurshid Ahmad, ed., \textit{Adabiyat-i Mawdudi} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972), pp.216-93.
\end{itemize}
interpretive reading of Islam, and to reduce the distance between their perspective and that of traditional Islam. Therefore both Mawdudi and Amin Ahsan Islahi, went on record denying that Jama'at was antagonistic towards Sufism. Mawdudi claimed that he was from a Sufi ancestry, which by itself, prevented him from denouncing Sufism.

During correspondences with 'Alau'ddin Shah, a Naqshbandi pir in Punjab who was also a relative, Mawdudi accepted the truth of Sufism, however, only as practiced by the venerated Shaikh - precluding the popular Sufism of the Chishti and the Qadri orders, their structure of authority based on the religious shrines, and the festivals and rituals associated with them.

Implicit in Mawdudi's qualified acceptance of Sufism was a definition of what he understood Sufism to be, and a rejection of what he believed the spiritual path should not entail. A drastic redefinition of Sufism had been a part of Mawdudi's program of reform from inception. However, unable to spurn Sufism altogether, a redefinition of Sufism now

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113 Mawlana Shaikh Ahmad, *Mawlana Mawdudi Awr Tasawwuf* (Deoband: Maktabah-i Tajalli, 1966). The author documents the negative responses which Mawdudi's attacks on Sufism had generated.

114 *TQ* (September 1951), pp.55-56, and (November 1951), pp.34-36. These denials happened just before the fatwa campaign against Mawdudi.

115 Interestingly, references to Mawdudi's Sufi ancestry, hitherto absent in his official biographies, began to appear in Jama'at publications on his life and thought from the late-1950s onwards.

116 Interviews with disciples of 'Alau'ddin Shah, Lahore. The correspondences were conducted over a number of years. They began as a debate between Mawdudi and the pir, but ended with Mawdudi's acknowledgement of Sufism in the following terms: "I accept Sufism as you practice it." As pointed out in the last chapter, in his later years Mawdudi became personally involved with Sufism.
found new importance. Mawdudi had attempted to eviscerate Sufism, and infuse its hollow shell with values and aims which would convert it into an aspect of the din - merely a component part of Mawdudi’s message:

"Fiqh deals with the apparent and observable conduct, the fulfilling of a duty in letter. What concerns itself with the spirit of conduct is known as Tasawwuf (Sufism). For example, when we say our prayers, Fiqh will judge us only by fulfillment of the outward requirements such as ablution, facing towards the Ka’ba...while Tasawwuf will judge our prayers by our concentration...effect of our prayers on our morals and manners." 118

For those in the Jama’at this redefinition was a reform of Sufism, and the restoration of its veritable spirit and intent. Mawdudi’s redefinition, however, imparted entirely new meaning on Sufism. Sufism was not the esoteric dimension of religion, but merely a gauge for "concentration" and "morals". It existed, Mawdudi conceded, but not in the form and spirit Muslims had thought it did.

The redefinition of Sufism occurred in tandem with emphasis on Mawdudi’s own Sufi lineage. The latter, no doubt, legitimized the former, and the former rendered the same service to Mawdudi’s adumbration of an interpretive reading of Islam. Sufi terminologies, such as tazkiyah-i nafs (cleansing the soul); ta’alluq bi’llah (dedication to


119 Sayyid As’ad Gilani, *Sayyid Mawdudi: Bachpan, Jawani, Barhapa* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), P.176. Gilani also argues that Mawdudi universalized Sufism, bringing it out of the khaniqahs (Sufi cloisters) into the society.

God); *karamat* (spiritual charisma); *tajalliyat* (reflections), *mazahir* (epiphanies) and *mushahadat* (realizations) of God gradually found their way into Mawdudi's discussions,\(^{121}\) and his ideological formulation became his *suluk* (Sufi path).\(^{122}\)

Mawdudi's redefinition of Sufism, however, neither completely assuaged admonitions of the Jama'at's position on Sufism, nor did it expand the base of support of the Jama'at among the masses. The Jama'at therefore, was compelled to accede more ground to Sufism, and from the mid-1960s onwards, redefinition increasingly gave place to outright recognition of Sufism. Idarah-i Ittihad-i 'Ulama was expanded to also include the *mashayikh* (sing. *shaikh*, Sufi masters). The Idarah actively sought to foster greater understanding between various Sufi orders and the Jama'at.\(^{123}\) The political incentives behind this *rapprochement* with Sufism became clearer when in 1987, when Qazi Husain Ahmad launched his Karvan-i Da'wat'u Muhabbat (the Caravan of Invitation and Benevolence), directed at gathering mass support for the Jama'at with a visit to the shrine of Sayyid 'Ali Hujwiri (Data Ganjbakhsh) (d.1072) in Lahore.\(^ {124}\) The visit was of great significance. By engaging in the most "obscurantist" aspect of Sufi devotion - visitation of


\(^{122}\) Sayyid As'ad Gilani, *Maududi*, pp.242-57.

\(^{123}\) Mawdudi's correspondences with 'Alamu’ddin Shah occurred in the context of this project, as did Mian Tufayl’s translation of the great mystic, Sayyid ‘Ali Hujwiri’s seminal work, *Kashf al-Mahjub* into Urdu. The Jama'at’s overtures were found receptive by Qadri and Naqshbandi leaders; interview with Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi, Karachi.

\(^{124}\) The shrine of Data Ganjbakhsh is one of the most venerated and popular Sufi shrines of the Subcontinent. Qazi Husain’s visit stirred much controversy within as well as outside of the Jama'at. On the Karvan see chapter 5.
the shrine of a saint - the Jama‘at had now accepted Sufism at face value. The event was not only a testimony to the primarily political motivation of the Jama‘at and its traditionalizing influence, but also to the final victory of traditional Islam over revivalist challenges to it.

The vicissitudes of the Jama‘at’s relations with traditional Islam have created a complex process of interaction between the two, one which has arrested the Jama‘at’s sectarian tendency, and kept the movement within close proximity to tradition. It is apparent from the foregoing that the ideological formulations and interpretive reading of Islam, after its initial break with tradition, was unable to satisfactorily institutionalize a sectarian position, and has been gradually collapsing back into traditional Islam. Yet, the proximity of the Jama‘at, as debilitating as it may have been to the consolidation of the movement’s world view into an independent religiopolitical formulation, has provided the Jama‘at with occasion to directly influence traditional Islam. By virtue of staying within the pale of traditional Islam, the Jama‘at has possessed a real opportunity to influence traditional Islam and to modernize it from within. In other words the Jama‘at’s final significance may not rest in its successful institutionalization of a new school of thought, as the movement’s leaders had originally intended, but in influencing the structure of

125 Faced with increasing challenge from the Brailwi Anjuman-i Tulabah-i Islam (Islamic Student Association) for the control of university campuses in the Punjab, the Jamai‘at has been forced to make similar concessions to popular religion and Sufism. The Jamai‘at now holds conferences on the life and works of Sayyid ‘Ali Hujwiri, and routinely begin their meetings with na’t (devotional chants in praise of the Prophet), which are associated with folk religion and had heretofore been criticized by the Jama‘at.
traditional Islamic thought and world view. Moreover, it is not so much the dialectic of Mawdudi's discourse which has accomplished this feat, but the organizational power and reach of the Jama'at's organizational structure.

\[126\] For instance, the political activism of the 'ulama in Pakistan, and the content of their political program has been in great part influenced by the Jama'at.
"They'll rely on proofs and on eloquence; 
but will also do the work of Truth by the sword and the shield."

Muhammad Iqbal
CHAPTER 7
IDEOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES AND PRAGMATIC TENDENCIES:
THE DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN
JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI

During the course of the past five decades, the history of the Jama'at has been shaped through the dialectics of a process which began with the idealization of religion and culminated in the routinization and institutionalization of that idealism, channeling the movement's energies into the pursuit of politics. The dynamics of this process has determined the pattern of continuity and change in the history of the Jama'at, determining the crystallization of its organizational structure, the nature of its corporatist identity, and the role of ideology in shaping the organization's understanding of social change and approach to political action. Important as the forces which have controlled the historical development of the Jama'at may be, the exact nature of their influence on the Jama'at, and the manner in which they interact with the organization's ideological perspective and pragmatic political proclivities remain unstudied. This chapter therefore, will focus on discerning and analyzing forces and factors which have influenced the Jama'at's political socialization, resolved tensions created by the pull of the Jama'at's ideological impetus and that of its pragmatic political tendencies; and as such, produced a paradigm which governs the pattern of continuity and change in the historical evolution of the Jama'at.

The Place of "Organization" in Mawdudi's Thought

The Jama'at has, over the years, served as the intermediary between Mawdudi's ideological formulations and the sociopolitical context in which it was to find shape. It has translated his ideas into a sociopolitical program which has been an animating force in
Pakistani politics. It has cultivated a political constituency for Mawdudi's ideas, transforming his revivalist vision into a political movement, and ultimately a party. The scrutiny of the history of the Jama'at here, will therefore, not only shed greater light on the working of the paradigm which has controlled organizational change in the Jama'at, but will provide additional insights into the trials and tribulation of the organization in Pakistani politics, reasons for its continued salience, and yet, stymied growth.

Selznick writes of the role of the party in communism that,

"For Lenin, organization was an indispensable adjunct to ideology. He did not believe that he could win power by propaganda alone. Rather he urged the need to forge a group which, beginning with an ideological commitment, would use whatever means were available to influence decision in society. For him the task was...to raise to power a select group of communicants."

One may substitute "Lenin" with "Mawdudi" in the above passage to arrive at a description of the place of the Jama'at in Mawdudi's program of action. This is not so much suggestive of direct borrowing, although Mawdudi had been exposed to communist influence, as it confirms the working of the same linkage between ideology and socio-political action that has related the former to the latter in European history.

The emergence of this linkage in the case of the Jama'at, was already implied in Mawdudi's articulation of an "ideology", and has since, given more concrete form to the modernizing impetus of the process of idealization of religious thought and action as adumbrated in his works. The Jama'at, however, is by no means unique in displaying such modernizing proclivities. It has been argued that the success of Islamic movements in

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modern times hinges on the formation of rational organizations, and hence, the ability to embody new interpretations of the religion in institutional bodies capable of operation in increasingly modern sociopolitical settings. An "organizational weapon" is the prerequisite and concomitant of the idealization of faith, and its subsequent use as a harbinger of sociopolitical change. No particular event prompted the creation of the Jama'at, recollects Na'im Siddiqi, it was the culmination of the ideas which Mawdudi advocated and the agenda which he had set before himself since 1932.

For Lenin the "vanguard" was won over by the doctrine, and then charged with the task of maneuvering the masses into the position of struggle against the economic and political order. The Jama'at fulfilled the same function, only with a more straddled strategy; focusing its attention not so much on organizing the masses, but on maneuvering the leadership of the society. Mawdudi's conception of an "organizational weapon" was never as lucidly defined as that of Lenin. For Mawdudi, the Jama'at was both a "virtuous community" and a political "party", pursuing the path to sociopolitical change through both expanding its own boundaries and waging a struggle against the established order. The mechanisms and working of the process of change therefore, remained less clearly defined, reducing its potential considerably. The idea of the role of the organization in

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3 Interview with Na'im Siddiqi, Lahore.

operationalizing ideology was, however, essentially the same. The ambiguities which characterize Mawdudi's understanding and adumbration of modern ideas also condition his approach to the concept and role of the "organizational weapon", but to a lesser extent than was the case with his intellectual discourse. For, the Jama'at is the product of the most successful and thorough assimilation of a modern concept into Mawdudi's interpretive reading of Islam.

While the idea of the Jama'at, as was discussed earlier, was influenced by disparate political and intellectual trends, the actual decision to launch the organization had its roots in the vicissitudes of Mawdudi's efforts to renew and reform Islam. He had floated the idea of an organizational solution to the political predicaments of Indian Muslims as early as 1934:

"The erection, endurance and success of a social order requires two things: one, that a jama'at [party/organization] be founded on that order's principles...and second, that there be patience and obedience to that jama'at."  

His notion of a jama'at at this stage was not clearly defined; it purported, for the most part, to the invigoration of the Islamic faith and the recreation of a rigorous ummah (community of the faithful):

"If the two fundamentals of Islam salat (prayers) and zakat (alms) are established, automatically dispersed people would form jama'ats, and those organizations in of themselves would come to life and their movement would by itself gain strength and naturally step in the direction of progress."  

5 TQ, (November 1934), P.162.

6 TQ, (March 1936), P.6.
However, motivated by communal concerns and predicated upon a rationalization of Islamic thought, the idea of a jama‘at was also per force imbued with sociopolitical connotations. As a force for progressive change, and a bulwark against the political marginalization of Indian Muslims, the definition of the jama‘at had to be narrowed, from an amorphous ummah to a discrete sociopolitical entity. This requisite redefinition, however, was never properly reflected in Mawdudi’s thinking on organizations. Consequently, the Jama‘at always remained divided between its religious and sociopolitical functions.

The dual role of the jama‘at, as political party and a religious community was, interestingly, further underlined as a result of Mawdudi’s ever greater involvement in Indian politics from 1937 onwards. He appealed to an organizational solution to political questions, but remained unclear as to whether it was a revived ummah or a communally conscious political organization which was to deliver the beleaguered Muslim community. For Mawdudi the party and the ummah would eventually be one and the same. A jama‘at would be a vehicle for augmenting the political power of the Muslims, not only by virtue of its organizational structure, but also by the power of its moral rectitude. The power of the organization would emanate as much from its structure as from its embodiment of the Islamic ideal. For Mawdudi, just as political concerns invoked abeyance by the religious law, to enact the dictums of Islam would ipso facto lead to political activism. The urgency of the political circumstances of the pre-partition years, the failure of the Daru’l-Islam project, and the sense of frustration which Mawdudi shared with his co-religionists at the time, made him oblivious to the ambiguity of his stance. His desire to hasten
Islam's drive for power developed into an obsession with discipline and an organizational solution, which he saw as the panacea for Muslims. 

"...societies which have been considered worthy of honour...have possessed the virtues of organization, discipline....Disorganization, indiscipline, anarchy, disunity, injustice...have always been considered manifestations of decay and disintegration in a society." 

The structure and moral quality of a jama'at, concluded Mawdudi, would provide the necessary regimentation of Muslim religious life and political activity. This conclusion further ensconced the dual role of the jama'at, as an exemplary community which would be the repository of Muslim values, and a party which was to spear-head their drive for power.

The dual role of the jama'at remained a constant feature of Mawdudi's program, one which precipitated significant crises within Jama'at-i Islami in later years, and confused its role in society and politics. It was with view to resolving the inherent confusion in the Jama'at's dual role that, in the 1980s Tahiru'l-Qadri, as mentioned earlier, launched two discrete organizations to propagate his religious call and promote his political objectives. The confusion wrought by this dual role, and the compromises which were necessitated by it, were significant enough to expose the Jama'at's flank to the claim of Israr Ahmad's Tanzim-i Islami to be the true Jama'at-i Islami, following the

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7 TQ, (January 1941), pp.250-64.


original pristine doctrines and ideals of the movement.\textsuperscript{10} The resolution of this confusion has been the single most important cause of tension within the Jama‘at, and hence, the impetus for continuous clarification of the movement’s religious role, social function and political aims. The pace and breadth of the debates revolving around this issue in the Jama‘at has increased with the organization’s political enfranchisement in 1957, and the repeated anomalies between its doctrinal stance and political predilections.

\textbf{The Emergence and Consolidation of the Jama‘at-i Islami}

Mawdudi’s thinking on an organizational solution to the political quandary before Muslims at first pertained to creating greater ideological unity among the existing Muslim religious and political organizations. The idea of Jama‘at-i Islami came to the fore "as a last resort", only after three years of efforts (1938-41) to create unity among Muslim parties and organizations came to a naught,\textsuperscript{11} leading Mawdudi to view them all as inherently inadequate for the task before the Muslims:\textsuperscript{12}

"...to save the world of the danger which lies in its future, and to inform its affairs with the blessing of Islamic values, it is not enough to win in elections; rather, dedication to a correct principle, and along with it, a virtuous organization are also necessary."\textsuperscript{13}

Mawdudi was concerned with more than stop-gap measures to protect the interests of

\textsuperscript{10} Israr Ahmad has suggested this notion time and again by continuously harping on the Jama‘at’s infidelity to its original views, and the compromises undertaken by the organization. See \textit{NGH} series of articles.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.215.

\textsuperscript{12} Syed Asad Gilani, \textit{Maududi; Thought and Movement} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), pp.50-51.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{TQ}, (April 1941), pp.90-101.
Islam, his aim was to significantly alter the balance of power between Muslims, Hindus, and the colonial order. He was therefore not content with only "winning in elections" - a clear reference to the Muslim League strategy and objective at the time - but sought to revamp the cultural and hence political foundations of the Muslim community of India, vesting Muslims with the ability to seek a final and total solution to their political predicaments. While it was with this objective in mind that Mawdudi had begun his mission in 1932, the increasing systematization of Mawdudi’s views on Islam at the intellectual level, itself necessitated the formation of an organization which would not only manifest the "systemic" view of Islam, but would work to realize it. One is therefore, inclined to believe that Mawdudi had reached his conclusion regarding the deficiency of heretofore Muslim political organizations long before he launched the Jama’at. Yet, the actual decision to set-up an autonomous religiopolitical movement was arrived at gradually - as a corollary of the piece-meal crystallization of Mawdudi’s views on the role of religion in the future of the Muslim community of India - and as a consequence of his greater interaction with the political forces who were determining the future of Muslims in the late 1930s.

Mawdudi believed that, the resolution of the problems before the Muslims required great sacrifice and dedication, which he did not believe the existing Muslim organizations in their lackluster loyalty to Islam to be capable of. What the Muslims needed was a

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15 See, TQ, (April 1941), P.98; Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, The Islamic Movement; Dynamics of Values, Power and Change, Khurram Murad, ed. and trans., (Leicester: The
cadre of dedicated, morally upright, and religiously exemplary men, who would both represent the ideals of the Islamic order and be prepared to strive for its materialization. The need for the "vanguard" role of such a cadre became more apparent following the Lahore Resolution of 1940 of the Muslim League, wherein the League formally advocated a separate state for Muslims in Northern India. The Resolution created a whole new arena - a Muslim state - for Mawdudi’s ideas to operate in more freely. It also confirmed the League’s increasing domination of Muslim politics, which in turn nudged Mawdudi to launch his organization with view to preventing the consolidation of the League’s hold over Muslims. For, Mawdudi’s final objective was to supplant the ideologically misguided Muslim League, which he believed to be incapable of leading Muslims to a veritable sociopolitical solution.

The increasing division of Muslims between the League and the Congress, accelerated by the specter of the partition of India, moreover, attested to the irrelevance of Mawdudi’s views to the ongoing political debates among Muslims lest some form of

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17 Mawdudi even specifies that the consolidation of an organization consisting of such men is a prerequisite to launching the struggle for the Islamic order; see, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Witness Unto Mankind: The Purpose and Duty of the Muslim Ummah*, Khurram Murad, ed. and trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp.46-50.

organization embody them. He had been a player in the political arena ever since his opposition to Congress Party's Mass Contact Campaign, and broadside blasts against JUH in 1938, but had failed to develop a following for his vision of the future of Muslims in India. This situation could only be remedied, concluded Mawdudi, if he launched an organization which would be capable of relaying his ideas to the masses, and to organize those who were receptive to his views, into a single organizational unit.

Mawdudi proposed the idea of Jama'at-i Islami in an invitation of all those who were interested in such a concept, to a meeting in Lahore in the April 1941 issue of *Tarjuman u'l-Qur'an*.\(^1\) Seventy Five men, most of whom had not known Mawdudi prior to that forum,\(^2\) responded to Mawdudi's invitation, and gathered in Lahore at the house of Mawlana Zafar Iqbal\(^3\) on August 26, 1941.\(^4\) The Jama'at was officially formed on that day, after each of the seventy five, following the example of Mawdudi, stood up and professed the *shahadah* (testimony of faith) - thereby re-entering into the Islamic faith.\(^5\)

The constitution of the Jama'at, and the criteria for its membership were all duly agreed upon during the course of that first session of the organization, which lasted for three days.\(^6\) While all of those who attended this gathering were familiar with Mawdudi's

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\(^1\) *TQ*, (April 1941), pp.90-101.

\(^2\) *SAAM*, vol.1, P.244.

\(^3\) *JIKUS*, P.5.


\(^5\) Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad and Na'im Siddiqi, Lahore.

\(^6\) The criteria for membership is outlined in Article 6 of the Jama'at constitution; see, *Dastur-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan* (Lahore: Jama'at-i Islami, 1989).
writings in the *Tarjuman*, and therefore by virtue of their presence, concurred with his views on the simultaneously educational and sociopolitical role of the Jama'at, they were not in agreement over the manner in which the organization was to be governed. Some of those present favored an *amir*, as did Mawdudi, while others advocated a ruling council. Among those who favored an *amir* there was little concord regarding the extent of his powers. Mawdudi with the help of a number of those present struck a compromise: the Jama'at would be led by an *amir* with limited powers - a *primus inter pares*.25

The debate then turned to the selection of the organization's first Amir. While no one was permitted to forward his candidacy, in addition to Mawdudi there existed other possible contenders for the title. Notably, Muhammad Manzur Nu'mani, a Deobandi 'alim, who was the editor of a respectable religious journal in Lucknow, *al-Furqan*. Nu'mani had known Mawdudi since his visit to Daru'l-Islam in the 1930s, and believed that Jama'at was conceived of by him and Mawdudi jointly, after the two read "Mawlana 'Ali Mian's biography of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid" in 1938.26 Nu'mani had furthermore, actively supported Mawdudi's call for the Jama'at, using his journal to propagate the idea further. He had moreover, used his influence to enlist the support of a number of the more prominent attenders of the first session of the Jama'at such as Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi

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and Amin Ahsan Islahi.\textsuperscript{27} Nu’mani therefore wielded considerable clout in that first session, and as his differences with Mawdudi later on indicate, he was not disinterested in the leadership of the Jama’at.

Amin Ahsan Islahi too, was a strong contender for the position of Amir. As the editor of the \textit{al-Islah}, a student of Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi and Hamidu’ddin Farahi, and an instructor at the Madrasatu’l-Islah \textit{daru’l-‘ulum} of Sara’-i Mir in U.P., he too was a towering figure among the founders of the Jama’at.\textsuperscript{28} However, for most of those present, since the Jama’at was Mawdudi’s idea and brainchild, it was only natural that he serve as its first head.\textsuperscript{29} A committee was thus formed which nominated Mawdudi and Muhammad ibn ‘Ali Kakwarwi for the office of Amir.\textsuperscript{30} Mawdudi was elected to the office of the Amir by a majority of founding members on August 27, 1941.\textsuperscript{31} For those who elected Mawdudi as the Jama’at’s first Amir, their mandate did not confer a mantle of religious leadership on Mawdudi, they rather chose the best manager among them to lead the organization.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{ibid}, pp.41-43. Islahi was not present in the first meeting of the Jama’at in Lahore, but following Nu’mani’s persuasions had accepted to join. His name was therefore cited among the organization’s founding members; interview with Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, Lucknow.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{ibid}; and interview with Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Lahore.


\textsuperscript{31} \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{32} In fact it is related that when Islahi was taken by Nu’mani to meet Mawdudi for the first time, he commented about Mawdudi in Arabic, "la farq bainahu wa bain Parwez" (there is no difference between him and Parwez). Although not convinced of Mawdudi’s
Following the meeting in Lahore, the founding members dispersed, each carrying with him the message of the nascent organization to potential new recruits. Nu'mani and his journal again played a crucial role in propagating the cause of the Jama'at and inviting new members into its fold, efforts which soon gave him propriety claims over the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{33}

The Jama'at expanded its membership significantly following the Lahore gathering. Its message was found relevant by those who were disturbed by the flow of Muslim politics at the time, who viewed the Congress Party's Mass Contact Campaign with alarm, and saw danger in the bifurcation of Muslim politics between the Congress and the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{34} Many of those who welcomed the Jama'at were of the belief that Muslims lacked effective leadership.\textsuperscript{35} They were attracted by the Jama'at's anti-British rhetoric, which they had found lacking in the League's proclamations.\textsuperscript{36} Many had been influenced by Azad, their appetite had been whetted by the fiery articles of \textit{al-Hilal}, and then left insatiated following Azad's change of heart.\textsuperscript{37} They had lamented Azad's abandonment of his earlier vocation, and now found solace in the invitation of the religious stature, Islahi saw him as a suitable flag-bearer for the cause of Islam; cited in \textit{NGH}, P.59.

\textsuperscript{33} Nu'mani, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi}, pp.40-43.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Sayyid Abu'l-Hasan Nadwi, Lucknow.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{36} Na'im Siddiqi, \textit{Al-Mawdudi} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1963), P.35; and interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf, Faisalabad.
Interestingly, young 'ulama were well-represented among the early members of the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{38} Fourteen 'ulama joined the Jama'at in 1941 alone; six from Madrasatu'l-Islah: Sadru’ddin Islahi, Amin Ahsan Islahi, Muhammad Yusuf Islahi, Jalil Ahsan Islahi, Akhtar Ahsan Islahi and Abu’l-Laith Islahi;\textsuperscript{39} four Deobandis: Muhammad Manzur Nu’mani, Sibghatu’llah Madrasi, Muhammad Ja’far Phulwari and ‘Abdu’l-Jabbar Ghazi;\textsuperscript{40} and four Nadwis: Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, Abu’l-Laith Nadwi, Akhtar Hasan Nadwi and Mas’ud ‘Alam Nadwi.\textsuperscript{41} During the same period ‘Abdu’l-Rahim Ashraf and ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan, both of the Ahl-i Hadith also joined the Jama’at.\textsuperscript{42} By 1945 the Jama’at boasted the membership of some 224 'ulama, sixty of whom continued to teach at various daru'l-'ulum.\textsuperscript{43} Some of the Jama’at’s most loyal and dedicated members such as, Mistri Muhammad Siddiq, Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Na‘im Siddiqi and Malik Nasru’lllah Khan ‘Aziz also joined the organization at this time. These men, who

\textsuperscript{38} Mawdudi had sent an invitation to some 50 senior Indian ‘ulama, including Manazir Ahsan Gilani, ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi, Qari Muhammad Tayyib, and Husain Ahmad Madani, all of whom rebuffed Mawdudi’s overture; see, Abad Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh-i Jama'at-i Islami} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1990), vol.1, P.525.

\textsuperscript{39} Sadru’ddin Islahi later became Jama’at-i Islami of India’s first Amir.

\textsuperscript{40} One important Deobandi recruit was Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali Kandihlawi who briefly joined the Jama’at in 1941; see, Nu’mani, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi}, P.40.

\textsuperscript{41} Cited in Sayyid As’ad Gilani, "Jama’at-i Islami, 1941-47", Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Punjab, 1989-90, pp.360-65.

\textsuperscript{42} Interviews with the two ‘ulama, Faisalabad.

\textsuperscript{43} Gilani, "Jama’at-i Islami", P.365.
bore no affiliation with the ‘ulama proved to be Mawdudi’s most staunch supporters, and eventually formed the leadership echelon of the Jama‘at in Pakistan.

Given the diversity and stature of its membership, the Jama‘at, in its early years, did not produce a monolithic and centralized movement, nor did its amorphous structure permit its effective control by the Amir. It operated around a consensus regarding its objectives: to imbue Muslim character with religious values, and to serve as an alternative to both the Muslim League and the Congress.44 The latter was predicated upon success with promoting the former. Great emphasis was placed on moral rectitude and education of Jama‘at members in these years. The organization sought to encompass the society by expanding its own boundaries rather than winning in elections. This was seen as a more fundamental and definitive solution to Muslim political predicaments.45 Hence, from inception the Jama‘at saw education and propaganda as central to its program, even if at the cost of a more effective political strategy.46

The broad outlines of this agenda, however, did not lend itself to the elaboration of lucid directives for an organizational strategy. Selznick argues that, the communist party in Leninist conception consciously sublimated propaganda in favor of a clear political strategy.47 Such refinement of the Jama‘at’s agenda eluded the organization’s founders. Even in later years, when Mawdudi saw the need for a more clearly defined political

45 Adams, "Ideology", P.389.
46 ‘Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.178.
strategy at the heart of the Jama’at’s agenda, and realized the high costs of the organization’s straddled strategy, he was unable or unwilling to thoroughly sublimate emphasis upon education and propaganda. The tension inherent in the Jama’at’s simultaneous pursuit of the two objectives has confused the Jama’at’s modus operandi, sapped the movement’s political effectiveness, and remained a source of contention within the organization. It was, in fact, Mawdudi’s efforts to resolve this inconsistency by moving towards greater reliance on elections (which will be elucidated later in this chapter) that precipitated the most serious crisis in the ranks of the Jama’at.

The Pathankot Years, 1942-1947: Intellectual Synthesis and Organizational Expansion

Some six months after the formation of the Jama’at, it was decided that Lahore was not a suitable place for its activities. Mawdudi was then afraid that, the Jama’at as yet unconsolidated, would be engulfed by the Pakistan Movement. Moreover, uncertain about the future of India, he did not want the Jama’at to be too closely associated with any one political trend, lest its ideological purity be compromised. Nu’mani, meanwhile, did not view Lahore as the proper place for developing a virtuous community. At first Sialkot, a small city in West Punjab, was considered for this aim, but later the attention of the Jama’at leadership turned to Pathankot and Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali’s endowment.

48 Nu’mani, Mawlana Mawdudi, pp.43-46.
49 JIKUS, P.47.
50 Nu’mani, Mawlana Mawdudi, pp.43-46.
51 ibid. Mawdudi was not enthusiastic to approach Chaudhri Niyaz ‘Ali and hence suggested the organization to move to the village of Sarna not far from the original location of Daru’l-Islam. This idea was found impractical; see, SAAM, vol.1, P.256.
Nu'mani and Mistri Muhammad Siddiq, who was a friend of Niyaz ‘Ali, were deputed to contact the latter and secure his agreement to settling the Jama’at at Pathankot. With his concerns about Mawdudi’s feelings regarding the League put to rest, Niyaz ‘Ali agreed with the Jama’at’s move to Pathankot. Hence, on June 15, 1942 the Jama’at moved its headquarters from Lahore to Pathankot.

The Pathankot years, 1942-47, was a period of seclusion, and yet, of organizational and intellectual consolidation for the Jama’at. During the course of those five years, a significant number of Jama’at members took up residence at Pathankot, thus forming strong personal, intellectual and organizational bonds. Away from the tumult of national politics, the Pathankot years were a time of learning, debate and intellectual creativity. Jama’at members, many belonging to different religious schools of thought, engaged in discussions and debate. The impact of the interactions of Deobandi, Nadwi, and Ahl-i Hadith perspectives during this period were later manifested in the structure of Mawdudi’s reading of Islam and its place in society.

The Jama’at also expanded its organizational base during these years. Jama'at

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53 *RJI*, vol.1, P.60.

54 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.325; and Muhammad Yahya, "Sikandarpur Se Lahore Tak", in *QDMN*, P.175.

55 Visitors from outside also participated in these debates and discussions. Muhammad Asad, the renowned Austrian Muslim frequently travelled from Simla to Pathankot, and engaged Islahi and Mawdudi in debate, the former in Arabic and the latter in English. See, Yahya, "Sikandarpur", P.180, and Interview with Ja’far Qasmi, Lahore.

One effect of these early debates was to convince Mawdudi of the wisdom of the Nadwi educational tradition; see, *JIKUS*, P.35.
leaders and members travelled across India, from Peshawar to Patna to Madras, holding regional and All-India conventions, addressing new audiences, and establishing nationwide organizational networks.\textsuperscript{56} These gatherings were a source of new recruits for the organization, and permitted the Jama'at to remain in the political fray despite the seclusion of Pathankot.\textsuperscript{57} The strategy was successful in diversifying the Jama'at's ethnic and geographic base of support across India. The distribution of the Jama'at members in 1946, as indicated in table 7.1, attests to the all-India poise of the Jama'at, as well as to its relative success in relaying its message far and wide.

**TABLE 7.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total        | 486    |

*Source: RJI, vol.4, P.41

By 1947, the Jama'at boasted at least one member in every Indian province, save for

\textsuperscript{56} By 1946 the Jama'at had grown enough to hold regional conventions; see RJI, vol.4, pp.115-18; and to organize Jama'at finances locally; ibid, pp.124-26.

\textsuperscript{57} For instance, in April of 1947 the Jama'at held three regional conventions, at Tonk (West/Central India); Madras (South India); and in Patna (East India). See RJI, vol.5.
Assam, Baluchistan and Orissa. The leadership of the Jama’at, as reflected in the geographical distribution of the Shura’ members between 1945 and 1947 indicates, however, did not change as rapidly, and remained predominantly North Indian, and from Muslim minority areas. Of the 16 Shura’ members in those years, 4 were from Punjab, 3 from the United Provinces, 1 from Delhi, 1 from Bihar, 2 from Hyderabad, and 1 from Bombay. Yet, changes in the national distribution of the membership was significant, more so in that the number of members from areas that were inherited by Pakistan increased in these critical years. In 1947, 277 requests for membership were submitted to the Jama’at, 135 of which were accepted. Some %50 of the applications came from Pakistan’s future provinces, as were %40 of those accepted into the fold of the Jama’at. (See table 7.2).

**TABLE 7.2**

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP TO JAMA‘AT-I ISLAMI IN 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>APPLIED</th>
<th>ACCEPTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 Cited in RJI, vol.5, P.43.

59 For instance, regarding Sind, the Jama’at literature began appearing in Sindhi in 1944, when the first members from that province joined the Jama’at; see, Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, "Sind Main Jama’at-i Islami", in Muhammad Musa Bhutto, *Mawlana Jan Muhammad Bhutto; Shakhsiyat Awr Kirdar* (Hyderabad: Sind National Academy, nd.), P.303.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Consolidation of Power in the Office of the Amir and the First Organizational Crisis

The setting at Pathankot, also accentuated a basic anomaly in the structure of the Jama'at, and hence, precipitated the first major crisis in the organization. The issue of the extent of the powers of the Amir, as alluded to earlier, had been left undefined by the founding members. Many had seen the office of the Amir as merely that of the director or overseer of the Jama'at organization. Mawdudi, however, saw his position more as that of a spiritual and political leader of an ideologically committed movement. Hence, the obedience which he demanded from the members was not always forthcoming, especially from those who saw themselves as Mawdudi's equal or even superior in religious matters, and who had grounding in traditional religious education. The communal life at Pathankot brought the tension between Mawdudi's leadership, and the perception of it among a segment of the membership into the open, forcing a significant defection from the ranks of the organization.

The seeds of this crisis were sown from the very beginning of the Jama'at's activities. Nu'mani, as mentioned earlier, had been active in forming, and later, expanding the Jama'at. As a Deobandi 'alim and editor of the al-Furqan he, moreover, viewed himself superior to Mawdudi in piety and scholarship. While Nu'mani had acquiesced

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60 Interview with Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore.
to Mawdudi’s election to the office of the Amir, at Pathankot he began to challenge
Mawdudi’s authority, and right to leadership of the Jama’at. Nu‘mani’s dissent focused on
two issues, both directed at effectively undermining Mawdudi’s authority. The first issue
revolved around the copyright and control of the proceeds of *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an* and
Mawdudi’s celebrated book, *Risalah-i Diniyat* (Treatise on Religion); and the second, per-
tained to Mawdudi’s moral standing and piety.

The early years of the Jama’at was a period of great financial difficulties and
personal sacrifices, more so for those who had left their urbane lifestyles for the rural
setting of Pathankot. Mawdudi, however, lived better than his cohorts and followers in
that Jama’at community. He maintained a separate house, a servant, and a modicum of
amenities not available to others. The discrepancy between the lifestyle of the Amir and
those of the others was sufficiently pronounced to permit Nu‘mani to manipulate the issue
for his purposes.

Nu‘mani argued that, the copyrights of *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an* and *Risalah-i Diniyat,*
the proceeds of which Mawdudi claimed were supporting his lifestyle, be turned over to
the Jama’at for the benefit of all members. The Jama’at, argued Nu‘mani, was not an
extension of Mawdudi, but should encompass his whole livelihood - what Mawdudi had
demanded of other members.\(^{61}\) Mawdudi retorted that both the journal and the book
in dispute had been his personal undertakings long before he conceived of the Jama’at.
The organization, argued Mawdudi, had no propriety rights over his scholarship.\(^{62}\)

\(^{61}\) *ibid.*

\(^{62}\) *SAAM,* vol.1, P.256.
both Mawdudi and Nu'mani the issue was a challenge to the authority and person of the Amir.

Nu'mani then followed this initial assault with a more direct one. He contended that Mawdudi's beard was not of the right length, his wife did not observe proper purdah before their male servant, Mawdudi himself had not been prompt for dawn prayers, and generally, the extent of his piety was not in keeping with what was expected of the Amir of a veritable Muslim community.\(^63\) Mawdudi, rather apologetically, conceded that his behavior and that of his wife were not always ideal, but had been changing according to what the position of the Amir required of them.\(^64\) However, suspicious of Nu'mani's personal intentions, Mawdudi stayed his ground.\(^65\) Nu'mani, therefore, pressed him to convene a special session of the organization's Majlis-i Shura' to decide on this issue. The Shura' met in Delhi in October 1942.\(^66\)

Nu'mani had meanwhile, consulted a number of Jama'at members, notably, Amin Ahsan Islahi, Muhammad Ja'far Phulwari, Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi and Mistri Muhammad


\(^64\) It is interesting that, Mawdudi remained conscious of Nu'mani's charges and the crisis which it caused throughout his life. When in the late 1970s the entire leadership of the Jama'at moved to the Mansurah compound, Mawdudi declined to do so, fearing that the behavior and life style of his sons may produce yet another challenge to his piety and leadership.

\(^65\) In a letter to Nu'mani at a later time he wrote: "If you were attracted to the Jama'at because of me, then you should have never joined; and if you were attracted to it because of its cause, then how can I prompt you to fall from a path you deemed to be in the interest of Islam. Cited in Abu'l-Afaq, *Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi: Sawanih, Afkar, Tahrik* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1971), pp.266-67.

\(^66\) *ibid*, P.54; and *SAAM*, vol.1, P.256.
Siddiq regarding this issue. Convinced of support for his position, Nu‘mani sought to use the Delhi session to unseat Mawdudi altogether. In response to the complaints which Nu'mani placed before the Shura’, Mawdudi offered to either resign from the office of Amir, or alternately, to dissolve the Jama’at. Nu‘mani and his supporters opted for the second option. The Shura’, however, was not prepared to self-destruct, and therefore, moved to Mawdudi’s side. Nu‘mani’s faction, consisting of Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi, Muhammad Ja‘far Phulwari (briefly the Na‘ib Amir - Vice-President - of the Jama’at), Mawlana ‘Ata’u’llah, and Qamaru’ddin Khan (the Qayyim -Secretary-General - of the Jama’at at the time) resigned from the organization.67 The defectors were few in number, but significant in their status within the Jama’at.

Thus defeated, Nu‘mani began a public campaign against Mawdudi in his journal, al-Furqan, claiming that since he had been responsible for enlisting the support of so many for the Jama’at, he now had the moral responsibility to inform them of the reasons for his resignation from the organization.68 Privately too, Nu‘mani worked diligently to convince others, such as Amin Ahsan Islahi, to leave the Jama’at. In this, he was not, however, successful. The organizational structure of the Jama’at, young as it was, and the lure of its ideological commitment proved strong enough to withstand the challenge of Nu‘mani. As Islahi put it, "he was not fanatical enough to jeopardize the future of Islam

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67 SAAM, vol.1, P.256; and RJI, vol.1, pp.71-76.

68 Nu‘mani, Mawlana Mawdudi, pp.60-62.
over the length of Mawdudi's beard.\footnote{This statement was made by Islahi to ‘Abdul-Ghaffar Hasan in response to the latter’s queries regarding the proceedings of the Delhi session; interview with ‘Abdul-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.}

The crisis precipitated by Nu'mani, however, for the first time exposed an important dilemma for the Jama'at, namely, the issue of principles versus Jama'at's organizational needs and political aims. The Shura', in the first of a series of such decisions, voted in favor of the interests of the organization over considerations for principles or ethics. In fact, by virtue of their decision, members of the Shura’ acted to further strengthen the organizational structure and interests of the Jama'at. The Shura’ had taken steps to rationalize and strengthen the structure of the Jama'at, and to confirm the primacy of its titular head, the Amir, somewhat resolving the initial ambiguity regarding the role and extent of the powers of the Amir.

Nu'mani’s resignation, moreover, gave Mawdudi greater room to maneuver, and to establish his leadership over the organization. Assured of the backing of the Shura’ Mawdudi set out to spread the reach of the Jama'at, expanding its organizational structure. He travelled across India, presenting the Jama'at’s ideological position, and inviting Muslims to its support. The imprint of Mawdudi’s views on the organization meanwhile, became increasingly more pronounced. The Jama'at’s convention in Dharbanga, Bihar, in 1943 for instance, turned into a forum for the discussion of Mawdudi’s theory of *hukumat-i ilahiyah* (divine government).\footnote{SAAM, vol.1, pp.284-85.} Mawdudi was elected to
the office of Amir again in 1945 during the organization's first all-India convention.\textsuperscript{71} Thenceforth, the Jama'at moved increasingly into the orbit of Mawdudi's personal leadership, a trend evident in his speech following his election to a second term as Amir, wherein he underlined, repeatedly, the primacy of his office in the organizational design of the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{72}

Mawdudi's efforts in these years bore fruit. The Jama'at's conventions were of some consequence in Muslim political circles, sufficiently so to boast the attendance of Mahatma Gandhi at one.\textsuperscript{73} More importantly, they helped the Jama'at to grow in size, and to find a following among those whom it was able to reach. The number of those who attended the Jama'at's first all-India convention in Pathankot in 1945, was 800, ten times more than those who gathered in Lahore to form the organization.\textsuperscript{74} In the same year some forty residents of Sirsa, a village in the Hisar District of East Punjab, influenced by Mawdudi's teachings and the example of the Jama'at, moved to another waqf property in order to form a second Daru'l-Islam.\textsuperscript{75}

The expansion of the purview of the organization's activities was not, however, free

\textsuperscript{71} ibid, P.297.

\textsuperscript{72} ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Gandhi briefly attended a session of a Jama'at convention in Patna on April 26, 1947, precipitating much anguish within the Jama'at and consternation among Jama'at's rivals who were quick to label the organization pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan; see, \textit{RJI}, vol.5, pp.251ff. Also see chapter 10 for more on this issue.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.297.

\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Lahore. The interviewee had been one of the participants in this scheme.
of problems. Organizational development lagged behind the increase in membership, produced by Mawdudi's national campaign. A good deal of the Jama'at conventions between 1943 and 1947 were devoted to resolving the organization's internal problems, usually revolving around the issue of discipline.\(^76\) The Jama'at was repeatedly purged during this period of its less-than-fully-committed members. In 1944 Mian Tufayl Muhammad reported to the Majlis-i Shura' the expulsion of 300 members from the organization, while stipulating more inhibitive criteria for new memberships.\(^77\) Yet, despite these measures, in 1947, while 135 new members joined the Jama'at, 85 left the organization.\(^78\) The lion's share of Mawdudi's speeches before the Jama'at conventions of Allahabad and Muradpur in 1946, and again in Madras and Tonk, Rajasthan, in 1947, were devoted to lamenting the morale and discipline problems in the Jama'at, and hence, to emphasis upon character building.\(^79\) Mawdudi had clearly favored rapidly expanding the Jama'at, so it would be able to influence the highly fluid and rapidly changing Indian political scene. Yet, the problems of discipline, which threatened to destroy the Jama'at from its roots compelled him to greater caution. As early as 1943, he declared that the pace of growth of the Jama'at should be restrained, a plea which was repeated along with every lament over the organization's problems of morale thenceforth.\(^80\) It was not until the organization moved

\(^{76}\) \textit{RII}, vol.1, pp.8ff.


\(^{80}\) Cited in Abbott, "The Jama'at", pp.18-19.
to Pakistan that, Mawdudi was able to tackle this problem more effectively.

The Jama'at's organizational difficulties, interestingly, acted to augment Mawdudi's powers. Greater emphasis upon ideological unity and especially organizational discipline favored vesting greater powers in the office of the Amir. Moreover, as India slid towards partition, the need for effective leadership at the helm of the organization was felt strongly. Hence, during the meeting of the Shura' in Tonk in 1947, the Shura' ceded some of its powers to the Amir, especially control over the organization's finances.81

The paramount issue before the Jama'at at this time was, however, the question of Pakistan. Since its creation the Jama'at had retained an open stand on this issue. Despite its vehement opposition to the Congress and tacit favor for communalism, the Jama'at had viewed close association with either the Muslim League or the Congress as detrimental to its integrity and autonomy. The Jama'at was going to address the problems of Muslims on its own, finding a longer run and definitive solution to their predicament, regardless of what the immediate changes in the political situation may have entailed. Hence, the Jama'at had remained poised towards Pakistan - advocating the case of an Islamic state - and yet maintained its all-India organizational linkages. When the partition did materialize, Mawdudi decided on Pakistan; the Jama'at, however, did survive in India. Mawdudi at the time rejected the retention of a united organizational structure for the two countries, arguing that the needs of the Muslims, and hence the agenda of the Jama'at, would be so varied in India and Pakistan as to make the operation of a united Jama'at improbable. Moreover, the extent of hostilities between Pakistan and India

81 RII, vol.5, pp.94-106.
precluded the possibility of a supranational arrangement. He, therefore, set the Jama‘at-i Islami of India free from his command, and became the Amir of Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan. The break up in the organization not only truncated its powers, but brought it more effectively under the control of Mawdudi, who continued to consolidate his power over the smaller and more vulnerable Jama‘at.

**Jama‘at-i Islami: Between Universalism and National Identity**

The organizational incision also, per force, committed the Jama‘at to the concept of "nation-state", which above and beyond the Mawdudi’s universalist claims, has determined the pattern of the Jama‘at’s political activities. Today, there exist seven Jama‘at-i Islami's; five by this name in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir, the U.K. Islamic Mission, and Islamic Circle of North America in the

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82 On the issue of the reaction of contemporary Islamic thought to the concept of "nation-state" see, James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

83 The Jama‘at was officially divided into Indian and Pakistani organizations in February 1948. Of the organization's 625 members at the time, 385 ended up in Pakistan, and 240 remained in India; see JIKUS, P.52.

84 Jama‘at-i Islami of Kashmir was formed in 1947 at the time of Partition. *RJI*, vol.5, P.61 which gives a list of Jama‘at members in 1947 cites no members in Kashmir. It has, however, been argued that, a number of Kashmiris had visited Daru‘l-Islam as early as 1937-38. They set up the first Jama‘at cell in Jamun in 1944 and in Kashmir in 1946; see, ‘Ashiq Kashmiri, *Tarikh-i Tahrik-i Islami, Jamun‘u Kashmir* (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma‘arif-i Islami, 1989), pp.212-99. The organization in that province, however, continued to grow independent of its sister organization centered in Delhi, and is today a major actor in the separatist movement in that province.

85 This organization was started to work among the sizeable Pakistani community of Great Britain; interview with Khurram Jah Murad, Lahore.
While all of these organizations are based on Mawdudi’s ideological perspective, and replicate the organizational structure of the Jama’at of Pakistan with minor variations, they operate as separate entities, the purview of the activities of which is defined by the territorial boundaries of the state in which they function. Relations between the various Jama’at organizations, much like their relations with other revivalist movements is, moreover, conditioned by those territorial boundaries. For, these boundaries create veritable barriers to greater organic unity among revivalist groups in general, and the various Jama’ats in particular, and bestow a "national" independence upon each of these organizations, which eschews greater universalism.

The evident discrepancy between the Jama’at’s professed universalism, and the organization’s "territorial" and "national" reality is not only a point of contention within the Jama’at, but yet another by-product of the organization’s incremental modernization, supplanting the quest for a supra-national Islamic order with a political dialectic premised on the concept of "nation-state".

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Mawdudi himself had a role in the development of a Jama’at organization in the U.S. During his visit to Buffalo, N.Y. for medical purposes between April and August 1974, Mawdudi met with several of Muslim community leaders, and a spectrum of visitors who came to Buffalo for consultations with him. Mian Tufayl wrote to him at this time encouraging him to organize his visitors in some fashion, for, the U.S. could be a receptive soil for Jama’at activity; cited in *SAAM*, vol.2, P.461. However, here again the Islamic Circle grew, for the most part, among the South Asian Muslim migrant community of North America.

87 On Mawdudi’s explicit acceptance of national identity in place of universalism see, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (Lahore, 1940), vol.3, P.44.
The seeds of this incongruity was already present at the time of formation of the Jama'at. The organization was motivated both by communalist concerns, and a universalist agenda of renewal and reform of Islam as a whole. Hence, while the founders of the Jama'at were grappling with the immediate political predicaments of Muslims of India, a considerable share of the nascent movement’s resources went into the propagation of Mawdudi’s works outside India. In 1944 the Jama’at established an Arabic journal, al-Huda, which was published at Daru’l-Islam under the aegis of Mas’ud ‘Alam Nadwi.88 By 1947 the Jama’at had established a whole Arabic Translation Bureau (Daru’l-‘Urubiyah), centered in Jullundar in East Punjab.89 The Jullundar organization, supervised by Mas’ud ‘Alam translated an impressive number of Mawdudi’s works into Arabic, which began to appear in Palestine and Iraq in 1947, and Egypt and Syria soon then after.90 Daru’l-‘Urubiyah was transferred first to Rawilpindi and later to Lahore following the partition, and continues to function with equal rigor today.91 Mawdudi’s


89 RJI, vol.5, pp.69-70.

90 ibid; also see, Gilani, Maududi, pp.150-52. The most important works which were translated into Arabic in this period were, Tajdid’u Ihya’i Din, Islam Awr Jahiliyat, Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash, Islam ka Siyasi Nazriyah, Din-i Haqq, Qur’an ki Char Buniadi Istilahain and Islami Hukumat kis Tarah Qa’im Huti Hey.

91 Mawdudi’s works were, for the main part, translated into Arabic by four of his followers, Mas’ud ‘Alam Nadwi, Muhammad Kazim, ‘Asimu’l-Haddad and Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi. The four were all competent Arabists, of whom only Hamidi remains with the Jama’at today as the Director of Daru’l-‘Urubiyah.

For an outline of Daru’l-‘Urubiyah’s activities see, Khalil Ahmad Hamidi, “Jama’at-
numerous travels through the Arab world in subsequent years helped establish a place for his works in the Arab world, and also to further spread the Jama'at's influence into more distant lands such as, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Arabic translations were significant in increasing the purview of the Jama'at's influence across the Muslim world. Hitherto unaffected Muslims such as those of Gabon, Mali, Malaysia or Iran came into contact with the writings of Mawdudi through these Arabic translations. Needless to add, these translations have been consequential in the development of contemporary revivalist thought across the Muslim world.

Similar projects were devised to translate the Jama'at literature into Turkish and

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93 Mawdudi’s works began to appear in Iran in the 1960s. They were translated into Persian from Arabic by Ayatollah Hadi Khusrawshahi and members of a translating team working with him. Articles on Mawdudi and excerpts from his works also appeared in various issues of Khusrawshahi’s journal, *Maktab-i Islam*. Following the revolution of 1978-79, a number of Mawdudi’s works were translated into Persian from Arabic, by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Khamana’i; interview with Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi, Lahore. Interestingly, the first Persian translation of a work of Mawdudi was done in Hyderabad, Deccan, by Mahmud Faruqi in 1946; *RJI*, vol.4, P.90. More recent translations of Mawdudi’s works into Persian have occurred in Pakistan by the Jama’at, targeting the Afghan community of Pakistan.

English, and later an array of other languages from Japanese to Swahili, augmenting the significant impact of Mawdudi's thought. As a measure of the scope of these proselytical endeavors it may be stated that Mawdudi's *Risalah-i Diniyat* (1932) by 1974 had been translated into 26 languages, from Sinhala and Malayalam to English, French and Spanish.

The significance of Mawdudi's works, and the Jama'at's untiring efforts to propagate them far and wide across the world, in the rise and articulation of revivalism in the Islamic world underlines the universalist pretensions of the movement. However, Jama'at's transnational aims and impact end here. The organization, while conscious of its important role in the Muslim world, and desire to leave its mark outside of Pakistan, has no concrete agenda for a supra-national *pax Islamica*. Its universalism is effectively checked and limited by its commitment to Pakistani politics, and the vicissitudes of sociopolitical change in that country. The reality of the struggle for the soul of Pakistan has collapsed the Jama'at into the mold of "territorial" politics, relegating universalism to the realm of secondary concerns. Much like the tensions witnessed in communist history between the interests of Soviet Union and those of a universalist communist doctrine, the

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95 Translations into Turkish were done by a number of Central Asian visitors of Pathankot between 1942 and 1947, notably 'Azam Hashmi; see *RIJ*, vol.3, P.40, vol.5, P.70. More recently, the Jama'at has begun to target Afghan and Central Asian Muslims. Since 1967 numerous works of Mawdudi have been translated into the local languages of the area, the most interesting being, Pashtu translations of Mawdudi's works by an Afghan Chishti Sufi master, resident in Mashhad in Iran, by the name of Ahmad Shah.

English translations like those into the local Indian languages had a parochial political aim; however, they were also dispatched to the Arab world, Malaya, Burma, Africa, Sri Lanka, England, and the United States, beginning in April 1947. The first of Mawdudi's books to appear in English was *Risalah-i Diniyat*, then translated by Mawlvi Mazaharu'ddin Siddiqi; *RIJ*, vol.5, P.71.
Jama‘at’s revivalism, unable to escape the fate of universalist ideologies which preceded it, is Pakistani first and only then international. This development is itself a significant innovation in contemporary Islamic political thought, a modernization of doctrine and world view, harbingered by the interaction of a universalist doctrine with the tenacious reality of the "nation-state" system.

**Jama‘at-i Islami: The Pakistan Years**

During the years that followed the partition the Jama‘at continued to change, interacting more actively with other political forces, and repeatedly refining and restructuring its organizational design. The pattern of the Jama‘at’s political activism will be considered in Part IV. Our focus in the remainder of this chapter will rather be on the following two interrelated themes; 1) working of tensions created by the continued salience of ideological imperatives in the face of the Jama‘at’s increasing proclivity for pragmatic politics; and 2) the manner in which the organization’s grappling with those tensions shaped the paradigm which has since discerned the pattern of continuity and change in the structure and world view of the Jama‘at.

While tensions between ideological imperatives and pragmatic political tendencies were intrinsic to Mawdudi’s religiopolitical formulation, the Jama‘at had neither addressed the issue directly, nor taken the necessary steps to successfully resolve them during its first decade of existence. Allowed to fester, these tensions only mounted with the Jama‘at’s greater political activism after 1947, first producing a moral problematic, and subsequently, an organizational crisis.

Following the creation of Pakistan and the Jama‘at’s shift to Lahore, Mawdudi both
escalated the organization’s involvement in political matters, and consolidated its corporatist identity and organizational structure. The Jama’at grew in numbers during these years, but more importantly, was able to do so with greater discipline. The organization was no longer plagued with the kind problems of morale and discipline which characterized its pre-partition years. Problems, however, continued to loom in the horizon for an organization which remained divided over the extent of the rights of its leader, its religious calling and political agenda, and the question of ideological principles versus the organization’s political interests. The resolution of these ambiguities continued to beckon the attention of the leaders of the Jama’at during an otherwise uneventful decade in the history of the organization following its settlement in Pakistan. They produced a crisis in the ranks of the Jama’at which eventually erupted in the form of the most serious rupture in the organization’s history, and a significant purge of its rank and file in 1957, what came to be known as the Machchi Goth affair.

Schism, Purge, and The Routinization of the Jama’at’s Idealism: The Machchi Goth Affair, 1956-57

The Jama’at had maintained an ambivalent attitude towards politics since its creation. Since the Jama’at’s ideology has not always been receptive to the kind of compromises which political activism entails, the cumbersome task of resolving discrepancies between the demands of ideology and the needs of political activism, and of outlining a political strategy within the pale of the ideological stance of the Jama’at has produced a complex process of intellectual and organizational change. The unfolding of the dialectics of this process has determined the course of the Jama’at’s organizational
development, as well as the pattern of routinization of its idealism.

The Jama'at was launched as a movement of religious revival with eyes on politics. Its aim had been the reign of Islam at the centers of power, yet that reign had been defined in equally religious and cultural, as in political terms. As a result, the Jama'at had viewed the relation between religion and politics as a symbiotic, wherein each of the two pillars of the Jama'at's program justified the necessity of the other. Religion had no possibility of survival without recourse to politics, and politics no luster without resort to religion. Yet, Jama'at's calling and raison d'être was religious by nature. In 1945 Mawdudi stated, "...it is a pity that Muslims see their objectives in purely political terms, and are hence, oblivious to the role of religion in this world." Even as late as in 1951 the Jama'at had described its plan of action as, 1) the reform of the life and minds of individual Muslims, 2) organization and training of virtuous men, 3) social reform, 4) reform of government and the political structure. Politics was not only cited as the last priority, but one which could not be addressed without the successful completion of the first three stages of the plan. The movement had therefore, remained poised towards politics, but more actively immersed in religious activism. It had up until the end of the first decade of its existence remained a movement which strove to control the soul of men, eyeing politics with suspicion and awe. Hence, while the Jama'at spoke at that time of its

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98 Cited in Mithaq (Lahore), 39:3 (March 1990), pp.52-53.
political ideals, it remained aloof from the day to day conduct of politics. The Jama‘at, for instance, deliberately, avoided any entanglements with the Indian national elections of 1945.99

Yet, gradually political ideals found immediate relevance, and ethereal concerns for the soul of men gave way to efforts directed at determining their political choices. The symbiosis between religion and politics, which had begun by emphasizing the former, now shifted in favor of the latter. The creation of Pakistan, no doubt, accelerated the pace of the Jama‘at’s politicization. An event as momentous as the partition of India would hardly tolerate mere observers. Uncertain as the Jama‘at was then about the ineluctable direction which Indian politics had taken, and reluctant to take a stand on issues where the choices were limited to the positions of the Muslim League and the Congress, the organization proved unable to withstand the pull of politicization. Hence, while, still opposed to elections, Mawdudi permitted Jama‘at members to participate in the referendum on Pakistan in N.W.F.P. province in 1947.100

The Jama‘at started its existence in Pakistan with greater political consciousness, and yet continued to operate in the manner characteristic of its days in India. No longer inhibited by the fear of lending support to the Congress, the Jama‘at became bolder in its opposition to the Muslim League. The organization’s politicization was, however, in the nature of moral guidance and the articulation of an ideal for Pakistan. The Jama‘at continued to rely on the power and appeal of its message, operating more in the mold of

99 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.323.

100 *Kawthar* (Lahore), (July 5, 1947), P.1.
a religious movement than that of a political party. This was in keeping with Mawdudi's reading of Jinnah's success. Pakistan was not the product of Muslim League's efficacy as a political machine, the country rather owed its existence to the power of Jinnah's personality, and his ability to relay his vision to the multitude of Indian Muslims.

The Jama'at and the Jami'at, therefore, began their activity in Pakistan in debate with the country's founders and its citizens, hoping to replicate the intellectual and emotional process which Jinnah had initiated a decade earlier, culminating in Pakistan. The organization's emphasis upon propaganda, and its momentous campaign to publish its literature, during the early years of Pakistan, is indicative of the nature of their political orientation in those years.

The Jama'at's hopes for a facile and hasty transformation of Pakistan were soon dashed. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the Jama'at ran afoul of the powers-that-be, and imprisonment and harassment rather than glory and success became the lot of the organization. Mawdudi's naivete and the limits of its ingenuous political program soon began to show. Pakistan was not going to fall into the hands of the Jama'at through propaganda alone, the organization rather had to extend the purview of its activities into politics, to stave off challenges from a hostile government, as well as to push Pakistan towards an Islamic end.101

Elections scheduled in Punjab for March 1951, therefore, ushered the Jama'at into an era of more direct political involvement, initiating the organization into electoral

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101 Mawdudi's public statements, for instance, following his release from prison in 1950 reveal a marked turn towards politics; see, *SAAM*, vol.1, p.383.
politics. The issue of the elections came before the Jama'at at a time when Mawdudi was in prison, and the organization was led by the two provisional Amirs, 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan and 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi. The Majlis-i Shura debated Jama'at’s reaction to these elections. Despite opposition from some of its members who were inimical to elections altogether and wanted no part of the existing system, the Shura decided to involve the Jama'at in the elections.102 The Jama'at, however, would not put forward any candidates of its own, but would lend support to those candidates whom it deemed virtuous (salih).103 The organization formed panchayats, each consisting of 53 members, 23 of whom were Jama'at members. The panchayats would, in turn, decide on the virtuosity of the candidates, and hence, decide on whom to support.104 The Jama'at's role in the elections was therefore a peculiar one, it was not vying for its own political gain, but to prevent the election of those who would constrict the Jama'at. The organization still saw its fortunes in education and propaganda, and saw elections as merely a tool to sanitize politics in its own favor.

The results of the elections were not favorable to the Jama'at. Candidates supported by the Jama'at collected 200,000 votes in 37 constituencies.105 Either Punjabis had not heard the call of the Jama'at, or they had chose to ignore it. Whichever the case, the Jama'at, clearly dejected by the results, realized that the path to the Islamic state was

102 SAAM, vol.1, P.408.
103 Interview with Mawdudi in Chatan (Lahore), (January 24, 1951), P.2.
104 SAAM, vol.1, P.413.
105 ibid, P.419.
an arduous one. Mawdudi, however, saw gains even in this failure. The Jama'at, he argued, had managed to use the election campaigns to further popularize its program. This justification has since been repeated by Jama'at leaders, time and again, to warrant electoral politics, and to make defeats therein, palatable.

Despite Mawdudi optimism, the electoral defeat was serious enough to cause much soul-searching in the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{106} The Jama'at became more diligent in its organizational and propaganda efforts, hoping to amend those shortcomings which it saw responsible for its defeat, implicitly preparing for the opportunity to redeem itself in future elections. Eyeing electoral victories, moreover, required a different organizational outlook, that of a political party. The Jama'at gradually understood that victory at the polls necessitated a different posture towards politics and elections, and that the organization had to be adapted accordingly. The seeds of the Jama'at's greater politicization were thus sown.\textsuperscript{107}

The Jama'at, which had participated in the elections to prevent the success of its enemies, by virtue of its defeat found unexpected new vested interest therein, and began to compare itself with other political parties, and its aim of salih qiyadat (virtuous leadership) was transformed from an distant goal into an immediate objective. The new perception of the role of the organization left its mark on its subsequent development.

The travails of an election campaign also presented the Jama'at with yet another unwelcome predicament, the break down of discipline. To the chagrin of Mawdudi and the elders of the Jama'at, workers, and rank and file were sufficiently swayed by the

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Israr Ahmad, in \textit{HRZ}, P.65.

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islamabad.
demands of the electoral campaign to transgress the organization's code of ethics. The frequency and extent of complaints put before the organization's leaders in this regard were disconcerting, and led Mawdudi to underscore organizational discipline.

The election and its aftermath had, all in all, thrown the Jama'at into confusion. On the surface, the organization continued to adhere to the aforementioned 4-point plan of action, outlined in November 1951 - shortly before the elections. In reality, however, the Jama'at was now distinctly more interested in politics. Hence, debates over the veritable role of the organization - religious propaganda or politics - were waged with increasing frequency. Senior members of the Jama'at such as Mas'ud 'Alam Nadwi, 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi, and 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf, citing the deleterious effect of electoral politics on morale, argued against continuing with active politics for the time being. Mawdudi and Islahi's greater inclination towards politics, and their attempt to pursue the two agendas -political activism and religious education - simultaneously, meanwhile, only added to the confusion and the debate. The anti-Ahmadi agitations of 1953-54, and Mawdudi's subsequent imprisonment did not afford the Jama'at the opportunity to resolve this issue satisfactorily; it was rather sublimated and left to fester, eventually erupting into

110 Interview with 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf, Faisalabad.
111 Interview with Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islamabad. Also see, Mawdudi's interview reprinted in A'in (Lahore), (October 1989), pp.33-36; and his speech before the Jama'at annual session of November 20-23, 1955, cited in MMKT, vol.3, pp.139-56, wherein Mawdudi asserted that the Jama'at was not a party but a multi-dimensional organization. On Islahi's views see for instance, his article in TQ, (September 1956), pp.377-402.
a serious crisis in 1956-57.

Following Mawdudi's release from custody in 1954, the Jama'at held a general meeting in Karachi. This perfunctory session was, however, unexpectedly, turned into a forum for airing of various grievances, much of which pertained to procedural problems and the feeling of dejection, which the electoral defeat of 1951 and government harassment in 1953-54, had precipitated in the ranks of the Jama'at. In that session, Sa'id Malik, a one time Jama'at Amir of Punjab, leveled charges of ethical misconduct and financial embezzlement against a high ranking member of the Jama'at. Mawdudi was greatly disturbed by Malik's allegation, but more so because it had been aired before the entire body of the Jama'at. Islahi was therefore, dispatched to persuade Malik not to officially register his complaint before the gathering, promising him instead a full investigation of the matter by the organization's leadership.

Following the Karachi meeting, true to his promise to Malik, Mawdudi announced the formation of the Ja'izah (Review) Committee (from hereon JC), consisting of seven members of the Shura' and Malik himself. 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf was named as its head, and committee was charged with the task of investigating Malik's charges as well as prepare a report on the general discontent rampant in the Jama'at, which had been reflected in the Karachi meeting.

112 Much of the following discussion unless otherwise stipulated is based on interviews with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf, Israr Ahmad, and Mustafa Sadiq, the first two in Faisalabad, and the latter two in Lahore.

113 None of the Jama'at sources mention the name of the accused party, and since he had passed away, none of my interlocutors were prepared to divulge his name, lest they inveigh disrespect against the dead.
The formation of JC, however, immediately brought into the open a heretofore concealed source of power in the Jama'at, its organizational managers and staff, centered in the Jama'at Secretariat in Lahore. In its early years the Jama'at had few office holders, and hardly any "workers"; there had existed no extensive divisions of power and duties in the Jama'at, and no staff on the organization's pay-roll. Jama'at members, in those years, had all been "part-time" religious organizers and missionaries. The organizational expansion and rationalization of the Jama'at in Pakistan since 1947, however, had created an organizational machine which was led by operatives out of the Secretariat in Lahore. These organizational workers and managers, many of whom were full-time employees of the Jama'at had developed a distinct power base in the organization, and given their control of the Jama'at's operations, were capable of wielding power effectively. They moreover, consisted of younger and more politically inclined members, and had vested interests of their own, both with regards to the Jama'at's internal policies and its stance on national issues.

The Jama'at "bureaucracy" - the sobriquet by which this bloc of members is known - was close to the Jama'at leader accused of wrong doings by Malik. Furthermore, the complaints which JC would be reviewing, in most cases, revolved around the policies and operational procedures followed by the Lahore Secretariat. Fearing an indictment of their position and practices, the Jama'at bureaucracy, then led by Mian Tufayl Muhammad the Qayyim (Secretary-General) of the Jama'at at the time, stonewalled Ashraf's efforts to

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114 RJI, vol.2, pp.48-60, and 72ff.
115 NGH, pp.68-69.
begin the Committee’s work, by procrastinating in procedural matters.

Ashraf, who was then resident in Faisalabad (Lyallpur at the time), pursued the matter in the Central Shura’ meeting of November 1955.\textsuperscript{116} With the Shura”s sanction, JC was eventually launched, but the bureaucracy managed to trim its size. The Committee was reduced to four members, Ashraf, ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan, ‘Abdu’l-Jabbar Ghazi and Sultan Ahmad, all of whom were ‘ulama, and none of whom was either a Jama’at functionary, or stationed in Lahore.\textsuperscript{117}

No sooner had JC begun its investigations that it became clear that, the scope of complaints and misconducts far exceeded what had initially been expected. Moreover, it extended further up in the Jama’at hierarchy than anticipated. Mawdudi was meanwhile, away from Pakistan, touring the Arab world; he therefore, was not aware of the scope of the committee’s probes. His absence had favored JC in yet another regard. ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan was made the interim overseer of the organization, which permitted him to override any resistance to the investigation by the Lahore bureaucracy. JC’s investigations lasted for a year. Its members, separately and jointly, interviewed some two hundred Jama’at members across Pakistan, registering their complaints, and questioning them regarding their perceptions of their organization. Needless to add, the findings were not complimentary, and were in many ways disturbing.

Wide ranging ethical transgressions and financial misdeeds were reported to the

\textsuperscript{116} Dr. Israr Ahmad, 

\textsuperscript{117} Ashraf and Hasan were resident in Faisalabad (Lyallpur), and Ghazi and Ahmad were living in Karachi.
Committee, and as expected serious complaints were registered against the procedures and behavior of the Lahore bureaucracy. Even Mawdudi and Islahi were implicated by Jama'at members in these complaints. JC prepared a comprehensive report of its findings, and submitted it to the Shura' for consideration during its session in November 1956. The gist of the report can be summed up in the following five points: 1) the Jama'at had strayed from its path of "haqq-parasti" (adulation of the truth) to "maslahat-parasti" (opportunism) or "'awam-parasti" (adulation of the people or the masses); 2) the Jama'at had parted with its original educational vocation and mission, and had instead become a de facto political entity; 3) moral and ethical standards had sharply dropped in the Jama'at, and political work was occupying an increasing share of the time of the members to the exclusion of religious studies and even worship; 4) the treasury of the Jama'at was relying to a greater extent on outside sources of funding, which were influencing the thinking of the members and the decisions of the organization; and 5) 6.7% of Jama'at members were paid employees of the Jama'at, and hence, the membership was losing its independence of thought and action to the organization.\textsuperscript{18} The report moreover, suggested that, since the issues raised by the Committee's findings were in part the result of the organization's premature involvement in politics, and their remedy would require the lion's share of the organization's time and resources, the Jama'at decide against participation in the general elections which were expected to follow the passage of the Constitution of 1956 in Pakistan. This recommendation enmeshed the Committee's findings with the ongoing debate in the organization regarding its future course of action,

\textsuperscript{18} Cited in Ahmad, \textit{Tahrik-i Jama'at-i Islami}, 187-201.
further complicating the resolution of the problems before the Jama‘at. The issue of ethics was posited as the antithesis of politics, forcing the Jama‘at to make a conclusive choice.

The Shura’ meeting of November 1956 lasted for 15 days.\textsuperscript{119} It was the longest and most lively session of this body in the Jama‘at’s history. The four JC members, led by Ashraf, presented their case, concluding three main points: 1) the Jama‘at as shown by the extent and nature of the complaints registered in JC’s report, had gone completely astray, 2) politics had come to dominate the Jama‘at’s works with enervating results, and 3) if the Jama‘at did not desist from political activities, it would destroy its gains to date. Ashraf was most outspoken in this regard. In a nine hour speech, he not only presented the above points articulately, but argued that any departure from the 4-point plan of action stipulated in November 1951, was tantamount to a consequential doctrinal duplicity.\textsuperscript{120} Mawdudi and Islahi, although supported by some of the Shura’ members,\textsuperscript{121} were unable to argue with the findings of JC’s report, and hence, were at best able to stave off some of the sharp criticism leveled against the organization. Mawdudi tendered his resignation a number of times during this turbulent session of the Shura’, but was dissuaded by JC members, who argued their objective was not his departure but

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{119}] The Shura’ session lasted from November 25 until December 10, 1956; see \textit{NGH}, P.5.
\item[\textsuperscript{120}] \textit{NGH}, P.21.
\item[\textsuperscript{121}] Some Shura’ members such as Na’im Siddiqi and Malik Nasru’llah Khan Aziz were ardent Mawdudi loyalists, see \textit{NGH}, P.21.
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restoration of the organization’s moral standing.\textsuperscript{122} During most of Ashraf’s speech, Mawdudi held his head in his hands. When Ashraf compared Mawdudi’s earlier works, wherein he had denounced elections with his later arguments in favor of elections, Mawdudi only shook his head.

Mawdudi was not, however, thoroughly convinced by Ashraf and his supporters in the Shura’, but outvoted, agreed with their prognosis and decision. The 15 day Shura’ session ended with a four point resolution, the gist of which are as follows: 1) the Jama'at has veered away from its intended course. While the organization had made certain gains, it was argued, it had also incurred damage, which should be repaired; 2) the decisions of the Shura’ session of the Jama’at of July 1951 (i.e. the 4-point plan of action, placing least emphasis on politics) continue to hold true, hence, the fact that in recent years the fourth point of the agenda (political change) had dominated the first three, should be reversed; 3) the Jama’at’s position on various issues is based on the Qur’an, \textit{Hadith}, and decisions of the Amir and the Shura’, and not on the organization’s literature - implying that the organization is not based on Mawdudi’s works, nor is it an extension of him; 4) the findings of the JC must be followed upon, and the problems cited therein addressed, a committee consisting of Amin Ahsan Islahi, Na‘im Siddiqi and Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad (d.1970) will be formed to oversee this endeavor.\textsuperscript{123}

Mawdudi was clearly upset by the proceedings of the Shura’ and its resolution,

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{NGH}, pp.22-23. In fact the JC members agreed that the Shura’ resolution not reflect the extent of the disagreements within their ranks, lest it demoralize the organization; \textit{ibid}, P.24.

\textsuperscript{123} From the archives of the Idarah-i Ma’arif-i Islami, Lahore.
which was constitutionally binding on him and the Jama‘at. Not only had the 15 day meeting confirmed significant problems within the Jama‘at, and curbed the organization’s penchant for politics, but had also challenged and ostracized his authority. For the first time in Jama‘at’s history it was the Shura’, rather than he, that was deciding the future of the organization. The constitution of the Jama‘at had been invoked to assert the autonomy of the organization from his person. The steadfast guarantees for the continued autonomy and efficacy of Jama‘at’s organizational structure, designed by none other than Mawdudi, was now in competition with propriety rights which he felt over his brainchild. As subsequent events indicate, he was by no means, resolved to the decision of the Shura’, a fact which permitted the Lahore bureaucracy to once again enter the fray.

Remedying the problems cited in JC’s report, as cited before, would infringe upon the powers of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the bureaucracy, consisting mainly of lay religious activists, had a different view of the choice between ethics and politics than the ‘ulama members of JC. Young Jama‘at activists were predicting imminent victory at the polls in the forthcoming elections, while those like Ashraf or Islahi were fearful of a repeat of the organization’s 1951 electoral performance. The expectation of victory made the Jama‘at workers and office-bearers eager to push the organization into the electoral process, to omit the 4-point plan of action, and to accelerate the pace of the organization’s evolution into a party.

Hence, no sooner had Mawdudi arrived back in Lahore that, those in the bureaucracy or favorable to participation in upcoming elections, men like Sayyid As‘ad

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124 Interview with Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore.
Gilani, ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, and Kawthar Niyazi, approached Mawdudi with the objective of encouraging him to defy the writ of the Shura’. They argued that JC had been biased, and its resolution contained the germs of a mutiny against Mawdudi’s authority, fractionalism in the Jama’at, and even the dissolution of the organization, all of which were graver transgressions against the organization’s constitution than the Amir’s disobedience from the decisions of the Shura’. Moreover, since the resolution of the Shura’ was based on an "erroneous" report, it could not be binding, and hence, the issue should be reopened taking into account these facts. The Jama’at, or at least elements therein, were showing surprising independence of thought and action, influencing the views and decisions of the Amir in a manner hitherto not associated with the Jama’at. The Machchi Goth Affair in its entirety pointed to the autonomous nature of the Jama’at’s organization, its distinct and yet powerful corporatist identity and interests, separate and even paramount to the those of its leadership echelon.

Mawdudi was persuaded by the arguments of the Lahore bureaucracy, seeing in them the opportunity to break the unwelcome restrictions which the Shura’ had placed on the organization and on his office. Moreover, in them he found justification for

125 See for instance Gilani’s later accounts of the Machchi Goth imbroglio in Gilani, *Maududi*, P.10.

126 The Lahore bureaucracy never accepted the veracity of the JC report, and increasingly accused JC members of contriving a biased report with ulterior motives in mind.

127 For instance in a letter to Islahi after Machchi Goth, dated January 18, 1958, Mawdudi explains that he viewed the Shura’ session of November-December 1956 as the proof of emergence of factionalism in the Jama’at, which unless controlled there and then would destroy the Jama’at altogether. Since the factionalist tendency was unconstitutional and anti-Jama’at, no compromise with it, as was evident in the resolution that Shura’
fighting back against what he saw as unwarranted attacks on his leadership. Mawdudi's two year stint in prison over the anti-Ahmadi agitations, had given him national prestige, and made him a virtual hero in the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{128} He was not prepared to forego his newly-found status easily, and expected respect in keeping with it. The prolonged Shura' session had led to serious recriminations, and much bitterness. Mawdudi had viewed the excessively harsh criticism of his leadership as a sign of disrespect for the office of the Amir, and as a vendetta against his person.\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, thirteen days after the conclusion of the Shura' session, on December 23, 1956, Mawdudi wrote to the members of the JC, arguing that by exceeding the powers mandated to them they had inadvertently conspired against the Jama'at, and sought to "fractionalize" the organization with the possible objective of furthering their own designs for leading the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{130} Given the gravity of their "crime", and the fact their performance in the Shura' had proven their destructive potential, Mawdudi demanded their resignation from the Shura'. Should they not comply, he threatened, he would go to their respective constituencies, and demand from Jama'at members to "turn them out".\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128} 'Abd cites that even Islahi eulogized Mawdudi's sacrifices in prison, stating, "I...spontaneously kissed his hands which Allah had endowed with the help of the pen to be testimony to the Truth"; cited in Abdur Rahman Abd, \textit{Sayyed Maududi Faces the Death Sentence} (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), pp.16-17.

\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Mustafa Sadiq, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{130} Interviews, also see, \textit{NGH}, P.31.

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.
With their integrity put in doubt, the four members of the JC appealed to Islahi for justice and reason. Islahi, a man of mercurial temperament, who had to this point supported Mawdudi, was enraged. He took it upon himself to respond to Mawdudi on behalf of the four. He pointed out to Mawdudi that the four had been among the Jama'at's most senior members, all men of highest moral standing. Mawdudi had himself approved of their selection to JC. Three of them had been appointed by Mawdudi as provisional Amirs - 'Abdul-Ghaffar Hasan (1948-49, 1956), 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi (1948-49), and Sultan Ahmad (1953-54) - how could their integrity be slighted without casting aspersions on Mawdudi's own sense of judgement. Islahi, furthermore, charged that Mawdudi was being influenced by the propaganda of "the staff of the Jama'at's central offices," hence, acting "undemocratically" and against the constitution of the Jama'at. Islahi was, at a more fundamental level, seeking to establish the constitutional powers of the Shura' before what he deemed to be encroachments upon them by the Amir.

Upon receiving Islahi's letter, Mawdudi became incensed with yet another display of disrespect to the office of the Amir, and in response, informed Mian Tufayl Muhammad in a letter that, he was resigning from the office of the Amir, and ordered the organization to choose a new Amir just as "if [he] had died". Mawdudi was, no doubt,

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132 NGH, pp.33-56.
133 ibid, pp.40-44.
134 ibid, P.71.
135 Archival papers of Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, Lahore.
doing what he had already threatened JC members with, forcing Jama'at members to choose between him and his critics. Clearly, Mawdudi was confident of where the loyalty of the organization’s members lay.\textsuperscript{136}

In pursuance to this letter, Mian Tufayl, Na'im Siddiqi, and Malik Nasru'llah Khan ‘Aziz went to Islahi, and informed him of Mawdudi’s decision. Islahi asked them to prevent the news from spreading, and to quietly call a session of the Shura’. Siddiqi, a fervent Mawdudi loyalist, thought otherwise. He resigned from the Jama'at forthwith, relieving himself from the binds of the organization’s code of conduct and Islahi’s order, and thence, proceeded to spread the news of the resignation along with incriminating reports against Islahi and the members of the JC. The news soon reached those outside of the Jama'at, and was printed in the news media in January 1957.\textsuperscript{137}

With Mawdudi’s resignation, Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad was named Qa’im Maqam Amir (Deputy Amir) by Mian Tufayl, so that he may oversee the operation of the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{138} Ghulam Muhammad used his position to bring about a reconciliation between the two parties. Jama'at leaders were conscious of the possibility of government intrigue, should the Jama'at’s internal problems drag out, or find reflection in national

\textsuperscript{136} Israr Ahmad argues that Mawdudi knew that his resignation was serious enough to create fears in the hearts of the organization’s members regarding the future of the Jama'at, thus influencing their choice, see NGH, pp.73-75.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{ibid}, pp.73-74.

\textsuperscript{138} For more on Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad see, Muhammad Musa Bhutto, \textit{Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad; Ik Shakhsiyat, Ik Tahrik} (Hyderabad: Daru’l-Islam Publications, nd.).
news with embarrassing consequences for this self-appointed "veritable ummah". Arguing that the very future of the Jama‘at was at stake, Ghulam Muhammad asked Mawdudi to retract his resignation; ordered those aware of the disputes to maintain a strict code of silence; and suggested that the issues in dispute be put before an open Jama‘at meeting, to be scheduled at the earliest possible date. The trepidations of Jama‘at leaders and members regarding possible government machinations in this crisis, no doubt assisted Mawdudi. He was a national figure and the symbol of the Jama‘at; his removal from the office of Amir, many felt, could spell the end of the organization.

The Shura’ of the Jama‘at called by Mian Tufayl, met on January 12, 1957. Islahi, Ashraf and Ghazi were not present at this session. Islahi later charged that the Jama‘at bureaucracy had deliberately arranged the session such that key critics of Mawdudi would not attend it. Citing this example of blatant duplicity in the organization, Islahi tendered his resignation from the Jama‘at. A delegation of senior of Jama‘at members led by Ghulam Muhammad managed to dissuade him from this deed,

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139 ‘Abd, Mufakkir-i Islam, P.282.

140 In a circular which was released by Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad on January 16, 1957, it was emphasized that unless the Jama‘at stood united, and maintained secrecy regarding the waging disputes, it was bound to be embarrassed before its adversaries, and become susceptible to government harassment; cited in Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), (March 29-April 3, 1990), P.10.

141 Interestingly, Mian Tufayl did not invite Amin Ahsan Islahi, who was not officially a Shura’ member then, but had been a regular participant in its proceedings, to this crucial meeting.

142 Islahi charged that invitation to the Shura’ meeting were dispatched sufficiently late to prevent some from attending, while the membership of others such as ‘Abdu’l-Rahim Ashraf was suspended, disqualifying him from the Shura’, NGH, P.82.
pending the result of the Machchi Goth session.\textsuperscript{143} Islahi was, in fact, at the time receptive to a compromise. Those who approached him in this spirit such as Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, or Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, a friend of Mawdudi, found him forthcoming.\textsuperscript{144} Islahi demanded some redress for the grievances of the JC members, and hence, limits on Mawdudi’s powers.\textsuperscript{145} Mawdudi and his supporters, however, felt no need for such a compromise, and continued to force a showdown.

Under pressure from Ghulam Muhammad,\textsuperscript{146} the tailor-made Shura’ accepted his proposals without any rejoinders or changes, and ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan felt compelled to officially ask Mawdudi to rescind his resignation.\textsuperscript{147} An open meeting of the Jama’at was scheduled for February 1957 in Machchi Goth, a small village in the Chulistan Desert in southern Punjab.

Mawdudi accepted the Shura’’s plea, under the condition that the open Jama’at meeting be charged with the power to resolve the issue. He, however, stated that he would

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{ibid}, pp.82-83.

\textsuperscript{144} On Zafar Ahmad Ansari’s efforts in this regard see, \textit{Mithaq}, 39:3 (March 1990), P.32. Israr Ahmad also reports that similar efforts were mounted by members of the Jama’at from all over Pakistan to prevail upon their leaders to resolve their differences, \textit{ibid}, P.50.

\textsuperscript{145} Interviews, Lahore; and \textit{NGH}, P.86.

\textsuperscript{146} Ghulam Muhammad demanded that before attending to any other business, the Shura’ pass a resolution stating its confidence in Mawdudi’s leadership.

\textsuperscript{147} Since members of JC had never asked for Mawdudi’s resignation, they were hard-pressed not to go along with Ghulam Muhammad’s initiative. Sultan Ahmad did register a note of dissent regarding such manipulations of the Shura’ to Mawdudi’s advantage. This note was excluded from circular No. 118-4-27 of January 19, 1957 which reported the proceedings of this Shura’ session to the members; see \textit{NGH}, pp.80-81.
not return to his duties pending the decision of the open session.\textsuperscript{148} Aware of the reaction of Jama‘at members to his resignation, he intended to keep the pressure created by his resignation on the Shura’ and the JC. By now Mawdudi was convinced of support for his position among the rank and file of the organization, and felt that an open session would circumvent the constitutional powers of the Shura’, which was then stacked by supporters of Islahi and the JC group. Faced with the possibility of constitutional restrictions, and unable to win his case through regular channels, Mawdudi began going around the very organizational rules which he himself devised to prevent the domination of the Jama‘at by any one leader. This was a \textit{volte face} of momentous implications, a testimony to the fundamental role which politics and personal ambitions played in his decisions and policies. Meanwhile, by acceding to an open meeting, and Mawdudi’s demand that Jama‘at members arbiter the issues in dispute, the Shura’ conveniently surrendered its constitutional powers to that of an \textit{ad hoc} body, opening the door for the Amir to undermine the powers of the Shura’ with the blessing of the members of the organization.

Meanwhile, the Jama‘at bureaucracy, warned by Siddiqi, mobilized its considerable resources - organizational circulars, newspapers and magazines - to inveigh against Islahi and members of the JC, and to form the members’ opinion before the antagonistic parties could put their cases before them in the open session.\textsuperscript{149} The bureaucracy, especially

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{NGH}, P.81.

\textsuperscript{149} Islahi names \textit{Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an} and \textit{Tasnim} as most significant in this regard; see, \textit{Nida}, (March 14, 1989), P.30.
sought to shift the focus of the debate from the contents of the JC report, the grievances of senior Jama'at leaders against the Amir, and the constitutional implications of Mawdudi's attack on the Committee's members, to the victimization of Mawdudi, and his resignation from the Jama'at. The bureaucracy was also instrumental in emboldening Mawdudi by casting all criticisms leveled against him or the Jama'at functionaries in a conspiratorial light. They convinced Mawdudi that, with the backing of JC members Islahi was maneuvering himself into the position of Amir, an accusation which had enough truth to it to be found compelling by Mawdudi. Viewing criticism against his decisions as invidious efforts to paralyze the Jama'at, Mawdudi became uncompromising in his drive to cleanse the Jama'at of dissent, and saw justification in the use of extra-constitutional measures to preserve the organization's unity. This accusation also had the added benefit that it put Islahi on the defensive, and effectively silenced him. Unwilling to give credence to rumors regarding his personal ambitions, Islahi thenceforth approved of any and all resolutions that confirmed Mawdudi's leadership.

Islahi had from inception been a powerful leader in the Jama'at, not under the sway of Mawdudi's intellectual leadership. Islahi as editor of al-Islah, he had in fact, taken issue with some of the views expressed by Mawdudi in Tarjumanul-Qur'an, in 1937-38 which led to an open and spirited debate between the two; see, NGH, P.58. Islahi had a following of his own in the organization, and was viewed as a more serious scholar than Mawdudi by many outside the Jama'at. Interestingly, Mawdudi and Islahi had clashed over the issue of the extent of the powers of the Amir earlier, in the Jama'at session in Allahabad in 1946; see Nida (Lahore), (March 7, 1989), P.23.

Islahi showed great sensitivity to allegations that in his dispute with Mawdudi he was motivated by personal ambition. In fact, his first resignation was to silence such rumors. In a letter to Mawdudi in 1958, explaining his resignation, he denies all such charges in the strongest terms. That letter is reprinted in Nida, (March 14, 1989), P.29.
With the backing of Mawdudi, the Jama'at bureaucracy, now went on the offensive. Sa'id Malik and 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf were first suspended, and later, expelled from the Jama'at by the Amirs of Rawilpindi and Faisalabad (Lyallpur), Sadiqu'l-Hasan Gilani and Sayyid As'ad Gilani respectively. 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi, meanwhile, disgusted with the turn of events, resigned from the Jama'at. The tide was now turning in favor of Mawdudi, and his supporters revealed that they were not content with victory, nor did they seek conciliation, but instead, wished to purge the Jama'at of the critics of their views and objectives. In a session of the Shura' which convened in Machchi Goth prior to the open session, it was suggested that Mawdudi resume his activities as Amir, and a committee be appointed to review the findings of the JC. Mawdudi, smelling victory, rejected the suggestion, stating that if such a committee was formed, he would resign from the Jama'at. He wanted only his resignation from the office of Amir, and the issue of participation in future elections to be discussed in the open session. At the behest of Nasru'llah Khan 'Aziz, the Shura' declared that it preferred having Mawdudi as Amir than to pursue JC's report.

935 of the Jama'at's 1272 members at the time attended the Machchi Goth session. They arrived with a sense of anxiety about where their organization was heading,

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152 NGH, P.75.
153 ibid, P.76.
154 ibid, pp.76-77.
155 Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, meanwhile, as presiding officer over the Shura' session, prevented 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan from addressing the issue.
156 SAAM, vol.2, pp.8-10.
and with a deep sympathy for Mawdudi, conveyed to them through the organization’s circulars, journals, magazines and newspapers. An array of speakers addressed the session, Islahi being the most prominent of those in dissent. Interestingly, Islahi made no mention of the ethical questions which had caused his break with Mawdudi, and instead addressed the issue of the organization’s 4-point plan of action of November 1951.\textsuperscript{157} He preached moderation, and \textit{tawazun} (balance) between religious pursuits and political activities. Politics had begun to fill all the hours of the Jama’at members, lamented Islahi, leaving no room for religious works.\textsuperscript{158} The content and tone of Islahi’s speech indicated that he was interested in a reconciliation, of which Mawdudi wanted no part. It was this realization which infuriated Islahi and led to his eventual break with the Jama’at.\textsuperscript{159} He had withdrawn his earlier resignation, in pursuance to assurances given by Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari that a compromise would be reached in Machchi Goth. Islahi felt that he

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\textsuperscript{157} Cited in \textit{Mithaq} (Lahore), 39:3 (March 1990), pp.53-55. Israr Ahmad makes the suggestion that Islahi had expected the JC’s report to be included in the itinerary of Machchi Goth session by Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, see, \textit{ibid}, pp.50-51.

\textsuperscript{158} Interview with Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore. It has also been suggested that Islahi was of the belief that the paramount issue before Muslims was that of \textit{khatm-i nubuwwat} (seal of prophecy) - defending Islam’s claim to being the last reveled religion against new pretenders such as the Ahmadis. Hence, Islahi favored greater religious work rather than political activism; see Aqa Mazhar Husain Ghafarlahu, \textit{Mawdudi Jama’at ki ‘Aqa’id wa Nazriyat par Ik Tanqidi Nazar} (Jhelum, nd.), P.18.

\textsuperscript{159} In a letter to Mawdudi after Machchi Goth, Islahi writes that he was assured by Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Baqir Khan that, Mawdudi had accepted at least partially some of his grievances, and was willing to assuage him. These promises were not born out at Machchi Goth, proving that Mawdudi was conniving to mollify him and tone down his hostility before Machchi Goth, without actually intending a compromise. This realization, wrote Islahi, was a major reason why he left the Jama’at; \textit{Nida} (March 14, 1989), pp.30-31.
had kept his part of the bargain, while Mawdudi had reneged on his.  

Islahi's cautions, therefore, fell upon deaf ears, and his appeal for return to the organization's original agenda was strongly criticized by Na'im Siddiqi, and later Mawdudi. With the tempo of the event moving in Mawdudi's direction, his supporters became even less compromising. Hence, all subsequent dissenters, such as 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan were barred from addressing the gathering. Having kept the issue of JC's report, and Mawdudi's high-handed policies, off the rostrum, Mawdudi went on the attack. In a six hour speech, subsequently published as *Tahrik-i Islami ka A'indah La'ihah-i 'Amal* (The Future Plan of Action of the Islamic Movement), Mawdudi presented a *tour de force* in favor of greater participation in politics, introducing a new agenda for the Jama'at, in place of its erstwhile 4-point plan of action of 1951. He reiterated the Jama'at's original objectives, and presented a cursory review of the organization's history. The Jama'at, he added, would continue as a religious movement in keeping with its role in the first 15 years of its life, but it would now actively participate in electoral politics; the goal of political reform was moved up from a distant aim to an immediate preoccupation. He

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161 *ibid*, P.58. Elsewhere Israr Ahmad reports that 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf had requested Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad to guarantee adequate time for all views to be aired at Machchi Goth. Mawdudi turned down the request flatly, and Ghulam Muhammad complied, *Mithaq*, 13:2 (February 1967), P.49.

162 Mawdudi, *Tahrir-i Islami*, reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1986). This book is seen today as the most lucid exposition of Mawdudi's views on religion and politics, but is often not examined within the context of the crisis which prompted its ideas.

163 The elements of Mawdudi's new approach was evident in lectures he delivered in March 8, 1957 at Punjab University, and March 19, 1957 at the Law College; see *MMKT*, vol.4, pp.55-61.

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argued that, the Jama'at was formed with the objective of *iqamat-i din* (instituting religion), and the establishment of *hukumat-i ilahiya* (divine government). The two objectives were canonized in the constitution of the Jama'at.\(^{164}\) The two objectives, however, would be unattainable if the Jama'at permitted its opposition to become entrenched in the political arena. The organization must enter the political scene, if not to further its own cause, at least to deny success to its adversaries.\(^{165}\)

The Jama'at, therefore, was to revise its original agenda, pursuing political objectives with equal vigor as education and propaganda.\(^{166}\) Mawdudi's speech struck a receptive chord, so much so that subsequent moves during the Machchi Goth session to temper his penchant for politicizing the Jama'at, by Mustafa Sadiq, Israr Ahmad, and Arshad Ahmad Haqqani, met with hostile responses from the crowd.\(^{167}\) At the end of the session, the issue of participation in politics was put to vote. Mawdudi received the support of all those present save for 15, who handed in their resignations there and then. It is one of the peculiar features of this episode that, none of the issues which had originally precipitated this crisis - J.C.'s report, and Mawdudi reaction to it - were discussed at Machchi Goth. Neither Mawdudi, nor his opposition ever made a mention of it. An ethical issue was metamorphosed into a political one, and served as the handmaiden of the organization's greater politicization.

\(^{164}\) The *Dastur*, article 4.


\(^{166}\) *ibid*, pp.190-94.

\(^{167}\) *ibid*, pp.58-68. Mustafa Sadiq, however, managed to secure 148 votes for a resolution which censured overt politicization.
Mawdudi and his supporters were, however, not content with their victory at Machchi Goth. They met in the nearby village of Kut Shair Sangh, and initiated a purge of the Jama‘at, which Ashraf has termed as "the Jama‘at’s Karbala", hoping to reestablish the authority of the office of the Amir, and to bring back the organization its original unity of thought and practice. The fate of the JC’s report was sealed, it was to be destroyed, eliminating the specter of any future divisions over this issue. The Shair Sangh meeting also declared that all those who had differed with Mawdudi, much like the zimmis in an Islamic state, could remain in the organization, but were barred from holding office or positions which could form opinion in the Jama‘at. This decision, interpreted by many as sheer vindictiveness, led to further defections from the ranks of the Jam‘at, including those of Israr Ahmad, Mustafa Sadiq and ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan. Hasan resigned, primarily to protest the purge of those who had spoken their minds, while Na‘im Siddiqi who had violated the orders of Islahi and Ghulam Muhammad by leaking the news of Mawdudi’s resignation was reinstated as a member, but also in response to Mawdudi’s

168 Reference here is to the unjust martyrdom of Husain ibn ‘Ali in 682 in Karbala at the hands of the numerically superior army of Caliph Yazid. The event is a central theme of Shi‘i popular piety. Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Rahim Ashraf, Faisalabad.


170 Islahi cited in his resignation that his loyalty was to the constitution of the Jama‘at and not to Mawdudi, and hence, since the former was violated, he no longer felt it binding on him to remain in the organization; Nida (Lahore), (March 14, 1989), P.29. Mawdudi had become excessively autocratic and sensitive to criticism, Islahi recollects; interview with Islahi, Lahore.

Sadiq was disturbed by the fact that he was removed from the editorship of the Jama‘at magazine Tasnim based on his pre-Machchi Goth views, and without being asked where he stood thence. He saw his removal from the magazine as a punitive retaliation, and hence, resigned from the Jama‘at; interview with Mustafa Sadiq, Lahore.
attempt to institutionalize his doctrinal revisions at Machchi Goth through an interpretive reading of what is immutable and what is changeable in Islam.\textsuperscript{171}

Although Islahi enjoyed a certain following among Jama'at members and especially those who had studied the Qur'an with him,\textsuperscript{172} his departure from the Jama'at much like Nu'mani's did not translate into a mass exodus. Altogether 56 members of the Jama'at left the organization as a result of this affair, most were 'ulama and the bulk of the organization's religious weight and intellectual talent.\textsuperscript{173} The Jama'at was inherited by the lay activists, and the functionaries of its bureaucracy. Mawdudi was not greatly discomforted by the desertions; for, the numbers were too few, and those who left were likely to interfere with his plans for the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{174} In a letter to Ghulam Muhammad

\textsuperscript{171} See Mawdudi's article in \textit{TQ}, (December 1956), pp.9-32. Mawdudi responded to those who criticized his departures from his earlier position by arguing that, Islam is a rational religion, and it permits choice between two evils when expediency necessitates such a choice; see, \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.59-60.

\textsuperscript{172} Interview with Israr Ahmad in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, pp.98-99.

\textsuperscript{173} Among those who left the most noteworthy were: Amin Ahsan Islahi (Jama'at second highest ranking leader, provisional Amir, 1954; and later an important scholar and commentator of the Qur'an); Sultan Ahmad (member of Shura', and provisional Amir, 1953-54); 'Abdu'l-Jabbar Ghazi (member of Shura', and provisional Amir, 1948-49); 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan (member of Shura', and provisional Amir, 1948-49, and 1956); 'Abdu'l-Rahim Ashraf and Sardar Muhammad Ajmal Khan (both members of Shura'); Mawlana Abu'l-Haqi Jamai'i (former Amir of Bhawalpur); Sa'id Malik (former Amir of Punjab); Muhammad 'Asimu'l-Haddad (Director of Daru'l-'urubiyah, Jama'at's Arabic translation bureau); Arshad Ahmad Haqqani (editor of \textit{Tasnim}); and Israr Ahmad and Mustafa Sadiq (both of whom became notable political and religious figures in later years.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{174} Those who left were already given up by the organization as souls who had fallen off the path to the Islamic revolution; see Sayyid Ma'ruf Shirazi, \textit{Islami Inqilab ka Minhaj} (Chinarkut: Manshurat-i Islami, 1989). Of Islahi's disagreements with him and his departure from the Jama'at, Mawdudi said deprecatingly, "Amin Ahsan Sahab was scared off by his experience with prison" (referring to his incarceration following the anti-Ahmadi agitations); interview with Begum Mahmudah Mawdudi, Lahore. In a more serious note,
after Machchi Goth, Mawdudi clearly showed disinterest in patching up his differences with Islahi, preferring instead the uniformity which thenceforth reigned in the Jama'at. Shortly then after the Jama'at participated in the elections of Karachi Municipal Corporation, winning 19 of the 23 seats which it contested. The victory vindicated Mawdudi, erased the last traces of remorse over the Machchi Goth imbroglio, and pushed the Jama'at further into the political arena.

The Significance and Implications of the Machchi Goth Affair

The Machchi Goth affair and the subsequent purge of the Jama'at were events of significant importance and lasting influence in the history of the Jama'at. They reoriented the movement towards politics, redefined its conception of Islam and its place in the life of men, and did much to routinize and institutionalize the movement’s idealism, replacing chiliasm with pragmatic politics. The Jama’at had begun as a movement of cultural and religious rejuvenation, it had been premised on ethics and the incumbency and inviolability of religious teachings. Its primary target was man, whose conversion to the din

Mawdudi explained to Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad that, Islahi’s temper, which had shown its full force throughout the Machchi Goth ordeal was likely to be a source of trouble, and had alienated many in the Jama’at from him; hinting that Mawdudi was not eager for Islahi to return to the Jama’at; Nida (Lahore), (March 7, 1989), P.26. Those supporting Mawdudi in the Jama’at saw his handling of the Machchi Goth affair as a successful case of building consensus in the Jama’at; interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

175 Mawdudi’s letter is reproduced in Nida (Lahore), (March 27, 1989), pp.24-25.

176 There were 100 seats in total being contested in those elections.

177 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.53.

178 Israr Ahmad, Islam Awr Nish’at-i Jadid (Lahore, 1968).
would catalyze social change, and eventually, political reform. At Machchi Goth, this puritanical and somewhat traditional formula for Islamicity and the salvation of man was altered. The conversion of men would now occur in tandem with, if not in pursuance to, the reform of politics. The Jama‘at, much like revivalism everywhere, was showing greater concern for the sociopolitical context in which Muslims lived than for their individual souls. By overlooking the JC’s report, or Sa‘id Malik’s allegations of financial misconduct, in order to maintain the Jama‘at’s role in politics, Mawdudi proved that the direction of the flow revivalist Islamization is ultimately from politics to society, to the individual.

There were, however, also more fundamental forces at play in this affair. It can be argued that Machchi Goth, above and beyond the decisions of Mawdudi, the Jama‘at bureaucracy, and their critics, was born of the inner dynamics of the Jama‘at’s pattern of growth, manifesting the organization’s reaction to changes in sociopolitical context in which it was operating. The Jama‘at had been conceived of in a different political setting in India, it had operated in Pakistan for a decade with little change in perspective, as both the country and the organization had been in a state of flux. By 1956, the Pakistani polity had consolidated, and the country had become an irrefutable reality, unlikely to wither away. The Jama‘at’s original chiliastic idealism, and romantic perceptions of revolution or a facile conquering of the new country’s soul and centers of power had proven to be fleeting enthusiasm. Its campaign for Islamic constitution had, moreover, came to its conclusion with the passage of the Constitution of 1956, which the Jama‘at had accepted as "Islamic". The Jama‘at, therefore, had to find a more stable role in the political arena. To remain relevant to Pakistani politics, and the future developments of the country the
Jama’at had to take a definitive shape, it had to move out of its organizational shell, and beyond single-issue causes; it had to engage in concrete sociopolitical debates, lest it become petrified into yet another *tabligh* (missionary) movement. While, even after the Machchi Goth affair the Jama’at did not fully abide by the writ of these directives to its own detriment, significant pressure was brought to bear on the organization, pushing it towards greater rationalization of its structure and refinement of its plan of action.

Also of relevance in this regard was the fact that, the Jama’at by 1956 was, by and large, a spent religious force. Its zeal and ideological perspective had been consequential to the development of contemporary Muslim thought in the Subcontinent as well as elsewhere; the movement, however, was no longer producing ideas which would sustain its continued relevance. Its experience over the past decade, 1946-56, had shown that its contribution and influence lay not so much in what it espoused, but in its organizational muscle and pragmatic political activism. The survival and continued prominence of the Jama’at could only be guaranteed in the political arena. Hence, there existed palpable pressures within the Jama’at, which pushed it into politics, in hope of regaining the momentum which the movement seemed to have lost. These pressures were most acutely felt by those who had least grounding in Islamic learning, and for whom the Jama’at was their sole link to a holistic view of the role of Islam in the world - the organization’s lay activists and its bureaucratic force. In the same vein, many in the senior cadre of the Jama’at, ‘ulama whose ties to Islam were formed independent from the Jama’at, felt the consequence of the depletion of the organizations’s ideological energies less acutely. They did not share the sense of urgency which the first group felt, nor were they prepared to
sacrifice perennial values to resuscitate an organization. Their departure from the Jama'at, no doubt, augmented the organization's intellectual and ideological crisis, and hence, intensified pressures which would continue to politicize the movement.\textsuperscript{179} Their departure also augmented the power of the Jama'at bureaucracy with the same effect.

The corporatist interests of the Jama'at therefore, sanctioned politicization as the solution to this quandary. Politicization had to occur at the cost of romantic idealism, and as a vehicle for the routinization and institutionalization of that idealism. It was the means to reorient the Jama'at, move it away from a moribund course, and reinvigorate its energies. The enthusiasm among the rank and file and the bureaucratic element in the Jama'at for political activism, moreover, confirmed the widespread belief in the promise of politicization along pragmatic lines as a new lease of life for the organization. It was in this vein that, commitment to Pakistan, and the constitutional process in attaining the movement's objectives, as a new green pasture for the organization's activism, featured so prominently in Mawdudi's speech at Machchi Goth.\textsuperscript{180} Interestingly, Mawdudi presided, and subsequently oversaw, the routinization of his own chiliastic and romantic idealism, which is a rare occurrence in development of charismatic movements.

Although, the outcome of the Machchi Goth session sowed the seeds of a "cult of

\textsuperscript{179} Rana Sabir Nizami, \textit{Jama'at-i Islami Pakistan; Nakamiyun ke Asbab ka 'Ilmi Tajziyah} (Lahore: Idarah-i Tafhimu'l-Islam, 1988), pp.47, and 76-77. The author suggests that the departure of the 'ulama and elders from the Jama'at left the leadership of the organization in the hands of those whose motivations were primarily political. The Jama'at therefore, was damaged at its foundations.

personality" around Mawdudi, more importantly, it marked the "end of ideology" and the beginning of pragmatic politics and decision making in the Jama'at. It is interesting to note that, while Mawdudi's earlier works and career has done so much to kindle revivalism across the Muslim world, his arguments for abandoning the ideological perspective in favor of the routinization of the Jama'at have, in large measure, gone unnoticed by his admirers across the Muslim world.

The Jama'at's greater proclivity for pragmatic politics, and participation in national politics, meanwhile, necessitated the presence of a powerful Amir at the helm. An acephalous organization, as fitting as that arrangement may have seemed to its founders, was unlikely to yield positive results in the political arena. The political needs of the organization required its Amir to be more than a *primus inter pares*; the organization needed a command structure which precluded the kind of discussion, debate and dissension which the 'ulama members of the Jama'at - and the bulk of those who left the Jama'at in 1957 - were accustomed to. The Machchi Goth Affair much like Nu'mani's departure from the Jama'at, augmented the powers of the Amir, institutionalizing this eventuality as a corollary of any resolution of tensions and crises surrounding the organization's politicization.

If the consolidation of power in the office of the Amir meant the purge of its senior members, its scholars and intellectual talent, that was a cost which an organization bent on pragmatic politics had to incur. In fact, the central questions posed by Mawdudi

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181 On Mawdudi's powers and image in the Jama'at from 1957 onwards see, Nizami, *Jama'at-i Islami*, pp.52-53.
at Machchi Goth pertained to this issue. In short, he asked Jama'at members: "are you in favor of Jama'at's involvement in electoral politics?", and if so "are you willing to bear the cost?" No doubt, Mawdudi's six hour speech went a long way in eliciting a positive response to both questions. Yet, it was the Jama'at members who realized that they confronted a "zero-sum" situation, their choices were consequential, and whichever decision they took the organization would have to bear the costs. The issues before them were of a fundamental nature, they pertained to more than the bickering of their leaders. It was probably this realization on the part of all those present at Machchi Goth that, made the discussion of the contents of the JC's report, or Mawdudi's reaction to it irrelevant. What was at issue was "whither the Jama'at?"

Mawdudi, however, did not remain altogether oblivious to the problems which had produced the Machchi Goth imbroglio in the first place. At Kut Shair Sangh he not only purged the Jama'at, but also initiated far-reaching constitutional reforms, which would guarantee greater organizational unity in the future, and moreover, prepare the Jama'at for its new program of action. Some of the reforms he initiated at Shair Sangh were designed to contain the abuses of the power, by himself as well as other Jama'at members. In pursuance to these reforms, in May 1957, the Jama'at constitution was formally revised; the Amir was made subject to the writ of the Shura' more effectively, but would no longer be elected by the Shura', but by Jama'at members; the Shura' was expanded to 50 members; the procedural regulations of the Shura' were streamlined; the Amir was given greater control over the itinerary and flow of discussions in the Shura'; the Shura' was given veto power over the Amir’s decisions, and vice versa; procedural guidelines now
governed the outcome of disagreements between the two; and finally, a Majlis-i ‘Amilah (Executive Council) - a "politburo" of sorts - was formed to serve as the ultimate arbiter between the Amir and the Shura’, its select members would be appointed by the Amir.\textsuperscript{182}

\textbf{In the Shadow of Machchi Goth: Religious Idealism and Political Pragmatism in the Jama’at Since 1957}

The Machchi Goth affair by no means resolved the Jama’at’s intellectual and ideological crisis, nor did it render the organization invulnerable to the ethical implications of pragmatic politics. In fact, Machchi Goth exposed the soft underbelly of the organization, the increasing discrepancy between its religious facade and the pragmatic political reality of its program of action.

Hence, the shadow of yet another Machchi Goth debacle was cast over the Jama’at in 1963-64. While Mawdudi was in prison following a government crack-down on Jama’at activists, the organization which was then a member of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to Ayub Khan, accepted the choice of Fatimah Jinnah as the COP’s presidential candidate. Needless to add, Jama’at’s decision flew in the face of Mawdudi’s oft-repeated arguments against any public role for women.\textsuperscript{183} It was a doctrinal compromise of

\textsuperscript{182} These regulations are stipulated in the constitution of the Jama’at, the \textit{Dastur}. Kawthar Niyazi later criticized the idea of the Majlis-i ‘Amilah for overshadowing the Shura’, see Kawthar Niyazi, \textit{Jama’at-i Islami ‘Awami ‘Adalat Main} (Lahore: Qaumi Kutubkhanih, 1973), P.32.

\textsuperscript{183} Only in the summer of 1950 the Jama’at had deprecatingly criticized a public appearance by Miss Jinnah, questioning her place in such an occasion; see \textit{TQ}, (July-September 1950), P.220.
monumental magnitude, which given the national attention focused on it, could not be
easily justified.\textsuperscript{184} The Jama’at had abandoned its ideological mainstay, and declared
itself a political machine through and through, one which recognized no ethical or
religious bounds to its pragmatism. Mawdudi explained the Jama‘at’s decision as an evil
warranted by the necessity of combatting yet a greater evil - General Ayub and the
martial law regime.\textsuperscript{185} Mawdudi’s explanation was not found convincing by those outside
the Jama‘at, but more importantly led to dissention within the organization.

Kawthar Niyazi, then the Amir of Lahore, and an ardent defender of Mawdudi
during the Machchi Goth affair, began to openly question Mawdudi’s wisdom in the
Jama‘at journal, Shahab.\textsuperscript{186} Niyazi argued fervently against the Jama‘at’s support for the
candidacy of a woman to lead Pakistan, stating that, the Jama‘at had gone too far in
compromising its principles, and had ceased to be a religious entity altogether. In a
departure from his own earlier advocacy of candidature, and in a broadside blast against
the person of the Amir, Niyazi detailed Mawdudi’s vituperation against candidacy in
earlier times, comparing them with the Jama‘at’s policy since 1957. Inferring duplicity on
the part of Mawdudi, Niyazi began to push for a major factional strife within the Jama‘at.

\textsuperscript{184} This was especially so after Miss Jinnah lost the elections to Ayub Khan, and
Jama‘at got no political compensations for its ideological compromise, see, Freeland

\textsuperscript{185} Mawdudi explained the Jama‘at’s position in the following terms: "on one side is
a man, other than his gender there is nothing good about him; on the other side is a
woman, which aside from her gender nothing is wrong about her", cited in Israr Ahmad,
Islam Awr Pakistan: Tahriki, Siyas‘ Ilmi Awr Thiqafati Pasmanzar (Lahore: Khuddamu‘l-
Qur’an, 1983), P.37.

\textsuperscript{186} Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad; also see, Niyazi, Jama‘at-i Islami, pp.11-
17. Niyazi had been the founder and editor of Shahab.
Such, however, was not to be the case. Niyazi unlike Islahi enjoyed no following of his own within the Jama‘at, and there even existed disaffection with his style as a “bureaucrat” in the organization’s Secretariat. Moreover, the Jama‘at had changed significantly since 1957. It was now more centralized, and as Niyazi charged, more members were on the organization’s pay-roll, hampering their ability to freely express their ideas let alone voice their dissent. Furthermore, by immediately externalizing the problem through his journal, Niyazi had caused much anger among his cohorts in the Jama‘at, giving vent to charges that he was doing the bidding of the government, which was looking for ways to paralyze the Jama‘at before the elections. Mawdudi, therefore, responded hastily and definitively to Niyazi’s invective, simply asking him to resign from the Jama‘at.

While Niyazi’s challenge to Mawdudi was a manifestation of the tensions which continued to hound an organization which was caught between idealism and pragmatism, the Jama‘at’s response was suggestive of fundamental changes in the organization’s ethos, and of its greater ability to contend with such tensions. The organization had moved

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187 Interviews.


189 *ibid*, P.38, and interview with Niyazi, Islamabad.

190 The Jama‘at became even more sensitive over the years regarding the public expression of internal dissent. While Niyazi was asked to resign, Mawlana Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, an elder of the Jama‘at, and Amir of Sind, was expelled from the Jama‘at in 1976 for divulging information about Mawdudi’s disagreements with the Shura’ over the issue of Jama‘at’s continued participation in elections (which will be discussed later); correspondences of the author with Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, 1989-90; and interview with Javid Ahmadu‘l-Ghamidi, Lahore.
sufficiently far in the direction of pragmatism not to be shocked by Mawdudi’s *volte face* in lending support to the candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah. In fact, it had been other Jama‘at leaders, who in the absence of their incarcerated leader, had initially endorsed COP’s choice of Miss Jinnah, and were therefore, fully prepared to defend Mawdudi against Niyazi’s challenges.

These tendencies would continue to be enforced, causing more internal dissensions, and on occasion, purges of the Jama‘at members.\footnote{A major internal conflict erupted in the Jama‘at in 1983 over Jama‘at’s relations with General Ziya which will be discussed in chapter 14.} However, over the years the Jama‘at contended with the specter of rising tensions born of its slide towards pragmatic politics with greater ease, showing less tolerance for dissent, and a greater penchant for organizational unity. The purge of dissenting members has therefore, become a more frequent occurrence - an institutional mechanism for resolving internal tensions. For instance, Javid Ahmadu’l-Ghamidi a favorite student of Mawdudi, was expelled from the Jama‘at in 1976, for criticizing aspects of Mawdudi’s Qur’anic commentary, *Tafhimu’l-Qur’an* with reference to Islahi’s commentary, *Tadabburu’l-Qur’an*.\footnote{Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore. Interestingly, after stepping down as Amir, Mawdudi spent much time on training a select number of Jama‘at members in religious matters, noteworthy among them, Javid Ahmadu’l-Ghamidi and Mustansir Mir. Both eventually became interested in Islahi’s work, and parted ways with the Jama‘at.} Ghamidi who is today a respected independent religious thinker, was the last intellectual "rising star" from the ranks of the Jama‘at.

The Jama‘at was initially a diverse movement, built upon a tradition of discussion and debate, and consensus built upon a shared vision of the ideal Islamic order. Its...
transformation into a monolithic political party, through trial by fire at Machchi Goth, and the subsequent consolidation of the organization's exceedingly pragmatic proclivity, has emptied the organization of its original meaning and intellectual vitality, divorcing it of its ideological roots. It may be that such was to be the fate of the Jama'at. Machchi Goth gave the organization new lease on life when it had begun to reach the end of its rope. Yet, the Jama'at thenceforth, developed in directions not anticipated or desired by its founders - it became a full-fledged political party. Ghamidi's observation, "I never left the Jama'at, the Jama'at left me", is reflective of the eventual result of the Machchi Goth debacle, and the subsequent politicization of the Jama'at.

Mawdudi may have been unaware of where the Jama'at was headed, or he may have been unable to control the forces at work in the organization. He could ride those forces, as he did in 1956-57, but both he, and later, his successors at the helm of the Jama'at, were hard-pressed to contain them. Mawdudi's methodical approach to the question of the role of religion in politics had for long informed his decisions, and determined the modus operandi of the Jama'at, at times, even against Mawdudi's own sensibilities or better judgement. The compelling force of his time-honored doctrinal position had become too deeply entrenched in the ethos of the Jama'at to permit a serious consideration of a complete volte face.

A clear example of the dilemma posed by the trend towards greater pragmatism

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193 Na'im Siddiqi, himself an architect of the Jama'at's politicization, today laments that, the Jama'at is no longer the same, those who join it no longer have a sense about its original spirit; interview with Na'im Siddiqi, Lahore.

194 Interview with Ghamidi, Lahore.
is the crisis which besieged the Jama'at between 1983 and 1988 (which will be detailed in Part IV) over the Jama'at’s relations with the Ziya government. A large number of Jama'at members, motivated by pragmatic political concerns, demanded that the Jama'at break with General Ziya and his Islamization policies, and instead, to ally itself with the organization's erstwhile ideological pariah and political enemy, the Pakistan People’s Party, now led by Benazir Bhutto.

By the late-1960s Mawdudi continuous references to incidents of violence involving the Jama'at, and his emphasis upon organizational discipline, showed his growing concern with what political pragmatism had in store for the Jama'at.¹⁹⁵ The lion's share of his farewell address to the Jama'at, upon Mian Tufayl’s election to the office of the Amir, was dedicated to the discussion of the need to guarantee the continuation of the Jama'at through the restitution of the balance between ideological imperatives and pragmatic concerns which now increasingly governed the organization's activism.¹⁹⁶ Mawdudi's anxiety in this regard, had become more pronounced after the Jama'at was routed at the polls in 1970-71. The election results did not bear out the sacrifices of the Jama'at, nor the damage incurred by its purges and costly compromises. The organization had given away too much without gaining enough in return.¹⁹⁷ He would start afresh if he had the

¹⁹⁶ ibid, pp.426-28.
¹⁹⁷ Mawdudi’s anguish was reflected in a letter to Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, wherein he discusses his disappointment with the Jama'at; cited in Nizami, Jama'at-i Islami, pp.101-02. Begum Mawdudi recollects that her husband was particularly perturbed about the break down of ethical conduct in the Jama'at caused by the organization’s politicization, something he introduced to the Jama'at, and could not later on control. Interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.
stamina, he told his wife in 1972, "for the Jama‘at was not up to his standards".\textsuperscript{198} Similarly to the query of a friend regarding his view of the Jama‘at, he responded, "I hope this will not be the case, but when historians write of the Jama‘at, they will say it was yet another \textit{tajdid} movement that rose and fell."\textsuperscript{199} He finally aired his views before the Shura’ of the Jama‘at Shura’ in 1975. He advised them to move the Jama‘at away from politics, for elections had not only proved to be a dead end, but had a debilitating effect on the movement. He was argued with, and largely ignored.\textsuperscript{200}

The Jama‘at today is an important political actor in Pakistani politics, but intellectual and ideological lead of the Islamic revivalism in Pakistan has been passed on to other movements, many of whom were founded by those who left the Jama‘at, such as, Israr Ahmad or Javid Ahmadu’l-Ghamidi.\textsuperscript{201} The outcome of the routinization of the Jama‘at’s idealism may have saddened Mawdudi, but was an ineluctable outcome of the

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{199} Interview with Khwaja Amanu’l’lah, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{200} Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, who had been present in that Shura’ session later wrote to Mawdudi, and asked the Mawlana to reiterate his views and confirm what Nadwi had understood him to say. Mawdudi repeated his disdain for elections in letter to Nadwi. Nadwi was subsequently expelled from the Jama‘at for discussing the Shura’ session, and Mawdudi’s letter with those outside the Jama‘at. Correspondences with Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, 1989-90; interview with Ghamidi, Lahore; and \textit{Mithaq} (Lahore), 39:3 (March 1990), pp.11-12.

\textsuperscript{201} The Jama‘at for instance no longer has a notable and widely-respected religious thinker. While it does indulge in religious exegesis, they are not at the forefront of revivalist thinking in Pakistan any longer. Mian Tufayl accedes to this conclusion; "the calibre of \textit{Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an} despite its continued vitality has gone down since Mawlana Mawdudi’s death", he asserts; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore. However, Mian Tufayl takes comfort in the fact that, "Mawlana [Mawdudi] was such a paramount thinker that the Jama‘at will not need one for another century"; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.52.
inner dynamics of the organization's growth and the working of its idealism and charisma; and moreover, not all that unwelcome a development for the Jama'at's detractors who have for long feared the ideological rhetoric and chiliastic pretensions of the organization.

What the pattern of the Jama'at's historical evolution indicates is that, the relation between ideology and social action in Islamic revivalism is neither as harmonious and spontaneous, nor as permanent and immutable, as is often believed to be the case. The revivalist discourse, as powerful as its synthesis between religious idealism and political action, may seem, produces an inherently anomalous posture towards the world, one fraught with tensions, which in their demand for resolution, eventually routinize the original ideological zeal in favor of political pragmatism.
CHAPTER 8

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF JAMAʿAT-ISLAMI

Beyond the vicissitudes of the Jamaʿat’s historical development lies the reality of its organizational power and reach, what accounts for the organization’s continuous vitality, political salience, and religious and intellectual influence in Pakistan, as well as across the Muslim world. The Jamaʿat has been the fulcrum of Mawdudi’s revivalist program, the embodiment of his idealist vision, and the primary vehicle for their implementation. The Jamaʿat, not only manifests Mawdudi’s ideology, but in its power and structure, is the crowning achievement of his career. An examination of the organizational structure of the Jamaʿat and its working in this chapter, will serve as a glimpse into the working of Mawdudi’s ideas, and the process through which they were translated into institutional bodies, and as such, operationalized. It will provide insights into the manner in which Mawdudi’s ideological perspective found expression and continuity within the religious universe of Islam, and the ambient political culture of Pakistan.

In his works, Mawdudi often suggested that the Jamaʿat was an idea, *sui generis*, which he conceived of after much reflection on the problems before the Muslims of India.¹ The solution to those predicaments were not only in the realm of the "spirit", but were manifested in the social livelihood of the Muslims. The Muslims therefore needed not only moral rectitude and return to the pristine values of their religion, but an

organization capable of doing their bidding in the political realm.\textsuperscript{2} If the Islamic state was to be a panacea, its materialization would require the full force of organizational fiat;\textsuperscript{3} the Muslims should not expect, nor await, a miracle to harbing that state, argued Mawdudi, but must unite and strive for its institution.\textsuperscript{4} 22 years of observation, stated Mawdudi, led him to believe that no Muslim organization was likely to succeed in that aim, lest it be based on high moral and religious standards;\textsuperscript{5}

"I was of the opinion that importance [of an organization] lies not in numbers of its members, but in the dependability of their thoughts and actions."\textsuperscript{6}

However, despite Mawdudi's claim, the Jama'at was neither an original idea, nor was it conceived free of diverse exogenous influences on Mawdudi's thinking. The most notable and immediately recognizable influence on the vision of the Jama'at was the Prophetic model.\textsuperscript{7} Mawdudi was most influenced by the manner in which the first nucleus

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Witness Unto Mankind}, Khurram Murad, ed. and trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp.73-75.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Gilani reports that Mawdudi's drive for organizational work was evident from the very beginning of the Jama'at, and made him distinct from all the other founding members, see Sayyid As'ad Gilani, "Jama'at-i Islami, 1941-47", Ph.D. dissertation Presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Punjab, 1989-90, pp.199-200.
\item \textsuperscript{5} \textit{JIKUS}, P.31. Here Mawdudi refers to the Khilafat Movement, explaining its demise as a consequence of its low moral caliber.
\item \textsuperscript{6} ibid, P.32.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Abad Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh-i Jama'at-i Islami} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami, 1989), vol.1, pp.402-04.
\end{itemize}
of Muslims gathered around the Prophet in Mecca shortly after the revelation of Islam, how they grew in size and were thence able to project their power across Arabia.\textsuperscript{8} Mawdudi understood the success of Prophet Muhammad's mission not only in the power of his message, or the will of God, but in his organizational genius,

"Within thirteen years the Prophet was able to gather around him a small but devoted group of courageous and self-less people..."\textsuperscript{9}

It was exactly in these terms that, Mawdudi viewed the Jama'at, as an emulation of the Prophetic model,

"All those persons who thus surrender themselves are welded into a community and that is how the 'Muslim society' comes into being."\textsuperscript{10}

Mawdudi also understood the success of the Prophet in the segregation of the early Muslim community from its social context, what enabled the Prophet to establish a distinct corporatist identity for his "organization," thereby not only resisting the pressures of dissolution into the larger pagan Arab culture, but instead pulling its adversary into the ambit of Islam. For Mawdudi, the Jama'at, much like the Prophetic model, had to stand as a paragon for the rest of the Muslim community of India; the Jama'at would have to stand apart from its social milieu, and yet direct its energies at drawing the Muslim community into the pale of Mawdudi's reading of Islam. The Jama'at was therefore, from


\textsuperscript{9} Abul A'la Maudoodi, \textit{Islam Today} (Beirut: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1985), P.12.

\textsuperscript{10} Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, \textit{The Islamic Way of Life}, Khurshid Ahmad, ed. and trans., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), P.16.
inception a missionary movement.\textsuperscript{11}

There also existed more immediate and tangible examples for the Jama'at to follow. Indian Islam since the time of the Fara'izi movement in the nineteenth century had emphasized the importance of organizations.\textsuperscript{12} More recently, Abu'l-Kalam Azad had raised the banner of organizational work among the Muslims of India. In the 1910s he circulated the idea of the Hizbu'llah (Party of God), which was to serve as the vehicle for the reassertion of Muslim religious values and political interests. While the organization never amounted to much, its working and \textit{raison d'être} were articulated passionately by Azad in his journal \textit{al-Hilal}, which Mawdudi had read avidly. Later Azad proposed yet another organizational gambit, which again was of consequence for Mawdudi's thinking. In the 1920s, Azad and a number of Indian 'ulama suggested that the Muslims choose an Amir-i Shari'at (Leader of Holy Law) in each Indian province, to be aided by a council of 'ulama to oversee the religious affairs of Muslims.\textsuperscript{13} These provincial Amirs would in turn elect an Amir-i Hind (Leader [of the Muslims] of India), a coveted title, on which Azad had his eyes. While this scheme also came to a naught, Azad proceeded to launch an independent campaign for securing the title of Amir-i Hind for himself. He instructed a few close associates who had undertaken \textit{bai’ah} (oath of allegiance; today mostly

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See, \textit{RJI}, vol.5, P.195, where the organization’s missionary outlook is discussed.
\item The Fara’izi movement, an effort at the revival and reform of Islam, conceived by Haji Shari’atu’llah (d.1838) in Bengal, was based on an elaborate organizational network, which extended down to the district level, and was supervised by Khalifas (Caliphs) at each level; see A. Bausani, \textit{Fara’idiyya, EI(2)}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
associated with the Sufis) with him to travel across India, and propagate Azad's claim to the title and take additional *bai'ahs* on his behalf. One such emissary was Mistri Muhammad Siddiq, a close companion of Mawdudi during the Daru'l-Islam days, one who influenced Mawdudi's thinking on the matter of organizational work greatly, and helped found the Jama'at. The notion of an omnipotent Amir-i Hind, enjoying the unwavering allegiance of his disciples later found echo in the organizational structure of the Jama'at, and the role and powers of the Amir therein.

Keen observer as he was, Mawdudi was not oblivious to the working of those Muslim organizations which had until that time enjoyed a measure of success. Tahrik-i Khaksar, led by 'Inayatu'llah Mashriqi was a major force in the Punjab at the time. An ardent communalist, Mashriqi was nevertheless, violently opposed to the Muslim League. Despite the tenuous nature of his stance, his organizational talents had managed to make the Khaksar a force to be reckoned with. The example of Mashriqi, and the modest popularity which his communalist and yet anti-Muslim League rhetoric enjoyed were, no doubt, not lost on Mawdudi. Nor was Mawdudi unaffected by the words and

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14 Rahman Siddiqi, "Mawlana Azad Awr Mawlana Mawdudi ki Mabain Ik Gumshudah Kari", in *Nida* (Lahore), (February 7-13, 1990), P.21.

15 For instance, while conceiving of the Jama'at, Mawdudi discussed his thoughts on the matter with Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan through a series of correspondences. Zafaru'l-Hasan's was then formulating plans of his own for a Muslim organization, to be called Shabbanu'l-Muslimin (Muslim Youth). Zafaru'l-Hasan's papers concerning this organization are kept in the archives of Idarah-i Thiqafat-i Islam in Lahore. For correspondences between Mawdudi and Zafaru'l-Hasan see for instance, *al-Ma'arif* (Lahore), 18:1-2 (April-May 1985), pp.249-50.

deeds of his arch-rival, Jinnah, whose counsel to the League at the time, emphasizing
solidarity, organization, morality and perseverance, could have been excerpts from
Mawdudi’s later proclamations on the Jama’at; consider the following address by Jinnah
for instance:

"...Organize yourselves, establish your solidarity and complete unity. Equip
yourselves as trained and disciplined soldiers...work loyally, honestly for the
cause of your people....There are forces which may bully you, tyrannize over
you and intimidate you....But it is by going through the crucible of fire of
persecution which may be levelled against you...it is by resisting...and
maintaining your true convictions and loyalty, that a nation will emerge,
worthy of its past glory and history...as a well-knit, solid, organized, united
force [the Musalmans] can face any danger, and withstand any
opposition..."17

While the foregoing do not ascertain influences from Jinnah or the Khaksar on Mawdudi’s
conception of the Jama’at, they point out the fact that, the idea of the Jama’at was born
at a time when similar experiments were under way. The Jama’at, therefore, far from a
unique idea, was very much a product of the community from which it emerged. In fact,
the Jama’at was born of a greater confluence of intellectual and historical forces and
models than has thus far been outlined. Some of these have roots in the Islamic tradition,
and some were incorporated from without Islam. The Jama’at, as it will become apparent
in this chapter, was as much a hybrid conception, and a force for modernization, as was
Mawdudi’s ideological corpus. Let us begin with a discussion of the traditional roots of
the Jama’at.

While the notion of an organization as the solution to the predicaments of the

Muslims may have had its roots in the Prophetic model, the structure and operation of the Jama'at was more distinctly influenced by Sufism and its organizational structure. The Sufi tariqah (path or order) is designed to foster the spiritual ascension of the seeker. The tariqah system not only governs the practices which facilitate spiritual ascension, but creates steadfast boundaries around the seeker, which affords him a respite from outside influences in his quest for greater concentration, learning and character-building. Sufism, moreover, demands of a novice a "conversion" - the declaration of a commitment to the spiritual path, and the surrendering of his soul to the guidance of the Sufi master (pir, murshid or shaikh), what is popularly known as sarsipurdagi (committed following). The initiation into Sufism often follows a bai'ah (oath of allegiance), which symbolizes and yet, confirms the seeker's commitment to his master. The bai'ah demands of a Sufi total submission and obedience to his master; for, the master holds the soul of the Sufi novice, guiding it through the maze of spiritual experiences and mundane travails to the realization of Absolute Truth - God. The tariqah is often centered around a khaniqah (where Sufis congregate and engage in meditations), where novices often took up residence in order to be close to their master.

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18 While each Sufi order has its own specific rules, the tariqah system is present in all expressions of Sufism. See, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sufi Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp.45-55.


While ambivalent towards the purpose of Sufism, in the *tariqah* system Mawdudi saw a valuable organizational model. In a revealing note in August 21, 1935, Mawdudi wrote,

"Sufis in Islam have a special form of organization...known as *khaniqah*. Today this has a bad image....But the truth is that it is the best institution in Islam....It is necessary that this institution be revived in India, and in various places small *khaniqahs* be established. Therein novices can read the most valuable religious sources, and live in a pure environment. This institution encompasses the functions of club, library and *ashram* [Hindu place of worship]...the entire scheme rests on selection of the *shaikh* (master)....At least I do not know of someone with all the qualifications....If this task is to be undertaken, India should be searched for the right person."21

Many elements of this laudatory description featured in the Jama‘at’s original blue-print, and in its early existence at Pathankot, 1942-47.

The *tariqah* system also placed great emphasis on the central role of the master, and on total submission to his example and ideas, something akin to Mawdudi’s conception of the role of the Amir in the Jama‘at. In a letter dated March 1941, some four months before the formation of the Jama‘at, Mawdudi compared membership in an "Islamic party" with taking a *bai’ah*, and placed great emphasis on the primacy of the overseer of such a party in its working.22 Many Jama‘at leaders have since lamented that,

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22 Reprinted in ‘Asim Nu’mani, ed., *Makatib-i Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1977), vol.2, pp.8-10; and *Mithaq* (Lahore), 39:3 (March 1990), pp.25-26. Mawdudi, however, made a face-saving distinction between his views and those of the Sufis by proclaiming that *bai’ah* in the Jama‘at was to the office of the Amir, and not to him personally, a fact which has permitted smooth transfer of power following the resignations of Mawdudi and Mian Tufayl from the office of Amir; see Nu’mani, *Makatib*, vol.2, P.14.
from inception Mawdudi deviated from the managerial duties which the Amir was supposed to perform, and instead, looked upon his relations with Jama'at members as that of a "murshid" (Sufi master) with his "murids" (committed Sufi followers). In fact, for some like Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, the prospects of taking a bai'ah, albeit not openly, and then with Mawdudi, was compelling enough a reason to leave the Jama'at. The specter of a murshid-murid relationship between Mawdudi and the Jama'at members, exceeding the mandates of an elected leader, as what Mawdudi expected his role in the organization to be, manifested itself more definitively during the Machchi Goth affair, which led to severe criticism of Mawdudi by Islahi.

The Jama'at’s organizational structure, however, also bore the influence of other sources, this time outside of the purview of Islam. There is little doubt for any observer of the Jama'at that, the organization is a modern phenomenon. Its structure, procedural methods, and pattern of growth reveal both a deep imprint of modern ideas, and a successful accommodation of modernization. It has managed to escape the blatant traditionalization which has reduced the Muslims League and the Pakistan People's Party into patrimonial and dynastic political institutions. The Jama'at has rather created operable mechanisms and a management system, which is qualitatively different from the

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23 Interview with Amin Ahsan Islahi, Lahore.

24 Interview with Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali Nadwi, Lucknow.

traditional structures of authority extant in South Asia. Moreover, although operating in a fractious political system, infested with politics of patronage, the Jama'at has retained its organizational structure, discipline, and ethos.

Yet, the modernity and modernizing impetus of the concept of the Jama'at has not been generic, but has a particular intellectual legacy which has determined the course and mode of operation of the organization. To be specific, Mawdudi's conception was influenced by European models at display in the 1930s - fascism, and more likely, communism. For Mawdudi, the Jama'at was not a "party" in the liberal democratic sense of the term - translating popular interests into policy positions - it was rather an "organizational weapon", devised to project the power of an ideological perspective in the political arena. While Mawdudi differed with Lenin in that he sought to utilize this "weapon" within a constitutional order, his understanding of its requisite structure and


27 Mawdudi was very much aware of these issues. In responding to charges leveled against the Jama'at and his role therein, he went to great lengths to justify the working of the Jama'at in terms of organizational models and systems of government in operation in the West; see Mawdudi's letter to Islahi, dated January 18, 1958, reprinted in Nida (Lahore), (March 7, 1989), P.31.

28 Adams Suggests that while Mawdudi was not enamored by the ideas of fascism, he was impressed by the efficacy of its organizational methods; see Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P.375.


30 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
political function closely paralleled that of Lenin.\textsuperscript{31}

Smith writes that, Lenin replaced the "party" for the working class, as the primary vehicle of revolution - "an elite vanguard without the intermediary of which the working class would be unable to gain political consciousness, and thence translate it into a revolutionary movement.\textsuperscript{32} The Leninist party worked on the principle of "democratic centralism", wherein "rank-and-file members [were] strictly subordinate to the leadership....decision making was to be "central" in formulation, with rank-and-file members copying out orders received, but that higher bodies were to be "democratically" accountable to the membership at periodic meetings."\textsuperscript{33} Propaganda, while designed to further the cause of the revolution, also acted to reinforce group solidarity within the party, which lay at the basis of its well-knit administrative organization and network of "cadres".\textsuperscript{34} As our discussion of the working of the Jama'at later in this chapter will elucidate, it is not difficult to find analogous parallels between the Leninist model and the Jama'at.

The apparent similitude between the two is, however, more than a matter of conjecture. Mawdudi, as alluded to earlier, was familiar with the communist literature, and

\textsuperscript{31} ibid; and Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrir-i Islami ka A'indah La'ihah-i 'Amal}, reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1986), pp.231-32. Khurshid Ahmad reiterates Mawdudi's argument that the role of the Jama'at is not to translate popular interest into policy, but to serve as a vehicle for attaining power for a preconceived ideology in the existing constitutional set-up.


\textsuperscript{33} ibid, pp.83-84.

\textsuperscript{34} Selznick, \textit{The Organizational Weapon}, pp.10-11.
true to his style, he keenly observed his adversaries, imbibing much from his readings on communism and analysis of working of communist movement active in India at the time. Mian Tufayl recollects a conversation with Mawdudi, wherein he commented, "no more than 1/100,000 of Indians are communist, and yet see how they fight to rule India; if Muslims who are 1/3 of India be shown the way, it will not be so difficult for them to be victorious." In later years erstwhile communists such as Sayyid As‘ad Gilani and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan joined the ranks of the Jama‘at, bringing with them additional insights into the working of communist organizations.

The concept of the Jama‘at, while born of Mawdudi’s understanding of the importance and paramountcy of the role of "organization" in ideological struggle and political action, was informed by a confluence of ideas borrowed from disparate intellectual traditions and organizational experiments. Mawdudi’s reading of these sources were reflected in the organizational design of the Jama‘at, the function which it has performed in the implementation of his ideas, and the role which it has thus far played in Pakistani politics.

The Working of the Jama‘at

The organizational structure and working of the Jama‘at has over the course of its

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35 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore. The Jama‘at’s awareness of the ways and means of the left became sharpened in the 1960s when the two were pitted in a bitter struggle for the soul of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). The Jama‘at recollects, Sayyid Munawwar Hasan gained many insights into the working of the leftist organizations in those years; see JVNAT, vol.2, pp.107-09.

36 Information on the background of the two Jama‘at leaders were gathered in interviews with them.
five decades of existence evolved substantially. The Jama'at organization initially consisted of the office of the Amir, the Central Majlis-i Shura', and the members (Arkan, sing. Rukn). This nucleus did not expand much during the first years of the Jama'at; the organization rather focused its attention on creating mechanisms to disseminate its literature, the most important of which was the *Tarjumanul-Qur'an* journal; expand its publications and education units at Pathankot, and give form to the Daru'l-'Urubiyah (Arabic Translation Bureau) which was established in Jullundar in 1942.37

Organizational changes in these early years, 1941-47, given the Jama'at's morale and discipline problems, essentially revolved around the membership and base of support of the organization. During this period the Jama'at divided its audience hierarchically, based on the extent of their commitment to the Jama'at. This pyramidal gradation began with the Muta'arif (those introduced to the Jama'at's message), and moved up to Muta'athir (those influenced by the Jama'at's message), Hamdard (sympathizer), and ended with Rukn (member). The first three categories had no official relations with the Jama'at, they helped relate the message of the Jama'at to greater numbers, and also served as a potential pool of new members.

This gradation was revised in 1950-51 with the objective of streamlining the Jama'at's organizational structure in preparation for the Punjab elections of 1951. The Muta'arif and Muta'athir categories were eliminated altogether, and a new category was added, that of Mutaffiq (ally or affiliate). Mutaffiqs stand higher in this hierarchy than

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37 *RIJ*, vol.1, pp.35-37. Also the Jama'at set-up a tax division on August 31, 1941, again with view to promoting the propaganda efforts; *ibid*, P.40.
Hamdards. They are, moreover, provided for in the constitution of the Jama‘at, and are therefore, bound by certain ethical norms, stipulated by the organization.\textsuperscript{38} The 1950-51 revision in the hierarchy of Jama‘at’s audience, tightened the control of the Jama‘at over those associated with it. Loose connections with those who had come into contact with the Jama‘at’s message, originally important to a movement with a missionary objective, was severed. The Jama‘at, instead, focused its attention on increasing commitment to the organization, strengthening its prowess and reach, and hence, enabling it to launch effective political campaigns. The Jama‘at’s decision also indicates that, it did not see political success in expansion of its popular base, which would have been possible through the extension of its loose connections with the electorate, but rather saw organizational power as the harbinger of political success.

The category of Mutaffiq was, moreover, in itself, a catalyst for greater politicization. Since 1941, the Jama‘at had been besieged with problems of morale and discipline. The organization had tightened its membership criteria through a number reform measures.\textsuperscript{39} Mawdudi had deemed these problems to be serious enough to devote a substantial part of the organization’s resources to safe-guarding against the breakdown of morale and discipline, and had pushed for the canonization of strict criteria for

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\textsuperscript{38} The Mutaffiq, is defined by Maryam Jameelah as one who favors an Islamic order, and supports the Jama‘at, but is not a member. The Mutaffiq is, however, under the Jama‘at’s supervision, and are organized into circles and clusters; see Maryam Jameelah, Islam in Theory and Practice (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), P.336.

\textsuperscript{39} RJI, vol.1, pp.45-56; and vol.2, pp.16-28. The Jama‘at placed greater emphasis upon knowledge of Islam for those become members, and prolonged the period of waiting before being accepted as a member.
\end{flushleft}
membership in 1945.\textsuperscript{40} Jama'at's greater concern with direct political activity, however, necessitated a more rapid expansion of the Jama'at's membership than possible under the standards stipulated by the organization. The Mutaffiq category in this regard, provided an outlet for the Jama'at. It incorporated greater numbers into the organizational network of the Jama'at without compromising the quality, calibre, and uniformity of ideas of its actual members. The Mutaffiq category also served the Jama'at with the means to observe, scrutinize, and indoctrinate potential members before accepting them, hence, reducing the problems of morale and discipline within the organization.

The issue of the role and contribution of the Mutaffiqs points to the centrality of the moral calibre of the membership of the Jama'at to the organization's aims and ability to strive in obtaining them.\textsuperscript{41} Membership in the Jama'at begins with a "conversion" to the organization's reading of Islam.\textsuperscript{42} Thenceforth, it demands of the member a total commitment to the decisions and objectives of the organization. The members form the core of the Jama'at, and give shape to its original vision of recreating the Muslim "ummah". The members are, therefore, encouraged to incorporate every aspect of their lives into the Jama'at, and the organization has expanded in order to facilitate this. Wives of members are encouraged to become involved in the women's wing of the Jama'at, and the children with the Jama'at's student wings or programs for children. Many Jama'at members are now employed by the organization, and those who work outside the

\textsuperscript{40} RJI, vol.3, pp.53-96; and vol.4, pp.37-40.

\textsuperscript{41} On Jama'at membership see, Malik, "Islamic Political Parties", pp.43-44.

\textsuperscript{42} RJI, vol.1, P.45.
organization are enjoined to participate in the organization's numerous labor and white-collar union outfits.\textsuperscript{43} Members often participate in "training" camps, which educate them in Jama'at's views, as well as train them in political work and methods of propaganda.\textsuperscript{44}

Organizational unity is also boosted through frequent meetings, at both the local and national levels. Every Jama'at unit hold weekly meetings, wherein personal, local and national issues are discussed, and every member reports a \textit{muhasibah} (account) of his weekly activity to his superiors.\textsuperscript{45} Since every local Jama'at unit is part of a larger unit, which consists of a number of those smaller units, and has meetings of its own, members may attend several meeting each week.\textsuperscript{46} The Jama'at sessions encourage discussion and airing of views, but once a decision is made all discussion ends, and the members are bound by it.\textsuperscript{47}

National level open meetings (\textit{ijtima'-i 'amm} - open session), meanwhile, act to

\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{44} The training camps were started soon after the Jama'at was formed, and were initially based in Pathankot. They were later supervised by 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan until 1957. Today, they are held across Pakistan, and act as a necessary first step for a member's initiation into the organization; interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, also see, \textit{JIKUS}, pp.38-41.

\textsuperscript{45} These accounts help the Jama'at control the private lives, and especially the religiosity of its members; interview with Aslam Salimi. If a member misses more than two of these meetings without a valid excuse he could be expelled from the Jama'at; see Jameelah, \textit{Islam in Theory}, P.337.

\textsuperscript{46} For instance a Rukn who is member of the Punjab Shura' may attend meetings of his neighborhood Jama'at, as well as those of the city of his domicile, as well as those of the provincial Jama'at.

\textsuperscript{47} See Article 10 of the constitution of the Jama'at, see \textit{Dastur-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan} (Lahore: Jama'at-i Islami, 1989).
promote solidarity among membership as a whole, and hence, underlines the corporatist identity of the organization. The Jama'at began holding provincial meetings across India from 1942 onwards, and held its first All-India organizational meeting in April 1945 at Pathankot.48 These meetings were held with regular frequency until the partition. In Pakistan, the tradition of national meetings continued. The Jama'at held its first national meetings in Lahore in May 1949 and in Karachi in November 1951.49 The extraordinary meeting at Machchi Goth was the most momentous of the Jama'at gatherings, which ceased altogether from 1958-62 due to the martial law ban on gatherings of this kind. In November 1989 the Jama'at for the first time in 42 years opened its national meeting to the general public, once again making use of the propaganda value which these meetings had for the organization in its early years.

Following its move to Pakistan, the Jama'at began to deepen its organizational structure, by reproducing the offices of Amir, Na'ib Amir, Majlis-i Shura', and the office of Qayyim (Secretary-General) (all of which will be discussed later on in this chapter), with some variations, at provincial, division, district, city, town/zone, and village/circle levels.50 The Jama'at structure became based on a series of concentric circles, relating

49 RJI, vol.6, P.43.
50 If the numbers of Jama'at members in a town be equal to the number required for forming a zone (halqah), that Jama'at unit will be defined with the boundaries of the town. Otherwise two or more towns may constitute one zone unit. The same holds true for village and circle units.

The following is based on information provided by the Office of the Qayyim Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore, and the Shu’bah-i Tanzim (Organization Bureau) of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.
the Jama'at's smallest unit, a Maqam (unit), consisting of two or more members,51 to the organization's national level command structure (see table 8.1).52 Each level is defined on the basis of the number of Jama'at members resident in it, and with view to the administrative topography of Pakistan. In the case of smaller Jama'at units, numbers may not warrant the formation of a Jama'at unit whose boundaries coincide with that of a village or a town. In such cases two or more villages may form one Jama'at circle (Halqah), and two or more towns one zone. In administrative terms, a circle unit features at the same level in the organization's hierarchy as a village unit, and a zone as a town. The Amir-Na'ib Amir-Shura'-Qayyim structure of authority as an administrative unit operates at each level, and is, by and large, formed at that level through elections.53 These circles envelope one another, producing an all-encompassing administrative and command structure, decentralized and yet closely knit to form the organizational edifice of the Jama'at.54 The working of each of the ingredients of the Jama'at's administrative and command structure, Amir, Na'ib Amir, Majlis-i Shura' and office of Qayyim should

51 A Maqam is the smallest Jama'at unit. However, since it is to small to have a structure of its own, it is encompassed by the next larger unit enveloping its geographical territory.

52 If a Maqam is too small it may not have a structure of authority of its own, and may be subservient to the next Jama'at unit, for example, village or town unit, or alternately several small maqams may form a district unit where Jama'at members are thinly distributed.

53 To gain a sense of the depth of this structure, one may point to the fact that in Punjab alone there are 30 Jama'at district level units, each with an Amir, Shura', and Qayyim.

54 The smaller units of the Jama'at, Zone and Circle could exist in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas they may encompass the whole of a district or locality, while in the cities they may encompass a neighborhood or city district.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>OFFICES</th>
<th>TERM (YRS) AMIR/SHURA'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All-Pakistan</td>
<td>Amir/Na‘ib/Amir/Shura’/Qayyim</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Amir/Na‘ib Amir/Shura’/Qayyim</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Amir/Na‘ib Amir/Shura’/Qayyim</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Amir/Na‘ib Amir/Shura’/Qayyim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Amir/Shura’/Qayyim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/Zone</td>
<td>Amir/Shura’**/Qayyim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village/Circle</td>
<td>Amir/Qayyim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Office of Qayyim of Jama‘at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore. **Shura’ is only convened when there are 20 or more Jama‘at members present at that level.
be considered in turn.

The Office of the Amir

The office of the Amir was the first administrative unit created in the Jama‘at, and has remained the most important position of authority in the organization,

"Islam is none other than jama‘at (organization), and jama‘at is none other imarat (office of Amir)."\(^{55}\)

Originally the Amir was elected by the Central Shura’ through a simple majority vote. Based on the provisions of the 1956 reforms to the constitution of the Jama‘at, he is now elected by Jama‘at members, and his term of office is fixed at five years, with no limits existing on the number of terms he may be elected to the office.\(^{56}\) A select committee of the Central Shura’ chooses three candidates, whose names are then put before the members, who in turn, send in their secret ballots to the Secretariat of the Jama‘at. A Controller of Elections (Nazim-i Intikhabat) is appointed to oversee the process. List of candidates must be put forth by the Shura’ 60 days before the elections, and members must register to vote 90 days prior to the date of the elections.\(^{57}\)

The Amir is constitutionally bound by a set of checks and balances which following the Machchi Goth affair, have streamlined the operation of his office. All doctrinal issues

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\(^{55}\) From speech delivered by Mawdudi before the Jama‘at’s opening session in 1941, cited in *RJI*, vol.1, P.25.

\(^{56}\) Article 13 of the Jama‘at constitution contend with the criteria for election of the Amir, and articles 17-19 with his role in the organization, see the *Dastur*.

\(^{57}\) Jameelah, *Islami in Theory*, pp.338-40. It can be argued that this system always favors the incumbent, as the Jama‘at is unlikely to unseat one who serves more than the administrative head of the organization, and is implicitly its religious leader. No Amir has to date been voted out of office. Each transition has followed the resignation of an Amir.
are to be determined by the Shura’. Should the Amir disagree with the Shura’ on any issue, he has a right to veto, thereby referring the matter back to the Shura’. Should the Shura’ return the same verdict, it is then binding on the Amir, who can either accept the decision of the Shura’ or resign. The Amir can be impeached by a 2/3 majority of the vote of the Shura’.

In budgetary and administrative matters the Amir is bound by the decisions of the Majlis-i ‘Amilah (Executive Council), whose members he appoints. The Amir, moreover, oversees the operation of the Jama’at Secretariat - "bureaucracy". This model is replicated at each level of the Jama’at to the extent possible. Each lower level Amir is elected by the members of his constituency to terms varying between 1 and 3 years depending on the level of the Jama’at in question. These Amirs are similarly bound by the decisions of their Shura’s. The lower level Amirs also oversee the working of the office of their Qayyims. However, lower level Qayyims are also accountable to the Jama’at’s national level Qayyim, which reduces the autonomy of the lower level Amirs, reducing the purview of their activities to administrative affairs.

The working of the office of the Amir, at all levels in the Jama’at, and notably at the national level, has been fully institutionalized based on the organization’s constitutional code. The erratic eruption at Machchi Goth proved to be a transient aberration, in an otherwise uneventful and orderly history of this office. The constitutional mechanisms governing the operation of the office of the Amir have proven their efficacy in practice and staying power, as they have steered the Jama’at through two succession periods, from Mawdudi to Mian Tufayl Muhammad in 1972, and from Mian Tufayl to
Qazi Husain Ahmad in 1987. The orderly transfer of power from one Amir to another - which stands in sharp contrast to transition of power in other Pakistani parties such as the PPP and the Muslim League - has, moreover, confirmed the primacy of constitutional edicts in the conduct of the Jama'at, and guaranteed the continuity of the organization's institutional values and the entrenchment of its modernizing impetus despite changes in the leadership. The successions also point to the working of the Jama'at's internal dynamics in the face of outside pressures in determining the direction of the development of the organization.

Succession of Amirs: The Deciding Factors

Following Jama'at's defeat at the polls in 1970-71, in an organizational meeting in Lahore on January 10, 1971, a group of Jama'at members, led by Sayyid Munawwar Hasan (later Amir of Karachi), launched into tirade against Mawdudi. They argued that the Jama'at had been routed at the polls because of Mawdudi's persona. Old and taciturn, Mawdudi had relinquished the limelight to the more energetic and charismatic Bhutto.59 Similar views were related to the editors of Tarjumanul-Qur'an by other Jama'at members and supporters during the following months.60 Implicit in these venting of frustrations was a demand for a new leader at the helm of the Jama'at. Shortly then after, on February 19, 1972, Mawdudi suffered a mild heart attack and decided to step down as the

58 The date of meeting is cited in A'in (Lahore), (April 25, 1985), P.6.

59 Interviews.

60 TQ, (June-August 1971).

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Amir of the Jama‘at. Mawdudi informed the Central Shura’ of the Jama‘at of his decision. The Shura’ recommended Mian Tufayl Muhammad (then Qayyim of the Jama‘at), Ghulam A’zam (later the Amir of Jama‘at-i Islami of Bangladesh), and Khurshid Ahmad (a long time disciple of Mawdudi) as candidates for the office of the Amir. On November 2, 1972, Mian Tufayl was elected Amir of the Jama‘at.

Neither of those named by the Shura’ qualified as charismatic leaders, least of all Mian Tufayl Muhammad, the choice of the Jama‘at members for the office of the Amir. The Jama‘at’s choice appeared to have been governed by more pressing concerns than those posed by the organization’s "Young Turks". The Jama‘at had been greatly disappointed by its performance in the elections; it now faced a belligerent opponent in the Bhutto government; and with the secession of East Pakistan, the country’s politics seemed more volatile than ever. By choosing a loyal lieutenant of Mawdudi, an administrator rather than a political maverick, the organization thus opted for continuity and stability. The organization’s search for a more charismatic Amir, although still an issue to be contended with, was postponed to a later time.


62 *Rudad-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, 1972* (Lahore: Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, nd.), pp.12-13. Mian Tufayl (b. 1914) had joined the Jama‘at in 1941, served as the Qayyim of the organization, 1942-72, and for a period as Na‘ib Amir (Vice-Amir), and Qa‘im Maqam Amir (Deputy Amir), see *Zindagi* (Lahore), (November 10-16, 1989), P.60.

63 Ghulam A’zam, however, enjoyed a following among the younger Jama‘at members, and those who had clamored for a more charismatic leadership. Interview with Javid Ahmadu‘l-Ghamidi, Lahore.

64 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

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The choice of Mian Tufayl, however, bore other implications as well. He was not an effective politician, nor able to project or assert the powers vested in the office of the Amir. Following his election to the office, a good deal of the Amir’s powers, retained by Mawdudi, were ceded to other organs and institutional bodies of the Jama’at, and the authority in the organization became more decentralized. Independent leaders and constituencies emerged within the Jama’at, further disseminating the powers of the Amir. Constitutional procedures became even more visibly entrenched, and the Shura’, as the original source of authority in the Jama’at, once again asserted its powers and primacy.

Mian Tufayl’s 15 years (three terms) at the helm of the Jama’at, to the chagrin of those who had wished to reinvigorate the organization’s idealism and chiliastic zeal, further routinized and institutionalized the Jama’at’s idealism.65

A different set of concerns controlled the elections of Qazi Husain Ahmad to the office of Amir on October 15, 1987. After a brief surge in the Jama’at’s popularity in the 1970s, the Ziya years had eclipsed the political fortunes of the Jama’at. The routinization of the organization’s idealism during the term of office of Mian Tufayl had occurred in tandem with the increasing marginalization of the Jama’at in the political sphere, and as a result, great dissension within the Jama’at regarding its policies and performance. Aging, and increasingly under criticism, Mian Tufayl resigned from the office of Amir, paving the way for the rise of a new generation to the leadership of the Jama’at. The Shura’ selected three candidates for the office of Amir: Khurshid Ahmad, Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi (Amir

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65 Mian Tufayl has reflected on his three terms as Amir in an interview with Haftrozah Zindagi (Lahore), (November 10-16, 1989), pp.59-61.
of Sind) and Qazi Husain Ahmad (then Qayyim of the Jama'at). The first two were conservative leaders in the tradition of Mawdudi and Mian Tufayl, while Qazi Husain possessed a populist style and a good rapport with younger and politically more active Jama'at members. The Jama'at chose Qazi Husain (b.1938) as Amir, responding to the need felt by many in the organization, both among the younger generation members and the conservative old guard, that after much focus on institutionalization and continuity, the Jama'at needed a force to propel it in new directions and to invigorate its political potential. Qazi Husain had been responsible for creating an important constituency for the Jama'at in the N.W.F.P. province, which today elects a notable share of the Jama'at's national and provincial assembly members. It was hoped he could do the same for the Jama'at at the national level.

Qazi Husain, moreover, was of the unique quality of appealing to both category of voters in the Jama'at, the conservative as well as those favoring change. As the Jama'at's liaison with the Ziya government in the Afghan Jihad he was favored by the pro-Ziya conservative faction, while his populist style and call for restoration of democracy

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66 Qazi Husain Ahmad came from a family with a strong Deobandi heritage. His two elder brothers are Deobandi 'ulama, and his father was a devotee of Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani of JUH. Qazi Husain Ahmad, putatively, was named after that great JUH leader. Qazi Husain's Deobandi ties have done much to create linkages between the Jama'at and the Deobandi 'ulama of N.W.F.P. on the one hand, and their followers on the other.

He became acquainted with the Jama'at through the IJT, and joined the Jama'at in 1970.

67 Since his early years with the Jama'at Qazi Husain had been in charge of the organization's propaganda work in Afghanistan, and had developed ties with such Afghan Mujahidin leaders as Gulbabin Hikmatyar, see Khurram Badr, Qazi Husain Ahmad (Saba Publications, 1988), pp.10-12.
endeared him to the younger generation who wanted the Jama‘at to reorient its political stance by distancing itself from the Ziya government.\textsuperscript{68} The election of Qazi Husain was based on a different confluence of internal dynamics and external pressures than those which led to the election of Mian Tufayl, both of which this time pushed the Jama‘at towards a politically sagacious choice - to elect a more assertive and populist Amir.\textsuperscript{69} Qazi Husain is the first Jama‘at leader to hold a national political office while Amir, he has been a Senator in the Pakistani parliament since 1985. The institutionalization of the Jama‘at’s idealism, the replacement of its chiliasm with pragmatic politics, and the entrenchment of constitutional procedures, however, have gone far enough to preclude a reassertion of the powers of the Amir in lieu of established norms. Qazi Husain’s populist charisma, to date, has been more clearly directed at swaying the Pakistani electorate than asserting his powers over the rank and file of the Jama‘at.

\textbf{The Office of Na‘ib Amir}

The Jama‘at has over the years instituted a "vice-presidency" in its organizational structure. Twice in Jama‘at’s history the organization appointed a Qa‘im Maqam Amir (Deputy Amir), Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad and Mian Tufayl Muhammad. The office was an interim measure, designed to fill the lacuna left by the absence of the Amir on each occasion. More important has been the office of Na‘ib Amir (Vice-Amir). Three Na‘ib Amirs were selected by the founding members of the Jama‘at in 1941. The three,

\textsuperscript{68} Qazi Husain’s humility has been very popular with younger Jama‘at members, and so has his emphasis on the poverty of his family; see, \textit{ibid}, pp.18-19.

\textsuperscript{69} The dynamics of the Jama‘at’s relations with the Ziya regime and the role which the election of Qazi Husain played therein will be fully considered in chapter 5.
Amin Ahsan Islahi, Sayyid Sibghatu'llah Madrasi, and Sayyid Ja'far Phulwari (all of whom eventually left the Jama'at) were chosen by the powerful Shura' at the time, mainly to ensure that Mawdudi remained a *primus inter pares*. After the latter two Na‘ib Amirs left the Jama‘at in 1942, the office fell into desuetude. The title was on occasion conferred on Islahi and Mian Tufayl, again to give them additional executive powers in the absence of Mawdudi.

In 1976, however, the office was reintroduced to the Jama‘at with a new objective in mind. In that year ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi and Khurshid Ahmad were appointed Na‘ib Amirs, and each was given a specific area of Jama‘at activities to oversee. The Na‘ib Amirs, chosen by the Amir, and approved by the Central Shura’ exist only at the national level. The reintroduction of this office was a feature of decentralization of power during the tenure of office of Mian Tufayl. It rationalized the Jama‘at’s organizational structure by sequestering its activities into separate units, and delegating authority to Na‘ib Amirs who would oversee those units. The office of Na‘ib Amir also served to accommodate both the rising generation of Jam‘at leaders with high office, and bring the increasing number of Jama‘at’s peripheral activities and affiliated bodies under the central command of the organization, both of which has helped ease inter-organizational tensions.

In 1987 the offices of Na‘ib Amirs was formalized, the boundaries of their activities were more clearly defined, gaining constitutional sanction by the Shura’. Their number,

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moreover, was increased in that year to five. The five are today, ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad (in charge of relations with other political parties), Khurshid Ahmad (in charge of the Teachers Union and Senate and Parliamentary affairs), Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi (in charge of the operations of the Mansurah compound), Khurram Jah Murad (liaison with IJT), and Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi (in charge of relations with ‘ulama).72 The office of Na’ib Amir, in view of its role in the continued institutionalization of the Jama‘at, has become established as a component of the Jama‘at’s command structure.

The Majlis-i Shura’

After the office of Amir, the Majlis-i Shura’73 is the most important pillar of the Jama‘at’s organizational structure. It governs the evolution and implementation of the Jama‘at’s ideology, and oversees the working of the organization’s constitution.74 The functions of the Central Shura’ are, by an large, replicated by the lower level Shura’s, but they do not have the same significance as the Central Shura’. Members of Shura’s at all levels are elected. Each represents a Jama‘at constituency, geographically defined by the Jama‘at Secretariat. These constituencies, drawn-up by the Jama‘at’s Election Commissioner (Nazim-i Intikhabat), whenever the numbers permit, coincide with the electoral

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72 The duties of the Na’ib Amirs are not constitutionally fixed, and are assigned by the Amir.

73 The Central Shura’ is officially known as the Markazi Majlis-i Shura’ (Central Council Session) in distinction to the local Shura’s.

74 Articles 20-33 of the Jama‘at constitution outlines the extent of the powers and mode of operation of the Shura’; see Dastur.

At the lower levels, the Shura’ functions more as weekly forum for Jama‘at members, wherein religious, social and political matters are discussed, and the daily affairs of individual members is examined.
division of Pakistan. A Shura' member, meanwhile, must be a resident of his constituency.

In its early years the Central Shura' consisted of 12 members. In anticipation of the Punjab elections of 1951, the membership of the Central Shura' was increased to 16.\textsuperscript{75} As part of the constitutional reforms which followed Machchi Goth, the membership of the Central Shura' was increased to 50.\textsuperscript{76} That number was again increased to 60 in 1972, giving greater representation to the increasing numbers of Jama'at members. In 1989, every Central Shura' member represented approximately 100 Jama'at members. The increase in size has vested greater powers in the Central Shura', and yet reduced the prominence of its members, which was one of the reasons Mawdudi increased their numbers following the Machchi Goth affair. In similar vein, the legislative power of the Shura' is kept in check as the Amir, Na'ib Amirs, Qayyim, and provincial Amirs also attend Shura' sessions and as \textit{ex-officio} members have the right to vote.\textsuperscript{77} The number of these extra-Shura' votes can tally to 12, 1/5 of the Shura’ votes and 1/6 of the total votes cast. Should the Shura’ become dead-locked on an issue, the vote of the Amir will count as two, a clear sign of the primacy of the Amir over the Central Shura’.

The Central Shura’ meets once or twice a year, and may be called by the Amir or a majority of its members should its meeting be deemed necessary. The Central Shura’ reviews the affairs of the Jama'at, and determines the future course of the organization. It has some 10 sub-committees which specialize in different areas of the Jama'at's

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{75} \textit{RJI}, vol.6, P.154.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Interview with Aslam Salimi, Lahore.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Regular members of the Jama'at may attend sessions of the Shura’ with the permission of the Amir, but have no right of speech or vote.
\end{itemize}

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activities, providing the whole Shura' with policy positions. It is moreover, the Central Shura', which is vested with the power to exercise *ijtihad*, when and if there exist no precedent for the ruling under consideration in religious sources. The power of *ijtihad* enables the Central Shura' to decide on, and clarify, doctrinal matters. While issues are openly debated in the Shura', verdicts, however, are not handed down by majority vote only. The Shura', especially regarding doctrinal matters, works through consensus. The majority opinion must convince the minority of its wisdom, leaving no doubts regarding the course on which the Jama'at embarks. In 1970 Mawdudi reported that in its 29 years of activity the Central Shura' had given a majority opinion on only 4 occasions, the most renowned of which was a prelude to Machchi Goth. Otherwise the Central Shura' had, time after time, given unanimous verdicts.\(^7^8\) Since Machchi Goth, moreover, many executive decisions are put before the 22 member Majlis-i 'Amilah, hand-picked by the Amir from among the members of the Central Shura'. This smaller council steers the Jama'at through most of its activities while the Central Shura' is not in session.

**The Office of the Qayyim and the Working of the Jama'at Secretariat**

The actual working of the Jama'at, meanwhile, revolves around its organizational machine, the "bureaucracy" of the Jama'at centered in its Secretariat. The office of the Qayyim was created in 1941; since then, it has grown in powers to become something akin to that of a "party boss". The concept of a "party worker", meanwhile, was introduced to the Jama'at in 1944, when the organization set up special training camps in Pathankot to

\(^7^8\) *JIKUS*, P.42.
train its "personnel". With the growth of the Jama'at in size and the expansion of the purview of its activities, the workers became an increasingly important element in the organization. From 1947 onwards they were centered in Lahore under the direction of the office of the Qayyim, who is appointed by the Amir in consultation with the Central Shura'. Over the years, not only has the size of the central Secretariat increased, but it has reproduced itself at lower levels in the Jama'at, creating an administrative command structure which extends from the center to the smallest unit, paralleling the command structure under the control of the Amir.

The Jama'at's numerous publications are also controlled by the bureaucratic element, the scope of the activities of which not only increases their hold on the Jama'at, but gives them a say in the organization's political stance (see table 8.2). The importance of this bureaucratic force, as discussed earlier, was evident as early as the 1950s. Its subsequent rise to prominence in the organization can be seen in the fact that both Mian Tufayl and Qazi Husain moved to the office of Amir directly from that of Qayyim. Similarly, members of the bureaucracy often are also members of the Shura' at various levels, augmenting the power of the central bureaucratic machine in the decision-making bodies of the organization, and precluding the kind of autonomy of legislative activity which led to the Machchi Goth affair.

In the 1970s, following the defeat at the polls, and with an Amir at the helm who pushed to further institutionalize Jama'at's idealism into distinct norms and procedures, the Jama'at Secretariat grew further. The number of workers trained to serve the

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79 RJI, vol.6, pp.131-32.
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<th>NAME</th>
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<th>FREQUENCY</th>
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<td>daily</td>
<td>7/25/48</td>
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*Source: Archives of Idarah-i Ma‘arif-i Islami, Lahore.
**Published by the women’s wing.
+Published in English.
++The official daily of the Jama‘at.
P.S. Some of these publications have either ceased to appear in print or are no longer associated with the Jama‘at. The Jama‘at also has publications in Arabic for consumption outside of Pakistan which are not cited here.
Secretariat steadily increased. In 1979 a permanent training camp for workers was established at Jama‘at headquarters in Lahore, and in 1980 alone the Jama‘at trained 2800 new workers. The Jama‘at’s considerable financial resources since the 1970s, has further, permitted the organization to hire these workers, expanding the size and importance of its bureaucratic force. An increasing share of those joining the growing bureaucracy come from the ranks of IJT alumni, who are educated in modern subjects, and share close bonds with each other since their university days. The ethos and organizational bonds of this younger generation has acted to further strengthen the position of the bureaucratic element in the Jama‘at.

The bureaucratic structure of the Jama‘at has, moreover, been duplicated in the organization’s relatively new (1950s) and thriving women’s wing (Halqah-i Khawatin). The Jama‘at women, some %70 of whom come from families wherein a male family member belongs to the Jama‘at, have no Amir of their own. They, however, have a

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80 Rudad, 1972, P.17.

81 ISIT(2), P.44. Of the 2800, 1411 were trained in Punjab, 593 in NWFP, 375 in Sind, and 243 in other Pakistani provinces and administrative areas.

82 All workers of the Jama‘at are paid for their services. Office holders such as Amir, Na‘ib Amirs or Shura’ members receive no pay from the Jama‘at for their work. They, however, may serve in other paying capacities in the Jama‘at. In the case of Qazi Husain, his thriving business in Peshawar has helped resolve the question of monetary compensation for his services.

83 Jama‘at regulations stipulate that IJT members or affiliates must wait for a period of six months at the least before joining the hierarchy of members and associates of the Jama‘at.

84 The information on the women’s wing were obtained in an interview which this author and Shahla Haeri conducted with Aslam Salimi, Lahore.
Central Shura' and an office of Qayyimah (Secretary-General). Their headquarters are situated at the Mansurah compound, wherefrom the working of Nazimah (organizers) of lower level units are supervised. The women's wing is primarily concerned with propagation of Jama'at literature and ideas among Pakistani women through their periodicals, the most important of which is Batul. The women's wing also seeks to further incorporate Jama'at families into a single Jama'at community by appealing directly to the wives and daughters of Jama'at members, and by educating women in bringing up their children with view to the teachings of the Jama'at.

The Jama'at Secretariat also oversees the working of specialized departments, the number and duties of which change depending on the needs of the organization. These departments perform special services for the Jama'at. In 1989-90 they were, the Departments of Finance, Worker training, Social Services and Welfare, Theological Institutions, Press Relations, Elections, Public Affairs, Parliamentary Affairs, and Jama'at's Organizational Affairs. Each department is headed by a Nazim (Head or Organizer) appointed by the Amir. The departments are responsible to the Qayyim, and at times to a Na'ib Amir.

The increasing bureaucratization of the Jama'at is clearly manifested in the central role of the organization’s Secretariat and workers in its community/headquarter

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85 Information provided by the office of the Qayyim of Jama'at-i Islami. The working of some of these departments in earlier years are described in Malik, "Islamic Parties", pp.39-40, and Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp.77-78. The two sources cite departments which today no longer exist, and conversely there are today departments which had not existed at the time of their studies.
compound, Mansurah, located on the outskirts of Lahore. The Jama'at was since inception based on the idea of recreating a model Islamic ummah. However, following the organization's relatively short stay (1942-47) in Pathankot, Jama'at members had not been able to again gather in one location in sizeable numbers.\textsuperscript{86} The establishment of a community/headquarters complex had, however, remained a goal of the Jama'at.

The land for the Mansurah compound was purchased in 1968, and construction on it began in 1972.\textsuperscript{87} The funding came from private donations to the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{88} The Jama'at began to move its offices to Mansurah in 1974. The complex has since grown to include a small living area consisting of housing complexes, where many Jama'at leaders reside; the central offices of the Jama'at secretariat, and those of some of its numerous affiliated bodies: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islami (Islamic Research Academy), Sayyid Mawdudi International Education Institute, Office of Adult Education, Idarah-i Sida-i Islam,\textsuperscript{89} and Daru'l-Urubiyyah (Arabic Translation Bureau), Kisan Board (Jama'at's peasants union), the 'Ulama Academy; the offices of Jama'at-i Islami of Punjab; schools, libraries, a

\textsuperscript{86} In 1943-44 the Jama'at had purchased land in the Attock District near Rawilpindi for purposes of constructing a community/headquarters. The plan never materialized. In the mid-1960s the Jama'at once again considered this idea; interview with Sayyid As'ad Gilani, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Rudad, 1972}, P.13.

\textsuperscript{88} The largest source of contribution for the construction of the complex was an Eritrean entrepreneur resident in Europe by the name of Nasiru'ddin; interview Khwaja Amanu'llah, Lahore. The mosque at the complex was a gift from the government of Kuwait, see Saulat, \textit{Maulana Maududi}, pp.98-99.

\textsuperscript{89} Idarah-i Sada-i Islam (Bureau of the Voice of Islam) was inspired by the Iranian revolution, and concentrates on disseminating Jama'at literature and propaganda through distribution of cassette and video recordings.
mosque and a hospital.\textsuperscript{90}

The depth and breadth of the Jama'at's organizational structure stands as testimony to the routinization and institutionalization of the movement and its idealism, and the greater preponderance of "legal-rational" mode of authority in its working. The sheer weight of the Jama'at's organizational machine, and regularized mechanisms which govern its working, preclude the possibility of anomie, but nudge the organization towards greater assertion of its power in the political arena. The Jama'at organizational model - the Amir-Shura'-Qayyim administrative and command networks stretching from the top of the organization to its smallest units - has proven so efficacious that it has become an example for others to emulate. Jama'at rivals from 'ulama parties to Israr Ahmad's Tanzim-i Islami and Tahiru'l-Qadri's Minhaju'l-Qur'an, with some changes in titles and functions, have reproduced it in their own organizations part and parcel, as has the secular ethnic Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM).\textsuperscript{91}

The Finances of the Jama'at

The size of the Jama'at "bureaucracy", and the scope of its activity bring any observer to the question of the organization's finances.\textsuperscript{92} The Jama'at's total founding

\textsuperscript{90} As an indication of the size of Mansurah, in 1989-90, according to the estimate of the Election Commission of Pakistan in Islamabad, the compound had some 4,000 eligible voters. Figure provided by the Election Commission.

\textsuperscript{91} This author's examination of Minhaju'l-Qur'an and Tanzim-i Islami revealed uncanny resemblances with the Jama'at model. Israr Ahmad had been a member of the Jama'at, as have many of the leaders of the MQM.

\textsuperscript{92} All budgetary matters are handled by the Department of Finance, are overseen by the office of the Qayyim, and are reported to the Shura', as are all of the organization's expenditures.
capital was Rs.74. The income at the end of 1942, mainly from the sale of books and literature, was Rs.17,005. This figure rose to Rs.78,700 in 1947, and 198,714 in 1951, a ten time rise in a period of 10 years. The Jama'at's income, from sale of books, and increasingly from voluntary contributions and zakat (obligatory religious tax or alms) payments by supporters and members, continued to grow at a steady pace throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. The purview of the Jama'at's activities, however, had grown at equal if not faster rate than its income during this period, hence, ensuring a subsistence level existence for the organization. It was not until the 1970s that the fortunes of the Jama'at turned for the better.

The rise of Prime Minister Bhutto and his left-leaning Pakistan Peoples Party to power in 1971, and the Jama'at's open and virulent opposition to it, brought new sources of financial support to the assistance of the Jama'at. The Pakistani comparador elite, threatened by PPP's nationalization policy, the lower middle class Pakistani's whom Bhutto alienated with his socialist rhetoric and open display of moral laxity, and the Muhajir community which began to feel the threat of Sindhi nationalism, all began to

93 RJI, vol.1, P.84.
94 ibid, P.77.
95 RJI, vol.5, P.92; and vol.6, P.168.
96 Between 1941 and 1945 the income of the Jama'at stood at Rs.73119, Rs.42573 came from the sale of books, Rs.19531 from outside help to the Jama'at, and Rs.5118 from zakat donations; see RJI, vol.3, pp.50-52.
97 The organization's financial resources during these years were so meager at this time that, it relied on the sale of the skin of animals sacrificed during the Muslim 'Idu'l-Azha' to raise funds for its activities; see Freeland Abbott, "The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan", in The Middle East Journal, 11:1 (Winter 1957), pp.44-45.
invest money in anti-PPP forces, one of the most prominent of which was the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{98} Foreign government's - especially the monarchies of the Persian Gulf Trucial States, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - wary of Pakistan's turn to the left also began supplying funds to forces which could provide an ideological break to the spread of socialism, and to bog down Bhutto in domestic crises; again the Jama'at became a major recipient of these contributions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a decade later, merely increased the flow of funds from these concerned Persian Gulf sources.

The Jama'at's own connections with Saudi 'ulama went a long way in convincing the Persian Gulf donors of the wisdom of their cause, and moreover, made the Jama'at the main beneficiary of the funds that Persian Gulf states earmarked for Islamic activities across the Muslim world. In fact, the Jama'at's ideological affinity with the Wahhabi Sunnis of the Persian Gulf states, the Jama'at's earlier ties with Saudi authorities, and the organization's considerable reach across the Muslim world made them a convenient agent for the management of these funds and their distribution.\textsuperscript{99} The Jama'at's international activities became increasingly intertwined with those of the Saudi-based Rabitah 'Alam-i

\textsuperscript{98} The Jama'at, for instance received sizeable contributions from the Adamjee business house in this period, while the Jam'i'at workers recollect that they would fulfill their weekly quotas for collection of donations from shopkeepers in Lahore (I'anat) in half a days time. Interviews, Lahore and Karachi.

\textsuperscript{99} The Jama'at's ties with the Saudis go as far back as the 1950s, when Mawdudi's Arabic translations gained him respect among Saudi 'ulama, and the country's rulers King Saud and King Faisal. The former paid Rs.3000 from his own personal funds to finance Mawdudi's trip to Saudi Arabia in 1959-60; \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.77-78. In 1963 Mawdudi got permission from Saudi authorities for the cloth covering the Kābah (the kiswa) to be made in Lahore rather than in Cairo, and in 1965 he became a founder and member of Board of Governors of Medina University; \textit{ibid}, pp.77-99.
Islami, which has overseen the Saudi relations with various Islamic organizations from Indonesia to Morocco. The Jama'at's international influence, in good measure, grew through the aegis of the Rabitah. Saudi Arabia financed the establishment of a Jama'at research institute in England, The Islamic Foundation, where the Jama'at literature is published and disseminated in large quantities across the Muslim world. Ties with Jama'at-i Islami's elsewhere in South Asia were strengthened, as were relations with disparate Islamic movements across the Muslim world. The Rabitah also helped increase the Jama'at's leverage in its dealings with Pakistani governments, as numerous projects funded by Persian Gulf states in Pakistan such as, the International Islamic University in Islamabad, or the lucrative management of the flow of funds and arms to the Afghan Mujahidin, were opened to Jama'at's influence. The flow of funds to the Jama‘at from Saudi and other Persian Gulf sources, however, has not guaranteed a commitment on the part of the organization to its financial patrons. The Jama‘at’s decision to support Iraq in the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-91, and the organization’s open derision of Saudi Arabia as a decadent lackey of American imperialism, has significantly effected the

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100 The Islamic Foundation's potential, however, extends beyond propaganda work. In 1988-89 it was instrumental in securing funds from Saudi Arabia for initiating wide-scale protests in England against Salman Rushdi's novel *Satanic Verses*, which culminated in agitations in Pakistan, and an international diplomatic imbroglio. Fa'izu’ddin Ahmad of the Islamic Foundation, in fact was one of the initiators of the entire campaign. Following the publication of *Satanic Verses*, he circulated numerous photocopies of passages from Rushdie's book in England, and travelled to Saudi Arabia to secure funding for the anti-Rushdie campaigns; interviews in London and Islamabad, also cited in *Kayhan* (London), No.239 (November 23, 1989), P.12.

101 Some of these projects, especially the funding and supply of the Afghan Mujahidin, established ties between the Jama'at and the security organs of the Pakistani state, notably, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
organization’s relations with the Persian Gulf states, and is likely to seriously effect this fecund rapport.

Meanwhile, the considerable rise in the number of Pakistani migrant workers in the Persian Gulf states in the 1970s, translated into larger voluntary contributions and zakat payments to the Jama'at, as well as even closer ties between the organization and the migrant workers' hosts and employers in the Persian Gulf states. Similar flow of funds to the Jama'at coffers has followed the rise in number of Pakistani migrants to the U.S., many of whom are former alumni of IJT.102 These financial links, and especially rewards for stemming the tide of Bhuttoism, in turn influenced the Jama'at's outlook on a number of issues. It made the organization more staunchly anti-Bhutto and opposed to socialism in the 1970s, blinding its eyes to the importance of populist politics in Pakistan. The anti-socialist activism provided the Jama'at with greater international renown and financial rewards, diverting the organization's attention from the realities of their political choices in Pakistan, especially after the fall of Prime Minister Bhutto. The free flow of funds also dampened the resolve of the Jama'at, damaged their hard-earned discipline and morale, and gave Jama'at members a false sense of achievement and confidence which proved to be ephemeral. In similar vein, these ties determined the Jama'at's stance on a host of religiopolitical issues in Pakistan and in the Muslim world at large. Notable in this regard was the influence of the Persian Gulf connection in determining the ideological and political response of the Jama'at to other expressions of Islamic revivalism. For instance, the straining of relations between the Jama'at and the Islamic Republic of Iran

102 Interviews.
is directly correlated with Iran’s relations with the Persian Gulf states. The Jamaʿat’s Affiliate Organizations

Outside of the official boundaries of the Jamaʿat’s organizational structure exist a host of affiliate, semi-autonomous, and allied institutions, which extend the reach of the Jamaʿat far beyond that which is expected of the organization itself. Despite the decentralized appearance of this arrangement, there exists little doubt about the control of the Jamaʿat over the operation of this ostensible confederate arrangement. At first glance, one can conclude that the decentralized and yet, centrally controlled nature of Jamaʿat’s extended affiliation increase the power and reach of the organization considerably. Beyond the operational efficacy, however, there existed political motivations of more immediate nature which have pushed the Jamaʿat to sequester certain areas of its activities, and to relegate authority to autonomous bodies, in order to manage them.

No sooner had Pakistan been established that the Jamaʿat was declared a pariah entity by the government, and the country’s civil service, a primary target of the Jamaʿat’s propaganda was forbidden from any contacts with the organization. The Jamaʿat was thus compelled to set up institutional bodies which were sufficiently distant from the Jamaʿat to permit them to surreptitiously do its bidding without the fear of government retribution. During the Ayub Khan era these problems were compounded. The Jamaʿat and all operations which were officially or legally associated with it were banned. The Jamaʿat found it wise to divest itself of some of its key subsidiary organs in order to guarantee the continuity of the organization. Noteworthy in this regard was the

103 See chapter 11 for greater detail on this issue.
establishment of the Islamic Publications, LTD. in Lahore in 1963, which has subsequently become the main publisher of the Jama'at literature in Pakistan. As dependent as the Jama'at had been on its publications as a source of revenue and the means to project its power, the closure of its publications activities during the early years of the Ayub era had proved devastating. The new arrangement, therefore, would legally safe-guard the Jama'at's most important sources of income and propaganda from government clamp downs against the organization itself. Additional affiliate bodies were created in the 1970s to expand the base of support of the Jama'at, and hence, help the organization to aim at a national power base without introducing any changes to its structure and operations.

The affiliate organs fall into two categories, the first deal with propaganda and publications, and the second, with political activities. Aside from Islamic Publications, other important affiliate bodies engaged in with propaganda work are the Jama'at's numerous research and educational institutions. The first of these was the Islamic Research Academy of Karachi. The Academy was established in 1963 with view to influencing the country's civil service,104 a task from which the Jama'at is officially barred, and which the Academy too, has since largely relinquished to the Institute of Policy Studies of Islamabad, created in the early 1980s to serve as a "think tank" concerned with informing policy makers of the Jama'at's views on national affairs. Institute of Regional Studies of Peshawar and Idarah-i Ta'limi Tahqiq (Institute of Educational Research) of Lahore also function in the same capacity; and outside Pakistan, The Islamic Foundation in Leicester, England, and The Islamic Foundation in Nairobi, Kenya, operate

along similar lines. These institutions have done much to propagate the ideas and views of the Jama'at, and have as such, contributed to the greater salience of Islam across the Muslim world in general, and in the social and political life of Pakistanis in particular.

Also important in this category of affiliate bodies are magazines, published by editors who are not officially associated with the Jama'at but are close to its ideological and political position. The most important of these are, *Chatan*, published by Aqa Shurish Kashmiri (d.1975); *Zindagi* and *Qaumi Digest*, published by Mujibu'l-Rahman Shami; *Takbir*, edited by Muhammad Salahu'ddin; and *Urdu Digest*, edited by Altaf Hasan Quraishi. The latter two editors were long time staff writers of the Jama'at's daily in Karachi, *Jasarat*. The *Urdu Digest*, moreover, has been a major source of contact between the Jama'at and members of the Pakistan armed forces. The periodical, since 1962 when it first appeared, has enjoyed a considerable following in the armed forces. These publications all focus on social and political commentary and news analysis, seasoned with the Jama'at's perspective on the issues discussed.

The contribution of these ostensibly independent institutions to the dissemination of the Jama'at's views among the civil service, and the military and political establishment has been substantial. For, they have, moreover, translated the ideological and political discourse of the Jama'at into intellectual and policy positions of relevance to the aims and agenda of their target audiences.

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105 Other important magazines in this regard are, *A'in* (Lahore), *Thalith* (Lahore), and *Avaz-i Jahan* (Lahore).

106 Interview with Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Lahore.

548
Affiliate institutions contending with political matters, however, have been of greater consequence for the Jama'at. These are, for the most part, unions which act to both propagate the Jama'at’s views among specific social groups, and more importantly, to consolidate power through union activity especially among the new social groups born of industrial change in Pakistan,\(^{107}\) and to utilize it for furthering the Jama'at’s political position. Some of these unions such as the Jama'at’s semi-autonomous student union, Islami Jami'at Tulabah (IJT) was formed in 1947 with a different objective in mind, but has now been transformed into an effective political instrument. Other unions were launched in the late-1960s to combat the influence of leftist unions, and still others to expand the popular base of the Jama'at following its defeat at the polls in 1970-71. The most notable of these are, Pakistan Unions Forum, Pakistan Medical Association, Muslim Lawyers Federation, Pakistan Teachers Organization,\(^{108}\) National Labor Federation, Kisan Board (Peasants Union), Jami'at-i Tulabah-i ‘Arabiyyah, Islami Jami'at Talibat (female students union), and Islami Jami'at Tulabah. These unions cover the gamut of professional endeavors and social strata in Pakistan, from the peasants to the educated middle classes.

The most important of these unions are, however, the peasants, labor and student unions. The Kisan Board was formed in 1976 to promote Jama'at’s views in the rural areas, creating new vote banks for the Jama'at. It was a means to alleviate the Jama'at’s


\(^{108}\) This union is supervised by Khurshid Ahmad. The 1978-79 convention of the union boasted the attendance of 12,000 teachers; interview Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
political predicaments as reflected in the tally of their votes in the elections of 1970-71. The Kisan Board, however, was also a component of the Jama‘at’s anti-PPP campaign. It was launched with the objective of curtailing the influence of the leftist peasants union, Anjuman-i Kashtkaran, and capitalizing on the opposition to Bhutto’s nationalization of agricultural businesses in 1976. This dual objective informs the working of all Jama‘at unions. The Kisan Board has sought to lure the rural masses to the cause of the Jama‘at by addressing their immediate problems, and finding remedies to them; it has thus far only addressed the problems and needs of the rural small land owners, rather than the grievances of the more numerous landless laborer and peasants.

The National Labor Federation (NLF), began its work in the 1950s, but grew in prominence in the 1960s and the 1970s with the same objectives as the Kisan Board. The NLF and its subsidiary propaganda wing, Tahrik-i Mihnat (Toilers Movement)\(^\text{109}\) were effective tools in somewhat circumventing the power of the left among the Pakistani laborer. In the late-1970s, with the weakening of the Bhutto government and rifts between the PPP and the leftist forces, NLF won important union elections at Pakistan International Airlines, Steel industry, ship building industry, and Pakistan Railways. It became sufficiently powerful to cause consternation in General Ziya’s government, which soon after taking over the reigns of power decided to ban all union activities. However, the Jama‘at has not reoriented its political outlook so as to utilize its rising power base among the labor force effectively. Thus far, there has existed a disjuncture between the

\(^{109\text{ Tahrik-i Mihnat focuses on dissemination of the Jama‘at literature among the laborer.}}\)
Jama'at efforts to create a power infrastructure and base of support among the labor, and the parent organization's reluctance to engage in populist politics. The debilitating effects of this hiatus, however, can be reversed by a change of policy in the Jama'at - something Qazi Husain has promised his organization.

NLF has, moreover, served as a model and base for the upward expansion of Jama'at labor union activity. The Jama'at has since 1979 formed white-collar unions among clerical staff of various government organizations, which despite their small size, has increased the control of the Jama'at over the working of the provincial and national civil service. For instance, in 1989 the clerical union at Punjab University was controlled by the Jama'at. The consequences for furthering the position of IJT on the university's campuses, enforcing a specific code of conduct, and controlling the choice of curricula and academic staff have as a result been significant.

The most important of the Jama'at unions, however, is the Islami Jami'at Tulabah (IJT). The Jami'at, as it is popularly known, unlike the labor or the peasant unions has no ideological justification for its prominence. It does not hold the key to galvanizing support among any one significant social strata. However, it has proven to be an efficacious means for projecting power in single battles against the Jama'at's adversaries, and also an effective means of infiltrating the very structure of power which governs Pakistan. The structure and working of the Jami'at, as the most successful Jama'at union, and as the model used for organizing others, will be considered in greater detail here.

Islami Jami'at Tulabah

The roots of Islami Jami'at Tulabah may be found in Mawdudi's address before
the M.A.O. College of Amritsar on February 22, 1940, where, for the first time, he alluded
to the need for a political strategy which would benefit from the activities of "a well-
meaning" student organization.\footnote{Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, *Tafhimat* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1965), vol.2, P.286.} The Jama'at, however, did not come into being immediately, but some seven years later, after the Jama'at moved to Pakistan. The Jama'at began its activity among students in 1945 at the Islamiyah College in Lahore, where six years earlier, Mawdudi had harkened the students back to Islam.\footnote{It should be noted that at this time student activism was rampant in Northern India, and critical to the Pakistan movement. The Muslim League's student organization, Muslim Student Federation (MSF), for instance was highly active in Punjab at the time; on this issue and its relation to later student activism in Pakistan see Ishtiaq Husain Quraishi, *Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives and Achievements* (Karachi: Ma'aref, 1975), pp.263-65.} Early in 1947, students sympathetic to the Jama'at, who were then mostly sons of Jama'at mem-
ers,\footnote{Interview with Zafaru'llah Khan (the first titular head, Nazim-i A'la of IJT) in *JVNAT*, vol.1, P.11.} gathered at Pathankot in order to formalize an organization.\footnote{Interview with Murad 'Ali Shah, Lahore.} IJT was formed later that year on December 23, 1947 in Lahore, by 25 students.\footnote{Zafaru'llah Khan in *JVNAT*, vol.1, P.12.} Zafaru'llah Khan, son of the Jama'at leader Malik Nasru'llah Khan ‘Aziz, was elected as IJT’s first Nazim-i A'la (Supreme Head or Organizer), and the newly found organization held its

\footnote{On that occasion 25 students gathered from all around Punjab for the occasion. Mawdudi and a number senior Jama'at members attended the opening session and presented speeches; see, *ibid*; also see Ahmad Anis, "Jami’at ka Ta’sisi Pasmanzar", in *TT*, vol.1, pp.113-14.}
very first meeting in that year. Similar Jami‘at cells were formed in other cities of the Punjab, and notably, in Karachi by Zafar Ishaq Ansari. It took the Jami‘at three to four years to consolidate these disparate student cells into one organization, centered in Karachi; and IJT’s constitution was not ratified until 1952.

The Jami‘at was initially conceived of as a da‘wah movement, a voluntary expression of Islamic feelings among students, given shape by organizers (sons of Jama‘at members) dispatched by the Jama‘at. Its utility then lay in its role in influencing the future leadership of Pakistan, hence operationalizing Mawdudi’s conception of "revolution from above". The Jami‘at was at the time, therefore, greatly concerned with the caliber of its members. It aimed at attracting the best and the brightest, and used the exemplary quality of its members, in education as well as piety, as the means of gaining acceptance, legitimacy and a greater following.

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115 Cited in Jang (Lahore), (November 8, 1989), supplement.
116 Zafaru’lallah Khan, JVNAT, vol.1, P.15.
117 ibid, pp.16-17.
120 Interview with Murad ‘Ali Shah, Lahore.
121 Interviews with Khurshid Ahmad and Absar Ahmad in JVNAT, vol.1, pp.144-45 and 153.

Amjad Mukhtar, who began the first IJT cell at the National College of Arts in Lahore in the late-1970s - one of the last and least expected of IJT encroachments - recollects that, the exemplary ethics and academic records of the founders of that cell was crucial in creating a base of support for IJT on that campus. The incipient support was
Although organized under the supervision of the Jama‘at, the Jami‘at interestingly, was greatly influenced by the working of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Khurshid Ahmad recollects that, many of the early leaders of IJT such as Khurram Jah Murad, ‘Umar Chapra and ‘Abdu’llah Ja‘far were greatly influenced by Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational model. IJT leaders consulted a Brotherhood member resident in Karachi at the time, Sa‘id Ramazan, on organizational matters. Between 1952 and 1955, Ramazan helped IJT leaders devise an organizational strategy. The most visible mark of Ramazan’s influence is IJT’s "study circle" and all-night study sessions, both of which were emulated from the Brotherhood.\footnote{Interview with Khurshid Ahmad in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, pp.127-28.} The Brotherhood’s influence bears testimony to the Jami‘at’s relative autonomy of thought and action at the time, which observers of the Jama‘at are hard-pressed to accept at face-value.

The task of religious propaganda on university campuses gave the Jami‘at a missionary and literary outlook. In 1950 IJT launched its first journal, \textit{Azm} (Determination) in Urdu, soon to be followed by an English language magazine, \textit{Students Voice}, in 1951.\footnote{\textit{ibid}, P.130.} However, shortly then after the Jami‘at embarked on a new path which gradually became the central focus of all its activities - campus elections. In 1951 IJT participated in student union elections at Karachi’s Urdu College, with less than then translated into campus electoral victories, and later galvanized into a solid following once IJT began to address student issues, administrative affairs and Islamic concerns; interview with Amjad Mukhtar, Lahore.
successful results. The Jami'at's new area of activity was not then an end for the idealist students to strive for, but a means to check the growth of leftist unions among students, notably, the Democratic Student Federation (DSF) and the National Student Federation (NSF). This was to become a motivation for the launching of all Jama'at unions in the years to come.

The election campaign began to pave the way for the transformation of the Jami'at, from a missionary movement into a political organization. While the very consolidation of the Jami'at's organizational structure nudged it along a more political direction, the religiopolitical nature of the anti-Ahmadi issue of 1953-54, and the Jama'at's subsequent role therein, further pushed the Jami'at towards politics, especially after Mawdudi was condemned to death. IJT had, moreover, by this time began to discern a distinct constituency among the Muhajir community in both Sind and East Pakistan, which in turn made IJT an actor in Pakistan's ethnic debates, and hence, further politicized the Jami'at. The left, however, continued to act as the paramount cause of the Jami'at's politicization.

The Jami'at's position from inception had been to bifurcate all issues before students into secular and religious. This doctrinal position and strategy for proselytism,
however, proved politically volatile. IJT’s increasing politicization at a time of mounting leftist activity on university campuses, transformed the ideological dichotomy between the religious and the secular into actual clashes between Islam and the left, IJT and DSF or NSF. Confrontations with leftist students, therefore, became more intensified, both radicalizing IJT, and increasing its interest in campus politics. Egg tossing gave place to open clashes on university campuses, especially in Karachi and Multan. Between October 1952 and January 1953, IJT clashed violently with DSF, causing street violence, and the intercession of police. The tactics and organizational power of DSF in those months became a lesson for the Jama’at, which began to organize more vigorously thenceforth. IJT, moreover, developed deep-seated resentments towards the left, which left its mark on the Jama’at’s subsequent political choices.

Given the scope of the student clashes of 1952-53, the Jama’at moved its base of operations from Karachi, where student politics threatened to thoroughly radicalize the organization. The Jama’at shifted to Lahore, where numerous colleges in that city and across Punjab proved to be a fertile ground for its activities. In Lahore, moreover, IJT leaders came into closer contact with the Jama’at leadership. The Jama’at therefore, was more closely supervised by the Jama’at, and Jama’at leaders became more embroiled in

128 Khurshid Ahmad recollects that in earliest confrontations with leftist students, IJT would throw eggs at its opponents; interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

129 Interview with Israr Ahmad in JV Nat, vol.1, P.91.


131 ibid, pp.142-43.
religious discussions and education. Despite the moderating influence of IJT's move to Lahore, the organization had undergone a significant change of heart. It no longer viewed its vocation as training future leaders for Pakistan and influencing those who were bound for the civil service, but saw itself as a "soldiers brigade", which would fight the cause of Islam against its enemies - secularists and leftists. By 1955 Mawdudi began to show signs of concern with the new direction which IJT had taken, and the corruptive influence of student violence on that organization. However, the Jama'at's own turn to politics after Machchi Goth obviated the possibility of restraining the political proclivities of IJT. By 1960, in fact, the Jama'at with the tacit approval of Mawdudi became fully embroiled in student politics, and to an increasing extent in national politics. Asked about student violence in 1969, Mawdudi responded that the fault lay not with the students but with the educational system, because it was not Islamic. In effect, he brushed criticisms of violence aside, and suggested that the educational system as it stood was the culprit and, moreover, was expendable.

It was Jama'at's activities in East Pakistan, where leftist and Bengali nationalist forces were highly active on university campuses that began to push the student

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132 Interview with Israr Ahmad in *JVNAT*, vol.1, pp.92-99.
133 'Umar Mansur, "Talabah Awr Qaumi' u Milli Masa'il", in *TT*, vol.1, P.149.
135 Interview with Hafizu'l-Rahman Ihsan, Lahore.
organization into national politics, and determined the pattern of its subsequent development.\textsuperscript{137} The Jama'at, then keen to play a major role in East Pakistan, further encouraged the Jami'at in this regard.\textsuperscript{138} Violent clashes with the left, and the resultant radicalization of IJT, thenceforth, thoroughly transformed the spirit of the organization. IJT became infested with violence, and morale in its ranks effectively broke down. The Jama'at, although in need of foot soldiers to fight its political battles was not by any means reconciled to this development. When in 1967 IJT members openly abused the Vice-President of Punjab University, ‘Allamah ‘Alau’ddin Siddiqi, an enraged Mawdudi chastised IJT leaders for a conduct unbecoming.\textsuperscript{139}

The Jami'at had, however, grown too large and independent, all too quickly (see table 8.3), to be tamed by the Jama'at. Moreover, IJT was delivering tangible political gains to the Jama'at, which increasingly had little else to work with than IJT. Many in the Jama'at were therefore, reluctant to tamper with the Jami'at. Some like Sayyid Munawwar Hasan (himself a one-time leader of IJT) or Khurshid Ahmad (again a former IJT leader) saw the political situation before the Jama'at (1968-84) in apocalyptic terms, one wherein

\textsuperscript{137} In East Pakistan the Jami'at was known by its Bengali name, Islami Chhatra Shangha; on their clashes with the left in East Pakistan see, Qureshi, \textit{Education in Pakistan}, P.269.

\textsuperscript{138} On November 9, 1969, for instance Mawdudi told a gathering IJT members that, the important task before them was to rid Pakistani universities of the left; cited in \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.348-49.

\textsuperscript{139} Interview with Ihsan, Lahore.
TABLE 8.3*
DISTRIBUTION OF ISLAMI JAMI'AT TULABAH MEMBERS, 1974-89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>RUKN RAFIQ</th>
<th>RUKN RAFIQ</th>
<th>RUKN RAFIQ</th>
<th>RUKN RAFIQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Punjab</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Sind</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Pakistan</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Computer Services of Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.

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any and all behavior was justified.\textsuperscript{140} The Jama'at now itself primarily concerned with political gain, therefore, deemed the power and activism of IJT, especially in terms of manpower needed to wage demonstrations and electoral campaigns, as too valuable to forego. Political events thenceforth, acted to only perpetuate the Jama'at's ambivalence and the Jami'at's moral collapse.

The Jama'at's silence before the evident break down of moral standards, decline in calibre of members, and deviations from Jama'at's ethos, was also in part due to the parent organization's simple inability to alter the course of events. The Jami'at which had been designed to operate independently, could not now be easily reigned in. Since its formation IJT has maintained its autonomy \textit{vis a vis} the Jama'at. There are no formal organizational links between IJT and the Jama'at, and the Jami'at stands outside of purview of Jama'at's command structure. The parent organization has few if any visible financial ties with its student affiliate.\textsuperscript{141} While a Na'ib Amir of the Jama'at is assigned to supervise the Jami'at, the extent of his powers are limited to moral suasion over

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{140} Sayyid Munawwar Hasan was an architect of IJT's activism in the 1960s and the 1970s, and Khurshid Ahmad was the overseer of the Jami'at during the organization's most violent period, 1977-84; interviews, Islamabad.

\textsuperscript{141} Israr Ahmad states that since its early years the Jami'at relied on funds collected by it members, usually through collecting voluntary outside donations (i'anat). I'anat to this day acts as major source of income for IJT.

The extent of the Jami'at's activities, lead to charges, often credible, that IJT workers receive stipends from their organization. This, however, suggests that surreptitious financial linkages do exist between IJT and the Jama'at. One source cites these stipends from Rs.150 to Rs.1000 per month are dispersed by IJT, depending on the level of the worker or member of IJT; see interview with Mahdi Hasan, (Professor at University of Punjab), in \textit{Friday Times of Lahore}, (September 14, 1989), P.11.
\end{flushright}
The increase in the number of Jama'at members with IJT backgrounds has, however, increased certain bonds between IJT and the Jama'at, but by the same token, has increased the Jama'at's tolerance of IJT's transgressions.\textsuperscript{143}

What ties the Jami'at to the Jama'at, and can at times serve as a leverage by the latter over the former, is Mawdudi's works and the professed ideological perspective of the two organizations.\textsuperscript{144} Jami'at members are indoctrinated in Jama'at ideology rigorously.\textsuperscript{145} Fidelity to Jama'at's reading of Islam is the primary criterion deciding membership, and upward mobility in IJT. The ideology of the Jama'at is indelibly imprinted on the ethos and corporatist identity of the Jami'at, enough so to harness the student organization's energies. Strong as discipline and ideological conformity is among the core of IJT's official members, it is not a steadfast guarantee in itself. The bulk of IJT's power comes from its far more numerous periphery of non-members, who are not as well-trained in Jama'at's ideology, nor are as closely bound by IJT's discipline. The ability of the ideological nexus between the Jama'at and the Jami'at to control the activities of the student organization is therefore tenuous. Political interests of the Jami'at

\textsuperscript{142} Interview with Khurram Jah Murad, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{143} For instance, Khurram Jah Murad, the Na'ib Amir in charge of IJT affairs is himself a former Nazim-i A'la of IJT. The rise of former IJT members in the ranks of the Jama'at also serves as incentive for subservience of the former to the latter; for, many IJT activists see the Jama'at as the best means of pursuing their political ambitions or continuing with their religious vocation.

\textsuperscript{144} Interview with Javid Hashmi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{145} Mawdudi's writings were particularly important in recruiting and harnessing every generation of IJT members. See for instance, interviews with Israr Ahmad, Liaqat Baluch, Farid Ahmad Parachah, and Hafiz Muhammad Idris in \textit{HRZ}, pp.87-99.
could easily nudge the organization in independent directions. In 1969, for instance, it was Muti' u'l-Rahman Nizami, a student from East Pakistan who was then the Nazim-i A'la of the Jami'at, that directed the IJT of East Pakistan to render assistance to the army's counter-insurgency efforts against Mukti Bahini, by joining the Al-Badr and Al-Shams guerilla groups. Similarly, when in 1988 the Jama'at decided to ally itself with the Muslim League in the anti-PPP Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI, Islamic Democratic Alliance), IJT who was then at loggerheads with the Muslim League student union, Muslim Student Federation (MSF), balked at the prospects, and brought the IJI to the brink of collapse.

The Jami'at generally grew more independent of the Jama'at, and the latter became more dependent on the former with the rise of Bhutto to power in 1971. The Jama'at had been routed at the polls that year, while the Jami'at, fresh from a "patriotic struggle" in East Pakistan, immediately after the accession of Bhutto to power defeated the PPP student union, Peoples Student Federation (PSF), in Punjab University elections, and maintained its control of that campus throughout the 1970s. IJT's victory breathed new life and hope into the dejected Jama'at. The student organization had "valiantly stood up" to PPP and won, and had moreover, suggested that "Mawdudi's ideas could win elections". The Jama'at, following its victory, became a more suitable vehicle for launching anti-PPP campaigns than the Jama'at, which as a defeated party, was then hard-

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146 Interview with I'jaz Gilani, Islamabad. For more on Al-Badr and Al-Shams see Salim Mansur Khalid, *Al-Badr* (Lahore: Idarah-i Matbu'at-i Talabah, 1985).

147 See chapter 14.

148 Interview with Mujibu'l-Rahman Shami, Lahore.
pressed to assert itself. Unable to function as a mass-based party before the widely popular PPP, the Jama'at increasingly pushed the Jami'at into the political limelight as the "chief opposition party". The Jami'at therefore became the bulwark behind such agitations as the "Bangladesh Namanzur (Non-Recognition of Bangladesh)" campaign. IJT thus found national recognition as a political party, and a new measure of autonomy from the Jama'at. The Jami'at as an extra-parliamentary force, however, could only resort to street demonstrations and violent clashes with government forces to express itself, which in turn further radicalized the organization, sapping it of its moral standing. The Jami'at proved to be a tenacious opponent for the PPP - a mainstay of the anti-Bhutto campaign, which eventually culminated in the Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement and the fall of Bhutto in 1977.\textsuperscript{149}

Jami'at's bitter struggle against Bhutto deeply wounded the organization, which was increasingly overtaken by radical elements, prone to the use of violence. The penchant for violent activity, increasingly directed at rival student groups in the 1980s, became so entrenched in IJT's psyche that it escalated rather than abet after the rise of General Ziya to power. Campus violence by and against IJT, and continuous assassination of student leaders, which claimed the lives of some 80 students between 1982 and 1988,\textsuperscript{150} began

\textsuperscript{149} The fact that General Ziya chose Javid Hashmi, the IJT President of Punjab University Student Union, known for his opposition to Bhutto and his Governor and Chief Minister of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, as Minister of Culture, was testimony to IJT's importance in the fall of Bhutto, and also a reward for IJT's practices in the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{150} Cited in Zahid Hussain, "The Campus Mafias", in Herald (Karachi), (October 1988), P.52.
to mar the popularity which IJT had gained from its opposition to Bhutto\textsuperscript{151} (see changes in the number of IJT Rafiqs in table 8.3). The organization developed a "Kalashnikov culture", which efficacious as it had proven in waging political campaigns and controlling Pakistani campuses, was increasingly difficult for the Jama'at to either control or approve of.

Despite pressures from General Ziya, the Jama'at proved unable to control the "militarization" of IJT.\textsuperscript{152} General Ziya therefore proceeded to ban all student union activities,\textsuperscript{153} which precipitated even greater IJT violence. Mian Tufayl, then Amir of the Jama'at, following pleas by General Ziya, directly interceded with the Jami'at, again to no avail.\textsuperscript{154} IJT's intransigence began to interfere with the Jama'at's rapport with General Ziya, and effect the parent organization's popular image. It was only when IJT realized the popular backlash against its activities, which cost it a number of campus elections from 1987 on, that the organization desisted to some extent from perpetuating

\textsuperscript{151} Jama'at and Jami'at leaders often blamed the violence on their opposition. While the assassination of 30 IJT members between 1984 and 1989 may have given credence to their justification, it was hardly a source of comfort. Interview with Khurram Jah Murad, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{152} Muhammad Afzal, General Ziya's Minister of Education negotiated with Khurshid Ahmad, the overseer of the Jami'at in the Jama'at, on the issue of student violence a number of times. The Jama'at resisted taking serious measures, in part due to their fear of being unable to produce any results; interview with Muhammad Afzal, Islamabad.

\textsuperscript{153} Afzal states that the decision was solely and directly caused by IJT violence, and Jama'at's inability to control it, see \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{154} Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
the cycle of violence on Pakistani campuses.\textsuperscript{155}

The Organizational Structure of IJT

The Jami'at operates through an organization similar to that of the Jama'at, again centered in Lahore. Within its pale there are several categories of associates. At the base of its organizational pyramid are the Hami (supporters), loosely affiliated pro-IJT students; then are the Karkun (worker);\textsuperscript{156} Rafiq (Friend);\textsuperscript{157} Umidvar-i Rukniyat (Candidate for Membership); and finally, the Rukn (member).\textsuperscript{158} The members (Arkan, sing. Rukn) then occupy organizational offices which run IJT. At the top is Nazim-i A'la (Supreme Head or Organizer), an equivalent of Amir, and the organization's link with the Jama'at and other political actors. Each lower unit of IJT has its own Nazim (see table 8.4). The first four layers of IJT's organizational pyramid have Shura's, which represent IJT members of that unit. IJT's activities and inter-organization matters are supervised by the Mu'tamid-i A'la (Supreme Secretary General), appointed by the Nazim-i A'la as the equivalent of the Jama'at's Qayyim. Lower levels of IJT also have Mu'tamids who report to their respective Nazims and the Mu'tamid-i A'la. Each level of the IJT oversees the

\textsuperscript{155} Decline in IJT Rafiqs between 1983 and 1989 is indicative of decline of their support; see table 8.5. One measure taken by the Jama'at to ameliorate the situation was to place Khurram Jah Murad, a figure popular with IJT, as the Jama'at overseer of the Jami'at.

\textsuperscript{156} This category, not provided for in IJT constitution, was created in 1975-76 to accommodate the greater numbers flocking to the ranks of the Jami'at; and it helped the Jami'at better organize its sympathizers.

\textsuperscript{157} In the 1970s when the Jami'at gained popularity on Pakistani campuses, it was the number of Rafiqs which increased most.

\textsuperscript{158} Information provided by the Office of Mu'tamid-i A'la of Islami Jami'at Tulabah of Pakistan, Lahore.
**TABLE 8.4***

**ISLAMI JAMI‘AT TULABAH’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>OFFICE PRESENT AT THAT LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All-Pakistan</td>
<td>Nazim-i A‘la/Mu’tamid-i A‘la/Shura’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Nazim/Mu’tamid/Shura’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Nazim/Mu’tamid/Shura’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Nazim/Mu’tamid/Shura’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus (if more than one is present at the university)</td>
<td>Nazim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Department</td>
<td>Nazim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Class or Year</td>
<td>Nazim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dormitory</td>
<td>Nazim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Office of Mu’tamid-i A‘la of Islami Jami‘at Tulabah, Lahore.*
activities of the one below it. For instance, the command structure extends from IJT headquarters to Punjab IJT, Lahore IJT, the various universities in Lahore, campuses in each university, and finally departments, classes and dormitories in each university. IJT also has subsidiary departments such as International Relations, Press, or Publications which deal with specific areas of concern. On each campus, moreover, IJT has units which monitor student affairs, campus politics and student behavior, and the working of university administration and faculty, at times making them the de facto administrators of the university.\textsuperscript{159}

The Jami'at's organizational structure is duplicated in its sister organization, Islami Jami'at Talibat (women's wing of IJT), formed in Multan in September 1969.\textsuperscript{160} This organization works closely and in harmony with IJT, extending the power of the latter over university campuses. Most Talibat members and sympathizers, unlike IJT members, come from families with Jama'at or IJT affiliation. Their ties to the Talibat organization is therefore, stronger, and as a result the requirements of indoctrination and ideological education less arduous.\textsuperscript{161}

IJT organization, however, lacks continuity. Nazim-i A'las are elected each year as

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{159} Mahdi Hasan, Professor at University of Punjab states that IJT uses the university campus as its headquarters, and utilizes university facilities such as auditoriums and buses for its purposes. Admission forms to the university are sold to applicants, generating revenue and control over the in-coming students. Hasan argues that IJT uses strong-arm tactics to resolve the academic problems of its members or associates; provide university housing to them, and in some cases, gain admission for them to the university. See interview with Mahdi Hasan in \textit{Friday Times of Lahore}, (September 14, 1989), P.11.

\textsuperscript{160} Interview with Muhammad Akmal in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.2, pp.187-88.

\textsuperscript{161} Interviews with Islami Jami'at Talibat members, Lahore.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushleft}
are lower level Nazims. IJT constitution permits the Nazim-i A'la to hold the office for two terms only. However since 1947 only 14 Nazim A'las have held that title for two years. The Jami'at has therefore vested greater powers in its Secretariat, only partially alleviating the problem which is inherent to an organization with revolving membership. Also significant in creating organizational continuity has been IJT's regional and all-Pakistan conventions, which have been held regularly since 1948. These gatherings have given IJT greater solidarity and corporatist identity.

All IJT associates from Karkun upwards attend training camps, wherein they are indoctrinated in the organization's ideological views and tactical methods. Acceptance into higher categories of organizational affiliation depend greatly on the extent of ideological conformity. To become a full-fledged member, candidates must read and be examined on a specific syllabi. All IJT associates are encouraged to collect funds for the organization through outside donations (i'ānat), which not only helps IJT financially, but also increases loyalty to the organization. Each Nazim is charged with supervising the affairs of those in his unit. IJT members, and also candidates for membership meet regularly with their Nazim, providing him with a logbook known as Ruz'u Shab (Night and Day), wherein every activity of the member or candidate is recorded. The logbook details

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162 Cited in Jang (Lahore), (November 8, 1989), supplement.

163 Interview with Husain Khan in JVNAT, vol.1, P.170.

164 These training camps are often supervised by Jama'at members, which acts to strengthen ideological bonds between the two organizations; see interview with Shaikh Mahbub 'Ali in JVNAT, vol.2, P.23.

165 Certain amount of ideological conformity already exists among those who wish to join IJT; for, many are attracted to the organization through the Jama'at literature. Ibid.
the academic activities, religious study, time spent in prayers, and hours dedicated to IJT work. The book is monitored closely, and gives IJT total control over the life of its associates from the rank of Rafiq up to that of the Rukn.166

The strict criteria for membership and upward mobility in IJT has kept its membership limited. Yet, organizational discipline and hence, fiat, has eschewed any limitations to IJT's ability to effectively project power. IJT's accomplishments in this regard are all the more astounding once the actual numbers of the core members, responsible for the organization's vital political role in the 1970s and the 1980s, is taken in to consideration (see table 8.3).

The Jami'at has also been extending the purview of its activity outside of university campuses. While the Halqah-i Ahbab (Circle of Friends) has for a number of years served as a loosely organized IJT alumni association, in recent years more serious efforts have been at creating organizational linkages which would keep university graduates with IJT ties connected to the organization.167

IJT has, however, more effectively extended its organizational reach in the other direction into high schools. Limits to growth of IJT on university campuses in the late-1970s led IJT to look to high schools to both recruit greater numbers, and to reach

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166 Interview with Ishtiyaq Gundal, Lahore. In earlier times the logbook was a means of ensuring moral rectitude and exemplary academic standing among IJT members.

167 These efforts were made, in part, to counter Muslim League's Youth Force, which relates the party to its student wing. In September 1989 the Jama'at floated a Shu'bah-i Nawjavanan (Youth Wing) with 600 members; 360 from the Punjab, 196 from N.W.F.P., 117 from Sind, 18 from Baluchistan, and 6 from Azad Kashmir; cited in Takbir ( Karachi), (October 12, 1989), pp.42-43.
potential recruits before other student unions could. This strategy was particularly successful in universities such as the Engineering University of Lahore, where a large block of students came from N.W.F.P. through special quota systems. The Jami'at was increasingly hard-pressed to compete with the ethnically-based Pakhtun Student Federation. In 1978-79 the Jami'at began activity in N.W.F.P. high schools, creating a base of support among future students of the Engineering University before they arrived in Lahore, where they would come into contact with the Pakhtun Student Federation for the first time. The strategy was so effective that, Pakhtun Student Federation was also compelled to turn to activity among high school students in N.W.F.P.

Jama'at's activity among high school students, named Bazm-i Paygham (Celebration of the Message) began in 1978. These activities centered around the magazines which spread the IJT message among the younger audience, and promoted themes of organization and unity through neighborhood and high school clubs. Politics was not a central feature of these efforts; emphasis was rather placed on creating familiarity with the message of the Jama'at, and a nuclei of support for and affinity with the Jami'at. By 1982-83, IJT was recruiting more associates in high schools than in universities. The

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168 These limits were pronounced enough to compel the Jama‘at, which has access to university records to track down many of those accepted to a university, to persuade them or their parents, especially in the case of female students, to join IJT; see interview with Mahdi Hasan in Friday Times of Lahore, (September 14, 1989), P.11.

169 Interview with Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Lahore.

170 The Project was named after its main magazine, Bazm-i Paygham (20,000 circulation). Additional magazines cater to regional needs. In Punjab the magazine was Paygham Digest (Message Digest, 22,000 circulation); in N.W.F.P., Mujahid (One Who Embarks on Jihad, 8,000 circulation); and in Sind, Sathi (Friend or Companion, 14,000 circulation). Information provided by office of Mu'tamid A'la of IJT.
project also has an added benefit for the Jama'at; for, many of those whom the Bazm-i Paygham reaches in high schools never go to university, and would not otherwise come into contact with the Jama'at and its literature. More than a tactical ploy to extend the organizational reach of the Jami'at, this effort may prove as a decisive means to expand the social base of the Jama'at, and deepen its influence on Pakistani society.

The Jami'at has also, over the years, become a major source of new recruits into the ranks of the Jama'at. 1/3 of the current leadership of the Jama'at, according to one informed estimate, come from IJT\footnote{Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad. According to Khurshid Ahmad in Bangladesh this ratio is even higher, and stands at %50 of that country's total Jama'at membership.} (see table 8.5). The Jami'at recruits bring with them closer organizational bonds, and a feeling of camaraderie which was born of their years student activism.\footnote{Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, for instance recollects that the Jami'at's study circles were instrumental in fostering permanent bonds between IJT members in his time. See interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan in JV\textsc{NAT}, vol.2, pp.141-43.} Their surge in the ranks of the Jama'at has created a block of voters in the organization who are more attuned to political interests which they developed in IJT. In addition, they possess a more bureaucratic outlook on matters, a result of long time experience with organizational work and education in modern subjects. The IJT recruits, by virtue of the sheer weight of their numbers are transforming the Jama'at by leaps and bounds, and also creating greater organizational continuity between the Jama'at and the Jami'at.

The Jami'at, in the final analysis has been a successful organization, and political
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK IN THE JAMA'AT IN 1989-90</th>
<th>LEVEL OF AFFILIATION WITH IJT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qazi Husain Ahmad</td>
<td>Amir</td>
<td>Rafiq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khurram Jah Murad</td>
<td>Na‘ib Amir</td>
<td>Nazim-i A‘la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khurshid Ahmad</td>
<td>Na‘ib Amir</td>
<td>Nazim-i A‘la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudhri Aslam Salimi</td>
<td>Qayyim</td>
<td>Rafiq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaqat Baluch</td>
<td>Na‘ib Qayyim</td>
<td>Nazim-i A‘la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hafiz Muhammad Idris</td>
<td>Na‘ib Qayyim</td>
<td>Rukn/Senior Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyid Munawwar Hasan</td>
<td>Amir of Karachi</td>
<td>Nazim-i A‘la</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abdu’l-Muhsin Shahin</td>
<td>Amir of Multan</td>
<td>Rukn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabbir Ahmad Khan</td>
<td>Amir of Peshawar</td>
<td>Rukn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Turabi</td>
<td>Amir of Azad Kashmir</td>
<td>Rukn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amiru’l-‘Azim</td>
<td>Director of Information</td>
<td>Rukn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqsud Ahmad</td>
<td>Qayyim of Punjab</td>
<td>Rukn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abdu’l-Rahman Quraishi</td>
<td>Director of International</td>
<td>Mu‘tamid of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affairs Office</td>
<td>Sind</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Office of Qayyim of Jama’at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.*
tool for the Jama'at. In fact, it has been its very success and efficacy which eventually checked its continued growth, and led it into the abyss of campus violence. The Jama'at throughout the 1970s projected the power of a small party - the Jama'at - seriously impairing the operation of a far larger mass party - the PPP. This feat was, moreover, accomplished by a small core of dedicated activists (see table 8.3). The lesson of IJT's success was not lost on the sundry of small Pakistani parties, nor on larger political organizations such as the PPP or the Muslim League, who realized that the menace of student activism could only be confronted by students themselves. The result, needless to add, has not benefitted the Pakistani educational system.

The Jama'at's success, in the same time period, also pointed to the importance of Islamic loyalties among students. This was a time when few other viable "Islamic" student organizations were extant, and IJT reigned supreme among religiously conscious Pakistani students. The Jama'at had successfully manipulated this state of affairs, translating the abhorrence for PPP's avowed socialism, and the party leaders' indiscreet breach of Muslim moral sensibilities, among the religiously conscious students into victories in campus elections. IJT was therefore, able to consolidate the anti-PPP sentiments on campuses into a single political platform; and as such, was able to win votes far exceeding its

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173 IJT has been a significant political force in Pakistan; one notable consequence of their activism being, the fact that it gave life to the MQM, one of Pakistan's most vociferous and volatile political elements.

174 One of the events which gave great popularity to IJT, according to one of its leaders at the time, was the alleged kidnapping of two girls for illicit reasons by the Governor of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar. Javid Hashmi led a major IJT demonstration to the Governor's house which led to the release of the two girls; interview with Javid Hashmi, Lahore.
numbers - what the Jama'at has always aimed at and failed to realize. Other Islamic parties, however, quickly became aware of the basis IJT's success, and with view to tapping into the same vote bank, strengthened student unions of their own. Many of these unions were formed by members who broke away from IJT. By 1981, Punjab had become infested with student unions, mostly associated with right of center and religious parties, which no longer restrained by their opposition to a common enemy - Bhutto, socialism, and the PPP which IJT had extricated from the campuses between 1977 and 1981 - began to nibble at IJT's base of support, dividing the religious vote manyfold, and significantly reducing IJT's base of power.

IJT's predicament was also precipitated by the authoritarian nature and Islamic image of the Ziya regime. Chaudhry and McDonough, in their study of Pakistani students, found urban students to be more politically conscious than rural ones. The PPP government in the 1970s, with its authoritarian style and secular posture, had provided IJT with the means to coalesce the anti-authoritarian urban and the religiously conscious rural students into a single student protest movement. Ziya's regime by appealing to the religious sensibilities of rural students, and antagonizing the politically conscious urban students, had effectively divided IJT's coalition.

For instance one of the founder of the Jami'at-i Tulabah-i Ahl-i Hadith Pakistan (Ahl-i Hadith Student Organization of Pakistan) was 'Allamah Riazu'l-Rahman Yazdani, a one time IJT Nazim of Gujranwala; interview with Yazdani, Lahore. Similarly, President of Anjuman-i Tulabah-i Islam (Society of Muslim Students, affiliated with JUP) in 1987-88 had been a member of IJT; interview with Zafar Iqbal, Lahore.

As a result of the confluence of these factors, the Jami'at began to lose elections in one campus after another, and by 1984 became bogged down in a vicious battle with rival student organizations - religious, ethnic and secular in orientation - in order to protect its turf. Most small-town campuses in Punjab were lost to Anjuman-i Tulabah-i Islam (ATI), a Brailwi student group affiliated with JUP. Competition with ATI by 1989 had escalated to pitched battles in Gujranwala leaving behind scores of students dead on both sides. MSF, a right wing student union launched by Muslim League in 1985, meanwhile, managed to unseat the Jami'at in a number of Lahore campuses, again culminating into a cycle of assassinations.177 In N.W.F.P. it was PSF and the Pakhtun Student Federation; in Islamabad, the PSF; and in the Baluchistan Baluch Student Federation (BSF), which went to battle against the Jami'at. Finally, in rural Sind, PSF and Sindhi nationalist student groups; and in Karachi and Hyderabad a break away of IJT, the All-Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO), floated by MQM, that routed the Jami'at in student elections, and restricted its maneuverability on campuses. IJT’s confrontation with APMSO turned Karachi University into a war zone, which forced the armed forces to occupy the University and to close it down. Fighting simultaneously against religious, ethnic and secular student organizations, needless to add, has created much confusion in the ranks of IJT with deleterious consequences.

The Jami'at, however, after a decade of student battles (1980-90) continues to

177 At the Engineering University a number of student unions formed an anti-IJT coalition named Qa'id-i A'zam Student Federation, just to keep IJT at bay.
remain the most prominent student force in Pakistan. Efforts such as Bazm-i Paygham have helped IJT overcome some of its loss of ground in the universities, but more importantly, IJT has remained the only student organization which is present in every province and in every university campus - the only student union capable of acting on a national scale. As a symbolic sign of its continued vitality, the Jami‘at managed to retain control over the most important Pakistani university and the prize of student politics, Punjab University.

The greatest significance, and long run effect of the Jami‘at, however, lies in its influence on Pakistani society. Year after year, multitude of students come into contact with the Jama‘at’s literature through the Jami‘at; many even undergo various levels of indoctrination at a formative and impressionable juncture in their lives. Through IJT, the Jama‘at leaves a permanent mark on the thinking and political socialization of future Pakistani leaders, intellectuals and civil servants. Regardless of where these alumni of the Jami‘at go following their graduation, whether they stay close to the Jama‘at or steer in other directions, they carry the mark of the Jama‘at, its reading of Islam, and its social ethos with them. They become the vehicles for a gradual, and yet, fundamental process of cultural engineering, what lay at the crux of Mawdudi’s original program and has far greater social and ultimately political ramifications than the immediate gains of the

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178 As a sign of the Jami‘at’s continued national political power, the organization’s open annual session in Lahore in October 1989 boasted the appearance of national politicians such as, Nawwabzadah Nasru’llah Khan, and Ghulam Mustafa Jotoi (the leader of the Combined Opposition Parties in the National Assembly, and later, the provisional Prime Minister of the country).
Afkhami points to the working of a similar process in Iran, where communist indoctrination of the youth through the aegis of the Tudeh Party in the 1940s and the 1950s left an indelible imprint on the thinking of the future Iranian elite, whether they remained leftist in orientation, or changed the course of their political thinking, joining the monarchist establishment. See Gholam R. Afkhami, *The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos on a National Scale* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1985), pp.51-53.

Also instructive in this regard is Joel Migdal's study of the impact of society on the state, its powers, and ability to govern. This impact, argued Migdal can explain the pattern of development of the state. The Jami'at and the Jama'at's influence on social thought and ethos in Pakistan, purports to control the nature and direction of impact of Pakistani society on the Pakistani state during the development process. See, Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
CHAPTER 9
JAMA‘AT-I ISLAMI AND THE PAKISTANI SOCIETY:
A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL BASIS AND NATIONAL ROLE
OF REVIVALISM

Earlier in this study the Jama‘at’s aversion to populist politics, and its aim of discerning an audience among educated Muslims was discussed. The organization’s approach to politics has, thus far, eschewed the articulation of a plan of action which could successfully galvanize the masses into a Jama‘at-led social movement. In similar vein, the Jama‘at’s organizational and command structure, discipline and strict membership criteria, while underscoring its role as a "vanguard," in the absence of a lucid understanding of the revolutionary agenda before it, was never successfully utilized to create a mass movement. It, instead, lessened the organization’s popular appeal and stymied its expansion into a consequential sociopolitical force, engendering the organization’s sequestration from society. Hence, despite the Jama‘at’s revolutionary pretense, and its extensive organizational preparation for its realization in some form, Mawdudi and his followers never actively inculcated support in any social class, nor effectively related their objectives to the demands of any social movement. In fact, given the directives of their ideological stance, they never even sought to do so.

This, however, did not mean that the teleology of the Jama‘at was altogether divorced of social influences, nor that the Jama‘at has been marginal to the working of Pakistani politics. In fact, while the leadership of the Jama‘at remained oblivious to social imperatives and the importance of delineating a social base, unbeknown to them, segments of Pakistani society found their views relevant to their lives and aspirations, and

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as such gave the organization a base of support. Continuity and change in the scope and nature of this base of support, the inclusion of new social groups and classes into it over the years, and conversely the departure of others, has determined the role and function of the Jama‘at in Pakistani politics. While the organization’s social roots has not significantly deepened, it has spread its tentacles laterally, bringing new social strata and ethnic groups within the purview of the Jama‘at’s influence. The Jama‘at has, as a result, become further entangled with Pakistani politics and with its territorial and national interests, and has by the same token, been converted into a significant "party" with a national role to play. While the numbers involved in the expansion of the Jama‘at’s base of support are modest, the trends which they suggest are, nevertheless, notable. They are instructive with regard to the nature of interactions between revivalist ideology and social action on the one hand, and the extent of continuity and change in working of politics and its cultural determinants in Pakistani society, on the other.

Changes in the political outlook, organizational structure and ethos of the Jama‘at over the course of the past five decades, engendered by the routinization of the movement’s initial idealism has further animated the transfigurations in its social base. The kaleidoscopic pattern of interactions between changes within the Jama‘at and those occurring in the sociopolitical context in which it operates, has deepened and diversified the Jama‘at’s linkages to Pakistani society. The Jama‘at’s place in Pakistan’s political equation is today more complex than when the organization moved to Lahore in 1947.

The absence of detailed membership records make the task of determining the exact social composition and base of support of the Jama‘at arduous. Much can, however,
be surmised about the social role and national significance of the organization from the available membership data, as well as from their correlation with the decisive episodes in Jama‘at’s history, shaping its internal changes, and political experiences.

**Discerning A Social Base**

The Jama‘at began with 75 members in 1941, all of whom came from the ranks of the young ‘ulama and the religious literati of Northern India.¹ By 1947 the Jama‘at had grown modestly, to boast 625 members,² and a wider geographic representation. The social composition of the members, however, remained roughly the same. With no concrete political agenda, the Jama‘at’s appeal in these years was to the religious and moral sensibility of those who came into contact with its message through the wide distribution of its prolific literature and numerous meetings and conventions across India.³ The Jama‘at’s message, therefore, found a fertile ground in the followers of those religious schools and communities, which identified with the Jama‘at’s moral stance, were sympathetic to Mawdudi’s exegesis on Islam, and who had no political organization of their own. Noteworthy in this regard were the Ahl-i Hadith, whose austere theology, strict

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¹ Nu‘mani states that the *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an* was read widely among the religious literati in the 1940s, and did enjoy a certain following among them; see Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani, *Mawlana Mawdudi Mili Sath Rifaqat ki Sarguzasht Awr Ab Mira Mauqaf* (Lahore: Quraishi Book Agency, 1980), pp.31-33.

² As alluded to earlier, the number of those who joined the Jama‘at in these six years was much larger. The size of the movement was, however, checked by departures and expulsions from its ranks.

³ Adams states that the Jama‘at’s organizational unity and moral excellence was, and continues to be, the source of its appeal to many; see, Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", in Donald E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P.380.
reliance on the fundamentals of the Islamic faith in religious exegesis, antagonism towards Deobandi and Brailwi 'ulama, vehement opposition to Sufism and popular practices associated with it, and emphasis upon individual interpretation, closely paralleled Mawdudi's interpretive reading of Islam and the Jama'at's official doctrinal stance. The Ahl-i Hadith flocked to the Jama'at in large numbers, forming the core of its early followers. Until recently, when the Ahl-i Hadith of Pakistan formed their own national religiopolitical and student organizations, the followers of this school of Islam found the Jama'at the most representative expression of their views on religion and society. The Ahl-i Hadith tradition was, and continues to be, strongest among the educated middle and lower middle class Muslims of Northern India. As such, the Jama'at's religious stance, rather than its political aims, militated a social base for the movement among those classes.

The role of religious exegesis in delineating the organization's social base was bolstered and underlined by the literary nature of the Jama'at's activism, and its avowed objective of realizing its "revolution" by educating Muslims in the "veritable teachings of

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4 Ja'far Qasmi, who spent some time in Pathankot in the 1940s recollects that the Ahl-i Hadith constituted the bulk of those resident at Jama'at headquarters in those days; interview with Ja'far Qasmi, Lahore.

5 This was also true of members of other religious movements, some of which were opposed to Pakistan, and hence waned in power after 1947; see, Freeland Abbott, "The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan", in The Middle East Journal, 11:1 (Winter 1957), P.41.

The followers of these movements, again mainly from the lower middle classes, saw the Jama'at as the only effective movement representing their sentiments and objectives, and hence, flocked to the Jama'at. Two notable lieutenants of Mawdudi, Aqa Shurish Kashmiri - a close companion of Mawdudi - and Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, a senior Jama'at leader came from such a background. The former had belonged to the Anjuman-i Ahrar, and the latter to the Khaksar Tahrik.
Islam. In fact, if the Jama'at ever set out to inculcate support among any social stratum, it was among the educated Muslims⁶ - the primary agents for effecting a revolution from above - for, in the words of Mawdudi,

"The aim [of the Jama'at] is not to [attract] the common man among Muslims, but the intellectuals, for they are the real leaders of a nation."⁷

This emphasis upon swaying the educated and the intellectuals, in conjunction with the organization's religious teachings, further narrowed the target audience of the Jama'at to the lower middle classes - the only social stratum which was religiously conscious, and especially among Muhajirs and Punjabis, was literate enough to be receptive to the literary nature of the Jama'at's activism.⁸

Despite the Jama'at's undaunted proselytism of the educated classes, the

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⁶ See in this regard, Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Jama'at-i-Islami Movement in Pakistan" Pacific Affairs, XXX:1 (March 1957), P.63.

⁷ Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Jama'at-i Islami; Uska Maqsad, Tarikh Awr La'ihah-i 'Amal (Lahore, 1952), P.18.

⁸ This observation is confirmed by the Jama'at itself. In an interview with this author, Chaudhri Aslami Salimi, the current Qayyim of the Jama'at stated that, "Jama'at-i Islami is by and large lower middle class"); interview with Aslam Salimi, Lahore. Binder and Ahmed too, confirm this finding in their studies on the Jama'at. Binder identifies the Jama'at's supporters in the 1950s as those "drawn from the traditional middle classes, the students, and those who have failed to enter into the modern middle class despite achieving a bachelor's degree"; Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), P.8. Ahmed writes, "Jamaat-i-Islami’s social base is located amongst small businessmen, small land-holders, and urban lower middle class strata of shopkeepers, teachers, clerks and petty government officials"; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of An Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), pp.112-13.
organization failed to establish a solid base of support among this social stratum. The goal of "revolution through education", therefore, became an increasingly unlikely prospect, a realization which led the Jama'at to rely increasingly on the organizational fiat of IJT, and its "white-collar" unions, to compel the educated classes to religious activism. In recent years, and with the increasing democratization of Pakistani politics, moreover, the Jama'at has begun to question the wisdom of its heretofore literary orientation when most of the votes cast in Pakistani ballots are by the illiterate.

Mawdudi's religious exegesis was sufficiently creative to capture the attention of Muslim intellectuals, and to even bring some into the ambit of the Jama'at. His modernizing proclivity, provided him with a niche in the ambient culture and world view of the educated classes. However, despite his untiring efforts, Mawdudi was never able to successfully build a bridge across the rupture which separates the Islamic and the modern world views. His rational argumentation plagued by anomalies, therefore, often collapsed.

As a result of emphasis placed upon education in 1989 the Jama'at had a literacy rate of 85% while the literacy rate in Pakistan stood at 28%; figures provided by the Office of Qayyim of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.

In similar vein, the Jama'at did make some headway in attracting members of Pakistan civil service, but these figures are not reflected in organizational records. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, as will be detailed in later chapters, Liaqat 'Ali Khan declared the Jama'at a seditious organization, banning members of the civil service from joining it. Mawdudi told his followers among the country's bureaucrats that in the interests of the organization's long run goal they should avoid official affiliation with the Jama'at, and to surreptitiously support it from whatever position they serve. In later years the same policy was adopted vis a vis the personnel of the armed forces.

Jama'at members blame government harassment, and charges of sedition and subversion leveled against them, especially between 1947 and 1956, as partly responsible for their failure to more effectively recruit from among the educated classes; see Syed Asad Gilani, *Maududi; Thought and Movement* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), P.132.
into moralizing sermons. He presented Islam in the language and the logical outlook of the educated classes, but as was often the case, proved unable to persuade his wider audience of the logical consistency of his hybrid formulations, and was therefore, forced to resort to threats of damnation and promise of salvation to underscore his conclusions. As Mawdudi’s ideology remained ill-at-ease with modern thought, so did the Jama’at find its base among the educated confined.

However, as unsuccessful as it may have been in national politics, the Jama’at’s campaign to bring the educated classes into its fold did influence the composition, ethos, and ultimately, the political fate of the organization itself. Over the years, the organization which was started by ‘ulama and religious literati, has become increasingly dominated by those who have received modern education. In 1964, for instance, ‘ulama composed only 26% of the Jama’at’s Central Shura’ members, and in 1970, 45% of the East Pakistan and West Pakistan’s provincial Shura’ members. Similarly, in the same year only 20% of the those who were assigned tickets for National Assembly seats in the general elections by the Jama’at were ‘ulama (see tables 9.1-9.3).11

This changing composition of the Jama’at has also, in part, been a product of the patrimonial structure of Pakistani politics. The firm control of the feudal and comparador classes over the political parties and electoral process in Pakistan, and the class domination of the political system owing to the high cost of entry into the electoral system, has made ideological organizations such as the Jama’at the sole avenue for the

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11 ‘Ulama here refer to those who had received their education in madrasahs and daru’l-‘ulums, and themselves taught religious sciences in these educational institutions, or performed the social functions associated with the ‘ulama.
TABLE 9.1*
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MAJLIS-I SHURA’, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL DEGREE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Ulama/Madrasah Ijazah</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Year Degree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matriculation/High School</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Sayyid As'ad Gilani, Qafilah-i Sakht Jan (Sargodha: Idarah-i Adab-i Islam, 1965) and Khurshid Ahmad, Tazkirah-i Zindan (Karachi: Chiragh-i Rah, 1965). Both books are prison memoirs. They provide information on 60 of the 64 members of Shura' arrested by the government in 1963-64. Information on the remaining 4 was provided by Shu'bah-i Tanzim of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.

**Of the 64, 26 were professors or teachers, 6 were writers or publishers, 9 were merchants or shopkeepers, 18 were bureaucrats or white collar professionals, and 5 were small land holders.
TABLE 9.2*

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF MEMBERS OF MAJLIS-I SHURA'S EAST PAKISTAN AND WEST PAKISTAN IN 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Ulama</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Ed.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc./Agriculture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL.B.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.Com.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: JIKUS, P.43.
### TABLE 9.3*

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI CANDIDATES FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1970-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Ulama</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A./B.Sc.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A./MSM/M.Com.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBBS (Medicine)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL.B.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>150@</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: JIKUS, pp.43-44.
**These included one retired Major General, 1 retired Brigadier, and 3 retired Army Majors.
@The Jama'at actually fielded only 144 candidates for National Assembly elections in 1970-71.
materialization of the political aspirations of the educated middle and lower middle class youth. The Jama'at for instance, is almost unique (with the exception of MQM) in its abeyance by organizational discipline and norms, and consideration of merit and loyalty, in determining upward mobility within the organization, distribution of local and national offices, and assignment of national, provincial, district and city tickets in general elections. The lower middle class background of the Jama'at leadership and elected officials stands in sharp contrast to the upper class social origins of the leaders of other Pakistani national parties, from the populist Pakistan People's Party to the nationalist Muslim League.\(^\text{12}\) For so long as patrimonial norms continue to control Pakistani politics, the Jama'at, which is gaining an increasingly national image, is likely to recruit from the ranks of the politically frustrated and yet aspiring middle and lower middle classes.

The surge in the number of those educated in modern subjects in the ranks of the Jama'at has been consequential in molding the ethos and structure of the Jama'at, and the nature of the organization's interactions with various sociopolitical actors. The laicization of the Jama'at, as seen in the Machchi Goth affair and its aftermath, has both encouraged the bureaucratization of the movement, and the routinization of its religious idealism in favor of greater political activism. Those with modern education maintain organic ties to Islamic sodalities, but stand outside their boundaries, and are divorced from their world views. The norms and discipline of Islamic sodalities has little sway over the religiously-conscious laity, who are instead compelled by the emotive power of religion, and as such,

\(^{12}\) It is the same party discipline which permits the Jama'at to project great power in the national and provincial assemblies, despite its meager numbers.
are more likely to freely utilize that power for sociopolitical purposes.

The Jama'at's literary orientation and courting of the educated classes has also shaped the organization's external relations with the society in which it operates. The concept of "revolution from above" through the aegis of the best and brightest of the society, harbingered through an elaborate propaganda scheme tailored to this "vanguard" group, has closed the Jama'at to Pakistan's plebeian masses, in urban as well as rural areas, who are predominantly illiterate. They remain oblivious to Jama'at's plethora of printed literature, and the logic and language of the organization, which is designed to appeal to the educated Pakistanis. Over the years, as the concept of "revolution from above" has been revised, and its original locomotive - the educated classes - been supplanted by electoral politics, the wisdom of targeting the Jama'at literature to the educated classes has come into question.

The problem of inculcating a base of support among the lower classes, however, runs deeper. The chasm separating the Jama'at's propaganda drive from the urban and rural poor is not only a result of rampant illiteracy in Pakistan, but is also both political and cultural. The continued dominance of traditional forms of power relations, based on the patronage systems supported by pirs or hereditary landed families, in the rural areas has limited the access of the Jama'at to the mass of Pakistani peasantry as well as to recent migrants to cities, who retain political attachments with the rural areas. The purview of the organization's political influence is, therefore, effectively limited to the

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urban areas - where the writ of the traditional political leaders does not reign supreme. This political predicament is, however, compounded by an even more consequential cultural disjuncture between the Jama'at's ideas and style, and the religious and political culture of the rural areas, especially in Sind and Punjab.

One need not look too deep to find fundamental differences between the Jama'at's puritanical and modernizing view of Islam, and the culturally eclectic Islam of the poor. Yet, the conversion of the poor to "veritable" Islam as interpreted by the Jama'at, or encroachment into the rural structure of authority, need not have been insurmountable had the organization been able to effectively communicate with the Pakistani under-class. Rooted in the high culture of the Islamic literati of Northern India, and the tradition of Islamic learning in the Subcontinent, the Jama'at is firmly based in the Urdu language. The organization's Muhajir base of support, and recruiting among the middle and lower middle classes has further entrenched this tendency. The ambient culture of the rural and urban poor, and their nexus with Islam, is deeply rooted in the parochial vernaculars such as Punjabi and Sindhi. The power of Urdu, outside of the Muhajir areas of Hyderabad and Karachi, does not extend any further down than the lower middle classes.

The problem facing the Jama'at in this regard is symptomatic of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan, and of its legitimating role in a highly fractious and precarious polity. Caught in the tangle of a federal arrangement defined in terms of the boundaries of the Urdu

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14 Following it creation the Jama'at made a concerted effort to translate Mawdudi's works into local Indian languages from Malayalam to Sindhi; see RJI, vol.s 1-5. However, the scope of these efforts never matched the weight of the organization's efforts in Urdu, nor did it influence the predominantly Urdu orientation of the movement.
language, which has been kept at bay by the deeply entrenched provincial and parochial political forces, Islamic revivalism has definitively compromised its ability to spread downwards into the masses.\textsuperscript{15} Operating as a national party and a defender of the reality of Pakistan compels movements such as the Jama'at to adopt a universal language, and to avoid appealing to provincial and parochial sentiments - to remain attached to Urdu.\textsuperscript{16} The resolution of this dilemma is far from simple; it requires a significant reinterpretation of the role of Islam in Pakistani politics.

Over the years the Jama'at has nevertheless expanded the purview of its proselytism, and established a base of support in Sind, N.W.F.P., and notably Punjab. The Jama'at's efforts in this regard have closely paralleled Pakistan state's efforts to integrate its disparate provinces into a consolidated state structure. While the greater geographic distribution of the membership has given the Jama'at a national image, they have not sufficiently expanded its social base. To expand that base any further, the Jama'at will have to succumb to the pressures of ethnicity, to sacrifice its national goals and stakes, not to mention its sacrosanct doctrine of Islamic universalism.\textsuperscript{17} As much as the question of

\textsuperscript{15} In 1955 for instance, with view to expanding its base of support, the Jama'at launched a three year policy plan to teach 25,000 people Urdu; cited in \textit{RJI}, vol.7, unpublished manuscript.

\textsuperscript{16} For instance, Tahiru'l-Qadri, the founder of Minhaju'l-Qur'an and Pakistan Awami Tahrik, comes from a rural Punjabi background; yet, his organizations are based solely in Urdu, thereby both seeking religious legitimacy by association with the tradition of Islamic activism in Northern India, and propagating the cause of a united Pakistan. Interview with Tahiru'l-Qadri, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{17} Such a choice interestingly, has precedence in Mawdudi's decision to separate the Indian and Pakistani Jama'at's, eschewing supra-national politics in favor of closer identification with the polities in which the organization's operated.
expanding the Jama'at’s social base may be pointing the movement to adopt a more parochial, provincial and ethnic outlook, the organization, as its strong defense of the unity of Pakistan during the East Pakistan debacle (which will be detailed in chapter 12) shows, has not, as yet, prepared itself to undertake such a momentous step.\textsuperscript{18} The Jama'at, however, cannot altogether remain unmoved by the whirlwind of ethnic politics which is altering the very political equilibrium which has conditioned the organization’s political choices; nor can the organization expect to retain control over the rapidly changing and highly fluid political environment in which it operates. For instance, MQM was established in urban centers of Sind in the 1980s by a number of IJT students who objected to the domination of the Jama'at’s student union by Punjabis.\textsuperscript{19} The Jama'at which had never consciously solicited domination by any one ethnic group, proved incapable of preventing the resurgence of Muhajir sentiments within its ranks, nor did the organization have recourse to mechanisms for controlling it. MQM has subsequently, effectively marginalized the Jama'at in urban centers of Sind, forcing the organization into a \textit{de facto} Punjabi existence - a fate which was neither desired nor welcomed by the organization.

The emergence of a successful ethnic party among the one Pakistani community with most at stake in the federal union of Pakistan, indicates a fundamental change in the

\textsuperscript{18} The Jama'at has, however, taken some steps in this direction. For instance, the current Amir of Sind and Na'ib Amir of the Jama'at, Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi is a Sindhi, and the organization claims that %25 of its membership in Sind are Sindhis; information provided by the Central Offices of Jama'at-i Islami of Sind, Karachi.

\textsuperscript{19} Zahid Hussain, "The Campus Mafias", in \textit{Herald} (Karachi), (October 1988), P.54.
political balance of the country.\textsuperscript{20} This change has eroded the base of support of political groups such as the Jama'at, narrowed their angle of entry into national politics, and by implication, poses a challenge to their heretofore political relevance and efficacy. One may have expected that the diminishing importance of the federal unit at the center to have removed the impediments to the Jama'at's downward expansion among new social strata. However, the rise of the MQM and its mix of ethnic and populist politics, rather than catalyzing the Jama'at transition to a provincial and ethnic mold, has created some resistance in the organization to this development. Faced with the prospects of the collapse of the Pakistani federation at the center and the immediate costs of the loss of the constituency associated with the organization's national role, the enthusiasm of the Jama'at for realigning its political stance along provincial and parochial lines has dampened. Moreover, the desire to serve as an alternative to MQM has compelled the Jama'at to remain hinged on national politics, presenting the Muhajirs with a political platform not available in the repertoire of MQM. The Jama'at has, in essence, been effectively divided between its heretofore political role and ultimate political aim - legitimizing and defending the unity of the polity and territory by which the Jama'at is defined on the one hand, and expanding the social base of the organization with view to electoral success, on the other.\textsuperscript{21}

The resolution of this complex dilemma, however, will in good measure, depend

\textsuperscript{20} This fact is also underscored by the proliferation of ethnic student organizations on Pakistani campuses, which are seriously threatening IJT's position.

\textsuperscript{21} Given the spread of ethnic student organizations on Pakistani campuses, IJT has become a major participants in the debates within the Jama'at over this issue.
on the following three interrelated factors. First, the extent to which provincial and ethnic politics prove receptive to the encroachment of religious ideas and parties into their arena; facilitating or hampering the Jama'at's transformation from an all-Pakistan organization into one with parochial interests and agenda.

Second, the Jama'at's ability to decentralize its organizational structure, and hence, to adapt itself to the disparate needs of the variegated political arena. It is interesting to note at this juncture that, the Jama'at has, thus far in its history, shown no inclination to engage in provincial or ethnic politics, and has instead remained fully committed to national politics. This course of action has over the years found the character of a sacrosanct organizational doctrine, further proving the Jama'at's incorporation of the notion of "nation-state" into its political thinking. When faced with crises in this regard, the Jama'at's response has been in keeping with its commitment to the "nation-state". For instance, the Jama'at did not favor appealing to parochial political forces at play in 1971 when Bangladesh was created. The Jama'at's Election Manifesto of 1970, specifically, rejected appealing to "sons of the soil", and the organization instead declared its aim to be evolution into a national party standing in contrast to ethnic parties; nor did changes in the political climate of Pakistan ever reconcile Mawdudi to a change of course for the

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22 Jameelah argues that since its move to Pakistan, the Jama'at has viewed itself, and by implication, Islam, as guarantors of the continued existence of Pakistan, in lieu of divisive ethnic resurgence. This argument has been entrenched into the political outlook of the Jama'at so deeply that it possesses the force of a basic doctrine; see Maryam Jameelah, *Who is Maudoodi?* (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), p.6.

Jama'at in this regard. Faced with a the collapse of the national entity which defined the parameters of the Jama'at's activities, first, in 1947, and again in 1971, the organization reluctantly, but hastily, adapted itself to the new circumstances. It did so, however, not by recognizing the paramountcy of parochial forces in the political balance of South Asia, and thereby somewhat decentralizing its command structure, but by realigning its strategy and operations along the new national lines, divorcing the organization's non-Pakistani segments, and instead, floating independent Jama'at-i Islamis, with national identities and poise. The Jama'at, therefore, has proved resistant to abandoning national politics. It has accepted change of strategy and organizational structure, only along national lines when the polity itself has divided into new national entities. Firmly committed to the primacy of national politics, the Jama'at is, therefore, hard-pressed to appeal to provincial and ethnic political forces.

The Jama'at is not as yet faced with yet another partition of the political arena in which it operates, but with notable axial shifts in the center of gravity of Pakistani politics. The problem facing the organization, therefore, is to part with its heretofore national poise, and to submit to a change of strategy which is commensurate to changes in the

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24 In a gathering of Jama'at members in 1974, Mawdudi declared that, the Jama'at's aim is not only gaining political success for itself, but more importantly, the preservation of the unity of Pakistan. As such, he enjoined Jama'at members not to be distracted from the legitimating function which their organization performs at the national level, and not to be swayed by the lure of ethnic politics, and hence, to maintain the organizational unity and all-Pakistan poise of the Jama'at; cited in *ISIT(I)* (Lahore: Jama'at-i Islami, 1989), pp.47-49.

25 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad in *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), (November 5, 1979), P.4.
political environment of Pakistan. Modest decentralization may prove to be more palatable, and hence, palpable than the kind of organizational incision which took place in 1947 and 1971; however, given the Jama'at's time-honored resistance to engaging in politics below the national level, such changes may not be forthcoming unless they be imposed on the Jama'at.

Finally, the Jama'at's future course will be determined by the rate at which the organization will lose support in the vote banks affiliated with its national role should it turn to parochial politics, as well as the extent to which that loss would be compensated by a new base of support. For the time being, while examining the organization's possibilities in provincial and ethnic politics, the Jama'at continues to operate at the national level, tenaciously defending the turf of the federal structure against encroachments by parochial forces.

The Muhajir Base of Support and the Political Function of the Jama'at

The Jama'at began its existence in Pakistan as a Muhajir organization, consisting for the most part of Urdu speaking migrants from Muslim minority provinces of India, who settled in the urban centers of Sind and East Pakistan, and migrants from East Punjab who settled in the Pakistani side of that province. The Muhajir community remained the Jama'at's most visible base of support well into the 1980s.²⁶ There have existed notable reasons for the Jama'at's affinity with the Muhajir community, and their

²⁶ For instance of the first 13 Nazim-i 'Ala's of IJT, only 3 were born in Indian provinces inherited by Pakistan (1 in Punjab and 2 in N.W.F.P.). The other 10 were born in areas which today rest within India, and all belonged to the Muhajir community. See the biographical sketches of JV/NAT, vols.1-2.
continued mutual rapport since 1947. No sooner had the Jama'at moved to Pakistan that it began extensive relief work among the refugees in Karachi and Lahore.\textsuperscript{27} Jama'at workers cleaned refuse in refugee camps, buried unclaimed dead bodies, and provided food and medicine.\textsuperscript{28} The Jama'at set up some 42 aid centers for assisting the refugees, spending in excess of Rs.260,000 on these centers between 1947 and 1954, which had benefitted some 1.5 million Muhajirs during that period.\textsuperscript{29} These efforts created a firm bond between Muhajirs and the Jama'at, the more so as at that critical juncture in Pakistan's history the government proved incapable of resolving the problems before the refugees.\textsuperscript{30}

The appeal of the Jama'at for the Muhajirs, however, extended further. The Jama'at's anti-Hindu rhetoric found a receptive ear in the Hinduphobic Muhajirs whose

\textsuperscript{27} RJI, vol.6, pp.123-25.


\textsuperscript{29} Cited in Syed Riaz Ahmad, \textit{Mawlana Mawdudi and the Islamic State} (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), P.176.

This campaign proved so successful that social works of this kind was incorporated into the structure of the Jama'at. The organization created its Shu'bah-i Khidmat-i Khalq (Division for Service to the People), which today runs hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages, centers for assistance to widows and the old, and collects revenues and contributions for distribution among the poor; interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi Lahore. Moreover, when in the 1980s large numbers of Afghan refugees began to pour into Pakistan, the Jama'at initiated similar projects as those for the Muhajirs in the 1950s to inculcate support among the Afghans; interview with Murad 'Ali Shah, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{30} Binder argues that, the more the government proved unable to address the problems of the refugees, the more the Jama'at's efforts in aiding them proved significant in creating a bond between the organization and the Muhajir community, sufficiently so as to attract the JUP and JUI into the fray; see Leonard Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics in Pakistan} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp.96-99.
harrowing experiences with the partition had made them particularly sensitive to the Indian threat. They were moreover, most keen on Mawdudi’s promises of restoration of Islam to its veritable place at the helm of power in the Subcontinent, which for many Muhajirs meant restoration of their fortunes, status and property.

More importantly, the Muhajir community had arrived in a country, where prior to the partition the Muslim League had enjoyed only a modicum of influence, and where ethnic politics and provincial interests superseded the kind of loyalty to Islamic universalism which had warranted Pakistan. The geographical territory of Pakistan or its ethnic and provincial political structure, which had meanwhile, remained unreceptive to the Muhajirs, had no significance for them. The sole reason for whose exodus to their new homeland had been their religious identity. In Mawdudi’s denunciation of nationalism and the Jama‘at’s emphasis upon Urdu and Islam, the Muhajirs therefore, found a political program attuned to their interests, one which sought to conveniently

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32 Metcalf has pointed out that revivalist tendencies in their emphasis upon law, are particularly suited to providing a common cultural identity to Muslims who are uprooted from their local societies; Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India; Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), P.256. Mottahedeh underlines the same issue in his study of Iran; see, Roy Mottahedeh, Mantle of the Prophet; Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985).
obfuscate the fundamental realities of Pakistani politics in the name of Islam.\textsuperscript{33} The Jama'at's political program in general, and its anecdotal depiction of the Muhajir plight as similar to those experienced by the companions of the Prophet who migrated with him from Mecca to Medina - the \textit{muhajirun} \textsuperscript{34} in particular, provided the Muhajirs with a justification for their presence in Pakistan, and a say in the country's politics.\textsuperscript{35} Hence, once again the Jama'at's ideological pronouncements, its appeal to puritanism at a time of social "disorder" and political "transition",\textsuperscript{36} in lieu of a specific sociopolitical program, discerned a base of support for the organization.

The campaign for the "Islamic state", moreover, assigned a political role to the Jama'at, somewhat akin to that of the Muslim League itself, to legitimate the concept of Pakistan, and to provide hope and solace at times of deep division and apprehension in the polity. This legitimating function became the primary role of the Jama'at in Pakistani politics. Given the fragile and fractious nature of Pakistan's political structure, the legitimating function provided the Jama'at with a base of support among those who had,

\textsuperscript{33} In examining the social base of the Iranian revolution, Arjomand argues that, the integrative response of revivalism was greatly appealing to those who had experienced social dislocations; see, Said Amir Arjomand, \textit{The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.189-210.

\textsuperscript{34} For more on this issue see, Martin Lings, \textit{Muhammad; His Life Based on the Earliest Sources} (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp.125-31.


\textsuperscript{36} Michael Walzer has correlated the rise of puritanical movements with the advent of "disorder" in transition periods; see, Michael Walzer, \textit{The Revolution of the Saints; A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics} (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp.313-15.
and continue to have, a stake in the federal unit, notably, the Muhajirs, but also a segment of Punjabi and Pathan middle and lower middle classes. Limited as this legitimating function may seem, it has provided the Jama'at, and other similar Islamic political groups with a significant political role. Given the debilitating crises which have besieged the Pakistani state, and the threat which the disintegrative tendencies within it pose for Pakistan, Islamic movements such as the Jama'at have experienced favorable surges in their following, and found success in their propaganda campaigns. These surges, in good part, account for the Jama'at's reluctance to abandon its legitimating role at the center, and instead to turn to provincial and ethnic politics.

Although the Jama'at had devised no conscious plan to sway the Muhajirs, it soon became conscious of the political value of the Muhajir community, and the pivotal role which urban centers that were dominated by them played in Pakistani politics. By 1951, the year when the first census in Pakistan was taken, the Muhajirs accounted for %57 of Karachi's population, %65 of Hyderabad's, %55 of Sukkhur's, and in all, %46 of the population of Pakistan's 12 major cities. With eyes on elections, and increasingly conscious of its own legitimating function in Pakistani politics, the Jama'at began giving

37 On the positive correlation between popularity of Islamic political themes and instability of the Pakistani political structure see, Lawrence Ziring, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, XXIV:9 (September 1984), pp.931-46.

38 Burki alludes to the disproportionately great power which urban centers have wielded in Pakistan since the country's creation, and especially during its early years of existence; see, Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp.16-17.

political form to its ties with the Muhajir community, thereby focusing its attention on tides of urban politics; both of which soon bore positive results. Most notably, the organization was able to attract large crowds for demonstrations and public rallies in urban areas such as Karachi, time and again intimidating the government into adopting measures demanded by the Islamic political groups. However, with no elections, save for local ballots, in the works until 1970-71, the Jama‘at did not find the opportunity to test the extent of its popularity among the Muhajirs, nor the wisdom of its policy of relying mainly on that community.

Similarly, it was in the elections of 1970-71 that the Muhajirs for the first time took a hard look at their policy of upholding the unity of Pakistan, and hence, lending support to the Jama‘at, the Muslim League or JUP. While the political metamorphosis of the Muhajir community did not manifest itself until the 1980s, doubts produced by the elections of 1970-71, and the subsequent pressures brought by Bhutto to bear on the Muhajirs, set the forces of change in motion.

The Muhajir community therefore, eventually proved to be a fleeting base of support for the Jama‘at. While attracted to the Jama‘at’s ideology and political platform, the Muhajirs found the organization incapable of delivering on their demands. The Jama‘at could perform a legitimating function for them, but could not deliver on specific sociopolitical issues. The Jama‘at’s staggering defeat at the polls in the elections of 1970-71 clearly underlined the limits of the Jama‘at’s political potential, militating new political choices among the Muhajirs. That defeat had, moreover, coincided with the secession of East Pakistan, the loss of its Muhajir community, and the rise to power of a Prime
Minister hostile to the interests of the Muhajirs. The community therefore, more than ever before, felt the need for effective political representation in order to assert its demands and safe-guard its interests. Given the tally of the votes in the elections, that kind of representation was no longer to be found in the Muhajir’s traditional favorites at the polls, least of all in the Jama’at and its meager electoral showing.

The Muhajir community, therefore, began to look elsewhere, not for an alternate all-Pakistan political solution, whereby they could be integrated into the structure of Pakistani politics, but for an ethnic identity, in lieu of their erstwhile all-Pakistan one. The Muhajirs now sought to gain admission into the political system based on its rules, and as one more player in the fractious balance of power. The ethnic solution, moreover, promised to deliver tangible gains to the Muhajirs, to ameliorate their social predicaments, provide channels for upward mobility, and serve as an arena for open expression of political aspirations, all of which were only vaguely implied in the Jama’at’s intangible goal of an Islamic order. By succumbing to the lure of ethnic politics, which emerged in the form of MQM in the 1980s, the Muhajirs closed the door to ideological politics, the Jama’at (as well as other right of center parties such as the Muslim League and JUP), and its vision of a united Pakistan under the overriding banner of Islam.

Fortunately for the Jama’at, the defeat at the polls in 1970-71, as mentioned earlier, had initiated changes within the Jama’at, which helped the organization survive the demise of its Muhajir base of power in the 1980s.

**Continuity and Change in the Jama’at’s Base of Support**

No sooner had the results of the elections of 1970-71 come in that the Jama’at
reexamined its base of support, and embarked upon a program to expand it. In a speech before the workers of the Jama'at on January 10, 1971, Mawdudi blamed the organization's lackluster performance at the polls on its limited base of support. In a spate of self-criticism, Mawdudi declared that the Jama'at boasted a literacy rate of 85% in a country wherein the same percentage represented the illiterate; the organization had spent much of its energy and resources on attracting the educated classes, while it was the poor and the uneducated who determined the outcome of elections. No doubt, the Jama'at had to reexamine its past policies, and undertake significant changes in its orientation and future strategy. Mawdudi's candor resulted in some new policies: greater proselytical work among a wide variety of social groups, notably, women, industrial labor force, the peasants, "ulama, university professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists, government employees, students, and urban youth". Separate programs, and at times, institutional bodies were formed to inculcate support for the Jama'at among each of these strata. The Jama'at began making more active use of "religious schools, mosques, social service centers, zakat committees, municipal offices" and the like for implementing its multi-

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40 Mawdudi's speech was reprinted in A'in (Lahore), (April 25, 1985), P.6.

41 Sayyid Abul Ala Maudoodi, "Muslim Women Must Participate in Islamic Movement", in The Criterion (Karachi), 5:5 (Rajab-Sha'ban 1390/1970), pp.45 and 74.

The women became important to the Jama'at also with regard to the importance which the special women's seats in the provincial and national assemblies has found for the Jama'at. There are today 20 seats reserved for women in the National Assembly, and 23 in Provincial Assemblies. In the elections of 1988 the Jama'at was able to secure 1 special women's seat in the National Assembly, and 1 each in the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and N.W.F.P. Given the limited numbers of Jama'at elected representatives the women's seats have become important to the organization.

42 ISIT(2), P.49.
pronged campaign. The Jama'at elected representatives were directed to establish firm roots in their constituencies, and to solidify their basis of support therein, using an amended version of the PPP motto, "roti, kapra, makan, 'alaj awr zaruri ta'lim (bread, cloth, housing, health and compulsory education). The organization set higher goals for increasing the number of Mutaffiqs, and increased the number and frequency of its training camps for the organization's workers and sympathizers, thereby establishing the ground work for better performance in future elections. These policies were continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s as the mainstay of the Jama'at's organizational development, and harbinger of greater political success. Finally, the analysis of the results of the elections of 1970-71 led the Jama'at to increase its proselytical and organizational work in the provinces, especially in Punjab and N.W.F.P., which were crucial to the working of Pakistani politics, and wherein the Jama'at had shown great weakness, and its all-Pakistan outlook had thus far failed to hit a receptive chord.

43 *ibid.*

44 The motto defined the Jama'at's new khidmat-i khalq (service to the masses) approach launched in 1972. See, *Rudad-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1972* (Lahore: Jama'at-i Islami, nd.), pp.22-23.

45 *ibid*, pp.48-50.

46 In January 1979 the Jama'at Shura' declared mutaffiq-sazi (making Mutaffiqs) a major goal of the organization, setting a goal of %25 increase in their numbers before the Jama'at, and directing the organization to form committees and circles across Pakistan to accomplish this feat. Between March and May 1979 the Jama'at drive brought 109,000 new Mutaffiqs to the Jama'at, 50,000 from N.W.F.P., 32,000 from Sind, 22,000 from Punjab, and 5,000 from Baluchistan; *ibid*, P.32.
These efforts produced some favorable results for the Jama'at. The organization found a more solid base of support in Punjab, but more significantly, was able to grow roots in N.W.F.P. - where the concatenations of traditional power structures, rooted in popular religion exist to a lesser extent than in the other provinces. Since the elections of 1985 (which will be detailed in chapter 14), N.W.F.P. has provided the Jama'at with a steady number of national and provincial assembly seats. While it was the vigorous organizational work undertaken by Qazi Husain Ahmad in the 1970s that opened N.W.F.P. to the Jama'at, the absence of elaborate traditional structures of authority based in Sufism among Pathans also made that province more permeable to Jama'at's proselytical activities. A notable aspect of the Jama'at's rise in prominence in N.W.F.P. is its rural base of support. Nearly all of Jama'at's electoral victories in N.W.F.P. have come from small towns such as Swat, and interestingly, from the rural district of Dir, which has proved to be a Jama'at stronghold, and the only electoral district to choose Jama'at candidates in consecutive general elections since 1970-71.

The result of the aforementioned endeavors was to significantly alter the national distribution and social base of support of the Jama'at. While for much of its existence in Pakistan, from 1947 to 1985, the Jama'at had been associated with the Muhajir

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47 A measure of this success was the Ijtima'-i 'Am (Public Gathering) of the Jama'at in Lahore in November 1989. The Jama'at felt confident enough for the first time to open its organizational meeting to the public, drawing a crowd of 75,000 men and 15,000 women on the opening day of the event. Cited in Nida (lahore), (November 21, 1989), P.17. The evening session of the Ijtima', meanwhile, drew a crowd of 50,000; cited in interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in Herald (Karachi), (December 1989), P.104.

48 In 1988 elections the Jama'at won 4, and in 1990 5, of Dir's 6 Provincial Assembly seats. See chapter 14 for greater detail.
community, and hence, the urban centers of Sind, from 1971 onwards, as the result of the three general elections of 1985, 1988 and 1990 indicate, this picture began to change. In 1988 the Jama'at as a member of IJI won 6 seats to the National Assembly from Punjab, and 2 from N.W.F.P. In 1990 the figures were 7 and 1 respectively. In 1988 the organization won 6 seats to the Punjab Provincial Assembly, and 7 to N.W.F.P. Assembly. In 1990 the figures were 11 and 8 respectively.49 Jama'at's electoral showings in provincial elections improved in the 1990 election. Otherwise the constituencies which elected Jama'at members in 1988 and 1990 remained the same.50 Since 1977, Karachi, as the secure base of Jama'at support and guaranteed source of elected representatives, has given place to Dir and Swat in N.W.F.P. and Lahore and small towns of Punjab. Urban base of support, with the exception of sporadic electoral victories in Lahore and Rawalpindi, evaporated and was replaced by new presence in small towns and rural districts in Punjab and N.W.F.P.51

A comparison of the results of the 1977 elections with those of 1988 and 1990 will further illustrate this point. In the elections of 1977, the results of which have remained in doubt in light of charges of massive rigging, the Jama'at won 9 seats to the National Assembly; 4 from Sind, 2 from Punjab, and 3 from N.W.F.P., indicating the further spread

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49 Figures have been provided by the Shu'bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan.

50 In 1990, however, the Jama'at did better in Punjab than in N.W.F.P., at least in the contest for the National Assembly. Moreover, it did better in larger cities of Punjab than in the elections of 1988. For details see, table 14.7 of chapter 14.

51 Despite variations in number of members elected to provincial and national assemblies in N.W.F.P., the Jama'at's electoral performance in 1988 and 1990 have quite similar, confirming the patterns discerned here.
of the Jama'at's influence into that province. Of the 9 seats, three in N.W.F.P. and 1 in Punjab were in rural/small town constituencies.\textsuperscript{52} The remaining 5 seats were from urban areas. In 1988, of Jama'at’s 8 National Assembly seats, only 2 were from large urban areas. The remaining 6 seats, were all from rural/small town centers. Similarly, in provincial elections in that year, of the Jama'at’s 13 seats only 4 were from major urban centers. The results of the 1990 elections closely parallel those of 1988. Of the Jama'at’s 8 seats to the National Assembly, 3 were from urban centers, all in Punjab, and 5 were from rural/small town areas. Of the 19 provincial seats won by the Jama'at in this year, 9 have been from major urban areas, and 10 from rural/small town areas.\textsuperscript{53}

The scope and nature of the changes in national distribution and structure of the Jama'at's base of support, as seen in tables 9.4-9.7, have been significant, and with far reaching ramifications for the Jama'at's standing in Pakistani politics. While Jama'at’s organizational work and propaganda has been significant in producing these changes, government policies such as Bhutto's nationalization of agricultural businesses, unpopular with rural and small town land owners and the petty-bourgeoisie - small scale urban and rural traders and manufacturers, and the lower segment of the salaried middle classes - have also been significant in opening these new social strata to Jama'at’s influence in the late 1970s.

The desire to consolidate these gains, and to encourage them further, has led the organization to divert an increasing share of the organization’s efforts and resources from

\textsuperscript{52} For greater detail see chapter 12.

\textsuperscript{53} For more details see chapter 13.
### TABLE 9.4*

**MEMBERSHIP FIGURES OF JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI, 1941-1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MEMBERS</th>
<th>% RISE</th>
<th>MUTAFFIQS</th>
<th>% RISE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>385**</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2913</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3308</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>186,085</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3497</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>282,089</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4798</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>238,331</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5723</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>305,792</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: RJI, vol. 5, P.60; vol.6, pp.25-26, 98, and 150; SAAM, vol.2, pp.8 and 392; and Su'bah-i Tanzim of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.

** At the time of partition Jama'at-i Islami had 626 members, 240 of whom remained in India.
### TABLE 9.5*

**JAMA'AT MEMBERS AND WORKERS BY PROVINCE, 1974-1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PUNJAB</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>BALUCHISTAN</th>
<th>SIND</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2077</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>3308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
<td>90957</td>
<td>53272</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>40580</td>
<td>186085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Workers</td>
<td>5102</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>18959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2135</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>3497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
<td>125546</td>
<td>89722</td>
<td>2738</td>
<td>54083</td>
<td>282089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>5436</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>8682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2320</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>3309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
<td>135684</td>
<td>95000</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>13609</td>
<td>245161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>3299</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>3569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2921</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2692</td>
<td>4776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
<td>58797</td>
<td>137514</td>
<td>7273</td>
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<td>256403</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6528</td>
<td>2586</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2692</td>
<td>12016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2905</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>4798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
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<td>103533</td>
<td>1442</td>
<td>71371</td>
<td>238331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6345</td>
<td>2151</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2637</td>
<td>11281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2954</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>5598</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutaffiqs</td>
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<td>126403</td>
<td>2485</td>
<td>116658</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Workers</td>
<td>6430</td>
<td>2674</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3574</td>
<td>13724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>3265</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>5723</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>7583</td>
<td>3374</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3169</td>
<td>14233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Shu'bah-i Tanzim of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.*
# Table 9.6*

**JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, 1974-1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PUNJAB</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>BALUCH</th>
<th>SIND</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISTAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>9272</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2412</td>
<td>11936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCs**</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2753</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>3972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Su'bah-i Tanzim of Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.  
**TC stands for Training Camps.
***MWPR stands for Meetings With Potential Recruits.
@MC stands for Missionary Work Training Camp.
@@JL stands for Jama'at Libraries and Reading Rooms.
@*CC stands for Conferences and Conventions.
### TABLE 9.7*

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SHURA’ MEMBERS, 1950-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1989</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Punjab</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Major Cities of Punjab**</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Cities/Towns of Punjab***</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of Sind</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of NWFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source; Shu’bah-i Tanzim of Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, Lahore.

**Consisting of Multan, Bhawalpur, Lyallpur/Faisalabad, and Rawilpindi/Islamabad.

***In 1950 this figure accounted for the 4 Shura’ members who were from Gujranwala; in 1954 the figure accounted for 2 towns. In 1989 this figure accounted for 19 towns.
the urban centers of Sind to Punjab and N.W.F.P., which also increasingly account for greater numbers of Jama'at members, sympathizers and office holders in those provinces. Moreover, as the distribution of Central Shura' members indicate, the Jama'at's base of support has effectively shifted from urban centers in Punjab and N.W.F.P. to smaller towns and rural areas in those provinces. In Punjab, in 1957, the five major cities of Lahore, Rawilpindi, Lyallpur (Faisalabad), Multan and Bhawalpur accounted for 23 of the 29 members of the province's share of Central Shura' members; with the remaining 6 coming from 2 smaller towns. In 1989, the share of the 5 cities had shrunk to 11, whereas 24 Central Shura' members came from 19 Punjab towns. Similarly, while Peshawar accounted for all of N.W.F.P.'s 5 Central Shura' members in 1957, in 1989 that city accounted for only 2 of the 8 N.W.F.P. Central Shura' members, the other 6 being from small towns and rural areas.

The greater prominence of the more conservative small town and rural elements in the Central Shura' has, moreover, influenced the extent of the organization's flexibility in contending with sociopolitical exigencies. For instance, in November 1989, the Jama'at leadership with view to expanding the Jama'at's base of support, suggested that the organization's views on the purdah system be relaxed - to be specific, women be permitted to show their faces in public. The matter was placed before the Majlis-i 'Amilah for debate. The suggestion met with great resistance from the majority of the Majlis' members, who are from small towns and rural areas of Punjab and N.W.F.P. Backed by a fatwa from the Jama'at's 'ulama, who ruled that purdah was an issue addressed in the

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54 Interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, Lahore.
religious sources, and not open to interpretation or change. The conservative small town/rural element soundly defeated the initiative for relaxing the Jama'at's strict ethical standards.

These changes were even reflected in the leadership of the Jama'at. In 1987, after 46 years with a Muhajir at the helm, the Jama'at chose its first Pathan Amir from N.W.F.P., Qazi Husain Ahmad. The organization has, moreover, adopted an increasingly populist posture to further, and also to consolidate these changes. The choice of a populist Amir, Qazi Husain, to succeed the laconic Mian Tufayl Muhammad was, no doubt, motivated by the desire to replace the heretofore subdued image of the Jama'at's leadership with a more magnetic one, thereby both invigorating activism within the Jama'at, and kindling appeal for the organization among a greater number of Pakistanis. In 1987, Qazi Husain began his term of office as Amir with a much publicized mass contact tour from Peshawar to Karachi, named Karvan-i Da'wat'u

55 Mawdudi was born in Hyderabad, and resident in Delhi and East Punjab, while Mian Tufayl Muhammad belonged to East Punjab. One reason for the choice of Qazi Husain was his success in expanding the Jama'at's base of support in N.W.F.P., showing Jama'at's greater concern with its new gains, and lesser concern with the Muhajir vote.

56 See text of Qazi Husain's speech to the "Jama'at youth" in Takbir (Karachi), (October 12, 1989), pp.42-43; wherein Qazi Husain argues fervently for expanding the Jama'at's reach into the masses of illiterate Pakistanis. Qazi Husain himself is of the opinion that while the Jama'at realized the importance of appealing to lower social strata after the 1970-71 elections, few structural changes were undertaken to reorient the politics of the Jama'at. He therefore, sees such an undertaking as the central focus of his leadership of the Jama'at; interview with Qazi Husain, Lahore.

57 The Jama'at's policies in this regard are increasingly motivated by the perceived threat which the organization feels from the resurgent populist Islamic groups, such as Tahiru'l-Qadri's Minhaju'l-Qur'an, which combine revivalism with populism, thereby posing the possibility of making inroads into the Jama'at's base of support.
Muhabbat (the Caravan of Invitation and Benevolence), which gained him the sobriquet "surkhah" (red, i.e. leftist) in the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{58} Since his election to the office of Amir, Qazi Husain has, moreover, harped on populist themes - attacking \textit{jagirdari} (feudalism) and \textit{sarmayahdari} (capitalism)\textsuperscript{59} - informing Jama'at politics of sociopolitical imperatives to a greater extent, and deliberately bestowing upon the organization's rhetoric and plan of action sensitivity for class consciousness:

"In this country there is a small imperialist class whom the British established in power. Since the British left, this small class has been ruling the country. The culture of this class is foreign; in their houses they speak in another language. They are educated in special institutions. This is our ruling class, which is as foreign and alien as were the British. This the people understand.\textsuperscript{60}

Interestingly, Qazi Husain, much like Mawdudi, approaches social analysis from the angle of culture rather than economics.

It is also apparent from his rhetoric that, the Jama'at's political discourse continues to unfold in the context of national politics. The organization has responded to the weakening of the utility of its legitimating function, not by looking to more parochial political arenas, but by seeking out contentious issues which would have national relevance, and would, therefore, bolster the preeminence of federal unit in the working of Pakistani politics. The efficacy of this approach in both substituting the legitimating

\textsuperscript{58} The campaign was specifically designed to increase the Jama'at's appeal in rural Sind, through which Qazi Husain proceeded en route to Karachi, see, \textit{Jasarat} (Karachi), Ijtima'-i 'Amm Number (November 1989), P.1.

\textsuperscript{59} Badr, \textit{Qazi Husain}, pp.95-108.

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (June 30, 1988), P.14.
function of the Jama'at at the national level with a populist one, and providing the Jama'at with a base of support among new social classes remains to be tested in the years to come.

While changes in the national distribution of the Jama'at base of support had to do with the politics of the Muhajir community, and the Jama'at’s organizational activities in Punjab and N.W.F.P., Jama'at’s reach into small towns and rural districts owed its success, in good measure, to IJT.

Chaudhry and McDonough in their study of Pakistani university students, found students from rural areas to be more prone to religious activism; and in similar vein, more likely to identify with religious groups. Moreover, IJT’s operations on university campuses effect rural students, and those from small towns, more directly. The organization controls university hostels and other much needed facilities, which are more frequently used by rural and small town students, and also provides academic and administrative assistance and services to students, which again are mostly beneficial to students from rural areas and small towns.

Despite the gains made by the Jama'at in expanding its national base of support, and making inroads into the small towns and rural areas of Punjab and N.W.F.P., which

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62 In an interview with *The Friday Times of Lahore*, (September 21-27, 1989), P.2, the IJT Nazim of Lahore stated that the organization is predominantly composed of students from rural areas.
were reflected in their modestly improved electoral showings in 1985, 1988 and 1990, the Jama'at has not sufficiently changed its political stance, and especially, organizational structure to fully accommodate Qazi Husain's populism, and hence, realize the expectation of electoral victory in a country where %69 of the population live in the rural areas. Even, as efficacious as IJT has proven to be, it too, has reached the limit of its downward expansion. With no political program to directly address the problems of the rural and small town voters, IJT has proved unable to galvanize its network on the campuses into a national political network. Moreover, IJT's reach does not extend to the masses of illiterate peasantry who never enter universities, and at best encompasses the rural small land-holders and the petty-bourgeoisie. In fact despite the changes which are apparent in the Jama'at's base of support, the organization remains based in the petty-bourgeoisie, and tied to the vicissitudes of that class in Pakistani politics. The Jama'at has therefore, been increasingly forced to face up to the questions which Mawdudi posed in his speech of January 10, 1971, and to put such issues as fundamental changes in the structure of the Jama'at to debate.

**Religious Organization or Political Party: The Debate Over Jama'at Membership**

Since its creation in 1941, the Jama'at has adhered to a set of steadfast rules and sacrosanct criteria in restricting its membership. Mawdudi explicated the reasoning for this policy in the following terms,

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63 For details of these election results see, Part IV.

"So I concluded that I wanted Jama'at-i Islami's discipline to be very strict and firm, whether some stay or leave...I would not permit compromise on the organization."\textsuperscript{65}

Discipline, moral rectitude, and strong organizational bonds were seen as both the foundation stones of recreating the veritable \textit{ummah} of the Prophetic era, and the most efficacious means of pursuing the goals of "Islamic revolution" and the "Islamic state". Yet, as the Jama'at began to invest its fortunes in the Pakistani political process, beginning in 1951, the relevance of the concept of a "vanguard" - an "organizational weapon" - in the revolutionary sense of the term, as floated by Lenin and adopted by Mawdudi, became suspect.

The leadership of the Jama'at, still unclear about the exact nature of its decision to turn to politics, and the scope and extent of the implications of this change in strategy, was reluctant to undertake any substantial reforms in the structural make-up of the organization. Hence, with view to the demands of an electoral campaign - increasing the size of the Jama'at's cadre of workers - and the need to expand the base of support of the Jama'at, in 1951 the leadership decided to introduce a new category of affiliate with the Jama'at, the Mutaffiq (ally or affiliate). Mutaffiqs were convenient buffers between the Jama'at and the Pakistani society, the means whereby the Jama'at could expand its organizational networks, without compromising the principles and criteria which formed the core of its organizational structure. The Mutaffiq category, therefore, both reflected and confirmed the ambivalent nature of the Jama'at's political existence, and the tensions between its religious idealism and pragmatic political proclivity - what culminated in the

\textsuperscript{65} JIKUS, P.32.
Machchi Goth affair.

The Mutaffiqs were to be constituted of those who favored the Jama'at's goals and ideas, but were not ready to abide by its organizational discipline, a periphery through which the hardened organizational structure of the Jama'at could interact with the society at large.\footnote{JIKUS, pp.34-35.} In November 1951, during the organization's convention in Karachi, the Jama'at decided to actively recruit and organize at least 12,000 Mutaffiqs.\footnote{RJI, vol.6, pp.26-27.} Thenceforth, with the increasing interest of the Jama'at in electoral politics, this category of Jama'at affiliates became the organization's political life-line, the means to expand its base of support and organizational reach. The Mutaffiq category also permitted the Jama'at to evade the question of more fundamental structural changes in the organization. A positive correlation was thus established between greater political activity and the resultant electoral defeats on the one hand, and emphasis upon the Mutaffiqs, on the other. The humiliating defeat in the Punjab elections of 1951 precipitated no debates regarding the membership criteria of the Jama'at, but led to a more aggressive policy of recruiting and organizing Mutaffiqs.\footnote{SAAM, vol.1, P.384.} In 1955, with an eye on possible national elections, the Jama'at leadership directed the organization to recruit 40,000 Mutaffiqs in a three year period.\footnote{RJI, vol.7, unpublished manuscript.}

Although no elections took place in Pakistan until 1970-71, the Jama'at continued to expand its organizational networks through the Mutaffiq category. The Machchi Goth
affair, ironically assisted the Jama‘at in this regard. The declaration of the Majlis-i Shura’ in November-December 1956 that Mawdudi’s writings were not binding on the organization and its membership, was used by Jama‘at activists to attract greater numbers of followers of other schools of Islamic thought into the purview of the Jama‘at’s influence.70 These new recruits were often loyal to Deobandi or Ahl-i Hadith traditions, or were followers of other self-styled religious movements, but sympathized with the Jama‘at’s sociopolitical goals. Their entry into the pale of the Jama‘at, therefore, transformed the terms under which the Mutaffiq allied himself with the Jama‘at. The category of Mutaffiq no longer represented only those who were swayed by the message of the Jama‘at but were hesitant to submit to its rigorous discipline. Mutaffiq, increasingly referred to those who sympathized with the Jama‘at’s political program only, and while religiously remained attached to other schools of Islamic thought.

While efficacious in expanding the organizational horizons of the Jama‘at, the Mutaffiq category proved inadequate in satisfying the rapidly rising political expectations of the organization. The Jama‘at’s momentous defeat at the polls in 1970-71, left little room for the organization’s leadership to remain sanguine about the promise of the Mutaffiq category. Mawdudi came under increasing pressure to reform the criteria for membership itself, and to prepare the Jama‘at for a more effective expansion of its organizational reach. Conscious of the implications of such a move, Mawdudi balked at the idea, and by blaming the defeat on the machinations of foreign powers diverted

70 Interview with Farid Ahmad Parachah, Lahore.
attention from fundamental organizational reforms.\textsuperscript{71} His vision of the Jama'at was still not that of a "party", but that of a "virtuous" community - an embryonic \textit{ummah} - and a "vanguard". If success in electoral politics necessitated a fundamental change in the structure and ethos of the Jama'at, then Mawdudi preferred that the Jama'at opt out of the electoral process altogether. It was this consideration that led him to argue before the Jama'at Shura' in 1975 that the organization was better advised to reevaluate its agenda to date, as well as its future course of action - possibly leaving electoral politics in the interests of ideological purity.\textsuperscript{72} The Jama'at had, however, since 1957 incorporated commitment to electoral politics too successfully into its ethos to now simply walk away from it. Tensions therefore, continued to brew in the ranks of the Jama'at, periodically producing conflicts. For instance, suggestions by 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad in 1978 that, the Jama'at as a political "party" should more closely ally itself, and even blend in, with other Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) parties, provoked a public censure from Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{73}

Mawdudi's adamant stance staved off any moves to open up the Jama'at membership. The organization, instead, resorted to other means to expand its base of

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.392-93. Also interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi.

\textsuperscript{72} Correspondences with Mawlana Wasi Mazhar Nadwi, 1989-90.

\textsuperscript{73} The Jama'at leadership went to great lengths first, to dissuade Mawdudi from publicly chastising 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad, sending Mawlana Gulzar Mazari to speak with Mawdudi. Mazari's failure led the organization to launch a concerted effort to prevent various newspapers from publishing the text of Mawdudi's censure. In the case of \textit{Wifaq} newspaper of Lahore, for instance, its editor, himself a one-time Jama'at member, Mustafa Sadiq recollects that, the Qayyim of the Jama'at made a number of personal pleas, albeit in vein, to prevent the publications of Mawdudi's statement; interview with Mustafa Sadiq, Lahore. The censure was eventually published in \textit{Wifaq} and \textit{Nawa'i-i Waqt} in Lahore; see also, Nizami, \textit{Jama'at-i Islami}, pp.102.
support such as, greater organizational activity among students, women, the labor force and the peasants. The popularity which the organization enjoyed in the 1970s as a result of its firm opposition to the Bhutto government and success with mobilizing the masses around single causes, such as the "Bangladesh Namanzur" (non-recognition of Bangladesh) campaign, moreover, obfuscated the issues which had given rise to the debate over membership.

The problem of expanding the Jama'at's base of support more definitively, and the resolution of the anomaly inherent in utilizing a "vanguard" organizational structure in electoral politics, however, continued to beckon the attention of the Jama'at leaders. Since 1985, when lackluster electoral results once again raised the specter of doubt regarding the fate and objectives of the Jama'at; the loss of support among the Muhajirs underlined the deficiencies of the Jama'at's political program and organizational structure; and with Mawdudi out of the picture, impassioned debates regarding reform of membership criteria have been waged within the organization as well as among its periphery of sympathizers.

A group of Mawdudi loyalists - those who continue to see the Jama'at as a religious movement, as well as those who advocate an "Islamic revolution" of some form - resist any significant changes in the structure of the Jama'at. They argue that the Jama'at's *raison d'être* and prowess rest in its ideological vision, which could be diluted or worse yet, manipulated by an influx of members who do not have firm loyalties to Jama'at's

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ideological foundations. They could use their vote to obliterate the Jama‘at from within, to do what successive governments have attempted and failed. The Jama‘at, they argued, owed its continuity to its strong structural foundations, and the moral calibre and loyalty of its strict membership criteria.\textsuperscript{75} Their position has been bolstered by the fact that no one in the Jama‘at wishes to compromise the discipline which underlies the power of the organization. In a country wherein political parties are hopelessly divided from within into factions and autonomous wings, Jama‘at leaders believe, there is something to be said for the organization’s moral standing and discipline.

The more politically motivated Jama‘at leaders and workers, however, favor some form of opening up of the Jama‘at.\textsuperscript{76} They argue that, for the Jama‘at to succeed electorally, it must encompass greater numbers of the masses, and to engineer and manipulate their "political participation" - it must become a full-fledged party.\textsuperscript{77} In the words of Khurram Murad, "revolution has no meaning without popular support."\textsuperscript{78} The Jama‘at, the advocates of this position contend, must interpret its constitution more liberally in order to open its ranks, and subsequently, decision-making process to the many

\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Chaudhri Rahmat Iliahi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{76} There exist different positions within the Jama‘at on this issue, from opening the Jama‘at membership to the few and the sundry, to creating new intermediary criteria between Rukn and Mutaffiq, to providing mechanisms for greater participation by Mutaffiqs in Jama‘at’s decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{77} Muhammad Salahu’ddin, "Tajziyah" and "Qa’idin-i Jama‘at ki Khidmat Main Chand Ma'zurat", in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), pp.9-13. Salahu’ddin, a journalist close to the Jama‘at favors opening the membership to the organization completely, and instead, placing restrictive criteria for holding office in the Jama‘at.

\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Khurram Jah Murad in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, pp.78-79.
Pakistanis who are close to the Jama’at ideologically and politically, and yet are kept away from the organization by the forbidding criteria for, and demands of, the Jama’at’s membership. While the Jama’at has done much to create an "Islamic vote bank" in Pakistan, by denying sufficient representation to this group of voters, the organization is unable to effectively consolidate a base of support among them, and therefore, cannot benefit from the fruits of its own toil. The Jama’at, moreover, cannot count on affiliates and sympathetic voters, and to succeed, it must retain organizational control over great numbers. Jama’at’s loss of ground among the Muhajir community is a strong argument in favor of this position. The great ease and rapidity with which this community abandoned the Jama’at, attests to the transient and evanescent nature of the ad hoc social linkages which the Jama’at’s current organizational structure engenders. Those hardest hit by the loss of the Muhajir vote, members of the Jama’at in Sind, argue that, had the Muhajir community been able to express its views in the Jama’at to a greater extent, and hence seen more of its interests reflected in the organization’s policies, it might not have been compelled to look for an alternate political solution to its predicaments so readily.

The demand for change has been voiced from different quarters. From within the Jama’at by the organization’s Muhajir element, as well as by those to whom the

79 Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi.

80 The most notable advocates of opening up of the Jama’at in this category are ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Khurram Jah Murad, both Muhajir Na’ib Amirs of the Jama’at; interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi and Khurram Murad, Lahore. Also see, interview with Khurram Jah Murad in Awaz-i Jahan (Lahore), (January 22, 1990), pp.10-14.

Also significant pressures for change come from the influential periphery of the Jama’at, from men like Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Muhammad Salahu’ddin and Mujibu’l-
Jama'at has made overtures in order to evade opening the Jama'at's ranks - members of its various unions. The Jama'at's efforts in the 1970s and the 1980s to find a base of support among the labor force, peasants, and also white collar professionals has only created new demands for greater say in the affairs of the organization. The more these new social groups have come close to the Jama'at, the more the organization has felt the pressure for change, lest it fail to sustain its rapport with its new found allies and supporters. The proliferation of semi-autonomous organizations such as those focusing on the labor force, peasants, teachers, or lawyers, moreover, threaten the Jama'at's organizational structure directly by creating centrifugal tendencies within the organization. If these expanding groups are not successfully incorporated into the body of the Jama'at, the organization will face the threat of losing control over them.

The pressures for opening the ranks of the Jama'at to greater numbers are not always produced by the concern for, or the political benefits of, the incorporation of new elements into the organization, but also by anxieties over the implications of the inhibitive membership criteria for the organization's world view. The Jama'at's organizational discipline, and limited membership, have kept the Jama'at afloat throughout its turbulent history. Yet, such benefits have been matched by exacting political costs. Limited membership has provided the Jama'at with a strong sense of corporatist identity, and by the same token, distanced the Jama'at from Pakistani society. The strict demands of the Rahman Shami. These men are staunch supporters of the Jama'at, but are not bound by the code of conduct which bars Jama'at members from public discussion of organizational issues. Moreover, as editors of magazines and journals with large following within the ranks of the Jama'at these men have been able to disseminate ideas about change directly into the Jama'at, forcing the organization to debate its future course of action.
membership, have reduced the interactions between the Jama'at and the social context in which it operates, imbuing the organization with an elitist and patronizing outlook, and a distinct ethos and code of conduct - what one erstwhile Jama'at votary calls "a Jama'at 'asabiyyah (group solidarity)"\(^{81}\) - effectively sequestering the members of the organization from the society at large.\(^{82}\) For many years, the intellectualized, pedantic, and often apolitical, discourse of the Jama'at - telling Pakistanis what they should think and demand rather than representing their aspirations - and the distinct appearance and sartorial characteristics of its members - long sherwani coats, caracul caps - and long beards has distinguished them from their audience, giving currency to the explicative sobriquet, "Jama'ati" (of the Jama'at). More significant in this regard, has been a distinctive world view, born of greater interactions within the Jama'at rather than with those outside of it, one which permeates through the ranks of the Jama'at. Not only has this world view created a fundamental gap between the Jama'at members and those it has addressed, but has distorted the organization's views on the working of society and politics in Pakistan, leading them, at least on one occasion - 1970-71 - into the abyss of electoral defeat. The Effective political activism, therefore, must occur in tandem with more facile communications between the Jama'at and various Pakistani social groups and political actors. The opening of the Jama'at is therefore, not only a concession to outsiders who

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\(^{81}\) The term refers to Ibn Khaldun's notion of Group or Tribal Solidarity, as the most basic determinant of social identity and interaction in his *Introduction*; for a more detailed explanation see, Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.196ff.

\(^{82}\) Nizami, *Jama'at-i Islami*, pp.77-79.
desire greater role in the Jama'at, but also the means whereby the organization can become sensitive and responsive to the sociopolitical imperatives and dynamics which determine the course of politics in Pakistan, and the fate of the Jama'at therein. As the danger of annihilation appears to be a waning threat, the pressures for removing obstacles for more integrative social interaction continue to mount, increasingly so from the more politically conscious Jama'at leadership and workers.

The Jama'at has not, as yet, decided upon a future course of action with regard to its membership criteria. The scope and nature of the debates concerning this issue, much like those which have determined the pattern of the organization's evolution over the years and the changes in its social base outlined here, however, have far-reaching implications. They reflect the Jama'at's continuing struggle with tensions born of applying the organization's ideological perspective to the pursuit of its political goals, and the manner in which the resolution of these tensions, and the changes they have wrought in the organizational structure and social base of the Jama'at, control the pattern of the routinization of the organization's idealism, channeling it into political activism. The outcome of this process, and the ultimate shape which the Jama'at's greater political activism is likely to take, however, have, in good part, been controlled and conditioned by the dialectic of the organization's interactions with other political actors, and the various Pakistani governments; to which we shall turn in Part IV.
PART IV
JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI AND THE PAKISTAN STATE, 1941-PRESENT: CONFLICT, CONCORD, AND THE DYNAMICS OF A SYMBIOSIS

"Our politics is religion, and our religion is politics."

Mian Tufayl Muhammad
CHAPTER 10
JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI, MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT, 1941-1947

Earlier in this study the parameters of the Jama'at's role in politics was briefly sketched out. The genesis of the Jama'at's ideological perspective, the dynamics of its implementation, the nature of the nexus between ideology and social action, and the pattern of continuity and change in the organization's structure and political program were all duly examined. Three overriding and interrelated processes were subsequently identified, which serve as the fundamental determinants of both the nature of the Jama'at's political activism, and the outlines of the historical paradigm which has governed the evolution of the movement. The three processes are the routinization of the Jama'at's idealism, the encadrement of the organization's ideological perspective and political aspirations within the boundaries of the Pakistan "nation-state", and the articulation and unfolding of the Jama'at's legitimating function within the national polity. Our objective in Part IV will be to examine the actual working of these processes, individually, as well as in their collectivity, in shaping the Jama'at's ethos, and delineating its organizational structure and sociopolitical function, all within the context of the gyrations of Pakistan's political history. The analytical narrative here will, moreover, seek to discern the manner in which the dialectics of the Jama'at's unfolding political orientation and organizational consolidation interacted with the objectives and needs of the Pakistan state to engender a symbiotic relationship between the two, above and beyond the mutual antagonisms.
between the organization and the governments in power in Pakistan.\footnote{In this regard also see, Anita Weiss, "The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia", in Anita Weiss (ed.), \textit{Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp.1-20; Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology", in \textit{ibid}, pp.21-48; and the various essays in Asghar Khan (ed.), \textit{Islam, Politics and the State; the Pakistan Experience} (London: Zed Books, 1985).}

The roots of the relations between the Jama'at and the Pakistan state predate the creation of the country. The antagonistic and yet symbiotic relations between the two can be traced to the late-1930s, when the Muslim League and the question of a separate Muslim homeland became a serious consideration, and Mawdudi's revivalist agenda began to take shape. The relations between the two has since then been both complex, and consequential, in the manner in which it has influenced the evolution of the Jama'at on the one hand, and the Islamization of the political discourse in Pakistan, on the other. The depth and breadth of this relationship, however, cannot be appreciated without taking note of the subtleties of the Jama'at's stance on the issue of Muslim separatism, and especially the nebulous but significant distinction which the organization made between Pakistan and the Muslim League. It has been a curious aspect of the relations between the Jama'at and the Muslim League - which is usually reduced by the Jama'at's detractors to "opposition to Pakistan" - that, the Jama'at displayed more congenial feelings to the idea of a separate Muslim homeland in 1941 than in 1947, and its venomous attacks on Muslim separatism escalated in direct relation and reference to the greater paramountcy of the Muslim League. The Jama'at's stance on Pakistan emerged not so much in debate with Muslim separatism, but in response to the prospects of its materialization under the
aegis of the Muslim League.²

Jama'at-i Islami and the Pakistan Movement

Jinnah, as it was alluded to earlier in this study, was instrumental in forming Mawdudi's thinking on politics, and the role of religion and its traditional spokesmen therein. It was Jinnah who unveiled the political potential of religion to Mawdudi and the Jama'at, and by the same token, blinded Mawdudi to the importance of socioeconomic factors in the evolution of the Pakistan movement. Although the Jama'at followed the League's example in wooing the politically significant educated Muslim middle classes, this did not constitute a socioeconomic reading of the Pakistan Movement. For, Mawdudi never saw the League as a product of the Congress Party's intransigence vis a vis Muslim demands, nor born of the frustrations of the educated Muslim middle classes with the machinery of the British Raj, nor a result of the Congress' Hinduization under the aegis of Gandhi.³ Mawdudi, instead, understood the power of the Muslim League to be quintessentially summarized in Jinnah's appeal to Islamic symbolisms and Muslim religious sensibilities.⁴ Time and again, Jama'at leaders have repeated the Muslim League slogan: "Pakistan ka matlab kiya hey? La ilaha ila'llah" (What is Pakistan about? there is no god

² In a letter dated August 1, 1976 Mawdudi asserted that, he was opposed to the Muslim League because it was clear to him that Jinnah never intended to build an Islamic state in Pakistan. He furthermore lamented that, Jinnah’s successors were not true to his vision, and sought to depict all criticisms of the League as criticisms of Jinnah, and all criticisms of Jinnah as disloyalty to Pakistan; Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Pakistan Awr Jama'at-i Islami (Multan: Ikhwan Publications, nd.), P.2.

³ On these issues see Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁴ Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Pakistan, P.6.
but God - the Muslim testimony of faith) to underline this point. For Mawdudi the League's successful use of religious symbolisms was a proof of the receptivity of Muslim politics to intrusive forays by religious elements, all the more so as the League leadership not only consisted of laymen, but of secular, westernized, and "nominal" Muslims. The very success of the League in manipulating religious symbolisms became Mawdudi's justification for demanding an Islamic state. Mawdudi argued that, the Muslims of India desired such a state, short of which there existed no incentive for them, as well as for him, to secede from India; there was no point in substituting Hindu rule with a godless one.

"If I could secure one square mile of territory in which none other than God would reign supreme, I would value every speck of its dust more than the entirety of India."

The League, Mawdudi insisted, knew what it was promising to Muslims, but was neither willing nor capable of delivering on its promise.

If religion was to portent political success, concluded Mawdudi, then he was naturally a more superior leader for his community than the westernized Jinnah who


6 JIKUS, P.27.


9 Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash (Lahore, 1940), vol.3, P.127.
neither prayed, nor spoke proper Urdu. The League, Mawdudi surmised, could at best only partially satisfy the appetite for Islamicity which it had whetted among Muslims; it was to be a precursor to "a veritable Pakistan", pointing the way for a true "vanguard" - the Jama'at - to create and run the Islamic state for the Muslims of India. If Muslims had mobilized so enthusiastically around the League's half-baked Islamic appeal, then the Jama'at was bound to sweep away the Pakistan movement once Muslims had heard Mawdudi's message and learnt of the religiously more meaningful program of the Jama'at. Moreover, Mawdudi, aptly saw the Muslim League as a "one man Show", hence, incapable of the kind of organizational activity which the realization of a Muslim state demanded, The Movement he concluded, was bound to falter in light of the frailty of its leader and its nebulous nexus with the religious sentiments that were sustaining its drive. Mawdudi therefore, maintained a distance with the League, preparing the Jama'at as a "rear-guard" ('aqab lashkar), waiting in the wings for the opportune moment to step in the League's

10 See interview with Sayyid Abu'l-Khayr Mawdudi in Nigar (Karachi), (September 1963), P.63.

11 In a letter to Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan, dated 23 Rabi'u'l-Thani 1356 (1938/39) Mawdudi stated that Muslims were demanding an Islamic state, and hence, "cannot fully identify with Muslim League"; the letter is reprinted in Al-Ma'arif (Lahore), 18:1-2 (April-May 1985), P.249.

12 Malik Ghulam 'Ali, who had been an ardent supporter of Pakistan when he joined the Jama'at, recollects that many proponents of Pakistan like himself congregated around Mawdudi. They did not see Mawdudi as anti-Pakistan, but viewed his position as reflective of the vision for a "true Pakistan"; interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.

13 Letter to Dr. Zafaru'l-Hasan, in Al-Ma'arif, pp.249-50; the term "rear-guard" in reference to Jama'at's strategy was also cited in TQ, (December 1937), P.301.
shoes. Hence despite pressures for cooperation with the League from within the Jama'at, the organization maintained its distance with the Muslim League, even when the threat of ominous electoral victory by the Congress loomed in the horizon; an attitude most clearly reflected in the Jama'at's decision not to assist the League in the Indian elections of 1945, arguing that the organization could not render assistance to "a party with no morals [Muslim League]." In later years, Mawdudi summarized the Jama'at's policy in the 1941-47 period in the following terms,

"We did believe in a separate Muslim state, but chose not to interfere with the Muslim League. Had the Qa'id [Jinnah] failed, we would have then stepped in."

It can be concluded that, Jama'at-i Islami had been formed in August 1941 in direct response to the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 of the Muslim League, not to stop Pakistan, but to replace the Muslim League in the effort for its realization; to prevent a secular future for Muslims, and to deliver what the League had promised but could

15 Interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.
16 Kawthar (Lahore), (October 28, 1945), P.1. The only exception to this policy was Mawdudi's defence of the League before charges leveled by Congress Party, in which Pakistan was compared to Israel, and the League's wisdom for supporting the former, and rejecting the latter were questioned. Mawdudi wrote a lengthy and detailed rebuttal to the Congress position; see, Kawthar (Lahore), (July 5, 1947), P.1.
17 Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, "Ham ne Tahrik-i Pakistan ke Sath Nehin Diya Tha", in Nawa'-i Waqt (Lahore), (August 15, 1975), P.3.
not possibly usher in.\textsuperscript{19} The Jama'at's agenda and objectives were devised with view to the shortcomings of the League, which Mawdudi had viewed as significant enough to warrant the Jama'at's "wait and see policy". In May 1939, Mawdudi had asserted that, "[forming] the party implies changing the government".\textsuperscript{20} When the Jama'at was formed some two years later, the only government it portended to change, as is evident in the direction of its propaganda and political activities, was that of the future Muslim state.\textsuperscript{21}

The Jama'at emerged as a movement of "renaissance" of Islam (\textit{nish'at-i naw}), aiming at Islamic government (\textit{iqamat-i din}), to be distinguished from the League's "territorial and cultural conception of Muslim nationhood" and secular notions of government.\textsuperscript{22} Mawdudi's aversion to the League and its policies were not only doctrinal, but had their roots in his understanding of the trials and tribulations of Muslims in India. For Mawdudi, who had witnessed the decline of the Nizam's state in Hyderabad, Muslim rule by itself was a hollow and ephemeral concept. When and where it had existed it had not guaranteed the rights and political fortunes of Muslims; it was a model of government, the shortcomings of which were born out by Muslim experiences. If Muslims sought an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Sayyid As'ad Gilani, "Jama'at-i Islami, 1941-47", Ph.D. dissertation presented to Department of Political Science of Punjab University, 1989-90, pp.99-100; also see, Mawdudi, \textit{Tahrik-i Pakistan}, pp.7-8.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{TQ}, (May 1939), P.171.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Mawdudi has stated that, as early as 1942, the Jama'at began to devise plans for operating in Pakistan, should it materialize; cited in \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, P.256.
\end{itemize}
indubitable panacea to their quandary, they had to look farther than the Muslim League's manifesto, to the fundamental sources of power and glory in their culture - Islam. It was in this spirit that in Tonk, Rajasthan, in 1947 Mawdudi exhorted:

"[If the Muslim League] sincerely stood up as the true representatives of Islam, the whole of India could become Pakistan."\(^{23}\)

The Jama'at, therefore, from inception, placed a great deal of emphasis on the distinction between things "Islamic" and "Muslim", and more importantly, "Islamic" and "secular". In this regard the organization, for instance, contrasted its membership with the secular and westernized leadership of the Muslim League. It pointed to the moral laxity and fleeting loyalties of the latter, to the blatant "opportunism" of the like of Bengal's Fazlu'l-Haq, or the "heterodox" faith of the Shi'i Jinnah, the Isma'ili Sir Agha Khan, or the Ahmadi Sir Chaudhri Zafaru'llah Khan.\(^ {24}\) By consciously underlining the circumspect Islamicity of the League leaders in light of their arrogation of the mantle of leadership of the Muslims, Mawdudi came perilously close to undermining the mandate of the leadership of the League, a sin of which the Muslim League has not absolved the Jama'at, even to this day:

"No trace of Islam can be found in the ideas and politics of the Muslim League....he [Jinnah] reveals no knowledge of the views of the Qur'an, nor does he care to research them....yet what ever he does is seen as the way of the Qur'an....All his knowledge comes from Western laws and sources....His followers can not be but "Jama'at-i Jahiliyah" (Party of Pagans)."\(^ {25}\)

The term "Jama'at-i Jahiliyah" was, no doubt, coined to make comparison between the

\(^{23}\) RJII, vol.5, P.93.

\(^{24}\) Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, P.474.

\(^{25}\) TQ, (February 1941), P.66.
League and Jama‘at-i Islami more facile.

Blunt as Mawdudi had been in his attacks on the Muslim League and its leadership, contrary to assertions by his detractors, he did not espouse a clear anti-Pakistan stance. In fact, Mawdudi’s fulminations against Muslim League, interestingly, took form in tandem with his articulation of a tacit acceptance of some form of partition of India.

Mawdudi and the "Two Nation" Theory

Ever since his portentous train ride with B.G. Kher in 1935, Mawdudi had been convinced that he could not live in a state ruled by Hindus. As idealist as he may have been, by the late 1930s the dream of converting the whole of India to Islam no longer seemed to be a palpable eventuality. Therefore, in lieu of the universalist directives of his ideological stance, Mawdudi increasingly succumbed to the pressures of communalist feelings; what had all along, surreptitiously but surely, influenced his turn to revivalism and thenceforth political activism. His universalist rhetoric and tirades against nationalism thinly veiled his evermore apparent appeal to Muslim communalist sentiments. If he was opposed to secular nationalism, it was primarily because he was a communalist at heart.

Many, including Mawdudi’s own supporters, have argued that the Jama‘at’s opposition to the Pakistan movement and the Muslim League was a logical culmination of Mawdudi’s doctrinal opposition to secular nationalism. Yet, Mawdudi’s rejection of secular nationalism was neither as steadfast nor as jejune as his detractors suggest. An erstwhile nationalist, Mawdudi’s political outlook was conditioned in light of the trials and

26 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
tribulations of that concept in India. Mawdudi had abandoned secular nationalism, not because it had failed, nor in order to pursue Islam - at least not at first - but because he had succumbed to communalism. It was communalism which had led Mawdudi to revivalist Islam; and as such, it was communalism, behind the facade of Islam, which governed Mawdudi's bifurcation of the world into sacred and profane. For Mawdudi, secular nationalism, more than an ideological pariah, was a communalist threat, and only as such did it feature in his ideological demonology. Secular nationalism meant Congress rule - a "Hindu Raj" in Mawdudi's words - which was the single most poignant threat to Muslim communal feelings at the time. In 1938 he wrote, "Nehru's promises of scientific progress and nationalist democracy will be tantamount to the extinction of Islam, and hence, Muslims." Mawdudi was therefore, not inherently inimical to the lure of nationalism, but remained apprehensive about the catalytic role which it could play in subjugating Muslims to Hindu rule. Mawdudi, in fact, had propagated nationalist schemes of his own, based on Muslim communal aspirations, in reaction to Congress' secular nationalism, as well as to the League's plans for Pakistan.

In 1938, in a lengthy article in Tarjuman-ul-Qur'an Mawdudi systematically attacked the premises of the Congress position on secular nationalism and democracy as unworkable and detrimental to the interests of Indian Muslims. Mawdudi, instead, presented "two nation" theories of his own. Specifically he put forth two plans, in both of which the territorial integrity of India would be preserved, but Muslims would be given

27 TQ, (October-December 1938), P.306.

substantial communal autonomy. The first plan favored dividing India into two "culturally autonomous" democratic entities, which would form the "international federation" of India with a constitution similar to those of "Switzerland, Australia or the U.S." The constituent entities would be equal partners in running the state, would have distinct boundaries, and would be sovereign over their internal affairs. Most importantly, each entity would have the power to formulate and implement its own laws. In matters pertaining to the state as a whole, such as in formulation of its confederate constitution, a constituent assembly would be formed, the members of which would be elected through elections based on proportional representation.

Should the first plan find no adherents, Mawdudi devised a second one. In this plan India would again be reorganized along confederate lines, this time, into fourteen "territories", thirteen of which - East Bengal, Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh, Jawrah, Tonk, Ajmer, Delhi, Awadh, North and West Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan - would be awarded to Muslims, the remaining territory would be a Hindu monolith. Twenty Five years would be consigned for an exchange of populations between the thirteen territories and their Hindu neighbor. The 14 territories would be held in an Indian confederacy, but enjoy sovereignty over their internal affairs. Mawdudi's plans clearly pointed to his communal inclinations. While his thoughts were still framed in an Indian framework, such would not be the case for long. Even at the end of this revealing article

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29 ibid, P.317.

30 The thirteen were "justly" suggested by Syed ‘Abdu’l-Latif in his book Cultural Future of India, which Mawdudi credits with its wisdom in redrawing the map of India along communal lines.
he wrote, if the second plan too be rejected then we "will have no choice other than to demand a completely autonomous unit, tied together [with its Hindu counterpart] for only defense, communications and trade", an idea not too distant from what the Congress, the League and the Viceroy were debating at the time.

The dreams of an Indian confederacy, however, increasingly gave place to more sober realizations of the fractious direction in which Indian politics was heading. Mawdudi, like most Muslims with communalist sentiments, began to feel the constraint of the narrowing of options before him. When asked in 1938-39 of his choice of the title Daru'l-Islam for his project in Pathankot, Mawdudi explained "it only means a Muslim Cultural home and not a Muslim state but if God wills it the two may become one.\textsuperscript{31} By Muslim state, he surely no longer meant the entirety of India; for, he had left South India some two years earlier after he concluded that there was no future for Muslims in there.\textsuperscript{32} It was at that critical historical juncture, following the portentous elections of 1937, that like many of his co-religionists who resided in Muslim minority provinces, Mawdudi too, began to succumb to the temptation of secessionism. As his dream of an "Islamic India" was shattered by the harsh reality of the options before Muslims, talk of converting the whole of India to Islam gave place to sober assessments of the possibility for an "Islamic state" in a separate Muslim territory.

\textsuperscript{31} Text of the letter in which Mawdudi responded to this question is cited in Shahpuri, \textit{Tarikh}, vol.1, pp.396-97.

\textsuperscript{32} In fact, Mawdudi's position in this period led to a series of serious criticisms against him in \textit{Al-Islah} by Amin Ahsan Islahi, who accused Mawdudi of "Muslim nationalism", and stealthily supporting the Muslim League; cited in \textit{NGH}, 39:1 (January 1990), P.58.
The parameters of Mawdudi's political orientation became even clearer a year later, when he addressed the Muslim students of Aligarh University. In a *tour de force*, Mawdudi outlined his conception of the Islamic state in comparison and contrast with the plans of the League for Pakistan. Mawdudi's plans were now clearly focused on the Muslim community of India, and not on that country as a whole.\(^3\) Unsure of the future, the Jama'at had sought to keep its options open by maintaining its distance with the Pakistan movement.\(^4\) Mawdudi's competitive posture *vis à vis* the League, however, further underscored the fact that his eyes were ultimately set on Pakistan.

As Pakistan became an increasingly palpable reality, and Indian politics became divided between Congress and the League, partition became more clearly reflected in Jama'at's political discourse. By the same token the Jama'at's rivalry with the Muslim League escalated, and the rhetoric against Muslim nationalism became more venomous. Behind the veneer of the Jama'at's sanctimonious derision of the League's enterprise, however, lay its ever more articulate communalist inclinations. Poised towards Pakistan, and with eyes on the League's constituency, the Jama'at intensified its campaign to expose the "un-Islamic" nature of the League's program, believing that a people moved by their religious concerns and loyalties were bound to gravitate towards the movement that best

\(^3\) Shahpuri, *Tarikh*, vol.1, pp.463-64; and Muhammad Yusuf, "Mawlana Mawdudi Bi Haithiyat-i Ik Adib", in *SSMN*, P.117.

\(^4\) *JIKUS*, pp.27-28.
represented the essence of their communal identity.\(^5\) The fact that Mawdudi's conclusion proved to be fallacious suggests that, while religion served as the handmaiden of communalism, it was not its primary cause or mainstay. Muslims were compelled by Islamic symbolisms, but in their political decisions, they were not primarily motivated by religion. Muslim communalism encompassed Islam, but went far beyond the theological parameters of the faith.

Guided by his belief that religious loyalties lay at the heart of Muslim communalist feelings, in October 1945, Mawdudi issued what can be termed a *fatwa* (religious decree) forbidding Muslims to vote for the "secular" Muslim League in the crucial elections of 1945.\(^6\) In the eyes of the League, such cavalier behavior from an organization which was not contesting in the elections could only indicate their pro-Congress sentiments. The League, therefore, began to show signs of weariness with the Jama'at's menace.

It was not long, however, before it became apparent that the Jama'at's campaign had failed to cause any dents in the mounting popularity and prominence of the League, let alone derail its plans for Pakistan. Mawdudi, in a revealing comparison of the extent of support of the League and that of the Jama'at, explained the latter's failure to replace the former in the leadership of the Pakistan movement as function of Jinnah's considerable wealth, and his own comparatively meager means.\(^7\) The Jama'at, however,

\(^5\) Mawdudi later recollected that the lion's share of the Jama'at's efforts in the years preceding the partition went into exposing the secular nature of the League's program and leadership; Mawdudi, *Tahrik-i Islami*, pp.110-20.

\(^6\) *TP*, (September-October 1945), pp.2-3; and Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Rasa'il'u Masa'il* (Lahore, 1951-65), vol.1, P.513.

\(^7\) Cited in *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.138-39.
did not find much solace in such justifications, and instead relieved its frustrations by further escalating its scurrilous attacks against the League, which by 1947 had reached a fever pitch. Mawdudi himself set the tone for new ebb which the Jama'at's attacks on the League now reached. In *Kawthar* in January 1947, he referred to "Pakistan of the Muslim League" as, *faqistan* (land of the famished) and *langra*-Pakistan (crippled Pakistan). While Mawdudi had referred to the spiritual deficiencies of the League's program for the new state, read at face value, these tracts incensed Muslim Leaguers who were already burdened with defending their cause against Hindu criticism. Muslim Leaguers, therefore, began to show greater sensitivity to Jama'at's potentially damaging theatrics, which soon took the form of retaliatory measures. Later in that year, asked about the Muslim League in a regional Jama'at convention in Madras, Mawdudi responded that, "the Jama'at's sole objective was to present Muslims with a virtuous leadership, and to stop the ascendancy of a corrupt (*fasiq* and *fajir*) leadership to the helm [of the Pakistan movement]." The crowd, unexpectedly, erupted into chants of "long live the Muslim League", "long live Qa'id-i 'Azam [Jinnah]", and "down with Jami'at-i 'Ulama [i.e. JUH]". The congregation then dissolved, giving place to a Muslim League rally.

Such confrontations, moreover, invited other actors into the fray, which added fuel to fire, further deepening the mutual distrust and antagonism between the League and the

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38 *Kawthar* (Lahore), (January 13, 1947) and (June 13 and 17, 1947).

39 *RII*, vol.5, pp.140-41.

40 Opponents of the Jama'at among Muslim Leaguers had often seen the Jama'at and JUH as one and the same.
Jama’at. To the chagrin of the politically naive Jama’at, Congress Party did not remain disinterested in the hostile altercations between the League and the Jama’at, the subtlety of whose own communalism was all but drowned by its all too eager vituperations against Jinnah and his party. Hopeful to enlist the support of the Jama’at, and anxious to embarrass the Muslim League, the Congress now sought to openly woo Mawdudi. Hence, in April 1947, during the Jama’at’s regional convention in Patna, Gandhi attended a lecture by Amin Ahsan Islahi. Following the lecture, Congress officials in the city announced that Gandhi had been invited to the session by Jama’at leaders, and possible merger might be in the works. Gandhi, moreover, lauded and endorsed Islahi’s views which the Mahatma argued "attacked political uses of Islam". Muslim League officials, already perturbed by Mawdudi’s menace, were finally provoked to express what they had felt all along, that the Jama’at was a Congress "Trojan horse" among Muslims. The pro-League Nawa’i Waqt of Lahore led the charge against Mawdudi, accusing him of anti-Pakistan feelings, collaboration with the Congress, and political duplicity. For the League, the Jama’at had until that day been at worst a tolerable inconvenience, and at times, as will be elucidated shortly, a valuable "Islamic" tool against the pro-Congress ‘ulama. The Patna incident, however, changed the nature and balance of relations between the two completely. Muslim League now began to see the Jama’at not only as a menace, but as an enemy. The Jama’at, however, was not resolved to this change of circumstances.

41 RJI, vol.5, P.257.

42 For a more thorough account of the accusations and recriminations in this incident see, RJI, vol.5, pp.170-77, and 253-62.

43 Nawa’i Waqt (Lahore), (April 30, 1947), P.1.
More importantly, the Jama'at was not happy with the change of venue in its debate with the League, from the Islamicity of the League's program and leadership to the loyalty of the Jama'at to Muslim communal sentiments.

Caught off guard by the Congress' coup, the Jama'at, rather apologetically, sought to explain the whole incident. It appealed to *Nawa'i Waqt* to publish the whole text of Islahi's speech, which Gandhi had found favorable to the Congress' position, and wrote an official denial of ever having invited Gandhi to the session. *Nawa'i Waqt* declined on both counts; the League having altered the balance of advantage between itself and the Jama'at did not wish to let Mawdudi off the hook. The Jama'at therefore, to the dismay of the Congress, was thenceforth thoroughly mollified. In May, Mawdudi issued another salvo of abuses against the "secular, irreligious national democracy" promised by the League, but sensing the adverse climate, the Jama'at desisted from seriously attacking the League.44 In June 1947, Mawdudi wrote an open letter to Muslims of India, encouraging them to choose Pakistan over the "Indian Republic," and in July 1947 he encouraged Muslims of N.W.F.P. to turn out their Congress Ministry, and to vote for Pakistan in the referendum which was scheduled to decide the fate of that province.46 Fearful of giving vent to accusations of being anti-Pakistan, the organization withdrew into the "splendid isolation" of Pathankot, and remained aloof from politics until January 1948.

44 *MMKT*, vol.1, pp.212-18.

45 *Kawthar* (Lahore), (June 21, 1947), P.2.

46 *ibid*, (July 5, 1947), P.1. However, Mawdudi qualified his decree by stipulating that a vote for Pakistan was not a vote of confidence in the Muslim League; *MMKT*, vol.1, pp.285-88.
The Making of A Symbiosis: The Jama'at and the Congressite Muslims

The escalating hostilities between the League and the Jama'at which we have been outlined here do not present the entire picture of the relations between the two political entities. The mutual antagonisms were preceded by, as well as complimented with, instances of tacit cooperation between the two. Specifically, the convergence of the objectives of the inherently communalist programs of the two bickering parties during the 1937-39 period, laid the foundations of a conterminous outlook on the problems before the Muslims and the solution to them. This outlook continues to decide the political function of the Jama'at in Pakistan, and to form the basis of the relations between religion and state in that country.

Mawdudi began his forays into politics by asserting Muslim communal consciousness against Congress' secular nationalist platform in 1937, some two years before he took notice of the Muslim League.47 His religiopolitical program was first articulated in the *Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an*, and later published in his seminal works, *Musalmān Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (*Muslims and the Existing Political Struggle*) and *Mas'alah-i Qaumiyat* (*Question of Nationality*). There, he systematically attacked his erstwhile mentors among Congress supporters, men such as the Khilafat activist, 'Ubaidu'llah Sindhi, and JUH leaders such as Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani.48 In these works Mawdudi depicted the Congress as a convenient front for a Hindu hegemony,


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and as a secular, and worse yet, socialist party, incompatible with Muslim values.⁴⁹ He therefore, challenged the sagacity of the Muslims’ siding with Congress, asserting,

"...there is no common grounds between our movements [Muslims and the Hindus]; our death is their life, and their death our life."⁶⁰

Nor was Mawdudi persuaded by the anti-imperialist rhetoric and logic of Madani or Azad. Combatting the evil of imperialism, Mawdudi argued, did not justify sacrificing Islam,⁵¹ in fact, anti-imperialism could have meaning only in the context of Islam:

"The fight against imperialism...and expulsion of the British has meaning for us only in the context of la ilaha ila'llah (there is no god but God)...otherwise there is no difference between imperialism and idol-worshipping democracy [Congress’ position]. Lot goes and Manat [Qur'anic terms referring to evil and pagan forces] replaces it."⁶²

Mawdudi’s attacks on JUH leadership, between 1937 and 1939, and especially those leveled against Madani, were phrased in an exegetic language which not only refuted JUH’s political platform, but challenged its religious justification. So forceful was Mawdudi’s charge against Madani and the JUH that, as mentioned earlier, Mufti Kifayatu'lllah, a senior JUH stalwart, advised his colleagues not to engage Mawdudi in any further embarrassing debates.⁵³ The debates had already prompted Iqbal to remark,

⁴⁹ On elaboration of these charges and Mawdudi’s attacks on Nehru’s socialist inclinations see, Mawdudi, Musalman, vol.1, pp.308-309, 457-458, and 464-68. Also see, Shahpuri, Tarikh, vol.1, pp.293-307.


⁵² ibid, P.127.

⁵³ Quraishi, Ulema, P.352.
"Mawdudi will teach a lesson to these Congressite Muslims," and had led some enthusiastic League members to refer to Mawdudi as "our Abu'l-Kalam [Azad]."

The Muslim League, desperate for some support for its "two nation" stance from the religious quarter, found Mawdudi's attacks against JUH and its effort to sanction support for the Congress through religious decree, particularly germane to its own campaign. The League therefore, developed a keen interest in Mawdudi's ideas and anti-JUH crusade; finding new religious justifications for rejecting Congress' politics, its platform of a united stand against imperialism, and an effective weapon in its crucial confrontation with Congressite Muslims - what Jinnah had termed, "war to the knife". Muslim League speakers soon borrowed such terms as "hukumat-i ilahiyah" (divine government), "Muslim India", and "khilafat-i rabbani" (divine caliphate) from the repertoire of Mawdudi's terminologies; and his contribution to the League's political thinking was often cited and acknowledged in private sessions along with those of Iqbal and Mawlana Hasrat Muhani.

Mawdudi's writings were widely distributed in Muslim League sessions between

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54 Cited by Mian Muhammad Shafi' in Iqdam (Lahore), (June 9, 1963), P.1. Shafi' had been Iqbal's private secretary.

55 Interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.

56 Zafar Ahmad Ansari, "Tahrik-i Pakistan Awr 'Ulama", in Chiragh-i Rah (Karachi), 14:12 (December 1960, pp.232-34; Ishtiaq Husain Quraishi, "Mawdudi Sahab ki Siyasat Qiyam Pakistan Se Pahle", in QDMN, pp.71-72; and Muhammad Sarwar, Mawlana Mawdudi Ki Tahrik-i Islam (Lahore, 1956), P.108.

57 Cited in Wolpert, Jinnah, P.149.

58 Ansari, "Tahrik", P.233.
1937 and 1939.\textsuperscript{59} League workers found this effort especially productive in Amritsar in 1939, when scores of \textit{Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash} was distributed.\textsuperscript{60} Similar attitude was evident in the League Central Committee, which authorized the widespread circulation of Mawdudi's \textit{fatwa} against JUH leaders in 1939.\textsuperscript{61} Mawdudi's contribution to Muslim League's position, inadvertent as it had been, was nevertheless significant.\textsuperscript{62} One Muslim League leader, wrote of Mawdudi in retrospection that,

"The venerable Mawlana [Mawdudi]'s writings in \textit{Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an} greatly furthered Muslim League's religious and national demands."\textsuperscript{63}

So favorable was the impression of the Muslim League of Mawdudi that in 1939, Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, then the Secretary of the Central Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League, who was at the time campaigning for the League with senior 'ulama, took it upon himself to approach Mawdudi with view to officially enlisting his support for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, a former League worker, in \textit{Awaz-i Jahan} (Lahore), (November 1989), pp.20-21.
\item\textsuperscript{60} Manzuru'l-Haq, "Mawlana Mawdudi, Hama Pahlu Shaksiyat", in Jalil Ahmad Rana and Salim Mansur Khalid, ed., \textit{Tazkirah-i Sayyid Mawdudi} (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma'arif-i Islam, 1986), P.113. The author was himself a Muslim League worker in Amritsar at the time.
\item\textsuperscript{61} Ansari, "Tahrik", P.232.
\item\textsuperscript{62} See for instance, Sayyid Sharifu'ddin Pirzadah, secretary to Jinnah's interview in \textit{Jasarat} (Karachi) (Mawdudi Number 1973), P.2, where the interviewee asserts that \textit{Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an} was critical in galvanizing support for the League in such places as Aligarh.
\item\textsuperscript{63} Nawwab Sadiq 'Ali Khan, \textit{Bi Tiq Sipahi} (Karachi: Allied Books, 1971), P.28. The Nawwab had been the Salar-i A'la (Supreme Commander) of the Muslim League National Guards, and later secretary to Liaqat 'Ali Khan.
\end{enumerate}
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the League. Mawdudi, not unexpectedly, turned down this offer. For, he saw his contributions to the League, and his success in stemming the tide of Muslim religious fervor for the Congress, not as a sign of the confluence of the views of the two, but of the fundamentally religious nature of the Pakistan movement, his own inherent qualities as a leader, and his ultimate destiny to lead that movement. Hence, Mawdudi’s crucial assistance to the League in 1937-39 actually laid the foundations of the rivalry between the two, which as alluded to earlier, eventually escalated into outright enmity. Yet, foundations for a symbiotic relationship between the League and the Jama'at, rooted in the communal and later national interests of the two was also laid in the 1937-39 period. Its force, over and above their apparent hostilities, would keep the fates of the two antagonists intertwined for decades to come.

The Making of A Symbiosis: Muslim League, Islam, and the Jama'at

From 1939 onwards, when Mawdudi ceased to attack the JUH and the Congress, and instead, directed his invective against the League, antagonism and discord replaced the collaborative tone of the relations between the two parties. As uneasy as the League felt about Mawdudi’s broadside blasts against Jinnah and his program, the reclusive thinker, and later his small coterie of followers, resident in Pathankot, presented no real dangers to the League. Right up to 1947, the Jama'at was viewed by the League as a tolerable inconvenience, which the party hoped to win over. Mawdudi and the Jama'at in those years had no concrete sociopolitical plans; their conception of an Islamic state was too vague, intangible, and often unpalatable to be persuasive; and their hatred of the

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64 Interview with Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islamabad.

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Congress and the Hindus still outweighed their dislike for the League. More importantly, unlike the Ahrar, the Jama'at had never openly sided with Congress, and unlike the Khaksar, their anti-League rhetoric had never been translated into violence. The Muslim League's attitude towards the Jama'at, up until 1947, therefore, remained cautious but cordial.

The years 1941 to 1947, were also a time of increasing Islamization of the language and tone of the League's political program. The relations between the two organizations in these years was shaped in the light of the League's incremental move towards Islam. It not only created a common ground between the two organizations, but created greater interest in the League for the Jama'at, and by the same token, made the League more susceptible to Mawdudi's maneuvers. Most significantly, the League's conscious appeal to Islamic symbolisms created a niche in the political arena for the Jama'at, and prepared the ground for its activism. The League's actions began to directly influence the Jama'at's reactions. In collaboration, and more often, in confrontation with the League, the Jama'at found a political existence. The entanglement of the two therefore, became more evident as the League's policies became the calling of the Jama'at.

Personal, and on occasion, institutional contacts between the two organizations, moreover, reinforced this trend of events. While the Jama'at and the League, increasingly found themselves in loggerheads in the 1940s, it was the cordial rapport between Mawdudi and the leadership of the League that determined the politics of the Jama'at. Those with religious inclinations among the leadership of the League, men such as Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Nawwab Bahadur Yar Jang of Hyderabad, and Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali,
the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, maintained close personal ties with Mawdudi. These ties not only served to limit Mawdudi’s distance from the League, but also tempered the League’s reaction to Mawdudi’s rhetoric. Similar influence was exerted by a multitude of Muslim League workers who had grown close to the Jama’at, and on occasion had even joined the organization.

As a result, Mawdudi himself proved to be more pliable towards the Muslim League than otherwise thought to be the case. A copy of Mawdudi’s *Islam ka Naziyah-

65 Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, himself a deeply religious man was an acquaintance of Mawdudi since the 1930s. Mahiru’l-Qadri recollects visiting Mawdudi at Muhammad ‘Ali’s house in Delhi in 1937, where the former was lodging during his stay in that city; see Mahiru’l-Qadri, "Chand Nuqush-i Zindagi", in Muhammad Yusuf Buhtah, *Mawlana Mawdudi, Apni Awr Dusrun ki Nazar Main* (Lahore: Idarah-i Ma’arif-i Islami, 1980), pp.241-42. Similarly, Sayyid Amjad ‘Ali, who was a frequent visitor to Muhammad ‘Ali’s house in Delhi, recollects meeting Mawdudi at the house in the 1940s.

Nawwab Bahadur Yar Jang, who again was a religious man, maintained similar close ties with Mawdudi. When Mawdudi travelled to Hyderabad in 1943, at the behest of Bahadur Yar Jang, he was received by state officials including Minister of Finance, Ghulam Muhammad. Receptions were held in Mawdudi’s honor, and he was invited to deliver the Friday sermon at the Jami’ah Mosque of Hyderabad. Begum Bahadur Yar Jang, meanwhile, volunteered to launch a women’s branch of Jama’at-i Islami; see, Naqi ‘Ali, *Sayyid Mawdudi ka ‘Ahd* (Lahore, 1980), pp.227ff.

66 Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, "Jama’at-i Islami, 1941-1947", Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Department of Political Science of University of Punjab, 1989/90, P.374. One such Muslim League worker was Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, who in later years became Mawdudi’s personal secretary; see Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, "Professor Mawdudi ke Sath Sath Islamiyah College se Zaildar Park Tak", in *HRZ*, P.119. Also interesting in this regard is the background of Khurshid Ahmad, an important IJT and later Jama’at leader, who during the partition years was a Muslim League student leader; see, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, "Khurshid Ahmad: Muslim Activist-Economist", *The Muslim World*, LXXX:1 (January 1990), pp.24-25.

67 On occasion, for instance, emissaries from the League would travel to Pathankot and consult or negotiate with Mawdudi. One frequent Muslim League visitor to Pathankot was Hakim Haidar Zaman Siddiqi, see, ‘Abdu’l Wahid Khan, "Lash Har Qimat par La’i Ja’i", in *QDMN*, P.215.
i Siyasi (Islam's Political Views) adorned with the phrase "compliments of the author" are kept in the collection of Jinnah's papers at the Ministry of Culture of Pakistan. Mawdudi was most malleable, and hence, receptive to the League's overtures when his own stature could be augmented. When in 1940, the President of the Muslim League of U.P., Nawwab Sir Isma'il Khan invited Mawdudi to participate in a Majlis-i Nizam-i Islami (Council of Islamic System) in Lucknow, which was being convened to devise a plan for incorporating religion into the structure of the future Muslim state, he accepted without hesitation. The council was to consist of Isma'il Khan, Chaudhri Khaliq'ul-Zaman, Nawwab Shamsu'l-Hasan, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, Mawlana Azad Subhani, 'Abdu'l-Majid Daryabadi, and Mawdudi. To be invited to this select council in the same vein as such religious luminaries as Nadwi, Daryabadi and Subhani, was no doubt, a great honor for Mawdudi. The League may have been hard-pressed to find any other religious leaders to attend; it may have sought to placate Mawdudi through this invitation; or had viewed the occasion as an opportunity for rewarding Mawdudi for his attacks on the Congress and

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68 The book is entered in Qaid-i A'zam Papers Seal, Paper Number 952, Ministry of Culture of the Government of Pakistan. The book was sent to Jinnah in January 1940, see Manzur'1-Haq Siddiqi, "Tahrik-i Pakistan Talib-i 'Ilm ki Yadain", in TT, vol.1, P.98.


70 The council was headed by Mawlana Azad Subhani, and its findings was later published in Mawlana Muhammad Ishaq Sindahlawi, Islam ka Siyasi Nizam (A'zamgarh: Daru'1-Mussanifin, nd.).

71 Daryabadi writes of this meeting and the four religious figures who were invited to attend it in his introduction to the finding of the committee in ibid, pp.1-10.
Conversely, Isma'il Khan may have been put to the task by Mawdudi's friends in the leadership of the League. Whatever the motivation, the League went a long way in boosting Mawdudi's ego, and more importantly, elevating his stature as a religious leader. Between 1939 and 1947, the Muslim League reciprocated the favor Mawdudi had rendered it during the two preceding years.

The most consequential and significant contact between the Jama'at and League, however, came about at the behest of Mawdudi himself following the Lahore Resolution and the formation of the Jama'at. It directly pertained to the issue of Pakistan, the division of opinion between the League and the Jama'at over the ultimate shape of the state, and the possibility of a modus vivendi between the two. Soon after the formation of the Jama'at, Qamaru'ddin Khan, the Qayyim of the Jama'at was dispatched to Delhi to meet with Jinnah. Through the good offices of Raja Mahmudabad, the deeply religious and generous patron of the League, a meeting was arranged between Qamaru’ddin Khan and Jinnah at the latter's resident, Gul-i Ra’na. During the meeting which lasted for 45 minutes, Qamaru’ddin Khan outlined the position of the Jama'at, and enjoined Jinnah to commit the League to the concept of an Islamic state. Jinnah, astutely responded that, he saw no incompatibilities between the positions of the League and the Jama'at. However, the rapid pace at which the events were unfolding did not permit the League to pause in order to define the nature of the future Muslim state. I will continue to strive

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72 The council's findings were clearly favorable to "two nation" theory, which again confirmed Mawdudi's communalist sentiments.

73 The details of this meeting were narrated by Qamaru’ddin Khan in Thinker (Karachi), (December 27, 1963), pp.10-12.
for the cause of a separate Muslim state, and you do your services in this regard; our efforts need not be mutually exclusive". Then he added, "I seek to secure the land for the mosque; once that land belongs to us, then we may decide how to build the mosque". The allegory of the mosque, no doubt, assuaged Qamaru’ddin Khan, who in it saw as assurances as to the Islamicity of the future state. Jinnah, however, cautioned Qamaru’ddin Khan that, achievement of an independent Muslim state took precedent over purification of souls.

The Jama’at at the time decided not to publicize this meeting. It, however, served to quell the anxieties of pro-Pakistan members of the Jama’at, and more importantly, was seen as a green light for greater political activism by the organization. For if anything, Jinnah had hinted that his task was only to secure the land for the "mosque", its building, the Jama’at concluded, would be the work of the religiously adept. What this meant for the Jama’at was that, there existed a continuum between the activities of the League and those of the Jama’at; where one ended - partition - the other began. The Jama’at was to inherit Pakistan. As such, the basis of the symbiosis between the League and the Jama’at was strengthened.

Ultimately striving to secure communal rights for Muslims, the Jama’at and League legitimated the political function of the other, furthering their common communalist cause which established a symbiotic rapport between the two. It was the structure of this relation which determined the interactions of the Jama’at, and the fruit of the League’s toil - the Pakistan state - at a more fundamental level than their bickering over the nature of the Pakistan state. The Jama’at provided the League with respite from religious criticism, and

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helped galvanize its base support through the aegis of religious symbolisms. The League, in turn, increasingly Islamized the political discourse on Pakistan to the Jama‘at’s advantage, creating a suitable gateway for the organization’s entry into the political fray. The leadership of Muslim League, moreover, consciously elevated the status of the Jama‘at, while institutional contacts and personal linkages between the two organizations gave more concrete shape to structure of relations between the two. Conflict, contact and concord were placed into a symbiotic framework, which was rooted in communal interests and the legitimating role of Islam. That framework has governed the scope and nature of relations between the two organizations since partition on the one hand, and the political function and role of the Jama‘at in Pakistan, on the other.
CHAPTER 11
THE STRUGGLE FOR AN ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION:
JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI AND THE CONSOLIDATION
OF THE PAKISTAN STATE, 1941-1958

Mawdudi revealed his plans for Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan for the first time in
July 1947.\(^1\) The Jama'at's first contact with the new state occurred a month later, through
the aegis of the Muslim League Ministry in Punjab. Mawdudi had arrived in Lahore from
Pathankot, aboard a truck escorted by units of the Pakistan army. While still stationed in
a tent at Islamiyah Park,\(^2\) Mawdudi met with the Muslim League Chief Minister of the
province, Nawwab Iftikhar Husain of Mamdot.\(^3\) Mawdudi asked Mamdot's permission for
the Jama'at to begin work among the refugees,\(^4\) and more importantly discussed Kashmir
and the Radcliff Award with the Chief Minister.\(^5\) Mawdudi pressed upon Mamdot that,
Pakistan was obligated to secure control of the Madhpur Bridge and the Srinagar Airport
immediately, and asked the Chief Minister to relay a message to that effect to the Prime

\(^1\) In an article in *Kawthar* (Lahore), (July 28, 1947), P.3, Mawdudi laid out a detailed
plan for the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

\(^2\) Begum Mawdudi recollects that the family lived in that tent as refugees for 8 weeks,
before renting a house in Ichrah, a middle class neighborhood of Lahore, where Mawdudi
lived the rest of his days and is today buried; interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.

\(^3\) Sarwat Saulat, *Maulana Maududi* (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1979),
P.29; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in *Takbir* (Karachi), (November 16, 1989),
P.56; and Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, *Pakistan Main Jama'at-i Islami ka Kirdar* (Lahore:
Markazi Shu'bah-i Nashr'u Isha'at-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1990), P.13.


Minister, Liaqat ‘Ali Khan.6

Mamdot, a powerful member of the landed gentry of Punjab, was at the time embroiled in a tussle with Liaqat ‘Ali Khan and Mian Mumtaz Daultana, the favorite candidate of the leadership of Muslim League for ruling Punjab.7 The Chief Minister was eager to placate Islamic groups such as the Jama‘at in his efforts to stave off Daultana’s challenge. Mawdudi, therefore, found Mamdot receptive to his overtures. The Chief Minister not only welcomed Jama‘at’s assistance with relief work among the refugees, but invited Mawdudi to deliver a series of talks in Radio Pakistan, one of the numerous stations of which was located in Lahore.8

Unbeknown to Mawdudi, he had strolled into the midst of a significant tug-of-war in Pakistani politics, which immediately set the tone for relations between the central government and the Jama‘at.9 The Muslim League and the powers-that-be in Karachi

6 Interview with Mian Tufayl in Takbir, P.56.


8 These talks were delivered between January 6 and February 10, 1948. They were later published as Islam ka Nizam-i Hayat, and published in English in Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Islamic Way of Life, Khurshid Ahmad and Khurram Murad, eds., (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986).

9 The Muslim League was generally wary of Islamic groups at the time, for their fissiparous activities across Pakistan had complicated the relations between the capital and the provinces, and created tensions within the Muslim League. Aside from the Mamdot-Daultana conflict in Punjab, in N.W.F.P. a serious challenge was posed to the League Ministry of ‘Abdu’l-Qayyum Khan by Pir of Manki Sharif, whose political platform revolved around demand for "Shari‘at rule"; see Jalal, State, P.92. Meanwhile, religious elements within Muslim League, led by the maverick Mawlana ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi, began to clamor for greater commitment to Islamicity, and to the chagrin of party leaders, launched a break-away Muslim League (Khilafat Group); interview with Mawlana ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi in Herald (Karachi), (January 1990), P.272.
were not, however, as inimical to sacralization of politics as their rhetoric may indicate; nor were the two altogether insouciant in sanctioning the entry of Islamic groups into politics.\textsuperscript{10} As the stand off between Karachi and the provinces became entrenched, the example set by Mamdot was metastasized further. More significantly, the rise in tensions between Karachi and East Pakistan, nudged the central government itself closer to Islam; the pattern of symbiotic interactions between the League and the Jama‘at in the pre-partition years was, therefore, to repeat itself.\textsuperscript{11}

Pakistan was built in the name of Islam, but had little else in the form of common national or cultural values to unite the state.\textsuperscript{12} In the words of one observer,

"By accepted criteria of nationhood it was obvious that there was in fact no such thing as a Pakistani nation".\textsuperscript{13}

Besieged with the threats posed by provincialism and ethnic tensions, for Muslim League leaders, religious as well as secular in disposition, Islam became the only viable means for maintaining the unity of the state. While many Pakistani political leaders were hesitant

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\item \textsuperscript{10} Leonard Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics in Pakistan} (Berkeley: University of California, 1961), P.259; the author argues that, the respect accorded to Islamic groups by successive Pakistani governments between 1948 and 1951 went a long way in explaining the sacralization of Pakistani politics.
\item \textsuperscript{11} IJT, for instance was a bulwark against communism both in West Pakistan and in East Pakistan. As such, it received financial support from the coffers of the Muslim League between 1949 and 1952; see interview with Khurram Jah Murad in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, P.70.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Rupert Emerson, \textit{From Empire to Nation} (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1960), P.92.
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to traverse down this course, faced with the gravity of the situation before the state, few could resist the temptation of appealing to Islamic symbolisms.14 In the words of Abbott,

"In the view of government leaders a viable Pakistan could not develop under the political leadership of the mullah [religious cleric]; on the other hand, a strong Pakistan was not likely to develop without their help. The central government both wooed the mullahs and ridiculed them."15

Islamic groups such as the Jama'at were not, however, simply invited into the political arena. The very efficacy of Islamic symbolisms, enough to appeal to a wide spectrum of Pakistani leaders, was proof of the deeply entrenched loyalty of Pakistanis to Islam and their acceptance of the relevance of Islam to their sociopolitical concerns. Herein lay the dilemma of manipulating Islamic symbolisms for political ends. Factors which made Islamic symbolisms appealing to politicians, also paved the way for the entrance of Islamic groups into politics - often with the blessing of politicians - and yet, limited the ability of the powers-that-be to successfully manage the role of Islam in politics.

The lesson of the League's effort at demarcating the role of Islam in the future constitution of Pakistan in Lucknow in 1940 is instructive in this regard, and was not lost on Mawdudi and the Jama'at. In Mawdudi's mind, the task of drawing up a constitution for Pakistan had began in Lucknow, in a session presided over by 'ulama in which he also participated, all at the invitation of Muslim League leaders. The same considerations which prompted the Lucknow session, to the chagrin of many in the leadership of the

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14 As Punjab has come to dominate Pakistani politics, Islam has become a mainstay of the Punjabi elite's political ethos and state ideology.

League, were again informing the political process in Pakistan. Islam could not be divorced from Pakistani politics, just as it could not have been divorced from the politics of the partition. The League’s leadership was therefore caught in a cycle of emphasizing Pakistan’s Islamicity, and yet "ridiculing" and undermining those groups whose political fortunes were predicated upon the Islamization of the political discourse. Hence, while as early as 1948 Muslim League leaders began to overtly appeal to Islamic symbolisms, they viewed groups such as the Jama‘at as inherently opposed to their visions of Pakistan. The flow of this cycle was, meanwhile, determined by the extent of the crises of governability and state formation, which have characterized Pakistani history to date.

The Jama‘at, it should be added, did little to assuage the fears of the Muslim League leaders. As early as December 1947 the Jama‘at began to clamor for greater Islamization with the specific objective of underlining the duplicity of the Muslim League’s appeal to Islam. Amin Ahsan Islahi, stated rather cavalierly that, "Pakistan will deserve

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17 On the role of religion in politics in Pakistan between 1948 and 1956, and the pattern of interactions between various Islamic groups and the government see the excellent study by Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). Binder has fully detailed the events and legislative proposals regarding the place of Islam in politics, to which this study is indebted. For an overview the political history of Pakistan during this period see, Jalal, *State of Martial Rule*.

18 See *Kawthar* (Lahore), (November 25, 1947), P.7; (December 13, 1947), P.2; (December 17, 1947), P.1; (December 25, 1947), P.4; and (January 25, 1948), P.2.
its name only if it becomes an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{19} The Jama'at saw the Muslim League's conception of Pakistan to be merely territorial. The absence of a clear conception of the nature of the state, therefore, opened the door for maneuvering by the "rear-guard" forces - the Jama'at - which just as it had expected to lead the Pakistan movement, now saw its rise to power in Pakistan to be imminent.\textsuperscript{20} Arguing that Pakistan was built for the sole purpose of "demonstrating the efficacy of the Islamic way of life,"\textsuperscript{21} Mawdudi asked,
\begin{quote}
"Will the architects who are well-versed in building bars and cinemas spend their energies in erecting a mosque? If the answer is in the affirmative, it will indeed be a unique experiment of its kind in human history; godlessness fostering godliness to dethrone itself!"
\end{quote}

Soon these sporadic outbursts gave place to an organized campaign. On January 6 and February 19, 1948, Mawdudi presented two lectures at the Law College in Lahore, which were subsequently published as \textit{Islamic Law and Constitution}. In these lectures, Mawdudi presented a coherent plan for the Islamization of Pakistan, and set guide-lines for drawing up an Islamic constitution. His emphasis was upon the operability of such a

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{19} \textit{ibid}, (March 5, 1948), P.1.

\bibitem{20} Rana Sabir Nizami, \textit{Jama'at-i Islami: Nakamiyun Ke Asbab ka 'Ilmi Tajziyah} (Lahore: Idarah-i Tafhimu'l-Islam, 1988), P.44. Nizami, a former Jama'at votary, writes that the Jama'at then saw itself in its "Meccan" era, and expected to enter a "Medinan" one shortly after partition. Reference here is to the example of Islamic history, when the nascent Islamic community flowered and expanded following the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Medinah; \textit{ibid}, P.45.


\bibitem{22} \textit{ibid}, P.53.
\end{footnotesize}
constitution, and exposing the true intent of the members of the Constituent Assembly by posing the following questions: "was Pakistan made in the name of Islam or not? Are you going to establish an Islamic state or not?"

The Lahore lectures were followed by a tour of Pakistan in April and May 1948, during which Mawdudi continued to harp on the themes which he had first presented in Lahore. It was also during this tour that Mawdudi began making direct overtures to the 'ulama, hinting of the possibility of a grand Islamic alliance, a suggestion which was viewed as propitious for the Muslim League as Mawdudi's rhetoric. In March Mawdudi sent an emissary to Karachi to directly contact a number of Constituent Assembly members, to press upon them Mawdudi's demands, and to encourage them to pass a resolution which would confirm that Pakistan was an "ideological state". Mawdudi's emissary failed to solicit the resolution. Umar Hayat Malik, then the Vice-Chancellor of Punjab University, a man sympathetic to Jama'at's position, advised Mawdudi that while members of the Constituent Assembly were not prepared to issue the resolution, they were necessarily opposed to it either. Should the Jama'at succeed in mobilizing public opinion over the issue, argued Malik, members of the Constituent Assembly may become

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23 Mian Tufayl Muhammad argues that soon after Mawdudi delivered his talks at Radio Pakistan, he was challenged by Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the renowned Pakistani literary figure, and by League leaders such as Raja Ghazanfar 'Ali that, his schemes were incongruous and inoperable. Mawdudi thenceforth became greatly concerned with emphasizing the viability and practicality of his ideas; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takkir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.48.


more favorably disposed towards it.26 Thus began the Jama'at's concerted public campaign for an Islamic constitution. Pakistani politicians, needless to add, did not take kindly to Mawdudi's attempts to call their bluff, nor to his efforts to force their hand on the issue of the Islamic constitution.27 The cabinet even debated the idea of placing certain restraints on the Jama'at's activities.28 Subsequently, the Jama'at and its leading members were placed under surveillance,29 and the grant of a school in Lahore to Mawdudi in compensation for the property which he had lost in India was revoked on the direct orders of the Prime Minister, Liaqat 'Ali Khan.30 The Jama'at's political naivete in the following months only acted to further stretch Muslim League's tolerance for Mawdudi and the Jama'at to its limits.

The 1947 Independence Act had stipulated that until a new constitution was promulgated, Pakistan would remain a British domain, wherein oaths of allegiance by all government employees, from the Governor General down, would be made in accordance

26 ibid.

27 The League leadership became particularly perturbed by Mawdudi's threats that Islamization could not be left to the League, and required direct action by Muslims themselves; see Kawthar (Lahore), (December 25, 1947), P.4.

In later years Mawdudi recounted that the campaign for Islamic constitution was launched once he realized that the Muslim League leadership, despite their promises, indeed did not intend to create an Islamic state in Pakistan; see, JIKUS, pp.53-54.

28 Jama'at members believe that as early as 1948 members of the cabinet had demanded action against the Jama'at. Jinnah had, however, opposed clamping down on the Jama'at; this fact was related to Jama'at leaders by Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali, see ibid.

29 Ahmad, Mawlana Mawdudi, pp.94-96.

30 Interview with Begum Mawdudi, Lahore.
with the provisions of the India Act of 1935. Early in 1948, a query regarding the issue of giving an oath of allegiance to the British Crown was put before Mawdudi. In a private letter, Mawdudi declared such an oath to be "sinful", arguing that a Muslim can in clear conscience only give his allegiance to God. The letter soon found its way into the press, causing much consternation among the authorities, even in Punjab where Mammadot’s Ministry was favorably disposed to Mawdudi.31

The Jama‘at’s maverick political style, however, would only further strain its relations with the power brokers in Karachi. In April 1948 India and Pakistan had reached an interim cease-fire agreement over Kashmir, the provisions of which inter alia provided that the government of each country would desist from perpetuating hostilities against the other, and the press in each country would refrain from publishing incendiary material. In a letter to Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Uthmani, Mawdudi argued that regardless of the merits of this agreement, now that it had been signed by the Pakistan government its terms were binding on all Pakistani citizens. A Muslim government, and its citizenry, were compelled by the Shari‘ah to abide by the terms of agreements to which they are a party.32 Covert operations, it could be surmised from Mawdudi’s decree, for so long as this agreement was standing would not only be a violation of the Shari‘ah, but would attest to the "un-Islamic" nature of the Pakistan state. Rumors regarding Mawdudi’s letter to ‘Uthmani soon began to circulate, and the letter was interpreted as a fatwa against jihad


(holy war) in Kashmir.

In May 1948, during a speech in Peshawar, in a province where from many of the "volunteer" Pathan tribal forces fighting in Kashmir were recruited, Mawdudi was asked by the Director of Information of the provisional Kashmir government to explain his position on jihad in Kashmir. Mawdudi responded that, for so long as the government of Pakistan was bound by the terms of its cease-fire agreement with India, it could not declare a jihad in Kashmir, lest it violate the Shari'ah's injunctions regarding abeyance by the terms of an agreement. Since jihad had to be declared by a proper governmental body, added Mawdudi, there was no possibility for any other source to declare jihad. Therefore, Pakistanis could not wage jihad in Kashmir for so long as their government was officially observing a cease-fire. Mawdudi had thus implicitly, tied the question of Kashmir to the Islamicity of the state. A state with an Islamic pretense could not engage in covert operations, or wage jihad through proxy; and since Pakistan could not forgo Kashmir, it was best advised in the opinion of Mawdudi to resume hostilities against India, what Mawdudi had recommended to Mamdot earlier. Mawdudi's explanation only further complicated the matter for Pakistani authorities. The force of his argumentation was sufficiently provocative to bring the wrath of the government upon the Jama'at. India, however, would provide even a better pretext for that.

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33 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.51.

34 Binder, however, argues that by declaring that there could be no jihad in Kashmir, Mawdudi sought to push the Kashmir issue to the sidelines in the interests of highlighting the debate over the Islamic constitution, see Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.136-37.
Srinagar and Kabul radio stations broadcasted reports of Mawdudi "decree against" war in Kashmir with view to dampening the resolve of the "freedom fighters". The Pakistan government was not only incensed, but found the Jama'at sufficiently exposed to charges of sedition - now propagated by the authorities along with tales of Mawdudi's disloyalty to the Pakistan movement - to effectively silence this most vociferous of the Islamic groups. Undaunted, Mawdudi issued rebuttals against government propaganda, while restating his arguments in Peshawar in simpler terms, all to his own detriment. The government, understandably so, was not assuaged by Mawdudi's cavalier explanation of his views that "it was sheer hypocrisy to sanction a jihad, stealthily declared, while Pakistan told the whole world that it was in a state of cease-fire with India"; Pakistan should either desist from jihad, or preferably go to war. The noose, however, began to tighten around the Jama'at's neck. Unable to satisfactorily explain its ostensibly "unpatriotic" casuistry to the Pakistanis - and especially the all-important Muhajir community - who were then besieged with "Indophobia" and obsessed with Kashmir, by August 1948 Mawdudi was compelled to alter his stance. Debating the logic of jihad in Kashmir gave place to solemn oaths of allegiance to Pakistan, denunciation of Indian policy in Kashmir, and declarations of support for Pakistan's claims over Kashmir.

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35 Pakistani leaders understood Mawdudi to be saying that only an Islamic government can declare jihad, which they believed to more seditious than the argument that there can be no jihad during cease-fire; see, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act 11 of 1953 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore, 1954), P.226.

36 SAAM, vol.1, P.225.

moreover, argued that while the cease-fire agreement was binding on the Pakistan government, volunteers were permitted to participate in the freedom movement in Kashmir. When in September the government of Pakistan officially admitted to its engagement in conflict in Kashmir, eager to convince the sundry and the few of the logic of his position, Mawdudi lost no time in declaring a *jihad* in Kashmir.\(^3\) It was with the same thought in mind that in 1989-90, when Kashmir again erupted into turmoil, the Jama'at took the lead in the "Jihad in Kashmir" campaign in Pakistan. Yet, despite the Jama'at's efforts, the organization's intellectualized approach to politics, overestimation of the power of Islamic dictums, and most significantly, underestimation of the appeal of nationalist and patriotic sentiments damaged the Jama'at's image seriously, from which the organization never fully recovered.\(^3\)

Lessons in the realities of politics, however, did not come to the Jama'at easily. The dust from the Kashmir episode had not yet fully settled that Mawdudi's altruistic style landed the Jama'at in yet another controversy. In August 1948, Mawdudi was again asked about allegiance to the Pakistan state. In an unnecessarily detailed response Mawdudi presented his most incendiary challenge to the state to date. He declared that allegiance of a Muslim was to God alone, and as such until that day that Pakistan became an Islamic state - ruled by the writ of the *Shari'ah* - a Muslim was forbidden from serving in a "non-

\(^{38}\) *ibid*, P.357. With the hope of dispelling the charges of collaboration with India in *TQ* of September 1948, Mawdudi wrote a long eulogy for Jinnah, lauding his achievements.

\(^{39}\) In later years Mawdudi has recounted the events surrounding this episode in a talk at Radio Pakistan in April 1975, printed in *TQ*, (October 1980), pp.36-38.
Muslim" army, i.e. the Pakistan army. Tampering with the army was not a trifle matter. Mawdudi’s religious logic and reading of the religious sources were increasingly seen to be consciously subversive and dangerous.41

The more secular leadership of the Muslim League, the civil service, and the armed forces, who were generally less inclined towards religion, successfully argued that the Jama’at menace had clearly outstripped its political utility; the organization was doing more to delegitimize Pakistan state than to bolster it.42 This group led by Raja Ghazanfar ‘Ali, Iskandar Mirza and possibly General Ayub Khan, prevailed upon Liaqat ‘Ali Khan to clamp down on the Jama’at, and to cleanse Pakistani politics of their

40 SAAM, vol.1, pp.359-60.

41 The editor of the pro-Muslim League newspaper, Nawa’i Waqt, Hamid Nizami began a series of articles in which Mawdudi was depicted as an Indian agent, a supporter of JUH, and Congressite; see Nawa’i Waqt (Lahore), (September 2, 1948), P.1; (September 3, 1948), P.1, and (September 3, 1948), P.4. These attacks were serious enough to damage the Jama’at’s popular image, and was cited by the Jama’at’s leadership as a cause of the organization’s failure to expand its base of support more effectively.

42 It should be pointed out that between 1948 and 1958, in addition to performing its general legitimating role, the Jama’at served the objectives of the government in a number of concrete ways. First, the Jama’at, focused on the politics of the urban middle and lower middle classes, stayed away from populist politics, and even defended the propriety rights of the landed gentry, many of whom constituted the leadership of the League; specifically in 1950 the Jama’at plans by Liaqat ‘Ali Khan to address the land ownership structure in Pakistan. See, SAAM, vol.1, P.373, and Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Sunnat’u Bid’at ki Kashmakash (Lahore: Idarah-i Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an, 1950), pp.33-39. Secondly, the Jama’at stood as a bulwark against communism. IJT continuously battled leftist student groups on campuses, while the Jama’at engaged communists in ideological debates. The Jama’at not only gave the government much breathing room vis a vis leftist forces, but helped Karachi to pass important measures such as alliances with U.S., which, it should be noted, was not favored by the Jama’at itself. The Jama’at had opposed Pakistan’s joining SEATO and CENTO; see RJI, vol.6, pp.38-39.

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menace. On October 4, 1948 Jama'at publications, *Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an*, *Kawthar*, *Tasnim* and *chiragh-i Rah* were closed down, Mawdudi, Islahi, Mian Tufayl, and editors of some of the Jama'at's newspapers were apprehended. ‘Abdu'l-Qayyum Khan, the Chief Minister of N.W.F.P. followed suit by rounding up all Jama'at workers in that province. In October 1948, Ministry of Interior declared the Jama'at to be a seditious organization on par with communist groups, and proceeded to strictly enforce the Civil Service Code which it had promulgated to bar bureaucrats from joining communist organizations to extricate the Jama'at's influence in the Civil Service. As a result, 25 Jama'at members and sympathizers were forced to resign from the civil service in October and November 1948. In December, another ordinance was issued by the Prime

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43 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in *Takbir* (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.49.

44 These papers were again closed down in October 1950; *RII*, vol.6, pp.138-39.

45 Malik Nasru'llah Khan 'Aziz, editor of *Kawthar*, and Misbahu'l-Islam Faruqi, editor of *Tasnim* were also jailed, but on a later date; *RII*, vol.6, pp.133-34. Between 1948 and 1951 additional Jama'at leaders were jailed for various time periods; *ibid*, pp.133-35.

46 *SAAM*, vol.1, pp.359-60.

47 On October 16, 1948 in a Division Classified Letter No. F.4/8/48 EST.(SE), the Jama'at, was declared a subversive organization, the membership of which was prohibited for Pakistani government employees. Other organizations cited in this code are Anjuman-i Azad Khiyal Musanifin (Society of Free Thinking Writers) and the Punjabi Majlis (Punjabi Council), both of which were communist bodies. The code is interestingly still in the statutes, and was cited in the latest edition of the Civil Service Code printed during the Ziya years; see, *ESTA CODE. Civil Service Establishment Code* (Islamabad: O & M Division. Public Administration Research Center; Government of Pakistan, 1983), P.317.

48 *RII*, vol.6, pp.136-37. Mawdudi was thus forced to ask of many government employees who were sympathetic to the Jama'at to forego membership in the organization, or to resign from it, in order to maintain their jobs, and hence, the Jama'at's foothold in the bureaucracy; interviews with a number of those involved in this scheme.
Minister, this time banning the reading of the works of Mawdudi and the Jama’at literature by government employees.\(^{49}\) The government had thus declared the Jama’at an anti-state and outlaw organization, and had closed off the Jama’at’s primary target - the civil service and the bureaucracy - to its propaganda.\(^{50}\)

The Jama’at was stunned by these developments. Mawdudi had never viewed his challenges to the legitimacy of the state as seditious or disloyal, and hence, failed to appreciate the gravity with which the government had viewed his seemingly perfunctory religious decrees. In fact, Mawdudi’s first reaction was to rejoice in the prominence which was accorded to the Jama’at.\(^{51}\) However, once in the Lyallpur (later Faisalabad) jail, Mawdudi interpreted matters differently.\(^{52}\) Mawdudi, however, still saw no fault in his style or in views which were expressed by the Jama’at, and instead, developed reservations regarding the extent of the government’s commitment to democracy. He concluded that, the government had moved against the Jama’at with such force only because Jinnah was no longer a restraining influence against the authoritarianism of the leadership of the League. Posthumously, the Jama’at began to appreciate Jinnah for his abeyance with the

\(^{49}\) ibid, P.135.

\(^{50}\) Between 1949 and 1951, the government further clamped down on the Jama’at, by arresting more of its leaders, closing more of its magazines, or demanding new forbidding security deposits for them. It also began to monitor the Jama’at’s mail; RJI, vol.6, pp.136-42.

\(^{51}\) SAAM, vol.1, P.360.

\(^{52}\) Interestingly, Mawdudi was imprisoned in the same cell as communist activist, Dada Mansur; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.51.
promise he had given Qamaru’ddin Khan in Delhi to allow the Jama’at to work to Islamize Pakistan, and for his unbending adherence to principles of freedom and due process of law which he had always advocated.\textsuperscript{53} The Jama’at was to repeatedly invoke the memory of Jinnah in later years; more emphatically each time it was persecuted under the provisions of the Public Safety Act or the Defense of Pakistan Rules. Mawdudi’s reading of the Jama’at’s predicament informed the organization’s political thinking with an acute sense of awareness of democratic rights and civil liberties, and thenceforth fused the clamor for Islamicity with a quest for constitutional rights.

Mawdudi, moreover, did not view his own proclamations as seditious, and hence interpreted the government’s genuflection as less of a response to the issue of oath of allegiance or jihad in Kashmir, and more as a means to guarantee the secular nature of the state at a time when the constitutional debates were reaching a climax. The Jama’at was therefore, silenced and Mawdudi was stowed away to weaken Islam at a critical juncture, relieving the Constituent Assembly from their constant pressure.\textsuperscript{54} This was a significant conclusion which reshaped Mawdudi’s thinking on the future course of the

\textsuperscript{53} In a passage written about Jinnah by Mawdudi in 1948, he lauds him for his democratic spirit above all else; see Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, \textit{Shahksiyat}, Sami’u’llah and Khalid Humayun, eds., (Lahore: Al-Badr Publications, nd.), pp.273-80. In interviews conducted by this author it became apparent that the appreciation shown for Jinnah by Jama’at members has less to do with the desire to pay lip-service to the Pakistan movement, and more as a genuine reflection of the way the Jama’at came to believe in Jinnah’s defense of fundamental political rights in general, and those of the Jama’at in particular.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{RJI}, vol.6, pp.101-02. Mawdudi later argued that entire episode beginning with the question which was posed to him in Peshawar on jihad in Kashmir had been an elaborate and sinister conspiracy hatched by the government to silence the Jama’at. This realization made him all the more dedicated to democracy and constitutional rights; \textit{JKUS}, pp.57-58.
Jama'at. The government had cast the organization in an unsavory light, and by pushing it to edge of a precipice had paved the way for its radicalization. Mawdudi, however, balked at the prospect of becoming a subversive organization - a true revolutionary force. Instead, he chose to alter the course of the Jama'at, to desist from questioning the legitimacy of the state, and instead to concentrate on the virtue, efficacy and Islamicity of the governments that rule Pakistan. The distinction between Pakistan and the Muslim League was once again underlined. At the time, opposition to Muslim League was tantamount to questioning the authority of the state, and the Jama'at set out to do all in its power to reverse all popular notions to that effect. The demand for an Islamic state was therefore, more sharply focused into a campaign for an Islamic constitution, one which combined the Jama'at's long-time demand for Islamicity with its newly-found dedication to constitutional rights.

From his cell in prison, Mawdudi began to direct the Jama'at's activities with view to resuming the campaign for Islamic constitution, but also with the objective of confirming the Jama'at's commitment to the state. The government had failed to silence the Jama'at, but had compelled it to do away with its idealism. The Jama'at reentered the fray not as a distant observer - a "rear-guard" awaiting to benefit from the Muslim League's failure - but as a participant in the political process. Meanwhile, unable to directly interact with the government, nor as yet able to effectively mobilize the masses, Mawdudi and the Jama'at turned to the 'ulama as a convenient vehicle for realizing its aims.

The 'ulama at that time did not possess a clear agenda, nor a definite conception
of their objectives in Pakistan.\footnote{Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, pp.141-42. For instance, the ‘ulama were negotiating with the government for the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs, or the creation of an institution of Shaikhul-Islam; \textit{ibid}, P.33. Mawdudi found such endeavors as meaningless. Religious leaders he argued were better advised to pursue the goal of the Islamic state, which once achieved would resolve all the smaller details which such a Ministry may address; interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.} Under the leadership of Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Uthmani, however, they enjoyed a great deal of leverage with the government. Mawdudi therefore, deputed two Jama’at leaders who were from the ‘ulama, and were also serving as the organization’s provisional Amirs while he was in jail, ‘Abdu’l-Jabbar Ghazi and ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffar Hasan to contact various ‘ulama, and especially ‘Uthmani with view to creating a united religious front before the government. The immediate objective of these contacts was to influence the content of the Objectives Resolution which the Prime Minister was going to present to the Constituent Assembly as a prelude to the final draft of the constitution, and which was eventually passed in March 1949.\footnote{Interview with ‘Abdul-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.} Ghazi and Hasan worked diligently to bring the various ‘ulama groups into an alliance, and were especially successful in influencing ‘Uthmani. Mawlana ‘Uthmani who was then the don of Pakistani ‘ulama as well as a member of the Constituent Assembly,\footnote{Mawdudi also maintained contacts at the time with other members of the Board of Ta’limat-i Islamiyah such as Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, P.158.} had shown interest in Mawdudi’s ideas which were relayed to him from prison through Ghazi.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Mawdudi’s endeavors from behind bars proved fruitful. Demands which he had put
before 'Uthmani were reflected in the Objectives Resolution.\textsuperscript{59} The alliance with 'ulama also augured well for the Jama'at. It not only provided the marginalized organization with an effective medium of political activity, but laid the foundations for a more concerted campaign for Islamic constitution.\textsuperscript{60} It also confronted the government with a new dilemma; their efforts to sideline the Jama'at had instead resulted in a more formidable alliance for the cause of Islam. Debunking this alliance became a major concern of the government in the years to come.

The Jama'at was quick to proclaim victory following the passage of the Objectives Resolution, letting their hand show through the sleeve of 'Uthmani.\textsuperscript{61} The Jama'at's acknowledgement would decide their political choices some three decades later when General Ziya officially incorporated the Objectives Resolution into the preamble of Pakistan's constitution. Despite the euphoric mood in the Jama'at following the passage of the Resolution, Mawdudi's reaction in prison remained guarded. For him this was not victory yet, the battle had just begun. Neither should the government be allowed to think

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{RIJ}, vol.6, pp.103-05.

\textsuperscript{60} As an indication of the importance of the alliance with 'Uthmani it may be cited that Mian Mumtaz Daultana observed at the time that the Objectives Resolution was a personal favor to 'Uthmani by Liaqat 'Ali Khan, in that the sovereignty of God was acknowledged in the Resolution; see Afzal Iqbal, \textit{Islamization of Pakistan} (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1986), P.41. In similar vein 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan recollects that, 'Uthmani personally interceded with the authorities on a number occasions to obtain the release of Mawdudi from prison; interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghaffar Hasan, Faisalabad.

\textsuperscript{61} See Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Jama'at-i Islami ka Maqsad, Tarikh Awr La'ihah-i 'Amal} (Lahore: Shu'bah-i Nashr'u Isha'at-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1951), P.68. Mawdudi here writes that had it not been for the Jama'at the Objectives Resolution would have never come into being in the form that it did.
that it had mollified the Islamic groups, nor the 'ulama be permitted to relax their vigilance. 62 His first public statement on the passage of the Resolution was therefore, to everyone's surprise, far from enthusiastic. He said of the Resolution:

"This is a strange rain, before which there were no clouds rising, and after which no growth is visible." 63

Meanwhile, he ordered the Jama'at to begin educating the masses in the contents of the Objectives Resolution, lest the government manipulate their ignorance, and interpret the Resolution into extinction. 64 The government reciprocated by further extending Mawdudi's sentence in October 1949.

The Jama'at's official reaction was, however, different. While the Jama'at did not wish the resolve of the religious alliance to falter, it could not forgo its moment of glory either. The Jama'at, therefore, declared the Objectives Resolution a victory for Islam, and more importantly for the Jama'at. The Resolution, the Jama'at argued, was also a statement of good intentions on behalf of the government, 65 justifying the Jama'at's acceptance of the legitimacy of the political order. More significantly, the Resolution was used by the Jama'at to routinize its idealism, hence joining the political process with view to not only furthering the interests of Islam, but more importantly, preserving the unity

62 JIKUS, pp.59-60.

63 RII, vol.6, pp.107-08.

64 ibid, pp.110-11. The campaign also entailed greater emphasis upon religious observance. The Jama'at sought to utilize the impression that the government had sanctioned greater Islamicity to increase greater adherence to Islamic dictums, especially with regard to purdah; RII, vol.6, pp.108-09.

65 Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.194-95.
of Pakistan. Objective Resolution was viewed as a commitment by the erstwhile pariah government to Islamization, a fact which in itself anointed the political order into a new existence, and permitted the Jama'at to accept its legitimacy. Mian Tufayl recollects that the Resolution was interpreted by the Jama'at as the utterance of the Muslim testimony of faith by an unbeliever - it was a consequential act of "conversion".66

The Jama'at's stance was also, in part, motivated by the deterioration of relations between Karachi and Dacca. East Pakistani public opinion had throughout 1949-50 mobilized around opposition to the policy directives of Karachi and the hegemony of power by the Punjabi and Muhajir elite, which were viewed as detrimental to provincial interests. The mounting crisis was threatening to precipitate a crisis of governability. The Jama'at viewed the challenge to the primacy of the center with grave concern, and took it upon itself to defend the state against Bengali rebellion. The entire episode, therefore, provided the Jama'at with the pretext for routinizing its idealist politics, and gaining entry into the political system without any apparent doctrinal compromises. The mounting Bengali challenge to Pakistan's federal arrangement, meanwhile, may well have softened the state's resolve to extricate the Jama'at from the political arena, creating a climate which would be conducive to the Jama'at's political enfranchisement.67 With Mawdudi still in prison the Jama'at Shura declared that the Jama'at would participate in the Punjab

66 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.

67 Jalal reports in this regard that, in 1951 Firuz Khan Nun, the Governor of East Pakistan, sponsored the expansion of JUI's activities in the province with view to bolstering the position of the state vis a vis the provincialist forces; see Jalal, State of Martial Rule, P.291.
provincial elections scheduled for March 1951; thereby canonizing the Jama'at's new orientation.\textsuperscript{68}

The Jama'at's transition into its new role, however, was not free of problems. Accepting the state's legitimacy in light of its promulgation of the Objectives Resolution meant that the task of Islamization would be carried out from within rather than from without the political process; most importantly, it would be carried out. The passage of the Resolution now meant that Pakistan had to evolve into an Islamic state; and the government must be compelled to carry through its promise, as reflected in the Resolution. Hence, in July 1950 the Jama'at began its election campaign in Punjab with the objective of using the occasion to disseminate its ideas, to "Islamize" the election campaign, and to influence the composition of the future Punjab Assembly.\textsuperscript{69}

Meanwhile, cognizant of the rapidly changing political environment, and the need to personally oversee the Jama'at's transition to its new political existence, Mawdudi began to actively campaign for his release. Mawdudi had been imprisoned in October 1948 under the provisions of the Public Safety Act.\textsuperscript{70} He was not, however, officially charged by the government. Hence, soon after his term of custody was extended by the government, Mawdudi wrote to the Chief Secretary of Punjab Government, arguing that, the government should either bring charges against him or release him. He quoted Jinnah's criticisms of the Public Safety Act before the Central Assembly of India in 1935

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{RJI}, vol.6, P.115.
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{RJI}, vol.6, pp.115-17.
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{SAAM}, vol.1, pp.365-66.
\end{itemize}
at length to underline his point. The Jama‘at, meanwhile, orchestrated a letter writing campaign to the press and the government, lamenting the unconstitutional persecution of Mawdudi for "the crime of loyalty to God," at a time when the government itself had passed the Objective Resolution which placed national sovereignty in God.

As effective as these tactics were, the fate of the Jama‘at in this stand-off, as in subsequent ones, would rest in the hands of the judiciary, which has time and again defied the wishes of the power brokers to give the Jama‘at new lease on life. In a different ruling pertaining to the "Rawilpindi conspiracy" the Punjab High Court had ruled that the period of custody of those jailed under the Public Safety Act could be extended only twice. Mawdudi’s jail term had already been officially extended on two occasions. Since he could no longer be kept under the Public Safety Act, he was ordered released by the High Court on May 28, 1950. Mawdudi was deeply impressed by the independent action of the judiciary, which was later reflected in his works on the working of the Islamic state.

No sooner had he hung his prison garb that, he set off on a campaign for Islamic state, setting a new tone for the Jama‘at’s struggle for power. Not only did Mawdudi fervently argue the incumbency of Islamic state to Pakistanis, but stated time and again, in tune with his declarations before the partition that, the ruling establishment - whom he

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71 ibid.

72 ibid, P.370.

73 The "Rawilpindi conspiracy" was an alleged military plot hatched in the Pakistan army by officers who favored a resumption of hostilities with India over Kashmir. For more details see, Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp.119-24.

74 SAAM vol.1, P.244.
now referred to derisively as *ahl-i bid'at* (innovators) - were incapable of realizing the aims of the Objectives Resolution. Only those firmly rooted in Islamic learning - the *ahl-i sunnat* (those who followed the example of the Prophet) could be entrusted with realizing the task set before the state.\(^75\) This bifurcation also had the added advantage of drawing a wall between the government and the religious alliance as a whole; for, a silent war between the Jama'at and the government over the loyalty of the *'ulama* was already afoot.

The purview of Mawdudi's campaign against Liaqat 'Ali Khan's administration, however, extended further. The government was no longer only challenged on Islamic questions, but over a gamut of issues, which the Jama'at deemed politic. The government repeatedly came under fire for its autocracy. More indicative of the Jama'at's frustration and vindictiveness was the organization's imprudent opposition to Liaqat 'Ali Khan's plans for a land reform bill.\(^76\)

In October 1950, Basic Principles Committee (BPC), charged with determining the distribution of power in the future legislature presented its Interim Report. The Jama'at lost no time in criticizing the report for its autocratic bent and unfavorable distribution of power between the provinces. Mawdudi especially objected to extent of powers which the Report had vested in the presidency. Mawdudi depicted the Report, uncharitably, as a reiteration of the Government of India Act of 1935, and in violation to the spirit of the

\(^{75}\) MMKT, vol.2, pp.82-99.

Objectives Resolution. Its governmental design was thoroughly secular, argued Mawdudi, and had no basis in the Islamic doctrines of government and statecraft. The government, ever more sensitive to the carping of the Jama'at, closed the Jama'at publications, *Kawthar, Tasnim, Qasid* and *Jahan-i Naw*, incarcerating the editors of the first two.

The BPC report, however, also came under fire from another quarter, diverting attention from the place of Islam in the constitution, instead focusing it on the balance of power between the provinces and the center. The BPC report was rejected by Bengalis of all political hues, creating the first serious crack in the edifice of the Pakistani state. The Jama'at, true to its legitimating role, scurried to the support of the state, reiterating the paramountcy of Islam and Urdu in the scheme for a united Muslim state. Bolstering the position of the state was not, however, tantamount to a vote of confidence for the government. Mawdudi astutely combined his support for the unity of Pakistan with his demand for a veritable Islamic constitution, which he argued would underscore the two guarantors of the unity of Pakistan, Islam and an equitable distribution of power in a just

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77 *MMKT*, vol.2, pp.161-65.


79 *RJI*, vol.6, pp.138-39, and Saulat, *Maulana Maududi*, pp.40-41. *Tasnim* and *Qasid* were closed at the instigation of Daultana’s Ministry in Punjab, who had found the Jama’at a thorn in its side during the Punjab elections of 1951.


81 *TQ*, (June 1950), pp.360-65.
constitutional arrangement. BPC's Interim report, Mawdudi argued was deficient on both counts.

The government unable to withstand criticism from both the Bengalis and the Islamic groups, was compelled to withdraw the Interim Report, challenging the religious groups to present a substitute. The Jama'at responded by initiating negotiations with leading JUI 'ulama, Mawlanas Zafar Ahmad Thanwi, Ihtishamu'l-Haq Thanwi ('Uthmani's successor), and Mufti Muhammad Shafi' in looking for ways to present a new report, one which would keep the wheel of Islamization moving. These contacts eventually culminated in a major gathering of 31 'ulama in Karachi in January 1951 under the aegis of Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, which openly demanded an Islamic state, and proposed the Twenty Two Principles which were submitted to the Constituent Assembly for consideration. Mawdudi's imprint on this report was evident in its emphasis upon the independence of the judiciary. The 'ulama convention, to the government's chagrin was yet another display of the fructuous unity between the 'ulama and the Jama'at, in which Mawdudi openly basked. It was perhaps the success of this 'ulama convention that prompted the government to organize the fatwa campaign against Mawdudi, hoping to draw a wedge

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82 The Jama'at even made suggestions for a Trades Unions Rights Bill, hoping to undermine the left in East Pakistan, and to assuage the anxieties of the Bengalis. The proposal even featured in the Jama'at's elections manifesto in Punjab in 1950-51, but was quickly withdrawn. See, Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, "Pakistan Main Jumhuri Iqdar ki Baqa Awr Furugh", Chiragh-i Rah, Tahrik-i Islami Number (November 1963), P.202.

83 RII, vol.6, P.115; and Binder, Religion, pp.216-17.

84 MMKT, vol.2, pp.212-17.
between the self-styled religious maverick and the conservative divines.\textsuperscript{85}

The campaign against the Interim report had further determined the direction of the Jama'at's activism. The organization's efforts to foster Islamization were intertwined with a conscious effort to safe-guard the constitutional rights and civil liberties of Pakistanis, what was tantamount to a platform of "Islamic constitutionalism". What began as a tactical consideration to protect the rights of the Jama'at in a polity dominated by secular forces bent on consolidating power in the executive, increasingly became a doctrinal stance. Constitutionalism, moreover, presented the Jama'at with a lucrative slogan and political program with which to appeal to the educated social strata. It should be noted, however, that as politically opportune as this platform may have seemed, it was more than a mere ploy. It had its roots in Mawdudi's experience with the Public Safety Act and the democratic spirit of the Pakistani judiciary on the one hand, and the desire to placate the secular opposition to Karachi's policies, on the other.

The battleground where this evolving platform would be put to test was the Punjab provincial elections of March 1951. The organization was not contesting any tickets, but had taken upon itself to be the judge of the virtuosity and Islamicity of the candidates. The Jama'at would assist those candidates which it deemed to be virtuous, religiously committed, and favorably disposed to the intent and aims of the Objectives Resolution. Although the Jama'at did not officially endorse any party, it is safe to assume that few if any of the "progressive" Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Mumtaz Daultana's candidates

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{RIJ}, vol.6, pp.140-42. In its propaganda the government continuously associated the Jama'at with JUH, hoping to provoke the Jama'at into a renewed attack on JUH, and thereby, creating trouble between the Jama'at and the Deobandi JUI.
were deemed virtuous (salih) by the Jama'at; while, conversely, many of Nawwab of Mamdot's Jinnah Muslim League candidates received the blessing and support of the Jama'at panchayats.86

The Jama'at had commenced its election campaign in July of 1950. It had organized 1390 voters councils (panchayats) in 37 electoral districts across Punjab, whose mandate was to determine the moral calibre of various candidates.87 The Jama'at did not do well in the elections. It had spent eight months on the campaign, parted with Rs.127,000, and yet, collected only 50,000 signatures supporting its legislative proposals, 217,859 votes, and secured the election of only one "virtuous" candidate.88 The organization's lackluster performance in the elections was in part due to the fact that its campaign had ran afoul of Daultana's Ministry. In the months before the elections the Jama'at had been squeezed by the government in Karachi, and Daultana in Punjab. Mawdudi had come under attack by a flurry of fatwas by the 'ulama; Jama'at papers in Punjab, Kawthar, Tasnim and Qasid were closed down; and the pro-Muslim League press had attacked the Jama'at, and as usually was the case, had "exposed" the organization's "anti-Pakistan" background. Government machinations were consequential in the rout of the Jama'at, enough so to compel the disappointed and exhausted organization to opt

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86 Jalal, State of Martial Rule, P.146. The author cites the existence of an alliance of sorts between the Jama'at and Mamdot's party.

87 RJI, vol.6, P.118.

88 RJI, vol.6, pp.117-29. Mawlana Muhyu’ddin Lakhavi was the elected candidate who was approved of by the Jama'at.
against participation in N.W.F.P. provincial elections scheduled for later that year.\textsuperscript{89} For, Daultana's strong-arm tactics would pale before those of the N.W.F.P. Chief Minister, ‘Abdu’l-Qayyum Khan, who had always shown a penchant to outdo the central government when it came to clamping down on religious activists.

The balance of relations between the Jama’at and the government, however, changed significantly in October 1951, when Liaqat ‘Ali Khan was assassinated in a public gathering in Rawalpindi. The Prime Minister's death brought the consummate bureaucrat, Ghulam Muhammad, to the office of Governor General. Known for his secularist ways, Ghulam Muhammad's rise to the top was less than comforting to the Jama’at. The choice of Prime Minister was, however, propitious for the Islamic groups. Khwaja Nazimu’ddin, the Bengali Muslim Leaguer, was known to be a pious man, as were a number of his ministers. More importantly, Mawdudi’s personal friend Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali became the Minister of Finance, and the pro-Jama’at Ishtiaq Husain Quraishi was given the portfolios of Minister of State for Refugees, and supervision of the Ministry of Information.

Nazimu’ddin’s administration greatly encouraged religious activism in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{90} The piety of the Prime Minister and that of some of his ministers was reason enough for

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{ibid}, P.121.

\textsuperscript{90} Jama’at’s policies on other issues also concurred with those of Nazimu’ddin. Nazimu’ddin was for instance, favorable to retaining strong ties with Great Britain, which was not the position of the more pro-American Ghulam Muhammad, and Generals Mirza and Ayub; see, Jalal, \textit{State of Martial Rule}, pp.171-72. Israr Ahmad recollects Nazimu’ddin and Sardar Abdu’rrab Nishtar’s attendance at an IJT meeting in 1953-54, wherein the student speakers had virulently attacked Pakistan’s greater closeness to the United States; interview with Israr Ahmad in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.1, P.100.

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various Islamic groups to expect better returns for their activism. Hence, undaunted by the results of the Punjab elections, and responding to the apparent pliability of the Nazimu’ddin administration, Mawdudi continued to articulate the Jama’at’s political platform. By 1952, Mawdudi’s speeches had become lessons in the virtues of democracy seasoned with anecdotal references to Islamic precepts. In January, Mawdudi began to severely criticize the Public Safety Act - under the provisions of which he had been imprisoned - and the Public Representatives Disqualification Act (known as PRODA). The Act had been originally devised to circumvent abuse of office among elected representatives. It had, however, been widely used by Muslim League leaders to control the provincial legislatures, and to keep the politicians in line. In May, in a speech in Karachi, Mawdudi presented his most lucid formulation of the concept of Islamic Constitutionalism. The following months witnessed the continued harping of this theme across Pakistan.

With the expectation of a new report from the Basic Principles Committee, the Jama’at’s call for Islamic constitution reached a fever pitch. The organization celebrated a "constitution week" in November 1952 during which large processions were held, the largest being in Karachi. An entire issue of the *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an* was dedicated to discussing the details of the Islamic constitutionalism of Mawdudi, leaving no room for the

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91 For instance, soon after the investiture of Nazimu’ddin, Mawdudi told a crowd in Karachi that the Jama’at would no longer be satisfied with lip-service to Islamization, and wanted concrete results; cited in *RIJ*, vol.6, P.89.

92 *MMKT*, vol.2, 367-70.

93 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.430.
BPC report to side-line the idea. BPC, having witnessed a glimpse of the reaction which could expect from the report, postponed its presentation arguing the need for further consultation. It was not presented until December 22, 1952.

The final draft of the report made several concessions to the Islamic groups, which were duly acknowledged by Mawdudi, who was also quick to point out the efficacy of organizational activity to those present. Having smelled victory, and sensed weakness in the government, Mawdudi now raised the stakes. He was not to be contented with token concessions. He demanded that Pakistan be called "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", shari'ah reign supreme in the land, and 'ulama boards be set up to oversee the passage of laws in the country. Mawdudi also called for further streamlining of electoral procedures, to be supervised by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, finally, demanded that Pakistan follow a non-aligned foreign policy. His consistent challenges to the government, now backed by the more efficacious Islamic constitutionalism platform, and the increasingly rambunctious Jama'at muscle on the streets, was no doubt closely watched by the powers-that-be, especially in the bureaucracy and the army, and was not without consequence for their decisions regarding the fate of the Jama'at, when the two were locked in yet another loggerhead in 1953-54.

The Jama'at's activism in the 1948-53 period was instrumental in anchoring the

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94 TQ, (November 1952).

95 MMKT vol.2, pp.385-432.

96 RII, vol.6, pp.48-55.
unfolding constitutional debate of Pakistan in Islam, and in introducing Islamic idioms and concepts to the unfolding national political discourse. The Jama'at's propaganda and maneuvering foiled the attempts of League leaders such as Raja Ghazanfar 'Ali to extricate Islam from politics, nor did Mawdudi's untiring campaign for Islamization permit the government, Muslim League leaders, or the provincial elite to simply manipulate Islam for political ends. The Jama'at mobilized the 'ulama and the masses, determining the terms of the constitutional debates, and the role of Islam in the nascent state. Mawdudi and the Jama'at, throughout this period, supported the unity of the Pakistan state by underlining the primacy of Islam and Urdu in the national culture. However, the Jama'at found itself in loggerheads with the government over virtually every issue of concern to Pakistani politics at the time; from war in Kashmir, to the refugee problem, center-province stand-off, and the constitutional debates. Conflict continued to characterize the relations between the two, even as the symbiosis rooted in the inseparable entanglement of Islam and Pakistan which played a hand in the Jama'at's enfranchisement, continued to keep the Jama'at and the government in an uneasy stalemate.

The Jama'at itself also underwent changes during this period. Opposition to the state was supplanted by political maneuverings within the state system; and the

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97 See Allahbukhsh K. Brohi, "Mawlana Abul A'la Mawdudi; the Man, the Scholar, the Reformer", in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, eds., Islamic Perspectives (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1979), P.295. Brohi, who was at this time opposed to Mawdudi's views writes that Mawdudi, more than any other activist, influenced the place of Islam in the constitutional debates in Pakistan.

98 Binder, Religion, P.76.
organization's ideological proclamations, and idealistic approach to politics gave place to an Islamic constitutionalist platform. Yet, the political enfranchisement of the Jama'at, as significant as it was in routinizing the organization's ideological zeal, did not resolve the discord between the organization and the power brokers in Lahore or Karachi.

The Jama'at and the Anti-Ahmadi Controversy, 1952-54

The issue of the role of minorities in Pakistan had for long been a major concern of a number of Islamic groups and the 'ulama, especially 'Uthmani.99 Mawdudi, however, had never fully focused his attention on the issue, believing that the question of the minorities to be a non sequitur bound to be resolved within the overall framework of an Islamic constitution. Such was not the general feeling of the Islamic groups when it came to the issue of the Ahmadis. The Ahmadi issue had been the favorite of the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, a self-styled Islamic group with a checkered political history, best known for the impassioned style of its speakers.

The Ahrar had flip-flopped between the Congress and the League prior to the partition. The one constant throughout their existence had been their vehement opposition to the Ahmadis.100 The Ahrar had expressed this opposition first in 1934 when Shah 'Ata'ullah Bukhari, the eminent Ahrar leader, had issued a resolution demanding the official exclusion of the Ahmadis from the pale of Islam, and the dismissal of Sir

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99 The opposition of the Deobandis to the Ahmadis went back to the 1920s. 'Uthmani himself had written a book in refutation of the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1924; see, Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), P.29.

100 See Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1986), pp.53-56.
Zafru' llah Khan - later Pakistan's Foreign Minister - from the Viceroy's Council.101 Following the partition the erstwhile pro-Congress Ahrar moved to Pakistan, and declared itself a staunch ally of the Muslim League, and joined hands with Daultana’s faction of the League in Punjab.

Following the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the Ahrar decided to utilize the state’s professed loyalty to Islam to elicit a ruling on the Ahmadis. Hence, throughout 1949 the Ahrar incited passions in Punjab against Ahmadis, who had meanwhile, established their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwah - not far from Lahore. The Ahrar were once again demanding the ouster of Zafaru’ llah Khan, this time from the cabinet.102 The anti-Ahmadi campaign soon found support among the ‘ulama, and hence, served as the foundations of a religious alliance commensurate to the one created by the Jama’at earlier.

The Ahrar soon found a strange "bed-fellow" in the putatively "progressive" Chief Minister of the Punjab, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, who had found the Ahrar and their emerging anti-Ahmadi alliance a useful counter-balance to Mamdot and the Jama’at in the election campaign.103 The Punjab elections of 1951, therefore, became a platform for sounding out the Ahrar’s anti-Ahmadi propaganda. Daultana, bogged down in the election campaign, and eager to inculcate a base of support among the religiously

101 Friedmann, Prophecy, P.37.

102 Binder, Religion and Politics, P.261.

103 The Muslim League of Punjab was itself receptive to the Ahrar’s agitations; for, it had earlier refused the entry of Ahmadis into its ranks. See, Friedmann, Prophecy, pp.37-38.
conscious electorate, turned a blind eye to these activities. Nor did Daultana show any signs of discomfort with the Ahrar following his victory in the elections. In fact, the Ahrar were further emboldened with Daultana’s sweep of the Punjab, and set out to turn the Ahmadi issue into a national debate. The dire economic conditions of the Punjab at the time, rise in the price of food, and conditions of famine precipitated by the intransigence of the land owning clique, meanwhile, provided a fertile ground for the Ahrar agitations.104

Zafaru'llah Khan, meanwhile, unperturbed by the clamor of the Ahrar, played the situation directly into their hands. Turning down pleas by the Prime Minister Nazimu’ddin, in May 1952 the Foreign Minister addressed an open Ahmadi session in Karachi. The Ahrar and the ‘ulama, infuriated by the Foreign Minster’s open endorsement of his religion, organized a protest march which clashed with the Ahmadis, and precipitated a riot.105 On May 18, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, Pakistan’s new spiritual leader, formed an ‘ulama board to formulate an official response to the events. Shaikh Sultan Ahmad represented the Jama’at on the board. The board demanded that, the Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority; Zafaru’llah Khan be removed from his cabinet post; and all key government jobs be cleansed of Ahmadis. The board also elected a Majlis-i ‘Amal (Council of Action) to pursue the matter. Amin AhsanIslahi and Malik Nasru’llah Khan ‘Aziz of the Jama’at were members of this Majlis.106

105 Binder, Religion and Politics, P.261.
The issue was, meanwhile put before Jama‘at’s Majlis-i Shura’. While a number of Jama‘at leaders such as Sultan Ahmad, Islahi and Nasru’llah Khan ‘Aziz favored the organization’s whole-hearted participation in the agitations, Mawdudi was reluctant to give his seal of approval. Mawdudi then embroiled in formulating his constitutional proposals, argued that, the Ahmadi issue would be resolved automatically once the country was Islamized. At the meantime, riots and agitations would only tarnish the image of the Islamic groups, lessen the appeal of an Islamic constitution, and by playing into the hands of the opponents of Islamization it was bound to derail the whole campaign for an Islamic state. Mawdudi was moreover not keen on the Ahrar, viewed their alliances built around the Ahmadi issue with suspicion, and was generally unhappy with acceding to their leadership in any cause.\footnote{Malik Ghulam ‘Ali argues that while opposed to the Ahmadis, Mawdudi never subscribed to the kind of impassioned denunciations which characterized the ‘ulama or the Ahrar’s encounters with the Ahmadis. Mawdudi had always believed that proper Islamization would "reconvert" the Ahmadis to Islam, or the Islamic state would find a political solution to their place in society. Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, "Professor Mawdudi ke Sath Sath Islamiyah College Se Lahore Tak", in HRZ, pp.123-24.} The Shura’, therefore, remained undecided on the issue. It would not give its whole-hearted endorsement to the Majlis-i ‘Amal, then dominated by the Ahrar; but recognizing the paramountcy of the Ahmadi issue, the Jama‘at would incorporate the demands of the Majlis-i ‘Amal into its own constitutional demands.\footnote{Mawdudi added the demands of the Majlis-i ‘Amal to his eight point August 1952 constitutional proposals as proposal number nine.}

The August 1952 issue of the Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an, therefore, carried a lengthy denunciation of the Ahmadis, promising to include the demand for their exclusion from Islam into the Jama‘at’s proposals for an Islamic constitution. The article was written by

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Mawdudi. In August 1952, the Jama‘at members of the Majlis-i ‘Amal, in keeping with Mawdudi’s views on the issue, sought to temper the Ahrar’s violent inclinations by proposing peaceful solutions to the crisis. Unable to control the Ahrar’s penchant for violence, the Jama‘at officially dissociated itself from Majlis-i ‘Amal on February 26, 1953.109

Between July 1952 and January 1953, Mawdudi had actively lobbied with the ‘ulama to draw them away from the agitations, hoping instead to keep their attention on the issue of the Islamic constitution, and to preserve the alliance which had produced the Objectives Resolution.110 Mawdudi argued, fervently at times, that there existed no need for "direct action" on the Ahmadi issue, nor was there a need for a theological solution; the Islamic constitution would conveniently provide a political solution to not only this issue, but a host of other ones.111 Mawdudi was increasingly worried over the implications of the crisis for the government of Nazimu’ddin, which the Jama‘at had viewed as a clear asset. The situation was, however, quickly radicalizing, and spiraling out of the control of the Jama‘at. The Majlis-i ‘Amal, dominated by the Ahrar, and nudged along by Daultana and the Punjab Muslim League,112 proved a more decisive force in determining the position of the ‘ulama than Mawdudi’s cautions.

109 SAAM, vol.1, P.441.

110 Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.276-87. The author here details Mawdudi’s overtures to the ‘ulama.

111 ibid, pp.273 and 283.

112 Binder, Religion and Politics, pp.294-95; and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp.153-54. Both works detail Daultana’s support for the Ahrar.
In July 1952, the Punjab government had imposed Section 144 restricting public gatherings. On July 21 the restrictions had been lifted, and a week later "the council of Punjab Muslim League...[had] adopted a resolution by a vote of 264 against eight in support of the anti-Ahmediya agitation."\textsuperscript{113} The Ahrar had, therefore, found more cause to continue to push for a show-down. The break-down in the constitutional effort, which Mawdudi had feared, had soon followed. Forgoing their greater interests in Islamization of Pakistan, in January 1953 the ‘ulama gave Nazimu’ddin an ultimatum, to declare the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority within a month or face "direct action" - a euphemism for wide-scale agitations.\textsuperscript{114} The Jama‘at leader, Sultan Ahmad was a party to this undertaking.\textsuperscript{115} The government did not react favorably to the ‘ulama’s threat. Nazimu’ddin sanctioned a virulent attack against the ‘ulama in the press, which given the Prime Minister’s reputation for piety was a bolt out of the dark for the Majlis-i ‘Amal, and cause for remorse for Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{116} Worse yet, on February 27, the government ordered a number of ‘ulama to be rounded up and placed under protective custody.\textsuperscript{117}

Mawdudi was no longer able to remain aloof from the goings on. The constitutional debates were completely side-lined, and the ‘ulama had been radicalized. The situation was now polarized between the government and the religious groups, and the loyalties of

\textsuperscript{114} Binder, \textit{Religion}, P.294.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Report of the Court}, pp.69-70.
\textsuperscript{116} ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} ibid.
the Jama'at naturally lay with the latter. Moreover, wary of the Ahrar's meteoric rise to prominence, the Jama'at, conscious of the direction which public opinion was taking, began to reassess its own irenic approach to the crisis.118

Mawdudi and Sultan Ahmad participated in all-Muslim parties convention in January 1953, and approved of the declaration of the session demanding the resignation of Nazimu'ddin.119 Mawdudi then briefly joined the Majlis-i 'Amal, but quickly withdrew in light of its violent proclivity.120 Mawdudi and the Jama'at, however, had now become fully entangled in the agitations, which between February and March spread throughout the Punjab.121 On March 5, 1953, the most systematic denunciation of the Ahmadis produced since the beginning of the crisis, *Qadiyani Mas'alah (The Ahmadi Problem)*, written by Mawdudi, was published. Designed to confirm his primacy in the religious circles, reiterate his religious credentials to the 'ulama who had chastised the Jama'at for lack of support for the agitations, and to upstage the Ahrar, the book placed Mawdudi squarely at the center of the controversy.122 True to his form, Mawdudi who was

118 *SAAM*, vol.1, P.441.


120 The Jama'at's relations with the Majlis-i 'Amal were sufficiently ambivalent to inculpate the Jama'at in later court proceedings; see, *ibid*, pp.69-71:

"While Jama'at's criticism of acts of violence by agitators were only indirect and veiled, Mawdudi was throughout emitting fire against the Government in a most harsh language."

*ibid*, P.71.

121 Some members of the Jama'at such as Sultan Ahmad continued to be active in the Majlis-i 'Amal throughout despite Mawdudi's reservations.

122 The book was not rounded up by Martial Law authorities until March 23, and in 18 days sold 57,000 copies; *SAAM*, vol.2, P.32.
opposed to the agitations, now became its central focus.

The federal cabinet although perturbed by Daultana’s machinations continued to vacillate. General Iskandar Mirza concerned with the rising agitations in Punjab, and seeing Nazimu’ddin’s indecision and Daultana’s "flirtations with the mullahs (religious divine) as yet another example of the ineptitude and destructive potential of the politicians," ordered General ‘Azam Khan on the next day, March 6, to place Punjab under martial law. Daultana resigned, and Mawdudi along with Mawlana ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi and number of Ahrar leaders were arrested.

Mawdudi was arrested for violating Martial Law regulations, and for "promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between different groups in Pakistan" by publishing the *Qadiyani Mas’alah*, as well as writing inflammatory articles in *Tasnim* which were published in February 28 and March 7, 1953 editions of the magazine. Some 12 Jama’at leaders, including Islahi and Mian Tufayl, and 28 workers including the publisher of the *Qadiyani Mas’alah* were also arrested on the same charges; and Jama’at papers *Kawthar* and *Tasnim* were closed down in the face of forbidding security deposits.

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123 Jalal states that wary of the worsening situation, General ‘Azam Khan took it upon himself to push Punjab under martial law, see Jalal, *State of Martial Rule*, P.177. However, in his memoirs, unpublished in full to this date, General Mirza writes that he saw the events in Punjab as proof of the inherent inability of the politicians to manage their affairs, he ordered General ‘Azam Khan to impose martial law on Punjab. See unpublished manuscript of General Iskandar Mirza’s memoirs, pp.52-54. This manuscript was made available to this author by Sayyid Asad ‘Ali and Begum Fakhr-i Jahan ‘Ali, the daughter of General Mirza.

124 SAAM, vol.1, P.442.

125 Cited in *HRZ*, P.134.
stipulated by the authorities. Jama'at headquarters were raided, and papers and funds of the organizations were confiscated. It was announced that Mawdudi along with the editor of *Tasnim*, Nasru'llah Khan 'Aziz, and the publisher of *Qadiyani Mas'alalah* would be tried on charges of sedition in May.

The anti-Ahmadi agitations, as Mawdudi had feared, proved to be the undoing of Nazimu'ddin, and a major set-back for the campaign for Islamic constitution. With martial law in place in Punjab, and a climate of uncertainty and crisis reigning in the country, Ghulam Muhammad found ample room for maneuvering, and summarily dismissed Nazmi'uddin on April 17, 1953. Ghulam Muhammad’s action was strongly backed by Pakistani leaders such as General Mirza who had already taken issue with Nazimu’ddin’s "flirtations with the mullahs," enough to place the entire responsibility for the crisis in Punjab on his shoulders.

The pious Nazimu’ddin was replaced by the more secular Muhammad ‘Ali Bugra, whose impact was immediately reflected in the Interim Constitutional Proposals of June 1953, which conveniently omitted all the hitherto agreed upon conclusions regarding the place of Islam in the constitution making process. The problems before the Islamic groups, however, did not end here. A special court of Inquiry was set up in June 1953

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126 *ibid.*

127 *SAAM*, vol.2, pp.30-32.


129 Binder, *Religion and Politics*, P.305. Also ominous for the ‘ulama was the appointment of Allahbukhsh K. Brohi as Minister of Law in this cabinet, who was then an articulate opponent of the Islamic groups’ demands on the constitutional process.
under the supervision of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir, who not only looked into the roots of the agitations in Punjab, but set out to methodically roll-back the gains made by Islamic groups, and to close their niche in politics. Placed on the defensive, the power of religious activists was effectively truncated by the adroit Justice Munir, who disassembled the arguments of Islamic groups, and depicted them as incompetent with regards to the needs of running a modern state with such queries as to the meaning of a Muslim. The inability of the 'ulama and the lay religious activists to produce a unanimous response, led to the general conclusion that there existed no definition of Islam, let alone an Islamic constitution, and that the religious experts were best advised to leave the constitution making process alone, and instead concentrate on putting their own house in order. Munir's incisive inquiry known more popularly as the Munir Report later became singled out as the most celebrated "modernist" backlash against Islamic activism - an act of bravado warranted by the momentary change in the balance of advantage between the government and the Islamic groups - and an indictment against religious activism. The shadow of Munir's inquiry continues to cast over the activities of the sundry of Islamic groups in Pakistan.

By blaming Pakistan's developmental problems on the "perfidious" meddling of religious groups in politics, the Munir Report turned the central question before the

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130 The Court of Inquiry was set-up on June 19, 1953, and also included Justice M.R. Kiyani, a Shi'i with a secular outlook.


132 A summary of this report along with Munir's own retrospection was published as Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1979).
Pakistan state on its head. Islam was depicted as an unwelcome impediment to national development, whereas it had been developmental crises which had invited Islam into the political arena in the first place. What the Munir Report failed to come to terms with was the fact that, as deficient as the program of the Islamic groups may have been, in the absence of veritable representative institutions in a fractious polity superimposed on a variegated culture, it was all that was available to Pakistanis. In a society with arrested political development and state formation, a fecundity of fissiparous tendencies, and what Migdal has termed the "politics of survival," Islam had become the intermediary between state and society; and the more so as the former had faltered and the latter grown unruly. The same motivations that governed the politicians appeal to Islam had also conditioned the role of Islam in the politics of the masses. In similar vein, just as the politicians had opened the door political activism by the Islamic groups, so had the masses. Neither side, it now appeared, was capable of controlling the flow of Islam in politics, nor predict the nature of the sacralization of the national political discourse. Religion could not be selectively appealed to and then successfully manipulated. Forays into the domain of the 'ulama and the Islamic groups by politicians, and the resultant

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sacralization of the political discourse, could engender uncontrollable and undesirable outcomes. There had existed costs and responsibilities to be shouldered by Liaqat ‘Ali Khan, Nazimu’ddin and Daultana to name only a few of Pakistan’s political leaders at the time, as well as by those whom the Munir Report sought to implicate. The Report focused on the symptoms rather than the root causes of the seemingly ineluctable sacralization of the political discourse in Pakistan. The dilemma of Islamic activism had to be understood and addressed within the context of the vicissitudes of Pakistani democracy, and the inherent tendency of politicians at the time to aid rather than hinder the sacralization of the political discourse. This was perhaps the most apparent lesson of the Punjab crisis, which deluded the Munir Report, but not the secularist military and bureaucratic elite who came to the conclusion that, secularism was the handmaiden of political stability, and only an apolitical polity could harbinger a secular society.\footnote{See chapter 12.}

All this was, however, more a testimony to the emotive power of Islamic symbolisms than to their invidious influence. In fact, the successful use of Islam in a protest movement such as the one witnessed in Punjab may at first glance have detracted from the appeal of Islam and its proponents, but in fact, it underlined the continuing salience of Islam in Pakistani society. The ‘ulama and the likes of Mawdudi may be ridiculed, but in the absence of nationally shared values or a viable state ideology, Islam was bound to return to the limelight.

The Munir Report was the apogee of the secular leadership’s attempts to extricate Islam from their midst; yet, neither Munir nor Ghulam Muhammad, nor in later years,
Ayub Khan proved able to find a substitute for the legitimating role of Islam in the polity. Therefore, despite conflict, symbiosis continued to weld Islam and the state together. In fact, the more, in the years to come, Pakistan fell into the throes of developmental crises, the more the politicians and the masses alike appealed to Islamic symbolisms and loyalties in constructing more efficacious political programs and stronger social movements. The paradox of the Munir Report is best captured in the fact that, while Justice Munir was busy systematically "rolling back" the gains made by Islamic groups, Nuru’l-Amin, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan told the secularist Prime Minister Bugra that, "Islam was the League’s one hope of warding off defeat in East Bengal,"\(^{135}\) and keeping the wayward province under the control of Karachi.

Changes in the political climate in 1953 also proved ominous for the legal debacle before the Jama’at. On May 9, 1953 the military tribunal convened to determine the fate of those arrested in pursuance to the imposition of martial law in Punjab, sentenced Mawlanas Mawdudi and ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi to death on charges of sedition. The court also sentenced Nasru’llah Khan ‘Aziz and Naqi ‘Ali, the publishers of Tasnim and Qadiyani Mas’alah to 3 and 9 years jail terms respectively. The sentences were unexpected, and in the case of Mawdudi, was interpreted by many to be incommensurate to his role in the entire affair. Mawdudi was arrested and subsequently sentenced to death primarily for writing the Qadiyani Mas’alah. The book was published a day before martial law was declared, and yet, Mawdudi was arrested for violating a martial ordinance by writing the book. Mawdudi’s writings were hardly as inflammatory as those of the Ahrar leaders none

of whom received as severe a punishment. The logic of the sentences was even more perplexing considering the facts that, the most active of the Jama'at leaders in the agitations, Sultan Ahmad, was not even arrested; and that, Mawdudi had received the same sentence as Niyazi, whose inflammatory speeches had directly encouraged violence, and on one occasion had led to the murder of a policeman outside of the mosque where he was preaching.

The Jama'at began to clamor for justice. Sultan Ahmad, now the provisional Amir of the Jama'at, declared on June 18, 1954 that Mawdudi's arrest and sentence had nothing to do with the anti-Ahmadi agitations, and everything to do with his constitutional proposals.136 Sultan Ahmad, echoing a general sentiment among the religious groups, stated that the government's reaction to the agitations was merely a pretext for doing away with the Islamic stumbling blocks to the passage of a secular constitution. Justice Munir's probing into the political acumen and religious sensibilities of the religious groups, under the pretext of determining of the causes of the Punjab agitations, did little to assuage the suspicions of the religious divines. Many religious leaders, including those in the Jama'at, charged that the Court of Inquiry was better advised to look into the economic roots of the crisis, and the political maneuverings of the Daultana Ministry in fomenting the

136 Report of the Court, P.92. Ghulam Muhammad was found by Jama'at members to be particularly keen on convicting Mawdudi on charges of sedition, which only heightened Jama'at's anxieties about the government's true intentions; see for instance, Abdur Rahman Abd, Sayyed Maududi Faces the Death Sentence, reprint, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), pp.14-15.
agitations.\textsuperscript{137}

Some in the military and the bureaucracy saw the Punjab agitations and the five year campaign for an Islamic constitution as irrevocably interrelated, and as such, believed that Mawdudi’s crime extended beyond his role in the Punjab agitations. In their eyes he was guilty of creating a paralyzing national crisis.\textsuperscript{138} Munir has cited from the proceedings of Mawdudi’s trial the following revealing conclusion:

"Jamaat believes in, and has in its objective the replacement of the present form of Government by a Government of the Jamaat’s conception."\textsuperscript{139}

The military tribunal may have been astounded by this discovery. The Jama‘at, although they now denied such an agenda, had openly advocated it since they set foot in Pakistan. The Jama‘at’s campaign for Islamization was now depicted as a seditious undertaking, the only result of which could be what occurred in Punjab. Therefore, there existed no difference between Mawdudi’s academic undertakings and Niyazi’s manipulation of the mobs.

Despite the gravity of the situation before the Jama‘at, Mawdudi remained unapologetic. While he may have received assurances regarding his fate from League leaders such as Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali and the ousted

\textsuperscript{137} See Na‘im Siddiqi and Sa‘id Ahmad Malik, \textit{Tahqiqat-i ‘Adalat ki Report Par Tabsarah} (Lahore: Shu‘bah-i Nashr‘u Isha‘at-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1955). This critique of the Munir report was translated in to English in 1956 by Khurshid Ahmad, and was published as, \textit{An Analysis of the Munir Report} (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami, 1956). Also see in this regard, Statement of Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi Before the Punjab Disturbances Court of Inquiry (Karachi, nd.).

\textsuperscript{138} Binder, \textit{Religion and Politics}, P.303.

\textsuperscript{139} Munir, \textit{From Jinnah}, P.55.
Premier, Nazimu’ddin, true to form, he forbade his followers from seeking clemency on his behalf. The Jama‘at, however, staged a number of strikes and street demonstrations decrying the "injustice" rendered to Mawdudi by the military tribunal. To the government’s dismay, Mawdudi was gradually gaining the stature of a hero, which no doubt, prompted those in power to reevaluate the situation.

Reacting to pressures from within, hesitant to actually carry out the sentences against Mawdudi and Niyazi, and perturbed by the Jama‘at’s success in arguing its case in evermore vociferous public campaigns, the government adopted a conciliatory posture towards Mawdudi. Mian Muhammad Sharif, a judge of the Supreme Court was deputed by the government to review the decision of the military tribunal. Sharif

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140 This assertion was made by Abu’l-Khayr Mawdudi, who seems to always have taken pleasure in cutting to size the ego of his younger brother. Cited in, Ja’far Qasmi, "Mujhe Yad Hey Sab Zara Zara..." in Nida (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), pp.28-34. Also see, Aziz Ahmad, "Mawdudi and the Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan", in The Middle East Journal, 21:3 (Summer 1967), pp.369-70), where the author argues that Nazimu’ddin and Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali interceded on Mawdudi’s behalf with the authorities, preventing his execution. Also of consequence in this regard was King Saud of Saudi Arabia, who intervened on Mawdudi’s behalf with Governor General Ghulam Muhammad; cited in Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, Maududi; Thought and Movement (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), pp.103-04.

141 The Jama‘at staged large demonstrations in Karachi on May 12 and 13, 1953, the latter at Karachi airport at the time of the arrival of the Prime Minister to the city.

142 Jama‘at members argue that while Mawdudi was in prison, their demonstrations which dealt solely with the issue of his trial and sentence, began to attract large crowds, which boosted morale in the organization greatly; SAAM, vol.1, pp.461-66.

143 See note 137.

144 ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi recollects that a section of the army was unhappy with the decision of the military tribunal in Mawdudi and Niyazi’s cases; interview with ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi in Herald (Karachi), (January 1990), P.272.
recommended that, the Martial Law Administration commute its sentences. Mawdudi’s sentence was reduced by the Martial Law authorities to 14 years imprisonment. By the end of 1953 most of the Jama‘at workers had been freed, and in March 1954, Islahi was released from prison. Mawdudi, however, was to stay away from the political process for as long as the government could manage. The judiciary, however, once again proved to be a boon for the Jama‘at. Late in 1954, a group of defendants in the "Rawilpindi Conspiracy" case, reacting to the constitutional confusion created by the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, filed a petition challenging sentences which were handed out in their cases based on the Indemnity Act which still awaited the approval of the Governor General when the Assembly was dismissed. The judiciary ruled in favor of the defendants. Since Mawdudi and his cohorts were also tried and sentenced subject to the same disputed bill, they too, were all ordered released by the Pakistan Supreme Court.

After two years of imprisonment, Mawdudi was released from prison on April 29, 1955. His prison experience had given him the status of a hero in the religious circles. He quickly became the spokesman of the ambivalent religious alliance, whose zeal Mawdudi

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145 ibid.

146 When the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in favor the Governor General over dismissing the Constituent Assembly, it de facto declared that the Assembly, which had also served as the federal legislature had never been a sovereign body. As such the acts which it had passed, especially those without approval of the Governor General had no legal authority; on this issue see Jalal’s insightful analysis in The State of Martial Rule, pp.203-04.

147 Interview with Niyazi in Herald, P.272.

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was determined to rekindle.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{Jama’at-i Islami and the Constitution of 1956}

Jama’at’s experience with the strong-arm tactics of the Martial Law administration in Punjab, and its dismay at the ouster of Nazimu’ddin had been enough reason to entrench the organization’s newly-found dedication to the preservation and promotion of civil liberties.\textsuperscript{149} In July 1953,\textsuperscript{150} the Jama’at celebrated the "Islamic Constitution Day", and in November of the same year the organization ordered its workers to join various civil liberties unions across Pakistan, and also began debate in the Shura’ for establishing a Central Civil Liberties Association.\textsuperscript{151} Similarly, the Munir Report and the markedly more secular Interim constitutional proposals floated by BPC following the change of government had convinced the Jama’at to intensify its efforts on behalf of Islam.

Jama’at’s nascent Islamic constitutionalism was soon given ample ammunition when the secularist Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, summarily dismissed the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954, and Justice Munir gave judicial support to Governor General’s blatant show of contempt for the constitutional process. The Jama’at, with Mawdudi still in prison and conceivably at the mercy of Ghulam

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{148} Following his release from Prison for instance, in a trip to Shaikhapura, the local Ahl-i Hadith ‘alim paid a glowing tribute to the Amir of the Jama’at. Mawdudi’s years in prison had gained him respect and his movement credence among the religiously inclined Pakistanis. See SAAM, vol.2, P.466.

\textsuperscript{149} On Jama’at’s dismay at the dismissal of Nazimu’ddin see, interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.53.

\textsuperscript{150} Saulat, \textit{Maulana Maududi}, P.45.

\textsuperscript{151} Chaudhri Ghulam Muhammad, "Pakistan Main Jumhuri", P.211.
\end{footnotesize}
Muhammad's good will, began organizing agitations against the Governor General's decision, and in support of the petition filed before the Sind High Court by the Speaker of the defunct Assembly Mawli Tamizu'ddin on November 7, 1954, challenging the dismissal.\textsuperscript{152}

For the Jama'at, the issue of the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly was not only a suitable \textit{cause celebre} around which to organize and to reinvigorate the languishing religious alliance, but was also an occasion to challenge both Ghulam Muhammad and Justice Munir, with whom the Jama'at had an axe to grind over the anti-Ahmadi issue. The abrogation of the assembly had moreover, removed the only institutional avenue open to the religious alliance for influencing the constitutional process, which now lay fully in the hands of secularist leaders. The restoration of the Assembly was therefore, a matter of life and death for the Islamic constitution, and yet another proof that the fate of Islam was enmeshed with that of democracy in Pakistan.

The Jama'at's anxieties were not assuaged until the Assembly was restored in May 1955. By the time the Assembly met in July, the situation had begun to turn even more favorable to the Jama'at. In August both Ghulam Muhammad and Bugra left office, to be replaced by General Iskandar Mirza and Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali respectively. Although the Governor General and the Prime Minister were preoccupied, for the most part, with the consolidation of West Pakistan into a single province, the constitutional

\textsuperscript{152} The Sind High Court's ruling did not favor the Governor General's action, and the case therefore went before the Supreme Court and Justice Munir. On Jama'at's efforts to assist the petition see, Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, \textit{Pakistan Main}, pp.16-17; and Nawwabzadah Nasru'llah Khan, "Ham Unke, Vuh Hemarah Sath Rahe", in \textit{HRZ}, P.37.
process also received a fair share of their attention.\footnote{Mawdudi and the Jama'at stayed away from this debate, arguing that it was immaterial to the issue of Islamic constitution. Mawdudi pointed out that Islam could just as easily be achieved in a single unit West Pakistan as in its hitherto multi-province structure; \textit{MMKT}, vol.3, pp.90-91.}

The Jama'at continued to propagate the cause of the Islamic constitution. Its zeal was, however, somewhat more subdued. Not only had the set-backs which their cause had received during the anti-Ahmadi imbroglio dampened the Jama'at's enthusiasm, but Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali's premiership had also calmed their nerves. The debate over the Islamic constitution, in light of Munir's debilitating criticisms and the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, was less focused on issues of substance and more on simply obtaining a constitution. The pious Muslim League leader and civil servant, Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali, whom Mawdudi had known since the 1930s, moreover, brought the Jama'at into the constitution making process, albeit unofficially. The organization's political strategies, thus, underwent commensurate change.\footnote{Faruqi writes that, Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali maintained close contact with Mawdudi throughout 1956, and frequently consulted him over the constitutional draft; ‘Abdu’l-Ghani Faruqi in \textit{HRZ}, P.29. This observation is also verified by Muhammad ‘Ali’s friend Sayyid Amjad ‘Ali; interview, Lahore.}

On February 29, 1956 the Constituent Assembly formally sanctioned the Constitution drafted by Muhammad ‘Ali into law. The Constitution recognized token demands of the Islamic groups, naming the state "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", and subjecting all legislative undertakings to the veto of the "repugnancy clause".\footnote{The clause stipulated in Clause 205 of the Constitution argued that, no laws may be passed which are deemed repugnant to the teachings of the Qur’an and the Hadith; and moreover, all laws passed to date could be examined in light of the religious sources, and if need be dismissed.} Most of the earlier
demands of the Islamic groups, the conclusions made by the Board of Ta’limat-i Islamiyah, Objectives Resolution, or reports of the BPC, however, found no reflection in the Constitution. Most notably, Islam was not declared the official religion of Pakistan, nor was it stipulated that the Speaker of the National Assembly who could become president under special circumstances, must be a Muslim.

The Constitution of 1956, moreover, closely paralleled the India Act of 1935, and hence, despite its prima facie adherence to the Westminster model, gave broad powers to the President.\(^{156}\) The Constitution had retained all the aspects of the earlier BPC Interim Report, which Mawdudi had most vehemently denounced for its authoritarian predilection.\(^{157}\)

Mawdudi and the Jama‘at, however, quickly accepted the Constitution at face value as an "Islamic Constitution".\(^{158}\) Mawdudi’s decision, religiously suspect as it was, was politically prudent, and was therefore, a concomitant of the organization’s political enfranchisement. Mawdudi, no doubt, was motivated by his desire to support Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, and making the best of a declining situation. The Jama‘at was, moreover, cognizant of the direction which Pakistani politics had been taking. Bengali restlessness with Karachi’s political intrigues had increased markedly since 1954 when the League had


\(^{157}\) On August 11, 1955 during a speech in Karachi Mawdudi had denounced the India Act of 1935 in strongest of terms as a British confabulation deserved to be abrogated for good; *MMKT*, vol.3, pp.63-66.

\(^{158}\) The only serious criticism lodged by Mawdudi was to the "preventive detention" clause of the Constitution, which given his recent experiences with the heavy handed policies of the government, was derided as outright authoritarian; *TQ*, (January-February 1956), pp.2-8.
been routed in East Pakistan's provincial elections. Pakistan, Mawdudi, decided needed a working constitution, the continuation of debate over which could only further divide the country. In similar vein, the Jama'at had eyed the political maneuverings of General Mirza, who was no less a threat to the interests of the Jama'at than Ghulam Muhammad, with alarm. A prolonged constitutional dead-lock could only have benefitted General Mirza and his allies in the bureaucracy and the armed forces, who were impatient with Pakistani politics and were poised to dispense with the entire process altogether. Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali, no doubt, had been instrumental in convincing Mawdudi of these conclusions.

The Jama'at had therefore, deemed it wise to forgo clamoring for a constitution of their liking, and to accept Muhammad 'Ali's formulation as a satisfactory framework for furthering the cause of Islam incrementally. The implications of the Constitution were not, however, readily apparent to the Jama'at which was then embroiled in the Machchi Goth affair. Adjustments to the organization's strategy in light of the change in the political arena therefore did not begin until 1957. Perhaps for this reason the organization took no part in the party-less Punjab provincial elections of 1956. Mawdudi, however, sensing the waning of Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali's power in light of the skirmishes between the newly found Republican Party and the Muslim League, sought to bolster his position.

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160 *TQ* throughout 1956 contained several attacks on Pakistan's leadership, with the conspicuous exception of Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali.
Muhammad ‘Ali was, nevertheless, removed from office on September 12, 1956. He was replaced by the veteran Bengali politician, Shahid Husain Suhrawardi, whose mix of provincialism and populism did not sit well with West Pakistan’s landed and bureaucratic elite. The Jama’at, however, was more concerned with Suhrawardi’s secularist outlook and the leftist inclinations of his party, the Awami League. The Constitution of 1956 had left the question of electorates unresolved. Most West Pakistanis, the Jama’at included, favored separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. The Awami League, echoing the sentiments of Bengalis favored joint electorates. No sooner had Suhrawardi moved into his new office that the disagreement erupted into the a significant controversy.

The Jama’at quickly mobilized against the Awami League and Suhrawardi in defense of separate electorates. The organization soon found itself in the same camp as its erstwhile enemies and rivals. Muslims League leaders who had fought for separate electorates in India, General Mirza and the bureaucratic and military elite all favored separate electorates because they did not favor bolstering Bengali political consciousness at the cost of an Islamic, and by implication, Pakistani one. The Jama’at was rather motivated by its dislike of Hindus who were the main beneficiaries of joint electorates in East Pakistan, its zimmi-Muslim dichotomous outlook on social organization, and above

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162 Mawdudi went on a tour of East Pakistan to campaign against joint electorates hoping to influence the East Pakistan’s Provincial Assembly’s decision on the matter; Saulat, Maulana Maududi, pp.47-50. Also see Mawdudi’s numerous speeches on this issue in MMKT, vol.4, pp.31-32, 66-70, 77-80, 166-79, and 182-83.
all, by desire to bolster the role of Islam in Pakistan's political process. The interests of Pakistan's rulers and the religious sensibilities of the Jama'at had converged, but more importantly, so had their visions of the predicaments as well as the needs of the state - a reiteration of the evolving symbiosis between the two.

Hence, while the Jama'at remained ill-at-ease with Suhrawardi and his two successors between 1957 and 1958, the organization grew markedly closer to the government, especially so as clamor for provincial autonomy among Bengalis came to dominate Pakistani politics in that period, socioeconomic grievances erupted in the form of strikes and demands for economic justice, and as the hand of General Mirza in steering Pakistani politics towards the abyss of military rule became more apparent. When Firuz Khan Nun, the Prime Minister of Pakistan called an "all-parties conference" in 1958, the Jama'at was graciously invited to attend.

The Jama'at interpreted the turn in events as propitious. The organization contested 23 seats in the Karachi municipal elections in 1958 winning 18. Taking the result

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163 As early as 1950 Mawdudi had declared: "one must therefore accept the fact that it is Islam and only Islam that keeps disparate segments of East and West [Pakistan] together"; TQ, (June 1950), P.365.

164 Suhrawardi left his office on October 11, 1957. His successor, I.I. Chundrigar remained in office until December 16, 1957, and was replaced with Malik Firuz Khan Nun, whose tenure of office extended until October 7, 1958.

165 See Mawdudi's criticisms of General Mirza's policies in MMKT, vol.4, pp.125-32.

166 Nasru'llah Khan, "Ham Unki", P.37.
a sign of greater victories to follow, it began preparing for the expected national elections,\textsuperscript{167} even forging an electoral alliance with East Pakistan's Nizam-i Islam Party.\textsuperscript{168} The Jama'at's hopes were, however, dashed when on October 7, 1958 Generals Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan staged a military coup, dismissed the civilian government, shelved the Constitution of 1956.

During the years 1948 and 1958, the Jama'at found its place in Pakistani politics. Following an uncertain start, and a series of challenges to the Pakistan state, the organization utilized the campaign for an Islamic constitution, which created circumstances favorable to the enfranchisement of the Jama'at, to articulate a political program, and to routinize its original idealism. The Jama'at found a clear-cut political program, amending its Islamic vision with a commitment to democracy and constitutional rights. In the process it infused the political discourse with religious idioms and conceptions, the impact of whose language and symbolisms have left an indelible mark on Pakistani politics.\textsuperscript{169} Conflict, however, continued to characterize the relations between the Jama'at and the rulers of Pakistan during these years. The foundations of the symbiosis between Islam and state was, however, also strengthened during this period.

\textsuperscript{167} See the text of Mawdudi's speech announcing the organization's decision to contest elections in *MMKT*, vol.4, pp.85-91. Also see *Election Manifesto of Jamaat-e-Islami* (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami, 1958).

\textsuperscript{168} Binder, *Religion and Politics*, P.374.

\textsuperscript{169} See the tribute of one of Mawdudi's staunchest critics during these years on this issue, AllahBukhsh K. Brohi, "Mawdudi, Pakistan Ka Sab Se Bara Wakil", in *HRZ*, pp.33-36.
CHAPTER 12
THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND NATIONAL UNITY:
JAMA’AT-I ISLAMI AND THE AYUB KHAN AND YAHYA KHAN REGIMES,
1958-1971

The Jama'at did not take kindly to the praetorian military coup engineered by
Generals Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan. For, not only the coup ran against
the grain of the Jama'at's emerging platform of Islamic constitutionalism, but it also
effectively derailed the organization's immediate political plans by postponing national
elections indefinitely.¹ The Jama'at was led to believe that, the generals were prompted
to stage the coup out of contempt for the "Islamic" Constitution of 1956, and the fear of
an electoral victory by Islamic groups in general, and the Jama'at in particular. Basking
in the modest glory of its showing in the Karachi municipal elections of 1958, the Jama'at
concluded that its performance - winning 18 of the 23 seats which it contested - must of
have caused much consternation in the army and the civil service - the bastions of
secularism.² The coup, Mawdudi argued, was staged, specifically, to stop the Jama'at and
its ilk from getting any closer to the seats of power. If General Mirza’s own renditions are
any indication, the Jama'at's conclusions were not all that off the mark. In a revealing
passage, written in later years about the reasons behind the coup, General Mirza

¹ For more on the Ayub era see, Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in
Pakistan 1958-69 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), and Herbert Feldman,
Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial-Law Administration (Karachi: Oxford

² In those municipal elections there had been 100 seats up for election. These figures
were furnished by the offices of Jama'at-i Islami of Karachi. For interpretation of those
results and its relation to the coup see interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir
(Karachi), (November 16, 1989), P.53.
recollected,

"On 8th January 1956, the draft of the proposed constitution was published. I was very doubtful about two of its features. I was opposed to inserting Islamic provisions into the machinery of government. We have seen how Liaquat Ali Khan's 'Objectives Resolution' gave a handle to the Ulama, and allowed them to go and almost destroy Pakistan in 1953. But the Muslim League never learnt anything from past experience. Despite my repeated warnings, Muhammad Ali deliberately created an 'Islamic Republic' for Pakistan, giving the Ulama another invitation to interfere. Maulana Maudoodi and his party were given a heaven-sent opportunity to mess up the state."

The politicians, implied General Mirza, were neither able to withstand the temptation of "flirting with the mullahs", nor were they capable of averting or containing the resultant political crises. The progress of the country depended on extricating Islam from the political process, a feat which could not be accomplished with politicians running the country - secularism went hand-in-hand with martial rule. The praetorian coup had been staged not only to forestall the collapse of the political order, but explicitly to foil the "insidious" plans of the Islamic groups - the Jama'at in particular - in this regard.

The implications of the coup for relations between the Jama'at and the government on the one hand, and Islam and the state on the other, were self-evident. Not only had one of the primary architects of the coup lucidly explained that "trouble" - possible good electoral showings - was expected from the Islamic groups if elections were to have decided the fate of Pakistan under the Constitution of 1956, but he had singled out Mawdudi and the Jama'at in that regard. It is therefore, not surprising that, the Jama'at

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3 General Iskandar Mirza's unpublished memoirs, pp.109-10; provided to the author by Sayyid Asad 'Ali and Begum Fakhr-i Jahan 'Ali, the General's daughter.

quickly developed a loathing for General Mirza, and after his dismissal and exile later in 1958, for General Ayub Khan.5

The Jama'at's response to the military coup was shaped in direct response to the alliance between secularism and martial rule as enunciated by General Mirza. The implications of military autocracy for the religious as well as the political aspirations of the Jama'at, as will be elucidated here, acted to reinforce the organization's commitment to its nascent platform of Islamic constitutionalism - a neologism which now defied the state-sponsored secularist autocracy word for word. The generals had not only done away with the fruits of a decade of Jama'at activism, but in the eyes of the Jama'at, they had also stolen the elections from the organization.6 The Jama'at, however, was not as concerned about what had come to pass as they were about the implications of the coup for their future. The martial law had already denied the Jama'at one political victory, which led the organization to believe that only the restoration of the constitution and the democratic order would pave the way for their ascension to power.7 The organization's credo of Islamic constitutionalism, therefore, found new life and vigor in light of this realization. The October coup was not to be last time that the Jama'at would blame martial law for denying it access to power. Islamic constitutionalism was to develop into


6 In 1962, Mawdudi told the Shura' of the Jama'at that the military coup was designed to suspend elections which were to have benefitted the Jama'at; TQ, (June 1962), P.322.

7 Maryam Jameelah, "An Appraisal of Some Aspects of Maulana Sayyid Ala Maudoodi's Life and Thought", The Islamic Quarterly, XXXI:2 (Second Quarter 1987), P.124. The author recollects Mawdudi asserting that the fate of Islam in Pakistan was inevitably linked with that of democracy.
more than merely a convenient motto; it was to become the means for restoring the Jama’at’s political fortunes before government autocracy, in the 1960s, and again in the 1970s and the 1980s.

Soon after the coup it became apparent that the task before the Jama’at was a complex one. The martial regime, determined to shape the future of Pakistan would not be easily debunked. The Jama’at now confronted a qualitatively different political and administrative establishment, one which proved to be less pliable to pressure, and more willing to exert it. The predicament before the Jama’at, as well as the rest of the opposition at this stage was further complicated by the fact that, the martial law regime at this stage did enjoy certain popularity. The coup, as the generals had successfully argued, had brought a modicum of stability to a fractious polity which had got dangerously close to the edge of a precipice, and the new regime’s anti-corruption and economic readjustment policies were welcomed by many. Simple expression of dissent, as a result carried little weight. The Jama’at was, therefore, compelled to envision a more coherent political program, one which would give doctrinal meaning and ideological significance to its opposition to the new regime. Given the mood of the country at the time, however, even the politically efficacious constitutionalist stance was hard-pressed to bear any immediate results for the Jama’at.

More ominously, the October coup changed the balance of relations between the Jama’at and the state in a fundamental fashion, not only by pushing the organization into

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a retreat, but also by throwing it into a state of confusion. The coup had side-lined the politicians - power brokers who had the greatest propensity for appealing to religious symbolisms and idioms. It had instead brought the most anglicized, and hence, least religiously-inclined segments of Pakistani leadership - the civil bureaucracy and the military - into the political limelight. Not only were the bureaucracy and the military ideologically inimical to the ideas and political formulations of the Islamic groups, but did not share their enthusiasm for placing religious concerns at the crux of the constitutional process. The architects of the coup were instead motivated by administrative or socioeconomic concerns. They sought to change the focus of the constitutional debates, and hence, the political process from the reason why Pakistan was created, to where it may be heading - from religious idealism to developmental concerns. The impending clash with the ‘ulama and the Islamic groups was central to the question of political change in Pakistan during this period, for which the government and its opposition both braced themselves. The Bureau of National Reconstruction was charged with the task of devising a new cultural outlook clad in secular political idioms, and yet geared to unite the fissiparous Pakistani society. This was an undertaking which also had the blessing of leftists forces. They expected to reap the benefits of the government’s campaign to simultaneously cleanse Pakistani politics of the influence of the like of the Jama‘at, and to

9 Altaf Gauhar, himself a high ranking Pakistani civil servant during the Ayub Khan era, writes that, since 1947 the civil bureaucracy, given its British traditions, had been the repository of greatest animosity towards Mawdudi in Pakistan; Altaf Gauhar, "Pakistan, Ayub Khan, Awr Mawlana Mawdudi, Tafhimu‘l-Qur’an Awr Main", in HRZ, pp.41-42.

focus the country on socioeconomic concerns.\textsuperscript{11} The redoubtable implications of this shift in emphasis - away from the symbiosis between Islam and the state - were to stretch the nexus between Jama'at and the state to the point of rupture.\textsuperscript{12} The Jama'at, however, as it will be elucidated in this chapter, refused to be provoked by the Ayub regime. The organization remained within the bounds of the symbiotic relationship between Islam and the state, even when it was the government's espoused policy to eradicate that arrangement. Faced with government belligerence, and the marked secularization of politics during the Ayub era, the Jama'at consciously resisted the temptation of greater radicalization. Desirous to avoid the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser, Mawdudi steered the Jama'at clear of radical solutions to the challenges posed by the Ayub regime.\textsuperscript{13} The organization responded to the increasing autocracy and bellicosity of the government on the one hand, and the evermore apparent bifurcation of Pakistani society into modern and traditional sectors produced by the ruling establishment's modernization and industrialization schemes, on the other, by further routinizing its idealism and streamlining its functioning in the political process. This was an arduous task which tested the limits of Mawdudi's hold over the Jama'at. In later years

\textsuperscript{11} Quraishi claims that the left eagerly pushed Ayub Khan to clamp down on the Islamic groups, and especially the Jama'at. Leftist propaganda soon created a climate, wherein any talk of religion was derided as "Jama'ati" and hence, deemed as insidious; see, Ishtiaq Husain Quraishi, \textit{Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives and Achievements} (Karachi: Ma'aref, 1975), pp.268-69.

\textsuperscript{12} It was in this light that in a speech in Rawalpindi in 1962 Mawdudi referred to the Ayub regime as "anti-Pakistan", cited in \textit{MMKT}, vol.5, pp.14-17.

\textsuperscript{13} In 1956 the Jama'at showed greater cognizance of the working of religion and politics in Egypt, and looked disapprovingly of Muslim Brotherhood's increasing radicalization; \textit{TQ}, (April 1956), pp.220-28.
in a revealing remark Mawdudi reminisced, "we put up with Ayub with the patience of Ayub [Job]."\textsuperscript{14}

The Jama'at's experiences with the Ayub regime more clearly articulated its political platform of Islamic constitutionalism, which although not central to the eventual outcome of Pakistani politics in the 1960s, was nevertheless significant in determining the pattern of the organization's development, and in its subsequent interactions with the powers-that-be. The admixture of Islam and democracy, at times thoroughly overshadowed by the concerns for the latter, proved to be a serious attempt at bridging the widening political and cultural gap between the traditional and the modern segments of the society. The Jama'at strove to preserve the Pakistani state at its roots when the policies of the ruling establishment pushed it increasingly to the brink of crisis.

**The Campaign to Destroy the Jama'at**

No sooner had the martial law regime taken hold of power that it launched a concerted effort to extricate the influence of Islamic groups from politics. The objective was both to rid the state of the clamor for Islamicity, and to justify suspending the Constitution of 1956 which bore the imprint of their influence. This campaign was not, however, openly secularist in outlook. Secularism was introduced to Pakistan in the guise of religious modernism.\textsuperscript{15} Islam, it was apparent to the new regime, could not be


\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that the government sponsored religious modernism, unlike earlier attempts at reforming Islam, was not born of intellectual conundrums or ideological dissonance, and therefore did not have theological roots, but political ones. The implications of this fact for the viability of this process of reform, exogenous to the
immediately side-lined; it could, however, be reformed - modernized and depoliticized - and subsequently be eased out of politics, all under the aegis of the government. The government, therefore, introduced a campaign which was initially ideological, and was predicated upon a momentous propaganda effort whose aim was to appropriate the monopoly of interpreting Islam from the Islamic groups, and thereby control the nature and extent of religion's meddling in politics. The national concern for "Islamicity" in literary and political circles quickly gave place to lip-service to the "principles of Islam", hence undermining the religiopolitical platform of groups such as the Jama'at.

The government's campaign was initially managed by Ayub Khan's Ministers of Interior and Information, Habibu'llah Khan and Qazi Shahabu'ddin respectively. They launched a wide-scale propaganda campaign, directed primarily against the various Islamic groups, questioning their loyalty to Pakistan, their knowledge of modern state-craft, and even their moral and ethical standing. More importantly, the government began formulating its own conception of Islam, and hence, its own religiopolitical platform. The government's synthesis was essentially modernist, premised on reforming Islamic law, and interpreting its tenets liberally in light of the needs of the government's developmental objectives. Qazi Shahabu'ddin was particularly vocal in furthering the cause of the government, and his pronouncements on a host of religious issues soon incensed the 'ulama. The government's efforts in this regard were, however, primarily centered in Lahore's Institute of Islamic Culture (Idarah-i Thiqafat-i Islam) led by Khalifah 'Abdu'l-

religious establishment of Pakistan, were significant.
Hakim (d.1959),\textsuperscript{16} and more significantly, in Karachi's Islamic Research Institute, led by General Ayub's confidant, Fazlur Rahman (d.1988).\textsuperscript{17} The two thinkers outlined the government's strategy against the 'ulama and the Islamic groups, intellectualizing the essentially political onslaught against the religious quarter. The polarity between \textit{ahl-i sunnat} and \textit{ahl-i bid'at}, identified by Mawdudi in earlier times, had now in earnest taken shape.\textsuperscript{18} However, while the government's attempts to appropriate the use of Islamic symbolisms in politics served as a means of undermining the Islamic groups, it also attested to the continuing salience of Islam, and hence, to the government's inability to do away with religion altogether. As naked secularism was masqueraded behind the veneer of guided Islamization, Islamic groups regained their momentum, were able to find linkages between religion and politics which provided them with a new niche through which they could once again encroach into the political process.

The onslaught against the 'ulama and the Islamic groups occurred in tandem with changes in the political arena, whose aim of depoliticizing the polity was deemed as threatening to the interests of secular parties as to those of the Jama'at and its religious allies. In December 1959 General Ayub Khan introduced his politician-less Basic

\textsuperscript{16} Khalifah 'Abdu'l-Hakim is the author of the famous books, \textit{Islamic Ideology} (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1951).


\textsuperscript{18} Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, \textit{Sunnat'u Bid'at ki Kashmakash} (Lahore: Idarah-i Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an, 1950).
Democracies system, which elected him President on February 17, 1960. Soon then after Ayub Khan commissioned the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Muhammad Shahabu’ddin, to look into to the causes of the "failure" of the Constitution of 1956 with view to preparing the grounds for a new constitution.\textsuperscript{19} The Jama'at, conscious of the fact that, Islam would most likely be singled out as a nefarious influence to be thenceforth excluded from constitution making, began to mobilize the dormant religious coalition.\textsuperscript{20} A meeting of 'ulama was convened in May 1960 in Lahore, wherein 15 'ulama and four Jama'at leaders participated. The meeting defended the role of Islam in statecraft, presented a set of proposals to be taken into consideration in any future constitutional debates, and demanded the abrogation of the marriage of convenience between "bureaucracy and democracy" - Basic Democracies - enjoining the government to instead hold national elections based on adult suffrage.\textsuperscript{21}

The government reacted by summoning Mawdudi to appear before martial law authorities in Lahore, where he was chastised for violating martial law regulations prohibiting political activities.\textsuperscript{22} The government, however, by and large, took little notice of this effort to revive the once omnicompetent religious alliance, and plod along

\textsuperscript{19} Mawdudi had spent a good deal of 1959 in traveling across the Muslim world, see \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.77-119.

\textsuperscript{20} In January 1960 General Ayub had already alarmed the Islamic groups when he had remarked that, an Islamic constitution should not be tantamount to "backwardness"; \textit{Pakistan Observer} (Karachi), (January 25, 1960), P.1.


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, P.121.
with its reform measures which soon precipitated a show-down.

The government's team of religious reformers had drawn up plans for a new family law. The Family Laws Ordinance of March 1961, as it came to be known, was to be the first in a series of legal and social reform measures which were designed to hasten Pakistan's development; it, however, encroached into the very heart of the 'ulama's domain, and hence, catapulted the Islamic alliance back into the political arena. The Jama'at took the lead in organizing street demonstrations, and publishing pamphlets to inform the public of the government's transgression. The government, meanwhile, unwilling to compromise, reacted adversely; Mian Tufayl Muhammad, who had written one such pamphlet, along with a number of Jama'at workers, were put in prison.

The clash over the Ordinance was followed by yet another tussle, this time over the government's proposed constitution which was introduced on March 1, 1962. The new Constitution made some overtures to Islam. The official religion of Pakistan was declared to be Islam, and the "repugnancy clause" was retained; its operation, however, was to be overseen by an Islamic Council controlled by the President. The Jama'at took little note

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25 In a meeting in Chittagong when asked about the Islamicity of the Ordinance, General Ayub had responded that, "religion is for man, and not man for religion. My religion is to do good for mankind"; cited in Abbott, Islam, P.197.

of the token lip-service to Islam, and saw the new Constitution, wherein the name of the state was "Republic of Pakistan," as a crushing blow to the organization’s fundamental interests. The new Constitution was a visible set-back for the cause of Islam in Pakistan, which if allowed to stand would prove to be the undoing of the Jama’at.

The organization did not, however, resort to direct action until June when the new legislature met and the martial law was lifted. Following the Political Parties Act of July 17, 1962, the Jama’at began political activity on an even wider scale. The Shura’ of the Jama’at met in August, and after adopting a resolution which called for restoration of democracy - argued by Mawdudi to now be the very harbinger of the Islamic state - the gathering issued a virulent denunciation of both the new Constitution, and the Basic Democracies system. Thenceforth, Mawdudi systematically fused democracy and Islam into a single religiopolitical platform against the Ayub regime. Convinced that democracy alone could safe-guard the interests of Islam before the autocratic secularization policies of the bureaucratic and military elite, the demand for Islamic democracy became indelibly imprinted on the mind-set of the Jama’at. This theme was reiterated time and again, more articulately on each repetition, throughout the Ayub Khan era.

The Jama’at, however, could no longer hope to attain much by being sequestered in the religious quarter. The challenge of the authoritarian government and its

27 ibid, P.58.


determination to inculcate a modernist interpretation of Islam in Pakistan was too overpowering to be tackled by the religious alliance alone. In October 1962 therefore, the Jama'at, through the intermediary of Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali, began negotiating with the secular political opposition to General Ayub, then led by Suhrawardi in the National Democratic Front. The rank and file of the Jama'at, meanwhile, did not look favorably upon association with the proponent of joint electorates, a man whom the Jama'at had once attacked with the same fervor with which it was now challenging Ayub Khan. The Jama'at, however, had few other choices, and in the first of a series of such rulings, Mawdudi argued that the dangers posed to Islam by Ayub Khan warranted such a compromise. The lifting of the martial law also facilitated greater activism on Pakistani campuses, in large measure, under the aegis of IJT. Although initially engaged in skirmishes with leftist student organizations, the power and zeal of IJT was hardly a source of comfort for the government.

The government gradually began to show impatience with the activities of the Jama'at. Mawdudi's demands that the new Constitution be amended - thereby inserting the title "Islamic" before Pakistan's official name - and that the government provide greater guarantees for fundamental individual rights, along with the Jama'at's incessant

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31 IJT began it activism against the government as early as 1960, when Mawdudi took it upon himself to mobilize the students through a series of lectures on Pakistani campuses; see Ziya Shahid, "Amiriyat, Talabah Awr Garmi Guftar", in *TT*, vol.1, pp.180-82. These activities led to successes in student elections at Punjab University in 1961-62; see, Baraku'llah Khan, "Main ne Sayyid ke Sath Jail Kati", in *HRZ*, P.88.

32 Interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi.
criticisms of the government's overtly pro-Western foreign policy had become a thorn in the side of the powers-that-be. More disturbing to the government was the fact that the Jama'at had emerged from the martial law period intact, and was by 1962 the most organized and robust of the Pakistani political organizations. Generally concerned with controlling the extent of political activism in Pakistan, the government, therefore, remained particularly sensitive to Jama'at's activities. In a report presented to the cabinet in 1961-62 it was argued that the Jama'at was essentially a seditious and invidious force with the potential to become "yet another Muslim Brotherhood." The report recommended that the government take measures similar to those adopted by Nasser in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and to forcibly dismantle the Jama'at. The cabinet did not endorse the conclusions of this report. The cabinet's vacillation was partly due to the fact that, although the report was primarily focused on the Jama'at it had been vague in distinguishing between that organization and other Islamic groups which the government was not willing to attack at the time. The solutions proposed by the report were, moreover, too drastic for the government to seriously consider. As Ayub Khan dithered, some in the General's coterie of advisors, men such as Hakim Muhammad Sa'id (Minister of Health), Allabakhsh K. Brohi (Minister of Law), and Afzal Chimah (Speaker of the Legislature), all of whom religiously-inclined, and were sympathetic to the Jama'at, began to vigorously lobby with General Ayub on the Jama'at's behalf. Once again, Jama'at's friends in high places proved instrumental in sparing the movement from

33 SAAM, vol.2, pp.128-34.

34 Interview with S.M. Zafar, Lahore.
greater hardship.\textsuperscript{35}

In light of the report submitted to the cabinet, Chimah cautioned Ayub Khan against a rash decision, and advised him to, instead, mollify and coopt the Jama'at. Ayub Khan favored Chimah's suggestion, and during a trip to Lahore in 1962 invited Mawdudi for a meeting at the Governor's mansion. There the General asked Mawdudi to leave politics to the politicians and to dedicate himself to religious studies. He moreover, offered the job of Vice-Chancellor of Bhawalpur Islamic University to Mawdudi. In no mood to be appeased by Ayub Khan's patronizing sermon and "bribe," Mawdudi flatly rejected both the offer and the counsel.\textsuperscript{36} Mawdudi's response, however, was not tantamount to a declaration of war between the two. For, just as Ayub Khan had shied away from adopting drastic measures in dealing with the Jama'at, Mawdudi too, had kept the Jama'at's activism in check. When pushed by his followers to resort to more militant solutions, in a tone reminiscent of the pacifism of medieval Islamic political thought, Mawdudi declared that he had no intention to "creat[e] a chaotic situation in which forces inimical to the interests of Islam find an opportunity to capture power."\textsuperscript{37} Mawdudi's response was also indicative of the importance of the fear of the left in deciding the rapport between the government and the Jama'at. The influence of this consideration

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Hakim Muhammad Sa'ид, Lahore; and personal correspondences with Allahbakhsh K. Brohi, 1985-86. Hakim Sa'ид and Chimah both knew Mawdudi since the early days of the Jama'at. The former had been close with the Jama'at since its creation in Lahore, and the latter had been a visitor to Pathankot; \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, P.186.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.186-87; and Lalah Sahra'i, "Sipasname", in \textit{HRZ}, P.55.

would only increase through the 1960s.

Following the Lahore meeting the government kept a close watch on the Jama'at. Meanwhile, by 1963 it had become apparent that Suhrawardi's national coalition had come to a naught. This had provided the government with an opportunity to finish off its opposition by attacking, one by one, the constituent parties of the coalition which were now left without the protection of the umbrella alliance. The Jama'at, not surprisingly, topped the government's list of targets; especially so because, in September 1963, Mawdudi in a defiant mood, had announced that "even if Convention Muslim League [Ayub Khan's party] nominated an angel (in the future elections), the Jama'at would oppose him." The organization's scheduled show of force in Lahore in October 1963 was singled out by the government and the Governor of Punjab and the Jama'at's scourge, Nawwab of Kala Bagh, as the best occasion for the government to flex its muscles.

When the Jama'at submitted a request for holding an open meeting in Lahore, the government first stalled, then declined a permit for use of loud-speakers. The Jama'at filed a petition to the Lahore High Court, but to no avail. The organization, per force, held its meeting in the old city of Lahore without loud-speakers, on October 25, 1963. The session was disrupted by hecklers half-way through; a gun was aimed at Mawdudi, and

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38 JIKUS, P.62.
39 SAAM, vol.2, pp.156-57. Ayub was particularly riled by Mawdudi's attacks on his person, and decided to flex his muscles in return; interviews with Hakim Muhammad Sa'id and S.M. Zafar, Lahore.
40 ibid, P.157.
during the ensuing commotion a Jama'at worker was shot dead. The Jama'at severely criticized the government's tactics as undemocratic. The government's campaign, however, had only begun to gain momentum. Habibu'llah Khan followed the Lahore clash with a highly publicized literary campaign against the Jama'at, which within a year produced some 72 books and pamphlets against the organization and its ideas. The government now began to seriously contemplate the closure of the Jama'at, and hence, looked for the appropriate excuse to push for such an eventuality.

Earlier in 1963 during a trip to Mecca Mawdudi had met with Ayatollah Khomeini. Upon return from that trip, Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi had written an article in Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an, severely criticizing the Shah's regime and his secularizing policies. Following complaints lodged by the Iranian Consulate in Karachi, the


42 Mawdudi himself pointed the finger to Interior Minister Habibu’llah Khan and the Minister of Communications Sabur Khan; cited in Bahadur, The Jama'at, P.103. Altaf Gauhar in later years reported that the government's intention had been to put embarrassing questions before Mawdudi during the session, but not to perpetuate violence; Gauhar, "Pakistan", P.64.


44 In Mecca, Mawdudi had delivered a lecture about the duties of Muslim youth in contemporary times. Khomeini who had attended the lecture was impressed with Mawdudi, stood up and praised him for his views. Later that evening, along with a companion, Khomeini went to Mawdudi's hotel where the two men met for half an hour. Through the intermediary of Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi, Mawdudi's Arabic translator, the two men talked. Khomeini described the outlines of his campaign against the Shah to Mawdudi during that meeting; interview with Khalil Ahmadu’l-Hamidi, Lahore; and Bidar Bakht, "Jama'at-i Islami ka Paygham Puri Duniya Main Pahila Raha Hey", Awaz-i Jahan (Lahore), (November 1989), pp.33-34.

45 Khalil Hamidi, "Iran Main Din Awr La-Dini Main Kashmakash", TQ, (October 1963), pp.49-62.
government accusing the Jama'at of sabotaging Pakistan's foreign policy closed down Tarjumanu'l-Qur'an.\textsuperscript{46} In January 1964 the government, backed by a lengthy charge-sheet, which accused the Jama'at of anti-Pakistan activities, halted the rest of the organization's operations.\textsuperscript{47} Mawdudi and Mian Tufayl along with the entirety of the Jama'at Shura', and 44 other members\textsuperscript{48} were arrested and put in jail under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908 on January 6, 1964.\textsuperscript{49}

The Jama'at thus found occasion to once again criticize the government's authoritarian practices, thereby further articulating its Islamic constitutionalist platform. The organization meanwhile, challenged the government's action by filing petitions at the provincial High Courts of East and West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{50} The Jama'at won its case in the East Pakistan High Court, and lost in the West Pakistan High Court. The government appealed the first ruling, and the Jama'at the second. The cases went before the Supreme

\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Hamidi, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{47} Abbott reports that a month before the arrests Ayub Khan had told a gathering that "he deplored religious groups taking part in politics, and warned Muslims against being trapped by people who, in the garb of religion, were trying to achieve political power"; Freeland Abbott, "Pakistan and the Secular State", in Donald E. Smith, ed., \textit{South Asian Religion and Politics} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P.362.

The government was also motivated in its action by the signs of infiltration of the civil service and the ranks of the government employees by the Jama'at, SAAM vol.2, pp.166-67.


\textsuperscript{49} SAAM, vol.2, pp.169-70; and ISIT(1), pp.6-7. Also see, Syed Abul A'la Maududi, \textit{The Political Situation in Pakistan} (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami, 1965), pp.21-41.

\textsuperscript{50} The Jama'at was interestingly defended in these petitions, in part, by some of Ayub Khan's ministers, led by Allahbakhsh K. Brohi; SAAM, vol.2, pp.169-70. Also see, \textit{Pakistan Times} (Lahore), (January 7, 1964), P.1 on this issue.
Court, which declared the banning of the Jama'at to have been illegal, and ordered the organization restored. Mawdudi and other Jama'at leaders were freed from prison in October 1964. The relations between the Jama'at and the government were now visibly deteriorating.

While the Jama'at leaders were incarcerated Pakistan had geared for a presidential election, scheduled for January 1, 1965. The opposition parties, including the Jama'at, had formed an electoral coalition named Combined Opposition Parties (COP) under the leadership of Muslim League leaders such as Daultana and Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali. Once again the Jama'at saw itself in an alliance of convenience with an erstwhile enemy. Yet, this time the extent of Mawdudi's political compromises did not end here. In Mawdudi's absence, COP leaders had agreed on Miss Fatimah Jinnah to serve as the opposition's presidential candidate. Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali was deputed to secure Mawdudi's agreement to this unpalatable choice. Muhammad ‘Ali met with Mawdudi in prison, and by manipulating the Jama'at's increasing apprehension of the Ayub regime convinced the Mawlana of the urgency of COP's situation, and the necessity of giving Miss Jinnah unwavering support. Mawdudi acceded to COP's demand, only to open himself to a barrage of government criticism, which saw in Mawdudi's decision the Achilles heel of COP and a means to paralyze its organizational muscle - the Jama'at. Numerous fatwas were elicited from conservative ‘ulama denouncing Mawdudi and his religiously dubious justification for the Jama'at's support of Miss Jinnah's candidacy. The controversy was,

51 ibid, (September 26, 1964), P.1 and (October 10, 1964), pp.1 and 3.
52 Nasru'llah Khan, "Ham Unki", P.39.
moreover, used by the government to engineer a split within the ranks of the organization by instigating Kawthar Niyazi to push the Jama‘at towards another Machchi Goth.53

The government’s efforts, however, failed. Mawdudi retained control over the Jama‘at, and undaunted by the fatwa campaign pushed to the organization to the forefront of the COP campaign. Mawdudi himself, toured Pakistan, denouncing Ayub Khan for his dictatorship and secularism, and demanding a restoration of democracy as the first step towards the establishment of the Islamic state.54 In its zeal for dethroning Ayub Khan, Mawdudi’s rhetoric increasingly appealed to democracy, and to a lesser extent to Islam, revealing a new tendency for pragmatic politics.55 He travelled around Pakistan, frantically organizing the Jama‘at, hoping to match the operations of the Convention Muslim League and the government.56 Despite Mawdudi’s efforts, and the hopes and aspirations of COP, Miss Jinnah failed to unseat General Ayub Khan. While victory in the presidential elections gave General Ayub a modicum of confidence, and bestowed a semblance of legitimacy on the government, it also gave the ruling order the opportunity to hound one of COP’s most vociferous and organized element - the Jama‘at. The organ-

53 According to some sources, Kawthar Niyazi had since the 1950s maintained close contacts, hidden to Jama‘at leaders, with Punjab government. This fact had been related by Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, the senior statesman and Governor of Punjab in 1953-54, who later became a close friend of Mawdudi to Jama‘at leaders; interviews, Lahore.

54 MMKT, vol.6, pp.11-26.

55 ibid, pp.11-35.

56 ibid, pp.27-35.
ization, which had increased its organizational activity following the elections, was spared the wrath of General Ayub only by the reemergence of the question of Kashmir, and the intercession of military conflict with India.

Throughout the presidential campaign, Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto, had sought to divert attention from COP's clamor for democracy and Islamicity by rekindling passions over Pakistan's perennial foreign policy pestilence, the Kashmir issue. While whipping up passions over Kashmir had created some expectations among the masses who now demanded action, it was the General's own volition that led Pakistan down the path to war. Eager to consolidate his hold over the country, General Ayub soon after the presidential campaign, sought to resolve the Kashmir issue once and for all, thereby redeeming Pakistan's strategic and national interests in the region. The subsequent escalation of conflict in Kashmir led to a costly war between Pakistan and India in September 1965.

The military conflict sublimated tensions between the government and opposition groups. On September 6, 1965, Mawdudi was invited to visit with Ayub Khan in Islamabad along with other opposition leaders, Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, Chaudhri Ghulam ‘Abbas, and Nawwabzadah Nasru’llah Khan. The meeting made an unassuming Ayub Khan subject to moralizing sermons by opposition leaders, none more so than Mawdudi. Ayub

57 Mawdudi had concluded that COP's loss was due to his incarceration and pressures exerted on the Jama'at by the government; it had been a matter of organizational shortcomings. The Jama'at's organizational structure had to be bolstered such as to make it immune to such machinations; SAAM, vol.2, P.181.

Khan, however, was eager to secure the opposition’s cooperation, and especially to get the blessing of the Jama‘at. A picture of Ayub Khan talking with Mawdudi while surrounded by other opposition leaders adorned the front pages of Pakistani newspapers the day following the meeting.

The Jama‘at was receptive to Ayub Khan’s overture, and anxious to assist the state in this moment of crisis. Following the meeting, Mawdudi declared a *jihad* for liberating Kashmir from India. Later in the month Mawdudi was again invited to meet with Ayub Khan, this time alone. During this meeting it is reported that Mawdudi lectured Ayub Khan on the virtues of the Islamic state; the President, however, had proved more eager for Mawdudi to expand upon his declaration of *jihad* on Radio Pakistan. This was a clear indication of the Jama‘at’s singular importance in the COP, and the government’s dire need to appeal to the emotive power of Islam to bolster the state, resorting to the very symbiosis which for seven years it had diligently worked to debunk.

Mawdudi was pleased with the government’s overtures, and noticeably basked in his new found status of "senior statesman". Ayub Khan’s change of heart had not only bestowed the Jama‘at with political prominence, but had attested to the continued salience of Islam, and hence, the Jama‘at in the political life of Pakistan.

Following the declaration of cease fire on September 23, 1965, Mawdudi again

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59 Gauhar, "Pakistan", pp.60-63.


61 Gauhar, "Pakistan", P.43.
appeared on Radio Pakistan, this time speaking on *jihad* in peacetime. The Jama'at, however, did not intend to become merely a religious "rubber stamp" for the government, nor to be restricted to religious affairs only. The organization, therefore, focused the lion’s share of its attention on relief work in war ravaged areas of Punjab, and used every occasion to express its own views on the war and its aftermath. Notably, Mawdudi began pushing the government to only accept a cease fire agreement which would provide for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

More importantly, Mawdudi used the thaw in the Jama'at’s relations with the government to underscore the fact that the fate of Pakistan as a state was inevitably intermeshed with the Muslim reality of the country. He called upon the powers-that-be to pave the way for greater Islamization of Pakistan with view to strengthening the state, and to realign Pakistan’s foreign policy by bringing the country closer to the Muslim world. Mawdudi’s line of argument was not welcomed by the government, which saw it as a criticism of its seven year rule, and as an unsolicited interference with their management of the affairs of the country. Just as was the case in the 1950s, the political benefits of Islamic symbolisms were matched by its costs. It bolstered the stability of the state and legitimated the government’s rule, but also sanctioned greater religious activism, and led to the unsolicited interference of Islamic groups in political matters; all of which

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62 *MMKT*, vol.6, pp.85-94.

63 *ISIT*(1), pp.8-9.

64 *MMKT*, vol.6, pp.78-79.

65 *ibid*, pp.97-102, and 138-43.
bore consequences that the hapless government, short of using force, was unable to control. The course of events, however, once again diverted attentions elsewhere, hence, precluding a crack-down against the Jama'at.

Following the Tashkant Agreement of January 1966 the political situation in Pakistan changed. The Agreement led to student demonstrations in Lahore in which IJT was active, greater leftist agitations in West Pakistan, and the sudden eruption of pent-up socioeconomic frustrations in East Pakistan. The Jama'at was taken unawares by the turn of events in East Pakistan, but for the first time began to view socialism with greater alarm than the secularist modernism of the regime. On January 16, Mawdudi convened a meeting of the opposition leaders at his house in Lahore. The meeting, chaired by Mawdudi, who was vying to become the chief spokesman of the group, criticized the Tashkant Agreement for its omission of reference to Kashmir, and for its tacit acceptance of a "no-war" arrangement with India. The opposition parties continued to harp on these issues in another conference in February.

Despite their vocal opposition to the government, it soon became apparent that, Mawdudi and his cohorts were unable to successfully ride the tide of the anomie. Mawdudi and the COP leaders continued to view Pakistani politics from the angle of the struggle for Islam and democracy, and were therefore oblivious to the significance of the sociopolitical changes which Pakistan had undergone during the Ayub Khan era. They

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67 For instance, in 1967 the Jama'at journal, Chiragh-i Rah dedicated an entire issue to the study of socialism.

failed to take notice of the extent to which socioeconomic imperatives were propelling the mounting anti-government agitations, and saw them as an isolated venting of frustrations over Kashmir.\(^{69}\) The realization which led Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto to leave the cabinet and form the Pakistan Peoples Party completely deluded the COP. Their politics was still cast in the mold of the early 1960s, and was free of any populist trappings. Moreover, in the case of the Jama‘at, emphasis upon the role of Islam in Pakistan had committed the organization to bolstering the unity of the state, and had therefore, made it unsympathetic to provincialist sentiments. As a result, it did not take long in the February gathering of opposition forces for Mawdudi to engage Shaikh Mujibu’l-Rahman of the Awami League in a bitter altercation over the League’s controversial six point plan for provincial autonomy.\(^{70}\)

The confrontation between Mawdudi and Shaikh Mujib was also ominous in a different context. The Awami League, and especially the left wing of it, led by Mawlana ‘Abdu’l-Hamid Khan Bhashani, was a main bulwark of the mounting leftist agitation in Pakistan in general, and in East Pakistan in particular. Mawdudi had traditionally been opposed to the left, lock, stock and barrel. Mujib and Bhashani’s agitations were enough reason to prompt Mawdudi to reaction. The antagonism towards the left was further compounded by the fact that, having gained prominence in the COP, the Jama‘at now had a vested interest in an orderly transfer of power from Ayub Khan to the COP, which

\(^{69}\) Mawdudi and the COP leaders, therefore, continued to address the Kashmir issue, and chastise the government for omitting it from the Tashkant Agreement, hoping to thereby take the leadership of the opposition.

Mawdudi hoped to lead. Ideological opposition to the left was now complimented by political interests with the result of completely blinding the Jama'at to the changing climate of Pakistani politics, and the evermore apparent socioeconomic grievances which were sustaining leftist agitations. The rise in the fortunes of the left in both wings of Pakistan were therefore, dismissed as without merit, and as Indian intrigues supported by atheistic and unpatriotic Pakistanis.

Mawdudi directed the Jama'at to remain within the COP, and to propagate a platform premised on demands for Islamicity and democracy, while engaging the left in general, and Awami League in particular, in street clashes. The objective was to defend the country against the "deleterious" machinations of the left, and also to cleanse Pakistani politics of their menace, thereby bringing the focus of national politics to the debate between COP and the government. The Jama'at was particularly disturbed about the growing popularity of Maoism in Punjab which had followed China's crucial assistance to Pakistan during the war, as well as about the rising specter of Bhutto's version of populism and "Islamic socialism."

Leftist forces had, meanwhile, become aware of the Jama'at's growing restlessness and its potential to interfere with their drive for power. The confrontations between the two were, however, still largely restricted to literary exchanges. In 1967 Muhammad Safdar Mir began a series of articles in Pakistan Times, criticizing Mawdudi and his views,

71 The February meeting therefore, ended with yet a stronger denunciation of the Tashkant Agreement, signed by Mawdudi, Chaudhri Muhammad 'Ali, and Nawwabzadah Nasru'llah Khan; see, ibid, P.361.
accusing him of pro-capitalist and pro-feudal sentiments.\textsuperscript{72} The articles soon were turned into a public debate between the Jama‘at and the left, serving as a prelude to the more open hostilities that were soon to break out in Punjab and Karachi.

Relations between the government and the Jama‘at, meanwhile, had also continued to strain. Ayub Khan, as perturbed as he was with leftist agitations, proved to be equally impatient with the COP’s campaign, and especially with the Jama‘at’s activities.\textsuperscript{73} The main issue at stake was once again the government’s incursion into the jealously-guarded domain of authority of the ‘ulama and the Islamic groups. In May 1966, Fazlur Rahman, Director of Islamic Research Institute declared that zakat rates should be enhanced with view to increasing the state’s financial resources, and moreover riba’ (usury) should be viewed as nominal rate of interest only, permitting the normal functioning of banks which had been viewed as a bane of the ruling regime by the religious divines. Viewing this declaration as the resumption of the government’s efforts to wrest control of Islam from the Islamic groups, the Jama‘at severely criticized the government’s "misguided tampering with Islam."\textsuperscript{74} Fazlur Rahman reciprocated a month later, by advising Ayub Khan that, Mawdudi’s religiously controversial book, \textit{Khilafat’u Mulukiyat (Caliphate and Monarchy)}

\textsuperscript{72} Mir’s articles were later on published as, Muhammad Safdar Mir, \textit{Mawdudiyyat Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash}, 2nd ed., (Lahore: Al-Bayan, 1970).

\textsuperscript{73} It has been argued that the government had begun to show signs of impatience with the increasing influence of the Jama‘at in the armed forces; interview with ‘Abdu’l-Hafiz Pirzadah, Karachi. Earlier in this study it was mentioned that the pro-Jama‘at journal, \textit{Urdu Digest} had enjoyed a wide readership in the armed forces ever since 1962. For more on the growing religious sentiments in the armed forces see, Stephen P. Cohen, \textit{The Pakistan Army} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{MMKT}, vol.6, pp.279-82.
published in June 1966, was a direct attack on the government.\textsuperscript{75} This dispute was to eventually lead to another show-down between the government and the Jama'at in January of 1967, when Mawdudi and a number of 'ulama rejected the "scientifically" determined citation of the moon by the government - which is traditionally cited by the 'ulama, and thence marks the end of the holy month of Ramazan.\textsuperscript{76} The religious divines had once again repelled the government's attempt to interfere in their affairs, and were as a result jailed.\textsuperscript{77} Mawdudi remained in prison from January 29 until March 15, 1967, when the High Court of West Pakistan rejected the legality of the invocation of the Defense of Pakistan Rules under the provisions of which Mawdudi was jailed.\textsuperscript{78} The controversy, however, only came to an end when Ayub Khan was forced to dismiss Fazlur Rahman on September 1968.\textsuperscript{79}

The Jama'at sought to use the occasion to reinvigorate its campaign for Islamic constitutionalism, but to no avail. For, the agitations of the Awami League continued to soar throughout the 1966-68 period, radicalizing Pakistani politics. Mawdudi had sought to diffuse the situation to the advantage of the Jama'at and its platform by, on the one

\textsuperscript{75} 'Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp.361-64.

\textsuperscript{76} Government spokesman, Fazlur Rahman, declared meanwhile that the government's position was binding on the religious divines, a position which only incensed the Jama'at and the 'ulama further; see, \textit{Pakistan Times} (Lahore), January 16, 1967, P.1.

\textsuperscript{77} ‘Abd, \textit{Mufakkir-i Islam}, pp.367-78.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{ibid}, pp.373-74.

hand, challenging Bhashani and Mujib in his speeches, and on the other, demanding changes in the Constitution of 1962, restoration of democracy, and redress for the political grievances of East Pakistan. The focus of the Jama'at's activism, however, had been shifting to street clashes with Awami League in East Pakistan, and leftist forces in West Pakistan. The main force behind this campaign was IJT.

Since 1962 IJT had successfully mobilized students in a number of anti-government causes, usually pertaining to unpopular educational reform measures such as the University Ordinance which decreed an extension of degree requirements from two years to three. The government, already apprehensive about the activities of the Jama'at, had reacted to student unrest by restricting IJT through the imposition of Section 144, and arresting and incarcerating numerous IJT leaders, only to further politicize and radicalize the student organization. Also significant in IJT's radicalization was its clashes with leftist students. Given the Jama'at's antagonism towards the left and the arrogation of defense of Pakistan's territorial unity, the student organization could not remain immune to the provocations of the political environment of East Pakistan.

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81 Salim Mansur, "Tin Salah Degree Course Awr University Ordinance", in TT, vol.1, pp.160-75; and Munir Ahmad Munir, "Punjab University Se Shahi Qila Tak", in TT, vol.1, pp.198-214. This agitation which led to the arrest of numerous IJT activists had escalated into a significant crisis, and was defused only with the advent of the India-Pakistan war of 1965.
82 Interview with Shaikh Mahbub 'Ali, JV NAT, vol.2, pp.30-33. The government’s crack down against IJT had forced the student organization to rationalize and further strengthen its structure; interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan in JV NAT, vol.2, pp.83-85
1962-67 period, IJT had developed as an anti-left force, and not without encouragement from the government in this regard. The success of this posture in attracting new recruits from among the ranks of religiously conscious students in Punjab, and anti-Bengali Muhajirs in Karachi and Dacca had further encouraged IJT's political orientation and propensity for resorting to show-downs with the left and Bengali nationalists. Opposition to the Tashkant Agreement, however, continued to give IJT its much needed anti-government image, which helped consolidate the organization's base of support on campuses. The problematic of IJT's two tier policy of simultaneous opposition to the left and the government became gradually resolved as the organization began to sublimate its opposition to Ayub Khan in favor of a crusade against the left, especially in East Pakistan. From 1965 onwards IJT became increasingly embroiled in confrontations with Bengali nationalist and leftist forces in East Pakistan, first at Dacca University, and later in pitch-battles in the streets. IJT's activities were soon to create tensions within COP.

In May 1967 COP parties, including the Awami League had formed a new opposition alliance, Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). In its first resolution PDM parties had demanded the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1956, restoration of

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84 In 1962-65, the government actively encouraged IJT in its clashes with the leftist NSF in East Pakistan, and with labor union activists in West Pakistan; interview with Muti'u'l-Rahman Nizami in JVNAT, vol.2, pp.223-25; and interview with Shaikh Mahbub ‘Ali in JVNAT, vol.2, pp.16-17.

85 On expansion of IJT during this period see, interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan in JVNAT, vol.2, pp.98-100.

86 The arrest of Shaikh Mahbub ‘Ali, the Nazim-i ‘Ala of IJT for organizing student demonstrations in Dacca in January 1964 was significant in this regard; interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan in JVNAT, vol.2, pp.110-12.
democracy in Pakistan, resolution of the Kashmir crisis, greater distance from the U.S., and greater regional autonomy for East Pakistan. Mawdudi interpreted the resolution as a renewed call for Islamic constitutionalism, and in his subsequent elaboration of the resolution throughout 1967 and 1968, launched into tirades against the Awami League’s six point plan on the one hand, and Mawlana Bhashani’s home-grown version of Maoism on the other. Mawdudi’s rhetoric along with IJT’s clashes with Awami League in East Pakistan greatly weakened PDM, which after the withdrawal of the Awami League from the alliance following the Agartala Conspiracy Case, gave place to Democratic Action Committee (DAC).

The new opposition coalition demanded the lifting of the State of Emergency, and the rescinding of the Criminal Law Amendment which had been invoked to arrest Shaikh Mujib for participation in the Agartala Conspiracy. These were both tools with which the government had contended with the worsening political situation, and which the Jama‘at and the Awami League both wanted out of the way, the former to promote Islamic constitutionalism, and the latter to foster greater provincial autonomy. Faced with the rising popularity of Shaikh Mujib following his arrest, the government responded favorably to DAC’s demands on February 16, 1968, lifting the Emergency and abrogating the Amendment. This, however, proved to be a pyrrhic victory. To begin with it did away with the demands that the Jama‘at and the Awami League had shared, and which could foster a working arrangement between the two. Tensions between the two, therefore, were

87 MMKT, vol.7, pp.156-57, and 175-76.

further escalated in East Pakistan following the government's conciliatory overtures. The government's response moreover, removed the democratic demands from the political agenda of the opposition, focusing attention instead on provincial demands in East Pakistan, and populist demands in West Pakistan - on the Awami League and the Peoples Party respectively - rendering the DAC redundant. Mawdudi's efforts to revive interest in the Islamic constitutionalist platform between February and August 1968, as a result, came to a naught. The Jama'at's political platform had become irrelevant to the main imperatives of the unfolding political dialectic in the country.

In August 1968 Mawdudi was taken ill, and was compelled to leave Pakistan for medical treatment in England. He did not return to Pakistan until December 1969. During this critical period the affairs of the Jama'at were overseen by Mian Tufayl Muhammad. Mawdudi's absence ipso facto reduced the prominence of the Jama'at in DAC, and reduced the organization's flexibility during times of turbulent political change. Mian Tufayl was unable to adapt the Jama'at to the changing circumstances, nor did he provide new strategies for confronting either the more rambunctious Awami League, or the new force in Pakistani politics, the Peoples Party. The provisional Amir, moreover, proved unable to assert control over IJT, which soon became a force unto itself, drawing the Jama'at into the quagmire of East Pakistani politics.

Mawdudi returned to the helm of the Jama'at in time for the Round Table

89 ibid, pp.274-90.
Conference between Ayub Khan and the DAC, which convened in March 1969. The Round Table Conference focused its attention on reform of the Constitution of 1962 with view to accommodating some of the demands of the Awami League. No mention was, however, made of the socioeconomic grievances which Bhutto was manipulating so successfully. Mawdudi's address to the Conference was even more removed from the realities of Pakistani politics at the time. He placed the entire blame for the crisis on the government's intransigence before the demands for Islamization, which he argued, was the only policy that could keep Pakistan united. The Conference not only left DAC - now shown to have no views on the evermore apparent socioeconomic grievances of Pakistanis - more vulnerable than before to the populist challenge of Bhutto, but underlined the clear chasm which separated Jama'at's political outlook from the actual working of Pakistani politics at the time. The Conference once again proved that DAC, and the Jama'at, were only a shadow of the 1965 COP. The true forces in the polity were the Awami League and the Peoples Party.

This realization was not lost on the Jama'at. Soon after the Conference, the organization stopped attacking the government, and directed its invective more squarely against Bhutto on the one hand, and Bhashani and Shaikh Mujib on the other, who

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90 On the proceedings of the Conference see, S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis (Lahore: Book Center, 1970). The Jama'at was represented in these proceedings by Mawdudi and Ghulam A'zam; ISIT(1), P.15.

91 MMKT, vol.8, pp.188-92; and Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp.204-05. Also see, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Dakter ka Nishtar Awr Daku ka Khanjar (Lahore: Daru'l-Fikr, nd.), P.5.

92 Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp.119ff.

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were accused of violence mongering, and acting undemocratically and in violation of Islamic dictums.\textsuperscript{93} The Jama'at’s rhetoric indicated that, Islamic constitutionalism continued to condition the organization’s approach to politics. Mawdudi refused to be swayed by populism, and held those such as Bhashani or Ghulam Ahmad Parwez who sought to mix religion with leftist ideas in great contempt.\textsuperscript{94} He still deemed it politic to further the Jama'at’s cause by doing away rather than appealing to populism; a course of action which clearly distinguishes the Jama'at from the Shi'i revolutionaries in Iran.

In the face of insurmountable opposition to his rule, on March 25, 1969 General Ayub Khan resigned. Mawdudi declared the event a victory for the Round Table Conference and the opening of a vista for the establishment of the Islamic order, which he believed democracy would harbinger. In a display of political naivete, he exhorted to Bhutto and Mujib to desist from their activities. Not surprisingly, Mawdudi’s invitation found no takers. To his dismay, Mawdudi found democracy and Islam to be irrelevant to the ongoing political debates. With no political platform to lure the masses, the Jama'at had no recourse left but to accept the Yahya Khan regime, and to succumb to the lead of IJT in pursuing street battles against Awami League and the Peoples Party.\textsuperscript{95}

The Jama'at and the Yahya Khan Regime, 1969-1971

The Jama'at was dismayed at the turn of events following Ayub Khan’s resignation.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{MMKT}, vol.8, pp.184-85.

\textsuperscript{94} Mawdudi was greatly enraged by Ghulam Ahmad Parwez’s book, \textit{Mao Tse Tung Awr Qur'an} (Mao and the Qur'an) published in Lahore in 1967.

\textsuperscript{95} The Jama’at in fact closely monitored IJT’s activities from 1969 onwards, especially in Punjab, training, indoctrinating and supervising its activities; Interview with Hafiz Muhammad Idris, "Sarmayah-i Millat ki Nigahban", in \textit{TT}, vol.1, pp.261-64.

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Not only had the fall of the General produced no orderly transfer of power to the DCA parties who negotiated with the government in the Round Table Conference, but the left, whether in the garb of the Peoples Party or the Awami League, clamoring for economic justice or provincial autonomy, had effectively dominated the political arena to the exclusion of the Jama'at. The Jama'at's first reaction was to again work through negotiations with the government rather than appeal to popular sentiments. Following Yahya Khan's ascension to power the Jama'at quickly renewed its demand for restoration of democracy and Islamization, this time demanding the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1956 as a satisfactory framework for initiating the political process on the path to Islam and democracy. Yet, beyond these demands, lay the groundwork for greater cooperation between the new government and the Jama'at. Both were opposed to the rise of the left in the two wings of Pakistan, and looked upon Bengali provincialism with suspicion. The Jama'at, moreover, with no political manifesto with which to recapture its niche in popular politics was compelled to vest its fortunes in the fate of the central government, and in the hope that it may be the beneficiary of the eventual democratization of the system after the left has been routed by the armed forces. Once the polity was cleansed of the left, with no viable alternatives in sight, the Jama'at expected to win any elections. The organization concluded that the investiture of Yahya Khan signalled the army's determination to crush the left, uprooting both the PPP and the

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96 Throughout the Ayub era the Jama'at had favored reinstatement of the Constitution of 1956. On occasion, however, such as during the Round Table Conference it had accepted amendments to the Constitution of 1962 as acceptable. On demands put before the Yahya regime see, ISIT(I), P.15.
Awami League. The Jama'at took its cue in this regard from Yahya Khan's oft-repeated remark that, no party opposed to the ideology of Pakistan would be acceptable to the government. The Jama'at could only rejoice at the prospects of such an eventuality, and vested its political fortunes in the martial law regime and its promise of a democracy cleansed of the left.

Yahya Khan, a Shi'i with a reputation for heavy drinking was by no means a favorite of the Jama'at. The organization, however, looked approvingly upon the new government's frequent reference to the term "ideology of Pakistan," which it understood to be a euphemism for Islamization. These impressions were further strengthened through personal contacts between Jama'at leaders and members of Yahya Khan's circle of advisors, men such as Nawwabzadah Sheir 'Ali Khan, Yahya Khan's Minister of Information, who was the main architect of the new regimes political strategy. The Jama'at took the government's pronouncements to be an articulation of its intention to hand over power to a right of center Islamic party. This led the Jama'at to actively lobby with the government to become that party of choice. On March 23, 1969, Mawdudi and Mian Tufayl met with Yahya Khan in Lahore, and thus was laid the basis of a mutual understanding between the government and the Jama'at. Mawdudi and Mian Tufayl came back from that meeting convinced of the fact that Yahya Khan was going to give Pakistan


98 On the Minister's views on the notion of "ideology of Pakistan" see, Nawwabzadah Sheir 'Ali Khan, *Al-Qisas* (Lahore, 1974).
to them on a silver platter; however, after the left and Bengali nationalists had been dealt with. Following that meeting Mian Tufayl lauded Yahya Khan as a "champion of Islam," and declared that the General's constitution, still in the making and not as yet unveiled, was "Islamic."99

Political exigency led Islamic constitutionalism into an unholy alliance with the very regime that had produced that platform in the first place. Democracy as the condito sine qua non of Islamization, for the duration of the Yahya Khan regime, was replaced by martial rule. The Jama'at's change of heart was not so much doctrinal as tactical, attesting to the increasing pragmatism of the organization. In light of this new strategy, the Jama'at shelved all efforts to formulate a new political platform in place of Islamic constitutionalism, one which would be in tune with the political climate of the time, and instead focused all its energies on combatting the Peoples Party and the Awami League, actively but unofficially aiding what it understood the army's agenda to be. The struggle against the left became a substitute for a sound and efficacious political platform as the Jama'at sought to alter the political climate rather than adapt itself to it.

In West Pakistan, Mawdudi launched a crusade against Bhutto and his economic policies - "economic centrism" - arguing that, Islam would truly remedy the socioeconomic grievances that Bhutto's "Islamic socialism" had spurious claims to solve.100

The Jama'at's attacks soon prompted Muhammad Safdar Mir to resume his much vaunted

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100 *SAAM*, vol.2, pp.323-25.
criticisms of Mawdudi and the Jama'at in Nusrat, published in Lahore. Mir's efforts were, however, cut short by Bhutto, who sent message from prison to the magazine's editor, Hanif Ramay, ordering the articles to be stopped. While the leftist elements in PPP saw the Jama'at as an inherent enemy which should be dealt with swiftly and quickly, Bhutto was eager to somehow mollify the organization. Bhutto's hopes, were soon dashed as literary altercations increasingly gave place to violent clashes in Lahore, Multan and Karachi.

In East Pakistan, the Jama'at launched an elaborate patriotic propaganda campaign, one which was predicated upon convincing Bengalis that their loyalties should lie first with Islam, i.e. Pakistan, and not with their ethnic, cultural and provincial roots. The Jama'at's campaign soon led to violent clashes with the Awami League, resulting in the death of an IJT worker on the campus of Dacca University. The Jama'at had now produced a martyr. Undaunted by the deteriorating situation, Mawdudi openly directed IJT to cleanse the universities of Pakistan of the left. Yahya Khan's offer of elections, to be held in 1970, only acted to added fervor to the Jama'at's campaign against the left.

The Jama'at's activities brought the organization closer to Yahya Khan's regime.

101 Interview with Muhammad Safdar Mir, Lahore.

102 The campaign was launched by Mawdudi himself in June of 1969; see, SAAM, vol.2, pp.324-28.

103 ibid, P.328.

104 ibid, P.348.
With tangible signs of success in IJT's drive to control Punjab University,\textsuperscript{105} the Martial Law Administrator of Punjab, General Nur Khan, initiated a direct dialogue with IJT leaders in the fall of 1969.\textsuperscript{106} With an eye on the elections, however, the Jama'at continued to demand the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1956 as a means of retaining a modicum of oppositional status \textit{vis a vis} the martial law administration.

In preparation for the promised elections, in December of 1969 the Jama'at announced its election manifesto. The organization's declaration, with minor variations, was a reiteration of the Jama'at's Islamic constitutionalist platform. More importantly, it was a testimony to Jama'at's continued "apolitical" approach to politics. Forty years of "drawing-room" politics, and of pedantic exhortations on what the Pakistanis wanted and ought to demand from their rulers, had left the organization without the means to successfully interpret politics, and to incorporate popular demands into its ideological orientation and plan of action.

Pakistan's economy had undergone great many changes during the Ayub Khan era. The country had gained an industrial infrastructure and made significant strides in developing its economy. Progress, however, had not been a halcyon affair, and had come to Pakistan at a great cost in social and political terms.\textsuperscript{107} Rapid industrialization and

\textsuperscript{105} The Jama'at began winning campus elections at Punjab University in 1968, when Hafiz Muhammad Idris was elected the President of Student Union of the University.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Muhammad Kamal in \textit{JVNA}, vol.2, pp.186-87.

\textsuperscript{107} One observer has even challenged the veracity of the rates of economic growth cited for the Ayub era, arguing that they did not reflect indigenous economic activity, but were bolstered by foreign aid. See, Rashid Amjad, \textit{Pakistan's Growth Experience: Objectives, Achievement, and Impact on Poverty, 1947-1977} (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1978), P.6.
growth through the "functional utility of greed,"\textsuperscript{108} openly advocated by the regime and its host of foreign advisors, had exacted staggering costs.\textsuperscript{109} Poverty had increased markedly, both in the rural and the urban areas, as had the gap which divided the rich from the poor - giving rise to greater class consciousness.\textsuperscript{110} While between 1963 and 1967, when opposition to Ayub Khan gained momentum, the percentage of the poor - those whose income was below Rs.300 per month - had declined from in both the rural and the urban areas, from %60.5 to %59.7 and from %54.8 to %25 respectively, the actual numbers of the poor in both areas had risen, from 23.46 million to 24.8 million in rural areas, and from 6.78 million to 6.81 million in urban areas.\textsuperscript{111} Moreover, the disparity in the distribution of wealth between the provinces, and between the comparator classes and the masses had increased during the same period. According to Mahbubu'l-Haq, "[b]y 1968 22 families controlled 2/3 of Pakistan's industrial assets; 80% of banking; 70% of insurance."\textsuperscript{112} Economic growth had biased the industrial sector at the cost of the


\textsuperscript{111} \textit{ibid}.

traditional economy, and the cities at the cost of the rural hinterland and small towns. The business elite had amassed greater fortunes, as had civil servants and members of the armed forces, while the middle classes and the poor had experienced a relative deprivation in their economic standing. Rampant corruption, which by 1967 had infested the country's development regime, had only acted to further discredit the government's promise of economic progress in the eyes of those who had not shared in its fruits to date. The government's agricultural policy had caused wide-scale migration from rural areas to the cities, while industrialization had created significant grievances among the labor force whose numbers rose three-fold in the 1960s.113 These statistics and their reflection in the political mood of the country explain, in good measure, the popularity of Shaikh Mujib's six point program, and Bhutto's "kapra, roti, awr makan (cloth, bread, and housing)" motto.

The Jama'at's manifesto, aside from token references to the need for addressing economic grievances which were by and large left to the Islamic state to accomplish, promised little to the Pakistani electorate.114 It attacked feudalism and "Western capitalism," promised to limit land ownership to 200 acres, and proposed a minimum wage of Rs.150-Rs.200 along with better working conditions. These promises, however, were consciously divorced from any concerted political attack on the ruling establishment, and were moreover, hidden between the myriad of the more publicized demands for


Islamization and greater democratization. Socioeconomic issues were even overshadowed by avowed opposition to the "idea of sons of soil," reference to Bengali and Sindhi provincial sentiments. The discussion of socioeconomic issues, therefore, fell far short of changing the political fortunes of the Jama'at.

The Manifesto, bearing the unmistakable imprint of Mawdudi's thinking posed three central questions to the electorate, the answers to which Mawdudi assumed were self-evident to Pakistanis, whom he viewed to be more concerned with Islam and patriotism than socioeconomic issues. These questions were the following: 1) should Pakistan retain its Islamic foundations; 2) should Pakistan remain united; and 3) is it not the Jama'at the only party running in the elections which was capable of maintaining the primacy of Islam while fostering national unity? Mawdudi believed that once the Pakistani electorate had confronted these questions squarely, they would vote for Islam, national unity, and the Jama'at.

The Jama'at's election campaign was designed to place the three questions at the center of the national political debate, to underscore the weight of the decisions in the balance to the voters, and to bring Pakistani politics back to the center, the beneficiary of all of which could be the Jama'at. Pakistani politics, however, would not be tamed as easily as the Jama'at had hoped. Problems arose for the Jama'at first in East Pakistan. The organization's electoral campaign in that province came to an abrupt end when Mawdudi was prevented from attending a Jama'at rally in Dacca by the Awami League.

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115 It was with this objective in mind that the Jama'at began accusing Bhutto of receiving funds from the Ahmadis and Christians; ISIT(I), pp.18-19.
The incident led to the death of three Jama'at workers, following which bloody clashes, outside the framework of electoral politics, between Jama'at workers and the votaries of Mawlana Bhashani, in East Pakistan as well as in Punjab, continued with great fervor.

In West Pakistan the Jama'at had greater room for maneuverability. There, the organization launched a major campaign, sounding out its manifesto in competition with the platform of the Peoples Party. The water-shed of the campaign was the Yawm-i Shawkat-i Islam (Glory of Islam Day), celebrated by the Jama'at in the form of rallies, marches, speeches, and political meetings, across West Pakistan on May 30, 1970. The Jama'at's objective was to bring Islam back to the center stage of Pakistani politics, and to promote the Islamic constitutionalist platform in competition with PPP's populist program. The Jama'at saw the celebration as a resounding success, and was convinced of the functional utility of its election manifesto, and hence, its ineluctable success at the polls. It was following this erroneous conclusion that the Jama'at decided to field 151 candidates for National Assembly seats, challenging nearly every seat.

\[1\]

\[116\] *ISIT*(1), P.17.

\[117\] On the events of this day see, *ibid*, P.18.


\[119\] Mawdudi made a statement to this effect at the eve of the elections, arguing that the question of defeat in the polls hardly arose, and he expected the Jama'at election manifesto to be fully implemented; *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), (December 7, 1970), pp.1 and 7. Also see, Saulat, *Maulana Maududi*, pp.75-76.
which PPP was contesting.  

Subsequent events proved that the Yawm-i Shawkat celebrations did little to improve the Jama'at's electoral showing, and even less to derail the political campaigns of either the PPP or the Awami League. They did, however, produce an unexpected, and yet consequential negative side-effect for the Jama'at. The celebrations, for reasons usually attributed by the Jama'at to PPP, KGB or CIA machinations, caused a serious rupture in the religious alliance which since 1958 the Jama'at had quietly led. The Yawm-i Shawkat awakened the hitherto dormant JUI and JUP, and brought them into the political arena to the detriment of the Jama'at. The two parties may have been convinced by the Yawm-i Shawkat of the electoral possibilities of a religiopolitical platform, which neither party was prepared to relinquish to the Jama'at. Moreover, while since 1947 the 'ulama had been willing to cooperate with the Jama'at in political matters, they were not prepared to submit to the religious leadership of Mawdudi. As the anti-Mawdudi fatwa campaign of 1951-55 and the clamor against Mawdudi's book Khilafat'u Mulukiyat in 1965-66 indicate, the 'ulama had continued to be ill-at-ease with Mawdudi's religious views. The

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120 Even in those electoral districts where the Jama'at did not stand against the PPP it lent crucial support to PPP's opponents. For instance, in Lahore, Mawdudi personally aided the campaign of Javid Iqbal who was running as the Council Muslim League candidate against Bhutto. Interview with Javid Iqbal, Lahore. Javid Iqbal had been a prominent modernist thinker during the Ayub Khan era, and the author of The Ideology of Pakistan and Its Implementation, a book written at the behest of Ayub Khan to bolster the government's position on religious modernism; see Abbott, Islam, P.218.

121 ibid; and interviews with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad, and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi.

122 See Chapter 6.
‘ulama saw Yawm-i Shawkat-i Islam not only as a political gambit, but as an attempt by Mawdudi to monopolize the religious scene. For those primarily motivated by religious concerns, Mawdudi’s attempt to become the cynosure of religious expression in Pakistan was a danger even greater in magnitude than those posed to their position by Bhutto or the Awami League. Hence, JUI’s Mawlanas Mufti Mahmud and Hazarwi openly criticized the celebrations, while JUP proceeded to field 42 candidates for National Assembly seats in direct competition to Jama‘at candidates; a decision which hopelessly divided the religious and anti-PPP vote in those constituencies, and on occasion, took seats away from the Jama‘at directly.\textsuperscript{123}

The Election of 1977 and Its Aftermath

The time period between May and December 1970 was one of frenetic campaigning for the Jama‘at. This was also a period wherein the venomous altercations between Mawdudi and Bhashani escalated tensions in East Pakistan and Punjab, while clashes with PPP, and the challenge from the Jama‘at’s religious flank continued to tax organization’s energies.\textsuperscript{124}

The Jama‘at’s dreams of an electoral victory were shattered. The organization won only 4 of the 151 National Assembly Seats which it contested, all in West Pakistan. It won

\textsuperscript{123} This was a problem which partially accounts for the success of PPP and Jama‘at’s defeat in the elections. For instance in 82 electoral constituencies of the Punjab, 260 candidates from right of center parties, and another 114 independent rightist candidates divided the vote. 4 parties had demand for Islamic constitution on their election manifestoes, and another 4 favored it. See, Sharif al Mujahid, "Pakistan’s First General Elections", \textit{Asian Survey}, XI:2 (February 1971), P.170.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.388-90.
only 4 of the 331 Provincial Assembly seats which it had aimed for, one in each province except Baluchistan (see tables 12.1-12.4). Not only did the Jama'at trail far behind the PPP and the Awami League, but to its dismay and embarrassment, in terms of seats won, the organization finished behind JUI and JUP. The former even served as a partner to the National Awami Party in forming provincial governments in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P.

To the Jama'at's surprise JUI and JUP managed to obtain better results than the Jama'at while contesting fewer seats in national and provincial elections, and after receiving a lower percentage of the votes cast. In elections to the national assembly, the Jama'at's share of the total vote tallied to %6.03, as opposed to JUI(WP)'s %3.98 and JUP's %3.94.\footnote{The main faction of this 'ulama party in the elections was Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan.} The Jama'at secured 4 seats - none in East Pakistan where its share of the total votes cast was %6.07 - while the other two got 7 seats each. In provincial elections, the Jama'at received %3.25 of the votes cast, while JUI(WP) got %2.25 and JUP %2.11 of the votes cast; yet the Jama'at won only 4 provincial seats, as opposed to JUI's 9 and JUP's 11. Moreover, the Jama'at's %6.03 of the votes cast in National Assembly elections gave the Jama'at only %1.3 of the seats. Similarly, in provincial elections, Jama'at's %3.25 share of the vote accounted for a mere %0.67 of the seats. The results made the Jama'at an ardent believer and advocate of a proportional representation electoral system for Pakistan.\footnote{The organization did much to persuade General Ziya to reform introduce a proportional representation system to Pakistan; interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad. Interestingly, following the elections of 1990 wherein PPP's share of the votes cast were close to that of IJI, while the distribution of seats greatly favored the latter, the}
### TABLE 12.1
THE TALLY OF VOTES FOR THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE ELECTIONS TO
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN IN 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>JI**</th>
<th>JUI(WP)+</th>
<th>JUI/NI++</th>
<th>MJUP@</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>1,044,137 %6.07</td>
<td>158,058 %0.92</td>
<td>485,774 %2.83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>515,564 %4.74</td>
<td>564,601 %5.19</td>
<td>28,246 %0.26</td>
<td>1,083,196 %9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>321,471 %10.31</td>
<td>151,284 %4.85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>216,418 %6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>103,958 %7.22</td>
<td>366,477 %25.45</td>
<td>7,744 %0.54</td>
<td>244 %0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>4,331 %1.16</td>
<td>74,651 %20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,989,461 %6.03</td>
<td>1,315,071 %3.98</td>
<td>521,764 %1.58</td>
<td>1,299,858 %3.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JI stands for Jama'at-i Islami.
+JUI(WP) stands for Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Islam, West Pakistan.
++JUI/NI stands for Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Islam/Jami'at-i Ahl-i Hadith, Pakistan.
@MJUP stands for Markazi Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Pakistan.
TABLE 12.2*

SEATS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONTESTED AND WON BY THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>JUI (WP)</th>
<th>JUI/NI</th>
<th>MJUP</th>
<th>Total+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>ran for</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


+The total here represents the total number of contestants, belonging to all parties, and the number which won their elections, again from all parties.
TABLE 12.3*

THE TALLY OF VOTES FOR THE ISLAMIC GROUPS IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES OF PAKISTAN IN 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>JUI(WP)</th>
<th>JUI/NI</th>
<th>MJUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>678,159</td>
<td>76,735</td>
<td>223,634</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>161,627</td>
<td>313,684</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>448,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>89,245</td>
<td>37,418</td>
<td>14,702</td>
<td>184,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>37,387</td>
<td>201,030</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>8,609</td>
<td>45,609</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>975,027</td>
<td>674,416</td>
<td>241,289</td>
<td>632,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>JUI (WP)</th>
<th>JUI/NI</th>
<th>MJUP</th>
<th>Total+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>ran for 174</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>ran for 80</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>ran for 37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>ran for 28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>319</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won 1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>ran for 12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won -</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>ran for 331</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>won 4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


+The total here represents the total number of contestants, belonging to all parties, and the number which won their elections, again from all parties.
Islamic groups put together did not do well in either wing of Pakistan, a fact which did not augur well for groups which had held a sword of damocles over the head of the politicians since the country’s creation.

The election results, not unexpectedly, dealt a severe blow to the morale and confidence of the Jama‘at. Mawdudi’s political savvy came under question, as did the organization’s time-honored reliance upon the emotive power of Islamic symbolisms and the putative Islamic loyalties of the Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{127} The election results, moreover, effectively sidelined the Jama‘at as a power broker in the subsequent political debates. The Jama‘at, however, was not as yet pulverized. Mawdudi quickly regrouped the Jama‘at, this time to defend Pakistan before the swift polarization of the country between PPP and the Awami League. Mawdudi and Ghulam ‘Azam, a Bengali leader of the Jama‘at, visited with Yahya Khan, and encouraged him to accept the writ of the elections; avoid distinguishing between Pakistani, and hence Muslims, by favoring those in the Western wing over those in the Eastern one; and to permit Shaikh Mujib and the Awami League to form the national government.\textsuperscript{128} When Yahya Khan did not comply with the Jama‘at’s advice, the organization openly broke with him, accusing him of unfair partiality towards the PPP, a dangerous gambit, which the Jama‘at hoped to avert.\textsuperscript{129} Meanwhile,

\textsuperscript{127} Earlier in this study, the ramifications of the electoral defeat for the Jama‘at was discussed, especially with reference to Mawdudi’s decision to step down as Amir.

\textsuperscript{128} Mashriqi Pakistan Talib-i ‘Ilm Rahnima, "Mashriqi Pakistan Akhri Lamhi", in \textit{TT}, vol.1, P.316.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{ISIT(1)}, pp.20-21.
the Jama'at began severely criticizing Bhutto and the PPP for their "undemocratic tactics" in denying the Awami League the fruit of its victory.

The Jama'at's line of argument, however, did not endear the organization to the Awami League; for, Mawdudi's attacks on Bhashani and Shaikh Mujib, the former for his base political views, and the latter for his rapacious inclinations had continued apace with his criticisms of Bhutto and the PPP. In similar vein, violent clashes between IJT supporters and Bengali nationalists had continued to escalate in light of the Jama'at's pro-Pakistan and anti-Awami League propaganda, which had increased following the elections.

With the greater deterioration of the situation in East Pakistan throughout 1971, a hapless Jama'at now convinced of a communist/Hindu plot to dismember Pakistan began to succumb to the pressures of the situation at hand. Driven by its fervent dedication to the unity of Pakistan, unable to counter the challenge of the left ideologically or politically, the Jama'at in general, and the Jama'at and IJT of East Pakistan in particular, abandoned their self-avowed role as intermediary and joined the fray on the side of the Pakistan army, forging an unholy alliance with an erstwhile enemy which cast a shadow on the political thinking of the Jama'at well into the 1980s.

In July 1971, a group of Jama'at votaries led by Khurram Murad travelled to Europe to propagate Pakistan's case before the world. Similar ventures in defence of the army's campaign in East Pakistan were also undertaken in the Arab world, where the Jama'at drew upon its considerable influence to gain support for Pakistan's cause. In September 1971, the alliance between the Jama'at and the army was made official when

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130 Bahadur, *Jama'at-i Islami*, P.133.
4 members of the Jama'at of East Pakistan joined the military government of the province.\textsuperscript{131} Both sides saw gains to be made from their mutual cooperation. The army hoped to receive religious sanction for its increasingly brutal campaign of repression, while the Jama'at found a welcome rise in prominence which given its electoral showings would have been otherwise inconceivable. The decision to throw in their lot with the military was also a natural outcome of the organization's unwavering adherence to the principle of primacy of Islam in politics, which now manifested itself in their firm denunciation of separatist sentiments.

Above and beyond political or ideological motivations, what was seen as the Jama'at's official position was, in good measure the result of decisions taken by the Jama'at of East Pakistan, then supervised by Ghulam 'Azam and Khurram Murad. This branch of the Jama'at, faced with the threat of annihilation was thoroughly radicalized and hence acted increasingly in an autonomous fashion, dealing with the military regime in Dacca directly. The Lahore Secretariat often reacted to, or merely sanctioned the lead taken by the Jama'at and IJT in Dacca. Nowhere was this development more evident than in IJT's contribution to the ill-fated Al-Badr and Al-Shams counter-insurgency operations.

The two para-military units were set up by the Pakistan army in May 1971 to counter the Mukti Bahini. Their members consisted of Bihari youth - from the Muhajir community settled in East Pakistan. IJT provided a large number of the two organizations' members.

\textsuperscript{131} The four portfolios given to Jama'at provincial ministers were, Revenue, Education, Commerce and Industry, and Local Government; see, ISIT(1), P.23.
recruits, especially that of al-Badr.\textsuperscript{132} The decision to join al-Badr and al-Shams was taken by Muti’u’l-Rahman Nizami, the East Pakistani Nazim-i A’la of IJT at the time, who was stationed at Dacca University.\textsuperscript{133} Nizami galvanized support for the counter-insurgency operations among IJT activists in East Pakistan, most of whom then proceeded to join the two organizations.\textsuperscript{134}

The Jama’at and IJT’s eventually paid dearly for their activities in East Pakistan during the civil war in that province. During the clashes between al-Badr and al-Shams with the Mukti Bahini numerous IJT activists lost their lives. These numbers were to escalate further when scores were settled by Bengali nationalists after the fall of Dacca.\textsuperscript{135} Some 2,000 Jama’at members, workers and sympathizers were killed following the defeat of the Pakistan army, and many more were rounded up and placed in prison camps.\textsuperscript{136} As in 1947, the Jama’at decided to divide in accordance with the new political

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item On the Al-Badr see, Salim Mansur Khalid, \textit{Al-Badr} (Lahore: Idarah-i Mutala’at-i Tulabah, 1985).
\item Nizami’s primacy in East Pakistan was sanctioned by Mawdudi during a meeting between the two in January 1971; see interview with Muti’u’l-Rahman Nizami in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.2, pp.234-35. On Nizami and IJT’s role in politics in East Pakistan see this source, pp.235-37.
\item Khalid, \textit{Al-Badr}, 178-79.
\item Interview with Khurram Jah Murad, Lahore. The interviewee, an overseer of the Jama’at in East Pakistan at the time, was kept at a prison camp between 1971 and 1974. Also see, interview with Tasnim ‘Alam Manzar, in \textit{JVNAT}, vol.2, P.258. One Jama’at publication places the number of those incarcerated at prison camps at 10,000-12,000; see,
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
reality. Jama'at-i Islami of Bangladesh was formed in 1971, and began to reorganize in 1972 under the leadership of Ghulam A'zam.

The scars of the bloody civil war left their mark on the Jama'at, and especially on the Jami'at. The Jama'at, despite its avowed irenic outlook, was now introduced to violence. For the Jama'at leaders the East Pakistan debacle also had its bright side. The nationalist credentials of the organization, which was repeatedly accused of anti-Pakistan, could no longer be questioned. As one Jama'at leader put it, "while the Muslim League youth took refuge in their opulent havens, it was the Jami'at which gave its blood to save Pakistan."

It was this outlook which gave the organization, routed at the polls a year earlier a new-found confidence, one which spear-headed its return to the political arena for a new round of battles with the government.

The years 1958 to 1971 was a period of great change in the political life of the Jama'at. The symbiosis between Islam and the state which had harbingered the political enfranchisement of the organization during the preceding decade began to come apart at the seams under systematic pressure exerted by the Ayub Khan regime. The polity was increasingly secularized, and the government, headed by bureaucrats and generals with a modernizing agenda in mind, openly sought to banish the Jama'at from the political arena. The Jama'at's response, however, was kept in check by Mawdudi. The government pressure only increased the penchant of the organization for routinizing its idealistic

\textit{ISIT}(I), P.24.

\textsuperscript{137} Interviews with Khurram Jah Murad and Liaqat Baluch, Lahore.
tendencies, giving greater shape and meaning to the intermeshing of Islam and democracy, and the resultant Islamic constitutionalist platform. It was a curious feature of the Ayub Khan era that religious modernism went hand-in-hand with martial rule, while the fortunes of revivalism became intertwined with those of democracy. The fusion of Islam and democracy defied the writ of the government’s bifurcation of society into traditional and modern by building a political common ground between the two. Hence, politicization rather than radicalization became the credo of the Jama‘at, and enfranchisement rather than alienation characterized its politics. These developments had significant implications for the Jama‘at’s world view, which stands in clear contrast to the paths taken by Iranian or Egyptian revivalists. While Ayub Khan’s modernizing schemes or autocratic tendencies paled before those of the Pahlavis or Nasser, government policy alone does not account for the parting of the ways of Mawdudi, and Khomeini or Sayyid Qutb. Although the precarious nature of the Pakistan state may not have permitted Mawdudi to act otherwise, the encadrement of the Jama‘at’s ideological outlook within the framework of the Pakistani nation-state as a corollary of the organization’s political enfranchisement, already underlines the importance of internal factors which decided the Jama‘at’s proclivity to resist alienation and radicalization.

Throughout the Ayub Khan era, the government’s systematic efforts to marginalize the Jama‘at instead encouraged its tendency to participate more aggressively in the political process, and to bolster the symbiotic relations between Islam and state by means of a political stance which encompassed the demands of the modern and the traditional social sectors. Throughout the Ayub era the organization became increasingly immersed
in the working of Pakistani politics, such that by the end of this period it had become a consummate political party.

The 1965 war, the worsening political situation in East Pakistan, and the increasing clamor for social justice, meanwhile, reinforced the Jama‘at’s tendency to further politicize; for, these new political constellations acted to resuscitate the symbiosis between Islam and the state, which the government had brought to the brink of collapse. If radicalism of kinds became the lot of the Jama‘at during this period, ironically, it came about at the heels of the organization’s greater commitment to the Pakistan state, and to the symbiosis which underlay the relations between Islam and the state. It was in defending the unity of Pakistan, and bolstering the Islamic basis of the state against the onslaught of Bengali nationalists during the Yahya Khan era that the Jama‘at became embroiled in violence, with political solutions giving place to hitherto forbidden radical actions.
The meteoric rise of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party to power in 1969-71 was a momentous event in Pakistani politics, one which promised to bring fundamental changes to that country. The Bhutto years, however, did not turn out to be the catharsis which Pakistan had hoped for. The new populist regime never managed to successfully institutionalize the charismatic appeal of its leader, and instead steadily collapsed into the mold of the country’s time-honored patrimonial politics. The failure of the Bhutto government, proved to be the calling of the Jama’at, and the opening for its reentry into the political arena.

The PPP rose to power at the helm of a successful social movement which took most of the credit for ousting the Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan regimes. It, however, took over the reigns of power in the wake of the dismemberment of Pakistan. The confluence of the psychological shock of the fall of Dacca to Indian troops, and the impact of the new regime’s populist political and economic agenda produced a deluge in Pakistani society, which the PPP government was neither able to harness nor effectively suppress.¹ The quandary before the new regime was further aggravated by Bhutto’s autocratic style, and his unwillingness to utilize the Pakistan army’s moment of weakness to institutionalize his party. No sooner had Bhutto assumed power that the contours of an anti-PPP constituency became apparent, in turn giving rise to a new constellation of forces, whose appeal was

solely predicated upon their opposition to the government's policies. Throughout the 1971-77 period this constituency grew in size, and the constellation of forces predicated upon its demands became more powerful. The Jama'at played a central role in articulating the demands of this constituency, and in channeling its directing its considerable energies into a successful campaign of political agitation, which eventually brought down the Bhutto government. The issues around which the anti-Bhutto forces rallied were religious, political, and socioeconomic. The manner in which the Jama'at contended with these issues provides insights into both the pattern of the Jama'at's continuing politicization, and also the factors and events which led to the demise of the Bhutto regime.

Throughout the 1960s the Jama'at had denounced the left for its atheism, and had sought to bring Islam to the center of Pakistani politics. As the results of the elections of 1970-71 indicate, these efforts proved to be less than successful. The eclipse of Islam, however, was not permanent; more importantly, its return to politics did not occur through the intermediary of the Jama'at alone. Ironically, it was Yahya Khan and the civil war of 1971 that ushered Islam back into the center of Pakistani politics. The inability of Islam to keep the two halves of the country united, interestingly, did not diminish the appeal of religious symbolisms to the politicians and the masses alike, but conversely, augmented them. The cataclysmic events of 1971, and the apparent precarious nature of the Pakistan state at that juncture, led Pakistanis, and especially those social and ethnic groups which maintained firm loyalties to the state, to reaffirm Islamic roots of Pakistan.² Even the

² See in this regard, Lawrence Ziring, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan", Asian Survey, XXIV:9 (September 1984), pp.931-46.
avowedly secularist and left of center PPP government did not remain immune to the force, and hence, appeal of "re-Islamizing" the political discourse in Pakistan. After all, the Ayub Khan era had proved that as a force for national integration and state consolidation, socioeconomic concerns were not a substitute for Islam. The PPP government, therefore, sought to manipulate rather than marginalize Islam. Overtures to Islam, and efforts to woo the religious vote did provide the government with a mechanism for direct an efficacious interaction with the society; but they also made the ruling establishment susceptible to criticism from the religious quarter. For, in the end, the government's gambit was tantamount to an official sanction for sacralizing politics, and creating the kind of political climate in which groups such as the Jama'at had a clear advantage over the PPP. Although not the main force behind the return of Islam into the limelight, the Jama'at proved to be its main beneficiary. Its views on the nature of national politics were, for once, in tune with the views of a majority of Pakistanis.

Since the beginning of the East Pakistan crisis Mawdudi had repeatedly warned Pakistani rulers and masses alike that the quandary before the country was the product of their lackluster adherence to Islam. This line of reasoning was found to be increasing pertinent by Pakistanis after 1971. The following example is illustrative in this regard. Soon after the secession of East Pakistan the Jama'at distanced itself from the Yahya Khan regime, and Mawdudi blamed the debacle on the General's womanizing and drinking habits.  

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3 Cited in 'Abdu'l-Ghani Faruqi, "Hayat-i Javidan", in HRZ, P.31.
of Pakistanis: "What broke up the country?"; the answer to which was "sharab (wine)".4

The political ramifications of this rather simplistic answer to Pakistan's most calamitous national tragedy to date, however, extended beyond the emotional responses of the Jama'at's constituency. In 1972-73, the Pakistan army uncovered a plan for a military coup, known as the Attock Conspiracy Case.5 The authorities arrested a group of officers, most of whom were veterans of the civil war of 1971. The groups was led by Brigadier F.B. 'Ali. The officers were charged with sedition, and brought to trial. S.M. Zafar, who defended the officers in court, recollects that, the officers were motivated in their actions by the belief that, East Pakistan was lost because of the government's "un-Islamic" ways in general, and General Yahya Khan's drinking habits in particular.6 The similarity between the Jama'at and the rebellious officers' views may be just a matter of conjecture. The Jama'at's views disseminated in the armed forces through the Urdu Digest since 1962 may have influenced some in the officer corps such as those involved in the Attock Conspiracy Case. Alternately, the officer corps which since the opening of the ranks of the cadets to the lower middle classes after 1965 had become markedly more conscious of Islamic values, may have reached those conclusions independently, and found its views conterminous with those of the Jama'at.7 The Attock Conspiracy Case, however,

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4 This fact was related to this author by Mumtaz Ahmad.

5 There was another Attock Conspiracy Case in 1984. The first coup attempt is therefore often referred to as the First Attock Conspiracy Case.

6 Interview with S.M. Zafar, Lahore.

attests to the fact that the Jama'at's views were in tune with those of a wider segment of the population than was the case in 1969-71. For religious parties, the armed forces, dominated by Punjabi and Pathan officers, had been one of the most impregnable of the state apparatuses. It had also been the most staunch defender of the unity of Pakistan and the integrity of the state. The signs of greater concern for religious values among officers was not only a manifestation of the fundamental axial changes which were afoot in the state and the polity, but also signalled the resurgence of the symbiosis between Islam and the Pakistan state.

Despite the army's reaction to the Attock Conspiracy Case the convergence of the views of the Jama'at and the religiously inclined officers increased throughout the 1970s. The Jama'at, in fact, became the beacon for the spread of Islamic values in the armed forces. The prominence of the Jama'at in the armed forces owed much to the initiative of Bhutto's seemingly dilettante choice for Chief of Staff of the armed forces, General Muhammad Ziyau'l-Haq. General Ziya had been sympathetic to the Jama'at long before he was placed in charge of the armed forces in 1976. He had been greatly impressed with the works of Mawdudi, and following his investiture as Chief of Staff Ziya used the powers vested in his office to widely distribute the Jama'at literature in the armed forces. Bhutto was greatly dismayed at this development, and General Ziya was summoned before the cabinet to explain his actions. Not long then after, during his trial before the

8 Jama'at leaders admit to having maintained contacts with army officers since the 1960s, but do not name General Ziya as one. Interview with Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Lahore.

9 Interview with 'Abdu'l-Hafiz Pirzadah, Karachi.
Supreme Court of Pakistan Bhutto remarked, "I appointed a Chief of Staff belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before all of us."

Bhutto may have exaggerated Ziya’s ties with the Jama’at, but his statement, nevertheless, underscored the importance of the Jama’at’s increasing influence in the armed forces, and the significance of the Jama’at in bringing down his regime.

The increasing interest in reinvoking the Islamic basis of the state among various social strata from 1971 onwards eventually compelled the Bhutto government to succumb to the pressures of Islamization, increasingly so throughout the 1971-77 period, as its grip over the hearts and minds of the people was loosened, and also in part as a response to the growing ties between Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states.

PPP’s credo from inception had been, "Islamic Socialism;" the battle-cry of an order which found meaning in Bhutto assertion that, "Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy." The Constitution of 1973, therefore, reinserted the "Islamic" into the official name of the state, which became the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan." The government’s overtures to Islam, much like those made to democracy, were not found to be convincing by the masses. Bhutto had been a protege of General Mirza, and one of the most anti-

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12 Bhutto explained his choice of this slogan to Javid Iqbal in the following terms: "I believe in neither. To get anywhere in East Pakistan I have to raise the banner of socialism, and to succeed in West Pakistan I have to talk of Islam. Islamic socialism is therefore the most appropriate slogan." Interview with Javid Iqbal, Lahore.
religious of Ayub Khan's lieutenants. He had done little since 1969 to dispel the myth of his rabid secularism. The direction of his religious policy - seeking to placate and yet outwit the religious elements - following his accession to power, was not deemed genuine by those it sought to appease, and only acted to confirm the suspicions of the Islamic parties.

The PPP government, for instance, named Kawthar Niyazi as its Minister of Religious Affairs. The choice of a Minister in itself, and then a man with Jama'at connections, was no doubt, a concession to Islamic parties. Niyazi, however, was not held in high esteem by the 'ulama, and was actually despised by the Jama'at for his defection under dubious circumstances from the organization in 1964. The choice of Niyazi was viewed more as a bane rather than a boon by the Jama'at.

The Islamic parties, moreover, viewed the government's religious transgressions as more tangible evidence of its real character than its Islamic pretensions. Notably, the 'ulama, the Jama'at, and the religiously-conscious Pakistanis were greatly disturbed by the Prime Minister and his coterie of friends and associates' public flaunting of disregard for religious values and mores. The negative repercussions of this image of moral corruption were compounded by the widely-held belief in religious circles that Bhutto had enjoyed

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13 Bhutto's connections with Generals Mirza and Ayub was important in shaping the Jama'at's opinion of him; interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore. In this regard also see, Muhammad Salahu'ddin, Peoples Party: Maqasid Awr Hikmat-i 'Amali (Karachi: Matbu'at-i Takbir, 1982).

the financial and organizational backing of Pakistan's Ahmadi community. Rumors in this regard were circulated among the masses by religious groups since 1969. The government could do little to put a stop to these charges, or to allay the apprehensions of the Islamic parties in this regard. By 1974 the Ahmadi connection had become sufficiently damaging to the government, to compel Bhutto to declare the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority. Despite such concessions the PPP government never managed to redeem itself in the eyes of the religiously-inclined Pakistanis.\footnote{On the importance of this issue in the eventual fall of the Bhutto government see, Professor Ghafur Ahmad, \textit{Pher Martial Law A-Giya} (Lahore: Jang Publications, 1988), P.101; and "Pakistan: Of Whisky, War and Islam", in \textit{The Economist}, (March 5, 1977), P.68.} The myth and reality of the un-Islamic ways of the leaders of Pakistan's seemingly most religiously attuned government to date, never ceased to be a sensitive political issue. When in 1976 the Jama'at launched a campaign demanding the enforcement of the shari'ah, the organization attracted some 15,000 new Mutaffiqs to its ranks.\footnote{ISIT(2), P.17.}

The dialectic of the relations between the PPP government and the Islamic parties in general, and the Jama'at in particular, went beyond purely religious issues, and extended to other social sectors, producing over time an anti-PPP constituency, which interfaced with the Islamic parties in producing the Nizam-i Mustafa (order of the Prophet) social movement, which eventually toppled the Bhutto administration. The constellation of political forces which converged in an anti-PPP alliance points to the importance of the interaction of economic and political factors in articulating a movement
of dissent. The resultant social movement, as predicted by Barrington Moore, in elaborating its program of action at a time of upheaval eschewed clearly-defined class alignments. Economic concerns did not evolve into primary concerns, but set the stage for the unfolding of a political dialectic which spelled the demise of the Bhutto experiment. While the government created the economic parameter for dissent, the Jama'at and its religious allies played a crucial role in providing its decisive political content.

The political predicament before the PPP arose from the very program of action which brought it into office. Populism proved to be a double-edged sword; it defined both the PPP's base of support, and that of the opposition to the party. PPP's appeal to Islamic symbolisms, and the resolution of the party's own inherent anomalies, moreover, underscored the problematic of Bhutto's populism. The leftist wing of the PPP and Pakistani labor unions which were disgruntled with the Ayub Khan regime played a pivotal role in bringing Bhutto to power. Distrustful of the left, and eager to allay the fears of the Islamic parties and the landed and comparador elite which had begun to join the ranks of the PPP, Bhutto systematically purged the left from his party, and rather than developing a reliable party machine, vested his fortunes in the army, civil service, and the newly-found Federal Security Forces (FSF). The government's suppression of labor unrest in Karachi in 1973 thoroughly alienated the labor from the government, broke the monopoly of the left over their politics, and opened them to the influence of the Jama'at.

Hence, while populism acted to galvanize an opposition to Bhutto, it did not produce an institutionalized base of support to bolster his regime. The nationalization of industries, and the use of the public sector to foster greater economic equity, which followed PPP’s rise to power benefitted the bureaucracy and the state bourgeoisie, whose powers were augmented to oversee the state-run industries, more than it did the labor force. Moreover, with the influx of scores of erstwhile enemies - landed gentry and business leaders - into the ranks of the PPP, the populist agenda in practice acted to petrify the party into a patronage machine, which increasingly benefitted those with political clout rather than the poor.\(^{18}\) The PPP, increasingly manned by lateral entries, thence collapsed into the mold of patrimonial power politics. Emptied of meaning, and with no power structure to sustain it, Bhutto substituted his party’s program for a balancing act between the various Pakistani interests groups.\(^{19}\) The traditionalization of the PPP; Bhutto’s increasingly bold appeal to Islamic symbolisms on the one hand and the support of the traditional elite and interest groups on the other; and the ruling establishment’s strong-arm tactics, disheartened the loyal party workers, and the base of support among the modern social sector, whose heightened expectations had remained unfulfilled.\(^{20}\) As a result, in 1977 while the labor unions and the urban educated middle


\(^{20}\) On the disgruntlement of the Pakistani middle classes with the PPP government see, Burki, *Pakistan*, pp.167, and 184-89.
classes, both of which were by this time far more numerous than in 1969,\textsuperscript{21} did not participate in the agitations which brought the Bhutto government down, more significantly, they did little to save it. By abandoning ideological politics, moreover, the PPP government handed over the monopoly over the conduct of that kind of political activism to its opposition, which substituted Islam for socialism in waging a total war against the PPP government.

The government's nationalization and labor reform measures, however, as mentioned earlier, did produce a clearly defined anti-PPP alliance. The comparador elite and the Islamic parties, the first motivated by its economic and business interests, and the latter by its belief in the sanctity of property and the financial and political backing of the former, joined forces to denounce the government's economic policies. Their opposition, however, manifested itself in a host of non-economic anti-government issues. The government's efforts at land reform in 1972, and nationalization of agro-businesses - cotton ginning and rice husking mills in 1976 brought the landed gentry, small landowners, the rural political forces, shop-keepers, and merchants, who saw their economic interests threatened and their upward mobility jeopardized, into an alliance.\textsuperscript{22} The alliance, however, did not focus its attention on economic issues, but on religious and political ones. Not only were the latter deemed to be a more effective basis for creating a social movement, but had the added advantage of taking the debates beyond individual policies, instead challenging the legitimacy of the government as a whole.

\textsuperscript{21} Sayeed, \textit{Politics in Pakistan}, P.143.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{ibid}, P.159.
The alliance between the state and the bourgeoisie, to which the PPP had purported, produced a more significant concord between the rural elements and the landed classes. The participation of this religiously-inclined social stratum in the anti-PPP coalition was, however, guaranteed by the Islamic coloring of the alliance. Bhutto’s efforts to inculcate a base of support in the rural areas, in a fashion typical of PPP’s dilemma of meeting the demands of diverse interest groups, was interpreted by the urban population as an "anti-urban bias," and further pushed the middle and lower middle classes into the fold of the anti-PPP alliance. In the final analysis, the government’s failure to institutionalize a mass-based party which could control the flow of politics, combined with its disregard for the religious sensibilities of the masses provided this opposition with an open field for political activity. The emergence of a discernable anti-PPP constituency and political coalition, meanwhile, provoked the government to increasingly resort to undemocratic measures, which in turn added further fuel to the fire and emboldened the opposition.

The government confronted similar problems in its dealings with the Pakistani bureaucracy. This class of "mandarins" benefitted from the nationalization of the industries which extended its purview of activities, and made Bhutto more receptive to their wishes. However, initially at least, the Civil Service of Pakistan, used to the trappings of power under Ayub Khan, did not fare well with the rise of a politician to prominence. Bhutto’s power was unleashed against the interests of the comparador elite, but found expression, for the most part, against the bureaucracy - the only pillar of the Ayub Khan regime not be affected by events of 1969-71. In 1973 the Civil Service of Pakistan was formally
abolished, and was replaced by a national grade structure which permitted the lateral entry of political appointees into the bureaucracy. The demise of CSP, and the suppression of the bureaucracy by the new political establishment, created great resentments which made the mandarins open to the suasion of the nascent anti-PPP alliance. When Altaf Gauhar, one of Ayub Khan's trusted lieutenants and a don of the CSP was imprisoned in 1972-73 on the direct orders of Bhutto, significantly, he chose to translate Mawdudi’s *Tafhimul-Qur'an* into English, the text of which was serialized in the Karachi daily, *Dawn.*

The failure of the PPP to develop into a mass based party eventually left Bhutto with no means to counter the power of the bureaucracy, and the politician at the helm eventually became a captive of the "mandarins".

The anti-PPP alliance also found an ethnic and provincialist base of support. Bhutto's open courting of the Sindhis, his dismissal of the provincial government in Baluchistan and use of the army to suppress all expressions of dissent in that province, and his policy *vis a vis* India and Bangladesh were quite unpopular with the Muhajir community and the Punjabis. Throughout the electoral campaign of 1970, Bhutto had openly assailed the Muhajir community, and promised the Sindhis a greater share of power in the Sind province as well as in the central government. Once in power, Bhutto delivered on his promises by distributing coveted bureaucratic and political positions to

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23 Altaf Gauhar, "Pakistan, Ayub Khan Awr Mawlana; Tafhimul-Qur'an Awr Main", in *HRZ*, pp.42-44.

24 In a symbolic move, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (later the President of Pakistan) as the Secretary of Defense in 1977, was instrumental in prompting General Ziya to stage a coup. The bureaucracy, moreover, embraced the Ziya regime readily. Interviews, Lahore.
Sindhis without regard for bureaucratic procedures or merit. The Muhajirs who already blamed Bhutto's intransigence for the loss of East Pakistan did not take kindly to the new Prime Minister's pro-Sindhi policies. When in 1972 the Sind Provincial Assembly, controlled by the PPP, passed a resolution which required that all provincial government's employees - most of whom were Muhajirs and Punjabis - learn Sindhi in three months or be dismissed, the Muhajir community reacted strongly. Karachi became embroiled in riots, and Muhajirs and a good segment of Punjabi public opinion came to view PPP's challenge to the sacrosanct primacy of Urdu as treacherous. For the Muhajirs and the Punjabis, Bhutto was increasingly sounding like Shaikh Mujib.

These fears were further aggravated by Bhutto's high-handed assertion of the primacy of the center by suppressing dissent in Baluchistan. In February 1973 he summarily dismissed the JUI-National Awami Party coalition government in that province. Shortly then after, the JUI-NAP government of N.W.F.P. resigned in protest. A constitutional crisis thus besieged the state. The Baluchis, meanwhile, decided to actively resist Bhutto's unwarranted interference in the affairs of the province. The result was a brutal guerilla war which by the December of 1974 had pitched the traditional power structure of the province - its tribes - against the Pakistan army. For the Jama'at and its constituency the parallels between Baluchistan and East Pakistan were uncomfortably close. The Baluchistan debacle was yet another proof of the bane of the PPP

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25 Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, P.154.

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administration. The government, however, was compelled by the crisis to appeal to Islamic symbolisms, and the symbiosis between religion and the state to a greater degree.

Also of concern to the already apprehensive Muhajir and Punjabi communities was the Simla Accord and Pakistan's decision to recognize Bangladesh. In June 1972 Bhutto met with Indira Gandhi in Simla to discuss the geopolitical order in South Asia in the aftermath of the dismemberment of Pakistan. Although the meeting was a positive step in creating a framework for improving the relations between Pakistan and India, the very agreements reached between the two leaders was not welcome in all quarters in Pakistan. Most contentious was the belief that Bhutto had promised India to recognize Bangladesh. The Indophobic Muhajir community, many of whose members suffered greatly at the hands of Bengali nationalists, and the Punjabis who boasted the greatest numbers in the Pakistan armed forces who had fought to prevent the creation of Bangladesh were vehemently opposed to the recognition of the independence of Pakistan's erstwhile province. The "Bangladesh Namanzur" (Non-Recognition of Bangladesh) campaign, spearheaded by IJT following the unveiling of Bhutto's decision to recognize Bangladesh was centered in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad, and found great support among the Muhajirs and the Punjabis. The Muhajir/Punjabi-Sindhi stand-off in Sind, the Baluchistan imbroglio, and the dispute over the recognition of Bangladesh, made the Muhajir community, and a sizeable portion of Punjabi public opinion a strong base of support for the anti-PPP alliance in general, and the Jama'at in particular.

Just as Bhutto, confined by the realities of Pakistani politics and beguiled by the
popular enthusiasm that brought him into office, missed a unique opportunity in 1972-73 to institutionalize the "charismata" of his movement in the form of an effective mass-based party, so did the Jama'at also fall prey to the same folly that deluded Bhutto. The Jama'at grew in strength throughout the Bhutto era. The rise in the fortunes of the organization was predicated upon the re-introduction of Islam to the political process, and the emergence of a constellation of dissident political forces and social groups which formed core of the anti-PPP alliance. The Jama'at was able to successfully relate to these forces, and effectively manipulate and direct their political activism. The organization, however, failed to develop a coherent sociopolitical program which could inculcate a base of support for the Jama'at among these forces and groups above and beyond the commonality of their opposition to the government. Even the Islamic constitutionalist platform was shelved in favor of direct political action. The Jama'at remained content with agitational politics, and mobilization of the masses and the anti-PPP forces around single issues such as the Non-Recognition of Bangladesh or the declaration of Ahmadis as a minority. The Jama'at basked in the momentary glory of its leadership in the anti-government agitations, and failed to grasp the importance of institutionalizing its leadership among the opposition. The alliance of convenience between the Jama'at and the anti-PPP forces and masses remained a transient coalition, which given the importance of street agitations, disproportionately favored the Jama'at, and no doubt served as an incentive for the organization's continued commitment to the Pakistani state and the constitutional political process. Jama'at's failure to evolve this incipient convergence of objectives into more concrete relations by developing a tangible nexus between political
action and the social base which sustained it, proved detrimental to the interests of the organization. Agitational politics strengthened the organizational structure of the Jama'at, but also weakened it politically. The Jama'at's apparent success during the Bhutto years, therefore, in the end proved to be a pyrrhic victory; a moment of enthusiasm which disappeared once the Bhutto government fell, and the army put an end to agitational politics. In the elections of 1977, the wide-scale rigging of which led to the down fall of the PPP government, the nine party electoral alliance against the government tallied 36 seats, 9 of which were won by Jama'at candidates.\textsuperscript{27} In the next elections in 1985, the Jama'at was again reduced to its modest electoral showings.\textsuperscript{28} The dynamics of the Jama'at's political activism, the rise in the organization's political fortunes, the expansion of its base of support, as well as the reasons for its failure to sustain its newly found prominence should be examined in greater detail.

\textbf{The Jama'at, the Jami'at, and the PPP Government, 1971-1975}

The origins of the Jama'at and the PPP's mutual antagonism goes back to the Yahya Khan era, and to Mawdudi's virulent campaign against Bhutto and his party. Following the elections of 1970-71, the Jama'at had pressed Yahya Khan to call on Shaikh Mujib to form the government, and had accused Bhutto of niggardly behavior and the betrayal of the interests of Pakistan. All this had led many in the PPP, especially the leftist wing of the party led by Mi'raj Muhammad, to encourage Bhutto to effectively suppress

\textsuperscript{27} For results of this election see later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{28} For results of this election see chapter 14.

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the Jama'at. Bhutto and a number of his advisors, notably the erstwhile Jama'at votary, Kawthar Niyazi were, however, eager to first try to mollify the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{30}

The Jama'at, meanwhile, having championed the cause of democracy for the preceding two decades, was compelled to recognize the electoral mandate of PPP, albeit begrudgingly. The PPP understood the Jama'at's move as a sign of conciliation. Conflict, however, continued to loom in the horizon. On December 20, 1971, the Jama'at initiated its policy of dissent \textit{vis a vis} the government by ridiculing Bhutto for his assumption of the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator, and demanding the abrogation of martial rule in favor of a civilian government.\textsuperscript{31} The Jama'at in demanding an end to martial law was also airing its serious misgivings about any form of constitutional debate which was to take place under a military order, even if led by a civilian.\textsuperscript{32}

Meanwhile the dynamics of the escalation of clashes between PPP and IJT began to shift the focus of the stand-off between PPP and the Jama'at from hostile altercations over the constitution and civilian rule to campus politics. IJT had proved to be a thorn in the side of the PPP since 1969 when it began winning campus elections at Punjab University, soundly defeating PPP candidates in face to face contests. The latest of these elections, which was won by the Jama'at candidate, Javid Hashmi, closely followed PPP's

\textsuperscript{29} Mujibu'l-Rahman Shami, "Jama'at-i Islami Awr Peoples Party; Fasilah Awr Rabitah, Ik Musalsal Kahani", \textit{Qaumi Digest} (Lahore), 11:2 (July 1988), P.13.

\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{ISIT(I)}, P.25; and \textit{Rudad-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan 1972} (Lahore: Jama'at-i Islami, nd.), pp.1-2.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{ibid.}
victory in the national elections.

IJT's victory in Punjab, PPP's stronghold, had momentous political ramifications. It not only shattered the myth of the invincibility of the PPP, but symbolically, made the Jama'at and the Jami'at the *de facto* opposition party of Pakistan - the only political organization to be willing and able to challenge the PPP electorally.\(^3^3\) IJT was, moreover, as a result emboldened to challenge the PPP on an increasing number of issues, which were no longer limited to campus politics. In January 1972, IJT revealed a glimpse of future direction of its activism by challenging the PPP in a national educational conference in Islamabad, wherein IJT solicited and won a resolution which demanded the Islamization of the educational system in Pakistan.\(^3^4\) Shortly then after in a move that augured ill for the relations between PPP and IJT, and was moreover, indicative of the direction in which the student organization was developing, IJT students disrupted the Convocation ceremonies at Karachi University, barring the Governor of Sind from addressing the ceremonies.\(^3^5\) Similar measures were also undertaken at Punjab University. In fact it was not until 1990 that a prominent government official, on this occasion President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was permitted to preside over the Convocation Ceremonies at the IJT controlled campus in Lahore. For the PPP, the events at Karachi University were proof that IJT was going to be more than just a political inconvenience.

\(^{3^3}\) Interview with Javid Hashmi, Lahore. In later years Mawdudi attested to the importance of IJT's electoral victories at Punjab University; interview with Mawlana Mawdudi in *Nawa'i Waqt* (Lahore), (October 24, 1978), P.6.

\(^{3^4}\) Interview with Tasnim ‘Alam Manzur, in *JVNAT*, vol.2, pp.297-98.

\(^{3^5}\) Zahid Hussain, "The Campus Mafias", in *Herald* (Karachi), (October 1988), P.56.
IJT’s radicalism was a source of great concern for the newly installed government. IJT had since the 1960s grown to be the repository of political activism within the pale of the Jama’at. While the parent organization advocated the cause of Islamic constitutionalism, IJT had harped on the demand for Islamic revolution. Although victory at the polls at Punjab University had greatly boosted the morale of the student organization, its growing radicalism which lay outside the purview of the Jama’at’s control continued to condition its approach to politics. The tales of the heroism of al-Badr and al-Shams, a project in which the Jama’at had no direct role, had imbued IJT with an air of revolutionary activism, one which interestingly, made the organization appealing to some within the constituency of the leftist student organizations. The example of al-Badr and al-Shams were found more pertinent in light of yet another model of student activism, this one from an unexpected quarter. The myths and realities of the French student riots of 1968 had found their way into the ambient culture of IJT activists, and encouraged their militancy, especially during the Non-Recognition of Bangladesh campaign.

During the early months of the Bhutto administration, despite IJT’s visible activism, the Jama’at continued to set the organization’s policy vis a vis the government. The electoral success of IJT had given the Jama’at sufficient confidence to assert itself, while

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36 Liaqat Baluch, one of the most notable of IJT leaders of the 1970s recollects that it was the tales of al-Badr and al-Shams that led him to leave his leftist student group for IJT in 1971. See Liaqat Baluch, "Main Ne Samajha Puri Ka’inat Mil Ga’i", in HRZ, P.96.

37 Hafiz Khan, "Zawq-i ‘Amal", in TT, vol.2, P.23; and Chaudhri Ghulam Gilani, "Ik Chatan", in ibid, P.16.
student radicalism pushed the organization's leadership to adopt more unbending positions. In February 1972 the Jama'at intensified its pressures on the government by launching a country-wide campaign demanding the convention of the National Assembly.\(^{38}\) In March the Jama'at tightened the screws on the government further by demanding an official investigation into the causes of the loss of East Pakistan, and the roles of Yahya Khan and Bhutto therein.\(^{39}\) The Jama'at was making effective use of the continuation of the martial law under Bhutto to revive its Islamic constitutionalist platform, which had fallen into desuetude during the Yahya Khan period.

The National Assembly was convened in late April of 1972, altering the political climate of Pakistan once again. The Jama'at welcomed the measure, and adhered to the government line by abandoning its demand for the restitution of the Constitution of 1956, and instead prepared itself for participation in the drafting of a new constitution. The government again understood the Jama'at's move as a sign of conciliation.\(^{40}\) Subsequent events proved their optimism to have been premature. A *modus vivendi* deluded the two sides in 1972, in large part, due to the government's breach of faith in its handling of campus politics on Punjab University. Agents of the Federal Security Forces were infiltrated into the PSF with the objective of stealing the April 26, 1972 campus elections.

\(^{38}\) *ISIT(1)*, pp.25-26.

\(^{39}\) *Rudad*, pp.2-3. Ghulam A'zam of the Jama'at later appeared before the official commission of inquiry and testified; *ISIT(1)*, pp.25-26.

\(^{40}\) It should be noted that there was reason for government's understanding. For, Mawdudi had personally interceded to break the opposition coalition, United Democratic Front's boycott of the constitutional debates in parliament. See, Saulat, *Maulana Maududi*, P.85.
The FSF agents used live ammunition and strong-arm tactics in deciding the outcome of the elections.\textsuperscript{41} In the end, ballot boxes were confiscated and taken away from the campuses. The events created much bitterness towards the government among IJT's rank and file, and led the student organization to arm itself in order to defend its turf and right to fair elections.\textsuperscript{42}

The resultant militarization of IJT had immediate consequences for national and provincial politics. In August 1972, IJT took it upon itself to secure the release of two girls who were abducted by the PPP Governor of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar for illicit purposes. The IJT rally, which gained great support in Lahore, secured the release of the abducted girls, humiliated the authorities by revealing the extent of arbitrary rule and immorality which was rampant in the ruling circles, and once again underlined the potential of IJT and the Jama'at.\textsuperscript{43} Although the government's immediate reaction was brusque, disrupting an IJT session in Karachi in September, generally, it sought to mollify IJT before events could thoroughly overwhelm the parties to the conflict. In September 1972 Javid Hashmi, by now a national political figure, was invited to meet with Bhutto at the Governor House in Lahore,\textsuperscript{44} and later with Mumtaz Bhutto, the PPP Chief Minister

\textsuperscript{41} Liaqat Baluch, "Rushaniyun Ka Safar", in \textit{TT}, vol.2, pp.220-21.

\textsuperscript{42} 'Abdu'l-Shakur, "Jahan-i Tazah Ki Takbirin", in \textit{TT}, vol.2, pp.71-72. Also interview with Farid Ahmad Parachah, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{ibid}, P.77. Also interview with Javid Hashmi, who led the IJT procession which gained the release of the two girls.

\textsuperscript{44} Interestingly, when Bhutto had visited Punjab University in December 1971 and met with student representatives, he had refused to meet the IJT leaders on that campus; cited in Javid Hashmi, "IK Jur'at-i Rindanah", in \textit{TT}, vol.2, pp.51-52.
of Sind in Karachi. The meetings, which attested to the growing prominence and notable success of IJT, brought about a short-lived truce which lasted until December 1972.

In the Assembly, meanwhile, the Jama'at had adroitly used that legal and constitutional forum to press the government to reveal its intentions for Pakistan, its dealings with India over Bangladesh, and the extent of its commitment to socialism. Although few in numbers, the Jama'at delegation in the Assembly proved to be a tenacious opponent and an insurmountable obstacle to Bhutto's objectives of monopolizing the constitutional process. Frustrated with the constant menace of the Jama'at, the PPP resorted to force. On June 8, 1972, Nazir Ahmad, one of the Jama'at's most vociferous members of the National Assembly was assassinated in his home constituency of Darah Ghazi Khan in Punjab. The Jama'at viewed this event with great consternation. Never before had any Pakistani government gone so far in order to silence its opposition. Although Mawdudi preached caution to the Jama'at, and especially to IJT, following this incident the two organizations did not remain impervious to the introduction of blatant violence into the political process by the government. The assassination of Nazir Ahmad marks the beginning of the rapid militarization of IJT and the

45 ibid, P.78.
46 ibid.
47 Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, pp.31-38.
48 Rudad, P.5.
greater politicization of the Jama'at during the Bhutto years.

A month later, in July 1972, Bhutto invited leaders of various Pakistani parties to Murree in order to report on his meeting with Indira Gandhi in Simla. The Jama'at was represented by Mian Tufayl, who bluntly warned Bhutto against recognizing Bangladesh and "selling out Pakistan's interests to India." The Jama'at’s warning was not, however, tantamount to an immediate danger for the government. Such did not remain the case for long as events in Sind provided the Jama'at with the means for precipitating a crisis over the issue.

July had proved to be an ominous month in Sind. Brewing tensions between Muhajirs and Sindhis finally erupted into a full-fledged conflict as the two sides became embroiled in the language riots. The subsequent violent exchanges between Sindhis and Muhajirs in Sind, hence, further strained the relations between the government and the Jama'at. Emboldened by Bhutto's rhetoric, and enjoying the patronage of the PPP Ministry in Sind, the "sons of soil" had mounted a concerted campaign to assert their power in the province to the detriment of the Muhajirs, further alienating them from the PPP. Bhutto was greatly alarmed by the extent of the disgruntlement of the Muhajir community, and by the fact that it could serve as a source of support for one of the government's most troublesome adversary, the Jama'at. Despite its awareness of the unrest among Muhajirs, the government had done little to allay their fears. The government's negligence permitted the Jama'at to exploit the grievances of the Muhajirs, mobilizing that community around the issue of the recognition of Bangladesh. Although, the non-

50 *Rudad*, pp.6-7.
recognition of Bangladesh campaign later found great support in Punjab as well, the Muhajirs continued to serve as its fulcrum.

The Jama'at understood the emotional weight of the Bangladesh issue, especially in the wake of the Muhajir community's open display of its opposition to the government. The government too was cognizant of the gravity of the issue, and its potential for precipitating a political crisis. On September 25, 1972, Bhutto invited Mawdudi to a meeting at the Governor's House in Lahore. The issue of Bangladesh was discussed with no apparent understandings emerging between the two sides. More importantly, the general framework of relations between the government and the Jama'at were examined, this time with consequential results. In this regard, the discussions first focused on the role of the left in the PPP, which Mawdudi argued, was a scourge against which the Jama'at would continue to fight. Mawdudi then encouraged Bhutto to distance himself from the left, and told the Prime Minister, "if they [the left] challenge you, we will support you."51 Mawdudi's assurance and promise, according to Kawthar Niyazi, played an important part in Bhutto's decision to downplay socialist themes in the constitutional debate, and to purge the left from the PPP from 1973 onwards.52

During the meeting, Mawdudi also pressed upon Bhutto to adhere to the democratic principles which he had advocated during his fight to bring down Ayub Khan. Mawdudi stipulated fair play as the \textit{condito sine qua non} for any \textit{rapprochement} between

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51 Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad, and Interview with Kawthar Niyazi in Ahmad Munir, \textit{Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi} (Lahore: Atashfishan Publications, 1986), P.111.

52 Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.
the Jama'at and the government:

"We have no policy of confrontation with any one. In the remaining Pakistan [i.e. after the secession of East Pakistan] as long as your party enjoys a majority, we recognise your party's right to rule the country constitutionally, democratically and with justice and fair play. We shall not exert to remove you by undemocratic and violent means. But you should also concede that we have a right to perform the role of the opposition in a peaceful and democratic manner. And this is our constitutional and democratic right, that we should point out and criticize the wrong policies of the government. If the ruling party and the opposition were to act within their limits, there would be no danger of confrontation between them."

Given the fact that the meeting took place soon after the assassination of Nazir Ahmad, Mawdudi's tone and proposals were highly conciliatory. The proceedings, moreover, revealed the extent of his personal, if not the Jama'at's, commitment to the democratic process. It was also an irony that, the leader of a putatively autocratic religious organization lectured the leader of the avowedly democratic PPP on his constitutional duties. More curious and portentous was the fact that, the relations between the two political entities was thenceforth, in good measure, typified by the undemocratic transgression of the latter, and the former's demands for the government's abeyance by the country's constitution.

Bhutto took note of Mawdudi's views, and in turn asked Mawdudi to reduce the Jama'at's opposition to the recognition of Bangladesh. The PPP, no doubt, was taking the power and potential of the Jama'at seriously. The meeting between Bhutto and Mawdudi, if anything, attested to the eminent role of the Jama'at in Pakistani politics at the time. Neither side, however, viewed the exchanges of this meeting as binding. Soon then after

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the government barred the Jama’at from contesting by-elections in Swat and Darah Ghazi Khan,\textsuperscript{54} which led the Jama’at Shura’ to issue a resolution strongly condemning the autocratic ways of the government.\textsuperscript{55} The Jama’at also reciprocated by actively fanning the flames of national opposition to recognition of Bangladesh. In October Mawdudi, in his last political undertaking as Amir, took the initiative by elaborating a detailed case against the Simla Agreement and the recognition of the independence of Pakistan’s former province.\textsuperscript{56} The Jama’at then, under the direction of the new Amir, Mian Tufayl, continued to reiterate the position stated by Mawdudi in numerous meetings and gatherings across Pakistan. By December, IJT had also entered the fray, and on December 9 the “Bangladesh Namanzur” (Non-Recognition of Bangladesh) campaign, which was to be waged for a good two years, was officially launched with full force.\textsuperscript{57} Two days later IJT produced its first martyr in clashes with the PPP government on the old campus of Punjab University.\textsuperscript{58}

After an unsuccessful meeting between Governor of Punjab, Khar and IJT leader, Hashmi,\textsuperscript{59} the government reacted to IJT’s campaign with an iron fist, arresting and jailing scores of IJT activists. The student organization was, however, further emboldened,

\textsuperscript{54} Rudad, pp.9-10.

\textsuperscript{55} ibid, P.11.

\textsuperscript{56} ibid, pp.10-11.

\textsuperscript{57} Gilani, "Ik Chattan", pp.18-19.

\textsuperscript{58} Sajjad Mir, "Wahid-i Shahid", in TT, vol.2, P.60.

\textsuperscript{59} Javid Hashmi, "Ik Jur’at-i Rindanah", pp.52-53.

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and to the dismay of the Jama'at elders, thoroughly militarized under the pressure of the government.60 With Mawdudi's resignation from the office of the Amir, the Jama'at proved less and less able to control the rapid radicalization of IJT, which became further embroiled in violence and agitation with each bout of government repression, arrests and imprisonments.61 Its popularity, moreover, only increased the more it withstood the blatant repressive measures of FSF. By 1974 IJT had begun to win campus elections, not only at Punjab University, but in an increasing number of colleges across the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and urban center of Sind, with larger margins than before.62 The Jama'at, which was initially worried about the radicalization of IJT now began to bask in its glory, and hence, moved closer to the student organization. The example of IJT's success in student elections despite government efforts to derail it, may well have given vent to Bhutto's fears of the verdict of a national election, leading him to rig the elections of 1977.

The Jama'at, meanwhile, gave full support to IJT in the Bangladesh Namanzur campaign. On February 18, 1973, Mian Tufayl Muhammad, then Amir of the Jama'at was arrested and jailed under Defense of Pakistan Rules for his criticism of the government's policies in Baluchistan as well as his participation in the Bangladesh Namanzur campaign.63 He remained in jail for a period of one month, during which, significantly

60 Interview with Husain Haqqani, Lahore.
61 Javid Hashmi, "Ju Guli Chalana Chahta Hey, Chalaie", in HRZ, pp.91-93.
63 ISIT(1), P.34.
enough, the fifty nine year old Amir was severely abused by FSF; a transgression which brought a strong rebuke from Mawdudi. The leaders of the Jama'at had not been strangers to Pakistani prisons. However, never before had they witnessed the kind of brutality which was perpetrated against those incarcerated during the Bhutto period. Although in 1977 Bhutto formally apologized to Mian Tufayl, and blamed the wrong doing on Khar, the Amir of the Jama'at continued to harbor great bitterness towards the PPP which may explain, at least in part, the Jama'at's decision to stand by General Ziya in seeing through the execution of Bhutto in 1979. The government was able to resolve the Bangladesh controversy only by convening the Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974, and bringing the full force of the support of Muslim heads of state to silence its critics and finalize Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh.

Throughout 1973 the Jama'at expanded the purview of its anti-government activism. The dismissal of the provincial government in Baluchistan in February 1973 gave the Jama'at the opportunity to once again put Bhutto's record during the East Pakistan crisis on trial. The Jama'at lambasted the government's increasingly "fascist" tendencies, stating that, "Pakistan is not the surf of Mr. Bhutto", and demanding that the ruling establishment abide with the Constitution in its dealings with the provinces and opposition

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64 SAAM, vol.2, pp.434-35.


66 ibid.

parties. The Jama'at also began to place its constitutional concerns before the National Assembly which was then on the throes of confirming the last draft of the Constitution of 1973. The new Constitution in acknowledgment of the rising power of the Jama'at and the Jami'at incorporated significant concessions to the demands of Islamic parties. Opposition to the Bhutto government, however, continued unabated. Following the promulgation of the Constitution, the Jama'at joined the coalition of opposition parties, first the United Democratic Front and later the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which had become the means for expression of its views.

Throughout 1973 clashes between government forces and IJT increased, and tensions between the PPP and the Jama'at mounted. By the end of 1974 the Jama'at and IJT had produced 4 martyrs beginning with Nazir Ahmad. In March 1974, the Jama'at which had initially pressed Bhutto to convene the National Assembly and had fully participated in its proceedings now made a volte face. Jama'at leaders declared that the Assembly had been illegal in the first place, for it was based on the elections of 1970-71, the majority of whose seats, belonging to East Pakistan, were never occupied. It therefore never had the necessary quorum to operate, let alone formulate a constitution. The attack against the legality of the Constitution of 1973 was followed by a flurry of criticisms leveled against Bhutto’s economic policies, the moral laxity of the ruling political elite, and

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68 Rudad, pp.19-20.
69 Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, pp.39-40.
70 ibid, pp.46-69.
71 ISIT(1), P.52.
demands for more aggressive posture with India over the Kashmir issue. All this amounted to a call for greater adherence to Islamic values, in the constitution as well as in the conduct of government affairs. The Jama'at, probably sensed weakness in the government, and the greater potential for mobilizing a political movement around Islamic symbolisms. The government must have reached the same conclusion, as it became noticeably more attentive to the demands of the Islamic parties, thoroughly purged itself of its socialist trappings, and itself sought to ride the rising tide of religious fervor.

This trend found manifestation in a renewed attack on the Ahmadi community under the banner of "Khatm-i Nubuwwat" (Finality of Prophethood) campaign in 1974. The issue not only had the emotive power to coalesce the variegated right of center and religious anti-PPP forces into a united opposition force, but was also both a test of strength for the Islamic parties and a litmus test for the sincerity of the government's newly established religious image. The widely held belief at the time that Bhutto's rise to power had the backing of the Ahmadis, which the Jama'at had done much to propagate, made this issue particularly pertinent to the opposition's objectives.

The renewed anti-Ahmadi controversy began on May 22, 1974 when the train carrying 170 IJT students en route to Lahore from Multan stopped in Rabwah, the Ahmadi town in Punjab. Ahmadi missionaries boarded the train and distributed Ahmadi pamphlets and books among the passengers. The students on board reacted by

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72 ibid, pp.54-57.

73 'Abdu'l-Shakur, "Jahan", pp.85-86.

74 Salim Mansur, "Talabah Awr Tahrik-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat", in TT, vol.2, pp.159-75.
staging an anti-Ahmadi demonstration at the station. A week later, on May 29 an organized Ahmadi gang boarded the train which was carrying the same IJT contingent back to Multan and, in an ill-conceived move, assailed the students. Three days later the Nazim-i A'la of IJT, Zafar Jamal Baluch, delivered a speech during which he launched into a tirade against the Ahmadis, and officially initiated the drive to declare the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority. The IJT initiative, just as was the case in 1953-54, quickly gained momentum in Punjab. The Jama'at was not initially in favor of pursuing the matter, but since Mawdudi was away from Pakistan on medical treatment, the parent organization proved unable to influence IJT, and hence, quickly fell in line in order to retain control over IJT and the flow of events.\textsuperscript{75} ‘Abdul-Ghafur Ahmad, took up the issue in the National Assembly, and Mian Tufayl met Bhutto regarding the unfolding events.\textsuperscript{76}

The leadership of the campaign, however, remained with IJT; and the campaign confirmed the student organization's emergence as a semi-autonomous force on the political scene, which was reflected in IJT's independent participation in PNA proceedings in later years.\textsuperscript{77} The anti-Ahmadi issue also brought IJT closer to a host of other Islamic groups, especially the rural and small town based Brailwis who have a special attachment to the memory of the Prophet, and are therefore vehemently anti-Ahmadi. This alliance served as the basis of IJT's hold over the religious vote on university campuses well into

\textsuperscript{75} Abu Sufyan Muhammad Tufayl Rashidi, \textit{Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwat Awr Jama'at-i Islami} (Lahore: Majlis-i Ta'zim-i Sahabah, nd.), pp.81-85.

\textsuperscript{76} ISIT(2), pp.9-10.

\textsuperscript{77} Khukar, "Uqabun", P.216; and Baluch, "Rushaniyun", P.224.
the 1980s.

Following the anti-Ahmadi issue, IJT which had grown considerably in size throughout the ordeal won 9 consecutive student elections in Peshawar and Karachi colleges.\footnote{ISIT(2), P.10.}

The government, aware of the possible implications of the issue, approached IJT leaders directly, initially hoping to persuade IJT to desist from pursuing its campaign. On June 17, 1974, Hanif Ramay, the Chief Minister of Punjab, invited IJT leaders and advised them to act prudently.\footnote{Ibid.} IJT leaders flatly turned down Ramay’s counsel, and proceeded to escalate the conflict on June 26, which in 102 days culminated in 8797 meetings and 147 processions.\footnote{Ibid, P.174.} Despite the arrest of some 834 IJT leaders and workers the government proved unable to stem the tide of the movement.\footnote{Ibid.} On September 7, 1974, therefore, the government declared the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority,\footnote{The decision included both the Qadiyani and Lahori group of Ahmadis. The latter had maintained certain reservations about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s claims to prophecy and had remained closer to the mainstream Islamic position. For more on the distinctions between the two see, Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous; Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp.147-64.} and by doing so attested to the power and prominence of IJT in particular, and the Islamic parties in general. The polity which only five years before had been overwhelmed with the ground swell of support for populism and socialist idealism, had once again opened itself to the
manipulations of religious symbolisms. The return of Islam to the center stage was now complete. The fact that all this happened under the aegis of Pakistan's most popular government to date, one which had a strong ideological basis of its own, only attested to the incomparable influence of Islam on the life and thought of Pakistanis. The seemingly implausible resurgence of Islam in lieu of socialism during the Bhutto era was tantamount to a total victory for Islam, and a confirmation of its central role in Pakistani politics. The fall of Bhutto, as it will become apparent shortly, proved that Islam provides for a more efficacious means of mobilizing a social movement in Pakistan than any other ideological platform.

PNA and the Nizam-i Mustafa Movement, 1975-1977

No sooner had the Constitution of 1973 been promulgated that a parliamentary opposition coalition, the United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged in the National Assembly. The Jama'at was very active in the UDF, and used it as a forum for propagating its views on the government's handling of politics, economics and religious issues.83 UDF also served as a convenient means of underscoring the constitutional demands of the opposition, and the illegality of the government's dealings with expressions of dissent. Between 1974 and 1975, the Jama'at registered 283 complaints against the government and the PPP for harassment of the Jama'at, and the closure of its paper, Jasarat.84 The efficacy of pursuing dissent through constitutional channels and thereby

83 ISIT(2), pp.10-18.

84 ibid, pp.15-16. Jasarat was closed six times during the Bhutto period. Its declaration was finally revoked by the government. The paper began appearing in print only after the coup of 1977.
exposing the government to accusations of undemocratic behavior proved so effectual that on October 21, 1975, the opposition leaders decided to further streamline the UDF into a more efficient anti-PPP coalition. In a move which was indicative of the increasingly central role which Islam was playing the unfolding of events, Mufti Mahmud, the leader of JUI, assumed the leadership of UDF. The Jama‘at’s role, owing to its organizational fiat and the muscle of IJT was from inception critical to the successful propagation of the views of UDF, and eventually the PNA.\textsuperscript{85}

While the composition of UDF already pointed to the incremental Islamization of the political discourse, a number of government policy initiatives in 1976 accelerated this trend. Most notably, in the summer of that year the government appointed the Attorney General, Yahya Bakhtiyar, to head a committee charged with drawing up a legislative proposal for a women’s rights bill. The committee’s report was presented to the government in July. The Islamic parties moved into action immediately. The Jama‘at’s opposition was articulated by Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, and was widely propagated through various meetings and processions.\textsuperscript{86} The government, jettisoning between various interest groups, was gradually losing its grip over national politics to the opposition. Bhutto saw the only path out of this quagmire in renewing his electoral mandate. The stage was, therefore, set for a show-down between the government and the opposition at the polls.

On January 7, 1977 the government announced that national elections would be

\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi. JUP’s decision to part ways with UDF on October 21, 1975 only paved the way for the Jama‘at to further assert its prominence in the alliance. JUP joined the PNA in 1977.

held on March 7 of that year. The opposition immediately sprung to action and began to prepare itself for the elections. The UDF was disbanded, and on January 12, 1977 was replaced by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which eventually incorporated 9 parties.\textsuperscript{87} The alliance adopted a religiopolitical platform, Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet), which automatically favored the religious parties. The Jama‘at received 32 national tickets and 78 provincial ones from the PNA.\textsuperscript{88} The Jama‘at took the possibility of an electoral victory seriously, and hence did much to further the PNA’s popular appeal. One interesting example was the Jama‘at’s effort to woo the Shi‘i vote, and to break the myth of the alliance between PPP and the Shi‘i. Mian Tufayl and ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad personally courted a number of Shi‘i politicians, especially, the Shi‘i patriarch from South Punjab, Khawar ‘Ali Shah. The two Jama‘at leaders went to great lengths to persuade him to run as a Jama‘at candidate in Punjab provincial elections.\textsuperscript{89} Khawar ‘Ali agreed and was thus made a Hamdard of the Jama‘at.

The election campaign, it was soon understood by the Jama‘at and the PNA, was not going to be an orderly affair. The PNA and the Jama‘at decided to contest Bhutto in his home town constituency of Larkana in Sind. On January 19, 1977 when Bhutto travelled to Larkana to declare his candidacy, the PNA announced that Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi, the Jama‘at Amir of Sind and a native of Larkana would challenge Bhutto.


\textsuperscript{88} ISIT(2), P.25.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Sayyid Khawar ‘Ali Shah, Lahore.
‘Abbasi was, however, kidnapped and thereby prevented from filing his papers on time, and the government declared that Bhutto was uncontested in his bid for the Larkana seat.\textsuperscript{90} Much of the Jama’at and the PNA’s time and effort during the election campaign was spent on decrying the government’s illegal strong-arm tactics. Towing the constitutionalist line in place of a concrete electoral platform, however, was effective enough to compel the panic-stricken PPP to resort to rigging the elections in order to guarantee its victory.

The elections to the National Assembly were held on March 7, 1977.\textsuperscript{91} Of 31 (%19 of PNA’s total of 168)\textsuperscript{92} seats contested by the Jama’at, the organization won 9 (see table 13.1), %25 of PNA’s total of 36 seats. The Jama’at did surprisingly well, both nationally as well as within the PNA, winning 2 seats in Punjab (Multan and Muzaffargarh), 3 in N.W.F.P. (Swat, Malakand and Dir), and 4 in Sind (1 in Hyderabad and 3 in Karachi). If the results of the rigged elections were any indication, the Jama’at had been headed for its best electoral showings to date, and dominating the PNA in the process. By July 1977, as a result of PNA’s post-election agitational campaign, the Jama’at’s popularity had risen still further, and it most likely would have done even better in the new elections, a belief which remained a source of tension between the Jama’at and

\textsuperscript{90} Ahmad, \textit{Pher Martial Law}, pp.92-93.


\textsuperscript{92} Mujahid, "The 1977 Elections", P.73. The Jama’at was originally given 32 tickets by PNA, but contested only 31, as Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi was prevented by the government from running in Larkana.
TABLE 13.1*

THE TALLY OF VOTES AND NUMBER OF SEATS WON BY JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>SEATS CONTESTED</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTE RECEIVED</th>
<th>SEATS WON BY THE JAMA'AT</th>
<th>SEATS WON BY PNA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>789,743</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>133,362</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>290,411</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,213,516</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Shu'bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.
General Ziya whose coup postponed elections indefinitely.

The government's interference with the election process, securing 155 of the total of 191 seats contested (%77.5 of the National Assembly of 200 seats) for the PPP, was blatant enough to immediately cast doubt on their veracity (see table 13.2). The PNA lost no time in decrying government actions. On March 8, PNA declared that election results were fraudulent, and were not acceptable to the opposition. The alliance called for Bhutto's resignation, boycotted the provincial elections scheduled for March 10, demanded a new date for national elections, and in a show of force, called for a national strike on March 11. Mian Tufayl took the lead in this regard, symbolizing the general feeling among Jama'at and IJT members that Bhutto had not simply stolen the elections, but had deprived the Jama'at of its chance to move into power. The Jama'at thenceforth found a vested interest in challenging the results of the elections of 1977, and in demanding fresh elections.

In a defiant mood, on March 12, Bhutto denied any wrongdoing, thereby setting the stage for a show down with the opposition. On March 18, 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad (then the Secretary General of PNA), Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi and Mahmud A'zam Faruqi

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93 The difference between the share of the popular vote between the two contenders was, however, less staggering. The PPP won only %58 of the popular vote compared to PNA's %35, which again convinced the Jama'at of the benefits of a proportional representation electoral system for Pakistan. For these figures see, Burki, Pakistan, P.196.

What was contentious was that given the success of the PNA, PPP was clearly less popular than in 1970, yet both its percentage of national votes and seats won to the National Assembly increased markedly, from %39.9 to %58 and from 81 to 155 respectively; see Mujahid, "The 1977 Elections", pp.83-84.

94 On these elections see, ibid, pp. 63-91, and Burki, Pakistan, pp.195-97.

95 Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, P.112.
### TABLE 13.2*

RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam-abad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Areas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(all of whom would became PNA ministers in 1978) were arrested along with other PNA leaders. On March 25, Mian Tufayl Muhammad and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, and in early April, Mawlana Gulzar Mazahiri and Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi were also apprehended in the general crack down by the government on the PNA. Civil disobedience, street demonstrations and clashes with the government organized in good part by the Jama'at and IJT, meanwhile, increased markedly, further deepening the cleavage between the government and the opposition. Demand for constitutional and democratic rights were, in the process, transformed into an Islamic social movement under the banner of the demand for Nizam-i Mustafa.

With the official leadership of the Jama'at behind bars, Mawdudi became the de facto leader of the organization, which itself had become the main force on the streets defying the government crack down. On April 2, Mawdudi issued a statement inviting the government to initiate negotiations with the PNA. He, moreover, stipulated a number of preconditions for the proposed negotiations. They were, the release of all arrested PNA leaders and workers; the lifting of Section 144 which had legitimated government crack down; the abrogation of the Defense of Pakistan Rules; references of all cases placed before special tribunals by the government for violation of Section 144 to the judiciary;

96 ibid, P.122.

97 ibid, pp.140-52.

98 Interview with Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi.

99 For a detail of government's policies vis a vis its opposition see, Ahmad, Pher Martial Law; and Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan (Cincinnati, OH.: Asia Publishing House, 1990), pp.29-76.
and a declaration by the government to the effect that, it would be open to amending the Constitution through negotiations.\textsuperscript{100} With no positive reaction from the government forthcoming, on April 10 Mawdudi escalated the crisis by declaring that the government was illegitimate.\textsuperscript{101}

Bhutto now decided to seize upon Mawdudi's earlier initiative, and on April 16, 1977 under the pretext of "wishing to solicit the advice and good offices an elder statesman,"\textsuperscript{102} arrived at Mawdudi's house in Lahore for informal talks. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Pakistan's elder statesman and a friend of Mawdudi had pleaded with the Mawlana not to meet with Bhutto.\textsuperscript{103} A crowd of IJT workers, whose headquarters is situated on the same street as Mawdudi's residence, also congregated outside the house and began shouting slogans against Bhutto as well as against Mawdudi, chiding the latter for agreeing to the meeting.\textsuperscript{104} Mawdudi's answer to Gurmani and the fulminating IJT workers was that he had not solicited the meeting, and common courtesy did not permit him to turn away a visitor.\textsuperscript{105} The meeting, however, did not bear the results which Bhutto had wished for. Mawdudi counseled him to resign, allowing a provisional

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} Saulat, \textit{Maulana Maududi}, P.96.
\item \textsuperscript{101} \textit{SAAM}, vol.2, pp.460-61.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Interview with Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Interview with 'Abidah Gurmani, Lahore.
\item \textsuperscript{104} \textit{ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{105} \textit{ibid}.
\end{itemize}
government to take over and hold new elections.\textsuperscript{106}

It soon became apparent that the government believed that, it had less to fear from a movement demanding adherence to Islamic principles than one which questioned the government's legality. The former, Bhutto believed, he could better manipulate and assuage. It was therefore, the government, which from this point on sought to further Islamize the opposition. Bhutto’s decision to visit with Mawdudi was also, in part, motivated by this consideration. Mawdudi’s advice to Bhutto, however, indicated that, despite the role which Islam played in the opposition movement, PNA had no intention of truncating its influence by being reduced to merely a religious movement. The government policy became further apparent when on April 17, 1977, a day after his meeting with Mawdudi, Bhutto announced that in recognition of the writ of the Nizam-i Mustafa the government would form an Islamic Advisory Council consisting of Mufti Mahmud, leader of JUI and PNA, to oversee the implementation of Nizam-i Mustafa.\textsuperscript{107} The PNA, however, was able to retain the momentum of its demand for fresh elections despite Bhutto’s attempts to derail it by Islamizing the point of contention between himself and the opposition.

The political situation therefore continued to deteriorate as the government, unable to stem the rising tide of PNA’s agitational campaign resorted to greater repressive measures. On May 17 Mawdudi’s house was surrounded by police, and attempts were

\textsuperscript{106} Ahmad, \textit{Pher Martial Law}, P.152.

\textsuperscript{107} The other two members of the Council were to be Mawlanas Shah Ahmad Nurani of JUP and Ihtishamu’l-Haq of JUI.
made to plant arms in the house in preparation for arresting the ailing Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{108} This led the PNA to issue a statement on May 28, warning the government that the arrest of Mawdudi would explode the political situation.\textsuperscript{109} With no way out of the impasse, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador now intervened, utilizing the financial leverage of his government on both sides to bring about an end to the stalemate. As a result, negotiations were begun between the government and PNA on June 3, 1977. The government side was represented by Bhutto, ‘Abdu’l-Hafiz Pirzadah (Minister of Law) and Kawthar Niyazi (Minister of Religious Affairs). PNA was represented by Mufti Mahmud (JUI), ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad (Jama’at-i Islami), and Nawwabzadah Nasru’llah Khan (Pakistan Democratic Party).\textsuperscript{110}

The PNA contingent was careful to focus the negotiations on the legitimacy of the results of the elections of 1977, the legality of the government in office, and the date for new elections. All talk of Islam and the Nizam-i Mustafa, used to mobilize the masses, were kept away from the negotiations. The government was therefore denied the means to manipulate religious concessions to avoid confronting the political demands of PNA. A frustrated Bhutto now tried to rally Pakistani’s around an anti-imperialist platform by charging that the PNA, and especially the Jama’at, were American agents who were ordered to debunk the government; because the socialist and Third Worldist leanings of

\textsuperscript{108} Mian Tufayl’s house was also placed under surveillance, although he was in prison; Ahmad, \textit{Pher Martial Law}, P.182.

\textsuperscript{109} Saulat, \textit{Maulana Maududi}, P.98.

\textsuperscript{110} For accounts of these meetings see, Niyazi, \textit{Awr Line} and Ahmad, \textit{Pher Martial Law}. 
the PPP were in conflict with America's interests in the region.\textsuperscript{111} Bhutto's charges were not found to be persuasive by the masses, and only clouded the climate of the negotiations. Bhutto's suggestions during a speech in the parliament that the Jama'at was a lackey of American interest brought a sharp rebuke from Mawdudi, and aggravated the tense situation in the streets.\textsuperscript{112}

Despite the government's theatrics the negotiations progressed for a month. During this period, Bhutto's resolve gradually waned, and he became increasingly open to suggestions of scheduling new elections. It is not certain as to whether the government and PNA reached an agreement regarding fresh elections or not. Most PNA leaders along with Niyazi and Pirzadah believe that an agreement was reached; whether or not it would have been signed by all of the PNA parties or by Bhutto, however, remains open to speculation.\textsuperscript{113} All sides, however, concur on the fact that, the delay in finalizing the agreement during the last hours before the coup owed much to General Ziya's counsel to Bhutto advising against entering into an agreement with PNA, which was not

\textsuperscript{111} Chishti, Betrayals, P.40.

\textsuperscript{112} Ahmad, Pher Martial Law, P.194.

\textsuperscript{113} Interviews with 'Abdul-Ghafur Ahmad, Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, 'Abdu'l-Hafiz Pirzadah, Karachi; Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Lahore; and Kawthar Niyazi, Islamabad. Pirzadah argues that, he and Mufti Mahmud finalized the agreement in the late hours of July 2, which Bhutto was to sign on July 5. General Ziya, recollects Pirzadah, argued that the agreement was unacceptable to the armed forces; for, it required the army to leave Baluchistan in two months and to release National Awami Party leaders from custody.

Begum Nasim Wali Khan argues that, despite the enthusiasm of the negotiating team, other PNA leaders had reservations about the agreement, and most were not likely to sign.
acceptable to the army as it stood. Bhutto's dithering gave the impression of an impasse, and augured ill for the stability of the country.

On July 5, 1977 the Pakistan army, led by General Ziyau'l-Haq, staged a military coup, removing the government, arresting political leaders from both sides to the conflict, and imposed martial law on Pakistan. Whether or not the army's preemptive measures were justified in light of the PNA-PPP talks remains a subject of heated debate. Doubts about the motivation of the coup, meanwhile, colored the perspective of the PNA leaders during the following months.

The Bhutto years spelled the apogee of the Jama'at's political activism. The organization witnessed the collapse of socialism, and reinstitution of Islam at the center stage of national politics. Successful agitations against the government's undemocratic transgressions brought the Jama'at to the verge of a notable political victory. The Bhutto years, however, proved to be a short-lived aberration to the norm in Jama'at's political history. The success of agitational politics, and the gains made by the resurgence of Islam diverted the Jama'at's attention from the importance of establishing more lasting relations with the new social forces which PPP's economic policies, and later on, ill-conceived political practices had brought into the political arena. As the coup of July 5 changed the political map of Pakistan, the alliance of convenience based on opposition to the

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114 Absence of a formal agreement between the government and PNA was used as an excuse by the armed forces to stage a coup in order to break the dangerous impasse. Those justifying the coup, therefore, argue that no agreement had been reached between the two sides. See for instance, Chishti, *Betrayals*, P.66.
government dissolved, leaving the Jama‘at once again at odds with the society and the
forces which animate its politics. The gains of the 1970s were also balanced with costs.
The brutality of the Bhutto regime, and the vicissitudes of the anti-government agitation
campaign left an indelible mark on the psyche of the Jama‘at, and especially the Jami‘at;
compromising their moral resolve, and initiating an irreversible trend towards naked
political activism which soon became the bane of the entire movement.
CHAPTER 14

The praetorian military coup of July 5, 1977, led by General Muhammad Ziyau’l-Haq, not only removed the Bhutto government from the scene, but presented Pakistan with a political *tabula rasa*, which caught the country’s political parties, including the Jama’at, off guard and threw them into a state of confusion. The coup in one swoop removed the *raison d’etre* of the opposition’s large scale mass mobilization campaign, and altered the contours of the political arena in which they operated.1 The government had been removed all too quickly, and then by the armed forces rather by the PNA, leaving the opposition with no immediate plan of action with which to respond to the new developments.

For the Jama’at this confusion was compounded by the Islamic veneer of the new regime.2 For the first time in its history the Jama’at was to operate in a hospitable


political environment, enjoying certain amount of government patronage. Yet, General Ziya's admixture of Islam and autocracy created tensions within the Jama'at between the organization's Islamic idealism and avowed democratic objectives. The Ziya period rendered the Jama'at's Islamic constitutionalist platform obsolete, and eventually put to test the extent of the organization's loyalty to its ideological foundations on the one hand, and routinization of its idealism in the direction of pragmatic politics, on the other. The tensions between Islamic idealism and democratic objectives greatly complicated the Jama'at's relations with the Ziya regime and subsequently, with its successor, Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI, Islamic Democratic Alliance). The Jama'at's ideological instincts led to its cooptation by the Ziya regime, producing what one Jama'at source has called, "a mother-daughter relationship". The political ramifications of embracing the martial law regime, however, soon underlined the Jama'at's democratic predilections, precipitating the most significant schism within the organization since Machchi Goth. The crisis, unlike in 1957, did not result in any defections from the ranks of the Jama'at, but brought the organization to the brink of open factionalism. The dialectics of this tussle has determined the nature and direction of the Jama'at's political activism, as well as the role of ideology in the organization's social action since 1977.

The vicissitudes of the Jama'at's relations with the Ziya regime, moreover, cast the organization's symbiotic relations with the state, and its legitimating function in a new light. Open association with armed forces in name of preserving Pakistan's unity against internal and external foes undermined the Jama'at's political gains to date, and the rise

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3 Chatan (Lahore), (November 15, 1989), P.19.
of ethnic political parties debunked the Jama‘at’s legitimating function for the time being. The Jama‘at was, therefore, compelled to look for a new role in Pakistani politics, one which would more attuned to the underlying imperatives of the political life of the country - greater pragmatism in place of their erstwhile idealism.

The pattern of accommodation and opposition, concord and conflict, in the Jama‘at’s relations with the Ziya regime, and its consequences, will be in turn examined in this chapter.

**Accommodation and Cooptation: the Jama‘at and the Ziya Regime, 1977-1985**

The Jama‘at had never favored General Ziya’s coup. Accounts of government-PNA negotiations, especially that of ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, all point to the fact that the talks had produced an understanding between the two parties, as a result of which fresh elections were expected. The Jama‘at, impressed with its performance in the elections of 1977, and the ground swell of support for its role in the agitational campaign of March-July of the same year, expected to do well in those elections. General Ziya was fully aware of this bone of contention with PNA leaders in general, and those of the Jama‘at in particular. He therefore, followed a two-tier strategy after the coup directed at silencing the PNA. In his meetings with PNA leaders he conveyed the impression that Bhutto had never intended to abide by his agreement with PNA leaders, and had intended to unleash the army against them. Had the army not acted with alacrity, argued the General, Pakistan would have been immersed in a blood bath, and PNA parties would have been thoroughly

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4 See chapter 13.

5 Interview with Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Lahore; and ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi.
routed. General Ziya, moreover, made full use of his reputation as an observing Muslim to gain the sympathy of the Islamic parties in the PNA, and quickly adopted the Nizam-i Mustafa platform; a move which was bound to add to the PNA’s confusion.

The Jama'at was not immune to the perplexity which the advent of General Ziya and his subsequent policies harbored for the PNA. In fact, the Jama'at's confusion, for reasons which will become apparent in this chapter, was somewhat greater, with more far-reaching implications. As mentioned earlier, the Jama'at did rather well in the elections of 1977, better than most of its allies in PNA. If the events which followed the elections of 1977 were any indications, the political fortunes of the Jama'at both within the PNA as well as nationally soared even further. The alliance had expected to inherit the government from the PPP, and the Jama'at had anticipated ruling the coalition government that was to succeed Bhutto. Once again a military coup had intervened to rob the Jama'at of the spoils of its political toil. This time, however, unlike 1958, Jama'at's expectations had reasonable ground in facts. Dumbfounded by the Islamic facade of the martial law regime, and its favorable attitude towards the PNA, the Jama'at sought to salvage its fortunes by

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6 Whether or not such a plan had been devised by the PPP government is open to question. However, those close to General Ziya believe that he was prompted to stage the coup after he was alerted to the existence of such a plan by Ghulam Ishaq Khan (the Secretary of Defense); interviews, Islamabad and Karachi. General Chishti refutes this view and argues that as the civilian government approached the end of its rope, the coup was planned the knowledge of Bhutto; see, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, *Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan* (Cincinnati, OH.: Asia Publishing House, 1990), pp.66-69.

7 Jama'at leaders recollect that General Ziya's humble demeanor was quite disarming; and having arrived at the heels of the more arrogant Bhutto, went a long way to impress the PNA leaders and also allay their fears; interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore; 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad and Mahmud A'zam Faruqi, Karachi.
lobbying with the army for elections to be held as soon as possible.

Elections, along with Islamization, eventually became a bate by the use of which the Ziya regime coopted the Jama'at. Between 1977 and 1979 the Jama'at continued to anticipate elections, and in hope of persuading General Ziya to hold them was increasingly drawn into the web of the martial law regime. General Ziya took the demands of the Jama'at and other PNA parties regarding elections seriously, and decided not to alienate the PNA by ruling out elections altogether. Rather, the promise of elections would be used to check the activities of the coalition. Hence, the martial law regime announced the first of a series of promised election dates for October 1, 1977. This announcement only made official an earlier promise which was given to PNA leaders in a meeting between the coup leaders and the PNA negotiating team in Murree soon after the coup on July 15, when General Ziya referred to the protective custody of the three as "an enforced rest...[to] rejuvenate themselves for the coming General Elections."8

The Jama'at was, more specifically, promised that, subsequent to the elections a civilian government would be allowed to take over the reigns of power.9 Eager to maintain stability lest the martial law regime renege on its promise, the Jama'at went to great lengths to promote greater cooperation between General Ziya and the PNA, eventually acting as the broker between the two sides. General Ziya's personal attachments to the works of Mawdudi, and the fact that he and Mian Tufayl both belonged to the Arian biradri (clan), and were from Jullundar in East Punjab, went a long

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8 Cited in Chishti, Betrayals, P.16.

9 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

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way to strengthen the relations between General Ziya and the Jama‘at.

Hence, the Jama‘at, led in this regard by Mawdudi, enthusiastically endorsed General Ziya’s initiatives in implementing the demands of the Nizam-i Mustafa movement, hailing the resurrection of the hitherto moribund Islamic Consultative Council in the form of Council of Islamic Ideology in September 1977 as the "renewal of the covenant" between the government and Islam.¹⁰ Thus began the Jama‘at’s confusion over the extent of its loyalties to its ideological roots, to which General Ziya was appealing, and the organization’s political interests, which were seriously threatened by the martial law regime.

Between 1977 and 1979 General Ziya, moreover, adroitly manipulated the fate of Bhutto and his party as a means of keeping the Jama‘at and the rest of the PNA in check. General Ziya intimated to PNA leaders that elections were not in the interests of the PNA, nor that of the country, if they were to serve as the means for the resuscitation of PPP. Bhutto, he added further, could only be prevented from returning to office if he was made accountable for the crimes which were committed during his term of office. It should be noted that, the prospects of the return of Bhutto to power sent shock waves through the opposition, which had been already convinced by the General that, gallows had awaited them all had the military not intervened when it did.¹¹ The Jama‘at quickly took its cue from the government and raised the banner of "retribution first, elections


¹¹ Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi.
The Jama'at was initially motivated by the desire to remove all obstacles to holding elections. However, when Bhutto, temporarily released from prison, was received in Lahore on August 8, 1977 by a large and cheering crowd, the Jama'at and the PNA quickly found an added incentive to push for bringing Bhutto to justice.

The enthusiasm shown for Bhutto by Lahoris had made the upcoming elections less promising than before. There was no point in pushing for elections unless they would favor PNA. Hence, as the memory of the anti-Bhutto agitations of the summer of 1977 among the masses began to wear off, the Jama'at and its allies looked to the judicial system as the means for debunking any attempts at a comeback by the PPP. The appeal to the judicial system had an added emotive meaning for the Jama'at. The pent-up frustrations of seven years of clashes with government forces, and a four month long agitational campaign could best be vented in a demand for justice and retribution, which almost had a therapeutic function for the organization.

There had been no love lost for Bhutto and the PPP among the Jama'at and IJT members, least of all with the Amir, Mian Tufayl, who had personally experienced the excesses of the Bhutto regime. The quest for justice, therefore, quickly became thinly-guised vindictiveness, and once the courts had convicted Bhutto, the call for accountability gave place to an outright demand for the execution of Bhutto. Mawdudi characterized the Jama'at's sentiments in the following terms,

"Mr. Bhutto has not been punished as a political convict. The Court has sentenced him for involvement in a murder case. Being a moral criminal

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and murderer, any demand for commutation of his sentence would be tantamount to interference in judicial verdicts. ¹³

So central was the Jama'at's support for the execution of Bhutto that General Ziya felt obliged to meet with Mian Tufayl for an hour and a half the night preceding the former prime minister's execution. ¹⁴

The Jama'at's demand for accountability of Bhutto, provided Ziya with critical support in suppressing the remaining pockets of PPP resistance. Again it was Mawdudi who set the tone for the Jama'at's policy in this regard by arguing that if PPP was allowed to run in the upcoming elections, the debacle of East Pakistan would be repeated. ¹⁵

Ironically, it was the Jama'at's policy here which also provided General Ziya with occasion to further entrench the martial law regime, and conveniently postpone elections. ¹⁶

Throughout this period, however, the Jama'at continued to vest its hopes in the promised elections which became the focus of the organization's relations with the government. Having postponed the elections scheduled for October 1977, General Ziya now argued that elections could not be held by a martial law regime, and a civilian facade was required to oversee an orderly electoral process, and possibly, the transfer of power. Between April and August 1978 the Jama'at and its PNA allies negotiated with General

¹³ Saulat, Maulana Maududi, P.101.

¹⁴ Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Takbir (Karachi), (November 16, 1989), pp.55-56.

¹⁵ Interview with Mawdudi, Asia (Lahore), (September 4, 1977), pp.4-5.

Ziya over this matter. On August 21, 1978, an agreement was reached between the two sides, whereby the PNA would form a government which would oversee the national elections, now set for November 17, 1979. The PNA was assigned a share of 2/3 of cabinet ministers, and General Ziya 1/3. Symbolic of the Jama'at's unique role in Pakistani politics at the time, the organization joined the government as part of the PNA, as well as a component of General Ziya's team. Three Jama'at leaders, 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad, Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi and Mahmud A'zam Faruqi (Amir of Karachi at the time) were named Ministers of Production and Industry; Petroleum, Minerals, Water and Power; and Information and Broadcasting, respectively. Khurshid Ahmad was, meanwhile, named as Minister of Planning as part of General Ziya's quota of ministers. Thus, after thirty years of political activity in Pakistan, and for the first time in its history, the Jama'at became the part of the ruling political establishment. The PNA's arrangement with General Ziya did not, however, last for long. On April 21, 1979, in order to prepare themselves for participating in national elections, the PNA parties dissolved the government and resigned. General Ziya personally appealed to Mian Tufayl Muhammad to keep the Jama'at in the government, but the organization, hoping to control the post-elections civilian government turned down the General's offer and decided to stay with

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17 ISIT(2), P.34.

18 Of the 7 PNA parties at the time only Muslim League and the Jama'at were favorable to forming a government; interview with Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi.

19 Mawdudi was, putatively, opposed to Jama'at's joining the government, believing that the organization would compromise its individuality; interview with Khwajah Amanu'llah, Lahore.
The PNA interregnum was designed to spear-head the reintroduction of civilian rule to Pakistan. Jama'at leaders, much like their other PNA cohorts, took General Ziya's words at face value, expecting elections in November 1979. In October 1978, for instance, Mawdudi declared that elections would soon bring the Jama'at to power, and therefore no additional extra-constitutional activities were necessary to hasten the advent of Islamization. The organization's enthusiasm for an electoral victory soared in September 1979 when the Jama'at participated in national municipal elections. In Karachi, the Jama'at won 57 of the 160 seats contested in the elections to the Municipal Corporation. The %35 margin of victory was sufficient to assure the Jama'at's domination over the Corporation, and by implication, the politics of the Muhajir community, at least for the time being. The elections had been held on party-less basis. The Jama'at had, however, formed an Ukhuwwat (Brotherhood) Group, whose name was a euphemism for the Jama'at. The Jama'at's tally of seats in Corporation was sufficient to secure the mayorship of Karachi for the organization, a title which was held by 'Abdu'ssattar Afghani until 1986. The results from elsewhere in Sind were not, however,

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20 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in _Takbir_, (November 16, 1989), P.55.

21 Cited in _Nawa'-i Waqt_, (October 25, 1978), P.1.

22 Information was provided by the Jama'at-i Islami of Karachi.

23 The Jama'at had broken with other PNA parties in participating in these elections. Most PNA parties saw municipal elections as a ploy by the government to postpone national elections, and therefore chose not to contest in it. The Jama'at saw any elections better than none, and benefitted from the boycott of its PNA allies.

24 Interview with 'Abdu'ssattar Afghani, Karachi.
as promising. Of the province’s 13 District Councils, 11 were won by pro-PPP candidates and 2 by those close to the Muslim League. The Jama‘at came up with only the Chairmanship to Sukkhur Corporation.25

In Punjab the Jama‘at did not do well either, but the results were, nevertheless, encouraging. In the Punjab District Council elections, of the 500 seats contested, pro-PPP candidates tallied 212, independents 135, and the Jama‘at 35 seats.26 The Jama‘at may have come in a distant third, but did better than the Muslim League with 28, JUI with 13 and JUP with 6 seats each.27 In corporation and municipal elections in Punjab, pro-PPP candidates got 527, independents 390, and Jama‘at candidates 93 seats.28 Overall, in Punjab the Jama‘at got one District Council Vice-Chairman, 5 Municipal Committee Chairmen, 6 Municipal Committee Vice-Chairmen, 52 Town Committee Members, 5 Town Committee Chairmen, and 4 Town Committee Vice-Chairmen.29

In N.W.F.P. the results were more promising. Of the 360 District Council seats, the Jama‘at got 32, coming in second behind pro-PPP candidates who tallied 52 seats.30 The Jama‘at again defeated the Muslim League and the JUI. The Jama‘at did better in these elections than other PNA parties, and was defeated only by the cluster of pro-PPP

25 ISIT(2), P.41.
26 Results are cited in ibid, P.41.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
candidates. Bhutto's party, however, would not have been allowed to run in the national elections, which led the Jama'at leaders to believe that, they would sweep the polls in November 1979. The Jama'at became even more sanguine about its electoral prospects when Mawdudi's funeral procession in Lahore later in that month, on September 26, 1979 - less than a month before the promised November 17 national elections - drew a sizeable crowd.

The municipal corporations, it should be noted, were the first openly elected body since the advent of martial law, a fact which given the Jama'at's full-fledged participation in them, somewhat intensified the Jama'at's sense of rivalry with the Ziya regime for the control of Pakistan. While the Jama'at's victory in Karachi may have been a reflection of how closely the city identified with PNA, for the Jama'at it was a sign of greater victories to come. General Ziya viewed the matter from the different angle. For him the Jama'at's victory proved that for now the organization could be relied upon to control Karachi and contain the pockets of pro-PPP sentiments in the city, which was a cornerstone of the General's strategy for governing Pakistan. The Jama'at's organizational capabilities in manipulating a party-less election, however, did not go unnoticed by General Ziya. These two concerns, namely, the organization's ability to control Karachi and keeping it away from PPP, and the potential of the Jama'at to project significant power, as will be discussed shortly, in later years proved critical to the relations between General Ziya and the Jama'at.

Although the Jama'at's attention throughout the 1977-79 period was primarily focused on national elections and capitalizing on its popularity during the anti-Bhutto
agitations, the organization proved unable to resist the pull of General Ziya’s ideological overtures. In later years, the Jama‘at leaders have said that General Ziya used Islamization to silence groups such as the Jama‘at and to dampen their resolve in pushing for elections. Fed on their own ideology, which they could neither denounce nor wished to endorse at the cost of elections, the Jama‘at and others Islamic parties, were paralyzed, and often mollified.31 While there is a great deal of truth to this assertion, General Ziya’s manipulation of the ideological platform of the Jama‘at had a certain appeal for the organization’s leaders and ran and file members, even in lieu of their political sensibilities. Although the organization’s routinization and political enfranchisement had progressed far, it had not as yet thoroughly eradicated the idealist foundations of the Jama‘at. General Ziya’s Islamization schemes appealed directly to the organization’s ideological beliefs, awakening its somewhat dormant idealist instincts, the interference of which with the organization’s political interests was to soon precipitate a second internal crisis within the Jama‘at.32

The tone for this internal struggle and the confusion which led to it was set by none other than Mawdudi himself, who by now was at odds with the overtly politicized leadership of the Jama‘at. Mawdudi took the lead within the Jama‘at, although putatively in no official capacity, to endorse the Islamization initiatives of General Ziya, first unveiled in the December 2, 1978 declaration that no laws repugnant to the shari‘ah

31 Interviews with Mian Tufayl Muhammad and Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Lahore; Mahmud A’zam Faruqi and ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi.

would be passed. In April and March 1978 during a talk on Radio Pakistan, Mawdudi hailed the efforts of General Ziya as welcome first steps in bringing Islam to Pakistan's judicial and political system.\(^3\) While Mawdudi's primary objective was to claim the greater visibility of Islam in the political process as Jama'at's doing, he *ipso facto* made Islam a major issue in the emerging linkages between the new regime and the Jama'at, which were then locked in debate over the formation of the PNA government.

Jama'at leaders then took their cue from Mawdudi and wholeheartedly assisted the Ziya regime in preparing a comprehensive Islamization program.\(^3\) The program was introduced to the public on February 10, 1979, sanctioning the enforcement of Islamic edicts on religious taxes and *hudud* punishments. The Jama'at, eager to prove its political prowess, claimed the new measures - which Mawdudi had once declared should not precede the full implementation of the Islamic state\(^3\) - to be the fruits of its decades long struggle to introduce Islamic law to Pakistan, an enterprise which began with the debates over the Objectives Resolution in 1949, now incorporated by General Ziya into the Preamble to the Constitution.\(^6\) Islamization, however, proved to be also a divisive point of contention. While it created concord between the Jama'at and the Ziya regime over issues of principle, it also promoted greater conflict between the two over issues of

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\(^3\) These talks were given on March 8 and 10; and April 7 and 8, 1978. The talks were subsequently published in the form of a book as, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *System of Government Under the Holy Prophet* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), see pp.22-23 for instance.

\(^3\) Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

\(^3\) See chapter 4.

substance.

The Jama'at had endorsed General Ziya's Islamization measures with view to eventually dominating the state-sponsored Islamization drive. General Ziya, to Jama'at's dismay, having received the organization's blessings, decided that it was not politic for the martial law regime to restrict its patronage to only one Islamic organization. General Ziya, therefore, consciously cultivated stronger ties between his regime and "the 'ulama and mashayikh (sing. shaikh, Sufi leaders)", a policy which the Jama'at soon ridiculed as religiously suspect and politically motivated. As one Jama'at leader put it, "we were interested in siratu'l-nabi (life of the Prophet), while General Ziya was content with miladu'l-nabi (celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, which is popular with Brailwis)." The Jama'at, therefore, surmised from General Ziya's "divide and rule" Islamic policy that he was not sincere about Islamization, and furthermore, would not be easily manipulated by the Jama'at.

General Ziya's motivations in diversifying the religious basis of his regime were not entirely premeditated and machiavellian. The General had been an admirer of Mawdudi and the Jama'at for a long time. He looked to the Jama'at as an intellectual force which could serve the same function in his regime as the left had done in the PPP in the 1969-74 period. The fact that the Jama'at had been the main ideological adversary of the left since the 1960s, and had always claimed to have a blue-print for the Islamization of the state, further led General Ziya to draw parallels between the Jama'at and Pakistan's leftist

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37 Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.

38 ibid.
intelligentsia. Hence, not only were Jama‘at leaders placed in charge of sensitive cabinet portfolios, and invited to serve on such state sponsored organs as the Council of Islamic Ideology, but a number of pro-Jama‘at thinkers, writers and journalists were inducted into the inner circle of General Ziya’s advisors. Some these figures such as Muhammad Salahuddin, Altaf Hasan Quraishi and Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami remained close to General Ziya to the last days of his regime.

Meanwhile, despite the claims which the Jama‘at had advanced regarding its abilities, the organization proved unable to deliver on its promises. Aside from abstract notions about the shape and working of the ideal Islamic state, the Jama‘at had little to offer in the way of better managing the machinery of a state with some ninety million people. Nor did the organization’s notions about the working of Islamic dictums in the framework of the economic operations which sustained the state provide General Ziya with a congruous plan of action. Just as the Jama‘at became disappointed in the political ruse of the Ziya regime, so did the latter become cynical about the ideological worth and practical relevance of the ideas of the former. A chasm, therefore, soon emerged between the positions of the two, especially over in religious issues, which would only grow wider over time.

When despite the execution of Bhutto the elections of November 1979 also came to a naught, relations between the Jama‘at and the martial law regime became further strained. The Jama‘at had taken the elections seriously and had mobilized its resources in anticipation for the November poll.\(^{39}\) Moreover, the Jama‘at had began to sense that

\(^{39}\) \textit{ISIT}(2), pp.38 and 43.
after two years the memory of the excesses of the Bhutto government had began to wane, and the paramount political issue before the country was the martial law. The Jama'at’s association with the ruling order which was designed to bring about elections and secure a political victory for the organization was quickly becoming a liability.

The mantle of the leadership of the country had been passed from the PNA to General Ziya, opposition to whom had by 1979 become the rallying point for pro-democracy forces, to which the Jama'at claimed to belong. The solid showing of pro-PPP candidates in the national municipal elections was sufficient proof in this regard. When General Ziya postponed the elections on October 15, Mian Tufayl, Ziya’s closest ally among the Jama'at leadership, issued a terse statement, warning General Ziya about the consequences of his policy.\(^{40}\) In October 1980 the Jama'at issued an official statement, criticizing the martial law, and encouraged General Ziya to restore the civilian order and the rule of law, end censorship, and hold elections.\(^{41}\) This statement, the first sign of an open breach between the Jama'at and the martial law regime, brought no reaction from the General, compelling the Jama'at to reissue it to the press in November 1981. The Jama'at leaders, thenceforth, began to show signs of restlessness with the General’s intransigence. The Shura’ sessions began to reassess the Jama'at’s policy to date, and to issue strong denunciations of the martial law regime’s policies, tactics, tampering with the Constitution, and strong-arm tactics in dealing with the opposition.\(^{42}\) Thus began the

\(^{40}\) *ibid*, pp.43-44.

\(^{41}\) *ibid*, P.47.

\(^{42}\) *ibid*, pp.53-54, and 76-77.
Jama'at's consequential soul-searching regarding the relative weight of political objectives and ideological loyalties of the organization. The pace and breadth of the attacks against the government increased between 1980 and 1985 as it became apparent that the martial law regime had in good measure squandered and hence dissipated the repository of Islam's political prowess, significantly diminishing the ability of religious symbolisms to legitimate political action and authority. The damage to the Islamic parties became more apparent as a consequence of General Ziya dithering over elections; The Jama'at saw its erstwhile popularity wither away in tandem with popular hopes for fresh elections. The organization, however, to its own detriment did not distance itself from the martial law regime swiftly and rapidly enough to put an end to its political hemorrhaging.

A number of other factors also controlled the nature of the Jama'at's reaction to the martial law regime. First, Mian Tufayl, who was personally close to Ziya, and who was particularly bitter towards the Bhutto regime played a direct role in determining the Jama'at's plan of action. It was he who dampened the organization's zeal for resuming agitational politics by pointing out that the last time the Jama'at opted for such a course - during the Ayub Khan era - the ultimate beneficiary was not the Jama'at but the left. As evil as martial law may turn out to be, he argued, PPP remained Pakistan's greatest scourge. Following the leadership of Mian Tufayl, the Jama'at was reduced to inaction, even in the face of General Ziya's de facto abrogation of all open political activities after 1979.

43 Interviews with Mahmud A'zam Faruqi and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi.
44 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
Second, the Jama'at had been partially compensated for its political losses during the Ziya period with gains of another kind. The organization's high profile status, often underlined by the regime as means of silencing Jama'at's caviling, had opened the machinery of state to the influence of the Jama'at to an unprecedented extent. The Jama'at now began to infiltrate into the armed forces more effectively than before, and was able to open the ranks of the civil service, the bureaucracy, and important national research and educational institutions to its votaries to a greater extent. An open break with the regime could have jeopardized these valuable gains, and was as such, was deemed by some to be imprudent.

Such gains, however, were merely a consolation for the political damage which association with the martial law regime had engendered. Therefore, despite ad hoc compensations, the Jama'at continued to struggle with its role in the Ziya regime. A deleterious ambivalence regarding the future course of action of the organization resulted,

45 The martial law regime specially dealt with Mawdudi as a senior statesman and a religious sage. State sponsored educational institutions, such as the National Hijrah Council, established during the Ziya period, treated him on equal footing with Pakistan's other literary and religious luminaries. Mawdudi was invited to give talks on Radio Pakistan, his advice was solicited by General Ziya, and his words began to adorn to the front page of national newspapers.

46 Interview with Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Lahore.

47 A clear example of the benefits accrued to the Jama'at during the Ziya period is the International Islamic University, established in Islamabad with the financial backing of the Rabitah 'Alam-i Islami. The University with the backing of both General Ziya and the Rabitah was handed over to the Jama'at, which in a de facto fashion controls its working. A second example is the Islamic Research Institute which was established during the Ayub Khan era to propagate a modernist view of Islam, and was a bastion of anti-Jama'at feelings. The Institute today operates under the supervision of the International Islamic University, and unofficially under the aegis of the Jama'at.
which soon escalated into internal tensions, and a debate over ideological loyalties versus pragmatic political choices. The debate, meanwhile, took shape around political indicators, which often acted to further entrench the Jama'at's ambivalence. When in the 1983 Karachi Municipal Corporation elections the Jama'at retained its margin of victory - 36% (winning 85 of 232 seats contested) - which gave Afghani another term as the city's mayor - the Jama'at took comfort in the wisdom of its policies to date.48

General Ziya, aware of the Jama'at's energies and potential, and eager to prevent an open break with the organization, brought the Jama'at into the military's Afghan policy.49 The Jama'at, known for its anti-communism, had been privy to the government's Afghan policy since 1977, and had played a major role in mobilizing Pakistani public opinion for an Islamic crusade against the Soviet challenge since then.50 From 1979 onwards the Jama'at found a more active role in managing the affairs of Afghan refugees in N.W.F.P.,51 the planning and execution of the Jihad, and mobilizing Pakistanis behind the government's cause.52

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48 Information provided by the offices of Jama'at-i Islami of Karachi.


50 Following Nur Muhammad Taraki's coup in Afghanistan in 1977, Generals Ziya and Fazl-i Haq had met with Mawdudi, Mian Tufayl and Qazi Husain Ahmad, exploring a role for the Jama'at in Pakistan's Afghan policy; cited in Khurram Badr, Qazi Husain Ahmad (Karachi: Saba Publications, 1988), pp.70-71.

51 Interview with Murad 'Ali Shah, Lahore.

52 The Jama'at shared the government's fear that the communist regime in Afghanistan could sow the seeds of ethnic unrest in Pakistan, which countered the organization's nationalist, anti-ethnic position. For more on this rationale for Pakistan's support for the Afghan Jihad see, Marvin Weinbaum, "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role", The Middle East Journal, 45:1 (Winter 1991), P.72.
There were numerous tangible returns for the Jama'at's decision to support the Ziya regime's Afghan policy. The Afghan Jihad provided the Jama'at with closer ties with the Pakistani armed forces, and most importantly, compensated the Jama'at for its efforts with funds and arms funnelled to the Mujahidin by the Pakistani military and the Persian Gulf supporters of the cause. These compensations for the Jama'at's cooperation with the government over the Afghan issue, which played a significant role in strengthening the Jama'at's organizational structure and hence political reach in the 1980s, were, no doubt, instrumental in the Jama'at's decision to remain allied with the Ziya regime despite internal opposition.

The close contact with the Afghan Mujahidin and refugees, moreover, opened them to the political and religious influence of the Jama'at. The organization's intellectual sway over segments of the Afghan refugee community and the Mujahidin, in turn, boosted the image of the Jama'at in Islamic revivalist circles across the Muslim world, and gave the organization a pan-Islamic image. More tangibly, the Afghan connection provided the Jama'at with valuable military training. Between 1980 and 1990, the Jama'at, and increasing, IJT became fully embroiled in the Jihad, and as a result, received military training. In the eyes of the Ziya regime, the Jihad had served as a useful means of harnessing the energies of the Jama'at, diverting them away from domestic politics.53

The Jama'at's commitment to the Jihad was, however, serious. Between 1980 and 1990 some 72 IJT and Jami'at-i Tulaba'-i 'Arabiyah students were killed in fighting in

Afghanistan, some of whom were the sons of high ranking Jama‘at officials.\textsuperscript{54} Jihad has subsequently dominated the Jama‘at’s thinking, a fact which is clearly reflected in their response to the current crisis in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{55}

General Ziya’s strategy was not, however, thoroughly successful, especially with regard to IJT. Between 1977 and 1984 the organization closely cooperated with the Ziya regime.\textsuperscript{56} It used government patronage in purging the campuses of leftist student unions and faculty members.\textsuperscript{57} IJT also became a convenient tool for the new regime in controlling the flow of politics without directly intervening in it. In Lahore and Karachi, for instance, IJT played a critical role in subduing public reaction to Bhutto’s execution. An IJT procession led by Hafiz Salman Butt, moved through the streets of Lahore on the day of Bhutto’s execution, intimidating any public expressions of remorse, and conversely, encouraging jubilations by distributing sweets.\textsuperscript{58} In Karachi, moreover, IJT became a

\textsuperscript{54} Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi and Malik Ghulam ‘Ali both lost a son to the Afghan Jihad; interviews with the two in Lahore and Karachi. The number of IJT and Jama‘at-i Tulaba‘i ‘Arabiyah students dead in battle was provided by the office of Jama‘at-i Islami of Sind, Karachi.

\textsuperscript{55} See for instance, Khurshid Ahmad, "Mas‘alah-i Kashmir ka Hall, Jihad Ya Muzakirat", in Asia (Lahore), (February 4, 1990), pp.15-16 and 35. During a speech before IJT at Punjab University on March 19, 1990, Qazi Husain Ahmad openly advocated the arming and training of Kashmiris in the same manner as was done with Afghan Mujahidin.

\textsuperscript{56} IJT invited General Ziya to a number of campus convocation ceremonies in IJT controlled campuses, while IJT leaders such as Javid Hashmi and Liaqat Baluch were given high profile attention by the new regime; see, Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), P.18.

\textsuperscript{57} Interviews with Khalid Mahmud and ‘Azizu‘ddin Ahmad, Lahore.

\textsuperscript{58} Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), P.18.
vigilante force against al-Zulfiqar, an underground guerilla organization which was launched by the PPP to undermine the martial law regime.\textsuperscript{59}

The martial law regime’s understanding with IJT, however, proved to be even more tenuous than the one with the Jama'at. As mentioned earlier, following the fall of Bhutto and the purge of the left from Pakistani campuses, Islamic, right of center, and ethnic student organizations had proliferated across Pakistan. They increasingly infringed upon the territory and constituency of IJT, triggering rivalries over control of campuses, which given the militarization of the student organizations during the course of the previous years soon converted Pakistani campuses into virtual battle zones. IJT, forced to defend its turf against the intruders, was at the center of the mounting student violence. The student organization soon came under attack from various quarters for its militancy and violent predilections. IJT did not respond to criticism favorably, and began to direct its energies against its critics outside of the campuses, rampaging and setting ablaze the offices of newspapers, and generally terrorizing its opponents, many of whom were close to the martial law regime.\textsuperscript{60} IJT, therefore, quickly became a liability, which the martial law authorities felt the more IJT acted as an autonomous political entity, the more the martial law authorities felt

\textsuperscript{59} See, Zahid Hussain, "The Campus Mafias", \textit{Herald} (Karachi), (October 1988), P.56. Hussain cites one such instance of cooperation when IJT workers apprehended an al-Zulfiqar activist who had set an army jeep ablaze.

\textsuperscript{60} IJT’s attack on the Lahore offices of the Urdu dailies \textit{Jang} and \textit{Nawa’i Waqt} following the appearance of a story about an IJT leader who was barred from boarding an airplane for carrying a gun, was instrumental in galvanizing public opinion behind the government’s decision to restrict IJT. For IJT’s view of these events see, Sa’id Salimi, "Furugh-i Subh", in \textit{TT}, vol.2, pp.316-18.
compelled to extend the ban on political parties and open political activism to IJT.

Early in 1979, General Ziya’s Minister of Education, Muhammad Afzal, approached Khurshid Ahmad, the Jama’at’s liaison with IJT at the time, and asked the Jama’at to control student violence. The negotiations between the two bore no results. The government was given the impression that the Jama’at believed that it was impolitic to demobilize the force which had catapulted it into its current position of power. General Ziya then directly approached Mian Tufayl Muhammad concerning this issue. Mian Tufayl revealed the Jama’at’s inability to control IJT by responding that the student organization was independent of the Jama’at and was, therefore, not bound by his edicts. Between 1979 and 1984 the Jama’at remained hard-pressed to contain IJT’s violence, which meanwhile, continued to place greater pressures on the government for restoration of order. In 1984, Afzal proceeded to lay the groundwork for a ban of all student unions. He secured the agreement of all Vice-Chancellors of Pakistani universities to a ban of all student union activities, which was placed before General Ziya in the form of a request, and later became the official reason for the February 9, 1984 ban of IJT and its rivals.

The ban on student unions had followed a similar measure against labor union activities, which again the Jama’at believed was intended to curtail its progress. The

61 Interview with Muhammad Afzal, Islamabad.

62 ibid.

63 General Ziya’s decision to ban all student unions was also motivated by the desire to control the activities of the Pakhtun Student Federation, which was loyal to the Pathan politician Wali Khan, who was a MRD leader, and an outspoken opponent of the Afghan Jihad.

64 ibid.
Jama'at, therefore, criticized General Ziya's decision as undemocratic and directed at weakening the Jama'at. IJT's response to the ban was, however, more vociferous. Between February and May of 1984, IJT workers launched a wide-scale agitational campaign across Pakistan, openly denouncing the Ziya regime. The deterioration of relations between IJT and the martial law regime placed a great deal of strain on the Jama'at's rapport with General Ziya. This was especially the case after the nine party coalition, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), floated by the PPP in 1981 began to make overtures to IJT in March 1984. The Jama'at, under the leadership of Mian Tufayl, however, stayed its ground, with the Amir personally intervening with IJT leaders to encourage patience and calm. The Jama'at rather than responding to pressures from its student wing, interestingly, became the de facto tool of the martial regime in controlling the students. IJT workers found no solace in Mian Tufayl's counsel and in an open show of defiance continued to agitate against the martial law regime.

Mian Tufayl, therefore, appealed to General Ziya to defuse the situation by lifting the ban on student activities. When General Ziya travelled to Lahore in order to personally appeal to Mian Tufayl for support in the Referendum of December 19, 1984, he was informed by the Jama'at leadership that the organization's endorsement of the referendum was contingent on the lifting of the ban on student activities, and the promise

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66 ibid, P.363. Some observers argue that a certain amount of dialogue between IJT and PPP was initiated in this period; interviews, Lahore.

67 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
that the National Assembly would be sovereign. General Ziya accepted both conditions, only to renege on the first immediately after the Referendum, and violate the second in May 1988 when the Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Juneiju was summarily dismissed from office, and the Assemblies were dissolved. General Ziya’s actions greatly undermined the position of Mian Tufayl, especially with IJT. Mian Tufayl, who was outwitted by General Ziya, lost control over IJT completely, and was also greatly weakened within the Jama’at. To General Ziya’s chagrin, the martial law regime’s ruse acted to give greater momentum to ant-Ziya sentiments among Jama’at votaries.

Since 1979, perturbed by the resurrection of the PPP in the form of MRD in 1981, and deeply concerned about the Soviet threat to Pakistan, Mian Tufayl had overrode the objections of Jama’at members and IJT leaders to the continuation of close associations with the martial law regime, promising to deliver on the demands of Jama’at and IJT members through his personal liaison with the regime. General Ziya, however, not only damaged Mian Tufayl’s credibility before his organization, but proved to the Jama’at that nothing substantial could be gained from close cooperation with his regime, save for negative publicity.

The Election of 1985

As a result of the agreements between General Ziya and Mian Tufayl Muhammad, the Jama’at along with the Muslim League - the sole two parties to adopt this position - openly endorsed General Ziya’s decision to hold a referendum on December 19, 1984, with view to legitimating his rule to date, all in the name of Islam. This was to be the last

\[68 \text{ibid.} \]
instance of the organization's open endorsement of the Ziya regime. From here on Jama'at's political fortunes plummeted, and while the Karachi Municipal elections of 1983 had allowed the organization to remain sanguine about its electoral potential, the national elections of 1985 proved that the popularity of the 1977-79 period had been dissipated. Debate over Jama'at's relations to Ziya regime, and conversely, the possibility of greater cooperation with MRD became intensified, which in the first instance, prolonged the organization's ambivalence regarding its future course of action. The elections of 1985 also led General Ziya to believe that the Jama'at was not the national party with extensive social control to anchor his regime in. He therefore, began to look to more powerful political allies, the Muslim League and MQM; a move which further strained the relations between the General and the Jama'at. As a result, an unprecedented factionalism emerged within the Jama'at's ranks, the dynamics of which will be examined in the next section.

The Jama'at launched a national campaign during the elections of 1985, still hoping to capitalize on the popularity it had enjoyed during the PNA days. The referendum of 1984 had, moreover, approved of General Ziya's Islamization schemes, convincing the Jama'at of the wide popularity of Islamic themes. Jama'at candidates, therefore, sought to distance themselves from the martial law regime, the association with which had marred the luster of their organization, and yet, capitalized on the seeming popularity of the Islamization measures by harping on moral and religious values. To underscore their position, the Jama'at candidates began to criticize the content and extent of General Ziya's Islamization schemes, promising to bring about a more thorough and equitable
Islamization package once in office. The organization hoped to both attract those voters who were disgruntled with General Ziya and his policies, and appeal to General Ziya's base of support among the religiously conscious social strata.  

The subtlety of Jama'at's electoral strategy deluded the Pakistani electorate. Although the Jama'at did better than its previous electoral showing, winning 10 seats (of the 68 contested) to the National Assembly (compared with 9 out of 31 in 1977, and 4 out of 151 in 1970-71), and 13 (of the total of 102 contested) to various Provincial Assemblies (compared to 4 in 1970-71), the results fell far short of expectations (see table 14.1-14.2). The elections, as all Pakistanis knew, was boycotted by the left and centrist parties, and was an easy prey for the Islamic and right of center parties. The Jama'at did best in N.W.F.P., and for the first time was able to elect candidates from Baluchistan. Its performance in Punjab, and especially in Karachi, were however, a cause for concern. JUP, which maintained a greater distance with the Ziya regime did much better than the Jama'at in Karachi, winning 5 seats. Many of the Jama'at candidates elected to the National Assembly in 1977 who were closely associated with the martial law regime were not re-elected by their constituencies, notably, Mahmud A'zam Faruqi (Karachi), Sayyid

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69 Interviews with Sayyid As'ad Gilani and Liaqat Baluch, Lahore. Both men were elected to the National Assembly in these elections.

70 The break down of these 13 seats is as follows: 2 from Punjab (Sargodha and Liyah); 5 from N.W.F.P. (Dir 3, Mardan and Swat); 5 from Sind (Karachi 5); and 1 from Baluchistan (Turbat); Report on General Elections, 1985 (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, nd.), vol.3.

71 The Jama'at subsequently received two Senate seats, Khurshid Ahmad and Qazi Husain Ahmad.

72 The Jama'at, for instance won 3 of Dir's 5 Provincial Assembly seats.
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<th>NAME</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>VOTES RECEIVED</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTES CAST</th>
<th>% OF VOTES</th>
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<td>Liaqat Baluch</td>
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**This seat was originally won by Mian Nawaz Sharif, who chose not to occupy it. Gilani won the seat with the results presented here in a by-election.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ASSEM</th>
<th>ELECTION RESULT</th>
<th>PUNJAB</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>SIND</th>
<th>BALUCH -ISTAN</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA@</td>
<td>Total Vote Received</td>
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<td>160056</td>
<td>13916</td>
<td>665893</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Average Vote Per Cand.</td>
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<td>5187</td>
<td>6669</td>
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<td>6528</td>
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*Source: Shu'bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.
+NA is National Assembly.
@PA is Provincial Assembly.
Munawwar Hasan (Karachi) and Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi (Lahore). ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, elected to the National Assembly in 1970-71 and 1977, showed his opposition to Mian Tufayl’s stance symbolically, by not contesting in the elections at all.

The political weakening of the Jama‘at altered the structure of its relations with the Ziya administration completely, and moreover, threw the organization into a cathartic internal schism, which has since determined the pattern of change within the organization, and its interaction with the forces in the political arena.

The Dialectics of Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State, 1985-1988

The gradual dissipation of the PNA’s base of political support; the emergence of MRD and anti-martial law constituency in 1981; the ban on labor unions, political parties, and finally, student unions in 1984; and the results of the elections of 1985 had all acted to create doubts in the minds of many Jama‘at members regarding the wisdom of their association with the Ziya regime. When General Ziya took over the reigns of power in Pakistan Islamization had been a popular enterprise. If the public’s apathy for the Referendum of 1984 was any indication, after seven years of martial rule, Islamization had lost much of its luster and appeal. So had the Jama‘at and IJT, whose political fortunes had taken a turn for the worse as a result of their support for the martial law regime. Even to the extent to which the Islamization measures held sway over the masses, it was General Ziya who benefitted from the popular good will and not the Jama‘at. These concerns were first raised by a select few among the organization’s leaders, notably,

'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad, but had increasingly found echo among a wider segment of the organization's rank and file members and workers.

Mian Tufayl had sought to contain these growing concerns by placing emphasis upon the ideological roots and basis of the Jama'at, which in his view were conterminous with General Ziya's Islamization scheme, and at odds with the spirit of MRD which Tufayl had dubbed as, "Movement for Restoration of PPP". Mian Tufayl pointed to the dangers which were posed to the interests of Pakistan as a result of the Afghan debacle and the activities of the Al-Zulfiqar in order to dissuade the Jama'at from pressing for the resumption of its agitational posture vis a vis the government. The Afghan Jihad, a cause which the Jama'at members and workers were wholly committed to, served as the fulcrum of Mian Tufayl's pro-Ziya policy. It was Mian Tufayl's belief and promise that, General Ziya can be persuaded to do the bidding of the Jama'at and to restore democracy to Pakistan. When General Ziya reneged on his agreement to lift the ban on student unions in exchange for the Jama'at's support in the Referendum, Mian Tufayl's hold over the Jama'at was greatly weakened. More so when a year later the semblance of civilian rule returned to Pakistan, not under the banner of the Jama'at, but in the form of a Muslim League government. The Jama'at, argued many of its leaders, had been conveniently used by General Ziya without any significant gains to compensate for the resultant political damage.

As a result of the weakening of Mian Tufayl a new political constituency began to

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74 For a clear expression of Mian Tufayl's views see, Mian Tufayl, "General Zia", pp.45-53; also interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Lahore.
rear its head within the Jama'at, one which sought to restore pragmatic political motivations to their rightful place in Jama'at's policy making. The anti-Ziya faction was centered in Karachi and was led by 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad, Mahmud A'zam Faruqi, and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan - all pragmatic politicians. The leaders of the "Karachi group" - as opposed to the "Lahore group" - argued that if the Jama'at was to survive politically it had to move away from its ideological commitments, and to return to its erstwhile Islamic constitutionalist stance, with a greater emphasis upon the latter than on the former components of the neologism.

The size of the religious vote had increased during the Ziya period, but so had the number of parties which appealed to it. As a result the Jama'at had faced a political deadlock despite the Islamization of Pakistan and the civilianization of martial rule. As the soaring popularity of MRD indicated, there were less contenders for the support of the relatively neglected anti-Ziya democratic constituency. The Jama'at had moreover, always thrived in dissent; and therefore, such a strategy had a certain nostalgic appeal for Jama'at members. It was also the most logical next step for an organization which had for most of its years been more in opposition. It should be noted that not all those who constituted the anti-Ziya faction in the Jama'at were motivated by machiavellian concerns. For some like Malik Ghulam 'Ali, democracy was as much a basis of the Jama'at's message as Islamization. Neither could satisfactorily exist without the other. Islamization without democracy, argued Malik Ghulam 'Ali, could not be but a sham.\(^75\) This was a compelling argument which had been developed for some four decades by Mawdudi's lessons on the

\(^75\) Interview with Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.
inherent virtues of democracy, and led the Jama'at to take part in two successive national movements against authoritarian rule.

Malik Ghulam ‘Ali’s stance found echo in the arguments of the leaders of the Karachi group. Democracy, they argued, was a necessary prerequisite of Islamization. Without the prior of existence of the former there could exist no possibility of implementing the latter. This was not only a convenient means of turning to pragmatic politics without openly denouncing the ideological basis of the Jama'at, but was also a pincer attack against the Ziya regime, whereby undemocratic ways were underlined, while the legitimacy of the government’s religious policies was questioned. The nebulous, but yet significant, shift in emphasis from Islam to constitutionalism in the Jama'at’s revived Islamic constitutionalism platform was evident in the oft-repeated assertion that "martial law is the worst of all political evils," implying that it was worse than socialism or modernism, and worse than the PPP. Since it took the Jama'at some seven years to reach this conclusion, its volte face was not thoroughly convincing to all; it however, signalled the beginning of a significant reorientation.

The anti-Ziya faction was centered primarily, but not entirely in Karachi, while those favorably disposed to the martial law regime congregated for the most part around

76 Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad in Jasarat (Karachi), (March 10, 1990), P.6.

77 Qazi Husain Ahmad repeated this assertion in a different fashion, arguing, "however bad a democracy gets it better than martial law, for only under martial law has the national and territorial integrity of Pakistan come under question". Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad, Lahore.
Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Lahore. It is reported that Karachi has the largest concentration of Jama'at members. Its membership was relatively homogeneous, all urban-based, and politically attuned. The Karachi Jama'at was, and continues to be, more pragmatic and less idealistic in its political outlook. The Karachi Jama'at was at the time in control of the city of Karachi, which itself had been instrumental to the success of the PNA movement. The Jama'at leadership in Lahore was, therefore, sensitive to the unrest in its ranks in Karachi. As opposition to General Ziya gained momentum after 1984, the Jama'at leadership became more amenable to the views of its Karachi members, especially because their views were also voiced by IJT members and workers across Pakistan. As a result, the Jama'at leadership, agreed to distance the Jama'at from the Ziya regime, by first creating a distance between the organization's views on Islamization and those of the martial law regime. Mian Tufayl also conceded to demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1973 and the holding of fresh party-based elections.

The Karachi group leaders were not satisfied with these token measures, and demanded a more open break with General Ziya, and began to suggest the possibility of dialogue with MRD. There had existed contacts between the Jama'at and MRD since

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78 It should be noted that not all those opposed to the martial law were in Karachi, many were from and resident in Punjab; and conversely, General Ziya had support among many Jama'at members in Karachi. However, the rough distribution of followers of the pro- and anti-Ziya factions would lead one to the Karachi-Lahore dichotomy.

79 In 1989-90 it had 1,100 members and 7,000 workers, divided into 5 divisions. Information provided by Jama'at-i Islami of Karachi.

80 One Jama'at votary, Sayyid As'ad Gilani, has gone so far as to refer to General Ziya as a munafiq (one who sows discord), and to chastise Mian Tufayl for his tendency to side with authoritarian regimes. See interview with Sayyid As'ad Gilani in Nida (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), pp.14-15.
1981 when one of MRD’s founders, Sardar ‘Abdu’l-Qayyum had invited the Jama‘at to join the alliance, but was rebuffed by Mian Tufayl.\textsuperscript{81} Two meetings between the Jama‘at and MRD leaders, however, did take place in 1982; first, between Qazi Husain Ahmad (the Qayyim of the Jama‘at) and Faruq Laghari (the Secretary General of PPP) in Lahore; and the second, between ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and MRD’s Piar ‘Ali Alanah in Karachi.\textsuperscript{82} Mian Tufayl, meanwhile, was not willing to break with General Ziya politically, and even less willing to see the Jama‘at join MRD.\textsuperscript{83} The Amir’s intransigence, therefore, precipitated a factional crisis between the Karachi and Lahore groups.\textsuperscript{84} Mian Tufayl’s decision to keep the Jama‘at within the ambit of the Ziya regime also acted to radicalize the Karachi group. As a result, the purview of the debate was extended beyond the question of the Jama‘at’s policy towards the Ziya regime to encompass the more fundamental issue of the relative importance of ideology and pragmatic politics in the future of the organization.

The younger and politically inclined Jama‘at leaders began to push for greater rationalization of the Jama‘at’s religiopolitical platform. Islam, in the eyes of many of them, could no longer serve as the leitmotif of a successful political campaign. Religious

\textsuperscript{81} Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami, "Jama‘at-i Islami Awr Peoples Party; Fasilah Awr Rabitat; Ik Musalsal Kahani", in \textit{Qaumi Digest} (Lahore), 11:2 (July 1988), P.22.

\textsuperscript{82} This meeting took place in 1982; \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (July 14, 1988), P.5.

\textsuperscript{83} Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in Haftrozah \textit{Zindagi} (Lahore), (November 10-16, 1989), P.60.

\textsuperscript{84} One of the most interesting aspects of this unfolding debate was its openness. Views were aired in various journals and magazines rather than in closed meetings. This was a sign of the weakening of the power of the Amir, the growing frustrations within the Jama‘at, and the relaxation of the organization’s code of discipline.
politics had already peaked and began to ebb. Islam had to be subsumed into a more comprehensive and rational political program, one which is rooted in the socioeconomic and political imperatives of the Pakistani society, but which would continue to be informed with Islamic values. These ideas, no doubt, had their roots in Machchi Goth, and Mawdudi’s own elaboration of the theme of Islamic constitutionalism. The greater emphasis upon the latter rather than the former component of this credo, however, owed to the disaffection of the Jama‘at with the Ziya regime, the inability of the Jama‘at to make tangible gains from the undisputed Islamization of Pakistan, and later on, to the success of secular political parties such as MQM in supplanting the Jama‘at in Sind.

Interestingly, the very success of Islam in Pakistan in the 1980s came to be a bane for the Jama‘at, further pushing some in the Jama‘at towards pragmatic politics. As the country became inundated with Islamic parties, the Jama‘at and IJT began to lose their place in the limelight, and hence, the need arose to break away from the pack of Islamic parties which were dividing the religious vote in far too many directions. The Karachi group saw more promise for the organization in pursuing socioeconomic issues, what had accounted for the relative success of MRD, and later, the meteoric rise of MQM. For the Karachi group leaders, therefore, the Jama‘at had no alternative before it other than

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86 These views were, and to some extent continue to be, advocated by ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad, Mahmud A‘zam Faruqi, Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Qazi Husain Ahmad, and Khurram Jah Murad, to name only a few. The information presented here was gathered in interviews with these personages, as well as in interviews with Siraj Munir, Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Mustafa Sadiq, Husain Haqqani and Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami in Lahore, and Muhammad Salahu’ddin in Karachi.
to break with the Ziya regime completely, and to join the MRD, just as it had joined COP, UDF and PNA before.

The debate within the Jama'at was soon also influenced by outside political developments. Following the investiture of the Muslim League government in March 1985 the Jama'at was effectively replaced as the main political pillar of the Ziya regime. Already inclined to part ways with General Ziya, the Jama'at adopted the posture of an opposition to party to the government of Muhammad Khan Juneiju, and that of the Muslim League ministry in Sind.\textsuperscript{87} Despite sporadic instances of cooperation between the two over the years, relations between the Muslim League and the Jama'at had been far from friendly. Once again locked in a rivalry for power, the legacy of their mutual antagonism during the early years of Pakistan began to mar the relations between the two.

The Muslim League government was moreover, secular in nature, and was wary of criticism from the religious quarter, and was also aware of the extent of mischief which the Jama'at and IJT's agitational tactics were capable of. The Jama'at and the issue of the role of Islam in politics, in Juneiju’s eyes, were swords of damocles, hanging perilously low over the head of his government. The Jama'at, Juneiju believed, was General Ziya’s last line of defence against any challenges to his authority. Juneiju, needless to add, hoped to eventually inherit the reigns of power from the Ziya regime. The Jama'at was, therefore, viewed by the League with suspicion and awe. As Pir Pagaro, the President of Muslim

\textsuperscript{87} Khurshid Ahmad was asked to join the Juneijo government, but he declined; interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
League at the time put it, "the Jama‘at [was] the B-team of the martial law." Therefore, before launching any campaign against General Ziya, the League had to neutralize the Jama‘at. Hence, once in power, Juneiju and the League Chief Minister of Sind, Ghaws ‘Ali Shah, lost no time in attacking the basis of support of the Jama‘at. Muslim League launched its own student union, Muslim Student Federation (MSF), to counter any possible threats from IJT, and began to actively undermine Jama‘at’s power base in Karachi, a city which was crucial to any successful anti-government campaign. The Jama‘at, furthermore, accused Ghaws ‘Ali Shah of actively supporting MQM, if not actually creating it, to undermine the Jama‘at. On February 12, 1987 the Sind government dissolved the Karachi Municipal Corporation, arresting ‘Abdu’ssattar Afghani and other Jama‘at council men, hence, paving the way for fresh municipal elections which brought MQM into power in that city. The Jama‘at felt brutalized by the Muslim League onslaught, and was greatly disappointed at the fact that Ziya rendered no assistance to the organization. The Jama‘at was once again paying for its association with the Ziya regime. More damaging for the Jama‘at was the political implications of the civilian government’s attacks on the Jama‘at, all in the name of wishing to gain greater autonomy from General Ziya. The Jama‘at was being identified with the martial law regime and as General Ziya’s most important ally just when it was struggling to distance

88 Takbir (Karachi), (July 7, 1988), pp.12-13. Muhammad Salahu’ddin in an editorial cites a conversation between Juneijjo and JUP’s Shah Faridu’l-Haq, wherein the former confessed that, Ghaws ‘Ali Shah gave assistance to a certain organization in Karachi [i.e. MQM] in order to undermine the Jama‘at.

89 Interview with ‘Abdu’ssattar Afghani, Karachi.
itself from the regime. Pir Pagaro's "B-team" remark had a profound psychological impact on the Jama'at by underscoring the sense of political isolation that continued proximity to the Ziya regime had engendered, what the Karachi group had warned against. The pejorative and deprecating tone of Pir Pagaro's depiction shot through the ranks of the Jama'at like a bolt of thunder, galvanizing tremendous support for the Karachi group. The Jama'at began to sense the political cost of its association with the Ziya regime more acutely, and therefore began to actively distance itself from General Ziya, and to look for ways to reorient the political direction of the organization.

The psychological impact of the government's anti-Jama'at campaign was compounded by a more devastating development - the loss of Karachi, Hyderabad, and generally the Muhajir vote to MQM. The Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz had first reared its head in a rally in Karachi on August 8, 1986. It was organized by former members and affiliates of IJT, and was initially predicated upon the Jama'at vote bank among Muhajirs, some of whom had also propelled the Karachi group into action. On February 12, 1987, Ghaws 'Ali Shah dissolved the Karachi and Hyderabad Municipal Corporations, and in November MQM won the fresh elections in the two cities with a wide margin.\textsuperscript{90} MQM took over the office of the mayor in the two cities in January 1988.

In the eyes of Jama'at leaders the meteoric rise of MQM to power could not have occurred without the explicit assistance of the powers-that-be. The complicity of Ghaws

\textsuperscript{90} The Jama'at won 20 out of the 232 seats on the Karachi Municipal Corporation, down to %8.6 from %36.6 in 1983. Figures provided by the Jama'at-i Islami of Karachi.
'Ali Shah in the affair was evident to the Karachi Jama'at from inception. It was he who dissolved the Karachi Municipal Corporation, and then proceeded to issue the arrest warrants for Afghani and 101 other incumbent municipal representatives, all to assure a MQM victory at the polls. The apparent anti-Jama'at bias of the Muslim League during this period increased the mutual antagonism between the two parties, and created grave difficulties for the anti-PPP alliance of convenience between the two in IJI from 1988 onwards.

More problematic for the Jama'at was the role of the army and General Ziya in the rise of MQM. Since the beginning of his rule General Ziya had remained wary of the political situation in Sind. His regime had replaced that of a popular Sindhi Prime Minister, and during the course of the martial law relations between Sindhis and the Punjabi-dominated army had further deteriorated. The appointment of another Sindhi as Prime Minister had not markedly improved the situation. The power base of the PPP in Sind had been in rural areas. Eager to maintain stability in those areas, General Ziya had relied on Sindhi landlords and ethnic parties - such as G.M. Syed's Jiya Sind Party. As a result General Ziya's Sind policy was noticeably tilted towards the interests of Sindhis. The much disliked quota system of Sind which was implemented by Bhutto to the detriment of the interests of the Muhajirs was kept intact by General Ziya. Not surprisingly, the Muhajir community grew resentful of the martial law regime and its allies,

91 Badr, Qazi, pp.85-86.
92 Interview with 'Abdu'ssattar Afghani, Karachi. Also see, Shami, "Jama'at-i Islami Awr Peoples Party", P.21.
93 Takbir (Karachi), (May 1989), pp.44-45.
and more importantly, developed doubts about the wisdom of vesting its fortunes in the promise of Islamization.\textsuperscript{94} The advent of MQM, for the first time, brought to light the extent of the grievances of the Muhajirs against the Ziya regime, and underlined the Jama‘at’s obliviousness to the demands and aspirations of its Muhajir constituency. To salvage its fortunes in Karachi, the Jama‘at began to scurry for cover by attacking General Ziya’s Sind policy.

The advent of MRD had created concern among Pakistan’s military leaders. While Sindhi landlords and ethnic parties could be relied upon to squeeze MRD out of rural Sind, Karachi presented a more complex picture. Wali Khan, the Pathan leader of Awami National Party (ANP) and a MRD stalwart, who was opposed to the Afghan Jihad and the Ziya regime, enjoyed wide popularity among Karachi’s sizeable Pathan community. The inroad provided by Wali Khan and ANP had led to greater activity by the PPP, which could benefit from the restlessness of the Muhajir community. Meanwhile the 1985 elections had proved that the Jama‘at did not have the political power to control the intrusion of MRD into Karachi. Worse yet, the Jama‘at had developed doubts of its own about the Ziya regime, which were manifested in meetings between Faruq Laghari and Qazi Husain Ahmad in 1982 and 1984, and in IJT’s vociferous agitations against the military regime since the ban on student unions. General Ziya had always favored regional and ethnic parties over national ones, and given the Jama‘at’s growing doubts about its ties to the regime, the Sind-based MQM was deemed more favorable to the interests of the regime than the Jama‘at. The army and the Sind Ministry, argue Jama‘at leaders,

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Akhl\q{a}qi Jang} (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), P.33.
therefore, actively encouraged and armed MQM.\footnote{Interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Mahmud A’zam Faruqi, Karachi.} Although MQM was formed around grievances against the Ziya regime, it was at this stage still more antagonistic towards the PPP, and at any rate, in the short run it would be preoccupied with rooting out its rivals - the Jama’at and MRD parties. What General Ziya did not realize was that the advent of MQM made the Jama’at and the PPP natural allies. As IJT was squeezed out of Karachi and Hyderabad campuses and the Jama’at lost its base of support in Karachi, it found a natural ally in the PPP which was also hard-pressed to make inroads into MQM’s territory.\footnote{Interview with Mahmud A’zam Faruqi, Karachi.}

The loss of Karachi greatly intensified the crisis that was waging within the ranks of the Jama’at. IJT and the Karachi group were restless, both demanding open negotiations with MRD. Moreover, as the Jama’at began to accept the advent of MQM as a genuine manifestation of festering sociopolitical problems in the Muhajir community, demands were made on the Jama’at leadership for a drastic realignment of the organization’s political program.

In response to the growing crisis, Mian Tufayl Muhammad decided not to seek another term as Amir of the Jama’at. Three candidates were named by the Shura’ to seek the office of the Amir: Khurshid Ahmad, a neutral candidate; Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi, who was opposed to the Karachi group; and Qazi Husain Ahmad, the populist Jama’at leader who had the dual advantage of having close contacts with the Ziya regime as the Jama’at’s liaison with the army in the Afghan Jihad, and yet having advocated the joining

\footnote{Interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Mahmud A’zam Faruqi, Karachi.}

\footnote{Interview with Mahmud A’zam Faruqi, Karachi.}
of MRD as early as 1983.\textsuperscript{97}

The election of Qazi Husain to the office of Amir was a clear victory for the Karachi group. It also indicated that the majority of Jama'at members favored both a turn to towards pragmatic politics, and a break with the Ziya regime.\textsuperscript{98} Qazi Husain lost no time in reorienting the Jama'at. He began his tenure of office from a national mass contact tour from Peshawar to Karachi, Karavan-i Da'wat'u Muhabbat; began to address popular socioeconomic concerns, attack feudalism and capitalism, talk of the rights of the impoverished many and the social obligations of the wealthy few, and directed Jama'at workers to extend the purview of the organization’s activities into the rural areas and among the urban under-class.\textsuperscript{99} Qazi Husain’s populist agenda kept apace with the demands of the Karachi group, whose anxieties were greatly assuaged by the words and actions of their new leader. The populist posture also created a common ground for greater communication with PPP which also had a populist approach to politics.\textsuperscript{100}

Qazi Husain also was quick to redefine the Jama'at’s policy towards the Ziya regime, putting an end to the organization’s debilitating ambivalence in this regard. The new Amir of the Jama'at was openly critical of the martial law regime, arguing that neither Islamization nor the Afghan Jihad justified the abrogation of democracy in Pakistan. He went even further in delegitimizing the Ziya regime by asserting that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cited in \textit{The Friday Times} (Lahore), (March 15-21, 1989), P.3.
\item Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad, Lahore.
\item \textit{Chatan} (Lahore), (November 15, 1989), P.19.
\item Interview with 'Abdu'l-Ghafur Ahmad in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (July 7, 1988), pp.18-19; and Badr, \textit{Qazi}, pp.48-76.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
General Ziya’s Islamization measures did not enjoy legitimacy; for, they were mere lip-services to Islam which changed little of the country’s judicial, bureaucratic and political structures,\(^{101}\) and moreover, lacked a popular mandate.\(^{102}\) Pakistan’s political predicament could be solved only by abrogating martial rule, and not by promulgating a Shari’at Ordinance.\(^{103}\) General Ziya’s persistence in using Islam as a means for justifying martial rule, if anything, had hurt rather than promoted the cause of Islam in Pakistan.\(^{104}\) The Jama’at, therefore, refused to participate in the discussion on the Shari’at Bill and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution - vesting greater powers in the President - in 1988.\(^{105}\) Although the final draft of the Shari’at Ordinance was similar to Jama’at’s own earlier proposals, the organization rejected the Bill through and through.\(^{106}\) The Bill was criticized for having no popular mandate, and hence, despite its religious wisdom found no support among Jama’at leaders.\(^{107}\) The Jama’at was quick to point out that, it will not look favorably upon the postponement of the elections on

\(^{101}\) Qazi Husain, for instance, asserted that the Shari’at Ordinance had no meaning so long as the anglicized legal system remained the same; Badr, *Qazi*, P.97.


\(^{103}\) *ibid*, P.16.

\(^{104}\) Badr, *Qazi*, pp.81-84.

\(^{105}\) The Jama’at had originally been very much in favor of the Shari’at Bill, and only came to oppose it out of political expedience. See for instance, Qazi Husain Ahmad, *Shari’at Bill: Uski Zarurat Awr Us Par I’tirazat Ja’izah* (Lahore: Mutahhidah Shari’at Mahaz, 1986).

\(^{106}\) Munir, "Azadi".

\(^{107}\) Badr, *Qazi*, P.82. Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in *Takbir* (Karachi), (June 30, 1988), pp.11-14.
account of the Shari‘at Ordinance. Interestingly, criticism of the Shari‘at Ordinance was not limited to Qazi Husain or the leaders of the Karachi group, and was also voiced by many Jama‘at leaders in Punjab, including Mian Tufayl. This was a clear manifestation of the Jama‘at’s new pragmatism, which was overshadowing the religious sensibilities of the organization.

In similar vein, Qazi Husain argued that the Afghan Jihad, as critical as it was for Pakistan’s strategic interests, was not the work and hence monopoly of General Ziya, but was originally conceived of by Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto. Qazi Husain’s shocking assertion was backed by his confession that since the fall of Muhammad Zahir Shah from power in Afghanistan in 1974, he had been privy to Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which was drawn up under the aegis of Bhutto, and later served as the basis for the Afghan Jihad. With Qazi Husain’s initiative, the break with the Ziya regime, in the political arena, was now complete.

Qazi Husain now sought to take the Jama‘at closer to the MRD. He argued that the Jama‘at was open to cooperation with all political forces, and he wished to put an end

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108 ibid.

109 On June 16, 1988 a statement was issued by the Jama‘at Secretariat in Lahore, signed by Mian Tufayl Muhammad, Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Khurram Murad, Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, Malik Ghulam ‘Ali, Na‘im Siddiqi, Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Mawlana Fatih Muhammad and Khalil Ahmad Hamidi. The statement criticized the Shari‘at Ordinance for seeking to pay a superficial lip-service to Islam without changing the legal structure of the country, and deplored General Ziya’s political use of Islam; cited in Takbir (Karachi), (June 30, 1988), P.12.

110 Badr, Qazi, P.83; also see, Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Pakistan Main Jama‘at-i Islami Ka Kirdar (Lahore: Markazi Shu‘bah-i Nashr‘u Isha‘at-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1990), pp.18-19.
to the cold war between the Jama'at and the PPP.\textsuperscript{111} He had himself laid the foundations of a dialogue with PPP in two meetings with the MRD emissary, Faruq Laghari, in Mansurah first in 1982 and later in 1984.\textsuperscript{112} During those meetings the Jama'at was invited to join MRD and Qazi Husain had favored accepting the invitation. Despite pressures exerted by the Karachi group, whose views were aired through the editorials of the Jama'at daily Jasarat, Mian Tufayl had barred the Jama'at from contemplating such a move. He may have been willing to break with the Ziya regime, but was not prepared to embrace PPP.

With Mian Tufayl out of the way, and the greater possibility of fresh elections in 1988, the Karachi group and the new Amir made another bid for joining MRD. The new initiative was, moreover, prompted by the dismissal of Juneiju and the dissolution of the Assemblies on May 29, 1988, which the Karachi group interpreted as the martial law regime’s reversion to autocracy. The Jama'at not only did not wish to associated with the new face of the regime, but believed that it should join the opposition to it.

The PPP was, meanwhile, eager to secure the endorsement of the Jama'at. Elections were expected, and it was deemed important for MRD to represent as wide a spectrum of parties as possible. Moreover, the Jama'at had been PPP’s toughest opponent throughout the 1970s, and was closely associated with the rise of General Ziya to power and the military regime’s subsequent policies. Winning over the Jama'at, therefore, had a symbolic significance for MRD. The PPP was also aware of Jama'at’s street power, and

\textsuperscript{111} Badr, Qazi, pp.84-96.

\textsuperscript{112} Takbir (Karachi), (July 14, 1988), pp.5-11.
wished to initially neutralize the organization’s possible opposition to MRD’s own agitational campaign, and possibly to solicit the Jama’at’s help in mounting a more effective one.\textsuperscript{113}

In the summer of 1988, therefore, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of MRD, initiated a new contact with the Jama’at. Through the intermediary of Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari,\textsuperscript{114} a meeting was arranged between ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Benazir Bhutto in the PPP headquarters at 70 Clifton in Karachi on June 7, 1988. The initial meeting created an understanding between MRD and the Jama’at, and was followed by a second more formal meeting, which was attended by Ghafur Ahmad, Benazir Bhutto, Piar ‘Ali Alanah, and Makhdum Amin Fahim on June 19, 1988. The agenda before this meeting was to bring about agreements between the Jama’at and MRD over the following issues: 1) that the next elections be based on parties; 2) the elections be held within 90 days; and 3) the elections be held on the basis of the PPP-PNA agreement of July 1977.\textsuperscript{115} The three point agreement was to serve as the basis of a common electoral platform which would induct the Jama’at, in a \textit{de facto} fashion, into MRD. It was alleged that, the negotiations also involved a discussion of the distribution of election tickets, with the

\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi. The interviewee was present at the first Ghafur-Benazir meetings.

\textsuperscript{114} Mazari knew Ghafur Ahmad well since the PNA days, and was also close to Benazir Bhutto; interview with Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Karachi.

\textsuperscript{115} Cited in \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (June 23, 1988), P.24. The PNA-PPP agreements relevance was in that it had detailed a plan to conduct elections without the Registrations Law and had provided for the autonomy of the Election Commission to oversee the elections; see Shami, "Jama’at-i Islami Awr Peoples Party", P.24.
Jama'at asking for %30 of the MRD's slate.\textsuperscript{116}

The Karachi meetings between the Jama'at and MRD were followed by two more meetings between Qazi Husain and Faruq Laghari in Lahore, the last of which occurred in September 1988, after the death of General Ziya. Meanwhile, Ghafur Ahmad gave a report of his meetings to the Jama'at Shura', and requested from the Shura' a ruling which would convert the agreements reached by him into Jama'at political directives. The Shura', which was predominantly composed of representatives from Punjab, was not as eager about cooperation with MRD, nor as antagonistic towards General Ziya, as was the Jama'at of Karachi. The Shura' session, despite the intercession of the Amir, was deadlocked. The session was adjourned without a verdict in order to take an opinion poll of the Jama'at. It, however, put forth a new condition for continuing its dialogue with MRD, which significantly enough had not surfaced in Ghafur Ahmad's two meetings with Benazir Bhutto. This new condition was that, the MRD political platform adopt a demand for the "creation of an Islamic order."\textsuperscript{117} Mian Tufayl, Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi, and Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, meanwhile, began to oppose the joining of MRD actively and openly. They were assisted in this regard by a host of right of center writers, statesmen, and thinkers - many of whom were old enemies of the Jama'at, and had always denounced the organization's ideological convictions - who now began to chastise the Jama'at for forsaking its ideological roots. An array of publications began to pressurize the Jama'at, encouraging the organization to revert to its religious idealism, and to forgo an alliance

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Jang} (Karachi), (July 7, 1988), P.1.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (June 23, 1988), P.25.
with MRD. Although motivated by their dislike and fear of the PPP, this unanticipated concern for the Jama'at's ideological fidelity was not altogether divorced of General Ziya's surreptitious machinations.118 Leading the pack in criticizing the Jama'at were pro-Jama'at journalists and advisors to General Ziya, Muhammad Salahu'ddin and Mujibu'l-Rahman Shami,119 a fact which revealed to the Jama'at a new, and hitherto veiled, danger of too close of an association with outside political forces - the Ziya regime proved particularly adept at turning the Jama'at against itself.

Salahu’ddin, a vehement opponent of the PPP, was particularly vociferous in his criticism of Ghafur Ahmad and the new policy of the Jama'at. Salahu’ddin reminded Jama’at leaders of Mawdudi’s saying that, ”Jama'at-i Islami is not only a political party, but an ideological one.”120 The memory of the architect of Jama'at pragmatism was now conveniently invoked to restrain the organization’s real politick. The pages of Takbir were filled with open criticisms of the Jama’at leadership in general, and Ghafur Ahmad in particular. The Jama’at leaders were reminded of the excesses of the Bhutto years, of PPP's inherently secular approach to politics, and of the suffering which the Jama'at and IJT endured during his reign.121 Jama’at leaders were also reminded of the fact that

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118 Both Mian Tufayl and Na’im Siddiq have hinted that Muhammad Salahu’ddin was prompted to criticizing Ghafur Ahmad by General Ziya; see, Takbir (Karachi), (June 23, 1988), P.24. Also see, Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), P.23.

119 The editors of Takbir (Karachi), and Zindagi (Lahore) and Qaumi Digest (Lahore), respectively.

120 Takbir (Karachi), (July 14, 1988), P.7.

121 Takbir (Karachi), (June 23, 1988), (July 14, 1988), and (July 21, 1988); also see, Muhammad Salahu’ddin, Peoples Party: Maqasid Awr Hikmat-i ‘Amali (Karachi: Matbu’at-i Takbir, 1982).
their base political instincts were overriding their religious sensibilities, and that the organization was turning its back to its ideological heritage. The Jama'at's response to General Ziya's Shari'at Ordinance was cited by Salahu'ddin to underline his point. The PPP, warned Salahu'ddin, would give the Jama'at "the kiss of death." Alliance with MRD will convert the Jama'at into a consummate political party with no principle or ideological mainstay - it would be the end of the Jama'at.

Takbir was, and continues to be, popular with Jama'at members. Salahu'ddin's articles which appeared in Takbir throughout July of 1988 were read widely by Jama'at members, and the right of center vote bank to which the organization appeals; and as such, effectively undermined the position of the Jama'at leadership among the rank and file of the organization, both in Karachi which was putatively in favor of Ghafur Ahmad's position, and in Punjab, where General Ziya enjoyed a good deal following among Jama'at members. Takbir's role was particularly significant because the Jama'at Shura' had postponed any decision on the future course of the Jama'at pending its tabulation of the opinion of the rank and file members on the issue. In Karachi, the Jama'at workers responded to Salahu'ddin's meddlesome criticism by staging a demonstration outside the offices of Takbir, burning the issues of the magazine. In Lahore, Safdar 'Ali Chaudhri, Director of the Jama'at's Publications Bureau, issued a mild reprimand of Salahu'ddin, mainly showing annoyance with his interference with the Jama'at's structure of authority by encouraging a revolt of the rank and file against their leaders.122

Although in agreement with the views of Salahu'ddin, the Lahore group was

122 Takbir (Karachi), (July 21, 1988), P.7.
compelled to close ranks with the Karachi group lest the Jama'at's internal disputes become an embarrassing political predicament. The Jama'at Secretariat argued that Ghafur Ahmad had met Benazir Bhutto as part of his routine contacts with the leaders of various political parties.\textsuperscript{123} The Jama'at was, however, clearly placed on the defensive, not only because national public opinion had been alerted to the Jama'at's reorientation, but because Salahu'ddin had managed to cast the new changes in the Jama'at in an unsavory light. The psychological implications of these changes for the Jama'at members, especially in N.W.F.P. and Punjab - where Jama'at votaries are from small towns and rural areas, and are therefore, politically less sensitive - was tremendous.

While the Jama'at had moved away from the Ziya regime with relative ease, joining MRD proved to be a more forbidding undertaking.

The attempts of the Jama'at, and the Karachi group in particular, to sublimate idealism in favor of naked pragmatism had been effectively rebuffed. Compelled to recapture its poise, and to quell anxieties within its ranks, the Jama'at began to pull back from its agreements with MRD. Discipline within the Jama'at had reached the brink of collapse, and the internal debates of the organization had been opened to public scrutiny. While outside criticism had forced the Jama'at to reexamine its position, it was not reconciled to totally forgoing its overtures to MRD either. The Jama'at was therefore, once again thrown into confusion. While those advocating pragmatic politics continued to press for joining MRD, the Lahore group firmly resisted such a move. Qazi Husain,

\textsuperscript{123} This fact has been since reiterated by all Jama'at leaders as the stock response to any criticism of the Ghafur-Benazir meetings; interviews with Ghafur Ahmad and Jan Muhammad 'Abbasi, Karachi.
meanwhile sought to maintain the unity of the increasingly polarized Jama'at by escalating attacks against General Ziya while expressing reservations about joining MRD. Qazi Husain denounced the Ziya regime for its excessive reliance on the U.S., promoting corruption in Pakistan, creating ethnic dissensions in Sind, and sowing the seeds of discord among Pakistani political parties. Jasarat elaborated further on these themes, and taking its cue from Qazi Husain, stepped up its anti-Ziya rhetoric throughout the summer of 1988, underlining the Karachi group's defiant stance. In Jasarat's editorials, General Ziya was denounced for the killing of demonstrators in Karachi in 1986, for his anti-Shi'i tendencies, and for his sleight of hand in using the Shari'at Ordinance to ouster Juneiju from office. Bluntly put, "nothing good came of the rule of the anglicized army officer, whose Islamic convictions were skin deep." Editorial commentaries soon found manifestation in the Jama'at's organizational meetings. The Jama'at of Sind's annual convention in Hyderabad on August 12, 1988, for instance, soon turned into a forum for airing grievances against the martial law regime, and General Ziya was blamed

124 In an interview with Takbir Qazi Husain stated that there was no question of an electoral alliance between the Jama'at and MRD, but attempts were being made to merely "coordinate common objectives"; Takbir (Karachi), (June 30, 1988), P.13.

125 Qazi Husain himself played an active role in these anti-Ziya vituperations. For instance, he charged that General Ziya had encouraged Asghar Khan, the leader of Tahrak-i Istiqlal to travel to Iran in 1977, where the Shah had persuaded the former Air Force General to part ways with PNA; Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), pp.20-23.

126 Jasarat (Karachi), (June 18, 1988) and (June 19, 1988).

127 ibid, (June 3, 1988), P.2; and (June 3, 1988), P.4.
for debunking the PNA-PPP talks.\textsuperscript{128}

The escalation of attacks against General Ziya, as mentioned earlier, went hand-in-hand with distancing the Jama'at from MRD. After three tumultuous meetings, the Jama'at Shura' finally rejected the MRD option.\textsuperscript{129} If the decision was any indication of the opinion of the Jama'at membership, the majority had favored staying away from MRD. Although more overtly political than before, the Jama'at was not yet ready for thoroughly sacrificing its religious legacy at the altar of its pragmatic interests. The vote of the Shura' despite its facade of unanimity was, however, not reflective of the discord which reigned within the organization and threatened its unity.

The confusion over joining MRD indicated that the Jama'at continued to grapple with tensions between its ideological loyalties and political imperatives. The routinization of the Jama'at was by no means complete; but as the political motivations behind the organization's breaking away from the overtly Islamic Ziya regime, and dialogue with the secular MRD indicated, the Jama'at had taken a momentous step in the direction of pragmatic politics. A significant change had occurred in the balance of relations between Islam and politics in the program of the Jama'at. Gradually but surely the Jama'at had progressed towards a political existence, sublimating its religious idealism in place of a more rational approach to politics. The Karachi-Lahore controversy was a culmination of a process which was set in motion at Machchi Goth, a process which continues to reshape the Jama'at's views on its ideological content and political role. What is of interest at this

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{ibid}, pp.20-22.

\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Khurshid Ahmad, Islamabad.
juncture, is the nature of the constellation of forces, exogenous to the organization, which emerged in order to inhibit the Jama'at's progress towards pragmatism. The very success of these forces was, however, proof of the extent to which the ideological and political outlook of the Jama'at has come to be conditioned by the society and polity in which the organization operates.

**The Jama'at in the Post-Ziya Period, 1988-Present: Between IJI and PPP**

Although the Shura’ had rejected the offer of joining MRD, the Jama'at continued to be besieged by debate over the issue. It was finally force of circumstance rather than the resolution of this internal debate that set the course for the political future of the Jama'at. On August 17, 1988 General Ziya was killed in an airplane crash in Bhawalpur, significantly changing the factors which controlled the Jama'at's political options.

Following the death of General Ziya the MRD no longer needed the Jama'at. Without the overshadowing presence of General Ziya, there existed few apprehensions about the upcoming elections - now scheduled for November 1988 - and little chance that they may be postponed or interfered with. Whatever problems persisted, were moreover, ironed out by the courts. For instance, following a petition filed before the Supreme Court, a judgement was issued for holding the future elections on the basis of party identity, which was quickly approved by the new President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Thenceforth, the PPP no longer saw any need for MRD, dissolved the alliance, and decided to contest the elections alone. The dissolution of MRD made any debate within the Jama'at regarding the joining of that alliance mute. Some Jama'at leaders argue that, the final decision to keep the Jama'at out of MRD was not taken by the Jama'at Shura',

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The dissolution of MRD, ironically, presented the Jama'at with a dilemma. The organization was clearly unprepared to contest in the elections on its own. Since 1971 the Jama'at had decided to participate in elections as part of a larger coalition which could permit the organization to project greater power than would otherwise be possible. During the Ziya era the Jama'at had been weakened, it had lost its Muhajir base of support, and its popularity had plummeted as a result of its earlier association with the martial law regime. The elections of 1988, moreover, were increasingly reduced into a choice between the PPP and pro-Ziya candidates, leaving little room for any other platforms. All this obviated the possibly of contesting the elections outside of a larger coalition. MRD was no longer a possibility. The only option open to the Jama'at was IJI.

IJI was put together at the behest of the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which manages Pakistan's role in the Afghan Jihad. The military had its reasons for wishing to keep PPP out of power, old enmities and Benazir's Bhutto's vindictive tendencies being one. More importantly, the military was interested in protecting the political and social gains it had made during the Ziya years, and had a vested interest in the continuation of the Afghan Jihad. It was clear to the powers-that-be that, only a strong national coalition, rooted in Islam and the nostalgia of the Ziya years could put up a credible challenge to the PPP. The Jama'at, with its considerable organizational power, was critical to the success of this alliance.

Considerable pressure was therefore brought to bear on the Jama'at by the armed

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130 Interviews with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan and Mahmud A'zam Faruqi, Karachi.

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forces. Qazi Husain, who was opposed to joining IJI, was approached directly by ISI, with whom he had closely worked in the Afghan Jihad. The matter was put before the Jama‘at Shura’ for consideration. There were several issues at stake for the Jama‘at, which were passionately debated by the Karachi and Lahore groups.

Qazi Husain was not willing to join in alliance with the Muslim League. After launching his populist program with much fanfare, the Amir was hard-pressed to join hands with a party of land lords and industrialists, the very epitome of the order which he had vowed to topple.131 IJI would be a set-back for the Jama‘at’s long run political objectives.132 Moreover, significant damage had been incurred to the Jama‘at by the Muslim League since 1985. The memory of the repression of the PPP was far less compelling in 1988 than that of Ghaws ‘Ali Shah’s contribution to the rise of MQM, the launching of MSF, or Pir Pagaro and Juneiju’s rhetoric against the Jama‘at since 1985.133

The Jama‘at, however, had to contend with the fact that, General Ziya became a far more popular man once he was "martyred,"134 and that a ground swell of sympathy and admiration emerged for him among the right of center vote bank in the country. Joining an alliance designed to continue the legacy of the Ziya regime was all of a sudden

131 Even after joining IJI, the Jama‘at issued an election manifesto in September 1988, which was highly populist in tone; see *Awaz-i Jahan* (Lahore), (November 1989), pp.50-53.

132 Interview with Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Lahore.

133 *ibid.*

134 He is routinely referred to as Shahidu‘l-Islam (martyr for Islam) by his sympathizers.
not as impolitic an option as it had seemed only months earlier. More to the point, the rank and file of the Jama'at did not remain impervious to the rising popularity of the late General. The position of the Karachi group was, as a result, seriously undermined within the Jama'at, and its leaders were compelled to retreat. With no other real alternatives before the organization short of either not contesting the elections or suffering a humiliating defeat by contesting alone, the Jama'at agreed to join IJI.

The problem before the Jama'at was now one of entering into an alliance based on the legacy of General Ziya after having spent the preceding three months denouncing the General in the strongest terms. The Jama'at contended with this dilemma by placing greater emphasis upon the Afghan Jihad and the common goals which the Jama'at and the army shared regarding its conduct. Nothing would be said about, unless need be, of the other aspects of General Ziya's rule, and the Jama'at would avoid the embarrassment of openly going back on its words by justifying its entry into IJI solely in terms of defending the Jihad. The Jama'at's political gambit, *ipso facto*, brought the Afghan Jihad to the forefront of the organization's political outlook and policy making. The Jama'at rhetoric against the PPP was, meanwhile, increased, providing justification for the Jama'at's choice of "the lesser of two evils" to those observers who continued to eye the Jama'at's political maneuvers with skepticism.

Jama'at's entry into IJI was also facilitated by the central role which Mian Nawaz

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135 Interview with Siraj Munir, Lahore. The interviewee advised Qazi Husain in this regard, and was present at Jama'at meetings in Mansurah where this decision was reached. Over time, the Jama'at gradually went beyond the Afghan Jihad, and referred more frequently to the Islamization measures of General Ziya as the basis for its continued participation in IJI.
Sharif played in the alliance. Nawaz Sharif, unlike the majority of the Muslim League leadership, was known to be a devout man. He had remained loyal to General Ziya, and hence, continued as the Chief Minister of Punjab even after the Muslim League government had been dismissed by the General. His apparent treachery to his party had created serious tensions between him and Juneiju - the President of Muslim League - which compelled Nawaz Sharif to look for sources of support outside of the League, one of which was the Jama‘at. Qazi Husain reached an understanding with Nawaz Sharif directly, and as such, avoided the unpalatable prospects of a formal alliance with the Muslim League. This, however, made the Jama‘at’s presence in IJI tenuous, and contingent on the vicissitudes of Nawaz Sharif’s rapport with his own party.

The Jama‘at was given 26 national tickets and 44 provincial ones by IJI. The Jama‘at won 8 National Assembly seats, one of which was a special women’s seat; and 13 Provincial Assembly seats, 2 of which were special women’s seats (see table 14.3-14.6). The Jama‘at, therefore, actually won 7 National Assembly seats and 11 Provincial Assembly ones. The Jama‘at percentages, %26.9 and %25 were the lowest of all IJI parties. Hence, although the Jama‘at workers were crucial to IJI’s respectable electoral showings, the Jama‘at was greatly humbled within IJI. In similar vein, MQM’s

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136 The same pro-Jama‘at writers, political analysts and journalists - Muhammad Salahu’ddin, Altaf Hasan Quraishi, and Mujibu’l-Rahman Shami - who had served as General Ziya’s advisors, were now inducted into the inner circle of Nawaz Sharif, as were a number of erstwhile IJT votaries, the most notable of whom is Husain Haqqani.

137 Information was provided by the Shu‘bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Lahore.

138 Special women’s seats are fixed in number, and are distributed after the elections based on the vote of the assemblies.
### TABLE 14.3*

**JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI'S TALLY OF VOTES AND SEATS IN THE 1988 ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>PUNJAB</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>SIND</th>
<th>BALUCHISTAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEATS CONTESTED</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATS WON</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL WOMEN’S SEATS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SEATS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTE RECEIVED</td>
<td>620,952</td>
<td>88,840</td>
<td>100,520</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>810,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE VOTE PER 14.3CANDIDATE</td>
<td>44,354</td>
<td>22,210</td>
<td>12,565</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31,165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Shu‘bah-i Intikhabat-i Jamaʿat-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.*
TABLE 14.4*

JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI'S TALLY OF VOTES AND SEATS IN
THE ELECTIONS OF 1988 TO THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>VOTES/SEATS</th>
<th>PUNJAB</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>SIND</th>
<th>BALUCH-ISTAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEATS CONTESTED</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEATS WON</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPECIAL WOMEN'S SEATS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL SEATS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL VOTES RECEIVED</td>
<td>327,617</td>
<td>93,826</td>
<td>36,537</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>459,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVERAGE VOTE PER CANDIDATE</td>
<td>16,380</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>4,059</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>10,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Su‘bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.
TABLE 14.5*

SEATS WON BY JAMA'AT-Î ISLAMI TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>CITY/SEAT</th>
<th>VOTES RECEIVED</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTES CAST</th>
<th>VOTES OF CLOSEST RIVAL</th>
<th>PARTY OF CLOSEST RIVAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>16,639</td>
<td>67,669</td>
<td>16,149</td>
<td>-**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>35,288</td>
<td>74,643</td>
<td>28,974</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>61,188</td>
<td>139,142</td>
<td>39,294</td>
<td>IND***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>65,210</td>
<td>125,581</td>
<td>57,351</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujrat</td>
<td>32,827</td>
<td>86,465</td>
<td>31,125</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>51,764</td>
<td>108,382</td>
<td>47,908</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Darah Ghazi Khan</td>
<td>60,297</td>
<td>120,234</td>
<td>45,590</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No party affiliation or declaration of independence cited.
***IND stands for Independent.
TABLE 14.6*

SEATS WON BY JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI TO PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>CITY/STATE</th>
<th>VOTES RECEIVED</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTES CAST</th>
<th>VOTES OF CLOSEST RIVAL</th>
<th>PARTY OF CLOSEST RIVAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>24,592</td>
<td>5,284</td>
<td>IND**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>5,542</td>
<td>18,448</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>ANP***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>7,098</td>
<td>14,334</td>
<td>5,852</td>
<td>IND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>11,324</td>
<td>24,049</td>
<td>11,067</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>6,767</td>
<td>16,317</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>ANP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>9,363</td>
<td>23,034</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>IND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>27,452</td>
<td>67,149</td>
<td>23,559</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Khushab</td>
<td>32,452</td>
<td>64,632</td>
<td>24,580</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>22,836</td>
<td>48,069</td>
<td>22,549</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>26,729</td>
<td>59,424</td>
<td>25,864</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB</td>
<td>Lyah</td>
<td>26,438</td>
<td>67,832</td>
<td>14,940</td>
<td>IND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IND stands for Independent.
***ANP stands for Awami National Party.
total victory in Karachi, and especially the defeat of ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad and Sayyid Munawwar Hasan at the polls, greatly weakened the Karachi group within the Jama‘at, all of whose national and provincial seats now came from the more strongly pro-Ziya and pro-IJI N.W.F.P. and Punjab.

In the aftermath of the elections, the PPP took over the reigns of government at the center and in N.W.F.P. and Sind, and IJI took over the Ministry of Punjab. Since neither the PPP nor IJI had stable majorities, parliamentary intrigues soon followed with the objective of toppling the central government and various ministries. The resultant byzantine intrigues replaced the time-honored agitational style of dissent in Pakistan. It took politics out of the streets, where the Jama‘at’s organizational prowess could exact the greatest political price, to the National and Provincial Assemblies, where the Jama‘at was weakest. The organization, therefore, found itself increasingly marginalized, and irrelevant to the flow of politics.

Consequently, the dormant internal tensions again reared their head as the organization began to ponder ways in which to break out of its political impasse. The Jama‘at leadership began to consider alternative courses of action, and meanwhile, looked for ways to augment their power within IJI.\(^\text{139}\)

The Karachi group and elements within the Lahore group began to look for

\(^{139}\) In an interview with this author Qazi Husain Ahmad commented that, he did not view IJI as a positive force, but merely as a means to stop the hegemony of PPP. However, there existed benefits for the Jama‘at in staying with Nawaz Sharif; for, as Qazi Husain put it "he is the shadow Prime Minister"; interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad, Lahore.
solutions beyond IJI.\textsuperscript{140} The Jama’at was not yet reconciled to its coercion into IJI, and was unhappy with the role of the Muslim League in the alliance.\textsuperscript{141} Antagonisms with Pir Pagaro and Juneiju continued, as did clashes with the Muslim League leadership in Punjab - Mian Manzur Watu, Chaudhri Shuja’at and Chaudhri Parvez Ilahi. The Jama’at’s nexus with IJI had become perilously restricted to Nawaz Sharif, whose position in Punjab in 1988-89 was by no means certain. Not only was Nawaz Sharif under attack from the PPP, but the Muslim League leadership, believing in the efficacy of secular politics, pressurized him to break with the Jama’at.\textsuperscript{142} Meanwhile attacks by MSF on IJT continued, and the unchecked rivalry between the two became a source of grave concern for IJI leaders.\textsuperscript{143}

The Jama’at, however, could not easily break with IJI; mainly because of the rising popularity of General Ziya, which were clearly manifested at the commemoration of the first anniversary of his death on August 17, 1989 in Islamabad.\textsuperscript{144} No where was this

\textsuperscript{140} Jama’at leaders such as, Qazi Husain, Khurram Murad, Liaqat Baluch and Ghafur Ahmad favored looking beyond IJI, even to PPP, while Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi, Jan Muhammad ‘Abbasi and Hafiz Muhammad Idris favored staying with IJI.

\textsuperscript{141} Sayyid As‘ad Gilani, for instance, berated PPP and the Muslim League in similar vein as secular and feudalist parties. Interview with Sayyid As‘ad Gilani in \textit{Nida} (Lahore), (April 17, 1990), P.14.

\textsuperscript{142} Interviews with Siraj Munir and Altaf Hasan Quraishi, Lahore; and Mahmud A’zam Faruqi, Karachi.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Takbir} (September 28, 1989), pp.28-29.

\textsuperscript{144} This author was particularly surprised at the number of times during the speeches of the Jama’at leaders at their open convention in Lahore in November 1989 that, the crowd interrupted the speakers, to their annoyance, by chants of "Mard-i Haq, Ziyau’l-Haq (man of truth, Ziyau’l-Haq)."
surge in the popularity of General Ziya more visible than among the rank and file of the Jama'at. The organization, therefore, adopted a more reserved policy of criticism of IJI, but continued its support for Nawaz Sharif. Relations between the Jama'at and IJI were, therefore, further personalized. The Jama'at leaders raised concerns about the extent of IJI's dedication to Islamization of Pakistan, and criticized the absence of concern for socioeconomic issues in the alliance's agenda. The relations between the Jama'at and IJI took a turn for the worse when in October 1989 MQM broke with the PPP and was wooed by the IJI leadership. MQM threw its lot in with the IJI in November 1989 in anticipation of toppling the PPP government through a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. The idea of cooperating with MQM, which now played the role of the IJI arm in Sind, brought the relations between the Jama'at and IJI to the brink of collapse. The Jama'at of Karachi took particular offense at the fact that, the IJI-MQM negotiations were conducted without consultations with the Jama'at.

Despite its anger at IJI, the Jama'at did not break with the alliance. It instead made a qualified positive response to overtures made by the PPP. Benazir Bhutto's government was once again eager to secure the cooperation of the Jama'at. The Jama'at's break with IJI would deny that alliance much of its street power and political workers,

145 See, The Friday Times (Lahore), (March 15-21, 1990), pp.1-2. Here, Khurram Murad is quoted as saying, IJI was designed to put a stop to PPP, and hence, the Jama'at does not expect to see its goals materialize through the aegis of this ad hoc body.

146 The arrangement between IJI and MQM came about under the aegis of Combined Opposition Parties (COP), which was an anti-PPP parliamentary coalition between IJI and other parties opposed to the PPP which did not wish to formally join IJI.

147 Interview with Mahmud A'zam Faruqi, Karachi.
which could prove decisive in snap elections - which were being considered at the time. If the Jama’at could be made to move close to PPP, it would provide the government with a much needed Islamic legitimacy, and conversely, would divide the seemingly unified pro-Ziya political camp. Moreover, for a government threatened by a vote of no confidence, any vote taken from the opposition counted, and the Jama’at had 8 such votes.

Early in November 1989, the Jama’at’s old enemy, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and a veteran of IJT-PSF clashes of the late-1960s - Jahangir Badr - met separately with Qazi Husain and Liaqat Baluch in Lahore. The Jama’at was told that, PPP was making headway in winning over the Muslim League of Punjab, which meant that Nawaz Sharif was to fall. It was to the benefit of the Jama’at to reach an agreement with PPP while it had a bargaining position; otherwise, it would be buried along with Nawaz Sharif. The Jama’at seriously considered both the PPP’s offer of a carrot as well as that of the stick, especially as the PPP government survived the vote of no confidence, and for a while appeared to be more stable. Indications were, therefore, made that the Jama’at was willing to consider more concrete proposals from the PPP.

As a result, additional meetings took place between PPP and Jama’at leaders. On February 1, 1990 Qazi Husain met with the Deputy Secretary General of PPP, N.D. Khan, who also met with Ghafur Ahmad on February 18. These meetings did not result in

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148 Interview with Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Lahore.

149 Nation (Lahore), (February 2, 1990), P.1; and (February 19, 1990), P.8. Ghafur Ahmad went so far as to sent messages of advice regarding the deteriorating law and order situation in Sind for Benazir Bhutto and the PPP Chief Minister of Sind, Qa’im ‘Ali Shah, through Khan.
any concrete agreements, but the Jama'at accepted the possibility of its cooperation with PPP in principle, which was nevertheless, a significant development. The Jama'at, however, was not as yet prepared to go any further than this concession. Hence, insurmountable conditions were placed before the PPP as prerequisites for Jama'at's further cooperation. Jama'at leaders stated that they would consider cooperating with PPP if it would change its policy in Sind, alter its foreign policy, accept the ideological nature of the Pakistan state and the desirability of the establishment of an Islamic state, and change its leadership. The last condition was, needless to add, the most contentious. PPP had to purge itself of Benazir Bhutto, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, and Mukhtar A'wan. The first two because they were women - although the Jama'at had supported the candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah - and the latter two for their atrocities against the Jama'at and IJT. The Jama'at even went further to name its choice for leading the PPP. Mian Tufayl announced that a woman would be unacceptable to the Jama'at, but if PPP were to be led by Mi'raj Khalid, Faruq Laghari or Amin Fahim, the Jama'at would be congenial to closer relations with that party. In a more official declaration Qazi Husain announced that the Jama'at, given the dangers posed to Pakistan by the Kashmir crisis, would consider joining a PPP-led national unity government; however, only if it was not led by Benazir or Nusrat Bhutto, and if it was, preferably, led by Faruq Laghari.

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150 Interview with Sayyid Munawwar Hasan, Karachi; and Malik Ghulam 'Ali, Lahore.

151 Interview with Chaudhri Aslam Salimi, Lahore.

152 Interview with Mian Tufayl Muhammad in *Takbir* (Karachi), (March 29, 1990), P.24.

153 Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in *Dawn* (Karachi), (February 9, 1990), P.3.
Laghari, Qazi Husain's interlocutor during the Jama'at-MRD negotiations was Minister of Water and Power in the PPP government. Not surprisingly, the conditions set by the Jama'at closed the door to any serious negotiations between the two. They were, however, significant in that the Jama'at officially established the possibility of cooperation with the PPP, what the Karachi group had fought for in the summer of 1988, and failed to bring about.

The possibility of closer cooperation between the Jama'at and the PPP government increased in March 1988. The Jama'at leaders began to worry that IJI was pushing Pakistan towards a new military coup, of which the Jama'at wanted no part. A Jama'at Shura' meeting in the first week of March passed a resolution strongly criticizing Jama'at’s alliance with the Muslim League, and advising the Amir to pull the Jama'at out of IJI. On March 6, 1990, Qazi Husain announced that the Jama'at, to the dismay of IJI leaders who were fanning Pakistani passions against PPP’s handling of the Kashmir crisis, was in full agreement with the government’s Kashmir policy. If the Afghan Jihad had permitted the Jama'at to join IJI without losing face, the Kashmir crisis could do the same for the organization’s rapprochement with the PPP government.

The gradual warming of relations between the Jama'at and PPP, however, came to a naught. In the first instance, from May 1990 onwards the law and order situation in Sind deteriorated, and the PPP government, now under debilitating charges of corruption and mismanagement, was once again pushed into the defensive by IJI. The Jama'at found

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154 Interview with ‘Abdu’l-Ghafur Ahmad in The Friday Times (Lahore), (March-8-14, 1990), P.1.
it prudent to await the outcome of PPP’s latest crisis, and not become entangled with a government which was increasingly viewed in an unsavory light.\(^{155}\) The PPP government, as it turned out, did not survive the fall in its political fortunes in the summer of 1990, and was ousted from office on August 6, 1990, when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, and called for fresh elections for October 1990.

The Jama‘at, therefore, remained with IJI. It was given 18 National Assembly tickets, and 37 provincial seats - 8 fewer national tickets and 7 fewer provincial tickets than in 1988.\(^{156}\) In the closely contested electoral race of 1990, this was a mark of the Jama‘at diminishing value for IJI. The Jama‘at insisted upon contesting against IJI’s ally, MQM, and was finally given 6 of its national tickets and 11 of its provincial ones from that province\(^{157}\) - none of which was won. The Jama‘at, however, did better in these elections than in 1988. It won 8 of 18 contested national seats (won 7 of 26 in 1988), and 19 of 37 contested provincial seats (won 11 of 44 in 1988) (see table 14.7). The Jama‘at’s percentages were improved to \(\%44.4\) and \(\%51.3\) for National and Provincial Assembly races respectively. The Jama‘at did especially well in Punjab, where it won all of the 7 National Assembly seats it contested, and 11 of the 14 Provincial seats it was assigned. Although the improvement came about as a result of the soaring of IJI’s fortunes, it nevertheless, has boosted the morale of the organization significantly.

However, as a mark of the organization’s continuing unhappiness with its

\(^{155}\) Interview with Ghafur Ahmad, Karachi.

\(^{156}\) Information provided in correspondence by Shu‘bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama‘at-i Islami, Lahore.

\(^{157}\) Interview with Ghafur Ahmad in *Herald* (Karachi), (October 1990), P.62.
TABLE 14.7*

SEATS CONTESTED AND WON BY JAMA'AT-I ISLAMI
IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NA** SEATS CONTESTED</th>
<th>NA SEATS WON</th>
<th>PA+ SEATS CONTESTED</th>
<th>PA SEATS WON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUNJAB++</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP+++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIND</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALUCH-ISTAN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Shu'bah-i Intikhabat-i Jama'at-i Islami, Pakistan, Lahore.
**NA stands for National Assembly.
+PA stands for Provincial Assembly.
++In Punjab the Jama'at’s NA seats won were from Rawilpindi, Lahore (2), Sargodha, Sahiwal, Shaikhapura, and Sialkot. The PA seats were won in Rawilpindi (2), Lahore (3), Faisalabad, Sargodha, Gujranwala, Liyah, Bhawalpur, and Gujrat.
+++In NWFP, the Jama'at won its NA seat in Swat. Its PA seats were won in Swat (2), Chitral, and Dir (5).
arrangement with IJI, the Jama'at declined participation in Nawaz Sharif's cabinet, and chose instead, to keep its options open.\textsuperscript{158} Since October 1990 the Jama'at's distance from the IJI government has become even more clear.\textsuperscript{159} This has been in part due to the fact that, IJI much like General Ziya is relying to an increasing extent upon provincial and ethnic parties such as MQM in Sind and ANP in N.W.F.P. to exert its control in those provinces.\textsuperscript{160} These parties, needless to add are the Jama'at's rival, and create problems for the organization's participation in IJI.\textsuperscript{161} In a move which is indicative of the organization's greater pragmatism as well as unhappiness with IJI, the Jama'at has shifted its rhetoric away from demand for democracy, focusing it instead on religious concerns. The Jama'at has therefore, turned its attention to the Shari'at Bill, which has been presented to the Senate for approval. The Bill which was at one point derided by the Jama'at as a ploy by the Ziya regime to keep the Islamic groups in check and postpone elections, is now championed by the organization as the means of exerting pressure on the IJI government, and adumbrating an Islamic oppositional stance to the right of the government.

Similar function was played by the Jama'at's strong stance in support of Iraq, and

\textsuperscript{158} Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in Takbir (Karachi), (January 31, 1991), P.26. Although here Qazi Husain asserts that no concrete offers were forthcoming from the new government either.

\textsuperscript{159} See interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in Takbir (Karachi), (December 27, 1990), pp.26-27; and \textit{ibid}, (January 3, 1991), P.35, and (January 31, 1991), pp.26-27.

\textsuperscript{160} Takbir (Karachi), (December 27, 1990), pp.26-27.

\textsuperscript{161} The Jama'at was greatly annoyed with IJI's decision to ask ANP to form a coalition Ministry in N.W.F.P., and declined to join the government of that province; see, Herald (Karachi), (January 1991), pp.66-68.
increasingly vehement opposition to the Persian Gulf monarchies and emirates - the organization's financial patrons and political allies to date - all against the official policy of the IJI government during the Persian Gulf crisis between August 1990 and February 1991.\textsuperscript{162} The Jama'at's new policy orientations have been deemed as embarrassing about-turns, compromises which did not occur free of criticism. Critics of the organization were quick to point out that not too long ago the Jama'at had shied away from supporting the Shari'at Bill, and the organization could hardly conceal its long-running financial and political alliance with Saudi Arabia behind its new rhetoric against the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{163} The charges were serious enough to prompt Qazi Husain to tour Pakistan in March 1991 to explain the logic of the organization's new policies, especially on the Persian Gulf crisis, to Jama'at workers and supporters.\textsuperscript{164} Although the decision to support Iraq may on surface to be an idealist posture, it signals greater pragmatism.\textsuperscript{165} The Jama'at, even at

\textsuperscript{162} The Jama'at viewed the war as a "Zionist plot", carried out by the U.S. to weaken the Muslim world and the Middle East in order to guarantee the security of Israel; see interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in \textit{Herald} (Karachi), (February 1991), P.24. The Jama'at has more specifically demanded that the government recall its 11,000 troops from Saudi Arabia. Between September 12 and 15, 1990 the Jama'at participated in a pro-Iraq Islamic conference convened in Jordan. For greater details see the debate between the editor of \textit{Takbir} and the Jama'at leadership over this issue in the magazine's issues of (January 31, 1991), pp.5-57 and 50; and (February 14, 1991), pp.15-18.

\textsuperscript{163} Muhammad Salahu'ddin, the editor of \textit{Takbir}, for instance, suggested that in light of the Jama'at's assertion that the Kingdom is an undemocratic lackey of imperialism, Khurshid Ahmad return the Faisal Award which he received in 1989 to the Saudi government; see \textit{Takbir} (Karachi), (January 31, 1991), P.7.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{The Friday Times} (Lahore), (February 7-13, 1991),P.7.

\textsuperscript{165} In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis the Jama'at has joined hands with the left in an attempt to create a broad-based pro-Iraq coalition; see, \textit{Herald} (Karachi), (March 1991), P.29.
the cost of losing its financial base of support in the Kingdom, has viewed the stance in favor of Iraq and against "American imperialism and its stooges" as a popular one, one which discerns the organization's position from that of the government. The decision to support Iraq was taken after Pakistan was embroiled in wide-spread anti-American agitations following the commencement of the war. The organization having sensed the ground swell of popular support for Iraq in Pakistan has decided to take up the popular issue as "the cause of the masses," and hence to ride the tide of resurgent Islamic feelings which it believed would once again sweep across Pakistan. The success of the IJI in the elections of 1990 was moreover associated in part with the coalition's anti-American rhetoric. The lesson of IJI's success was not lost on the Jama'at. Resort to pragmatism, however, is not as yet divorced of charges of ideological infidelity and hence, continues to exact a price from the Jama'at.

The return of democracy to Pakistan has presented the Jama'at with a significant new problem. As Pakistani politics has become tamed, and moved from the streets into the assemblies, the Jama'at's fortunes have plummeted. While the organization still enjoys a favorable bargaining position during election campaigns, when other national parties are in need of the Jama'at's considerable organizational prowess, by and large, the Jama'at has been marginalized. In the new democratic era, the Jama'at short of a better electoral showing cannot wield the same kind of power in IJI that it enjoyed in the PNA. The Jama'at has therefore been compelled to seriously consider expanding its base of power by appealing
to a greater extent to populist themes. This, however, puts the organization at odds with
the IJI, and especially with the Muslim League. The Jama‘at, despite its inner inhibitions,
feels that an alliance with PPP will better help the organization to develop its nascent
populism. The Islamic basis of IJI, the great appeal which the memory of the Ziya era
holds for the Jama‘at constituency and its rank and file, and finally the demise of the PPP
in the elections of 1990 have impeded the Jama‘at’s ability to move away from its
ideological tendencies in the direction of pragmatic considerations which alone are likely
to open the political horizons of the organization. Despite inhibitive forces which have
restrained the Jama‘at from shedding its Islamic cloak more definitively, between 1988 and
1990, the organization made significant strides towards incorporating the principle of
pragmatic considerations in policy making into its political thinking. This was all, no
doubt, caused by the apparent decline in the returns to the Jama‘at’s legitimating function,
and conversely, serves as a mark of its greater political enfranchisement.

Negotiations with PPP occurred during this period, divorced from the kind of
psychological trauma and organizational confusion that characterized the contacts with
MRD; and as a result, the notion of cooperation with a secular party, an erstwhile enemy,
and the pariah of the Islamic parties, was imprinted on the political thinking of the
Jama‘at. The organization, therefore, took further steps in the direction of routinizing its
religious idealism, and supplanting religious concerns with purely political ones in its
decision-making.
CONCLUSION

"Heed not the blind eye, the echoing ear, 
nor yet the tongue, but bring this great 
debate to the test of reason."

Parmenides
In the preceding chapters the history, ideological perspective, organizational structure, and the politics of Jama‘at-i Islami were examined. The origins of the idea of the Jama‘at, the articulation of its world view, the nature of its ideology, the evolution of its organizational structure, and the forces which have controlled and conditioned the organization's political views and practices were all detailed. Over the past five decades the Jama‘at has emerged as a significant force in Islamic revivalism, the vicissitudes of whose activism has been intermeshed with Muslim politics in South Asia, first in India, and later, in Pakistan. Born of Muslim communal frustrations, and a progeny of the social and intellectual forces which shaped the politics of the Muslim community of India during the inter-war period, the Jama‘at eventually evolved into a religiopolitical organization aimed at Islamizing Pakistan. The history of the Jama‘at, therefore, has been intertwined with the contemporary history of Islam in South Asia. The religiopolitical outlook of Mawdudi was shaped and implemented throughout this period in light of the imperatives of the community and polity in which the Jama‘at operated. Just as the vicissitudes of Indian, and later, Pakistani politics, in good measure, explain the nature and direction of the development of the Jama‘at, so does the revivalist ideas and activism of the Jama‘at shed light on the internal dynamics of politics in pre-partition India, and later, Pakistan. The prolonged and dynamic interactions of the Jama‘at with its sociopolitical context, moreover, provides a rare glimpse into the inner working of revivalist ideology and praxis, and outlines the trajectory along which Islamic revivalism may evolve. This study, therefore, identifies those forces which control the dynamics of continuity and change in revivalist thinking, determines the nature of revivalism’s political agenda and social
impact, and finally, presents us with clues as to whither Islamic revivalism.

As such, a central concern before this study, which was stipulated at the outset, has been to discern the nature and scope of the influence of Islamic ideology on the political process, and hence, to determine extent of the political efficacy of Islamic revivalism. It became apparent from our examination of the history of the Jama'at that, it has enjoyed considerable success in articulating, and subsequently institutionalizing, a distinct interpretive reading of Islam. The Jama'at has informed the political discourse in Pakistan with concerns born of its ideological perspective, and imbued the popular world view with a strong sense for religious ideals. Yet, the organization’s success in the intellectual and ideological domains has not found reflection in the political realm. Ideologically consequential, the Jama'at has remained politically marginal. It has influenced politics - setting the parameters for the national political discourse - but has failed to successfully control the working of Pakistani politics, and to anchor its underlying debates in religious concerns. The Jama'at has proved capable of forming sociopolitical alliances predicated upon an Islamic political program; the resultant movement, however, has not been able to satisfactorily monopolize the fundamental political debates in Pakistan, and hence, has not served as a satisfactory means for securing power for the organization.

The discrepancy between ideological prowess and political weakness is one which is not usually associated with Islamic revivalism. It is therefore, theoretically significant. For, it suggests that the linkage between ideological appeal and political power in the case of Islamic revivalism is neither causal nor necessarily direct. The universalist appeal of Islamic revivalism is, rather, checked by the vicissitudes of the sociopolitical context in
which it operates. Islamic revivalism has generally - with the exception of the case of Iran - shown greater ability in setting the tone for and determining the language of national political debates - the form which shapes the parameters of their political discourse - but has been hard-pressed to determine the content of the ensuing debates. As result of this disjuncture, the political efficacy of Islamic revivalism remains limited - predicated upon its ability to relate to the ebb and flow of popular political concerns.

The similarity of their ideological proclamations withstanding, what distinguishes between the emergence of coherent and politically instrumental Islamic sociopolitical movements in the cases of Iran, Algeria or Jordan from that of Pakistan and the Jama'at is the ability of the former to successfully bridge the gap between ideology and politics - form and content of their political discourse. The translation of Islamic revivalist ideology into a successful sociopolitical movement is, therefore, controlled by the dynamics of an active interaction between ideology and social action. The dialectics of this interactive process is evident in the historical growth of the Jama'at whose trials and tribulations in the context of Pakistani politics underlines the salience of the confluence of the form and content of the national political discourse to the success of Islamic revivalism.

The importance of this confluence, and its reflection in such determinants of social action as the charismatic style of leadership, a nexus between the ideological perspective and socioeconomic imperatives, a clear understanding of the aims, program and organizational agenda of the movement - whether it is revolutionary and directed at toppling the state, or conversely, a party designed to project power in the electoral process - and appeal to the language and culture of the masses are underlined in this study by their
conspicuous absence in the Jama'at's thinking and policies. Therefore, the successes and failures of the Jama'at, as they have become evident in our examination of the history, ideology and the political *modus operandi* of the organization can shed much light on the nature of interactions between Islamic ideology and the politics of Muslim societies, discerning the extent of the influence of the former on the latter.

Fifty years of political activism within the fold of the Pakistan movement, and later the Pakistan state, has produced little in the form of political gains for the Jama'at. While the organization's electoral showings have improved modestly over time, the pace of growth of the organization's popularity has hardly been a source of comfort. To some extent the Jama'at's political fortunes have become the victim of the organization's success in enunciating and propagating an Islamic ideological perspective, and in imbuing the national political discourse with a concern for Islam. With no means of preventing new entries into the revivalist arena, the fruits of the Jama'at's efforts were reaped by an array of other religiopolitical organizations. While the Islamic revivalist ideology has fared well in Pakistan, in good measure owing to the efforts of the Jama'at, the organization's political interests have not been served in the process. A cursory review of the electoral data since 1971 indicate that, while the Jama'at's share of the national vote has remained relatively constant at a marginal level, the percentage of religious vote which the Jama'at helped cultivate has become politically more significant. While this may explain the Jama'at's predicament, at least in part, it only attests to the political quandary before the organization, and as such does not augur well for the future.

In fact, over the years it has become increasingly clear to Jama'at leaders that the
organization is effectively constrained in its effort to act as a political movement. Moreover, organizational fiat, it was soon realized, was by itself incapable of alleviating the Jama'at's problem. These realizations did not come to Jama'at leaders until 1971 when the organization was routed at the polls. Absence of any meaningful national elections in Pakistan between 1947 and 1971 had given the organization a false sense of security, and no means for gauging the success of its policies to date. Thenceforth, as a testimony to the organization's political plight, the Jama'at has not participated in national elections outside of an umbrella multi-party coalition.

The Jama'at's predicament initially stemmed from its particular understanding of the relation of ideology to politics. Throughout its history, the Jama'at has viewed the power of Islamic values and symbolisms as sufficiently compelling to secure political power. It was this folly which led Mawdudi to expect to inherit the mantle of Jinnah and the Muslim League, and it has also been the same folly which has led the organization to steer clear of sociopolitical concerns - populist themes and concrete social and economic issues - in its ideological outlook, and subsequently, political conduct. Although promising a revolution, the Jama'at has remained anchored in traditional Islam; and moreover, has seen revolution in ethical terms, and as an educational process. As a result the Jama'at has become a significant force in the evolution of Pakistani political culture, but has been unable to exercise effective power in the political arena. More to the point, as a result of over-reliance upon the political promise of its ideological perspective, the organization has
failed to secure any means of social control. While it exhorts Pakistani to do right, avoid wrong, and abide by Islamic dictums, the Jama'at has no mechanisms in its possession to provide social and political services to the masses - especially in the rural areas where traditional structures of authority reign supreme - nor is the organization able to present them with effective strategies of survival at times of crisis or change. As a result, neither the state nor the masses have found reason to invest their political fortunes in the Jama'at. It is at this juncture that the linkage between ideological appeal and political support has broken down. Enthusiasm for the Jama'at's cause is not sufficiently compelling to override the more paramount sociopolitical concerns of both the powers-that-be and the masses. The sociopolitical context of Pakistan, from which the Jama'at has remained divorced, has brought to the fore the limits of the political appeal and efficacy of an apolitical and discrete interpretation of the revivalist ideology; and by the same token underlined the importance of continuity between ideology and social action.

This point is best illustrated by the politics of the Ziya period. Initially optimistic about the promise of Islam and Islamic revivalist parties, General Ziya closely associated his regime with the Islamic forces - the Jama'at being the most influential of them - and assigned the various spokesmen of Islamic revivalism to serve as intermediaries between the government and the people. Soon it became apparent that although ideologically significant, the Islamic parties in general, and the Jama'at in particular, were unable to exercise any significant form of social control. General Ziya, therefore, realized that

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despite the appeal of Islam, his regime had no firm grounding. It was then that he turned to traditional political leaders - land lords and the rural and urban strongmen - under the aegis of the Muslim League government on the one hand, and ethnic forces in Sind on the other, to provide social control and bolster his regime. While the manipulation of Islamic values and symbolisms by the Ziya regime may have tarnished the image of the Jama'at and its cohorts, it was the fact that the General had to appeal to ethnic forces and traditional political leaders in lieu of Islamic ideology that dealt the heaviest blow to the prestige of the Islamic revivalist forces. It was a testimony to their weakness and the political ineffectiveness of their whole enterprise.

The Jama'at's inability to exercise social control is a direct result of its reliance upon the promise of the appeal of Islamic symbolisms, to the exclusion of immediate and tangible popular concerns, to harbinge a political victory. Jama'at leaders have, for most of the organization's history, failed to see the need for creating veritable linkages with the society. The organization has not as yet served as a mechanism for translating popular interests into policy platforms under the aegis of Islam, but it has rather, handed down what it believes the population ought to feel, expect and demand. The organization has, therefore, remained divorced from the dynamics and flow of politics in Pakistan. Its organizational fiat has never been complimented with the power of a mass based movement. Only in the 1972-77 period did the Jama'at come close to achieving such a feat, as in opposition to the Bhutto government the Jama'at came to reflect popular demands. Yet, even then the organization failed to institutionalize its incipient ties to society, and was thus easily preempted by the armed forces in its bid for power.
The Jama'at's pedantic tendencies have been reinforced by the organization's overall orientation toward the state. Believing that revolution is implemented from above rather than initiated from below, the Jama'at has directed the lion's share of its energies at influencing the organs of the state. As a result it has remained oblivious to the power and potential of mass politics. The Jama'at's rhetoric has been anchored in Urdu and directed at the elite; its tone has been didactic, and its style dispassionate; its culture has remained that of the urban middle and lower middle classes. Aside from its tenuous rapport with the Muhajir community, the organization has seldom addressed itself to the Sindhi, Punjabi, Pakhtun or Baluchi rural and urban poor, nor has it envisioned a struggle for power which encompasses the aspirations of the masses, harnessing their political energies.

Preoccupation with the importance of the state has, moreover, made the Jama'at a strong defender of Pakistan's stability and territorial integrity. This has been a nationalist posture which was not always in keeping with the demands of populist politics. As Pakistan became the culmination of the Muslim communalist struggle in India, the Jama'at, despite its pan-Islamic pretensions, talk of Islamizing the whole of India, and opposition to the Muslim League, became an ardent defender of Muslim separatism. Mawdudi chose to live in Pakistan, and dissected the Jama'at along the nation-state boundaries of India and Pakistan. Ever since, the Jama'at has functioned in a legitimating role in Pakistan, underlining the Islamic identity of a country which was created in the name of Islam, and which save for its religious identity has had few other means of bolstering its state structures and containing the disintegrative forces which have been at

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work within its polity. Hence, while the Jama'at has continued to pay lip-service to the ideal of pan-Islamism, in reality it has adopted Pakistani nationalism as the vehicle for both defining and implementing its agenda. As a result, the boundaries between the Jama'at's political objectives and organizational policies have become straddled, sublimating political activism and obfuscating the organization's ultimate aims.

The commitment to the Pakistan nation-state - the self-avowed homeland of the Muslims of India - was necessitated by the very precariousness of that state. The Jama'at's ideological outlook had since the creation of Pakistan compelled the Jama'at to defend the integrity of the state before challenges to its existence. Commitment to defending the Pakistan state, not unexpectedly, came about in tandem with suspending anti-state revolutionary activism. Needless to add, this is not a development which favors an ideological formulation such as Islamic revivalism. The structure and working of the Pakistani state has nudged the Jama'at in the direction of greater participation in and support of the state. For, revolutions are a feature of highly centralized states, which Pakistan has never become.² The realities of Pakistani politics, reflecting the dialectics of the working of Islam in a weak state, have therefore, eschewed revolutionary activism and favored participation in the political process, whose boundaries are demarcated by those of the nation-state. The fractious nature of the Pakistan state has, moreover, made it more permissive to Islam, which has in turn, somewhat straddled the boundary between the state and the Islamic opposition to it, dissipating ideological posturing vis a vis the


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state. The kind of disjuncture between state and society upon which revolutions are predicated, as a result, did not emerge in Pakistan. The Jama'at, therefore, became bound to its national role, accepting gradual Islamization, and then, from within, in place of a direct bid for power by overthrowing the state from without.

Despite this change in orientation the Jama'at did not adjust its position sufficiently or drastically enough to fundamentally effect its political fortunes. An ideological perspective and a closely-knit organizational structure suited to revolutionary activism, thenceforth, were employed in an electoral setting with less than favorable results. The belief in the political efficacy of the Islamic ideology led the Jama'at to conclude that the organization required no reassessment of its ideological stance and reform of its organizational structure with view to the needs of electoral politics, nor did it deem direct linkages with society, appeal to socioeconomic grievances or ethnic and linguistic loyalties to be necessary. The organization, therefore, remained focused on its efforts to influence the state, and steered clear of either populist or ethnic politics. It directed its efforts at legitimating the Pakistan state, espousing an ideological perspective which was sanitized of all hints of populist themes.

If the folly the Jama'at's "apolitical" approach to politics was brought to light by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the PPP’s successful manipulation of populist themes in the late 1960s, the political costs of the Jama'at’s national posture, although lauded by Pakistani nationalists, became apparent with the meteoric rise to prominence of MQM. The implications of these developments go beyond the policy choices of the Jama'at. The lesson of Bhutto’s success, much like that of the Iranian revolution, suggests that for
Islamic ideology to succeed in its bid for power it must successfully relate to socioeconomic issues and populist themes; it must address the bottom strata of the society, and not its ruling elite; and above all else, it must both set the tone for national political debates, and show concern for popular political demands.

The issue of MQM, however, has had even more far reaching implications. The emergence of ethnic loyalties among the one Pakistani community which was most closely associated with Pakistan and Islam, has suggested that ethnic and linguistic loyalties supersede the appeal of Islamic ideology. Muhajir group solidarity, as ephemeral as it may have seemed, has proved to possess greater popular appeal, political promise, and possibly staying power, than the Islamic brotherhood which is implied in the reviverist ideology. The result has been to put the very efficacy of Islam as a social bond, and a political tool into question; for none more so than for the Jama‘at leadership.

Cognizant of the problems which face the organization, and eager to free themselves of the constraints that have checked their political aspirations, Jama‘at leaders have increasingly sublimated their religious idealism in favor pragmatic politics - abandoning their faith in the political efficacy of their ideology. This process began early on, and has unfolded in a piece-meal fashion since. It first encompassed the theological teachings of the organization, but increasingly pitted ideological dogma against pragmatic political choices. The Jama‘at, despite internal resistance, has systematically favored political interests at the cost of ideological purity. The result has been a gradual, but significant routinization of the Jama‘at’s idealism.

This process occurred in tandem with the political enfranchisement of the Jama‘at.
Political dissent rather than anti-state revolutionary activism became the hallmark of the organization. Interestingly, politicization - participation in the Pakistani political process - became the harbinger of routinization, and was negatively correlated with idealism. Politicization inculcated a new set of values and objectives in the mind-set of the Jama'at and its growing bureaucratic structure, and necessitated pragmatism which over time has gradually, but surely, supplanted purely religious or ideological concerns. In many instances, pragmatic concerns have influenced ideological sensibilities, continuously reforming and refining the Jama'at's underlying ethos and doctrines. In similar vein, pragmatic concerns have brought the Jama'at somewhat closer to Pakistani society, and made the organization more tolerant of the obscurantist cultural mores of the masses and the society's views on Islam. Routinization has, therefore, traditionalized the Jama'at, bringing it closer to traditional Islam.

The political enfranchisement of the Jama'at has, moreover, influenced the ideological position of the organization. A greater commitment to democracy and the constitutional process - complimenting the organization's significant modernization of Islamic thought - emerged in the Jama'at's thinking, first as a political ploy, but increasingly as the mark of a new orientation. In a country which has spent 25 years of its 44 years of independence under martial rule, and another 5 under the heavy hand of an autocratic civilian ruler, the fate of an oppositional expression of Islam which had already forgone the option of revolution, would inevitably be intertwined with that of democracy.

Routinization of idealism, and greater pragmatism, however, have not as yet resolved the problem of the Jama'at's stultified political growth. Despite the increasing
pragmatism of the organization no significant changes in its electoral showings and mass popularity have become apparent. The routinization process has come about in conjunction with embarrassing compromises, some of which have hurt the Jama'at more than they have helped it. Many have left the Jama'at as a result of the organization's change of policy, as have many of the voters who are motivated by religious concerns. The more contentious the routinization process, the more this tendency has become apparent.

The Jama'at has since inception proved to be resistant to radical internal changes. As a result it has approached routinization and pragmatic policies with great caution. It has initiated no radical changes of policy, but minor adjustments, the sum total of which over time amount to a new orientation. As a result rather than clarifying a new stance it has straddled the boundaries between its appeal to Islamic sentiments and pragmatic policies. It has not moved rapidly enough to shed its long-standing image and to adopt a new one. Consequently, its policies have been found suspect by the religious vote, and yet failed to sway those who are motivated by pragmatic concerns. The organization's vacillation in revising its heretofore forbidding membership criteria has further complicated the transformation of the organization.

While Qazi Husain Ahmad has taken firm steps in the direction of resolving the Jama'at's janus-faced existence, internal resistance combined with political exigencies have interfered with, and hence hampered, the Amir's efforts. For instance, the decision to join IJI, a party of the landed elite, immediately put a halt to the Jama'at's much publicized new anti-feudal and anti-capitalist populist platform.

The realization that, Islam was not the omnipotent political tool which would
readily harbinger power, and that the road to power passes through "politics," especially since democracy returned to Pakistan in 1988, has compelled the Jama'at to hasten the routinization of its idealism. The Jama'at has definitely distanced itself from its idealism of earlier years. More recently, the pace of change within the Jama'at, with the aim of streamlining the organization's ideological stance and improving its electoral showings, has gained momentum. The fate of the Jama'at from this point on will rest as much in the direction which the organization has taken, as in the speed with which it proceeds with its experiment. Unless the organization is able to transform itself rapidly enough to alter its place in the political map of Pakistan, its electoral fortunes are not likely to change significantly. Having distanced itself from revolutionary idealism, unless the Jama'at completes the journey to pragmatic politics swiftly, it will become a prisoner of the routinization process. The current disjuncture between ideological loyalties and pragmatic tendencies has been debilitating. Without a clear directive before the Jama'at, the organization's policy is likely to oscillate between its traditional constituency, from which it will become increasingly estranged, and the new constituencies whose support it hopes to cultivate but will most likely prove unable to sway for some time to come.

Only time can tell whether the Jama'at will succeed in this undertaking. What is important to note at this juncture is that an organization which is associated with the very rise of contemporary Islamic revivalism, prompted by its political interests, has invested its future in a process of transmutation which will inevitably sever its ties to Islamic ideology.
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