http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7698 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49679 Managing uncertainty : foresight and flexibility in cryptography and voice over IP policy Hung, Shirley Kon-Jean This main question in this dissertation is under what conditions government agencies show foresight in formulating strategies for managing emerging technologies. A secondary question is when they are capable of adaptation. Conventional wisdom and most organization theory literature suggest that organizations are reactive rather than proactive, reluctant to change, and responsive only to threats to their core mission or autonomy. The technological, economic, social, political, and sometimes security uncertainties that often accompany emerging technologies further complicate decision-making. More generally, organizations must often make decisions under conditions of limited information while guarding against lock-in effects that can constrain future choices. The two cases examined in this dissertation suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom, organizations can show foresight and flexibility in the management of emerging technologies. Key factors that promote foresight are: an organizational focus on technology, with the emerging technology in question being highly relevant to the organization's mission; technical expertise and a recognition of the limits of that knowledge; and experience dealing with other emerging technologies. The NSA recognized the inevitability of mass market encryption early on and adopted a sophisticated strategy of weakening the strength of, reducing the use of, and slowing down the deployment of mass market encryption in order to preserve its ability to easily monitor communications. The Agency showed considerable tactical adaptation in pursuit of this goal. The FCC adopted a rather unusual policy of forbearance toward VoIP. The Commission deliberately refrained from regulating VoIP in order to allow the technology to mature, innovation to occur, uncertainties to resolve, and to avoid potential market distortions due to too early or suboptimally formulated regulation. Eventually, however, pressure from outside interests such as law enforcement forced the Commission to act. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. "February 2008." Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-248). http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49677 Freedom and order : how democratic governments abridge civil liberties after terrorist attacks -- and why sometimes they don't Rubin, Gabriel, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology This dissertation is driven by the following question: "What explains the variation in governments' civil liberty-abridging responses to terrorist attacks?" In the United States, it was not until a year after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing-and three years after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing-that Bill Clinton signed major civil liberty-limiting, counter-terror legislation in the form of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. By contrast, George W. Bush passed the much more comprehensive and repressive Patriot Act through a divided Congress in a month-and-a-half after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In Great Britain, Tony Blair's own party blocked clauses in his anti-terrorism legislation that would have created national ID cards and extended the duration terror suspects could be held without charge to 90 days after the July 7, 2005 London bombings. Yet liberty-reducing counter-terror laws were easily passed time and again after IRA terror attacks in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In Israel, Yitzchak Rabin's government largely forewent abridging liberties during the Oslo peace process, but Ariel Sharon passed numerous liberty-abridging laws such as one prohibiting the granting of citizenship to Palestinians that marry Israelis during the second intifada. (cont.) This work forwards the theory that chief executives in government, be they presidents or prime ministers, drive civil liberty-abridging responses to terrorist attacks, but that they are constrained by public opinion and institutional factors. Spikes in public fear levels after terror attacks, along with other factors, create a window of opportunity for executive action that can lead to the passage of civil liberty-reducing counter terror legislation. This work looks at cases where such legislation is passed, blocked and not pursued in order to decipher the factors that best explain the variation in passage of liberty-abridging legislation after terror attacks. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49582 R.A.F. war plans and British foreign policy: 1935-1940. Smith, Gordon Scott Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. Thesis. 1966. Ph.D. Bibliography: leaves 306-322. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/46656 Between adaptation and resistance : labor responses to globalization in France Ancelovici, Marcos, 1971- This dissertation aims at accounting for labor responses to globalization in France. It addresses this issue through a comparative study of two labor organizations-the French Democratic Labor Confederation (CFDT) and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT)-that today respond differently to globalization even though they held common positions in the past: while the CGT opposes globalization, the CFDT sees it as an opportunity for French workers. I call the former response the resistance strategy and the latter the adaptation strategy. This dissertation claims that responses to globalization are formed and transformed over time as the environment of organizations changes and intraorganizational struggles unfold. More specifically, it argues that in France the formation of labor responses to globalization stemmed from a path dependent process constituted by three different steps. First, organizational failure, illustrated by union decline, implied a critical juncture that fed intraorganizational struggles and opened the way for a reorientation of labor organizations. Second, once the crisis was acknowledged, whether organizations would take the path to adaptation or resistance depended on three factors: (1) resources inherited from the past that limit the range of options that actors can conceive and choose; (2) the presence and content of two mechanisms of change-bricolage and identity shift-that describe how actors used their inherited resources; and (3) the ability of leaders to articulate a narrative that would appeal to enough people inside their organizations so as to induce cooperation. The third and last step of this path dependent process refers to the stabilization of the new path that the CFDT and the CGT had taken. The central mechanism that stabilized these paths was a shift in the organizational opportunity structure. Although labor organizations were not completely locked in the new path, once the organizational opportunity structure had shifted it was very difficult to return to the previous path or engage in a substantially different one. (cont.) Therefore, unless another critical juncture takes place, the CFDT and the CGT are likely to stick with their current responses to globalization for many years. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 267-289).