http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7808 Wed, 19 Jun 2013 11:04:48 GMT 2013-06-19T11:04:48Z http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79347 Political Economy in a Changing World Acemoglu, Daron; Ergorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin We provide a general framework for the analysis of the dynamics of institutional change (e.g., democratization, extension of political rights or repression of different groups), and how these dynamics interact with (anticipated and unanticipated) changes in the distribution of political power and in economic structure. We focus on the Markov Voting Equilibria, which require that economic and political changes should take place if there exists a subset of players with the power to implement such changes and who will obtain higher expected discounted utility by doing so. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural single crossing (increasing differences) conditions, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results that apply at this level of generality. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of radical groups that can stochastically grab power. We characterize the conditions under which the presence of radicals leads to repression (of less radical groups), show a type of path dependence in politics resulting from radicals coming to power, and identify a novel strategic complementarity in repression. Tue, 18 Jun 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79347 2013-06-18T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79209 Essays on international macroeconomics Rees, Daniel Morgan This thesis examines the impact of terms of trade shocks on commodity-exporting small, open economies. The first chapter examines whether households, firms and policymakers in these economies can distinguish between temporary and permanent commodity price shocks. I find that they are largely unable to do so. In fact, my model suggests that the expected future path of commodity prices following a temporary price shock is almost identical to the expected future path of commodity prices following a permanent price shock. However, I also find that these information frictions reduce the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations, contrary to popular belief. In the second chapter I describe optimal monetary policy in an environment where agents cannot directly observe whether commodity price shocks are temporary or permanent and where an economy's non-commodity sector features a learning-by-doing externality. I find that under optimal monetary policy the non-commodity sector contracts by more during a transitory commodity price boom under incomplete information than it does under full information, but by less during a permanent boom. I also examine the performance of simple monetary policy rules. A policy of responding strongly to deviations of home-produced goods inflation from target with a modest response to changes in the nominal exchange rate comes close to replicating the welfare outcomes of optimal policy. In contrast, an exchange rate peg generally produces large welfare losses. The third chapter, co-authored with my classmate Patricia Gomez-Gonzales, examines the consequences of changes in the volatility of commodity price shocks on commodity exporters. We first demonstrate the existence of time-varying volatility in the terms of trade of a selection of commodity-exporting small open economies. We then show empirically that increases in terms of trade volatility trigger a contraction in domestic consumption and investment and an improvement in the trade balance in these economies. Finally, we construct a theoretical model and demonstrate that it can replicate our empirical results. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2013.; Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-174). Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79209 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79070 The miracle of microfinance? Evidence from a randomized evaluation Banerjee, Abhijit; Duflo, Esther; Glennester, Rachel; Kinnan, Cynthia This paper reports on the first randomized evaluation of the impact of introducing the standard microcredit group-based lending product in a new market. In 2005, half of 104 slums in Hyderabad, India were randomly selected for opening of a branch of a particular microfinance institution (Spandana) while the remainder were not, although other MFIs were free to enter those slums. Fifteen to 18 months after Spandana began lending in treated areas, households were 8.8 percentage points more likely to have a microcredit loan. They were no more likely to start any new business, although they were more likely to start several at once, and they invested more in their existing businesses. There was no effect on average monthly expenditure per capita. Expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas, while expenditures on “temptation goods” declined. Three to four years after the initial expansion (after many of the control slums had started getting credit from Spandana and other MFIs ), the probability of borrowing from an MFI in treatment and comparison slums was the same, but on average households in treatment slums had been borrowing for longer and in larger amounts. Consumption was still no different in treatment areas, and the average business was still no more profitable, although we find an increase in profits at the top end. We found no changes in any of the development outcomes that are often believed to be affected by microfinance, including health, education, and women’s empowerment. The results of this study are largely consistent with those of four other evaluations of similar programs in different contexts. Thu, 06 Jun 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79070 2013-06-06T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79066 Innovation, Reallocation and Growth Acemoglu, Daron; Akcigit, Ufuk; Bloom, Nicholas; Kerr, William The standard approach to policy-making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy, and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria. Wed, 05 Jun 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79066 2013-06-05T00:00:00Z