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Securing software : an evaluation of static source code analyzers

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dc.contributor.advisor Richard Lippmann. en_US
dc.contributor.author Zitser, Misha, 1979- en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2005-06-02T19:40:34Z
dc.date.available 2005-06-02T19:40:34Z
dc.date.copyright 2003 en_US
dc.date.issued 2003 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/18025
dc.description Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2003. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-105). en_US
dc.description.abstract This thesis evaluated five static analysis tools--Polyspace C Verifier, ARCHER, BOON, Splint, and UNO--using 14 code examples that illustrated actual buffer overflow vulnerabilities found in various versions of Sendmail, BIND, and WU-FTPD. Each code example included a "BAD" case with one or more buffer overflow vulnerabilities and a "PATCHED" case without buffer overflows. The buffer overflows varied and included stack, heap, bss and data buffers; access above and below buffer bounds; access using pointers, indices, and functions; and scope differences between buffer creation and use. Detection rates for the "BAD" examples were low except for Splint and PolySpace C Verifier, which had average detection rates of 57% and 87% respectively. However, average false alarm rates, as measured using the "PATCHED" programs, were high for these two systems. The frequency of false alarms per lines of code was high for both of these tools; Splint gave on average one false alarm per 50 lines of code, and PolySpace gave on average one false alarm per 10 lines of code. This result shows that current approaches can detect buffer overflows, but that false alarm rates need to be lowered substantially. en_US
dc.description.provenance Made available in DSpace on 2005-06-02T19:40:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 57225430.pdf: 8499325 bytes, checksum: 0cf40fca15a388e4cd7a47d50e648d58 (MD5) 57225430-MIT.pdf: 8516258 bytes, checksum: 530c0031f1ecfb241586c2ef9c80fd5d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 en
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Misha Zitser. en_US
dc.format.extent 130 leaves en_US
dc.format.extent 8499325 bytes
dc.format.extent 8516258 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subject Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. en_US
dc.title Securing software : an evaluation of static source code analyzers en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree M.Eng. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 57225430 en_US

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