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Revenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Design
(2007- 11-0)
Little is known about generating revenue in UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions. (In particular, the VCG mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) In this paper we determine how much revenue can be guaranteed in such auctions. ...
Knowledge Benchmarks in Adversarial Mechanism Design (Part I) and Implementation in Surviving Strategies (Part I)
(2008-07)
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum ...
Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
(2009-12-04)
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly ...
Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
(2007-11-02)
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent ...
Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
(2007-03)
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism ---by disregarding ...
Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply
(2008-12-02)
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark.
Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions
(2008-11-13)
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies INDEPENDENT players will actually choose. ...
Subcontracted Rational SFE
(2005-11-02)
In their paper, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design," Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali show that any one-shot mediated game can be simulated by the players themselves, without the help of a trusted mediator, ...
Rational Robustness for Mechanism Design
(2009-11-10)
The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, we ...