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Multipollutant markets
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2001)
I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I ...
Trading quasi-emission permits
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2002)
I study the design of environmental policies for a regulator that has incomplete information on firms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in cities with numerous small polluting sources). ...
Testing the efficiency of a tradeable permits market
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2002)
A tradeable permits market is said to be efficient when all affected firms trade permits until their marginal costs equal the market price. Detailed firm-level data are generally required to perform such an efficiency test, ...
The temporal efficiency of SO₂ emissions trading
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2002)
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the temporal efficiency of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, which implemented a nationwide market for trading and banking sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances. We first develop ...
Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2004)
We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to ...
Prices vs. quantities with incomplete enforcement
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 1999)
This paper extends Weitzman's (1974) "Prices vs. Quantities" to allow for incomplete enforcement. Whether the regulator uses prices (e.g., taxes) or quantities (e.g., tradeable quotas), a first-best design is always ...
A note on market power in an emission permits market with banking
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2004)
In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium ...
The efficiency and robustness of allowance banking in the U.S. Acid Rain Program
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2005)
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the efficiency of allowance banking (i.e., abating more in early periods in order to abate less in later periods) in the nationwide market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission ...
Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2005)
We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to ...
A market-based environmental policy experiment in Chile
(MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2000)
Despite growing interest in the use of emissions trading for pollution control, empirical evidence for this regulatory instrument has been confined to a few experiences in the United States. This paper broadens the empirical ...