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Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply

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Title: Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply
Author: Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
Other Contributors: Theory of Computation
Advisor: Silvio Micali
Issue Date: 2008-12-02
Abstract: We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43946
Related To http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43716
Related To MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-072
Series/Report no.: MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-073
Keywords: Single-good, unlimited-supply auctions, Resilient mechanism design, Provision of a public good, Knowledge-Based Benchmarks

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