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Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

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Title: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply
Author: Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing
Other Contributors: Theory of Computation
Advisor: Silvio Micali
Issue Date: 2008-12-17
Abstract: We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947
Series/Report no.: MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074
Keywords: Resilient mechanism design, Knowledge-Based Benchmarks, Player-Knowledge Benchmarks, Aggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarks, Aggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarks

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