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Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

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dc.contributor.advisor Silvio Micali
dc.contributor.author Micali, Silvio en_US
dc.contributor.author Chen, Jing en_US
dc.contributor.other Theory of Computation en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z
dc.date.available 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z
dc.date.issued 2008-12-17
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947
dc.description.abstract We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks. en_US
dc.description.provenance Submitted by CSAIL Importer (publications-dspace@csail.mit.edu) on 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z No. of bitstreams: 2 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074.pdf: 172810 bytes, checksum: 7296273c3174b3463cd71be58c144aa7 (MD5) MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074.ps: 487655 bytes, checksum: 808ba0425e670e7b72b56be5a43780bc (MD5) en
dc.description.provenance Made available in DSpace on 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074.pdf: 172810 bytes, checksum: 7296273c3174b3463cd71be58c144aa7 (MD5) MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074.ps: 487655 bytes, checksum: 808ba0425e670e7b72b56be5a43780bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-17 en
dc.format.extent 3 p. en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074
dc.subject Resilient mechanism design en_US
dc.subject Knowledge-Based Benchmarks en_US
dc.subject Player-Knowledge Benchmarks en_US
dc.subject Aggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarks en_US
dc.subject Aggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarks en_US
dc.title Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply en_US

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