dc.contributor.author | Montero, Juan-Pablo | en_US |
dc.contributor.other | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-04-03T17:04:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-04-03T17:04:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | en_US |
dc.identifier | 2001-008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44980 | |
dc.description.abstract | I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the different markets are steeper than the marginal benefit curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also find that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 24 p | en_US |
dc.publisher | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 01-008WP. | en_US |
dc.title | Multipollutant markets | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.identifier.oclc | 52314541 | en_US |