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dc.contributor.authorEvans, Joanneen_US
dc.contributor.authorGreen, Richard C.en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-03T17:05:32Z
dc.date.available2009-04-03T17:05:32Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier2003-007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45000
dc.description.abstractIn an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Econometric analysis on monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two conflicting hypotheses. On a static view, increases in competition and the capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices. If generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a few months before the abolition of the Pool. That view implies that NETA reduced prices.en_US
dc.format.extent14 pen_US
dc.publisherMIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Researchen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 03-007WP.en_US
dc.titleWhy did British electricity prices fall after 1998?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc53192798en_US


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